Consumer Staples

One-Way Ticket For Staples Stocks One-Way Ticket For Staples Stocks Your feedback is important to us. Please take our client survey today. Underweight In yesterday’s US Equity Sector Insight we highlighted why investors should stay on the sidelines when it comes to the defensive S&P household products index. But, with regard to the broader S&P consumer staples sector, our view remains that over the next 9-12 months this safe haven sector, which peaked in the depths of the COVID-19 recession, will continue to underperform. As the pandemic-induced recession disappears from the rear-view window, it no longer pays to favor stable cashflow growth staples companies. In fact, our relative macro earnings model paints a dark picture for this GICS1 sector (middle panel). Among other reasons, one of the factors that will drive relative earnings lower is the weaker US dollar. As a reminder, the S&P consumer staples sector derives approximately 32% of its sales from abroad, which is 10 percentage points lower than the S&P 500. As a consequence, on a relative basis staples stocks cannot benefit from positive currency tailwinds to the same extent as the overall market can. Bottom Line: We remain underweight the S&P consumer staples sector.  

Caught In The Crosscurrents Caught In The Crosscurrents Neutral We remain neutral the S&P household products index. A V-shaped economic recovery following a recession has historically been synonymous with this defensive industry underperforming (top panel). However, the uniqueness of the current recession must be taken into account. The US consumer continues to binge on household products, which are currently outpacing overall retail sales growth by 13% year-over-year (middle panel, relative consumer spending shown truncated). This trend is slated to continue until a vaccine arrives as the second wave of infections emerges. The same story holds for foreign consumers who also have an incentive to keep up their spending on US household products: a softer US dollar. A weaker US dollar will boost competitiveness of US exporters, which will translate into robust top line growth (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Given the strangeness of the current recession, we remain neutral the S&P household products index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOPR – PG, CL, KMB, CLX, CHD.    

Trim Staples To A Below Benchmark Allocation Trim Staples To A Below Benchmark Allocation Underweight Our recent downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight also pushed the overall S&P consumer staples sector to a below benchmark allocation. According to our mid-April research on what sectors investors should avoid during recessionary recoveries, consumer staples stocks trail the SPX on average by 660bps one year following the SPX trough. The current macro backdrop corroborates this analysis and underscores that the path of least resistance is lower for relative staples share prices. Not only is the ISM manufacturing survey on fire, but also consumer confidence is making an effort to trough (ISM manufacturing and consumer confidence shown inverted). Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P consumer staples index to underweight. For more details, please refer to the most recent Weekly Report. ​​​​​​​

Lightening Up On Defensives Lightening Up On Defensives Underweight We have been adding cyclical exposure to the portfolio and lightening up on defensives and as a continuation of this shift we recently downgraded the S&P hypermarkets group to underweight. The economy is reopening and thus it no longer pays to seek refuge in safe haven hypermarket equities. In fact, most of the macro indicators we track suggest the recession is over that will sustain severe downward pressure on relative share prices. The chart on the right shows that the ISM manufacturing new orders subcomponent has slingshot from below 30 to north of 60, junk spreads are probing all-time lows, consumer confidence has troughed and small and medium enterprises hiring intentions are on the mend. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5HYPC – WMT, COST. For more details, please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report. ​​​​​​​

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. A firming macro backdrop, the USD’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight, today. This move also pushes our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Table 1 Lessons From The 1940s Lessons From The 1940s Feature In our March 23 Weekly Report, when we identified 20 reasons to start buying equities, we published a cycle-on-cycle profile (Chart 1, top panel) of how the SPX performs following a greater than 20% drawdown. History suggested that, on average, new all-time highs would emerge sometime in early 2022! Unfortunately, this assessment proved offside as the S&P 500 made fresh all-time closing highs last week, less than five months from the March 23 trough. Chart 1Overstretched Overstretched Overstretched Nevertheless, comparing the current unprecedented SPX rebound with the historical recessionary profile remains instructive as it highlights how excessively stretched equities currently appear. The bottom panel of Chart 1 warns that the SPX is vulnerable to a snapback, were the SPX to return to the historical mean or median recovery profile. Likely rising (geo)political risks could serve as a near-term catalyst for a healthy pullback. Importantly, all of the SPX’s return since the March lows is due to the multiple expansion and then some, as forward EPS have taken a beating (not shown). Equities are long duration assets and given the drubbing in the discount rate, the forward P/E multiple has done all the heavy lifting. Chart 2 puts some historical context to the S&P 500 forward P/E going back to 1979 using I/B/E/S data. Empirical data supports finance theory and shows that the 40-year bull market in bond prices has caused a structural upshift to the SPX forward P/E. Chart 2Moving In Opposite Directions Moving In Opposite Directions Moving In Opposite Directions While low rates explain the near all-time highs in the SPX forward P/E, looking ahead we doubt that the SPX multiple can expand much further if we assume that the easy assist from ZIRP is behind us and will not repeat; i.e. the Fed will refrain from wrecking the US banking system by exploring NIRP. In contrast, our analysis suggests that a selloff in the bond market is the missing ingredient that will ignite a massive rotation out of growth stocks and into value and propel deep cyclicals versus defensives to uncharted territory. More specifically, the rallies in copper prices, crude oil and the CRB Raw Industrials index need confirmation from the bond market that they are demand, rather than supply driven. This backdrop will also shift equity returns within deep cyclicals away from a handful of tech stocks and toward other beaten down high operating leverage sectors (i.e. energy, industrials and materials) as we posited in our recent August 3 Special Report “Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives”. Zooming out and observing how investors have moved capital from one asset class to the next in the aftermath of QE5 is in order (Chart 3). First, the SPX enjoyed a V-shaped recovery from the March 23 lows. Then in early-May, as we first posited in our May 11 Weekly Report, the big EURUSD up-move was set in motion and investors started piling into short USD positions taking cue from the Fed’s QE5 that was directly targeting the US dollar with liquidity swaps. The debasing of the dollar served as a global reflator. Now the final piece of the QE5 puzzle is the bond market. Chart 3 highlights that in order for QE to work, counterintuitively a selloff in the bond market would confirm that the economy is healing and is ready to start standing on its own two feet. The jury is still out. With regard to the Fed’s remaining bullets, yield curve control (YCC) is one unorthodox tool that the FOMC could choose to deploy in the coming years. On that front, turning back in time and drawing parallels with the 1940s is instructive. In 1942 the Fed, at the behest of the Treasury, pegged long-term interest rates at 2.5% and ballooned its balance sheet in order to finance the government’s expenditures during WWII. The Fed surrendered its independence, and this YCC unwarrantedly stayed in place until 1951 when in the midst of the Korean War, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord finally ended the peg of government long-dated bond interest rates.1 Chart 3Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally Chart 4WWII-Like Starting Point WWII-Like Starting Point WWII-Like Starting Point Chart 4 shows the ebbs and flows of the US government’s total debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit as a percentage of output since 1940. While the debt-to-GDP profile fell from 1945 onward owing partially to a tight fiscal ship that the US subsequently ran, it troughed when the US floated the greenback. Since then, the US has been fiscally irresponsible running large budget deficits and the debt-to-GDP ratio has never looked back and very recently went parabolic (top panel, Chart 4). Charts 5 & 6 take a closer look at some macro variables in the 1940s and Charts 7 &  8 compare them to today. Chart 5The… The… The… Chart 6…1940s… …1940s… …1940s… First, YCC did not prevent the late-1948 recession (Chart 5, shaded areas). Crudely put, monetary stimulus is not a panacea for boom/bust cycles. Second, M2 growth was climbing at a 30%/annum rate, the money multiplier was on a secular advance and money velocity was surging especially in the first half of the 1940s (Chart 6). As a result and as expected, YCC caused three significant inflationary jumps (bottom panel, Chart 6) that aided the US government in bringing down the massive debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. inflating its way out of a debt trap) that it had accumulated via large deficits in the front half of the 1940s (top panel, Chart 5). Third, interest rates were a coiled spring and once the Treasury-Fed Accord was signed, they exploded higher (fourth panel, Chart 5). Finally, equities fared well during the first three years of YCC until the end of WWII, but then suffered an outsized setback until mid-1949, before recovering and taking out the 1945 highs in 1951 (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 7...Compared With… ...Compared With… ...Compared With… Chart 8…Today …Today …Today Were the Fed to embark on YCC in the near-future in order to monetize the US government’s deficits, there are a few parallels to draw with the 1940s especially given that the starting point of debt-to-GDP is similar to the WWII figure (top panel, Chart 4). The Fed would likely lose its independence. This would be a paradigm shift. The Fed would crowd out fixed income investors, and flood the market with US dollars. M2 money stock would continue to surge. Few investors will be chasing US dollar assets including equities. The path of least resistance would be significantly lower for the US dollar as foreign investors would flee. This debt monetization along with a depreciating currency and swelling money supply would result in inflation rearing its ugly head, especially given that import prices would soar. What is difficult to envision is how the economy would perform during an inflationary impulse. Our sense is that the risk of stagflation would rise significantly, especially given the current inverse correlation between M2 growth and the velocity of money.2 In the stagflationary 1970s, any liquidity injections via higher M2 growth failed to translate into rising money velocity. Importantly, the “Nixon shock” effectively ended the Bretton Woods system and floated the US dollar causing a 40% devaluation from peak-to-trough (Chart 9). Tack on the oil related supply shock and stagflation reigned supreme in the 1970s, owing to cost-push inflation. Chart 9Dollar The Reflator Dollar The Reflator Dollar The Reflator In contrast during the 1940s, demand-pull inflation hit the economy rather hard, as the US was retooling its industrial base to win WWII alongside its allies. Also the US dollar was linked to gold since the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 and ten years later the Bretton Woods international monetary agreement ushered in the era of fixed exchange rates, which is a big difference from the 1970s.3 As a reminder, from a political perspective venturing down the inflation avenue is the least painful way of dealing with a debt burden, rather than pursuing tight fiscal policy which is synonymous with political suicide. From an equity perspective, owning commodity-levered sectors and other hard asset-linked equities including REITs would make sense as we highlighted in our recent inflation Special Report. Health care stocks would also shine in case of an inflationary spurt according to empirical evidence that we highlighted in the same Special Report. On the flip side, our inflation Special Report also revealed that shedding telecom services and utilities would be wise and most importantly avoiding technology stocks. Tech stocks are disinflationary beneficiaries as they are mired in constant deflation and have built business models not only to withstand, but also to thrive in deflation. Inflation is a tech killer as these growth stocks suffer when the discount rate spikes and causes valuations to move from a premium to a discount. Nevertheless, deflation/disinflation is more likely in the coming 12-to-18 months, whereas inflation is at least two-to-three years away as we mentioned in our recent inflation Special Report. This week we continue to augment our cyclicals versus defensives portfolio bent and take our defensive exposure down a notch by downgrading consumer staples to a modest below benchmark allocation via a downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index. Downgrade Hypermarkets To Underweight… Last summer we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight as we were preparing the portfolio to withstand a recessionary shock given that the yield curve had inverted. Fast forward to the March carnage in the equity markets and this defensive move served our portfolio well. However, we did not want to overstay our welcome and set a stop in order to exit this position that was triggered in late-March netting our portfolio 26% in relative gains. More recently, we have been adding cyclical exposure to the portfolio and lightening up on defensives and as a continuation of this shift we are now compelled to downgrade the S&P hypermarkets to underweight. The economy is reopening and thus it no longer pays to seek refuge in safe haven hypermarket equities. In fact most of the macro indicators we track suggest the recession is over that will sustain severe downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 10 shows that the ISM manufacturing new orders subcomponent has slingshot from below 30 to north of 60, junk spreads are probing all-time lows, consumer confidence has troughed and small and medium enterprises hiring intentions are on the mend. Moreover, the extraordinary fiscal expansion has brought spending forward and PCE is all but certain to skyrocket when the Q3 GDP figures get released in late-October, signaling that the easy money has been made in Big Box retailers (top panel, Chart 11). Similarly, discretionary spending should pick up the slack from staple-related purchases, further dampening the need to own hypermarket shares (middle & bottom panels, Chart 11). Chart 10Rebounding Macro Rebounding Macro Rebounding Macro Chart 11Returning to Normality Returning to Normality Returning to Normality On the operating front, while WMT is making strides in its online presence and offering mix, non-store retail sales are on a tear dominated by King AMZN (as a reminder we are overweight the S&P internet retail index). This is a secular trend and should continue unabated and in a relative sense continue to weigh on hypermarket profitability (bottom panel, Chart 12). Finally, a significant tailwind is turning into a severe headwind for this industry: import price inflation. The US dollar has reversed course and it is in a freefall. Historically, the greenback has been an excellent leading indicator of import price inflation and the current message is grim for hypermarket razor thin profit margins (import prices shown inverted, Chart 13). Chart 12Amazonification Is On Track Amazonification Is On Track Amazonification Is On Track Chart 13Currency Headwinds Currency Headwinds Currency Headwinds Adding it all up, softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5HYPC – WMT, COST. …Which Pushes Consumer Staples To A Below Benchmark Allocation The downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index tilts our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Countercyclical consumer staples stocks served their purpose and provided the support to our portfolio in the front half of the year when we needed them most. Now that the economic reopening is gaining steam and the government, the health care system and society are all ready to effectively deal with a flare up in the pandemic, the allure of defensive positioning has diminished. In other words, COVID-19 is currently a known known risk versus an unknown unknown risk early in the year, and defending against it now is more successful. Moreover, according to our mid-April research on what sectors investors should avoid during recessionary recoveries, consumer staples stocks trail the SPX on average by 660bps one year following the SPX trough. The current macro backdrop corroborates this analysis and underscores that the path of least resistance is lower for relative share prices. Not only is the ISM manufacturing survey on fire, but also consumer confidence is making an effort to trough (ISM manufacturing and consumer confidence shown inverted, Chart 14). Meanwhile, financial market variables emit a similarly bearish signal for safe haven staples stocks. Following a brief spike in the bond-to-stock ratio (BSR), the BSR has recently resumed its downdraft (top panel, Chart 15). Volatility has all but collapsed since soaring to over 80 in March, as the Fed has orchestrated a quashing of all asset class volatilities (middle panel, Chart 15). Lastly, the pairwise correlation between stocks in the S&P 500 has also nosedived bringing some semblance of normality back into equity markets (bottom panel, Chart 15). All three of these financial market variables will continue to exert downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 14V-shaped Recovery… V-shaped Recovery… V-shaped Recovery… Chart 15...Across The Board ...Across The Board ...Across The Board On the US dollar front, while consumer goods manufacturers get a P&L translation gain from a depreciating currency, their export exposure is on par with the SPX and does not provide a relative advantage. In marked contrast, empirical evidence shows that relative profitability moves in tandem with the greenback and the USD recent weakness will undercut consumer staples profitability (bottom panel, Chart 16), especially via climbing input cost inflation. In sum, a firming macro backdrop, the US dollar’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P consumer staples index to underweight. Chart 16Mind the Gap Mind the Gap Mind the Gap Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/special_reports/treasury_fed_accord/background 2     The velocity of money “is the number of times one dollar is spent to buy goods and services per unit of time. If the velocity of money is increasing, then more transactions are occurring between individuals in an economy.” Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 3    Our colleagues from The Bank Credit Analyst recently illustrated how a strong dollar is good for the US economy on a medium term basis. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Drilling Deeper Into Earnings Drilling Deeper Into Earnings ​​​​​​​ Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 ​​​​​​​Favor value over growth

Feature Feature ChartThe Sales Of Makeup And Perfumes Collapsed, But The Sales Of Hair Care And Skin Care Grew The Sales Of Makeup And Perfumes Collapsed, But The Sales Of Hair Care And Skin Care Grew The Sales Of Makeup And Perfumes Collapsed, But The Sales Of Hair Care And Skin Care Grew The pandemic era is diminishing our close quarters intimacy with people, which raises a fascinating question. In a world of social and physical distancing, widespread use of face coverings, and virtual meetings on Zoom or Skype, is it still important to look good? Is it important to smell good? And perhaps the most fascinating question of all: is it important to feel good? The so-called ‘lipstick effect’ is a putative counter-cyclical phenomenon during recessions in which the demand for small treats and pick-me-ups increases while other spending is shrinking. One theory is that it is based on the basic human desire to feel good, even during hard times. When budgets are squeezed, people simply cut out large extravagances and substitute them with small luxuries, epitomised by lipstick. The lipstick effect was first recorded during the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1933, unemployment in Germany surged to six million. But thanks to the booming demand for its cosmetics, the German firm Beiersdorf could boast that it did not have to lay off a single worker. Across the Atlantic, the same was true. When US economic output shrank by a third, cosmetics were one of the few products whose sales grew. The lipstick effect was also observed during the Great Recession. Between September 2008 and January 2009 when US consumer spending shrank, the sales of cosmetics bucked the downtrend, and grew (Chart I-2).  Chart I-2Cosmetics Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Cosmetics Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Cosmetics Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... The Lipstick Effect Is Working In An Evolved Form Fast forward to 2020, and the pandemic-induced economic slump is the one recession in which we would expect not to observe the lipstick effect. After all, if you are in lockdown, or must maintain physical distancing with other people, or must wear a face covering when near other people, what is the point of wearing makeup or perfume? The sales of cosmetics and fragrances collapsed in the 2020 recession… Just as we would expect, between February and April this year, the US sales of cosmetics and fragrances collapsed by 18 percent, exactly in line with the plunge in US consumer spending. On the face of it, the lipstick effect does not work under a facemask (Chart I-3). Chart I-3...But Shrank In The 2020 Recession ...But Shrank In The 2020 Recession ...But Shrank In The 2020 Recession Yet on closer examination, the lipstick effect is working, albeit in an evolved form. While the sales of makeup and perfumes have collapsed in 2020, the sales of skincare and haircare products are growing (Chart I-1). As the pandemic took hold and forced hair and beauty salons to shutter, people replaced salon visits with at-home care routines. And interestingly, even in the Great Recession of 2008-09, the US sales of haircare and non-cosmetic personal products outperformed the sales of cosmetics (Chart I-4-Chart I-7). Chart I-4Hair Care And Skin Care Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Hair Care And Skin Care Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Hair Care And Skin Care Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Chart I-5...And Grew In The 2020 ##br##Recession ...And Grew In The 2020 Recession ...And Grew In The 2020 Recession Chart I-6Total Personal Products Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Total Personal Products Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Total Personal Products Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Chart I-7...And Have Held Up Well In The 2020 Recession ...And Have Held Up Well In The 2020 Recession ...And Have Held Up Well In The 2020 Recession In fact, 60 percent of the total beauty market comprises skincare and haircare products compared with 30 percent for makeup and perfumes (Chart I-8). It turns out that the cosmetics and personal products firms that have a diversified exposure to all segments of the beauty market are the ones that outperform in hard times as well as good. And it turns out that these companies are European. Chart I-8Skin Care And Hair Care Dominates The Beauty Market Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? The European Cosmetics Sector Is Outperforming In hard times, the European cosmetics sector, led by L’Oréal, has consistently outperformed the US cosmetics sector, led by Estee Lauder, and the Japanese cosmetics sector, led by Shiseido. In hard times, the European cosmetics sector, led by L’Oréal, has consistently outperformed. Specifically, the 12-month forward earnings for the European cosmetics sector barely declined in the 2008-09 recession and have barely declined in the 2020 recession. In contrast, the forward earnings for the US and Japanese cosmetics sectors collapsed both then and now (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The European Cosmetics Sector Has Been Recession-Proof The European Cosmetics Sector Has Been Recession-Proof The European Cosmetics Sector Has Been Recession-Proof Furthermore, the latest quarterly reports show that while operating profits for L’Oréal are down by around 20 percent from a year ago, the operating profits for Estee Lauder and Shiseido have slumped by more than 80 percent.1 As a result, the L’Oréal share price took a much smaller hit than those of Estee Lauder and Shiseido in both the 2008 and the 2020 stock market crashes (Chart I-10 and Chart I-11). Chart I-10L’Oréal Took A Smaller Hit Than Estee Lauder And Shiseido In 2008… L'Oreal Took A Smaller Hit Than Estee Lauder And Shiseido In 2008... L'Oreal Took A Smaller Hit Than Estee Lauder And Shiseido In 2008... Chart I-11…And In ##br##2020 ...And In 2020 ...And In 2020 An important reason for L’Oréal’s consistent outperformance is its diversified product range. L’Oréal acknowledges that for both its consumer products and luxury divisions “the health crisis triggered a sharp deceleration in the makeup market”. But the hit to makeup was counterbalanced by continued strong growth in skin care thanks, for example, to the launch of serums in its Revitalift range. Additionally, its hair care products grew thanks to Fructis Hair Food plus very strong performance in the “highly dynamic home-use hair colour market”.  Estee Lauder confirms that “Covid-19 and its various impacts have influenced consumer preferences due to the closures of offices, retail stores and other businesses and the significant decline in social gatherings”. While the demand for makeup and fragrance has slumped, the demand for skin care and hair care products has been more resilient. The trouble is that hair care accounts for less than 4 percent of Estee Lauder’s total sales. Meanwhile, the collapse in makeup sales has forced goodwill asset impairments to several of its makeup brands causing the 80 percent collapse in its overall profits. Likewise, Shiseido blames the 83 percent slump in its operating profits largely on “a product mix deterioration” which outweighed prompt cost-saving measures in response to the rapid deterioration of the market environment. Another vulnerability is that Shiseido’s sales are highly concentrated in Asia. By comparison, L’Oréal benefits from geographical diversification, with sales almost equally split between Europe, the Americas, and Asia (Table I-1). Table I-1L’Oréal Benefits From Geographical Diversification Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? The European Personal Products Sector Is Also Outperforming Turning to the general personal products sector, the leading companies are Unilever and Beiersdorf in Europe, Procter & Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, and Kimberly Clark in the US, and Kao in Japan. In the personal products sector too, Europe has consistently outperformed the US and Japan. In the personal products sector too, Europe has consistently outperformed the US and Japan. Indeed, while the European sector’s profits have steadily grown through the past decade, the US sector’s profits have been going nowhere since the mid-2010s (Chart 1-12). Chart I-12The European Personal Products Sector’s Profits Have Grown Through The Past Decade The European Personal Products Sector's Profits Have Grown Through The Past Decade The European Personal Products Sector's Profits Have Grown Through The Past Decade   One reason for the European personal products sector’s reliable growth is that both Unilever and Beiersdorf are highly exposed to the beauty sector – in fact, Unilever has an even larger market share than Estee Lauder (Chart I-13). And as we have just seen, a diversified exposure to all segments of the beauty sector – makeup, fragrances, skin care, and hair care – should produce resilient growth in all economic backdrops. Pre-pandemic, and potentially once the pandemic is over, makeup and fragrances were/will be the growth drivers. Whereas during the pandemic, skin care and hair care are the drivers. Chart I-13Unilever Is A Big Player In Beauty Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? A final point is that despite the superior and safer growth prospects of the European cosmetics and personal products companies, they are not generally more richly valued than their peers in the US and Japan (Table I-2 and Table I-3). Table I-2The European Cosmetics Sector Is Not More Expensive Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? Table I-3The European Personal Products Sector Is Not More Expensive Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? Does The Lipstick Effect Work Under A Facemask? To sum up, for the pandemic era and beyond, the European cosmetics and personal products sector is well set for diversified growth via product mix, price points, and regional exposures. And it is relatively well valued versus its peers elsewhere in the world. As such, the sector – dominated by L’Oréal, Unilever, and Beiersdorf – should remain a core holding in an investment portfolio.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Mohamed El Shennawy Research Associate mohamede@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The most recent quarterly report for Estee Lauder is due on August 20. But at the time of writing the latest quarterly report was to the end of June 2020 for L’Oréal and to the end of March 2020 for Estee Lauder and Shiseido.

The Fed’s efforts to jawbone the US dollar are paying off as investors have been shedding their greenback exposure over the past several weeks. In recent research,1 we have also been highlighting that although Powell would never admit it, the Fed is trying to devalue the greenback and reflate the global economy. The knock-on effect of a depreciating USD is to rekindle S&P sales. According to S&P Dow Jones Indices,2 the SPX derives approximately 43% of its sales from abroad making the US dollar among the key macro profitability drivers (Chart 1, middle panel, US dollar shown advanced and inverted). One of the mechanisms to undermine the greenback is to flood the market with dollars. Ample US dollar based liquidity has historically served as a catalyst to reignite global growth and consequently S&P earnings (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 1US Dollar - The Key Driver US Dollar - The Key Driver US Dollar - The Key Driver Chart 2Bearish Across All Timeframes Bearish Across All Timeframes Bearish Across All Timeframes The Dollar: A Bearish Case The fate of the US dollar is yet to be sealed, but piling evidence suggests that the path of least resistance will be lower. Looking at structural (five years+) dynamics, swelling twin deficits emit a bearish USD signal. In more detail, prior to COVID-19 outbreak, the US twin deficits were estimated to gradually rise towards the 7.5% mark (Chart 2, top panel, dotted red line), but now the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates3 that the US fiscal deficit alone will be approximately 11% of nominal GDP for 2020. In other words, the recent pandemic has exacerbated already structurally bearish dynamics for the US dollar. Switching gears from a structural to a medium term horizon (2-3 years), BCA’s four-factor macro model, is sending an unambiguous bearish message regarding the greenback’s fate (Chart 2, middle panel). Finally, on a short-term time horizon, the USD is lagging the money multiplier by approximately 3 months. The COVID-19 induced recession and resulting money printing will likely exert extreme downward pressure on the US dollar (Chart 2, bottom panel). Summarizing, when looking across three different time horizons, the evidence is pointing toward a weakening US dollar for the foreseeable future. SPX Sectors And US Dollar Correlations With a rising probability of a US dollar bear market on the horizon, it pays to look back in time and examine which S&P GICS1 sectors benefited from a depreciating US dollar. The purpose of this Special Report is to shed light on the empirical evidence of SPX sectors and USD correlations and serve as a roadmap of sector winners and losers during USD bear markets. Table 1 provides foreign sales exposure for each of the sectors. All else equal, a falling greenback should be synonymous with technology, materials, and energy sectors outperforming as they are the most internationally exposed sectors. In contrast, should the USD change its course and head north, financials, telecom, REITs, and utilities will be the key beneficiaries. Why? Because most of these industries are landlocked in the US and thus in a relative sense should benefit when the US dollar roars. Table 1S&P 500 GICS1 Foreign Sales As A Percent Of Total Sales* US Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell US Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell To confirm the above hypothesis, we have identified three previous US dollar bear markets (Chart 3) and computed GICS1-level sector relative returns (Table 2). Chart 3US Dollar Bear Markets US Dollar Bear Markets US Dollar Bear Markets Table 2S&P 500 Gics1 Returns* During US Dollar Bear Markets US Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell US Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell Looking at median return profile reveals that our hypothesis held as all three: technology, materials, and energy decisively outperformed the market when the US dollar headed south. Similarly, domestically focused and predominately defensive industries such as utilities and telecoms underperformed the market with the consumer staples sector being a notable outlier – something that we address in the consumer staples section of the report. What follows next is a detailed discussion on each of the GICS1 sectors historical relationship with the US dollar, ranked in order of foreign sales exposure from highest to lowest. For completion purposes, we also provided S&P 500 GICS1 relative sector performance against the US dollar charts since 1970 in the Appendix.     Arseniy Urazov Research Associate arseniyu@bcaresearch.com   Technology (Neutral)  Technology sits atop the foreign sales exposure table garnering 58% of revenues from abroad, which is a full 15% percentage points higher than S&P 500 (Table 1). In two out of the three periods of USD bear markets that we examined, tech stocks bested the broad market and the median outperformance sat over 9%. Nevertheless, the correlation between the US dollar and relative share prices is muted over a longer-term horizon (see Appendix Chart A1 below). Likely, one reason for the inconclusive long-term correlation between tech and the greenback is that the majority of tech gadgets are manufactured overseas (Chart 4, third panel). Therefore, an appreciating currency boosts margins via deflating input costs. Tack on the resilient nature of demand for tech hardware goods and especially software and services which preserves high selling prices and offsets and negative P&L losses from a rising greenback. We are currently neutral the S&P technology sector and employ a barbell portfolio approach preferring software and services and avoiding hardware and equipment. Chart 4Technology Technology Technology Materials (Neutral) The materials sector behaves similarly to its brother the energy sector as both move in the opposite direction of the greenback (Chart 5, top panel). Consequently, materials stocks have outperformed the market during periods of US dollar weakness that we analyzed. The third panel of Chart 5 shows that our materials exports proxy is the flip image of the greenback. This tight inverse relationship is exacerbated by the negative impact of a firming dollar on underlying metals commodity prices (Chart 5, second panel). As a result, materials profit margins widen when the dollar falls and narrow when it rises. Ultimately, S&P materials earnings reflect this USD-commodity dynamic (Chart 5, bottom panel) We are currently neutral the S&P materials index. Chart 5Materials Materials Materials Energy (Overweight) The energy sector enjoys a tight inverse correlation with the US dollar (Chart 6, top panel) as it is the third most globally exposed sector as shown in Table 1 with 51% of sales coming from abroad. As nearly all of the global oil trade is conducted in US dollars, a weakening USD underpins the price of crude oil (Chart 6, second panel). In turn, US energy sector exports rise reflecting the fall in the greenback (Chart 6, third panel). Finally, the S&P energy companies enjoy a boost to their income statements (Chart 6, bottom panel), which explains the sizable median sector outperformance of 43% during dollar bear markets as highlighted in Table 2. We are currently overweight the S&P energy sector and have recently capitalized on 40%+ combined gains in the long XOP/short GDX pair trades.4 Chart 6Energy Energy Energy Industrials (Overweight) US industrials stocks’ foreign sales exposure is on a par with the S&P 500, which explains why the sector only barely outperformed the broad market during periods of dollar weakness. Still, the correlation between this manufacturing-heavy sector and the greenback is negative (Chart 7, top & second panels). Similar to its deep cyclical brethren (materials and energy), the link comes via the commodity channel. A softening dollar boosts global growth, which in turn supports higher commodity prices. Not only do US capital goods producers benefit from overall rising demand (i.e. infrastructure spending), but also via market share gains in global markets as the falling greenback results in a comparative input cost advantage (Chart 7, third panel). Finally, P&L translation gain effects act as another fillip to industrials stocks profits when dollar heads south. We are currently overweight the S&P industrials index. Chart 7Industrials Industrials Industrials Health Care (Overweight) The defensive health care sector is positively correlated with the dollar as its foreign sales revenues are below the ones of the SPX (Chart 8, top panel). Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between the sector’s exports and the USD has been mostly positive, which is counterintuitive (Chart 8, middle panel). Keep in mind that pharma and biotech represent roughly half the index and derive 75%+ of their profits domestically as they dictate pricing terms to the US government (it is written into law). This is not the case in Europe where the NHS and the German government for example, have a big say on what pharmaceuticals can charge for their drugs. The bottom panel of Chart 8 summarizes the domestic nature of the health care sector, highlighting the tight positive relationship between the sector’s earnings and the greenback. We are currently modestly overweight the S&P health care sector. Chart 8Health Care Health Care Health Care Consumer Discretionary (Overweight) While the impact of the US dollar on the consumer discretionary sector varied over time switching from a positive to a negative and vice versa, today the sector enjoys a positive correlation with the currency (Chart 9, top panel). The 33% foreign sales exposure may appear as a significant proportion, but it is still a full 10% percentage points below the SPX (Table 1). The implication is that even though the exports benefit from a falling dollar (Chart 9, middle panel), this bump is not enough to drive sector outperformance. Likely, the key reason why consumer discretionary stocks currently enjoy a positive correlation with the dollar is the US large trade deficit. In other words, the US imports the lion’s share of its consumer goods. As the dollar grinds higher, the cost of imports decreases for the US consumer, which provides a boost to companies’ earnings (Chart 9, bottom panel). Tack on the heavy weight AMZN has in the sector (comprising 40% of consumer discretionary sector market cap) and the positive correlation with the currency is explained away. We are currently overweight the S&P consumer discretionary index. Chart 9Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staples (Neutral) While a softening US dollar generally favors cyclical industries as it reignites global trade, the defensive S&P consumer staples sector outperformed the overall market on a median basis during USD bear markets (Table 2). Granted, the results are likely skewed as staples stocks rallied more than 300% in the last two decades of the 20th century. Nevertheless, there is a key differentiating factor at play that helped the consumer staples sector trounce other defensive industries during US dollar bear markets. Staples stocks derive 33% (Table 1) of their sales from abroad, whereas other traditional defensive industries (utilities, telecom services) have virtually no export exposure. In other words, given that staples companies are mostly manufacturers, a depreciating currency acts as a tonic to sales via the export relief valve (Chart 10, bottom panel). We are currently neutral the S&P consumer staples sector. Chart 10Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Financials (Overweight) Financials sit at the bottom half of our Table 1 in terms of their foreign sales exposure, which underpins the sector’s positive correlation with the greenback (Chart 11, top panel), and explains why the sector underperforms the market during dollar bear markets. One of the transmission channels between this sector’s performance and the currency is via increased credit demand. Currency appreciation suppresses inflation and supports purchasing power, and thus loan demand, in addition to keeping bond yields low (Chart 11, middle panel). The process reverses as the US dollar stars to depreciate. We are currently overweight the S&P financials index. Chart 11Financials Financials Financials Utilities (Underweight) Utilities underperformed in all three dollar bear markets we analyzed. As we highlighted in the energy section of the report, a softening dollar is synonymous with higher crude oil prices, which in turn raise inflation expectations. The ensuing selloff in the 10-year Treasury, compels investors to shed this bond proxy equity sector (Chart 12, middle panel). With virtually no exports, utilities also miss on the positive currency translation effects that other GICS1 sectors enjoy. In fact, utilities underperformed by the widest margin on a median basis across all GICS1 sectors (Table 2). This defensive sector typically attracts safe haven flows when the dollar spikes and investors run for cover. This positive correlation with the dollar is clearly reflected in industry earnings, which rise and fall in lockstep with momentum in the greenback (Chart 12, bottom panel). We are currently underweight the S&P utilities sector. Chart 12Utilities Utilities Utilities Telecommunication Services (Neutral) Telecom services relative performance is positively correlated with the dollar, similarly to its defensive sibling, the utilities sector. In fact, telecom carriers go neck-in-neck with utilities as the former is the second worst performing sector during dollar bear markets (Table 2). A softening dollar has proven to be fatal to the industry’s relative pricing power beyond intra industry competition. In fact, industry selling prices are slated to head south anew if history at least rhymes (Chart 13, middle panel). Importantly, this defensive sector is in a structural downtrend and is trying to stay relevant and avoid becoming a “dumb pipeline” with the eventual proliferation of 5G. Worrisomely, telecoms only manage to claw back some of their severe losses during recessions. But, the latest iteration is an aberration as this safe haven sector has failed to stand up to its defensive stature likely owing to the heavy debt load. We are currently neutral the niche S&P telecom services index that now hides underneath the S&P communication services sector. Chart 13Telecom Services Telecom Services Telecom Services REITs (Underweight) Surprisingly, US REITs enjoy an overall negative correlation with the dollar, especially since 1993, and in fact lead the greenback by about 18 months (Chart 14). Our hypothesis would have been a positive correlation courtesy of the landlocked nature of this sector i.e. no export exposure. Granted, in the three periods of dollar bear markets we examined, REITs slightly outperformed the market by 2.5% on a median basis. While the causal link (if any) is yet to be established and the correlation may be spurious, our sense is that forward interest rate differentials are at work and more than offset the domestic nature of this index. REITs have a high dividend yield and thus outperform when the competing risk free asset the 10-year Treasury yield is falling and vice versa (except during recessions). As a result, REITs outperformance is more often than not synonymous with a depreciating currency as lower Treasury yields would exert downward pressure on the USD ceteris paribus.  We are currently underweight the S&P REITs index. Chart 14REITs REITs REITs   Appendix Chart A1Appendix: Technology Appendix: Technology Appendix: Technology Chart A2Appendix: Materials Appendix: Materials Appendix: Materials Chart A3Appendix: Energy Appendix: Energy Appendix: Energy Chart A4Appendix: Industrials Appendix: Industrials Appendix: Industrials Chart A5Appendix: Health Care Appendix: Health Care Appendix: Health Care Chart A6Appendix: Consumer Discretionary Appendix: Consumer Discretionary Appendix: Consumer Discretionary Chart A7Appendix: Consumer Staples Appendix: Consumer Staples Appendix: Consumer Staples Chart A8Appendix: Financials Appendix: Financials Appendix: Financials Chart A9Appendix: Utilities Appendix: Utilities Appendix: Utilities Chart A10Appendix: Telecommunication Services Appendix: Telecommunication Services Appendix: Telecommunication Services Chart A11 landscapeAppendix: REITs Appendix: REITs Appendix: REITs   Footnotes 1    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bottomless Punchbowl” dated May 11, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2    https://us.spindices.com/indexology/djia-and-sp-500/sp-500-global-sales 3    https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-05/56351-CBO-interim-projections.pdf 4    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Gauging Fair Value” dated April 27, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.  

  In a webcast this Friday I will be joined by our Chief US Equity Strategist, Anastasios Avgeriou to debate ‘Sectors To Own, And Sectors To Avoid In The Post-Covid World’. Today’s report preludes five of the points that we will debate. Please join us for the full discussion and conclusions on Friday, June 12, at 8:00 AM EDT (1:00 PM BST, 2:00 PM CEST, 8.00 PM HKT).   Highlights Technology is behaving like a Defensive. Defensive versus Cyclical = Growth versus Value. Growth stocks are not a bubble if bond yields stay ultra-low. The post-Covid world will reinforce existing sector mega-trends. Sectors are driving regional and country relative performance. Fractal trade: Long ZAR/CLP.   Chart of the WeekSector Defensiveness/Cyclicality = Positive/Negative Sensitivity To The Bond Price Sector Defensiveness/Cyclicality = Positive/Negative Sensitivity To The Bond Price Sector Defensiveness/Cyclicality = Positive/Negative Sensitivity To The Bond Price 1. Technology Is Behaving Like A Defensive How do we judge an equity sector’s sensitivity to the post-Covid economy, so that we can define it as cyclical or defensive? One approach is to compare the sector’s relative performance with the bond price. According to this approach, the more negatively sensitive to the bond price, the more cyclical is the sector. And the more positively sensitive to the bond price, the more defensive is the sector (Chart I-1).   On this basis the most cyclical sectors in the post-Covid economy are, unsurprisingly: energy, banks, and materials. Healthcare is unsurprisingly defensive. Meanwhile, the industrials sector sits closest to neutral between cyclical and defensive, showing the least sensitivity to the bond price. The tech sector’s vulnerability to economic cyclicality appears to have greatly reduced. The big surprise is technology, whose high positive sensitivity to the bond price during the 2020 crisis qualifies it as even more defensive than healthcare. This contrasts sharply with its behaviour during the 2008 crisis. Back then, tech’s relative performance was negatively correlated with the bond price, defining it as classically cyclical. But over the past year, tech’s relative performance has been positively correlated with the bond price, defining it as classically defensive (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2In 2008, Tech Behaved Like ##br##A Cyclical... In 2008, Tech Behaved Like A Cyclical... In 2008, Tech Behaved Like A Cyclical... Chart I-3...But In 2020, Tech Is Behaving Like A Defensive ...But In 2020, Tech Is Behaving Like A Defensive ...But In 2020, Tech Is Behaving Like A Defensive This is not to say that the big tech companies cannot suffer shocks. They can. For example, from new superior technologies, or from anti-oligopoly legislation. However, the tech sector’s vulnerability to economic cyclicality appears to have greatly reduced over the past decade. 2. Defensive Versus Cyclical = Growth Versus Value If we reclassify the tech sector as defensive in the 2020s economy, then the post mid-March rebound in stocks was first led by defensives. Cyclicals took over leadership of the rally only in May. Moreover, with the reclassification of tech as defensive, the two dominant defensive sectors become tech and healthcare. But tech and healthcare are also the dominant ‘growth’ sectors. The upshot is that growth versus value has now become precisely the same decision as defensive versus cyclical (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Defensive Versus Cyclical = Growth Versus Value Defensive Versus Cyclical = Growth Versus Value Defensive Versus Cyclical = Growth Versus Value 3. Growth Stocks Are Not A Bubble If Bond Yields Stay Ultra-Low Some people fear that growth stocks have become dangerously overvalued. There is even mention of the B-word. Let’s address these fears. Yes, valuations have become richer. For example, the forward earnings yield for healthcare is down to 5 percent; and for big tech it is down to just over 4 percent. This valuation starting point has proved to be an excellent guide to prospective 10-year returns, and now implies an expected annualised return from big tech in the mid-single digits. Yet this modest positive return is well above the extremes of the negative 10-year returns implied and delivered from the dot com bubble (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Big Tech Is Priced To Deliver A Positive Return, Unlike In 2000 Big Tech Is Priced To Deliver A Positive Return, Unlike In 2000 Big Tech Is Priced To Deliver A Positive Return, Unlike In 2000 Moreover, we must judge the implied returns from growth stocks against those available from competing long-duration assets – specifically, against the benchmark of high-quality government bond yields. If bond yields are ultra-low, then they must depress the implied returns on growth stocks too. Meaning higher absolute valuations (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6Tech's Forward Earnings Yield Is Above The Bond Yield, Unlike In 2000 Tech's Forward Earnings Yield Is Above The Bond Yield, Unlike In 2000 Tech's Forward Earnings Yield Is Above The Bond Yield, Unlike In 2000 Chart I-7Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield Is Above The Bond Yield, Unlike In 2000 Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield Is Above The Bond Yield, Unlike In 2000 Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield Is Above The Bond Yield, Unlike In 2000 In the real bubble of 2000, big tech was priced to return 12 percent (per annum) less than the 10-year T-bond. Whereas today, the implied return from big tech – though low in absolute terms – is above the ultra-low yield on the 10-year T-bond. If bond yields are ultra-low, then they must depress the implied returns on growth stocks too. The upshot is that high absolute valuations of growth stocks are contingent on bond yields remaining at ultra-low levels. And that the biggest threat to growth stock valuations would be a sustained rise in bond yields. 4. The Post-Covid World Will Reinforce Existing Sector Mega-Trends If a sector maintains a structural uptrend in sales and profits, then a big drop in the share price provides an excellent buying opportunity for long-term investors. This is because the lower share price stretches the elastic between the price and the up-trending profits, resulting in an eventual catch-up. However, if sales and profits are in terminal decline, then the sell-off is not a buying opportunity other than on a tactical basis. This is because the elastic will lose its tension as profits drift down towards the lower price. In fact, despite the sell-off, if the profit downtrend continues, the price may be forced ultimately to catch-down. This leads to a somewhat counterintuitive conclusion. After a big drop in the stock market, long-term investors should not buy everything that has dropped. And they should not buy the stocks and sectors that have dropped the most if their profits are in major downtrends. In this regard, the post-Covid world is likely to reinforce the existing mega-trends. The profits of oil and gas, and of European banks will remain in major structural downtrends (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Conversely, the profits of healthcare, and of European personal products will remain in major structural uptrends (Chart I-10 and Chart I-11). Chart I-8Oil And Gas Profits In A Major ##br##Downtrend Oil And Gas Profits In A Major Downtrend Oil And Gas Profits In A Major Downtrend Chart I-9Bank Profits In A Major ##br##Downtrend European Banks Profits In A Major Downtrend Bank Profits In A Major Downtrend European Banks Profits In A Major Downtrend Bank Profits In A Major Downtrend Chart I-10Healthcare Profits In A Major Uptrend Healthcare Profits In A Major Uptrend Healthcare Profits In A Major Uptrend Chart I-11Personal Products Profits In A Major Uptrend Personal Products Profits In A Major Uptrend Personal Products Profits In A Major Uptrend   5. Sectors Are Driving Regional And Country Relative Performance Finally, sector winners and losers determine regional and country equity market winners and losers. Nowadays, a stock market’s relative performance is predominantly a play on its distinguishing overweight and underweight ‘sector fingerprint’. This is because major stock markets are dominated by multinational corporations which are plays on their global sectors, rather than the region or country in which they have a stock market listing. It follows that when tech and healthcare outperform, the tech-heavy and healthcare-heavy US stock market must outperform, while healthcare-lite emerging markets (EM) must underperform. It also follows that the tech-heavy Netherlands and healthcare-heavy Denmark stock markets must outperform. Sector mega-trends will shape the mega-trends in regional and country relative performance. Equally, when energy and banks underperform, the energy-heavy Norway and bank-heavy Spain stock markets must underperform. (Chart I-12 and Chart I-13). These are just a few examples. Every stock market is defined by a sector fingerprint which drives its relative performance.  Chart I-12Sector Relative Performance Drives... Sector Relative Performance Drives... Sector Relative Performance Drives... Chart I-13...Regional And Country Relative Performance ...Regional And Country Relative Performance ...Regional And Country Relative Performance If sector mega-trends continue, they will also shape the mega-trends in regional and country relative performance – favouring those stock markets that are heavy in growth stocks and light in old-fashioned cyclicals. Please join the webcast to hear the full debate and conclusions. Fractal Trading System*  This week’s recommended trade is to go long the South African rand versus the Chilean peso. Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. In other trades, long Spanish 10-year bonds versus New Zealand 10-year bonds achieved its 3.5 percent profit target at which it was closed. And long Australia versus New Zealand equities is approaching its 12 percent profit target. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 63 percent. Chart I-14ZAR/CLP ZAR/CLP ZAR/CLP   When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

The COVID-19 induced recession has accelerated several paradigm shifts that were already afoot. Populism, anti-immigrant sentiment, deglobalization, and fiscal profligacy were replete – particularly in the US – even before the pandemic. For the first time since WWII, the US budget deficit significantly expanded for three years running at a time when the unemployment rate was declining, late in the cycle. We fear that the Washington Consensus – a catchall term for fiscal prudence, laissez-faire economics, free trade, and unfettered capital flows – is being replaced by economic populism, by a Buenos Aires Consensus, as our geopolitical strategists have posited in the past. Buenos Aires Consensus is our catchall term for everything that is opposite of the Washington Consensus: less globalization, fiscal stimulus as far as the eyes can see, erosion of central bank independence, and a dirigiste (as opposed to laissez-faire) approach to economics that seeks to protect “state champions,” stifles innovation, and ultimately curbs productivity growth. The most important long-term consequence of the Buenos Aires Consensus will be higher inflation. And we are not talking just the asset price kind – which investors have enjoyed over the past decade – but of the more traditional flavor: consumer price inflation (Chart 1). Chart 1Inflation Is Coming Inflation Is Coming Inflation Is Coming A profligate US government where $3 trillion + fiscal packages are passed with a strong bipartisan consensus, rising odds of increased defense and infrastructure spending, a renewed focus on protecting America’s industrial champions from competition (foreign or domestic), and a robust protectionist agenda (again, on both sides of the aisle), are all inherently inflationary and negative for bonds, ceteris paribus. A whiff of inflation would be a positive for the broad equity market, further fueling the “risk on”, liquidity-driven, melt-up phase. However, historically when inflation has entered the 3.7%-4% zone in the past, the broad equity market has stumbled (Chart 2). Despite these powerful longer-term inflationary forces, our working assumption is that, in the next 9-12 months, headline CPI inflation will only renormalize, rather than surge, as the coronavirus-induced deficient demand and excess supply dynamic will take time to reach a new equilibrium (Chart 3). Chart 2Only A Whiff Of Inflation Is Good For Stocks Only A Whiff Of Inflation Is Good For Stocks Only A Whiff Of Inflation Is Good For Stocks Importantly, the magnitude of the economic damage, the likelihood that a “second wave” requires renewed lockdowns, and a new steady state of the apparent “square root” type of recovery remain unknown. This means that “deflationistas” may continue to have an upper hand on the “inflationistas”, as witnessed by the subdued inflation expectations (Chart 3). Chart 3In The Near-Term Disinflation Looms In The Near-Term Disinflation Looms In The Near-Term Disinflation Looms The Federal Reserve’s Function As The Lender Of Last Resort What is certain is the Fed’s resolve to keep things gelled together and allow businesses and the economy enough time to heal and overcome the coronavirus shock. Simply put, there are high odds that the Fed will remain accommodative and take inflation risk “sitting down” for quite some time, certainly for the next year, and likely longer (Chart 4). While early on, the Powell-led Fed had been ambivalent, the FOMC’s swift and immense response to the coronavirus calamity with unorthodox monetary policies has been appropriate and unprecedented (Chart 5). Clearly, the sloshing liquidity cannot cure the coronavirus, but providing the credit needed in parts of the financial markets and select business sectors that had completely dried up was the proper policy response. The Fed acted promptly as a lender of last resort. Unlike the difficulty in defeating deflation – look no further than Japan – ending inflation is easy. The great Paul Volcker has taught the Fed and the world how to break the back of inflation. The Fed, therefore, has the credible tools to deal with a possible inflationary impulse. Chart 4Do Not Fight The Mighty Fed Do Not Fight The Mighty Fed Do Not Fight The Mighty Fed Chart 5Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Until economic growth regains its footing and climbs to its post-GFC steady 2-2.5% real GDP growth profile, the probability is high that the Fed will take some inflation risk (Chart 6). Chart 6The Fed Can Afford To Take Inflation Risk The Fed Can Afford To Take Inflation Risk The Fed Can Afford To Take Inflation Risk This is especially the case given that political risk in the US is tilted to the downside. With income inequality at nose bleeds levels, US policymakers (both fiscal and monetary authorities) will hesitate to act on the inflation mandate with gusto and objectivity (Chart 7). Chart 7The Apex Of Globalization And Income Inequality The Apex Of Globalization And Income Inequality The Apex Of Globalization And Income Inequality The Fed will therefore not rush to abruptly tighten monetary policy, a view confirmed by the bond market: fed funds futures are penciling a negative fed funds rate in mid-2021 and ZIRP as far as the eye can see (Chart 8). A sustainable breakout in bond yields would require inflation (and to a lesser extent real GDP growth) to significantly surprise to the upside, which would compel the Fed to aggressively raise the fed funds rate. But that is not on the immediate horizon especially given the recent coronavirus-related blow to unit labor costs (please see Appendix below). Even if there were an inflationary backup in longer term Treasury yields, yield curve control is a tool the Fed is considering, something it first tried on the Treasury’s orders during and following WWII for a nine year period. Chart 8ZIRP As Far As The Eye Can See ZIRP As Far As The Eye Can See ZIRP As Far As The Eye Can See Dollar And The Inflationary Valve Importantly, the US dollar’s direction will be critical in determining whether any lasting inflation acceleration occurs. The top panel of Chart 9 shows that inflation accelerates during U.S. dollar bear markets. A depreciating greenback greases the wheels of the global financial system and also serves as a global growth locomotive given that trade is largely conducted in US dollars (bottom panel, Chart 9). Thus, the Fed’s recent US dollar swap lines to other Central Banks, along with its FIMA facility, were instrumental in unclogging the global financial system. Sloshing US dollar liquidity restored a semblance of normality to asset prices (Chart 10). Chart 9Inversely Correlated Inversely Correlated Inversely Correlated Chart 10Ample Liquidity To Debase The Greenback Ample Liquidity To Debase The Greenback Ample Liquidity To Debase The Greenback As we highlighted in our December 16 Special Report titled “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade” ,1 there are rising odds that a US dollar bear market takes root this decade. Eventually, the steeper the greenback’s fall, the higher the chance of a longer lasting inflationary spurt as US import price inflation will rear its ugly head (Chart 11). Chart 11US Dollar Bear Markets Are Synonymous With Inflation US Dollar Bear Markets Are Synonymous With Inflation US Dollar Bear Markets Are Synonymous With Inflation So What? While, in the near-term, accelerating inflation is a negligible risk owing to excess economic slack, in the intermediate-term, it is a rising probability outcome. BCA’s long-held de-globalization theme,2 the US/Sino trade war that is here to stay irrespective of the next electoral outcome and excessive US government fiscal largesse will likely, in the next two-to-three years, swing the global deflation/inflation pendulum toward sustained inflation (Chart 12). For investors that are worried about the prospect of higher inflation, the purpose of this Special Report is to serve as an equity sector positioning roadmap, especially if inflationary pressures become more acute sooner than we anticipate. Chart 12Deglobalization Will Result In Inflation Deglobalization Will Result In Inflation Deglobalization Will Result In Inflation Historically, inflation has been synonymous with an aggressive Fed and hard asset outperformance, suggesting that deep cyclical sectors would be the primary beneficiaries. Table 1 shows that over the last six major inflationary cycles, energy, materials, real estate and health care have been consistent outperformers. On the flip side, utilities, tech and telecom have been clear underperformers. The remaining sectors have been a mixed bag. Table 1S&P 500 Sector Performance During Inflationary Periods Revisiting Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs Revisiting Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs With the exception of real estate, our portfolio will benefit from an accelerating inflationary backdrop. However, our early- and late-cyclical preference to defensives is a consequence of the current stage of the cycle: when in recession it pays to have a cyclical portfolio bent (please see Charts 6 and 7 from our mid-April Weekly Report).3 Ultimately, we expect relative profit trends to dictate relative performance on a cyclical investment horizon, and are not rushing to further shift our portfolio in order to benefit from accelerating inflation. What follows is a one page per sector analysis of the impact of inflation on pricing power and performance. Sectors are ranked by their average returns (largest to smallest) in the six inflationary cycles we studied as shown on Table 1.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Health Care Health care stocks have consistently outperformed during the six inflationary periods we examined. Over the long haul, it has paid to overweight this sector given the structural uptrend in relative share prices. Spending on health care services is non-cyclical and demand for such services is on a secular rise around the globe most recently further catalyzed by the COVID-19 pandemic: in the developed markets driven largely by the aging population and in the emerging markets by the accelerating adoption of health care safety nets and higher standards. Chart 13Health Care Health Care Health Care Health care pricing power is expanding at a healthy clip, outshining overall CPI. Importantly, recent geopolitical uncertainty had cast a shadow on the sector’s pricing power prospects that suffered from a constant derating. Now that political uncertainty has lifted as Biden is a more moderate Democratic President candidate than either Sanders or Warren, a rerating looms. Finally, demand for health care goods and services will not only remain robust, but also get a boost from the recent coronavirus pandemic as governments around the globe beef up their health care response systems. Chart 14Health Care Health Care Health Care Energy The energy sector comes out on top of the median relative return results in times of inflation, and second best in average terms (Table 1 above). Oil price surges are typically synonymous with other forms of inflation. During the six inflationary periods we analyzed, all but one period were associated with relative share outperformance. Oil producers in particular benefit from the increase in the underlying commodity almost immediately (assuming little to no hedging), which also serves as an excellent inflation hedge. Chart 15Energy Energy Energy Relative energy pricing power collapsed during the COVID-19 accelerated recession plumbing multi-decade lows. Saudi Arabia’s decision in early-2020 to refrain from balancing the oil market triggered a plunge in WTI crude oil prices to negative $40/bbl. While global demand remains deficient, this breakdown in oil prices has brought some much needed supply discipline in global oil producers including US shale. As the reopening of economies takes hold oil demand will recover and absorb excess oil inventories. While base effects will push crude oil inflation to the stratosphere in Q1/2021, eventually a more balanced global oil market will pave the way to a sustainable rebound in oil prices. Chart 16Energy Energy Energy Real Estate REITs have outperformed the overall market during the five inflationary periods we analyzed, exemplifying their hard asset profile. While the 1976-81 iteration skewed the mean results, REITs still come out with the third best showing among the top eleven sectors even on median return basis (Table 1 above). Real estate prices tend to appreciate when inflation is accelerating, because landlords have consistently raised rents at least on a par with inflation. Chart 17Real Estate Real Estate Real Estate Following the GFC trough, REITs pricing power has outpaced the overall CPI. CRE selling prices had been on a tear since the GFC, but the ongoing recession has short-circuited this hard asset’s near uninterrupted price appreciation; according to Green Street Advisors, average CRE prices contracted by roughly 10% in April. Worrisomely the persistent multi-family construction boom and the “amazonification” of the economy will act as a restraint to the apartment REIT and shopping center REIT segments, respectively. Tack on the longer-term knock-on effects of the work-from-home wave that has staying power and even office REITs may suffer a demand-related deflationary shock. Chart 18Real Estate Real Estate Real Estate Materials Materials equities have a tight positive correlation with accelerating inflation. Resource-related stocks are the closest representation of hard assets, given their ability to store value among the eleven GICS1 sectors. As inflation takes root and commodity prices rise, materials sales and EPS growth get a boost with relative share prices following right behind. Chart 19Materials Materials Materials Our relative materials pricing power gauge is currently contracting, but encouragingly it is showing some signs of stabilization. The drubbing in Chinese GDP in Q1 has dealt a blow to commodities-related demand and thus prices as infrastructure projects ground to a halt. As the Chinese economy has restarted slightly ahead of developed markets a return to normalcy is a high probability outcome in the back half of the year. Keep in mind that the delayed effect of stimulus spending should also hit in Q3 and Q4 likely further tightening commodity markets. Chart 20Materials Materials Materials Consumer Discretionary While the overall trend in consumer discretionary stocks has been higher since the mid-1970s, relative performance mostly declines during inflationary times. Consumer spending takes the backseat as a performance driver when interest rates rise on the back of higher inflation. In addition, previous inflationary periods have also coincided with surging energy prices, representing another source of diminishing consumer discretionary purchasing power. Chart 21Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Consumer discretionary selling prices are expanding relative to overall wholesale price inflation, and are on a trajectory to hit double digit growth. Deflating energy prices, ultra-loose monetary conditions and the $3tn fiscal stimulus have kept the US consumer afloat. As Washington and the Fed are providing a lifeline to the economy during the recession, the reopening of the economy has the potential to turbo-charge consumer discretionary spending as pent up demand will get unleashed. Chart 22Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Financials Financials relative returns are neither hot nor cold when inflation rears its ugly head. In fact they sit in the middle of the pack in terms of relative median and mean returns. This lack of consistency reflects different factors that exerted significant influence in some of these inflationary periods. Moreover, Chart 23 shows that relative share prices have been mean reverting since the 1960s, likely blurring the inflation influence. Ultimately, the yield curve, credit growth and credit quality determine the path of least resistance for the relative share price ratio of this early cyclical sector. Chart 23Financials Financials Financials Financials sector pricing power has jumped by about 450bps since the 2019 trough and have exited deflation. Given the recent steepening of the yield curve that is typical at the depths of the recession, the odds are high that sector pricing power will remain firm via rising net interest margins. Any easing in the regulatory backdrop even temporary could also provide a fillip to margins and offset the large precautionary provisioning that banks are taking to combat the looming recession-related losses. Chart 24Financials Financials Financials Industrials The industrials sector tends to outperform during inflationary periods. In fact, relative share prices have risen 50% of the time since the mid-1960s when inflation was accelerating. The two oil shocks in the 1970s raised the profile of all commodity-related sectors as investors were scrambling to find reliable inflation hedges. Chart 25Industrials Industrials Industrials Following a three-year period in the deflation zone, industrials relative pricing power is steadily rising, likely as a consequence of decreasing supplies, CEO discipline and the ongoing US/Sino trade war. The previously expansionary mindset has given way to retrenchment, as the scars from the late-2015/early 2016 manufacturing recession remain fresh. However, infrastructure spending is slated to increase at some point in late-2020 as China revs its economic engine and bolster the demand prospects for this deep cyclical sector. Chart 26Industrials Industrials Industrials Consumer Staples Similar to the health care sector, consumer staples stocks have been stellar outperformers over the past 55 years. The sector’s track record during the six inflationary periods we studied is split down the middle. Most consumer staples companies are global conglomerates and their efforts have been focused on building global consumer brands, allowing them to implement a stickier pricing strategy. As a result, overall inflation/deflation pressures are more benign. Chart 27Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Relative consumer staples pricing power has slingshot higher and is flirting with the upper bound of the past three decade range near the 10% mark. The current recession has augmented the status of consumer staples. While the lockdowns has dealt a blow to select discretionary purchases, demand for staples has actually increased according to recent retail sales and inflation data releases. Tack on falling commodity input costs and the implication is that consumer staples manufacturers will likely continue to enjoy widening profit margins. Chart 28Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Tech Technology stocks have underperformed every time inflation has accelerated with two exceptions, in the mid-to-late 1960s and mid-to-late 1970s. Creative destruction forces in the tech industry are inherently deflationary. As a result, tech business models have evolved to thrive during disinflationary periods. Moreover, tech stocks have become more mature than is typically perceived, generating enormous amounts of free cash flow. Cash flow growth is also steadier than in the past and has served as a catalyst to embark on shareholder friendly activities. Chart 29Tech Tech Tech Tech companies are constantly mired in deflation. While relative pricing power has been in an uptrend since 2016, it has recently soared as tech companies preserved their pricing power, but overall wholesale inflation has suffered a sizable setback. Importantly, demand for tech goods and services has remained resilient during the current recession, further adding to the allure of the tech sector. Chart 30Tech Tech Tech Utilities Utilities relative returns during inflationary bouts are the second worst among the top eleven sectors on an average basis and dead last on a median return basis (Table 1 above). In five out of the six inflationary phases we examined, utilities stocks suffered a setback. The industry’s lack of economic leverage and fixed income attributes anchor the relative share price ratio during inflationary times. Chart 31Utilities Utilities Utilities Our utilities sector pricing power proxy has sprung to life recently moderately outpacing overall inflation. Natural gas prices, the industry’s marginal price setter, have risen 18% since the early-April trough, signaling that recent utility pricing power gains have more upside. Nevertheless, as the economy is gradually reopening, soft data will stage a V-shaped recovery bolstering the odds of a selloff in the bond market. Such a backdrop will dampen the demand for high-yielding defensive equities, including pricey utilities. Chart 32Utilities Utilities Utilities Telecom Services Relative telecom services performance and inflation appear broadly inversely correlated since the early 1970s, underperforming 60% of the time when core PCE prices accelerate. Importantly, in two of the periods we studied (during the late-70s and the TMT bubble) the drawdowns were massive, skewing the mean results portrayed in Table 1 above. This fixed income proxy sector tends to suffer in times of inflation as competing assets dilute its yield appeal and vice versa. Chart 33Telecom Services Telecom Services Telecom Services Telecom services pricing power has been on a recovery mode since February 2017 when Verizon surprised investors and embarked on a price war by reinstating its unlimited plans in order to defend its market share. Importantly, earlier in the year telecom carriers relative selling prices exited deflation coinciding with the completion of the T-Mobile/Sprint deal. Intra-industry M&A is over as now only three major wireless providers are left raising the threat of monopolistic power. Nevertheless, the ongoing 5G deployment is of the utmost importance for telecom carriers and a foray further into cable/media/content services is inevitable so that the telecom incumbents move beyond being “dumb pipelines”. Chart 34Telecom Services Telecom Services Telecom Services Appendix Chart A1 CHART A1 CHART A1 Chart A2 CHART A2 CHART A2 Chart A3 CHART A3 CHART A3 Chart A4 CHART A4 CHART A4 Chart A5 CHART A5 CHART A5 Chart A6 CHART A6 CHART A6     Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade” dated December 16, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2     Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here” dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Fight Central Banks At Your Own Peril” dated April 14, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Investment Grade Sector Valuation: Our investment grade corporate bond sector valuation models for the US, euro area, UK, Canada and Australia show some common messages, as markets have adjusted to a virus-stricken world. The most attractive valuations can be found within Energy and Financials, with defensive sectors like Utilities and Consumer Non-Cyclicals looking expensive everywhere. Global Corporate Bond Strategy: Investors should focus global investment grade corporate bond allocations along country lines, while keeping overall spread risk close to benchmark levels, over the next 6-12 months. Specifically, we favor overweighting the US (especially at maturities of five years or less where the Fed is buying) and the UK, while keeping a neutral allocation to euro area corporates. We also like Australian and Canadian corporate debt versus sovereigns in both countries. Feature Chart 1A Swift Policy Response Has Brought Spreads Under Control A Swift Policy Response Has Brought Spreads Under Control A Swift Policy Response Has Brought Spreads Under Control Global policymakers have responded swiftly and aggressively to the COVID-19 outbreak and associated deep worldwide recession. This includes not only fiscal stimulus and monetary easing, but central banks buying corporate debt outright and providing other liquidity backstops. Coming at a time of collapsing economic growth and deteriorating corporate credit quality, these combined policy initiatives have reduced the negative tail risk for growth-sensitive assets like corporate debt. The result: a sharp tightening of corporate bond spreads across the developed markets (Chart 1). After such a large and broad-based rally, the easiest gains from the “beta” of owning corporate credit have been exhausted. Additional spread tightening is still expected in the coming months as governments begin to restart their economies after the COVID-19 quarantines start to loosen and global growth slowly begins to improve. Spreads are unlikely to return all the way to the pre-virus tights, however, as the recovery will be uneven and there is still the threat of a second wave of coronavirus infections later this year. To that end, it makes sense for investors to begin seeking out the “alpha” in corporate debt markets by looking at relative valuations across sectors to find opportunities. It makes sense for investors to begin seeking out the “alpha” in corporate debt markets by looking at relative valuations across sectors to find opportunities.  In this report, we will conduct a review of our entire suite of global investment grade corporate sector relative value models. We will cover the US, provide fresh updates of our recently published look at the euro area1 and the UK,2 while also revisiting our relative value framework for Canada first introduced last year.3 We will also apply the same corporate bond sector value methodology to a new country: Australia. In addition, we will examine value across credit tiers using breakeven spread analysis for each of these regions. A Brief Note On Our Corporate Bond Relative Value Tools Before delving into the results from our models, we take this opportunity to refresh readers on the methodology underpinning these analyses. Our sector relative value framework determines “fair value” spreads for each of the major and minor industry level sub-indices of the overall investment grade universe of individual developed market economies (using Bloomberg Barclays bond indices). The methodology takes each sector’s individual option-adjusted spread (OAS) and regresses it with all other sectors in a cross-sectional model. The models vary slightly across countries/regions, as the independent variables in the regression are selected based on parameter significance and predictive power for local sector spreads. Using the common coefficients from that regression, a risk-adjusted "fair value" spread is calculated. The difference between the actual OAS and fair value OAS – a.k.a. the residual from the regression - is our valuation metric used to inform our sector allocation ranking. We then look at the relationship between these residuals and duration-times-spread (DTS), our primary measure of sector riskiness, to give a reading on the risk/reward trade-off for each sector. We then apply individual sector weights based on the model output and our desired level of overall spread risk to come up with a recommended credit portfolio. The weights are determined at our discretion and are not the output from any quantitative portfolio optimization process. The only constraints are that all sector weights must add to 100% (i.e. the portfolio is fully invested with no use of leverage) and the overall level of spread risk (DTS) must equal our desired target. To examine value across credit tiers, we use a different metric - 12-month breakeven spread percentile rankings. Specifically, we calculate how much spread widening is required over a one-year horizon to eliminate the yield advantage of owning corporate bonds versus duration-matched government debt. We then show those breakeven spreads as a percentile ranking versus its own history, to allow comparisons over periods with differing underlying spread volatility. With the key details of our models squared away, we will now present the results of our models for each country/region, along with our recommended allocation across sectors. We also discuss our recommended level of overall spread risk for each country/region, which helps inform our specific sector weightings. A Country-By-Country Assessment Of Investment Grade Corporates US In Table 1, we present the latest output from our US investment grade sector valuation model. In keeping with the framework used by BCA Research US Bond Strategy, we use the average credit rating, duration, and duration-squared (convexity) of each sector as the model inputs. To determine our US sector recommendations, we not only need to look at the spread valuations from the relative value model, but we must also consider what level of overall US spread risk (DTS) to target. Table 1US Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle With the Fed now purchasing investment grade corporates with maturities of up to five years in the primary and secondary markets, it makes sense to take advantage of that explicit support by focusing exposures on shorter-maturity bonds. Thus, we recommend targeting a relatively moderate level of spread risk (within an overweight allocation to US investment grade corporates) by favoring sectors with a DTS less than or equal to that of the overall US investment grade index. The sweet spot, therefore, is the upper-left quadrant in Chart 2 - sectors with positive risk-adjusted spread residuals from the relative value model and a relatively lower DTS. Chart 2US Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 3US IG: More Value In The Lower Tiers US IG: More Value In The Lower Tiers US IG: More Value In The Lower Tiers On that basis, some of the most attractive overweight candidates are Cable Satellite, Media Entertainment, Integrated Energy, Diversified Manufacturing, Brokerage/Asset Managers, and Other Financials. Meanwhile, the least attractive sectors within this framework are Railroads, Communications, Wirelines, Wireless, Other Industrials and Utilities (including Electric, Natural Gas, and Other Utilities). While we have chosen to underweight much of the Energy space (with the exception of Integrated Energy) because of generally high DTS numbers, investors who are comfortable with taking on a higher level of spread risk can find some of the most attractive risk-adjusted valuations within oil related sectors. Our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy expect oil prices to continue to steadily rise in the months ahead, with Brent oil trading, on average, at $40/bbl this year and $68/bbl in 2021.4 We recommend targeting a relatively moderate level of spread risk (within an overweight allocation to US investment grade corporates). Across credit tiers, the higher-quality portion of the US investment grade corporate bond market appears unattractive, with spreads ranking below the historical median for Aaa- and Aa-rated debt (Chart 3). Conversely, Baa-rated debt appears most attractive, with spreads almost in the historical upper quartile. Euro Area In Table 2, we present the results of our euro area investment grade sector valuation model. The independent variables in this model are each sector’s duration, trailing 12-month spread volatility, and credit rating. Note that we will be using the same independent variables in our UK model. Table 2Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Spreads have already tightened significantly since our last discussion of euro area corporates in mid-April, with credit markets more fully pricing in greater monetary stimulus from the European Central Bank (ECB) – including increased government and corporate bond purchases. Thus, we believe it is reasonable to target a neutral level of overall portfolio DTS close to that of the benchmark index (within a neutral allocation to euro area investment grade). This means that, visually, we can think about our overweight candidates as sectors that are in the top half of Chart 4 - with positive residuals from our relative value model - but close to the dashed vertical line denoting the euro area benchmark index DTS. Target a neutral level of overall portfolio DTS close to that of the benchmark index (within a neutral allocation to euro area investment grade). Chart 4Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 5Euro Area IG: All Credit Buckets Are Attractive Euro Area IG: All Credit Buckets Are Attractive Euro Area IG: All Credit Buckets Are Attractive Within this framework, the most attractive sectors are Diversified Manufacturing, Packaging, Media Entertainment, Wireless, Wirelines, Automotive, Retailers, Services, Integrated Energy, Refining, Other Industrials, Bank Subordinated Debt and Brokerage/Asset Managers. The most unattractive sectors are Chemicals, Metals & Mining, Lodging, Restaurants, Consumer Products, Pharmaceuticals, Independent Energy, Midstream Energy, Airlines, Electric Utilities, and Senior Bank Debt. On a breakeven spread basis, all euro area investment grade credit tiers look attractive and rank well above their historical medians (Chart 5). The greatest value is in the upper rungs, with Aa-rated spreads ranking in the historical upper quartile; Aaa-rated and A-rated spreads almost meet that qualification as well, with Baa-rated spreads lagging a bit further behind (but still well above median). UK In Table 3, we present the latest output from our UK relative value spread model. With the Bank of England’s record expansion of corporate bond holdings still underway, we see good reason to maintain our overweight allocation to UK investment grade corporates on a tactical (0-6 months) and strategic basis (6-12 months). We are also targeting an overall portfolio DTS higher than that of the benchmark index—which we accomplish by overweighting sectors in the upper right quadrant of Chart 6. Table 3UK Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 6UK Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 7UK IG: Value In All Tiers Except Aaa UK IG: Value In All Tiers Except Aaa UK IG: Value In All Tiers Except Aaa Based on this framework, some of the most attractive overweight candidates are Diversified Manufacturing, Cable Satellite, Media Entertainment, Railroads, Financial Institutions, Life Insurance, Healthcare and Other Financials. Meanwhile, the most unattractive sectors are Basic Industry, Chemicals, Metals and Mining, Building Materials, Lodging, Consumer Products, Food & Beverage, Pharmaceuticals, Energy, and Technology. On a breakeven spread basis, Aa-rated spreads appear most attractive while A-rated and Baa-rated spreads also rank above their historical medians (Chart 7). Canada Table 4 shows the output from our Canadian relative value spread model. The independent variables in this model are: sector duration, one-year ahead default probability (as calculated by Bloomberg) and credit rating. Table 4Canada Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle This week, the Bank of Canada (BoC) will join peer central banks in purchasing investment grade debt via its Corporate Bond Purchase Program (CBPP). First announced in April, the program has a maximum size of C$10 billion, equal to only 2% of the Bloomberg Barclays Canadian investment grade index. Nonetheless, the BoC’s actions have already helped rein in corporate spreads. Yet given this unprecedented support from the central bank, with room to add more if necessary to stabilize Canadian financial conditions, we feel comfortable recommending an overweight allocation to Canadian investment grade corporates vs. Canadian sovereign debt, but with spread risk close to the overall index. Consequently, we are targeting sectors in the upper half of Chart 8 with a DTS close to the corporate average denoted by the dashed line. Chart 8Canada Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 9Canada IG: Great Value Across Tiers Canada IG: Great Value Across Tiers Canada IG: Great Value Across Tiers Our top overweight candidates are concentrated within the Financials category: Life Insurance, Healthcare REITs and Other Financials. Meanwhile, we recommend underweighting Construction Machinery, Environmental, Retailers, Supermarkets, Wirelines, Transportation Services, Cable Satellite, and Media Entertainment. On a breakeven spread basis, there is value in all credit tiers in the Canadian investment grade space, with Aaa-rated, Aa-rated, and Baa-rated spreads all in the uppermost historical quartile (Chart 9). Australia Table 5 shows the output from our new Australia relative value spread model. The independent variables in this model are sector credit rating, one-year ahead default probability (as calculated by Bloomberg), and yield-to-maturity. Due to the relatively small size of the Australian corporate bond market, we are focusing our analysis on Level 3 sectors within the Bloomberg Barclays Classification System (BCLASS) rather than the more granular Level 4 analysis we have employed for other markets. Table 5Australia Investment Grade Corporate Sector Valuation & Recommended Allocation Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle We recently recommended going overweight Australian investment grade corporate debt vs. government bonds.5 We feel comfortable reiterating that overweight stance while maintaining a neutral level of overall spread risk. As with Canada, we are looking for sectors in Chart 10 that show positive risk-adjusted valuations and have a DTS close to the Australian corporate benchmark. Chart 10Australia Investment Grade Corporate Sectors: Risk Vs. Reward Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 11Australia IG: Favor A-Rated and Baa-Rated Credit Australia IG: Favor A-Rated and Baa-Rated Credit Australia IG: Favor A-Rated and Baa-Rated Credit Based on that, our top overweight candidates are Capital Goods, Consumer Cyclicals, Energy, Other Utility, Insurance, Finance Companies, and Other Financials. Meanwhile, we are avoiding sectors such as Technology, Transportation, Electric and Natural Gas. On a breakeven spread basis, Baa-rated spreads look incredibly attractive, ranking at the 99.9th percentile; A-rated spreads are also above their historical median (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the higher quality Aaa and Aa tiers are relatively unattractive. As the relevant data by credit tier are not available in the Bloomberg Barclays Indices, we have instead used the Bloomberg AusBond Indices for this particular case, which unfortunately limits the history of our analysis to mid-2014. Bottom Line: Investors should focus global investment grade corporate bond allocations along country lines, while keeping overall spread risk close to benchmark levels, over the next 6-12 months. Specifically, we favor overweighting the US (especially at maturities of five years or less where the Fed is buying) and the UK, while keeping a neutral allocation to euro area corporates. We also like Australian and Canadian corporate debt versus sovereigns in both countries. Comparing Sector Valuations Across Markets The above analyses have allowed us to paint a picture of sector valuation within regions. However, there is added benefit in looking at risk-adjusted valuations across the three major corporate bond markets—the US, euro area and UK—with the intent of spotting broader sector level trends in the global investment grade universe that are not limited to just one market. Looking at Table 6, we can see some clear patterns: Table 6Valuations Across Major Corporate Bond Markets Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Chart 12Canada, Euro Area, and UK Win Out On A Breakeven Spread Basis Canada, Euro Area, and UK Win Out On A Breakeven Spread Basis Canada, Euro Area, and UK Win Out On A Breakeven Spread Basis The most attractive sectors across the board are concentrated in the Financials space. Brokerage/Asset Managers, Insurance—especially Life Insurance - REITs and Other Financials all look well positioned. Valuations for Oil Field Services and Refining within the Energy space are also creating an attractive entry point ahead of the steady rebound in oil prices. Conversely, the most expensive sectors are the traditionally “defensive” ones, such as Utilities, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, and even Technology, which is now debatably a defensive sector. Most interesting are the idiosyncratic stories. These are sectors which have benefited or lost in outsized ways due to the unique impacts of COVID-19 on the economy, but which also have relatively wide or tight risk-adjusted spreads across all three countries. For example, Packaging and Paper, which should benefit from the increased demand for online shopping, and Media Entertainment, which benefits from a captive audience boosting streams and ratings, both have attractive spreads. On the other hand, we have Restaurants, with unattractive spread valuations at a time where more people will choose to stay home rather than take the health and safety risks associated with eating out. The most expensive sectors are the traditionally “defensive” ones, such as Utilities, Consumer Non-Cyclicals, and even Technology, which is now debatably a defensive sector. Finally, we can also employ our breakeven spread analysis to assess value across investment grade corporate bond markets and the country level (Chart 12). Within this framework, all the regions we have covered in this report appear attractive – especially Canada, the euro area and the UK – with Australia only appearing fairly valued. Bottom Line: Our investment grade corporate bond sector valuation models for the US, euro area, UK, Canada and Australia show some common messages, as markets have adjusted to a virus-stricken world. The most attractive valuations can be found within Energy and Financials, with defensive sectors like Utilities and Consumer Non-Cyclicals looking expensive everywhere.   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy What The Central Banks Are Buying", dated April 14, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great White North: A Framework For Analyzing Canadian Corporate Bonds", dated August 28, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "US Politics Will Drive 2H20 Oil Prices", dated May 21, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End", dated May 13, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Hunting For Alpha In The Global Corporate Bond Jungle Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns