Corporate Bonds

Highlights Uncertainty & Yields: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation. Bond Portfolio Strategy: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Governments: Upgrade countries that are more responsive to changes in the level of overall global bond yields and with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading sovereign debt with a lower “global yield beta” and less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Credit: Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekOn The Verge Of Global ZIRP On The Verge Of Global ZIRP On The Verge Of Global ZIRP The title of this report is a quote from a worried BCA client this morning, discussing his daily commute into Manhattan from the New York suburbs. We can think of no better analogy for the mood of investors in the current market panic. After having enjoyed a decade of riding the gravy train of recession-free growth and robust returns on risk assets, all underwritten by accommodative monetary policies, worries about a deflationary bust following the boom have intensified. The global spread of COVID-19, the ebbs and flows of the US presidential election and, now, a stunning collapse in oil prices – markets have simply been unable to process the investment implications of these unpredictable events all at once. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. It is clear that global government bonds have been a preferred hedge, with yields collapsing to record lows worldwide. While most of the market attention has been on the breathtaking fall in US yields that has pushed the entire Treasury curve below 1% as the market has moved to discount a swift move to a 0% fed funds rate. New lows were also hit yesterday in countries that had been lagging the Treasury rally: the 10-year German bund reached -0.85% yesterday, while the 10-year UK Gilt fell to an intraday all-time low of 0.08% with some shorter-maturity Gilt yields actually dipping into negative territory (Chart of the Week). The common driver of yesterday’s yield declines was the 25% plunge in global oil prices after the weekend collapse of the OPEC 2.0 alliance between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The inflation expectations component of global bond yields fell accordingly, continuing the correlation with energy prices seen over the past decade. Yet the real component of global bond yields has also been falling, with markets increasingly pricing in an extended period of weak growth and negative real interest rates – especially in the US. Collapsing US Treasury Yields Discount A Recession, Not A Financial Crisis Chart 2Re-opening Old Wounds Re-opening Old Wounds Re-opening Old Wounds While this latest plunge in US equity markets has been both rapid and powerful, the damage only takes us back to levels on the S&P 500 last seen as recently as January 2019 (Chart 2). The turmoil, however, has reopened old wounds in markets that had suffered their own crises over the past decade, with European bank stocks hitting new all-time lows and credit spreads on US high-yield Energy bonds and Italian sovereign debt (versus Germany) sharply blowing out. The backdrop remains treacherous and global equity markets will likely remain under pressure until the number of new COVID-19 cases peaks outside of China (especially in the US). If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. Bank funding indicators like Libor-OIS spreads and bank debt spreads have widened a bit over the past week but remain at very subdued levels (Chart 3). This is in sharp contrast to classic risk aversion indicators like the price of gold and the value of the Japanese yen versus the Australian dollar, which are closing in on the highs seen during the 2008 global financial crisis and 2012 European debt crisis. Chart 3A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis We interpret this as investors being far more worried about a deep global recession than another major financial crisis. That is also confirmed in the pricing of US Treasury yields, especially when looking at the real yield. Chart 4Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Chart 5Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally The entire TIPS yield curve is now negative for the first time, even with the real fed funds rate below the Fed’s estimate of the “r*” neutral real rate (Chart 4). The combination of low and falling inflation expectations, and plunging real yields, indicates that the Treasury market now believes that the neutral real funds rate is not 0.8%, as suggested by the Fed’s estimate of r*, but is somewhere well below 0%. With the fed funds rate now down to 0.75% after last week’s intermeeting 50bps cut, the Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. The Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. Yet that may be too literal an interpretation of the incredible collapse of US Treasury yields. The power of negative convexity is also at work, driving intense demand for long-duration bonds that puts additional downward pressure on yields. Large owners of US mortgage backed securities (MBS) like the big commercial banks have seen the duration of their MBS holdings collapse as yields have fallen. The result is that banks are forced to buy huge amounts of Treasuries (or receive US dollar interest rate swaps) to hedge their duration exposure of negative convexity MBS, hyper-charging the fall in Treasury yields – perhaps over $1 trillion worth of buying, by some estimates.1 This is a similar dynamic to what occurred last summer in Europe, when sharply falling bond yields triggered convexity-related demand for duration from large asset-liability managers like pension funds, further fueling the decline in bond yields (Chart 5). Yet even allowing that some of the Treasury yield decline has been driven by a mechanical demand for duration, a 10-year US Treasury yield of 0.56% clearly discounts expectations of a US recession, as well – which appears justified by the recent performance of some critical US economic data. In Charts 6 & 7, we show a “cycle-on-cycle” analysis of some key US financial and indicators and how they behave before and after the start of the past five US recessions. The charts are set up so the vertical line represents the start of the recession, and we line up the data for the current business cycle as if the latest data point represents the start of a recession. Done this way, we can see if the current data is evolving in a similar fashion to past US economic downturns. Chart 6The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy Chart 7COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession The charts show that the current flat 10-year/3-month US Treasury curve and steady decline in corporate profit growth are both accurately following the path entering past US recessions. Other indicators like the NFIB Small Business confidence survey, the Conference Board’s leading economic indicator and consumer confidence series typically peak between 12-18 months prior to the start of a recession, but appear to be only be peaking now. The same argument goes for initial jobless claims, which are usually rising for several months heading into a recession but remain surprisingly steady of late – a condition that seems unlikely to continue as more companies suffer virus-related hits to their sales and profits and begin to shed labor. Net-net, these reliable cyclical US data suggest that the Treasury market is right to be pricing in elevated recession risk – especially with US cases of COVID-19 starting to increase more rapidly and US financial conditions having tightened sharply in the latest market rout. Bottom Line: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation – most notably in the US. Allocation Changes To Our Model Bond Portfolio The stunning fall in global bond yields has already gone a long way. Yet it is very difficult to forecast a bottom in yields, even with central banks easing monetary policy to try and boost confidence, before there is evidence that the global COVID-19 outbreak is being contained (i.e. a decreasing total number of confirmed cases). By the same token, corporate bonds (and equities) will continue to be under selling pressure until the worst of the viral outbreak has passed. We raised our recommended overall global duration stance to neutral last week – a move that was more tactical in nature as a near-term hedge to our strategic overweight corporate bond allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio amid growing market volatility. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. This week, we are making the following additional changes to our model bond portfolio to reflect the growing odds of a global recession: Downgrade global corporates to underweight versus global governments Maintain a neutral overall portfolio duration, but favor countries within the government bond allocation that are more highly correlated to changes in to the overall level of global bond yields. Chart 8Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Given how far yields have declined already, we think raising allocations to “high yield beta” countries that can still cut interest rates, at the expense of reduced weightings toward low beta countries that have limited scope to ease policy, offers a better risk/reward profile than simply raising duration exposure across the board. Such a nuanced argument is less applicable to global corporates, where elevated market volatility, poor investor risk appetite and deteriorating global growth momentum all argue for continued near-term underperformance of corporates versus government bonds. Specifically, we are making the following changes to our recommended allocations, presented with a brief rationale for each move: Upgrade US Treasuries and Canadian government bonds to overweight: Both Treasuries and Canadian bonds are higher beta markets, as we define by a regression of monthly yield changes to changes in the yield of the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index (Chart 8). The Fed cut 50bps last week as an emergency measure and has 75bps to go before reaching the zero bound, which the market now expects by mid-year. Additional bond bullish moves after reaching the zero bound, like aggressive forward guidance, restarting quantitative easing and even anchoring Treasury yields in a BoJ-like form of yield curve control, are all possible if the US enters a recession. Meanwhile, the Bank of Canada (BoC) followed the Fed’s cut with a 50bp easing the next day and signaled that additional rate cuts are likely to prevent a plunge in Canadian consumer confidence. The collapsing oil price likely seals the deal for additional rate cuts by the BoC in the next few months. Downgrade Japanese government bonds to maximum underweight: Japanese government bonds (JGBs) are the most defensive low-beta market in model bond portfolio universe, thanks to the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy that anchors the 10yr JGB yield around 0%. This makes JGBs the best candidate for a maximum underweight stance when global bond yields are not expected to rise in the near term, as we expect. Downgrade Germany and France to Underweight: The ECB meets this week and will be under pressure to ease policy given recent moves by other major central banks. A -10bps rate cut is expected, which may happen to counteract the recent increase in the euro versus the US dollar, but there is also possibility that ECB will increase and/or extend the size and scope of its current Asset Purchase Program. Given the ECB’s lack of overall monetary policy flexibility, and low level of inflation expectations, we see limited scope for the lower-beta German and French government bonds to outperform their global peers. Remain overweight UK and Australia: While both Australian government bonds and UK Gilts have a “median” yield beta in our model bond portfolio universe, both deserve moderate overweights as there is still the potential for rate cuts in both countries. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) cut the Cash Rate by -25bps last week and they are still open to cut further to boost a sluggish economy hurt by wildfires and weak export demand from China. The RBA will stay more dovish for longer until we will see clear signs of a rebound of the Chinese economy from the COVID-19 outbreak. The Bank of England (BoE) will likely cut its policy rate later this month, or even before the next scheduled policy meeting, as COVID-19 is starting to spread through the UK. Downgrade US High-Yield To Underweight: US junk bonds had already taken a hit during the global market selloff in recent weeks, but the collapse in oil prices pummeled the market given the high weighting of US shale producers in the index (Chart 9). With additional weakness in oil prices likely as Russia and Saudi Arabia are now in a full-fledged price war, US high-yield will come under additional spread widening pressure focused on the weaker Caa-rated segment that contains most of the energy names. We recommend a zero weight in the Caa-rated US junk bonds, within an overall underweight allocation to the entire asset class. Downgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to underweight: COVID-19 is now spreading faster in Germany and France, after leaving Italy in a full-blown national crisis. The export-oriented economies of the euro area were already vulnerable to a global growth slowdown, but now domestic growth weakness raises the odds of a full-blown recession – not a good environment to own corporate bonds, especially with the euro now appreciating. Downgrade emerging market (EM) USD-denominated sovereigns and corporates to underweight: EM debt remains a levered play on global growth, so the increased odds of a global recession are a problem for the asset class – even with sharply lower interest rates and early signs of a softening in the US dollar (Chart 10). Chart 9Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Chart 10Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD We will present the new specific model bond portfolio weightings, along with a discussion of the risk management implications of these changes, in next week’s report. Bottom Line: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Upgrade high-beta countries with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading lower-beta countries with less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.wsj.com/articles/fear-isnt-the-only-driver-of-the-treasury-rally-banks-need-to-hedge-their-mortgages-1158347080 Recommendations Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights An analysis on Colombia is available below. If EM share prices hold at current levels, a major rally will likely unfold. If they are unable to hold, a substantial breakdown will likely ensue. The direction of EM US dollar and local currency bond yields will be the key to whether EM share prices break down or not. We expect continuous EM currency depreciation that will likely trigger foreign capital outflows from both EM credit markets and domestic bonds. This leads us to reiterate our short position in EM stocks. We are booking profits on the long implied EM equity volatility and the short Colombian peso/long Russian ruble positions. Feature The Federal Reserve’s intra-meeting rate cut this week might temporarily boost EM risk assets and currencies. However, it is also possible that investors might begin questioning the ability of policymakers in general and the Fed in particular to continuously boost risk assets. In recent years, investors have been operating under the implicit assumption that policymakers in the US, China and Europe have complete control over financial markets and global growth, and will not allow things to get out of hand. Investors have been ignoring contracting global ex-US profits as well as exceedingly high US equity multiples and extremely low corporate spreads worldwide. In the past 12 months, investors have been ignoring contracting global ex-US profits (Chart I-1) as well as exceedingly high US equity multiples. This has been occurring because of the infamous ‘policymakers put’ on risk assets. As doubts about policymakers’ ability to defend global growth and financial markets from COVID-19 heighten, investors will likely throw in the towel and trim risk exposure. A sudden stop in capital flows into EM is a distinct possibility. The Last Line Of Defense EM share prices are at a critical juncture (Chart I-2). If they hold at current levels, a major rally will likely unfold. If they are unable to hold at current levels, a substantial breakdown will likely ensue. Chart I-1Profitless Rally In 2019 Makes Stocks Vulnerable Profitless Rally In 2019 Makes Stocks Vulnerable Profitless Rally In 2019 Makes Stocks Vulnerable Chart I-2EM Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture EM Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture EM Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture   What should investors be looking at to determine whether EM share prices will find a bottom close to current levels, or whether another major down-leg is in the cards? In our opinion, the direction of EM sovereign and corporate US dollar bond yields as well as EM local currency government bond yields will be the key to whether EM share prices break down or not. Chart I-3 illustrates that EM equity prices move in tandem with EM corporate US dollar bond yields as well as EM local currency bond yields (bond yields are shown inverted on both panels). Falling EM fixed income yields have helped EM share prices tremendously in the past year. Chart I-3EM Equities Drop When EM US Dollar & Domestic Bond Yields Are Rising EM Equities Drop When EM US Dollar & Domestic Bond Yields Are Rising EM Equities Drop When EM US Dollar & Domestic Bond Yields Are Rising EM corporate US dollar bond yields can rise under the following circumstances: (1) when US Treasury yields are ascending more than corporate credit spreads are tightening; (2) when EM credit spreads are widening more than Treasury yields are falling; or (3) when both US government bond yields and EM credit spreads are increasing simultaneously. Provided the backdrop of weaker growth is bullish for US government bonds, presently EM corporate US dollar bond yields can only rise if their credit spreads widen by more than the drop in Treasury yields. In short, the destiny of EM equities currently rests with EM corporate spreads. EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads are breaking above a major technical resistance (Chart I-4). The direction of these credit spreads is contingent on EM exchange rates and commodities prices as demonstrated in Chart I-5. Credit spreads are shown inverted in both panels of this chart. Chart I-4A Breakout In EM Sovereign And Corporate Credit Spreads? A Breakout In EM Sovereign And Corporate Credit Spreads? A Breakout In EM Sovereign And Corporate Credit Spreads? Chart I-5Falling EM Currencies And Commodities Herald Wider EM Credit Spreads Falling EM Currencies And Commodities Herald Wider EM Credit Spreads Falling EM Currencies And Commodities Herald Wider EM Credit Spreads   EM exchange rates are also crucial for foreign investors’ in EM domestic bonds. The top panel of Chart I-6 demonstrates that even though the total return on the JP Morgan EM GBI domestic bond index has been surging in local currency terms, the same measure in US dollar terms is still below its 2012 level. The gap is due to EM exchange rates. EM local currency bond yields are at all-time lows (Chart I-6, bottom panel), reflecting very subdued nominal income growth and low inflation in many developing economies (Chart I-7). Chart I-6EM Currencies Are Key To EM Domestic Bonds Total Returns EM Currencies Are Key To EM Domestic Bonds Total Returns EM Currencies Are Key To EM Domestic Bonds Total Returns Chart I-7Inflation Is Undershooting In EM Ex-China Inflation Is Undershooting In EM Ex-China Inflation Is Undershooting In EM Ex-China   Hence, low EM domestic bond yields are justified by their fundamentals. Yet foreign investors are very large players in EM local bonds, and their willingness to hold these instruments is contingent on EM exchange rates’ outlook. The sensitivity of international capital flows into EM US dollar and local currency bonds to EM exchange rates has diminished in recent years because of global investors’ unrelenting search for yield. As QE policies by DM central banks have removed some $9 trillion in high-quality securities from circulation, the volume of fixed-income securities available in the markets has shrunk. This has led to unrelenting capital inflows into EM fixed-income markets, despite lingering weakness in their exchange rates. Nonetheless, sensitivity of fund flows into EM fixed-income markets to EM exchange rates has diminished but has not yet outright vanished. If EM currencies depreciate further, odds are that there will be a sudden stop in capital flows into EM fixed-income markets. Outside of some basket cases, we do not expect the majority of EM governments or corporations to default on their debt. Yet, we foresee further meaningful EM currency depreciation which will simply raise the cost of servicing foreign currency debt. It would be natural for sovereign and corporate credit spreads to widen as they begin pricing in diminished creditworthiness among EM debtors in foreign currency terms.     Bottom Line: Unlike EM equities, EM fixed-income markets are a crowded trade and are overbought. Hence, any selloff in these markets could trigger an exodus of capital pushing up their yields. Rising yields will in turn push EM equities over the cliff. EM Currencies: More Downside We expect EM currencies to continue depreciating. EM ex-China currencies’ total return index (including carry) versus the US dollar is breaking down (Chart I-8, top panel). This is occurring despite the plunge in US interest rates. Notably, as illustrated in the bottom panel of Chart I-8, EM ex-China currencies have not been correlated with US bond yields. The breakdown in correlation between EM exchange rates and US interest rates is not new. This means that the Fed's easing will not prevent EM currency depreciation. EM currencies correlate with commodities prices generally and industrial metals prices in particular (Chart I-9, top panel). The latter has formed a head-and-shoulders pattern and has broken down (Chart I-9, bottom panel). The path of least resistance for industrial metal prices is down. Chart I-8More downside In EM Ex-China Currencies More downside In EM Ex-China Currencies More downside In EM Ex-China Currencies Chart I-9A Breakdown In Commodities Points To A Relapse In EM Currencies A Breakdown In Commodities Points To A Relapse In EM Currencies A Breakdown In Commodities Points To A Relapse In EM Currencies Chart I-10Chinese Imports Are Key To EM Currencies Chinese Imports Are Key To EM Currencies Chinese Imports Are Key To EM Currencies EM currencies’ cyclical fluctuations occur in-sync with global trade and Chinese imports (Chart I-10). Both will stay very weak for now. Finally, China is stimulating, and we believe the pace of stimulus will accelerate. However, the measures announced by the authorities so far are insufficient to project a rapid and lasting growth recovery. In particular, the most prominent measure announced in China is the PBoC’s special re-lending quota of RMB 300 billion to enterprises fighting the coronavirus outbreak. However, this amount should be put into perspective. In 2019, private and public net credit flows were RMB 23.8 trillion, and net new broad money (M2) creation was RMB 16 trillion. Thus, this re-lending quota will boost aggregate public and private credit flow by only 1.2% and broad money flow by mere 2%. This is simply not sufficient to meaningfully boost growth in China. Notably, daily, commodities prices in China do not yet confirm any growth recovery (Chart I-11). Barring an irrigation-type of credit and fiscal stimulus, the mainland economy will disappoint. Bottom Line: The selloff in EM exchange rates will persist. As discussed above, this will likely lead to outflows from both EM credit markets and domestic bonds. Reading Markets’ Tea Leaves It is impossible to forecast the pace and scope of the spread of COVID-19 as well as the precautionary actions taken by consumers and businesses around the world. In brief, it is unfeasible to assess the COVID-19’s impact on the global economy. The direction of EM sovereign and corporate US dollar bond yields as well as EM local currency government bond yields will be the key to whether EM share prices break down or not. Rather than throwing darts with our eyes closed, we examine profiles of various financial markets with the goal of detecting subtle messages that financial markets often send: Aggregate EM small-cap and Chinese investable small-cap stocks seem to be breaking down (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Daily Commodities Prices In China: No Sign Of Revival Daily Commodities Prices In China: No Sign Of Revival Daily Commodities Prices In China: No Sign Of Revival Chart I-12Investable Small Cap Stocks Seem To Be Breaking Down Investable Small Cap Stocks Seem To Be Breaking Down Investable Small Cap Stocks Seem To Be Breaking Down   The technical profiles of various EM currencies versus the US dollar on a total return basis (including the carry) are consistent with a genuine bear market (Chart I-13). Hence, their weakness has further to go. Global industrial stocks’ relative performance against the global equity benchmark has broken below its previous technical support (Chart I-14). This is a bad omen for global growth. Chart I-13EM Currencies Are In A Genuine Bear Market EM Currencies Are In A Genuine Bear Market EM Currencies Are In A Genuine Bear Market Chart I-14A Breakdown In Global Industrials Relative Performance A Breakdown In Global Industrials Relative Performance A Breakdown In Global Industrials Relative Performance   Finally, Korean tech stocks as well as the Nikkei index seem to have formed a major top (Chart I-15). This technical configuration suggests that their relapse will very likely last longer and go further. Chart I-15A Major Top in Korean And Japanese Stocks? A Major Top in Korean And Japanese Stocks? A Major Top in Korean And Japanese Stocks? All these signposts relay a downbeat message on global growth and, consequently, EM risk assets and currencies. A pertinent question to ask is whether the currently extremely high level of the VIX is a contrarian signal to buy stocks? Investors often buy the VIX to hedge their underlying equity portfolios from short-term downside. However, when and as they begin to view the equity selloff as enduring, they close their long VIX positions and simultaneously sell stocks. In brief, the VIX’s current elevated levels are likely to be a sign that many investors are still long stocks. When investors trim their equity holdings, they will likely also liquidate their long VIX positions. Thereby, share prices could drop alongside a falling VIX. Therefore, we are using the recent surge in equity volatility to close our long position in implied EM equity volatility. Even though risks to EM share prices are still skewed to the downside, their selloff may not be accompanied by substantially higher EM equity volatility. However, we continue to recommend betting on higher implied volatility in EM currencies. The latter still remains very low. Investment Conclusions We reinstated our short position on the EM equity index on January 30, and this trade remains intact. For global equity portfolios, we continue to recommend underweighting EM versus DM. Within the EM equity universe, our overweights are Korea, Thailand, Russia, central Europe, Mexico, Vietnam, Pakistan and the UAE. Our underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Colombia. We are contemplating downgrading Brazilian equities from neutral to underweight. The change is primarily driven by our downbeat view on banks (Chart I-16). This is in addition to our existing bearish view on commodities. We will publish a Special Report on Brazilian banks in the coming weeks. Barring an irrigation-type of credit and fiscal stimulus, the mainland economy will disappoint. Among the EM equity sectors, we continue to recommend a long EM consumer staples/short banks trade (Chart I-17, top panel) as well as a short both EM and Chinese banks versus their US peers positions (Chart I-17, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-16Brazilian Bank Stocks Are Breaking Down? Brazilian Bank Stocks Are Breaking Down? Brazilian Bank Stocks Are Breaking Down? Chart I-17Our Favored EM Equity Sector Bets Our Favored EM Equity Sector Bets Our Favored EM Equity Sector Bets   We continue to recommend a short position in a basket of the following currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, ZAR, PHP, IDR and KRW. We are also structurally bearish on the RMB. Today we are booking profits on the short Colombian peso / long Russian ruble trade (please refer to section on Colombia on pages 13-17). With respect to EM local currency bonds and EM sovereign credit, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Colombia, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea. Our underweights are South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The remaining markets warrant a neutral allocation. As always, the list of recommendations is available at end of each week’s report and on our web page. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Upgrade Domestic Bonds; Take Profits On Short Peso Trade Chart II-1Oil Makes A Huge Difference To Colombia's Current Account Oil Makes A Huge Difference To Colombia's Current Account Oil Makes A Huge Difference To Colombia's Current Account Today we recommend upgrading local currency bonds and booking profits on the short Colombian peso / long Russian ruble trade. The reason is tight fiscal and monetary policies are positive for bonds and the currency. Although we are structurally bullish on Colombia’s economy, we remain underweight this bourse relative the EM equity benchmark. The primary reason is the high sensitivity of Colombia’s balance of payments to oil prices. In particular, oil accounts for a large share (40%) of Colombia’s exports. As of Q4 2019, the current account deficit was $14 billion or 4% of GDP with oil, and $25 billion or 7.5% of GDP excluding oil (Chart II-1). In short, each dollar drop in oil prices substantially widens the nation’s current account deficit and weighs on the exchange rate. Besides, the current hawkish monetary stance and overly tight fiscal policy will produce a growth downtrend. The Colombian economy has reached a top in its business cycle: The flattening yield curve is foreshadowing a major economic slowdown (Chart II-2, top panel). Our proxy for the marginal propensity to spend for businesses and households leads the business cycle by about six months and is presently indicating that growth will roll over soon (Chart II-2, bottom panel). Moreover, the corporate loan impulse has already relapsed, weighing on companies’ capital expenditures (Chart II-3).  Chart II-2The Business Cycle Has Peaked The Business Cycle Has Peaked The Business Cycle Has Peaked Chart II-3Investment Expenditures Heading South Investment Expenditures Heading South Investment Expenditures Heading South   The government considerably tightened fiscal policy in the past year and will continue to do so in 2020. The primary fiscal balance has surged to above 1% of GDP as primary fiscal expenditures have stagnated in nominal terms and shrunk in real terms last year (Chart II-4). In regards to monetary policy, the prime lending rate is 12% in nominal and 8.5-9% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Such high borrowing costs are restrictive as evidenced by several business cycle indicators that are in a full-fledged downtrend: manufacturing production, imports of consumer and capital goods, vehicle sales and housing starts (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Hawkish Fiscal Policy Hawkish Fiscal Policy Hawkish Fiscal Policy Chart II-5The Economy Is In The Doldrums The Economy Is In The Doldrums The Economy Is In The Doldrums Chart II-6Consumer Spending Has Been Supported By Borrowing Consumer Spending Has Been Supported By Borrowing Consumer Spending Has Been Supported By Borrowing Overall, economic growth has been held up solely by very robust household spending, which accounts for 65% of GDP. Critically, consumer borrowing has financed such buoyant consumer expenditures (Chart II-6). However, the pace of household borrowing is unsustainable with consumer lending rates at 18%. Moreover, nominal and real (deflated by core CPI) wage growth are decelerating markedly and hiring will slow down in line with reduced capital spending.  Besides, disinflationary dynamics in this country will be amplified due to the massive influx of immigration from Venezuela in the past two years. Currently, the number of immigrants from the neighboring country stands at 1.4 million people, or 5% of Colombia’s labor force. Such an enormous increase in labor supply introduces deflationary pressures in the Colombian economy by depressing wage growth. Therefore, despite the depreciating currency, core measures of inflation will likely drop to the lower end of the central bank’s target range in next 18-24 months. Investment Recommendations The economy is heading into a cyclical slump but monetary and fiscal policies will remain restrictive. Such a backdrop is bullish for the domestic bond market and structurally, albeit not cyclically, positive for the currency. We have been recommending fixed-income investors to bet on a yield curve flattening by receiving 10-year and paying 1-year swap rates. This trade has returned 77 basis points since its initiation on January 17, 2019. Given the central bank will stay behind the curve, this strategy remains intact. Today we recommend upgrading Colombian local currency bonds from neutral to overweight. Further currency depreciation and an exodus by foreign investors remain a risk. However, on a relative basis – versus its EM peers – this market is attractive. The share of foreign ownership of local currency government bonds in Colombia is 25%, smaller than in many other EMs. Additionally, Colombian bond yields are 80 basis points above the J.P. Morgan EM GBI domestic bonds benchmark and its currency is one standard deviation below its fair value (Chart II-7). We are also overweighting Colombian sovereign credit within an EM credit portfolio. Fiscal policy is very tight and government debt is at a manageable 50% of GDP. The government considerably tightened fiscal policy in the past year and will continue to do so in 2020. Continue to underweight Colombian equities relative to the emerging markets benchmark. We will be looking for a final capitulation in the oil market to upgrade this bourse. Finally, we are booking profits on our short COP versus RUB trade, which has returned a 19% gain since May 31, 2018 (Chart II-8). As mentioned earlier, the peso has already cheapened a lot according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs (Chart II-7). Meanwhile, Colombia’s macro policy mix is positive for the currency. Chart II-7The Colombian Peso Has Depreciated Substantially The Colombian Peso Has Depreciated Substantially The Colombian Peso Has Depreciated Substantially Chart II-8Taking Profits On Our Short COP / Long RUB Trade Taking Profits On Our Short COP / Long RUB Trade Taking Profits On Our Short COP / Long RUB Trade   In contrast, Russia is relaxing its fiscal policy – which is marginally negative for the ruble – and the currency has become a crowded trade. Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights At the current rate of work resumption, March’s PMI should rebound to its “normal range” from February’s historic lows. If so, our simple calculation, using China’s PMI figures and GDP growth in Q4 2008 as a template, suggests that China's economic growth in Q1 2020 should come in at around 3.2%. Chinese stocks passively outperformed global benchmarks in the last two weeks.  The likelihood of a stimulus overshoot in the next 6-12 months continues to rise, supporting our view that Chinese stocks will actively outperform global benchmark in the coming months. Cyclical stocks have significantly outperformed defensives lately. While this is consistent with our constructive view towards Chinese equities in general, the magnitude of a tech stock rally in the domestic market of late appears to be somewhat excessive. As such, investors should focus their sector exposure in favor of resources, industrials, and consumer discretionary. The depreciation in the RMB against the dollar will come primarily from a stronger dollar rather than a weaker RMB, and the downside in the value of the RMB should be limited. Feature Despite the past week’s plunge in global equities due to the threat of a worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese stocks have outperformed relative to global benchmarks. This underscores our view that epidemic risks within China are slowly abating, and China’s reflationary response to the crisis will likely overcompensate for the short-term economic shock. Tables 1 and 2 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets in the past month. On the growth front, both the February official and Caixin PMIs dropped to historic lows as a result of the virus outbreak and nationwide lockdown. On the other hand, economic data from January confirmed that pre-outbreak activity in China was on track to recovery. Daily data also suggests that production in China continues to resume. Moreover, monetary conditions have significantly loosened and fiscal supports have materially stepped up.  Chinese equities in both onshore and offshore markets dropped by 2% and 7% respectively (in absolute terms) from their January 13 peaks. Nevertheless, they have both significantly outperformed global equities, particularly in the past week. Equally-weighted cyclical stocks versus defensives in the onshore market have also moved up sharply, driven by a rally in the technology sector stocks. While the outperformance of cyclical stocks is consistent with our constructive view towards Chinese stocks, the magnitude appears to be excessive. Thus, we would advise investors positioning for a cyclical recovery in China to favor exposure in resources, industrials and consumer discretionary stocks. Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we have a number of observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Chart 1Inventory And Production Shortages Are A Bigger Near-Term Concern Than Weaknesses In Demand Inventory And Production Shortages Are A Bigger Near-Term Concern Than Weaknesses In Demand Inventory And Production Shortages Are A Bigger Near-Term Concern Than Weaknesses In Demand February’s drop in the official PMI below 40% is reminiscent of November 2008, which was the height of the global financial crisis. The raw material inventory sub-index of the PMI in February fell to a record low, a clear indication of strain in China’s manufacturing sector. While the finished goods inventory sub-index ticked up slightly compared with January, factories will likely run out of existing raw materials to produce goods if transportation logistics do not return to normal soon (Chart 1). A higher number in the new orders sub-index relative to production output also suggests the pressure on the supply side will intensify if the virus outbreak in China worsens and continues to disrupt manufacturing activities. This will in turn undermine the effectiveness of Chinese policy response.   Daily data from various sources suggests Chinese industrial activities continue to pick up. Between February 10 (the first official return-to-work day after an extended Chinese New Year holiday) and February 25 (the cutoff date for responding to PMI surveys), daily coal consumption in China’s six largest power plants was only about 60% of consumption compared from the same period last year (adjusted for the Lunar Year calendar). This is in line with the 35.7 reading in February’s manufacturing PMI, versus 49.2 a year ago. In the last four days of February, however, coal consumption reached nearly 70% of last year’s consumption. This figure is in keeping with a 10 percentage point increase in the rate of work resumption of enterprises above-designated size in China’s coastal regions.1 If energy consumption and work resumption rates reach about 90% by the end of March compared with Q1 2019, then PMI in March should pick up to 45% or higher. A 45% or higher reading in March’s PMI will imply economic impact from the virus outbreak is mostly limited to February. A simple calculation using China’s GDP growth in Q4 2008 as a template suggests that China's economic growth in Q1 2020 should come in at around 3.2% in real terms. This is in line with the estimate from BCA's Global Investment Strategy service.2 As we pointed out in November last year,3 China is frontloading additional fiscal stimulus in Q1 2020 to secure the economic recovery, which started to bud prior to the virus outbreak. The increase in January’s credit numbers confirms our projection. The monthly flow in total social financing in January (with only three work weeks effectively) reached above RMB 5 trillion. This figure exceeded that in January 2019, the highest monthly credit number last year. Local government bond issuance in January was almost double that a year ago, and a total of 1.2 trillion local government bonds were issued in the first two months of this year - a 53% jump from the same period last year. This suggests that fiscal stimulus has indeed stepped up in 2020. Money supply in January was slightly distorted by the earlier Chinese New Year (it fell in January this year instead of February as in most years) and the COVID-19 outbreak.  M1 registered zero growth from a year ago, whereas it grew by 0.4% in January 2019.4 Normally, during the month of the Chinese New Year, households have more cash in deposits whereas corporations have less as they pay pre-holiday bonuses to employees. This seasonality factor causes the growth rate in M0 to rise and M1 growth to fall. The seasonality was exacerbated by the nationwide lockdown on January 20 this year, as many real estate developers reportedly suffered from a significant reduction in home sales and delays in deposits for down payments. Household consumption in the service sector during the Chinese New Year was also severely suppressed. This explains near-zero growth in M1 and a larger-than-expected increase in household deposits in January (Chart 2). We expect the growth in both M0 and M1 to start normalizing in March, as production and household consumption continue to resume. While we do not expect large fluctuations in housing prices, we think growth in home sales may accelerate from Q2 2020. There are early signs that the government is starting to relax restrictions on the real estate sector, on a region by region basis. Land sales remain a major source of local governments’ income, accounting for more than half of total revenues as of last year. Chart 3 shows that as government expenditures lead land sales, a major increase in fiscal stimulus and local government spending means that a significant bump in land sales will be needed in 2020. A strengthening supply of land, coupled with the unlikelihood of large fluctuations in property prices, suggests that there will be more policy supports to the real estate sector and more incentives to boost housing demand. Chart 2Corporates Are Short On Cash Corporates Are Short On Cash Corporates Are Short On Cash Chart 3Land And Home Sales Likely To Pick Up In 2020 Land And Home Sales Likely To Pick Up In 2020 Land And Home Sales Likely To Pick Up In 2020 In the past two weeks, China’s equity market has registered a near-vertical outperformance in both investable and domestic stocks relative to global benchmarks (Chart 4). While this recent outperformance was passive in nature, our policy assessment supports future active outperformance. The recently announced pro-growth policy initiatives increasingly resemble those rolled out at the start of the last easing cycle in 2015/2016. These policy initiatives increase the odds that the upcoming “insurance stimulus” will overcompensate for the short-term economic shock, and will likely lead to a significant rebound in corporate profits in the next 6-12 months.  This supports our bullish view on Chinese stocks. Chart 5 also shows that, unlike during the 2015’s “bubble and bust” cycle, both the valuation and margin trading as a percentage of total market cap in China’s onshore market remain materially lower than 2015. Equally-weighted cyclical sectors continue to outperform defensives in both China’s investable and domestic markets, particularly the latter where stock prices in the technology sector were up 12% within the past month. While the outperformance of cyclical stocks relative to defensives is consistent with our constructive view towards Chinese equities in general, the magnitude appears to be somewhat excessive. Given this, we would advise investors positioning for a cyclical recovery in China’s economy to focus their sector exposure in favor of resources, industrials, and consumer discretionary stocks. Chart 4Chinese Stocks Strongly Outperformed Global Benchmarks Over The Past Two Weeks Chinese Stocks Strongly Outperformed Global Benchmarks Over The Past Two Weeks Chinese Stocks Strongly Outperformed Global Benchmarks Over The Past Two Weeks Chart 5Onshore Market Trading Does Not Seem Overly Leveraged Onshore Market Trading Does Not Seem Overly Leveraged Onshore Market Trading Does Not Seem Overly Leveraged China’s three-month repo rate (the de facto policy rate) has fallen significantly in the past month, roughly 30bps below its lowest level in 2016 (Chart 6). China’s government bond yields have also reached their lowest level since 2016. While corporate bond yield spreads in other major economies have picked up sharply in the past month, the reverse is happening in China. This suggests that the market is pricing in further easing and the notion that policy supports will be effective in preventing a surge in corporate bond default rate. From a global perspective, yield spreads on China’s onshore corporate bonds have been elevated since 2016. This indicates that investors have long either priced in a much higher default rate among Chinese corporate bond issuers, or demand an unjustifiably large risk premium (Chart 7). Since we expect Chinese policymakers to continue easing, risks of a surge in China’s corporate bond default rate remain low this year. As such, until we see signs that the Chinese authorities are reverting to a financial de-risking mode, we will continue to favor onshore corporate versus duration-matched government bonds. Chart 6Monetary Policy Now More Accommodative Than 2015-2016 Monetary Policy Now More Accommodative Than 2015-2016 Monetary Policy Now More Accommodative Than 2015-2016 Chart 7Chinese Corporates Pay High Risk Premium For Their Bonds, Even At A Relatively Low Default Rate Chinese Corporates Pay High Risk Premium For Their Bonds, Even At A Relatively Low Default Rate Chinese Corporates Pay High Risk Premium For Their Bonds, Even At A Relatively Low Default Rate Chart 8The RMB Likely To Continue Outperforming Other EM Currencies The RMB Likely To Continue Outperforming Other EM Currencies The RMB Likely To Continue Outperforming Other EM Currencies As we go to press, the Federal Reserve Bank has just made a 50bps cut to the Fed rate, the first emergency cut since the global financial crisis. The USD weakened against the Euro, the Japanese Yen, as well as the RMB immediately following the rate cut. While this reflects the market’s concerns of a worsening virus outbreak and the rising possibility of an economic slowdown in the US, the USD as a countercyclical currency will likely appreciate against most cyclical currencies as the virus continues spreading globally. Hence, the depreciation in the RMB against the dollar will come primarily from a stronger dollar rather than a weaker RMB, and the downside in the value of the RMB should be limited. The continuation of resuming production in China and the expectations of a Chinese economic recovery in Q2 will support an appreciation in the RMB against other EM currencies (Chart 8).   Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    http://app.21jingji.com/html/2020yiqing_fgfc/ 2   Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus," dated February 21, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Questions From The Road: Timing The Turn," dated November 20, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4   M1 is mainly made up by cash demand deposits from corporations, whereas M0 is mainly deposits from households Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Chart 1Making New Lows Making New Lows Making New Lows While the number of daily new COVID-19 cases is falling in China, the virus is spreading rapidly to the rest of the world. It is now clear that the outbreak will not be contained, though much uncertainty remains about the magnitude and duration of the global economic fallout. US bond yields have dropped dramatically, with the 10-year yield threatening to break below 1% for the first time ever (Chart 1). Interest rate markets are also pricing-in a rapid Fed response, with more than 100 bps of rate cuts priced for the next year and a 50 bps rate cut discounted for March. On Friday, BCA released a Special Alert making the case that stock prices have fallen enough to buy the market, even on a tactical (3-month) horizon. It is too early to make a similar call looking for higher bond yields. While risk assets will get near-term support from a dovish monetary policy shift, bond yields will stay low (and could even fall further) until global economic recovery appears likely. On a 12-month horizon, our base case scenario is that the Fed will not have to deliver the 110 bps of cuts that are currently priced. We therefore expect bond yields to be higher one year from now. But investors with shorter time horizons should wait before calling the bottom in yields.  Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 176 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -255 bps. Coronavirus fears pushed spreads wider in February, and the average spread for the overall investment grade index moved back above our cyclical target (Chart 2).1 As for specific credit tiers, Baa spreads are 9 bps above target and Aa spreads are 3 bps cheap. A-rated spreads are sitting right on our target, and Aaa debt remains 5 bps expensive. Looking beyond the economic fallout from the coronavirus, accommodative monetary conditions remain the key support for corporate bonds. Notably, both the 2-year/10-year and 3-year/10-year Treasury slopes steepened in February, and both remain firmly above zero. This suggests that the market believes that the Fed will keep policy easy. As we discussed two weeks ago, restrictive Fed policy – as evidenced by an inverted 3-year/10-year Treasury curve and elevated TIPS breakeven inflation rates – is required before banks choke off the supply of credit, causing defaults and a bear market in corporate spreads.2 Bottom Line: Corporate spreads will keep widening until coronavirus fears abate, but COVID-19 will not cause the end of the credit cycle. Once the dust settles, a buying opportunity will emerge in investment grade corporates, with spreads back above our cyclical targets. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 271 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -379 bps. The junk index spread widened 110 bps on the month and is currently 37 bps below its early-2019 peak. Ex-energy, the average index spread widened 93 bps in February. It is 71 bps below its 2019 peak. High-yield spreads were well above our cyclical targets prior to the COVID-19 outbreak and have only cheapened further during the past month. More spread widening is likely in the near-term, but an exceptional buying opportunity will emerge once virus-related fears fade. This is especially true relative to investment grade corporate bonds. To illustrate the valuation disparity between investment grade and high-yield, we calculated the average monthly spread widening for each credit tier during this cycle’s three major “risk off” phases (2011, 2015 and 2018). We then used each credit tier’s average option-adjusted spread and duration to estimate monthly excess returns for that amount of spread widening (Chart 3, bottom panel). The results show that, in past years, Baa-rated corporates behaved much more defensively than Ba or B-rated bonds. But now, because of the greater spread cushion and lower duration in the junk space, estimated downside risk is similar. In other words, the valuation disparity between investment grade and junk means that investment grade corporates offer much less downside protection than usual compared to high-yield. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -60 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 1 bp on the month, driven by a 7 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread that was partially offset by a 6 bps reduction in expected prepayment losses (aka option cost). The 10-year Treasury yield has made a new all-time low, and the 30-year mortgage rate – at 3.45% – is only 14 bps above its own (Chart 4). At these levels, an increase in mortgage refinancing activity is inevitable, and indeed, the MBA Refi index has bounced sharply in recent weeks. MBS spreads, however, have not yet reacted to the higher refi index (panel 3). The nominal spread on 30-year conventional MBS is only 9 bps above where it started the year, and expected prepayment losses are 5 bps lower.3 Some widening is likely during the next few months, and we recommend that investors reduce exposure to Agency MBS. Even on a 12-month horizon, MBS spreads offer good value relative to investment grade corporate bonds for now (bottom panel), but investment grade corporates will cheapen on a relative basis if the current risk-off environment continues. This is probably a good time to start paring exposure to MBS, with the intention of re-deploying into corporate credit when spreads peak. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 86 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -99 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 270 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -367 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 162 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -189 bps. Local Authority debt underperformed Treasuries by 14 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +47 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 5 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -7 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. We continue to see little value in USD-denominated Sovereign debt, outside of Mexico and Saudi Arabia where spreads look attractive compared to similarly-rated US corporate bonds (Chart 5). The Local Authority and Foreign Agency sectors, however, offer attractive combinations of risk and reward according to our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C). Our Global Asset Allocation service just released a Special Report on emerging market debt that argues for favoring USD-denominated EM sovereign debt over both USD-denominated EM corporate debt and local-currency EM sovereign bonds.4 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 80 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -114 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 11% on the month to 88%, remaining below its post-crisis mean (Chart 6). For some time we have been advising clients to focus municipal bond exposure at the long-end of the Aaa curve, where yield ratios were above average pre-crisis levels. But last month’s sell-off brought some value back to the front end (panel 2). Specifically, the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year M/T yield ratios are all back above their average pre-crisis levels at 85%, 83% and 86%, respectively. 20-year and 30-year maturities are still cheapest, at yield ratios of 93% and 94%, respectively. Investors should adopt a laddered allocation across the municipal bond curve, as opposed to focusing exposure at the long-end. Fundamentally, state and local government balance sheets remain solid. Our Municipal Health Monitor is in “improving health” territory and state & local government interest coverage has improved considerably in recent quarters (bottom panel). Both trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outpace downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-steepened dramatically in February, with yields down at least 30 bps across the board. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 9 bps on the month, reaching 27 bps. The 5/30 slope also steepened 9 bps to reach 76 bps. February’s plunge in yields was massive, but the fact that it occurred without 2/10 or 5/30 flattening signals that the market expects the Fed to respond quickly and that any economic pain will be relatively short lived. In fact, the front-end of the curve is now priced for 110 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months (Chart 7). That amount of easing would bring the fed funds rate back to 0.48%, less than two 25 basis point increments off the zero lower bound. Though the drop in 12-month rate expectations didn’t move the duration-matched 2/5/10 or 2/5/30 butterfly spreads very much, the 5-year note remains very expensive relative to both the 2/10 and 2/30 barbells (bottom 2 panels). The richness in the 5-year note will reverse if the Fed delivers less than the 110 bps of rate cuts that are currently priced for the next year. At present, we view less than 110 bps of easing as the most likely scenario, and therefore maintain our position long the 2/30 barbell and short the 5-year bullet. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 159 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -232 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 24 bps to 1.42%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 21 bps to 1.50%. Both rates remain well below the 2.3%-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s inflation target. We have been recommending that investors own TIPS breakeven curve flatteners on the view that inflationary pressures will first show up in the realized inflation data and the short-end of the breakeven curve, before infecting the long-end.5 However, recent risk-off market behavior has caused long-end inflation expectations to fall dramatically, while sticky near-term inflation prints have supported short-dated expectations. Case in point, the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate declined 16 bps in February, compared to a 24 bps drop for the 10-year (Chart 8). Inflation curve flattening could continue in the near-term but will reverse when risk assets recover. As a result, we recommend taking profits on TIPS breakeven curve flatteners and waiting for a period of re-steepening before putting the trade back on. Fundamentally, we note that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 38 bps cheap according to our re-vamped Adaptive Expectations Model (bottom panel).6 Investors should remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. ABS: Underweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +26 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 7 bps on the month. It currently sits at 33 bps, right on top of its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C) shows that Aaa-rated consumer ABS ranks among the most defensive US spread products. This explains why the sector has weathered the recent storm so well, and why it is actually up versus Treasuries so far this year. ABS also offer higher expected returns than other low-risk spread sectors such as Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals. For as long as the current risk-off phase continues, consumer ABS are a more attractive place to hide than Domestic Agencies or Supranationals. However, once risk-on market behavior re-asserts itself, consumer ABS will once again lag other riskier spread products. In the long-run, we also remain concerned about deteriorating consumer credit fundamentals, as evidenced by tightening lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans, and a rising household interest expense ratio (bottom 2 panels). Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 42 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +1 bp. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 9 bps on the month. It currently sits at 76 bps, below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). In a recent Special Report, we explored how low interest rates have boosted commercial real estate (CRE) prices this cycle and concluded that a sharp drawdown in CRE prices is likely only when inflation starts to pick up steam.7 In that report we also mentioned that non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS spreads look attractive relative to US corporate bonds in risk-adjusted terms (Appendix C), and that the macro environment is close to neutral for CMBS spreads. Both CRE lending standards and loan demand were close to unchanged during the past quarter, as per the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey (bottom 2 panels).  Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS performed in line with the duration-equivalent Treasury index in February, leaving year-to-date excess returns unchanged at +35 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month to reach 56 bps. Agency CMBS offer greater expected return than Aaa-rated consumer ABS, while also carrying agency backing (Appendix C). An overweight allocation to this sector remains appropriate. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 110 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a flat fed funds rate over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of February 28, 2020) Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of February 28, 2020) Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 50 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 50 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of February 28, 2020) Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields Too Soon To Call The Bottom In Yields   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For more information on how we calculate our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Credit Cycle Is Far From Over”, dated February 18, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Expected prepayment losses (or option cost) are calculated as the difference between the index’s zero-volatility spread and its option-adjusted spread. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Understanding Emerging Markets Debt”, dated February 27, 2020, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com  6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability”, dated January 27, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Policy Responses To The Virus: Markets are now pricing in significant monetary policy easing in response to the growth shock from the COVID-19 outbreak and related financial market instability. It is not yet clear, however, that central banks will NOT ease by as much as currently discounted in the low level of bond yields – especially as risk assets will riot anew if policymakers are not dovish enough. Duration: Raise overall global duration exposure to neutral on a tactical basis (0-3 months) until there is greater clarity on the full magnitude of the hit to global growth from the virus. Spread Product: The widening of global corporate bond spreads during last week’s equity market correction was relatively modest, suggesting that the COVID-19 outbreak has not become a credit event that raises downgrade/default risks. Maintain an overall overweight allocation to global corporates versus government bonds. Downgrade US MBS to neutral, however, given the risk of higher prepayments from falling mortgage rates. Feature What a wild ride it has been for investors. Equity markets worldwide corrected sharply last week as investors were forced to downgrade global growth expectations with the COVID-19 outbreak spreading more rapidly outside of China. US equities were particularly savaged with the S&P 500 shedding -11% of its value in a mere five trading sessions, with the VIX index of implied equity volatility spiking over 40, evoking comparisons to some of the darkest days of the 2008 financial crisis. Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Concerns Causing Market Jitters COVID-19 Concerns Causing Market Jitters COVID-19 Concerns Causing Market Jitters Government bond yields have collapsed alongside plunging equity values, with the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield hitting an all-time intraday low of 1.04% yesterday. Investors are betting on aggressive rate cuts by global central bankers to offset weak growth momentum and disinflationary pressures that were already in place before the arrival of COVID-19. At the same time, corporate credit spreads widened worldwide last week, but the moves were relatively subdued and do not signal growing concern over future default losses (Chart of the Week). In this report, we discuss how to best position a global bond portfolio given these competing messages from government bond and credit markets. We conclude that maintaining selective strategic (6-12 months) overweights in global spread product versus governments, while also maintaining a neutral tactical (0-3 months) overall duration exposure - as a hedge against a more “U-shaped” recovery from the virus-driven downturn in global growth - is the best way to position for a backdrop where policymakers will need to be as easy as possible in a more uncertain world. What To Do Next On … Duration Risk assets were staging a massive rebound yesterday as we went to press, after policymakers worldwide signaled the need for stimulus measures to offset the COVID-19 growth shock. Both Fed Chairman Jerome Powell and Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor Haruhiko Kuroda promised to ease monetary policy, if necessary, to stabilize markets. Meanwhile, looser fiscal policy may finally be on the way in Europe. The government of virus-stricken Italy announced a €3.6 billion stimulus package, while the German Finance Minister has hinted at a temporary suspension of Germany’s constitutional “debt brake” on deficit spending. A true coordinated global easing of both monetary and fiscal policy, would be very bullish for beaten-down growth-sensitive assets like equities and industrial commodities that have been focused on the shutdown of China’s economy in February to combat the spread of the virus. A true coordinated global easing of both monetary and fiscal policy, would be very bullish for beaten-down growth-sensitive assets like equities and industrial commodities that have been focused on the shutdown of China’s economy in February to combat the spread of the virus (Chart 2). It’s a different story for government bonds, however, as a rebound in yields from current depressed levels is not assured, even if monetary policy is eased further. This is because central bankers must maintain a dovish bias until the virus-driven uncertainty over global growth begins to fade, or else risk assets will riot once again. It’s all about financial conditions now, especially in the US where COVID-19 and the stock market selloff have become front-page news in a presidential election year. Chart 2How Quickly Will China Rebound? How Quickly Will China Rebound? How Quickly Will China Rebound? For example, the entire US Treasury curve now trades below the mid-point of the fed funds target range, with the market now pricing in a very rapid dovish move by the Fed (Chart 3). Chart 3A Big Grab For Global Duration A Big Grab For Global Duration A Big Grab For Global Duration Yield curves are now very flat in other major developed market (DM) economies, as well. This is partly due to the risk aversion bid for safe assets, which is evident in the deeply negative term premium component of bond yields. Flat curves also reflect a more long-lasting component, with markets pricing in lower equilibrium rates in the future. Investors are not only demanding immediate rate cuts to boost growth and stabilize financial markets, but also see little chance of those cuts eventually being reversed in the future. Chart 4Markets Increasingly Pricing In Global ZIRP Markets Increasingly Pricing In Global ZIRP Markets Increasingly Pricing In Global ZIRP Our simple proxy for the market expectation of the nominal terminal rate- the 5-year overnight index swap (OIS) rate, 5-years forward – is between 0-1% for all major DM countries (Chart 4). The implication is that investors are not only demanding immediate rate cuts to boost growth and stabilize financial markets, but also see little chance of those cuts eventually being reversed in the future. Chart 5Our Central Bank Monitors Say More Easing Is Needed Our Central Bank Monitors Say More Easing Is Needed Our Central Bank Monitors Say More Easing Is Needed Chart 6Global Yields Reflect Dovish Rate Expectations Global Yields Reflect Dovish Rate Expectations Global Yields Reflect Dovish Rate Expectations At the moment, our global Central Bank Monitors – a compilation of economic and financial variables that influence monetary policy decisions – are all signaling a need for rate cuts (Chart 5). This is a function of sluggish growth & weak inflation. The plunge in global government bond yields already reflects that dovish shift in market expectations for central banks. Our 12-month discounters, which measure the expected change in short-term interest rates over the next year as extracted from OIS curves, are all priced for lower policy rates in the US (-97bps as of last Friday’s close), the euro area (-15bps) the UK (-35bps), Japan (-17bps), Canada (-72bps) and Australia (-46bps) (Chart 6). In the US, the current level of the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield is consistent with the extended slump in US industrial activity – as measured by the fall in the ISM manufacturing index – and risk-off sentiment measures like the CRB Raw Industrials/Gold price ratio (Chart 7). Yet at the same time, financial conditions remain very accommodative despite last week’s selloff, suggesting that the US economy can potentially weather a bout of COVID-19 uncertainty – as long as the Fed does not disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than the market is demanding and creating another down leg in the equity market. Chart 7UST Yields Need To Stay Lower For Longer UST Yields Need To Stay Lower For Longer UST Yields Need To Stay Lower For Longer Outside the US, other central banks that have non-zero policy rates – like the Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of Australia and Bank of England – can deliver on the rate cuts discounted in their OIS curves to fight a COVID-19 global growth downturn, if needed. Chart 8UST Bullishness Still Not At Historical Extremes UST Bullishness Still Not At Historical Extremes UST Bullishness Still Not At Historical Extremes The negative rate club of the ECB and BoJ, however, is far less likely to actually cut rates and will rely on greater asset purchases and forward guidance to try and provide more policy stimulus. We prefer to view duration exposure – on a tactical basis – as a hedge to owning risk assets like corporate bonds, where we see some value now opening up after last week’s selloff, rather than a way to express a directional view on interest rates where we have less visibility and conviction. So what should a bond investor do with duration exposure? It is a difficult call with so many uncertainties on global growth momentum, the spread of the virus outside China, the size of any monetary or fiscal policy stimulus measures, and the degree of risk aversion still evident in financial markets. We prefer to view duration exposure – on a tactical basis – as a hedge to owning risk assets like corporate bonds, where we see some value now opening up after last week’s selloff, rather than a way to express a directional view on interest rates where we have less visibility and conviction. Therefore, we are raising our recommended overall duration exposure to neutral this week on a tactical basis. At the same time, we are maintaining an underweight stance on government bonds versus an overweight on corporate debt. We think a true bottom in yields will be reached when there are more decisive signs that bond positioning has reached a bullish extreme, according to indicators like the JP Morgan duration survey and the Market Vane US Treasury bullish sentiment index (Chart 8). In our model bond portfolio, we are expressing that extension of duration by shifting exposure from shorter maturity buckets to longer duration buckets in most countries. While also increasing exposure to “higher-beta” government bond markets like the US and Canada, at the expense of lower-beta Japanese government bonds. Bottom Line: Raise overall global duration exposure to neutral on a tactical basis (0-3 months) until there is greater clarity on the full magnitude of the hit to global growth from the COVID-19 outbreak. Increase allocations to countries with higher yield betas, like the US and Canada, at the expense of low-beta markets like Japan. What To Do Next On … Spread Product Allocations Chart 9US HY Selloff Was Focused On Energy Names US HY Selloff Was Focused On Energy Names US HY Selloff Was Focused On Energy Names Last week’s equity market meltdown did spill over into corporate bond markets, with credit spreads widening for both investment grade and high-yield corporate debt in the US and Europe. In the US, however, the jump in high-yield spreads was particularly acute among Energy names, with the index option-adjusted spread (OAS) climbing over 1000bps as oil prices plunged (Chart 9). US high-yield ex-energy has been relatively more stable, with the spread climbing to 436bps, despite the surge in equity volatility. Stepping back and looking at US investment grade and high-yield corporates, more broadly, last week’s selloff has restored some value, most notably in high-yield. Stepping back and looking at US investment grade and high-yield corporates, more broadly, last week’s selloff has restored some value, most notably in high-yield.  According to our framework for calculating spread targets for global credit, last week’s selloff pushed US investment grade spreads back to our spread targets from very expensive levels (Chart 10).1 Baa-rated US investment-grade moved slightly above our spread target, but we would describe investment grade spreads as now overall fairly valued. US high-yield spreads, on the other hand, have widened well in excess of our spread targets across all credit rating tiers (Chart 11). Chart 10US Investment Grade Spreads Now Fairly Valued US Investment Grade Spreads Now Fairly Valued US Investment Grade Spreads Now Fairly Valued Chart 11US High-Yield Spreads Look Very Cheap US High-Yield Spreads Look Very Cheap US High-Yield Spreads Look Very Cheap In our framework, the spread targets are determined by looking at 12-month breakeven spreads – the amount of spread widening necessary to eliminate the yield cushion of owning corporates over government bonds on a one-year horizon – relative to their long-run history. We group those spreads according to phases of the monetary policy cycle, as defined by the slope of the US Treasury yield curve. The spread target is then calculated based on the median breakeven spread for that phase of the cycle. Currently, we are in “Phase 2” of the policy cycle, which means that the Treasury yield curve (10-year minus 3-year) is positively sloped between 0 and 50bps. In Charts 10 & 11, we add a new wrinkle to our existing way to present the spread targets. We also calculate the targets using the 25th and 75th percentile observations for the breakeven spreads for that phase of the monetary policy cycle. This gives us a range for the spread target that encompasses more of the historical data. Given the improved valuations in US junk bonds, however, we think increasing allocations in our model bond portfolio makes sense. The spread widening in US high-yield has very clearly restored value to spreads, which are well above the upper level of our spread target range. The same cannot be said for US investment grade, where spreads are in the middle of the target range. Chart 12European Corporates Now Offer Better Value European Corporates Now Offer Better Value European Corporates Now Offer Better Value Based on this analysis, we remain comfortable in maintaining our neutral recommended stance on US investment grade corporates and overweight stance on US high-yield. Given the improved valuations in US junk bonds, however, we think increasing allocations in our model bond portfolio makes sense. Thus, this week, we are adding to our recommended high-yield exposure (see Page 12). That increased allocation is “funded” by reducing our US Agency MBS exposure from overweight to neutral. Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy are concerned that MBS spreads are likely to widen in the next few months to reflect the higher prepayment risk from the recent steep fall in US mortgage rates. One final note: our spread target framework for euro area corporates also indicates that last week’s global risk-off event also restored some value to European credit (Chart 12). Thus, we are maintaining our recommended overweights for both euro area investment grade and high-yield. Bottom Line: The widening of global corporate bond spreads during last week’s equity market correction was relatively modest, suggesting that the COVID-19 outbreak has not become a credit event that raises downgrade/default risks. Maintain an overall overweight allocation to global corporates versus government bonds. Downgrade US MBS to neutral, however, given the risk of higher prepayments from falling mortgage rates.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We presented our framework for calculating global corporate spread targets, which builds on the work from our US Bond Strategy sister service, back in January. Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds", dated January 21, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index What Bond Investors Should Do After The "Great Correction" What Bond Investors Should Do After The "Great Correction" ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Dear Client, This week, we had originally planned to publish a Special Report introducing a framework for modeling and selecting global yield curve trades. In light of the market turbulence of the past few days, however, we felt the need to provide a short note updating our current thoughts on the expanding threats to the global economy and financial markets from the coronavirus (a.k.a. 2019-nCoV, COVID-19). Thus, this week, you will be receiving two reports from BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy. Kind regards, Robert Robis Feature The news of more occurrences of the COVID-19 virus in countries outside China – South Korea, Italy, Iran, and Israel – has created a new wave of fear among investors who had started to see signs that the spread of the virus was losing some momentum in China. The appearance of COVID-19 infections in countries like Italy, where there was no obvious connection to the epicenter in China, raised new concerns that the outbreak could turn into a true global pandemic that would be a major negative shock to global growth. The latest market moves fit the profile of a major risk-off move driven by higher uncertainty. Global equities have sold off sharply over the past two trading sessions, and volatility measures like the VIX have spiked. The 10-year US Treasury yield reached a new all-time low (on an intraday basis) of 1.35% yesterday, leaving it -18bps below the 3-month US Treasury bill rate. That curve inversion has occurred alongside falling TIPS breakevens and rising expectations of Fed rate cuts in 2020, in a familiar parallel to the “tariff war shock” of 2019 that prompted the Fed to lower the funds rate by a cumulative 75bps. We see some similarities today to a more recent “black swan” event: the June 2016 UK Brexit vote, which was when the previous intraday all-time low in US Treasury yields was reached. Yield movements have been somewhat smaller in other countries where yields were already very low to begin with, like the 10-year German bund reaching -0.49% and 10-year UK Gilt hitting 0.54% yesterday. Global credit markets have also underperformed, with corporate bond spreads widening alongside spiking equity market volatility in the US and Europe. Amidst the fear, investors have been searching for a potential roadmap to follow, for economies and financial markets, based on past viral outbreaks like the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2009 global swine flu (H1N1) pandemic. We see some similarities today to a more recent “black swan” event: the June 2016 UK Brexit vote, which was when the previous intraday all-time low for US Treasury yields was reached. After that stunning electoral outcome, investors worldwide tried to process the potential negative implications of an unexpected political outcome. Risk assets sold off and government bonds rallied sharply. Global policymakers responded with various easing measures, both direct (rate cuts and fresh QE from the Bank of England) and indirect (delayed Fed rate hikes, more QE from the ECB). This all came at a time when global growth momentum was already picking up before the Brexit vote, stoked by large-scale fiscal and monetary stimulus in China (Chart 1). In the end, the supportive monetary/fiscal backdrop, and not the political uncertainty, won out and the global economy – along with risk assets and bond yields – all recovered over the second half of 2016. Chart 1Doomsday? Or 2016 Revisited? The Pandemic Panic The Pandemic Panic Today, policymakers are starting to mobilize to fight the threat to growth from COVID-19, hinting at potential monetary easing measures. China is already set to deliver more monetary and fiscal easing, although it is not clear if those will be on the same massive scale as 2015/16. While the scale of the shock to global growth from a potential pandemic is obviously far different than the political uncertainty of Brexit, stimulus measures in 2020 could generate a similar positive response from financial markets if the coronavirus impacts growth less than currently feared. So what should investors expect next? We admit that we do not have a strong conviction level on near-term market moves, given how the coronavirus outbreak has set off an unpredictable chain of events that has gone against our base case expectation of a global growth rebound in 2020. Yet amidst all the uncertainty and fear, we can hazard a few guesses as to the potential future moves in global bond markets. For riskier borrowers, the ability to service debt is what matters most, and the majority of borrowers can still meet their interest payments with global borrowing costs near all-time lows. DURATION: A lot of bad news is discounted in current global bond yield levels, both in terms of absolute levels and expected rate cuts. Yet until there are signs of the virus being contained, both within and outside China, investors will continue to seek out hedges for the uncertainty. That means the any challenge to the current downward momentum in yields may not become evident until the economic data releases begin to show signs of a Q2 recovery from what is assuredly going to be an awful Q1 for the global economy. YIELD CURVE: A continuation of the risk-off momentum in global equity markets will put additional bull-flattening pressure on developed market government bond yield curves in the near term. The more medium-term move, however, should be towards steeper yield curves. Either the viral outbreak becomes contained and/or the growth shock is minimized, triggering a reversal of the latest risk-off bull flattening into risk-on bear-steepening; or the economic downturn and risk asset selloff intensifies and central banks deliver rate cuts that will bull-steepen global yield curves. CREDIT: Global corporate bond spreads should remain under upward pressure in the near term until the spread of the coronavirus outbreak begins to ease. However, the cumulative spread widening in credit markets could turn out to be surprisingly modest. The conditions that are typically in place before credit bear markets and periods of sustained spread widening – tight monetary policy and rapidly deteriorating corporate financial health – are not currently in place. This is true in both the US and Europe for high-yield, where our bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors are still sending a neutral message – thanks largely to interest coverage ratios that are still above typical pre-recessionary levels (Chart 2). For riskier borrowers, the ability to service debt is what matters most, and the majority of borrowers can still meet their interest payments with global borrowing costs near all-time lows - even in the event of a sharp, but short, global economic slowdown. Chart 2Low Yields Supporting High-Yield Borrowers The Pandemic Panic The Pandemic Panic   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com  

