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Foreword Today we are publishing a charts-only report focused on the S&P 500 and its sectors. Many of the charts are self-explanatory; to some we have added a short commentary.  As with the styles Chart Pack, published a month ago, the sector charts cover macro, valuations, fundamentals, technicals, and the uses of cash.  Our goal is to equip you with all the data you need to underpin sector allocation decisions.  We also include performance, valuations, and earnings growth expectations tables for all the styles, sectors, industry groups, and industries (GICS 1, 2 and 3). We hope you will find this publication useful. We plan to update it monthly, alternating sector and style coverage. Overarching Investment Themes Macro Economic surprise index is flagging while Q2-21 earnings surprises are unprecedented.  Much of the good economic news has been priced in and the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index is hovering around zero (Chart 1A).  Most of the economic indicators have turned, confirming that the surge in growth has run its course and the macroeconomic environment is normalizing. Covid-19 fears are resurfacing:  The spread of the Delta variant is unlikely to trigger another lockdown, but consumers may curtail their activities out of fear of infection, adversely affecting demand for goods and services.  However, for now, we are sanguine about this risk. Investors expect inflation to roll over: Investors’ inflation fears are dissipating, attested by the falling 5Y/5Y inflation breakevens (Chart 1B).  Indeed, it appears that the debate on the persistence of inflation has been won by the “inflation is transitory” camp.  Yet, we won’t be surprised if inflation surprises on the upside (no pun intended).  Chart 1AGood Economic News Has Been Priced In Good Economic News Has Been Priced In Good Economic News Has Been Priced In Chart 1BMost Investors Are Now Convinced That Inflation Will Be Transitory Most Investors Are Now Convinced That Inflation Will Be Transitory Most Investors Are Now Convinced That Inflation Will Be Transitory Labor shortages are starting to dissipate: On the labor front, companies are still struggling to fill job openings.  However, there are signs that the labor market is healing, with more and more workers interested in returning to the labor force  (Chart 2). Inventories will be replenished, spurring investment: Post-pandemic economic recovery is still plagued by the mismatch between supply and demand. Supply-chain disruptions and shortages fail to meet pent-up demand of consumers eager to spend “helicopter drop cash” and accumulated savings.  As a result, inventories have been drawn down, chipping away 1.1% from GDP growth. In fact, they are at all-time lows: Non-farm inventories to final sales have dropped lower than they were during the GFC (Chart 3).  Low inventories will have to be replenished, resulting in further gains in investment and providing a boost to industrial activity going forward. Chart 2More Workers Are Interested In Returning To The Labor Force US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Demand for services will continue to exceed demand for goods: Last, but not least, consumers have money to spend but are shifting away from goods and toward services and experiences.  Consumer expenditure on goods is above trend and has recently turned down, while spending on services is still below pre-pandemic levels, and rebound is still running its course (Chart 4). Chart 3Inventories Are At All Time Low Inventories Are At All Time Low Inventories Are At All Time Low Chart 4Real Spending On Services Is At PrePandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Real Spending On Services Is At PrePandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Real Spending On Services Is At PrePandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Valuations And Profitability The US stock market remains expensive: The S&P 500 is trading more than two standard deviations above the long-term average.  However, there are pockets of reasonably priced, albeit unloved, stocks within the S&P 500: Telecom (11x forward earnings), Health Care (17x), Energy (14x), and Financials (14x).  Earnings continue to crush expectations: While equities are expensive, they are redeemed by the strong showing of earnings and sales growth reported for Q2-2021.  The scale of earnings beats relative to analyst expectations is spectacular: Running at nearly 20%, or more than two standard deviations above the historical average (Chart 5). Chart 5Earnings Surprises Are Unprecedented US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Earnings growth is normalizing: Earnings have increased 90% over the lackluster Q2, 2020.  Compared to Q2-2019 as a baseline quarter, earnings are up 22%, pointing to normalization going forward.  Earnings growth will become a tailwind for the outperformance of equities into the balance of the year and will help the S&P 500 to grow into its big valuation “shoes”. Margins are expanding despite inflation:  Many sectors are able to grow earnings and recover margins despite increases in costs of raw materials and labor, thanks to their strong pricing power, i.e., ability to pass on higher input costs to their customers (Chart 6A).  Sectors with the highest pricing power are: Communications Services, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Energy and Materials.  They are the best inflation hedges. Chart 6ACompanies' Profitability Is Improving To Pre-Pandemic Levels Companies' Profitability Is Improving To Pre-Pandemic Levels Companies' Profitability Is Improving To Pre-Pandemic Levels Uses Of Cash Cash to be disbursed to shareholders: Share buybacks and other shareholder-friendly activities are on the rise again and are expected to gain steam this year and next.  This is supported both by strong earnings growth, healthy balance sheets, and regulatory headwinds to any potential M&A activity due to the anti-trust stance of the current administration Capex is about to make a comeback: Capex is still lagging across most sectors.  A pickup in capex will signal that the post-pandemic recovery is firmly on track, and companies are comfortable investing in future growth.  However, there are early signs that that is about to change.  Philly Fed survey shows that over 40% of respondents are planning to increase their capex expenditure  (Chart 6B). Chart 6BCapex Increases Are On The Way Capex Increases Are On The Way Capex Increases Are On The Way Investment Implications Overweight sectors and industry groups exposed to consumer services spending (airlines, hotels, leisure) and be selective about consumer goods and retailing industry groups: Real PCE for goods has turned down toward the trend line.  Exceptions are areas of the market with well-publicized shortages such as Autos and Parts. Overweight Industrials – US manufacturing has limited capacity, onshoring is a new trend, inventories need to be replenished, and capex intentions are on the rise. Overweight Health Care – growth slowdown favors this defensive sector, which also benefits from a backlog of demand for medical procedures and services. Reflation trade is out of the picture, now that inflation fears have abated and the Delta variant preoccupies investors.  For that, we still favor Growth over Value.  Yet, we watch this allocation closely, to time rotation once Covid-19 fears dissipate, rates pick up and inflation surprises on the upside. With valuations high, and forward returns expectations lackluster, we favor sectors likely to delivery healthy cash yield: Financials, Health Care, Energy, and Technology.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   S&P 500 Chart 7Macroeconomic Backdrop And Earnings Surprise Macroeconomic Backdrop And Earnings Surprise Macroeconomic Backdrop And Earnings Surprise Chart 8Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 9Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 10Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart 11Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 12Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 13Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 14Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart 15Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 16Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 17Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 18Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart 19Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 20Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 21Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 22Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Energy Chart 23Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 24Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 25Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 26Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Financials Chart 27Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 28Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 29Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 30Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart 31Health Care: Sector vs Industry Groups Health Care: Sector vs Industry Groups Health Care: Sector vs Industry Groups Chart 32Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 33Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 34Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart 35Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 36Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 37Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 38Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart 39Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 40Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 41Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 42Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Materials Chart 43Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 44Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 45Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 46Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart 47Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 48Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 49Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 50Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart 51Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 52Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 53Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 54Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash  Table 1Performance US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Table 2Valuations And Forward Earnings Growth US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Recommended Allocation   Footnotes  

Highlights The ECB has changed its inflation target, but its credibility remains weak. Inflation will not allow the ECB to tighten policy anytime soon. Instead, the ECB will have to add to its asset purchase program next year and may even consider dual interest rates. EUR/USD should continue to appreciate because of the weakness in the USD, but EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK will soften. The SNB will follow the ECB; buy Swiss stocks / sell Eurozone defensives as an uncorrelated trade. China matters more than COVID-19 for the cyclical/defensive ratio. Despite our pro-cyclical medium- to long-term portfolio bias, the reflation trade is pausing. Remain tactically long telecom / short consumer discretionary as a hedge. European momentum stocks are near critical levels relative to growth equities. Feature The European Central Bank has found a new way to shed its Bundesbank heritage further and to justify the continuation of its QE program well after other central banks around the world will have ended their asset purchases. The early results of the Strategy Review and the subsequent comments by President Christine Lagarde will make it near impossible for the ECB to taper its asset purchases anytime soon. Practically, this means that the European yield curve will steepen relative to that of the US. Additionally, this policy should not hurt EUR/USD, but it will hurt EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK. In the equity space, Swiss stocks will outperform European defensive equities, creating an opportunity for an uncorrelated trade. A New Tougher Target The ECB has abandoned its long-standing target of “close but below” 2% inflation. Even more importantly, the ECB followed the Bank of Japan and the Fed in adopting an approach whereby both downside and upside deviations from the 2% inflation target are to be fought. The ECB’s credibility was already hurt by its inability to achieve its more modest previous inflation target. Since 2009, the Euro Area HICP only averaged 1.2% (Chart 1). To prevent losing further credibility under its new mandate, the ECB will have to increase its stockpile of assets. Moreover, the ECB is far from achieving its new mandate, which will add to the ECB’s need to expand stimulus to the system even once the impact of owner-equivalent rent is included in CPI. Chart 1Mission Impossible Mission Impossible Mission Impossible Chart 2Narrow Inflationary Pressures Narrow Inflationary Pressures Narrow Inflationary Pressures Today, the ECB’s measure of core inflation stands at 1%, while headline inflation is 1.9%. As the economy re-opens, a surge in inflation is likely, but this spike will be transitory, even more so than in the US. As we recently showed, our estimate of the Eurozone trimmed-mean CPI has plunged close to 0%, which highlights that inflation pressures remain narrow (Chart 2). The labor market is another hurdle that will prevent Eurozone inflation from durably reaching 2% anytime soon. Currently, the total hours worked in the Euro Area remains well below the equilibrium level implied by the working-age population (Chart 3), which historically constrains wages. Moreover, it generally takes many quarters after labor shortages become prevalent before inflation begins to inch higher (Chart 4). Chart 3No Wage Pressure Yet No Wage Pressure Yet No Wage Pressure Yet Chart 4No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While The euro is the last force that caps European inflation. Despite the recent depreciation in EUR/USD, the trade-weighted euro remains near all-time highs, which historically imparts strong deflationary pressures to the economy (Chart 5). Beyond the time it will take for realized inflation to reach the ECB’s new target, inflation expectations are still inconsistent with 2% inflation. As the top panel of Chart 6illustrates, market-based inflation expectations in the Eurozone remain well below both 2% and the levels that prevailed before the Great Financial Crisis, even though rising commodity prices are lifting global inflation expectations. Market participants are not alone in doubting the ECB; professional forecasters do not see inflation at 2% in the near-term or the long-term (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5The Euro Is Deflationary The Euro Is Deflationary The Euro Is Deflationary Chart 6The ECB Lacks Credibility The ECB Lacks Credibility The ECB Lacks Credibility   In addition to the continued inability of the ECB to achieve its previous inflation target, let alone its present one, sovereign risk still hamstrings the central bank. The Italian economy remains fragile, because little structural reform has taken place. The Spanish economy cannot stand on its own two feet while the tourism industry continues to suffer due to COVID-19 related fears. And the exploding debt load of the French economy as well as its structural current account deficit raise the possibility that OATs will become unmoored. The ECB will ensure that spreads in those nations do not widen, or Eurozone inflation will never reach the new 2% target. Bottom Line: When it was time to achieve near—but below—2% inflation, the credibility of the ECB was already limited. The new target will be even harder to reach, but the symmetry around it gives the ECB more leeway to provide additional support to the Eurozone economy. Market Implications The ECB is now bound to maintain policy accommodation beyond the scheduled end of the PEPP program in March 2022, or the new policy target will be even less credible than the previous one. BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy team expects the ECB to maintain its asset purchase program beyond the stated end of the PEPP. Practically, this means that the ECB will fold the program into the pre-pandemic APP. The ECB cannot tighten policy while it remains so far from its target, especially now that missing the goalpost to the downside is as problematic as missing it to the upside. We expect the ECB to hint at this on Thursday. Chart 7The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The ECB will also not increase interest rates for the foreseeable future, which the EONIA curve already anticipates (Chart 7). Money markets only expect a first hike in late 2024, which is appropriate. Compared to a month ago, overnight rates 10-year forward fell by more than 10bps, from 0.75% to 0.61%. We are inclined to fade this move. More stimulus raises the outlook for long-term policy rates. Amid the correction in global bond yields, betting against the decline in the long-term EONIA rate is akin to catching a falling knife; however, because the ECB is easing relative to the Fed, a box trade of buying European steepeners at the same time as US flatteners remains appropriate. The ECB could also lower the rate on TLTRO operations, resulting in a dual interest rate regime in the Eurozone. As Megan Greene and Eric Lonergan have argued, this policy would provide a further lift to the Euro Area economy by boosting the attractiveness of borrowing; at the same time, it would limit the deleterious impact of ever-more negative deposit rates on the profitability of the banking sector, because banks would borrow at extremely negative rates to finance lending activities.  Chart 8JPY And YCC JPY And YCC JPY And YCC The effect of the policy on the euro is more complex. When Japan announced its Yield Curve Control strategy in September 2016, it defined price stability as achieving a 2% inflation rate over the span of the business cycle. In other words, the BoJ implemented a backdoor average inflation mandate. Following this announcement, USD/JPY strengthened (Chart 8), but this move reflected the dollar rally and the global bond selloff around the US election, not yen-specific factors. This suggests that the euro will continue to track the USD inversely. BCA’s FX Strategy team remains bearish on the greenback, as a result of the growing US current account deficit and the fact that the Fed continues to target an overshoot in inflation, which suggests that, even if US nominal interest rates rise, real rates will lag behind. The EUR is nonetheless set to underperform compared to other European currencies. In the UK, house price gains are accelerating, the jobless count is declining rapidly as the economy re-opens, and the cheapness of the pound is accentuating positive inflation surprises. This combination suggests that the BoE is likely to follow the path of the Bank of Canada or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, by beginning to tighten policy by early next year. Norway also faces a similar set of circumstances and has already announced it will lift interest rates this year. As we argued two months ago, the Riksbank is likely to follow its western neighbor, because the Swedish housing market is roaring, and the economy will remain well supported by the upcoming global capex boom. Hence, EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK will depreciate.  The Swiss National Bank should be the outlier that will follow the ECB. Swiss headline and core inflation linger at 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. Wage growth is a meager 0.5%, because the Swiss output gap remains a massive 5.5% of GDP (Chart 9, top panel). Meanwhile, consumer confidence and retail sales are much weaker than those of Sweden, Norway, or the UK. Finally, Swiss private debt stands at 270% of GDP, which means that this economy still risks falling into a Fisherian debt-deflation trap. As a result, the SNB will continue to try to cap the upside in the CHF vis-à-vis the EUR, because the currency remains the main determinant of Swiss monetary conditions. Moreover, according to the central bank, the Swiss franc is still 10% overvalued relative to the euro, which is weighing on the country’s competitiveness (Chart 9, bottom panel). To fight the recent depreciation of EUR/CHF, the SNB will not raise rates for a long time and will intervene further in the FX market. The liquidity injections should prompt additional increases in the SNB’s domestic sight deposits, which since 2015 have resulted in a rise of Swiss bond yields relative to those of Germany (Chart 10). While counterintuitive, this relationship reflects the reflationary impact of the SNB’s asset purchases. It also means that the Swiss real estate market is set to become ever bubblier. Chart 9The SNB Will Follow The ECB The SNB Will Follow The ECB The SNB Will Follow The ECB Chart 10Swiss/German Spreads To Widen Swiss/German Spreads To Widen Swiss/German Spreads To Widen For Swiss shares, the picture is more complex. Swiss equities are extremely defensive, but, while they underperform Euro Area stocks when global yields rise, widening Swiss / German spreads often provide a lift to the SMI. A simple model, assuming US 10-year Treasury yields rise to 2.25% by the end of 2022 (BCA’s US Bond Strategy forecast) and that Swiss/German spreads widen to 20bps as the SNB domestic sight deposits swell, suggests that Swiss stocks will underperform that of the Euro Area over the coming 18 months (Chart 11). However, if we compare Swiss equities to European defensive sectors, then the widening in Swiss/German spreads should prompt an outperformance of Swiss equities, because their multiples benefit from ample liquidity conditions in Switzerland (Chart 12). Chart 11Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Chart 12...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives ...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives ...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives Bottom Line: The results of the ECB Strategy Review will force this central bank to remain a laggard and continue to expand its balance sheet well after the expected end of the PEPP program. Eurozone interest rates will also fall behind that of other major economies. The ECB may even consider cutting the interest rate on TLTROs to boost lending. These policies will have a minimal impact on EUR/USD, which will continue to be dominated by the dollar’s fluctuations. However, EUR/GBP, EUR/SEK, and EUR/NOK will suffer. Finally, the SNB will follow the ECB and expand its balance sheet further, which will paradoxically lift Swiss/German spreads. As a result of their defensive nature, Swiss stocks will underperform Euro Area ones over the next 18 months, but they will outperform European defensive equities. Go long Swiss equities relative to European defensives, as a trade uncorrelated to the broad market. Follow China, Not Delta Chart 13 The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove In recent days, doubts have grown about the European re-opening trade because of the resurgence of COVID-19 cases. The Delta variant (or any subsequent mutation for that matter) will cause hiccups along the way, but, ultimately, the re-opening will continue to proceed. As a result of the growing rate of vaccination, hospitalizations and deaths remain stable even if new cases are climbing rapidly in many countries (Chart 13). As long as the burden on the healthcare system remains limited, governments will find it difficult to justify further large-scale lockdowns. Instead, measures such as Macron’s Pass Sanitaire will provide increasing, widespread incentives for greater vaccination. Despite this sanguine take on the Delta variant, we remain concerned for the near-term outlook for cyclical equities because of the Chinese economy, even after the recent 50bps cut in the Reserve Requirement Ratio. BCA’s China Investment Strategy service believes that the RRR cut does not signal the beginning of a policy easing cycle.  More evidence would be needed, such as additional RRR cuts, rising excess reserves, or supportive policies for the infrastructure and real estate sectors. For now, we heed the message from PBoC official Sun Guofeng that “the RRR cut is a standard liquidity operation.” Chart 14Fade The RRR Cut Fade The RRR Cut Fade The RRR Cut The dominant force for the Chinese economy remains the previous deterioration in the credit impulse, which suggests that Q3 and Q4 growth will decelerate materially (Chart 14, top panel). Moreover, the softening impulse is consistent with weaker global economic activity, as approximated by our Global Nowcast (Chart 14, middle panel), especially since the lingering effect of the past RRR increases is still consistent with a global deceleration (Chart 14, bottom panel). In this context, we continue to hedge our long-term preference for cyclical stocks because of the near-term risks created by China and the excessively rapid move in the cyclical-to-defensives ratio (Chart 15). In response to this pause in the reflation trade, we continue to favor a long telecom/short consumer discretionary tactical position, which is supported by valuations and RoE differentials, as well as the still extended relative momentum (Chart 16). The period of risk to the global reflation trade should also allow the dollar to remain firm in the near-term, which means that for the coming months, the euro will not go beyond its trading range in place since the beginning of the year. Chart 15Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Chart 16Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Bottom Line: China’s RRR cut is not yet enough to bet against the temporary pause in the global reflation trade. Thus, investors should continue to hedge pro-cyclical long-term bets in their portfolios via a long telecom / short consumer discretionary position. An Exciting Chart A chart caught our eye this week: The underperformance of Eurozone momentum stocks relative to growth stocks is massively overdone (Chart 17). For now, we only want to highlight the phenomenon, but, in the coming weeks, we will delve deeper into the topic to gauge if these oversold conditions constitute an attractive opportunity. Chart 17Washed Out Moment Washed Out Moment Washed Out Moment   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Currency Performance The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Corporate Bonds The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Equity Performance Major Stock Indices The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Geographic Performance The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Sector Performance The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove

Highlights Tactically downgrade cyclical equities from overweight in Europe. The shift in global growth drivers, the beginning of the global liquidity withdrawal, and lingering COVID worries create headwinds for the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio this summer. Weaker global inflation expectations, commodity prices, and a dollar rebound will accompany this period of turbulence. The relative technical and valuation backdrop will also contribute to this period. Short consumer discretionary / long telecommunication is a high-octane version of the trade. Short technology / long healthcare is its lower-risk / lower-reward cousin. This temporary portfolio shift is a risk management move to capitalize on our positive 18- to 24- month view on cyclicals. Feature Last week, we recommended investors adopt a more defensive tactical posture.  They should raise cash and shift into defensive quality names in order to weather a summer replete with potential downside risk. This will place investors in a good position to shift back into a more aggressive stance this fall, when cyclical sectors should resume their outperformance. This week, we explore this idea in more detail. The combination of a Chinese credit slowdown, a potential transition in the driver of growth away from goods into services, and a shift in tone from global central banks will feed the expected market volatility this summer. European defensive stocks are set to outperform during this period. Buying telecommunication equities / selling consumer discretionary stocks is a high octane bet on this trend, while going long healthcare / short technology shares is its low-risk incarnation. Summer Storms This summer, three forces will feed some downside risk in the market and, more specifically, an underperformance of cyclical sectors relative to defensive ones: a transition in global growth, preliminary signs that global central banks will begin to take away the punch bowl, and disappointments caused by COVID variants. Growth Transition The global economy is set to cool down as we transition away from the first stage of the post-pandemic recovery. As we showed last week, China’s deteriorating credit impulse is consistent with global industrial activity receding from its extremely robust pace of expansion (Chart 1). The continued decline in China’s banking system excess reserve ratio suggests that total social financing flows will slow further. Consequently, China’s intake of raw materials and industrial goods will decelerate, which will impact global industrial activity negatively. Already, the New Orders component of China’s Manufacturing PMI has rolled over. The disappointment of Chinese retail sales last week further indicates that China will act as a drag on global growth in the coming quarters. We have also highlighted that the combined effect of higher yields and oil prices has become strong enough to alter negatively the path of global industrial activity going forward. Our Global Growth Tax indicator, which includes both variables, shows that the US ISM Manufacturing survey and the global manufacturing PMI have reached their apex and will moderate this summer (Chart 2). Chart 1The China Drag The China Drag The China Drag Chart 2Rising Costs Bite Rising Costs Bite Rising Costs Bite The problem for global growth is one of changing leadership. Global economic activity is not about to collapse, but the extraordinary surge in goods consumption that started in 2020 will make room for a catch-up in the service sector. As an example, US retail sales stand 15% above their pre-pandemic trends; however, services spending still lies 7% below its pre-pandemic tendency (Chart 3). Thus, as summer progresses, the recent deceleration in consumer spending on goods will continue and services will progressively pick up the slack. The change in growth leadership will cause some temporary trepidation in global economic activity, because it is happening when the effect of both the Chinese credit slowdown and the previous increase in yields and oil will be most potent. As a result, we expect the G-10 Economic Surprises Index to follow that of China and experience an air pocket this summer (Chart 4). Chart 3From Goods To Services From Goods To Services From Goods To Services Chart 4Where China Goes, So Will The G-10 Where China Goes, So Will The G-10 Where China Goes, So Will The G-10   The Chaperone Is On The Way More than 65 years ago, former Fed Chair William McChesney Martin noted that the job of central bankers was to be “the chaperone who has ordered the punch bowl removed just as the party was really warming up.” Chart 5The Chaperone Is Waking Up The Chaperone Is Waking Up The Chaperone Is Waking Up Today, the party is a rager, and central bankers are indicating that they will remove the punch bowl soon. Real estate speculation is worrying the Bank of Canada, and its balance sheet has already shrunk by C$99 billion, to C$476 billion. The Norges Bank has indicted that it will lift interest rates twice this year. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is set to lift the Official Cash Rate soon. The Bank of England has begun to adjust its asset purchases and could begin a full-fledge tapering this year. The 800-pound gorilla is the Fed, which telegraphed more clearly last week its intention to raise rates twice in 2023, and therefore moved closer to the pricing of the OIS curve (Chart 5). Implied in this forecast, the Fed will start tapering its asset purchase in early 2022 at the latest. This change in tone by global central banks is not a major problem for the business cycle – global rates are still far below any reasonable estimates of the neutral rate of interest, but periods of transition in monetary policy are often associated with transitory market turbulences. This time will not be an exception, especially because it is happening when global growth is downshifting. Delta, Gamma, Epsilon, etc? Chart 6Depressed Macro Volatility Depressed Macro Volatility Depressed Macro Volatility With the rapid progress of vaccination, the worst of the COVID tragedy is behind us. Nonetheless, the pandemic is not yet fully in the rear-view mirror, not even in the Western nations that lead the global inoculation campaign. SARS-CoV-2 continues to evolve and will therefore produce new variants over time, some of which will be problematic. The UK illustrates this phenomenon. The government has postponed the so-called Freedom Day, when life returns to normal, by five weeks despite the country’s high vaccination rate. The Delta variant is significantly increasing among the unvaccinated and not fully inoculated Britons. Many countries will also face this problem. These delays will be minor and will not threaten national recoveries. However, they will feed market tensions in a context where global macro volatility is low (Chart 6), global growth is already peaking, and monetary accommodation is receding. Global Market Implications… The confluence of the change in global economic growth leadership, the upcoming liquidity removal, and the potential for short-lived delays to the global economic re-opening point toward a decline in global inflation expectations, a rebound in the US dollar, weaker commodity prices, and an underperformance of global cyclical relative to defensive equities. Over the coming months, inflation breakeven rates are likely to soften, while real yields will rise modestly. In May, US inflation breakeven rates peaked near 2.6%, their highest level in ten years. A weaker global growth impulse in combination with a Fed that is more willing to remove some monetary accommodation will cool inflationary fears among investors and cause inflation expectations to decline further. However, the specter of tighter policy will also support TIPS yields. Bond yields are likely to correct somewhat more over the summer. Bond prices have not yet fully purged their oversold conditions (Chart 7); thus, a decrease in inflation expectations will temporarily support Treasury prices, even if real yields do not fall. Recent market action is moving in this direction. Last week, by Thursday evening, 10-year Treasury yields had already lost their 9 bps rise that followed Wednesday’s FOMC meeting. 30-year Treasury yields have plunged to a four-month low. Bund yields are unable to hang on to their gains either. The dollar has more upside this summer. Higher real US yields offer a potent backing for a DXY that still refuses to drop below 89. Moreover, the greenback is a highly counter-cyclical currency and is particularly sensitive to the gyrations in the global industrial cycle. Thus, the deceleration in the global manufacturing cycle will create a temporary tailwind for the greenback. Over the past three years, the gap between US TIPS yields and the Chinese Economic Surprise index explained the fluctuation of the DXY; it currently points toward a continued rebound in the USD (Chart 8). Even if this move is ephemeral, it will have implications for investors this summer. Chart 7Technical Backdrop For Bonds Technical Backdrop For Bonds Technical Backdrop For Bonds Chart 8Near-Term Upside For The DXY Near-Term Upside For The DXY Near-Term Upside For The DXY Commodities will also suffer. Natural resource prices have rallied in a parabolic fashion and our Composite Technical Indicator is massively overbought (Chart 9). Meanwhile, Chinese authorities are verbally jawboning industrial metal prices and have begun to release copper, zinc, aluminum, and nickel from their stockpiles. In this context, the Chinese credit slowdown and the imminent removal of monetary accommodation in various corners of the globe will catalyze a correction in commodities, even if a new supercycle has begun. The recent travails of lumber prices, which have collapsed 47% since May 7 (while they still remain in technical bull market!), may constitute a canary in the coalmine for the wider commodity complex. Global cyclical equities have greater downside against their defensive counterparts. US markets are global trendsetters; while the S&P cyclicals have lost some altitude compared to defensives, they have yet to purge their oversold state and remain very expensive (Chart 10). This backdrop makes them vulnerable to slowing Chinese import growth, a stronger dollar, and weaker commodity prices. Chart 9Will The GSCI Follow Lumber? Will The GSCI Follow Lumber? Will The GSCI Follow Lumber? Chart 10Vulnerable Global Cyclicals Vulnerable Global Cyclicals Vulnerable Global Cyclicals   … And European Investment Implications Chart 11European Cyclicals Are Also At Risk European Cyclicals Are Also At Risk European Cyclicals Are Also At Risk The European cyclicals-to-defensives ratio is vulnerable, like it is in the US. Hence, a more defensive portfolio bias makes sense for the summer, which should allow investors to regain maximum cyclical exposure later this year. Short consumer discretionary / long telecommunications and short technology / long healthcare are pair trades with particularly attractive risk profiles. The cyclicals-to-defensives ratio is technically unattractive. The relative share prices stand toward the top of their 16-year trading range (Chart 11). Moreover, their 52-week momentum measure is rolling over at a highly elevated level, while the 13-week rate of change is deteriorating. Meanwhile, the Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator1 (CMVI) of the cyclicals towers far above that of the defensives and is consistent with a corrective episode (Chart 11, bottom panel). The drivers of the performance of Eurozone cyclical relative to defensive sectors confirm that cyclicals could suffer a turbulent summer. For instance: The potential for further declines in global yields does not bode well for the European cyclicals-to-defensives ratio (Chart 12). Weaknesses in market-based inflation expectations would prove particularly threatening (Chart 12, bottom panel). The deceleration in China’s total social financing flows anticipates an underperformance of European cyclicals (Chart 13). As China’s credit decelerates, so will the earnings revisions of cyclical equities. Moreover, a weaker Chinese TSF is consistent with falling Treasury yields. Chart 12Lower Inflation Expectations Equals Underperforming Cyclicals Lower Inflation Expectations Equals Underperforming Cyclicals Lower Inflation Expectations Equals Underperforming Cyclicals Chart 13Cyclicals Listen To China Cyclicals Listen To China Cyclicals Listen To China The potential for weaker commodity prices is another problem for European cyclical equities (Chart 14). Commodities capture the ebb and flow of global growth sentiment, which is also a driver of the earnings revisions of cyclicals relative to defensives. Moreover, commodity prices greatly affect the earnings of cyclical equities. Unsurprisingly, the momentum of the European cyclicals-to-defensives ratio correlates closely with the BCA Commodity Composite Technical Indicator (Chart 14, bottom panel). Cyclicals perform poorly when the dollar appreciates. The Eurozone’s cyclicals-to-defensives ratio moves in lock-step with the euro and high-beta cyclical currencies (Chart 15). These relationships reflect the counter-cyclicality of the dollar, as well as the negative effect on global financial conditions of its rallies, and thus, on the earnings outlook for cyclicals. Chart 14Beware The Impact Of Weaker Commodities Beware The Impact Of Weaker Commodities Beware The Impact Of Weaker Commodities Chart 15A Strong Dollar Hurts European Cyclicals A Strong Dollar Hurts European Cyclicals A Strong Dollar Hurts European Cyclicals Chart 16Short Consumer Discretionary And Long Telecommunication Short Consumer Discretionary And Long Telecommunication Short Consumer Discretionary And Long Telecommunication Based on these observations, we are tactically downgrading cyclicals from our overweight stance for the summer, despite our conviction that cyclicals have upside on an 18- to 24-month basis. We look at this move as risk management. For investors looking to bet on a potential underperformance of cyclical equities in Europe, we recommend two positions: a high-octane pair trade and a lower-risk one. The high-octane version is to sell consumer discretionary stocks and buy telecommunications ones (Chart 16). This pair trade is exposed to lower yields, lower inflation expectations, and the shift in growth drivers from China and goods consumption to services expenditures. Additionally, the relative 52-week momentum measure is overextended, while the 13-week rate of change is already sagging. The CMVI of the consumer discretionary sector is extremely elevated, while that of telecommunication stocks is the most depressed of any Eurozone sector. Consequently, the gap between the two sectors’ CMVI stands at nearly three-sigma, which is concerning because the RoE of consumer discretionary shares lies 7% below that of the telecoms industry (Chart 16, third and fourth panel). Because higher RoEs should justify higher valuations, consumer discretionary and telecommunication stand out as the greatest outliers among European sectors (Chart 17). As an added benefit, this trade enjoys a positive dividend carry of more than 2.5%. Chart 17Spot The Outliers Summertime Blues Summertime Blues Chart 18Short Technology And Long Healthcare Short Technology And Long Healthcare Short Technology And Long Healthcare The low octane pair trade is to sell technology stocks and buy healthcare names instead. This position offers lower expected returns but also a lower risk, because both sectors are growth stocks and they will benefit from falling yields and inflation expectations. However, based on their respective CMVI, tech equities are much more expensive than healthcare ones (Chart 18), while they are also extremely overbought. Thus, healthcare should benefit more from falling yields and inflation expectations than tech. Moreover, technology is a more cyclical sector than healthcare; it will therefore be more sensitive to the evolution of global growth. Bottom Line: We remain positive on the outlook for cyclical equities on an 18- to 24-month horizon, but the changing global growth leadership, the imminent removal of global monetary accommodation, and the demanding valuation and technical backdrop of the European cyclicals-to-defensives ratio suggest that a period of turbulence will materialize this summer. Thus, we are tactically downgrading cyclicals. Investors should consider going long telecommunications / short consumer discretionary as a high-octane tactical bet on this portfolio stance. Buying healthcare / selling technology would constitute a lower risk / lower return play. Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For a detailed explanation of the Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator, see Special Report, “Valuation – A Mechanical Approach,” dated May 31, 2021. Currency Performance Summertime Blues Summertime Blues Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Summertime Blues Summertime Blues Corporate Bonds Summertime Blues Summertime Blues Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Summertime Blues Summertime Blues Geographic Performance Summertime Blues Summertime Blues Sector Performance Summertime Blues Summertime Blues

While the Fed’s dots dovishly surprised, the FOMC’s output and inflation projections were on the hawkish side. Adding the committee’s core PCE price inflation estimate for 2021 to their real GDP forecast results in a roughly 9% nominal GDP estimate, assuming the PCE and GDP deflators approximate one another. The last time the US economy hit such a high mark on a q/q annualized basis (ex-2020) was in late-2003 (Chart 1). Back then the Bush tax cuts were signed into law in late May 2003 turbocharging the economy. Chart 2 shows that the fed funds rate was pegged at 1% and the bond market was in selloff mode, with both the 10-year US Treasury yields surging violently and inflation breakevens galloping higher. While the S&P eventually shrugged off the bond market’s new equilibrium yield, drilling beneath the surface is revealing. Chart 1 Shades Of 2003/4? Shades Of 2003/4? Chart 2 Shades Of 2003/4? Shades Of 2003/4? As a reminder, back then the Fed was actually sowing the seeds of the housing bubble by keeping rates at 1%, which resulted in an economy running on steroids. Deep cyclical sectors outperformed the SPX and defensives significantly lagged the broad market especially as the economic data caught on fire in 2004 (see Appendix Charts A1, A2, A3, ). Financials were range bound and relative tech performance slumped in 2004 (for inclusion purposes Charts A4-A9 in the Appendix also show GICS2 sector relative performance). Bottom Line: Using the 2003/4 parallel as a guidepost we remain comfortable with our current positioning of preferring industrials and energy to consumer staples and communication services. Appendix Chart A1 Appendix Appendix Chart A2 Appendix Appendix Chart A3 Appendix Appendix Chart A4 Appendix Appendix Chart A5 Appendix Appendix Chart A6 Appendix Appendix Chart A7 Appendix Appendix Chart A8 Appendix Appendix Chart A9 Appendix Appendix  

Dear client, Next week instead of our regular Strategy Report we will be sending you a Special Report from BCA’s Equity Analyzer service on Inflation and Factor investing penned by my colleague Lucas Laskey, Senior Quantitative Analyst. Finally, on February 22 we will be hosting our quarterly webcast one at 10am EST for North American and EMEA clients and one at 8pm EST for Asia Pacific, Australian and New Zealand clients “From Alpha To Omega With Anastasios”. Mathieu Savary, who heads our Daily Insights service, will be our special guest in the morning webcast. On March 1 we will resume our regular publication schedule. Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights Portfolio Strategy China’s engineered economic deceleration, the knee jerk US dollar bounce along with signs of soft US capital expenditures entice us to protect our deep cyclicals versus defensives portfolio gains and institute a 2.5% rolling stop to this share price ratio. Rising relative capital outlays, firming software pricing power and an M&A frenzy more than offset the negative relative profit signal from our models that sell side analysts already anticipate. Continue to overweight the S&P software index.  Recent Changes Last Tuesday we closed out our VIX futures hedge for a gain of 19% since the December 7, 2020 inception. Last Wednesday we re-initiated our long “Back-To-Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” pair trade. Feature Equity volatility settled down last week following a ferocious ten-day SPX oscillation that sent the VIX soaring to roughly 38 near the peak at the end of January, courtesy of the GME/Wallstreetbets (WSB) saga before collapsing back down near 21 last week. Chart 1 shows that this was likely an equity-only event: both risk off currencies – the yen and the franc – actually fell versus the USD, junk bond spreads barely budged and the vol curve violently inverted, a move that more often than not signals that complacency has morphed into panic. Importantly, when the Fed embarks on active QE the SPX drawdown maxes out at 10% based on empirical evidence, including the recent September/October 10% drawdown. Using the ES futures low hit two Sundays ago, the S&P 500 experienced a 5.3% peak-to-trough pullback well within the range of previous Fed active QE iterations. As a reminder, the 2010 and 2011, 17% and 20% respective drawdowns took root after the Fed had concluded QE1 and QE2 operations. The implication is that for a more significant drawdown to materialize, likely the Fed has to end the current QE operation and reinject some volatility in the bond markets (bottom panel, Chart 1).  Isolating the true signal from all this noise, convinced us to book handsome gains to the tune of 19% in our VIX June futures hedge (conservatively assuming that no leverage was used), reinitiate the long “Back-To-Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” pair trade and put the small cap size bias on our upgrade watch list. As volatility has slowly died down, investors can start to refocus on profit fundamentals. Similar to the steep fall in EPS that the SPX 35% drawdown predicted in March of 2020, in recent research we showed that were we to hold the SPX at current levels, its 12-month rate-of-change would surpass the 61% mark next month and forecast that profit growth would rise by a similar amount. Indeed, sell side analysts’ bottom up earnings estimates corroborate this analysis as quarterly EPS will peter out roughly at a 48% year-over-year (YOY) growth rate next quarter and vault to all-time highs in quarterly level terms in Q3 following a three-year hiatus (Chart 2). Chart 1Equity-only Event Equity-only Event Equity-only Event Chart 2Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Importantly, the tech sector no longer commands an earnings weight similar to its market cap weight likely because it’s run ahead of itself and also because the rest of the sectors are playing catch up this year as the US economy is slated to reopen on the back of the herculean inoculation efforts (profit weight and mkt cap weight columns, Table 1). Table 1Sector EPS And Market Cap Weights Re-grossing? Re-grossing? This is most evident on the sector contribution to this year's SPX earnings growth. Historically, the tech sector commanded the lion’s share of profit explanation for the SPX, but not in 2021. In fact, the S&P IT sector is ranked 4th in terms of contribution to overall SPX profits, behind industrials, financials and consumer discretionary (Chart 3).   Delving deeper into 12-month forward earnings growth figures is instructive. Table 2 shows our universe of coverage ranked first by GICS1 sector growth rates and then re-ranked per sub-group. As an aside the energy sector’s EPS is slated to contract in calendar 2020 and thus any YOY growth rate figures are rendered useless for the broad sector and the energy sub-industries. Chart 3Sector Contribution To 2021 SPX EPS Growth Re-grossing? Re-grossing? Table 2Identifying S&P 500 Sector EPS Growth Leaders And Laggards Re-grossing? Re-grossing? Our portfolio positioning is well aligned with the sector ranking of EPS growth for the coming year. Put differently, given the havoc that COVID-19 wreaked to the US industrial and service bases it is normal that deep cyclical sectors along with financials and the decimated services-heavy parts of the consumer discretionary sector to occupy the top ranks. In contrast, defensives sectors that were largely COVID-19 beneficiaries (especially health care and consumer staples) are near the bottom of the pit. The sole misalignment is the bombed out real estate sector that we remain overweight (Table 2). Netting it all out, our sense is that the market has successfully navigated a tumultuous two-week period and we reiterate our long-held sanguine 9-12 month cyclical view on the prospects of the S&P 500. This week, we update a defensive tech sub-group and put a tight stop in the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent in order to protect profits. Risks To The Cyclicals Over Defensives Portfolio Bent Last December we highlighted that China’s four year cycle will peter out in the back half of 2021 and could cause some equity market consternation, with stocks likely sniffing out any trouble likely by the end of Q1/2021. It appears that investors have been sleeping at the wheel and largely distracted by the GME/WSB saga. Not only did they neglect the robust SPX profit season, but they also ignored that something is amiss in China as we first showed last week (please refer to Chart 12 here). Importantly, what worries us most is the transition from China being the primary locomotive of global growth to the US taking the reins in coming quarters. Clearly such a handoff is tumultuous, especially given the recent added risk of a reflex rebound in the greenback that we first warned about on January 12 when we set the cyclicals/defensives ratio on downgrade alert. Subsequently, we upgraded the S&P utilities sector to neutral locking in gains of 15% for the portfolio, and today we decide to institute a 2.5% rolling stop in the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent, in order to participate on further upside but also protect 16% gains for the portfolio since the July 27, 2020 inception in case of a market relapse. Practically, when the rolling stop gets triggered we will move the cyclicals/defensives bent down to neutral via executing the downgrade alert we have in the S&P materials sector. In more detail, China’s slamming on the brakes is the key risk to cyclicals/defensives. Not only are the Chinese authorities trying to engineer a slowdown with the recent reverse repo operations, but also BCA’s China Monetary Indicator, the selloff in the Chinese sovereign bond market and the cresting in the PBOC’s balance sheet are all corroborating the economic deceleration signal (Chart 4). Chinese total social financing has peaked, the 6-month credit impulse is plunging, and the nosedive in Goldman Sachs’ Chinese current activity indicator (CAI) are all firing warning shots that the economy is slated to slowdown (Chart 5).  Chart 4Everywhere… Everywhere… Everywhere… Chart 5…One Looks… …One Looks… …One Looks… Already both the Chinese manufacturing and services PMIs have hooked down with the manufacturing new orders-to-inventories (NOI) in free fall and export orders in outright contraction. Tack on the reversal in the Citi economic surprise index (ESI) for China and the outlook dims further for US cyclicals/defensives (Chart 6). No wonder Chinese demand for loans has turned the corner, infrastructure spending has topped out and railway freight volumes have ticked down as a direct response to the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions (Chart 7). Chart 6…China… …China… …China… Chart 7…Is Slowing… …Is Slowing… …Is Slowing… Chinese imports flirting with the zero line best capture all this softening in Chinese data and also warns that the US cyclicals/defensives ratio is nearing a zenith (Chart 8). Beyond the dual risk of a counter trend rally in the USD and China’s undeniable deceleration, returning to US shores reveals another source of potential trouble for cyclicals/defensives. Chart 8…Down …Down …Down The US Citi ESI has come back down to earth, and the ISM manufacturing PMI cooled off last month with the NOI ratio flashing red (Chart 9). Importantly, Goldman Sachs’ US CAI is sinking like a stone corroborating that, at the margin, US economic data is softening (Chart 10). Moreover, US capex is in the doldrums courtesy of the collapse in EPS last year that dealt a blow to CEO confidence. Worrisomely, the rollover in the latest capex intentions from regional Fed surveys along with the downbeat NFIB survey’s capital outlays in 6-months component underscore that CEOs remain reluctant to invest (Chart 9). Chart 9Even US Trouble… Even US Trouble… Even US Trouble… Finally, relative valuations have surged to all-time highs leaving no cushion in case of a mishap, while relative technicals are in extreme overbought territory near a level that has marked the commencement of prior relative share price drawdowns (Chart 11). Chart 10…Is Brewing …Is Brewing …Is Brewing Netting it all out, China’s engineered economic deceleration, the knee jerk US dollar bounce along with signs of soft US capital expenditures entice us to protect our deep cyclicals versus defensives portfolio gains and institute a 2.5% rolling stop to this share price ratio. Bottom Line: Prepare to move the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent back down to neutral from currently overweight. Today we recommend investors establish a 2.5% rolling stop to the cyclicals/defensives relative share price ratio as a risk management tool in order to protect profits. Chart 11Overstretched And Pricey Overstretched And Pricey Overstretched And Pricey Software On The Ascend While we remain on the sidelines with regard to the broad S&P technology sector we continue to recommend a barbell portfolio approach preferring defensive software and services stocks to aggressive hardware and equipment equities. In that light, we reiterate our overweight stance in the key S&P software sub-industry that still commands the highest market cap weight in the tech sector just shy of 33%. While overall capex is sluggish as we highlighted above, software capital outlays have recovered smartly and according to national accounts are growing at a 10%/annum pace. Stock market-reported capex confirms that software capital expenditures are on an absolute tear and remain a key pillar of our secular preference for this defensive tech group (Chart 12). On the sales front, COVID-19 accelerated the push to the cloud and 2020 has been a bumper year for industry sales. True there is an element of stealing revenues from the future, but as long-time readers of our publication know we do not believe that SaaS is a fad and the adoption of cloud services remains in the early innings. Impressively, while relative forward top line growth expectations have rolled over, the attempt of the software price deflator to exit deflation suggests that software stocks will easily surpass this lowered revenue bar in coming quarters (Chart 13). Chart 12Primary Capex Beneficiary Primary Capex Beneficiary Primary Capex Beneficiary Amidst the IPO frenzy that has captured investors’ imagination especially given the spectacular increases in both SNOW and PLTR (neither of which is in the SPX yet), software M&A fever remains as high as ever. This constant reduction of software stock supply, coupled with the insatiable appetite of software executives to aggressively retire equity, signals that software equity prices will remain well bid (Chart 14). Chart 13Software Tries To Exit Deflation Software Tries To Exit Deflation Software Tries To Exit Deflation Chart 14Positive Share Price Dynamics Positive Share Price Dynamics Positive Share Price Dynamics Nevertheless, our relative EPS growth models are waving a yellow flag. The SPX is slated to grow profits north of 25% this year, but according to our profit models software will only manage to grow in the single digits, thus trailing the broad market by a wide margin. Encouragingly, this grim relative profit growth backdrop is already reflected in depressed sell side analysts’ forecasts (Chart 15). Finally, while relative valuations are still lofty they recently have corrected back to one standard deviation above the historical mean. Similarly, relative technicals have worked off overbought conditions and have settled down near the recent historical average (Chart 16). Chart 15Risks… Risks… Risks… In sum, rising relative capital outlays, firming software pricing power and an M&A frenzy more than offset the negative relative profit signal from our models that sell side analysts already anticipate. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the S&P software index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT – MSFT, ADBE, CRM, ORCL, INTU, NOW, ADSK, ANSS, SNPS, CDNS, FTNT, PAYC, CTXS, NLOK, TYL. Chart 16…To Monitor …To Monitor …To Monitor   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Overdose? Overdose? Size And Style Views January 12, 2021  Stay neutral small over large caps July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives (2.5% rolling stop) June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, ABNB, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Buy The Breakout In Movies & Entertainment Buy The Breakout In Movies & Entertainment Overweight The S&P movies & entertainment index has been on a tear recently likely due to receding fiscal uncertainty and the normalization process in the economy (third panel). This niche communication services sub-industry is dominated by the two key players DIS and NFLX, and while they are fierce competitors, our view remains that there is plenty demand for the pair of them to remain successful. We first showed the relative P/E/G ratio for this index in mid-December, and highlighted how the ratio was below the historical mean and offered compelling value. True, today it has spiked, but it is nowhere near previous extreme readings (bottom panel). Keep in mind that analysts still remain relatively neutral to slightly pessimistic on the industry’s growth prospects and earnings power (second panel). The fact that relative net earnings revisions are negative, underscores that investors should buy the breakout in relative share prices. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P movies & entertainment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MOVI – DIS, NFLX, LYV. ​​​​​​​

Many investors feel that the Phillips Curve has failed to predict weak inflation over the past decade. But this perception is due to a singular focus on the economic slack component of the modern-day version of the curve to the exclusion of inflation expectations, and a failure to fully consider the lasting impact of sustained periods of a negative output gap on those expectations. In addition, many investors tend to downplay the long-term balance sheet impact of two episodes of excesses and savings/capital misallocations on the relationship between the stance of monetary policy and the output gap, via a persistently negative shock to aggregate demand and a reduced sensitivity of economic activity to interest rates. The COVID-19 pandemic was certainly a major economic shock. But for now, it seems like this was a sharp income statement recession, not a balance-sheet recession. This fact, along with lower odds of negative supply-side shocks and several structural factors, suggest that inflation will be higher over the next ten years than it has over the past decade. Investors looking to protect against potentially higher inflation should look primarily to commodities, cyclical stocks, and US farmland. Gold is likely to remain well supported over the coming few years, but rich valuation suggests the long-term outlook for the yellow metal is poor. A hybrid TIPS/currency portfolio has historically been strongly correlated with the price of gold, and may provide investors with long-term protection against inflation – at a better price. Introduction Chart II-1A Surge In Long-Dated Inflation Expectations A Surge In Long-Dated Inflation Expectations A Surge In Long-Dated Inflation Expectations The pandemic, and the corresponding fiscal and monetary response is challenging the low-inflation outlook of many market participants. Chart II-1 highlights that long-dated market-based inflation expectations have surged past their pre-COVID levels after collapsing to the lowest-ever level in March. The shift in thinking about inflation has partly been a response to an extraordinary rise in government spending in many countries. But Chart II-1 shows that long-dated expectations in the US were mostly trendless from April to June as Federal support was distributed, and instead rose sharply in July and August in the lead-up to the Fed’s official shift to an average inflation targeting regime. This new dawn for US monetary policy has been prompted not just by the pandemic, but also by the extended period of below-target inflation over the past decade. In this report, we review how the past ten-year episode of low inflation can be successfully explained through the lens of the expectations-augmented (i.e. “modern-day”) Phillips Curve. Many investors fail to fully appreciate the impact that inflation expectations have on driving actual inflation, as well as the cumulative impact of two major capital and savings misallocations over the past 25 years on the responsiveness of demand to interest rates and on the level of inflation expectations. Using the modern-day Phillips Curve as a guide, we present several reasons in favor of the view that inflation will be higher over the next decade than over the past ten years. Finally, we conclude with an assessment of several ways for investors to protect their portfolios from rising inflation. Revisiting The “Modern-Day” Phillips Curve The original Phillips Curve, as formulated by New Zealand economist William Phillips in the late 1950s, described a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the pace of wage growth. Given the close correlation between wage and overall price growth at the time, the Phillips Curve was soon extended and generalized to describe an inverse relationship between labor market slack and overall price inflation. Chart II-2Rising Unemployment And Inflation Challenged The Original Phillips Curve Rising Unemployment And Inflation Challenged The Original Phillips Curve Rising Unemployment And Inflation Challenged The Original Phillips Curve However, the experience of rising inflation alongside high unemployment from the late 1960s to the late 1970s underscored that prices are also importantly determined by inflation expectations and shocks to the supply-side of the economy (Chart II-2). In the 1980s and 1990s, the Federal Reserve’s success at reigning in inflation was achieved not only by raising interest rates to punishingly high levels, but also by sharply altering consumer, business, and investor expectations about future prices. The experience of the late 1960s and 1970s led to a revised form of the Phillips Curve, dubbed the “expectations-augmented” or “modern” version. As an equation, the modern Phillips Curve is described today by Fed officials, in terms of core inflation, as follows: πct = β1πet + β2πct-1 + β3πct-2 - β4SLACKt + β5IMPt + εt where: πct = Core inflation today πet = Expectations of inflation πct-n = Lagged core inflation SLACKt = Slack in the economy IMPt = Imported goods prices εt = Other shocks to prices Described verbally, this framework suggests that “economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to deviate from its longer-term trend that is ultimately determined by long-run inflation expectations.1” This framework can easily be extended to headline inflation by adding changes in food and energy prices. In most formal models of the economy in use today, the modern Phillips Curve is combined with the New Keynesian demand function to describe business cycles: Yt = Y*t – β(r-r*) + εt where: Yt = Real GDP Y*t = Real potential GDP r = The real interest rate r* = The neutral rate of interest εt = Other shocks to output This equation posits that differences in the real interest rate from its neutral level, along with idiosyncratic shocks to demand, cause real GDP to deviate from potential output. Abstracting from import prices and idiosyncratic shocks, these two equations tell a simple and intuitive story of how the economy generally works: The stance of monetary policy determines the output gap and, The output gap, along with inflation expectations, determine inflation. The Modern-Day Phillips Curve: The Pre-2000 Experience This above view of inflation and demand was strongly accepted by investors before the 2008 global financial crisis, but the decade-long period of generally below-target inflation has caused a crisis of faith in the idea of the Phillips Curve. Charts II-3 and II-4 show the historical record of the New Keynesian demand function and the modern-day Phillips Curve, using five-year averages of the data in question to smooth out the impact of short-term and idiosyncratic effects. We use nominal GDP growth as our long-run proxy for the neutral rate of interest,2 the US Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) estimate of potential GDP to determine the output gap, and a proprietary measure of inflation expectations based on an adaptive expectations framework3 (Chart II-5). Chart II-3With Just Two Exceptions, Monetary Policy Strongly Explained Demand Before 2000 With Just Two Exceptions, Monetary Policy Strongly Explained Demand Before 2000 With Just Two Exceptions, Monetary Policy Strongly Explained Demand Before 2000 Chart II-4Similarly, Pre-2000 The Output Gap Generally Explained Unexpected Inflation Similarly, Pre-2000 The Output Gap Generally Explained Unexpected Inflation Similarly, Pre-2000 The Output Gap Generally Explained Unexpected Inflation Chart II-3 shows that until 1999, the stance of monetary policy was highly predictive of the output gap over a five-year period, with just two exceptions where major structural forces were at play: the late 1970s, and the second half of the 1990s. In the case of the former, the disruptive effect of persistently high inflation negatively impacted output growth despite easy monetary policy, and in the latter case, economic activity was modestly stronger than what interest rates would have implied due to the beneficial impact of the technologically-driven productivity boom of that decade. Similarly, Chart II-4 shows that until 1999 there was a good relationship between the output gap and the deviation in inflation from expectations, again with the late 1970s and late 1990s as exceptions. Along with the beneficial supply-side effects of the disinflationary tech boom, persistent import price weakness (via dollar strength) seems to have also played a role in suppressing inflation in the late 1990s (Chart II-6). Chart II-5The Expectations Component Of The Modern Phillips Curve, Visualized The Expectations Component Of The Modern Phillips Curve, Visualized The Expectations Component Of The Modern Phillips Curve, Visualized Chart II-6A Strong Dollar Also Played A Role In Suppressing Inflation During The 1990s A Strong Dollar Also Played A Role In Suppressing Inflation During The 1990s A Strong Dollar Also Played A Role In Suppressing Inflation During The 1990s   The Modern-Day Phillips Curve Post-2000 Following 2000, deviations between the monetary policy stance, the output gap, and inflation become more prominent, particularly after 2008. As we will illustrate below, these deviations are more apparent on the demand side. In the case of inflation, the question should be why inflation was not even lower in the years immediately following the global financial crisis. On both the demand and inflation side, these deviations are explainable, and in a way that helps us determine future inflation. Charts II-7 and II-8 show the same series as in Charts II-3 and II-4, but focused on the post-2000 period. From 2000-2007, Chart II-8 shows that the relationship between the output gap and the deviation in inflation from expectations was not particularly anomalous. The output gap was negative from the end of the 2001 recession until the beginning of 2006, and inflation was correspondingly below expectations on average for the cycle. Chart II-7Post-2000, The Output Gap Decoupled From The Monetary Policy Stance Post-2000, The Output Gap Decoupled From The Monetary Policy Stance Post-2000, The Output Gap Decoupled From The Monetary Policy Stance Chart II-8Since The GFC, The Real Mystery Is Why Inflation Has Been So Strong Since The GFC, The Real Mystery Is Why Inflation Has Been So Strong Since The GFC, The Real Mystery Is Why Inflation Has Been So Strong   Chart II-7 shows that the anomaly during that cycle was in the relationship between the output gap and the stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy was the easiest it had been in two decades, yet the output gap was negative for several years following the recession. Larry Summers pointedly cited this divergence in his revival of the secular stagnation theory in November 2013, arguing that it was strong evidence that excess savings were depressing aggregate demand via a lower neutral rate of interest and that this effect pre-dated the financial crisis. Why was demand so weak during that period? Chart II-9 compares the annualized per capita growth in the expenditure components of GDP during the 2001-2007 expansion to the 1991-2001 period. The chart shows that all components of GDP were lower than during the 1991-2001 period, with investment – the most interest rate sensitive component of GDP – showing up as particularly weak. On the surface, this supports the idea of structural factors weighing heavily on the neutral rate, rendering monetary policy less easy than investors would otherwise expect. But Chart II-9 treats the 2001-2007 years as one period, ignoring what happened over the course of the expansion. Chart II-10 repeats the exercise shown in Chart II-9 from Q1 2001 to Q3 2005, and highlights that the annualized growth in per capita residential investment was much stronger than it was during the 1991-2001 period – and nonresidential fixed investment was much weaker. Spending on goods was roughly the same, which is impressive considering that the late 1990s experienced a productivity boom and robust wage growth. All the negative contribution to growth from residential investment during the 2001-2007 expansion came after Q3 2005, as the housing market bubble burst in response to rising interest rates. In short, Chart II-10 highlights that there was a strong relationship between easy monetary policy and the demand for housing, but that this was not true for the corporate sector. Chart II-9Looking At The Whole 2001-2007 Period, Investment Was Extremely Weak January 2021 January 2021 Chart II-10Housing Absolutely Responded To Easy Monetary Policy January 2021 January 2021   Explaining Weak CAPEX Growth In The Early 2000s This leads us to ask why CAPEX was so weak during the 2001-2007 period. In addition to changes in interest rates, business investment is strongly influenced by expectations of consumer demand and corporate profitability. Chart II-11 shows that real nonresidential fixed investment and as-reported earnings moved in lockstep during the period, and that this delayed corporate-sector recovery also impacted the pace of hiring. Weak expectations for consumer spending do not appear to be the culprit. Chart II-12 highlights that while real personal consumption expenditure growth fell during the recession, spending did not contract (as it had done during the previous recession) and capital expenditures fell much more than what real PCE would have implied. Chart II-11Post-2001, Persistently Weak Profits Led To Weak Investment And Jobs Growth Post-2001, Persistently Weak Profits Led To Weak Investment And Jobs Growth Post-2001, Persistently Weak Profits Led To Weak Investment And Jobs Growth Chart II-12CAPEX Was Much Weaker In 2002 Than Justified By Consumer Spending CAPEX Was Much Weaker In 2002 Than Justified By Consumer Spending CAPEX Was Much Weaker In 2002 Than Justified By Consumer Spending   Instead, persistently weak CAPEX in the early 2000s appears to be best explained by the damaging impact of corporate excesses that built up during the dot-com bubble. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in response to a series of corporate accounting frauds that came to light in the wake of the bubble, but in many cases had been occurring for several years. Chart II-13 highlights that widespread write-offs badly impacted earnings quality and the growth in the asset value of equipment and intellectual property products (IPP), both of which only began to improve again in early 2003. This occurred alongside an outright contraction in real investment in IPP as investors lost faith in company financial statements and heavily scrutinized corporate spending. Chart II-14highlights that a contraction in IP spending was a huge change from the double-digit pace of growth that occurred in the late 1990s. Chart II-13The Damaging Impact Of Corporate Excesses The Damaging Impact Of Corporate Excesses The Damaging Impact Of Corporate Excesses Chart II-14A Near-Unprecedented Collapse In IPP Investment Followed The Tech Bubble A Near-Unprecedented Collapse In IPP Investment Followed The Tech Bubble A Near-Unprecedented Collapse In IPP Investment Followed The Tech Bubble   In addition, corporate sector indebtedness also appears to have played a role in driving weak investment in the early 2000s. While the interest burden of nonfinancial corporate debt was not as high in 2000 as it was in the early 1990s, Chart II-15 highlights that debt to operating income surged in the late 1990s – which likely caused investors already skeptical about company financial statements to impose a period of elevated capital discipline on corporate managers following the recession. Chart II-16 shows that while the peak in the 12-month trailing corporate bond default rate in January 2002 was similar to that of the early 90s, it was meaningfully higher on average in the lead-up to and following the recession. Chart II-15The Late-1990s Saw A Major Increase In Corporate Debt The Late-1990s Saw A Major Increase In Corporate Debt The Late-1990s Saw A Major Increase In Corporate Debt Chart II-16Above-Average Corporate Defaults Before And After The 2001 Recession Above-Average Corporate Defaults Before And After The 2001 Recession Above-Average Corporate Defaults Before And After The 2001 Recession   To summarize, Charts II-10-16 underscore that management excesses, governance failures, and elevated debt in the corporate sector in the 1990s were the root cause of the seeming divergence between monetary policy and the output gap from 2001 to 2007. This was, unfortunately, the first of two major savings/capital misallocations that have occurred in the US over the past 25 years. Explaining The Post-GFC Experience In the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve was faced with a decision between two monetary policy paths: one that was appropriate for the corporate sector, and one that was appropriate for the household sector. The Fed chose the former, and it inadvertently contributed to the second major savings/capital misallocation to occur over the past 25 years: the enormous debt-driven bubble in US housing that culminated into the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. Chart II-17It Is No Mystery Why Demand And Inflation Were Weak Last Cycle It Is No Mystery Why Demand And Inflation Were Weak Last Cycle It Is No Mystery Why Demand And Inflation Were Weak Last Cycle As a result, 2007 to 2013/2014 was a mirror image of the early 2000s. Unlike previous post-war downturns, the GFC precipitated a balance-sheet recession that deeply affected homeowners and the financial system. This lasting damage led to a multi-year household deleveraging process, which substantially lowered the responsiveness of the economy to stimulative monetary policy. On a year-over-year basis, Chart II-17 shows that total nominal household mortgage credit growth was continuously negative for six and a half years, from Q4 2008 until Q2 2015, underscoring that the large divergence during this period between the stance of monetary policy and the output gap should not, in any way, be surprising to investors. And this is even before accounting for the negative impact of the euro area sovereign debt crisis and double-dip recession, or the persistent fiscal drag in nearly every advanced economy last cycle. What is surprising about the post-GFC experience is that inflation was not substantially weaker than it was, which is ironic considering that the secular stagnation narrative was revived to help explain below-target inflation. Chart II-8 showed that actual inflation steadily improved versus expected inflation alongside the closing of the output gap and the decline in the unemployment rate, but that it was much stronger than the output gap would have implied – particularly during the early phase of the economic recovery. It is still an open question as to why this occurred. A weak dollar and a strong recovery in oil prices likely helped support consumer prices, but we doubt that these two factors alone explain the discrepancy. A more credible answer is that expectations stayed very well anchored due to the Fed’s strong record of maintaining low and stable inflation (thus preventing a disinflationary spiral). In addition, the fact that the Fed actively communicated to the public during the early recovery years that a large part of its objective was to prevent deflation may have helped support prices. For example, in a CBS interview following the Fed’s November 2010 decision to engage in a second round of quantitative easing (“QE2”), then-Chair Bernanke prominently tied the decision to the fact that “inflation is very, very low.” When asked whether additional rounds of easing might be required, Bernanke responded that it was “certainly possible” and again cited inflation as a core consideration. Chart II-18Rising US Oil Production Caused The Massive 2014 Oil Price Shock Rising US Oil Production Caused The Massive 2014 Oil Price Shock Rising US Oil Production Caused The Massive 2014 Oil Price Shock While inflation did not ultimately fall relative to expectations post-GFC as much as the output gap would have implied, the long-lasting weakness in demand left expectations vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In 2014, such a shock occurred: oil prices collapsed almost exactly at the point that US tight oil production crossed the four-million-barrels-per-day mark (Chart II-18), a level of output that many experts had previously believed would not be attainable (or would roughly mark the peak in production). We view this event as a truly exogenous shock to prices, given that research & development of shale technology had been ongoing since the late 1970s and only happened to finally gain traction around 2010. Chart II-19 shows that the 2014 oil price collapse caused a clear break lower in our measure of inflation expectations, to the lowest value recorded since the 1940s. This break also occurred in market-based expectations of inflation, such as long-dated CPI swap rates and TIPS breakeven inflation rates, and surveys of consumer inflation expectations (Chart II-20). This decline in inflation expectations meant that the output gap needed to be above zero in order for the Fed to hit its 2% target (absent any upwards shock to prices), and that the meaningful acceleration of inflation from 2016 to 2018 should actually be viewed as inflation “outperformance” because its long-term trend had been lowered by the earlier downward shift in expectations. Chart II-19The 2014 Oil Price Shock Collapsed Inflation Expectations... The 2014 Oil Price Shock Collapsed Inflation Expectations... The 2014 Oil Price Shock Collapsed Inflation Expectations... Chart II-20...No Matter What Inflation Expectations Measure Is Used ...No Matter What Inflation Expectations Measure Is Used ...No Matter What Inflation Expectations Measure Is Used   The Modern-Day Phillips Curve: Key Takeaways Based on the evidence presented above, we see the perceived “failure” of the Phillips Curve to predict weak inflation over the past decade as being due to: A singular focus on the output gap/slack component of the modern Phillips Curve, to the exclusion of expectations A failure to fully consider the lasting impact of sustained periods of a negative output gap on expectations Downplaying the long-term balance-sheet impact of two episodes of excesses and savings/capital misallocations on the relationship between the stance of monetary policy and the output gap, via a persistently negative shock to aggregate demand and a reduced sensitivity of economic activity to interest rates. One crucial takeaway from the modern-day Phillips Curve equation presented above is that if inflation expectations are largely formed based on the experience of past inflation, then inflation is ultimately determined by three dimensions of the output gap: whether it is rising or falling, whether it is above or below zero, and how long it has been above or below zero. The extended period of below-potential output over the past two decades, accelerated recently by a major negative shock to energy prices, has now lowered inflation expectations to a point that merely reaching the Fed’s target constitutes inflation “outperformance.” This realization, made even more urgent by the COVID-19 pandemic, has strongly motivated the Fed’s official shift to an average inflation targeting regime. That shift does not suggest that the Fed is moving away from the modern-day Phillips Curve framework; rather, the Fed’s new policy is aimed at closing the output gap as quickly as possible in order to prevent a renewed decline in inflation expectations (and thus inflation itself) from another long period of activity running below its potential. The Outlook For Inflation While the Fed has shifted its policy to prefer higher inflation, that does not necessarily mean it will get it. Why is it likely to happen this time, if the last economic cycle featured such a large divergence between monetary policy and the output gap? Chart II-21Above-Target Inflation Is Not Imminent Above-Target Inflation Is Not Imminent Above-Target Inflation Is Not Imminent First, to clarify, we do not believe that above-target inflation is imminent. The COVID-19 pandemic was an extreme event, and even given the very substantial recovery in the labor market, the unemployment rate remains almost 2½ percentage points above the Congressional Budget long-run estimate of NAIRU (Chart II-21). But based on our analysis of the modern-day Phillips Curve presented above, there are at least four main reasons to expect that inflation may be higher on average over the next ten years than over the past decade. Reason #1: This Appears To Be A Sharp Income Statement Recession, Not A Balance-Sheet Recession We highlighted above the importance of savings/capital misallocations in driving a gap between monetary policy and the output gap over the past two decades, but this recession was obviously not sparked by such an event. The onset of the pandemic came following a long period of US household sector deleveraging which, while painful, helped restore consumer balance sheets. Chart II-22 highlights that household debt to disposable income had fallen back to 2001 levels at the onset of the pandemic, and the interest burden of debt servicing had fallen to a 40-year low. From a wealth perspective, Chart II-23 highlights that total household liabilities to net worth have fallen below where they were at the peak of the housing market boom in 2005 for almost all income groups, and that a decline in leverage has been particularly noteworthy for the lowest income group since mid-2016. Chart II-22Households Have Repaired Their Balance Sheets... Households Have Repaired Their Balance Sheets... Households Have Repaired Their Balance Sheets... Chart II-23...Across Almost All Income Brackets ...Across Almost All Income Brackets ...Across Almost All Income Brackets   Total credit to the nonfinancial corporate sector rose significantly relative to GDP over the course of the last cycle, but subpar growth in real nonresidential fixed investment and a rise in share buybacks highlight that this debt went largely to fund changes in capital structure rather than increased productive capacity. Chart II-24 highlights that corporate sector interest payments as a percentage of operating income are low relative to history, and they do not seem to be necessarily dependent on extremely low government bond yields.4 Finally, the corporate bond default rate may have already peaked (Chart II-25) and the percentage of jobs permanently lost looks more like 2001 than 2007 (Chart II-26), signaling that a prolonged balance-sheet recession is unlikely. Chart II-24Corporate Sector Debt Is Currently High, But Affordable Corporate Sector Debt Is Currently High, But Affordable Corporate Sector Debt Is Currently High, But Affordable Chart II-25Corporate Defaults Have Already Peaked Corporate Defaults Have Already Peaked Corporate Defaults Have Already Peaked Chart II-26So Far, Permanent Job Losses Look Like The 2001 Recession, Not 2007/2008 So Far, Permanent Job Losses Look Like The 2001 Recession, Not 2007/2008 So Far, Permanent Job Losses Look Like The 2001 Recession, Not 2007/2008 The bottom line is that while the pandemic has not yet been resolved and that major and permanent economic damage cannot be ruled out, the absence of “balance-sheet dynamics” is likely to eventually lead to a stronger responsiveness of demand for goods and services to what is set to be an extraordinarily easy monetary policy stance for at least another two years. Reason #2: The Fed May Be Able To Jawbone Inflation Higher The Fed’s public commitment to set interest rates in a way that will generate moderately above-target inflation is highly reminiscent of its defense of quantitative easing in the early phase of the last economic expansion, and (in the opposite fashion) of Paul Volker’s campaign in the 1980s against the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of inflation. From 2008-2014, the Fed explicitly linked the odds of future bond buying to the pace of actual inflation in its public statements. On its own, this was not enough to cause inflation to rise, but we highlighted above that it may have contributed to the fact that inflation expectations did not collapse. Chart II-1 on page 12 showed that long-dated market-based expectations for inflation have already been impacted by the Fed’s regime shift, suggesting decent odds that Fed policy will contribute to self-fulfilling price increases if the US economy does indeed avoid “balance-sheet dynamics” as a result of the pandemic. Reason #3: The Odds Of Negative Supply Shocks Are Lower Than In The Past We noted above the impact that energy price shocks and large typically exchange-rate driven changes in import prices can have on inflation, with the 2014 oil price collapse serving as the most vivid recent example. On both fronts, a value perspective suggests that the odds of negative shocks to inflation over the coming few years from oil and the dollar are lower than they have been in the past. Chart II-27 shows that the cost of global energy consumption as a share of GDP has fallen below its median since 1970, and Chart II-28 highlights that the US dollar is comparatively expensive relative to other currencies – which raises the bar for further gains. Stable-to-higher oil prices alongside a flat-to-weak dollar implies reflationary rather than disinflationary pressure. Chart II-27Massive, Downward Shocks To Oil Prices Are Now Less Likely Massive, Downward Shocks To Oil Prices Are Now Less Likely Massive, Downward Shocks To Oil Prices Are Now Less Likely Chart II-28Valuation Favors A Declining Dollar, Which Is Inflationary January 2021 January 2021   Reason #4: Structural Factors In addition to the cyclical arguments noted above, my colleague Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, has also highlighted several structural arguments in favor of higher inflation. Chart II-29 highlights that the world support ratio, calculated as the number of workers relative to the number of consumers, peaked early last decade after rising for nearly 40 years. This suggests that output will fall relative to spending the coming several years, which should have the effect of boosting prices. Chart II-30 also highlights that globalization is on the back foot, with the ratio of trade-to-output having moved sideways for more than a decade. Since the early 1990s, rising global trade intensity has corresponded with very low goods prices in many countries, and the end of this trend reduces the impact of a factor that has been weighing on consumer prices globally over the past two decades. Chart II-29Less Production Relative To Consumption Is Inflationary Less Production Relative To Consumption Is Inflationary Less Production Relative To Consumption Is Inflationary Chart II-30Trade Is Not Suppressing Prices As Much As It Used To Trade Is Not Suppressing Prices As Much As It Used To Trade Is Not Suppressing Prices As Much As It Used To   Positioning For Eventually Higher Inflation Below we present an assessment of several potential candidates across the major asset classes that investors can use to protect their portfolios from rising inflation once it emerges. We conclude with a new trade idea that may provide investors with inflation protection at a better valuation profile than more traditional inflation hedges. Fixed-Income Within fixed-income, inflation-linked bonds and derivatives (such as CPI swaps) are the obvious choice for investors seeking inflation protection. Inflation-linked bonds are much better played relative to nominal equivalents, as inflation expectations make up the difference between nominal and inflation-linked yields. But Table II-1 shows that 5-10 year TIPS are also likely to provide positive absolute returns over the coming year even in a scenario where 10-year Treasury yields are rising, so long as real yields do not account for the vast majority of the increase. Barring a major and positive change in the long-term economic outlook over the coming year, our sense is that the Fed would act to cap any outsized increase in real yields and that TIPS remain an attractive long-only option until the Fed becomes sufficiently comfortable with the inflation outlook. Table II-1TIPS Will Earn Positive Absolute Returns Next Year Barring A Surge In Real Yields January 2021 January 2021 Commodities Commodities are arguably the most traditional inflation hedge, and are likely to provide investors with superior risk-adjusted returns in an environment where inflation expectations are rising. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service is positive on gold, and recently argued that Brent crude prices are likely to average between $65-$70/barrel between 2021-2025.5 Chart II-31Gold Is Expensive And Long-Term Returns May Be Poor Gold Is Expensive And Long-Term Returns May Be Poor Gold Is Expensive And Long-Term Returns May Be Poor One caveat about gold is that, unlike oil prices, it appears to be quite expensive relative to its history. Since gold does not provide investors with a cash flow, over time real (or inflation-adjusted) prices should ultimately be mean-reverting unless real production costs steadily trend higher. Chart II-31 highlights that the real price of gold is already sky-high and well above its historical average. Over a ten-year time horizon, gold prices fell meaningfully following the last two occasions where real gold prices reached current levels, suggesting that the long-term outlook for gold returns is poor. However, over the coming few years, gold prices are likely to remain well supported given our economic outlook, the Fed’s new monetary policy regime, and the consistently negative correlation between real yields and the US dollar and gold prices. As such, we would recommend gold as a hedge against the fear of inflation, which is likely to increase over the cyclical horizon. Equities We provide two perspectives on how equity investors may be able to protect themselves against rising inflation. The first is simply to favor cyclical versus defensive sectors. The former is likely to continue to benefit next year in response to a strengthening economy as COVID-19 vaccines are progressively distributed, and historically cyclical sectors have tended to outperform during periods of rising inflation. In addition, my colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, BCA’s Equity Strategist, presented Table II-2 in a June Special Report,6 and it highlights that cyclical sectors (plus health care) have enjoyed positive relative returns on average during periods of rising inflation. Table II-2S&P 500 Sector Performance During Inflationary Periods January 2021 January 2021 The second strategy is to favor companies that are more likely to successfully pass on increasing prices to their customers (i.e., firms with “pricing power”). Pricing power is a difficult attribute to identify, but one possible approach is to select industries that have experienced above-average sales per share growth over the past decade. While it is true that the past ten years have seen low rather than high inflation, it has also seen firms in general struggle to achieve robust top-line growth. Industries that have succeeded in this environment may thus be able to pass on higher costs to their customers without disproportionately suffering from lower sales. Chart II-32Last Decade's Revenue Winners: Potential Pricing Power Candidates Last Decade's Revenue Winners: Potential Pricing Power Candidates Last Decade's Revenue Winners: Potential Pricing Power Candidates Chart II-32 presents the historical relative performance of these industries in the US plus the materials and energy sector, equally-weighted and compared to an equally-weighted industry group portfolio (level 2 GICS). The chart shows that the portfolio has outperformed steadily over the past decade, although admittedly at a slower pace since 2018. An interesting feature of this approach is that, in addition to including industries within the industrials, consumer discretionary, and health care sectors (along with the food & staples retailing component of the consumer staples sector), tech stocks show up prominently due to their outstanding revenue performance over the past decade. Table II-2 above highlighted that tech stocks have historically performed poorly during periods of rising inflation, although it is unclear whether this is due to increasing prices or expectations of rising interest rates. Tech stocks are typically long-duration assets, meaning that they are very sensitive to the discount rate, but the Fed’s new monetary policy regime all but guarantees that investors will see a gap between inflation and rates for a time. It is thus an open question how tech stocks would perform in the future in response to rising inflation, and we plan to revisit this topic in a future report. Chart II-33Owners Of Existing Infrastructure Assets Are Primarily Utilities And Telecom Companies Owners Of Existing Infrastructure Assets Are Primarily Utilities And Telecom Companies Owners Of Existing Infrastructure Assets Are Primarily Utilities And Telecom Companies As a final point within the stock market, we would caution against equity portfolios favoring companies that are owners or operators of infrastructure assets. While increased infrastructure spending may indeed occur in the US over the coming several years, indexes focused on companies with sizeable existing infrastructure assets tend to be highly concentrated in the utilities and telecommunications sectors. Chart II-33 shows that the relative performance of the MSCI ACWI Infrastructure Index is nearly identical to that of a 50/50 utilities/telecom services portfolio, two sectors that are defensive rather than pro-cyclical and that have historically performed poorly during periods of rising inflation. Direct Real Estate Alongside commodities, direct real estate investment is also typically viewed as a traditional inflation hedge. For now, however, the outlook for important segments of the commercial real estate market is sufficiently cloudy that it is difficult to form a high conviction view in favor of the asset class. CMBS delinquency rates on office properties have remained low during the pandemic, but those of retail and accommodation have soared and the long-term outlook for all three may have permanently shifted due to the impact of the pandemic. By contrast, industrial and medical properties are likely to do well, with the former likely to be increasingly negatively correlated with the performance of retail properties in the coming few years (i.e., “warehouses versus malls”). I noted my colleague Peter Berezin’s structural arguments for inflation above, and Peter has also highlighted farmland as a real asset that is likely to do well in an environment of rising inflation.7 Chart II-34 further supports the argument: the chart shows that despite a significant increase in real farm real estate values over the past 20 years, returns to operators as a % of farmland values are not unattractive. In addition, USDA forecasts for 2020 suggest that operator returns will be the highest in a decade relative to current 10-year Treasury yields, underscoring both the capital appreciation and relative yield potential of US farmland. A Hybrid TIPS/Currency Inflation-Hedged Portfolio Finally, as we highlighted in Section 1, in a world of extremely low government bond yields, global ex-US investors have the advantage of being able to hedge against deflationary risks in a long-only portfolio by employing the US dollar as a diversifying asset. The dollar is consistently negatively correlated with global stock prices, and this relationship tends to strengthen during crisis periods. The flip side is that US-based investors have the advantage of being able to hedge against inflationary risks in a long-only portfolio by buying global currencies. Chart II-35 presents a 50/50 portfolio of US TIPS and an equally-weighted basket of six major DM currencies against the US dollar. The chart highlights that the portfolio is strongly positively correlated with gold prices, but with a better valuation profile. We already showed in Chart II-28 on page 28 that global currencies are undervalued versus the US dollar. TIPS valuation is not as attractive given that real yields are at record low levels, but the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently sits at its 40th percentile historically (and thus has room to move higher). Chart II-34Farmland: Protection Again Inflation, At A Decent Yield Farmland: Protection Again Inflation, At A Decent Yield Farmland: Protection Again Inflation, At A Decent Yield Chart II-35A Hybrid TIPS/Currency Portfolio: Liquid, And Cheaper Than Gold A Hybrid TIPS/Currency Portfolio: Liquid, And Cheaper Than Gold A Hybrid TIPS/Currency Portfolio: Liquid, And Cheaper Than Gold   As such, while gold prices are likely to remain supported over the cyclical horizon, a hybrid TIPS/currency portfolio may also provide investors with long-term protection against inflation – at a better price. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 “Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy,” Janet Yellen, Speech at the Philip Gamble Memorial Lecture, University of Massachusetts - Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts, September 24, 2015. 2 The use of nominal GDP growth as our proxy for the neutral rate of interest is based on the idea that borrowing costs are stimulative if they are below that of income growth. 3 An adaptive expectations framework suggests that expectations for future inflation are largely determined by what has occurred in the past. Our proxy for inflation expectations is thus calculated using simple exponential smoothing of the actual PCE deflator, which provides us with a long and consistent time series for expectations. 4 The second debt service ratio shown in Chart II-24 would only rise to its 68th historical percentile if the 10-year Treasury yield were to rise to 3%, or the 75th with a 10-year yield at 4%. This would be elevated relative to history, but not extreme. 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Report “BCA’s 2021-25 Brent Forecast: $65-$70/bbl,” dated November 12, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report “Revisiting Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs,” dated June 1, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover?” dated May 29, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com

DIS & NFLX Can Both Be Winners DIS & NFLX Can Both Be Winners Overweight The S&P movies & entertainment industry has sprung to life on the back of encouraging DIS news. In more detail, Disney’s price hike for the Disney+ service along with exponential subscription growth projections propelled this S&P consumer discretionary sub-group to fresh multi-year highs (top panel). Disney’s timing could not have been better, as both the ISM non-manufacturing PMI and NFIB surveys forecast improving consumer data (second & third panels). Tack on the secular rise in demand for at home entertainment that benefits both NFLX and DIS and the allure of the S&P movies & entertainment index increases further. Importantly, while on a relative forward price-to-earnings basis this index is expensive, correcting for growth reveals that it is actually very compellingly valued: using I/B/E/S data, the bottom panel of the chart shows that the relative P/E/G ratio has fallen both below the historical mean and below par. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P movies & entertainment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MOVI – DIS, NFLX, LYV.    

Languishing Buybacks Languishing Buybacks This summer we have been highlighting unsustainable trends in the US equity market and today we turn our attention to buybacks. As we first pointed out in the late-2019 Weekly Report, share buybacks have been a key pillar underpinning stocks since the GFC averaging roughly $500bn/annum since 2010, and reaching nearly the $1tn/annum mark in 2018 on the back of President Trump’s massive fiscal easing package. Clearly, such breakneck pace was unsustainable and a renormalization was overdue.  Fast forward to Q2, and even our conservative quarterly $125bn equity retirement estimate proved overly optimistic. From the recent peak to just below $90bn/qrt, SPX buybacks have fallen by a whopping 67%. Such a corporate buyer’s strike is negative for the near term prospects of the S&P 500 (top panel). Drilling deeper beneath the surface is revealing. When we disaggregate the headline buybacks number into GICS1 sectors, we observe that once again the tech titans (comprising the S&P technology and the S&P communication services indexes) are doing all the heavy lifting accounting for 70% of the overall number (bottom panel). Q2 was the first time in recent memory that a cross has occurred where tech accounts for more buybacks that all the other sectors put together! Bottom Line: We continue to recommend investors keep some powder dry and refrain from deploying capital at the current juncture. A better entry point in the broad equity market will likely materialize in late Q4.

Dear Client, I will be on vacation next week. Instead of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan will explore the risks posed to commercial real estate and the banking system from work-from-home policies and the potential for urban flight towards less populated and more affordable areas. I hope you find his report insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The Nasdaq 100 index is up 31% since the start of the year. The “Awesome 8” stocks (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, Nvidia, and Tesla) have gained a staggering 59%. Will tech outperformance continue? There are five reasons to think it will not: 1) The dismantling of pandemic lockdown measures, hopefully facilitated by a vaccine later this year, could shift some spending from the online realm back to brick-and-mortar stores; 2) Interest rates are unlikely to fall much further, which will remove one of the tailwinds propelling tech outperformance; 3) Tech valuations are now quite stretched; 4) Many marquee tech companies have become so big that further gains in market share may be difficult to achieve; 5) Regulatory and tax policy changes could negatively impact a number of prominent tech names. A pivot in market leadership from tech to non-tech is likely to foster the outperformance of value over growth and non-US over US stocks. Are The Awesome 8 At Risk Of Becoming The Awful 8? After plunging alongside the rest of the stock market in March, tech stocks have roared back. The tech-heavy Nasdaq 100 is up 31% since the start of the year. The “Awesome 8” stocks (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, Nvidia, and Tesla) have gained a staggering 59% on a market cap-weighted basis. Meanwhile, the median US stock has lost 14% this year (Chart 1). Will tech outperformance continue? There are five reasons to think it will not: Reason #1: The dismantling of pandemic lockdown measures could shift some spending from the online realm back to brick-and-mortar stores The pandemic has led to a major reallocation of spending from brick-and-mortar stores to online retailers. Sales at US online stores increased by 25% year-over-year in July versus -1% at physical stores (Chart 2). According to Bank of America, after rising steadily from about 5% in 2009 to 16% in 2019, the US e-commerce penetration rate has jumped to 33%, representing more than ten years of growth in only a few months. Chart 1Awesome 8 Propelling Tech Stocks To New Highs Awesome 8 Propelling Tech Stocks To New Highs Awesome 8 Propelling Tech Stocks To New Highs Chart 2Will The Dismantling Of Lockdown Measures Bring Brick-And-Mortar Retailers Back To Life? Will The Dismantling Of Lockdown Measures Bring Brick-And-Mortar Retailers Back To Life? Will The Dismantling Of Lockdown Measures Bring Brick-And-Mortar Retailers Back To Life?   There is little doubt that we are still in the midst of a secular transition towards e-commerce. However, it is likely that the dismantling of lockdown measures – hopefully facilitated by the release of a vaccine later this year – will bring back some spending to brick-and-mortar stores. This could produce a temporary air pocket in sales for online sellers, a risk that does not seem to be fully discounted (Chart 3). Chart 3Online Retail Spending Could Slow, At Least Temporarily, As Shopping Malls Reopen The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Chart 4The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge Meanwhile, other tech companies that have benefited from the pandemic could face headwinds. Netflix saw its global subscriber count jump 27% in the second quarter relative to a year earlier. If someone did not bother to purchase a Netflix subscription in March or April, how likely is it that they will subscribe for the first time in September? Along the same lines, global PC and server shipments surged to multi-year highs earlier this year as millions of people were forced to work from home (Chart 4). This likely brought demand for computers and peripheral equipment forward, which could produce a spending vacuum over the next few quarters. Reason #2: Interest rates are unlikely to fall much further, which will remove one of the tailwinds propelling tech outperformance Technology companies are used to cutting prices on older models as newer, more innovative versions come to market. In this sense, deflation is built into their business models. Many tech companies also trade on long-term growth prospects, which means that changes in discount rates have a disproportionately greater impact on the present value of their cash flows than for slower growing companies. All this means that tech stocks tend to outperform in environments where inflation and interest rates are falling. Chart 5Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Financials Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Financials Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Financials We do not expect inflation to surge over the next two years. Nevertheless, the deflationary impulse from the pandemic is likely to abate as spare capacity is absorbed and overall demand recovers. Likewise, bond yields are likely to rise modestly over the next 12 months. Higher bond yields will benefit bank shares (Chart 5). Reason #3: Tech valuations have gotten increasingly stretched Based on full-year estimates, the Nasdaq 100 trades at 32-times 2020 earnings and 27-times 2021 earnings. The Awesome 8 stocks are even more pricey, trading at 43-time and 34-times this year’s and next year’s earnings, respectively (Table 1). Table 1Equity Valuations: Tech Versus Non-Tech The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Outside the IT sector, the S&P 500 trades at 26-times 2020 earnings and 20-times 2021 earnings. It should be noted that these numbers overstate how expensive the non-tech part of the S&P 500 index really is because Amazon resides in the consumer discretionary sector while Facebook, Google, and Netflix sit in the communication sector. In fact, only three of the Awesome 8 are in the S&P 500 IT sector (Tesla has yet to be admitted into the S&P 500, despite having a market cap that would now make it the 10th most valuable company in the index, right ahead of P&G).  While the PE ratio on tech stocks is still well below the nosebleed levels reached during the dot-com bubble, other valuation measures are approaching their prior peaks. The S&P 500 IT sector now trades at 6.2-times sales, not far below the peak price-to-sales of 7.8 reached in 2000. Tech stocks trade at 9.6-times book value, the highest level since early 2001, and more than double their peak valuation level in 2007 (Chart 6). Reason #4: Many marquee tech companies have become so big that further gains in market share may be difficult to achieve The Nasdaq’s lofty valuation presumes that earnings will continue to rise at a rapid pace for many years to come. That has certainly been true for the past decade. The Nasdaq 100 enjoyed annualized earnings per share growth of 16% since 2010, 2.5-times the pace of the S&P 500 index and 3.2-times faster than the non-IT constituents of the S&P 500. Indeed, most of the outperformance of tech stocks can be chalked up to their faster earnings growth (Chart 7). Chart 6Tech Stocks: Some Valuation Measures Are Quite Stretched Tech Stocks: Some Valuation Measures Are Quite Stretched Tech Stocks: Some Valuation Measures Are Quite Stretched Chart 7Most Of The Outperformance Of Tech Stocks Can Be Attributed To Faster Earnings Growth Most Of The Outperformance Of Tech Stocks Can Be Attributed To Faster Earnings Growth Most Of The Outperformance Of Tech Stocks Can Be Attributed To Faster Earnings Growth But will such earnings growth continue? That is far from certain. Bottom-up estimates foresee earnings per share among Nasdaq 100 members rising by 20% in 2021. This is actually below the projected earnings growth of 27% for the S&P 500. One sees a similar pattern within S&P 500 sectors: The IT sector is expected to see earnings growth of 15% in 2021 compared with 31% for non-IT sectors (Table 2). Table 2Earnings Growth Projections The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Admittedly, the faster projected earnings growth of non-tech companies in 2021 will constitute a reversal of this year’s pandemic-induced earnings collapse, from which tech was largely insulated. Thus, there is a base effect at work. Nevertheless, if most investors focus mainly on annual growth rates, they could become enamoured with non-tech stocks, at least temporarily. Looking further out, the rapid growth in tech earnings could decelerate as many of today’s marquee tech companies struggle to expand market share. Close to three-quarters of US households already have an Amazon Prime account. Slightly over half have a Netflix account. Nearly 70% have a Facebook account. Google commands 92% of the internet search market. Together, sites owned by Google and Facebook generate about 60% of all online advertising revenue. New opportunities for growth will undoubtedly arise, but there is no guarantee that today’s leaders will be able to take advantage of them. History is littered with tech companies that failed to keep up with a changing world: RCA, Kodak, Polaroid, Atari, Commodore, Novell, Digital, Sinclair, Wang, Iomega, Corel, Netscape, Altavista, AOL, Compaq, Sun, Lucent, 3Com, Nokia, and RIM were all major players in their respective industries, only to fade into oblivion. Stock market investors were very lucky that companies such as Microsoft, Cisco, Nvidia, Qualcomm, Oracle, Amazon, and Netflix issued shares to the public at an early stage in their development (Table 3). All seven had market caps below $1 billion when they went public. Such hidden gems are becoming less common: The number of publicly listed companies in the US is still well below what it was two decades ago (Chart 8). The median age of tech companies at the time of their IPO has risen from around 7 years in the 1990s to 11 years in 2019 (Chart 9). Table 3Big Gains From Once Small Companies The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Chart 8The Number Of US Publicly Listed Companies Is Not What It Once Was The Number Of US Publicly Listed Companies Is Not What It Once Was The Number Of US Publicly Listed Companies Is Not What It Once Was   Chart 9Tech Companies Entering The Public Arena Are Now More Mature The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Reason #5: Regulatory and tax policies could negatively impact a number of prominent tech names Historically, the US government has taken a laissez-faire approach towards the tech sector. As an avowedly pro-business party, the Republicans were happy to espouse deregulation and low corporate taxes, while lauding Silicon Valley’s dynamism and global dominance. The Democrats also had a cozy relationship with the tech sector. As Chart 10 shows, political donations from tech company employees are heavily skewed towards Democratic candidates. Chart 10Tech Company Employees Donate Heavily Towards Democrats The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Things may not be as easy for the tech sector going forward, however. Conservatives have accused social media companies of stifling their voices. According to a recent Pew Research study, 53% of conservative Republicans favor increasing government regulation of big tech companies, up from 42% in 2018 (Chart 11). For their part, Democrats have expressed concerns about the growing monopoly power of tech companies and their perceived insouciant attitude towards consumer privacy. Chart 11Conservatives Favor Increased Government Regulation Of Big Tech Companies The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog A Biden administration would not be as tough on tech companies as say, an Elizabeth Warren administration. Nevertheless, Biden has said that breaking up big tech companies is "something we should take a really hard look at."1  He has also argued that online platforms should not be granted legal immunity for user-generated content. On the tax side, Biden has vowed to reverse half of Trump’s corporate tax cuts, while introducing a minimum 15% corporate tax. The latter could disproportionately affect a number of prominent tech companies that have taken full advantage of the current tax code to minimize their tax liabilities. Meanwhile, tech companies are increasingly finding themselves in the crossfire between China and the US. While Joe Biden would not be as quick to impose unilateral tariffs on China as Donald Trump, BCA Research’s  geopolitical strategists warn that the rivalry between the two nations will intensify over the coming decade as they reduce their economic interdependency and vie for military advantage in Asia.2 This could have adverse implications for tech firms’ ability to maximize global market share, never mind optimizing global supply chains. Pivot Towards Value And International Stocks Tech stocks are overrepresented in growth indices, while financials dominate value indices (Table 4). Thus, it is not surprising that the relative performance of tech versus financial stocks has closely mirrored the relative performance of growth versus value stocks (Chart 12). If tech stocks shift from being leaders to laggards, value stocks will shift from being laggards to leaders. Table 4Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Chart 12The Relative Performance Of Tech Stocks Has Closely Mirrored The Relative Performance Of Growth Versus Value The Relative Performance Of Tech Stocks Has Closely Mirrored The Relative Performance Of Growth Versus Value The Relative Performance Of Tech Stocks Has Closely Mirrored The Relative Performance Of Growth Versus Value Chart 13The Valuation Gap Between Value And Growth Is Larger Today Than At The Height Of The Dot-Com Bubble The Valuation Gap Between Value And Growth Is Larger Today Than At The Height Of The Dot-Com Bubble The Valuation Gap Between Value And Growth Is Larger Today Than At The Height Of The Dot-Com Bubble Value stocks usually appear “cheap” in relation to growth stocks, but the valuation gap is much larger today than in the past – larger, in fact, than at the height of the dot-com bubble (Chart 13). Despite their name, growth stocks usually underperform value stocks when global growth is on the upswing (Chart 14). Provided that progress is made towards developing a vaccine, global growth should remain above trend over the next 12 months, giving value stocks a lift. Chart 14Growth Stocks Usually Underperform Value Stocks When Global Growth Is On The Upswing Growth Stocks Usually Underperform Value Stocks When Global Growth Is On The Upswing Growth Stocks Usually Underperform Value Stocks When Global Growth Is On The Upswing Value stocks also generally do better when the US dollar is weakening. Recall that tech stocks did phenomenally well in the late 1990s when the dollar was rising, but faltered during the period of dollar weakness from 2001 to 2008 (Chart 15). As we discussed last week, the dollar is likely to depreciate further in the months ahead. Chart 15Value Stocks Generally Do Better When The US Dollar Is Weakening Value Stocks Generally Do Better When The US Dollar Is Weakening Value Stocks Generally Do Better When The US Dollar Is Weakening   Chart 16Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker US Dollar Tend To Be Good News For Non-US Stocks Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker US Dollar Tend To Be Good News For Non-US Stocks Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker US Dollar Tend To Be Good News For Non-US Stocks Stronger global growth and a weaker US dollar tend be good news for non-US stocks (Chart 16). As US tech stocks enter a holding pattern, stock markets outside the US will assume the upper hand. Investors should reallocate equity capital towards value stocks and overseas stock markets. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Hunter Woodall, “2020 hopeful Biden says he’s open to breaking up Facebook,” The Associated Press, May 13, 2019. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War,” dated July 31, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Return Of Nasdog The Return Of Nasdog