Corporate Bonds

Highlights Rates: The Democratic sweep of the election has caused the uptrend in bond yields to accelerate and has benefited our recommended rates positions (below-benchmark duration, nominal and real curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners). We aren’t yet ready to exit any of these positions, and our medium-term target of 2% - 2.25% for the 5-year/5-year forward nominal Treasury yield remains unchanged. Municipal Bonds: Though valuation has become more expensive, we continue to recommend a maximum overweight allocation to municipal bonds. In particular, investors should favor municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with equivalent credit rating and duration. Economy: December’s employment report showed the first monthly contraction in nonfarm payrolls since April. However, this negative headline reflects the transitory impact of the latest COVID wave. It does not signal renewed weakness in the pace of economic recovery. Feature A Politically Driven Bond Rout In a Special Report last October, we argued that the bond market was vulnerable in a scenario where the November 3rd election resulted in the Democratic party winning the House, Senate and White House.1 It took some time, but after Democrats won both of Georgia’s Senate seats in last week’s special election, we are finally seeing the impact on the bond market. Nominal Treasury Yields First, the 10-year nominal Treasury yield moved above 1% for the first time since March. It currently sits at 1.13% (Chart 1). Meanwhile, the front-end of the Treasury curve held steady as the Fed continued to signal that liftoff is unlikely to occur within the next two years. The result has been a persistent steepening of the nominal curve (Chart 1, bottom panel). The 10-year nominal Treasury yield moved above 1% for the first time since March. We are positioned for a bear-steepening of the nominal Treasury curve, but the speed of this most recent move raises the question of how much further the bond sell-off can run. As we wrote in our year-end Special Report, we see yields continuing to rise until the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield reaches levels consistent with survey estimates of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate (Chart 2).2 This would be in line with where yields peaked during the prior two global growth recoveries (2013/14 and 2017/18). At present, survey responses put our target for the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield at roughly 2% to 2.25%, still 18 to 43 bps above current levels. Chart 1Nominal Curve Bear-Steepening Nominal Curve Bear-Steepening Nominal Curve Bear-Steepening Chart 2How Much Upside For Yields? How Much Upside For Yields? How Much Upside For Yields? The prospect of greater fiscal stimulus under a Democratic government doesn’t necessarily translate into a higher ceiling for Treasury yields, but it does increase the speed with which yields will reach our target. All in all, we remain positioned for a bear-steepening of the nominal Treasury curve but will re-consider this stance if the 5-year/5-year forward yield reaches a range of 2% to 2.25%. Inflation Compensation Chart 3Stay Overweight TIPS For Now Stay Overweight TIPS For Now Stay Overweight TIPS For Now The recent 20 bps jump in the 10-year nominal Treasury yield was driven by a 15 bps increase in the 10-year TIPS yield and a 5 bps increase in the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate. Notably, the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates have both pushed above 2% and are sitting at 2.08% and 2.06%, respectively. While these long-maturity TIPS breakevens have recovered nicely, the Fed won’t be tempted to adopt a more hawkish policy stance until they reach a range of 2.3 – 2.5 percent, a range that has been consistent with “well-anchored” inflation expectations in the past (Chart 3).. While TIPS breakeven inflation rates aren’t yet high enough to worry the Fed, they are starting to look elevated compared to actual inflation. At 2.08%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 27 bps above the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 3, panel 3).3 Given this expensive valuation, we are currently looking for an opportunity to tactically reduce our allocation to TIPS. We expect that opportunity will come when the 12-month core and trimmed mean inflation rates re-converge (Chart 3, bottom panel). The low level of core CPI inflation relative to the trimmed mean suggests that inflation has near-term upside as some downtrodden sectors that are excluded from the trimmed mean recover from the pandemic. But inflation will moderate once that “snapback phase” is over, and we should get an opportunity to reduce our TIPS allocation.4   Along with an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, we also recommend owning inflation curve flatteners. The inflation curve tends to flatten when the cost of inflation protection rises, and this has indeed been the case during the past few weeks (Chart 4). It will make sense to exit this flattener when we tactically reduce our TIPS allocation, but this will only be a temporary move. In the long run, the inflation curve will eventually invert and then remain in negative territory for an extended period. This is the result of the Fed’s plan to engineer an overshoot of its 2% inflation target. If the Fed is successful, it means that it will be attacking its inflation target from above for the first time since the 1980s. In such an environment, it makes sense for the inflation curve to be inverted. Chart 4Inflation Curve Flattening Inflation Curve Flattening Inflation Curve Flattening Real Yield Curve Chart 5Real Curve Steepening Real Curve Steepening Real Curve Steepening Our final rates curve recommendation is a real yield curve steepener. This position has also performed well during the recent bond rout, as a 14 bps increase in the 10-year real yield occurred alongside a 13 bps drop in the 2-year real yield (Chart 5). As with our other rates positions, we are inclined to stay the course. A 2/10 real yield curve steepener can be thought of as the combination of a 2/10 nominal curve steepener and a 2/10 inflation curve flattener. During the recent bond sell-off, the 2/10 real curve has steepened by 27 bps, split between 17 bps of nominal curve steepening and 10 bps of inflation curve flattening. We will likely maintain our real yield curve steepener as a core portfolio position even if we eventually close our inflation curve flattener. Gradual progress toward fed funds liftoff and the resulting steepening of the nominal curve should be sufficient to steepen the real yield curve, even if inflation takes a pause. Corporate Credit Chart 6Move Down In Quality Move Down In Quality Move Down In Quality Corporate spreads have reacted well to the news of a Democratic sweep, even though it means that a corporate tax hike is coming in 2021. All else equal, the one-time hit to profits from a tax hike is negative for corporate balance sheets, but this is a minor consideration when the macro back-drop remains so positive for spread product. The combination of above-trend economic growth and highly accommodative monetary policy will encourage investors to keep adding credit risk, and the average investment grade and high-yield index spreads have still not quite recovered to their pre-COVID tights (Chart 6). We continue to view the Ba credit tier as the most attractive from a risk/reward perspective, as the incremental spread pick-up in Ba compared to Baa is elevated compared to what we’ve seen in recent years (Chart 6, panel 3). Bottom Line: The Democratic sweep of the election has caused the uptrend in bond yields to accelerate and has benefited our recommended rates positions (below-benchmark duration, nominal and real curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners). We aren’t yet ready to exit any of these positions, and our medium-term target of 2% - 2.25% for the 5-year/5-year forward nominal Treasury yield remains unchanged. Fiscal Policy In 2021 Chart 7Organic Household Income Has Recovered Organic Household Income Has Recovered Organic Household Income Has Recovered Our US Political Strategy service debuted last week with a report that considers the outlook for fiscal policy in 2021 given that Democrats now have control of the House, Senate and White House.5 In short, the Democrats now have complete control of the government but their majorities in the House and Senate are thin. This means that the most radical parts of the Democratic agenda, like the Green New Deal, will be hard to pass. However, the Democrats will be able to deliver two reconciliation bills in 2021. The first bill could come soon and will likely focus on additional COVID relief and social support, such as $2000 checks to individuals instead of $600 ones. After that, the Democrats will focus on expanding and entrenching the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). They will partially repeal the Trump tax cuts to help finance these priorities. On the issue of COVID relief, we are no longer concerned about the US economy receiving enough stimulus to avoid a double-dip recession. We had previously estimated that a further $600 billion to $1 trillion of income support for households would be required to support consumer spending at reasonable levels.6 This estimate now looks too high because non-CARES act household income has recovered much more quickly than we had anticipated. Non-CARES act household income is already back to pre-COVID levels (Chart 7). In our prior research, we assumed this wouldn’t happen until July 2021. In any event, another round of $2000 checks will provide more than enough income support to sustain a recovery in consumer spending. A Democratic sweep suggests big fiscal thrust in 2021 and less contraction in 2022. More generally, our US Political Strategy team has estimated the medium-term path for the US deficit under a “Democratic Status Quo” scenario that assumes another round of $2000 checks and that the remaining $2.5 trillion of the proposed HEROES Act will be enacted. It also considers a “Democratic High” scenario that adds Joe Biden’s $5.6 trillion policy agenda on top of the Democratic Status Quo (Chart 8). Biden will not achieve all of his agenda, so the reality will lie somewhere between the Democratic Status Quo and Democratic High scenarios. In either case, we will see considerably more fiscal thrust compared to the Republican Status Quo and Baseline scenarios. Chart 8Democratic Sweep Suggests Big Fiscal Thrust In FY2021 And Less Contraction FY2022 A Blue Sweep After All A Blue Sweep After All Municipal Bonds The prospect of federal government aid for challenged state & local governments is a crucial issue for municipal bond investors. Fortunately, the Democratic party’s HEROES act contains more than $1 trillion of aid to state & local governments and this will likely form the basis of the next COVID relief package. On top of that, further support for household incomes will also help support state & local tax revenues that are already recovering (Chart 9). Chart 9State & Local Austerity Will Continue State & Local Austerity Will Continue State & Local Austerity Will Continue That said, we are likely still in for a considerable period of state & local austerity given the large budget gaps that have opened during the past nine months. However, the expectation of help from the federal government makes us even more confident that state & local governments will muddle through without a spate of muni downgrades or defaults. We maintain our “maximum overweight” recommendation for tax-exempt municipal bonds, though valuation is turning more expensive by the day. Muni yield spreads versus Treasuries are contracting, particularly at the long end of the curve (Chart 10A) and valuations appear more expensive if we look at yield ratios instead of spreads (Chart 10B). In both cases, value looks better at the front end of the curve than at the long end. Chart 10AMuni / Treasury Yield Ratios Muni / Treasury Yield Ratios Muni / Treasury Yield Ratios Chart 10BMuni / Treasury Yield Ratios Muni / Treasury Yield Ratios Muni / Treasury Yield Ratios Bottom Line: The new Democratic government will deliver more than enough income support to sustain the recovery in consumer spending. Aid for state & local governments is also forthcoming and it will help sustain municipal bond outperformance versus both Treasuries and investment grade corporates. Though valuation has become more expensive, we continue to recommend a maximum overweight allocation to municipal bonds. In particular, investors should favor municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with equivalent credit rating and duration. December Payrolls Only A Temporary Setback At first blush, last week’s December employment report looks disastrous. Nonfarm payrolls fell by 140 thousand, the first monthly contraction since April. The contraction looks especially worrying when you consider that payrolls remain almost 10 million below pre-COVID levels and should be rising quickly at this stage of the economic recovery (Chart 11). Chart 11Payrolls Contracted In December Payrolls Contracted In December Payrolls Contracted In December Chart 12Permanent Unemployment Fell In December Permanent Unemployment Fell In December Permanent Unemployment Fell In December The grim headline numbers, however, severely overstate the magnitude of the problem. Rather than implying underlying economic weakness, the drop in payrolls reflects the transitory impact of the pandemic’s latest violent wave. December’s job losses came from the Leisure and Hospitality sector (-498k), the sector most impacted by the virus. Job gains remained solid elsewhere in the economy (+358k). The unemployment rate held flat at 6.7% in December, but encouragingly, this stable number masks both an increase in the number of temporarily unemployed (or furloughed) workers and a drop in the number of permanently unemployed workers (Chart 12). Those furloughed workers will return to work once the virus is better contained. Meanwhile, the drop in the number of permanently unemployed suggests that the economic recovery is taking hold. It will only gain momentum as the COVID vaccine is rolled out and additional fiscal stimulus is delivered in 2021.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Beware The Bond-Bearish Blue Sweep”, dated October 20, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on inflation’s “snapback phase” please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Political Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Reflation Plays On Georgia’s Blue Sweep”, dated January 6, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights 2021 Model Bond Portfolio Broad Allocations: Translating our 2021 global fixed income Key Views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio results in the following conclusions: target a relatively aggressive level of overall portfolio risk, while maintaining a moderately below-benchmark duration exposure alongside overweight allocations to lower-quality global corporate credit, and inflation-linked debt, versus nominal government bonds. Specific Allocation Changes: We are increasing credit spread risk in the US by upgrading our recommended overall US high-yield allocation to overweight, focused on B- and Caa-rated credit tiers, while downgrading US investment grade corporates to neutral. We are also reducing the size of our underweights in euro area corporates and shifting the overall allocation to emerging market USD-denominated credit to overweight. Feature Happy New Year! Just before our holiday break last month, we published our 2021 “Key Views” report, outlining the thematic implications of the BCA 2021 Outlook for global bond markets.1 In this follow-up report, we translate those themes into specific investment recommendations and changes to the allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. The main takeaways are that the expected global backdrop of improving economic growth momentum, a reduction in coronavirus uncertainty as vaccines are distributed, highly accommodative monetary policy and a weakening US dollar will all provide an additional reflationary lift to global financial markets after a strong H2/2020. That means moderately higher global government bond yields (led by US Treasuries) along with outperformance of growth-related spread product like corporate bonds – specifically in the riskier credit segments like US high-yield and emerging markets (Table 1). Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation A Review Of The 2020 Model Bond Portfolio Performance Before we look ahead to discuss the details of the changes to our model bond portfolio for 2021, we need to take a final look back at the performance of the portfolio in 2020. Chart 12020 Performance: A Positive Year After A Volatile Start 2020 Performance: A Positive Year After A Volatile Start 2020 Performance: A Positive Year After A Volatile Start Last year, the model bond portfolio delivered a total return (hedged into US dollars) of 5.9%, which outperformed its custom benchmark index by +20bps (Chart 1).2 That moderately solid return was not delivered without some volatility over the course of the year, particularly during the global market tumult last February and March. Over the full year, the government bond portion of the portfolio underperformed the custom benchmark index by -70bps while the spread product segment outperformed by +90bps. The government bond underperformance occurred entirely in the first quarter of the year, as we began 2020 with a recommended below-benchmark global duration stance and an underweight overall allocation to government bonds versus spread product. For a portfolio that is intended to reflect our strategic investment recommendations, the COVID-19 market volatility in Q1/2020 forced us to change our allocations more frequently and aggressively than usual. In early March, we moved to an overweight recommendation on government bonds and underweight on spread product (particular corporate debt) while also shifting the portfolio duration to above-benchmark. That was a large flip from a pro-risk portfolio construction to a defensive one, but which helped claw back some of the severe underperformance in the month of February as government bonds yields plunged and corporate credit spreads surged higher. After the dramatic easing of monetary policy by the major global central banks in March, most notably the US Federal Reserve’s decision to begin buying corporate bonds, we reverted back to a pro-risk stance by upgrading US investment grade credit and Ba-rated high-yield to overweight – positions that were maintained for the rest of 2021. Those US corporate bond exposures alone accounted for essentially all of the spread product outperformance of our model bond portfolio in 2020 (Table 2). Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Full Year 2020 Overall Return Attribution Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation In terms of specific country exposures (Chart 2), our underweight stance on US Treasuries (both in allocation and duration exposure) early in 2020 severely hurt the government bond portion of the portfolio (-76bps of underperformance versus the benchmark). This dwarfed the 2020 outperformance from other countries like Italy (+11bps), Japan (+17bps), and the UK (+5bps). Importantly, our move to allocate out of nominal government bonds to inflation-linked debt in the US, Italy and Canada back in June was a positive contributor on the year, boosting the overall portfolio outperformance by a combined +25bps. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Full Year 2020 Government Bond Performance Attribution Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Within spread product (Chart 3), the biggest gains outside of US investment grade came from UK investment grade (+18bps), euro area investment grade (+12bps) and US CMBS (+11bps). The biggest drags on performance came from underweights in euro area high-yield (-23bps) and US B-rated high-yield (-17bps), as we maintained a relatively cautious stance on those sectors even during the sharp rally in the latter half of 2020 given the lingering risks from COVID-19 and US election year uncertainty. In the end, 2020 proved to be an outstanding year for taking any kind of credit risk, as the majority of spread product sectors in our model bond portfolio universe strongly outperformed government debt. Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Full Year 2020 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation In the end, 2020 proved to be an outstanding year for taking any kind of credit risk, as the majority of spread product sectors in our model bond portfolio universe strongly outperformed government debt (Chart 4). Given our overweight stance toward credit, the year ended on a strong note, with the portfolio delivering +16bps of outperformance in Q4/2020 – the details of which can be found in the Appendix on pages 19-23. Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Universe In 2020 Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Top-Down Bond Market Implications Of Our Key Views As a reminder, the main fixed income investment themes from our 2021 Key Views report were the following: Global growth will accelerate over the course of 2021 as COVID-19 vaccines are distributed and economic confidence improves in response. Longer-term global nominal bond yields should see some upward pressure as growth picks up, with US Treasury yields rising the most. Global real bond yields will stay deeply negative with on-hold central banks actively seeking an inflation overshoot. The US dollar will remain soft in 2021, providing an additional reflationary impulse to the global economy. Lower-quality global credit should outperform against a backdrop that will prove positive for risk assets: easy money policies, improving growth momentum and a reduction in virus-related uncertainty. We now present the specific fixed income investment recommendations that derive from those themes, described along the following lines: overall portfolio risk, overall duration exposure, country allocations within government bonds, yield curve allocations within countries, and corporate credit allocations by country and credit rating. Overall Portfolio Duration Exposure: MODERATELY BELOW BENCHMARK Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of leading economic growth variables, is already signaling that the direction of global bond yields will be higher in 2021 (Chart 5). Successful distribution of COVID-19 vaccines should eventually add additional upward momentum to global growth as confidence improves later in the year. Even if the vaccine rollout does not go as smoothly as expected, that would put pressure for fiscal stimulus policy responses – especially in the US - that can help sustain economic recoveries. Chart 5Global Bond Yields Will Drift Higher In 2021 Global Bond Yields Will Drift Higher In 2021 Global Bond Yields Will Drift Higher In 2021 Chart 6Stay Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Exposure Stay Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Exposure Stay Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Exposure However, with major central banks like the Fed and ECB likely to keep policy rates unchanged in 2021, so as not to impede a recovery in inflation, any upward lift to bond yields will be moderate and driven overwhelmingly by rising longer-term inflation expectations and not a repricing of future monetary policy tightening. That means developed market yield curves should bearishly steepen, in general, as front-end yields remain anchored. We shifted to a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance back at the end of last October, equal to just over 0.5 years of duration versus the custom benchmark index (Chart 6). We are comfortable maintaining that position, in that size, while maintaining a bearish steepening bias to yield curve exposure across all countries in the model portfolio. Government Bond Country Allocation: OVERWEIGHT LOW YIELD BETA MARKETS, OVERWEIGHT PERIPHERAL EUROPE, UNDERWEIGHT THE US In more normal times, we would let our expectations of monetary policy changes guide our recommended government bond country allocations. Yet in 2021, we see almost no chance for any meaningful change in the monetary policy bias of any developed market central bank. Thus, we continue to rely on a “yield beta” framework for making fixed income country allocation decisions in our model bond portfolio. In 2021, we see almost no chance for any meaningful change in the monetary policy bias of any developed market central bank. We expect the largest increase in developed market bond yields in 2021 to occur in the US, thus we recommend favoring countries that have a lower sensitivity to changes in US Treasury yields (i.e. the “yield beta”). The obvious candidates are government bonds in Japan and core Europe, where inflation expectations are likely to see less upward pressure than in the US – especially if the US dollar weakens further (Chart 7). Thus, we begin 2021 by maintaining our existing overweight positions in Germany and France. Chart 7Favor Government Bond Markets Less Correlated To UST Yields In 2021 Favor Government Bond Markets Less Correlated To UST Yields In 2021 Favor Government Bond Markets Less Correlated To UST Yields In 2021 The UK has been transitioning from a high-beta to low-beta bond market in recent years and we do not see that trend turning in 2021. The Bank of England (BoE) will maintain a dovish policy bias this year as the UK economy begins adjusting to the post-Brexit world and a stronger pound will dampen inflation pressures. We also begin 2021 by staying overweight UK gilts in our model portfolio. We anticipate that the Italy-Germany government bond spread will converge to the lower Spain-Germany spread in 2021. Chart 8Stay Overweight Italian Government Bonds Stay Overweight Italian Government Bonds Stay Overweight Italian Government Bonds Australia and Canada are two countries where a high yield beta to US Treasuries would make them ideal underweight candidates in a global bond portfolio this year. However, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and Bank of Canada (BoC) have instituted aggressive quantitative easing (QE) programs that are designed to dampen increases in government bond yields. As a result of these opposing forces on Australian and Canadian bond yields, we begin 2021 with a neutral allocation to both countries. However, we may shift either or both to an underweight stance if we sense any wavering of the commitment of the RBA or BoC to their QE programs amid improving economic growth.  We also expect further declines in the risk premia for Italian government bond yields in 2021. The combination of aggressive ECB government bond purchases, which includes greater buying of BTPs than in years past, and signs of a somewhat more supportive backdrop of fiscal unity within the European Union (the €750bn Recovery Fund) reduce both the sovereign credit risk and “redenomination risk” of a potential euro breakup. We anticipate that the Italy-Germany government bond spread will converge to the lower Spain-Germany spread in 2021 – an outcome that last occurred in 2016 (Chart 8). We are not only maintaining our long-held overweight stance on Italy in our model portfolio, we are increasing the size of the allocation to begin 2021. Inflation-Linked Bond Allocations: MAINTAIN EXPOSURE IN THE US, ITALY AND CANADA; ADD A NEW ALLOCATION TO FRANCE Chart 9Stay Overweight Global Inflation-Linked Bonds Stay Overweight Global Inflation-Linked Bonds Stay Overweight Global Inflation-Linked Bonds Inflation-linked bonds had a strong relative performance versus nominal government debt across the developed markets during the second half of 2020, with breakevens widening even in countries with low realized inflation like France and Australia. Dovish central banks, the reflationary impacts of rising commodity prices (also fueled by US dollar weakness), and the V-shaped recovery in global economic growth from the 2020 COVID-19 recession have all played a role in helping lift breakevens from the depressed levels seen last spring. None of those factors is expected to change during at least the first half of 2021, thus allocations to inflation-linked bonds are still justified in several countries. We are adding a new position in French inflation-linked bonds versus nominal French bonds with breakevens below our model-implied fair value. Our fair value models for 10-year inflation breakevens show that valuations are no longer unequivocally cheap in most countries, but only in Australia do breakevens look much too high relative to underlying fundamental drivers (Chart 9). US TIPS breakevens are approaching levels that would appear “expensive”, defined as at least one standard deviation above fair value, but we still see additional upside as the model implied fair value is also rising. We currently have recommended allocations to inflation-linked bonds in the US, Italy and Canada in our model portfolio, and we are maintaining those positions as we begin 2021. We are adding a new position in French inflation-linked bonds versus nominal French bonds with breakevens below our model-implied fair value. Spread Product Allocation: OVERWEIGHT GLOBAL CORPORATES VERSUS GOVERNMENT BONDS, FOCUSED ON US HIGH-YIELD AND EM Our expectation of a combination of improving global economic growth and persistent reflationary monetary policies is a very positive backdrop for global spread product, most notably corporate bonds. However, valuations across the global corporate debt spectrum are not universally cheap after the strong H2/2020 performance. Thus, we are maintaining only a moderate overall overweight stance on spread product versus government bonds in our model bond portfolio, equal to 5% of the portfolio (Chart 10). At the same time, we recommend taking more relative spread risk within that moderate overweight allocation. This is the way we are balancing the competing forces of a pro-risk backdrop and increasingly stretched valuations in many sectors. The biggest change we are making to the credit side of our model bond portfolio is downgrading US investment grade corporate exposure to neutral while upgrading US high-yield to overweight. As we discussed in our 2021 Key Views report, spread valuation measures are more stretched for higher-rated US investment grade corporate debt compared to junk bonds. Chart 10A Moderate Recommended Overweight To Global Spread Product In 2021 Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Combined with a monetary liquidity backdrop that supports the performance of riskier assets like high-yield (Chart 11), we anticipate that US high-yield will be a relatively strong performer within the US credit markets in 2021. Chart 11Upgrade Lower Rated US High-Yield To Overweight Upgrade Lower Rated US High-Yield To Overweight Upgrade Lower Rated US High-Yield To Overweight When looking at the relationship between spread valuation (using our preferred metric of 12-month breakeven spreads) and risk (using a standard measure like duration-times-spread), the lower rated credit tiers of US high-yield stand out as having the most attractive risk/valuation tradeoff (Chart 12). Thus, we are focusing our shift to an overweight stance on US high-yield in our model bond portfolio by increasing the allocations to the B-rated and Caa-rated tiers. Chart 12Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Outside the US, we are also adding additional spread product exposure by increasing the weightings to euro area high-yield and emerging market USD-denominated sovereign debt. However, we are still maintaining a relatively higher allocation to US high-yield over euro area equivalents, and emerging market USD-denominated corporate debt over sovereigns. The biggest change we are making to the credit side of our model bond portfolio is downgrading US investment grade corporate exposure to neutral while upgrading US high-yield to overweight. Finally, we are entering 2021 with the same relative tilt within US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) we maintained during the latter half of 2020, with an overweight stance on agency commercial MBS and an underweight on agency residential MBS. Overall Portfolio Risk: AGGRESSIVE The net impact of all the changes made to our portfolio allocations is to boost the estimated tracking error – the relative portfolio volatility versus that of the benchmark – from 31bps to 73bps (Chart 13). This is a significant increase in the usage of our portfolio “risk budget”, but the tracking error is still below our self-imposed limit of 100bps. Chart 13Taking A More Aggressive Posture On Overall Portfolio Risk Taking A More Aggressive Posture On Overall Portfolio Risk Taking A More Aggressive Posture On Overall Portfolio Risk Chart 14Boosting Portfolio Yield Through Selective Overweights Boosting Portfolio Yield Through Selective Overweights Boosting Portfolio Yield Through Selective Overweights After maintaining a cautious stance on overall portfolio risk levels in the latter half of 2020, given the persistent uncertainties over the spread of COVID-19 and the US presidential election, we now deem it appropriate to be more aggressive within our model bond portfolio allocations. The pro-risk positioning changes will also boost the overall yield of the model bond portfolio. The greater allocations to riskier spread product sectors leave the portfolio with a yield that begins 2021 modestly higher than that of the benchmark index (Chart 14). Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months After making the shifts to our model bond portfolio allocations, which can all be seen in the tables on pages 24-25, we now turn to scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio for the first half of 2021. Table 2AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate Spread Product Yield Changes Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Table 2BEstimated Government Bond Yield Betas To US Treasuries Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 2A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 2B). For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios, based on the following descriptions and inputs: Base Case The current surge of global COVID-19 cases gives way to increased distribution of vaccines. The result is a steady improvement in global growth. Some additional fiscal stimulus is delivered in the US and the larger countries of Europe. Central banks keep their foot on the monetary accelerator with realized inflation moving only modestly higher. The US Treasury curve bear steepens as US inflation expectations continue drifting higher. The VIX index reaches 23, the US dollar depreciates by -5%, oil prices climb +10% and the fed funds rate remains at 0%. Optimistic Scenario The global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines goes smoothly and rapidly, while the current surge in COVID-19 cases fades in the early weeks of 2021. Global growth quickly accelerates on the back of soaring consumer & business confidence. Global fiscal stimulus surprises to upside, while central banks remain super-dovish even as inflation perks up. The US Treasury curve bear-steepens substantially as US inflation expectations steadily increase. The VIX index falls to 18, the US dollar depreciates by -10% in a pro-risk/pro-growth move, oil prices climb +20% and the fed funds rate remains at 0%. Pessimistic Scenario The vaccine rollout is slower than expected, with COVID-19 restrictions remaining in place for longer. Policymakers deliver inadequate new fiscal and monetary stimulus measures to support underwhelming growth. The US Treasury curve bull-flattens as US inflation breakevens plunge. The VIX index soars to 35, the US dollar appreciates by +5%, oil prices plunge -20% and the fed funds rate remains at 0%. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 3A. The US Treasury yield assumptions are shown in Table 3B. For the more visually inclined, we present charts showing the model inputs and Treasury yield projections in Chart 15 and Chart 16, respectively. Table 3AGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Table 3BUS Treasury Yield Assumptions For The 6-Month Forward Scenario Analysis Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Chart 15Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Chart 16US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis The model bond portfolio is expected to deliver an excess return over its performance benchmark during the next six months of +50bps in the base case and +78bps in the optimistic scenario, but is projected to underperform by -37bps in the pessimistic scenario. These are larger expected relative returns than witnessed during the latter half of 2020, consistent with the larger tracking error we are taking entering 2021.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation," dated December 17, 2020, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. 2 Our model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt and USD-denominated emerging market debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. Appendix Appendix Chart 1Q4/2020 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Appendix Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q4/2020 Overall Return Attribution Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Appendix Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q4/2020 Government Bond Performance Attribution Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Appendix Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q4/2020 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Appendix Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio In Q4/2020 Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2021: Leaning Into Reflation Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 12020 Returns 2020 Returns 2020 Returns After a tumultuous start to the year, corporate bonds rallied in 2020 H2, managing to eke out small annual gains versus Treasuries. Specifically, investment grade corporates outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 4 basis points in 2020 and high-yield outperformed by 185 bps (Chart 1). Treasuries, for their part, bested cash by 7% on the year but returns have been trending down since August. As we look forward to 2021, the economic cycle is in what we call a sweet spot for spread product returns. Economic growth is above trend, but inflation is low and monetary conditions are highly accommodative. This macro back-drop will lead to positive spread product returns versus Treasuries and a moderate bear-steepening of the Treasury curve in 2021. However, stretched valuations for investment grade corporates mean that investors must be selective within spread product. We think the Ba credit tier offers the best risk-adjusted opportunity in the corporate bond space, and also recommend favoring tax-exempt municipal bonds over equivalent-quality investment grade corporates. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-matched Treasury index by 79 basis points in December and by 4 bps in 2020. The investment grade corporate index eked out a small gain relative to the duration-matched Treasury index in 2020. Corporates underperformed Treasuries by 18% from the beginning of the year until March 23, the day that the Fed stopped the bleeding in credit markets by unveiling its suite of emergency lending facilities. With the Fed’s backstops in place, the corporate index went on to outperform Treasuries by 22% between March 23 and the end of the year (Appendix A). As we noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report, the corporate bond index option-adjusted spread is not quite back to its pre-COVID low.1 However, valuation is close to all-time expensive after adjusting for changes in the index’s average credit rating and duration. The 12-month breakeven spread for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index (adjusted to keep the average credit rating constant) has only been tighter 4% of the time since 1995 (Chart 2). The same figure for the Baa-rated credit tier is 5%. As noted, the macro environment of above-trend growth and accommodative Fed policy is very positive for spread product returns. However, better value exists outside of the investment grade corporate space. In particular, we advise investors to look at Ba-rated high-yield corporates and tax-exempt municipal bonds. High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 190 basis points in December and by 185 basis points in 2020. Ba-rated junk bonds outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 431 bps in 2020, while B-rated and Caa-rated bonds lagged by 13 bps and 238 bps, respectively. Since the March 23 peak in spreads, Ba-rated bonds outperformed Treasuries by 33%, B-rated bonds outperformed by 30% and Caa-rated bonds outperformed by 36% (Appendix A). We view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report that the additional spread earned from moving down in quality below Ba is in line with historical averages.2   Assuming a 25% recovery rate on defaulted debt and a minimum required risk premium of 150 bps, we calculate that the junk index is priced for a default rate of 2.8% for the next 12 months (panel 3). This represents a steep drop from the 8.4% default rate observed during the most recent 12-month period. However, only seven defaults occurred in November, down from a peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, are also falling rapidly (bottom panel). Overall, we see room for spread compression across all junk credit tiers in 2021 but believe that Ba-rated bonds offer the best opportunity in risk-adjusted terms.    Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot   MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in December but underperformed by 17 bps in 2020. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 10 bps on the month to reach 61 bps (Chart 4). This is higher than the 58 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 49 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 24 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the relatively attractive OAS, we continue to view the elevated primary mortgage spread as a material risk for MBS investors. The elevated spread suggests that mortgage rates need not rise alongside Treasury yields in the near-term, meaning that mortgage refinancings can continue at their current rapid pace (panel 3). Our view is that expected prepayment losses embedded in MBS spreads (aka the option cost) are too low relative to this pace of refinancing. Last year’s spike in the mortgage delinquency rate was driven by households that were granted forbearance by the federal government’s CARES act (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders is that these households will not be able to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period ends this spring. While the situation bears close monitoring, our sense is that excess savings built up during the past nine months will be sufficient to prevent a surge of bankruptcies when the forbearance period ends. The recent stimulus package provides households with even more assistance. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in December but underperformed by 161 bps in 2020. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 176 bps in December but underperformed by 98 bps in 2020. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 7 bps in December but underperformed by 640 bps in 2020. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 146 bps in December but underperformed by 86 bps in 2020. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 14 bps in December but underperformed by 9 bps in 2020. Supranationals outperformed by 2 bps in December and by 3 bps in 2020. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, 2020’s dollar weakness was mostly relative to other Developed Market currencies (Chart 5). Value has improved somewhat for EM Sovereigns during the past few weeks, but the index continues to offer less spread than the Baa-rated US Credit index (panel 4). At the country level, Turkey, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Indonesia are the only countries that offer a spread pick-up relative to duration and quality-matched US corporates. Of those, only Mexico looks attractive on a risk/reward basis. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 56 basis points in December but underperformed by 286 bps in 2020 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We upgraded municipal bonds to “maximum overweight” in our recent 2021 Key Views Special Report.3 Attractive valuations are the main reason for this move. First, spreads between Aaa-rated municipal bonds and equivalent-maturity Treasuries are elevated compared to history across the entire yield curve (Chart 6). Second, municipal bonds look even more attractive relative to duration and quality-matched credit. The Bloomberg Barclays Revenue Bond index offers a greater yield than the quality-matched Credit index across the entire maturity spectrum (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The same is true for the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation index beyond the 12-year maturity point (panel 3). While the failure to include state & local government aid in the recent relief bill is a big blow to municipal budgets that are already stretched, we think municipal bond spreads offer more-than-adequate compensation for default/downgrade risk. State & local governments are already engaging in austerity measures that will help protect bondholders (bottom panel) and State Rainy Day Fund balances were at all-time highs heading into the COVID downturn. Both of these things should help stave off a wave of municipal downgrades. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in December. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 13 bps to 81 bps. The 5/30 Treasury slope steepened 7 bps to 129 bps. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. A timely vaccine roll-out and the recently passed fiscal relief bill will serve to speed this process along. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening. Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar levels.        TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 141 basis points in December and by 117 bps in 2020. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 22 bps and 18 bps on the month. They currently sit at 2.01% and 2.07%, respectively. Core CPI rose 0.22% in November, pushing the year-over-year rate from 1.63% to 1.65%. Meanwhile, 12-month trimmed mean CPI fell from 2.22% to 2.09%, narrowing the gap between trimmed mean and core (Chart 8). We anticipate further narrowing in 2021 Q1 and therefore expect core CPI to print relatively hot. For this reason, we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate looks somewhat elevated on our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).4 Inflation pressures may moderate once the core and trimmed mean inflation measures converge, and this could give us an opportunity to tactically reduce TIPS exposure in the first half of this year. We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect short-maturity real yields to come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel).   ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in December and by 98 bps in 2020. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 12 bps in December and by 81 bps in 2020. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 33 bps in December and by 207 bps in 2020 (Chart 9). On paper, the Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 is quite negative for ABS. However, as we explained in a recent report, we don’t anticipate a material impact on spreads.5 For one thing, Aaa ABS spreads are already well below the borrowing cost offered by TALF. But more importantly, consumer credit quality is strong. As we first explained last June, the stimulus received from the CARES act led to a significant increase in disposable income and a jump in the savings rate (panel 4).6 Faced with an income boost and few spending opportunities, many households paid down consumer debt. Given the recently passed additional fiscal support and the substantial savings that have already accrued, we see household balance sheets as being in a good place. As such, we advise moving down-in-quality to pick up extra spread in non-Aaa ABS.   Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 113 basis points in December but underperformed by 57 bps in 2020. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 58 bps in December and by 56 bps in 2020. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 277 bps in December but underperformed by 360 bps in 2020 (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus will not be negatively impacted.7 Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 50 basis points in December and by 105 bps in 2020. The average index spread tightened 7 bps in December to reach 49 bps (bottom panel). At its September meeting, the Fed decided to slow its pace of Agency CMBS purchases. It is no longer looking to increase its Agency CMBS holdings, but rather, will only purchase what is “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. This is nonetheless a backstop of the market, and it does not change our overweight recommendation.   Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of December 31ST, 2020) The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of December 31ST, 2020) The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 85 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 85 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of December 31ST, 2020) The Cyclical Sweet Spot The Cyclical Sweet Spot   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

This is US Bond Strategy’s final report of the year. Our regular publication schedule will resume on January 5th with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2021. We wish you a happy, healthy and prosperous new year.   Highlights Interest Rate Policy: The Fed has given us a checklist of three criteria that must be met before it will lift rates off the zero bound. After those criteria are met, the pace of the eventual rate hike cycle will be determined by how quickly inflation expectations move back to “well-anchored” levels. We don’t expect Fed liftoff in 2021. Balance Sheet Policy: The Fed will only increase the pace or lengthen the maturity of its asset purchases if the economy or risk assets undergo a significant negative shock in 2021. Absent that, Fed communications in late-2021 will increasingly focus on the eventual tapering of asset purchases. Given the current vague guidance about when tapering will start, a scaled-down repeat of the 2013 Taper Tantrum is possible in late-2021 or 2022. Emergency Lending Facilities: The Fed will not undertake efforts to subvert Congress and re-establish its emergency lending facilities in 2021. However, the absence of the facilities will not have a negative impact on financial markets. Fiscal/Monetary Coordination: Looking beyond 2021, we see the lines between fiscal and monetary policy continuing to blur. The Fed will be increasingly incentivized to dip its toes into the fiscal arena and fiscal policymakers will let it. Feature Chart 1An Eventful Year An Eventful Year An Eventful Year It would be an understatement to say that 2020 was a busy year for the Federal Reserve. The Fed cut rates to the zero bound when the recession struck in March. It also exploded its balance sheet to fresh all-time highs and rolled out brand-new emergency lending facilities to support flagging credit markets (Chart 1). Then, to top it all off, the Fed concluded a Strategic Review of its monetary policy strategy in August and officially adopted an Average Inflation Target. This report touches on the market implications of 2020’s big Fed moves, but its focus is on what the Fed is likely to do in 2021. The first three sections discuss how we see the Fed’s interest rate policy, balance sheet policy and emergency lending facilities evolving next year. The final section considers a longer time horizon as it discusses what might be the next frontier for monetary policy: increased cooperation between monetary and fiscal authorities. Interest Rate Policy With the fed funds rate at its effective lower bound, bond investors will spend 2021 trying to determine the eventual start date and magnitude of the next tightening cycle. This will be especially complicated because the Fed’s adoption of an Average Inflation Target means that old models of its reaction function must be discarded. We discussed the implications of the move toward Average Inflation Targeting in a September Special Report.1 To quickly recap, the Fed made three main changes that will influence our outlook for interest rate policy in 2021. First, the Fed edited its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy to include a new interpretation of its price stability mandate. The new Statement reads: In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at [2 percent], the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.2 Second, the Fed modified its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy to signal that it will rely less on labor market indicators to forecast future inflation. In its old Statement, the Fed talked about minimizing “deviations of employment from the Committee’s assessments of its maximum level.” The revised Statement talks about mitigating “shortfalls of employment from the Committee’s assessment of its maximum level.” In other words, the Fed is saying that it will be less inclined to view an unemployment rate below its estimated natural level (NAIRU) as a signal that inflation is about to accelerate. The Fed’s adoption of an Average Inflation Target means that old models of its reaction function must be discarded. Finally, at the September FOMC meeting, the Fed translated the changes it made to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy into more explicit guidance about when it will consider lifting rates off the zero bound. That guidance is as follows: … it will be appropriate to maintain this target range until labor market conditions have reached levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of maximum employment and inflation has risen to 2 percent and is on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.3 The Timing Of Liftoff Table 1A Checklist For Liftoff The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Digging into the new guidance, we identify three criteria for lifting rates off the zero bound (Table 1). First, the unemployment rate must reach levels consistent with the Committee’s assessments of NAIRU. Currently, those estimates range from 3.5% to 4.5% (Chart 2). Practically, we view this as the least important of the three criteria. NAIRU estimates are revised based on what happens with inflation, and the Fed has already acknowledged that it is now less inclined to view a sub-NAIRU unemployment rate as an inflationary signal. In short, if inflation were to rise sustainably above 2% with the unemployment rate still at 5%, the Fed would simply revise up its NAIRU estimates and begin the rate hike cycle. Chart 2Criteria For Lifting Rates Criteria For Lifting Rates Criteria For Lifting Rates The Fed’s second criterion for lifting rates is also the most specific. Inflation must rise to 2 percent before the Fed will consider hiking rates. In a recent speech, Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida said he interprets this to mean that 12-month PCE inflation must be at least 2% before the Fed will consider hiking (Chart 2, bottom panel).4 This is helpful for bond investors. We can be certain that no rate hikes will occur at least until 12-month PCE inflation reaches 2%. Finally, the Fed also wants to be certain that inflation is “on track to moderately exceed 2 percent for some time.” This means that the event of 12-month PCE reaching 2% won’t automatically lead to a rate increase. The Fed must also view inflation gains as sustainable. This will likely become an issue in the first half of 2021 when we know that base effects will push 12-month PCE sharply higher, possibly even above 2%. However, we also know that those gains will be short lived.5 Of course, the Fed also knows about the impact of base effects and it will look past any temporary jump in inflation in H1 2021. More generally, while we advise investors to not pay much attention to the Fed’s NAIRU estimates, the unemployment rate will play a role in the Fed’s determination of whether above-2% inflation is sustainable. That is, the Fed is more likely to view above-2% inflation as sustainable if the unemployment rate is 4% than it is if the unemployment rate is 6%. What Does The Market Think? The bond market has been quick to price-in the big shift in the Fed’s interest rate guidance. At present, the overnight index swap curve is priced for a single 25 basis point rate hike in mid-2023 and only one more by mid-2024 (Chart 3). We see a good chance that the Fed’s three liftoff criteria are met before then, a view that forms the basis of our below-benchmark portfolio duration recommendation for 2021.6 In addition, the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants shows that only 43% of respondents expect liftoff before the end of 2023 and only 31% before the end of 2022 (Table 2A). This is further evidence that bond yields have room to rise if it looks like the Fed’s three liftoff criteria will be met in 2022 or the first half of 2023. Finally, the New York Fed’s survey shows that market participants understand the Fed’s three liftoff criteria and that differences in opinion about the timing of liftoff reflect differences in views about the economic outlook, not differences in understanding the Fed’s reaction function. The bulk of survey respondents think that the unemployment rate will be between 3.5% and 4.2% (consistent with the Fed’s NAIRU estimates) and that 12-month PCE inflation will be between 2.2% and 2.5% at the time of liftoff (Table 2B). Chart 3The Fed May Lift Rates Sooner Than Markets Expect The Fed May Lift Rates Sooner Than Markets Expect The Fed May Lift Rates Sooner Than Markets Expect Table 2ALiftoff Expectations The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Table 2BMarkets Understand The Fed’s Guidance The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 The Pace Of Tightening And Why We’re Watching Inflation Expectations We’ve seen the three criteria upon which the Fed will condition its decision to hike rates off the zero bound. But the timing of liftoff is not the only thing that bond investors need to consider. We also need to get a sense of how quickly rate hikes will proceed once the next tightening cycle begins. According to the Fed’s interest rate guidance, even after liftoff the Fed will seek to maintain accommodative monetary conditions until it has achieved its price stability goal under its new Average Inflation Target. Recall that this goal is defined as achieving “inflation that averages 2 percent over time”. This is somewhat vaguer than the Fed’s liftoff guidance. Over what time period should we seek to hit average 2% inflation? One option is to start calculating the average when the new regime was adopted in August. In that case, average PCE inflation is running at 0.96%, well below 2%. Alternatively, we could calculate average inflation since the Fed last cut rates to zero in March 2020 (1.50%) or average inflation since the Fed cut rates to zero in December 2008 (1.43%). The point is that the Fed has not given us a clearly defined target. Differences in opinion about the timing of liftoff reflect differences in views about the economic outlook. For this reason, it’s important for bond investors to understand why the Fed has shifted to an Average Inflation Target. The reason has to do with trying to re-anchor inflation expectations. Box 1 shows an example of an Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve, the Fed’s go-to framework for thinking about inflation. As the accompanying quote from Janet Yellen explains, the Fed thinks about inflation’s long-run trend as being driven by expectations. Shocks to economic slack and import prices can cause inflation to deviate from its long-run trend, but expectations drive the trend itself. This makes it critical for a central bank to keep expectations well anchored near its inflation target. Box 1The Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve (aka The Fed’s Inflation Model) The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 This is the underlying rationale for the Fed’s Average Inflation Target. The Fed has observed that inflation expectations have been too low in recent years. In the Fed’s model, this signals that inflation’s long-run trend has shifted down. In order to get expectations back up to target, the Fed understands that it will probably need to accept a period of above-target inflation. Since economic agents have just experienced a long period of sub-2% inflation, it will probably require a significant period of above-2% inflation before their expectations sustainably shift higher.7 To sum it all up, the Fed will seek to keep monetary conditions accommodative, and thus supportive for risk assets, until inflation expectations are deemed to be re-anchored. At that point, monetary policy will shift to a neutral or restrictive stance and risk asset performance will be challenged. But don’t just take our word for it. Here is what Vice-Chair Clarida said in a recent speech (referenced above): It is important to note, however, that the goal of the new framework is to keep inflation expectations well anchored at 2 percent, and, for this reason, I myself plan to focus more on indicators of inflation expectations themselves – especially survey-based measures – than I will on the calculation of an average rate of inflation over any particular window of time. It is clear that inflation expectations will dictate the eventual pace of Fed tightening. But the question of what measure of inflation expectations to track remains unresolved. Measures of inflation expectations fall into three main categories: Market-based measures Survey measures Trend measures Market-based measures are derived from inflation-linked bonds. Specifically, we derive TIPS breakeven inflation rates for different time horizons by taking the difference between a nominal yield and TIPS yield of the same maturity. In this publication, we often refer to the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates and have found that a range of 2.3% to 2.5% has historically been consistent with periods when inflation expectations were deemed “well anchored” (Chart 4A). One potential issue with using market-based measures of inflation expectations is that TIPS prices can sometimes move around for reasons unrelated to changing inflation expectations. That is, regulations or broader portfolio diversification concerns could change the risk premium an investor is willing to accept from TIPS, even if that investor’s underlying inflation view is unchanged. Academics have made attempts to solve this problem by using affine term structure models to decompose yields into various components. Chart 4B presents one such model from D’Amico, Kim and Wei (DKW).8 The DKW model splits the TIPS breakeven inflation rate (or inflation compensation) into an inflation expectation, a liquidity premium that compensates investors for the lower liquidity in TIPS compared to nominal Treasuries and an inflation risk premium that represents the extra compensation investors require to take inflation risk. We are skeptical of the usefulness of affine term structure models. In general, these models have too few inputs to reliably generate the components they purport to measure. However, the Fed clearly pays some attention to the DKW decomposition. If a future increase in TIPS breakeven inflation rates is driven entirely by movement in the liquidity or inflation risk premium components, it would be reasonable to question whether the Fed will react. Chart 4AInflation Expectations: Market-Based Measures The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Chart 4BA Decomposition Of TIPS##br## Breakevens The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Survey measures of inflation expectations are exactly that: Responses from surveys, usually of professional forecasters or households (Chart 4C). One drawback of survey measures compared to market-based measures is that they are updated less frequently. Another is that survey respondents, particularly households, may only be able to distinguish very large swings in prices. That said, the Fed tracks a wide range of survey measures and they were even singled out by Vice-Chair Clarida as being particularly important in the above quote. Trend inflation measures are statistical measures of the trend in the actual PCE or CPI inflation data. Chart 4D shows both a very simple trend measure, the 10-year annualized rate of change, and a slightly more complex trend measure based on an exponential smoothing rule. Academics have developed even more complex trend inflation measures.9 The logic behind these measures is that expectations tend to adapt only slowly to changes in the actual inflation data. Chart 4CInflation Expectations: Survey Measures The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Chart 4DInflation Expectations: Trend Measures The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Finally, we should point out a relatively new measure that the Fed will be using to track inflation expectations going forward. It is called the Common Inflation Expectations Index and it is a composite of 21 different survey and market-based inflation measures (Chart 4E), no trend inflation measures are included.10 Chart 4EIntroducing The Common Inflation Expectations Index The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 To summarize, the Fed has given us a checklist of three criteria that must be met before it will lift rates off the zero bound. After those criteria are met, the pace of the eventual rate hike cycle will be determined by how quickly inflation expectations move back to levels that are considered “well anchored”. Once that happens, the Fed will no longer have an incentive to keep monetary conditions accommodative and risk asset performance will be challenged. Charts 4A-4E in this report provide a wide array of different measures of inflation expectations to monitor. We will keep an eye on all of them, but in particular, we will track the Common Inflation Expectations Index’s progress back to 2.1% and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate’s progress back to a range of 2.3%-2.5%. While we don’t expect the Fed’s rate hike criteria to be met in 2021, a 2022 liftoff is possible if the COVID vaccine spurs a rapid economic recovery. However, we do expect that, in 2021, the market will start to price-in an earlier liftoff date and quicker pace of tightening than is currently discounted, thus pushing bond yields higher. The Financial Conditions Wildcard Chart 5Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Our base case view is that the eventual pace of Fed tightening will be determined by inflation expectations. However, there is one wildcard that could cause the Fed to abandon its inflation expectations goal and tighten policy earlier. That wildcard is financial conditions. Presently, financial asset valuations are a mixed bag (Chart 5). Corporate bond spreads are tight, but not at all-time expensive levels. Equity P/E ratios are very elevated, but equities don’t look expensive compared to bonds. If these valuations stay relatively stable, the Fed will continue to rely on inflation expectations to guide the pace of tightening. However, if inflation expectations take a long time to rise, it is conceivable that such a long period of low interest rates could lead to historically stretched financial asset valuations. In short, if inflation doesn’t return within the next couple of years, the Fed may have to tighten policy to take the wind out of an asset bubble that might otherwise burst and lead to an economic recession. We stress that we are not yet close to this point and that the bar for the Fed to abandon its inflation goal will be very high, but we would place financial conditions alongside inflation expectations as the two most important variables to monitor to assess the eventual pace of Fed tightening. Balance Sheet Policy With the funds rate pinned at zero and the Fed’s interest rate guidance essentially set in stone, changes to the pace and composition of asset purchases are the principal tool that the Fed will use to provide more or less immediate monetary accommodation in 2021. The Fed is currently purchasing $80 billion of Treasuries and $40 billion of Agency MBS each month, with Treasury purchases spread out across the yield curve. If this pace and distribution of Treasury purchases is maintained in 2021, the Fed will end up purchasing less and less of the Treasury flow. The Treasury Department has a stated policy goal of increasing the average maturity of the outstanding debt and it has been pursuing that goal by raising the amount of coupon issuance at the expense of bills. The Treasury has already given us its planned coupon issuance schedule for Q4 2020 and Q1 2021. Chart 6 shows that net Fed coupon purchases will gradually decline as a percentage of gross issuance, assuming the Treasury follows through with its plan and the Fed’s balance sheet policy is unchanged. Chart 6The Path For Treasury Supply And Fed Demand The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 Can The Fed Do More? … Will The Fed Do More? It is possible that the Fed will use its balance sheet to provide more monetary easing in 2021. There are two ways it could do this. First, it could simply increase the monthly pace of asset purchases. Alternatively, it could keep the same pace of purchases but shift Treasury buying toward the long-end of the curve. The idea here would be to prevent long-dated yields from rising too quickly. One or both of these changes could happen in 2021, but only if the economy experiences a negative growth shock or risk asset prices (equities and corporate credit) fall significantly. In that case, the Fed will want to be seen as responding to a negative shock, but absent that, the Committee seems comfortable with its current balance sheet strategy. Chart 7Rate-Sensitive Sectors Have Recovered Rate-Sensitive Sectors Have Recovered Rate-Sensitive Sectors Have Recovered Some have suggested that, even if the economic recovery stays on track, the Fed will try to use its balance sheet to lean against rising long-maturity bond yields. We doubt this. First, it is not obvious that the Fed would be able to stop the 10-year Treasury yield from rising to a range of, say, 1.25% to 1.5% by increasing bond purchases in that maturity range by a few billion dollars. As long as the Fed’s interest rate guidance is unchanged, the market’s interest rate expectations will continue to exert a powerful influence on bond yields across the entire curve. Unless the Fed announces a cap on long-dated bond yields, and pledges to buy enough securities to enforce that cap, we are skeptical about the effectiveness of just changing the quantity of asset purchases. Second, it is also not clear that a 10-year Treasury yield between 1.25% and 1.5%, in the context of a steepening yield curve and improving economic growth, would be a problem for either the economy or risk assets. In fact, these sorts of environments tend to be very positive for risk asset performance.11 It is only when the Fed is shifting to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and the yield curve is flattening that bond yields start to exert a negative influence on the economy and risk assets. Even if the Fed is not worried about a moderate bear-steepening of the Treasury curve, a case could be made for providing more easing right now in order to spur a quicker recovery. This question was posed to Chair Powell several times at the last FOMC press conference. In response, Powell noted that the sectors of the economy that are most sensitive to interest rates – residential investment and consumer spending on durable goods – have already recovered (Chart 7). The lagging sectors of the economy – particularly consumer spending on services – cannot recover until the COVID vaccine is widely distributed, irrespective of the level of interest rates. In our view, this is an acknowledgement that the Fed does not see much value in trying to provide further accommodation through the balance sheet channel. All in all, our base case scenario is that the Fed will maintain its current pace and maturity distribution of asset purchases throughout 2021. However, it will increase the pace and/or lengthen the maturity if there is a significant shock to the economy and/or financial markets. Later in 2021, if the recovery stays on track, Fed communications will increasingly take up the issue of when it will be appropriate to taper its pace of asset purchases. The Exit From Asset Purchases And The Possibility Of A Taper Tantrum Chart 8Remember The Taper Tantrum Remember The Taper Tantrum Remember The Taper Tantrum The Fed has already given us a timeline for how it will wind down its asset purchases. According to the minutes from the November FOMC meeting, most participants support a timeline where the Fed will start tapering its pace of asset purchases sometime before the first rate hike. It will then begin lifting interest rates and will stop purchases altogether sometime after that. At the December FOMC meeting, the Fed gave us additional guidance on when it will start the tapering process. Unfortunately, this guidance is quite vague and only confirms the fact that tapering will start before the liftoff date. Specifically, the Fed said that tapering will begin when “substantial further progress has been made toward the Committee’s maximum employment and price stability goals.” Because the guidance around the timing of the tapering process is quite vague, we think it’s possible that it could sneak up on investors and lead to a sharp upward re-adjustment in rate hike expectations, and thus a bond sell-off. In essence, a tamer version of the 2013 Taper Tantrum is possible in late-2021 or 2022. On May 22, 2013, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke explained the Fed’s plan to eventually start tapering its asset purchases. Because investors took this to mean that the rate hike cycle would start much sooner than anticipated, the bond market underwent a sharp re-adjustment. The market quickly went from pricing-in only 35 bps of rate hikes over the next 24 months to 116 bps, and Treasury returns fell precipitously as a result (Chart 8). The Fed has learned a few lessons about communications since then, and it will do its best to keep market expectations aligned with its own strategy. However, unless firmer guidance is provided about when tapering will begin, the risk of a hawkish surprise around the tapering announcement remains.  Bottom Line: The Fed will only increase the pace or lengthen the maturity of its asset purchases if the economy or risk assets undergo a significant negative shock in 2021. Absent that, Fed communications in late-2021 will increasingly focus on the eventual tapering of asset purchases. Given the current vague guidance about when tapering will start, a scaled-down repeat of the 2013 Taper Tantrum is possible in late-2021 or 2022. Emergency Lending Facilities In addition to cutting rates to zero and massively scaling up the size of its balance sheet, the Fed also responded to the COVID recession by launching a slew of emergency lending facilities, some re-treads from the financial crisis and some brand new. Facilities to support the corporate bond market (The Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities) and the Municipal Liquidity Facility were particularly successful at capping bond spreads versus Treasuries, even if their actual usage was quite low. In fact, corporate bond spreads peaked on the very day that the Fed announced its corporate credit facilities in March (Chart 1). More recently, however, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin refused to authorize the continuation of most of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities beyond the end of the year. We wrote in November that, even with the Treasury taking back the funds used to set up the facilities, the Fed could re-launch them in 2021 if incoming Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen provides her approval.12 However, a late addition to the recently passed fiscal stimulus package appears to prohibit the re-authorization of the facilities without Congressional approval. At the time of publishing, we have not been able to see the details of the new provision, so there remains some uncertainty about what the Fed can and cannot do in this regard. Credit spreads are no longer trading at distressed levels, primary issuance markets are functioning properly, and the Fed’s facilities have hardly been used at all. Nonetheless, while the new bill raises interesting questions about Fed independence in the long-run, we doubt that markets will respond negatively to the absence of the Fed’s emergency facilities in 2021. Credit spreads are no longer trading at distressed levels, primary issuance markets are functioning properly, and the Fed’s facilities have hardly been used at all (Table 3). Table 3Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities The Fed In 2021 The Fed In 2021 In short, we don’t see the Fed going out of its way to re-establish the facilities in 2021 because it will become clear that they are no longer needed. The Next Regime Shift In Fed Policy: Fiscal/Monetary Coordination The adoption of an Average Inflation Target represents a major regime shift in Federal Reserve policy. In the final section of this report, we expand our horizon beyond 2021 and speculate about what the next major regime shift for the Fed might be. The 2020 recession made two things crystal clear. First, traditional fiscal policy becomes essentially impotent once interest have been reduced to the zero-lower-bound. Once there, Fed policy is most impactful when it focuses on lending to the private sector. Lending to the private sector through an emergency lending facility is an act that blurs the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. This was made abundantly clear by Congress’ recent push to legislate the Fed’s activities in this arena. Second, it is difficult for fiscal policy to act quickly enough during an economic downturn. While the CARES act was delivered in a timely manner, it has taken many months to pass a follow-up bill. The Fed’s independence allows it to act immediately when it is economically necessary, while Congress’ increasing polarization makes swift action a challenge. If we take these two observations to their logical conclusion, and throw in the strong chance that the traditional channels of monetary policy will be increasingly blocked in the future as rates bump up against zero, it seems to us that the strict separation of responsibilities between fiscal and monetary policymakers will fade over time. More specifically, greater time spent at the zero-lower-bound will incentivize the Fed to get more and more creative with its quasi-fiscal private lending facilities. Further, Congress will be more than happy to allow this encroachment as it finds itself unable to respond effectively in times of crisis. Of course, this will also lead to periodic push-back as some members of Congress fret about the Fed’s over-reach, but we expect this push-back will be the exception rather than the rule. Greater time spent at the zero-lower-bound will incentivize the Fed to get more and more creative with its quasi-fiscal private lending facilities.  In fact, the best idea might be for fiscal and monetary policymakers to join together proactively to craft programs that can be deployed during the next recession. One example of such an idea was recently presented by Julia Coronado and Simon Potter.13 Coronado and Potter’s idea relies on the use of instant payment processing technology (which the Fed is already working on) to create digital accounts at the Federal Reserve for every household. Once those accounts are in place, the federal government could issue Recession Insurance Bonds, zero coupon bonds with some pre-determined face value, and grant one bond to every household in the country. Then, during the next economic downturn, the Fed could decide to do a “people’s QE” where it buys all the Recession Insurance Bonds leaving every household with a direct cash payment equal to the face value of the bond. This scheme directly addresses the two main problems we named earlier. It is fiscal policy, not monetary policy, so it can still be effective at the zero-lower-bound. Also, Congress can take its time to deliberate on the bill that authorizes the creation of the Recession Insurance Bonds, as this can be done proactively during a period of economic recovery. Then, the Fed can use its ability to move quickly during the next downturn to “activate” the bonds and deliver the fiscal stimulus that Congress actually passed years earlier. While likely not a story for 2021, we see increased cooperation between monetary and fiscal policymakers as the next big regime shift for the Fed.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A New Dawn For US Monetary Policy”, dated September 1, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-to-changes-in-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monetary20200916a1.pdf 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20201116a.htm 5 For a more complete discussion of our 2021 inflation outlook please see “BCA Outlook 2021: A Brave New World”, dated November 30, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 This is the theory of adaptive expectations and we use it to model changes in the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate. For further details please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/tips-from-tips-update-and-discussions-20190521.htm 9 Fed Governor Lael Brainard references several of these trend measures in this recent speech: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20201021a.htm&…; 10 More details on how this aggregate measure is constructed can be found here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/index-of-common-inflation-expectations-20200902.htm 11 For more details on how corporate credit performs during different yield curve environments please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/reviving-potency-monetary-policy-recession-insurance-bonds

Highlights Global growth will accelerate over the course of 2021 as COVID-19 vaccines are distributed and economic confidence improves in response. Longer-term global bond yields see some upward pressure as growth picks up, but global real yields will stay negative with on-hold central banks actively seeking an inflation overshoot. Maintain below-benchmark overall global duration exposure, and position for steeper government bond yield curves and wider inflation breakevens. The rise in global bond yields we anticipate will be relatively moderate, with US Treasury yields rising the most. Underweight the US in global bond portfolios, and favor countries where yields have a lower sensitivity to rising US yields (core Europe, Japan, UK). Also overweight Peripheral European debt given supportive monetary and fiscal policies that are helping to reduce credit risk (Italy, Spain, Portugal). The US dollar will remain soft in 2021, providing an additional reflationary impulse to the global economy. Overweight global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. Lower-quality global credit should outperform against a backdrop that will prove positive for risk assets: easy money policies, improving growth momentum and a reduction in virus-related uncertainty. Upgrade US high-yield to overweight through higher allocations to lower rated credit tiers, while downgrading US investment grade, where valuations are far less compelling, to neutral. Favor US corporates versus euro area equivalents, of all credit quality, based off less attractive euro area spread valuations. Within US$-denominated emerging market debt, favor corporates over sovereigns. Feature Dear Client, This report, detailing our global fixed income investment outlook for next year, will be our last for 2020. Please join me for a webcast this coming Friday, December 18 at 10:00 AM EST (3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT) where I will discuss the outlook followed by a Q&A session. Best wishes for a very safe, healthy and prosperous 2021. We’ve all earned that after a difficult 2020 that none of us will soon forget. Rob Robis, Chief Global Fixed Income Strategist BCA Research’s Outlook 2021 report, “A Brave New World”, outlining the main investment themes for next year based on the collective wisdom of our strategists, was sent to all clients in late November.1 In this report, we discuss the broad implications of those themes for the direction of global fixed income markets in 2021. In a follow-up report to be published in the first week of the New Year, we will translate those themes into specific recommended allocations and weightings within our model bond portfolio framework. A Summary Of The 2021 BCA Outlook The tone of the BCA 2021 Outlook was generally positive, with conclusions that are supportive for the outperformance of risk assets relative to safe havens like government bonds (Chart 1). Chart 1How To Play Recovery & Reflation In 2021 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation Global growth will strengthen over the course of next year, after an initial soft patch related to the late-2020 COVID-19 economic restrictions in Europe and the US. Economic confidence will improve as the COVID-19 vaccines become more widely distributed, at a time of ongoing substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus in most important countries. A major release of pent-up demand is likely, fueled by the surge in private sector savings in the US and Europe after households and businesses cut back on spending because of the pandemic. The lingering impact of China’s substantial fiscal and credit stimulus in 2020 will still be felt throughout the world for most of 2021, even with Chinese authorities likely to begin curtailing the expansion of credit around mid-year. The tremendous amount of global spare capacity created by the virus and associated economic restrictions will keep inflation subdued in most countries. Thus, both monetary and fiscal policymakers will be under no pressure to pre-emptively tighten policy. The pace of monetary/fiscal stimulus will inevitably slow on a rate-of-change basis after the massive ramp up of government spending, income support, loan guarantees and central bank asset purchases. However, policymakers are expected to pull any and all of those levers once again in the event of a severe pullback in economic growth or a major bout of financial market turbulence. After a wild 2020 in a US election year, geopolitical uncertainty is expected to recede a bit next year. Although US-China tensions will remain elevated even under the incoming Biden administration, European politics are expected to be a tailwind for financial markets. A UK-EU Brexit deal is expected to be reached given economic realities, increased fiscal cooperation within the EU will support fiscally weaker countries like Italy, and the threat of the US imposing tariffs on Europe will disappear after Donald Trump leaves office. Our Four Main Key Views For Global Fixed Income Markets In 2021 The following are the main implications for global fixed income investment strategy based off the conclusions from the 2020 BCA Outlook: Key View #1: Maintain below-benchmark overall global duration exposure, and position for steeper government bond yield curves and wider inflation breakevens. Chart 2COVID-19 Lockdowns Will Not Last Forever COVID-19 Lockdowns Will Not Last Forever COVID-19 Lockdowns Will Not Last Forever COVID-19 was the elephant in the room for financial markets in 2020, influencing sentiment whenever cases flared up or subsided. Yet the impact diminished steadily since the first wave of the virus stretched beyond China in the spring. The broad span of global risk assets – equities, corporate credit, industrial commodities – has performed very well during the current, and much larger, surge in cases occurring in the US and Europe. One big reason for this is that investors now understand that lockdowns, and the associated drag on economic growth, do not last forever. In addition, investors know that policymakers in most countries will react to any sharp downturn in economic confidence with more fiscal and monetary stimulus to help offset the negative growth impact of the lockdowns. In Europe, many European governments enacted harsh national lockdowns in a bid to “flatten the curve” during the latest surge. This has helped successfully reduce the growth rate of new cases and hospitalizations (Chart 2). This will eventually lead to an easing of restrictions, and a recovery in economic activity, in early 2021. While US case numbers are also surging, the response by governments has been much less widespread, and severe, compared to Europe. There is little political appetite (even with a new president) for another wave of harsh restrictions along the lines of what took place last spring. Some slowing of economic activity is inevitable because of increased regional restrictions in large states like California and New York, as is already evident in some late-2020 data. However, any downturn should not be expected to last long with the growth rate of US COVID-19 hospitalizations having already peaked. The big game-changer, of course, is the introduction of COVID-19 vaccines which have already begun to be distributed in the UK and US. While there are uncertainties related to the operational logistics of a worldwide vaccine rollout, including whether enough people will voluntarily choose to be vaccinated to achieve herd immunity on a global scale, the very high announced efficacy levels of the various vaccines mean that an end of the pandemic is now achievable. Investors should see through the current surge in COVID-19 cases, and any short-term hiccup in economic growth, and focus on the bigger picture of the introduction of the vaccine and the positive implications for global economic confidence in 2021. Growth has already been holding up well in the US and China in the final months of 2020, with both manufacturing and services PMIs remaining solidly above the 50 line indicating expanding activity. As the euro area lockdowns begun to ease up, growth there will catch up, which already appears to be underway with the sharp uptick in the December PMI data (Chart 3). Those three regions account for one-half of worldwide GDP, so that is already a solid footing for global growth entering 2021. A sustained improvement in the pace of global economic activity is important, as it is becoming increasingly harder for governments to sustain the extreme levels of policy stimulus delivered in 2020. In China, policymakers are starting to rotate their focus away from aggressive stimulus and fighting deflation back to the cautious risk management approach to credit expansion that was in place prior to COVID-19. BCA Research’s China strategists expect the latest Chinese credit cycle to peak by mid-2021, with the credit impulse set to decline in the second half of the year (Chart 4). Combined with the tightening of monetary conditions through a strengthening yuan and higher local interest rates, some slowing of Chinese growth is inevitable. Although given the lags between stimulus and growth, the impact is more likely to be felt toward year-end and into 2022 – good news for much of the global economy that still relies heavily on exporting to China as an engine of growth. Chart 3A Growth Recovery Without Inflation A Growth Recovery Without Inflation A Growth Recovery Without Inflation Chart 4China Stimulus Will Peak Out By Mid-2021 China Stimulus Will Peak Out By Mid-2021 China Stimulus Will Peak Out By Mid-2021 Overall global fiscal policy is on track to be less supportive in 2021. The latest estimates from the IMF show that the “fiscal thrust”, or the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance relative to potential GDP, in most developed economies will turn negative next year (Charts 5A and 5B). Such a swing is inevitable given the sheer magnitudes of the fiscal stimulus measures first introduced to combat the economic damage from COVID-19 that will not be repeated in 2021. By the same token, less fiscal stimulus will be necessary if overall global growth improves, especially if vaccines can be successfully distributed to much of the world. Chart 5ANegative Fiscal Thrust In 2021 … Negative Fiscal Thrust In 2021 ... Negative Fiscal Thrust In 2021 ... Chart 5B… But Governments Will Spend More If Needed ... But Governments Will Spend More If Needed ... But Governments Will Spend More If Needed What does all this mean for global government bond yields? We believe that it signals a continuation of the trends seen towards the end of 2020 – a slow grind higher in longer-term yields, led by better growth and rising inflation expectations, but without any need to discount a move to tighter monetary policy because of a sustained overshoot of realized inflation. The current economic projections of the Fed, ECB, Bank of England (BoE), Bank of Canada (BoC) and Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) all show that policymakers there expect unemployment rates to remain above pre-pandemic levels to at least 2023 (Chart 6). At the same time, central banks are also projecting inflation to be below their target levels/ranges over that same period. In response, the forward guidance from these central banks has been very dovish, with policy interest rates expected to remain at current levels at or near 0% for at least the next two to three years. Interest rate markets have taken the hint, with a very low expected path for rates over the next few years discounted in overnight index swap curves. Chart 6Central Banks Projecting A Slow Return To Full Employment 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation Chart 7Markets Expect Years Of Negative Real Policy Rates Markets Expect Years Of Negative Real Policy Rates Markets Expect Years Of Negative Real Policy Rates The implication of this is that central banks are projecting a sustained, multi-year period where policy rates will remain below forecasted inflation (Chart 7). Or put more simply, central banks are consistently signaling that negative real interest rates will persist for a long time. This means that one of the most oft-discussed “oddities” of global bond markets in 2020 - the persistence of negative real long term bond yields in most major economies, most notably in the US Treasury market, even as inflation expectations increase – is unlikely to disappear in 2021. Those negative real yields reflect, to a large part, the expectation that real global policy rates will stay persistently negative (Chart 8). At some point in 2021, markets could challenge this dovish guidance from central banks that could temporarily push up both future interest rate expectations and longer-term real yields, especially in the US. However, it is more likely that central banks will not validate that move higher in yields for fears of pre-emptively short-circuiting an economic recovery. Such a hawkish shift could be more plausibly delivered in 2022 at the earliest, with the Fed the most likely candidate to change its guidance. Summing up all of the above points with regards to our recommendations on overall management of government bond portfolios, we arrive at the following conclusions (Chart 9): Chart 8Rising Inflation Breakevens With Stable Negative Real Yields Rising Inflation Breakevens With Stable Negative Real Yields Rising Inflation Breakevens With Stable Negative Real Yields Chart 9Moderately Higher Global Bond Yields In 2021 Moderately Higher Global Bond Yields In 2021 Moderately Higher Global Bond Yields In 2021 Duration exposure should be set below-benchmark. Our forward-looking Duration Indicator, comprised of leading economic indicators and economic expectations data, is strongly signaling that global yields should head higher in 2021. Position for a bearish steepening of yield curves. This will be driven more by rising longer-term inflation expectations, as the short-ends of yield curves will remain anchored by dovish on-hold central banks. Key View #2: Underweight the US in global bond portfolios, and favor countries where yields have a lower sensitivity to rising US yields Moving beyond the overall global duration view, there are significant country allocation decisions that derive from our outlook for 2021. First and foremost, we recommend underweighting US Treasuries in global bond portfolios, as we anticipate the biggest increase in developed market bond yields next year to occur in the US. We expect the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield to rise to the 1.25% to 1.5% range sometime in 2021. This move will come mostly through higher inflation expectations. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is expected to reach the 2.3-2.5% range that we have long considered to be consistent with the market pricing in the Fed sustainably achieving its 2% inflation goal. Any additional Treasury yield increases beyond our 2021 forecast range would require the Fed to shift to a more hawkish stance signaling future rate hikes. With the Fed now operating with an Average Inflation Target framework, allowing for temporary overshoots of inflation after periods when inflation was below the Fed’s 2% target, the hurdle for such a shift in Fed guidance is much higher than in previous years. The Fed has also changed the nature of its forward guidance compared to years past, signaling that any future monetary tightening will only occur once actual inflation has sustainably returned to the 2% target. That means that the Fed will no longer pre-emptively choose to hike rates on merely a forecast of higher inflation – it will first need to see a sustained period of higher inflation materialize before considering any tightening. Thus, any move beyond our expected 1.25% to 1.5% range on US Treasuries would require a hawkish signal by the Fed that it intends to begin removing monetary accommodation through rate hikes. Under the Average Inflation Target framework, that will not happen in 2021 but could happen the following year if inflation stays at or above 2% over the course of next year. Turning to other countries, we recommend favoring bond markets with a lower historical “yield beta” to US Treasuries. In other words, we prefer overweighting counties where government bond yields are typically less correlated to changes in Treasury yields. We show those historical yield betas, using 10-year yields, in Chart 10. Importantly, the betas are calculated only for periods when Treasury yields are moving higher. We call this “upside beta”, which is a useful tool to identify which bond markets are more sensitive to selloffs in the US Treasury market. Chart 10Favor Lower Beta Government Bond Markets In 2021 Favor Lower Beta Government Bond Markets In 2021 Favor Lower Beta Government Bond Markets In 2021 The highest “upside beta” countries among the major developed markets are Australia, Canada and New Zealand, while the lowest “upside beta” countries are Germany, France and Japan. The UK is in the middle of those two groupings, although the trend over the past few years suggests that it is transitioning from a high-beta to low-beta country. Note that for all countries shown, the upside yield betas are below one, indicating that no market should be expected to see a bigger rise in yields than the US. Strictly based on our forecast of higher Treasury yields and calculated yield betas, we would recommend more overweight allocations to markets in the lower-beta group and more underweight allocations to the higher-beta group. We are comfortable recommending overweights to the lower-beta group of Germany, France, Japan and the UK. Although among the higher-beta group, we are reluctant to recommend underweighting all three countries because of the policy choices of their central banks. The RBA, BoC and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) have all enacted aggressively large quantitative easing (QE) programs in 2020 as a way to provide additional monetary stimulus after cutting policy rates to near-0%. The BoC stands out as being extremely aggressive on QE with its balance sheet expanding more than three-fold on a year-over-year basis (Chart 11). Chart 11More Divergence In The Pace Of Global QE More Divergence In The Pace Of Global QE More Divergence In The Pace Of Global QE None of these three central banks has discussed slowing the pace of purchases anytime soon. In the case of the RBA and RBNZ, they have gone as far as signaling the role of QE in dampening their bond yields to help stem the appreciation of their currencies. They may have limited success in driving down yields further, however. Measures of bond valuation like the term premium, which typically move lower when QE accelerates, have bottomed out across the developed markets even as central banks have absorbed a greater share of the stock of government debt in 2020 (Chart 12). Yet even if QE can no longer drive yields lower, it can limit how much yields can increase when under cyclical upward pressure. For this reason, we do not expect government bond yields in Australia, Canada or New Zealand to behave in line their historical higher yield beta that would make them clear underweight candidates in a period of rising US Treasury yields, as we expect. Net-net, we recommend that investors focus underweights solely on US Treasuries within global government bond portfolios. This suggests that yield spreads between Treasuries and other bond markets should continue to widen, as has been the case over the final few months of 2020 (Chart 13). We recommend neutral allocations to Australia, Canada and New Zealand, while overweighting core Europe, Japan and the UK. Chart 12More QE Is Less Impactful In Pushing Down Bond Yields More QE Is Less Impactful In Pushing Down Bond Yields More QE Is Less Impactful In Pushing Down Bond Yields Chart 13US Treasuries Will Continue To Underperform In 2021 US Treasuries Will Continue To Underperform In 2021 US Treasuries Will Continue To Underperform In 2021 We also are maintaining our overweight recommendation on Italian and Spanish government debt, which was one of our most successful calls of 2020. We view those markets more as a credit spread story versus core Europe, rather than a directional yield instrument like US Treasuries or German Bunds. On that basis, the spread of Italian and Spanish yields versus German yields has room to compress even further, as both are strongly supported by ECB bond purchases. Also, the introduction of the European Union’s €750bn Recovery Fund is a strong signal of greater fiscal co-operation within Europe – another important factor that has helped reduce the risk premium (credit spread) on Italy and Spain. When looking at the yields currently on offer in the developed world, Italy and Spain offer very attractive yields in a global low-yield environment (Table 1). Stay overweight. Table 1Developed Market Bond Yields, Both Unhedged & Hedged Into USD 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation Key View #3: Overweight global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt We have discussed the importance of rising inflation expectations as a core driver of the rise in global bond yields that we expect in 2021. This has been in the context of improving global growth, reduced spare economic capacity and central banks staying very dovish, all of which are necessary ingredients to boost depressed inflation expectations. A weaker US dollar will also play a significant role in that boost to inflation expectations and bond yields that we expect next year. The decline in the greenback seen in the latter half of 2020 has been driven by the typical factors (Chart 14): Chart 14More Negatives Than Positives For The USD More Negatives Than Positives For The USD More Negatives Than Positives For The USD The Fed’s aggressive rate cuts, dating back to 2019, have reduced much of the relative interest rate attractiveness of the US dollar Accelerating global growth after the sharp worldwide plunge in growth in Q2/2020 benefitted non-US economies more, eliciting a standard decline in the “anti-growth” US dollar Uncertainty and risk aversion declined after the initial COVID-19 shock at the start of 2020, easing the safe haven demand for dollars. Looking ahead, rate differentials continue to point to additional downward pressure on the US dollar, even with the moderate rise in longer-term US Treasury yields that we expect next year. Risk aversion and uncertainty should also decline in a dollar-bearish fashion with the US presidential election behind us and the COVID-19 vaccine ahead of us. Improving global growth should also be supportive of more dollar weakness, especially as Europe recovers from the current lockdown-driven slowdown. A weaker US dollar is a key variable to trigger faster global inflation through the link between the currency and global traded goods prices. On a rate-of-change basis, a weakening US dollar has a strong negative correlation to the growth rate of world export prices and commodity prices (Chart 15). Thus, more USD weakness in 2021 will lift realized global inflation through commodities and traded goods prices, especially against a backdrop of faster global growth. Chart 15Global Reflation Through A Weaker USD Global Reflation Through A Weaker USD Global Reflation Through A Weaker USD Chart 16Stay Overweight Global Inflation-Linked Bonds In 2021 Stay Overweight Global Inflation-Linked Bonds In 2021 Stay Overweight Global Inflation-Linked Bonds In 2021 BCA Research’s commodity strategists expect oil prices to move higher next year on the back of an improving demand/supply balance, with the benchmark Brent price of oil averaging $63/bbl over the course of 2021. A weaker USD could provide additional upside to that forecast, giving a further lift to realized inflation rates around the world. To position for this boost to inflation via a weaker dollar and rising commodity prices, we recommend that fixed-income investors continue holding a core allocation to inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. We have maintained that recommendation since last spring after the collapse of global breakeven inflation rates that left breakevens very undervalued according to our fair value models (Chart 16).2 The valuation case is far less compelling now after the steady climb in breakevens over the latter half of 2020, with only French and Japan breakevens below fair value. However, given our expected backdrop of improving global growth and highly accommodative global monetary policy, breakevens are likely to continue to climb to more expensive levels. Our preferred allocations are to US and French inflation-linked bonds, while we would be cautious on Australian inflation-linked bonds which appear extremely overvalued on our models. Key View #4: Within an overweight allocation to global corporate debt, overweight US high-yield versus US investment grade and favor all US corporates versus euro area equivalents. Global corporate bond markets have enjoyed a spectacular rally over the final three quarters of 2020 after the huge pandemic related selloff of last February and March. The benchmark index yields for investment grade corporates in the US, euro area and UK have all fallen back below pre-COVID levels, while index yields for high-yield in the same three regions are back at the pre-COVID lows (Chart 17). The story is similar on a credit spread basis. The benchmark index option-adjusted spread (OAS) for investment grade corporates is only 11bps away from the pre-COVID low in the US and 4bps from the pre-COVID low in the euro area, with the UK spread now slightly below the pre-pandemic low (Chart 18). High-yield spreads still have some more room to compress with US, euro area and UK junk index spreads 67bps, 68bps and 110bps above the pre-pandemic low, respectively. Chart 17Corporate Bond Yields Falling To New Lows Corporate Bond Yields Falling To New Lows Corporate Bond Yields Falling To New Lows Chart 18Corporate Bond Spreads Approaching Pre-COVID Lows Corporate Bond Spreads Approaching Pre-COVID Lows Corporate Bond Spreads Approaching Pre-COVID Lows Supportive monetary policy has played a huge role in the global credit rally. Central banks have used their balance sheets aggressively to help ease financial conditions, including the direct buying of corporate bonds by the Fed, ECB and BoE. Looking ahead to 2021, it is clear that credit markets are still benefitting from loose monetary policy while also enjoying a tailwind from better global growth. The global high-yield default rate is rolling over and the US default rate has clearly peaked (Chart 19). There is now less of a need for direct buying of corporates by central banks with credit markets seeing major investor inflows with a robust pace of corporate bond issuance. Corporate bond markets can now walk on their own with the support of central bank crutches. This means that investors should pivot away from the more cautious “buy what the central banks are buying” approach that we had advocated for much of 2020 and be more selectively aggressive. First and foremost, that means increasing allocations to US high-yield corporate debt, both out of US investment grade and euro area corporates. Default-adjusted spreads in the US, which measure the high-yield index OAS net of realized default losses, will look far more attractive as the US default rate peaks (Chart 20). If the US default rate moves back below 5% over the next year from the current 8% rate, the US default-adjusted spread will climb back into positive territory. This will compare more favorably to the default-adjusted spread for euro area high-yield, which has been higher because the euro area default rate did not suffer a major spike this year despite the sharp downturn in euro area growth back in the spring. Chart 19Easy Money Policies Supporting Global Credit Easy Money Policies Supporting Global Credit Easy Money Policies Supporting Global Credit Chart 20High-Yield Looks More Attractive With Fewer Defaults In 2021 High-Yield Looks More Attractive With Fewer Defaults In 2021 High-Yield Looks More Attractive With Fewer Defaults In 2021 US high-yield also looks most attractive using our preferred metric of pure spread valuation, the 12-month breakeven spread. This measures the amount of spread widening that must occur over a one year period for corporate debt to have the same return as a duration-matched position in government bonds. We compare this “spread cushion” to its own history in a percentile ranking to determine if spreads look relatively attractive. Within US corporate debt, the 12-month breakeven spread for investment grade credit is down to the 5th percentile, suggesting virtually no room for additional spread tightening (Chart 21). For US high-yield credit, the 12-month breakeven spread is still relatively elevated at the 60th percentile level, suggesting more room for spread compression. Within euro area corporates, the 12-month breakeven percentile rankings for investment grade and high-yield are at the 27th and 28th percentile, respectively, suggesting a more limited scope for spread compression compared to US high-yield (Chart 22). Chart 21Move Down In Quality Within US Corporates Move Down In Quality Within US Corporates Move Down In Quality Within US Corporates Chart 22No Compelling Value In Euro Area Corporates No Compelling Value In Euro Area Corporates No Compelling Value In Euro Area Corporates When comparing the 12-month breakeven spreads of all corporate debt in the US, euro area and UK, broken down by credit tier, to a more pure measure of spread risk - duration times spread – the attractiveness of lower-rated US junk bonds is most compelling (Chart 23). In particular, US B-rated and Caa-rated junk spreads offer very high 12-month breakeven spreads relative to spread risk. Chart 23Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation 2021 Key Views: Vaccination, Reflation, Rotation Adding it all up, it is clear that lower-rated US high-yield debt offers an attractive value proposition for 2021. This is especially true given the positive global growth and monetary policy backdrop. The annual growth rate of the combined balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, BoE and Bank of Japan has been an excellent leading indicator of the excess return of US high-yield US Treasuries (Chart 24). The surge in balance sheet growth of 2020 is pointing to strong US high-yield bond performance versus Treasuries, and an outperformance of lower-rated US high-yield, in 2021. Chart 24Upgrade US High-Yield To Overweight Upgrade US High-Yield To Overweight Upgrade US High-Yield To Overweight Chart 25Within EM USD Credit, Favor Corporates Over Sovereigns Within EM USD Credit, Favor Corporates Over Sovereigns Within EM USD Credit, Favor Corporates Over Sovereigns This leads us to shift to an overweight stance on US high-yield, while downgrading US investment grade to neutral, as our key global spread product recommendation for 2020. Within other corporate credit markets, we recommend only a neutral allocation to euro area corporate credit, given the relatively less attractive valuations. Finally, within the emerging market US dollar denominated universe, we continue to recommend an overweight stance on corporates versus sovereigns, as the former will benefit more in 2021 from the lagged effect of Chinese credit stimulus and central bank balance sheet expansion in 2020 (Chart 25).   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2021: A Brave New World", dated November 30, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Our breakeven inflation models use the growth rate of oil prices in local currency terms and a long-term moving average of realized inflation as the inputs. Recommendations Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Below-Benchmark Portfolio Duration: The economic recovery will continue (and even accelerate) in 2021. Meanwhile, the Fed’s forward interest rate guidance is already as dovish as it will get. Keep portfolio duration below-benchmark in 2021, targeting a level of 1.25% to 1.5% for the 10-year Treasury yield.  Overweight TIPS Versus Nominal Treasuries: We remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being but are actively looking for an opportunity to get tactically underweight. This opportunity could emerge in the first half of 2021 when core and trimmed mean inflation re-converge and when the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate looks expensive on our model.  Own Nominal Yield Curve Steepeners, Real Yield Curve Steepeners And Inflation Curve Flatteners: The nominal yield curve will continue to trade directionally with yields. Therefore, higher yields will coincide with a steeper nominal curve in 2021. Rising inflation and the Fed’s new Average Inflation Target both argue for a flatter inflation curve in 2021. We also recommend a real yield curve steepener as a high octane play on both a steeper nominal curve and flatter inflation curve. Overweight Spread Product Versus Treasuries: We see the economy as entering what we call “Phase 1” of the economic cycle in 2021, an environment of above-trend growth, low inflation and accommodative monetary policy. This is an environment where spread product typically performs very well relative to Treasuries. Move Down In Quality Within Corporates: Investment grade corporates will outperform Treasuries in 2021, but the potential for further spread compression is limited. Junk spreads have more room to tighten, and the Ba credit tier looks particularly attractive from a risk/reward perspective A Maximum Overweight Allocation To Municipal Bonds: Tax-exempt municipal bonds offer the best opportunity in the US fixed income space. Investors should adopt a maximum overweight allocation, and in particular, they should shift some allocation out of investment grade corporates and into Munis with the same credit rating and duration, but with a greater after-tax yield. Feature BCA published its 2021 Outlook on November 30. That report lays out the main macroeconomic themes that our strategists see driving markets next year. This Special Report explains how investors can profit from those themes in US fixed income markets. Specifically, we offer six key US fixed income views for 2021. This report is limited to the six key investment views listed on page 1, and only discusses Fed policy in the context of how it influences those views. Next week we will publish a more comprehensive “Fed In 2021” report that will delve into our outlook for the Fed next year. Outlook Summary First, a brief summary of the main economic views presented in BCA’s 2021 Outlook:1 The third wave of COVID infections will be a drag on economic activity in 2020 Q4 and 2021 Q1, but inventory re-stocking and the large build-up of household savings will prevent the US economy from falling into a double-dip recession. Ultimately, the vaccine roll-out will cause US GDP to grow well above trend in 2021. Inflation is likely to spike in the first half of 2021 due to base effects and the re-opening of some service sectors that were shuttered during the pandemic. But this initial surge will dissipate in the second half of the year. The wide output gap that opened in 2020 will persist in 2021 and will prevent a broad-based acceleration in consumer prices. The Fed’s forward interest rate guidance is as dovish as it will get. A large portion of the Outlook is devoted to considering longer-run economic and political trends that were accelerated by the global policy response to COVID-19. Specifically, rising populism, heavier corporate regulation and a greater appetite for MMT-like taxing and spending policies. The ultimate outcome of these trends will be significantly higher inflation, on the order of 3% to 5%, in the second half of the decade. Key View #1: Below-Benchmark Portfolio Duration Chart 1Treasury Yields In 2020 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income The economic recovery will continue (and even accelerate) in 2021. Meanwhile, the Fed’s forward interest rate guidance is already as dovish as it will get. Keep portfolio duration below-benchmark in 2021, targeting a level of 1.25% to 1.5% for the 10-year Treasury yield. Our recommendation to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration rests on two key pillars. The first is BCA’s view that the economic recovery will continue in 2021 and will even accelerate once enough of the population has received the COVID vaccine. The second pillar is our view that the Federal Reserve’s reaction function is as dovish as it will get. In other words, having already laid out the conditions that must be in place for it to begin the next rate hike cycle, the Fed will not undertake further efforts to guide interest rates lower in the face of economic recovery. Chart 1 provides a bit more context for our assessment of Fed policy. This year, economic growth and inflation expectations troughed in March and moved rapidly higher throughout the summer. Bond yields, however, stayed relatively flat between March and August. The reason is that, even as the economic outlook improved, the Fed was steadily guiding markets towards a dramatic shift in its forward interest rate guidance. Specifically, the adoption of an Average Inflation Target – a pledge to allow a moderate overshoot of the 2% inflation target to make up for past downside misses. The result of the Fed’s dovish shift is that the increase in inflation expectations between March and August was entirely offset by falling real yields (Chart 1, panel 3), leaving nominal yields close to unchanged. However, the Fed made its Average Inflation Target official at the Jackson Hole Symposium in August. Then, in September, it formalized its forward rate guidance by promising not to lift rates off the zero bound until inflation reaches 2% and is expected to moderately overshoot for a while. These events changed the dynamic in the bond market. The Fed is no longer trying to guide markets towards a more dovish reaction function. That reaction function is now officially in place, and presumably in the market price. Indeed, nominal bond yields have risen in concert with improving economic conditions since August, and we expect that trend to continue in 2021. Our Golden Rule of Bond Investing states that we should set portfolio duration by considering our own expectations for future changes in the fed funds rate relative to what is already priced in the yield curve. Appendix A at the end of this report shows that the Golden Rule once again performed well in 2020. Looking ahead, the market is currently pricing-in one full 25 basis point rate hike by mid-2023 and then only one more by mid-2024 (Chart 2). We see high odds that inflation could sustainably reach 2% – the Fed’s stated criteria for lifting off the zero bound – before that, necessitating some Fed tightening in 2022. Chart 2Market Priced For Liftoff In 2023 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income How High Could Yields Go In 2021? To answer this question, we first look at the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield relative to survey estimates of the longer-run equilibrium fed funds rate. In theory, long-dated forward yields should be relatively insulated from near-term shifts in the policy rate and should settle near levels consistent with estimates of the equilibrium fed funds rate. In practice, we find that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield does settle near these levels, but only during periods of global economic recovery when investors are presumably more inclined to envision the closing of the output gap and an eventual neutralizing of monetary policy. Notice that during the past two global growth upturns, 2013/14 and 2017/18, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield peaked close to survey estimates of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants and the Survey of Primary Dealers (Chart 3A). If the same thing happens next year, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield will rise to a range of roughly 2% to 2.25%, 54 bps to 79 bps above current levels. Chart 3AHow High Can Yields Rise? 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart 3BLess Upside In 10y Than In 5y5y 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income We see less upside next year for the benchmark 10-year yield than for the 5-year/5-year forward. Long-dated forward rates are not mathematically influenced by the near-term outlook for the policy rate, but the yield on the 10-year Treasury note embeds those expectations. Since it is unlikely that inflation will be strong enough to prompt a Fed rate hike in 2021, the yield curve will steepen as the economic outlook improves and the 10-year yield will rise by less than the 5-year/5-year forward. Looking at Chart 3B, next year’s bond market moves will look a lot more like 2013/14 than like 2017/18. The Fed kept rates at zero in 2013/14. This led to yield curve steepening and caused the 10-year Treasury yield to peak at a level well below survey estimates of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate. In contrast, the Fed was hiking rates in 2017/18. This led to a flatter yield curve and caused the 10-year yield to peak at around the same level as the 5-year/5-year forward. All in all, while we could see the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield reach a range of 2% to 2.25% next year, we expect the 10-year Treasury yield to reach a range of 1.25% to 1.5%. Will The Fed Use Its Balance Sheet To Stop Treasury Yields From Rising? By far, the most common disagreement we’ve received from clients on our call for higher bond yields is that the Fed will simply use its balance sheet to prevent any increase in long-maturity yields. We don’t see this as having a meaningful impact. For one, the Fed will only take significant steps to ease monetary policy if it looks like the economic recovery is under threat. This would require a large tightening of financial conditions, meaning significantly lower stock prices and wider corporate bond spreads. We don’t see a 1.25% to 1.5% 10-year Treasury yield in the context of a steepening yield curve, low inflation and improving economic growth as likely to cause such an event. Granted, the Fed could take more minor actions, like keeping the same pace of purchases but shifting them further out the curve, but a significant tightening of financial conditions is likely required for them to increase the monthly pace of bond buying. Second, even if the Fed does decide to ramp up the pace of bond buying (either overall or only at the long-end of the curve), if it keeps the same forward interest rate guidance, then bond yields will be driven by the market’s perceived progress toward the conditions that would prompt the start of the next tightening cycle. It won’t matter how many bonds the Fed buys in the meantime. Our Golden Rule of Bond Investing has a strong track record that it achieves by focusing only on changes in the fed funds rate relative to expectations. It does not consider asset purchases at all, and we are also inclined to view them more as a distraction. Key View #2: Overweight TIPS Versus Nominal Treasuries Chart 4Adaptive Expectations Model 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income We remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being but are actively looking for an opportunity to get tactically underweight. This opportunity could emerge in the first half of 2021 when core and trimmed mean inflation re-converge and when the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate looks expensive on our model. TIPS breakeven inflation rates fell dramatically when the COVID crisis struck in March, but they then rebounded just as quickly and are now near fair value according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 4). Our model forecasts the future 12-month change in the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate based on where the rate currently sits relative to several different measures of actual CPI inflation. Right now, our model is looking for a 12 basis point decline in the 10-year breakeven rate during the next year, but this forecast will rise if CPI prints strongly in the coming months, which is exactly what we expect. Chart 5Expect Higher Inflation In H1 2021 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income As noted in the above Outlook Summary, base effects and the re-opening of some service sectors will cause inflation to jump in the first half of 2021. A good way to see this is to look at the gap between 12-month core and trimmed mean CPI (Chart 5). Core inflation fell dramatically in March and April and is now in the process of bouncing back. Meanwhile, trimmed mean inflation measures were much more stable in the spring because they filtered out those sectors that experienced huge negative inflation prints during quarantine.   We think the gap between core and trimmed mean CPI is a good guidepost for our TIPS strategy. As long as the gap remains wide, we see upside risks to inflation. However, once the gap closes, that will signal that the “snapback phase” from re-opening the economy is over and that inflation pressures will moderate in line with the wide output gap. Shelter inflation is one of the components of inflation that is most sensitive to the output gap, and it has already been rolling over in line with the rising unemployment rate (Chart 5, bottom panel). Overall, our TIPS strategy in 2021 is to remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being. However, we are actively looking for an opportunity to get tactically short TIPS versus nominals. This could occur sometime in the first half of 2021 when core and trimmed mean inflation have re-converged and when (hopefully) the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate looks more expensive on our model. Key View #3: Own Nominal Yield Curve Steepeners, Real Yield Curve Steepeners and Inflation Curve Flatteners Chart 62/5/10 Butterfly Spread Valuation 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income The nominal yield curve will continue to trade directionally with yields. Therefore, higher yields will coincide with a steeper nominal curve in 2021. Rising inflation and the Fed’s new Average Inflation Target both argue for a flatter inflation curve in 2021. We also recommend a real yield curve steepener as a high octane play on both a steeper nominal curve and flatter inflation curve. Nominal Yield Curve With the funds rate pinned at zero and the Fed unlikely to actually lift it until 2022 (at the earliest), it is quite clear that the slope of the nominal yield curve will continue to trade directionally with yields as we head into 2021. That is, with volatility at the front-end of the curve completely suppressed, the yield curve will steepen when yields rise and flatten when they fall. In that context, we recommend complementing our below-benchmark portfolio duration view with nominal yield curve steepeners. Our preferred way to implement a nominal yield curve steepener is to buy the 5-year Treasury note and short a barbell consisting of the 2-year note and 10-year note. Allocations to the 2-year and 10-year should be weighted so that the duration of the 2/10 barbell matches that of the 5-year note. As we have explained in prior research, this sort of position is designed to profit from 2/10 yield curve steepening and it has worked well during the past few months (Chart 6).2  The one problem with this 5 over 2/10 trade is that it is not cheap. The 5-year yield is below the yield on the 2/10 barbell (Chart 6, panel 3) and the 5-year bullet looks expensive on our fair value model (Chart 6, bottom panel). However, we should also note that the 5-year looked much expensive during the last period of zero-bound rates in 2012. Given today’s very similar policy environment, we could see the 5-year yield getting even more expensive in 2021. Inflation Curve Chart 7Favor Inflation Curve Flatteners... 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Our second recommended yield curve position relates to the inflation curve, either the TIPS breakeven inflation curve or the CPI swap curve. Here, we recommend owning inflation curve flatteners for two reasons. First, short-maturity inflation expectations are more sensitive to the actual inflation data than long-maturity expectations. We saw a prime example of this relationship in 2020. The 2-year CPI swap rate plunged into negative territory when inflation fell in March while the 10-year CPI swap rate held relatively stable in comparison (Chart 7). Subsequently, the 2-year CPI swap rate rose much more quickly than the 10-year rate this summer as inflation rebounded. Looking ahead, with inflation biased higher in the first half of 2021, we should see greater upside in short-maturity inflation expectations than in long-maturity ones. The Fed’s adoption of an Average Inflation Target is the second reason to favor inflation curve flatteners. If the Fed is ultimately successful at achieving an overshoot of its 2% inflation target, it will mean that the Fed will be attacking its inflation target from above rather than from below for the first time since the 1980s. Logically, the inflation curve should be inverted in this sort of environment. This means that the inflation curve still has a lot of room to flatten from current levels (Chart 7, bottom panel). Real Yield Curve Chart 8...And Real Yield Curve Steepeners 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income The Fisher Equation tells us that real yields are simply the difference between nominal yields and inflation expectations. Viewed that way, it is easy to see that – all else equal – a steeper nominal curve will lead to a steeper real yield curve. Meanwhile, a flatter inflation curve will also lead to a steeper real yield curve. In that sense, a real yield curve steepener is just a combination of the nominal curve steepener and inflation curve flattener that we already mentioned (Chart 8). As inflation rises, it will pressure short-dated inflation expectations higher relative to long-dated ones. This will exert bull-steepening pressure on the real yield curve. Meanwhile, investors starting to price-in eventual rate hikes will lead to nominal yield curve steepening. This will exert bear-steepening pressure on the real yield curve. With that in mind, a real yield curve steepener is a high conviction position for us in 2021. We have less conviction on the outright direction for real yields, though we suspect that long-maturity real yields have already troughed for the cycle. Key View #4: Overweight Spread Product Versus Treasuries We see the economy as entering what we call “Phase 1” of the economic cycle in 2021, an environment of above-trend growth, low inflation and accommodative monetary policy. This is an environment where spread product typically performs very well relative to Treasuries.  Most spread sectors will likely end the year having underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries in 2020. However, this simple fact obscures the actual pattern of spread movements that was witnessed during the year. Spreads widened sharply when COVID struck but they peaked on March 23, the same day that the Federal Reserve announced its slew of emergency lending facilities.3 Spread product has been outperforming Treasuries since then (see Appendix B), a trend we expect will continue in 2021. The phase of the economic cycle when the economy is just emerging from a recession is typically one where risk assets perform well. The principal reason to expect spread product outperformance to continue is that the phase of the economic cycle when the economy is just emerging from a recession is typically one where risk assets perform well. It tends to be an environment where economic activity is growing at an above-trend pace, but inflation is still low and monetary conditions are accommodative. This is the perfect environment for credit spreads to tighten. The slope of the yield curve is a useful variable for summarizing the above macro conditions and we often use it to define three phases of the economic cycle (Chart 9): Chart 9The Three Phases Of The Cycle 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Phase 1 is defined as the time between the end of the last recession and when the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps. Phase 2 is defined as when the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps. Phase 3 is defined as the time between when the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope turns negative and the start of the next recession. As we are just now emerging from recession and the 3-year/10-year slope is above 50 bps and steepening, we see the economy as being firmly in Phase 1 of the cycle. Historically, this phase has been the best one for spread product returns relative to duration-matched Treasuries (Table 1). Table 1Corporate Bond Performance In Different Phases Of The Cycle 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income The main risk to this view of spread product is that we are not yet emerging from the recession and the corporate default rate may have another leg higher. Our sense, however, is that the default rate has already peaked. Gross leverage (the ratio between total corporate debt and pre-tax corporate profits) and job cut announcements are two variables that correlate very tightly with the default rate (Chart 10). Starting with leverage, net earnings revisions – a leader profit indicator – have already troughed and the corporate financing gap has turned negative (Chart 11). A negative financing gap means that the corporate sector has sufficient retained earnings to cover its capital expenditures. In other words, most firms are flush with cash and they won’t need to issue more debt in the coming quarters. Further, job cut announcements have come down sharply during the past few months (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10The Default Rate Correlates With Gross Leverage And Job Cuts 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart 11Firms Have Enough Cash 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income The above trends in corporate profits, corporate debt and job cut announcements are consistent with what we’re already seeing on the default front. The US corporate sector was experiencing upwards of 20 default events per month back in May, June and July. But only seven defaults occurred in November, following five in October and six in September (Chart 12). Chart 12The Default Rate Has Peaked 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income The bottom line is that the macro environment of above-trend growth, low inflation and accommodative monetary policy is one where we should expect spread product to outperform Treasuries. Relative valuation dictates which spread sectors we prefer over other ones, and the next two Key Views address this issue. Key View #5: Move Down In Quality Within Corporates Investment grade corporates will outperform Treasuries in 2021, but the potential for further spread compression is limited. Junk spreads have more room to tighten, and the Ba credit tier looks particularly attractive from a risk/reward perspective. As noted in the previous section, the macroeconomic environment is one where spread product should flourish. However, valuation in certain sectors could limit how much further spread tightening is possible. In particular, valuation looks to be a constraint for investment grade corporates. In absolute terms, investment grade corporate spreads look like they still have some room to compress (Chart 13). The overall index spread is 12 bps above its pre-COVID level. The Aa, A and Baa-rated spreads are 16 bps, 11 bps and 13 bps above, respectively. Only seven defaults occurred in November, following five in October and six in September. However, valuation looks much worse in risk-adjusted terms. Chart 14 shows the 12-month breakeven spread, i.e. the spread widening required for the sector to underperform Treasuries on a 12-month investment horizon. In addition, we re-weight the overall corporate index to ensure that it maintains a constant credit rating distribution over time, and we show all breakeven spreads as percentile ranks relative to their own histories. For example, a reading of 8% for the Baa credit tier means that the 12-month breakeven spread for the Baa credit tier has only been lower than it is today 8% of the time since our data begin in 1995. Chart 13IG Spreads Still Above ##br##Pre-COVID levels 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart 14IG Looks More Expensive In Risk-Adjusted Terms 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Adding it all up, we think there is scope for investment grade corporates to modestly outperform Treasuries in 2021, but there are also more attractively priced sectors that investors may want to consider. Municipal bonds are one particularly attractive alternative to investment grade corporates (we discuss our view on municipal bonds in the next section), but investors are also advised to pick-up additional spread by moving down in quality within the corporate credit space. High-Yield corporate bonds have significantly more scope for tightening than their investment grade counterparts, with the overall junk index spread still 69 bps above its pre-COVID level (Chart 15). Within junk, the Ba credit tier looks like the best place to camp out from a risk/reward perspective. The incremental spread offered by Ba-rated junk bonds compared to Baa-rated corporates is elevated compared to history, 111 bps above its 2019 low (Chart 15, panel 2). In contrast, the additional spread pick-up you get from moving into the lower junk tiers (B & Caa) is more in line with typical historical levels (Chart 15, bottom 2 panels). Chart 15Ba-Rated Bonds Look Best 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Another reason to be cautious about chasing the extra spread in the B-rated and below credit tiers is that the High-Yield index is pricing-in a fairly rapid decline in the default rate for the next 12 months (Chart 16). If we assume a 25% recovery rate and target an excess spread of 150 bps above default losses,4 then we calculate a spread-implied default rate of 3.1%. That is, we should only expect junk bonds to outperform duration-matched Treasuries if the default rate comes in below 3.1% during the next 12 months. This would represent a steep decline of 5.3% from the 8.4% default rate we just witnessed during the past 12 months, but this sort of big drop in the default rate would not be out of line with what typically happens when the economy emerges from recession. For example, in the last recession, the 12-month default rate peaked at 14.6% in November 2009 and then fell to 3.6% by November 2010, a decline of 11%! Chart 16Spread-Implied Default Rate 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income All in all, we view the Ba-rated credit tier as the sweet spot within corporate credit in terms of offering the best combination of risk and reward. We also expect the default rate to fall quickly enough that the lower-rated junk credit tiers will outperform Treasuries, but the risk here is greater and the potential additional compensation is not historically elevated. Investment grade corporate spreads will remain tight, but have limited room to compress further. Investors are advised to look at Ba-rated corporates and municipal bonds instead.  Key View #6: A Maximum Overweight Allocation To Municipal Bonds Tax-exempt municipal bonds offer the best opportunity in the US fixed income space. Investors should adopt a maximum overweight allocation, and in particular, they should shift some allocation out of investment grade corporates and into Munis with the same credit rating and duration, but with a greater after-tax yield. At present, we think that tax-exempt municipal bonds represent the best opportunity in US fixed income. Muni spreads have certainly tightened since March, but valuation remains attractive relative to both Treasuries and investment grade corporates. First, let’s consider value relative to Treasuries (Chart 17). Spreads between Aaa-rated municipal bonds and maturity-matched Treasuries are elevated compared to history across the entire yield curve. 2-year Munis even offer a 3 bps yield pick-up over 2-year Treasuries before adjusting for the tax advantage. Further out the curve, value is worst at the 5-year part of the curve where the breakeven effective tax rate between Munis and Treasuries is 42%, slightly above the top marginal tax rate of 37%. But value improves again for longer maturities. The breakeven effective tax rate between 10-year Munis and Treasuries is 24% and it is a mere 10% for 30-year bonds.5 Next, we can look at relative value between Munis and credit. This is where the attractiveness of munis really stands out (Chart 18). After controlling for credit rating and duration, municipal revenue bonds offer a yield advantage over the Bloomberg Barclays Credit Index across the entire yield curve, before any adjustment is made for the municipal tax exemption. General Obligation (GO) Munis only offer a before-tax yield advantage over credit beyond the 12-year maturity point, but the GO Muni/credit spread is nonetheless historically elevated for all maturity buckets. Chart 17Muni/Treasury Yield Spreads 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart 18Munis Versus Credit 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income This is all well and good, but it could easily be countered that municipal bonds only offer such attractive valuations because the COVID recession has been an historically challenging period for state & local government balance sheets. If this period leads to a spate of downgrades and defaults, then municipal bonds no longer look cheap. All this is true, but we think investors’ worst fears in this regard will not be realized. For one thing, state & local governments have been very quick to clamp down on spending and cut employment (Chart 19). Coming out of the last recession, Muni/Treasury yield spreads had almost fully recovered by the time that state & local government austerity began. Also, state budgets were in pretty good shape heading into the COVID downturn, with all-time high Rainy Day Fund balances (Chart 19, bottom panel). Chart 19State & Local Austerity Has Begun 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income We recommend that investors take advantage of historically attractive municipal bond spreads by adopting a maximum overweight allocation. In particular, investors should shift allocation out of investment grade rated corporate bonds, where valuations are stretched, and into municipal bonds that offer the same credit rating and duration with a greater yield pick-up. Finally, Chart 20 shows the spread between different municipal bond sectors and the Bloomberg Barclays US Credit Index. We match the credit rating and duration in each case, but we make no adjustments for the municipal tax exemption. The message from Chart 20 is that the yield advantage in investment grade Munis is broad based, with the exception of the Electric sector. We also see that attractive valuations do not extend to high-yield Munis, which appear expensive relative to High-Yield Credit. Chart 20Municipal Bond Sector Valuation 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Appendix A:  The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Our Golden Rule of Bond Investing says that we should determine what change in the fed funds rate is priced into the overnight index swap curve for the next 12 months, and then decide whether the Fed will deliver a hawkish or dovish surprise relative to that expectation. We contend that if the Fed delivers a hawkish surprise, then a below-benchmark portfolio duration positioning will pay off. Conversely, if the Fed delivers a dovish surprise, then an above-benchmark portfolio duration positioning will profit. Chart A1 shows how the Golden Rule has performed in every calendar year going back to 1990. We include year-to-date performance for 2020. In 31 years of historical data, our Golden Rule performed well in 23. It provided the wrong recommendation in 8 years, though 3 of those years were during the zero-lower-bound period between 2009 and 2015 when 12-month rate expectations were essentially pinned at zero.6 Chart A1The Golden Rule's Track Record 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income At the beginning of this year, the market was priced for 13 bps of rate cuts in 2020. The funds rate actually fell by 146 bps, leading to a dovish surprise of 133 bps. Based on a historical regression, we would expect a dovish surprise of 133 bps to coincide with a Treasury index yield that falls by 81 bps. In actuality, the index yield fell by 122 bps, more than our Golden Rule predicted. Chart A2 shows how close changes in the Treasury index yield have been to our Golden Rule’s prediction in each of the past 31 years. This regression between the change in Treasury index yield and the monetary policy surprise is the main source of error in our Treasury return forecasts. Chart A2Treasury Index Yield Changes Versus Fed Funds Surprises 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Based on our expected -81 bps index yield change, we would have expected the Treasury index to deliver 6.5% of total return in 2020 and to outperform cash by 5.5%. In actuality, the index earned 7.9% of total return and outperformed cash by 7%. Charts A3 and A4 show how index total and excess returns have performed relative to our Golden Rule’s expectations in each of the past 31 years. Chart A3Treasury Index Total Returns Versus The Golden Rule’s Predictions 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Chart A4Treasury Index Excess Returns Versus The Golden Rule’s Predictions 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Appendix B: Spread Product Performance In 2020 Table B1Spread Product Year-To-Date Performance 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Table B2Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income 2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, “Outlook 2021: A Brave New World”, dated November 30, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 We discussed these facilities in detail in two Special Reports published jointly this year with our US Investment Strategy team. US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020 and US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup Part 2: Shocked And Awed”, dated July 28, 2020. Both reports available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Our research has shown that this is the minimum excess spread investors should require to be confident that junk bonds will outperform duration-matched Treasuries. For more details please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 The breakeven effective tax rate is the effective tax rate that makes the after-tax muni yield the same as the Treasury yield. If the investor’s personal tax rate is above the breakeven effective tax rate, they will get an after-tax yield pick-up from owning the municipal bond over the Treasury. 6 We say the Golden Rule “worked” if a dovish surprise coincided with positive Treasury index excess returns versus cash, or if a hawkish surprise coincided with negative Treasury excess returns versus cash. Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Chart 1Bond Yields & The CRB/Gold Ratio Bond Yields & The CRB/Gold Ratio Bond Yields & The CRB/Gold Ratio In our last report of November, we noted that the rising COVID case count was likely to lead to a challenging few months for the US economy, but we also questioned whether financial markets would pay attention or whether they would stay focused on the vaccine roll-out and eventual economic recovery. We now have our answer. November’s employment report was the worst since April, but the Treasury curve has bear-steepened, credit spreads have come in and TIPS have outperformed nominals. What’s more, the jump in the CRB Raw Industrials / Gold ratio suggests that the 10-year Treasury yield has even more near-term upside (Chart 1). With a vaccine on the horizon and Congress closing in on a fiscal relief package, investors should stay positioned for the reflation trade on a 6-12 month horizon: below-benchmark portfolio duration, nominal and real yield curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners, overweight TIPS versus nominals and overweight corporate bonds rated Ba and higher. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 233 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -74 bps. The strong rally in corporate bonds since March has culminated in extremely tight valuations for investment grade corporates. The 12-month breakeven spread for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index (adjusted to keep the average credit rating constant) has only been tighter 4% of the time since 1995 (Chart 2). The same figure for the Baa-rated credit tier is 5%. We retain a positive outlook on corporate credit despite these stretched valuations. In our view, an environment where the economy is recovering and where the Fed will be very cautious about scaling back accommodation is the exact sort of environment where we should expect a lot of enthusiasm for spread product and, as a result, extremely tight spreads. We will not be surprised if our 12-month breakeven spread percentile rank valuation measure reaches its all-time expensive level within the next couple of months. While the macro environment makes it difficult to turn negative on investment grade corporates, we acknowledge that other sectors may offer better opportunities, particularly in the higher credit tiers. Specifically, we find better value in tax-exempt municipal bonds than in corporates and recommend that investors favor the former over the latter. At the sector level, we continue to recommend overweight allocations to subordinate Bank bonds, Healthcare and Energy bonds. We also advise underweight allocations to Technology and Pharmaceutical bonds. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 382 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -5 bps. After last month’s strong outperformance, Ba-rated junk bonds are now beating duration-equivalent Treasuries by 267 bps, year-to-date. The B and Caa credit tiers are lagging by 179 bps and 548 bps, respectively. We still view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We remain underweight B-rated and lower junk bonds for now as those securities are pricing-in a relatively optimistic outlook for the default rate. But, an imminent vaccine roll-out makes that outlook appear more realistic and we could soon upgrade the lower-rated junk credit tiers when we think the value is exhausted in the Ba-rated and higher securities. Looking at value for the junk index as a whole, we see that the index is pricing-in a default rate of 3% for the next 12 months, significantly below the 8.3% that was observed during the most recent 12-month period (panel 3). However, only four corporate issuers defaulted in October down from a monthly peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, are also falling rapidly (bottom panel). At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology and Energy bonds. We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview MBS: Underweight Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by one basis point in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -39 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 1 bp on the month, and it currently sits at 64 bps (Chart 4). This is significantly higher than the 59 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 53 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 25 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the relatively attractive OAS, we continue to view the elevated primary mortgage spread as a risk for MBS investors. It suggests that mortgage rates need not rise alongside Treasury yields in the near-term, meaning that mortgage refinancings can continue at their current rapid pace (panel 3). All else equal, this elevated refinancing activity will pressure MBS spreads wider. The recent spike in the mortgage delinquency rate does not pose a near-term risk to spreads as it is being driven by households that have been granted forbearance from the federal government (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders only comes into play if many households are unable to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period expires early next year. But even in that case, further government intervention to either support household incomes or extend the forbearance period would mitigate the risk. Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 64 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -222 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 157 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -269 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 46 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -647 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 139 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -228 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 10 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 9 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +2 bps. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, this year’s dollar weakness has occurred mostly relative to other Developed Market currencies (Chart 5). Value has improved somewhat for EM Sovereigns during the past few weeks, but the index continues to offer less spread than the Baa-rated US Credit index (panel 4). At the country level, Turkey, Colombia, Mexico, Russia and South Africa are the only countries that offer a spread pick-up relative to duration and quality-matched US corporates. Of those, only Mexico looks attractive on a risk/reward basis. Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 130 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -340 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads tightened sharply relative to both Treasuries and Corporates in November, but they remain exceptionally attractive relative to history (Chart 6). In fact, as we showed in a recent report, the Bloomberg Barclays Revenue Bond index offers a greater yield than the quality-matched Credit index across the entire maturity spectrum (before adjusting for the tax advantage).1 This is also true for the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation (GO) index beyond the 12-year maturity point. Eight-to-twelve-year maturity GO bonds trade only 1 basis point through the Credit index, implying a breakeven effective tax rate of 4%. Six-to-eight-year maturities trade 11 bps through the Credit index, implying a breakeven effective tax rate of 16%. Extraordinary valuation is the main reason for our recommendation to overweight municipal bonds. The severe ongoing state & local government credit crunch is a concern, but it is a risk we are willing to take. It now looks possible that a relief package containing some federal funds for state & local governments will be passed before the end of the year. This would alleviate a lot of the concern. But even in the absence of federal assistance, the combination of austerity measures (bottom panel) and all-time high State Rainy Day Fund balances should help stave off a wave of municipal downgrades. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell The Treasury curve bull-flattened in November, but then bear-steepened sharply during the first week of December. All told, the 2/10 Treasury slope is currently 81 bps, 7 bps steeper than at the end of October. The 5/30 Treasury slope is 131 bps, 4 bps steeper than at the end of October. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. A timely vaccine roll-out and/or further fiscal stimulus will speed this process up. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year note and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening.     Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar levels. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 70 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 8 bps and 5 bps on the month. They currently sit at 1.91% and 1.96%, respectively. Core CPI was flat in October and the year-over-year rate dropped from 1.73% to 1.63%. The 12-month trimmed mean CPI fell even more – from 2.37% to 2.22% – so the gap between core and trimmed mean inflation continued to narrow (Chart 8). We expect further narrowing in the months ahead, and therefore expect core CPI to come in relatively hot. For this reason, we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is now somewhat expensive according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).2 Inflation pressures may moderate once core and trimmed mean inflation measures converge, and this could give us an opportunity to tactically reduce TIPS exposure sometime next year. We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview ABS: Overweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +82 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +68 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 17 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +174 bps (Chart 9). On paper, the Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of the year is quite negative for ABS. However, as we explained in a recent report, we don’t expect a material impact on spreads.3 For one thing, Aaa ABS spreads are already well below the borrowing cost offered by TALF. But more importantly, consumer credit quality remains quite robust. As we first explained back in June, the stimulus received from the CARES act led to a significant increase in disposable income and a jump in the savings rate (panel 4).4  Faced with an income boost and few spending opportunities, many households took the opportunity to pay down consumer debt. Granted, further income support from Congress is needed now that the CARES act’s enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. But given the substantial boost to savings that has already occurred, we are confident that more stimulus will arrive in time to prevent a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -168 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 71 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -2 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 127 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -620 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the imminent expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus will not be negatively impacted.5  Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +55 bps. The average index spread tightened 6 bps on the month. It currently sits at 53 bps, above typical historical levels (bottom panel). At its September meeting, the Fed decided to slow its pace of Agency CMBS purchases. It is no longer looking to increase its Agency CMBS holdings, but rather, it is only purchasing what is “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. This is nonetheless a Fed back-stop of the market, and it does not change our overweight recommendation.    Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations  The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 70 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 70 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Stay Positioned For Reflation Stay Positioned For Reflation Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Political Risk Will Dominate In A Pivotal Month For The Bond Market”, dated October 13, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights US Corporates: The decision by the US Treasury to let the Fed’s emergency lending programs expire does not sound the death knell for the bull market in US corporate debt. Credit markets are functioning normally and US economic growth remains resilient, even amid a surge in COVID-19 cases, with politically unpopular European-style lockdowns unlikely. Global Corporate Strategy: Remain moderately overweight developed market corporate debt, favoring the US over the euro area. Look to increase allocations to lower-rated US high-yield credit on any near-term spread widening, as there is more room for junk spread compression over the next 6-12 months as defaults peak. Feature When looking at the 2020 year-to-date total returns from global corporate credit, the performance at first blush has not been terrible. The Bloomberg Barclays Global Investment Grade Corporate index has returned 8.2% since the start of the year, while the benchmark global high-yield index has returned 3.6%. While the bulk of those returns have come from duration exposure as global bond yields have fallen sharply, a passive allocation to corporate bonds on January 1 has been a money-making investment in 2020. Chart of the WeekUS Credit Markets Need Less Policymaker Support US Credit Markets Need Less Policymaker Support US Credit Markets Need Less Policymaker Support Of course, a lot has happened since the beginning of the year. A global pandemic, a historically severe global recession, a massive selloff of risk assets in February and March and an equally robust recovery of equity and credit markets on the back of huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It should come as no surprise that the 2020 peak in US corporate bond spreads occurred on March 23 – the day that the Fed and US Treasury introduced asset purchase vehicles designed to support stricken US credit markets. This is why the announcement last week that outgoing US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin has decided to let those emergency lending facilities expire on December 31, with the Fed returning the US Treasury’s capital invested in those programs, is potentially of major significance for credit investors. It is reasonable to think that credit markets could suffer without the Fed’s involvement. The growth and market liquidity backdrop, however, has improved substantially over the past several months. US corporate bonds can live, and likely thrive, without the Fed backstop. The US economy remains surprisingly resilient, with the November flash estimate for the Markit composite PMI index reaching the highest level since 2015. This occurred even in the midst of a huge surge of global COVID-19 cases that has weighed heavily on European economies (Chart of the Week). Add to that signs that corporate bond markets are functioning smoothly - investors are willing to commit capital to credit markets, and borrowers are having no problem placing large volumes of debt at low yields and spreads – and it is easy to conclude that Fed’s explicit support is no longer required. The growth and market liquidity backdrop, however, has improved substantially over the past several months. US corporate bonds can live, and likely thrive, without the Fed backstop. From the point of view of corporate bond investment strategy, we continue to recommend a moderate overweight stance on global corporate debt versus government bonds over the next 6-12 months, favoring US investment grade and high-yield over European equivalents, even with the Fed pulling away its bid. Steve Mnuchin May Have A Good Point Even though Fed Chair Jerome Powell publicly disagreed with Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s decision, the Fed will shut down the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility, the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility, the Municipal Liquidity Facility and the Main Street Lending Program on December 31. Those facilities are part of the US government support programs under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act. The US Treasury seeded the facilities with $195 billion in capital, which the Fed levered up to create as much as $2 trillion in buying power (Table 1). Yet the actual usage of that spending capacity has been quite low, with only $13.3 billion spent in the Fed’s secondary market facility. Not a single dollar was spent in the primary market facility, as companies had no problems issuing debt directly to markets rather than selling new bonds to the Fed. Table 1US CARES Act Programs: Little-Used, But Highly Successful US Corporate Credit Can Walk Without Crutches US Corporate Credit Can Walk Without Crutches According to data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the pace of monthly US corporate bond issuance and daily trading volumes are now following the typical seasonal pattern seen over the past two years (Chart 2). This occurred after a surge of issuance activity in Q2 as issuers took advantage of the vastly improved trading conditions in corporate bond markets after the initiation of the Fed’s liquidity backstop. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin noted these trends in his letter to Fed Chair Powell that was essentially an order to shut down the Fed’s emergency lending facilities.1 Chart 2US Credit Markets Are Functioning Normally US Credit Markets Are Functioning Normally US Credit Markets Are Functioning Normally Chart 3No Stomach For Nation-Wide Lockdowns In The US No Stomach For Nation-Wide Lockdowns In The US No Stomach For Nation-Wide Lockdowns In The US US credit markets are not only functioning well, so is the US economy. The Markit US services PMI rose in November to 57.7 (from 56.9 in October), while the same index fell to 41.3 (from 46.9) in the euro area and 45.8 (from 51.4) in the UK (Chart 3). As services industries like dining, travel and retail spending are most directly impacted by lockdowns related to COVID-19, it should not be a surprise that the data underperformed massively in Europe, where severe economic restrictions have been imposed to slow the spread of the virus. This compares to the US where the restrictions have been far more modest and varying across cities and regions. The pace of monthly US corporate bond issuance and daily trading volumes are now following the typical seasonal pattern seen over the past two years. Some slowing of US domestic economic activity should be expected over the next month or two, with more parts of the country putting greater restrictions on activities like indoor dining and in-person schooling. However, the political will to impose the sort of harsh nation-wide “shelter at home” type lockdowns currently in place in Europe is simply not there in the US after the shock of the Q2 lockdown-induced economic slump. US growth should thus continue to outperform – to the benefit of US corporate bond market performance relative to US Treasuries and European corporate equivalents. US corporate bond yields, both for investment grade and high-yield credit, have already declined massively in 2020, as have yields for European credit and even emerging market bonds (Chart 4). Given our view that US Treasury yields have bottomed and will likely drift higher over the next 6-12 months, it will be difficult to see further declines in corporate bond yields that are already near record lows. Chart 4Corporate Yields Falling To New Lows Corporate Yields Falling To New Lows Corporate Yields Falling To New Lows Chart 5Corporate Spreads Approaching 2020 Lows Corporate Spreads Approaching 2020 Lows Corporate Spreads Approaching 2020 Lows Corporate bond spreads, on the other hand, do have room to compress even just to levels seen before the February/March credit market rout – especially for US high-yield. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the Bloomberg Barclays US investment grade index is now 17bps away from the 2020 low, while the OAS for the euro area and UK are 7bps and 8bps away, respectively. For high-yield, the US index OAS is 107bps above the 2020 low, compared to 95bps for euro area high-yield and 81bps for UK high-yield (Chart 5). The near-term economic case for favoring US corporates over European corporates is a strong one, given the slightly larger spread cushions for US credit and the absence of large-scale US lockdowns.  Given the severity of the lockdown-induced economic slump in the euro area and UK, which is likely to linger over the holiday season and into the early part of 2021, the near-term economic case for favoring US corporates over European corporates is a strong one, given the slightly larger spread cushions for US credit and the absence of large-scale US lockdowns. Bottom Line: The decision by the US Treasury to let the Fed’s emergency lending programs expire does not sound the death knell for the bull market in US corporate debt. Credit markets are functioning normally and US economic growth remains resilient, even amid a surge in COVID-19 cases, with politically unpopular European-style lockdowns unlikely. A Quick Look At Corporate Bond Spread Valuations In The US & Europe The tremendous rally in global corporate bond markets since late March has pushed credit spreads down to levels that raise concerns about valuations. Thus, it is now a good time to revisit some of our favorite spread valuation metrics. One simple way to evaluate the attractiveness of the level of spreads, and how much further they could fall, is to compare them to standard macro volatility gauges like the US VIX index. Credit spreads and equity volatility are highly correlated, as both are measures of investor uncertainty that rise during risk-off episodes and vice versa. The ratio of corporate credit spreads to equity volatility, therefore, can signal if spreads appear stretched relative to the broader risk backdrop. Chart 6US Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol US Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol US Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol Chart 7Euro Area Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol Euro Area Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol Euro Area Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol We show the ratio of the US investment grade and high-yield index OAS to the VIX index in Chart 6. For both higher-quality and lower-rated corporate credit, the spread-to-VIX ratio is now close to the lowest level seen since 2000 – both around 1.7 standard deviations below the long-run mean – suggesting that spreads are tight relative to overall macro volatility We show similar ratios for euro area corporates versus the VStoxx European equity volatility index in Chart 7, and UK corporates versus the IVI UK equity volatility index in Chart 8. The conclusions are similar to US credit, with spread-to-volatility ratios for both investment grade and high-yield now at low levels, one standard deviation below the mean since 2000. Chart 8UK Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol UK Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol UK Corporate Spreads Look Tight Vs Equity Vol Chart 9Notable Duration Differences Between Corporates Notable Duration Differences Between Corporates Notable Duration Differences Between Corporates It is difficult to draw any relative conclusions about credit valuations between the regions from the spread/volatility ratios, as they all point to spreads looking tight. Thus, we need to look at other valuation tools. Our more preferred metric to assess credit spreads is to look at the percentile rankings of 12-month breakeven spreads. The 12-month breakeven spread is the amount of credit spread widening that must occur for a credit product to have a return equal to a duration-matched, risk-free government bond over a one-year horizon. We look at the historical percentile ranking of the 12-month breakeven spreads to determine how current levels compare with the past. It is difficult to draw any relative conclusions about credit valuations between the regions from the spread/volatility ratios, as they all point to spreads looking tight.  To calculate the 12-month breakeven spreads for corporate bonds, we take the ratio of the index OAS to the index duration for the specific bond market in question. This allows a comparison of breakeven spreads across different markets with varying risks, with duration being a main source of price risk (Chart 9). The 12-month breakeven spreads for the investment grade and high-yield corporate debt for the US, euro area and UK are shown in Charts 10, 11 and 12, respectively. For the US, the breakeven spread for investment grade corporates is currently in the bottom decile of its history, suggesting that the spread does not look particularly attractive on a risk-adjusted basis. Chart 10US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 11Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 12UK Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings UK Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings UK Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Euro area and UK investment grade breakeven spread percentile rankings are a bit higher than in the US, right on the cusp of the bottom quartile for both. Although for euro area corporates, the breakeven spread is boosted by the much lower duration of the euro area investment grade index and does not necessarily suggest that spreads there are currently more attractive than in the US and UK. Turning to junk bonds, the US high-yield 12-month breakeven spread is currently in the 67th percentile of its own history, suggesting that spreads are relatively attractive. The UK high-yield breakeven spread is also above average, with the latest reading in the 55th percentile. Euro area high-yield is the least attractive, with the latest 12-month breakeven spread in the 33rd percentile of its own history. Taking the 12-month breakeven spread as a measure of value (and, hence, a gauge of prospective future returns), we can compare it to a measure of spread volatility to evaluate the risk/return tradeoff for various credit markets. To measure spread risk, our preferred metric is duration times spread (DTS). We show a scatter chart of the latest 12-month breakeven percentile ranking for the overall US, UK and euro area corporate bond markets – for investment grade and high-yield, and including all the major credit rating tiers – in Chart 13. The most attractive trade-off of valuation versus spread risk is currently in the lower rated US junk bond tiers (B-rated and Caa-rated). Chart 13Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) US Corporate Credit Can Walk Without Crutches US Corporate Credit Can Walk Without Crutches Chart 14A Lingering Positive Impact On Credit Markets From Global QE A Lingering Positive Impact On Credit Markets From Global QE A Lingering Positive Impact On Credit Markets From Global QE What stands out in the chart is that the most attractive trade-off of valuation versus spread risk is currently in the lower rated US junk bond tiers (B-rated and Caa-rated). At the other end of the spectrum, US investment grade offers one of the least attractive risk/reward tradeoffs. This suggests a potential attractive opportunity to move down in quality within US corporate debt, particularly with ultra-accommodative global monetary policies providing a lingering tailwind for global corporate bond performance over the next 6-12 months (Chart 14). We prefer scaling into that trade on any bouts of US high-yield weakness, however. There are still near-term risks associated with the rapid spread of COVID-19 in the US and the lack of momentum on US fiscal stimulus negotiations during the transition period to the new Biden administration. Turning across the Atlantic, euro area high-yield looks far less attractive than US high-yield on a risk/reward basis. This fits with our current recommendation to underweight euro area junk bonds versus US equivalents (see our strategic recommendation tables on page 14). We also continue to recommend an overweight stance on UK investment grade corporates, which still offer a slightly more attractive risk/return tradeoff versus US equivalents. Bottom Line: Remain moderately overweight developed market corporate debt, favoring the US over the euro area. Look to increase allocations to lower-rated US high-yield credit on any near-term spread widening, as there is more room for junk spread compression over the next 6-12 months as defaults peak.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Mnuchin’s letter to Powell can be found here: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/letter11192020.pd Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index US Corporate Credit Can Walk Without Crutches US Corporate Credit Can Walk Without Crutches Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Please note that there will be no US Bond Strategy report next week. We will publish December’s Portfolio Allocation Summary on December 8th, followed by our Key Views For 2021 on December 15th and a Special Report titled “The Fed In 2021” on December 22nd. Highlights Duration: Weaker Q4 economic growth could cause Treasury yields to fall in the near-term, but knowledge of a vaccine coming in 2021 will limit the downside. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month horizon. Fed: The Treasury’s decision to let the Fed’s emergency lending facilities expire is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on credit spreads, and it may even increase the odds of getting another fiscal stimulus bill through Congress. Spread Product: Value is quickly disappearing from high-rated corporate bonds, and municipal bonds look like an attractive alternative. Stay overweight municipal bonds and corporate bonds rated Ba and higher. Avoid junk bonds rated B and lower. Feature Increasingly, financial markets look caught in a tug-of-war between two competing economic outlooks. On the one hand, the US sits on the precipice of what is likely to be a dark winter. COVID hospitalizations are breaking through prior peaks and deaths are following closely behind (Chart 1). On the other hand, excellent results from vaccine trials offer a ray of light in the not-too-distant future. Focusing on the next 1-to-2 months, economic activity is poised to slow. This is partly because many states will respond to the surging case count by enacting stricter lock-down measures (Chart 2). In fact, New York shuttered schools just last week. But even in the absence of stricter quarantine laws, consumers will certainly exercise greater caution this holiday season. Already, consumer sentiment looks to be waning at a time when more than 700 thousand people are filing new unemployment claims each week (Chart 2, bottom 2 panels). Chart 1A Dark Winter A Dark Winter A Dark Winter Chart 2Look For Slower Growth In Q4 Look For Slower Growth In Q4 Look For Slower Growth In Q4 With consumer sentiment souring at a time when the household income support from the CARES act has expired, it is only a matter of time before consumer spending dips. Added to that, last week’s decision by the Treasury Department to call in the funds used to back-stop the Fed’s emergency lending facilities demonstrates that Donald Trump’s administration will be increasingly erratic during the next two months.1 Chart 3Treasury & Corporate Excess Returns Treasury & Corporate Excess Returns Treasury & Corporate Excess Returns Heightened political uncertainty during a period of slowing economic growth should point to lower bond yields and wider credit spreads in the near term. But, at least so far, the market reaction has been muted (Chart 3). Treasuries have strengthened somewhat during the past week. Treasury returns in excess of cash are running at +735 bps, year-to-date. This is up from +617 bps on November 10th. However, year-to-date investment grade corporate returns in excess of duration-matched Treasuries just hit -121 bps, the highest since February. Year-to-date High-Yield excess returns have dipped to -72 bps, after peaking at -39 bps on November 9th. It’s possible that investors need more evidence of weakening economic growth before the market impact is really felt. Or, it could simply be that forward-looking markets are much more focused on news about the COVID vaccine, and that investors are willing to tolerate a couple months of poor growth if they are confident that better times lie ahead. It’s also conceivable that financial markets would look through a spate of poor economic data if investors believed that more fiscal stimulus is on the way. Given the protracted nature of fiscal negotiations so far, it’s fair to be skeptical that a deal can be struck. But with the election now over, the House Democrats and Senate Republicans may have a greater incentive to compromise on a small relief bill, on the order of $1 trillion or less. According to surveys, a compromise deal would curry favor with voters of all political stripes. Most Republicans, Democrats and Independents support further fiscal aid (Table 1). What’s more, having a timeline for vaccine distribution could make negotiations less contentious, since any stimulus can be sold as the final COVID relief bill before a vaccine is available. Finally, it’s possible that Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin’s gambit will pay off, and that policymakers will view the funds being returned by the Fed as “free money” that should be re-deployed in the form of fiscal support. All in all, we are optimistic that a moderately-sized relief bill will be passed, if not this year then early next year. Table 1The Public Supports Another Round Of Stimulus Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Investment Implications Chart 4Better Value In Munis Than IG Corporates Better Value In Munis Than IG Corporates Better Value In Munis Than IG Corporates With regards to our outlook for Treasury yields, we could see yields dip during the next month or two as the economic data weaken. However, we expect the knowledge that a vaccine is on the horizon will prevent yields from falling that much. We also could see progress made on a fiscal stimulus package, which would offset any downward pressure on yields. With that in mind, we advise investors to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month horizon. On spread product, our investment conclusion is similarly colored by the tug of war between a negative near-term economic outlook and the positive news of a COVID vaccine. We recommend maintaining our current positioning: overweight investment grade corporates and Ba-rated junk, underweight junk bonds rated B and lower. If we do get some spread widening during the next month or two, driven by negative economic news or the expiry of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities, we would view that as an opportunity to get more aggressive by upgrading the lower-rated junk credit tiers. One caveat to our positive view on corporate credit is that value has deteriorated markedly in recent months, particularly for higher-rated investment grade corporates (Chart 4). At the same time, tax-exempt municipal bonds offer an exceptional spread pick-up relative to both Treasuries and equivalently-rated corporate bonds (Chart 4, bottom panel). We recommend that investors favor municipal bonds over corporate credit, particularly at the upper-end of the credit spectrum. The value in high-rated investment grade corporates has deteriorated markedly. Bottom Line: Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month horizon. Stay overweight investment grade corporates and Ba-rated junk, while avoiding high-yield bonds rated B and below. Stand ready to upgrade low-rated junk bonds if spreads widen significantly during the next two months. Favor municipal bonds over equivalently-rated corporate credit, particularly at the upper-end of the credit spectrum. Treasury – Fed Disaccord As mentioned above, last week’s big news was that Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin sent a letter to the Federal Reserve saying that he would (a) not authorize an extension of some of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities beyond December 31st and (b) would like the Fed to return the unused funds that the Treasury Department had allocated to serve as the equity back-stop for those facilities. Though the Fed issued a statement saying that it would prefer to extend the facilities, Chair Powell eventually acceded to both requests. This means that the Secondary and Primary Market Corporate Credit Facilities (SMCCF & PMCCF), the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF), the Main Street Lending Facilities (MSLF) and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) will all cease operations at the end of the year.2 Gone For Good? Given the Fed’s stated desire for the facilities to continue and the fact that a new Treasury Secretary – presumably one that will show greater deference to the Fed – will take over in January. It’s conceivable that the facilities could be quickly re-started. If the Treasury had simply not authorized an extension of the facilities without taking its money back, this would be as simple as flicking a switch. The fact that the Fed will return the money makes the process slightly more complicated, but by no means impossible. The facilities in question are all structured as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to which the Treasury Department supplies some amount of equity financing. The Fed then loans money to the SPVs, levering them up dramatically in the process. Crucially, there is no statutory limit on the amount of leverage the Fed can provide to the SPVs. This means that the Fed could ramp them back up, even if it gets only a small injection of capital from the Treasury. A new Treasury Department could easily find enough money in the Exchange Stabilization Fund for the Fed to re-start the facilities in January, without seeking Congressional approval. While the Fed and Treasury will be able to re-start the facilities in January, we aren’t sure they will feel the need to do so. While the Fed and Treasury will be able to re-start the facilities in January, we aren’t sure they will feel the need to do so. In our view, Secretary Mnuchin has a point when he writes that markets are functioning well enough on their own. Simply look at how little the emergency facilities have been used (Table 2). The Fed has purchased only $13 billion of corporate bonds in the SMCCF. TALF has only been tapped for $3.75 billion and both the MSLF and MLF are operating at less than 1% of their maximum capacities. The PMCCF, which the Fed can use to purchase new issuance in the corporate bond market, has never been accessed! Table 2Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Even the SMCCF, the facility through which the Fed buys corporate bonds and corporate bond ETFs in the secondary market, has significantly scaled back its purchases during the past few months. It also hasn’t purchased an ETF since August (Chart 5). Chart 5The Fed Is Not Very Active In The Corporate Bond Market Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? At a certain point, if the facilities aren’t being used, it is entirely reasonable to ask whether they are still necessary. They would no doubt prove useful if we hit another crisis – like in March – where spreads widen sharply and primary markets shut down. But that seems like a relatively low-risk tail event at this stage of the recovery. Finally, Secretary Mnuchin made the case in his letter that the returned funds from the Fed could be re-deployed as fiscal stimulus by Congress. This argument doesn’t make a lot of sense economically. When it scored the CARES act, the Congressional Budget Office assumed that the Treasury would take no losses on the money used to finance the Fed’s emergency lending facilities, so clawing those funds back has no impact on the deficit. But this may not matter. What matters is whether Senate Republicans can use the Treasury’s maneuver as political cover to justify voting for more fiscal relief. We think they might be able to do so, and we therefore see the Treasury’s move as increasing the odds of getting another fiscal relief bill through Congress. Investment Implications Chart 6MLF And TALF Aren't Pushing Yields Lower MLF And TALF Aren't Pushing Yields Lower MLF And TALF Aren't Pushing Yields Lower This development does not immediately influence our recommended investment strategy. On corporate bonds, we can’t definitively rule out the possibility that the expiry of the facilities will cause spreads to widen in the near-term. But if that does occur, we will view it as an opportunity to quickly increase exposure. For municipal bonds, the MLF allows municipal governments to place new debt with the Fed at a rate that varies depending on the municipality’s credit rating. At present, that MLF rate is well above municipal bond yields for all credit ratings (Chart 6), meaning that it would only become important in the event of a crisis that caused municipal yields to rise sharply. Similarly, TALF allows participants to take out loans from the Fed using Aaa-rated securitizations as collateral. But the current yields on Aaa-rated consumer ABS and Aaa-rated non-agency CMBS are 91 bps and 33 bps below this rate, respectively (Chart 6, bottom panel). In other words, spreads would need to widen fairly sharply for TALF to be relevant for investors. The expiry of TALF is more concerning for CMBS than consumer ABS. Commercial real estate is structurally challenged by the current crisis, while consumer balance sheets are in good shape. We recommend overweighting consumer ABS across the entire credit spectrum but would limit non-agency CMBS exposure to the Aaa credit tier. Appendix: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care? Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The second section of this report (titled “Treasury – Fed Disaccord”) examines the specific market implications of the Treasury Department’s decision to not authorize an extension of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities. 2  For details on how these facilities are structured and what they are designed to do please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020 and US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup Part 2: Shocked And Awed”, dated July 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights US Election & COVID-19: Joe Biden’s apparent victory in the US presidential race, as well as the announcement of a potential successful COVID-19 vaccine trial, are both bond-bearish outcomes. This is especially so for US Treasuries given the more resilient growth momentum in the US. Fixed Income Strategy: The big news announcements do not motivate us to change our fixed income investment recommendations. Stay below-benchmark on overall duration, and underweight the US in global bond portfolios. Stay overweight global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt, particularly in the US and Italy. Maintain an overweight stance on global spread product, focused on US corporates (investment grade and Ba-rated high-yield) and emerging market US dollar denominated corporates. Feature Chart of the WeekUS Yields Leading The Way Higher US Yields Leading The Way Higher US Yields Leading The Way Higher Investors have digested two major pieces of news over the past few days – the projected election of Joe Biden as the 46th US President and the positive results of Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine trial. Both outcomes are bond-bearish, but the bigger response came after the news of a potential vaccine, with the 10-year US Treasury yield hitting an 8-month high of 0.96% yesterday. Yields in other countries rose by a lesser amount, continuing the recent trend of US Treasury underperformance (Chart of the Week). After the US election result, however, we remain comfortable with our recommended below-benchmark overall duration stance and underweight allocation to US Treasuries in global bond portfolios.  The introduction of a successful vaccine would obviously be a game-changer for all financial markets, not just fixed income, as it would allow investors to see an end to the pandemic and a return to more normal economic activity. While we are heartened by the vaccine trial announcement, there are still many hurdles that need to be cleared before any vaccine is approved and distributed around the world. It is still too soon to adjust our bond investment strategy in anticipation of a post-COVID world. After the US election result, however, we remain comfortable with our recommended below-benchmark overall duration stance and underweight allocation to US Treasuries in global bond portfolios. While a Biden victory combined with the Republicans likely keeping control of the US Senate was the least bond-bearish outcome - thus avoiding the big surge in government spending likely after a Democratic “blue wave” - there is clear upward momentum in US economic growth that suggests more upside for Treasury yields on both an absolute basis and relative to other countries. Cross-Country Divergences Are Starting To Appear Our recent decision to cut our recommended overall global duration stance to below-benchmark was motivated by our more bearish view on US Treasuries. However, a more defensive duration posture was justified by the rapid rebound in global growth seen since the depths of the COVID-19 recession. Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of leading economic data, has been calling for a bottom in global bond yields toward the end of 2020 (Chart 2). The rise in global yields we are witnessing now appears to be right on cue. There are now more relative growth, inflation and policy divergences opening up that will allow country allocation to become a bigger source of outperformance for fixed income investors. Chart 2Global Yields Are Bottoming Global Yields Are Bottoming Global Yields Are Bottoming Importantly, inflation expectations across the developed world have yet not risen by enough to force central banks to become less dovish. This suggests that global yield curves will have a steepening bias over at least the next six months, with longer-term yields rising more on the back of faster growth (and additional increases in inflation expectations) than shorter-maturity yields which are more sensitive to monetary policy shifts. Those trends will not be seen equally across all countries, though. There are now more relative growth, inflation and policy divergences opening up that will allow country allocation to become a bigger source of outperformance for fixed income investors. For example, the October US manufacturing ISM and Payrolls data released last week showed robust strength, even in a month where new US COVID-19 cases rose sharply. Europe, on the other hand, has seen an even bigger surge in new cases, resulting in a wave of national lockdowns that has already begun to weigh on domestic economic activity. Thus, core European bond yields have remained stable, even with the euro area manufacturing PMI remaining elevated (Chart 3). We see similar divergences in other developed economies, with generally strong manufacturing PMIs and mixed responses from bond yields. When looking at the breakdown of nominal bond yields into the real yield and inflation expectations components, even more divergences are evident (Chart 4).1 Chart 3Mixed Responses To Rebounding Growth Mixed Responses To Rebounding Growth Mixed Responses To Rebounding Growth Chart 4Real Yield Trends Are Starting To Diverge Real Yield Trends Are Starting To Diverge Real Yield Trends Are Starting To Diverge Chart 5Discounting An Extended Period Of Negative Real Rates Discounting An Extended Period Of Negative Real Rates Discounting An Extended Period Of Negative Real Rates The real yields on benchmark 10-year inflation-linked bonds are slowly rising in the US and Canada, but remain stable in Germany, the UK and Australia. Market expectations for central bank policy rates, extracted from overnight index swap (OIS) curves, are currently priced for an extended period of low policy rates over the next few years. This is no surprise, as central banks have told the markets this would be the case via dovish forward guidance. Yet central banks are also projecting inflation rates to move higher between 2021 and 2023, even as they are signaling unchanged interest rates over that same period (Chart 5). Central banks are effectively telling markets that they want an extended period of negative real policy rates - a major reason why real bond yields are negative across the developed world. At some point, however, markets will begin to challenge the need for deeply negative real policy rates as economies recover from the COVID-19 shock to growth. Unemployment in the US and Canada has already declined sharply since spiking during the first wave of COVID-19 lockdowns. In the US, the unemployment rate has fallen from a peak of 14.7% to 6.9%; in Canada, the decline has been from 13.7% to 8.9% (Chart 6). This contrasts sharply to trends in Europe and Australia, where unemployment rates remain elevated. Chart 6Diverging Trends In Unemployment A Vaccine For Uncertainty A Vaccine For Uncertainty At some point, however, markets will begin to challenge the need for deeply negative real policy rates as economies recover from the COVID-19 shock to growth. With the Fed and Bank of Canada (BoC) projecting additional declines in unemployment over the next few years, markets are starting to discount a less dovish stance from both central banks. The US and Canadian OIS curves are now discounting one full 25bp policy rate hike by Aug 2023 and May 2023, respectively. This is a bit sooner than signaled by the forward guidance of the Fed and BoC. Thus, markets are now pricing in a less negative path for real policy rates – and, by association, real bond yields. Chart 7Markets Still Discounting Low Yields For Longer A Vaccine For Uncertainty A Vaccine For Uncertainty This contrasts to the euro area, Australia and the UK, where unemployment rates remain elevated. The recent surge in coronavirus cases across Europe means that the ECB and Bank of England will be under no pressure by markets to reconsider their current easy money policies. While in Australia, persistently weak inflation and, more recently, worries about an appreciating Australian dollar are keeping expectations for Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) policy ultra-dovish. Given the likely hit to longer-term potential growth from the COVID-19 pandemic, coming at a time of elevated debt levels (both government and private), markets are justified in pricing in a structurally lower level of policy rates for longer (Chart 7). Yet even in such a world, there will be cyclical upswings in growth and inflation that will upward pressure on bond yields. At the moment, those pressures seem greatest in the developed world in the US and Canada. This suggests that global bond investors should underweight both the US and Canada. However, the Fed seems more willing to accept a period of rising bond yields than the BoC, which has been very aggressive in the expansion of its quantitative easing (QE) program, which leaves us to only consider the US as a recommended underweight. Bottom Line: Joe Biden’s apparent victory in the US presidential race, as well as the announcement of a potential successful COVID-19 vaccine trial, are both bond-bearish outcomes. This is especially so for US Treasuries given the more resilient growth momentum in the US. Recommended Fixed Income Strategy After A Busy Few Days Joe Biden’s election victory and the potential COVID-19 vaccine do not lead us to make any changes to our main fixed income investment recommendations, which generally have a pro-growth, pro-risk bias that would benefit from the reduction in US political uncertainty and, potentially, the beginning of the end of the pandemic. On duration, we continue to recommend a moderate below-benchmark overall exposure. Our main fixed income investment recommendations, which generally have a pro-growth, pro-risk bias that would benefit from the reduction in US political uncertainty and, potentially, the beginning of the end of the pandemic. On country allocation, we remain underweight the US, neutral Canada and Australia, and overweight the UK, core Europe, Italy, Spain and Japan. The country allocations are determined by each country’s sensitivity to changes in US Treasury yields, particularly during periods of rising yields. We are overweight the countries with a lower “yield beta” to changes in US yields. We view Italy and Spain as credit instruments, supported by large-scale ECB purchases and more fiscal cooperation within Europe. We are not recommending underweights to higher-beta Canada and Australia, however, with both the BoC and RBA being very aggressive with bond purchases (Chart 8). On credit, the backdrop remains very conducive to spread product outperformance versus government bonds, particularly with the monetary policy backdrop remaining highly accommodative (Chart 9). Chart 8Global QE Has Been Aggressive Global QE Has Been Aggressive Global QE Has Been Aggressive We expect some additional spread tightening for developed market corporate debt as well also emerging market US dollar denominated corporates. In terms of regions and credit tiers, we prefer US investment grade and Ba-rated high-yield to euro area credit. Chart 9Central Bank Liquidity Still Supportive For Global Credit Central Bank Liquidity Still Supportive For Global Credit Central Bank Liquidity Still Supportive For Global Credit Chart 10More Global QE Is Good For Inflation-Linked Bonds More Global QE Is Good For Inflation-Linked Bonds More Global QE Is Good For Inflation-Linked Bonds Finally, we continue to recommend overweight allocations to inflation-linked bods versus nominal government debt in the US, Italy and Canada. Central banks will continue to err on the side of maintaining stimulative monetary policy settings to keep financial conditions easy to support economic growth. That means no hawkish surprises on the interest rate front, while also continuing to buy bonds via quantitative easing (Chart 10) – reflationary policies that should help boost inflation expectations.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We have deliberately left Japan out of this analysis, as the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy has effectively short-circuited the link between Japanese economic growth, inflation and bond yields. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index A Vaccine For Uncertainty A Vaccine For Uncertainty Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns