Consumer

Executive Summary Reporters at last week’s post-FOMC press conference were consumed by the prospect of a recession. Their questions about the economy echoed the analysts’ on bank earnings calls and Chair Powell’s answers echoed the CEOs’ and the CFOs’: while it has clearly slowed, it remains stronger than it would be in a recession. Although the Econ 101 definition of a recession – two or more quarters of contracting real GDP – is embedded in the public’s mind, the NBER’s recession criteria are more involved and do not appear as if they have yet been met. With a little over half of index constituents (~70% of market cap) having reported, S&P 500 earnings have surprised to the upside. Despite a rampaging dollar and a sharp backup in corporate bond yields, margins are down less than 60 basis points from 2Q21 and are unchanged from 1Q22. We are constructive on equities and credit over a three-to-twelve-month timeframe because we believe markets have priced in the impact of the next recession too soon. We expect the Fed will eventually induce a recession, but not for at least another year. Earnings Haven't Stumbled Yet Bottom Line: Continue to overweight equities in multi-asset portfolios with a twelve-month timeframe because markets have gotten ahead of themselves by selling off so sharply. A recession will not arrive before underweight investors judged on their relative quarterly performance are forced back into stocks. Feature And we thought investors were preoccupied with recession. The questions sell-side analysts asked on big bank earnings calls in mid-July revealed that the shadow of a recession loomed large in their institutional investor clients’ minds. The questions markets and economics reporters asked Chair Powell at his post-FOMC meeting press conference last week demonstrated that the media is positively obsessed with it. If it bleeds, it leads is no longer just the local TV newscast’s mantra. We have been trying to steer the discussion away from are-we-or-aren’t-we toward questions that we think are more productive for investors. How bad will the next downturn be? What is its current estimated time of arrival? Have markets under or overreacted to our best guess about severity and ETA, assuming the marginal price setter has a timeframe of twelve months or less? Are-we-or-aren’t-we is manifestly Topic A in the financial and general media, however, so the body of this week’s report is given over to why we think we are neither in a recession nor on the cusp of one. We will turn to financial markets and investment strategy in the concluding section. What Is A Recession? In Econ 101 three-plus decades ago, I learned that a recession was defined as back-to-back quarters of economic contraction as measured by real GDP. For all the time that has passed since, I remember that definition clearly. Apparently other graduates do, too, and the definition taught in central Virginia was the standard in Economics departments across the nation. Alas, life is more complicated than it seemed in those halcyon student days. Business cycle inflections are not always apparent to the naked eye and the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee has been tasked with assessing when downturns are sufficiently deep, diffuse and persistent to constitute a recession. The committee monitors a broad range of indicators and moves deliberately, announcing its determinations only after enough subsequent data have arrived to support its assessment of peaks and troughs. For the six recessions since 1980, the committee has announced cycle peaks with an average lag of seven months and cycle troughs with an average lag of fifteen months (Table 1). Table 1Long And Variable Lags Equity and credit portfolio managers and analysts spend a lot more time on corporate earnings than GDP, so the recession debate would seem to be of interest mainly within the ivory towers of academia, think tanks and the bureaucracy. The topic is relevant for investors, however, because equity bear markets tend to coincide with recessions. As bear markets (Chart 1, light red shading) typically begin before NBER-designated recessions (gray shading) and always end before them, it is worth investors’ time to try to anticipate their onset. Since a significant portion of bear market drawdowns occur after the recession is deemed to have started, there is also value in the humbler (and more attainable) aim of recognizing a recession once it’s begun. Chart 1Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Travel Together So Has It Begun? At the risk of sounding like Jay Powell before a skeptical pool of reporters, we do not think the economy is in a recession, primarily because the labor market is so strong. Recessions always follow one-third percentage-point increases in the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate, but it has yet to begin moving upward (Chart 2). Leading indicators like small business hiring intentions (Chart 3, second panel), temporary employment (Chart 3, third panel) and initial jobless claims (Chart 3, bottom panel) point to continued payroll expansion (Chart 3, top panel). The economy is unquestionably slowing, and labor demand will slow with it, but the record backlog of job openings (Chart 4, top panel) and unabated stream of job quits (Chart 4, bottom panel) suggest that the labor market has a sizable cushion that will allow it to endure a few blows. Chart 2Unemployment Has Not Turned Yet Chart 3The Employment Outlook Is Still Good ...​​​​​ Chart 4... As There Is Still A Shortage Of Workers Like Chair Powell, we would venture that the labor market’s cushion extends to the overall economy. We believe that households’ excess pandemic savings will buffer the largest component of aggregate demand from inflation pressures, though the eventual fate of those savings is hotly debated within BCA. Related Report  US Investment StrategyA Difference Of Opinion We expect that a meaningful share of the $2 trillion-plus that households have amassed will eventually be spent; our Counterpoint team does not. The matter is not yet settled, but we are encouraged that the savings rate dipped below its February 2020 level of 8.3% in the fourth quarter and has been less than 6% every month this year, reaching a low of 5.1% in June. If the savings rate is mean-reverting, and if households don’t circle the wagons en masse as they might if recession prophecies become self-fulfilling, households have quite a bit of catching up to do (Chart 5). If consumption continues to lead business investment in line with the empirical record, fixed investment should be able to keep its head above water. Even a downshift in consumption and investment ought to be enough to offset the modest fiscal drag that may ensue if gridlock becomes even more constraining after November’s elections, as our US Political Strategy colleagues expect, and keep the expansion going for a few more quarters. Chart 5These Squirrels Have Stored Up A Lot Of Nuts For The Winter Okay, But What About Earnings? S&P 500 earnings are where the rubber meets the road for investors. Befitting the one-step-forward, one-step-back course the macro data releases have followed, second quarter earnings have been mixed.1 In the aggregate, however, they’ve been solid, with the 56% of index constituents (~70% of market cap) that have reported so far beating earnings expectations by 5.2%. That’s in line with the typical underpromise-and-overdeliver earnings season theater but feels like a reprieve for investors who’ve been subjected to a steady drumbeat of recession talk. Profit margins have narrowed – earnings per share have grown 7.7% year over year, well shy of revenue per share’s 12.1% growth – but by less than expected, as the 5.2% earnings surprise has swamped the 1.6% revenue surprise. S&P 500 operating profit margins observed a tight range after the crisis before jumping by more than a percentage point when the top marginal corporate tax rate was lowered beginning in 2018 (Chart 6). They then made another percentage-point leap in 2021, as companies seemed to find another efficiency gear as they adjusted to the pandemic. The reasons for the pandemic leap aren’t clear – shrinking office footprints, lower utility bills and reduced travel and entertainment don’t seem like candidates to move the needle so far on their own – but according to Refinitiv, the owner of I/B/E/S, the definitive source for earnings estimates, it has persisted through the first two quarters of 2022.2 The contraction in real compensation since 2021 (Chart 7, second panel) has likely been the primary driver, but the backup in corporate bond yields (Chart 7, third panel) and the surging dollar (Chart 7, bottom panel) have been margin headwinds so far this year. Chart 6Profit Margins Remain Elevated Chart 7Falling Real Wages Have Been Great For Margins We expect that the interest expense and currency translation headwinds will largely disappear in the second half, leaving real wages as the critical swing factor. Our benign take on wages (from employers’ perspective) is not unanimously held within BCA and could be a crucial determinant of our more bullish recommendations’ outcome. Our view is predicated on an analysis of US labor relations history positing that employers have achieved formidable structural advantages over employees that cannot be unwound by a few years of a cyclical boost and one term of the determinedly labor-friendly Biden administration. Our interpretation runs counter to the prevailing view but we believe it is well supported and can provide a lengthy source bibliography for those inclined to check our work. Investment Implications There are no absolutes in financial markets. No asset is good or bad in itself; its merit is solely a function of its relative probability-adjusted risk-reward profile. The recession debate doesn’t matter much in itself; the key is whether this year’s market declines have gone too far in pricing in the severity, breadth, duration and proximity of the next downturn. We add proximity to the list of the NBER’s criteria because it is a critically important factor when most professional money managers, who exert outsize influence in setting prices, are judged on their relative quarterly and annual performance. We are not perma-bulls or attention-seekers. We are more bullish than our colleagues and the investor consensus purely because we think the equity market has gone too far in discounting the impact of a recession that we estimate will not begin before the second half of 2023 and may not be particularly deep in the absence of imbalances that make the real economy vulnerable to a metastasizing downturn. Inflation pressures have not been building unopposed across four presidencies (LBJ through Carter) while corporate management teams nearly indifferent to shareholder interests rolled over at the feet of the UAW and other formerly potent labor unions, entrenching the wage-price spiral. The Powell Fed has begun to hike the funds rate aggressively, but it will not have to smother the economy like the Volcker Fed to round up a fugitive inflation genie and force it back into the bottle. Chart 8It Is Not A Spiral When Prices Rout Wages Levered capital has not been cascading into commercial real estate for better than a decade to exploit tax loopholes which were closed by the 1986 Tax Act, leaving savings and loans holding the bag and imperiling a sizable swath of the banking system. Stocks are expensive and there are plenty of pockets of silliness, but financial markets have not replayed the dot-com mania, no matter how promiscuously the term "bubble" is applied or how thoroughly the post-crisis rise in asset values has driven Austrian School devotees up the wall. Malinvestment has not occurred on anything close to the scale of the subprime crisis, when lenders, ratings agencies, regulators, banks and investors collectively failed at their duties, spawning a global crisis. American households have modest debt loads and a mountain of savings. Nonfinancial corporations are well heeled after a frenzy of pandemic debt issuance at laughably favorable terms. The banking system is doubly and triply reinforced with the biggest banks hemmed in by excessive capital requirements and stifling risk limits. The economy is likely to be on a better footing at the start of the next recession than it has been in any of the recessions of the previous 40 years (ex-the flash COVID recession). Although he wouldn’t answer the question directly, we thought Chair Powell made it abundantly clear that the Fed is willing to induce a recession if that’s what it takes to bring inflation to heel. We ultimately think the Fed will have to squash the economy to get inflation back down to its 2% target, but we don’t think it will happen over the timeframe that matters to the institutional investor constituencies that have a huge say in setting marginal prices. That view is at risk if inflation does not show signs of peaking soon or if longer-run inflation expectations rise to uncomfortable levels. For now, neither has happened and the latest run of data did not break one way or the other. Final July long-run inflation expectations of 2.9% from the University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey were down from June’s final 3.1% reading and meaningfully below the 3.3% preliminary June false alarm that jarred the FOMC. The second quarter employment cost index grew by more than 1% for the fourth straight quarter, extending its nominal rise (Chart 8, top panel) even while it continues to contract in real terms (Chart 8, bottom panel). A growth shortfall is a threat as well, though it failed to materialize in second quarter earnings, forcing the S&P 500 to unwind some of the weak growth expectations it had already discounted. If our base-case scenario holds, more such unwinding is in store. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      As we worked on this report after Thursday’s market close, Amazon delighted investors, Apple pleased them and Intel, as per a barrons.com headline, “missed by a mile.” 2     Per Standard & Poor’s, the index’s operating margin fell by a percentage point in the first quarter. Though S&P has tended to define operating earnings less favorably than Refinitiv/I/B/E/S, the two series moved together directionally until 1Q22 and only Refinitiv’s data facilitates comparisons between past results and future expectations.

Special Report

US services spending collapsed during the COVID-19 pandemic, and remains significantly below the level that would have prevailed had the pandemic not occurred. This raises the question of whether services consumption will ever return to “normal.” In this report, we address this question by examining the weakest components of services spending, with an eye towards any evidence indicating that this weakness is permanent. A category analysis of services spending highlights that the spending gap currently exists due to a combination of work-from-home trends and evidence of lasting aversion to COVID-19. The latter is unlikely to be permanent, and the former will be partially or fully offset by a permanent increase in substitutable goods spending. In a non-recessionary scenario, our analysis suggests that the US services spending gap will continue to close, which will provide support for overall consumption as goods spending slows in response to weak real wage growth and higher interest rates. The COVID-19 pandemic has been enormously disruptive, socially as well as economically. In the US, a massive shift from services to goods spending represents one of the most significant economic disruptions caused by the pandemic, which persists even today. Chart II-1The Pandemic Caused An Extreme Shift In Spending From Services To Goods Chart II-1 presents our best estimate of the real goods and services spending gaps relative to potential GDP, which illustrates how extreme the shift from services to goods has been. The real goods spending gap exploded during the pandemic to a level that had not been seen since the early-1950s, and services spending collapsed in an unprecedented fashion and remains at a level that is lower than at any other point over the past seven decades (aside from the worst of the pandemic itself). Chart II-2 highlights that the overall output and household consumption gaps have not yet turned positive, despite an extremely strong labor market. This underscores that weak services spending is playing a role in depressing consumption, and thus overall economic activity. Chart II-2Weak Services Spending Is Playing A Role In Depressing Consumption This persistent weakness in services spending raises the question of whether services consumption will ever return to “normal,” defined as the level of spending that would have likely prevailed had the pandemic never occurred. In this report we address this question by examining the weakest components of services spending, with an eye towards any evidence indicating that this weakness is permanent. We conclude that the services spending gap currently exists due to a combination of WFH trends and evidence of lasting aversion to COVID-19. While the effect of the former may be permanent, we do not believe that the effect of the latter will be. And, in cases where certain categories of services spending are likely to be permanently lower, at least some of this decline in spending is likely to be partially or fully offset by a permanent increase in substitutable goods spending. In a non-recessionary scenario, our analysis suggests that the US services spending gap will continue to close, which will provide support for overall consumption as goods spending slows in response to weak real wage growth and higher interest rates. The Pandemic, Remote Work, And Services Spending During the very early phase of the pandemic, COVID-19 was spreading rapidly in industrialized economies. Following recommended or mandatory stay at home orders from governments in many countries, most office-based businesses rapidly shifted to work-from-home (WFH) arrangements as an emergency response. This, in conjunction with forced closures of “close contact” businesses such as restaurants, entertainment, and travel caused US services spending to collapse. However, by the summer of 2021, many of these pandemic control measures had been significantly eased or lifted in the US. In addition, several national US surveys found many office workers preferred the flexibility afforded by WFH arrangements. Many employers, correspondingly, found that the productivity of their employees did not suffer while working from home, or that it even improved. These findings led many in the business community to conclude that WFH policies are not, in fact, emergency measures that will ultimately be reversed and instead reflect the “new normal” for work. While this “new normal” is still in the process of being defined, it seems fairly clear that some form of hybrid work arrangements will be permanent for many businesses. Chart II-3 presents the Kastle Systems Back to Work Barometer, which reflects keycard swipes in office buildings in the top 10 US cities. The chart highlights that urban office building activity has recovered to less than half of its pre-pandemic level, and that there has been no evidence of a continued uptrend over the past 3 months. Chart II-4 reinforces this point by highlighting that public transit use in major US cities has lagged the recovery in air travel, and also has not substantially changed over the past few months. Chart II-3Urban Office Building Activity Has Recovered To Less Than Half Of Its Pre-Pandemic Level Chart II-4Urban Public Transit Use Has Lagged The Recovery In Air Travel This underscores that investors have a basis to question whether at least some US services spending may be permanently impaired by the pandemic, as was the case for overall output for several years following the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. To answer this question, we present a detailed review of the most lagging categories of US services spending on pages 8-15, focused on whether WFH trends and/or activity in central business districts can plausibly explain the gap in spending in each category. The US Services Spending Gap: Key Observations And Conclusions As discussed in greater detail below, we make the following observations about the US services spending gap: Among the seven major categories of US services spending, health care accounts for the largest portion of the services spending gap. Reduced health care spending has little to do with work from home trends, and more to do with an aversion to contracting the disease in a healthcare environment and the reluctance to place elderly relatives in nursing homes given the higher risk that COVID presents to those who are older. Some recreation services spending has been impacted by WFH trends and thus may be permanent, but a lingering fear of crowded indoor spaces and still-recovering international tourism appear to be more important drivers of the recreation services spending gap. Some portion of reduced transportation services spending may be permanent (either in whole or in part), as the spending gap in road transportation seems strongly connected to WFH trends. But the sizeable and impactful decline in real spending on motor vehicle leasing is likely to recover as motor vehicle production improves over the coming year, suggesting that transportation services spending will continue to improve over the coming year relative to its pre-pandemic trend even if a spending gap in this category of services spending is permanent or long-lasting. Personal care and clothing services is mostly responsible for the spending gap in other services, and clear WFH effects do suggest that a reduction in spending in this category may be permanent. However, these categories are relatively small, and in some cases have been partially offset by what is likely to be a permanently positive spending gap on equivalent goods. The takeaway for investors is that the services spending gap currently exists due to a combination of WFH trends and evidence of lasting aversion to COVID-19. While some investors may interpret these observations as suggesting that the gap will act as a permanent or long-lasting drag on consumer spending, we disagree for two important reasons. First, we agree that some form of hybrid work arrangements will be permanent for many businesses, and that a spending gap may be permanent or long-lasting for spending categories most closely tied to WFH effects. But this also suggests that the goods-equivalent spending that has occurred as a result of this decline in services spending will also be permanent. In other words, some of the drag that permanent WFH effects will have on overall consumer spending will be offset by a permanent increase in certain categories of goods spending. Chart II-5Some Of The Permanent Drag On Services Spending Will Be Offset By Permanently Higher Goods Spending Chart II-5 highlights the sum of spending for two pairs of clearly substitutable services/goods categories: miscellaneous personal care services plus personal care products, and sporting equipment, supplies, guns, and ammunition plus membership clubs and participant sports centers. The chart highlights that the sum of these four categories is currently above its pre-pandemic trend, highlighting that permanently lower spending in some services categories affected by WFH trends will likely be offset by permanently higher spending in some goods categories. Second, we doubt that a strong aversion to a COVID-19 infection will be permanent, as the endemicity of the disease has yet to be recognized by the public and normalized by political leaders and health professionals. This is especially true given that the availability and awareness of Pfizer’s Paxlovid antiviral therapy is still in its early stages in the US, and remains severely restricted in other developed economies and (for now) essentially unavailable in the emerging world. As an additional point concerning the lingering societal fear of COVID-19, estimates for the likely annual disease burden from “endemic COVID” are now coming into focus. In a recent New York Times opinion piece, the author cited forecasts from a number of medical professionals that endemic COVID-19 will likely infect roughly half of the US population per year, and will kill on the order of 100,000-250,000 Americans annually.1 That compares with roughly 50,000 fatalities over the course of a year from the worst flu season experienced over the past decade, implying that COVID-19 will end up being between 2-5 times as bad over the longer term as worst-case flu. If the disease burden of endemic COVID-19 ends up being on the higher end of that estimate, then it is likely that an aversion to crowded spaces and shared human settings will be permanent. But we suspect that the eventually-widespread availability of Paxlovid – and other treatment options that have yet to be developed – makes it more likely that annual fatalities will be on the lower end of that range. Chart II-6“Endemic COVID” Will Still Be A Significant Killer, But It Will Not Likely Cause A Permanent Fear Of Crowded Spaces While tragic, a disease with a fatality rate of 30 per 100,000 people (equivalent to 100,000 US deaths per year) will rank behind accidents, chronic lower respiratory diseases (such as bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma), stroke, and just in line with Alzheimer’s disease as a leading cause of death (Chart II-6). It is certainly unwelcome that a new leading cause of death has emerged. But given that COVID-19 will never go away, we doubt that this will be enough to cause a permanent change in public behavior, suggesting that US services spending will return to normal over time. To the extent that some services spending declines are permanent, we expect that to be partially or fully offset by a permanent increase in substitutable goods spending. Investment Conclusions As we discussed in Section 1 of our report, the risk of a US recession is quite elevated. In a non-recessionary scenario, our analysis suggests that the US services spending gap will continue to close, which will provide support for overall consumption as goods spending slows in response to weak real wage growth and higher interest rates. Chart II-7In A Nonrecessionary Scenario, Excess Savings Will Support Services Spending Chart II-7 highlights that the excess savings that have accumulated since the onset of the pandemic – which can be deployed to support spending – have accrued heavily to upper income earners, who are typically responsible for a significant amount of services spending. While it is true that upper income earners have also suffered a significant wealth shock from the combined effect of falling stock and bond prices, we strongly suspect that excess savings and the transition to endemic COVID-19 will support services spending and cause it to move toward the level that would have prevailed had the pandemic not occurred. In a recessionary scenario, we doubt that services spending would fall significantly, given that it is still extraordinarily depressed relative to history. However, some cyclical categories of services spending would decline, and Chart II-1 highlighted that services spending does tend to decline during recessions. The key point for investors is that changes in services spending would not be large enough to cushion a meaningful decline in goods spending were a recession to emerge. While the emergence of a US recession is not yet a foregone conclusion, the risk that it will occur is an important reason supporting our a neutral asset allocation stance. As noted in Section 1 of our report, further signs of an impending recession would cause us to recommend that investors underweight risky assets over the coming 6-12 months. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Gabriel Di Lullo Research Associate Overall Household Consumption Expenditures for Services Household consumption expenditures for services is composed of seven categories of services spending: Housing and Utilities, Health Care, Transportation Services, Recreation Services, Food Services and Accommodations, Financial Services and Insurance, and Other Services. In order to gauge to what degree services spending is likely to be permanently impaired by the COVID-19 pandemic, we estimate the “services spending gap” for each of these seven categories based on the pre-pandemic trend of overall services spending and the pre-pandemic weight of each category (Chart II-8). Chart II-8The Services Spending Gap Is Fairly Broad-Based Spending fell in all seven services categories during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the pace of their respective recoveries has been varied. Spending in many of these sectors has not yet fully recovered relative to its pre-pandemic trend (Charts II-9 and 10), contributing to a spending gap of more than $350 billion real dollars.2 Chart II-8 presents a breakdown of this spending gap by category, and we analyze the drivers of each of these gaps by examining subcategories of services spending on pages 8-15. Our subcategory analysis focuses on areas of services spending that are well below their pre-pandemic level, rather than relative to the hypothetical level of spending that would have prevailed had the pandemic not occurred. This is due to BEA data limitations that prevent us from accurately attributing category spending gaps to subcategories in real terms. Charts II-8-10 underscore that the services spending gap is very broad-based. However, four categories stand out as being particularly impactful: health care, recreation services, transportation services and other services. We discuss the causes of the spending gap in these four categories below, with the goal of determining whether they will likely abate as the pandemic continues to recede, or whether they are likely to be permanent. Chart II-9Four Categories Of Services Spending Stand Out… Chart II-10…As Being Particularly Impactful Drivers Of The Services Spending Gap Health Care Real US personal consumption on health care services is currently $126 billion below our estimate of its pre-pandemic trend, and is currently just below its pre-pandemic level (Chart II-11). “Missing” health care spending accounts for the largest share of the overall spending gap for household consumption expenditures for services. Chart II-11“Missing” Health Care Spending Accounts For A Large Part Of The Overall Services Spending Gap Health care spending initially experienced a V-shaped recovery following the onset of the pandemic, but the pace of recovery has since slowed. The sectors displaying the most significant deviations from their pre-pandemic levels are physician services, dental services, and nursing home spending (Chart II-12). The gap in spending on hospital, physician, and dental services is clearly related to the COVID-19 pandemic, in the sense that some households likely fear contracting the disease in a healthcare setting (especially given the invasive nature of dental treatments). It is also possible that households have been visiting doctor and dentist offices less frequently due to work-from-home policies, in cases where these offices were located in or adjacent to central business districts. Nursing home spending is very much the outlier in the health care sub-sectors, in the sense that its recovery has been more U-shaped than V-shaped. As the pandemic placed the elderly at great risk, we suspect that many family members decided to remove them from nursing homes (or postpone moving them into a nursing home), due to the concern that a communal living environment significantly increased the risk of COVID exposure. Bottom Line: We strongly doubt that the gap in healthcare services spending is permanent. The increasing availability of Paxlovid should help physician services, dental services, and nursing home spending recover, although it is possible that nursing home spending will be the most lagging of the three. Still, we expect that the health care services spending gap will close meaningfully over the coming year if a US recession is avoided (and possibly even if a recession does occur). Chart II-12Some Households Likely Fear Contracting COVID In A Healthcare Setting Chart II-13Lingering Fears Of Crowded Indoor Spaces And Still Weak Tourism Explain Weak Recreation Services Spending Recreation Services Real spending on recreation services is currently $75 billion below its pre-pandemic trend, and remains well below its pre-pandemic level (Chart II-14). Despite only accounting for 6% of household consumption expenditure for services, the sharp decline in spending in certain sub-sectors of recreation services has been large enough to significantly contribute to the overall services spending gap. Chart II-14The Recreation Services Spending Gap: Concerts, Amusement Parks, Movies, And Gyms Chart II-13 highlights that the sectors most responsible for the gap in recreation services spending are 1) live entertainment excluding sports, 2) amusement parks, campgrounds and related recreational services, 3) motion picture theatres, and 4) membership clubs and participant sports centers. A fairly clear narrative explains large spending gaps in three of these categories. In contrast to real spending on spectator sports, which is currently $9 billion above its pre-pandemic level, movies and concerts tend to be held indoors, underscoring that large spending gaps in these categories likely reflect lingering fears of contracting COVID in crowded indoor spaces. Membership clubs and participant sports centers spending is also explained by the COVID-fear effect, although some of the spending gap in this subcategory may be long-lasting as it is also seemingly related to work-from-home effects (for example, substituting home exercise equipment for gym memberships). Real spending on amusement parks, campgrounds and related recreational services is somewhat more difficult to explain, given that spending on these types of services tend to occur outdoors. In addition, some high-profile examples of amusement parks, such as those maintained by the Walt Disney Company in California and Florida, have seemingly experienced strong attendance compared with pre-pandemic levels. We suspect that weakness in this spending category reflects the fact that international tourism has yet to return to its pre-pandemic level. Over the past 12 months, visitor arrivals to the US, while rising, have been less than 40% of what prevailed prior to the pandemic. Bottom Line: We strongly doubt that a sizeable majority of the recreation services spending gap is permanent. As noted for healthcare spending, the increased availability of Paxlovid should progressively reduce the fear associated with crowded indoor spaces, which we believe will cause the recreation services spending gap to close meaningfully over the coming year if a US recession is avoided. Transportation Services Real spending on transportation services is currently $64 billion below our estimate of its pre-pandemic trend, and remains well below its pre-pandemic level (Chart II-15). Chart II-15Road Transportation And Motor Vehicle Leasing Are The Largest Contributors To The Transportation Services Spending Gap Similar to recreation services spending, transportation services spending accounts for only 5% of household consumption expenditure for services, but the extent of the decline in certain categories of transportation services spending has significantly contributed to the overall gap in services spending. The sectors responsible for the transportation services spending gap are: road transportation, motor vehicle leasing, motor vehicle maintenance and repair, and parking fees and tolls (Chart II-16). Some of the gap in transportation services spending is related to work-from-home trends, and as such may be permanent (either in whole or in part). The decline in road transportation spending has been heavily driven by a collapse in spending on intercity buses and mass transit, which is strongly connected to reduced office building occupancy in major US cities and also appears to explain reduced spending on parking fees and tolls. In addition, weak motor vehicle maintenance and repair seems strongly correlated with retail and recreation mobility, which remains below its pre-pandemic level. However, reduced spending on motor vehicle leasing accounts for an important portion of the transportation services spending gap, and does not appear to be caused by work-from-home trends. Instead, the decline in leasing seems strongly linked to the decline in motor vehicle inventory that has caused an enormous rise in new and used car prices. As we have discussed at length in previous reports, this decline in vehicle production and sales has been caused by a semiconductor shortage that will eventually abate, underscoring that this subcomponent of transportation services spending will eventually recover. Bottom Line: We expect the transportation services spending gap to close further over the coming year, even if it does not close fully. Some portion of reduced transportation services spending may be permanent (either in whole or in part), but spending on motor vehicle leasing will not be, suggesting that transportation services spending will continue to improve over the coming year relative to its pre-pandemic trend if a contraction in the US economy is avoided. Chart II-16Some Of The Gap In Transportation Services Spending May Be Permanent Chart II-17Personal Care And Clothing Services Spending Has Definitely Been Impacted By Work-From-Home Trends Other Services Other services spending represents a 14% share of household consumption expenditure for services. Real spending on other services is currently $51 billion below our estimate of its pre-pandemic trend, and still below its pre-pandemic level (Chart II-18). In percentage terms, the other services spending gap is smaller than for health care, recreation services, and transportation services, but it is closer in dollar terms because other services spending is a larger expenditure category. Chart II-18Some Other Services Spending Is Higher Than Before The Pandemic, But Personal Care And Clothing Services Is The Laggard Real spending on other services is below its pre-pandemic level in four subcategories: personal care and clothing services, education services, household maintenance, and social services and religious activities. However, the majority of the spending gap in other services is accounted for by personal care and clothing services (Chart II-17). Some components of personal care and clothing services spending are likely permanently impaired (in whole or in part). Almost all of clothing and footwear services spending is made up by spending on laundry and dry-cleaning services, which remains 12% below its pre-pandemic level and is not exhibiting any meaningful uptrend. In addition, within personal care services, spending on hairdressing salons and personal grooming establishments remains well below its pre-pandemic level, and is only slowly recovering in line with central business district office occupancy. However, one interesting aspect of personal care services spending is that spending on personal care products has increased significantly during the pandemic as spending on miscellaneous personal care services decreased. This suggests that any permanently negative spending gap on personal care and clothing services will be at least partially offset by a permanently positive spending gap on personal care products. Bottom Line: Some of the negative spending gap on other services is likely to be permanent or long-lasting due to persistent work-from-home effects, but at least some of this negative gap will be offset by a permanently positive spending gap on the goods equivalent of these services.   Footnotes 1    New York Times Opinion, Endemic Covid-19 Looks Pretty Brutal, July 20, 2022 2    Please note that all real dollar references in this report refer to chained (2012) dollars.

Special Report

Executive Summary Compared to output, income and net worth, aggregate consumer indebtedness is at the low end of its twenty-first century range. Modest indebtedness and low interest rates have made it easy for households to service their debt and leave them with room to take on more. Low-income households are beginning to show some signs of strain and it appears most of them have used up their pandemic savings. Loans have been underwritten more rigorously since the crisis, however, and borrower quality has been rising, especially since the pandemic began. Loan performance always deteriorates during recessions, but attention-getting claims about credit busts appear to be overheated. Consumer borrowers are on solid footing, and the financial system is not particularly vulnerable to a consumer credit downturn. The White House is reportedly mulling some measure of student loan forgiveness for a targeted set of households at the lower end of the wealth and income distributions. The overall package will have to be small, but it may make a difference for some of the more vulnerable borrowers. Consumers Are Starting From A Good Place Bottom Line: Reports of the American consumer’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. Consumer credit is way down on the list of things to worry about in the current environment, and investors should not be distracted by sensationalized claims about bursting bubbles. Feature Our internal research meeting last Monday, live-streamed and archived in the Live & Unfiltered section of BCA's website, addressed media reports of an increase in auto repossessions. The juiciest report featured the anecdotal observations of Lucky Lopez, YouTuber and owner of Automotive Life, a Las Vegas-based auto-related company with a somewhat ambiguous mission. Lopez’s LinkedIn profile indicates that he has a wide range of experience in the automotive industry as an owner/operator of auto repair shops, an auto body shop, a rental car company and a car dealership, though he is now a consultant and coach for all automotive businesses. Although a cursory Google search indicates that the customer experience at his past businesses has not been uniformly happy, his January YouTube video, “Used Car Market Bubble Popped !!!” has garnered over 300,000 views, raising his profile beyond the bounds of the Internet’s echo chambers. That article also referenced the work of a professor, now at New York’s Cardozo Law School, who has warned that pandemic aid merely delayed the onset of an auto-loan crisis. “The bubble is beginning to show signs of bursting soon,” she said in the column. According to Google Scholar, her 2021 paper, “Bursting the Auto Loan Bubble in the Wake of COVID-19,” has subsequently been cited by three other papers, two of which she co-authored. She and the other people featured in the column pointed to reports of surging repossessions as a cause for alarm, but repo data are hard to come by and delinquency patterns don’t suggest that default rates are headed meaningfully higher. The internal discussion motivated us to look more deeply into consumer creditworthiness. After considering the level and composition of household indebtedness, borrower quality and borrower performance, we conclude that consumer credit is in a good place. It will worsen when the recession arrives, but it will start from a better than usual position and therefore poses less of a threat to financial markets and economic output than it typically would. Our findings reinforce the idea that the economy is not beset by imbalances that increase its vulnerability to an especially nasty recession. Household Indebtedness In contrast to the murky world of auto repos, there are several lengthy data series that allow us to evaluate households’ aggregate financial position. As a share of GDP, household debt is back to the 75% level it first reached 20 years ago (Chart 1), driven by the deleveraging that followed the financial crisis (the pandemic spike was about sudden GDP contraction, not increased borrowing). Adjusted for disposable income, the after-tax cash flowing to consumers to service their obligations, the pattern is the same, as mortgage indebtedness has unwound its crisis excesses while other consumer debt has remained steady (Chart 2). The growth in household borrowing has failed to keep up with appreciating asset values and debt as a share of household net worth fell to multi-decade lows at the end of the first quarter (Chart 3). Chart 1Household Balance Sheets Have Been Strengthening For A Decade Chart 2A 20-Year Round Trip Chart 3Debt Is Markedly Lower As A Share Of Net Worth, ... Chart 4... And Falling Rates Have Made It Especially Easy To Service Low levels of indebtedness, combined with low interest rates, have eased households’ debt service burden, with the share of their disposable income that goes to interest and principal repayments falling to multi-decade lows (Chart 4). No matter how you slice it, the debt yoke is as light as it has been heading into the last four recessions. From a composition perspective, mortgages maintain the dominant position, accounting for nearly three-fourths of household debt (Chart 5), while student loans (11%), auto loans (8%) and credit cards (6%) comprise nearly all the rest. Although those warning of an auto bubble cite rising auto loan balances as a sign of trouble, they have been mostly steady as a share of disposable income since 2015 and remain well short of their 2002-to-2005 peak.   Chart 5Consumer Credit Has Moved In Step With Disposable Income For The Last 20 Years Bottom Line: Household indebtedness is much more manageable now than it was ahead of the last four recessions, thanks to reduced balances relative to income and wealth and lower interest rates. Borrower Quality As household balance sheets strengthen, consumer borrowers become better credits, but loan quality is also a function of lenders’ appetites. Bad loans are made in good times, according to the bank examiner’s mantra, but the corollary is also true. Reluctant lenders make sound loans and banks lost some of their appetite after the crisis while regulators took away much of what was left of it. Basel III standards clipped banks’ wings by applying onerous capital charges to all but the most straightforward lending activity and Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s aggressive stance on returning defaulted residential mortgages to their originators over an uncompromisingly strict reading of representation and warranty claims have forced banks to scrutinize prospective homeowners’ credentials. Increased scrutiny has shown up in the vastly improved risk profile of mortgage originations (Chart 6), which are now overwhelmingly tilted in favor of prime-plus (FICO score of 720 to 780) and superprime (greater than 780) borrowers and away from near prime (600 to 660) and subprime borrowers (less than 600). It is understandable that investors who lived through the trauma of the financial crisis just over a decade ago remain sensitive to housing market vulnerability, but we think the FICO score data forcefully rebut any lingering concerns about residential mortgages. Chart 6Residential Mortgage Originations By FICO Score The remainder of household debt, detailed in the Fed’s monthly consumer credit reports, is primarily concentrated in student loans, auto loans and credit cards. Student loan balances, adjusted for disposable income, surged in the wake of the financial crisis to surpass declining credit card balances, which slid further in the early stages of the pandemic, and stable auto loans. Student loan borrowers at the lower end of the wealth and income distributions may soon have some of their obligations canceled, which may help consumer credit performance at the margin (Box), though the resumption of paused monthly payments will likely make the net effect a wash. The biggest banks’ customers are beginning to carry slightly higher credit card balances and though the banks have surely eased their standards to make more of their most profitable loans, we do not foresee cards as a systemic vulnerability. BOX Student Loan Debt: Pause, Play Or Erase Student loan borrowers have been able to pause making payments on their loans since the CARES Act took effect in April 2020, but the seventh extension of the temporary pause expires at the end of August and there will not be another. The Biden administration is grappling with whether to make good on a campaign promise to cancel at least some student debt held by the federal government. Washington holds over 80% of outstanding student loans and could wipe out any or all of it via executive order but the political calculus is complicated and perilous: the Democrats would like to appeal to young voters before the midterms, as well as women, who are on the hook for almost 60% of student debt, without alienating less well-off voters who might view cancellation as a giveaway to wealthy elites. Our US Political Strategy service expects that cancellation will be limited and targeted, too small to move the needle on aggregate household finances but perhaps providing the most vulnerable borrowers temporary relief to allow them to better service their other debt and/or maintain their consumption in the face of high food and fuel prices. That leaves auto loans as the swing factor within consumer credit performance. Despite the auto bubble-watchers’ assertions, anonymized Equifax data compiled by the New York Fed for its quarterly Household Debt and Credit Report do not indicate that auto lending standards have been eased: since 2017, the share of auto loan originations made to near-prime and subprime borrowers has steadily declined while the share of prime-plus and superprime originations has risen (Chart 7). Auto lenders did relax their standards in 2013 through 2016, once they got some distance from the crisis, but they reversed the trend in 2017 and tightened the screws even more when the pandemic arrived, as per the moves in a diffusion index calculated by subtracting the share of below-prime originations from the share of above-prime originations (Chart 8). Chart 7Auto Loan Originations By FICO Score Chart 8Tighter Standards On Showroom Floors And Used-Car Lots Chart 9Collateral Values Have Surged The increase in the value of the collateral securing outstanding auto loans, which have an average term of nearly six years, should help contain lender losses in the event of default (while encouraging borrowers not to default). Per the Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index, used car prices have risen between 150% and 180% since the 2016-2019 vintages of outstanding auto loans were issued (Chart 9). Cars driven for the last five or six years have been depreciating with each mile driven, so they would not bring 150-180% of their initial value if their lenders repossessed and sold them, but the unforeseen price appreciation does mean their loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) must be tiny if borrowers have kept up with their payments. Loans issued after used-car prices exploded higher in late 2020 are vulnerable on an LTV basis and are likely to generate larger-than-normal losses given default once vehicle prices come back to earth, but lenders are well insulated from losses on their older outstanding loans. Bottom Line: Borrower quality is robust relative to history. Mortgage lending standards have tightened considerably since the financial crisis and auto borrower quality has been improving since 2017. The most vulnerable student loan borrowers are likely to get some relief in the form of debt forgiveness and soaring used car prices will help shield auto lenders from losses on the loans they issued before the pandemic. Borrower Performance Monthly delinquencies across consumer borrowing categories support the idea that households are on firmer financial footing than they were before COVID-19. TransUnion’s publicly available data show that 60-day mortgage delinquencies have cratered, spending the last fourteen months at around one-half of their February 2020 level (Chart 10, bottom panel). 90-day credit card delinquencies, after rising from unprecedented lows, have settled over the last six months at about two-thirds of their February 2020 level (Chart 10, second panel). 60-day auto loan delinquencies are back to their pre-pandemic level (Chart 10, top panel), but they are a far cry from what alarmist claims would suggest. As we noted in the previous section, better borrowers and used car appreciation should help insulate lenders from losses on loans that were issued before car prices soared. Chart 10Consumer Delinquencies Remain Well-Behaved The Road Ahead As a SIFI bank CFO put it last week when discussing his company’s second quarter earnings, no cracks in consumer borrower performance have shown up yet. Credit performance frays when growth decelerates and deteriorates when the economy contracts. The coming recession will be no different but what’s different this time is the starting point for consumer credit. Consumers often stretch their credit to the limit by the time output peaks but they are in a comfortably sustainable spot today. This time around, lenders did not abandon their credit standards to maintain market share in an increasingly overheated environment. The borrowing performance rule of thumb is that consumers will pay their debts unless they lose their jobs, get divorced or suffer catastrophic illness. Much therefore depends on employment, and the job market still looks strong. Initial jobless claims are still close to record-low levels, surveys indicate that businesses still have ambitious hiring intentions and plenty of positions need to be filled if the leisure and hospitality industry is going to meet pent-up demand. We will continue to monitor every data series that might lead consumer spending and consumer credit performance. The SIFI banks’ second-quarter earnings releases and calls end today with Bank of America and we will present our July 2022 Big Bank Beige Book report next week. Bank management teams don’t have crystal balls, but they do gain a wealth of insight into consumers’ appetites and businesses’ investment plans, and they often share some of it during their earnings calls with sell-side analysts. The macro backdrop remains fluid and fraught, and consumer credit prospects look a lot like the overall economy – far from perfect, but better than the financial market selloff and persistent gloom would imply. We remain more constructive than the consensus on the twelve-month outlook for financial markets and the economy. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary Financial markets have buckled under the weight of 40-year highs in inflation that have forced the Fed and other major central banks to promise no quarter in their fight against inflation, spooking investors with visions of Volcker-like monetary policy. Well-anchored long-run inflation expectations suggest that the Fed may not have to throttle the economy before the year is out to achieve “clear and convincing evidence” that inflation is trending lower. The labor market may be in a sweet spot in which jobs are plentiful, but workers lack the leverage to drive compensation high enough to initiate a wage-price spiral. Corporate earnings may be more resilient than many investors fear. An earnings recession is not inevitable, as S&P 500 earnings have grown at a robust rate when year-over-year consumer prices have risen between 3.5 and 7%. Not As Bad As We First Thought Bottom Line: A once-in-a-century global pandemic, unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy responses and war have produced an especially uncertain macroeconomic backdrop. We acknowledge that financial markets could go either way, but we think the bearish consensus presents an opportunity to outperform by overweighting risk assets over the next twelve months. Feature 2022 has been a gloomy year for the economy and financial assets of all stripes. The reckoning from the excessive monetary and fiscal stimulus that allowed the economy to come through the pandemic mostly unscathed while fueling the greatest eight-quarter stretch of real household net worth gains on record, arrived ahead of schedule, hurried along by war in eastern Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine took a bite out of global grain and energy supplies, sending the prices of select commodities soaring and contributing to the worst developed-nation inflation in four decades. Global equity and bond markets have been upended by apprehension over just how forcefully the Fed and other central banks will have to squeeze their economies to keep inflation from taking lasting root. No investor should take the Fed lightly, but the sense of gloom pervading general media, financial media, Wall Street broker-dealers, our clients and their clients is at risk of going a little too far if it hasn’t already. This is a fraught moment, and the uncertainty is heightened by the unprecedented events of the last two years, but we perceive the backdrop as far more mixed than it’s being made out to be. As a result, we think there’s much more potential for positive surprises over the next year than most investors perceive. To give clients a chance to see it our way, we are getting out of the way. This week’s report belongs to the charts and we present them with a minimum of commentary. We do not know how things will turn out – the backdrop is unprecedented and leaves all of us to find our way without historical antecedents to guide us – and we are approaching our job with elevated humility and lower-than-normal conviction. We have been advising clients to be prepared to shorten the holding periods of their positions just as we are prepared to change our mind swiftly if incoming data fail to validate our view. For now, however, we continue to believe that the potential for positive surprises is greater than market pricing acknowledges and we recommend overweighting equities in multi-asset portfolios over the next twelve months.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Omicron Has Produced A Lot Of Infections,... Chart 2... But They've Been Decidedly Less Serious Chart 3Core Inflation Will Cool As Demand Shifts To Services, ... Chart 4...And Households Maintain Their Discipline Table 1The Term Structure Of Inflation Expectations … Chart 5… Remains Comfortably Inverted Chart 6Households See It Like Investors ... Chart 7... For Now, Anyway Chart 8Real Wages Have Been Falling For A Year And A Half ... Chart 9... As Workers Are At The Bottom Of A Steep Structural Hill Table 2Excess Savings Provide A Cushion Against Rising Food And Fuel Costs Chart 10High-End Households Have Had A Good Pandemic, Too Chart 11Businesses Haven't Taken Down The Help Wanted Signs ... Chart 12... And There's No Lack Of Supply To Fill The Positions     Table 3Inflation Isn’t So Bad For Nominal Earnings … Chart 13... And Companies May Be Re-Learning That Now Chart 14Originators Have Lent To Good Borrowers … Chart 15... On Proper Terms This Time Around​​​​​​​ Footnotes

In this <i>Strategy Outlook</i>, we present the major investment themes and views we see playing out for the rest of the year and beyond.

Executive Summary Depressing Housing Market And Service Sector Activity May’s economic data ticked up from extremely depressed levels in April, driven by a normalization in the supply chain and a resumption in production. The service sector and housing market continued to shrink on a year-on-year (YOY) basis and sentiment among households and corporates remains lackluster. The rebound in exports growth in May will likely be unsustainable. Chinese exports are set to contract from 2021 as external demand for goods weakens. The rapidly worsening labor market dynamics reinforce households’ unwillingness to consume and hence, will hinder the recovery in household consumption. Although industrial production showed a decent rebound in May, the manufacturing production recovery might be derailed by rolling lockdowns and prolonged logistic bottlenecks. Barring major lockdowns, China’s economy will likely improve in 2H 2022 from the very low base in Q2. That said, the country’s economic recovery faces several challenges and the magnitude of the rebound will be subdued. Bottom Line: The elements for a robust and sustainable recovery in the Chinese economy are not yet in place. The recent rally in the A-share market reflects a mean-reversal to the pre-March lockdown price level, rather than the beginning of a cyclical bull market. Investors should remain cautious on Chinese equities in the next several months. Feature China’s economic data moved up slightly in May from an extremely depressed level in April. A normalization of the supply chain and a resumption of production post-lockdown in Shanghai and other cities led to a modest recovery in business activities. However, indicators from the service sector and housing market continued to shrink on a YOY basis, highlighting persistent weaknesses on the demand side. Chart 1Import Dynamics Reflect Weak Domestic Demand May’s import data also reflects sluggish domestic demand. The increase in imports value from a year ago was largely driven by the elevated prices in energy and agriculture products. China’s imports in May, in volume terms, continued to contract on a YOY basis, albeit improved from its historical low in April (Chart 1). Barring major lockdowns, China’s economy will likely improve in the second half of this year. However, the economic recovery in 2H 2022 will be very subdued due to the following challenges: Downbeat sentiment among households and enterprises; Continued real estate woes; A contraction in exports; Deteriorating labor market conditions; and Risk of rolling lockdowns and persistent logistic bottlenecks. The recent rebound in the A-share market reflects an improvement in investors’ sentiment buttressed by the easing of lockdowns and a resumption of production. In other words, the rebound in Chinese stock prices is probably a mean-reversal to pre-lockdown levels, rather than a sustainable rally (Chart 2). Our cautious view on Chinese equities is also corroborated by the divergence between falling raw industrial prices, which reflect weak China’s growth, and rising Chinese equity prices (Chart 3). Overall, we continue to recommend a neutral stance in Chinese equities within a global portfolio. Chart 2Too Early To Turn Bullish On Chinese Stocks Chart 3Falling Prices In Raw Materials Do Not Signal An Imminent Round In Demand   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Downbeat Household And Corporate Sentiment Chart 4Subdued Bank Loan Growth Has Been A Drag On Credit Expansion Although China’s credit growth improved sequentially in May after a very weak reading in April, the magnitude of May’s credit rebound is much more subdued compared with the months following the first lockdowns in early 2020 (Chart 4). In addition, May’s rebound in credit growth was mainly driven by an acceleration in local government bond issuance. The modest pickup in the credit impulse - calculated as a 12-month change in total social financing (TSF) as a percentage of nominal GDP - is much more muted when excluding local government bond issuance (Chart 5). Furthermore, as noted in our previous report, given that most of the planned local government special purpose bonds (SPBs) will be issued by the end of June, barring any increase in this year’s SPBs quota, the support from local government bond issuance to TSF growth will likely wane significantly in the second half of 2022. Meanwhile, confidence among consumers and businesses remained downbeat through May (Chart 6). The poor private-sector sentiment will continue to dampen credit demand and thus, limit the effectiveness of monetary stimulus. Chart 5The Rebound In Credit Impulse Is Much More Muted When Excluding Local Government Bond Issuance Chart 6Gloomy Sentiment Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Private-sector credit demand remains very frail. Household medium- to long-term loans are still contracting from previous month, while bank loans to corporate peers were also weak in May (Chart 7 & 8). Chart 7Depressed Household Loan Demand Chart 8Corporate Demand For Credit Remains Weak Despite Accommodative Monetary Conditions Chart 9Deterioration In Corporate Sentiment Is Also Reflected In Surveys of Business Conditions On the other hand, corporate bill financing as a portion of new bank loans, although rolled over from April’s record high, remained very elevated through May (Chart 8, bottom panel). Moreover, enterprises’ financing and investment expectations deteriorated further in May (Chart 9).   Persisting Real Estate Woes The near-term outlook for China’s property market remains uninspiring. So far, easing measures in the housing sector have not been successful in reviving home sales and homebuyers’ sentiment. Residential property sales and real estate investment growth ticked up slightly in May after plummeting by 43% and 10% in April, respectively (Chart 10). However, the modest improvement in May does not mark the start of a full-fledged cyclical recovery. High-frequency data show a renewed weakening in floor space sales, particularly in tier-one and tier-two cities, during the first two weeks of June (Chart 11). Chart 10The Slight Improvement In Housing Market Indicators Does Not Signal A Cyclical Recovery Chart 11Renewed Deterioration In Home Sales In June Chart 12Real Estate Developers' Decreased Funding Will Further Dampen Housing Construction Activities Funds to real estate developers have been contracting at the fastest rate since data collection began in 1998. The lack of funding for real estate developers will further depress housing construction activities in the near term (Chart 12). Moreover, new home prices, which tend to lead housing starts, started to decrease on a YOY basis in May. This was the first price contraction since 2016. Our housing price diffusion index suggests that home price growth will continue to shrink in the next six to nine months (Chart 13). Many local cities reduced mortgage rates, by anywhere from 15 to more than 100 basis points, after the PBoC lowered mortgage rate floor and the benchmark rate (5-year LPR) in May. However, the average cost of mortgage loans remains higher than households’ income growth, making mortgage borrowing less attractive to ordinary households (Chart 14). Chart 13Housing Prices Are Set To Decline Further In 2H 2022 Chart 14Mortgage Rates Have Dropped, But Still Higher Than Income And Home Price Growth In addition, the widening gap between the average mortgage rate and the pace of housing price appreciation implies that housing has become much less appealing to residents who purchase homes as investment (Chart 14, bottom panel). In short, property purchases will remain weak given neither “to live in” nor investment demand for properties is likely to recover fast. China's Exports Are Set To Contract In 2H 2022 China’s exports rebounded in May from the April low as supply chain interruptions subsided and logistic disruptions began to ease. However, as US and European consumer spending on goods (excluding autos) declines, Chinese shipments will shrink in the months ahead. May’s improvement in suppliers’ delivery times and product inventory subindexes of China’s official Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) suggests that logistics were less of a drag on economic activity than in April (Chart 15). In addition, Shanghai and China’s exports freight indexes recovered significantly on a month-over-month basis (Chart 16) with the lifting of lockdown measures. Chart 15Chinese Logistics Pressures Have Eased Slightly In May... Chart 16...And Export Freight Indices Have Rebounded Chart 17Global Demand Is Dwindling Meanwhile, global demand for goods has been weakening. Korean exports volume growth, a bellwether for global trade, has been trending down since late 2021 (Chart 17). Moreover, the US and Euro Area manufacturing PMIs have been falling (Chart 17, bottom panel). Spending in developed economies is shifting from manufactured goods to services. Retail inventories in the US are well above their pre-pandemic trend, suggesting that the demand growth for Chinese goods will dwindle when US retailers start to destock their inventories (Chart 18). Falling US and Euro Area real household disposable income will also reinforce the downward trend in external demand (Chart 19). Therefore, China's exports are set to shrink in the second half of this year. Chart 18Well-Stocked Shelves In The US Bode Poorly For Chinese Export Demand Chart 19A Contraction in US and Euro Area Household Real Disposable Income Deteriorating Labor Market Conditions Will Curb Household Consumption Recovery Although improved from April’s extreme low, Chinese retail sales and service activity remained in contractionary territory in May, highlighting sluggish household demand (Chart 20). In addition, the cinema audience, which is used to gauge the impact of the pandemic on the service sector, indicates a further deterioration in the sector’s activity in June (Chart 20, bottom panel). The lackluster consumer demand is also evidenced by soft core and service consumer prices (CPI) in May (Chart 21). Chart 20Chinese Retail Sales And Service Activity Continued To Contract In May Chart 21Soft Core And Service CPIs Also Reflect Lackluster Household Demand   Labor market conditions have also worsened. Although the nationwide urban survey-based unemployment rate fell moderately in May, the 31-large city surveyed unemployment rate climbed to an all-time high in the 10-year history of this survey. Moreover, employment in the service sector deteriorated to the worst level since mid-2020 (Chart 22). Furthermore, urban new job creation fell into deep shrinkage on a YOY basis, while the unemployment rate among younger workers rose to the highest point since data collection began in 2018 (Chart 23). Chart 22Labor Market Situation Is Worsening Rapidly... Chart 23...Particularly Among Younger Workers Chart 24Weak Sentiment On Future Income Contributes To Households' Unwillingness To Consume The rapidly worsening labor market dynamics and income prospects reinforce households’ downbeat sentiment (Chart 24). The latter will impede household consumption recovery in the second half of this year.   Production Recovery Faces Risks Of Persistent Logistic Bottlenecks   The uptick in industrial activity in May was due to a lifting of Covid-related lockdown restrictions. Although industrial production showed a decent rebound, underlying data suggest that economic fundamentals remained subdued. Chart 25Industrial Activity Improved Only Slightly In May Chart 26Construction Material Production Continues To Shrink On A YOY Basis Electricity output remained in contractionary territory through May (Chart 25). Cement and steel output continued shrinking from the same period last year (Chart 26). Moreover, their prices have been falling even though production growth has been waning, which indicates that demand in the construction sector is depressed (Chart 3, bottom panel). Consumer durable goods production also remains well below their levels from a year ago (Chart 27 & 28). Chart 27Auto And Smartphone Production Keeps Decreasing From A Year Ago... Chart 28… As Well As Production Of Home Appliances Chart 29Prolonged Logistic Bottlenecks Chinese manufacturing investment rebounded in May. However, since exports will likely shrink in the second half of this year, it will create a major headwind for manufacturing investment and output. Moreover, China’s manufacturing production will likely be challenged by persistent logistic bottlenecks in 2H 2022. Chinese road freight was still declining in the first three weeks in June from the same period last year as shown in Chart 29. The risk of renewed Covid-induced lockdowns or mobility restrictions are nontrivial since China will maintain its zero-Covid policy at least through the end of this year.   Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Footnotes Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Special Report

Executive Summary High food and fertilizer prices are at risk of morphing into a full-blown food crisis in several developing countries. Some countries were plagued by severe food insecurity even before the Ukraine war broke out. The Ukraine war has upended two crucial aspects of food security: availability of food grains as well as the availability of fertilizers. A few Middle Eastern and African countries, who are dependent on both imported cereals and crude oil, are experiencing the greatest difficulty. The stock-to-use ratio of food grains is alarmingly low in several countries. Some of them also have high twin deficits (i.e., fiscal and current account deficits) – indicating that governments there would be hard-pressed to provide necessary relief. Several Countries Need To Import Over 90% Of Their Cereal Consumption Bottom Line: All aspects considered, we reckon Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka to be the most at risk of experiencing a food crisis, and consequent socio-political upheaval. Feature Food prices have surged in most parts of the world. In some developing countries however, food inflation is threatening to morph into a food crisis. In the year ahead, high food and fertilizer prices could accentuate food insecurity in several poorer countries − with major socio-political ramifications. In this report, we identify the nations most at risk, especially among countries included in the MSCI Emerging and Frontier Equity Indexes. Our research indicates that Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are the most vulnerable to a food crisis, and consequent socio-political upheaval. Food Inflation: In The Stratosphere In a few countries such as Lebanon and Venezuela, food inflation is at a mind-boggling 370% and 200%, respectively. It is abnormally high in many other developing countries as well – including Turkey (92%), Argentina (64%), Iran (49%), Sri Lanka (45%), Ghana (30%), and Egypt (28%). In several other countries such as Colombia, Nigeria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan, food prices are rising at about 20% or more. That is also the case in war-torn Ukraine and Russia (Chart 1). Chart 1Food Inflation Has Become Extremely Painful In Some Countries In a few countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, currency depreciation could explain part of the rise in food prices. Chart 2Food Prices Began To Surge Well Before The Ukraine Crisis That said, given that only a minor share of all food consumed is imported by these countries, the sharp rise in overall food prices cannot be explained away by currency depreciation alone. Rather, it points to genuine price pressures in domestically grown food. That is also the case in all other countries where food inflation is higher than currency depreciation. Notably, in many of these countries, food inflation was quite high even before the Ukraine war broke out. Indeed, global food grain prices had begun to surge in mid-2020 – well before Russia’s invasion began (Chart 2). And yet, the onset of the Ukraine war and the resulting sanctions and logistics bottlenecks have worsened the situation dramatically. Even though food prices have eased marginally in the past couple of weeks, they are still extremely elevated compared to pre-pandemic levels. More worryingly, many countries are now at risk of experiencing a full-blown food crisis.  Pre-existing Food Insecurity Some developing countries are more susceptible to a food crisis than others. This is because they were already plagued by food insecurity even before the Ukraine war broke out. The x-axis of Chart 3 shows the extent of “severe food insecurity”1 in various developing nations, as per the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Peru stand out in this respect among the countries included in the MSCI EM & Frontier market equity indexes: as high as 18 to 26% of the total population in these countries experienced severe food insecurity between 2018 and 2020. Chart 3Countries With Pre-Existing Food Insecurity Are More At Risk Notably, these countries also happen to have high fiscal deficits; and in some cases, high public debt (Chart 3, y-axis). This leaves their governments with less room to provide necessary relief should an acute food crisis hit their population. Not surprisingly, some of the countries plagued by severe food insecurity are highly dependent on grain imports to meet their domestic demand. The x-axis of Chart 4 shows the cereal import dependency of various countries as a percentage of their cereal intake. Most middle eastern countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman need to import nearly all of their cereal consumptions, as per FAO data. That said, what sets the truly vulnerable cereal importers apart from the rest is that some of them do not have much export earnings to pay for their rising food import bills. For instance, in Lebanon, food imports alone cost two-thirds of its total goods export revenues before the pandemic, according to FAO. For Egypt, Jordan and Kenya, food imports used up over 40% of their export earnings (Chart 4, y-axis). Chart 4Several Countries Need To Import Over 90% Of Their Cereal Consumption These figures must have gone up further as food prices have risen significantly in the past two years. If high food prices persist, the balance of payments of these countries will deteriorate further. That, in turn, will negatively affect their currencies and general inflation.  High Oil Prices Adding To The Woes Many oil and gas producers in the Middle East and Africa are also large net importers of food. Current high crude prices, however, are helping them to foot their food bills. But countries who need to import both food and oil and gas are facing a double whammy. Chart 5 shows that several food importers are indeed large net importers of oil and gas too. On this parameter, Lebanon, Pakistan, Jordan and Kenya appear to be facing the most acute pain − their annual food plus net oil import bills are very high, ranging from 60 to 120% of their goods export revenues. Needless to say, if both food and oil prices remain elevated, these nations could face major socio-economic upheavals. Chart 5Countries Which Need To Import Both Food And Fuel Are The Most Distressed Chart 6Industrial Metals And Ore Producers Will Face More Pain Going Forward On a separate note, many producers of industrial metals/raw materials such as Chile and Peru may also soon experience more difficulties. The reason is that industrial metal prices have recently rolled over relative to food prices (Chart 6). Going forward, slowing global growth will likely push down industrial metal prices further, robbing these nations of a major source of income. Falling income amid high food prices would hurt the population even more, as the former will also limit the authorities’ ability to provide relief. The Implications Of The Ukraine War Could Linger The Ukraine war has upended the two most crucial aspects of food security: availability of food grains and fertilizers. Notably, the exportable surplus of food and fertilizers in the world are concentrated in only a handful of countries. Russia and Ukraine are key among them. In the case of wheat, 28% of global exports (in volume terms) in 2021 came from Russia (18%) and Ukraine (10%),  as per the FAO. In the case of barley, their share was 24%, and for corn (maize) 12%. Chart 7Grain Prices Have Surged Across The Board These two countries are dominant in some oilseed exports as well. Ukraine (37%) and Russia (26%) together held about two-thirds of the global sunflower oil export market share. In the case of rapeseed, Ukraine had about 20% of global export share. Much of these supplies now face severe logistical hurdles. That, in turn, has pushed up grain and edible oil prices globally, hurting all countries whether they are dependent on food imports or not (Chart 7). That said, the countries who are heavily dependent on Russian and Ukrainian supplies are particularly hit hard. Chart 8 shows the import dependency of some countries on Russian and Ukrainian wheat. Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt will have to urgently find alternative suppliers as a very large share of their imports now face uncertainty. The same can be said about Eritrea, Somalia and some former Soviet republics.    In the case of fertilizers, Russia was the largest supplier of nitrogen-based fertilizers2 (the kind that is most heavily used) at 17% of global exports in 2021. The country was also the second largest exporter of potassium-based fertilizer (23%), and the third largest in phosphorus-based fertilizers (16%). Ukraine, however, has not been a big exporter of fertilizers. Just like in the case of wheat, several countries had been highly dependent on Russian fertilizers. Among EM countries, Peru procured 42% of its fertilizer needs from Russia last year. Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia each imported about 22% from Russia. That figure was substantially higher for some other developing countries such as Ghana (37%), Cameroon (47%), and Honduras (50%) (Chart 9). Given the numerous sanctions imposed on a multitude of Russian entities, shipments of Russian fertilizers are now at risk. As such, all these countries need to find substitute suppliers urgently.  Chart 8Russia And Ukraine Supplied Over 80% Of Wheat Imports For Many Countries Chart 9Russia Supplied Over 40% Of Fertilizer Imports For Many Countries   Notably, it’s not just the logistics/availability issues that fertilizer users must contend with. Prices of fertilizers have also surged by a massive 200 to 300% compared to pre-pandemic levels. The reason for that is sky-high natural gas prices, which is the primary feedstock of (nitrogen-based) fertilizers (Chart 10). Chart 10High Natural Gas Prices Will Keep Fertilizers Expensive Since Russia is also a major natural gas producer, the current situation does not bode well for the fertilizer price relief outlook. New western sanctions on Russia and countermeasures by Russia are continuing relentlessly. As such, one can expect that natural gas prices will likely stay elevated for the foreseeable future. That will keep fertilizers expensive. Meanwhile, the scarcity and/or high prices of fertilizers would force farmers in many poor countries to curtail their fertilizer use during the ongoing / upcoming crop season. That in turn would imperil their domestic food production, accentuating overall food scarcity. Where Do Countries’ Food Stocks Stand Now? Chart 11 shows various developing countries’ combined stockpile of food grains (wheat, corn and soybean) relative to their yearly usage (i.e., the stock-to-use ratio). Chart 11The Stock Of Foodgrains Is Precariously Low In Many Countries Among the countries who have high cereal import dependency (and, who are not oil producers), the stock-to-use ratio is particularly low for Lebanon, Jordan, Chile, Peru, and Egypt. Since some of the countries with low food stock-to-use ratio are also dependent on imported food and fertilizers, they are even more susceptible to an outright food shortage this year. Lebanon, Egypt and Peru are three such countries among MSCI included ones. If various countries’ stock-to-use figures are juxtaposed with their twin deficits, their wherewithal to provide necessary relief should their food stocks become inadequate can be demonstrated. Chart 12 shows that several countries with a low food stock-to-use ratio are also plagued by high twin deficits, and therefore low capacity to provide relief. Examples are Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Nigeria and Venezuela. Chart 12Some Countries With Low Food Stock Have A Low Capacity To Provide Relief Food Price Shock: Is It Inflationary Or Deflationary? High food prices can sometimes lead to higher general inflation. The starting point of that is usually household inflation expectations: facing higher grocery prices every day, consumer expectations of future prices become unmoored. That said, whether the higher inflation ‘expectations’ will evolve into higher ‘realized’ inflation depends on households’ (labor) power to negotiate wages. If they are successful to gain higher wages, core inflation also begins to rise in tandem with food inflation, which might eventually lead to a wage-inflation spiral. In most developing nations, however, that does not look to be the case. Wages are rising sharply in only a handful of countries. Moreover, since a very high share of consumer spending in developing countries is accorded to food (25% to 55%), higher food bills are eating substantially into households’ real discretionary spending. That does not bode well for (non-food) corporate earnings. In addition, the central banks in many developing economies are raising interest rates in response to high inflation. All these will likely push many developing economies on the brink of a recession.   Investment Conclusions Currently, most emerging and frontier market nations are facing a deteriorating growth outlook – thanks to tight fiscal and tightening monetary policies domestically, a very strong US dollar, rising global interest rates, and a subpar Chinese recovery. High food and/or fuel prices are additional ‘taxes’ on their economies, and especially for the import-dependent ones. As a result, their growth will be stymied further. The consequence could well be socio-political volatility. Incidentally, the last time global food prices witnessed a major surge (about 40%) was back in 2010. That was soon followed by social upheavals in much of the Middle East (known as the ‘Arab Spring’) and elsewhere in the developing world. In the present episode, food prices have risen by 70% in two years. As mentioned, some of the countries facing food and fertilizer scarcity are also plagued by low grains stocks (relative to requirement) and have weak fiscal and external accounts. Considering all the aspects, we reckon that Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are most-at-risk of slipping into a food crisis this year and beyond. Incidentally, the Emerging Markets Strategy team holds a bearish view on the near-term performances of EM stocks and bonds. Investors should stay underweight EM relative to global equities and bonds. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Sebastian Rodriguez Research Associate sebastian.rodriguez@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Severe food insecurity refers to missing meals and/or reduced food intake because of financial constraints 2     The three main type of chemical fertilizers are nitrogen-based (urea and ammonia), potassium-based (potash), and phosphorus-based (phosphates).

Executive Summary Though the BCA House View has downgraded global equities to neutral, US Investment Strategy still recommends overweighting equities in US multi-asset portfolios over the coming twelve months. We believe that financial markets have prematurely discounted a sharp economic downturn. The selloff is an opportunity to get long equities if the recession fails to begin this year and/or turns out to be mild. We were surprised and disappointed by the May CPI report but view it as merely a delay in the flow of evidence confirming our view that inflation is peaking, not a repudiation of it. Inflation expectations will shape the intensity of the Fed’s efforts to lean against the economy, but the University of Michigan consumer survey that placed it on high alert was only preliminary and market-based measures of longer-run inflation expectations remain contained. History, folklore and popular culture all suggest that wage-price spiral fears are overdone. The Bear's Here; Where's The Recession? Bottom Line: Although the odds of an adverse outcome are rising, we maintain a constructive base-case view on the twelve-month prospects for US equities and the US economy, subject to a meaningful decline in inflation over the rest of the year. Feature At our monthly editorial view meeting last Monday, BCA researchers voted to downgrade the 6-to-12-month House View on equities to neutral from overweight. The US Investment Strategy team argued for an overweight recommendation and cast our vote with the minority to maintain it. Though we are on the opposite side of the slight plurality that voted to underweight equities, we acknowledge that the risks to our constructive view have risen. The difference between our view and the BCA consensus is mainly a matter of timing – while we believe the US economy is on its way to a recession, we think the journey will be more winding than expected. The Timing And Severity Of The Gathering Storm Recession was the key economic issue informing our investment strategy decision: When will it begin (if it hasn’t already) and how severe will it be? The domestic economy is clearly slowing, and the Eurozone and China face sizable pressures. As Chief Global Strategist and Director of Research Peter Berezin highlighted, every one-third-percentage-point increase in the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has been followed by a recession. Mean reversion and the Fed’s campaign to combat inflation by cooling off demand suggest that the unemployment rate will soon be rising, en route to crossing the one-third-of-a-point threshold. Related Report  US Investment StrategyThe Yield Curve As An Indicator Though we noted last week that a return to the pre-pandemic labor force participation rate would allow payrolls to expand despite a rising unemployment rate, the expansion’s days are numbered. A broad range of series, from payroll employment (Chart 1, top panel) to the Leading Economic Index (Chart 1, middle panel) and consumer confidence (Chart 1, bottom panel), echoes the unemployment rate’s message: once the economy begins to move in the wrong direction, a recession eventually follows. Our read is that financial markets have overlooked the eventual aspect in their headlong rush to price in the effects of the Fed’s promised tightening campaign. While no one can pinpoint the equilibrium fed funds rate’s exact position, all agree that it’s nowhere near the current 1.5-1.75% target. Tight monetary policy is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for a recession; based on the latest guidance provided by Chair Powell and the dots, it looks like it won’t be met until around the end of the year. Once it is, the start of the recession will be subject to debate (Chart 2, top panel), along with its impact on the economy (Chart 2, middle panel) and equities (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 1Recessions Occur Once Key Metrics Roll Over Chart 2Predictions About The Future Are Hard As it dawns on investors that the recession is approaching at a meandering pace, and that it may turn out to be mild, equities will likely retrace some of their losses. The vicious May/June selloff was predicated on forecasts that a Category 4 or 5 hurricane could be arriving soon. If the storm system is downgraded to a Category 2 or 3 event, and the date that it’s due to make landfall is pushed back by two or three quarters, we expect that a playable rally will unfold. 4% Is Easy, 2% Will Be A Bear Our relatively constructive base-case view is predicated on the idea that core inflation has peaked and will soon begin declining toward 4% of its own accord. If inflation shows clear and convincing evidence of trending down over the rest of the year, the Fed will not feel obligated to race to push the fed funds rate to a restrictive level. The longer it takes for monetary policy to become restrictive, the longer it will take for the recession to begin. The further the recession can be pushed out into the future, the harder it will be for restless investors and asset allocators to stay on the sidelines as the dire scenario discounted in equity prices fails to materialize. Conversely, if the Fed has to proceed as rapidly as possible to regain the upper hand over inflation, the recession timetable will be accelerated, and the downturn may be more severe than anticipated. We were therefore relieved to hear our Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift, reiterate his team’s view that inflation will recede to 4% independent of any policy intervention, provided that pandemic-driven supply constraints unwind. Ryan cites the Atlanta Fed’s decomposition of core inflation into flexible and sticky components to illustrate how pandemic-fueled inflation in flexible categories that tend to experience more pricing variability, like new and used vehicles, hotel room rates and airfares, have pushed up the overall series to double-digit levels. The sticky subset, including rent and medical care, is elevated itself, but if the flexibles undershoot on their way back to the mean, year-over-year core CPI can end the year in the 4% neighborhood (Chart 3, top panel). Chart 3Not As Bad As It Looks An 8% trailing four-quarter increase in unit labor costs – a wage measure that considers compensation per unit of output instead of compensation per unit of time – would suggest on its face that inflation isn’t likely to dip to 4% any time soon. The four-quarter measure has been skewed by wild post-pandemic swings in productivity growth, however. Smoothing out those swings by using the annualized trailing five-year trend in productivity to deflate the 12-month growth rate in average hourly earnings yields a much easier to stomach 3.8% rate of compensation growth (Chart 3, bottom panel). With reference to other more nuanced measures of the underlying inflation trend and a deeper dive into the outlook for automobile prices, which will fall as demand wanes and supply increases, our bond strategists expect core CPI to move toward 4% across the rest of this year while the expansion continues, albeit at a slower pace. Unfortunately, sticky shelter is the largest component of core CPI, and labor market strength will keep residential rents growing at an elevated level consistent with 4% inflation. The Fed will have to lean heavily on the economy to get inflation from 4% back down to its 2% long-run target, and that should induce the recession markets have discounted. Our position is that the recession won’t begin until the second half of 2023 or the first half of 2024. Expectations Are Still Well Anchored Chart 4Still Anchored Chair Powell repeatedly cited increasing household inflation expectations as a driver of this month’s 75-basis-point rate hike following the preliminary June University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey’s sharp move higher (Chart 4, bottom panel). The Michigan survey is not the last word on inflation expectations, however, and 5-year-on-5-year TIPS breakeven rates are in line with the Fed’s 2% target (Chart 4, top panel). 5-year-on-5-year CPI swap rates have also remained well behaved (Chart 4, middle panel) despite the volatility in reported inflation and near-term expectations measures. We have been watching the evolution of inflation expectations carefully and will continue to do so; if they remain well anchored, and measured inflation comes down in line with our expectations, we are likely to remain constructive. A Half Century Of Bear Markets The fact that the S&P 500 has entered a bear market despite rising earnings estimates has stimulated a lot of discussion within BCA. More bearish observers’ general take has been, “If stocks are down almost 25% while earnings are up 8% since the start of the year, they’re in real trouble once the inevitable earnings declines arrive.” We have countered that a 30% valuation haircut on inchoate recession expectations could be considered extreme. A review of the empirical record might advance the discussion. Table 1 lists the ten bear markets of the last 60 years, defined as a peak-to-trough decline in closing prices of at least 20% (1990's 19.9% decline has been rounded up). Half of the bear markets lasted between one-and-a-half and two years, while the remainder, excepting the current unfinished one, have been relatively sudden events, persisting for less than six months. Table 1US Equity Bear Markets, 1968 -2022 Drawdowns have ranged from 20 to 57%, with average and median losses of 36% and 34%, respectively. The mean and median duration of the bear markets have been 12 and 17 months. Bear markets and recessions tend to coincide, as we’ve frequently noted, with only the first leg of the Volcker double dip in 1980 lacking ursine company and the Black Monday bear market of late 1987 occurring outside of a recession (Chart 5). The magnitude of the 1987 bear market was no different from the 50-year average, however, though it did end swiftly. Chart 5The Bear Arrived Ahead Of Its Escort Even though the specter of restrictive monetary settings triggered the current bear, Chart 2 demonstrated that there is not a clear parallel between the intensity or duration of rate hiking cycles and the severity of the economic or market declines. Mild recessions can produce mild drawdowns, as in 1990, or severe ones, as at the turn of the millennium. Bad recessions may occur alongside terrible stock market declines (1973-74 and 2007-09) or comparatively modest ones (1980-82). All we can say now is that equities and many other public assets were priced dearly at the start of the selloff and were therefore more vulnerable while the lack of glaring imbalances suggests the economy is reasonably well insulated. The bear markets only begin to show some resemblance to one another in terms of the relative share of the declines accounted for by earnings and multiple contractions. Valuations absorb the full force of the decline during bear markets, falling 30%, while forward earnings estimates are barely revised lower. The pattern is consistent no matter where starting multiples began, though the dot-com bust produced the biggest valuation haircut of the forward earnings era (Table 2). Table 2Bear Market Earnings And Multiple Changes ​​​​​​​ The multiple/earnings breakout is mostly a function of the fact that analysts do not adjust their forward estimates in real time while prices can change from moment to moment while markets are open. The result is that the numerator of the price-earnings ratio immediately resets, while the earnings denominator adjusts only after an extended lag. Considering the peak-to-trough changes in earnings estimates, which typically play out beyond the bounds of the strictly defined bear phases, the pain is nearly equally shared. The takeaway for today is that the nearly 30% forward multiple decline is partially a placeholder for future earnings revisions and downward revisions should not be viewed as an add-on to the valuation haircut that’s already occurred. John Henry And The Wage-Price Spiral Many of our colleagues and clients are concerned about rising wages. Nominal compensation is already growing at its fastest pace in decades. Though none of the major wage series has managed to keep pace with inflation, the labor market remains undeniably tight. Rising wages threaten to squeeze corporate profits, exacerbate demand-over-supply imbalances, and act as the linchpin of a vicious circle in which rising prices beget rising prices. The wage-price spiral of the seventies and early eighties lurks at the edge of all our inflation discussions, and nearly all investors seem to view the seventies as something of a baseline. A careful read of history highlights that the spiral took hold near the end of organized labor’s 50-year heyday, however, and challenges the received wisdom that the subsequent 40-year Reagan era is an anomaly at risk of being overturned. Those waiting for labor to be delivered from the depredations of the last 40 years might do well to consider the legend of John Henry, a nineteenth-century railroad laborer in West Virginia or Virginia who drove steel drill bits into mountain rockfaces to create openings for tunnel-blasting explosives. Henry competed against the newly invented steam shovel to see if a man could hew his way through the rock faster than a machine. Henry won the race but succumbed to exertion while doing so. Songwriter Jason Isbell’s take on the legend deftly links the pre-New Deal days with today. Labor may have the numbers, but management has the capital and the incentive to automate every process it can. We contend that wages will rise less than expected over the rest of this expansion and in the early stages of the coming recession, as labor faces a steeper climb than is widely recognized. A few years of cyclical labor market tightness will not be enough to overcome the structural advantages that employers have obtained over the last four decades and guarded jealously in John Henry’s time, before New Deal legislation temporarily leveled the playing field.   It didn’t matter if he’d won/ If he’d lived or if he’d run/ They’d changed the way his job was done/ Labor costs were high   That new machine was cheap as hell/ Only John would work as well/ So they left him layin’ where he fell/ The day John Henry died   “The Day John Henry Died” (Isbell)   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com​​​​​​​

Dear Client, In lieu of our weekly report next week, I will be hosting two webcasts with my colleague Arthur Budaghyan, Chief Emerging Market Strategist: Time To Buy EM/China? June 23, 2022 9:00 AM EDT (2:00 PM BST, 3:00 PM CEST) and June 24, 2022 9:00 AM HKT (11:00 AM AEST). We will discuss the implications of the global macro environment on EM economies and assets, and whether it is time to buy EM/Chinese equities. I look forward to answering any questions you might have. Kind regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Executive Summary Chinese Households Leverage Ratio Fell The Most Since The GFC China’s households may be entering a deleveraging mode.  The level of newly increased household medium- to long-term loans declined in two out of the first five months of this year. The household leverage ratio has also been falling. The deleveraging is driven by both cyclical and structural forces. Depressed economic growth, home prices as well as jobs and incomes, have all curbed borrowing. Structurally, China’s demographic shift and a decline in the working-age population will lead to a steady decrease in the demand for housing and mortgages. The experience in Japan and the US suggests that when households start deleveraging, the trend will likely progress into a decade-long cycle.  The household deleveraging cycle may lead to a structural downshift in real estate investment, consumption of durable goods and money supply in China. As an offset, interest rates in China will shift down. A low interest rate environment may be positive for China’s financial asset valuations. Bottom Line: Both cyclical and structural forces are prompting Chinese households to reduce debt. A prolonged deleveraging cycle will lead to a slump in the demand for housing and consumer durable goods. However, a deleveraging cycle, coupled with a decline in total population, may lead to a structurally lower interest rate environment, which may be positive for Chinese equity valuations in the long run. Feature China’s newly increased consumer medium- to long-term (ML) loans turned negative in February and April this year, the first negative readings since data collection started in 2007. The reading indicates that households are paying off more ML loans than borrowing (Chart 1).  Chart 1Chinese Household New ML Loans Dropped Below Zero Twice This Year In the near term, a slowing economy and uncertainties surrounding job and income prospects, coupled with stagnating housing prices, will curb households’ propensity to take on debt. In the longer term, China’s working-age population peaked in 2015 and its total population is set to decline beginning in 2025. This unfavorable demographic trend will drive down the demand for housing and ML loans. Japan's experience shows that when the working-age population falls along with the household leverage ratio, the growth in real estate investment, consumption of consumer durable goods and money supply M2 will structurally shift to a lower range. Although a weakening demographic profile and deleveraging households are negative factors for economic growth, interest rates in China will likely move down structurally. Lower borrowing costs will make corporate debt-servicing cheaper and increase corporate profitability, thus providing tailwinds to Chinese stocks and government bonds in the long run. An Inflection Point In Chinese Households’ Leverage? Chart 2Chinese Households Leverage Ratio Fell The Most Since The GFC Several signs suggest that Chinese household debt, after more than a decade of rapid expansion, may have reached an inflection point. Newly increased household ML loans, which are mostly mortgage debt, turned negative this year. Although household ML loans were slightly positive in May, the number was one of the weakest in the past 15 years. China’s household leverage ratio (measured by household debt versus disposable income) rolled over, the first such plunge since the 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis (Chart 2). Chinese households’ reluctance to take on debt reflects current dire economic conditions, which have been damaged by the pandemic and collapse in the housing market. Furthermore, structural forces, such as the nation’s unfavorable demographic shifts, will likely drive the ongoing cyclical deleveraging into a sustained secular trend. Related Report  Emerging Markets StrategyA Whiff Of Stagflation? The pandemic and frequent city lockdowns in the past two years in China have significantly reduced households’ income growth, which has increased debt repayment burdens on families. Even though the central bank and more than 100 cities in China recently slashed mortgage rates, the average cost of mortgage loans remains higher than income growth per capita.  In other words, the current mortgage rates in China are not low enough to reverse the downward trend in households’ ML loans (Chart 3). The investment appeal of real estate has also diminished. Prior to 2018, home prices often appreciated faster than the prevailing mortgage rates. Since late 2019, however, the rate of housing price appreciation in China’s 70 medium and large cities has been falling below the average interest rate on mortgage loans (Chart 4). Home price appreciation has stalled since the second half of last year, whereas mortgage rates are currently about 5.5%. As such, housing’s carry has become negative, discouraging investment purchases of residential properties. Chart 3Mortgage Rates Have Dropped But Still Higher Than Income Growth Chart 4Returns On Leveraged Property Investment Have Diminished In order for consumer ML loans to pick up strongly in the next 6 to 12 months, either the household income growth must significantly improve and/or mortgage rates will have to drop well below home price appreciation. Recent surveys suggest that both will probably not happen in the near term (Chart 5). Chart 5Chinese Households' Income And Investment Outlooks Are Dim Chart 6Demand For Housing Will Dwindle Along With Smaller Labor Force In a previous report we indicated that China’s falling birthrate and working-age population will lead to less demand for housing from a structural point of view. Home sales have fluctuated in a downward trend in the past five years along with a peak in the working-age population in 2015 (Chart 6). Moreover, the sharp deterioration in China’s birthrate will reduce the demand for housing even more significantly in the next 15-20 years. This unfavorable demographic trend will exert powerful downward pressures on the country’s household credit demand. Bottom Line: While the ongoing economic slowdown and housing market slump are curbing ML loans, China’s household loan demand may be entering a structural downturn due to the country’s demographic headwinds. The Economic Impact Of Household Deleveraging The experience in both Japan and the US suggests that when households begin to reduce their debt, the trend may spiral into a secular cycle that lasts up to a decade (Chart 7). A prolonged deleveraging cycle can push the growth in residential real estate investment, consumption of durable goods and money supply to much lower levels.  In Japan’s case, the household debt-to-income ratio rolled over in the late 1990s when the country’s working-age population peaked and began a nose-dive in the early 2000s.  The country’s growth in residential investment fell along with households’ debt reduction, from a 13% average annual rate (nominal) in the 1980s to about 3% in the 2000s (Chart 8). Chart 7Deleveraging Can Spiral Into A Decade##br## Long Cycle Chart 8Japan's Real Estate Investment Growth Slowed Along With Falling Household Leverage... Consumption growth, particularly in consumer durable goods, also dropped from more than 10% in the 1980s to around 0-2% in the late 1990s. It subsequently fell into a prolonged contraction in the 2000s when the household leverage ratio declined (Chart 9). Real estate credit is a major source for China’s money origination. Therefore, a lack of household loan demand will depress the country’s overall credit and money growth. Japan’s money supply grew by less than 4% in the 2000s in nominal terms, compared with a nearly 10% increase in the years prior to the household deleveraging cycle (Chart 10). Chart 9...So Did Demand For Consumer Durable Goods Chart 10Money Supply Growth Also Slowed Bottom Line: Without an imminent and significant improvement in the economy, household deleveraging can progress into a secular trend. A prolonged household deleveraging cycle will drive down the growth in residential property investment, consumption and money supply. Investment Conclusions The combination of declining household debt and total population will weigh on the demand for housing, consumption and investment growth, generating deflationary headwinds for China’s economy. Thus, China’s interest rate regime will likely follow Japan’s example and downshift structurally (Chart 11). A lower interest rate environment will at margin be positive for China’s financial asset valuations in the long run. Related Report  China Investment StrategyExpect A Much Weaker Economy In Q2 Weaker prices on capital will make corporate debt-servicing cheaper and increase corporate profitability. China will likely maintain a very accommodative fiscal policy in the next decade to offset less demand from households and to help implement industrial policies aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in technology and energy. Furthermore, Chinese households may bump up their savings while reducing debt. As returns on residential property investment diminish and yields on risk-free assets shift lower, Chinese households may be increasingly willing to invest in financial assets. This trend could provide tailwinds to Chinese equities in the long term (Chart 12). Chart 11Interest Rates In China Will Likely ##br##Structurally Downshift Chart 12Chinese Households May Shift Their Investment Preference From Properties To Financial Assets   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations