Corporate Bonds

Highlights Chart 1Yield Curve Suggests GDP Growth Has Peaked Yield Curve Suggests GDP Growth Has Peaked Yield Curve Suggests GDP Growth Has Peaked Last month we learned that the U.S. economy grew 4.1% in the second quarter, the fastest pace since 2014. The gap between year-over-year nominal GDP growth and the fed funds rate - a reliable recession indicator - also widened considerably (Chart 1). However, our sense is that this might be as good as it gets for the U.S. economy. With fewer unemployed workers than job openings and businesses reporting difficulties finding qualified labor, strong demand will increasingly translate into higher prices rather than more output. Higher interest rates and a stronger dollar will also start to weigh on demand as the Fed responds to rising inflation. For bond investors, it is still too soon to position for slower growth by increasing portfolio duration. Markets are priced for only 83 basis points of Fed tightening during the next 12 months, below the current "gradual" pace of +25 bps per quarter. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 133 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -50 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 14 bps on the month, and currently sits at 109 bps. Corporate bonds remain expensive with 12-month breakeven spreads for both the A and Baa credit tiers near their 25th percentiles since 1989 (Chart 2). Further, with inflation now close to the Fed's target, monetary policy will provide much less support for corporate bond returns going forward. These are two main reasons why we downgraded our cyclical corporate bond exposure to neutral near the end of June.1 Recent revisions to the U.S. National Accounts reveal that gross nonfinancial corporate leverage declined in Q4 2017 and Q1 2018, though from an elevated starting point (panel 4). While strong Q2 2018 profit growth should lead to a further decline when the second quarter data are reported in September, the downtrend in leverage will probably not last through the second half of the year. A rising wage bill and stronger dollar will soon drag profit growth below the rate of debt growth. At that point, leverage will rise. Historically, rising gross leverage correlates with rising corporate defaults and widening corporate bond spreads. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for the second quarter was released yesterday, and it showed that banks continue to ease standards on commercial & industrial loans (bottom panel). Rising corporate defaults tend to coincide with tightening lending standards (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Peak Growth? Peak Growth? Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Peak Growth? Peak Growth? High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 128 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +205 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 27 bps on the month, and currently sits at 334 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses is currently 213 bps, below its long-run mean of 247 bps (Chart 3). This tells us that if default losses during the next 12 months are in line with our expectations, we should expect excess high-yield returns of 213 bps over duration-matched Treasuries, assuming also that there are no capital gains/losses from spread tightening/widening. However, we showed in a recent report that the default loss expectations embedded in our calculation are extremely low relative to history (panel 4).2 Our assumption, derived from the Moody's baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate, calls for default losses of 1.2% during the next 12 months. The only historical period to show significantly lower default losses was 2007, a time when corporate balance sheets were in much better shape than today. While most indicators suggest that default losses will in fact remain low for the next 12 months, historical context clearly demonstrates that the risks are to the upside. It will be critically important to track real-time indicators of the default rate such as job cut announcements, which declined last month but remain above 2017 lows (bottom panel), for signals about whether current default forecasts are overly optimistic. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -4 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread tightened 3 bps on the month, driven by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp tightening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The excess return Bond Map shows that MBS offer a relatively poor risk/reward trade-off, particularly compared to Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS, High-Yield and Sovereigns. However, our Bond Map analysis does not account for the macro environment, which remains very favorable for the sector. In a recent report we showed that the two main factors that influence MBS spreads are mortgage refinancing activity and residential mortgage bank lending standards.3 Refi activity is tepid (Chart 4) and will likely stay that way for the foreseeable future. Only 5.8% of the par value of the Conventional 30-year MBS index carries a coupon above the current mortgage rate, and even a drop in the mortgage rate to below 4% (from its current 4.6%) would only increase the refinanceable percentage to 38%. As for lending standards, yesterday's second quarter Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that they continue to ease (bottom panel), though banks also reported that they remain at the tighter end of the range since 2005. The still-tight level of lending standards suggests that further gradual easing is likely going forward. That will keep downward pressure on MBS spreads. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +2 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 179 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -35 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 24 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -22 bps. Local Authorities outperformed by 33 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +61 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 6 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. Domestic Agency bonds broke even with duration-matched Treasuries in July, keeping year-to-date excess returns steady at -1 bp. The strengthening U.S. dollar is a clear negative for hard currency Sovereign debt (Chart 5) and valuation relative to U.S. corporates remains negative (panel 2). Maintain an underweight allocation to Sovereigns. In contrast, the Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to offer a favorable risk/reward trade-off compared to other fixed income sectors (please see the Bond Maps on page 15). Maintain overweight allocations to both sectors. The Bond Maps also show that while the Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors are very low risk, expected returns are feeble. Both sectors should be avoided. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 66 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +187 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio fell 3% in July to reach 83% (Chart 6). This is more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean and only slightly higher than the average of 81% that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. The total return Bond Map shows that municipal bonds still offer an attractive risk/reward profile for investors who are exposed to the top marginal tax rate. For investors who cannot benefit from the tax exemption there are better alternatives - notably Supranationals, Domestic Agency bonds and Agency CMBS. While value is dissipating, the near-term technical picture remains positive. Fund inflows are strong (panel 2) and visible supply is low (panel 3). Fundamentally, revisions to the GDP data reveal that state & local government net borrowing has been fairly flat in recent years, and in fact probably increased in the second quarter (bottom panel). At least so far, ratings downgrades have not risen alongside higher net borrowing, but this will be crucial to monitor during the next few quarters. Stay tuned. Treasury Curve: Buy The 5/30 Barbell Versus The 10-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve's bear flattening trend continued in July. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 4 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 2 bps, as yields moved higher. Despite the curve flattening, our position long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell returned +8 bps on the month and is now up +30 bps since inception.4 The trade's outperformance is due to the extreme undervaluation of the 7-year bullet versus the 1/20 barbell. As of today, the bullet still plots 12 bps cheap on our model (Chart 7), which translates to an expected 42 bps of 1/20 flattening during the next six months. We view that much flattening as unlikely.5 Table 4 of this report shows that curve steepeners are also cheap at the front-end of the curve, particularly the 2-year bullet over the 1/5 and 1/7 barbells. Meanwhile, barbells are more fairly valued relative to bullets at the long-end of the curve. The 5/30 and 7/30 barbells look particularly attractive relative to the 10-year bullet. We recommend adding a position long the 5/30 barbell and short the 10-year bullet. The 5/30 barbell is close to fairly valued on our model (panel 4), which implies that the 5/10/30 butterfly spread is priced for relatively little change in the 5/30 slope during the next six months. This trade should perform well in the modest curve flattening environment we anticipate, and it provides a partial hedge to our 1/7/20 trade that is geared toward curve steepening. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of August 3, 2018) Peak Growth? Peak Growth? TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 10 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +139 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 2.12%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 8 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.24% (Chart 8). Both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. We expect breakevens will return to that target range as investors become increasingly convinced that the risk of deflation has faded. Consistent inflation prints at or above the Fed's 2% target will be the deciding factor that eventually leads to this upward re-rating of inflation expectations. In that regard, core PCE inflation was relatively weak in June, growing only 0.11% month-over-month. That pace is somewhat below the monthly pace of 0.17% that is necessary to sustain 2% annualized inflation (panel 4). Nevertheless, 12-month core PCE inflation at 1.9% is only just below the Fed's target, and the 6-month rate of change is above 2% on an annualized basis. These readings are confirmed by the Dallas Fed's trimmed mean PCE inflation measure (bottom panel). Maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS relative to nominal Treasury securities for now. We will reduce exposure to TIPS once both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward breakeven rates reach our target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +9 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS narrowed 5 bps on the month and now stands at 38 bps, only 11 bps above its pre-crisis low. The Bond Maps show that consumer ABS continue to offer relatively attractive return potential compared to other low-risk spread products. However, we maintain only a neutral allocation to this space because credit quality trends have started to move against the sector. Despite the large upward revision to the personal savings rate that accompanied the second quarter GDP report, the multi-year uptrend in the household interest coverage ratio remains intact (Chart 9). This will eventually translate into more frequent consumer credit delinquencies, and indeed, the consumer credit delinquency rate appears to have put in a bottom. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey for Q2 was released yesterday and it showed that average consumer credit lending standards tightened for the ninth consecutive quarter (bottom panel). Credit card lending standards tightened for the fifth consecutive quarter, while auto loan standards eased after having tightened in each of the prior eight quarters. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +98 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 71 bps (Chart 10). In a recent report we showed that the macro picture for CMBS is decidedly mixed.6 A typical negative environment for CMBS is characterized by tightening bank lending standards for commercial real estate loans and falling demand. Yesterday's Q2 Senior Loan Officer Survey reported that both lending standards and demand for nonresidential real estate loans were very close to unchanged (bottom two panels). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +31 bps. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 47 bps. The Bond Maps show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of August 3, 2018) Peak Growth? Peak Growth? Chart 12Total Return Bond Map (As Of August 3, 2018) Peak Growth? Peak Growth? Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync", dated July 3, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Balance Sheet Problem", dated July 17, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Balance Sheet Problem", dated July 17, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights U.S. Investment Strategy is getting back to basics: We follow last week's report outlining our stance on interest rates with a review of the credit cycle and its current position. The credit cycle is not just about borrowers: Lender willingness is inversely related to loan performance over a five-year horizon, but it amplifies near-term performance swings. Our bond strategists use three broad indicators to track the credit cycle...: Valuation, monetary conditions and credit quality all offer insight into corporate bond performance. ... and we also consider the fed funds rate cycle: The way that lenders interact with the monetary policy backdrop is discouraging for the course of human evolution, but it follows a well-defined pattern that helps demarcate the credit cycle. The cycle is in its latter stages, and investors should be in the process of dialing down credit exposures: Our bond strategists downgraded spread product to neutral in mid-June, and we won't return to overweight until the next recession is well underway. Feature U.S. Investment Strategy is meant to provide analyses and forecasts of financial markets and the economy for the purpose of helping our clients make asset-allocation decisions. This report continues our focus on going back to the basics of meeting that mandate. Next week's Special Report will present a simple indicator for anticipating the onset of a recession and the end of the equity bull market. After Labor Day, we will publish a Special Report updating, and expanding upon, our work on the fed funds rate cycle. By the unofficial end of the summer, then, we will have outlined our positions on rates, credit, the business cycle, and the state of monetary policy. That will provide us with a framework for evaluating incoming data and engaging in an ongoing investment-focused dialogue. It will also hopefully put us in position to identify the first set of major cyclical inflection points since 2007-8 in a timely fashion. 2019 is shaping up as a pivotal year for asset allocation, and we look forward to navigating it alongside our clients. Lenders Never Learn, Part I: Lending Standards Investors typically think of the credit cycle exclusively in terms of borrower performance. After all, cycle peaks and troughs are defined by default-rate troughs and peaks. There are two parties to every loan, though, and a narrow focus on debtors precludes a full understanding of the landscape. The credit cycle encompasses lender willingness as well as borrower performance. Bad loans are made in good times, just as surely as good loans are made in bad times. Skepticism and gloom carry the day in a recession and its immediate aftermath, and the loans that manage to get made early in the credit cycle are tightly underwritten, insulated with a margin of safety that would warm Benjamin Graham's heart. As the cycle stretches on, however, lenders forget about the trauma of the last downturn and focus more on market share than standards. The fact that standards impact performance with a lag much longer than the annual bonus cycle obscures their importance and helps them persist. Like the rest of us, loan officers and their managers learn best when they receive immediate feedback that clearly results from their decisions. Over the three-decade history of the Federal Reserve's senior loan officer survey the last three cycles, however, it appears that lending standards impact loan performance with as much as a five-year lag. The Chart Of The Week shows the net percentage of loan officers tightening standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to large and mid-sized companies, inverted and advanced by 20 quarters. Easy standards line up with peak defaults, and tight standards align with default troughs. Chart of the WeekLending Standards Are Negatively Correlated With Intermediate-Term Loan Performance ... Lending Standards Are Negatively Correlated With Performance In The Intermediate-Term ... Lending Standards Are Negatively Correlated With Performance In The Intermediate-Term ... The lag between loan approval and loan performance is far too long to reinforce learning, however. Over the course of five years, factors that could not have been foreseen at origination may well end up precipitating a default. Lenders' response to that long-term uncertainty may help explain the positive short-term correlation (Chart 2). Partially goaded by pro-cyclical loan-loss reserve standards, lenders react to surging default rates by getting more conservative, nudging default rates higher in a feedback loop that plants the seeds for strong intermediate-term performance. Chart 2... But They March In Lockstep With Loan Performance In The Near Term ... But They March In Lockstep With Loan Performance In The Near Term ... But They March In Lockstep With Loan Performance In The Near Term Bottom Line: 2014's cyclical bottom in standards suggests that rising default rates will not peak until late 2019 or 2020. Increased near-term lender caution will reinforce the upward move. Tracking The Credit Cycle: Default Rates When the economy is expanding, borrowers in the aggregate find it easier to service their debts, just as recessions make debt service more onerous. The pro-cyclicality of inflation, which eases debt burdens, helps reinforce the relationship. There is more to tracking the credit cycle than tracking the business cycle, however. While defaults have peaked within five months after the end of the last three recessions, default-rate troughs have varied wildly, occurring anywhere from six years before the recession to the month it began (Chart 3). Our credit strategists try to identify the point at which defaults begin to take off by tracking lending standards, monetary conditions, and credit quality. None of these factors suggests that default rates can make new lows. The loan officer survey could improve, but tight spreads leave almost no room for the bond market to become more receptive (Chart 4). Monetary conditions are steadily becoming less accommodative, helped along by the rate-hike/dollar-strength loop (Chart 5). Our bond strategists expect that credit quality will weaken as soon as upward wage pressure snuffs out pre-tax corporate profits'1 ability to keep up with double-digit debt growth. It's hard to say just when default rates will begin to erode total returns in a meaningful way, but our bond strategists are of a mind that risk is rapidly catching up with reward. Chart 3The Business Cycle Reliably Calls Peaks,##BR##But It's No Help With Troughs The Business Cycle Reliably Calls Peaks, But It's No Help With Troughs The Business Cycle Reliably Calls Peaks, But It's No Help With Troughs Chart 4Little Room##BR##For Improvement Little Room For Improvement Little Room For Improvement Chart 5Tightening,##BR##But Not Yet Tight Tightening, But Not Yet Tight Tightening, But Not Yet Tight Tracking The Credit Cycle: Corporate Spreads Chart 6Spreads Aren't Ready To Blow Out Yet Spreads Aren't Ready To Blow Out Yet Spreads Aren't Ready To Blow Out Yet High-yield data only exist for the last two spread-widening episodes, but what they lack in quantity they make up for in consistency. Heading into both the dot-com bust and the financial crisis, spreads did not widen in earnest (Chart 6, top panel) until the Fed had completed its tightening cycle (Chart 6, second panel), BCA's proprietary Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) began to deteriorate (Chart 6, third panel), and lenders tightened their standards (Chart 6, bottom panel). That template suggests that spreads are not poised to blow out anytime soon, as we expect the Fed will not be finished tightening before the end of 2019 (or later), and lenders are still actively easing their standards for commercial borrowers. As noted above, we expect that deterioration in the CHM will pick up again, once runaway profit growth ceases to paper over surging leverage. All in all, our bond strategists do not think it is anywhere near time to panic. As with defaults, they think it is still too soon to expect the beginning of sustained spread widening. On balance, however, the indicators suggest that return expectations should be modest, and limited to coupon yields. It is too late to buy bonds with the expectation of realizing capital gains, and prudent return projections should pencil in some minor capital losses. Lenders Never Learn, Part II: The Fed Funds Rate Cycle The fed funds rate cycle has been a U.S. Investment Strategy pillar, informing many of our views on cycles and asset markets. We will publish a Special Report delving into it more fully the first week of September, but a quick summary is sufficient to illustrate its relevance to the credit cycle. We divide the fed funds rate cycle into four phases based on whether the Fed is hiking rates or cutting them, and whether or not the fed funds exceeds our estimate of the equilibrium rate. Per our stylized representation of the cycle (Chart 7), we are currently in Phase I (the Fed is hiking, but policy remains accommodative) and are likely to remain there until the second half of 2019, when we expect that policy will turn restrictive, ushering in Phase II. While we have found that the level of the fed funds rate trumps its direction when it comes to explaining equity and bond returns, loan growth is more sensitive to the direction of rates. Banks expand their loan books more rapidly when the Fed is tightening than they do when it's easing. The effect is most pronounced for C&I loans, which grow five times faster during rake-hiking campaigns than they do during rate-cutting campaigns (Table 1). The conclusion may seem counter-intuitive on its face, but one must remember that the Fed is charged with leaning against the cycle: it tightens when times are good to keep them from becoming too good, and its eases when times are bad to get the economy back on its feet. Chart 7The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Taking Stock Of The Credit Cycle Taking Stock Of The Credit Cycle Table 1An Example Of What Not To Do Taking Stock Of The Credit Cycle Taking Stock Of The Credit Cycle Lenders who take a countercyclical tack operate with the policy wind at their back. Those who follow the cycle are actually fighting the Fed. Most lenders short-sightedly follow the crowd aping the cycle, basing future projections on the most recent data samples and hewing to career incentives that encourage herding. Bankers who load up on loans when the cycle is demonstrably old and approaching its peak make two errors: they ignore a well-established cyclical pattern (tightening leads recessions, which lead defaults and higher losses given default), and they deploy capital when it's widely available in the marketplace, but husband it when it's scarce. Bottom Line: Banks reinforce the credit cycle by avidly deploying capital when conditions are about to take a turn for the worse, and withholding it when they're about to get better. We recommend investors reject their example, and limit their exposure to spread product. Investment Implications If our view that the Fed is going to hike rates more than the consensus expects is correct, all bonds will have to contend with a persistent headwind. Thanks to positive carry, and high-yield bonds' structurally shorter duration, spread product will be less vulnerable than Treasuries. Our bond strategists are nonetheless lukewarm on the risk-reward offered by investment-grade and high-yield bonds. The cycle is clearly in its latter stages and spreads are historically tight. We remain constructive on both the business cycle and the monetary policy cycle, and we are not yet ready to throw in the towel on the equity bull market. Although our equity take is more sanguine than the BCA consensus, our optimism does not extend to the credit cycle, which has clearly passed its peak. While neither modest spread widening nor a mild pickup in defaults is likely to wipe out all of spread product's excess returns, we do not expect that they will be large enough to merit more than benchmark weighting in balanced portfolios. Our sister Global ETF Strategy service's model portfolios hold benchmark spread-product positions (while underweighting Treasuries, maintaining below-benchmark duration across all bond categories, and overweighting cash) and that is the way we intend to be positioned in the small basket of ETFs we will recommend once we've completed our review of the most impactful macro drivers. A Note On Payrolls Friday's Goldilocks employment situation report for July reinforced our views on the economy and rates, but it was mixed enough to have satisfied anyone's preconceived notions. July's net payroll gains fell shy of the consensus expectation, but revisions to May and June pushed the 3-month moving average of net gains to over 224,000, slightly above expectations. Neither hours worked nor average hourly earnings set off any alarm bells, but the "hidden" unemployment rate slid 30 basis points to 7.5%, the lowest level since May 2001. We see the seeds of future inflation pressures in the continued absorption of slack, and believe that the Fed does as well. We continue to expect four hikes this year and next, two more than the money market is currently discounting. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Annualized profit growth calculated with data from the BEA's National Income and Profit Accounts.

Dear Client, Geopolitical analysis is a fundamental part of the investment process. My colleague, and BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic will introduce a one-day specialized course - Geopolitics & Investing - to our current BCA Academy offerings. This special inaugural session will take place on September 26 in Toronto and is available, complimentary, only to those who sign up to BCA's 2018 Investment Conference. The course is aimed at investors and asset managers and will emphasize the key principles of our geopolitical methodology. Marko launched BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) in 2012. It is the financial industry's only dedicated geopolitical research product and focuses on the geopolitical and macroeconomic realities which constrain policymakers' options. The Geopolitics & Investing course will introduce: The constraints-based methodology that underpins BCA's Geopolitical Strategy; Best-practices for reading the news and avoiding media biases; Game theory and its application to markets; Generating "geopolitical alpha;" Manipulating data in the context of political analysis. The course will conclude with two topical and market-relevant "war games," which will tie together the methods and best-practices introduced in the course. We hope to see you there. Click here to join us! Space is limited. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy Highlights Chart 1Inflations Expectations Hard To Shake Inflations Expectations Hard To Shake Inflations Expectations Hard To Shake Low inflation expectations are proving difficult to shake. Year-over-year core PCE inflation moved to within 5 bps of the Fed's 2% target in May, but long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates barely budged (Chart 1). Instead, breakevens are taking cues from commodity prices which are being held down by flagging global growth (bottom panel). The minutes from the June FOMC meeting revealed that "one participant" advocated postponing rate hikes in an attempt to re-anchor inflation expectations, but we do not expect the Fed to pursue this course. Instead, the Fed will continue to lift rates at a pace of 25 bps per quarter until a risk-off episode in financial markets prompts a delay, hoping that the incoming inflation data are strong enough to send TIPS breakevens higher in the meantime. Ultimately we think that strategy will be successful, but Fed hawkishness in the face of weakening global growth threatens the near-term performance of corporate credit. We recommend only a neutral allocation to spread product versus Treasuries, while maintaining a below-benchmark duration bias. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 60 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -181 bps. Value is no longer stretched in the investment grade corporate bond market, though it is not attractive enough to compensate for being in the late stages of the credit cycle or for the looming collision between a hawkish Fed and decelerating global growth. These factors led us to reduce exposure to corporate bonds two weeks ago.1 With inflation running close to the Fed's 2% target and the 2/10 Treasury slope between 0 bps and 50 bps, our research shows that small positive excess returns are the best case scenario for corporate bonds. The likelihood that leverage will rise in the second half of this year is also a concern (Chart 2). Profit growth is only just keeping pace with debt growth and will soon have to contend with rising wage costs and the drag from recent dollar strength. The Fed's staunch hawkishness in the face of decelerating global growth is reminiscent of 2015. Then, the end result was a period of spread widening that culminated in the Fed pausing its rate hike cycle. In recent weeks we also explored how to position within the investment grade corporate bond sector, considering both the maturity spectrum and the different credit tiers.2 We concluded that in the current environment investors should favor long maturities and maintain a balanced or slightly up-in-quality bias (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* The Deflationary Mindset The Deflationary Mindset Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* The Deflationary Mindset The Deflationary Mindset High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 40 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +76 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month, and currently sits at 365 bps. Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for expected default losses has widened to 262 bps, just above its long-run mean (Chart 3). This tells us that if default losses during the next 12 months are in line with our expectations, we should expect excess high-yield returns of 262 bps over duration-matched Treasuries, assuming also that there are no capital gains/losses from spread tightening/widening. However, we showed in last week's report that the default loss expectations embedded in our calculation are extremely low relative to history (panel 4).3 Our assumption, derived from the Moody's baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate, calls for default losses of 1.03% during the next 12 months. The only historical period to show significantly lower default losses was 2007, a time when corporate balance sheets were in much better shape than they are today. While most indicators suggest that default losses will in fact remain low for the next 12 months, historical context clearly demonstrates that the risks to that forecast are to the upside. It will be critically important to track real-time indicators of the default rate such as job cut announcements, which remain low relative to history but have perked up in recent months (bottom panel), for signals about whether current default forecasts are overly optimistic. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -24 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread widened 1 bp on the month, driven entirely by a 1 bp widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) held flat. The MBS option-adjusted spread has widened since the beginning of the year (Chart 4), though by much less than the investment grade corporate bond spread (panel 3). The year-to-date OAS widening has been offset by a contraction in the option cost component of spreads, and this has kept the overall nominal MBS spread flat at very tight levels (bottom panel). Going forward, rising interest rates will limit mortgage refinancing activity and this will ensure that MBS spreads remain low. In other words, while MBS valuation is not attractive, the downside is limited. Our Bond Maps show an unfavorable risk/reward trade-off in the MBS sector. This analysis, based on volatility-adjusted breakeven spreads, shows that only 7 days of average spread widening are required for the MBS sector to lose 100 bps versus duration-matched Treasuries. While this speaks to the low spread buffer built into current MBS valuations, the message from the Bond Map must be weighed against the macro outlook which suggests that the odds of significant spread widening are quite low. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -35 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 33 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -210 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -46 bps. Local Authorities underperformed by 9 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +28 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 7 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to zero. The escalating tit-for-tat trade war and increasing divergence between U.S. and non-U.S. growth is a clear negative for USD-denominated Sovereign debt. Relative valuation also shows that U.S. corporate bonds are more attractive than similarly rated Sovereigns (Chart 5). Maintain an underweight allocation to Sovereign debt. Within the universe of Emerging Market Sovereign debt, we showed in a recent report that only Russian debt offers an attractive spread relative to the U.S. corporate sector.4 In contrast, the Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to offer a favorable risk/reward trade-off compared to other fixed income sectors (please see the Bond Maps). Maintain overweight allocations to these two sectors. The Bond Maps also show that the Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors are very low risk, but offer feeble return potential compared to other sectors. The Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors should be avoided. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +120 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal/Treasury yield ratio fell 1% in June to reach 85%, close to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. It is also only slightly higher than the average 81% level that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. The technical picture remains favorable for Muni / Treasury yield ratios. Fund inflows increased in recent weeks, and visible supply has contracted substantially compared to this time last year (Chart 6). State & local government credit fundamentals are also fairly robust. Net borrowing is on the decline and this should ensure that municipal ratings upgrades continue to outpace downgrades (bottom panel). Despite relatively tight valuation compared to history, the Total Return Bond Map on page 16 shows that municipal bonds offer a fairly attractive risk/reward trade-off compared to other U.S. fixed income sectors, particularly for investors exposed to the top marginal tax rate. Given the favorable reading from our Bond Map and the steadily improving credit fundamentals, we recommend an overweight allocation to Municipal bonds. Treasury Curve: Favor 7-Year Bullet Over 1/20 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in June. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 10 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 7 bps. At present, the 2/10 slope sits at 29 bps, its flattest level of the cycle. The yield curve has flattened relentlessly in recent months as the impact of Fed rate hikes at the short-end of the curve have not been offset by higher inflation expectations at the long end. As explained in a recent report, we think it is unlikely that curve flattening can maintain this rapid pace.5 At 2.34%, the 1-year Treasury yield is already priced for 100 bps of Fed rate hikes during the next 12 months, assuming no term premium. Meanwhile, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below levels that are consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target. While curve flattening will proceed as the Fed lifts rates, higher breakeven inflation rates at the long-end of the curve will offset some flattening pressure during the next few months. With that in mind, we continue to recommend a position long the 7-year bullet and short the duration-matched 1/20 barbell. According to our models, this butterfly spread currently discounts 41 bps of 1/20 curve flattening during the next six months (Chart 7). This is considerably more than what is likely to occur. Table 4 of this report shows the output from our valuation models for each butterfly combination across the entire yield curve, as explained in a recent Special Report.6 Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of July 6, 2018) The Deflationary Mindset The Deflationary Mindset TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 35 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +129 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.12%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 5 bps and currently sits at 2.16% (Chart 8). Both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year TIPS breakeven inflation rates remain below the range of 2.3% to 2.5% that has historically been consistent with inflation expectations that are well-anchored around the Fed's 2% target. We expect breakevens will return to that target range as investors become increasingly convinced that the risk of deflation has faded. Consistent inflation prints at or above the Fed's 2% target will be the deciding factor that eventually leads to this upward re-rating of inflation expectations. In that regard, the current outlook is promising. Core PCE inflation has printed above the 0.17% month-over-month level that is consistent with 2% annual inflation in four of the past five months (panel 4). Year-over-year trimmed mean PCE inflation is at 1.84% and should continue to rise based on the 2.03% reading from the 6-month trimmed mean PCE (bottom panel). Finally, our Pipeline Inflation Indicator continues to point toward mounting inflationary pressures in the economy (panel 3). Maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS relative to nominal Treasury securities. We will reduce exposure to TIPS once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates return to our 2.3% to 2.5% target range. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 1 basis point in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -2 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month and now stands at 43 bps, 16 bps above its pre-crisis low. The Bond Maps show that consumer ABS continue to offer relatively attractive return potential compared to other low-risk spread products. However, we maintain only a neutral allocation to this space because credit quality trends are moving against the sector. The household debt service ratio on consumer credit ticked down slightly in the first quarter, but its multi-year uptrend remains intact (Chart 9). Consumer credit delinquency rates follow the household debt service ratio with a lag. Meanwhile, banks are noticing the decline in credit quality and have begun tightening lending standards (bottom panel). Tighter lending standards tend to coincide with upward pressure on delinquencies and spreads. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +61 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 74 bps (Chart 10). The gap between decelerating commercial real estate prices and tight CMBS spreads continues to send a worrying signal for CMBS (panel 3). However, delinquencies continue to decline and banks recently started to ease lending standards on nonfarm nonresidential loans (bottom panel). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +6 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 51 bps. The Bond Maps show that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector continues to make sense. The BCA Bond Maps The following page presents excess return and total return Bond Maps that we use to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Maps employ volatility-adjusted breakeven spread/yield analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Maps do not impose any macroeconomic view. The Excess Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the excess return Bond Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps in excess of Treasuries. The Total Return Bond Map The horizontal axis of the total return Bond Map shows the number of days of average yield increase required for each sector to lose 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of yield increases and are therefore less likely to lose 5%. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average yield decline required for each sector to earn 5% in total return terms. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of yield decline and are therefore more likely to earn 5%. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of July 6, 2018) The Deflationary Mindset The Deflationary Mindset Chart 12Total Return Bond Map (As Of July 6, 2018) The Deflationary Mindset The Deflationary Mindset Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, for further details on positioning across different credit tiers. Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync", dated July 3, 2018, for further details on positioning across the maturity spectrum. Both reports available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Out Of Sync", dated July 3, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Threats & Opportunities In Emerging Markets", dated June 12, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Dear Client, Geopolitical analysis is a fundamental part of the investment process. My colleague, and BCA's Chief Geopolitical Strategist, Marko Papic will introduce a one-day specialized course - Geopolitics & Investing - to our current BCA Academy offerings. This special inaugural session will take place on September 26 in Toronto and is available, complimentary, only to those who sign up to BCA's 2018 Investment Conference. The course is aimed at investors and asset managers and will emphasize the key principles of our geopolitical methodology. Marko launched BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) in 2012. It is the financial industry's only dedicated geopolitical research product and focuses on the geopolitical and macroeconomic realities which constrain policymakers' options. The Geopolitics & Investing course will introduce: The constraints-based methodology that underpins BCA's Geopolitical Strategy; Best-practices for reading the news and avoiding media biases; Game theory and its application to markets; Generating "geopolitical alpha;" Manipulating data in the context of political analysis. The course will conclude with two topical and market-relevant "war games," which will tie together the methods and best-practices introduced in the course. We hope to see you there. Click here to join us! Space is limited. Robert Robis, Chief Fixed Income Strategist Highlights Q2 Performance Breakdown: The return for the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) recommended model bond portfolio was flat (hedged into U.S. dollars) in the second quarter of 2018, outperforming the custom benchmark index by +13bps. This pushed the 2018 year-to-date performance back into positive territory. Winners & Losers: Nearly the entire outperformance came from our overweight stance on U.S. high-yield corporates versus our underweight tilt on emerging market corporates. Successful government bond country allocation (overweight U.K. & Australia, underweight Italy) helped offset the drag on performance from our overweight stance on U.S. investment grade corporates. Scenario Analysis: Our recent decision to downgrade overall spread product exposure, even as we maintain a below-benchmark duration stance, should help boost the expected alpha of the model portfolio over the next year. Feature This week, we present the performance numbers for the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio in the second quarter of 2018. As a reminder to existing readers (and for new clients), the portfolio is a part of our service that is meant to complement the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The model portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors, by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. In this report, we update our estimates of future portfolio performance, using the scenario analysis framework that we introduced three months ago.1 After our recent decision to downgrade global spread product exposure, our model portfolio is now expected to outperform the custom benchmark index over the next year in both our base case and plausible stress test scenarios. Q2/2018 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: Country & Credit Selection Pays Off The total return of the GFIS model bond portfolio was flat (hedged into U.S. dollars) in the second quarter of the year, which outperformed our custom benchmark index by +13bps.2 The first half of the quarter was driven by gains from our below-benchmark duration tilt, as the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield hit a peak of 3.13%. As yields drifted a bit lower in the latter half of Q2 in response to some cooling of global economic growth amid rising concerns on U.S. trade policy, the gains from duration reversed. At the same time, the outperformance from the spread product portion of our model portfolio started to kick in (Chart of the Week), even as credit spreads in all markets widened. Chart of the WeekSpecific Country & Credit Allocations##BR##Boosted Q2 Performance Specific Country & Credit Allocations Boosted Q2 Performance Specific Country & Credit Allocations Boosted Q2 Performance Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##Q2-2018 Overall Return Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated +5bps of outperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter outperformed by +8bps (Table 1). The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 and 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##Q2/2018 Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##Q2/2018 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound The main individual sectors of the portfolio that drove the excess returns were the following: Biggest outperformers Overweight U.S. high-yield B-rated corporates (+5bps) Overweight U.S. high-yield Caa-rated corporates (+2bps) Overweight Japanese government bonds (JGBs) with maturities up to ten years (+3bps) Underweight emerging market U.S. dollar-denominated corporate debt (+5bps) Underweight Italian government bonds (+4bps) Overweight U.K. Gilts (+1bp) Overweight Australian government bonds (+1bp) Biggest underperformers Overweight U.S. investment grade Financials (-2bps) Overweight U.S. investment grade Industrials (-2bps) Underweight JGBs with maturities beyond ten years (-5bps) Underweight French government bonds with maturities beyond ten years (-2bps) Two unusual trends stand out in the Q2 performance numbers: First, our overweight stance on U.S. high-yield debt was able to deliver positive alpha but a similar tilt on U.S. investment grade did not, even as U.S. corporate credit spreads widened during the quarter. It is odd for an asset class (high-yield) that is typically more volatile to outperform during a period of credit spread widening. Although that outcome did justify our view that U.S. investment grade corporates have been offering far less cushion to a period of spread volatility than U.S. junk bonds. Second, the flattening pressures on global government bond yield curves resulted in underperformance from the very long ends of curves in core Europe and Japan, even though the latter regions were the best performing bond markets in our model bond portfolio universe. This can be seen in Chart 4, which presents the benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio. The returns are hedged into U.S. dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and also adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color-coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during the second quarter.3 Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The Model Portfolio In Q2/2018 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound As can be seen in the chart, the best performers were government bonds in Germany, France and Japan. The fact that our excess return from those countries was only a combined +2bps, even with an aggregate overweight exposure to all three, suggests that our duration allocation within the maturity buckets of those countries was a meaningful drag on performance. Yet in terms of the overall success rate of our individual country and sector calls, the news was positive in Q2. We've been overweight U.K. Gilts and Australian government bonds, which were some of the top performers in Q2. On the other side, we have been underweight emerging market corporate debt and Italian sovereign debt, which were the worst performers in the quarter. Bottom Line: The GFIS model bond portfolio outperforming the custom benchmark index by +13bps. This pushed the 2018 year-to-date performance back into positive territory. Nearly the entire outperformance came from our overweight stance on U.S. high-yield corporates versus our underweight tilt on emerging market corporates. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns After Our Recent Changes Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will have different drivers in the third quarter and beyond after the recent changes to BCA's recommended strategic asset allocations.4 We downgraded global equity and spread product exposure to neutral, based on our concern that the backdrop for global growth, inflation and monetary policy was turning less supportive for risk assets, particularly given the potential new economic shock from the "U.S. versus the world" trade tensions. In terms of the specific weightings in the GFIS model bond portfolio, we still prefer owning U.S. corporate debt versus equivalents in Europe and emerging markets. Thus, while we downgraded our recommended allocation to U.S. and investment grade corporates to neutral from overweight, we also cut our weightings to euro area corporates, as well as to all emerging market hard currency debt (see the table on page 12, which shows the model bond portfolio changes that were made back on June 26th). The latter changes were necessary to maintain the relatively higher exposure to U.S. corporate debt versus non-U.S. corporates, although it does leave the model portfolio with a small overall underweight stance to global spread product (Chart 5). Importantly, we are maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration, even as we grow more cautious on credit exposure. This is because we still see potential medium-term upward pressure on bond yields coming from tightening monetary policies (Fed rate hikes, ECB tapering of bond purchases) and increasing inflation expectations. The majority of global central bankers are dealing with tight labor markets and slowly rising inflation rates. While global growth has cooled a bit from the rapid pace seen in 2017, it has not been by enough to have policymakers shift to a more dovish bias. Throughout the first half of 2018, we have been deliberately targeting a modest tracking error for our model portfolio, given the historical richness (low yields, tight spreads) of so many parts of the global bond universe. Our estimate of the tracking error is now below the 40-60bp range that we have been targeting (Chart 6), but we are willing to live with this given the higher degree of uncertainty at the moment.5 Chart 5New Spread Product Allocation:##BR##Neutral U.S., Underweight Non-U.S. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound Chart 6Staying Defensive With##BR##The Risk Budget Staying Defensive With The Risk Budget Staying Defensive With The Risk Budget Importantly, the changes to our asset allocation recommendations should help boost the expected return of the model portfolio over the next year. In our Q1/2018 portfolio review published in April, we introduced a framework for estimating total returns for all government bond markets and spread product sectors, based on common risk factors. For credit, returns are estimated as a function of changes in the U.S. dollar, the Fed funds rate, oil prices and market volatility as proxied by the VIX index (Table 2A). For government bonds, non-U.S. yield changes are estimated using recent historical yield betas to changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Table 2B). This framework allows us to conduct scenario analysis based on projected returns of each asset class in the model bond portfolio universe by making assumptions on those individual risk factors. Table 2AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate##BR##Spread Product Yield Changes GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound Table 2BEstimated Government Bond Yield##BR##Betas To U.S. Treasuries GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound With these tools, we can forecast returns for each bond sector under different scenarios. We can then use those forecasts to predict the expected return for our model bond portfolio under those same scenarios, but with our current relative allocations. In Tables 3A & 3B. we show three differing scenarios, with all the following changes occurring over a one-year horizon. Table 3AScenario Analysis For The GFIS Model Portfolio GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound Table 3BU.S. Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound Our Base Case: the Fed delivers another 100bps of rate hikes, the U.S. dollar rises +5%, oil prices rise by +10%, the VIX index increases by five points from current levels, and U.S. Treasury yields rise by 20-40bps across the curve. A Very Hawkish Fed: the Fed delivers 150bps of rate hikes, the U.S. dollar rises by +10%, oil prices rise by +10%, the VIX index increases by ten points from current levels and there is a sharp bear flattening of the U.S. Treasury curve. A Very Dovish Fed: the Fed only hikes rates by 25bps, the U.S. dollar falls by -5%, oil prices fall by -20%, the VIX index increases by fifteen points from current levels and there is a modest bull steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve (in this scenario, the Fed puts the rate hiking cycle on hold because of a sharp selloff in U.S. financial markets). The top half of Table 3A shows the expected returns for all three scenarios under our more bullish asset allocation prior to the changes made on June 26th, while the bottom half shows the expected performance of the model portfolio after our downgrade to global spread product. Importantly, the model bond portfolio is now expected to outperform the custom benchmark index in not only the base case scenario (+25bps of outperformance) but also in the two alternative scenarios of a very hawkish Fed (+46bps) and a very dovish Fed (+6bps). Those positive outcomes are not surprising, given that all three scenarios have some degree of risk aversion (higher VIX) that would play into our now-reduced exposure to credit risk in the portfolio. Our negative view on duration risk (Chart 7) also helps boost excess returns versus the benchmark in two of the three scenarios. Interestingly, these outcomes all occur despite the fact that the portfolio is now running with a negative carry (i.e. a lower total yield versus the benchmark index) after the reduction in spread product exposure (Chart 8). Although given our views that market volatility, bond yields and credit spreads are more likely to move higher in the next 6-12 months, we think that carry considerations now play a secondary role in portfolio construction. The time to try and earn carry is during stable markets, not volatile markets. Chart 7The Model Portfolio Is Not Chasing Yield The Model Portfolio Is Not Chasing Yield The Model Portfolio Is Not Chasing Yield Chart 8Staying Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Staying Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Staying Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Bottom Line: Our recent decision to downgrade overall spread product exposure, even as we maintain a below-benchmark duration stance, should help boost the expected alpha of the model portfolio over the next year. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2018 Performance Review: A Rough Start", dated April 10th 2018, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. 2 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 3 For Italy, Germany & France, the bars have two colors since the portfolio weights were changed in mid-May, when we cut the recommended stance on Italy to underweight and raised the allocations to Germany & France as an offset. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Spread Product Exposure To Neutral", dated June 26th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 In general, we aim to target a tracking error no greater than 100bps. We think this is reasonable for a portfolio where currency exposure is fully hedged and less than 5% of the portfolio benchmark is in bonds with ratings below investment grade. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2018 Performance Review: A Solid Rebound Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Global Growth: The divergence between strong U.S. and weak non-U.S. growth will increase in the coming months and culminate in wider credit spreads. The Fed's reaction to wider credit spreads will determine how Treasuries perform. High-Yield: High-Yield bonds will deliver excess returns in line with the historical average as long as default losses occur at close to historically low levels. This points to an unfavorable risk/reward balance in junk. Credit Curve: Investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration bias in their overall bond portfolios, but should lengthen maturities within their corporate bond allocations as much as possible while also maintaining a balanced or slightly up-in-quality allocation across credit tiers. Feature Chart 1Growth Divergence Redux Growth Divergence Redux Growth Divergence Redux Two factors influenced our recent decision to reduce the recommended exposure to credit risk in our U.S. bond portfolio.1 First, our indicators show that we are in the late stages of the credit cycle, meaning that small positive excess returns are the best case scenario for corporate bonds. Second, a large divergence in growth has emerged between the United States and the rest of the world, much like in 2014/15 (Chart 1). As was the case in 2014/15, such a divergence will put upward pressure on the U.S. dollar and eventually lead to a period of turmoil in U.S. risk assets - i.e. wider credit spreads and lower equity prices. Whether this turmoil translates into a playable rally in U.S. Treasuries will depend on how the Fed responds. First Spreads, Then (Maybe) Yields Chart 2The 2015 Template The 2015 Template The 2015 Template Using the 2015 episode as a template, we see that credit spreads widened sharply beginning in mid-2015. But despite the risk-off sentiment in credit markets, Treasury yields stayed roughly flat (Chart 2). This should not be too surprising. Since the weakness in global growth was concentrated outside the United States and a significant proportion of corporate profits are driven by foreign demand, a non-U.S. growth shock will have a more immediate impact on the U.S. corporate sector than it will on overall U.S. aggregate demand. Most of the latter is driven by the U.S. consumer who actually stands to benefit from a stronger dollar. Treasury yields and the Federal Reserve take their cues from overall GDP growth, not corporate profits. In fact, we contend that the 2015 widening in credit spreads was exacerbated by the fact that the Fed maintained its focus on overall U.S. growth and continued to signal a relatively steady pace of rate hikes. Spreads widened even further as the notion that the Fed would not bail out corporate bond investors took hold. Eventually, credit spreads widened enough by early 2016 that the Fed was forced to conclude that tighter financial conditions weighed significantly on the growth outlook. It then signaled a slower pace for rate hikes (Chart 2, panel 2), and only then did Treasury yields fall (Chart 2, bottom panel). The Fed's retreat also marked the peak in corporate bond spreads. We envision a similar pattern playing out this time around. Weaker foreign growth will first impact corporate credit, and eventually financial conditions may tighten so much that the Fed is forced to back away from its "gradual" 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. However, with inflation much closer to target than in 2015, the Fed will be more reluctant to respond. A Less Responsive Fed Our Fed Monitor shows why this is the case (Chart 3). The Monitor is composed of indicators related to economic growth, inflation and financial conditions. It is designed so that a reading above zero signals that the Fed should be hiking rates and a reading below zero signals that it should be cutting. If we consider the three components of the Fed Monitor individually, it is clear that we have recently seen a fairly substantial tightening of financial conditions (Chart 3, bottom panel), but this has barely made a dent in the overall Monitor. The reason is that the components related to economic growth and inflation are on solid footing, and they are offsetting the message from the financial conditions component. In other words, with the output gap much narrower and inflation much closer to target than in 2015, the Fed will need to see more market pain before putting rate hikes on hold. Even if financial conditions tighten so much that a pause in rate hikes is justified, it is highly unlikely that such a delay will last for more than a quarter or two. The end result could be that Treasury yields see only limited downside, even as credit spreads widen. Chart 3Fed Can Tolerate More Market Pain Fed Can Tolerate More Market Pain Fed Can Tolerate More Market Pain China To The Rescue? Another possibility is that we never even reach the point of significant market turmoil and much tighter financial conditions. Non-U.S. growth might recover in the months ahead, ushering in a renewed synchronized global recovery that prevents corporate bond spreads from widening. The most likely driver of such a revival would be significant policy easing from China that puts a floor under global growth before U.S. financial markets feel much pain. Chart 4 shows that China did ease monetary conditions dramatically in 2015 as U.S. credit spreads widened. That easing was achieved through a combination of lower real interest rates, stronger credit growth and a weaker exchange rate. The evidence also suggests that Chinese authorities have started to devalue the renminbi in recent weeks, but so far the weakness is limited and overall monetary conditions have not eased at all. If China is attempting to spur a rebound in global growth, a lot more easing will be required in the coming months and it is not at all obvious that policymakers are willing to go down that path.2 If China does engage in a significant currency devaluation, it will obviously increase the foreign demand for U.S. Treasuries. However, in general, we think that foreign demand will exert less downward pressure on U.S. Treasury yields than it did during the 2014/15 period. This has less to do with Chinese official demand than with the simple fact that U.S. government bonds are now a much less attractive investment vehicle for conventional non-U.S. fixed income investors. After we account for the cost of currency hedging on a 3-month horizon, a typical European investor who wants to gain exposure to the U.S. bond market without taking currency risk is faced with a lower realized yield from a 10-year U.S. Treasury note than from a 10-year German bund (Chart 5). This was not the case at all in 2014/15 when hedged U.S. yields offered a huge advantage over bunds. Japanese investors are faced with a similar quandary. The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield hedged into yen still looks attractive relative to a 10-year JGB, but the yield advantage is nowhere near the levels seen in 2014/15 (Chart 5, panel 3). Chart 4Policy Easing In China? Policy Easing In China? Policy Easing In China? Chart 5Less Foreign Demand For USTs Less Foreign Demand For USTs Less Foreign Demand For USTs U.S. bonds are much less enticing for foreign investors on a currency hedged basis because the Fed has raised rates seven times since 2015, while European and Japanese interest rates are still at the floor. This large rate divergence means that investors must pay a lot more to swap foreign currency for dollars. Essentially, foreign investors are faced with an unpalatable choice. They can gain access to elevated un-hedged U.S. Treasury yields only if they are willing to take on the substantial currency risk. If not, then they are better off keeping their money at home. The end result should be less foreign demand for U.S. bonds. Bottom Line: The divergence between strong U.S. and weak non-U.S. growth will increase in the coming months and culminate in wider credit spreads. The Fed's reaction to wider credit spreads will determine how Treasuries perform. High-Yield: The Good News Is Priced In Our measure of the excess spread available in the High-Yield index after accounting for default losses has recently widened to 260 bps, slightly above its long-run historical average (Chart 6). This tells us that if default losses during the next 12 months are in line with our expectations, we should expect excess high-yield returns of 260 bps over duration-matched Treasuries, assuming also that there are no capital gains/losses from spread tightening/widening. While the default-adjusted spread suggests that junk bonds are fairly valued relative to history, it's important to also consider the balance of risks surrounding our default loss assumptions. To calculate the default-adjusted spread we start with the Moody's baseline default rate projection for the next 12 months. It is currently 1.99% (Chart 6, panel 2). Then, we project the recovery rate based on its historical relationship with the default rate. This gives us a forecasted recovery rate of 48% (Chart 6, panel 3). Combined, the forecasted default rate and recovery rate give us expected high-yield default losses of 1.03% for the next 12 months (Chart 6, bottom panel). The only historical period to show significantly lower default losses was 2007, a time when non-financial corporate balance sheets were in much better shape than they are today. This is not to suggest that our default forecasts are unrealistically low. The economic and corporate landscape is consistent with a relatively low default rate. But that outlook can change quickly, and the historical record shows that the risk that we are underestimating future default losses is far greater than the risk that we are overestimating them. Gross non-financial corporate leverage is highly correlated with the default rate over time (Chart 7, top panel). It has flattened off during the past few quarters, but is likely to rise modestly in the second half of the year. As we have discussed in prior reports, corporate revenue growth is elevated but close to peaking, and labor costs are just now starting to ramp up. Even a small moderation in profit growth will be enough for leverage to start moving higher.3 Chart 6High-Yield Expected Returns High-Yield Expected Returns High-Yield Expected Returns Chart 7Macro Drivers Of The Default Rate Macro Drivers Of The Default Rate Macro Drivers Of The Default Rate Interest coverage is also still consistent with a low default rate (Chart 7, panel 2). But the combination of peaking profit growth and rising interest rates clearly biases it lower going forward. Other indicators that correlate strongly with corporate defaults, such as layoff announcements and C&I lending standards, also remain supportive for the time being (Chart 7, bottom 2 panels). Bottom Line: High-Yield bonds will deliver excess returns in line with the historical average as long as default losses occur at close to historically low levels. This points to an unfavorable risk/reward balance in junk. Considering The Credit Curve Two weeks ago we examined the risk/reward proposition of moving down in quality within an allocation to investment grade corporate bonds.4 We concluded that a move down the rating scale has a greater positive impact on risk-adjusted portfolio performance when excess return volatility and index duration-times-spread (DTS) are low. With index DTS currently elevated, now is not the best time to move down-in-quality. This week we perform a similar analysis using the maturity buckets of the investment grade corporate bond index. Charts 8-11 show four excess return Bond Maps. The horizontal axes of these maps show the number of months of average spread widening required for each maturity bucket to underperform duration-matched Treasuries by the return threshold indicated in the chart's title. Buckets plotting further to the left require more months of spread widening, and are thus less risky. Chart 8Investment Grade Corporate Excess Return ##br##Bond Map: +/- 50 BPs Threshold Out Of Sync Out Of Sync Chart 9Investment Grade Corporate Excess Return ##br##Bond Map: +/- 100 BPs Threshold Out Of Sync Out Of Sync Chart 10Investment Grade Corporate Excess Return##br## Bond Map: +/- 200 BPs Threshold Out Of Sync Out Of Sync Chart 11Investment Grade Corporate Excess Return ##br##Bond Map: +/- 300 BPs Threshold Out Of Sync Out Of Sync The vertical axes of the maps show the number of months of average spread tightening required for each maturity bucket to outperform duration-matched Treasuries by the return threshold indicated in the chart's title. Buckets plotting closer to the top require fewer months of spread tightening, and thus provide greater potential reward. Much like what we found with the different credit tiers, the maturity buckets tend to cluster together when we set a low return threshold. The risk/reward trade-off becomes more linear as the return threshold increases. We can therefore conclude that shorter maturities offer similar return potential to longer maturities when return volatility is low, along with less risk. The risk-adjusted advantage in low maturity buckets disappears as we transition into higher volatility environments. At the moment, average index DTS is elevated compared to other non-recession periods. There is no obvious advantage to maintaining a bias toward the short maturity buckets. Fundamental Drivers In addition to the risk/reward trade-offs shown in our Bond Maps, we also identify two fundamental drivers of relative performance across the corporate maturity spectrum. First, we notice that while long maturities offer a substantial spread advantage over short maturities, the advantage is entirely driven by differences in duration (Chart 12). Logically, if the duration difference between the short and long ends of the curve were to decline, then the option-adjusted spread term structure would flatten. In fact, this is exactly what should transpire as Treasury yields rise (Chart 12, bottom panel). The second factor that can influence the credit spread curve is the outlook for default losses. Short-maturity spreads widen more than long-maturity spreads when default losses increase. This is because only the highest quality firms are able to issue long maturity debt. Chart 13 shows that, after controlling for differences in duration, the credit spread curve is inversely correlated with default losses. Higher default losses coincide with a flatter spread curve, and vice-versa. A model of the credit spread curve (duration-adjusted) versus expected default losses shows that the curve is currently fairly valued relative to our optimistic default loss assumptions (Chart 13, bottom panel). In other words, if default losses were to surprise to the upside, then the credit spread curve would appear too steep. Chart 12IG Term Structure Is Steep IG Term Structure Is Steep IG Term Structure Is Steep Chart 13Rising Defaults Flatten The Spread Curve Rising Defaults Flatten The Spread Curve Rising Defaults Flatten The Spread Curve All in all, our outlook for higher Treasury yields and the negative balance of risks surrounding our default loss forecast both suggest that investors should favor the long-end of the maturity spectrum within an allocation to investment grade corporate bonds. Bottom Line: Investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration bias in their overall bond portfolios, but should lengthen maturities within their corporate bond allocations as much as possible while also maintaining a balanced or slightly up-in-quality allocation across credit tiers. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Now What?", dated June 27, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Recommended Allocation Quarterly - July 2018 Quarterly - July 2018 Risks to equities and credit are now evenly balanced. We downgrade both to neutral. We are worried that desynchronized growth will further push up the dollar, damaging emerging markets, especially since U.S. inflation will remove the Fed "put". The trade war is nowhere near over, and China shows signs of slowing growth. To de-risk, we raise U.S. equities to overweight, cut the euro zone to neutral, and increase our underweight in EM. We move overweight in cash, rather than fixed income because, with inflation still rising, we see U.S. 10-year rates at 3.3% by year-end. We turn more cautious on equity sectors (reducing the pro-cyclicality of our recommendations by raising consumer staples and cutting materials) and suggest less pro-risk tilts for alternative assets, shifting to hedge funds and away from private equity. Overview Lowering Risk Assets To Neutral Since last December we have been advising risk-averse clients, who prioritize capital preservation, to turn cautious, but suggested that professional fund managers who need to maximize quarterly performance stay invested in risk assets. With U.S. equities returning 3% in the first half of the year and junk bonds 0% (versus -1% for U.S. Treasury bonds), that was probably a correct assessment. Now, however, our analysis indicates that the risk/reward trade-off has deteriorated. Although we still do not expect a global recession until 2020, risks to the global equity bull market have increased. The return outlook is asymmetrical: a last-year bull market "melt-up" could give 15-20% upside, but in bear markets over the past 50 years global equities have seen peak-to-trough declines of 25-60% (Table 1). We think it better to turn cautious too early. A key to successful asset allocation is missing the big drawdowns - but getting the timing of these right is a near impossibility. Table 1How Much Stocks Fall In Bear Markets Quarterly - July 2018 Quarterly - July 2018 Chart 1Growth Is Becoming More Desynchronized Growth Is Becoming More Desynchronized Growth Is Becoming More Desynchronized What are the risks we are talking about? Global growth is slowing and becoming less synchronized (Chart 1). Fiscal stimulus and a high level of confidence among businesses are keeping U.S. growth strong, with GDP set to grow by close to 3% this year and S&P 500 earnings by 20%. But the euro zone and Japan have weakened, and these growing divergences are likely to push the dollar up further, which will cause more trouble in emerging markets. EM central banks are reacting either by raising rates to defend their currencies (which will hurt growth) or by staying on hold (which risks significant inflation). With the U.S. on the verge of overheating, the Fed will need to prioritize the fight against inflation. Lead indicators of core inflation suggest it is likely to continue to rise (Chart 2). The FOMC's key projections seem incompatible with each other: it sees GDP growth at 2.7% this year (well above trend), but unemployment barely falling further, bottoming at 3.6% by end-2018 (from 3.8% now) and core PCE inflation peaking at 2.1% (now: 2.0%). A further rise in inflation means that the Fed "put option" will expire: even if there were a global risk-off event, the Fed might not be able to put tightening on hold. It will take only one or two more hikes for Fed policy to be restrictive - something we have previously flagged as a key warning signal (Chart 3). Chart 2U.S. Inflation Could Pick Up Further U.S. Inflation Could Pick Up Further U.S. Inflation Could Pick Up Further Chart 3Fed Policy Is Close To Being Restrictive Fed Policy Is Close To Being Restrictive Fed Policy Is Close To Being Restrictive There is no end in sight for the trade war. President Trump is unlikely to back down on imposing further tariffs on China, since the tough stance is proving popular with his support base. On the other hand, President Xi Jinping would lose face by giving in to U.S. demands. BCA's geopolitical strategists warn that we are not at peak pessimism, and do not rule out even a military dimension.1 China is unlikely to roll out stimulus, as it did in 2015. With the authorities focused on structural reform, for example debt deleveraging, the pain threshold for stimulus is higher than in the past. Recent moves such as reductions in banks' reserve requirement have had little impact on effective interest rates (Chart 4). More likely, China might engineer a weakening of the RMB, as it did in 2015. There are signs that it is already doing so (Chart 5). This would exacerbate political tensions. Chart 4China Has Not Eased Monetary Conditions... China Has Not Eased Monetary Conditions... China Has Not Eased Monetary Conditions... Chart 5...But It Might Be Depreciating The RMB ...But It Might Be Depreciating The RMB ...But It Might Be Depreciating The RMB As we explain in detail in the pages that follow, with risk now two-way, we cut our weighting in global equities to neutral. We are not going underweight since global economic growth remains above trend, and corporate earnings will continue to grow robustly (though no faster than analysts are already forecasting). We see upside risk if the Fed were to allow an overshoot of inflation amid strong growth. If the concerns highlighted above cause a 15% correction in equity markets - triggering the Fed to go on hold - we would be inclined to move back overweight (having in mind a scenario like 1987 or 1998, where a sell-off led to a last-year bull-market rally). More likely, however, we will move underweight at the end of the year, when recession signals, such as an inverted yield curve, appear. We have shifted our detailed recommendations to line up with this de-risking. We move overweight U.S. equities (which are lower beta, and where unhedged returns should benefit from a stronger dollar). We keep our overweight on Japan, since the Bank of Japan remains the last major central bank in fully accommodative mode. We increase our underweight in EM equities. Among sectors, we reduce pro-cyclicality by cutting materials to underweight and raising consumer staples to overweight. We remain underweight fixed income, since inflationary pressures point to the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield moving up to 3.3% before the end of this cycle. We remain short duration and continue to prefer inflation-linked securities over nominal bonds. Within fixed income, we cut corporate credit to neutral, in line with our de-risking. Finally, we recommend that investors move into cash rather than bonds, though we understand that, especially for European investors, this may mean accepting a small negative return.2 Still puzzled how markets may pan out over the next 12 months? Then join BCA's annual Conference in Toronto this September, where I will be chairing a panel on asset allocation, featuring two experienced Chief Investment Officers, Erin Browne of UBS Asset Management, and Norman Villamin of Union Bancaire Privée. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking How To Overweight Cash? Chart 6Sometimes Cas Is The Only Answer Sometimes Cas Is The Only Answer Sometimes Cas Is The Only Answer BCA's call to start to derisk portfolios includes a new overweight in cash. This is logical since, historically, cash often outperformed both equities and bonds early in a downturn, when growth was starting to falter (bad for equities) but inflation was still rising (bad for bonds) - though this last happened in 1994 (Chart 6, panel 1). Currently, a move to cash is easy for U.S. investors, who can invest in three-month Treasury bills yielding 1.9%, or USD money market funds, some of which offer just over 2%. But it is much harder for investors in the euro area, where three-month German government bills yield -0.55%. Also, in Japan cash yields -0.17% and in Switzerland -0.73%. Some European investors will be tempted to go into U.S. cash. Given our view of dollar appreciation over the next six months, this should pay off. But it clearly is risky, should we be wrong and the dollar decline. As theory predicts, the cost of hedging the U.S. dollar exposure wipes out any advantage (since three-month euro-dollar forwards are 2.7% lower on an annualized basis than EURUSD spot). Some investors will have to put up with a small negative return in nominal terms in order to (largely) protect their capital. More imaginative European fund managers might be able to come up with schemes to get cash-like returns but with a positive return. For example, Danish mortgage bonds yield 1.8% (in Danish krone, which is largely pegged to the euro) with little risk. U.S. mortgage-backed securities offer yields well over 3%, which should give a positive return after hedging costs (and relatively low risk, given the robust state of the U.S. housing market) - panel 3. Carefully-selected global macro hedge funds can give attractive Libor-plus returns.3 We still see attractiveness of catastrophe bonds,4 which have a high yield and no correlation to the economic cycle. How Seriously Should We Take The Risk Of A Trade War? Is this a full-blown trade war? The answer is not yet. However, the risk is rising that the current spat will turn into one. President Trump has escalated tensions further by indicating that a 10% tariff would be placed on $200 billion of Chinese imports, in addition to the 25% tariff on $50 billion of imports announced in March and to be implemented on July 6. Trump's incentive to escalate the conflict is that a tough trade policy plays well with his support base (Chart 7). Ever since the trade issue hit the headlines early this year, his approval ratings have been on the rise. This means that he is unlikely to back down at least until the mid-term elections in November. Xi Jinping is also unlikely, for his own political reasons, to give in to U.S. demands. But China's retaliation will most likely come through non-tariff actions, since its imports from the U.S. total only about $130 billion (compared to $500 billion of Chinese exports to the U.S.). It could look to restrict imports, for example via quotas, or cause extra bottlenecks for U.S. businesses operating in China. Additionally, it could threaten to sell some of its holdings of U.S. Treasuries, or devalue the RMB. As Chart 8 shows, the RMB has already weakened against the dollar this year (though this was mainly due to the dollar's overall strength). There are suggestions that China might adjust the currency basket that it targets for the RMB, for example by adding more Asian currencies, to allow further depreciation against the dollar. Chart 7 Quarterly - July 2018 Quarterly - July 2018 Chart 8Sharp Rise In RMB This Year Sharp Rise In RMB This Year Sharp Rise In RMB This Year It is hard, then, to see a smooth outcome to this standoff. A further escalation could even have a military dimension, with the U.S. having recently opened a new "embassy" in Taiwan, and sailing navy vessels close to Chinese "islands" in the South China Sea. It is also a complication that President Trump has recently raised tensions with other G7 trading partners, rather than engaging their help in combatting China's perceived unfair trading practices. Is It Time To Buy Chinese A-Shares? In Q2 2018, MSCI China A-shares lost 19% in absolute terms, compared to a 3.5% gain for MSCI U.S. Some investors attribute this performance divergence to trade tension between the U.S. and China, and take the view that the Chinese government may step in to stimulate the economy and support the equity market, similar to what happened in 2015. We have no doubt that China will stimulate again if the economy appears to be heading for a deep slowdown. Given elevated debt levels and excess capacity in some parts of the economy and worries about pollution, however, the bar for a fresh round of stimulus is a lot higher than in the past. With the incremental inclusion of MSCI on-shore A-Shares into the MSCI China investible universe, A-shares are gaining more attention from international investors. However, the A-Share Index is very different from the MSCI China Index. First, the sector compositions are very different, as shown in Chart 9. The MSCI China index is not only dominated by the tech sector (40%), it's also very concentrated, with the top 10 names accounting for 56% of the index, while the top 10 names in the A-shares account for only about 20%. Second, even in the same sectors, the performance of the two indexes has diverged as shown in Chart 10. We see the reason for these divergences being that domestic investors are more concerned about growth in China than foreign investors are. Instead of buying A-Shares, investors should be more cautious on the MSCI China Index, for which we have a neutral view within MSCI EM universe. Chart 9 Quarterly - July 2018 Quarterly - July 2018 Chart 10ONE CHINA, TWO DIFFERENT EQUITY INDEXES ONE CHINA, TWO DIFFERENT EQUITY INDEXES ONE CHINA, TWO DIFFERENT EQUITY INDEXES What Are The Characteristics Of The Private Debt Market? Chart 11Private Debt Market Quarterly - July 2018 Quarterly - July 2018 Private debt (Chart 11) raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017, pushing aggregate AUM from $244 billion in 2007 to $664 billion in 2017. This explosive growth was driven by bank consolidation in the U.S., increased financial sector regulation, and the global search for yield. Private debt has historically enjoyed a higher yield and return, along with fewer defaults, than traditional public-market corporate bonds. Below are some of the key points from our recent Special Report:5 Private debt has returned an average net IRR of 13% from 1989 to 2015. This compares to an annualized total return of 7% and 7.2% for equities and corporate bonds respectively. Investors can diversify their sources of risk and return by giving access to more esoteric exposures such as illiquidity and manager skill. The core risk exposure in private debt comes from idiosyncratic firm-specific sources, which is not the case with publicly traded corporate credit. Investors can gain more tailored exposure to different industries and customized duration horizons. Additionally, private debt was the only group in the private space that did not experience a contraction in AUM during the financial crisis. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are capital preservation strategies that offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. Distressed debt and venture debt are more return-maximizing strategies that offer larger gains, but with a higher probability of losses. In the late stages of an economic cycle, investors should deploy capital defensively through first-lien and other senior secured debt positions. In contrast, a recession would create opportunities for distressed strategies and within deeper parts of the capital structure. Global Economy Overview: Growing divergences are emerging in global growth, with the U.S. producing strong data, but a cyclical slowdown in the euro area and Japan, and the risk of significantly slower growth in China and other emerging markets. This means that monetary policy divergences are also likely to increase, exacerbating the rise in the U.S. dollar and putting further pressure on emerging markets. Eventually, however, tighter financial conditions could start to dampen growth in the U.S. too. U.S.: Data has been very strong for the past few months, with the Fed's two NowCasts pointing to 2.9% and 4.5% QoQ annualized GDP growth in Q2. Small businesses are confident (with the NFIB survey at a near record high), which suggests that the capex recovery is likely to continue. With unemployment at the lowest level since 1969, wages should pick up soon, boosting consumption. But it is possible the data might now start to weaken. The Surprise Index (Chart 12, panel 1) has turned down. And a combination of trade war and a stronger dollar (up 8% in trade-weighted terms since April) might start to dent business and consumer confidence. Chart 12U.S. Growth Remains Strong... U.S. Growth Remains Strong... U.S. Growth Remains Strong... Chart 13...While Europe, Japan And EMs Start To Slow ...While Europe, Japan And EMs Start To Slow ...While Europe, Japan And EMs Start To Slow Euro Area: Euro area data, by contrast to the U.S., have turned down since the start of the year, with both the PMI and IFO slipping significantly (Chart 13, panel 1). This is most likely because the 6% appreciation of the euro last year has affected export growth, which has slowed to 3.1% YoY, from 8.3% at the start of the year. However, the PMI remains strong (around the same level as the U.S.) and, with a weaker euro since April, growth might pick up late in the year, as long as problems with trade and Italy do not deteriorate. Japan: Japan's growth has also slipped noticeably in recent months (Chart 13, panel 2), perhaps also because of currency strength, though question-marks over Prime Minister Abe's longevity and the slowdown in China may also be having an effect. The rise in inflation towards the Bank of Japan's 2% target has also faltered, with core CPI in April back to 0.3% YoY, though wages have seen a modest pickup to 1.2%. Emerging Markets: China is now showing clear signs of slowing, as the tightened monetary conditions and slower credit growth of the past 12 months have an effect. Fixed-asset investment, retail sales and industrial production all surprised to the downside in May. The authorities have responded to this (and to threat of trade disruptions) by slightly easing monetary policy, though this has not yet fed through to market rates, which have risen as a result of rising defaults. Elsewhere in EM, many central banks have responded to sharp declines in their currencies by raising rates, which is likely to dampen growth. Those, such as Brazil, which refrained from defensive rate hikes, are likely to see an acceleration in inflation Interest rates: The Fed has signaled that it plans to continue to hike once a quarter at least for the next 12 months. It may eventually have to accelerate that pace if core PCE inflation moves decisively above 2%. The ECB, by contrast, announced a "dovish tightening" last month, when it signaled the end of asset purchases in December, but no rate hike "through the summer" of next year. It can do this because euro zone core inflation remains around 1%, with fewer underlying inflationary pressures than in the U.S. The Bank of Japan is set to remain the last major central bank with accommodative policy, since it is unlikely to alter its yield-curve control any time soon. Global Equities Chart 14Neutral Global Equities Neutral Global Equities Neutral Global Equities A Bird In The Hand Is Worth Two In The Bush: After the initial strong recovery from the low in March 2009, global equity earnings have risen by only 20% from Q3 2011, and that rise mostly came after February 2016. In the same period, global equity prices, however, have gained over 80%, largely due to multiple expansion (Chart 14), supported by accommodative monetary and stimulative fiscal policies. Year-to-date, our pro-cyclical equity positioning has played out well with developed markets (DM) outperforming emerging markets (EM) by 8.8%, and cyclical equities outperforming defensives by 2.9%. As the year progresses, however, we are becoming more and more concerned about future prospects given the stage of the cycle, stretched valuations and the elevated profit margin.6 The three macro "policy puts", namely the Fed Put, the China Put and the Draghi Put, are all in jeopardy of disappearing or, at the very least, of weakening, in addition to the risk of rising protectionism. BCA's House View has downgraded global risk assets to neutral.7 Reflecting this change, within global equities we recommend investors to take a more defensive stance by reducing portfolio risk. We remain overweight DM and underweight EM; We upgrade U.S. equities to overweight at the expense of the euro area (see next page); Sector-wise, we suggest to take profits in the pro-cyclical tilts and become more defensive (see page 14). Please see page 21 for the complete portfolio allocation details. U.S. Vs. The Euro Area: Trading Places Chart 15Favor U.S. Vs. Euro Area Favor U.S. Vs. Euro Area Favor U.S. Vs. Euro Area In line with the BCA House View to reduce exposure in global risk assets, we are downgrading the euro area to neutral in order to fund an upgrade of the U.S. to overweight from neutral, for the following reasons: First, GAA's recommended equity portfolio has always been expressed in USD terms on an unhedged basis. Historically, the relative total return performance of euro area equities vs. the U.S. has been highly correlated with the euro/USD exchange rate. With BCA's House View calling for further strength of the USD versus the euro, we expect euro area total return in USD terms to underperform the U.S. (Chart 15, panel 1). Second, the euro area economy has been weakening vs. the U.S. as seen by the relative performance of PMIs in the two regions; this bodes ill for the euro area's relative profitability (Chart 15, Panel 2). Third, because euro area equities have a much higher beta to global equities than U.S. equities do, shifting towards the U.S. reduces the overall portfolio beta (Chart 15, Panel 3). Last, even though euro area equities are cheaper than the U.S. in absolute term, they have always traded at a discount to the U.S. On a relative basis, this discount is currently fair compared to the historical average. Sector Allocation: Become More Defensive Chart 16Sectors: Turn Defensive Sectors: Turn Defensive Sectors: Turn Defensive Year to date, our pro-cyclical sector positioning has worked very well, especially the underweights in telecoms, consumer staples and utilities, and the overweight of energy. The overweight in healthcare also has worked well, but the overweights in financials and industrials, as well as the underweight of consumer discretionary, have not panned out. Global economic growth has peaked, albeit at a high level. This does not bode well for the profitability of the economically sensitive sectors (industrials, consumer discretionary and materials) relative to the defensive sectors (healthcare, consumer staples and telecoms), as shown in Chart 16, top two panels. In addition, slowing Chinese growth will weigh on the materials sector, and rising tension in global trade will pressure the industrials sector. As such, we are upgrading consumer staples to overweight (from underweight) and telecoms to neutral, and downgrading materials to underweight (from neutral). Oil has gained 16% so far this year, driving energy equities to outperform the global benchmark by 6.2%. Going forward, however, the oil outlook is less certain as OPEC and Russia work to ease production controls, and demand is cloudy. This prompts us to close the overweight in the energy sector to stay on the sideline for now (Chart 16, bottom panel). We also suggest investors to reduce exposure in financials to a benchmark weighting due to our concerns on Europe and also the flattening of yield curves. After all these changes, we are now overweight healthcare and consumer staples while underweight consumer discretionary, utilities and materials. All other sectors are in line with benchmark weightings. Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration. BCA's house view has downgraded global risk assets to neutral and raised cash to overweight, while maintaining an underweight in fixed income.8 This prompts us to downgrade credit to neutral vs. government bonds (see next page). However, we still see rates rising over the next 9-12 months and so our short duration recommendation for the government bonds is unchanged. The U.S. Fed is on track to deliver a 25bps rate hike each quarter given robust business confidence and tight labor markets, and the ECB has announced it will stop new bond buying in its Asset Purchase Program after December this year. As such, bond yields are likely to move higher in both the U.S. and the euro area given the close relationship between 10-year term premium and net issuance (Chart 17). Chart 17Yields Will Rise Further Yields Will Rise Further Yields Will Rise Further Chart 18Favor Inflation-Linked Bonds Favor Inflation-Linked Bonds Favor Inflation-Linked Bonds Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. The latest NFIB survey shows that wage pressure is on the rise, with reports of compensation increases hitting a record high (Chart 18, top panel). BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy still believes that the U.S. TIPS breakeven will rise to 2.4-2.5% around the time that U.S. core PCE inflation exceeds the Fed's 2% target rate (the Fed forecasts 2.1% by end-2018). Compared to the current breakeven level of 2.1%, this means 10-year TIPS has upside of 30-40bps, an important source of return in the low-return fixed income space (Chart 18, panel 2). Maintain overweight TIPS vs. nominal bonds. However, TIPS are no longer cheap. For those who have not already moved to overweight TIPS, we suggest "buying TIPS on dips". Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) in Australia and Japan are also still very attractive vs. their respective nominal bonds (Chart 18, bottom panel). Overweight ILBs in those two markets also fits well with our macro themes. Corporate Bonds Chart 19Spreads Not Attractive Spreads Not Attractive Spreads Not Attractive We have favored both investment-grade and high-yield corporates (Chart 19) over government bonds for over two years. But, while monetary and credit conditions remain favorable, we think rising uncertainty and weakening corporate balance sheets in the coming quarters warrant a more cautious stance. We are moving to neutral on corporate credit. In Q1, outstanding U.S. corporate debt grew at an annualized rate of 4.4%, while pre-tax profits (on a national accounts basis) contracted by 5.7%, raising gross leverage from 6.9x to 7.1x. The benign default rates and tight credit spreads associated with robust economic growth are at risk now that leverage growth is soon poised to overtake cash flow growth, challenging companies' debt service capability. Finally, if labor costs accelerate, leverage will continue to rise in 2H18. Since February, our financial conditions index has tightened considerably driven by a combination of falling equity prices and a stronger dollar. As monetary policy shifts to an outright restrictive stance once inflation reaches the Fed's target later in 2018, corporates will suffer. The risk-adjusted returns to high yield (Chart 20) are no longer attractive relative to government bonds. Chart 20Junk Only Attractive If Defaults Stay Low Junk Only Attractive If Defaults Stay Low Junk Only Attractive If Defaults Stay Low Chart 21Rising Leverage Rising Leverage Rising Leverage Finally, valuations are expensive. Investment grade spreads have widened by 50bps from the start of the year, but junk spreads are still close to their post-crisis lows. As we are late in the credit cycle, we do not expect further contraction in spreads. For now monetary and credit quality indicators remain stable, but we are booking profits and moving both investment-grade and high-yield corporates to neutral. In the second half of the year, as corporate leverage (Chart 21) starts to deteriorate and monetary policy gets more restrictive, we will look to further review our allocations. Commodities Chart 22Strong Demand But Uncertain Supply In Oil Strong Demand But Uncertain Supply In Oil Strong Demand But Uncertain Supply In Oil Energy (Overweight): Underlying demand/supply fundamentals (Chart 22, panel 2) will continue to drive prices, as the correlation with the U.S. dollar breaks down. We expect the key OPEC countries to increase production by 800k b/d and over 210k b/d in 2H18 and 1H19 respectively. This will be offset by losses in the rest of OPEC of 530k b/d and 640k b/d in 2H18 and 1H19 respectively. Venezuelan production has dropped from a peak of 2.1m b/d to 1.4m b/d, and we expect it to reach 1.2m b/d by year end and 1.0m b/d by the end of 2019. Additionally, we expect Iranian exports to fall by 200k b/d to the end of 2018, and by another 300k b/d by the end of 1H19 as a result of sanctions. Demand seems to be holding up for now, but is conditional on developments in global trade. BCA's energy team forecasts Brent crude to average $70 in 2H18 and $77 in 2019. Industrial Metals (Neutral): China remains the largest consumer of metals, and so price action will react to underlying economic growth there and to the dynamics of its local metals markets. Additionally, a strengthening dollar will add downward pressure to prices and increase volatility. We expect a physical surplus in copper markets to emerge by year end, given slower demand growth and supply concerns due to restrictions on China's imports of scrap copper. Precious Metals (Neutral): Rising global uncertainties and geopolitical tensions driven by trade wars and divergent monetary policy will continue to keep market volatility high. During periods of equity market downturns, gold will continue to be an attractive hedge. Additionally, as inflationary pressures continue to rise, investors will continue to look for inflation protection in gold. However, rising interest rates and a strengthening dollar could limit price upside. We recommend gold as a safe-haven asset against unexpected volatility and inflation surprises. Currencies Chart 23Dollar Appreciation To Continue King Dollar Dollar Appreciation To Continue King Dollar Dollar Appreciation To Continue King Dollar U.S. Dollar: Following the recent strong economic data out of the U.S., the Fed is likely to maintain its moderately hawkish stance and follow its current dot plan of gradual rate hikes over the course of this year and next. For now the Fed is unlikely to accelerate the pace of hikes: it hinted that it could allow inflation to overshoot its target of 2% on core PCE. We expect the U.S. dollar to appreciate further over the coming months (Chart 23, panel 1). Euro: Disappointments in European economic data, in addition to political uncertainties in Italy, have led to a correction in the EUR/USD (Chart 23, panel 2). The ECB's indication that it will not raise rates through the summer of 2019 added further downward pressure on the currency. In addition, rising tension related to trade war and its impact on European growth is likely to dampen the euro's performance further. We look for EUR/USD to weaken to at least 1.12. JPY: The outlook for the yen is more mixed than for the euro. Japanese data over the past couple of months have been anemic, and interest rate differentials with the U.S. point to a weakening yen (Chart 23, panel 3). Moreover, the BoJ is still concerned with achieving its inflation target and so remains the last major central bank in full accommodative mode. However, escalating global tension is likely to be a positive factor for the JPY as a safe haven currency. It also looks far cheaper relative to PPP than does the euro. We see the yen trading fairly flat to the USD, but appreciating against the euro. EM Currencies: Tighter U.S. financial conditions, rising bond yields, and a strengthening dollar are all disastrous for EM currencies (Chart 23, panel 4). Additionally, the ongoing growth slowdown in China, and in EM as a whole, will add further downside pressures on most EM currencies. Alternatives Chart 24Turn Defensive On Alts Turn Defensive On Alts Turn Defensive On Alts Allocations to alternatives continue to rise as investors look for new avenues to preserve capital and generate attractive returns. We are turning more cautious on risk assets across all asset classes on the back of a possible growth slowdown and restrictive monetary policy. With intra-correlations between alternative assets reaching new lows (Chart 24), investors need to be especially careful picking the right category of alt investments. Return Enhancers: We have favored private equity over hedge funds since 1Q16, and this has generated an excess return of 20%. But, given our decision to scale back on risk assets on the back of a possible growth slowdown, we are turning cautious on private equity. Higher private-market multiples, stiff competition for buyouts from large corporates, and an uncertain macro outlook will make deal flow difficult. On the other hand, as volatility makes a comeback and markets move sideways, discretionary and systematic macro funds should fare better. We recommend investors pair back on their private equity allocations and increase hedge funds as we prepare for the next recession. Inflation Hedges: We have favored direct real estate over commodity futures since 1Q16; this position has generated a small loss of 1.4%. Total global commercial real-estate (CRE) loans outstanding have reached a record $4.3 trillion, 11% higher than at the pre-crisis peak. CRE prices peaked in late 2016, and are now flat-lining, partly due to the downturn of shopping malls and traditional retail. On the other hand, commodity futures have had a good run on the back of rising energy prices. We recommend investors reduce their real estate allocations, and put on modest positions in commodity futures as an inflation hedge. Volatility Dampeners: We have favored farmland and timberland over structured products since 1Q16, and this has generated an excess return of 6%. As noted in our Special Report,9 of the two, timberland assets tend to have a stronger correlation with growth, whereas farmland demand is relatively inelastic during times of a slowdown. Additionally, farmland returns tend to have lower volatility compared to timberland. Structured products will continue to suffer with rising rates. We recommend investors allocate more to farmland over timberland, and stay underweight structured products. Risks To Our View Chart 25What If China's Imports Weaken Sharply What If China's Imports Weaken Sharply What If China's Imports Weaken Sharply Our neutral view on risk assets implies that we see the upside and downside risks as evenly balanced. Could the macro environment turn out to be worse than we envisage? Clearly, there would be more downside for equities if the risks we highlighted in the Overview (slowing growth, U.S. inflation, trade war, Chinese policy) all come through. China and emerging markets are the key. China's import growth has been trending down for 12 months; could it turn significantly negative, as it did in 2015 (Chart 25)? Emerging markets look sensitive to further rises in U.S. interest rates and the dollar. The most vulnerable currencies have already fallen by up to 20% since the start of the year, but could fall further (Chart 26). We would not over-emphasize these risks, however. If growth were to slow drastically, China would roll out stimulus. Emerging markets are more resilient than they were in the 1990s, thanks to currencies that mostly are floating and generally healthier current account positions (though, note, their foreign-currency debt is bigger). Chart 26EM Currencies Could Fall Further EM Currencies Could Fall Further EM Currencies Could Fall Further Chart 27Is This An Excuse For The Fed To Be Dovish? Is This An Excuse For The Fed To Be Dovish? Is This An Excuse For The Fed To Be Dovish? On the positive side, the biggest upside risk comes from the Fed slowing the pace of rate hikes even though growth is robust. This might be because U.S. inflation remains subdued (perhaps for structural reasons) - or because the Fed allows an overshoot of inflation, either under political pressure, or because of arguments that its inflation target is "symmetrical" and that it has missed it on the downside ever since the target was introduced in 2012 (Chart 27). This would be likely to weaken the dollar, giving emerging markets a reprieve. It might lead to a 1999-like stock market rally, perhaps led again by tech - specifically, internet - stocks. 1 Please see What Our Clients Are Asking: How Seriously Should We Take The Risk Of A Trade War, on page 7 of this Quarterly for more analysis of this subject. 2 Please see What Our Clients Are Asking: How To Overweight Cash, on page 6 of this Quarterly for some suggestions on how to minimize this. 3 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Hedge Funds: Still Worth Investing In?", dated June 16, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds", dated December 12, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Private Debt: An Investment Primer", dated June 6, 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation - Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, dated April 3, 2018, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy - Special Report "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral", dated June 20, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy - Special Report "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral", dated June 20, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation - Special Report "U.S. Farmland & Timberland: An Investment Primer", dated October 24, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights We have been cautious on asset allocation on a tactical (3-month) horizon for two months. The backdrop has deteriorated enough that we believe that caution is now warranted beyond a tactical horizon. Trim exposure to global stocks to benchmark and place the proceeds in cash on a cyclical (6-12 month) horizon. Government bonds remain at underweight. Our growth and earnings indicators are not flashing any warning signs. Indeed, while economic growth is peaking at the global level, it remains impressive in the U.S. Nonetheless, given the advanced stage of the economic cycle and the fact that a lot of good news is discounted in risk assets, we believe that it is better to be early and leave some money on the table than to be late. There are several risks that loom large enough to justify caution. First, the clash between monetary policy and the markets that we have been expecting is drawing closer. The FOMC may soon be forced to more aggressively tighten the monetary screws. The ECB signaled that it will push ahead with tapering. Perhaps even more important are escalating trade tensions, which could turn into a full-scale trade war with possible military implications. China has eased monetary policy slightly, but the broad thrust of past policy tightening will continue to weigh on growth. The RMB may be used to partially shield the economy from rising tariffs. Global bonds remain vulnerable. In the U.S., rate expectations in 2019 and beyond are still well below the path implied by a "gradual" tightening pace. In the Eurozone, there is also room for the discounted path of interest rates beyond the next year to move higher. Lighten up on both U.S. IG and HY corporate bonds, placing the proceeds at the short-end of the Treasury and Municipal bond curves. Duration should be kept short. We would consider upgrading if there is a meaningful correction in risk assets. More likely, however, we will shift to an outright bearish stance later this year or in early 2019 in anticipation of a global recession in 2020. Diverging growth momentum, along with the ongoing trade row, will continue to place upward pressure on the dollar. Shift to an overweight position in U.S. equities versus the other major markets on an unhedged basis. The risk of an oil price spike to the upside is rising. Feature The time to reduce risk-asset exposure on a cyclical horizon has arrived. Escalating risks and our assessment that equities and corporate bonds offered a poor risk/reward balance caused us to trim our tactical (3-month) allocation to risk assets to neutral two months ago. We left the 6-12 month cyclical view at overweight, because we expected to shed our near-term caution once the global slowdown ran its course, geopolitical risk calmed down a little, and EM assets stabilized. Nonetheless, the backdrop for global financial markets has deteriorated enough that we believe that caution is now warranted beyond a tactical horizon. It is not that there have been drastic changes in any particular area. Indeed, while profit growth is peaking at the global level, 12-month forward earnings continue to rise smartly in the major markets (Chart I-1). In the U.S., our corporate pricing power indicator is still climbing, forward earnings estimates have "gone vertical", and the net earnings revisions ratio is elevated (Chart I-2). The negative impact of this year's dollar strength on corporate profits will be trounced by robust sales activity. The U.S. economy is firing on all cylinders and growth appears likely to remain well above-trend in the second half of the year. Chart I-1Forward EPS Estimates Still Rising Forward EPS Estimates Still Rising Forward EPS Estimates Still Rising Chart I-2Some Mixed Signals For Stocks Some Mixed Signals For Stocks Some Mixed Signals For Stocks This economic and profit backdrop might make the timing of our downgrade seem odd at first glance. Nevertheless, valuations and the advanced stage of the economic and profit cycle mean that it is prudent to focus on capital preservation and be quicker to take profits than would be the case early in the cycle. BCA has recommended above-benchmark allocations to equities and corporate bonds for most of the time since mid-2009. There are several risks that loom large enough to justify taking some money off the table. One of our main themes for the year, set out in the 2018 BCA Outlook, is that markets are on a collision course with policy. This is particularly the case in the U.S. Real interest rates and monetary conditions still appear to be supportive by historical norms, but this cycle has been anything but normal and the level of real interest rates that constitute "neutral" today is highly uncertain. The fact that broad money growth has slowed in absolute terms and relative to nominal GDP is a worrying sign (Chart I-3). Dollar-based global liquidity is waning based on our proxy measure, which is particularly ominous for EM assets (bottom panel). Chart I-3Liquidity Conditions Are Deteriorating Liquidity Conditions Are Deteriorating Liquidity Conditions Are Deteriorating Moreover, our Equity Scorecard remained at 'two' in June, which is below a level that is consistent with positive excess returns in the equity market (please see the Overview section of the May 2018 Bank Credit Analyst). Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay indicator reveals that investment flows are no longer favoring stocks over bonds in the U.S. (Chart I-2). Perhaps even more importantly for the near term are the escalating trade tensions, which could turn into a full trade war with possible military implications (see below). These and other risks suggest to us that the period of "prudent caution" may extend well into the 6-12 month cyclical horizon. For those investors not already at neutral on equities and corporate bonds, we recommend trimming exposure and placing the proceeds in cash rather than bonds. Fixed-income remains at underweight. There are risks on both sides for government bonds, but we believe that it is more likely that yields rise than fall. Trade Woes: Not Yet At Peak Pessimism The Trump Administration upped the ante in June by announcing plans to impose tariffs on another $200 billion of Chinese exports to the U.S., as well as to restrict Chinese investment in the U.S. We would expect China to retaliate if this is implemented but, at that point, China's proportionate response would cover more goods than the entire range of U.S. imports. Retaliation will therefore have to occur elsewhere. Tariffs are bad enough, but our geopolitical team flags the risk that trade tensions spill over into the South China Sea and other areas of strategic disagreement. The South China Sea or Taiwan could produce market-moving "black swan" geopolitical events this year or next.1 The Trump Administration has also launched an investigation into the auto industry, and has threatened to tear up the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Congress will likely push hard to save the agreement because it is important for so many U.S. companies, especially those with supply chains that criss-cross the borders with Canada and Mexico. Still, Trump has the option of triggering the six-month withdrawal period as a negotiating tactic to increase the pressure on the two trading partners. This would really rattle equity markets. Many believe that Trump will back away from his aggressive negotiating tactics if the U.S. stock market begins to feel pain. We would not bet on that. The President's popularity is high, and has not been overly correlated with the stock market. Moreover, blue collar workers, Trump's main support base, do not own many stocks. The implication is that the President will be willing to take risks with the equity market in order to score points with his base heading into the mid-term elections. The bottom line is that we do not believe that investors have seen "peak pessimism" on the trade front. A trade war would result in a lot of stranded capital, forcing investors to mark down the value of the companies in their portfolios. Can Trump Reduce The Trade Gap? One of the Administration's stated goals is to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. It is certainly fair to ask China to pay for the intellectual property it takes from other countries. Broadly speaking, rectifying unfair trade practices is always a good idea. However, erecting a higher tariff wall alone is unlikely to either shrink the trade gap or boost U.S. economic growth, especially given that other countries are retaliating in kind. During the 2016 election campaign, then-candidate Trump proposed a 35% and 45% across-the-board tariff on Mexican and Chinese imports, respectively. We estimated at the time that, with full retaliation, this policy would reduce U.S. real GDP by 1.2% over two years, not including any knock-on effects to global business confidence.2 Cancelling NAFTA would be much worse. The bottom line is that nobody wins a trade war. Moreover, the trade deficit is more likely to swell than deflate in the coming years, irrespective of U.S. trade policy action. The flip side of the U.S. external deficit is an excess of domestic investment over domestic savings. The latter is set to shrivel given the pending federal budget deficit blowout and the fact that the household savings rate continues to decline and is close to all-time lows. This, together with an expected acceleration in business capital spending, pretty much guarantees that the U.S. external deficit will swell in the next few years. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 18, discusses the consequences of the deteriorating long-term fiscal outlook and the associated "twin deficits" problem. We conclude that a market riot point will be required to change current trends. But even if disaster is avoided for a few more years, the dollar will ultimately be a casualty. In the near term, however, trade friction and the decoupling of U.S. from global growth should continue to support the dollar. We highlighted the divergence in growth momentum in last month's Overview. Fiscal policy is pumping up the U.S. economy, while trade woes are souring confidence abroad. Coincident and leading economic indicators confirm that the divergence will continue for at least the near term (Chart I-4). Policy Puts We do not believe that the current 'soft patch' in the Eurozone and Japanese economies will turn into anything worse over the next year. We are much more concerned with the Chinese economy. May data on industrial production, retail sales, and fixed asset investment all disappointed. Property prices in tier 1 cities are down year-over-year. Our leading indicator for the Li Keqiang index, a widely followed measure of economic activity, is in a clear downtrend (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Growth Divergence To Continue Growth Divergence To Continue Growth Divergence To Continue Chart I-5China's Growth Slowdown China's Growth Slowdown China's Growth Slowdown The authorities will likely provide fresh stimulus if the trade war intensifies. Indeed, recent statements from the Ministry of Finance suggest that planned fiscal spending for the year will be accelerated/brought forward, and the PBOC has already made a targeted cut to the reserve requirement ratio and reduced the relending rate for small company loans. Chart I-6U.S. Small Business Is Ecstatic U.S. Small Business Is Ecstatic U.S. Small Business Is Ecstatic However, the bar for a fresh round of material policy stimulus is higher today than it was in the past; elevated debt levels, excess capacity in some parts of the industrial sector, and worries about pollution all limit the extent to which the authorities can respond with monetary or fiscal stimulus. The most effective way for China to retaliate to rising U.S. tariffs is to weaken the RMB, but this too could be quite disruptive for financial markets and, thus, provides another reason for global investors to scale back on risk. Similarly, the bar is also rising in terms of the Fed's willingness to come to the rescue. Policymakers have signaled that they will not mind an overshoot of the inflation target. Nonetheless, the facts that core PCE inflation is closing in on 2% and that unemployment rate is well below the Fed's estimate of full employment, mean that the FOMC will be slower to jump to stock market's defense were there to be a market swoon. Small business owners are particularly bullish at the moment because of Trump's regulatory, fiscal and tax policies. The NFIB survey revealed that confidence soared to the second highest level in the survey's 45-year history (Chart I-6). Expansion plans are also the most robust in survey history. With the output gap effectively closed, increasing pressure on resource utilization should translate into faster wage gains and higher inflation. This was also quite apparent in the latest NFIB survey. Reports of higher compensation hit an all-time high as firms struggle to find qualified workers, and a growing proportion of small businesses plan to increase selling prices. Despite the signs of a very tight labor market, the FOMC's inconsistent macro projection remained in place in June. Policymakers expect continued above-trend growth for 2018-2020, but they forecast a flat jobless rate and core inflation at 3.5% and 2.1%, respectively. If the Fed is right on growth, then the overshoot of inflation will surely be larger than officials are currently expecting. Risk assets will come under downward pressure when the Fed is forced to shift into a higher gear and actively target slower economic growth. We expect the Fed to hike more aggressively next year than is discounted, and lift the consensus 'dot' for the neutral Fed funds rate from the current 2¾-3% range. Bonds remain vulnerable to this shift because rate expectations in 2019 and beyond are still well below the path implied by a "gradual" quarter-point-per-meeting tightening pace (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Market Expectations For Fed Funds Are Below A ''Gradual'' Pace Market Expectations For Fed Funds Are Below A ''Gradual'' Pace Market Expectations For Fed Funds Are Below A ''Gradual'' Pace At a minimum, rising inflation pressures have narrowed the Fed's room to maneuver, which means that the "Fed Put" is less of a market support. Italy Backs Away From The Brink Last month we flagged Italy as a reason to avoid risk in financial markets, but we are less concerned today. We believe that Italy will eventually cause more volatility in global financial markets, but for the short-term it appears that this risk has faded. The reason is that the M5S-Lega coalition has already punted on three of its most populist promises: wholesale change to retirement reforms, a flat tax of 15%, and universal basic income. The back-of-the-envelope cost of these three proposals is €100bn, which would easily blow out Italy's budget deficit to 7% of GDP. There was also no mention of issuing government IOUs that would create a sort of "parallel currency" in the country. If this is wrong and there is another blowout in Italian government spreads, investors should fade any resulting contagion to the peripheral countries. Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain - the hardest-hit economies in 2010 - have undertaken significant fiscal adjustment and, unlike Italy, have closed a lot of the competitiveness gap relative to Germany. Spread widening in these countries related to troubles in Italy should be considered a buying opportunity.3 ECB: Tapering To Continue The ECB looked through the recent Italian political turmoil and struck a confident tone in the June press conference. President Draghi described the first quarter cooling of the euro area economy as a soft patch driven mainly by external demand. We agree with the ECB President; in last month's Overview we highlighted several factors that had provided extra lift to the Eurozone economy last year. These tailwinds are now fading, but we believe that growth is simply returning to a more sustainable, but still above-trend, pace. That said, rising trade tensions are a wildcard to the economic outlook, especially because of Europe's elevated trade sensitivity. Draghi provided greater clarity on the outlook for asset purchases and interest rates. The pace of monthly purchases will slow from the current €30bn to €15bn in the final three months of year and then come to a complete end (Chart I-8). On interest rates, the ECB expects rates to remain at current levels "at least through the summer of 2019". This means that September 2019 could be the earliest timing for the ECB to deliver the first rate hike. Chart I-8ECB Balance Sheet Will Soon Stop Growing ECB Balance Sheet Will Soon Stop Growing ECB Balance Sheet Will Soon Stop Growing We agree with this assessment on the timing of the first rate increase. It will likely take that long for inflation to move into the 1½-2% range, and for long-term inflation expectations to surpass 2%. These thresholds are consistent with the ECB's previous rate hike cycles. Still, there is room for the discounted path of interest rates beyond the next year to move higher as Eurozone economic slack is absorbed. The number of months to the first rate hike discounted in the market has also moved too far out (24 months). Thus, we expect that bunds will contribute to upward pressure on global yields. Bond investors should be underweight the Eurozone within global fixed income portfolios. In contrast, we recommend overweight positions in U.K. gilts because market expectations for the Bank of England (BoE) are too hawkish. Investors should fade the central bank's assertion that policymakers now have a lower interest rate threshold for beginning to shrink the balance sheet. The knee-jerk rally in the pound and gilt selloff in June will not last. First, the OECD's leading economic indicator remains in a downtrend, warning that the U.K. economy faces downside risks (Chart I-9). Second, Brexit uncertainty will only increase into the March 2019 deadline. Prime Minister May managed to win a key parliamentary vote on the Withdrawal Bill in late June, but the Tories will face more tests ahead, including a vote on the Trade and Customs Bill. The fault lines between the hard and soft Brexiteers within the Tory party could bring an early end to May's government. Either May could be replaced with a hard Brexit prime minister, such as Brexit Secretary David Davis, or the U.K. could face a new general election. The latter implies the prospect of a Labour-led government. Admittedly, this will ensure a soft Brexit, but Jeremy Corbyn would almost surely herald far-left economic policies that will dampen business sentiment. As a result, we believe that the BoE is sidelined for the remainder of the year, which will keep a lid on gilt yields and sterling. Corporate Bonds: Poor Value And Rising Leverage Our newfound caution for equities on a 6-12 month investment horizon carries over to the corporate bond space. Corporate balance sheets have been deteriorating since 2015 Q1 based on our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM). The first quarter's improvement in the CHM simply reflected the tax cuts and thus does not represent a change in trend (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Fade BoE Hawkish Talk Fade BoE Hawkish Talk Fade BoE Hawkish Talk Chart I-10Q1 Improvement In Corporate ##br##Health To Reverse Q1 Improvement In Corporate Health To Reverse Q1 Improvement In Corporate Health To Reverse The improvement was concentrated in the components of the Monitor that use after-tax cash flows, and as such they were influenced by the sharp decline in the corporate tax rate. Profit margins, for example, increased from 25.8% to 26.4% on an after-tax basis in Q1 (Chart I-10, panel 2), but would have fallen to 25.5% if the effective corporate tax rate had remained the same as in 2017 Q4. As the effective corporate tax rate levels-off around its new lower level (bottom panel), last quarter's improvement in the Corporate Health Monitor will start to unwind. More importantly, the corporate sector has been leveraging aggressively, as we highlighted in our special reports that analysed company-level data from the U.S. and the Eurozone.4 We highlighted that investors and rating agencies are not too concerned about leverage at the moment, but that will change when growth slows. Interest- and debt-coverage ratios are likely to plunge to new historic lows (Charts I-11A and I-11B). Chart I-11ACorporate Leverage Will Come ##br##Back To Haunt Bondholders Corporate Leverage Will Come Back To Haunt Corporate Leverage Will Come Back To Haunt Chart I-11BCorporate Leverage Will Come ##br##Back To Haunt Bondholders Corporate Leverage Will Come Back To Haunt Corporate Leverage Will Come Back To Haunt Both U.S. investment grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) corporates are expensive, but not at an extreme, based on the 12-month breakeven spread.5 However, both IG and HY are actually extremely overvalued once we adjust for gross leverage (Chart I-12). Chart I-12U.S. Leverage - Adjusted ##br##Corporate Bond Valuation U.S. Leverage - Adjusted Corporate Bond Valuation U.S. Leverage - Adjusted Corporate Bond Valuation We have highlighted several other indicators to watch to time the exit from corporate bonds. These include long-term inflation expectations (when the 10-year TIPS inflation breakeven reaches the 2.3-2.5% range), bank lending standards for C&I loans, the slope of the yield curve, and real short-term interest rates or monetary conditions. While monetary conditions have tightened, the overall message from these indicators as a group is that it is still somewhat early to expect rising corporate defaults and sustained spread widening. That said, we have also emphasized that it is very late in the credit cycle and return expectations are quite low. Excess returns historically have been modest when the U.S. 3-month/10-year yield curve slope has been in the 0-50 basis point range. Similar to our logic behind trimming our equity exposure, the expected excess return from corporate bonds no longer justifies the risk. We recommend lightening up on both U.S. IG and HY corporate bonds, moving to benchmark and placing the proceeds at the short-end of the Treasury and Municipal bond curves. Duration should be kept short. Also downgrade EM hard currency sovereign and corporate debt to maximum underweight. We are already underweight on Eurozone corporates within European fixed-income portfolios due to the pending end to the ECB QE program. Conclusions The political situation in Italy and tensions vis-à-vis North Korea appear to be less of a potential landmine for investors, at least for the next year. Nonetheless, the risks have not diminished overall - they have simply rotated into other areas such as international trade. It is also worrying that the FOMC will have to become more aggressive in toning down the labor market. What makes the asset allocation decision especially difficult is that the economic and earnings backdrop in the U.S. is currently constructive for risk assets. Nonetheless, recessions and bear markets are always difficult to spot in real time. Given the advanced stage of the economic cycle and the fact that a lot of good news is discounted in risk assets, we believe that it is better to be early and leave some money on the table than to be late and go over the cliff. This does not mean that we will recommend a neutral allocation to risk assets for the remainder of the economic expansion. We would consider upgrading if there is a meaningful correction in equity and corporate bond prices at a time when our growth indicators remain positive. More likely, however, we will shift to an outright bearish stance on risk assets later this year or in early 2019 in anticipation of global recession in 2020. The divergence in growth momentum between the U.S. and the rest of the major economies, along with the ongoing trade row, will continue to place upward pressure on the dollar. We envision the following pecking order from weakest to strongest currency versus the greenback: dollar bloc and EM commodity currencies, non-commodity sensitive EM currencies, the euro and yen. The Canadian dollar is an exception; we are bullish versus the U.S. dollar beyond a short-term horizon due to expected Bank of Canada rate hikes. Tightening financial conditions are likely to culminate in a crisis in one or more EM countries; as a share of GDP, exports and international reserves, U.S. dollar debt is at levels not seen in over 15 years. Slowing Chinese growth and trade tensions just add to the risk in this space. The recent upturn in base metal prices will likely reverse if we are correct on the Chinese growth outlook. Oil is a different story, despite our bullish dollar view. OPEC 2.0 - the oil-producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia - agreed in June to raise oil output by 1 million bpd. The coalition aims to increase production to compensate for an over-compliance of previous deals to trim output, as well as production losses due to lack of investment and maintenance (Chart I-13). The bulk of the losses reflect the free-fall in Venezuela's output. Our oil experts believe that OPEC 2.0 does not have much spare capacity to lift output. Meanwhile, the trend decline in production by non-OPEC 2.0 states is being magnified by unplanned outages in places like Nigeria, Libya and Canada. While U.S. shale producers can be expected to grow their output, infrastructure constraints - chiefly insufficient pipeline capacity to take all of the crude that can be produced in the Permian Basin to market - will continue to limit growth in the short-term. In the face of robust demand, the risk to oil prices thus remains to the upside. A stronger dollar will somewhat undermine the profits of U.S. multinationals. U.S. equities also appear a little expensive versus Europe and Japan based on our composite valuation indicators (Chart I-14). Nonetheless, the sector composition of the U.S. stock market is more defensive than it is elsewhere and relative economic growth will favor the U.S. market. On balance, we no longer believe that euro area and Japanese equities will outperform the U.S. in local currency terms. Overweight the U.S. market on an unhedged basis. Chart I-13Oil Production Outlook Oil Production Outlook Oil Production Outlook Chart I-14Composite Equity Valuation Indicators Composite Equity Valuation Indicators Composite Equity Valuation Indicators Consistent with our shift in broad asset allocation this month, we have adjusted our global equity sector allocation to be more defensive. Materials and Industrials were downgraded to underweight, while Healthcare and Telecoms were upgraded (Consumer Staples was already overweight). Financials was downgraded to benchmark because the flattening term structure is expected to pressure net interest margins. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 28, 2018 Next Report: July 26, 2018 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?," March 28, 2017 and "Taiwan Is A Potential Black Swan," March 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Overview, dated December 2016, Box I-1. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap?," June 13, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2018 and June 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 The breakeven spread is the amount of spread widening that would have to occur over 12 months for corporates to underperform Treasurys. We focus on the breakeven spread to adjust for changes in the average duration of the index over time. II. U.S. Fiscal Policy: An Unprecedented Macro Experiment Congress is conducting a major economic experiment that has never been attempted in the U.S. outside of wartime; substantial fiscal stimulus when the economy is already at full employment. The budget deficit is on track to surpass 6% of GDP in a few years. It would likely peak above 8% in the case of a recession. The alarming long-term U.S. fiscal outlook is well known, but it has just become far worse. The combination of rising life expectancy and a decline in the ratio of taxpayers to retirees will place growing financial strains on the Social Security and Medicare systems. The federal government will be spilling far more red ink over the next decade than during any economic expansion phase since the 1940s. The debt/GDP ratio could surpass the previous peak set during WWII within 12 years. Shockingly large budget deficits in the past have sparked some attempt in Congress to limit the damage. Unfortunately, there will be little appetite to tighten the fiscal purse strings for the next decade. Voters have shifted to the left and politicians are following along. Factors that explain the political shift include disappointing income growth, income inequality, and rising political clout for Millennials, Hispanics and the elderly. Fiscal conservatism is out of fashion and this is unlikely to change over the next decade, no matter which party is in power. This means that a market riot will be required to shake voters and the political establishment into making the tough decisions necessary. While the U.S. is not at imminent risk of a market riot over the deteriorating fiscal trends, there are costs: in the long-term, the dollar will be weaker, borrowing rates will be higher and living standards will be lower than otherwise would be the case. Profligacy: (Noun) Unconstrained by convention or morality. Congress is conducting a major economic experiment that has never been attempted before in the U.S. outside of wartime; substantial fiscal stimulus at a time when the economy is already at full employment. Investors are celebrating the growth-positive aspects of the new fiscal tailwind at the moment, but it may wind up generating a party that is followed by a hangover as the Fed is forced to lean hard against the resulting inflationary pressures. Moreover, even in the absence of a recession, the federal government will likely be spilling far more red ink than during any economic expansion since the 1940s (Chart II-1). What are the long-term implications of this macro experiment? Will the U.S. continue to easily fund large and sustained budget deficits? Chart II-1U.S. Deficits Will Be Extremely Large For A Non-Recessionary Period U.S. Deficits Will Be Extremely Large For A Non-Recessionary Period U.S. Deficits Will Be Extremely Large For A Non-Recessionary Period Historically, shockingly large budget deficits sparked some attempt by Congress to limit the damage. Unfortunately, we argue in this Special Report that there will be little appetite to tighten the fiscal purse strings for the next decade. Voters have shifted to the left and politicians are following along. While the U.S. is not at imminent risk of a market riot over the deteriorating fiscal trends, the dollar will be weaker, borrowing rates will be higher and living standards will be lower than otherwise would be the case. On The Bright Side The Trump tax cuts, the immediate expensing of capital spending and a lighter regulatory touch have stirred animal spirits in the U.S. The Administration's trade policies are a source of concern, but CEO confidence is generally high. The NFIB survey highlights that small business owners are almost euphoric regarding the outlook. The IMF estimates that the tax cuts and less restrictive spending caps will provide a direct fiscal thrust of 0.8% in 2018 and 0.9% in 2019 (Chart II-2). The overall impact on the economy over the next 12-18 months could be larger to the extent that business leaders follow through on their newfound bullishness and ramp up capital spending. Chart II-2Lots Of Fiscal Stimulus In 2018 And 2019 July 2018 July 2018 Fiscal policy is a clear positive for stocks and other risk assets in the near term, as long as inflation is slow to respond. In addition to the near-term boost, there will be longer-term benefits from the 2017 tax act. Various provisions of the act affect the long-run productive potential of the U.S. economy, by promoting increases in investment and labor supply. Corporate tax cuts and the full expensing of business capital outlays should permanently increase the nation's capital stock relative to what it otherwise would be, leading to a slightly faster trend pace of productivity growth. Similarly, lower income taxes are projected to encourage more people to enter the workforce or to work longer hours. The CBO estimates that the tax act will boost the level of potential real GDP by 0.9% by the middle of the next decade. This may not sound like much, but it translates into almost a million extra jobs. The supply-side benefits of the 2017 tax act are therefore meaningful. Unfortunately, given the lack of offsetting spending cuts, it comes at the cost of a dramatically worse medium- and long-term outlook for government debt. The CBO estimates that the recent changes in fiscal policy will cumulatively add $1.7 trillion to the federal government's debt pile, relative to the previous baseline (Chart II-3). The annual deficit is projected to surpass $1 trillion in 2020, and peak as a share of GDP at 5.4% in 2022. Federal government debt held by the private sector will rise from 76% this year to 96% in 2028 in this scenario. Chart II-3Comparing To The Reagan Era Comparing To The Reagan Era Comparing To The Reagan Era The budget situation begins to look better after 2020 in the CBO's baseline forecast because a raft of "temporary provisions" are assumed to sunset as per current law, including some of the personal tax cuts and deductions included in the 2017 tax package. As is usually the case, the vast majority of these provisions are likely to be extended. The CBO performed an alternative scenario in which it extends the temporary provisions and grows the spending caps at the rate of inflation after 2020. In this more realistic scenario, the deficit reaches 7% of GDP by 2028 and the federal debt-to-GDP ratio hits 105% (Chart II-3). Moreover, there will undoubtedly be a recession sometime in the next five years. Even a mild downturn, on par with the early 1990s, could inflate the budget deficit to 8% or more of GDP. The Demographic Time Bomb Chart II-4The Withering Support Ratio The Withering Support Ratio The Withering Support Ratio The pressure that the aging population will place on federal coffers over the medium term is well known, but it is worth reviewing in light of Washington's new attitude toward deficit financing. The combination of rising life expectancy and a decline in the ratio of taxpayers to retirees will place growing financial strains on the Social Security and Medicare systems. In 1970, there were 5.4 people between the ages of 20 and 64 for every person 65 or older. That ratio has since dropped to 4 and will be down to 2.6 within the next 20 years (Chart II-4). Spending on entitlements (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Income Security and government pensions) is on an unsustainable trajectory (Charts II-5 and II-6). In fiscal 2017, these programs absorbed 76% of federal revenues and the CBO estimates that this will rise to almost 100% by 2028, absent any change in law. If we also include net interest costs, total mandatory spending1 is projected to exceed total federal government revenues as early as next year, meaning that deficit financing will be required for all discretionary spending. Chart II-5Entitlements Will Explode ##br##Mandatory Spending Entitlements Will Explode Mandatory Spending Entitlements Will Explode Mandatory Spending Chart II-6All Discretionary Spending ##br##To Be Deficit Financed? All Discretionary Spending To Be Deficit Financed? All Discretionary Spending To Be Deficit Financed? The CBO last published a multi-decade outlook in 2017 (Chart II-7). The Federal debt/GDP ratio was projected to reach 150% by 2047. If we adjust this for the new (higher) starting point in 2028 provided by the CBO's alternative scenario, the debt/GDP ratio would top 164% in 2047. Chart II-7An Unsustainable Debt Accumulation An Unsustainable Debt Accumulation An Unsustainable Debt Accumulation To put this into perspective, the demands of WWII swelled the federal debt/GDP ratio to 106% in 1946, the highest on record going back to the early 1700s (Chart II-8). The debt ratio could rocket past that level before 2030, even in the absence of a recession. Chart II-8U.S. Debt In Historical Context U.S. Debt In Historical Context U.S. Debt In Historical Context These extremely long-term projections are only meant to be suggestive. A lot of things can happen in the coming years that could make the trajectory better or even worse. But the point is that current levels of taxation are insufficient to fund entitlements in their current form in the long run. Chart II-9 shows that outlays as a share of GDP have persistently exceeded revenues since the mid-1970s, except for a brief period during the Clinton Administration. The gap is set to widen over the coming decade. Something will have to give. Chart II-9U.S. Outlays And Revenues U.S. Outlays And Revenues U.S. Outlays And Revenues Forget Starving The Beast "Starve the Beast" refers to the idea that the size of government can be restrained through a low-tax regime that spurs growth and pressures Congress to cut spending and control the budget deficit. It has been the mantra of Republicans since the Reagan era. The 1981 Reagan tax cuts included an across-the-board reduction in marginal tax rates, taking the top rate down from 70% to 50%. Corporate taxes were slashed by $150 billion over a 5-year period and tax rates were indexed for inflation, among other changes. It was not surprising that the budget deficit subsequently ballooned. Outrage grew among fiscal conservatives, but Congress spent the next few years passing laws to reverse the loss of revenues, rather than aggressively attacking the spending side. Today, Congressional fiscal hawks are in retreat and the Republican Party under President Donald Trump is not as fiscally conservative as it once was. This trend reflects the pull toward the center of the economic policy spectrum in response to a shift to the left among voters. BCA's political strategists have highlighted that this is the "median voter theory" (MVT) in action.2 The MVT posits that parties and politicians will approximate the policy choices of the median voter in order to win an election or stay in power. Every U.S. presidential election involves candidates making a mad dash to the most popularly appealing positions. President Trump exhibited this process when he ran in the Republican primary on a platform of increased infrastructure spending and zero cuts to "entitlement" spending. The Great Financial Crisis, disappointingly slow growth, stagnating middle class incomes and the widening income distribution have resulted in a leftward shift among voters on economic issues. Adding to the shift is the rising political clout of the Millennial generation, which generally favors more government involvement in the economy and will become the major voting block as it ages in the 2020s. There also are important changes underway in the ethnic composition of the electorate. The rising proportion of Hispanic voters will on balance favor the Democrats, according to voting trends (Chart II-10). A previous Special Report by Peter Berezin, BCA's Chief Global Strategist, predicted that Texas will become a swing state in as little as a decade and a solid Democrat state by 2030.3 Chart II-10The Proportion Of Minority Voters Set To Grow The Proportion Of Minority Voters Set To Grow The Proportion Of Minority Voters Set To Grow President Trump's shift to the left on economic policy helped him to out-flank Clinton in the election, particularly in the Rust Belt, where his protectionist and anti-austerity message resonated. Even his anti-immigration appeal is mostly based on economic reasoning - i.e. jobs, rather than cultural factors. Trump has admitted that he is not all that concerned about taking the country deeper into hock. The Republican rank-and-file has generally gone along with Trump's agenda because he has delivered traditional Republican tax cuts and continues to rate highly among his supporters (his approval is around 90% among Republicans). Fiscal hawks within the GOP have been forced to the sidelines while Trump and moderate Republicans have passed bipartisan spending increases with Democratic assistance. Where's The Outrage? Chart II-11Entitlements Are Popular* July 2018 July 2018 The implication is that, unlike the Reagan years, we do not expect there will be a strong political force capable of leading a fight against budget deficits. After a decade of disappointing income growth, voters are in no mood for tax hikes. On the spending side, health care and pensions are still politically untouchable. A recent study by the Pew Research Center confirms that only a very small percentage of Americans of either political stripe would agree with cuts to spending on education, Medicare, Social Security, defense, infrastructure, veterans or anti-terrorism efforts (Chart II-11). It is therefore no surprise that a populist such as Trump has promised to defend entitlement programs. Moreover, the graying of America will make it increasingly difficult for politicians to tame the entitlement beast. An aging population might generally favor the GOP, but it will also solidify opposition towards cutting Medicare and Social Security. As for defense, U.S. military spending was 3.3% of GDP and almost 15% of total spending in 2017 (Chart II-12). Congress recently lifted the spending cap for defense expenditures, but it is still projected to fall as a share of total government spending and GDP in the coming years. It is conceivable that Congress could eventually trim the defense budget even faster, but spending is already low by historical standards and it is hard to see any future Congress gutting the military at a time when the global challenge from China and Russia is rising. Indeed, given the geopolitical atmosphere of great power competition, defense spending is more likely to rise. Chart II-12What's Left To Cut? What's Left To Cut? What's Left To Cut? So, what is left to cut? If entitlements and defense are off the table, that leaves non-defense discretionary spending as the sacrificial lamb. This category includes spending by the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Justice, State and Veteran Affairs. Such spending has already declined sharply during the past several decades (Chart II-12). Non-defense discretionary spending amounted to $610 billion in 2017, which is only 15.3% of total federal spending. To put this into perspective, cutting every last cent of non-defense discretionary spending by 2022 would still leave a budget deficit of about 2½% of GDP. And it would be political suicide. The Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice and Veterans Affairs account for more than half of non-defense discretionary spending. But these programs are very popular among voters. And, at only 1.3% of total spending, eliminating all foreign aid won't make much difference. Either President Trump or Vice-President Mike Pence will be the GOP presidential candidate in 2020. Pence could be more fiscally conservative than Trump, but Congress is unlikely to remain GOP-controlled through 2024. Similarly, it is difficult to see the Democrats making more than a token effort to rein in the deficit if the party is in charge after 2020. Perhaps they will raise taxes on the rich and push the corporate rate back up a bit, but voters will probably not favor a full reversal of the Trump tax cuts. Democrats will not tackle entitlements either. In other words, we can forget about "starving the beast" as a viable option no matter which party is in power. There will be little appetite for fiscal austerity in the U.S. through to the mid-2020s at a minimum. International Comparison This all places the U.S. out of sync with other major industrialized countries, where structural budget deficits have been tamed in most cases and are expected to remain so according to the IMF's latest projections (Chart II-13). The U.S. cyclically-adjusted budget deficit is projected to be almost 7% of GDP in 2019, by far the highest among other industrialized countries except for Norway. Spain and Italy are expected to have relatively small structural deficits of 2½% and 0.8%, respectively, next year. Greece is running a small structural surplus! Including all levels of government, the IMF estimates that the U.S. general government gross debt/GDP ratio is projected to be well above that of the U.K., France, Germany, Spain and Portugal in 2023 (Chart II-14). It is expected to be on par with Italy at that time, although the newly-installed populist government there is likely to negotiate a loosening of the fiscal rules with Brussels, leading to higher debt levels than the IMF currently expects. The implication is that the U.S. government appears destined to become one of the most indebted in the developed world. Chart II-13U.S. Budget Deficit Stands Out July 2018 July 2018 Chart II-14International Debt Comparison July 2018 July 2018 The Fiscal Tipping Point Investors are not yet worried about the path of U.S. fiscal policy; the yield curve is quite flat, CDS spreads on U.S. Treasurys have not moved and the dollar is still overvalued by most traditional measures. The challenge is timing when a fiscally-induced crisis might occur. A warning bell does not ring when government debt or deficits reach certain levels. Fiscal trends generally do not suddenly spiral out of control - it is a gradual and insidious process reflected in multi-year deficits and slowly accumulating debt burdens. Eventually, a tipping point is reached where the only solution is drastic policy shifts or in extreme cases, default. Along the way, there are a number of signs that fiscal trends are entering dangerous territory. The relevance of the various signs will be different for each country, reflecting, among other things, the depth and structure of the financial system, the soundness of the economy, the dependence on foreign capital, and the asset preferences of domestic investors. Some key signs of building fiscal stress are given in Box II-1. None of the factors in Box II-1 appear to be a threat at the moment for the U.S. Moreover, comparisons with other countries that have hit the debt wall in the past are not that helpful because the U.S. is a special case. It has a huge economy and has political and military clout. The dollar is the world's main reserve currency and the country is able to borrow in its own currency. This suggests that the U.S. will be able to "get away with" its borrowing habit for longer than other countries have in the past. At the same time, financial markets are fickle and, even with hindsight, it not always clear why investors switch from acceptance to bearishness about a particular state of affairs. BOX II-1 Traditional Signs Of An Approaching Debt Crisis Government deficits absorb a rising share of net private savings, leaving little for new investment. Interest payments account for an increasingly large share of government revenues, squeezing out discretionary spending and requiring tough budget action merely to stop the deficit from rising. The government exhausts its ability to raise tax burdens. Traditional sources of debt finance dry up, requiring alternative funding strategies. Fears of inflation and/or default lead to a rising risk premium on interest rates and/ or a falling exchange rate. Political shifts occur as governments get blamed for eroding living standards, high taxes, and continued pressure to cut spending. The Costs Of Fiscal Profligacy Even if the U.S. is not near a fiscal tipping point, this does not mean that massive debt accumulation is costless: Interest Costs: Spending 3% of GDP on servicing the federal government's debt load over the next decade is not a disaster. Nonetheless, it does reduce the tax dollars available to fund entitlements or investing in infrastructure. Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Lawmakers would have less flexibility to use tax and spending policies to respond to unexpected events, such as natural disasters or recessions. As noted above, a recession in 2020 could generate a federal deficit of more than 8% of GDP. In that case, Congress may feel constrained in supporting the economy with even temporary fiscal stimulus. National Savings: Because government borrowing reduces national savings, then either capital spending must assume a smaller share of the economy or the U.S. must borrow more from abroad. Most likely it will be some combination of both. Crowding Out: If global savings are not in plentiful supply, then the additional U.S. debt issuance will place upward pressure on domestic interest rates and thereby "crowd out" business capital spending. This would reduce the nation's capital stock, leading to lower growth in productivity and living standards than would otherwise be the case. The CBO estimates that the positive impact on the capital stock from the changes to the corporate tax structure will overwhelm the negative impact from higher interest rates over the next decade. Nonetheless, the crowding out effect may dominate over a longer-time horizon. Academic studies suggest that every percentage point rise in the government's debt-to-GDP ratio adds 2-3 basis points to the equilibrium level of bond yields. If this is correct, then a rise in the U.S. ratio of 25 percentage points over the next decade in the CBO's baseline would lift equilibrium long-term bond yields by a meaningful 50-75 basis points. Much depends, however, on global savings backdrop at the time. External Trade Gap: If global savings are plentiful, then it may not take much of a rise in U.S. interest rates to attract the necessary foreign inflows to fund both the higher U.S. federal deficit and the private sector's borrowing requirements. Of course, this implies a larger current account deficit and a faster accumulation of foreign IO Us. Twin Deficits The U.S. has run a current account deficit for most of the past 40 years, which has cumulated into a rising stock of foreign-owned debt. The Net International Investment Position (NIIP) is the difference between the stock of foreign assets held by U.S. residents and the stock of U.S. assets held by foreign investors. The NIIP has fallen increasingly into the red over the past few decades, reaching 40% of GDP today (Chart II-15). The current account deficit was 2.4% at the end of 2017, matching the post-Lehman average. Nonetheless, this deficit is set to worsen as increased domestic demand related to the fiscal stimulus is partly satisfied via higher imports. Chart II-15Scenarios For The U.S. Net International Investment Position Scenarios For The U.S. Net International Investment Position Scenarios For The U.S. Net International Investment Position We estimate that a two percentage point rise in the budget deficit relative to the baseline could add a percentage point or more to the current account deficit, taking it up close to 4% of GDP. Upward pressure on the external deficit will also be accentuated in the next few years to the extent that the U.S. business sector ramps up capital spending. The implication is that the NIIP will fall deeper into negative territory at an even faster pace. A 2% current account deficit would be roughly consistent with stabilization in the NIIP/GDP ratio. But a 4% deficit would cause the NIIP to deteriorate to almost 80% of GDP by 2040 (Chart II-15). The sustainability of the U.S. twin deficits has been an area of intense debate among academics and market practitioners for many years. The U.S. has been able to get away with the twin deficits for so long in part because of the dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. The critical role of the dollar in international transactions underpins global demand for the currency. This has allowed the U.S. to issue most of its debt obligations in U.S. dollars, forcing the currency risk onto foreign investors. The worry is that foreign investors will at some point begin to question the desirability of an oversized exposure to U.S. assets within their global portfolios. We argued in our April 2018 Special Report 4 that the U.S. situation is not that dire that the U.S. dollar and Treasury bond prices are about to fall off a cliff because of sudden concerns about the unsustainability of the current account deficit. Even though the NIIP/GDP ratio will continue to deteriorate in the coming years, it does not appear that the U.S. is close to the point where foreign investors would begin to seriously question America's ability or willingness to service its debt. That said, the "twin deficits" and the downward trend in U.S. productivity relative to the rest of the world will ensure that the underlying long-term trend in the dollar will remain down (Chart II-16).5 Chart II-16Structural Drivers Of The U.S. Dollar Structural Drivers Of the U.S. Dollar Structural Drivers Of the U.S. Dollar Conclusions The long-term U.S. fiscal outlook was dire even before the Great Recession and the associated shift to the political left in America. Fiscal conservatism is out of fashion and this is unlikely to change before the mid-2020s, no matter which party is in power. This means that a market riot will be required to shake voters and the political establishment into making the tough decisions. Given demographic trends, it appears more likely that taxes will rise than entitlements cut. We do not foresee a crisis occurring in the next few years. Nonetheless, arguing that the U.S. fiscal situation is sustainable for the foreseeable future does not mean that it is desirable. There will be costs associated with current fiscal trends, even on a relatively short 5-10 year horizon. Interest costs will mushroom, potentially crowding out government spending in other areas. U.S. government debt has already been downgraded by S&P to AA+ in 2013, and the other two main rating agencies are likely to follow suit during the next recession as the deficit balloons to 8% or more. Investors may begin to demand a risk premium in order to entice them to continually raise their exposure to U.S. government bonds in their portfolios. Taxes will eventually have to rise to service the government debt, and some capital spending will be crowded out, both of which will undermine the economy's growth potential. Finally, the dollar will also be weaker than it otherwise would be in the long-term, representing an erosion in America's standard of living because everything imported is more expensive. Could Japan offer a roadmap for the U.S.? The Bank of Japan has effectively monetized 43% of the JGB market and has control over yields, at least out to the 10-year maturity. Moreover, Japan has enjoyed a "free lunch" so far because monetization has not resulted in inflation. The reason that Japan has enjoyed a free lunch is that it has suffered from a chronic lack of demand and excess savings in the private sector. The government has persistently run a deficit and fiscally stimulated the economy in order to offset insufficient demand in the private sector. The Bank of Japan purchased bonds and drove short-term interest rates down to zero. These policies have made very slow progress in eradicating lingering deflationary economic forces. However, if animal spirits in the business sector perk up, then inflation could make a comeback unless the policy stimulus is dialed down in a timely manner. In other words, the BoJ-financed fiscal "free lunch" should disappear at some point. The U.S. is in a very different situation. There is no lack of aggregate demand or excessive savings in the private sector. The economy is at full employment, and thus persistent budget deficits should turn into inflation much more quickly than was the case in Japan. In other words, the U.S. is unlikely to enjoy much of a "free lunch", whether the Fed monetizes the debt or not. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Mandatory spending refers to entitlements; that is, government expenditure programs that are required by current law. These include Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, government pensions and other smaller programs. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing The Median Voter Theory," June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "America's Fiscal Fortune: Leave Your Wallet On The Way Out," June 2011, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "U.S. Twin Deficits: Is The Dollar Doomed?," April, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 In the near term, fiscal stimulus and increased business capital spending will likely boost the dollar. But this effect on the dollar will reverse in the long-term. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The divergence between the U.S. corporate earnings data and our equity-related indicators continued in June. Forward earnings estimates continue to climb at an impressive pace. The U.S. net revisions ratio pulled back a little, but remains well above the zero line. Moreover, positive earnings surprises continue to trounce negative surprises. That said, the earnings upgrades are partly due to the Trump tax cuts, which are still being reflected in analysts' estimates. Second, some of our indicators are warning that there are clouds on the horizon. Our Monetary Indicator has fallen to levels that are low by historical standards, which is a negative sign for risk assets. This partly reflects the slowdown in growth in the monetary aggregates (see the Overview section). Our Equity Technical Indicator is threatening to dip below the zero line, which would be a clear 'sell' signal. Our Equity Valuation Indicator is flirting with our threshold of overvaluation, at +1 standard deviations. This is not bearish on its own, but valuation does provide information on the downside risks when the correction finally occurs. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. has rolled over, although this hasn't yet occurred for Japan and the Eurozone. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. This indicator suggests that flows into the U.S. stock market are waning. Finally, our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks remained on a 'sell' signal in June. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. These indicators are not aligned at the moment, further supporting the view that caution is warranted. The U.S. 10-year Treasury is slightly on the inexpensive side and our Composite Technical Indicator suggests that the bond has still not worked off oversold conditions. This suggests that the consolidation period has further to run, although we still expect yields to move higher over the remainder of the year. The dollar is expensive on a PPP basis, but is not yet overbought. The long-term outlook for the dollar is down, but it has more upside in the next 6-12 months. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

NOTE: We will not be publishing a report next week. The next Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report will be published on Tuesday, July 10th. Highlights Global Corporates: The clash between monetary policy and the markets that we have been expecting to unfold in 2018 is upon us. Downgrade global spread product exposure to neutral (3 of 5) from overweight, and raise government bond exposure to neutral. Maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration, however, as global bond yields have not yet peaked for this cycle. Country Allocation: Move to neutral on U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporates, while staying underweight (2 of 5) on euro area corporates. Downgrade emerging market hard currency sovereign and corporate debt to maximum underweight (1 of 5) - the combination of a rising dollar, Fed tightening and slower Chinese growth will remain a huge problem for emerging market assets. Feature Chart Of The Week3 Big Reasons To Downgrade Spread Product 3 Big Reasons To Downgrade Spread Product 3 Big Reasons To Downgrade Spread Product Last week, BCA as a firm moved to a less positive stance on global equities and credit, downgrading both to neutral from overweight on a cyclical (6-12 month) horizon.1 Dating back to our 2018 Outlook published at the end of last December, we had anticipated that we would be shifting to a less aggressive asset allocation sometime around mid-year.2 The expected trigger would be a move by central banks to a more restrictive policy stance that would start to impact future growth expectations. That time has come, and we are now recommending moving to a less bullish stance on global credit. Many of the tailwinds that supported the stellar performance of risk assets in 2017 - most importantly, coordinated global growth, accommodative monetary policies and a weakening U.S. dollar - have transformed into headwinds over the course of 2018 and are unlikely to reverse before risk assets suffer a setback (Chart of the week). At a minimum, there is now enough uncertainty, at a time when many asset classes are richly priced, to make the risk/reward balance for being long growth-sensitive assets like equities and corporate debt less attractive. This week, we are downgrading our recommended stance on global spread product to neutral (3 out of 5) from overweight, while upgrading our recommended allocation for government bonds to neutral from underweight. This represents an unwind of a long-standing recommendation that dates back to January 31st, 2017 when we strategically downgraded U.S. Treasury exposure and upgraded U.S. corporate debt.3 We are closing that recommendation at a relative total return gain of 2.3% for U.S. investment grade and 6.7% for U.S. high-yield over Treasuries (Chart 2). Chart 2Closing A Successful Overweight Stance ##br##On U.S. Corporates Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral We still believe that global bond yields will remain under upward pressure from both higher inflation and a less favorable supply/demand balance for fixed income (more issuance, less central bank buying). The fact that bond yields will NOT be able to fall much to reinvigorate softening global growth - because of rising inflation at a time of diminished economic slack - is a critical reason why we are turning more cautious on global credit. Thus, we are maintaining our recommended below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, even as we upgrade our government bond allocation to neutral. We recommend placing the proceeds of a reduction of global corporate debt exposure into shorter-maturity government bonds, which we are doing in our model bond portfolio (see page 15). At the country level, we are downgrading U.S. corporate bonds, both investment grade and high-yield, to neutral from overweight. We still are of the view that U.S. corporates are better positioned to outperform non-U.S. credit, however, even in a more challenging environment for credit returns. Thus we are keeping our recommended underweight allocations to euro area corporate debt (2 out of 5 for both investment grade and high-yield). We see a much nastier backdrop brewing for emerging markets (EM), however - a stronger dollar, higher U.S. interest rates, slowing Chinese growth, diminished global capital flows - so we are downgrading both EM hard currency sovereign and corporate debt to maximum underweight (1 out of 5). In terms of other spread product categories, we are maintaining our neutral allocation to U.S. mortgage-backed securities, while downgrading U.K. and Canadian corporate debt to underweight. For those that can invest in U.S. muni debt, we are upgrading that sector to overweight (4 out of 5). The Reasons To Cut Corporate Credit Exposure Now Global credit has not performed well in the first half of 2018, with only U.S. high-yield corporates providing a positive return year-to-date among the major markets: U.S. investment grade: -3.6% total return, -1.7% excess return over duration-matched Treasuries U.S. high-yield: +0.7% total return, +1.5% excess return Euro area investment grade: -0.3% total return, -1.1% excess return Euro area high-yield: -0.5% total return, -1.0% excess return EM USD-denominated sovereign debt: -5.5% total return, -3.6% excess return EM USD-denominated corporate debt: -2.9% total return, -1.7% excess return Chart 3The Start Of Something Big? The Start Of Something Big? The Start Of Something Big? While there have been plenty of geopolitical tensions for markets to fret over this year (U.S. trade policy, North Korea), the biggest reason for the underperformance of credit is due to the most typical of reasons - tightening global monetary policy. One way to measure the stance of monetary policy is to look at the slope of government bond yield curves. According to the Bloomberg Barclays government bond index data, the "global yield curve" - the spread between the Global Treasury index yield for the 7-10 year and 1-3 year maturity buckets - is now a mere 6bps (Chart 3). That is the flattest the global curve has been since the first quarter of 2007. That is a potentially ominous sign given that the Global Financial Crisis began brewing around the same time. The global yield curve became deeply inverted in the late 1990s, as well, which preceeded the 1998 EM crisis and, later, the global telecom bust. Fundamentally, we see four main reasons to downgrade global credit now: 1. Global growth is slowing and becoming less synchronized The first half of 2018 has seen a deceleration of global economic activity from the robust pace of 2017. This has been a broad-based cooling of activity so far, with cyclical indicators like manufacturing PMIs still well above the 50 level that suggests expanding growth in all major economies. Yet there are signs that the pullback in growth may persist throughout 2018 and into 2019. The OECD's global leading economic indicator (LEI) is rolling over and our LEI diffusion index - a leading indicator of the LEI - suggests additional weakness should be expected. This is significant for credit markets, as returns on corporate bonds are highly correlated to the swings in the global LEI (Chart 4). This is true even in the U.S., which is bucking the slowing global growth trend and where confidence is booming and domestic leading indicators are accelerating (Chart 5). Chart 4Corporate Bonds Follow The Global LEI Corporate Bonds Follow The Global LEI Corporate Bonds Follow The Global LEI Chart 5Upside Risks For U.S. Growth Upside Risks For U.S. Growth Upside Risks For U.S. Growth That easing of non-U.S. growth is likely rooted in the slowdown underway in China. Policymakers there have been tightening monetary conditions and acting to reign in excessive debt growth. This has resulted in a slowing of overall economic growth after the stimulus-fueled boom in 2016 that helped kick-start global growth last year through robust Chinese imports and consumption of industrial commodities. Given the sheer size of Chinese demand, the global economy will look very different when Chinese imports are growing at a 30% pace rather than the current pace below 10%. Our most reliable forward-looking indicators for Chinese growth, like our Li Keqiang leading indicator, are calling for additional cooling of Chinese economic activity in the latter half of 2018 (Chart 6). This reinforces the signal given by our global LEI diffusion index, with both indicating that additional struggles in the performance of global credit markets should be expected (based off the relationship shown in Chart 4). One additional point: the ongoing trade tensions between the Trump administration and all of the major U.S. trading partners represents an additional potential downside risk to global growth. The story is still quite fluid, as it always is with this president, but the uncertainty created by the trade frictions is definitely a negative for risk assets, at a minimum. 2. Global inflation pressures are rising, most notably in the U.S. Even with the latest dip in non-U.S. growth, the global economy is still operating with the least amount of spare capacity since the mid-2000s boom. The U.S. unemployment rate is down to 3.8%, the lowest level in eighteen years. 75% of OECD countries now have unemployment rates below the OECD's estimate of the full-employment NAIRU, with capacity utilization rates also rising. The pricing backdrop is as healthy as it has been since 2011, according to the measure of world export prices from the Netherlands-based Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis which is now growing at a 10% annual rate (Chart 7). Chart 6Downside Risks For Chinese Growth Downside Risks For Chinese Growth Downside Risks For Chinese Growth Chart 7A More Inflationary Global Backdrop, Especially In The U.S. A More Inflationary Global Backdrop, Especially In The U.S. A More Inflationary Global Backdrop, Especially In The U.S. The previous two times export prices grew that rapidly in 2008 and 2011 - two very challenging years for financial markets - global CPI inflation rates expanded rapidly, especially in the U.S. Headline CPI inflation ended up reaching peaks of 6% and 4%, respectively, during those prior two episodes. Non-U.S. inflation rates also accelerated, but not to the same degree as in the U.S. A similar dynamic is playing out in 2018, with U.S. inflation rates accelerating (both headline and core), at a faster pace than in the other major developed economies. With the U.S. labor market growing tighter each month, and with U.S. growth likely to continue expanding at an above-potential pace for the next few quarters, it is unlikely that the current upturn in U.S. inflation will slow on its own. This will ensure that the Fed will continue on its planned monetary tightening path that will soon take U.S. monetary conditions into restrictive territory - eventually weighing on U.S. growth expectations and raising concerns over future downgrade and default risks, and returns, in U.S. corporate bond markets. 3. Growth and monetary policy divergences will continue to boost the value of the U.S. dollar The divergences between growth, inflation and monetary policy in the U.S. and the rest of the world are now helping raise the value of the U.S. dollar, which had declined nearly 10% on peak-to-trough basis in 2017. The dollar has been rising in 2018, which has been weighing on EM currencies and financial markets as is typically the case during periods of dollar strength. EM economies have been rapidly accumulating dollar-denominated debt in recent years, leaving EM borrowers as highly exposed to the swings in the dollar and interest rates as they have been since the late 1990s. The current backdrop is setting itself up for a repeat of the 2015/16 period when pro-U.S. growth divergences caused the dollar to soar and triggered major selloffs in EM financial assets that spilled over into U.S. and developed market equities and credit (Chart 8). Right now, the moves have been far more modest than seen in the 2015/16 period. Since the start of 2018, the U.S. trade-weighted dollar is up 4% and EM equities are down -6% (in U.S. dollar terms), while U.S. investment grade credit spreads have risen 37bps from the February lows. This is far less than the moves seen in 2015/16, where the dollar rose 16%, EM equities sold off -34% and U.S. credit spreads widened nearly 100bps. Those moves were enough to cause the Fed to delay its rate hike plans after the initial post-QE rate hike in December 2015, triggering a significant decline in U.S. bond yields (bottom panel) and the dollar that eventually stabilized global financial markets. With the U.S. economy in a much healthier position today than two years ago, and with U.S. core inflation running close to the Fed's 2% target, it will take much larger market moves than have been seen of late before the Fed would consider taking a pause on its current 25bps-per-quarter pace of rate hikes. The mechanism for that to happen will be a stronger dollar and any associated impact on U.S. financial markets. However, it must be a very large move (as it was in 2015/16) to have enough of a negative impact on the U.S. economy, U.S. corporate profits or U.S. inflation for financial markets, and the Fed, to take notice. In Chart 9, we show the U.S. trade-weighted dollar with three different scenarios for the change in the currency to the end of 2018: flat, up 5% and up 10%. We show the dollar in level terms in the top panel, while showing the year-over-year growth rate of the dollar (on an inverted scale) in the bottom three panels. In those last three panels, we also show the potential areas where a strong dollar would impact the U.S. economy the most: net exports, corporate profit growth from earnings earned outside the U.S. (using top-down profit data) and headline inflation. Chart 82015/16 Revisited? Not Yet 2015/16 Revisited? Not Yet 2015/16 Revisited? Not Yet Chart 9A Much Stronger USD Is Needed To Impact U.S. Growth & Inflation A Much Stronger USD Is Needed To Impact U.S. Growth & Inflation A Much Stronger USD Is Needed To Impact U.S. Growth & Inflation The charts show that a 10% rise in the dollar by year-end would likely take enough of a bite out of U.S. growth and inflation for U.S. equity and credit markets to sell off and for the Fed to take a pause on its rate hike plans. A more modest 5% rise in the dollar will have a more muted impact, especially with stronger underlying U.S. growth and inflation pressures than was the case in 2015/16. That latter scenario of a more moderate rise in the dollar would be our most likely scenario - one that would prove to be challenging for U.S. credit market performance. The dollar increase would be enough to keep EM financial markets on the defensive, but would not be large enough to get Fed rate hikes out of the way and allow for a big decline in Treasury yields that would help support risk assets. A slowly rising dollar is another reason to reduce credit exposure in fixed income portfolios. 4. Central bank liquidity provision through asset purchases is slowing rapidly One of our major themes for 2018 has been that the removal of the extraordinary liquidity expansion by central banks would weigh on asset returns. This would occur through the Fed allowing maturing bonds accumulated during its QE program to begin running off its balance sheet, and through a slower pace of bond buying in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Already, the increase in developed market bond yields, and the lowering of returns in global equities and credit, have largely followed the path laid out by our indicator of central bank liquidity provision - the annual growth in the balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, BoJ and Bank of England (Chart 10). Our central bank liquidity indicator suggests that there is still more upside for global government bond yields as central banks become less directly active in bond markets. At the same time, the diminished liquidity growth means there is less investor money to be forced out of risk-free government bonds into risky assets like corporate credit, which should help erode credit market returns on the margin. This will occur through reduced inflows into credit that are just chasing yield, and a return to more fundamental drivers of credit market valuation like growth, inflation, leverage and downgrade/default risks - all of which are now on the rise in the U.S. Bottom Line: The clash between monetary policy and the markets that we have been expecting to unfold in 2018 is upon us. Tightening monetary policies, rising bond yields, slowing global growth, widening growth divergences, increasing U.S. inflation pressures, a strengthening U.S. dollar, emerging market instability, diminished central bank liquidity, reduced global capital flows, global trade tensions - all are now creating a backdrop that is more challenging for risk assets. Downgrade global spread product exposure to neutral (3 of 5) from overweight, and raise government bond exposure to neutral. Maintain a below-benchmark portfolio duration, however, as global bond yields have not yet peaked for this cycle. Asset Allocation Decisions To Be Made So in terms of our fixed income asset allocation recommendations, but in our strategic tables on page 16 and our model bond portfolio on page 15, we are making the following changes: Downgrade U.S. Investment Grade & High-Yield Corporates To Neutral (3 out of 5) The bulk of our primary indicators for U.S. credit are at levels that are consistent with a neutral allocation (Chart 11). Our top-down Corporate Health Monitor is right at the line dividing the deteriorating health and improving health regimes (although this is only because of a cyclical improvement in some of the underlying indicators). U.S. monetary policy is close to neutral, as measured by the real fed funds rate versus the Fed's r-star estimate. The U.S. Treasury curve is very flat, although it is not yet inverted as typically precedes the end of a credit cycle. Finally, bank lending standards are only modestly in "net easing" territory according to the Fed's senior loan officer survey. Chart 10Fading Impact Of Global QE On Bond Markets Fading Impact Of Global QE On Bond Markets Fading Impact Of Global QE On Bond Markets Chart 11Downgrade U.S. IG & HY Corporates To Neutral Downgrade U.S. IG & HY Corporates To Neutral Downgrade U.S. IG & HY Corporates To Neutral With all these indicators hovering around neutral levels, a neutral allocation to U.S. corporates seems justified. Additionally, we recommend cutting across all credit tiers for both investment grade and high-yield, rather than focusing on cutting a specific tier more than another. Our preferred valuation metric - the 12-month breakeven spread relative to its history - is near the bottom quartile for all credit tiers (Charts 12 & 13) without one looking particularly more expensive than the others. Chart 12Not Much Of A Spread Cushion In U.S. Investment Grade ... Not Much Of A Spread Cushion In U.S. Investment Grade ... Not Much Of A Spread Cushion In U.S. Investment Grade ... Chart 13... Or U.S. High-Yield ... Or U.S. High-Yield ... Or U.S. High-Yield Keep Euro Area Investment Grade & High-Yield At Underweight (2 out of 5) We have maintained this strategic view based on the convergence between our top-down Corporate Health Monitors for both the U.S. and euro area. Right now, the cyclical improvement in U.S. financial metrics has come at the same time as a cyclical deterioration of euro area metrics from very healthy levels (Chart 14). The spread between the two Monitors has proven to be a good directional indicator for the relative performance between U.S. and euro area credit. That spread continues to point to additional expected outperformance by U.S. corporates, even in an overall more challenging environment for global credit markets. Throw in increased Italian political turmoil, softer euro area growth and the upcoming ECB tapering of its asset purchases - which will include corporate debt that the ECB has been buying steadily for the past three years - and the case for underweighting euro area corporates, especially versus U.S. equivalents, is a strong one. Downgrade EM Hard Currency Sovereign & Corporate Debt To Maximum Underweight (1 out of 5) We have been favoring U.S. investment grade credit over EM credit the past several months. The growth divergence between the U.S. and EM has been widening, while EM market valuations had gotten very rich. Now, EM spread widening is starting to correct that mis-valuation, although is still early in the process. The spread differential between U.S and EM credit is a good leading indicator of the relative returns between the two asset classes (Chart 15), thus last year's EM outperformance is leading to this year's underperformance. Chart 14Stay Underweight Euro Area Corporates Stay Underweight Euro Area Corporates Stay Underweight Euro Area Corporates Chart 15Move To Maximum Underweight EM Credit Move To Maximum Underweight EM Credit Move To Maximum Underweight EM Credit We wish to maintain the same "two notch" gap between our recommended level of U.S. and EM credit exposure, so by downgrading U.S. corporates to neutral (3 of 5), we must downgrade EM corporates to maximum underweight (1 of 5). All of the above changes will be reflected in our model bond portfolio on page 15. One final point - we should lay out the case for out next move from here. If the Fed tightening cycle goes as we envision it will, with U.S. growth staying strong and inflation expectations rising back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target, then we expect the next move will be to downgrade U.S. corporates to underweight. However, if there is enough of a market setback to cause the Fed to delay its rate hike cycle, as was the case in 2016, then we may consider moving back to overweight U.S. corporates on a tactical basis. We suspect, however, that the moves today are the beginning of the end game for the current credit cycle - the negatives for corporates are now outweighing the positives, and that gap is likely to get wider in the coming months. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral", dated June 19th 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 Key Views: BCA's Outlook & What It Means For Global Fixed Income Markets", dated December 5th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Global Growth Upturn Has Legs: Reduce Duration, Upgrade Credit Exposure", dated January 31st 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Global Growth: The risk to U.S. financial markets from global growth divergences and increasingly hawkish trade policy is rising, and it is unlikely to be resolved without a market riot. Credit Cycle: Valuation is expensive and indicators of monetary conditions suggest we are very late in the cycle. Both factors suggest that excess returns to corporate bonds will be meager, even if recession is avoided. Given concerns about global growth, the risk/reward trade-off favors a more defensive allocation to spread product. Corporate Leverage: Profit growth has just barely kept pace with debt growth during the past few quarters and will likely moderate as wage costs accelerate in the second half of the year. The resultant increase in leverage will pressure corporate bond spreads wider. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio##br## Specification Go To Neutral On Spread Product Go To Neutral On Spread Product Last week we sent a Special Report to all BCA clients advising them to cyclically reduce exposure to risk assets (equities and corporate bonds), moving from an overweight allocation to neutral.1 For U.S. bond portfolios, we recommend that investors adopt a neutral allocation to spread product versus Treasuries, while also upgrading the more defensive municipal bond sector at the expense of corporate credit. We also advise investors to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration (Table 1). In this week's report we explain the rationale for these portfolio changes. Specifically, we run through our favorite credit cycle indicators, which we split into three categories: valuation, monetary conditions and credit quality. The message from the indicators is that it is still somewhat too soon to expect rising corporate defaults and sustained spread widening. However, the indicators also suggest that we are very late in the cycle and return expectations should be quite low. Put differently, the expected excess return from overweight corporate bond positions no longer justifies the risk of staying overweight for too long. This is particularly true given the ongoing slowdown in global growth and escalating tit-for-tat trade war. Neither of which is likely to be resolved without some market pain. Credit Cycle Indicators Valuation While value in the investment grade corporate bond space has improved somewhat since January, the sector remains expensive relative to history. Chart 1 shows the 12-month breakeven spread for each investment grade credit tier as a percentile rank for the period between 1996 and today.2 According to this measure, investment grade corporate bonds are about as expensive as they were in 2006/07, just prior to the 2008 recession and default cycle. Chart 2 shows the same valuation measure for the high-yield credit tiers. High-Yield spreads are somewhat wider than 2006/07 levels, though they are still quite low relative to the post-1996 timeframe as a whole. One critical difference between the late stages of the last credit cycle (2006/07) and the current environment is that corporate balance sheets are now in significantly worse shape. If we adjust for this by dividing the 12-month breakeven spread by our preferred measure of gross leverage we see that high-yield valuation now looks similar to 2006/07 levels, while investment grade credit looks significantly more expensive (Chart 3). Chart 1Investment Grade Valuation Investment Grade Valuation Investment Grade Valuation Chart 2High-Yield Valuation High-Yield Valuation High-Yield Valuation Chart 3Leverage-Adjusted Value Leverage-Adjusted Value Leverage-Adjusted Value These valuation measures do not suggest that spreads are about to widen. It is clear from the charts that valuation can remain expensive for long periods of time, particularly in the late stages of the credit cycle. However, the indicators do tell us that return expectations should be low relative to history and that relatively little spread widening is required before corporate bonds see losses relative to duration-matched Treasuries. All else equal, our threshold for moving out of corporate credit should be low. Monetary Conditions Chart 4Inflation Indicators Inflation Indicators Inflation Indicators We place a great deal of importance on monetary indicators for timing allocation shifts into and out of corporate bonds. The reason relates to our understanding of the Fed Policy Loop.3 When inflation is far below target, the central bank has a strong incentive to nurture economic growth. This means it will be quick to respond to any relapse in financial markets that might eventually lead to an economic slow-down. Credit spreads are unlikely to widen meaningfully in these environments of low inflation and a responsive Fed. However, as inflation approaches target the central bank's reaction function starts to change. It becomes marginally more concerned with preventing an overshoot of the inflation target and marginally less concerned with supporting economic growth. It will therefore be more willing to tolerate some widening in credit spreads before responding with a dovish policy action. With that in mind, we monitor three inflation indicators to help us determine when inflation is strong enough to significantly impair the "Fed put" on credit spreads. They are (Chart 4): Re-anchored long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates, within a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. The St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure above 15%. Year-over-year core PCE inflation above 2%. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have increased significantly during the past year, but have not quite hit our target range. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently sits at 2.11% and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently sits at 2.17%. Similarly, the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure, an aggregate economic indicator designed to measure the percent chance that inflation exceeds 2.5% during the next 12 months, currently sits at 13%. This is only just below the 15% threshold that we have previously found to be correlated with significantly lower corporate bond excess returns (Table 2).4 Table 2Investment Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different Ranges ##br##Of Price Pressures Measure** (January 1990 To Present) Go To Neutral On Spread Product Go To Neutral On Spread Product Finally, year-over-year core PCE inflation has not yet returned to the Fed's 2% target but appears to be on its way. The annualized 3-month rate of change has exceeded 2% in three of the past four months and the extreme tightness in labor markets and resultant wage pressures are likely to keep core inflation in a gradual uptrend going forward. Year-over-year core PCE inflation is very likely to reach the Fed's 2% target before the end of the year. All in all, inflation pressures suggest that investors' inflation expectations are not yet completely re-anchored around the Fed's 2% target, and probably have a bit more upside. However, we expect that all three of our inflation indicators will hit their key thresholds within the next few months. When we combine the fact that our inflation indicators are very close to sending a bearish signal for corporate bonds with our growing concerns about global growth and trade (see section titled "Global Growth Divergences: A Repeat Of 2015" below), we think it is prudent to start scaling back the credit risk in U.S. bond portfolios today. Another important indicator of monetary conditions is the slope of the yield curve. As Fed Chairman Jerome Powell explained at the last FOMC press conference, the yield curve is really about appropriate monetary policy. When it is very steep it signals that policy is currently accommodative and will tighten in the future. When it is inverted it signals that policy is restrictive and is likely to ease. Logically, when monetary conditions are close to neutral the yield curve will be very flat. The market will be uncertain about whether rates will rise or fall in the future. With that in mind we can split historical cycles into three phases based on the 3-year/10-year slope of the Treasury curve: (i) early in the recovery when the 3/10 slope is above 50 bps, (ii) the middle of the cycle when the 3/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps, and (iii) late in the cycle when the 3/10 slope is inverted (Chart 5). Chart 5Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve We find that corporate bond excess returns are highest early in the cycle when the yield curve is steep. Excess returns drop significantly once the 3/10 slope flattens to below 50 bps, and then turn negative once the yield curve inverts (Table 3). Table 3Risk Asset Performance In Different Yield Curve Regimes Go To Neutral On Spread Product Go To Neutral On Spread Product The 3/10 slope is currently 25 bps. We are firmly entrenched in the middle phase of the credit cycle where excess returns tend to be very low, though often still positive. Given the uncertainty surrounding when the yield curve will invert, sacrificing some small potential excess return by scaling back spread product exposure to neutral seems prudent. Credit Quality The final class of credit cycle indicators we track relates to the fundamental balance sheet health of the nonfinancial corporate sector. Chief among those indicators is our measure of gross leverage that we calculate as pre-tax profits divided by total debt. Typically, periods of rising gross leverage tend to coincide with corporate spread widening, and vice-versa. Alternatively, we can say that periods when profit growth is sustainably below the rate of debt growth tend to coincide with widening credit spreads (Chart 6). Using our most recent data, which extend only to the end of Q1 2018, profit growth has roughly kept pace with debt growth since the middle of 2016, resulting in relatively flat leverage. But this dynamic will probably not be sustained for much longer. While corporate revenue growth is strong, it cannot accelerate indefinitely. The ISM index is already peaking, and the recent bout of dollar strength will act as a headwind (Chart 7, panels 1 & 2). Chart 6Leverage Won't Stay Flat For Long Leverage Won't Stay Flat For Long Leverage Won't Stay Flat For Long Chart 7Watch Out For Rising Wages Watch Out For Rising Wages Watch Out For Rising Wages But more important is that tight labor markets are already putting upward pressure on wage costs and this wage acceleration is very likely to persist. Our Profit Margin Proxy, calculated as corporate selling prices less unit labor costs, already points to a moderation in profit growth in the second half of the year (Chart 7, panels 3 & 4). With profit growth very likely to moderate in the second half of the year, and given that it would be highly unusual for the rate of debt growth to decline meaningfully outside of recession, we expect corporate leverage to start rising again in the third and fourth quarters of this year. Bottom Line: The overall message from our credit cycle indicators is that we are very late in the cycle and expected excess returns to corporate bonds should be low. Given the risks to global growth on the horizon, it makes sense to turn more cautious on spread product. Global Growth Divergences: A Repeat Of 2015 Chart 8Global Growth Divergence Won't End Well Global Growth Divergence Won't End Well Global Growth Divergence Won't End Well From mid-2016 until a few months ago the global economy had benefited from a period of synchronized global growth, but that dynamic has now broken down. Leading indicators show that the large divergence between strong U.S. growth and weak growth in the rest of the world that was one of our key investment themes in 2014/15 has re-emerged (Chart 8). As in the 2014/15 period, the end result of divergent growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world is upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. This serves to tighten U.S. financial conditions at the margin, and exacerbates economic pain in emerging markets who have to contend with large balances of USD-denominated debt. Further, unlike in 2014/15, the global economy now has to deal with the imposition of tariffs and an escalating trade war that is unlikely to die down any time soon.5 Since the United States is a relatively large and closed economy, any moderation in global trade will be felt more acutely outside the U.S. But this only serves to increase global growth divergences and add to the upward pressure on the dollar. Eventually, as in 2015, we expect this divergence in growth and the resultant upward pressure on the dollar to culminate in a risk-off event in U.S. financial markets. At that point, the Fed will be forced to take notice and will likely pause rate hikes for a period of time. The Fed kept rate hikes on hold for an entire year following a similar market event in late 2015, but any future pause will probably not be as long. With inflation much closer to target than in 2015, the Fed will be reluctant to pause the rate hike cycle for more than a quarter or two. It is for this reason that we maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration even as we shift to a more defensive posture on spread product. The impact of divergent global growth will likely first be felt in credit spreads, and any knock-on impact to the pace of Fed rate hikes and Treasury yields could prove fleeting. Bottom Line: The risk to U.S. financial markets from global growth divergences and increasingly hawkish trade policies is rising, and is unlikely to be resolved without a market riot. Given meager expected returns in corporate bonds, it makes sense to get more defensive on spread product. Upgrade Municipal Bonds In addition to Treasuries, we also recommend allocating some of the proceeds from the corporate bond downgrade to tax-exempt municipals. As is shown in our Total Return Bond Map, municipal bonds are less risky than corporates and, depending on each investor's marginal tax rate, could offer reasonably high expected returns (Chart 9). Meanwhile, our Municipal Health Monitor remains entrenched below zero, suggesting that municipal ratings upgrades will continue to outpace downgrades, and net state & local government borrowing appears to be hooking down (Chart 10). Chart 9Total Return Bond Map (As Of June 21, 2018) Go To Neutral On Spread Product Go To Neutral On Spread Product Chart 10Municipal Health Still Improving Municipal Health Still Improving Municipal Health Still Improving In short, the current macro environment is much more negative for corporate credit quality than it is for municipal credit quality. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral", dated June 19, 2018, available at www.bcaresearch.com/reports/view_report/25520/bca 2 We focus on the breakeven spread to adjust for changes in the average duration of the index over time. We calculate the 12-month breakeven spread as simply the index option-adjusted spread divided by index duration, ignoring the modest impact of convexity. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Are You 'Sick Of Winning' Yet?", dated June 20, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com

Highlights We have downgraded our 12-month recommendation on global equities and credit from overweight to neutral. If macro developments evolve as expected, then we will shift to an outright bearish stance on risk assets later this year or early 2019 in anticipation of a global recession in 2020. BCA has identified ten periods since 1950 when U.S. equities moved sideways for at least five months in a narrow range; when the economy is at full employment, stocks are more likely to sell off after these sideways periods than if there is still some slack in the labor market. Feature The outlook for global risk assets will likely be more challenging in the coming months. With that in mind, we have downgraded our 12-month recommendation on global equities and credit from overweight to neutral. BCA still expects that the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio will grind higher in the next 12 months, as U.S. stocks move sideways and Treasury yields climb (Chart 1A and 1B). We recommend that investors put the proceeds from the sale of equity positions into cash. Chart 1AScenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio ##br##If 10-Year Treasury Hits 3.80% Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio If 10-Year Treasury Hits 3.29% Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio If 10-Year Treasury Hits 3.29% Chart 1BScenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio ##br##If 10-Year Treasury Hits 3.29% Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio If 10-Year Treasury Hits 3.80% Scenarios For Stock-To-Bond Ratio If 10-Year Treasury Hits 3.80% Within a fixed-income only portfolio, we are selling credit and putting the proceeds into Treasuries. We maintain our underweight duration stance given our view of the Fed and the 10-year Treasury. At 2.91%, the 10-year is still below BCA's view of fair value (3.29%). Moreover, BCA's position is that the Fed's gradual path of rate hikes is consistent with a cyclical peak in the 10-year Treasury yield between 3.30% and 3.80%, well above current levels.1 On the credit side, we note that late in the cycle the yield curve is moderately flat, between 0 and 50 bps. Work by our U.S. Bond Strategy team2 shows that periods when the curve is flat are consistent with much lower excess returns than when the slope is above 50 bps (Chart 2). Given the low potential reward, a neutral posture on credit makes the most sense. Investors will not give up too much by starting to downgrade early. Tomorrow's U.S. Bond Strategy report will provide more details on the corporates versus Treasuries allocation. Chart 2Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve BCA has recommended overweight positions in U.S. risk assets since spring 2009 when equities became attractive from a risk/reward perspective. At that time, the U.S. economy was weak, the Fed was easing, equity valuations were depressed and forward earnings estimates were dismal (Chart 3). In contrast, the risk/reward for risk assets today is much less attractive. The economy is in the late stages of an expansion and is running beyond full employment. The central bank is raising rates. Moreover, equity valuations are elevated and forward earnings estimates are at their most optimistic in 20 years (Chart 3 again). This means that good news is already priced into the equity market. When the Shiller PE, a measure of the market's valuation, is between 30 and 40, 1-year returns are tepid at best (Chart 4). Chart 3Five-Year Bottom-Up EPS Growth Estimates Are Impossibly High Five-Year Bottom-Up EPS Growth Estimates Are Impossibly High Five-Year Bottom-Up EPS Growth Estimates Are Impossibly High Chart 4Expected Returns Given Starting Point Shiller P/E Sideways Sideways We are not trimming exposure to risk assets because we are more concerned about the economic outlook. BCA's view is that odds of a U.S. recession in the next 12 months remain low. Furthermore, the traditional recession signals that we track do not suggest a recession is nigh (Chart 5). For example, the 2/10 yield curve is still positive at 34 basis points (panel 2). Upward movement in long-dated breakevens will offset some of the upward pressure at the front-end from further Fed rate hikes, limiting the amount of curve flattening during the next few months. Once long-dated breakevens get back to a range between 2.3% and 2.5% then flattening could proceed more rapidly.3 Panel 3 shows that the LEI crosses below zero when a recession is imminent. The May LEI rose by 6% year-over-year. Initial claims for unemployment insurance in the week ending June 16 were 24K below their mid-December 2017 reading. Panel 4 shows that a 6-month increase in unemployment claims of between 75,000 and 100,000 is associated with a recession. The bottom line is that we are not concerned about a recession. Nonetheless, BCA's Equity Scorecard has dropped to 2, below the critical value of three that has been consistent in the past with positive equity returns (not shown). Table 1 updates our Exit Checklist of items that are important for the equity allocation call. Three of the nine are now giving a 'sell' signal and they suggest that prudence is necessary, despite the constructive economic outlook. Chart 5No Recession Signal Here No Recession Signal Here No Recession Signal Here Table 1Exit Checklist For Risk Assets Sideways Sideways Furthermore, several technical indicators that we monitor signal caution. The National Association of Active Investment Managers (NAAIM) says that active managers have increased equity risk since the start of the year (Chart 6). At 89%, the average equity exposure of institutional investors is close to the cycle high reached in March 2017, which was the highest since 2007, just before the S&P 500 peak in October 2007. Furthermore, BCA's Equity Speculation Index remains elevated. At slightly under 2, it is at a position where bear markets began in 2000 and 2007, and it is well above the level seen just before the 2015 bear market (Chart 7, panel 1). That said, not all technical indicators are flashing red. Chart 8 shows that BCA's Technical Indicator is not at an extreme (panel 1). Moreover, BCA's Equity Sentiment Composite Index is neutral (panel 2); panel 3 shows that the U.S. large cap equities remain in the middle of their 2009-2018 recovery channel, albeit in the top half of the channel. Note that the S&P 500 tested the top end of the channel (near 2850) in January 2018. Chart 6Active Managers Have Increased ##br##Equity Exposure This Year Active Managers Have Increased Equity Exposure This Year Active Managers Have Increased Equity Exposure This Year Chart 7Equity Speculation Is Elevated Equity Speculation Is Elevated Equity Speculation Is Elevated Chart 8Not All Technical Indicators Are Bearish Not All Technical Indicators Are Bearish Not All Technical Indicators Are Bearish The risk to our neutral stance on equities is that credit and equities will rally to fresh highs before the cycle is done. However, given our bias for capital preservation and views on the late stage of the business cycle, it is not advisable to reach for the last few drops of return. With equity valuations stretched, we would rather be early and judicious and miss out on the last few basis points of outperformance rather than be late and underperform as risk assets sell off. BCA's view is that the next recession will be sparked by the Fed overtightening in 2019 and 2020 when it finds itself behind the curve on inflation. Moreover, because inflation is at the Fed's 2% target and the economy is beyond full employment, the price at which the Fed's "policy put" gets exercised is much lower than earlier in the cycle. The implication is that the Fed will be reluctant to deviate from its tightening path even in the face of more turmoil in the EM space or in Europe. This supports our guarded view on equities and our decision to move into cash instead of Treasuries. Geopolitical risk is another reason to be cautious. Chart 9 shows that globalization, a tailwind for risk assets, is stalling. Moreover, there is an increased threat of a breakup in the Eurozone, led by political uncertainty in Italy (Chart 10). In addition, tensions with Iran are mounting. Nonetheless, our Geopolitical Strategy service notes that the U.S.'s relationship with China is the primary source of geopolitical peril (Chart 11).4 Although we are not adjusting our view on the dollar,5 a stronger greenback would bolster our case for caution on risk assets. A higher dollar would hurt the profits of U.S. multinationals and could lead to instability in the emerging markets, raising the odds of a policy misstep. Chart 9Globalization Has Reached Its Zenith Globalization Has Reached Its Zenith Globalization Has Reached Its Zenith Chart 10Risk Of Eurozone Breakup Is Rising Risk of Eurozone Breakup is Rising Risk of Eurozone Breakup is Rising Chart 11BCA's Geopolitical Power Index Illustrates A Multipolar World BCA's Geopolitical Power Index Illustrates A Multipolar World BCA's Geopolitical Power Index Illustrates A Multipolar World Equity volatility will accelerate through year end, as is often the case late in equity bull markets. Bottom Line: If macro developments evolve as expected, then we will shift to an outright bearish stance on risk assets later this year or early 2019 in anticipation of a global recession in 2020. Absent a recession, we would move to underweight stocks if a wider trade war develops. We would consider temporarily shifting our 12-month recommendation back to overweight if global equities sell off by more than 15% in the next few months, especially if our economic indicators remain constructive and the Fed either cuts rates or signals that it is on hold. Treading Water BCA has identified ten periods since 1950 when U.S. equities moved sideways for at least five months in a narrow range (See Appendix Charts 1 and 2).6 We excluded bear markets and recessions from our analysis because our view is that neither condition will occur in the next 12 months. Table 2 shows that these sideways episodes lasted an average of eight months. At the end of six of the ten intervals, U.S. large cap equities rallied (1986, 1988, 1992, 1997-1998, 2004, and 2015); after two phases, stocks recovered briefly and then sold off (1951-52 and 1972). At the conclusion of the 1991 episode, stocks rallied and then resumed moving sideways. Stocks sold off after the eight-month sideways phase in 1976. Table 2What Happens After Stocks Move Sideways? Sideways Sideways Four (1951-52, 1972, 1988, 1997-98) of the ten sideways periods occurred after the U.S. economy reached full employment. The 10 year Treasury yield increased as stocks moved sideways in 1972 and in 1988, but fell in the 1997-98 episode. The S&P 500 PE ratio increased in two sideways phases (1972 and 1997-98) and contracted in 1988. S&P 500 EPS growth accelerated in 1972, 1988 and 1997-98 phases. The S&P 500 rallied after the sideways episodes in 1988 and 1997-98, but sold off after the 1951-52 and 1972 sideways phases that occurred after the economy hit full employment (Chart 12). Chart 12S&P 500 Valuations, EPS Growth, Margins And The 10-Year Treasury Yield When Stocks Move Sideways S&P 500 Valuations, EPS Growth, Margins And The 10-Year Treasury Yield When Stocks Move Sideways S&P 500 Valuations, EPS Growth, Margins And The 10-Year Treasury Yield When Stocks Move Sideways As the S&P 500 moved sideways when the economy was not yet at full employment (1976, 1986, 1991, 1992, 2004 and 2015), 10-year Treasury yields fell four times (1976, 1986, 1991 and 1992) and rose in two (2004 and 2015). The forward PE ratio for the S&P 500 expanded in 1986 and 1992, but contracted in 1991, 2004 and 2015. EPS growth during sideways episodes for stocks when the economy was not yet at full employment is mixed. EPS growth accelerated in 1976, 1992 and 2004, but slowed in 1986, 1991 and 2015 as oil prices fell. U.S. large cap equities rallied after four of the sideways periods when the economy was not yet at full employment (1986, 1992, 2004 and 2015) but sold off after the 1976 sideways move (Chart 12 again). We intend to further examine the macro backdrop during sideways periods for U.S. equities in future Weekly Reports. Bottom Line: BCA expects bond yields to rise in the next 12 months and S&P 500 profit growth will peak. Stocks are more likely to move higher after a period of sideways price action if the economy is not at full employment. Rising PE ratios as stocks move sideways most often lead to equity rallies after the sideways phases end. With valuations already elevated, PEs are unlikely to expand much further in this cycle. Moreover, the U.S. economy reached full employment in early 2017, making it less likely that the Fed will hit the pause button on its rate hike regime. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Bond Bear Still In Tact," published June 5, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "As Good as It Gets For Corporate Debt," published April 24, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty," published June 19, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy "Are You Sick of Winning Yet," published June 20, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral," published June 20, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 There are well-established periods for bull and bear markets for U.S. equities, however not for "sideways" episodes for stocks. We have defined "sideways" as a period of range-bound equity price movements that have lasted for at least five months outside of recessions and bear markets. Readers may have other definitions of "sideways". APPENDIX CHARTS Chart 1Sideways Epsisodes For Stocks 1950-1980... Sideways Epsisodes For Stocks 1950-1980... Sideways Epsisodes For Stocks 1950-1980... Chart 2..And 1980-2018 ..And 1980-2018 ..And 1980-2018