Commodities & Energy Sector

Executive Summary Upside Oil Price Risk Dominates Despite global recession fears and uncertainty over Russia’s retaliation for the EU embargo against its exports, oil markets will continue to tighten. After breaching $15/bbl in June, the Dec22 vs Dec23 Brent backwardation – our preferred seasonal indicator for inventory tightness – is back above $10/bbl and rising.  There is an increasing risk Russia will cut crude output, if G7 states impose a price cap on its oil sales.  Our modeling indicates the loss of an additional 2mm b/d of Russian output vs our base case beginning in 4Q22 would lift prices above $220/bbl by 4Q23. On the downside, our modeling indicates the loss of 2mm b/d of demand vs our base case – i.e., essentially wiping out this year’s expected growth – would push average Brent prices toward $60/bbl next year. Our base case forecast for Brent crude oil is unchanged.  We expect 2022 Brent to average $110/bbl, and for 2023 prices to average $117/bbl.  WTI will trade $3-$4/bbl below Brent. Bottom Line: We expect markets to continue to tighten as the EU embargo of Russia oil progresses.  A price cap on Russian oil sales could lead to a production cut that takes prices above $220/bbl by 4Q23.  An economic collapse could push Brent toward $60/bbl.  Risks remain skewed to the upside.  Our base case Brent price forecast remains unchanged: $110/bbl on average this year and $117/bbl in 2023. Feature The global oil market is tightening even with China demand restrained by its zero-Covid-19 tolerance policy, and parts of Europe almost surely facing recession if Russian pipeline gas supplies are cut off or tighten significantly between now and the approach of winter. Upside price risk dominates, in our view. Our Brent price forecast remains unchanged, averaging $110/bbl this year and $117/bbl in 2023. Markets remain tight: Oil supply will remain below demand, which will force inventories to draw (Chart 1). Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyRecession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices This will push Brent into a steeper backwardation going into year-end, forcing the Dec22 v Dec23 Brent spread higher (Chart 2). High levels of backwardation – i.e., prompt-delivery futures trading above deferred-delivery futures – is how inventory tightness manifests itself: Refiners are willing to pay more for prompt delivery than deferred delivery, because they need oil now to meet demand. This is occurring despite weaker demand coming out of China and EU states, as the latter begins to ration energy supplies ahead of the coming winter. Chart 1Inventories Will Tighten Chart 2Markets Will Backwardate Further Russia Risk Is Increasing The supply-side risks that we outlined in last week's report — chiefly the risk Russia will unilaterally cut oil supply if a price cap is imposed by G7 states led by the US – remain in place. We expect the EU to follow through on its commitment to phase out all Russian oil and refined product imports in 2H22 and 1Q23. The EU formally agreed to cut 90% of its Russian oil imports by the end of this year. The EU’s goal is to be completely out of ~ 2.3mm b/d of seaborne crude oil imports and 800k b/d of pipeline imports this year. In 1Q23, the EU will be reducing its refined product imports (e.g., diesel fuel) from Russia as well. Russia will lose more than 4mm b/d of crude and product exports to the EU as a result of these embargoes. We continue to expect the cutoffs in EU exports will result in Russia being forced to shut in 1.6mm b/d of production this year and another 500k b/d next year. In our base case, we expect this to take Russian crude production down from more than 10.5mm b/d prior to its invasion of Ukraine to something close to 8.0mm b/d by the end of next year. Spare capacity remains tight. Almost all of OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity is in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These are the only two OPEC 2.0 states that are able to increase production and maintain it at higher levels for an indefinite period of time. Despite repeated pleas from the US, these states continue to indicate they do not see the need to sharply increase oil production, even after US President Joe Biden made a trip to the region last week to ask them in person to do so. With ~ 2-3mm b/d of spare capacity available – the exact level is not public knowledge – digging into spare capacity now would leave nothing in the tank, so to speak, to meet another supply shock (e.g., a unilateral cut-off of Russian supplies in response to a G7 price cap on oil sales). KSA, as a matter of policy, maintains a minimal level of spare capacity (1.0 – 1.5mm b/d) to handle unforeseen supply shocks. In addition, the OPEC 2.0 agreement to return production removed from the market during the COVID-19 pandemic agreed last July, and the US release of 1mm b/d of inventories out of its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) both expire in September.1 The US SPR has not indicated it will extend its release of inventory beyond September. Markets will tighten. The return of barrels from OPEC 2.0 is largely moot, since only KSA and the UAE – which we dub Core OPEC 2.0 – have been able to consistently raise output since the July 2021 agreement to return barrels to the market. The other OPEC 2.0 member states – the “Other Guys” – have consistently missed their production quotas this past year (Chart 3). Lastly, the odds of the US and Iran reaching a rapprochement continue to fade, almost to the point of vanishing. Iran reportedly will supply Russia with drones for its war in Ukraine. This indicates the Iranian government has all but capitulated on reviving its nuclear deal with the US, which would have brought an additional 1mm b/d back on the market.2 Outside of OPEC 2.0, we expect US production in the Lower 48 states ex-US Gulf will increase 0.8mm b/d this year, and 0.75mm b/d next year, given price levels and the shape of the WTI forward curve (Chart 4). This is mostly unchanged from previous production expectations. Chart 3Lower OPEC 2.0 Production ex-KSA, UAE Chart 4Capital Discipline Drives US Shale Production Growth We continue to expect US shale-oil producers will maintain capital discipline, and will continue to prioritize shareholder interests by returning capital to investors via share buybacks and strong dividend distributions. Besides, boosting output over the balance of this year is becoming increasingly difficult, given oil-services equipment shortages and lack of capital.3 In our base case, we continue to anticipate demand will rise by 2.0mm b/d this year and 1.8mm b/d next year. This is lower than our estimates at the start of the year by close to 3mm b/d. This is all down to the sharp GDP growth slowdown forecast by the World Bank last month, which pushed our oil-demand estimates lower.4 Oil demand continues to grow, albeit it slowly, which, against a backdrop of tightening supplies, means the risk to prices remains to the upside. In our base case, the supply-demand fundamentals are largely balanced (Chart 5). These fundamentals (Table 1) are driving our forecast for $110/bbl Brent this year and $117/bbl next year (Chart 6). Chart 5Markets Remain Finely Balanced Chart 6Brent Backwardation Will Steepen Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Uncertain Evolutions: Between $60 And $220/bbl We have noted the heightened uncertainty surrounding our oil-price expectations, which makes forecasting more tentative than usual.5 This week, we consider larger supply and demand shocks via econometric simulations to at least define possible price paths consistent with our assumptions and modeling. To the upside, we estimate a 2mm b/d loss of output resulting from a cutoff of Russian crude oil production. Relative to the status quo ante – i.e., prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February – this would remove a total of ~ 4mm b/d of Russian production from the market (2mm in our base case plus an additional 2mm b/d). Our modeling indicates this could push prices above $220/bbl by 4Q23, depending on how the additional 2mm b/d production cut is implemented – i.e., suddenly or staged pro-rata (Chart 7).6 This high-price scenario would be difficult for markets to adjust to, given the short-term inelasticity of global oil demand. In its wake, we would expect demand destruction on a large scale. Chart 7Upside Oil Price Risk Dominates On the downside, we simulate a sharp contraction in oil consumption that removes an additional 2mm b/d of demand vs our base case – i.e., essentially wiping out this year’s expected growth. This would push average 2023 prices toward $60/bbl in our modeling. Losing this much demand would amount to a global economic collapse. A deep global recession cannot be ruled out, as markets have been reminding us over the past couple of weeks. However, the downside risks are not as pronounced as the upside risks in our estimation. There has not been an excessive accumulation of inventory in the OECD, as Chart 1 indicates. In the non-OECD economies, inventory accumulation in China appears to be intentional and policy driven. In addition, the supply response to sharply lower prices would be met by sharply lower production by KSA and the UAE, along with the US shale-oil producers over the course of a couple of months. This would arrest the down leg a demand shock produced in previous oil-price collapses when production was not as flexible, and inventories adjusted with longer lags. Economic growth in the EU could slow in some but not all of the member states, according to recent IMF estimates.7 The US may slow, and is at risk to a hard landing due to poorly calibrated Fed tightening. This could usher in a deep recession. However, the US also might even benefit from the EU going into recession, since it is not as resource constrained as the EU. Lastly, the EU’s been getting ready for this Russian energy cut-off and has lined up alternative energy sources (LNG and coal mostly). In addition, states already have begun asking their citizens to conserve energy, particularly natural gas. This forced conservation can achieve significant energy savings and is not new to the world: It was demonstrated by Japan after the Fukushima disaster in 2011 and the US in the late 1970s. Investment Implications Our base case oil-price forecast remains $110/bbl and $117/bbl on average for this year and next. Simulations of uncertain prices evolutions – i.e., evolutions we cannot attach a probability to at present – indicate upside price risk is dominant. This inclines us to remain long oil equities via the XOP ETF. We were tactically long 4Q22 and 1Q23 TTF futures until stop losses on both trades were elected on July 15th, generating returns of 89.6% and 83.1% respectively.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Markets will await the conclusion of maintenance on the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline scheduled for this week. We continue to expect a cut-off of Russian natgas shipments to Europe, in addition to the 60% of volumes that already have been cut. In its latest GDP forecasts, the IMF expects EU GDP growth of 2.9% and 2.5% in 2022 and 2023, respectively. In and of itself, this would support our expectation for oil prices averaging $110/bbl and $117/bbl this year and next, as it is in line with the GDP forecast expected by the World Bank, which drives our forecasts. However, EU GDP still could contract in response to a complete shut-off of Russian gas imports in 2H22, particularly if it is sudden and prompts the EU to go to Phase 3 of its energy emergency plan and invoke gas rationing. EU gas inventories continue to build going into winter (Chart 8). Markets are critically dialed in to how the inventory builds ahead of winter proceed following NS1 maintenance: If it is delayed for technical reasons the storage fill rate will slow. Base Metals: Bullish China formally created a state-backed company to oversee all of its iron ore imports and overseas ore assets on Tuesday. The purpose of this company is to wrest pricing power away from iron ore suppliers – most of which are based in Australia – and reduce its reliance on Australian iron ore imports. A single buying entity will effectively create a monopsony, since China imports ~70% of global iron ore to supply its steel making industry, the largest in the world. Precious Metals: Bullish We have tactically downgraded our gold view on the back of continued USD strength. Reports of civil unrest in China – which was forecast by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy - arising from the unfolding mortgage crisis likely will boost demand for gold, but it will boost demand for USD even more, in our view (Chart 9). We are closely monitoring this situation, along with possible increases in systemic financial risk in Chinese banks, which also would support USD demand. We remain strategically bullish gold. Chart 8 Chart 9       Footnotes 1     Please see OPEC+ agrees oil supply boost after UAE, Saudi reach compromise and U.S. to sell up to 45 mln bbls oil from reserve as part of historic release published by reuters.com on July 19, 2021 and June 14, 2022, respectively. OPEC 2.0 is our moniker for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia; it also is referred to as OPEC+ in the media. 2     This could presage an unravelling of the status quo in the Middle East, as our colleagues at BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy highlight in their most recent report Questions From The Road published on July 15, 2022. 3    Please see Fracking Growth ‘Almost Impossible’ This Year, Halliburton Says, published by bloomberg.com on July 19, 2022. 4    Please see Recession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices, which we published on June 16, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Running simulations is a good way to identify risks and at least have an intuition for where prices might go given difference evolutions of fundamentals. Please see Russia Pulls Oil, Gas Supply Strings for discussions and simulations of prices in response to different supply and shocks we ran last week. 6    The timing and depth of the shocks we simulate here are not assigned a probability to express our view of their likelihood. This reflects our belief that these are highly uncertain outcomes. That said, having an intuition for what to expect should the markets evolve in such a way as to create a probability one of these outcomes has become likely is useful. 7     The smaller EU economies are most at risk to sharp economic downturns from a cutoff in Russian gas exports, according to the IMF. The Fund estimates that in “Hungary, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic—there is a risk of shortages of as much as 40 percent of gas consumption and of gross domestic product shrinking by up to 6 percent.” Please see How a Russian Natural Gas Cutoff Could Weigh on Europe’s Economies published by the IMF on July 19, 2022. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations We were stopped out of our Long 4Q22 TTF Futures trade on July 15, with a return of 89.6%. We were stopped out of our Long 1Q23 TTF Futures trade on July 15, with a  return of 83.1%.  Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary Investors Should Mind Surging US Wages Despite Western sanctions on Russia, the country’s oil exports have not collapsed. According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) estimates, Russia’s shipments of crude and oil products have declined by only 5% since January. The combination of relatively stable supply and downshifting global oil demand constitutes a bearish cocktail for oil prices. Odds are that oil prices will decline further and recouple with industrial and precious metal prices. Labor costs are more important than oil prices for the US core inflation outlook and, hence, for Fed policy. In the US, surging wages and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more committed to tightening monetary policy substantially. The Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. EM/China exports will contract, and their domestic demand will also struggle. Bottom Line: As the US dollar continues to overshoot, EM stocks will underperform DM equities, and EM credit markets will underperform US credit markets on a quality-adjusted basis. An underweight position in EM in global equity and credit portfolios is warranted. Feature The decline in oil and food prices and the easing of supply-side bottlenecks have alleviated market worries about US inflation. As a result, the S&P500 has rebounded, despite the grim inflation report last week. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team expects oil and industrial metal prices to drop further. Does this mean that the worst of both US inflation and the Fed’s tightening is behind us and that it is time to buy risk assets? Not really. In this report, we discuss (1) why oil prices will drop further, (2) why the worst of US monetary tightening is not over, and (3) why emerging markets are not out of the woods. In fact, EM asset prices have so far failed to advance, despite the rebound in the S&P500. This is true for EM stocks, currencies, EM credit spreads, and domestic bonds (Charts 1 and 2). Overall, our macro themes of Fed tightening amid slowing global growth, the US dollar overshooting, and China’s disappointing recovery remain intact. These factors still warrant a defensive investment strategy, despite a possible near-term rebound in the S&P 500. EMs will lag and underperform in this rebound. Chart 1No Rebound In EM Stocks And Currencies… Chart 2…Nor In EM Credit Space And Local Bonds Oil Prices Will Drop But… Chart 3Russian Oil Export Volumes Have Dropped Only By 5% Since January Odds are that crude prices have peaked and face material downside: Despite the sanctions and logistical challenges that Western governments have enforced on Russia, the country’s oil exports have not collapsed. According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) estimates, Russia’s shipments of crude and oil products have declined by only 5% since January (Chart 3). Even though Saudi Arabia appears to be committed to its production management policy, it cannot completely ignore US demands to raise its oil output. Odds are that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will boost their oil output in the coming months. Chart 4US And Chinese Oil Consumption Is Weak In the meantime, global oil demand is shrinking, in part due to high prices. US consumption of gasoline and other motor fuel has marginally contracted (Chart 4, top panel). In China, rolling lockdowns and weak income growth will continue to suppress the nation’s crude oil imports, which have already been depressed over the past 12 months (Chart 4, bottom panel). In the rest of EM (excluding China), high oil prices in their local currency terms are leading to demand destruction. Chart 5 illustrates that oil and food prices in local currency terms are still very elevated for EM. When various commodity prices – ranging from industrial and precious metals, to soft commodities, and oil – all drop simultaneously and precipitously, it suggests that supply is not what is dominating the price action (Chart 6). Their supply is idiosyncratic, so the concurrent fall in their prices cannot be explained by their production. Chart 5Oil And Food Prices In EM Currencies Chart 6The Simultaneous Drop In Various Commodity Prices Cannot Be Explained By Supply   Our interpretation for the synchronized decline in various commodity prices is as follows: the sanctions imposed on Russia initially led buyers to increase their precautionary and speculative purchases of various commodities, which was a tailwind for prices. However, these precautionary and speculative purchases have since been halted or reversed, causing commodity prices to plunge. From the perspective of business and financial cycles, oil prices are a lagging variable. Their turning points often occur after the peaks or bottoms in global cyclical stock prices (Chart 7). Chart 7Oil Prices Often Lag Global Cyclical Stocks In contrast with the downbeat investor sentiment on risk assets, investor sentiment on oil prices remains very elevated (Chart 8). In terms of market technicals, the outlook for oil prices and energy stocks is troublesome. Crude prices have lately formed a double top (see Chart 6 above). From a long-term perspective, oil prices and global energy share prices in SDR1 terms might have formed a triple top (Chart 9). Chances are that the recent top in crude prices and energy stocks is a major one and a protracted selloff is in the cards. Chart 8Investors Are Still Bullish On Oil Chart 9A Triple Top In Oil Prices And Global Energy Stocks   Bottom Line: Fears that sanctions on Russia would considerably reduce global oil supply have not yet materialized. Meanwhile, global oil demand is downshifting in response to both high fuel prices and weakening global growth. In addition, the US is leveraging its geopolitical power to push Gulf countries to boost oil production. These forces all constitute a bearish cocktail for oil prices. That said, a flare-up in geopolitical tensions in the Middle East around Iran is a potential risk to our view on oil, as it would push crude prices up again. …Surging Wages Will Keep US Core Inflation Elevated Chart 10Investors Should Mind Surging US Wages A drop in oil prices has brought some relief to US financial markets as US inflation expectations have dropped materially. Yet, we do not think the drop in oil or food prices – and hence in US headline inflation – will lead to a less hawkish stance from the Fed. The basis for this belief is that US inflationary pressures are genuine and have been broadening. In fact, as we have argued since late last year, the US has entered a wage-price spiral. Recent wage data from the Atlanta Fed validates this thesis – US wage growth has surged to around 7% (Chart 10). To be technically correct, unit labor costs, not wages, are key to inflation dynamics (Chart 11). Unit labor cost = (wage per hour) / (productivity). Productivity is output per hour. Chart 11Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil, Drive US Core Inflation Given that labor, not oil, is the largest cost component of US businesses, unit labor costs swell and profit margins shrink when salaries rise faster than productivity. CEOs and business owners always do their best to protect their profit margins. Thus, accelerating unit labor costs will lead them to raise their selling prices. A wage-price spiral will be unleashed if consumers accept these higher prices and go on to demand even higher wages. Chart 12US Core Inflation Is Broadening And Is Well Above The Fed's Target This is why wage costs, and more specifically unit labor costs, are the most important variable to monitor for the inflation outlook. If consumers facing high energy and food prices are able to successfully negotiate greater wage gains that surpass their productivity growth, then inflation will become more broad-based and genuine. This is what is presently occurring in the US, and a decline in oil prices will not halt this dynamic for now. Only higher US unemployment will lead to a meaningful deceleration in wage growth. Consistent with broadening US inflation, trimmed-mean and median CPIs have accelerated and reached 6-7%, even though core CPI has recently moderated (Chart 12). After having mismanaged inflation in the past 18 months, the Fed will err on the side of tighter policy. The rationale is that the US is already facing surging wages and a very tight labor market. Financial markets are currently underrating this risk. In fact, in its official statement the Fed has asserted that its commitment to bring inflation to its 2% target is unconditional. As we have written extensively, wages and inflation are lagging business cycle variables. Despite the ongoing slowdown in the US economy, it will take many months before the underlying core inflation rate drops below 3.5%. Bottom Line: We maintain that the Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. In the US, surging wages and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more committed to tightening policy substantially. The basis for this perspective is that, even if core inflation falls in the coming months, it will still be well above the Fed’s target of 2%. EM/China Growth Outlook Chart 13Global Trade Will Shrink In H2 2022 EM currencies will continue depreciating versus the US dollar as the Fed reinforces its hawkish stance and global growth/EM exports contract. Indicators from Korea and Taiwan that lead global trade suggest that global export volumes are heading into contraction (Chart 13). While lower oil prices are marginally positive for EM energy importers, share prices and currencies of these countries are often driven by their exports. The latter are set to shrink. EM ex-China domestic demand will decelerate because of (1) drastic monetary tightening by their central banks, (2) reduced household purchasing power due to the substantial rise in food and energy prices in their local currency earlier this year (see Chart 5 above), and (3) the unwinding of pandemic fiscal stimulus. Currency depreciation and slumping global and domestic growth will weigh on both EM share prices and credit markets. Chart 14 illustrates that EM sovereign bond yields have continued rising (shown inverted on the chart), which is consistent with lower EM non-TMT equity prices. Chart 14Rising EM USD Bond Yields (Shown Inverted) Point To Lower Share Prices With respect to China, we discussed the country’s new infrastructure stimulus in depth in last week’s report. Our assessment is that this new infrastructure funding will not result in new investments. Rather, it will largely offset the drop in local government (LG) revenues from land sales this year. As for the latest events regarding mortgage boycotts and authorities’ decision to introduce a moratorium on mortgages linked to delayed housing completions, the damage to homebuyers’ confidence has already been done. Given the ongoing turmoil in China’s property market, potential homebuyers will drag their feet. As a result, home sales will be underwhelming, real estate developers will struggle, and construction activity will contract. The top panel of Chart 15 illustrates that home sales have relapsed anew in the first two weeks of July after stabilizing in June. This implies that June’s bounce was a one-off move driven by pent-up demand after lockdowns were eased. Moreover, house prices are deflating (Chart 15, bottom panel). Consistently, Chinese property stocks and offshore corporate bond prices continue to plunge (Chart 16). Chart 15Chinese Housing: Sales And Prices Are Falling Chart 16Chinese Property Developers: Stock And Bond Prices Continue Plunging All of the above corroborates our thesis that housing construction in China will continue to contract, weighing on raw material demand and prices and, thereby, EM exports. Finally, rolling lockdowns in China will persist as long as the mainland’s stringent dynamic zero-COVID policy remains in place. The number of cities under mobility restrictions or some form of lockdown climbed during the second week of July. Putting it all together, China’s private sector sentiment remains in the doldrums. The willingness to spend or invest among households and enterprises will remain depressed. This will ensure that the multiplier effect of the fiscal and credit stimulus will be small. Bottom Line: Not only will EM/China exports contract but their domestic demand will also struggle. These dynamics, in combination with a hawkish Fed, are bearish for EM currencies, credit markets and equities. Investment Conclusions Chart 17EM Domestic Bonds: Do Not A Catch Falling Knife Global risk assets are oversold, and investor sentiment is pessimistic. In this context, a technical equity rebound cannot be ruled out. However, we do not think it will be the beginning of a major cyclical rally. As the US dollar continues to overshoot, EM will underperform DM equities, and EM credit markets will underperform US credit markets on a quality-adjusted basis. An underweight position in EM in global equity and credit portfolios is warranted. With respect to EM local currency bonds, we remain on the sidelines as near-term risks are still elevated (Chart 17). For now, we prefer to bet on yield curve flattening. Our favorite markets for flatteners are currently Mexico and Colombia. We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, PHP, and IDR. In addition, we recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, and KRW vs. JPY. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Special Drawing Rights are the IMF’s synthetic currency – we use it as a proxy for the global average currency.   Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary The TIPS Market Foresees A Sharp Deceleration In Inflation TIPS breakevens are pointing to a rapid decline in US inflation over the next two years. If the TIPS are right, the Fed will not need to raise rates faster than what is already discounted over the next six months. Falling inflation will allow real wages to start rising again. This will bolster consumer confidence, making a recession less likely. The surprising increase in analyst EPS estimates this year partly reflects the contribution of increased energy profits and the fact that earnings are expressed in nominal terms while economic growth is usually expressed in real terms. Nevertheless, even a mild recession would probably knock down operating earnings by 15%-to-20%. While a recession in the US is not our base case, it is for Europe. A European recession is likely to be short-lived with the initial shock from lower Russian gas flows counterbalanced by income-support measures and ramped-up spending on energy infrastructure and defense. We are setting a limit order to buy EUR/USD at 0.981. Bottom Line: Stocks lack an immediate macro driver to move higher, but that driver should come in the form of lower inflation prints starting as early as next month. Investors should maintain a modest overweight to global equities. That said, barring any material developments, we would turn neutral on stocks if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050. US CPI Surprises to the Upside… Again        Investors hoping for some relief on the inflation front were disappointed once again this week. The US headline CPI rose 1.32% month-over-month in June, above the consensus of 1.1%. Core inflation increased to 0.71%, surpassing consensus estimates of 0.5%. The key question is how much of June’s report is “water under the bridge” and how much is a harbinger of things to come. Since the CPI data for June was collected, oil prices have dropped to below $100/bbl. Nationwide gasoline prices have fallen for four straight weeks, with the futures market pointing to further declines in the months ahead. Agriculture and metals prices have swooned. Used car prices are heading south. Wage growth has slowed to about 4% from around 6.5% in the second half of last year. The rate of change in the Zillow rent index has rolled over, albeit from high levels (Chart 1). The Zumper National Rent index is sending a similar message as the Zillow data.  All this suggests that inflation may be peaking. The TIPS market certainly agrees. It is discounting a rapid decline in US inflation over the next few years. This week’s inflation report did little to change that fact (Chart 2). Chart 1Some Signs That Inflation Has Peaked Chart 2Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly Over The Next Few Years TIPS Still Siding with Team Transitory If the TIPS market is right, this would have two important implications. First, the Fed would not need to raise rates more quickly over the next six months than the OIS curve is currently discounting (although it probably would not need to cut rates in 2023 either, given our higher-than-consensus view of where the US neutral rate lies) (Chart 3). The second implication is that real wages, which have declined over the past year, will start rising again as inflation heads lower. Falling real wages have sapped consumer confidence. As real wage growth turns positive, confidence will improve, helping to bolster consumer spending (Chart 4). To the extent that consumption accounts for nearly 70% of the US economy – and other components of GDP such as investment generally take their cues from consumer spending – this would significantly raise the odds of a soft landing.  Chart 3The Fed Is Signaling That It Will Raise Rates To Almost 4% In 2023 Chart 4Positive Real Wage Growth Will Provide A Boost To Consumer Confidence Chart 5Long-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Well Anchored Of course, the TIPS market could be wrong. Bond traders do not set prices and wages. Businesses and workers, interacting with each other, ultimately determine the direction of inflation. Yet, the view of the TIPS market is broadly in sync with the view of most households and businesses. Expected inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey has risen since the pandemic began, but at about 3%, it is close to where it was for most of the period between 1995 and 2015 (Chart 5). As we pointed out in our recently published Third Quarter Strategy Outlook, and as I discussed in last week’s webcast, the fact that long-term inflation expectations are well anchored implies that the sacrifice ratio – the amount of output that must be forgone to bring down inflation by a given amount — may be quite low. This also raises the odds of a soft landing. Investors Now See Recession as the Base Case Our relatively sanguine view of the US economy leaves us in the minority camp. According to recent polling, more than 70% of US adults expect the economy to be in recession by year-end. Within the investment community, nearly half of retail traders and three-quarters of high-level asset allocators expect a recession within the next 12 months (Chart 6). Chart 6Many Investors Now See Recession As Baked In The Cake Reflecting the downbeat mood among investors, bears exceeded bulls by 20 points in the most recent weekly poll by the American Association of Individual Investors (Chart 7). A record low percentage of respondents in the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations believes stocks will rise over the next year (Chart 8). Chart 7Bears Exceed The Bulls By A Wide Margin Chart 8Households Are Pessimistic On Stocks Resilient Earnings Estimates Admittedly, while sentiment on the economy and the stock market has soured, analyst earnings estimates have yet to decline significantly. In fact, in both the US and the euro area, EPS estimates for 2022 and 2023 are higher today than they were at the start of the year (Chart 9). What’s going on? Part of the explanation reflects the sectoral composition of earnings. In the US, earnings estimates for 2022 are up 2.4% so far this year. Outside of the energy sector, however, 2022 earnings estimates are down 2.2% year-to-date and down 2.9% from their peak in February (Chart 10). Chart 9US And European EPS Estimates Are Up Year-To-Date Another explanation centers on the fact that earnings estimates are expressed in nominal terms while GDP growth is usually expressed in real terms. When inflation is elevated, the difference between real and nominal variables can be important. For example, while US real GDP contracted by 1.6% in Q1, nominal GDP rose by 6.6%. Gross Domestic Income (GDI), which conceptually should equal GDP but can differ due to measurement issues, rose by 1.8% in real terms and by a whopping 10.2% in nominal terms in Q1. Chart 10Soaring Energy Prices Have Boosted Earnings Estimates How Much Bad News Has Been Discounted? Historically, stocks have peaked at approximately the same time as forward earnings estimates have reached their apex. This time around, stocks have swooned well in advance of any cut to earnings estimates (Chart 11). At the time of writing, the S&P 500 was down 25% in real terms from its peak on January 3. Chart 11Unlike In Past Cycles, Stocks Peaked Well Before Earnings This suggests that investors have already discounted some earnings cuts, even if analysts have yet to pencil them in. Consistent with this observation, two-thirds of investors in a recent Bloomberg poll agreed that analysts were “behind the curve” in responding to the deteriorating macro backdrop (Chart 12). Chart 12Most Investors Expect Analyst Earnings Estimates To Come Down Nevertheless, it is likely that stocks would fall further if the economy were to enter a recession. Even in mild recessions, operating profits have fallen by about 15%-to-20% (Chart 13). That is probably a more severe outcome than the market is currently discounting. Chart 13Even A Mild Recession Could Significantly Knock Down Earnings Estimates Subjectively, we would expect the S&P 500 to drop to 3,500 over the next 12 months in a mild recession scenario where growth falls into negative territory for a few quarters (30% odds) and to 2,900 in a deep recession scenario where the unemployment rate rises by more than four percentage points from current levels (10% odds). On the flipside, we would expect the S&P 500 to rebound to 4,500 in a scenario where a recession is completely averted (60% odds). A probability-weighted average of these three scenarios produces an expected total return of 8.3% (Table 1). This is enough to warrant a modest overweight to stocks, but just barely. Barring any material developments, we would turn neutral on stocks if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050. Table 1A Scenario Analysis For The S&P 500 What’s the Right Framework for Thinking About a European Recession? Whereas we would assign 40% odds to a recession in the US over the next 12 months, we would put the odds of a recession in Europe at around 60%. With a recession in Europe looking increasingly probable, a key question is what the nature of this recession would be. The pandemic may provide a useful framework for answering that question. Just as the pandemic represented an external shock to the global economy, the disruption to energy supplies, stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, represents an external shock to the European economy. In the initial phase of the pandemic, economic activity in developed economies collapsed as millions of workers were forced to isolate at home. Over the following months, however, the proliferation of work-from-home practices, the easing of lockdown measures, and ample fiscal support permitted growth to recover. Eventually, vaccines became available, which allowed for a further shift to normal life. Just as it took about two years for vaccines to become widely deployed, it will take time for Europe to wean itself off its dependence on Russian natural gas. Earlier this year, the IEA reckoned that the EU could displace more than a third of Russian gas imports within a year. The more ambitious REPowerEU plan foresees two-thirds of Russian gas being displaced by the end of 2022. In the meantime, some Russian gas will be necessary. Canada’s decision over Ukrainian objections to return a repaired turbine to Germany for use in the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline suggests that a full cutoff of Russian gas flows is unlikely. Chart 14The Euro Is 26% Undervalued Against The Dollar Based On PPP During the pandemic, governments wasted little time in passing legislation to ease the burden on households and businesses. The European energy crunch will elicit a similar response. Back when I worked at the IMF, a common mantra in designing lending programs was that one should “finance temporary shocks but adjust to permanent ones.” The current situation Europe is a textbook example for the merits of providing income support to the private sector, financed by temporarily larger public deficits. The ECB’s soon-to-be-launched “anti-fragmentation” program will allow the central bank to buy the government debt of Italy and other at-risk sovereign borrowers without the need for a formal European Stability Mechanism (ESM) program, provided that the long-term debt profile of the borrowers remains sustainable. Get Ready to Buy the Euro All this suggests that Europe could see a fairly brisk rebound after the energy crunch abates. If the euro area recovers quickly, the euro – which is now about as undervalued against the dollar as anytime in its history (Chart 14) – will soar. With that in mind, we are setting a limit order to buy EUR/USD at 0.981.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on  LinkedIn & Twitter   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Executive Summary China's Unemployment Over the past week we have been visiting clients along the US west coast. In this report we hit some of the highlights from the most important and frequently asked questions. Xi Jinping is seizing absolute power just as the country’s decades-long property boom turns to bust. He will stimulate the economy but Chinese stimulus is less effective than it used to be. The US and Israel are underscoring their red line against Iranian nuclear weaponization. If Iran does not freeze its nuclear program, the Middle East will begin to unravel again. The UK’s domestic instability is returning, with Scotland threatening to leave the union. Brexit, the pandemic, and inflation make a Scottish referendum a more serious risk than in the past. Shinzo Abe’s assassination makes him a martyr for a vision of Japan as a “normal country” – i.e. one that is not pacifist but capable of defending itself. Japan’s rearmament, like Germany’s, points to the decline of the WWII peace settlement and the return of great power competition. Bottom Line: Investors need a new global balance to be achieved through US diplomacy with Russia, China, and Iran. That is not forthcoming, as the chief nations face instability at home and a stagflationary global economy. Feature The world is becoming less stable as stagflation combines with great power competition. Global uncertainty is through the roof. From a macroeconomic perspective, investors need to know whether central banks can whip inflation without triggering a recession. From a geopolitical perspective, investors need to know whether Russia’s conflict with the West will expand, whether US-China and US-Iran tensions will escalate in a damaging way, and whether domestic political rotations in the US and China this fall will lead to more stable and productive economies. China: What Will Happen At The Communist Party Reshuffle? General Secretary Xi Jinping will cement another five-to-10 years in power while promoting members of his faction into key positions on the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. By December Xi will roll out a pro-growth strategy for 2023 and the government will signal that it will start relaxing Covid-19 restrictions. But China’s structural problems ensure that this good news for global growth will only have a fleeting effect. China’s governance is shifting from single-party rule to single-person rule. It is also shifting from commercially focused decentralization to national security focused centralization. Xi has concentrated power in himself, in the party, and in Beijing at the expense of political opponents, the private economy, and outlying regions like Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang. The subordination of Taiwan is the next major project, ensuring that China will ally with Russia and that the US and China cannot repair or deepen their economic partnership. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyWill China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Xi and the Communist Party began centralizing political power and economic control shortly after the Great Recession. At that time it became clear that a painful transition away from export manufacturing and close relations with the United States was necessary. The transition would jeopardize China’s long-term economic, social, political, and geopolitical stability. The Communist Party believed it needed to revive strongman leadership (autocracy) rather than pursuing greater liberalization that would ultimately increase the odds of political revolution (democratization). The Xi administration has struggled to manage the country’s vast debt bubble, given that total debt standing has surged to 287% of GDP. The global pandemic forced the government to launch another large stimulus package, which it then attempted to contain. Corporate and household deleveraging ensued. The property and infrastructure boom of the past three decades has stalled, as the regime has imposed liquidity and capital requirements on banks and property developers to try to avoid a financial crisis. Regulatory tightening occurred in other sectors to try to steer investment into government-approved sectors and reduce the odds of technological advancement fanning social dissent. China’s draconian “zero Covid” policy sought to limit the disease’s toll, improve China’s economic self-reliance, and eliminate the threat of social protest during the year of the twentieth party congress. But it also slammed the brakes on growth. China is highly vulnerable to social instability for both structural and cyclical reasons. Chinese social unrest was our number one “Black Swan” for this year and it is now starting to take shape in the form of angry mortgage owners across the country refusing to make mortgage payments on houses that were pre-purchased but not yet built and delivered (Chart 1). Chart 1China: Mortgage Payment Boycott The mortgage payment boycott is important because it is stemming from the outstanding economic and financial imbalance – the property sector – and because it is a form of cross-regional social organization, which the Communist Party will disapprove. There are other social protests emerging, including low-level bank runs, which must be monitored very closely. Local authorities will act quickly to stop the spread of the mortgage boycott. But unhappy homeowners will be a persistent problem due to the decline of the property sector and industry. China’s property sector looks uncomfortably like the American property sector ahead of the 2006-08 bust. Prices for existing homes are falling while new house prices are on the verge of falling (Chart 2). While mortgages only make up 15% of bank assets, and household debt is only 62% of GDP, households are no longer taking on new debt (Chart 3). Chart 2China's Falling Property Prices​​​​​​ Chart 3China's Property Crisis​​​​​​ Chart 4China's Unemployment Most likely China’s property sector is entering the bust phase that we have long expected – if not, then the reason will be a rapid and aggressive move by authorities to expand monetary and fiscal stimulus and loosen economic restrictions. That process of broad-based easing – “letting 100 flowers bloom” – will not fully get under way until after the party congress, say in December. Unemployment is rising across China as the economy slows, another point of comparison with the United States ahead of the 2008 property collapse (Chart 4). Unemployment is a manipulated statistic so real conditions are likely worse. There is no more important indicator. China’s government will be forced to ease policy, creating a positive impact on global growth in 2023, but the impact will be fleeting. Bottom Line: The underlying debt-deflationary context will prevail before long in China, weighing on global growth and inflation expectations on a cyclical basis. Middle East: Why Did Biden Go And What Will He Get? President Biden traveled to Israel and now Saudi Arabia because he wants Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab members of OPEC to increase oil production to reduce gasoline prices at the pump for Americans ahead of the midterm elections (Chart 5). Chart 5Biden Goes To Israel And Saudi Arabia True, fears of recession are already weighing on prices, but Biden embarked on this mission before the growth slowdown was fully appreciated and he is not going to lightly abandon the anti-inflation fight before the midterm election. Biden also went because one of his top foreign policy priorities – the renegotiation of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran – is falling apart. The Iranians do not want to freeze their nuclear program because they want regime survival and security. While Biden is offering a return to the 2015 deal, the conditions that produced the deal are no longer applicable: Russia and China are not cooperating with the US and EU to isolate Iran. Russia is courting Iran, oil prices are high and sanction enforcement is weak (unlike 2015). The Iranians now know, after the Trump administration, that they cannot trust the Americans to give credible security guarantees that will last across parties and administrations. The war in Ukraine also underscores the weakness of diplomatic security guarantees as opposed to a nuclear deterrent. Hence the joint US and Israeli declaration that Iran will never be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons. The good news is that this kind of joint statement is precisely what needed to occur – the underscoring of the red line – to try to change Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s calculus regarding his drive to achieve nuclear breakout. In 2015 Khamenei gave diplomacy a chance to try to improve the economy, stave off social unrest, prepare the way for his eventual leadership succession process, and secure the Islamic Republic. The bad news is that Khamenei probably cannot make the same decision this time, as the hawkish faction now runs his government, the Americans are unreliable, and Russia and China are offering an alternative strategic orientation. The Saudis will pump more oil if necessary to save the global business cycle but not at the beck and call of a US president. The drop in oil prices reduces their urgency. The Americans can reassure the Saudis and Israel as long as the deal with Iran is not going forward. That looks to be the case. But then the US and Israel will have to undertake joint actions to underline their threat to Iran – and Iran will have to threaten to stage attacks across the region so as to deter any attack. Bottom Line: If a US-Iran deal does not materialize at the last minute, Middle Eastern instability will revive and a new source of oil supply constraint will plague the global economy. We continue to believe a US-Iran deal is unlikely, with only 40% odds of happening. Europe: Will Russia Turn Back On The Natural Gas? Russia’s objective in cutting off European natural gas is to inflict a recession on Europe. It wants a better bargaining position on strategic matters. Therefore we assume Russia will continue to squeeze supplies from now through the winter, when European demand rises and Russian leverage will peak. If Russia allows some flow to return, then it will be part of the negotiating process and will not preclude another cutoff before winter. It is possible that Russia is merely giving Europe a warning and will revert back to supplying natural gas. The problem is that Russia’s purpose is to achieve a strategic victory in Ukraine and in negotiations over NATO’s role in the Nordic countries. Russia has not achieved these goals, so natural gas cutoff will likely continue. Russia also hopes that by utilizing its energy leverage – while it still has it – it will bring forward the economic pain of Europe’s transition away from reliance on Russian energy. In that case European countries will experience recession and households will begin to change their view of the situation. European governments will be more likely to change their policies, to become more pragmatic and less confrontational toward Russia. Or European governments will be voted out of power and do the same thing. Other states could join Hungary in saying that Europe should never impose a full natural gas embargo on Russia. Russia would be able to salvage some of its energy trade with Europe over the long run, despite the war in Ukraine and the inevitable European energy diversification. In recent months we highlighted Italy as the weakest link in the European chain and the country most likely to see such a shift in policy occur. Italy’s national unity coalition had lost its reason for being, while the combination of rising bond yields and natural gas prices weighed on the economy. The Italian bond spread over German bunds has long served as our indicator of European political stress – and it is spiking now, forcing the European Central Bank to rush to plan an anti-fragmentation strategy that would theoretically enable it to tighten monetary policy while preventing an Italian debt crisis (Chart 6). The European Union remains unlikely to break up – Russian aggression was always one of our chief arguments for why the EU would stick together. But Italy will undergo a recession and an election (due by June 2023 but that could easily happen this fall), likely producing a new government that is more pragmatic with regard to Russia so as to reduce the energy strain. Chart 6Italy's Crisis Points To EU Divisions On Russia Italy’s political turmoil shows that European states are feeling the energy crisis and will begin to shift policies to reduce the burden on households. Households will lose their appetite for conflict with Russia on behalf of Ukrainians, especially if Russia begins offering a ceasefire after completing its conquest of the Donetsk area. If Russia expands its invasion, then Europe will expand sanctions and the risk of further strategic instability will go up. But most likely Russia will seek to quit while it is ahead and twist Europe’s arm into foisting a ceasefire onto Ukraine. Bottom Line: A change of government in Italy will increase the odds that the EU will engage in diplomacy with Russia in the coming year, if Russia offers, so as to reach a new understanding, restore natural gas flows, and salvage the economy. This would leave NATO enlargement unresolved but a shift in favor of a ceasefire in Ukraine in 2023 would be less negative for European assets and the euro. UK: Who Will Replace Boris Johnson? Last week UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson fell from power and now the Conservative Party is engaging in a leadership competition to replace him. We gave up on Johnson after he survived his no-confidence vote and yet it became clear that he could not recover in popular opinion. The inflation outburst destroyed his premiership and wiped away whatever support he had gained from executing Brexit. In fact it reinforced the faction that believed Brexit was the wrong decision. Going forward the UK will be consumed with domestic political turmoil as the cost of stagflation mounts, and geopolitical turmoil as Scotland attempts to hold a second independence referendum, possibly by October 2023. Global investors should focus primarily on Scotland’s attempt to secede, since the breakup of the United Kingdom would be a momentous historical event and a huge negative shock for pound sterling. While only 44.7% of Scots voted for independence in 2014, now they have witnessed Brexit, Covid-19, and stagflation, producing tailwinds for the Scots nationalist vote (Chart 7). Chart 7Forget Bojo's Exit, Watch Scotland There are still major limitations on Scotland exiting, since its national capabilities are limited, it would need to join the European Union, and Spain and possibly others will threaten to veto its membership in the European Union for fear of feeding their own secessionist movements. But any new referendum – including one done without the approval of Westminster – should be taken very seriously by investors. Bottom Line: Johnson’s removal will only marginally improve the Tories’ ability to manage the rebellion brewing in the north. A snap election that brings the Labour Party back into power would have a greater chance of keeping Scotland in the union, although it is not clear that such a snap election will happen in time to affect any Scottish decision. The UK faces economic and political turmoil between now and any referendum and investors should steer clear of the pound. (Though we still favor GBP over eastern European currencies). Britain will remain aggressive toward Russia but its ability to affect the Russian dynamic will fall, leaving the US and EU to decide the fate of Russian relations. Japan: What Is The Significance Of Shinzo Abe’s Assassination? Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was assassinated by a lone fanatic with a handmade gun. The significance of the incident is that Abe will become a martyr for a certain vision of Japan – his vision of Japan, which is that Japan can become a “normal country” that moves beyond the shackles of the guilt of its imperial aggression in World War II. A normal country is one that is economically stable and militarily capable of defending itself – not a pacifist country mired in debt-deflation. Abe stood for domestic reflation and a proactive foreign policy, along with the normalization of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). True, economic policy can become less dovish if necessary to deal with inflation. Some changes at the Bank of Japan may usher in a less dovish shift in monetary policy in particular. But monetary policy cannot become outright hawkish like it was before Abe. And Abe’s fiscal policy was never as loose as it was made out to be, given that he executed several hikes to the consumption tax. Japan’s structural demographic decline and large debt burden will continue to weigh on economic activity whenever real rates and the yen rise. The government will be forced to reflate using monetary and fiscal policy whenever deflation threatens to return. Debt monetization will remain an option for future Japanese governments, even if it is restrained during times of high inflation. Chart 8Shinzo Abe's Legacy ​​​​​​​ This is not only because Japanese households will become depressed if deflation is left unchecked but also because economic growth must be maintained in order to sustain the nation’s new and growing national defense budgets. Japan’s growing need for self defense stems from China’s strategic rise, Russia’s aggression, and North Korea’s nuclearization, plus uncertainty about the future of American foreign policy. These trends will not change anytime soon. Indeed the Liberal Democratic Party’s popularity has increased under Abe’s successor, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who will largely sustain Abe’s vision. The Diet still has a supermajority in favor of constitutional revision so as to enshrine the self-defense forces (Chart 8). And the de facto policy of rearmament continues even without formal revision. Bottom Line: Any Japanese leader who attempts to promote a hawkish BoJ, and a dovish JSDF, will fail sooner rather than later. The revolving door of prime ministers will accelerate. As Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, Shinzo Abe opened up the reliable pathway, which is that of a dovish BoJ and a hawkish foreign policy. This is important for the world, as well as Japan, because a more hawkish Japan will increase China’s fears of strategic containment. The frozen conflicts in Asia will continue to thaw, perpetuating the secular rise in geopolitical risk. We remain long JPY-KRW, since the BoJ may adjust in the short term and Chinese stimulus is still compromised, but that trade is on downgrade watch. Investment Takeaways Russia’s energy cutoff is aimed at pushing Europe into recession so as to force policy changes or government changes in Europe that will improve Russia’s position at the negotiating table over Ukraine, NATO, and other strategic disputes. Hence Russia is unlikely to increase the natural gas flow until it believes it has achieved its strategic aims and multiple veto players in the EU will prevent the EU from ever implementing a full-blown natural gas embargo. Chinese stimulus cannot be fully effective until it relaxes Covid-19 restrictions, likely beginning in December or next year when Xi Jinping uses his renewed political capital to try to stabilize the economy. However, China’s government powers alone are insufficient to prevent the debt-deflationary tendency of the property bust. The Middle East faces rising geopolitical tensions that will take markets by surprise with additional energy supply constraints. The implication is continued oil volatility given that global growth is faltering. Once global demand stabilizes, the Middle East’s turmoil will add to existing oil supply constraints to create new price pressures. The odds are not very high of the Federal Reserve achieving a “soft landing” in the context of a global energy shock and a stagflationary Europe and China.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com ​​​​​​​ Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades () Section II: Special (EDIT this Header) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Executive Summary Further GDP Weakness Would Push Brent Lower Markets remain alert for indications of what Russia will do next. Last week, President Vladimir Putin threatened “catastrophic consequences” if G7 states are able to impose a price cap on Russian oil sales. A sharp drop in output – more than 3mm b/d – would send prices sharply higher, and could not be replaced in 2H22. KSA and the UAE are signaling their limited ability to significantly increase oil output ahead of US President Joseph Biden’s visit to the region later this week. Our simulation of demand losses of ~500k b/d in 2H22 and ~1.0mm b/d in 2023 suggests Brent could fall $7/bbl to $108/bb in 2H22 and $8/bbl to $109/bbl in 2023, all else equal. A Russian court decision last week briefly halted flows on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) 1.3mm b/d line moving Kazakh oil to the Black Sea through Russia, adding a new variable into supply-side modeling. A trivial fine was levied, but a larger message was delivered. Sporadic force majeure declarations and output losses in Libya, where Russian mercenaries actively support Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), continue to make supply assessments difficult. Bottom Line: Tight supply fundamentals will keep oil markets volatile and biased to the upside, despite recurrent recession fears overwhelming demand expectations.  While a deep recession cannot be discounted, we remain focused on the objective fact of physically tight markets, and Russia's political-economy considerations affecting the evolution of prices. Feature Anyone who has spent time in trading markets will appreciate the implications of a $65-at-$380/bbl bid-ask spread on Brent. This two-way quote represents worst cases scenarios on the demand and supply sides of the market. And huge uncertainty. The bid comes from Citi’s recession-driven view, while the offer is courtesy of JP Morgan’s worst-case supply-shock assessment – i.e., Russia pulling 5mm b/d off the market if G7 states impose a price cap on its exports.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyCopper Prices Decouple From Fundamentals Of late, demand-side concerns are driving markets, along with other technical factors we discussed in last week’s report on copper: low liquidity in trading markets; elevated global policy uncertainty, as seen by the two-way quote above; worries Fed tightening will overshoot the mark as it attempts to control hotter inflation, and an expansion of Russia’s economic war that now engulfs Ukraine.2 The latter point touches on events that cross commodity markets globally: Russia is threatening “catastrophic consequences” if G7 states impose a price cap on its oil sales. This goes directly to the supply side, as it most likely entails a dramatic gesture to reduce crude oil output sharply – i.e., more than 3mm b/d – which would send prices soaring. Russia’s coffers are in excellent shape at present, given the high prices its oil, gas and coal producers have been able to fetch since it invaded Ukraine.3 In our modeling, if Russia were to cut the 2.3mm b/d of crude and condensate it sent to Europe last year, Brent prices would move above $140/bbl.4 Higher volumes taken off the market would result in higher prices. These factors all interact with each other producing feedback loops – e.g., higher uncertainty causes lower liquidity in hedging markets and wider bid-ask spreads on smaller volumes – affecting decisions on everything from capex levels to headcounts. Demand Concerns Consume Markets Last month, we lowered our Brent forecast for this year and next to $110/bbl and $117/bbl, respectively, on the back of a sharp downgrade in global growth expectations from the World Bank. The Bank’s forecast prompted us to reduce our 2022 oil demand growth forecast to 2.0mm b/d this year vs 4.8mm b/d in our January forecast, and, for next year, to 1.8mm b/d. Given the obvious concern in markets, we simulated another hit to demand of 500k b/d in 2H22 and 1.0mm b/d next year, due to a further markdown in real GDP growth. This scenario brings our demand growth expectation down to 1.5mm b/d this year and 800k b/d next year. In this simulation, the lower GDP growth takes our average price expectation for 2H22 to $108/bbl and $109/bbl next year, or $7/bbl and $8/bbl lower, respectively (Chart 1). The lower demand we model here is offset to some degree by our maintained hypothesis that OPEC 2.0 – particularly its core producers Saudi Arabia and the UAE – will temper production somewhat (Chart 2), so as not to produce very large unintended inventory accumulations (Chart 3). Chart 1Further GDP Weakness Would Push Brent Lower This concern is particularly acute if these producers receive new information that demand is slowing more than they expected. We are certain this will come up when US President Biden is in Riyadh later this week to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS), to again discuss, among other things, the Kingdom’s ability and willingness to increase supply. Chart 2Core OPEC 2.0 Will Temper Production Increases... Chart 3...To Avoid Unintended Inventory Accumulations Russia Exerts Supply-Side Influence Russia is at war with Ukraine and the West – i.e., the G7 and NATO states arming and actively seeking to limit its access to revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons. Russia is treating this as a war, and it is operating on multiple fronts, in addition to its kinetic engagement with Ukrainian forces. In a market as finely balanced and uncertain as the current one, small, unexpected shifts in supply or demand can have outsized effects. Last week, for example, a decision by a Russian court briefly halted flows on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) 1.3mm b/d line moving Kazakh oil to the Black Sea. This boosted prices more than 5% over the ensuing couple of days. Flows were allowed to resume after trivial fine was paid and prices fell. But a larger message was delivered. This remains a powerful lever Moscow can use at a moment’s notice to tighten supplies. Opportunities elsewhere in oil-producing provinces also are continuously cultivated by Russian operatives to influence supplies. Sporadic public demonstrations and force majeure declarations have led to output losses in Libya, where Russian mercenaries actively support Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). This continues to make supply assessments difficult. Libya currently produces ~ 650k b/d, according to the US EIA, down from ~ 1.12mm b/d in 4Q21. As in many things, Russia’s playing a game of chess with its opponents and forcing them to react to its threats and decisions. And this strategy is not limited to Ukraine, the EU or oil. For example, the seizure of Shell’s ownership in the Sakhalin-2 LNG facilities by Russia’s state-owned Gazprom was described by The Journal of Petroleum Technology (JPT) as a “backdoor” nationalization of Shell’s interest. This will have long-term consequences far removed from the Ukraine War, and could affect LNG deliveries to Japan and South Korea, which will become critical in a super-tight LNG market going into winter. This couldn’t be more timely, as Japan and South Korean – in a first-ever event – attended the end-June NATO meeting.5 Investment Implications Russia’s war against Ukraine has multiple dimensions, all of which can impact oil and gas prices going forward. Despite the obvious concerns over a deep recession reducing global oil demand – and commodity demand generally – we continue to focus on the objective fact of physically tight markets, and Russia's political-economy considerations affecting the evolution of prices. This informs our view that prices will remain volatile with a significant bias to the upside. Small, unexpected shocks in a fundamentally tight market on the supply side support our view prices will move higher.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Whether the EU can avoid rationing – and fill its natural-gas storage – ahead of winter will depend on what Russia does with its exports of the gas exported on Nord Stream 1 (NS1) and other pipes (Chart 4). We believe Russia will cut off most of its exports to the EU before winter sets in. It likely will use use the current 10-day maintenance on NS1, which began Monday, as a pretext to cut supplies, in retaliation for the EU cutting off crude oil and refined products imports. President Putin of Russia most likely will offer to keep the gas flowing so inventories can be refilled, in return for the EU lifting sanctions it imposed following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Precious Metals: Bullish June headline US CPI was reported at 9.1% yoy, continuing the streak of rising prices. The Fed will need to aggressively hike rates to bring price levels lower, raising the risk of plunging the US into a recession. Recession fears will reduce long-term bond yields and should support gold prices. While high inflation is good for gold, the yellow metal saw investment outflows during May and June, as investors opt for the USD as a safe-haven asset. Ags/Softs: Neutral Food prices fell for the third straight month in June, but still are near historic highs following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.6 Wheat prices fell by 5.7% in June but was still higher by 48.5% compared to 2021 (Chart 5).7 This might be down to recession fears, or, more likely, due to better crop conditions, seasonal availability from new harvests in the northern hemisphere, and more exports from Russia. The UN’s FAO warned factors that drove global prices higher still persist. Russia is expected to harvest one of its largest wheat crops since the fall of the Soviet Union.8 According to the 2022/23 USDA outlook, there will be less supplies and consumption, higher exports and stocks.9 Chart 4 Chart 5   Footnotes 1     Please see Citigroup says oil prices could tumble to $65 by the end of the year if a recession whacks demand, published by businessinsider.com on July 5, 2022, and Oil could hit $380 if Russia slashes output over price cap, J.P.Morgan says, published by reuters.com on July 4, 2022. 2     Please see Copper Prices Decouple From Fundamentals published on July 7, 2022. 3    Please see Russia sees extra $4.5 billion in July budget revenue on higher oil prices published by reuters.com on July 5, 2022. 4    Please see Oil, Natgas Prices Set To Surge, which we published on May 19, 2022.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Please see Japan and South Korea's Attendance at the Upcoming NATO Summit Could Worsen Global Tensions, published by time.com on June 16, 2022. 6    Please see Global food prices may be falling, but economist warns Asia’s food costs could still soar published by CNBC on July 11, 2022. 7     Please see Wheat, Corn Prices Tempered- Easing Global Food Cost Concerns published by University of Illinois on July 1, 2022 . 8    Please see Dollar rises to 20-year highs, sends grains lower published by FarmProgress on July 12, 2022. 9    Please see Grain: World Market and Trade published by USDA on July 12, 2022.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trades Closed in 2022

In lieu of next week’s report, I will host the monthly Counterpoint Webcast on Monday, July 25. Please mark the date in your calendar, and I do hope you can join. Executive Summary Central banks face a ‘Sophie’s choice’. Inflation at 2 percent, or full employment? If they choose inflation at 2 percent, they will have to take the economy into recession. To take the economy into recession, bond yields and energy prices do not need to move any higher. They just need to stay where they are. The stock market has not yet discounted a recession. With stocks and bonds having become equally ‘cheaper’ this year, but stocks now vulnerable to substantial downgrades to their profits, stocks are likely to underperform bonds over the coming 6-12 months. In the event of recession followed by plunging inflation, a valuation uplift for bonds will also underpin stock prices and limit further downside in absolute terms. The biggest loser will be commodities. On a 6-12 month horizon, the optimal asset allocation is: overweight bonds, neutral stocks, underweight commodities. Fractal trading watchlist: Ethereum. The Bear Market Is A Valuation Bear Market. Profits Are Not Discounting A Recession… Yet Bottom Line: On a 6-12 month horizon, overweight bonds, neutral stocks, underweight commodities. Feature The Greek mythological sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis, sat on opposite sides of the narrow Strait of Messina, with one monster likened to a shoal of rocks, the other to a vortex. Avoiding the rocks meant getting too close to the vortex, and avoiding the vortex meant getting too close to the rocks. In today’s stock market, if Scylla is the monster of high bond yields, then Charybdis is the monster of falling profits. Whether the stock market can safely navigate these twin monsters without further damage depends on a sequence of questions. In today’s stock market, if Scylla is the monster of high bond yields, then Charybdis is the monster of falling profits. If the market can escape high bond yields, can it also escape falling profits? The answer to this depends on a second question. Can central banks guide inflation back to 2 percent without taking the economy into recession? The answer to this depends on a third question. Is 2 percent inflation still consistent with full employment? Central Banks Face A ‘Sophie’s Choice’ – Low Inflation, Or Full Employment? In the US, the main transmission mechanism from employment to inflation is through so-called ‘rent of shelter’. Because, to put it bluntly, you need a steady job to pay the rent. And rent comprises 41 percent of the core inflation basket. For the past couple of decades, the Fed could have its cake and eat it: full employment and inflation running close to 2 percent. This was because full employment was consistent with rent of shelter inflation running at 3.5 percent, which itself was consistent with core inflation running at 2 percent. The Fed faces a ‘Sophie’s choice’. Inflation at 2 percent, or full employment? If it chooses inflation at 2 percent, then the Fed will have to take the economy into recession. But recently, there has been a phase-shift between the employment market and rent of shelter inflation. The current state of full employment equates to rent of shelter inflation running not at 3.5 percent, but at 5.5 percent (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Central Banks Face A 'Sophie's Choice' - Low Inflation, Or Full Employment? Hence, the Fed faces a ‘Sophie’s choice’. Inflation at 2 percent, or full employment? If it chooses inflation at 2 percent, the unemployment rate will have to rise by 2 percent. Meaning, the Fed will have to take the economy into recession. The Economy Tries The ‘Cold Pressor Test’ To take the economy into recession, bond yields and energy prices do not need to move any higher – they just need to stay where they are. This is because the damage from elevated bond yields and energy prices doesn’t come just from their level. It comes from their level multiplied by the length of time that they stay elevated. Try putting your hand in a bucket of ice water. For the first few seconds, or even tens of seconds, you will not feel any discomfort. After a few minutes though, the pain becomes excruciating. This so-called ‘cold pressor test’ tells us that your discomfort results not just from the temperature level of the ice water, but equally from the length of time that you keep your hand in it. Likewise, a short-lived spike in the mortgage rate or in the price of natural gas, or a short-lived collapse in your stock market wealth will not cause any discomfort. But the longer the mortgage rate stays elevated, and more and more people are buying or refinancing a home at a much higher rate, the greater becomes the economic pain. In the same vein, most Europeans will not notice the sky-high prices of natural gas in the summer when the heating is off. But come the cold of October and November, many people will have to choose literally between physical or economic pain. Some commentators counter that the “war chest of savings” accumulated during the pandemic will buffer households against higher mortgage rates and energy prices. We strongly disagree. The savings accumulated during the pandemic just added to, and became indistinguishable from, other wealth. Yet now, in case you hadn’t noticed, wealth has been pummelled. In case you hadn’t noticed, wealth has been pummelled. The impact of wealth on spending is a huge topic which we will expand upon in a future report. In a nutshell, most spending comes from income and income proxies. Wealth generates income, but it also generates an income proxy via capital gain. So, to the extent that wealth can drive spending growth, the biggest contributor comes from the change in capital gain, also known as the ‘wealth impulse’. Unfortunately, the wealth impulse is now in deeply negative territory (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Wealth Impulse Is In Deeply Negative Territory The Stock Market Has Not Yet Discounted A Recession Coming back to the stock market, does the 2022 bear market mean that it has already discounted a recession? No, this year’s bear market is entirely due to a collapse in valuations. Since the start of the year, US profit expectations have held up. If the bear market were front running profit downgrades, then it would be underperforming its valuation component, but it is not. The counterargument is that analysts are notoriously slow to downgrade their profit estimates. Isn’t the bear market the ‘real-time’ stock market ‘front running’ big downgrades to these profit estimates? Again, no. If the market were front running profit downgrades, then it would be underperforming its valuation component, but it is not (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Bear Market Is A Valuation Bear Market. Profits Are Not Discounting A Recession...Yet The bear market in the S&P 500 has near-perfectly tracked the bear market in its valuation component, the 30-year T-bond price. The valuation component of the S&P 500 is the 30-year T-bond price because the duration of the S&P 500 equals the duration of the 30-year T-bond. Several clients have asked how to prove that the duration of the S&P 500 equals that of the 30-year T-bond. We can do it either a difficult theoretical way, or an easy empirical way. The difficult theoretical way is to take the projected cashflows, and calculate the weighted average time to those cashflows, where the weights are the discounted values of those cashflows. The much easier empirical way is to show that the S&P 500 tracks its profits multiplied by the 30-year T-bond price more faithfully than if we use a shorter maturity bond, such as the 10-year T-bond (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5) Chart I-4The S&P 500 Tracks Profits Multiplied By The 30-Year T-Bond Price More Faithfully... Chart I-5...Than Profits Multiplied By The 10-Year T-Bond Price One important upshot is that any valuation comparison of the S&P 500 with a bond other than the 30-year T-bond is a fundamental error of duration mismatch. Most strategists compare the S&P 500 with the 10-year T-bond because it is convenient. But the duration mismatch makes this ‘apples versus oranges’ valuation comparison one of the most common mistakes in finance. Overweight Bonds, Neutral Stocks, Underweight Commodities All of this is important to answer a crucial question about stock market valuations. With the stock market 20 percent down this year when expected profits have held up, it might appear that stocks have become much cheaper. The truth is more nuanced. Relative to expected profits over the next 12 months the US stock market is indeed much cheaper (Chart I-6). The caveat is that these expected profits are vulnerable to substantial downgrades in the event of a recession. Chart I-6The US Stock Market Is Cheaper Versus Expected Profits, But These Profits Are Too Optimistic Chart I-7The US Stock Market Is Not Cheaper Versus The 30-Year T-Bond But relative to the equal duration 30-year T-bond, the US stock market is not cheaper. Since, the start of the year, the uplift in the stock market’s (forward earnings) yield is precisely the same as the that on the 30-year T-bond yield (Chart I-7).  Relative to the equal duration 30-year T-bond, the US stock market has not become cheaper. With stocks and bonds having become equally ‘cheaper’ this year, but stocks now vulnerable to substantial downgrades to their profits, stocks are likely to underperform bonds over the coming 6-12 months. The good news is that a valuation uplift for bonds will also underpin stock prices, and limit further downside in absolute terms. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for commodities, whose real prices are still close to the upper end of their 40-year trading range (Chart I-8) Chart I-8The Real Price Of Metals Is Still At The Upper End Of Its 40-Year Trading Range In the event of recession followed by plunging inflation, the biggest winner will be bonds and the biggest loser will be commodities. Therefore, on a 6-12 horizon, the optimal asset allocation is: Overweight bonds. Neutral stocks. Underweight commodities. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week we are adding Ethereum to our watchlist, as its 130-day fractal structure is approaching the capitulation point that signalled previous major trend reversals in 2018 (a bottom) and 2021 (a top). The full watchlist of 27 investments that are approaching, or at, potential trend reversals is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions Chart I-9Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 1CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point   Chart 2US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 3CAD/SEK Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Chart 5The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended Chart 6The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended Chart 7FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 8Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Is Ending Chart 9The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 10The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 11Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 12German Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 13Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 14ETH Is Approaching A Possible Capitulation Chart 15The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended Chart 16The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended Chart 17A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 18Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 19Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 20Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 21Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Ended Chart 22USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 24A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 25GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 26US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 27The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary Caught In Risk-Off Selling Weak Chinese and European economies are suppressing copper demand and helping to temper prices in a market that remains fundamentally tight. Weaker US GDP growth could put the three largest economies in the world in or close to recession in 2H22/1H23, which would contribute to demand-side weakness in copper markets. The odds manufacturing and base-metals refining will be curtailed in Europe are rising. Although a strike in Norway has been averted by government intervention, maintenance on Russia’s Nord Stream 1 pipeline scheduled to begin next week likely will serve as a pretext for longer and deeper natgas supply cuts to the EU. Bottom Line: Despite fundamental tightness in global copper markets, prices are being restrained by fears weaker Chinese and European economic performance will lead to a global recession. Early reads of US GDP pointing to negative growth in 2Q22 stoke these fears. Heightened economic policy uncertainty globally exacerbates them. We remain fundamentally bullish copper and will re-establish our long SPDR S&P Metals & Mining ETF (XME) – down ~ 40% from its highs in April – at tonight’s close. In addition, we went long the XOP oil and gas ETF at Tuesday’s close, after prompt Brent breached the buy-trigger we set last week of $105/bbl during this week’s crude-oil sell-off.   Feature   Lower GDP growth expectations in China and the EU – along with a wobbly US economy being flagged by an Atlanta Fed GDPNow forecast pointing to negative growth in 2Q22 – are stoking fears of a global manufacturing and industrial recession. This prompted a rout in industrial commodities – base metals and oil – this week, which still has markets on edge. This slow-down in the world’s three largest economies – accounting for almost 50% of global GDP expressed in purchasing-power terms – is the only thing keeping the level of global copper demand close to supply at present (Chart 1).1 At least for the time being, this is keeping the threat of sharply higher copper prices, which would be more in line with the low levels of supplies and inventories globally, at bay (Chart 2). As of the week ended May 27th, global copper stocks stood at just above 562k tons, which is ~ 31% lower y/y. Chart 1World’s Biggest Economies Slowing Chart 2Copper Prices Disconnect From Fundamentals   Uncertainty Weakens Copper Prices Energy and metals markets remain extremely tight on a fundamental supply-demand basis.2 The sharp sell-off this week in oil and metals prices is, in our view, evidence industrial-commodity prices have decoupled from fundamentals.  This makes traders – hedgers and speculators – extremely risk-averse, which reduces liquidity and increases volatility. On the back of these concerns, markets exhibit the sort of volatility associated with economic collapse, despite still-strong underlying fundamentals. Chart 3Rising Global Policy Uncertainty Volatility is on the rise due to increasing economic uncertainty in these markets. This makes it extremely difficult to assign probabilities to different price outcomes (i.e., true uncertainty). The BBD Global Economic Policy Uncertainty is approaching levels seen during the early pandemic (Chart 3).  We put this rising uncertainty down to poor policy and communication from central banks and governments; a pig’s breakfast of energy policy globally that increasingly adds nothing but confusion to markets; and a muddled public-health policy in China, which produces random shut-downs in global supply chains as covid infections randomly crop up in important port cities.  Lastly, the East and West are moving toward a new Cold War, which already is having profound effects on all markets, trade flows and capital availability in the short- and medium-term. This keeps markets on edge and forces them to parse every geopolitical development that hits the tape.3 Re-forging supply chains, re-building basic industrial infrastructure as the West moves away from outsourcing to China and other EM states will be costly and volatile, especially as embargoes and sanctions increase between these blocs.    This political and economic evolution will require increased investment in base metals production and exploration, along with similar commitments to oil and gas. Low and volatile prices will not support this, as they disincentivize investment, and set markets up for continued shortage and scarcity going forward. In the metals markets, years of underinvestment by major mining companies will keep copper supplies and inventories tight going forward (Chart 4). This will hinder and delay the global renewable-energy transition, which cannot be realized without higher base-metals supplies.  Chart 4Structural Underinvestment In Mining Fundamentally Bullish Copper Recession Fears Haunt Metals Globally … The proximate causes of the persistent weakening of copper prices is the demand destruction arising from the lockdown in China, and an increasing concern over the economic prospects of the EU as it prepares for a possible shut-off of Russian natgas exports. Should Russian supplies be cut off, the EU will be pushed into recession as natural-gas rationing – and the attendant prioritization of human needs going into winter – will constrict economic activity, particularly in manufacturing.  This leaves two of the three largest economies in the world either in recession or not growing at all. Added to this is the fear of a wobbly US economy, which has been slowed by higher energy prices and the Fed’s hawkish tightening of monetary policy. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast for 2Q22 estimates a 2.1% contraction in US GDP. This would be the second consecutive quarter of negative growth and would meet a widely held rule-of-thumb indicator or recession.4  In our modelling, we estimate the income elasticity of copper demand in DM economies like the EU and US (1.39) and EM-ex-China (0.87) states is higher than that of China (0.37). This means that a 1% contraction in p.a. Chinese real GDP would translate to a 0.37% p.a. fall in copper demand, all else equal. A contraction of real incomes – i.e., real GDP – in the EU and EM-ex-China will cause a larger relative adjustment in copper demand than in China, even though the level of copper demand in China is far greater in absolute terms (Chart 5).  A recession in the EU will reduce import demand for China’s manufactured output in these markets (Chart 6). As China’s trade volumes fall, Chinese manufacturing PMIs will contract. Similarly, exports to China from the EU will weaken as manufacturing weakens and real GDP moves lower. We believe this will put more pressure on the Chinese government to provide fiscal and monetary stimulus to counter such a downdraft.  Chart 5Copper Demand Sensitive to Real GDP (Income) Chart 6Trade Channel Effects Follow GDP Weakness … But China Worries Dominate The Chinese economy is showing signs of further slowing.5 Weakness in credit levels, infrastructure investment, manufacturing, the property sector, and exports all indicate the covid-policy lockdowns, high commodity prices, and parsimonious credit and fiscal policies have produced a dramatic slowing in economic activity. In our modelling, we find evidence that each of these components exhibits a long-run inverse relationship with Chinese copper inventories, which in turn exhibits a long-run inverse relationship with COMEX copper prices.  Roughly 10 days after the initial Shanghai lockdown, copper prices went into contango (Chart 7). This occurred despite continuous declines in Chinese copper inventories during the lockdown months (Chart 8). Such anomalous behavior – i.e., as inventories fall markets become more backwardated – makes it difficult to connect prices and supply-demand-inventory fundamentals. Chart 7Copper In Contango For Most Of China’s Lockdown Chart 8Chinese Copper Inventories Continue To Draw In Lockdown BCA’s China Investment Strategy expects a muted 2H22 recovery for the Chinese economy. Rolling lockdowns due to China’s COVID policy will reduce the potency of fiscal and monetary stimulus. The stop-start nature of economic activity will stymie growth in disposable income and job creation, which in turn will translate to weaker aggregate demand. The knock-on effect of weaker business activity due to the lockdown earlier this year has been a higher propensity to save by households (Chart 9). Household surveys conducted by the PBoC show that, since 2017, household savings have been increasing, suggesting a precautionary sentiment (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Economic Slowdown Reduced Credit Demand Chart 10Rising Precautionary Savings... Chart 11...Will Impact Domestic Property Market We do not expect the property market to recover in a manner similar to what occurred following China’s re-opening after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Depressed household purchasing power will keep housing demand subdued, while the “three red lines” policy, which limits the amount property developers can borrow, will keep supply low (Chart 11).6 Housing accounts for ~ 30% of copper consumption in China, which means weak property markets will remain a drag on copper demand. Investment Implications Continued weakness in China’s economy and a potentially deep recession in the EU will continue to restrain demand for copper globally. In addition, with the US economy looking wobbly, the third global pillar of economic strength also will be weakening going into 2H22. These fundamental demand-side effects will lower pressure on tight copper inventories and keep prices subdued, in our view. This does not, however, signal an all-clear for copper supply or inventory tightness. Weaker demand is the only thing keeping prices from rising sharply, given the tight supply and inventory position of global copper markets. On the supply side, governance issues in copper-rich Latin American states, which are in the process of revising their social contracts with copper producers and consumers, will increase mining costs for companies, disincentivizing long-term and large-scale investments in new mines.7 These costs ultimately will be borne by consumers as supply shortages mount and the need to increase capex grows. Ultimately, this will feed into longer-term inflation and inflation expectations. Chart 12Caught In Risk-Off Selling We remain long-term bullish copper, as fundamentals remain tight and will get tighter. That said, over the short term, aggregate-demand weakness in the three major economic pillars in the world makes us leery of getting long copper futures, particularly as prompt COMEX prices test support (Chart 12).  Persistently weak copper prices will disincentivize the needed investment in new supply the world will need to effect a transition to renewable energy in coming decades. For this reason, we are comfortable re-establishing our long XME metals and mining ETF at tonight’s close, as copper prices are down 40% from their April highs. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Commodity Round-Up Energy: Bullish. A strike by Norwegian energy-sector workers that would have hit the natural gas market in Europe particularly hard was averted earlier this week.8 This still leaves the EU and UK (Europe) at risk of additional losses of Russian natgas exports beginning next week when Nord Stream 1 (NS1) maintenance is due to start. These threats have pushed Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) natural gas prices up close to 93% since 1 June, and close to 400% y/y as of Tuesday. For the first five months of this year, Europe’s been importing just under 15 Bcf/d of LNG, with ~ 8.5 Bcf/d of those volumes coming from the US, based on EIA data. The EIA expects US LNG exports to average ~ 11.9 Bcf/d this year and 12 Bcf/d in 2023. Europe accounted for just under 75% of US exports in January – April of this year, and we expect that to continue going forward. The IEA expects Russia to supply 25% of EU demand this year, the lowest in 20 years. Last year, Russian imports covered ~ 40% (~ 7 TCF) of EU demand. Base Metals: Zinc stocks are depleted but prices are dropping on recession fears (Chart 13). Smelting operations were hit last year following the power-supply crunches in China and Europe. While China has recovered its energy security, Europe, which accounts for ~15% of global refined zinc supply, has not. Reduced natgas supply from Russia will make the smelting shortage in Europe even more acute, especially if power and fuel rationing occur. In April, China was a net exporter of zinc for the first time since 2014, as low demand in the state and low European zinc supply incentivized Chinese smelters to ship metal to the West despite high outbound tariffs. Precious Metals: Markets switched from inflation to growth fears, as central banks, notably the Fed began hiking interest rates aggressively to curb inflation. Investors have been flocking to the USD, which hit a 20-year high on recession fears this week (Chart 14). This has happened at the expense of the yellow metal, which, since breaking through the USD 1800/oz mark last week, has continued to drop, hitting an 8-month low as of yesterday's close. Chart 13Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Chart 14   Footnotes 1     Please see China, US and EU are the largest economies in the world, which was published by Eurostat 19 May 2020. 2     For additional discussion of oil-market fundamentals, please see Recession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices, which covers our expectation for global oil balances and prices. It was published 16 June 2022. 3    Please see Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy 30 July 2021. See also Commodities' Watershed Moment, which we published 22 March 2022.  4    Please see GDPNow, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 1 July 2022. 5    Please see Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning, published by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy 24 June 2022. This report notes, “China’s political crackdown, struggle with Covid-19, waning exports, and deflating property market have led to an abrupt slowdown this year. The government is responding by easing monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, though so far with limited effect … . Economic policy will not be decisive in the third quarter unless a crash forces the administration to stimulate aggressively.” 6    In August 2020, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the People’s Bank of China proposed to implement a policy which kept a ceiling on companies’ asset to liability ratio at 70%, net debt to equity ratio at 100%, and cash to short-term borrowings ratio at 1. Developers whose liabilities are within these requirements may increase their liabilities by less than 15%. These were known as the “three red lines.” Per that policy, if one or more of these ceilings are surpassed, maximum liabilities growth is capped at a lower percentage. 7     Please see Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published 25 November 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also Chile sticks to plan for new mining profit tax up to 32% linked to copper price, published by reuters.com via mining.com 1 July 2022. 8    Please see Norway’s government halts oil and gas strike published by ft.com 5 July 2022. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trades Closed In 2022