Highlights Analyses on Asian semis, Argentina and Russia are available on pages 7, 12 and 14, respectively. The most likely trajectory for Chinese growth will be as follows: the initial plunge in business activity will be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, that quick rebound will probably be followed by weaker growth. Financial markets will soon focus on growth beyond the temporary rebound. In our opinion, it will be weaker than markets are currently pricing. Thus, risks for EM risk assets and currencies are skewed to the downside. A major and lasting selloff in EM stocks will only occur if EM corporate bond yields rise. In this week’s report we discuss what it will take for EM corporate credit spreads to widen. Feature The downside risks to EM risk assets and currencies are growing. We continue to recommend underweighting EM equities, credit and currencies versus their DM counterparts. Today we are initiating a short position in EM stocks in absolute terms. Chart I-1 illustrates that the total return index (including carry) of EM ex-China currencies versus the US dollar has failed to break above its 2019 highs, and has rolled over decisively.  In contrast, the trade-weighted US dollar has exhibited a bullish technical configuration by rebounding from its 200-day moving average (Chart I-2). Odds are the dollar will make new highs. An upleg in the greenback will foreshadow a relapse in EM financial markets. Chart I-1EM Ex-China Currencies Have Been Struggling Despite Low US Rates EM Ex-China Currencies Have Been Struggling Despite Low US Rates EM Ex-China Currencies Have Been Struggling Despite Low US Rates Chart I-2The US Dollar Remains In A Bull Market The US Dollar Remains In A Bull Market The US Dollar Remains In A Bull Market   Growth Trajectory After The Dust Settles The evolution of the coronavirus remains highly uncertain and unpredictable. As with any pandemic or virus outbreak, its evolution will be complex with non-trivial odds of a second wave. Even under the assumption that the epidemic will be fully contained by the end of March, its economic impact on the Chinese and Asian economies will likely be greater than global financial markets are currently pricing. As investors come to the realization that this initial pick-up in economic activity after the virus outbreak will be followed by weaker growth, the odds of a selloff in equities and credit markets will rise. In our January 30 report titled Coronavirus Versus SARS: Mind The Economic Differences, we argued that using the framework from the SARS outbreak to analyze the current epidemic is inappropriate. First, only a small portion of the Chinese economy was shut down in 2003, and for a brief period of time. The current closures and limited operations are much more widespread and likely more prolonged. Table I-1China’s Importance Now And In 2003 EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown Second, China accounts for a substantially larger share of the global economy today than it did in 2003 (Table I-1). Hence, the global business cycle is presently much more sensitive to demand and production in the mainland than it was during the SARS outbreak. Global financial markets have rebounded following the initial selloff in late January on expectations that the Chinese and global economies will experience a V-shaped recovery. In last week’s report, we discussed why the odds favor a tepid recovery for the Chinese business cycle and global trade. The main point of last week’s report was as follows: with the median company and household in China being overleveraged, any reduction in cash flow or income will undermine their ability to service their debt and will dent their confidence for some time. Hence, consumption, investment and hiring over the next several months will be negatively affected, even after the outbreak is contained. This in turn will diminish the multiplier effect of policy stimulus in China. Chart I-3Our Expectations Of China’s Business Cycle EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown The most likely pattern for Chinese growth will likely resemble the trajectory demonstrated in Chart I-3. It assumes the plunge in business activity will be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, that snap-back will likely be followed by weaker growth, for reasons discussed in last week’s report. Equity and credit markets in Asia and worldwide have been sanguine because they have so far focused exclusively on expectations of a sharp rebound. As investors come to the realization that this initial pick-up in economic activity will be followed by weaker growth, the odds of a selloff in equities and credit markets will rise. Bottom Line: The most likely trajectory for Chinese and Asian growth will be as follows: the initial plunge in business activity will be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, that quick rebound will probably be followed by weaker growth. Financial markets are not pricing in this scenario. Thus, risks are skewed to the downside for EM risk assets and currencies. The Missing Ingredient For An Equity Selloff The missing ingredient for a selloff in EM equities is rising EM corporate bond yields. Chart I-4 illustrates that bear markets in EM stocks typically occur when EM US dollar corporate bond yields are rising. Hence, what matters for the direction of EM share prices is not risk-free rates/yields but EM corporate borrowing costs. Chart I-4The Destiny Of EM Equities Is DependEnt On EM Corporate Bond Yields The Destiny Of EM Equities is DependEnt On EM Corporate Bond Yields The Destiny Of EM Equities is DependEnt On EM Corporate Bond Yields EM (and US) corporate bond yields can rise under the following circumstances: (1) when US Treasury yields are ascending more than corporate credit spreads are tightening; (2) when credit spreads are widening more than Treasury yields are falling; or (3) when both government bond yields and corporate credit spreads are increasing simultaneously. Provided the backdrop of weaker growth is bullish for government bonds, presently corporate bond yields can only rise if credit spreads widen by more than the drop in Treasury yields. In short, the destiny of EM equities currently relies on corporate spreads. A major and lasting selloff in EM stocks will only occur if their respective corporate bond yields rise. From a historical perspective, EM and US corporate credit spreads are currently extremely tight (Chart I-5). A China-related growth scare could trigger a widening in EM corporate credit spreads. As this occurs, corporate bond yields will climb, causing share prices to plummet. EM corporate spreads have historically been correlated with EM exchange rates, the global/Chinese business cycle, and commodities prices (Chart I-6). The Chinese property market plays an especially pivotal role for the outlook of EM corporate spreads. Chart I-5EM And US Corporate Spread Remain Tame EM And US Corporate Spread Remain Tame EM And US Corporate Spread Remain Tame Chart I-6EM Corporate Spreads Inversely Correlate With EM Currencies And Commodities Prices EM Corporate Spreads Inversely Correlate With EM Currencies And Commodities Prices EM Corporate Spreads Inversely Correlate With EM Currencies And Commodities Prices   First, offshore bonds issued by mainland property developers account for a large share of the EM corporate bond index. Chart I-7China Property Market Will Continue Disappointing China Property Market Will Continue Disappointing China Property Market Will Continue Disappointing Second, swings in China’s property markets often drive the mainland’s business cycle and its demand for resources, chemicals and industrial machinery. In turn, Chinese imports of commodities affect both economic growth and exchange rates of EM ex-China. Finally, the latter two determine the direction of EM ex-China corporate spreads. China’s construction activity and property developers were struggling before the coronavirus outbreak (Chart I-7). Given their high debt burden, the ongoing plunge in new property sales and their cash flow will not only weigh on their debt sustainability but also force them to curtail construction activity. The latter will continue suppressing commodities prices. The sensitivity of EM corporate spreads to these variables have in recent years diminished because of the unrelenting search for yield by global investors. As QE policies by DM central banks have removed some $9 trillion of high-quality securities from circulation, the volume of securities available in the markets has shrunk. This has distorted historical correlations of EM corporate spreads with their fundamental drivers – namely, China’s construction activity, commodities prices, EM exchange rates and the global trade cycle. Nonetheless, EM corporate credit spreads’ sensitivity to these variables has diminished, but has not vanished outright. If EM currencies depreciate meaningfully, commodities prices plunge and China’s growth and the global trade cycle disappoint, odds are that EM corporate spreads will widen. Given that credit markets are already in overbought territory, any selloff could trigger a cascading effect, resulting in meaningful credit-spread widening. Bottom Line: A major and lasting selloff in EM stocks will only occur if their respective corporate bond yields rise. The timing is uncertain, but the odds of EM corporate credit spreads widening are mounting as Chinese growth underwhelms, commodities prices drop and EM currencies depreciate. If these trends persist, they will push EM shares prices over the cliff. As to today’s recommendation to short the EM stock index, we anticipate at least a 10% selloff in EM stocks in US-dollar terms. For currency investors, we are maintaining our shorts in a basket of EM currencies versus the dollar. This basket includes the BRL, CLP, COP, ZAR, KRW, IDR and PHP. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Are Semiconductor Stocks Facing An Air Pocket? Global semiconductor share prices have continued to hit new highs, even though there has not been any recovery (positive growth) in global semiconductor sales or in their corporate earnings (EPS). The coronavirus outbreak and the resulting delay in 5G phone sales in China in the first half of 2020 will trigger a pullback in semiconductor equities. Global semiconductor sales bottomed on a rate-of-change basis in June, but their annual growth rate was still negative in December. In the meantime, global semi share prices have been rallying since January 2019. This divergence between stock prices and revenue of global semiconductor stocks is unprecedented (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Over-Hyped Global Semi Share Prices Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices Over-Hyped Global Semi Share Prices Global Semiconductor Market: Sales & Share Prices Over-Hyped Global Semi Share Prices Odds are that global semi stocks in general, and Asian ones in particular, will experience a pullback in the coming weeks. The coronavirus outbreak will likely dampen expectations related to the speed of 5G adoption and penetration in China. Critically, China accounted for 35% of global semiconductor sales in 2019, versus 19% for the US and 10% for the whole of Europe. In brief, semiconductor demand from China is now greater than the US and European demand combined. Furthermore, the latest news that the US administration is considering changing its regulations to prevent shipments of semiconductor chips to China’s Huawei Technologies from global companies - including Taiwan's TSMC - could hurt chip stocks further. Since Huawei Technologies is the global leader in 5G networks and smartphones, the ban, if implemented, will instigate a sizable setback to 5G adoption in China and elsewhere. Table II-1Industry Forecasts Of The 2020 Global 5G- Smartphone Shipments EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown EM: Growing Risk Of A Breakdown Our updated estimate of global 5G smartphone shipments is between 160 million and 180 million units in 2020, which is below the median of industry expectations of 210 million units (Table II-1). The key reasons why the industry’s expectations are unreasonably high, in our opinion, are as follows: Chinese demand for new smartphones will likely stay weak (Chart II-2). The mainland smartphone market has become extremely saturated, with 1.3 billion units having been sold in just the past three years – nearly equaling the entire Chinese population. Chinese official data show that each Chinese household owned 2.5 phones on average in 2018, and that the average household size was about three persons (Chart II-3). This suggests that going forward nearly all potential phone demand in China is for replacement phones, and that there is no urgent need for households to buy new phones. Chart II-2Chinese Smartphone Demand: Further Decline In 2020 Chinese Smartphone Demand: Further Decline In 2020 Chinese Smartphone Demand: Further Decline In 2020 Chart II-3Chinese Households: No Urgent Need For A New Phone Chinese Households: No Urgent Need For A New Phone Chinese Households: No Urgent Need For A New Phone   The Chinese government’s boost to 5G infrastructure investment will likely increase annual installed 5G base stations from 130,000 units last year to about 600,000 to 800,000 this year. However, the total number of 5G base stations will still only account for about 7-9% of total base stations in China in 2020. Hence, geographical coverage will not be sufficiently wide enough to warrant a very high rate of 5G smartphone adoption and penetration. From Chinese consumers’ perspectives, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a ‘nice-to-have,’ but not a ‘must-have.’ Given increasing economic uncertainty and many concerns related to the use of 5G phones, mainland consumers may delay their purchases into 2021 when 5G phone networks will have more geographic coverage.  The number of 5G phone models on the market is expanding, but not that quickly. Consumers may take their time to wait for more models to hit the market before making a 5G phone purchase. For example, Apple will release four 5G phone models, but only in September 2020. Moreover, the price competition between 5G and 4G phones is getting increasingly intense. Smartphone producers have already started to cut prices of their 4G phones aggressively. For example, the price of Apple’s iPhone XS, released in September 2018, has already dropped by about 50% in China. Outside of China, 5G infrastructure development will be much slower. The majority of developed countries will likely give in to pressure from the US and limit their use of Huawei 5G equipment. This will delay infrastructure installation and adoption of 5G throughout the rest of the world because Huawei has the leading and cheapest 5G technology. In 2019, China accounted for about 70% of worldwide 5G smartphone shipments. We reckon that in 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments will be between 120 million and 130 million units. Assuming this accounts for about 70-75% of the world shipment of 5G phones this year, we arrive at our estimate of global 5G smartphone shipments of between 160 million and 180 million units. We agree that 5G technology is revolutionary. Nevertheless, we still believe global semi share prices are presently overhyped by unreasonably optimistic 2020 projections. Overall, investors are pricing global semi stocks using the pace and trajectory of 4G smartphones adoption. However, in 2020 the number and speed of 5G phone penetration will continue lagging that of 4G ones when the latter were introduced in December 2013 (Chart II-4). We agree that 5G technology is revolutionary, and its adoption and penetration will surge in the coming years. Nevertheless, we still believe global semi share prices are presently overhyped by unreasonably optimistic 2020 projections (Chart II-5).  Chart II-4China 5G-Adoption Pace: Slower Than The Case With 4G China 5G-Adoption Pace: Slower Than The Case With 4G China 5G-Adoption Pace: Slower Than The Case With 4G Chart II-5Net Earnings Of Global Semi Sector: Too Optimistic? Net Earnings Of Global Semi Sector: Too Optimistic? Net Earnings Of Global Semi Sector: Too Optimistic?   Investment Implications Global semi stocks’ valuations are very elevated, as shown in Chart II-6 and Chart II-7. Besides, semi stocks are overbought, suggesting they could correct meaningfully if lofty growth expectations currently baked into their prices do not materialize in the first half of this year. Chart II-6Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated Chart II-7Global Semi Stocks’ Valuations: Very Elevated Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated   The coronavirus outbreak and the resulting delay in 5G phone sales in China in the first half of 2020, along with US pressure on global semi producers not to sell to Huawei, will likely trigger a pullback in semiconductor equities. We recommend patiently waiting for a better entry point for absolute return investors. Within the EM equity universe, we have not been underweight Asian semi stocks because of our negative outlook for the overall EM equity benchmark. The Argentine government will drag out foreign debt negotiations with the IMF and foreign private creditors to secure a more favorable settlement. We remain neutral on Taiwan and overweight Korea. The reason is that DRAM makers such as Samsung and Hynix have rallied much less than TSMC. Besides, geopolitical risks in relation to Taiwan in general and TSMC in particular are rising, warranting a more defensive stance on Taiwanese stocks relative to Korean equities. Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Argentina’s Eternal Tango With Foreign Creditors Chart III-1Downside Risks To Bond Prices Downside Risks to Bond Prices Downside Risks to Bond Prices Our view remains that debt negotiations will be drawn-out because the Argentine government is both unwilling and lacks the financial capacity to service public foreign debt. The administration’s recent attitude toward foreign creditors and the IMF have startled markets: sovereign Eurobond bond prices have tanked (Chart III-1). The reasons why the Fernandez administration will play tough ball with creditors and the IMF are as follows: The country’s foreign funding and the public sector debt situations are precarious. Hence, the lower the recovery rate they negotiate with creditors, the more funds will be available to expand social programs and secure domestic political support. Given Fernandez’s and Peronist’s voter base, the government is inclined to please the population at expense of foreign creditors. Moreover, Alberto Fernandez is facing increasing scrutiny from radical Peronists, who want to dissolve the debt altogether. Vice-president Fernandez de Kirchner stated that Argentina should not pay international agents until the economy escapes a recession. To further add to creditors’ frustration, the government has yet to announce a comprehensive economic plan to revive the economy and service outstanding debt. The public foreign currency debt burden is unsustainable – its level stands at $250 billion, about 4 times larger than exports. The country is still in a recession, and economic indicators do not show much improvement. Committing to fiscal austerity to service foreign debt would entail further economic suffering for Argentine businesses and households, something Fernandez rejected throughout his campaign. The authorities are singularly focused on reviving the economy: government expenditures have grown by over 50% annually under the current administration (Chart III-2). Crucially, Argentina has already achieved a large trade surplus and its current account balance is approaching zero (Chart III-3). Assuming exports stay flat, the economy can afford to maintain its current level of imports. This makes the authorities less willing to compromise and more inclined to adopt a tough stance in debt negotiations. Chart III-2Peronist Government Has Again Boosted Fiscal Spending Peronist Government Has Again Boosted Fiscal Spending Peronist Government Has Again Boosted Fiscal Spending Chart III-3Argentina: Current Account Is Almost Balanced Argentina: Current Account Is Almost Balanced Argentina: Current Account Is Almost Balanced   The risk of this negotiation strategy is that the nation will not be able to raise foreign funding for a while. Nevertheless, the country is currently de facto not receiving any external financing. Hence, this risk is less pressing. Moreover, the administration has already delayed all US$ bond payments until August. This allows them to extend negotiations with creditors over the next six months, thereby increasing uncertainty and further pushing down bond prices. A lower market price on Argentine bonds is beneficial for the government’s negotiation strategy as it implies lower expectations for foreign creditors. Thus, the Fernandez administration’s strategy will be to play hardball and draw-out negotiations as long as possible. We expect Argentina to reach a settlement with creditors no earlier than in the third quarter of this year and at recovery rates below current prices of the nation’s Eurobonds. Russian financial assets will be supported due to improving public sector governance, accelerating domestic demand growth and healthy macro fundamentals. Bottom Line: The government will drag out foreign debt negotiations with the IMF and foreign private creditors to secure a more favorable settlement. Continue to underweight Argentine financial assets over the next several months. Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Russia: Harvesting The Benefits Of Macro Orthodoxy Russian financial markets have shown resilience in face of falling oil prices. This has been the upshot of the nation’s prudent macro policies in recent years. We have been positive on Russia and overweight Russian markets over the past two years and this stance remains intact. Going forward, Russian financial assets will be supported due to improving public sector governance, accelerating domestic demand growth and healthy macro fundamentals: Fiscal policy will be relaxed substantially – both infrastructure and social spending will rise. Specifically, the Kremlin is eager to ramp up the national projects program. This is bullish for domestic demand. Russia’s public finances are currently in a very healthy state. Public debt (14% of GDP) is minimal and foreign public debt (4% of GDP) is tiny. The overall fiscal balance is in large surplus (2.7% of GDP). The current account is also in surplus. Hence, a major boost in fiscal spending will not undermine Russia’s macro stability for some time. As a major sign of policy change, President Putin has sidelined or reduced the authority of policymakers who have been advocating tight fiscal policy. This policy change has been overdue as fiscal policy has been unreasonably tight for longer than required (Chart IV-1). Chart IV-1Russia: Government Spending Has Been Extremely Weak Russia: Government Spending Has Been Extremely Weak Russia: Government Spending Has Been Extremely Weak Importantly, the recent changes at the highest levels of government are also positive for governance and productivity. The new Prime Minister Mishustin has earned this appointment for his achievements as the head of the federal tax authority. He has restructured and reorganized the tax department in a way that has boosted its efficiency/productivity substantially and increased tax collection. By promoting him to the head of government, Putin has boosted Mishustin’s authority to reform the entire federal governance system. Given his record of accomplishment, odds are that the new prime minister will succeed in implementing some reforms and restructuring. Thereby, productivity growth that has been stagnant in Russia for a decade could revive modestly. Also, Putin was reluctant to boost infrastructure spending as he was afraid of money being misappropriated without a proper monitoring system. Putin now hopes Mishustin can introduce an efficient governance system of fiscal spending to assure infrastructure projects can be realized with reasonably minimal losses. As to monetary policy, real interest rates are still very high. The prime lending rate is 10%, the policy rate is 6% and nominal GDP growth is 3.3% (Chart IV-2). Weak growth (Chart IV-3) and low inflation will encourage the central bank to continue cutting interest rates. Chart IV-2Russia: Interest Rates Remain Excessively High Russia: Interest Rates Remain Excessively High Russia: Interest Rates Remain Excessively High Chart IV-3Russia's Growth Is Very Sluggish Russia's Growth Is Very Sluggish Russia's Growth Is Very Sluggish   Finally, the economy does not have any structural excesses and imbalances. The central bank has done a good job in cleansing the banking system and the latter is in healthy shape. Bottom Line: The ruble will be supported by improving productivity, cyclical growth acceleration and a healthy fiscal position. We continue recommending overweighting Russian stocks, local currency bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Last week, we also recommended a new trade: Short Turkish bank stocks / long Russian bank stocks. The main risk to the absolute performance of Russian markets is another plunge in oil prices and a broad selloff in EM. On November 14, 2019 we recommended absolute return investors to go long Russian local currency bonds and short oil. This strategy remains intact. Finally, we have been recommending the long ruble / short Colombian peso trade since May 31, 2018. This position has generated large gains and we are reiterating it. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Global Growth & Market Volatility: Fears over global growth have pushed government bond yields lower as markets discount dovish monetary policy responses to the China viral outbreak. That combination may, perversely, be helping keep risk assets stable, even as investors try to assess the potential hit to global growth from a sharp China demand shock, through lower interest rate and currency volatility. Tactical Trade Overlay: We are in the process of revamping our Tactical Trade Overlay framework, thus we are closing all our recommended current positions this week. We will begin unveiling the new trade selection process - with more specific rules on idea development, holding period, security selection and performance measurement - in the coming weeks. Feature Chart of the WeekLow Inflation Sustaining The Low Volatility Backdrop Low Inflation Sustaining The Low Volatility Backdrop Low Inflation Sustaining The Low Volatility Backdrop The timing of the coronavirus outbreak in China has introduced uncertainty into what was looking like a true bottom in global growth after the 2019 slowdown. The epicenter of that improvement seen in measures like the global PMI was China, where not only was there a visible pickup in soft data like the manufacturing PMI about also hard data like import growth. The coronavirus outbreak - and the severe actions to contain its spread via widespread quarantines, factory shutdowns, supply chain disruptions and travel bans – has most likely triggered a “sudden stop” in Chinese economic growth in the first quarter of the year that will spill over beyond China’s borders. This could potentially snuff out the nascent 2020 global growth recovery if the virus is not soon contained. Global government bond markets, however, have already discounted a fairly sharp slowdown in global activity. 10-year US Treasury yields are back below 1.6%. Inflation expectations across the developed economies remain well below central bank targets and short-term interest markets are discounting additional rate cuts to varying degrees. This has created a backdrop of relative tranquility in interest rate and currency markets, with option implied volatilities for the latter back to post-crisis lows (Chart of the Week). Perversely, the shorter-term uncertainty surrounding the coronavirus outbreak may have created a backdrop for risk assets to stay resilient, by reducing the more longer-lasting uncertainty that comes from interest rate and currency market volatility.  Perversely, the shorter-term uncertainty surrounding the coronavirus outbreak may have created a backdrop for risk assets to stay resilient, by reducing the more longer-lasting uncertainty that comes from interest rate and currency market volatility. If the virus is contained and the hit to the world economy limited to just the first quarter of the year, then our underlying thesis of faster growth underpinning another year of global corporate bond market outperformance versus government bonds will remain intact. Extending The “Sweet Spot” For Global Risk Assets Chart 2How Low Will These Go? How Low Will These Go? How Low Will These Go? Investors are right to be worried about the potential hit to the global economy from China. Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, a modest improvement in Chinese import demand was underway that was finally starting to put a floor under global trade activity after the sharp 2019 downturn (Chart 2). Without that boost from Chinese demand, the world economy will be far less likely to recover in 2020. BCA Research’s Chief Investment Strategist, Peter Berezin, has attempted some back-of-the-envelope calculations to determine the potential hit to global growth from a “sudden stop” of China’s economy from the coronavirus.1 Assuming that real GDP growth will essentially be zero in the first quarter of 2020, Peter calculates that global growth will slow to 1.7% in Q1 – or one-half the IMF’s expected average growth rate for 2020 of 3.4%. The bulk of that effect comes from the direct impact of Chinese growth slowing from a trend pace of 5.5% in Q1, but that also includes spillover effects to the rest of the world from weaker Chinese spending on imported goods and tourism (Chart 3). Chart 3Chinese GDP Growth Will Plunge In Q1, But Should Recover In The Remainder Of 2020 - Provided The Coronavirus Outbreak Is Contained Slow & Steady Wins The Race Slow & Steady Wins The Race Importantly, Peter sees Chinese and global growth recovering during the rest of 2020, if the virus is contained by the end of March. The potential hit to overall global growth this year would only be 0.3 percentage points under that scenario. There is obviously a lot of uncertainty involved in making such estimates, from the timing of the spread of the virus to the potential monetary and fiscal policy responses from China (and other nations) to boost growth. Yet a total hit to global growth of only 0.3 percentage points would be fairly modest and may not end up derailing the signs of an economic rebound seen in indicators like the ZEW economic sentiment surveys. The individual country expectations component of the ZEW survey have shown solid improvements for the US, the UK, the euro area and even Japan over the past few months (Chart 4). Also, the current conditions component of the ZEW survey was just starting to bottom out in the most recent readings in the US, the UK and euro area. We have found that the spread between those two measures (ZEW current conditions minus expectations) is a reliable coincident indicator of year-over-year real GDP growth in the countries surveyed. Chart 4Will The Coronavirus Delay, Or Derail, The Recovery Process? Will The Coronavirus Delay, Or Derail, The Recovery Process? Will The Coronavirus Delay, Or Derail, The Recovery Process? As of the latest read of the data from mid-January – importantly, before the start of the more widespread media coverage of the viral outbreak in China – the “current conditions minus expectations gap” from the ZEW survey was still trending downward (Chart 5). Chart 5The ZEW "Current Vs Expected" Gap Is Still Signaling Soft Global Growth The ZEW "Current Vs Expected" Gap Is Still Signaling Soft Global Growth The ZEW "Current Vs Expected" Gap Is Still Signaling Soft Global Growth In other words, the boost in expectations had not yet translated into in a larger pickup in current economic activity. The risk now is that the turnaround in that gap, and in global GDP growth, will be delayed by a severe pullback in Chinese demand. The response of global business confidence to the virus is critical. According to the Duke University CFO Global Business Outlook survey taken at the end of 2019, more than half (52%) of US CFOs believe the US will be in an economic recession by the end of 2020, and 76% predict a recession by mid-2021. These numbers are similar to the 2018 survey, where 49% of CFOs thought a recession was likely by the end of 2019 and 82% predicted a recession by the end of 2020. The “CFO recession odds” are even larger outside the US, particularly in Asia and Latin America (Chart 6). Chart 6Duke/CFO Survey Respondents' 1-Year-Ahead Probability Of A Recession Slow & Steady Wins The Race Slow & Steady Wins The Race The Duke CFO survey also asks a question on CFO optimism about the outlook for their own businesses. That data, measured on a scale of 0 to 100, shows that companies remain relatively optimistic about their own companies (Chart 7). The levels of optimism at the end of 2019 were roughly the same as at the end of 2018, except for the US where CFO optimism has soared above the highs seen prior to the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 8). Chart 7Duke/CFO Survey Respondents’ Own Company Optimism Level Slow & Steady Wins The Race Slow & Steady Wins The Race Chart 8US Companies Are Thinking Globally, But Acting Locally US Companies Are Thinking Globally, But Acting Locally US Companies Are Thinking Globally, But Acting Locally The interesting implication of this data is that a considerable number of global companies has believed that recession was “only a year or two away” since the end of 2018, but have not expressed similar pessimism when it comes to their own businesses. The extreme financial market volatility at the end of 2018 likely explains why investors thought a recession was likely in 2019 or 2020, while the US-China trade war last year meant those recession fears were “extended” into 2020 and 2021. Yet one big variable changed over that period since the end of 2018 – global monetary policy was eased significantly and bond yields (i.e. borrowing costs) fell sharply for both governments and companies. Looking ahead, the likely policy response to the sharp fall in Chinese growth in Q1/2020 will be continued dovishness from global central bankers. With the US dollar now firming again, in what is shaping up to be a typical response of the greenback to slower global growth expectations, the reflation narrative that was brewing for 2020 has been postponed (Chart 9). With the US dollar now firming again, in what is shaping up to be a typical response of the greenback to slower global growth expectations, the reflation narrative that was brewing for 2020 has been postponed. A softer US dollar is a necessary ingredient for that reflation. Thus, a stable-to-firmer dollar will keep global inflation pressures muted, allowing central banks to maintain their current dovish policy biases. This will help keep market volatility for bonds, currencies and equities subdued – if the China demand shock to global growth is contained to the first quarter. From a fixed income investment perspective, an extended period of low rates/currency volatility, combined with very low government yields already reflecting a sharp global growth slowdown that is not yet assured, is an ideal “sweet spot” backdrop for corporate credit spreads to remain relatively stable. From a fixed income investment perspective, an extended period of low rates/currency volatility, combined with very low government yields already reflecting a sharp global growth slowdown that is not yet assured, is an ideal “sweet spot” backdrop for corporate credit spreads to remain relatively stable (Chart 10). Chart 9Renewed USD Strength Would Delay Global Reflation Renewed USD Strength Would Delay Global Reflation Renewed USD Strength Would Delay Global Reflation We continue to recommend a strategic (6-12 months) overweight allocation to corporate credit versus government bonds for global fixed income investors, focused on high-yield credit in the US. Chart 10Still A Sweet Spot For Global Credit Still A Sweet Spot For Global Credit Still A Sweet Spot For Global Credit Bottom Line: Fears over global growth have pushed government bond yields lower as markets discount dovish monetary policy responses to the China viral outbreak. That combination may, perversely, be helping keep risk assets stable, even as investors try to assess the potential hit to global growth from a sharp China demand shock, through lower interest rate and currency volatility. A Quick Note: Rebooting Our Tactical Trade Overlay Framework Back in 2016, we introduced a part of our service that was separate from our main framework which emphasized medium-term (6-12 month) investment recommendations.2 We called this piece our Tactical Trade Overlay and it was intended to focus on ideas with shorter-term horizons (less than 6-months) with specific “exit strategies”. The majority of past trades included in the Overlay did fit that description. The current list of open positions, however, has drifted away from the original mandate with recommendations now being held far longer than six months. We are in the process of developing a new framework for the Tactical Trade Overlay, with more specific rules on idea development, holding period, security selection and performance measurement. Thus, this week, we are closing out all the recommendations currently in the Overlay (see the table on page 12). The goal is to create a list of trade suggestions for our clients with the capability and/or mandate to seek out “quicker” ideas that can also be implemented in more liquid instruments whenever possible. The new Overlay will also include ideas from smaller fixed income markets not included in our Model Bond Portfolio (i.e. New Zealand or Sweden), but with the same focus on holding periods of six months or less. We will be introducing the new Tactical Overlay framework over the next few months. We plan on publishing separate reports covering the new process for selecting ideas for different types of fixed income trades, similar to the current groupings in the Overlay (rates trades, yield curve trades, relative value trades, inflation trades). The first such report, to be published by the end of February, will introduce a methodology for identifying yield curve trades in global government bond markets.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "From China To Iowa", dated February 7, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "GFIS Overlay Trades Review", dated October 4, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Slow & Steady Wins The Race Slow & Steady Wins The Race Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1The 2003 SARS Roadmap The 2003 SARS Roadmap The 2003 SARS Roadmap The bond market impact from the coronavirus has already been substantial. The 10-year Treasury yield has fallen back to 1.51%, below the fed funds rate. Meanwhile, the investment grade corporate bond index spread is back above 100 bps, from a January low of 93 bps. The 2003 SARS crisis is the best roadmap we can apply to the current situation. Back then, Treasury yields also fell sharply but then rebounded just as quickly when the number of SARS cases peaked (Chart 1). The impact on corporate bond excess returns was more short-lived (Chart 1, bottom panel). Like in 2003, we expect that bond yields will rise once the number of coronavirus cases peaks, but it is difficult to put a timeframe on how long that will take. The economic impact from the virus could also weigh on global PMI surveys during the next few months, delaying the move higher in Treasury yields we anticipated earlier this year. In short, we continue to expect higher bond yields and tighter credit spreads in 2020, but those moves will be delayed until markets are confident that the virus has stopped spreading. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 80 basis points in January. The sector actually outpaced the Treasury benchmark by 7 bps until January 21 when the impact of the coronavirus started to push spreads wider. As stated on page 1, we expect the impact of the coronavirus on corporate spreads to be short lived. Beyond that, low inflation expectations will keep monetary conditions accommodative. This in turn will encourage banks to ease credit supply, keeping defaults at bay and providing a strong tailwind for corporate bond returns.1 Yesterday’s Fed Senior Loan Officer survey showed a slight easing of C&I lending standards in Q4 2019, reversing the tightening that occurred in the third quarter (Chart 2). We expect that accommodative Fed policy will lead to continued easing of C&I lending standards for the remainder of the year. Despite the positive tailwind from accommodative Fed policy and easing bank lending standards, investment grade corporate bond spreads are quite expensive. Spreads for all credit tiers are below our targets (panels 2 & 3).2 As a result, we advise only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds. We also recommend increasing exposure to Agency MBS in place of corporate bonds rated A or higher (see page 7). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Contagion Contagion Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Contagion Contagion High-Yield Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 111 basis points in January. Junk outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 30 bps until January 21 when the coronavirus outbreak sent spreads sharply wider. Once the negative impact of the coronavirus passes, junk spreads will have plenty of room to tighten in 2020. In fact, the junk index spread is now at 390 bps, 154 bps above our target (Chart 3).3 While spreads for all junk credit tiers are currently above our targets, Caa-rated bonds look particularly cheap. We analyzed the divergence between Caa and the rest of the junk index in a recent report and came to two conclusions.4 First, the historical data show that 12-month periods of overall junk bond outperformance are more likely to be followed by underperformance if Caa is the worst performing credit tier. Second, we can identify several reasons for 2019’s Caa spread widening that make us inclined to downplay any negative signal. Specifically, we note that the Caa credit tier’s exposure to the shale oil sector is responsible for the bulk of 2019’s underperformance (bottom panel). Absent significant further declines in the oil price, this sector now has room to recover.   MBS: Overweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 53 basis points in January. The sector was only lagging the Treasury benchmark by 7 bps as of January 21, when the coronavirus outbreak sent spreads wider. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 8 bps in January, driven by a 7 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS) and a 1 bp increase in expected prepayment losses (aka option cost). The fact that expected prepayment losses only rose by a single basis point even though the 30-year mortgage rate fell by 23 bps is notable. It speaks to the high level of refi burnout in the mortgage market, which is a key reason why we prefer mortgage-backed securities over investment grade corporate bonds in our portfolio. Essentially, most homeowners have already had at least one opportunity to refinance during the past few years, so prepayment risk is low even if rates fall further. Competitive expected compensation is another reason to move into Agency MBS. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS is 49 bps, only 7 bps below the spread offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds (Chart 4). Also, spreads for all investment grade corporate bond credit tiers are below our cyclical targets. Risk-adjusted compensation favors MBS even more strongly. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency MBS plot well to the right of investment grade corporates. This means that the sector is less likely to see losses versus Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in January. The index was up 2 bps versus the Treasury benchmark until January 21, when the coronavirus outbreak hit. Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 99 bps on the month, and Foreign Agencies underperformed by 28 bps. Local Authorities, however, bested the Treasury benchmark by 60 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed Treasuries by 2 bps in January, while Supranationals outperformed by 2 bps. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to USD-denominated sovereign bonds, given that spreads remain expensive compared to US corporate credit (Chart 5). However, we noted in a recent report that Mexican and Saudi Arabian sovereigns look attractive on a risk/reward basis.5 This is also true for Local Authorities and Foreign Agencies, as shown in the Bond Map in Appendix C. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service also thinks that worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, and that bond yields embed too high of a risk premium (bottom panel).6  Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 33 basis points in January (before adjusting for the tax advantage). They were up 39 bps versus the Treasury index before the coronavirus outbreak hit on January 21. The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio swung around during the month, but settled close to where it began at 77% (Chart 6). We upgraded municipal bonds in early October, as yield ratios had become significantly more attractive, especially at the long-end of the Aaa curve (panel 2).7 Yield ratios have tightened a lot since then, but value remains at long maturities. Specifically, the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year M/T yield ratios are all below average pre-crisis levels at 62%, 65% and 78%, respectively. But 20-year and 30-year yield ratios stand at 89% and 93%, respectively, above average pre-crisis levels. Fundamentally, state and local balance sheets remain solid. Our Municipal Health Monitor is in “improving health” territory and state & local government interest coverage has improved considerably in recent quarters (bottom panel). Both of these trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outpace downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-flattened dramatically in January. Treasury yields declined across the curve, and the 2/10 slope flattened from 34 bps to 18 bps. The 5/30 slope flattened from 70 bps to 67 bps. Despite the significant flattening, the 2/10 slope remains near the middle of our target 0 – 50 bps range for 2020, and we anticipate some bear-steepening once the coronavirus is contained.8 The front-end of the curve also moved in January to price-in 57 bps of Fed rate cuts during the next 12 months (Chart 7). At the beginning of the year the curve was priced for only 14 bps of rate cuts. We expect that the Fed would respond with rate cuts if the coronavirus epidemic worsens, leading to inversion of the 2/10 yield curve. However, for the time being the safer bet is that the virus will be contained relatively quickly and the Fed will remain on hold for all of 2020. Based on this view, we continue to recommend holding a barbelled Treasury portfolio. Specifically, we favor holding a 2/30 barbell versus the 5-year bullet, in duration-matched terms. The position offers positive carry and looks attractive on our yield curve models (see Appendix B).9  TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 75 basis points in January. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 12 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.66%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 16 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.71%. Both rates remain well below the 2.3%-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s target. The divergence between the actual inflation data and inflation expectations remains stark. Trimmed mean PCE inflation has been fluctuating around the Fed’s target since mid-2018 (Chart 8). However, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain stubbornly low. It takes time for expectations to adapt to a changing macro environment, but even accounting for those long lags, our Adaptive Expectations Model pegs the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate as 31 bps too low (panel 4).10 It is highly likely that the Fed will have to tolerate some overshoot of its 2% inflation target in order to re-anchor long-term inflation expectations. As a result, the actual inflation data will lead expectations higher, causing the TIPS breakeven inflation curve to flatten.11 ABS: Underweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 32 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 14 bps on the month. It currently sits at 26 bps, below its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C) shows that Aaa-rated consumer ABS ranks among the most defensive US spread products. This explains why the sector performed so well in January when other spread sectors struggled. ABS also offer higher expected returns than other low-risk sectors such as Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals. However, we remain wary of allocating too much to consumer ABS because credit trends are slowly shifting in the wrong direction. The consumer credit delinquency rate remains low, but has put in a clear bottom. This is also true for the household interest expense ratio (panel 3). Senior Loan Officers also continue to tighten lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans. Tighter lending standards usually coincide with rising delinquencies (bottom panel). Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 43 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency CMBS tightened 6 bps on the month. It currently sits at 67 bps, below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). In last week’s Special Report, we explored how low interest rates have boosted commercial real estate (CRE) prices this cycle, and concluded that a sharp drawdown in CRE prices is likely only when inflation starts to pick up steam.12 In that report we also mentioned that non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS spreads look attractive relative to US corporate bonds from a risk/reward perspective (see our Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C), and that the macro environment is only slightly unfavorable for CMBS spreads. Specifically, CRE bank lending standards are just in “net tightening” territory. But both lending standards and loan demand are very close to neutral (bottom 2 panels). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 4 bps on the month to reach 54 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer a compelling risk/reward trade-off. An overweight allocation to this sector remains appropriate. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 57 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a flat fed funds rate over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Contagion Contagion Contagion Contagion Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of January 31, 2020) Contagion Contagion Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of January 31, 2020) Contagion Contagion Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 33 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 33 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Contagion Contagion Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Excess Return Bond Map (As Of January 31, 2020) Contagion Contagion ​​​​​​​ Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2  For details on how we calculate our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3  For details on how we calculate our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Perspective On Risk And Reward”, dated October 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Country Insights: Malaysia, Mexico & Central Europe”, dated October 31, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 For further details on our recommended yield curve trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Best Spot On The Yield Curve”, dated January 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 For further details on our Adaptive Expectations Model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11  Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12  Please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability”, dated January 27, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation