Consumer

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap The Chinese economy faces a trifecta of economic woes: 1) The threat of renewed Covid lockdowns; 2) Cooling export demand; 3) A floundering housing market. Trying to reflate the Chinese housing bubble would only damage the long-term prospects of China’s economy. A much better option would be to adopt measures that boost disposable income. Not only would this help offset the drag from slowing export growth and a negative housing wealth effect, but it would also take some of the sting out of China’s zero-Covid policy. With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash will only intensify. Chinese equities are trading at only 10-times forward earnings and about 1-times sales. A significant upward rating for equity valuations is likely if the government adopts broad-based income-support measures. Go long the iShares MSCI China ETF ($MCHI) as a tactical trade. Bottom Line: China faces a number of economic woes, but these are fully discounted by the market. What has not been discounted is a broad-based stimulus program focused on income-support measures.   Dear Client, I will be visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi next week. No doubt, the outlook for oil prices will feature heavily in my discussions. I will brief you on any insights I learn in my report on June 17. In the meantime, I am pleased to announce that Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, will be the guest author of next week’s Global Investment Strategy report. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Triple Threat The Chinese economy faces a trifecta of economic woes: 1) The threat of renewed Covid lockdowns; 2) Cooling export demand; 3) A floundering housing market. Let us discuss each problem in turn.   Problem #1: China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Age of Omicron Chart 1China’s Lockdown Index Remains Elevated China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes China was able to successfully suppress the virus in the first two years of the pandemic. However, the emergence of the Omicron strain is challenging the government’s commitment to its zero-Covid policy. The BA.2 subvariant of Omicron is 50% more contagious than the original Omicron strain and about 4-times more contagious than the Delta strain. While 89% of China’s population has been fully vaccinated, the number drops off to 82% for those above the age of 60. And those who are vaccinated have been inoculated with vaccines that appear to be largely ineffective against Omicron. Keeping a virus as contagious as measles at bay in a population with little natural or artificial immunity is exceedingly difficult. While the authorities are starting to relax restrictions in Shanghai, China’s Effective Lockdown Index remains at elevated levels (Chart 1). A number of domestically designed mRNA vaccines are in phase 3 trials. However, it is not clear how effective they will be. Shanghai-based Fosun Pharma has inked a deal to distribute 100 million doses of Pfizer’s vaccine, but so far neither it nor Moderna’s vaccine have been approved for use. Our working assumption is that China will authorize the distribution of western-made mRNA vaccines later this year if its own offerings prove ineffectual. The Chinese government has already signed a deal to manufacture a generic version of Pfizer’s Paxlovid, which has been shown to cut the risk of hospitalization by 90% if taken within five days of the onset of symptoms. In the meantime, the authorities will continue to play whack-a-mole with Covid. Investors should expect more lockdowns during the remainder of the year.   Problem #2: Weaker Export Growth China’s export growth slowed sharply in April, with manufacturing production contracting at the fastest rate since data collection began. Activity appears to have rebounded somewhat in May, but the new export orders components of both the official and private-sector manufacturing PMIs still remain below 50 (Chart 2). Part of the export slowdown is attributable to lockdown restrictions. However, weaker external demand is also a culprit, as evidenced by the fact that Korean export growth — a bellwether for global trade — has decelerated (Chart 3).  Chart 2China’s Export Growth Has Rolled Over China's Export Growth Has Rolled Over China's Export Growth Has Rolled Over Chart 3Softer Export Growth Is Not A China-Specific Phenomenon Softer Export Growth Is Not A China-Specific Phenomenon Softer Export Growth Is Not A China-Specific Phenomenon Spending in developed economies is shifting from manufactured goods to services. Retail inventories in the US are now well above their pre-pandemic trend, suggesting that the demand for Chinese-made goods will remain subdued over the coming months (Chart 4). The surge in commodity prices is only adding to Chinese manufacturer woes. Input prices rose 10% faster than manufacturing output prices over the past 12 months. This is squeezing profit margins (Chart 5). Chart 4Well-Stocked Shelves In The US Bode Poorly For Chinese Export Demand Well-Stocked Shelves In The US Bode Poorly For Chinese Export Demand Well-Stocked Shelves In The US Bode Poorly For Chinese Export Demand Chart 5Surging Input Costs Are Weighing On The Profits Of Chinese Commodity Users Surging Input Costs Are Weighing On The Profits Of Chinese Commodity Users Surging Input Costs Are Weighing On The Profits Of Chinese Commodity Users A modest depreciation in the currency would help the Chinese export sector. However, after weakening from 6.37 in April to 6.79 in mid-May, USD/CNY has moved back to 6.66 on the back of the recent selloff in the US dollar. Chart 6The RMB Tends To Weaken When EUR/USD Is Rising The RMB Tends To Weaken When EUR/USD Is Rising The RMB Tends To Weaken When EUR/USD Is Rising We expect the dollar to weaken further over the next 12 months as the Fed tempers its hawkish rhetoric in response to falling inflation. Chart 6 shows that the trade-weighted RMB typically strengthens when EUR/USD is rising. Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s Chief Currency Strategist, expects EUR/USD to reach 1.16 by the end of the year.   Problem #3: Flagging Property Market Chinese housing sales, starts, and completions all contracted in April (Chart 7). New home prices dipped 0.2% on a month-over-month basis, and are up just 0.7% from a year earlier, the smallest gain since 2015. The percentage of households planning to buy a home is near record lows (Chart 8). Chart 7The Chinese Property Market Has Been Cooling The Chinese Property Market Has Been Cooling The Chinese Property Market Has Been Cooling Chart 8Intentions To Buy A House Have Declined Intentions To Buy A House Have Declined Intentions To Buy A House Have Declined China’s property developers are in dire straits. Corporate bonds for the sector are, on average, trading at 48 cents on the dollar (Chart 9). Goldman Sachs estimates that the default rate for property developers will reach 32% in 2022, up from their earlier estimate of 19%. The government is trying to prop up housing demand. The PBoC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate by 15 bps on May 20th, the largest such cut since 2019. The authorities have dropped the floor mortgage rate to a 14-year low of 4.25%. They have also taken steps to make it easier for property developers to issue domestic bonds. BCA’s China strategists believe these measures will foster a modest rebound in the property market in the second half of this year. However, they do not anticipate a robust recovery – of the sort experienced following the initial wave of the pandemic – due to the government’s continued adherence to the “three red lines” policy.1 China is building too many homes. While residential investment as a share GDP has been trending lower, it is still very high in relation to other countries. China’s working-age population is now shrinking, which suggests that housing demand will contract over the coming years (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Property Developer Bonds Are Trading At Distressed Levels Chinese Property Developer Bonds Are Trading At Distressed Levels Chinese Property Developer Bonds Are Trading At Distressed Levels Chart 10Shrinking Working-Age Population Implies Less Demand For Housing Shrinking Working-Age Population Implies Less Demand For Housing Shrinking Working-Age Population Implies Less Demand For Housing Chinese real estate prices are amongst the highest anywhere. The five biggest cities in the world with the lowest rental yields are all in China (Chart 11). The entire Chinese housing stock is worth nearly $100 trillion, making it the largest asset class in the world. As such, a decline in Chinese home prices would generate a sizable negative wealth effect. Chart 11Chinese Real Estate Is Expensive China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes A Silver Bullet? Trying to reflate the Chinese housing bubble would only damage the long-term prospects of China’s economy. Luckily, one does not need to fill a leaky bucket through the same hole the water escaped. As long as there is enough demand throughout the economy, workers who lose their jobs in declining sectors will eventually find new jobs in other sectors. China needs to reorient its economy away from its historic reliance on investment and exports towards consumption. The easiest way to do that is to adopt measures that boost disposable income, which has slowed of late (Chart 12). Not only would this help offset the drag from slowing export growth and a negative housing wealth effect, but it would also take some of the sting out of China’s zero-Covid policy. The authorities have not talked much about pursuing large-scale income-support measures of the kind adopted by many developed economies during the pandemic. As a result, market participants have largely dismissed this possibility. Yet, with the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, the political incentive to shower the economy with cash will only intensify. Chinese equities are trading at only 10-times forward earnings and about 1-times sales (Chart 13). A significant upward rating for equity valuations is likely if the government adopts broad-based income-support measures. As we saw in the US and elsewhere, stimulus cash has a habit of flowing into the stock market; and with real estate in the doldrums, equities may become the asset class of choice for many Chinese investors. With that in mind, we are going long the iShares MSCI China ETF ($MCHI) as a tactical trade. Chart 12Disposable Income Growth Has Been Trending Lower Disposable Income Growth Has Been Trending Lower Disposable Income Growth Has Been Trending Lower Chart 13Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Relatively Cheap At a global level, a floundering Chinese property market would have been a cause for grave concern in the past, as it would have represented a major deflationary shock. Times have changed, however. The problem now is too much inflation, rather than too little. To the extent that reduced Chinese investment injects more savings into the global economy and knocks down commodity prices, this would be welcomed by most investors. China’s economy may be heading for a “beautiful slowdown.” Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter   Footnotes   1      The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. View Matrix China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes China: A Trifecta Of Economic Woes

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary Recession Checklist Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? US stocks were down almost 20% at their lowest point in May. Any lower and they would be pricing in recession. Central banks will raise rates to or above neutral to ensure that inflation comes back down to their targets. This will cause growth to slow. Markets will now start to worry more about faltering growth than about high inflation. In our recession checklist (see Table), no indicator is yet pointing to recession, but some may do so soon. The jury is likely to be out for some time on whether there will be a recession in the next 12-18 months. In the meantime, equities are likely to move sideways, amid high volatility. Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Bottom Line: Investors should stay cautiously positioned for now, with only a neutral weighting in equities, and tilts towards more defensive markets and sectors. We recommend a large holding in cash to allow for funds to be redeployed quickly when there is a better entry-point.   The narrative driving global markets has shifted from worries about inflation, to fretting about the risk of recession. Although headline inflation remains high (8.3% year-on-year in the US and 8.1% in the eurozone), inflation pressures have clearly peaked (for now, at least): Broad measures, such as the US trimmed-mean PCE, have started to ease significantly (Chart 1).  Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 1Inflationary Pressures Are Starting To Ease Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? But now signs are emerging of a slowdown in economic growth. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Indexes in all the major regions have turned down (Chart 2), and global industrial production is falling year-on-year (albeit partly because of lingering supply-side bottlenecks) (Chart 3).   Chart 2Global Growth Is Turning Down Global Growth Is Turning Down Global Growth Is Turning Down Chart 3IP Growth Has Turned Negative IP Growth Has Turned Negative IP Growth Has Turned Negative Equity markets – with US stocks down 19% from their peak to the May low, and global stocks 17% – are pricing in a slowdown, but not yet a recession. As we have often argued, it is almost unheard of to have a bear market (defined as a greater than 20% decline in US stocks) without a recession – the last time that happened was in 1987 (and all on one day, Black Monday) (Chart 4). Note from the chart how often stocks correct by 19-20%, on concerns about recession, without tipping into a bear market. That is where we stand today. Chart 4US Stocks Don't Fall More Than 20% Without A Recession US Stocks Don't Fall More Than 20% Without A Recession US Stocks Don't Fall More Than 20% Without A Recession Table 1Recession Checklist Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? So the key question is: Will we have a recession over the next 12-18 months? We have dug out the recession checklist we last used in 2019 (Table 1). While none of the indicators are yet clearly pointing to recession, several may do so by year-end (Chart 5). And there are a number of warning signs starting to flash. The US housing market – the most interest-rate sensitive part of the economy – could soon see home prices falling, after the 200 BPs rise in the 30-year mortgage rate since the start of the year (Chart 6). Wages have failed to rise in line with inflation, which has led to retail sales falling year-on-year in real terms (Chart 7). And there are even some signs that companies are slowing their hiring, presumably on worries about the durability of the recovery: In the latest ISM surveys, the employment component fell to close to 50 (Chart 8). Chart 5Some Recession Indicators Look Worrying Some Recession Indicators Look Worrying Some Recession Indicators Look Worrying Chart 6Housing Is The Most Vulnerable Sector Housing Is The Most Vulnerable Sector Housing Is The Most Vulnerable Sector Chart 7Real Retail Sales Are Falling Real Retail Sales Are Falling Real Retail Sales Are Falling Chart 8Signs That Companies Are Growing Wary Of Hiring? Signs That Companies Are Growing Wary Of Hiring? Signs That Companies Are Growing Wary Of Hiring? The strongest argument against there being a recession is the $2.2 trillion of excess savings held by US households (and $5 trillion among households in all major developed economies). The argument is that, even if interest rates rise and real wage growth is negative, consumers can continue to spend by dipping into these accumulated savings. But there are some problems here. The savings are highly concentrated among the rich, who have a lower propensity to spend (Chart 9). Because of “mental accounting” biases, people may think only of current income, not savings, when considering how much to spend. And, as spending shifts back from goods to services, now that pandemic rules are largely over (Chart 10), spending on manufactured products is likely to fall below trend (since many purchases were brought forward). But it is hard to catch up on previously missed services spending (you can’t take three vacations this year to make up for those you missed in 2020 and 2021), and so services spending will, at best, only return to trend. Chart 9The Rich Have All The Money The Rich Have All The Money The Rich Have All The Money Chart 10Can Services Take Over From Goods Spending? Can Services Take Over From Goods Spending? Can Services Take Over From Goods Spending?     Meanwhile, central banks will be focused on fighting inflation. All of them are expected to take rates to or above neutral over the next 12 months (Chart 11) – implying a squeeze on aggregate demand. Although inflation may be peaking, it is still well above most central banks’ comfort zones. In the US, for example, the FOMC expects core PCE to ease to 4.1% by year-end and 2.6% by end-2023, but that is still higher than its 2% target. The Fed is likely to remain focused on the upside risks to inflation: From rising services prices (Chart 12), and the risk of a price-wage spiral (Chart 13). BCA Research’s bond strategists expect the Fed to hike by 50 BPs at each of the next two meetings (in June and July), and then to revert to 25 BPs a meeting, as long as it is clear by then that inflation is trending down.1 Chart 11Rates Are Going To Or Above Neutral Everywhere Rates Are Going To Or Above Neutral Everywhere Rates Are Going To Or Above Neutral Everywhere Chart 12Inflation Risks: Rising Services Prices... Inflation Risks: Rising Services Prices... Inflation Risks: Rising Services Prices... Our conclusion is that the jury is out on the probability of recession – and is likely to stay out for a while. So far this year, equities and bonds have both performed poorly – with a 60:40 equity/bond portfolio producing the worst start to a year in three decades (Chart 14). Equities have wobbled because of tight monetary policy and worries about slowing growth; bonds because of inflation concerns. This is likely to remain the case until there is more clarity about the risk of recession. In this environment, we expect global equities to move sideways, with significant volatility – falling on signs of weakening growth, but rallying on hopes that the Fed may change its course.2  Chart 13...And A Price-Wage Spiral ...And A Price-Wage Spiral ...And A Price-Wage Spiral Chart 14Nowhere To Hide This Year Nowhere To Hide This Year Nowhere To Hide This Year We continue, therefore, to recommend fairly cautious portfolio positioning, with a neutral weight in global equities (and a preference for defensive country and sector allocations). Investors should keep a healthy holding in cash, giving them dry powder to use when a better entry-point into risk assets presents itself. Fixed Income: Bond yields have fallen over the past month, with the US 10-year Treasury yield slipping to 2.8% from 3.1% in early May. As per BCA Research’s Golden Rule of Bond Investing, the level of yields will be determined by whether the Fed (and other central banks) surprise dovishly or hawkishly relative to market expectations (Chart 15).3 The Fed is likely to hike slightly less this year than the market is pricing in, but may continue to raise rates beyond mid-2023, compared to a market expectation of rate cuts then (see Chart 11, panel 1 above). This points to the 10-year yield remaining broadly flat for the rest of this year, but possibly rising after that. Historically, rates tend to peak in line with trend nominal GDP growth (Chart 16). This means that, if the expansion continues for another couple of years, the 10-year yield could reach 4%. We, therefore, recommend an underweight on bonds. However, government bonds do now represent a good hedge again, with strong capital gain in the event of recession (Table 2). We recommend a neutral weight on government bonds within the fixed-income category. Chart 15The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 16Rates Tend To Peak In Line With Trend Nominal GDP Growth Rates Tend To Peak In Line With Trend Nominal GDP Growth Rates Tend To Peak In Line With Trend Nominal GDP Growth Table 2Government Bonds Now Offer Good Returns In A Recession Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 17Credit Now Offers Attractive Valuations Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? The recent rise in credit spreads has opened some opportunities. Valuations for both investment-grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) bonds are now attractive again, with all but the highest-quality bonds trading at a breakeven spread higher than the long-run median (Chart 17). The likelihood of defaults is rising, however, so we lower our weighting in HY (whilst remaining slightly overweight) and raise the weight in IG, also to a small overweight. We fund this by cutting our recommendation in Emerging Market debt to underweight. Credit, especially in the US, now offers tempting returns as long as the economy avoids recession, and is a relatively low-risk way to gain exposure to upside surprises.   Chart 18US Performance Has Lagged This Year US Performance Has Lagged This Year US Performance Has Lagged This Year Equities: US relative equity performance has been a little disappointing year-to-date, dragged down by the performance of the IT sector (Chart 18).  Nonetheless, we stick to our overweight, given the market’s lower beta and the likely greater resilience of the US economy. Among sectors, we raise our weighting in Energy to overweight from neutral. Our energy strategists recently lifted their forecast for end-2022 Brent crude to $120 from $90, and raise the possibility of even $140 (see below for more on why). Despite the sharp outperformance of Energy stocks over the past six months, the sector has barely registered net inflows – presumably because of ESG (Chart 19). As we argued in a recent report, oil producers could be the new “sin stocks”, making the sector attractive over the next few years to investors who do not have ethical restraints on investing in it. We fund the overweight in Energy by lowering our weighting in Industrials to neutral. Capex is a late-cycle play and capital-goods makers benefited as manufacturers rushed to increase production during the recent consumer boom. But signs are now emerging that companies are becoming more cautious on capex (Chart 20). Chart 19Weak Flows Into The Energy Sector Despite Strong Performance Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 20Companies Are Becoming More Cautious On Capex Companies Are Becoming More Cautious On Capex Companies Are Becoming More Cautious On Capex Commodities: China’s growth remains very weak and, although commodity prices have started to fall (with copper down 9% and iron ore 11% in Q2), they have not yet caught up with the slowdown in Chinese imports (Chart 21). The key question is whether China will now roll out a big stimulus. Given the government’s determination to persevere with the zero-Covid policy, and its need to achieve the 5.5% GDP growth target this year, it will eventually have no choice. But it is reluctant to trigger another housing boom, and there are doubts about how effective stimulus would be given the property market’s dysfunction. For now, we remain cautious on the Materials sector, and on commodities as an alternative asset – though the long-term structural story (because of the build-out of alternative energy) remains strong. Oil and natural-gas prices are likely to remain high due to disruptions in supply from Russia. Russia will probably have to shut 1.6 m b/d of production following the EU embargo on Russian oil imports. The EU is rushing to build up natural-gas inventories before the winter, in case Russia bans gas exports to Europe in retaliation (Chart 22). Higher oil prices are positive for the Energy sector, and for countries such as Canada (whose equity market we raise to neutral, funding this by trimming the overweight in the US). Chart 21Commodity Prices Dragged Down By Weak Chinese Growth Commodity Prices Dragged Down By Weak Chinese Growth Commodity Prices Dragged Down By Weak Chinese Growth Chart 22The EU Will Need To Buy Lots Of Natural Gas Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Currencies: Momentum, cyclical factors, and interest-rate differentials still favor the US dollar. Although the Fed will not raise rates quite as much as futures are pricing in, other central banks – especially the ECB and the Reserve Bank of Australia – will miss by more (Table 3). Nevertheless, the USD looks very overvalued (Chart 23) and speculators are long the currency. This means that, once global growth bottoms, there could be a sharp depreciation in the dollar. We remain neutral on the USD. Our preferred defensive currency is the CHF, since the other usual safe haven, the JPY, will remain depressed if, as we expect, the Bank of Japan persists with its yield curve control, limiting the 10-year JGB yield to 0.25%. Table 3Most Central Banks Will Not Hike As Much As Futures Predict Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Monthly Portfolio Update: Recession Or No Recession? Chart 23US Dollar Is Very Overvalued US Dollar Is Very Overvalued US Dollar Is Very Overvalued Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see US Bond Strategy Report, “Echoes Of 2018” dated May 24, 2022. 2     BCA Research’s US equity strategists call this a “Fat and Flat” market. Please see “What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat”. 3     Please see “Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks” for an explanation of how the Golden Rule works in different countries.   Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Executive Summary Selloffs across financial markets and evidence of decelerating growth have reminded us to play it close to the vest, but they haven't made us bearish. The stability of intermediate- and long-run inflation expectations suggests that the inflation genie has not yet gotten out of the bottle and that the Fed will be able to hold off on squashing the expansion until late 2023 or early 2024. Households' willingness to dip into their excess savings to maintain their spending in the face of inflationary pressures bodes well for the economy for the remaining year and a half that the excess savings cushion can be expected to last. The definitive causes of reduced labor force participation continue to elude researchers but we expect participation will improve over the rest of the year as the low-paid workers responsible for the exodus return to the grind. The Fed Fever Has Broken The Fed Fever Has Broken The Fed Fever Has Broken Bottom Line: Investors have no end of things to worry about, but we remain disposed to see the glass as half-full. We expect the expansion to continue at least into the second half of 2023 and that risk assets will generate positive excess returns over Treasuries and cash for the next twelve months. Feature We have begun meeting clients face-to-face again, in addition to continuing with conference calls. Our discussions with investors and colleagues highlight how uncertain the market and economic landscapes remain. Conditions remain especially uncertain and our views depend on the flow of data; as more pieces of the puzzle emerge, the way we assemble it is subject to change. Conviction Levels In Uncertain Times You are among the optimists at BCA and have been for a while. Are the equity selloff and the current slowdown making you nervous? Do you still see the glass as half-full? It’s our job to be nervous. The way we see the money management ecosystem, managers are responsible for worrying for their clients and we’re responsible for worrying for the managers. We continually ask how we could be getting it wrong and actively seek out information that challenges our view. We are neither foolish nor inexperienced enough to be overconfident; we’re always looking over our shoulder and our head has been on a swivel ever since the pandemic arrived. Related Report  US Investment StrategyIt All Depends On Whom You Ask The recent equity decline and growth deceleration have not materially changed our already low conviction level. All investment researchers look backward to look forward. That is to say that we review past interactions between macro variables and financial assets for guidance about future interactions. We even build regression models to formalize our empirical studies, though we keep them in their proper place. We know that models have blind spots and do not rely solely on them any more than we would change lanes on the highway based only on a glance at our rear-view mirrors. A central challenge of the last two-plus years has been that real-time conditions are so unusual that there is little historical framework for evaluating them. Much of what has occurred over that stretch has lacked a close precedent: vast swaths of the economy had not previously been idled in the interest of public safety; Congress did not appropriate 25% of a year’s GDP for distribution to households, businesses and state and local governments in any prior 13-month stretch; job losses had not been so starkly concentrated among unskilled workers while leaving knowledge workers largely unscathed; aggregate household savings and net worth have never risen so much, so fast; and central banks have launched campaigns that would make William McChesney Martin’s head spin, much less Walter Bagehot’s. The scope of the economic challenges and the novelty of the policy responses limit the usefulness of analytical methods that depend on the notion that the future will largely resemble the past. It is therefore too soon to tell if we should be more nervous. As we write, the S&P 500 has blasted 8% off its intraday lows five sessions ago and incoming economic data continue to resist a blanket bullish or bearish interpretation. We empathize with investors’ impatience; one would think that the key macro questions should be settled by now, given how long we’ve been discussing them. They are not settled, though, and we will revisit open debates as new data arrive. The Term Structure Of Inflation Expectations Real-time inflation prints are terrible and much more concerning than tame inflation expectations. Why are you focusing almost exclusively on inflation expectations? We have been keeping a close eye on the course of inflation expectations over time, or their term structure, ever since inflation began to emerge from its extended hibernation. As unsettling as it has been to witness 40-year highs in inflation, we have taken solace from the fact that market prices have uniformly indicated that businesses and investors expect that inflation will recede to familiar levels over the longer run. As indicated by the arrows in the right-hand column, long-term inflation expectations are considerably lower than near-term expectations as implied by the TIPS and nominal Treasury markets (Table 1, top panel) and directly indicated by CPI swaps (Table 1, bottom panel). Expressed as a continuous time series, neither the Treasury (Chart 1, top panel) nor the CPI swaps (Chart 1, bottom panel) market has wavered in its view that high inflation will not persist beyond the near term. Table 1The Inflations Expectations Curve Is Sharply Inverted Another Round Of Questions Another Round Of Questions   That is important because it suggests that neither businesses nor investors will need to adjust their strategies to accommodate a lasting upward inflection in price pressures. For businesses, that means that they don’t foresee a need to fight tooth and nail to pass along increased costs. Investors continue to be content with nominal long-term Treasury yields vastly below current year-over year inflation, investment-grade corporate yields that are about half of it and high-yield corporate yields that are a percentage point below it. Chart 1Investors And Businesses Don't Foresee A Lasting Change ... Another Round Of Questions Another Round Of Questions ​​​​​​ Chart 2... And Neither Do Households ... And Neither Do Households ... And Neither Do Households Although high inflation seems to have spooked the households responding to University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey takers, they remain unperturbed about its long-run direction. The difference between University of Michigan respondents’ long-run and near-term inflation expectations remains around multi-year lows (Chart 2), as 5-year expectations have held steady at 3% for three straight months. The inference that University of Michigan survey respondents expect high inflation to be fleeting is supported by their views on the advisability of big-ticket purchases. The share of respondents who deem it a bad time to buy a car because prices are (temporarily) high remains near all-time high levels (Chart 3, middle panel), while those who think buying now is auspicious because prices won’t come down is near all-time lows (Chart 3, top panel). The difference between the two continues to set record lows (Chart 3, bottom panel). The consensus view on consumer durables purchases is the same – now is a bad time to buy because high prices won’t last (Chart 4). The economic takeaway is that consumers are willing to bide their time until prices come back to earth and will not exacerbate upward price pressures by clamoring to buy before prices go even higher. Chart 3Consumers Are Willing To Wait Out Supply-And-Demand Imbalances, ... Consumers Are Willing To Wait Out Supply-And-Demand Imbalances, ... Consumers Are Willing To Wait Out Supply-And-Demand Imbalances, ... Chart 4... Instead Of Exacerbating Them By Rushing To Buy Now ... Instead Of Exacerbating Them By Rushing To Buy Now ... Instead Of Exacerbating Them By Rushing To Buy Now Bottom Line: Economic participants adjust their behavior based on their long-run inflation expectations. If they think the current fever will break, businesses, investors and consumers will not act in ways that fuel a self-reinforcing cycle in which high prices beget still higher prices. The longer that economic actors expect inflation pressures will abate, the greater the chance that they will. Interest Rates And The Fed You’ve been calling for interest rates to stop backing up, but it still feels like they only want to rise. It has been quite a ride from 1.72% on 10-year Treasuries from the beginning of March to 3.12% at the beginning of May, but we have gotten 40 basis points of retracement over the last three weeks (Chart 5). The nearly unanimous view that rates would keep rising was a contrarian sign that the move may have been played out. Reduced expectations for Fed rate hikes have also played a part in bringing yields down. After peaking at 3.45% on May 3rd, the day before the FOMC wrapped up its May meeting, the expected fed funds rate in twelve months is down to 3.09% (Chart 6). Chart 5The Benchmark Treasury Yield ... The Benchmark Treasury Yield ... The Benchmark Treasury Yield ... ​​​​​ Chart 6... Has Moved With Rate-Hike Expectations ... Has Moved With Rate-Hike Expectations ... Has Moved With Rate-Hike Expectations ​​​​​​ Chart 7Everything, All At Once Everything, All At Once Everything, All At Once While the prevailing view among commentators is that the Fed waited too long to begin removing monetary accommodation, financial markets have moved swiftly to price in a policy shift. Chair Powell and his colleagues have been taking every opportunity to communicate their seriousness about combating inflation and financial conditions have responded to their public relations campaign without delay (Chart 7, top panel) – yields have backed up (Chart 7, second panel), spreads have widened (Chart 7, third panel), stocks have fallen (Chart 7, fourth panel) and the dollar has surged (Chart 7, bottom panel). Our Global Investment Strategy colleagues argue that the Fed may soon perceive that tighter financial conditions threaten its soft landing goals and dial back the hawkish rhetoric if inflation eases in line with our house view. The Fed’s hawkish surprises might be behind us for the time being. Lightning Round You have argued that households will be more inclined to spend their excess pandemic savings than hoard them and that those savings will provide a buffer against inflation’s bite. The latest Personal Income Report showed that April’s savings rate was nearly half of its pre-pandemic level; are you now worried that the savings are going too fast to cushion the economy? We stand by our view that households will spend their excess savings and continue to think our guesstimate that they will spend half of them will prove to be conservative. We consider the declining savings rate – 6% in January, 5.9% in February, 5% in March and 4.4% in April, versus February 2020’s 8.3% – to be good news, indicating that socked-away stimulus payments are having the beneficial time-release effect of keeping the consumer afloat despite high inflation. We calculate that April’s accelerated consumption as a share of disposable income amounted to $60 billion of dis-savings relative to our no-pandemic baseline estimate, knocking excess savings down to $2,150 billion. At that rate, one-half of the excess balance will last for another 17 months. Will labor force participation ever get back to its pre-pandemic levels? If it doesn’t, upward wage pressures could be greater than you expect, and a wage-price spiral could be brewing. No one has satisfactorily determined why participation remains muted. It seems most likely to us that COVID fears, as indicated by the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, are the principal driver. Lavish stimulus measures may have played a role as well, though their tailwind has surely faded for households at the bottom rungs of the wealth and income distribution. We expect that participation will recover across the rest of the year as COVID morphs from acute threat to manageable nuisance and as the low-income workers who account for the shrinkage in the labor force (Chart 8) are pressed by financial exigency to return to the grind (Chart 9). Chart 8Those Who Have Left The Work Force ... Those Who Have Left The Work Force ... Those Who Have Left The Work Force ... ​​​​​ Chart 9... May Have To Come Back Soon ... May Have To Come Back Soon ... May Have To Come Back Soon ​​​​​​ What is your view on inflation? If you think recession fears are overblown, you must not think inflation will be bad enough over the rest of the year to induce the Fed to kill the expansion. The difference between our view and the recession-is-imminent crowd’s is merely one of timing. We expect inflation will abate enough over the rest of the year that the Fed won’t have to break up the party until late 2023/early 2024. We do think, however, that Congress and the Fed overstimulated demand in the wake of the pandemic and sowed the seeds for the eventual end of the expansion and the bull markets in equities and credit. We don’t think the overstimulation will manifest itself until late 2023 or early 2024, however, so we expect that the expansion and the bull markets in risk assets will trundle along for another year. Housekeeping We planned to dial up the risk exposures in our ETF portfolio this week, in line with BCA’s recent tactical equity upgrade to overweight from neutral. It isn’t always easy to make tactical recommendations on a weekly publication schedule and while waiting out a five-and-a-half-hour flight delay at O'Hare last Friday, we wished that we could have pushed a button to increase our equity allocation. Now that the S&P 500 has rallied over 6.5% week-to-date as we go to press, we are going to hold off on making any adjustments until next week at the earliest. With apparent short-term resistance just 1% away at 4,200 (the previous triple-bottom support level), we expect that we may find a better entry point and are willing to wait patiently for it.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com  

Executive Summary Equities Are Closer To Capitulation What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat The market appears to be moving away from concerns about inflation toward worries about slowing growth. The initial stage of the sell-off in risky assets, pricing in tighter monetary policy, may now be complete. The next and final stage of the bear market will be pricing in a global growth slump. Slowing growth is not yet built into consensus expectations, neither for earnings nor GDP – downgrades and negative surprises are in store. The US consumers are under duress and are unlikely to lend a “spending hand” to support economic growth. Inflation is easing. Positive inflation surprises will ignite powerful rallies but are unlikely to alter the trajectory of monetary policy. The Fed “put” is no longer at play – falling equities will help the Fed tame inflation via the “wealth effect”. The next chapter for the market is down but in a “fat and flat” manner, with “growth disappointment” equity sell-off being punctuated by short-lived rallies on hopes that the Fed may change its course. Our updated Equities Capitulation Scorecard is marginally more positive on equities but is still signaling that not all conditions for a sustainable rebound are yet met.​​​​​​ Bottom Line: Repricing of tighter monetary policy is likely complete. The next leg down for equities will be pricing in slower economic growth and a potential earnings recession. We expect the market to be “fat and flat” over the next few months, i.e., alternating between pullbacks and short-lived rallies. Monetary Tightening Is Probably Priced In Until now, the sell-off in equity markets was a repricing of tighter monetary conditions. One may argue that most of the damage has been done: Since the beginning of the year, the NASDAQ is down 30% while the S&P is down 20%. Nearly 34% of stocks in the S&P 500, and 14% of stocks in the NASDAQ are trading below their 200-day moving average. Does this mean that the sell-off is over and that hawkish Fed fears are overdone? After all, over the past few days, Fed rate expectations appear to have topped out (Chart 1), and Treasury yields have come down 37 bps from their recent peak to 2.75% (Chart 2). Monetary conditions have tightened substantially year to date, although more tightening is still on the way (Chart 3). The Citi Inflation Surprise Index has turned decisively down (Chart 4) and some of the series most affected by supply chain bottlenecks, such as shipping costs, have been deflating. Chart 1Fed Rate Expectations Have Stabilized Fed Rate Expectations Have Stabilized Fed Rate Expectations Have Stabilized Chart 2Treasury Yield Has Come Down Treasury Yield Has Come Down Treasury Yield Has Come Down Chart 3Financial Conditions Are Getting Tighter Financial Conditions Are Getting Tighter Financial Conditions Are Getting Tighter Chart 4Inflation Is Starting To Surprise To The Downside Inflation Is Starting To Surprise To The Downside Inflation Is Starting To Surprise To The Downside Is it clear sailing for longer-duration assets like growth equities? Not so fast: While much adversity has been priced in, a sustainable rebound in equities is probably still elusive. Worries About Economic Growth Are Starting To Dominate The Market Narrative We posit that long-term rates have come down because the markets have moved on from worries about raging inflation and the hawkish Fed to concerns about a downshift in growth both in the US and globally. As such, both earnings and economic growth disappointments are on the cards, potentially leading the markets down further. Overall, the next phase of the sell-off in global risk assets will likely be characterized by heightened growth worries. This phase will also mark the final chapter of this bear market. Thunder Clouds On The Horizon During the J.P. Morgan Investor Day, Jamie Dimon, in his otherwise upbeat speech, said that there are “thunder clouds on the horizon.” Indeed, the list of investor concerns is long: A global growth slowdown, build-up of inventories, inflation damaging consumer purchasing power, the soaring costs of raw materials, declining corporate profitability, tightening monetary conditions and, to top it all, a stronger dollar. However, from Dimon’s standpoint, these are just that: Clouds that could dissipate at any time. Of course, there is always a chance that things will turn out better than expected, and a “softish landing” is on the cards. We hope Dimon is right… Economic Growth Surprises To The Downside For now, our working assumption is that the economy is still strong, but growth is decelerating. To us, this is a story about the second derivative. The troubling part is that slowing growth is not yet built into consensus expectations: It is confounding that GDP growth forecasts have still barely budged from the beginning of the year and do not yet reflect all the headwinds listed above (Chart 5). Moreover, the Q1-2022 GDP revision has shown that growth was weaker than initially reported, with the latest reading of -1.5%, growth reduced by investments weaker than initially anticipated.  The Atlanta Fed Nowcast GDP tracker points to only 1.8% annualized growth in Q2-2022. Elevated expectations are setting investors up for disappointment, which will lead to the next leg of the sell-off. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index has recently shifted into negative territory (Chart 6). Chart 5GDP Forecasts Need To Be Revised Down Further GDP Forecasts Need To Be Revised Down Further GDP Forecasts Need To Be Revised Down Further Chart 6Economic Data Disappoints Economic Data Disappoints Economic Data Disappoints What is the evidence of slowing growth? Walking down the main street of any major city and seeing restaurants overflowing with customers and people buzzing in and out of shops, one may think that the economy is booming. Yet, there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. The ISM PMI is on a downward trajectory, hitting 55 in May, which was also 2.4 points below consensus. The S&P Global (former Markit) May flash PMI readings have also declined from 59.2 in April to 57.5 in May. This is hardly surprising: As night follows day, monetary tightening leads to slowing growth (Chart 7). Inventory overhang: It is noteworthy that the ISM PMI new orders-to-inventories ratio (NOI) is in a free-fall: It is foreshadowing further weakness in manufacturing activity as demand for durable goods is fading (Chart 8). May durable goods orders were also soft. Chart 7Monetary Tightening Leads To Slower Growth Monetary Tightening Leads To Slower Growth Monetary Tightening Leads To Slower Growth Chart 8Inventories Are Building Up Inventories Are Building Up Inventories Are Building Up   Freight volumes are also contracting, pointing to weakening growth, and are consistent with the NOI ratio (Chart 9). Global growth is also slowing as evidenced by the contraction in global trade volumes (Chart 10): US and European demand for goods ex-autos is shrinking following the pandemic binge, while China’s recovery has been delayed. Chart 9Freight Volumes Also Point To Weaker Growth Freight Volumes Also Point To Weaker Growth Freight Volumes Also Point To Weaker Growth Chart 10Global Export Volumes Are Set To Shrink Global Export Volumes Are Set To Shrink Global Export Volumes Are Set To Shrink Economic growth is slowing, and more negative surprises are in store. Earnings Growth Expectation Have Gotta Come Down While the stock market is not the economy, they are closely intertwined. One of the key differences between the two, however, is that the US economy is dominated by services, while the S&P 500 has higher exposure to goods. With the current demand for services outstripping demand for goods, the economy should fare better than the market (Chart 11). Therefore, it does not bode well for S&P 500 earnings expectations that the Q1-2022 GDP revision flagged earnings contracting 2.3% on a quarter-on-quarter basis, under the weight of slowing sales and rising costs. And while the S&P 500 Q1-22 results were just fine, the ratio of negative/positive guidance for Q2-22 was roughly two to one. Slowing growth at home and abroad, rising costs of raw materials and wages, as well as fading demand for goods will weigh on earnings over the balance of the year (Chart 12). Chart 11Slowing Growth Will Weigh On Earnings Slowing Growth Will Weigh On Earnings Slowing Growth Will Weigh On Earnings Chart 12US EPS Expectations Have Not Yet Been Downgraded US EPS Expectations Have Not Yet Been Downgraded US EPS Expectations Have Not Yet Been Downgraded Also, there is the not-so-small issue of a strong dollar, which has gained nearly 13% since January 2021. This makes US goods more expensive and also reduces companies’ bottom lines via the currency translation effect. According to our rough estimates, every percentage change in the USD reduces earnings growth by roughly 33 bps, i.e., 4.3% off earnings caused by the entire dollar move. We expect slower top-line growth and shrinking profit margins to translate into flat to negative real earnings growth over the next 12 months. Importantly, US economic growth does not need to contract for a profit recession to take hold. However, S&P 500 EPS expectations have not yet been downgraded and 12-month forward EPS growth expectations are at about 10%; despite the recent market rout, US stocks have not yet priced in negative profit growth. However, either downgrades or earnings disappointments are coming, neither of which bodes well for US equity performance. Earnings growth expectations need to come down to reflect reality on the ground.   Valuations Are Only Optically Cheap And one more salient point: If earnings expectations are set to unrealistically high levels, then the recent forward multiple of the S&P 500 is not 17x, but 2 to 3 points higher, and, voilà, US equities no longer look cheap. Will US Consumers Save The Day? Perhaps things are not as dire as we describe. After all, US consumers are healthy, their balance sheets are pristine, and retail sales look good. There is also the not-so-small issue of $2.2 trillion in excess savings. This argument rings true. Chart 13Negative Real Wage Growth Is Sapping Consumer Confidence Negative Real Wage Growth Is Sapping Consumer Confidence Negative Real Wage Growth Is Sapping Consumer Confidence However, inflation continues to put pressure on US consumers. Negative real wage growth is sapping their confidence (Chart 13) and is cutting into their purchasing power. Soaring inflation also makes people concerned about the future as they watch their life savings melt away. Underwhelming reports from Walmart and Target are cases in point: Lower-income consumers are shifting spending away from discretionary items and towards necessities. Strong reports from Dollar General and Family Dollar indicate that many Americans are price sensitive and are shopping around. Home Depot commented that fewer customers walked through its doors (but the ones that did, tended to spend more in nominal terms). And retail sales are reported in nominal terms: Rising prices inflate growth rates. Indeed, excess savings may help achieve the “soft landing.” However, there are early signs that either many lower-income Americans have spent the money, or their savings accounts are earmarked for a rainy day, and many people aim to spend only what they earn. However, higher-income Americans are still willing to spend, but this group is shifting spending away from goods and towards services, which is consistent with strong results from the US airline carriers, which report a significant gain in pricing power. A similar message came from both Nordstrom and Macy’s. Clearly, American consumers are highly heterogeneous, and there is a significant bifurcation between “haves” and “have nots.” It is, however, concerning that many of the wealthier Americans have lost a significant percentage of their nest eggs in the stock market. The theory goes that the wealth effect is one of the main mechanisms through which monetary tightening affects consumer demand (Chart 14). It stands to reason that it is only a matter of time (unless the stock market rebounds) before even the wealthier cohorts start tightening their belts, dampening demand for consumer services. Chart 14Nest Eggs Are Dwindling Nest Eggs Are Dwindling Nest Eggs Are Dwindling Another obvious implication is the effect of dwindling investments on the housing market: Americans are watching their down payments disappear, with cash buyers subject to the same negative forces. The US consumer is under duress, and the more embedded the inflation and the deeper the market rout, the greater proportion of the US population is affected, making them less and less likely to lend a “spending hand” to support economic growth.  Inflation Will Turn: Too Little, Too Late One may also argue that inflation will turn, which would help both the economy and the markets, and will reset the Fed trajectory. Inflation will come down assisted by the arithmetic of the base effect. Supply chain bottlenecks are clearing, shipping costs are coming down, and demand is weakening – all of these developments point to inflation coming down over the next few months. However, this process may be rather slow: Inflation permeates the entire economy (Chart 15), and there are also signs that a vicious wage-price spiral is taking hold (Chart 16). Therefore, inflation is unlikely to revert to levels that the Fed and the US consumer will consider acceptable any time soon. Chart 15Inflation Is Broad-based And It Will Take Time For It To Revert To Acceptable Levels Inflation Is Broad-based And It Will Take Time For It To Revert To Acceptable Levels Inflation Is Broad-based And It Will Take Time For It To Revert To Acceptable Levels Chart 16Wage-Price Spiral Is Taking Hold Wage-Price Spiral Is Taking Hold Wage-Price Spiral Is Taking Hold Just recently, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell reiterated the Fed’s commitment to hiking interest rates until core consumer price inflation gets closer to 2%. Notably, in his speech at a WSJ event on May 17, Powell noted: “This is not a time for tremendously nuanced readings of inflation… We need to see inflation coming down in a convincing way. Until we do, we’ll keep going.” Given that US core consumer price inflation is currently at around 6.2%, a mere rollover in core inflation from current levels will not be enough for the Fed to tone down its hawkishness. While we believe that the Fed will be steadfast in its objective to combat inflation, any positive news on inflation will be perceived by a hopeful market as a sign that the Fed may alter its course, which would lead to a rally, only to be punctured by the negative news from either growth or the Fed. Positive inflation surprises will ignite powerful rallies but are unlikely to alter the trajectory of monetary policy. The Fed “Put” Is No More The Fed “put” is no longer at play as the Fed has signaled that it cares far more about combating inflation than the performance of the stock market. In fact, falling equities will play into Powell’s hand as a negative wealth effect is likely to put a lid on inflationary pressures, with the wealthier Americans paying the toll.   When Bad News Is Good News We make a case that disappointing growth will be the next chapter of this market saga. One might wonder if poor growth readings would actually be perceived by the market as a positive: Not only does disappointing growth put downward pressure on Treasury yields but also creates an expectation that the Fed will pause and monetary policy will end up looser than initially projected. Our take is that stable or lower rates will offer support for equities, and that is the reason why we conclude that the first stage of the repricing is complete. Will slower growth invite a more gentle and considerate Fed? We don’t think so as the Fed has already telegraphed that it now aims for a “softish landing” and that fighting inflation will incur some “pain”. Investment Implications Chart 17In 1980-82, The Market Was "Fat And Flat" In 1980-82, The Market Was "Fat And Flat" In 1980-82, The Market Was "Fat And Flat" We expect the market to be “fat and flat” over the next few months, i.e., alternating between pullbacks and short-term rallies. Rallies are frequent during bear markets and other severe corrections and are generally significant in magnitude. Markets showed a similar pattern in 1980-1982 as Chairman Volker was battling inflation (Chart 17). The bull market took hold only in 1982. Rallies will follow pullbacks because the market is not yet ready for a sustainable rebound. This first leg of the correction was pricing in tighter monetary policy. The next leg down will be the market pricing in slowing growth both at home and abroad, corporate earnings disappointments, and weakening consumer demand. Over the next few months, the market is likely to trend down but in a “fat and flat” manner, with “growth disappointment” equity sell-off being punctuated by fast and furious rallies on hopes that inflation is abating, and that a gentler, data-driven Fed would be more supportive of the economy and the markets. Thus, with markets looking oversold, a short-lived rally is now likely. It will be accompanied by a change in leadership: Energy and Materials will give back gains, while Big Tech and other cyclicals will bounce. And US equities may still plumb new lows on the back of economic growth or earnings growth disappointments. The market will also not take it kindly if inflation turns out to be stickier than expected and is accompanied by slowing growth: Stagflation is one of the most challenging regimes for US equities (Chart 18). Sticky inflation would call for an even more aggressive rate hiking cycle. Chart 18Stagflation Would Be The Worst Possible Outcome For The Markets What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat Table 1Equities Are Closer To Capitulation What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat We believe that a sustainable rebound will take place once most of the negative “news” is priced in. Compared to two months ago, we conclude that the first part of the adjustment process, i.e., pricing in tighter monetary policy, has run its course. Now it is a matter of adjusting growth expectations. Our “Equities Capitulation” scorecard (“Have We Hit Rock Bottom” report), adds up to -1, a slightly less negative reading than the -2 just a few weeks ago — but a reading which still signals negative equity returns (Table 1). We conclude that staying close to the benchmark, with a small tilt towards defensive growth, remains the most sensible strategy.   Bottom Line The first stage of the market correction is probably complete and tighter monetary policy is getting priced in. The next leg down for equities will be pricing in slower economic growth and a potential earnings recession. We expect the market to be “fat and flat” over the next several months as rallies ignited by soothing inflation readings are punctured by growth disappointments and a resolute Fed.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com Recommended Allocation Recommended Allocation: Addendum What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat What Is Next For US Equities? They Will Be Fat And Flat

Executive Summary Credit Demand Collapsed Credit Demand Collapsed Credit Demand Collapsed Business activity data from April showed a broad-based contraction in China’s economy. Credit growth tumbled as demand collapsed. Bank loan expansion slowed by the most in nearly five years and annual change in new household loans declined to an all-time low. Exports decelerated sharply in April. China’s export sector faces headwinds from Omicron-related supply chain disruptions and weakening global demand for goods. Export growth will rebound following the resumption of business activity in China’s major cities, but is set to decelerate from 2021 as external demand for goods weakens. The PBOC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate (LPR) by 15bps last Friday, following a cut in the floor rate of first-home mortgages to 20bp below the benchmark. These moves will help to arrest the ongoing deep contraction in the property market. However, these policies alone will not generate strong recovery in housing demand, amid near-term Covid-related disruptions and dampened household income growth. Barring major lockdowns, China’s economy will likely bottom around mid-2022. We expect a muted recovery in the second half of the year, despite an acceleration in policy easing. From a cyclical perspective, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to Chinese onshore stocks in a global portfolio. Bottom Line: China’s economy has been hit by a relapse in demand and Covid-induced production disruptions. The economy will likely bottom by mid-year, but the ensuing recovery may be subdued. A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022 A broad-based contraction in China’s economy in April reflects hit by a combination of slumping domestic demand and Covid-related disruptions. Growth in retail sales and industrial production contracted from a year ago and home sales shrunk further. Economic activity will rebound when the current Covid wave is under control and lockdown restrictions are lifted. However, we expect a much more muted recovery in the second half of this year compared with two years ago when China’s economy staged an impressive V-shaped recovery as it emerged from the first wave of lockdowns in spring 2020. Presently, reported virus cases have steadily declined in cities in the Yangtze River region, including Shanghai which aims to lift its lockdown on June 1st. The number of regions and cities under stringent confinement also fell. However, China firmly maintains its dynamic zero-Covid policy, which means tight mobility restrictions and some forms of lockdowns will occur across the country on a rolling basis going forward.  China’s leadership has stepped up its pro-growth policy measures, such as a 15bps cut in the 5-year LPR last week. Given the pace of credit expansion collapsed in April and private-sector sentiment remains in the doldrums, a recovery will not be imminent or strong despite this rate cut (Chart 1). In the near term, the poor economic outlook in China, coupled with jitters in the global equity market, will continue to depress the performance of Chinese stocks in absolute terms (Chart 1, bottom panel). From a cyclical perspective, we maintain our neutral view on China’s onshore stocks and underweight view on China’s investable stocks within a global equity portfolio. China’s economy is set to underwhelm investor expectations and stock prices probably are unlikely to outperform their global counterparts (Chart 2). Chart 1Weak Economic Fundamentals Undermine Stock Performance Weak Economic Fundamentals Undermine Stock Performance Weak Economic Fundamentals Undermine Stock Performance Chart 2Too Early To Upgrade Chinese Stocks In A Global Portfolio Too Early To Upgrade Chinese Stocks In A Global Portfolio Too Early To Upgrade Chinese Stocks In A Global Portfolio Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Credit Growth Slowed Notably As Loan Demand Slumps Credit expansion in April relapsed, as lockdowns exacerbated the weakness in business activity and further depressed the demand for credit. Bank loan growth plummeted to its worst level in almost five years (Chart 3). Notably, annual change in new household loans origination contracted the most since data collection began because Covid lockdowns and the property market slump sapped consumers’ willingness to borrow (Chart 4). In addition, household propensity to spend declined to an all-time low, highlighting that bleak sentiment will continue to curb demand for loans (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, a rapid deceleration in corporate medium-and long-term loans versus soaring short-term bill financing indicates corporates’ weak demand for credit and investment (Chart 5). The deterioration in corporate sentiment is also reflected in business condition surveys (Chart 6). Chart 3Subdued TSF Growth Due To Collapsed Loan Demand Subdued TSF Growth Due To Collapsed Loan Demand Subdued TSF Growth Due To Collapsed Loan Demand Chart 4Annual Change In New Household Loans Contracted The Most In April Annual Change In New Household Loans Contracted The Most In April Annual Change In New Household Loans Contracted The Most In April Chart 5Corporate Demand For Credit Remains in The Doldrums … Corporate Demand For Credit Remains in The Doldrums... Corporate Demand For Credit Remains in The Doldrums... Chart 6... And Unlikely To Turn Around Soon Despite Accommodative Monetary Conditions ...And Unlikely To Turn Around Soon Despite Accommodative Monetary Conditions ...And Unlikely To Turn Around Soon Despite Accommodative Monetary Conditions Chart 7Early Signs Of Authorities Loosening Their Grip On Shadow Banking Early Signs Of Authorities Loosening Their Grip On Shadow Banking Early Signs Of Authorities Loosening Their Grip On Shadow Banking Local government bond issuance unexpectedly moderated in April after most of the front-loaded local government special purpose bonds (SPBs) was issued in Q1. In the January-April period this year, the amount of SPBs issuance was RMB 1.41 trillion. The SPBs quota for 2022 is 3.65 trillion, along with 1.1 trillion of SPB proceeds that can be carried over from last year. Given that most of the planned SPBs will be issued by the end of June, we will likely see a peak in SPB issuance in Q2.This entails about RMB 3 trillion of SPBs will be issued in May-June. The intensified SPB issuance will underpin total social financing (TSF) growth in the next two to three months. However, barring an increase in the SPB quota or an approval to issue Special Treasury bonds as occurred in 2H 2020, the support from government bonds issuance to TSF will likely decline sharply in the second half of this year. Notably, there has been stabilization in shadow bank financing growth, although it remains below zero (Chart 7). It may be an early sign that China’s leadership is allowing some shadow banking activity; a meaningful relaxation of local governments’ shadow banking activity would be positive for infrastructure investment. Exports: Weaker Than Last Year China’s exports growth softened sharply in April, led by an extensive reduction in shipments to major developed markets (Chart 8). In addition, exports by product group also indicate a wide ranging slowdown in both exports of lower-end consumer goods and tech products (Chart 9). The softness in China’s exports reflects Omicron-related supply chain and logistical disruptions along with a weakening external demand for goods. Chart 8China's Exports To Developed Markets Fell China's Exports To Developed Markets Fell China's Exports To Developed Markets Fell Chart 9A Broad-Based Decline Among Categories of Exported Goods A Broad-Based Decline Among Categories of Exported Goods A Broad-Based Decline Among Categories of Exported Goods Chart 10Weakening Global Demand For Goods Weakening Global Demand For Goods Weakening Global Demand For Goods South Korean exports, a bellwether for global trade, have also been easing in line with Chinese exports, which indicates dwindling global demand for manufacturing goods (Chart 10). In addition, the sharp underperformance of global cyclical stocks versus defensives heralds a worldwide manufacturing downturn (Chart 11). Falling US demand for consumer goods corroborates diminishing external demand (Chart 12). China’s exports will likely rebound from its April levels when manufacturing production resumes in Shanghai and supply-chain interruptions subside in the Yangtze River Delta region. Nonetheless, we expect a contraction in exports this year, as global consumer demand for goods dwindles. Chart 11Global Manufacturing Sector Is Heading Into A Downturn Global Manufacturing Sector Is Heading Into A Downturn Global Manufacturing Sector Is Heading Into A Downturn Chart 12External Demand For Chinese Export Goods Is Dwindling External Demand For Chinese Export Goods Is Dwindling External Demand For Chinese Export Goods Is Dwindling Recovery In China’s Manufacturing Sector Will Be Muted In 2H 2022 Manufacturing production growth contracted in April at the fastest rate since data collection began. The contraction was due to Covid-induced production troubles and weak demand (Chart 13). Chart 13Manufacturing Output Growth Contracted The Most Since Data Reporting Began Manufacturing Output Growth Contracted The Most Since Data Reporting Began Manufacturing Output Growth Contracted The Most Since Data Reporting Began Chart 14Mounting Product Inventory Mounting Product Inventory Mounting Product Inventory Chart 15Chinese Manufacturing Output And Capacity Utilization Face Headwinds From Weakening Exports Chinese Manufacturing Output And Capacity Utilization Face Headwinds From Weakening Exports Chinese Manufacturing Output And Capacity Utilization Face Headwinds From Weakening Exports The inventory of finished products soared to the highest point in the past 10 years due to port closures and domestic logistical issues (Chart 14).  Even when the impact of the current Covid wave wanes in the second half of this year, destocking pressures will dampen manufacturing production. In addition, Chinese manufacturing output and capacity utilization face headwinds from decelerating exports (Chart 15). While upstream industries, such as the mining, resources and materials sectors, benefit from strong pricing trends, profit margins for middle-to-downstream manufacturers remain very subdued (Chart 16). The large gap between prices for producer goods and consumer goods is a reflection of the inability of manufacturers to pass on higher input costs to consumers (Chart 17). Elevated input cost pressures and, hence, disappointing corporate profits, will continue to curb manufacturing investments and production in 2H 2022. Chart 16Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Are Further Squeezed Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Are Further Squeezed Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Are Further Squeezed Chart 17Manufacturers Are Under Rising Cost Pressures Manufacturers Are Under Rising Cost Pressures Manufacturers Are Under Rising Cost Pressures Housing Market Outlook Remains Gloomy The PBOC lowered the 5-year LPR by 15bps from 4.6% to 4.45% on May 20, the largest LPR rate cut since 2019. The easing measure followed a reduction in first-home mortgages to 20bps below the benchmark announced on May 15. The national-level mortgage rate floor and benchmark rate drops are clear signals that policymakers are ramping up policy easing measures in the property sector, given the failure of previous efforts to revive housing demand. Historically, mortgage rates tend to lead household loans and home sales by two quarters, suggesting that the housing market may see some improvement by year-end (Chart 18). However, as we pointed out in previous reports, without large-scale and direct fiscal transfers to consumers to boost household income, these housing measures will unlikely generate a strong rebound in household sentiment and home purchases (Chart 19). Chart 18Mortgage Rates Tend To Lead Consumer Loans And Home Sales By Two Quarters Mortgage Rates Tend To Lead Consumer Loans And Home Sales By Two Quarters Mortgage Rates Tend To Lead Consumer Loans And Home Sales By Two Quarters Chart 19Housing Market Sentiment Shows Little Signs Of Revival Housing Market Sentiment Shows Little Signs Of Revival Housing Market Sentiment Shows Little Signs Of Revival Lockdowns in April exacerbated the slump in all housing market indicators, with the exception of a moderate improvement in floor space completed (Chart 20). Home prices, which tend to lead housing starts, decelerated even more in April following seven consecutive month-to-month declines. Moreover, our housing price diffusion index suggests that home prices on a year-on-year basis will contract in the next six to nine months, a further drop from the current 0.7% growth (Chart 21, top panel). Falling home prices will curb housing starts and construction activity (Chart 21, bottom panel). In addition, real estate developers’ financing conditions have not improved because the “three red lines” policy is still in place and home sales have collapsed (Chart 22). Chart 20A Further Deterioration In Housing Market Indicators In April A Further Deterioration In Housing Market Indicators In April A Further Deterioration In Housing Market Indicators In April Chart 21Housing Prices Are Set To Contract In 2H 2022 Housing Prices Are Set To Contract In 2H 2022 Housing Prices Are Set To Contract In 2H 2022 Chart 22Slumping Home Sales Exacerbate Real Estate Developers’ Funding Woes Slumping Home Sales Exacerbate Real Estate Developers' Funding Woes Slumping Home Sales Exacerbate Real Estate Developers' Funding Woes   A Collapse In Household Consumption Due To Covid Confinement Measures City lockdowns have taken a heavy toll on China’s household consumption. Both retail sales and service sector business activity experienced their deepest contractions since March 2020 (Chart 23). Notably, the growth of online goods sales slipped under zero in April, below that recorded in early 2000 and the first contraction since data collection began. Furthermore, both core and service consumer prices (CPI) weakened again in April, reflecting lackluster consumer demand (Chart 24). Chart 23Chinese Retail Sales Contracted The Most Since March 2020 Chinese Retail Sales Contracted The Most Since March 2020 Chinese Retail Sales Contracted The Most Since March 2020 Chart 24Weak Core And Service CPIs Also Reflect Lackluster Household Demand Weak Core And Service CPIs Also Reflect Lackluster Household Demand Weak Core And Service CPIs Also Reflect Lackluster Household Demand Labor market dynamics went downhill rapidly. The nationwide urban unemployment rate rose to its highest level since mid-2020, while the unemployment rate among younger workers climbed to an all-time high (Chart 25). Meanwhile, sharply slowing wage growth since mid-2021 has contributed to a deceleration of household income (Chart 26). The gloomy sentiment on future income also impedes a household’s willingness to consume (Chart 27). Chart 25Labor Market Situation Is Dramatically Worse Labor Market Situation Is Dramatically Worse Labor Market Situation Is Dramatically Worse Chart 26Household Income Growth Has Been Falling Household Income Growth Has Been Falling Household Income Growth Has Been Falling All in all, China’s household consumption will be hindered not only by renewed threats from flareups in domestic COVID-19 cases, but also by a worsening labor market situation and depressed household sentiment in the medium term. Chart 27Poor Sentiment On Funture Income Contributes To Consumers' Unwillingness To Spend Poor Sentiment On Funture Income Contributes To Consumers' Unwillingness To Spend Poor Sentiment On Funture Income Contributes To Consumers' Unwillingness To Spend Table 1China Macro Data Summary A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022 A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022 Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022 A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022   Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off We tactically downgraded global equities in late February but see the current level of stock prices as offering enough upside to warrant an overweight. Global equities are now trading at 15.6-times forward earnings, and only 12.6-times outside the US. More importantly, the forces that pushed down stock prices are starting to abate: The war in Ukraine no longer seems likely to devolve into a broader conflict; the number of new Covid cases in China has fallen by half; and global inflation has peaked. The next 18 months of falling inflation and receding recession fears could see stocks recover much of their losses. The “Last Hurrah” for equities is coming. We continue to think that over a 5-year horizon, bond yields will rise from current levels, value stocks will outperform growth stocks, and crypto prices will fall. However, countertrend rallies are likely. To express this view, we recommend taking partial profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade recommendation (up 9.3% from an initial entry yield of 1.45% on June 30, 2021). We are also halving our long global value/growth position (up 20.1% since inception on December 10, 2020) and our short Bitcoin position (up 98% based on our exponential shorting technique). Bottom Line: Global equities are heading towards a “last Hurrah” starting in the second half of this year. Tactically upgrade stocks to overweight.   Feature Dear Client, We published a Special Alert early this afternoon tactically upgrading global equities to overweight. As promised, the enclosed report elaborates on our view change. Best regards, Peter Berezin Restore Tactical Overweight On Global Equities Chart 1Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off We tactically downgraded global equities from overweight to neutral on February 28th. The war in Ukraine, the Covid outbreak in China, and most importantly, the rise in bond yields have kept us on the sidelines ever since. At this point, however, the outlook for stocks has brightened, and thus we are restoring our tactical (3-month) overweight to stocks so that it is consistent with our bullish 12-month cyclical view. First, valuations have discounted much of the bad news. After the recent sell-off, global equities are trading at 15.6-times forward earnings (Chart 1). Outside the US, they trade at only 12.6-times forward earnings. Second, the forces that pushed down stock prices are starting to abate. The war in Ukraine is approaching a stalemate, with Russian troops unable to take much of the country, let alone seriously threaten regional neighbours. A European embargo on Russian oil is likely but will be watered down significantly before it is implemented. European officials have shied away from banning Russian natural gas, an action that would have much more severe economic implications. While still very high in absolute terms, December-2022 European natural gas futures are down 36% from their peak on March 7 (Chart 2). The 7-day average of new Covid cases in China has fallen by more than half since late April (Chart 3). Considering that a significant fraction of China’s elderly population is unvaccinated, the authorities will continue to play whack-a-mole with the virus for the next few months (Chart 4). Fortunately, Chinese domestic production of Pfizer’s Paxlovid anti-Covid drug is starting to ramp up, which should allow for some easing in lockdown measures later this year. Chart 2European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil Chart 3Covid Cases Are Falling In China… It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight The 20th Chinese National Party Congress is slated for this fall. In the lead-up to the Congress, it is likely that the government will move to diffuse social tensions over its handling of the pandemic by showering the economy with stimulus funds. Of note, the credit impulse has already turned higher, which bodes well for both Chinese growth and growth abroad (Chart 5). Chart 4… But Low Vaccination Rates Among The Elderly Remain A Risk It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Chart 5A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World   Inflation Is Peaking On the inflation front, the data flow has gone from unambiguously bad to neutral (and perhaps even slightly positive). In the US, core goods inflation fell by 0.4% month-over-month in April, the first outright decline in core goods prices since February 2021. The Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index has crested and is now 6.4% below its January peak (Chart 6). Global shipping rates have moved up a bit recently on the back of Chinese port shutdowns but remain well below their highs earlier this year (Chart 7). Chart 6Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Chart 7Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs It Is The Composition Of Spending That Is Distorted Despite the often-heard claim that US consumer spending is well above trend, the reality is that spending is more or less in line with its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 8). It is the composition of spending that is out of line: Goods spending is well above trend while services spending is well below. One might think that only the overall level of spending should matter for inflation, and that the composition of spending is irrelevant. However, this ignores the reality that services prices are generally stickier than goods prices. Companies that sold fitness equipment during the pandemic had no qualms about raising prices. In contrast, gyms barely cut prices, figuring that lower membership fees would do little to drive new business through the door (Chart 9). Chart 8Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Chart 9Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices This asymmetry matters, and it suggests that goods inflation should continue to fall over the coming months as the composition of spending shifts back to services. A Lull In Wage Growth Wages are the most important determinant of services inflation. While it is too early to be certain, the latest data suggest that wage growth has peaked. The 3-month annualized growth rate in average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers slowed from 7.2% in the second half of 2021 to 3.8% in April (Chart 10). Assuming productivity growth of around 1.5%, this is consistent with inflation of only slightly more than 2%. Nominal wage growth is a function of both labor market slack and expected inflation. Slack should increase modestly during the rest of the year as labor participation recovers. Chart 11 shows that the labor force participation rate is still about 0.9 percentage points below where one would expect it to be, even adjusting for an aging population and increased early retirements. Chart 10Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Chart 11Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Employment has been particularly depressed among lower-wage workers (Chart 12). This should change as more low-wage workers exhaust their savings and are forced to seek employment. According to the Fed, the lowest-paid 20% of workers are the only group to have seen their bank deposits dwindle since mid-2021 (Chart 13). Chart 12More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work Chart 13The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling Inflation expectations should come down as goods inflation recedes and oil prices come off their highs (Chart 14). Bob Ryan, BCA’s Chief Commodity Strategist, sees the price of Brent averaging $86/bbl in the second half of this year, down 16% from current levels.  Central Banks Will Dial Back The Hawkishness With inflation set to fall over the remainder of the year, and financial markets showing increasing signs of stress, the Fed and other central banks will adopt a softer tone. It is worth noting that the median terminal dot for the Fed funds rate actually declined from 2.5% to 2.4% in the March Summary of Economic Projections (Chart 15). Given that markets expect US interest rates to rise to 3.25% in 2023, the Fed may not want investors to further rachet up rate expectations. Chart 14US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop Chart 15Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral   The Bank of England has already veered in a more dovish direction. Its latest forecast, released on May 5, showed real GDP contracting slightly in 2023. Based on market interest rate expectations, the BoE sees headline inflation falling to 1.5% by end-2024, below its target of 2%. Even assuming that interest rates remain at 1%, the BoE believes that inflation will only be slightly above 2% at the end of 2024, implying little need for incremental policy tightening. Not surprisingly, the pound has sold off. We have been tactically short GBP/USD but are using this opportunity to turn tactically neutral. Given favorable valuations, we like the pound over the long run. Chart 16Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend The euro area provides a good example of the dangers of focusing too much on short-term inflation dynamics. Supply-side disruptions stemming from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have weighed on European growth this year. Yet, those very same factors have also pushed up inflation. Harmonized inflation across the euro area reached 7.5% in April, the highest since the launch of the common currency. The ECB is eager to put some distance between policy rates and the zero bound. However, there is little need for significant tightening. Unlike in the US, spending in the euro area is well below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 16). If anything, more inflation would be welcome since that would give the ECB scope to bring real rates further into negative territory if economic conditions warrant it. To its credit, the Bank of Japan has stuck with its yield curve control system, even as bond yields have risen elsewhere in the world. Japan’s currency has weakened but given that inflation expectations are too low, and virtually all of its debt is denominated in yen, that is hardly a bad thing. Too Late? Has the surge in bond yields already done enough damage to the global economy to make a recession inevitable? We do not think so. As noted above, much of the recent harm has been caused by various dislocations, namely the war in Ukraine and the ongoing effects of the pandemic. As these dislocations dissipate, inflation will fall and global growth will recover. Despite the hoopla over how the US economy contracted in the first quarter, real private final sales to domestic purchasers (a measure of GDP growth that strips out the effects of changes in government spending, inventories, and net exports) rose by 3.7% at an annualized rate. As Table 1 shows, this measure of economic activity has the highest predictive power for GDP growth one-quarter ahead. Table 1A Good Sign: Real Final Sales To Private Domestic Purchasers Rose By 3.7% In Q1 It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Meanwhile, and completely overlooked at this point, S&P 500 earnings have come in 7.3% above expectations so far in Q1, with nearly 80% of S&P 500 companies surprising on the upside. Earnings are up 10.4% year-over-year in Q1. Sales are up 13.6%. Looking out to Q4 of 2022, S&P companies are expected to earn $60.93 in EPS, up 4.3% from what analysts expected at the start of the year. It is also worth noting that homebuilder stocks have basically been flat over the past 30 days, even as the S&P 500 has dropped by nearly 10% over this period. Housing is the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. With the homeowner vacancy rate at record low levels, even today’s mortgage rates may not be enough to push the economy into recession (Chart 17). Economic vulnerabilities are greater outside the US. Nevertheless, there is enough pent-up demand on both the consumer and capital spending side to sustain growth. The Last Hurrah How long will the “Goldilocks” period of falling inflation and supply-side driven growth last? Our guess is about 18 months, starting this summer and lasting until the end of 2023. Unfortunately, as is often the case, the benign environment that will emerge in the second half of this year will sow the seeds of its own demise. Real wages are currently falling across the major economies (Chart 18). That has dampened consumer confidence and spending. However, as inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. This will stoke demand, leading to a reacceleration in inflation, most likely in late 2023 or early 2024. Chart 17Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Chart 18Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries   In the end, central banks will discover that the neutral rate of interest is higher than they thought. That is good news for stocks in the short-to-medium run because it means that forthcoming rate hikes will not induce a recession. Down the road, however, a higher neutral rate means that investors will eventually need to value stocks using a higher discount rate. It also means that the disinflation we envision over the next 18 months will not last. All this puts us in the rather lonely “transitory transitory” camp: We think much of today’s high inflation will prove to be transitory, but the transitory nature of that inflation will itself be transitory. Be that as it may, the next 18 months of falling inflation and receding recession fears could see stocks recover much of their losses. For most investors, that is too long a period to sit on the sidelines. The “Last Hurrah” for equities is coming. Taking Partial Profits On Our Short Treasury, Long Value/Growth, And Short Bitcoin Trades We continue to think that over a 5-year horizon, bond yields will rise from current levels, value stocks will outperform growth stocks, and crypto prices will fall. However, with the “Last Hurrah” approaching, countertrend rallies are likely. To express this view, we recommend taking half profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade recommendation (up 9.3% from an initial entry yield of 1.45% on June 30, 2021). We are also halving our long global value/growth position (up 20.1% since inception on December 10, 2020), and our short Bitcoin position (up 98% based on our exponential shorting technique). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight

Executive SummaryIn this report, we look at recent macroeconomic developments through the lens of the business cycle, inflation, and Treasury yield regimes to select winning sectors and styles.The US economy is currently in the slowdown stage of the business cycle, with all of its hallmark attributes, such as slowing growth, elevated inflation, and rising rates.We find that, despite being a real asset, equity performance deteriorates when inflation is on the rise. However, once inflation goes past its apex, the equity rebound is swift.During periods when both inflation and rates are rising, the Energy and Materials sectors tend to outperform, while the Financials and Consumer Discretionary sectors lag.The market is currently in a “high inflation and rising rates” regime but is about to transition to the “inflation is high but falling” regime, and today’s winners may turn into tomorrow’s losers. The new winners are likely to be the Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Technology sectors.Bottom Line: As inflationary regimes shift, investors can tilt the odds of positive returns in their favor by taking a granular approach to sector selection.  We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime So far, 2022 has not been a welcoming year for investors.  All at once, slowing growth, surging inflation, impending monetary tightening, soaring energy prices, lockdowns in China, and a war in the heart of Europe have been thrown at them.With so much happening, it is difficult to separate signal from noise in the cross-currents of economic data. To make sense of the markets, we will look at recent developments through the lens of macroeconomic regimes, focusing on the stages of the business cycle, level and change in inflation, and the direction of Treasury yields.The Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown StageThe business cycle is a cornerstone of any investment decision as it underpins the fundamentals, and preordains the types of assets likely to outperform based on their level of risk and sensitivity to economic growth. The stage of the business cycle is a succinct way to summarize a wide range of economic data, such as capacity utilization, growth, policy, credit conditions, and valuation (Table 1). Table 1Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  While we are barraged with somewhat contradictory economic data, it is still fair to say that we are currently in the middle of the slowdown stage of the business cycle. Our proprietary business cycle indicator, constructed from a mix of soft and hard data across multiple economic dimensions, is trending down, consistent with that position (Chart 1). Furthermore:Growth is slowing, albeit off high levels, and the most recent disappointing ISM PMI is just another case in point. More concerning is that the new orders-to-inventories ratio has plunged (Chart 2);Unemployment is at a 2-year low of 3.6%, and there are currently two job openings per job seeker;Capacity utilization is high;Inflation is elevated;The Fed has commenced a monetary tightening cycle. Chart 1Economic Growth Is Slowing Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage   Chart 2ISM PMI Disappointed ISM PMI Disappointed ISM PMI Disappointed  As such, during slowdown stage of a business cycle, returns tend to be lower than during recovery and expansion, while volatility is elevated (Chart 3).Chart 3During A Slowdown, Equity Returns Are Paltry, While Volatility Is Elevated Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  If equities are set to deliver pedestrian returns, we need to be more discerning in our sector and style selection. In an environment of slowing growth, growth stocks, large caps, and defensives tend to outperform (Chart 4).  However, we have all observed that Growth has not fared that well due to rapidly rising interest rates and soaring inflation. In order to better understand the implication of the macroeconomic backdrop for equities, we need to drill further down into the inflation and interest-rate regimes.Chart 4During A Slowdown, Quality, Growth, And Defensives Outperform Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Inflation And Rates RegimesHigh Inflation: Then And NowThe recent spike in inflation came as a shock to most money managers – the last time inflation hit this level was in the 1980s, which predated their investment careers.In the wake of major oil shocks, oil prices quadrupled in 1973-74 and doubled in 1979-80. The combination of high inflation with weak economic growth, fueled by repeated supply shocks, gave rise to the phenomenon of “stagflation”, i.e., soaring inflation accompanied by stagnating economic growth and high unemployment.The high inflation we are living through now was brought about by the pandemic, which ushered in unprecedented fiscal and monetary easing, soaring demand for consumer goods, and a disrupted global supply chain. More recently, inflation has been further exacerbated by the indirect effects of the war in Ukraine, such as skyrocketing energy, food, and materials prices. Despite the challenges of the current period, economic growth is still robust, and unemployment is at historically low levels. Energy and materials prices have soared, but not to the same extent as in the 1970s. And while economic growth is slowing, and stagflation is a risk, it is hardly inevitable.To ensure a more precise study of the sector and style analysis, we will separate the 1970-1984 period and look at it as a template for the performance of equities during a stagflation regime. We will use the 1984 to 2022 period to analyze sector performance during more ordinary inflation regimes.Equities Hate ItEquities are a real asset and, theoretically, should not be affected by inflation – sales and earnings growth are reported in nominal terms, and underlying economic growth is, by far, more important than inflation.Of course, reality is often different from theory, and businesses hate inflation: Not only do they have difficulty budgeting and planning ahead, but they are also often not able to convert sales growth into earnings growth, i.e., their costs may grow faster than their revenues. According to the most recent NFIB survey, 31% of small businesses consider inflation their biggest problem compared to 1-2% in 2019.In addition, high inflation is a harbinger of a hawkish Fed and rising interest rates. Hence, on balance, high inflation is bad news for equities (Chart 5). As inflation climbs, equity returns decline, as multiples contract in anticipation of lower earnings and higher discount rates (Chart 6). Chart 5Equities Underperform In A High-Inflation Environment Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 6High Inflation Leads To Multiple Contraction Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Investing In Periods Of High-Inflation And Rising RatesHigh inflation is often accompanied by rising rates both because of strong economic growth and imminent monetary tightening which aims to arrest growth to combat inflation. As a result, high inflation comes hand in hand with elevated risk aversion and the repricing of more economically sensitive areas of the market.Indeed, when inflation is high (>3.5%) and rates are rising, median three-month equity returns are outright negative, and positive three-months returns occur less than 50% of the time (Chart 7). To beat the market, we need to tilt the return distribution in our favor.Chart 7We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime  When inflation is elevated (above 3.5%) and Treasury yields are climbing, the most appropriate portfolio stance is a tilt toward all-weather defensive sectors like Consumer Staples and Health Care, which hold their own in an environment of slowing growth, as well as sectors that command significant pricing power (Chart 8). The following is a brief summary of the winners and losers. Chart 8Sector Performance In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  High Inflation/Rising Rate WinnersEnergy: High oil prices are often one of the culprits behind runaway inflation, with the exception of the mid-1980s episode when Saudi Arabia drowned the world in oil, causing a collapse in oil prices, while inflation was on the rise. The energy sector has significant pricing power as it is upstream of the supply chain and can pass on costs to customers (Chart 9). This sector also benefits from high operating leverage. Outperformance usually peaks when inflation turns.Health Care: Health Care stocks tend to outperform when overall consumer prices advance. The non-cyclical nature of health care services reflects their resilience against economic volatility, irrespective of the direction of pricing pressures (Chart 10).  Over the past few years, health care companies have struggled, mostly because of the pressure exerted on pharma by hospitals, insurers, and the government. However, recently, the sector’s pricing power has turned because of pent-up demand for medical procedures. Chart 9The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power   Chart 10Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand  Consumer Staples: Historically, Consumer Staples have outperformed during periods of high inflation (Chart 11). Just like Health Care, this is a non-cyclical sector, because the demand for necessities is inelastic. While this sector is experiencing challenges because of the rising prices of raw materials, it is able to pass on its costs to customers, who have to allocate an increasing share of their budget to necessities. It has also helped multinationals in the S&P 500 index, as they invest in brand building, which now aids them to differentiate their offerings even when consumers are under duress.Utilities: Utilities is another quintessential defensive sector, with a stable revenue stream, significant pricing power, and profitability controlled by the regulators.    Of course, one might argue that this is a highly leveraged sector which may be hurt by rising borrowing costs.  However, it fares well, as regulators have a target return-on-investment for utilities companies, thus allowing them to raise prices to offset rising costs.  Furthermore, with high inflation, long-term debt is smaller in real terms.  Chart 11Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building  High Inflation/Rising Rates LosersConsumer Discretionary companies underperform in an environment of high and rising inflation as inflation reduces consumers’ purchasing power and forces them to shift spending away from discretionary goods and services, and toward necessities. The high negative correlation of the sector with the Consumer Drag Indicator is a case in point (Chart 12). Further, rising interest rates often follow high inflation, and weigh on demand for durable goods that require financing.Financials: High inflation is a headwind for the sector because monetary tightening which follows on the heels of high inflation tends to flatten the yield curve, affecting banks’ Net Income Margins (NIM), or the spread between loans and deposits. Inflation also hurts S&P Financials due to the mismatch between bank assets and liabilities. A typical bank has longer maturity for its assets (loans) than for its liabilities (deposits). Consequently, as inflation rises, this reduces the future net inflow because creditors demand higher interest rates, while the returns earned by the bank on its current loan book are mostly fixed by existing contracts. Chart 12Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending  Inflation Will Turn Soon (Hopefully), And So Will Sector PerformanceInflation is likely to fade somewhat over the coming quarters, as supply chains normalize, and consumer demand wanes because of saturation and elevated prices. Arithmetic will also help, i.e., the base effect will kick in. Also, aggressive monetary policy is likely to slow economic growth and demand for labor further. With all of that, inflation will trend down but will reach the elusive 2% only years from now.However, when it comes to inflation, it is both the level of inflation and the direction of change that matter. While, overall, high inflation is bad for equities, it is necessary to differentiate between “inflation high and rising” and “inflation high and falling” regimes (Chart 13). As such, it is likely that we are about to shift into the “inflation is above 3.5% but falling” regime, where the median three-month return is 3.0% and returns are positive 69% of the time. We do anticipate a rebound in equities once the tighter monetary regime is priced in, and inflation shows signs of abating.Chart 13When Inflation Turns, Equities Will Rebound Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  With the Fed assuming an active role, we believe that going forward, equity returns will be more of a function of the monetary tightening cycle than of inflation. However, falling inflation readings may slow the pace of monetary tightening, or even put the Fed on hold.According to our analysis of sector performance in the “inflation is above 3.5% and is falling” regime, Energy and Materials will be the first sectors to reverse recent gains. The Consumer Discretionary sector is likely to rebound as pressure on consumer purses eases. Financials will also be among sectors that outperform in this regime, since fading inflation will help with asset/liability management. Consumer Staples and Health Care are likely to keep their outperformance going as inflation will continue to be an issue.Last, while empirical analysis does not show that the Technology sector outperforms when inflation is falling, we believe this will be the case based on the simple assumption that falling inflation will imply a lower discount rate (Chart 14). In this regime, we also anticipate a rotation from Value to Growth, and from Large to Small (Chart 15). Chart 14New Inflation Regime Will Usher In New Winners Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 15Changes In Inflation Regimes Brought About Market Rotations Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Stagflation: Magnifying Glass On The 1970sStagflation, along with a recession, is now on investors’ minds – concern about the Fed making a policy mistake. After all, the Fed is already behind the curve, and it is hard to put the inflation genie back into the bottle. What would happen then?In this case, just as in the 1970s, we will see continued growth slowdown accompanied by raging inflation (Chart 16). Back then, equities pulled back every time inflation was on the rise (Chart 17), with Energy, Materials, and Health Care outperforming.The market rebounded at the first signs of inflation abating, reversing sector performance, and turning losers into winners, i.e., Consumer Discretionary and Real Estate started outperforming (Chart 18).Chart 16In The 1970s’ Stagflation Crushed Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 17Energy And Materials Were Biggest Winners In the "Inflation High And Rising" Regime... Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 18...But They Gave Back Their Gains In "Inflation High But Falling" Regime Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Bottom LineWe are in a slowdown stage of the business cycle, and Quality, Defensives, and Growth are expected to outperform. However, high inflation has mixed up all the cards and sent Growth into a tailspin. High inflation is unfavorable, not only for Growth but also for equities in general, even though they are a real asset. However, investors can shift the odds of positive returns in their favor by taking a granular approach to sector selection suitable for different inflation regimes.The market is currently in a “high inflation and rising rates” regime, with Energy and Materials outperforming. However, we are about to transition into the “inflation is high but falling” regime, and today’s winners may turn into losers. Defensives is the only group which holds up across all high inflation regimes, thanks to its earnings resilience even in the face of slowing growth.  Irene TunkelChief Strategist, US Equity Strategyirene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com 

Executive Summary Rampant talk of a wage-price spiral is premature, ginned up by media reports about union organizing successes and union negotiators’ wins. Recent agreements negotiated by unions have not lit an inflationary fuse, as all major compensation series are contracting in real terms. The full sweep of US labor market history, buttressed by the history of the last four decades, suggests that labor has a steep hill to climb to reverse its fortunes. The president has a bully pulpit and the executive branch has a lot of enforcement levers at its disposal, but the judicial and legislative branches are powerful counterweights and the state-level climate is decidedly unfriendly to workers. Labor could regain the upper hand but we’ve been underwhelmed by its victories thus far in the pandemic. We will not believe that it’s turned the tide until we see definitive evidence. The Labor Tide Is Out The Labor Tide Is Out The Labor Tide Is Out Bottom Line: Investors assume that a wage-price spiral is inevitable, or has already begun, at their own peril. The playing field is still heavily tilted in employers’ favor and mainstream media has exaggerated labor’s pandemic gains. Feature Dear Client, This Special Report, updating and elaborating upon our view of the likelihood of a US wage-price spiral, will be our last written output until Monday, May 23rd. We are vacationing this week and we will be holding our quarterly webcast on May 16th in lieu of a publication. Please join us with your questions on the 16th to make it a fully interactive event. Best regards, Doug Peta The term “wage-price spiral” is being increasingly bandied about by the media, broker-dealers and independent strategists and economists. The talk has been prevalent enough that a significant proportion of investors seem to believe a spiral is inevitable if it hasn’t already begun. There is more to the history of US labor market relations than the stagflation seventies and early eighties, however, and we are tempted to see the early-thirties-to-late-seventies New Deal era as the anomaly and the Reagan era that began in 1981 as the rule. Much may hinge on just how much the administration of the “most pro-union president you’ve ever seen” will be able to accomplish when it faces the prospect of the loss of its Congressional majorities in six months. After restating our framework for thinking about the origins and outcomes of strikes and lockouts, we examine the outcomes of the pandemic-era work stoppages tracked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS’ database only covers strikes involving at least 1,000 workers, effectively limiting its scope to strikes involving large union locals. Though the database is not comprehensive, we strongly believe that the incidence of large strikes and their outcomes offer meaningful insight into the evolving balance of power between employees and employers. Our conclusion is that management retains the upper hand; it will take more than a pandemic and one friendly administration’s term to turn the tables. Strikes Occur When One Side Overplays Its Hand Chart 1The Strike-Slack Link Has Been Shattered The Strike-Slack Link Has Been Shattered The Strike-Slack Link Has Been Shattered Strikes (and lockouts) occur when labor and management cannot reach a mutually acceptable settlement, often because at least one side overestimates its bargaining power. It is easy to agree when labor and management hold similar views about each side’s relative position, as when both perceive that one of them is considerably stronger. In that case, a settlement favoring the stronger side can be reached quickly, especially if the stronger side exercises some restraint and does not seek to impose terms that the weaker side can scarcely abide. Restraint is rational in repeated games like employer-employee bargaining, especially if the stronger party recognizes that its advantage is not permanent. 40 years of waxing management power, however, may have imbued both sides with a sense that employers have insurmountable structural advantages. Since the early eighties, private sector union membership has withered, taboos against hiring strikebreakers have disappeared, the Federal bench has been filled with judges disposed to see things from management’s perspective, and state legislatures have increasingly weakened union protections to attract businesses. Since the Reagan administration took office, the incidence of major work stoppages (Chart 1, top panel) has ceased to correlate with the state of labor market slack (Chart 1, bottom panel). With the JOLTS, consumer confidence and NFIB surveys indicating that the pandemic has made it as easy as it has ever been to find a job (and extremely difficult to fill one), it is notable that so few unionized employees are playing their trump card of withholding their labor to extract concessions from their employers. Related Report  US Investment StrategyLabor Strikes Back, Part 2: Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them With the link between labor market tightness and strikes severed, game theory offers the best insight into the origin of strikes. We posit a simple framework in which each side can hold any of five perceptions of its own bargaining power, resulting in a total of 25 possible joint perceptions. Labor (L) can believe it is way stronger than Management (M), L >> M; stronger than Management, L > M; roughly equal, L ≈ M; weaker than Management, L < M; or way weaker than Management, L << M. Management also holds one of these five perceptions, and the interaction of the two sides’ perceptions establishes the path negotiations will follow. Limiting our focus to today’s prevailing conditions, Figure 1 displays only the outcomes consistent with labor’s belief that it has the upper hand. For completeness, the exhibit lists all of management’s potential perceptions, but we deem the three away from the extremes to be most likely. Record job openings and quits rates (Chart 2) should convince even the most cocksure management negotiators that the landscape has tilted at least a little in labor’s favor. On the other hand, four consecutive decades of victories will make it hard for all but the most objective management negotiators to believe that the tables have completely turned. Figure 1Lots Of Room For Disagreement Wage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Wage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Chart 2It's A(Labor)Seller's Market... It's A(Labor)Seller's Market... It's A(Labor)Seller's Market... The Availability Of Substitutes Chart 3... And Mothballed Supply Is Coming Back On Line ... And Mothballed Supply Is Coming Back On Line ... And Mothballed Supply Is Coming Back On Line Ultimately, leverage derives from the availability of substitutes. If employees can easily switch jobs and obtain better terms because employers are actively competing for scarce labor inputs, they should be able to extract concessions simply by threatening to strike. If employers can replace union members with cheaper non-union workers, substitute cheaper foreign labor for domestic labor while meeting less onerous working standards, or invest in automation to reduce the need for human inputs, employees will have little recourse but to accept whatever terms management dictates. The prevailing view is that there are precious few substitutes for domestic labor. The pandemic has exposed global supply chains' inherent vulnerability, forcing businesses to consider onshoring some functions. The labor market is exceedingly tight, as early retirements and the Great Resignation will suppress labor availability into the intermediate term. Quickening increases in labor force participation among those aged 55 to 59 (Chart 3, top panel) and 60 and 64 (Chart 3, bottom panel), however, are casting doubt on the narrative. We additionally expect that younger workers will not be able to hold themselves aloof from the work force indefinitely in the absence of new fiscal transfers. The explosion in nominal wage growth lends credence to the prevailing view (Chart 4). But none of the three main series, average hourly earnings (Chart 5, top panel), the Atlanta Fed wage tracker (Chart 5, middle panel) or the Employment Cost Index (Chart 5, bottom panel) is keeping pace with inflation. A wage-price spiral, as commonly understood, results when wages and consumer prices chase each other higher in something like a game of tag. Average hourly earnings got the game going in 2020, when essential workers received hazard pay for braving infection risks, but they’ve lagged consumer prices ever since. Chart 4Nominal Wages Are Surging ... Nominal Wages Are Surging ... Nominal Wages Are Surging ... ​​​​​​ Chart 5... But They're Not Keeping Up With Inflation ... But They're Not Keeping Up With Inflation ... But They're Not Keeping Up With Inflation ​​​​​​ This Is Not The Sixties And Seventies The wage-price spiral gained momentum when the unemployment rate spent eleven consecutive years (1964 through 1974) below or just barely above the CBO’s estimate of its natural rate (Chart 6, bottom panel). That helped feed consistently positive real wage gains through the seventies whenever the economy was expanding (Chart 6, top panel). Upward price pressures were stoked by profligate government spending (funding the war in Vietnam concurrently with Great Society programs) and a complacent Fed. The pandemic fiscal and monetary backdrop may look uncomfortably familiar, but today’s workers are far less equipped to turn it to its advantage. Chart 6The Wage-Price Spiral Of The Seventies Was A Long Time In The Making The Wage-Price Spiral Of The Seventies Was A Long Time In The Making The Wage-Price Spiral Of The Seventies Was A Long Time In The Making Union membership is way down from the mid-to-late sixties (Chart 7), leaving unions with far fewer resources and much less of a corner on available labor. They also have less public support, less likelihood of benefiting from sympathy strikes or other support from unionized workers elsewhere in the chain and little to no lived experience with striking. They confront better organized and more determined opposition, as business concentration has reduced competition for their services to the point of establishing near-monopsonies in localized labor markets. The only way to confront the monopsony power of very few buyers is to organize a monopoly of suppliers, but private-sector union membership is mired at post-Depression lows despite The New York Times’ and other outlets’ relentless cheerleading. Chart 7It's Hard To Be An Influencer When You're Hemorrhaging Followers It's Hard To Be An Influencer When You're Hemorrhaging Followers It's Hard To Be An Influencer When You're Hemorrhaging Followers I Walked A Picket Line For Four Weeks And All I Got Was This Lousy T-Shirt If workers are to change their fortunes (Chart 8), they need to achieve large-scale victories that win national attention, inspiring other workers to challenge management and laying out a roadmap for their own success. With that in mind, we examined the BLS’ detailed compilation of work stoppages since the beginning of 2020 to see what strikes were able to achieve. If striking reveals that labor truly has the whip hand, employers should accede en masse to employees’ demands, signaling that a broad compensation reset is afoot. Chart 8The Hazard-Pay Pop Was Short Lived The Hazard-Pay Pop Was Short Lived The Hazard-Pay Pop Was Short Lived After backing out graduate student attempts to escape indentured servitude as sub-minimum-wage instructors, we examined the outcomes of the 22 large-scale strikes since 2020 (Table 1). In terms of base wage and salary gains, the results were decidedly underwhelming. Two of the union walkouts produced nothing (Swedish Medical Centers, 2020, and Kaiser Permanente Oakland sympathy strike, 2021) and prospects are not favorable for the United Mine Workers’ strike against Warrior Met Coal (2021) that is entering its fourteenth month. Public workers’ walkouts generally yielded nothing more than compensation increases around the Fed’s 2% annual inflation target. Teachers and front-line healthcare workers touted agreements to reduce class sizes, increase support staffs, formalize hazard pay and stockpile personal protective equipment but they’ve fallen further behind economically. Table 1Large-Scale Pandemic-Era Strikes Wage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Wage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Private-sector workers have fared better, though one must often squint to see it. Kellogg’s cereal plant workers hit a home run, gaining cost-of-living adjustments on top of nominal salary increases, better retirement benefits and an accelerated path for new employees to transition to the more remunerative legacy employee tier, all without making a single concession. Seattle’s unionized carpenters also did well for themselves, gaining three 4.5% annual raises and a 50% increase in hourly parking reimbursements (no small matter in a full-to-bursting coastal city). Their fellows got some cash in their pockets via one-time bonuses for ratifying their deals, but whether they’ll be better off on an inflation-adjusted basis by the time they expire is an open question. In reading about the walkouts, negotiations and settlements, we were struck by how long it had been since many of these union locals had walked off the job. Minneapolis teachers last struck in 1970; the last nationwide Kellogg’s strike was in 1972; the UAW hadn’t struck John Deere since 1986; aside from a one-day 2017 walkout, Sacramento teachers hadn’t struck since 1989; and United Steelworkers hadn’t walked out from Allegheny Technologies in 30 years. Perhaps an unfamiliarity with striking among union leadership and rank-and-file made the unions timid and inclined to settle a little sooner than may have been optimal. Perhaps they were starting on the back foot and anchoring to that position, as many of the unions trumpeted that they refused management's concession demands. Workers in this round of negotiations may have been more concerned about working conditions than money and simply wanted to be heard and seen after running the COVID infection gauntlet. There’s no guarantee that will last, but it’s a good sign for corporate margins and municipal budgets in the near term. Management showed little inclination to cede its advantages: hospitals brought in temporary replacements like pricey traveling nurses at a cost far exceeding the raises unions sought, the two-tier compensation system for legacy and newer workers largely remains intact and companies preferred one-time bonuses to salary increases to pacify employees. It’s possible that workers simply lack much leverage; after securing 2% annual raises for 2020 and 2021 that woefully failed to keep pace with inflation, St. Paul teachers agreed to an eleventh-hour deal for 2022-23 that will provide another two years of 2% raises, though they also won $3,000 retention bonuses/recognition awards for their trouble. Looking Ahead When watching future negotiations between employers and unions, we will be looking out for the fate of the two-tier compensation model and the balance between salary/wage increases and one-time bonuses. Two-tier compensation has allowed employers to drive a wedge between senior employees and their successors. The model incents grandfathered employees to ratify deals that preserve their above-market compensation and benefits at the expense of less senior employees. “We can’t afford to pay all of you like UAW workers in the ‘70s and ‘80s, but we want to reward those who’ve demonstrated their loyalty to the company …” (and will disappear by attrition over the next ten years or so, bending our cost curve way down in real terms). We are also watching the mix of base salary and wage increases and bonus payments. We think of the former as akin to a public company’s dividends and the latter to their stock buybacks. Dividend payments (and wages) are sticky on the downside, as companies don’t want to signal financial weakness by cutting them and employees are loath to see their nominal pay decline. Once dividends and base salaries are raised, it’s hard to cut them. Buybacks, on the other hand, are purely discretionary and shareholders don’t count on them year after year. The same goes with bonuses – future base wages and salaries are a rigid function of previous base wages and salaries, but bonus payments are a one-off that don’t get directly factored into ongoing compensation. We thought John Deere’s agreement with the UAW preserved the status quo to management’s benefit. Per the terms of the new six-year contract, workers got splashy odd-year raises of 10%, 5% and 5%, interspersed with even-year bonuses. The compounded annual growth rate of their base pay is therefore 3.3% over the life of the contract [(1.1*1.05*1.05)^(1/6) – 1]. We’d bet the 3.3% growth will yield very close to zero real gains, and it seems like the 8.5% signing bonus workers received for ratifying the contract was a reasonable up-front price for Deere to pay to lock in six years of nearly flat real increases. The company must pay bonuses in years 2, 4 and 6 as well, but that might be a small price to pay to preserve the divide between workers hired before and after 1997. By the time the deal is up, the least senior of the expensive legacy employees will have been punching the clock for 30 years and their numbers will be thinning at a rapid rate. Ruth Milkman, a sociologist of labor and labor movements who has written or collaborated on over a dozen books in her half-century career, was recently asked when she last felt hopeful about workers’ outlook. After laughing, she said, “I remember when Obama was elected and I made a fool of myself predicting a big labor resurgence.”1 In a pattern reminiscent of Lucy pulling the football away from Charlie Brown, labor hopes pinned on the Obama administration failed to be realized. The Biden administration can direct the Department of Justice, Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Board and OSHA to enforce the laws on the books more vigorously, but it can’t write new ones without both houses of Congress and the Senate lacks the president's appetite to do so. “It’s a story of endless disappointments,” according to Milkman, “and it seems like that’s where we are now, too.” We will believe in labor’s renaissance only after we see it. The course of labor negotiations since the pandemic in no way suggests that a wage-price spiral is inevitable, nor that it is probable. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/17/magazine/unions-amazon.html. Accessed 4/27/22.

Executive Summary Everything the banks see indicates that their household customers are in fantastic shape, with overstuffed checking accounts and unusually low outstanding credit card balances. Despite low confidence measures, they are spending with vigor, showering revenue on pandemic-squeezed businesses. Inflation in the price of necessities like food and gasoline most harms households at the low end of the wealth and income distributions, but the banks report that they are bearing up remarkably well so far. Credit quality remains exceptionally good and delinquencies and other leading indicators are still flashing the all-clear sign. Growing deposits demonstrate that the world is still awash in liquidity and credit stresses are not at hand, but highlight the challenges the Fed faces in trying to cool the economy. The banks expressed little to no appetite for deploying their idle cash into securities. It appears that another constituency will have to step up to replace the Fed’s QE purchases of Treasuries and agencies. A Blessing And A Curse A Blessing And A Curse A Blessing And A Curse Bottom Line: The biggest banks’ observations support a rosy near-term outlook – the consumer is firing on all cylinders, businesses are well positioned and there is no credit distress on the horizon. The Fed will have its hands full slowing an economy that has so much momentum, however, and there is little chance that volatility will not be elevated over the rest of the year. What The Banks See The SIFI banks (BAC, C, JPM and WFC) and USB kicked off fourth quarter earnings across three days bracketing Easter weekend. Their results were ho-hum – it remains our view that the banks lack a fundamental catalyst to drive relative outperformance – and mainly illustrated that higher interest rates, despite boosting net interest income, are far from the industry cure-all they’re cracked up to be. The SIFIs have languished over the last three months after consistently outperforming the overall market since late 2020, often by wide margins, and now find themselves modestly leading since the first effective COVID vaccines were developed in November 2020 (Chart 1). Chart 1An Incomplete Comeback An Incomplete Comeback An Incomplete Comeback We do not compile the Big Bank Beige Book every quarter to assess the banks’ relative investment merits, however. The S&P 500 Diversified Banks have a uniquely privileged vantage point into activity across the economy and we are simply trying to look over their shoulders. The banks’ earnings releases and analyst calls offer insight into the broad macro backdrop via borrower performance, lender willingness, financial system liquidity and the actions, intentions and financial capabilities of households and businesses. The following is what we heard and how it informs our take on financial markets and the economy. Households Are Still Flush … Related Report  US Investment StrategyThe Big Bank Beige Book, January 2022 Bank of America consumers spent at the highest-ever [first quarter] level, … [a] double-digit percentage increase over 2021, … despite the stimulus bonus [boosting the year-ago numbers]. (Moynihan, BAC CEO) [C]ombined credit and debit [card] spend was up 21% year-on-year, with growth stronger in credit as we see a continued pickup in travel and dining. And as the quarter progressed, we saw robust reacceleration of T[ravel] and E[ntertainment] spend, up 64%. (Barnum, JPM CFO) Consumer credit card spend remained strong, up 33% from a year ago. All spending categories were up (Chart 2) with the highest growth in travel, entertainment, fuel and dining. … Discretionary [debit card] spending remained strong with entertainment up 39% and travel up 29% from a year ago. (Scharf, WFC CEO) Chart 2Making Up For Lost Time Making Up For Lost Time Making Up For Lost Time In the first quarter …, credit and debit card travel volumes exceeded pre-pandemic levels. March airline volume was flat compared to March 2019, the first … [monthly] recovery to pre-pandemic levels. Although corporate T&E-related volumes … are still below pre-pandemic levels, they continue their upward trajectory … [and were] 75% of their pre-pandemic level in March. (Dolan, USB CFO) We’re still seeing quite a bit of excess liquidity sitting there in the back pocket of our consumers and very healthy balance sheets (Chart 3). I think [credit card payment rates] have peaked … and I think that’s good, because it should be the return this year to more healthy behavior. The spend is obviously … quite remarkable, … up in the mid-20s%. [It’s] also great to see the experience side, and … services coming back in again. We’ve been seeing it in travel, we’ve been seeing it in apparel. People like getting dressed up to go to dinner again in their [favorite] restaurant. (Fraser, C CEO) Chart 3Up, Up And Away Up, Up And Away Up, Up And Away … Even The Ones In Higher Inflation’s Crosshairs [Today’s] very strong underlying growth will go on. It’s not stoppable. The consumer has money. They pay down credit card debt. Confidence isn’t high, but the fact that they have money, they’re spending their money. They have $2 trillion still in their savings and checking accounts. Businesses are in good shape. Home prices are up. Credit is extraordinarily good. … That’s going to continue in the second quarter, third quarter. After that, it’s hard to predict. (Dimon, JPM CEO) Q: Are you seeing any signs of pullbacks and shifts in the type of [consumer] spend[ing] that could point to some softening there? A1: What we are continuing to see [across the board] … is good, strong, both [in terms of] year-over-year growth and comparisons back to 2019. … I would expect that there’s probably going to be a shift to some extent from … durable goods … to more service-oriented sorts of activities, but in terms of the overall level of spend, I feel like that will continue at least for some period of time. (Dolan, USB) A2: Consumer credit card spend is up 35% versus pre-pandemic. … [W]e’re not seeing any negative trends thus far and it continues to be very strong. (Cecere, USB CEO) March was the eighth straight month in which inflation outpaced income, with lower-income consumers being most impacted by rising energy and food prices. That said, higher deposit balances and rising wages have thus far allowed consumers to weather these headwinds. (Scharf, WFC) Our data show continued growth in average deposit balance[s] across all customer levels … , suggest[ing] … strong spending [can] continue. On an aggregated basis, average deposit balances were up 47% from pre-pandemic levels … and the momentum continued through the first quarter, particularly in the low-balance accounts. [C]ustomers who had $1,000 to $2,000 of balances [pre-pandemic], with an average $1,400 balance … now have $7,400. [T]hose with $2,000 to $5,000 [and a pre-pandemic average of $3,250] today have an average … of $12,500. … Consumers are sitting on lots of cash. (Moynihan, BAC) Q: Are you starting to see any drawdown [of consumer deposits] because of inflation? A: It’s actually the opposite; they grew faster from February to March. That [jump is] probably because of tax refunds, but … beginning around May of last year, they pretty consistently grew 1-2% per month, [with the most growth in] lower-end balances. [The only exception was] November, [when] we saw a slight downdraft in lower-end balances and [then it] picked back up in December. … It grew [every] month this quarter and March had the strongest growth. We haven’t seen the data for April yet, but [deposits are still growing very strongly] all the way up into the people who carried balances of $10,000 – 20,000 pre-pandemic. We’re not seeing that deteriorate at all yet. (Moynihan, BAC) Some Business Loan Demand Is Returning (Chart 4) Chart 4No Thanks For The Loan; We Issued Bonds Instead No Thanks For The Loan; We Issued Bonds Instead No Thanks For The Loan; We Issued Bonds Instead C[ommercial]&I[ndustrial] loans were up 3% sequentially, ex-PPP [Paycheck Protection Plan loans], reflecting higher revolver utilization and originations across middle market and in corporate client banking. (Barnum, JPM) We do see pretty nice loan growth in the commercial bank. There’s a bunch of different factors there, it could be [some pent-up capex,] some inventory effects and so on. (Barnum, JPM) The economy is returning more towards normal and our line utilization is, … too. That’s part of what’s driving our loan growth. Revolver utilization in commercial banking now is 31.7%; pre-pandemic, our normal was around 35%. (Borthwick, BAC CFO) I think that most businesses have been kind of holding back … on capex [over the last couple of years] and so I think there’s a bit of an increase in that spend related to it. And then as companies see more and more inflationary pressure, they’re going to look to automation as a way of offsetting some of the [cost] pressure they see [when they try to hire]. At least in the near term, our expectation is that capex will continue to be reasonably strong. And our utilization rates support that. We’ve been running [around] 19%, plus or minus, for a number of quarters and we saw an increase, certainly not to normal levels, but up to 22-23% in the last few months. (Dolan and Cecere, USB) Revolver utilization rates have increased, but are still well below historical levels. Loan demand has been driven by larger clients who are increasing borrowing due to the impact of inflation on material and transportation costs as well as to support inventory growth. We’re also seeing new demand from some clients who are catching up from underinvestment in projects and capex over the past couple of years. (Santomassimo, WFC CFO) No Credit Warning Signals Yet Q: Are you seeing any stresses in the levered parts of the debt markets, … levered loan, high yield, CLO, private credit? A: Obviously, in this environment, everyone’s looking very closely everywhere for any risks and trying to see around the corner. But as of right now, we’re really not seeing anything of concern in the … spot metrics. (Barnum, JPM) Q: Are there any [household] income buckets where you’re seeing early-stage delinquencies picking up? A: In short, no. It’s an interesting question as you look across our customer base, particularly in card, that heavily debated question of real income growth and gas prices and what’s that doing to consumer balance sheets. And so we’re watching that, especially in the kind of LMI [lower-to-middle-income] segment of our customer base. But right now, we’re not actually seeing anything that gives us reason to worry. (Barnum, JPM) Consumers remain in good shape. … The average card balances of our credit card customers [with whom we have] deposit relationships are 8% lower than they were pre-pandemic. … These [card and deposit] customers have built significant additional savings and their average deposit balances are up 39%. … The small low-FICO-score subset of our customer base was even stronger [in terms of higher] cash balances and lower debt levels. We believe this is not a [BAC-specific] phenomenon, as … debt service levels are hovering near historic lows (Chart 5) and household deposit and cash levels are $3 trillion higher than when we entered the crisis. (Moynihan, BAC) Chart 5Debt Service Is Easy For Households Debt Service Is Easy For Households Debt Service Is Easy For Households We continue to see strong credit performance across our [U.S.] portfolio as clients’ balance sheets remain healthy. (Mason, C CFO) Credit is still exceptionally good, and certainly will be into the next quarter based on everything that we see and possibly beyond (Chart 6), even though at one point [charge-offs] will go up. (Scharf, WFC) Chart 6Consumer Credit Leading Indicators Are Healthy The Big Bank Beige Book, April 2022 The Big Bank Beige Book, April 2022 Credit quality remains strong. Over the next few quarters, we expect the net charge-off ratio will remain lower than historical levels, but continue to normalize over time. (Dolan, USB) The Banks Aren’t Eager To Buy Securities Deposits continued to grow in the first quarter and despite a pickup in loan growth, the largest banks continue to hold a great deal of cash (Chart 7). The sharp rise in interest rates affords them an opportunity to put that cash to work, potentially driving a big increase in net interest income (NII). Every bank that raised its NII guidance, however, stated that the increased guidance was independent of any growth in the aggregate size of its loan and securities portfolios. The banks’ priority is to lend to household and business customers (Chart 8) and if demand for loans continues to rise, their commentary implied that securities holdings may well shrink. Chart 7Demand For Loans Is Still Lagging ... Demand For Loans Is Still Lagging ... Demand For Loans Is Still Lagging ... Chart 8... Banks' Willingness To Make Them ... Banks' Willingness To Make Them ... Banks' Willingness To Make Them Q: Any appetite to deploy the excess liquidity? A: No, don’t expect that. (Dimon, JPM) Guys, we were just talking about interest rates going up maybe more than 3%. Convexity is going up. [Mark-to-market loss on available-for-sale securities] is going up. There are all these various reasons not to [move cash into securities]. We’re not going to do it just to give you a little bit more NII next quarter. (Dimon, JPM) When it comes to deploying liquidity, it’s going to be loans first. … And then based on what we see there, we will decide if we’re going to grow the securities portfolio. (Santomassimo, WFC) At the end of the day, the reason why we have securities investments is because we have $2 trillion of deposits and $1 trillion of loans, and we got to do something with the money. (Moynihan, BAC) We’re not interest rate traders, we’re interest rate managers through a cycle. (Borthwick, BAC) What Ails The Banks’ Stocks? We did not join the chorus of investors and strategists at the beginning of the year who were singing the praises of bank stocks in a rising rate environment. We loved the SIFIs back in 2020 when they built up enormous loan-loss reserves in the first two quarters of the pandemic because we believed they would not be needed given monetary and fiscal efforts to shield the economy from COVID disruptions. Those reserves were eventually released back into earnings, pumping the banks' per-share book values above expectations, but once the truing up of actual versus expected credit losses was complete, the stocks had no apparent outperformance catalyst. Rising rates didn’t do much to entice us because we believe investors dramatically overestimate banks’ earnings sensitivity to interest rates and the slope of the yield curve. Higher rates help boost net interest income, but they are not an unmitigated positive, as first-quarter results and management commentary indicated. Every bank suffered hits to its accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) from the decrease in the value of the securities it holds in the available-for-sale bucket. AOCI is not an income statement item, but it does reduce equity and thereby undermines the banks’ regulatory capital positions and makes regulatory constraints more binding. Rising rates also entice depositors to shift some money away from banks and raise the cost of retaining deposits and every call featured analyst questions about the sensitivity of bank deposit pricing to changes in interest rates (deposit betas). Rising rates might also lead to pressure on non-interest income, which is nearly equal to the SIFIs' net interest income. As WFC CEO Charlie Scharf put it, “The mortgage origination market experienced one of its largest quarterly declines that I can remember, and it will take time for the industry to reduce excess capacity.” Volumes will fall as that capacity is reduced and so will gain-on-sale margins as the banks shed their remaining inventory. The bottom line is that somewhat higher rates are a net positive but much higher rates will be a drag on bank earnings, just as they will on the overall economy, and investors right now seem to be skipping to the end of the rate hike story and ignoring the benign chapters along the way. Finally, it appears that the extraordinary volume of bond issuance over the last two years displaced some of the need for C&I loans. Given that any CFO or corporate treasurer who didn’t term out company debt in 2020-21 ought to have his or her head examined, the shortfall in credit line utilization and sharply below trend C&I loans outstanding may extend well into the intermediate term. Investment Implications The banks’ calls reinforced our take that the economy has a lot of momentum in the form of flush consumers and amply funded businesses. Credit performance is tremendously strong and net charge-off rates will remain subdued for the foreseeable future. Low delinquency rates will not suddenly spike when business and consumer deposit balances are extremely high and still growing. The Fed’s response to uncomfortably high inflation was a shadow looming over all the calls, just as it was over equities at the end of last week, but it will take a steady diet of rate hikes to rein in a galloping economy. While there is no shortage of concerns, our view remains that they will not be realized in 2022 and that it is therefore too soon to take evasive action in individual portfolios or at the broad asset allocation level. We still recommend that investors with a six-to-twelve-month timeframe remain at least equal weight equities in a multi-asset portfolio, though we are more confident about the next six months than we are about the next twelve and believe it is appropriate to manage portfolios more tactically. We wholeheartedly agree with JPM CEO Jamie Dimon’s assessment and think investors would do well to try to manage in accordance with it. I cannot foresee any scenario at all where you’re not going to have a lot of volatility in markets going forward. We’ve … spoken about the enormous strength of the economy, QT, inflation, war, commodity prices – there’s almost no chance that you won’t have volatile markets … and I think people should be prepared for that. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com  

Listen to a short summary of this report.         Executive Summary Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Adverse supply shocks have pushed down global growth this year, while pushing up inflation. With the war raging in Ukraine and China trying to contain a major Covid outbreak, these supply shocks are likely to persist for the next few months. Things should improve in the second half of the year. Inflation will come down rapidly, probably even more than what markets are discounting. Global growth will reaccelerate as pandemic headwinds abate. The return of Goldilocks will allow the Fed and other central banks to temper their hawkish rhetoric, helping to support equity prices while restraining bond yields. Unfortunately, this benign environment will sow the seeds of its own demise. Falling inflation during the remainder of the year will lift real incomes, leading to increased consumer spending. Inflation will pick up towards the end of 2023, forcing central banks to turn hawkish again. Trade Inception Level Initiation Date Stop Loss Long iShares Core S&P Small Cap ETF (IJR) / SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY) 100 Apr 21/2022 -5% Trade Recommendation: Go long US small caps vs. large caps via the iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF (IJR) and the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY). Bottom Line: Global equities are heading towards a “last hurrah” starting in the second half of this year. Stay overweight stocks on a 12-month horizon. Push or Pull? Economists like to distinguish between “demand-pull” and “cost-push” inflation. The former occurs in response to positive demand shocks while the latter reflects negative supply shocks. In order to tell one from the other, it is useful to look at real wages. When real wages are rising briskly, households tend to spend more, leading to demand-pull inflation. In contrast, when wages fail to keep up with rising prices, it is a good bet that we have cost-push inflation on our hands. Chart 1 shows that real wages have been falling across the major economies over the past year. The decline in real wages has coincided with a steep drop in consumer confidence (Chart 2). This points to cost-push forces as the main culprits behind today’s high inflation rates. Chart 1Real Wages Are Declining Real Wages Are Declining Real Wages Are Declining Chart 2Consumer Confidence Has Soured Consumer Confidence Has Soured Consumer Confidence Has Soured A close look at the breakdown of recent inflation figures supports this conclusion. The US headline CPI rose by 8.5% year-over-year in March. The bulk of the inflation occurred in supply-constrained categories such as food, energy, and vehicles (Chart 3). Chart 3The Acceleration In Inflation Has Been Driven By Pandemic And War-Impacted Categories Here Comes Goldilocks Here Comes Goldilocks The Toilet Paper Economy When the pandemic began, shoppers rushed out to buy essential household supplies including, most famously, toilet paper. Chart 4In A Break From The Past, Goods Prices Soared During The Pandemic In A Break From The Past, Goods Prices Soared During The Pandemic In A Break From The Past, Goods Prices Soared During The Pandemic The toilet paper used in offices is somewhat different than the sort used at home. So, to some extent, work-from-home (and do other stuff-at-home) arrangements did boost the demand for consumer-grade toilet paper. However, a much more important factor was household psychology. People scrambled to buy toilet paper because others were doing the same. As often occurs in prisoner-dilemma games, society moved from one Nash equilibrium – where everyone was content with the amount of toilet paper they had – to another equilibrium where they wanted to hold much more paper than they previously did. What has gone largely unnoticed is that the toilet paper fiasco was replicated across much of the global supply chain. Worried that they would not have enough intermediate goods on hand to maintain operations, firms began to hoard inputs. Retailers, anxious at the prospect of barren shelves, put in bigger purchase orders than they normally would have. All this happened at a time when demand was shifting from services to goods, and the pandemic was disrupting normal goods production. No wonder the prices of goods – especially durable goods — jumped (Chart 4).   Peak Inflation? The war in Ukraine could continue to generate supply disruptions over the coming months. The Covid outbreak in China could also play havoc with the global supply chain. While the number of Chinese Covid cases has dipped in recent days, Chart 5 highlights that 27 out of 31 mainland Chinese provinces are still reporting new cases, up from 14 provinces in the beginning of February. The number of ships stuck outside of Shanghai has soared (Chart 6). Chart 527 Out Of 31 Chinese Provinces Are Reporting New Cases, Up From 14 Provinces In The Beginning Of February Here Comes Goldilocks Here Comes Goldilocks Chart 6The Clogged-Up Port Of Shanghai Here Comes Goldilocks Here Comes Goldilocks Chart 7Inflation Will Decelerate This Year Thanks To Base Effects Inflation Will Decelerate This Year Thanks To Base Effects Inflation Will Decelerate This Year Thanks To Base Effects Nevertheless, the peak in inflation has probably been reached in the US. For one thing, base effects will push down year-over-year inflation (Chart 7). Monthly core CPI growth rates were 0.86% in April, 0.75% in May, and 0.80% in June of 2021. These exceptionally high prints will fall out of the 12-month average during the next few months. More importantly, goods inflation will abate as spending shifts back toward services. Chart 8 shows that spending on goods remains well above the pre-pandemic trend in the US, while spending on services remains well below. Excluding autos, US retail inventories are about 5% above their pre-pandemic trend (Chart 9). Core goods prices fell in March for the first time since February 2021. Fewer pandemic-related disruptions, and hopefully a stabilization in the situation in Ukraine, could set the stage for sharply lower inflation and a revival in global growth in the second half of this year. How long will this Goldilocks environment last? Our guess is that it will endure until the second half of next year, but probably not much beyond then. As inflation comes down over the coming months, real income growth will rise. What began as cost-push inflation will morph into demand-pull inflation by the end of 2023. The Fed will need to resume hiking at that point, potentially bringing rates to over 4% in 2024. Chart 8Spending On Services Remains Well Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Spending On Goods Is Above It Spending On Services Remains Well Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Spending On Goods Is Above It Spending On Services Remains Well Below The Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Spending On Goods Is Above It Chart 9Shelves Are Well Stocked In The US Shelves Are Well Stocked In The US Shelves Are Well Stocked In The US Investment Implications Wayne Gretzky famously said that he always tries to skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been. Macro investors should follow the same strategy: Ask what the global economy will look like in six months and invest accordingly. The past few months have been tough for the global economy and financial markets. Last week, bullish sentiment fell to the lowest level in 30 years in the American Association of Individual Investors poll (Chart 10). Global growth optimism dropped in April to a record low in the BofA Merrill Lynch Fund Manager Survey.    Chart 10AAII Survey: Equity Bulls Are In Short Supply AAII Survey: Equity Bulls Are In Short Supply AAII Survey: Equity Bulls Are In Short Supply Chart 11The Equity Risk Premium Remains Elevated The Equity Risk Premium Remains Elevated The Equity Risk Premium Remains Elevated Yet, a Goldilocks environment of falling inflation and supply-side led growth awaits in the second half of the year. Even if this environment does not last beyond the end of 2023, it could provide a “last hurrah” for global equities. Despite the spike in bond yields, the earnings yield on stocks still exceeds the real bond yield by 5.4 percentage points in the US, and by 7.8 points outside the US (Chart 11). TINA’s siren song may have faded but it is far from silent. Global equities have about 10%-to-15% upside from current levels over a 12-month horizon. We recommend that investors increase allocations to non-US stock markets, value stocks, and small caps over the coming months (see trade recommendation below). Consistent with our view that the neutral rate of interest is higher than widely believed in the US and elsewhere, we expect the 10-year Treasury yield to eventually rise to around 4% in 2024. However, with US inflation likely to trend lower in the second half of this year, we do not expect much upside for yields over a 12-month horizon. If anything, the fact that bond sentiment in the latest BofA Merrill Lynch survey was the most bearish in 20 years suggests that the near-term risk to yields is to the downside.  Trade Idea: Go Long US Small Caps Versus Large Caps Small caps have struggled of late. Over the past 12 months, the S&P 600 small cap index has declined 3%, even as the S&P has managed to claw out a 5% gain. At this point, small caps are starting to look relatively cheap (Chart 12). The S&P 600 is trading at 14-times forward earnings compared to 19-times for the S&P 500. Notably, analysts expect small cap earnings to rise more over the next 12 months, as well as over the long term, than for large caps. Chart 12Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Small Caps Are Looking Attractive Relative To Their Large Cap Peers Chart 13Small Caps Tend To Outperform When Growth Is Picking Up And The Dollar Is Depreciating Small Caps Tend To Outperform When Growth Is Picking Up And The Dollar Is Depreciating Small Caps Tend To Outperform When Growth Is Picking Up And The Dollar Is Depreciating Small caps tend to perform best in settings where growth is accelerating and the US dollar is weakening (Chart 13). Economic growth should benefit from a supply-side boost later this year as pandemic headwinds fade and more low-skilled workers rejoin the labor market. With inflation set to decline, the need for the Fed to generate hawkish surprises will temporarily subside, putting downward pressure on the dollar. Investors should consider going long the S&P 600 via the iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF (IJR) versus the S&P 500 via the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on  LinkedIn Twitter   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Here Comes Goldilocks Here Comes Goldilocks Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Here Comes Goldilocks Here Comes Goldilocks