Corporate Bonds

Highlights U.S. equities 'melted up' in January as tax cuts made the robust growth/low inflation sweet spot even sweeter. Ominously, recent market action is beginning to resemble a classic late cycle blow-off phase. The fundamentals supporting the market will persist through most of the year, before an economic downturn in the U.S. takes hold in 2019. The repatriation of overseas corporate cash will also flatter EPS growth this year via buyback and M&A activity. The S&P 500 could return 14% or more this year. Unfortunately, the consensus now shares our upbeat view for 2018. Valuation is stretched and many indicators suggest that investors have become downright giddy. This month we compare valuation across the major asset classes. U.S. equities are the most overvalued, followed by gold, raw industrials and EM assets. Oil is still close to fair value. Long-term investors should already be scaling back on risk assets. Investors with a 6-12 month horizon should stay overweight equities versus bonds for now, but a risk management approach means that they should not try to squeeze out the last few percentage points of return. In terms of the sequencing of the exit from risk, the most consistent lead/lag relationship relative to previous tops in the equity market is provided by U.S. corporate bonds. For this reason, we are likely to take profits on corporates before equities. EM assets are already at underweight. We still see a window for the U.S. dollar to appreciate, although by only about 5%. A lot of good news is discounted in the euro, peripheral core inflation is slowing and ECB policymakers are getting nervous. Monetary policy remains the main risk to a pro-cyclical investment stance, although not because of the coming change in the makeup of the FOMC. The economy and inflation should justify four Fed rate hikes in 2018 no matter the makeup. The bond bear phase will continue. Feature Chart I-1Investors Are Giddy Investors Are Giddy Investors Are Giddy U.S. equities 'melted up' in January as tax cuts made the robust growth/low inflation sweet spot even sweeter. Ominously, though, recent market action is beginning to resemble the classic late cycle blow-off phase. Such blow-offs can be highly profitable, but also make it more difficult to properly time the market top. Our base case is that the fundamentals supporting the market will persist through most of the year, before an economic downturn in the U.S. takes hold in 2019. Unfortunately, the consensus now shares our upbeat view for 2018 and many indicators suggest that investors have become downright giddy (Chart I-1). These indicators include investor sentiment, our speculation index, and the bull-to-bear ratio. Net S&P earnings revisions and the U.S. economic surprise index are also extremely elevated, while equity and bond implied volatility are near all-time lows. From a contrarian perspective, these observations suggest that a lot of good news is discounted and that the market is vulnerable to even slight disappointments. It is also a bad sign that our Revealed Preference Indicator moved off of its bullish equity signal in January (see Section III for more details). Meanwhile, central banks are beginning to take away the punchbowl as global economic slack dissipates. This is all late-cycle stuff. Equity valuation does not help investors time the peak in markets, but it does tell us something about downside risk and medium-term expected returns. The Shiller P/E ratio has surged above 30 (Chart I-2). Chart I-3 highlights that, historically, average total returns were negligible over the subsequent 10-year period when the Shiller P/E was in the 30-40 range. Granted, the Shiller P/E will likely fall mechanically later this year as the collapse of earnings in 2008 begins to drop out of the 10-year EPS calculation. Nonetheless, even the BCA Composite Valuation indicator, which includes some metrics that account for extremely low bond yields, surpassed +1 standard deviations in January (our threshold for overvaluation; Chart I-2, bottom panel). An overvaluation signal means that investors should be biased to take profits early. Chart I-2BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma Chart I-3Expected Returns Given Starting Point Shiller P/E February 2018 February 2018 As we highlighted in our 2018 Outlook Report, long-term investors should already be scaling back on risk assets. We recommend that investors with a 6-12 month horizon should stay overweight equities versus bonds for now, but we need to be vigilant in terms of scouring for signals to take profits. A risk management approach means that investors should not try to get the last few percentage points of return before the peak. U.S. Earnings And Repatriation Before we turn to the timing and sequence of our exit from risk assets, we will first update our thoughts on the earnings cycle. Fourth quarter U.S. earnings season is still in its early innings, but the banking sector has set an upbeat tone. S&P 500 profits are slated to register a 12% growth rate for both Q4/2017 and calendar 2017. Current year EPS growth estimates have been aggressively ratcheted higher (from 12% growth to 16%) in a mere three weeks on the back of Congress' cut to the corporate tax rate.1 U.S. margins fell slightly in the fourth quarter, but remain at a high level on the back of decent corporate pricing power. A pick-up in productivity growth into year-end helped as well. Our short-term profit model remains extremely upbeat (Chart I-4). The positive profit outlook for the first half of the year is broadly based across sectors as well, according to the recently updated EPS forecast models from BCA's U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service.2 The repatriation of overseas corporate cash will also flatter EPS growth this year via buyback and M&A activity. Studies of the 2004 repatriation legislation show that most of the funds "brought home" were paid out to shareholders, mostly in the form of buybacks. A NBER report estimated that for every dollar repatriated, 92 cents was subsequently paid out to shareholders in one form or another. The surge in buybacks occurred in 2005, according to the U.S. Flow of Funds accounts and a proxy using EPS growth less total dollar earnings growth for the S&P 500 (Chart I-5). The contribution to EPS growth from buybacks rose to more than 3 percentage points at the peak in 2005. Chart I-4Profit Growth Still Accelerating Profit Growth Still Accelerating Profit Growth Still Accelerating Chart I-5U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS We expect that most of the repatriated funds will again flow through to shareholders, rather than be used to pay down debt or spent on capital goods. Cash has not been a constraint to capital spending in recent years outside of perhaps the small business sector, which has much less to gain from the tax holiday. A revival in animal spirits and capital spending is underway, but this has more to do with the overall tax package and global growth than the ability of U.S. companies to repatriate overseas earnings. Estimates of how much the repatriation could boost EPS vary widely. Most of it will occur in the Tech and Health Care sectors. Buybacks appear to have lifted EPS growth by roughly one percentage point over the past year. We would not be surprised to see this accelerate by 1-2 percentage points, although the timing could be delayed by a year if the 2004 tax holiday provides the correct timeline. This is certainly positive for the equity market, but much of the impact could already be discounted in prices. Organic earnings growth, and the economic and policy outlook will be the main drivers of equity market returns over the next year. We expect some profit margin contraction later this year, but our 5% EPS growth forecast is beginning to look too conservative. This is especially the case because it does not include the corporate tax cuts. The amount by which the tax cuts will boost earnings on an after-tax basis is difficult to estimate, but we are using 5% as a conservative estimate. Adding 2% for buybacks and 2% for dividends, the S&P 500 could provide an attractive 14% total return this year (assuming no multiple expansion). Timing The Exit Chart I-6Timing The Exit (I) Timing The Exit (I) Timing The Exit (I) That said, we noted in last month's Report and in BCA's 2018 Outlook that this will be a transition year. We expect a recession in the U.S. sometime in 2019 as the Fed lifts rates into restrictive territory. Equities and other risk assets will sniff out the recession about six months in advance, which means that investors should be preparing to take profits sometime during the next 12 months. Last month we discussed some of the indicators we will watch to help us time the exit. The 2/10 Treasury yield curve has been a reliable recession indicator in the past. However, the lead time on the peak in stocks was quite extended at times (Chart I-6). A shift in the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate above 2.4% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We expect the Fed to tighten four times in 2018. We are likely to take some money off the table if core inflation is rising, even if it is still below 2%, at the time that the TIPS breakeven reaches 2.4%. We will also be watching seven indicators that we have found to be useful in heralding market tops, which are summarized in our Scorecard Indicator (Chart I-7). At the moment, four out of the seven indicators are positive (Chart I-8): State of the Business Cycle: As early signals that the economy is softening, watch for the ISM new orders minus inventories indicator to slip below zero, or the 3-month growth rate of unemployment claims to rise above zero. Monetary and Financial Conditions: Using interest rates to judge the stance of monetary policy has been complicated by central banks' use of their balance sheet as a policy tool. Thus, it is better to use two of our proprietary indicators: the BCA Monetary Indicator (MI) and the Financial Conditions Indictor. The S&P 500 index has historically rallied strongly when the MI is above its long-term average. Similarly, equities tend to perform well when the FCI is above its 250-day moving average. The MI is sending a negative signal because interest rates have increased and credit growth has slowed. However, the broader FCI remains well in 'bullish' territory. Price Momentum: We simply use the S&P 500 relative to its 200-day moving average to measure momentum. Currently, the index is well above that level, providing a bullish signal for the Scorecard. Sentiment: Our research shows that stock returns have tended to be highest following periods when sentiment is bearish but improving. In contrast, returns have tended to be lowest following periods when sentiment is bullish but deteriorating. The Scorecard includes the BCA Speculation Indicator to capture sentiment, but virtually all measures of sentiment are very high. The next major move has to be down by definition. Thus, sentiment is assigned a negative value in the Scorecard. Value: As discussed above, value is poor based on the Shiller P/E and the BCA Composite Valuation indicator. Valuation may not help with timing, but we include it in our Scorecard because an overvalued signal means investors should err on the side of getting out early. Chart I-7Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Chart I-8Timing The Exit (II) Timing The Exit (II) Timing The Exit (II) We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Table I-1Exit Checklist February 2018 February 2018 To our Checklist we add the U.S. Leading Economic index, which has a good track record of calling recessions. However, we will use the LEI excluding the equity market, since we are using it as an indicator for the stock market. It is bullish at the moment. Our Global LEI is also flashing green. Table I-1 provides a summary checklist for trimming equity exposure. At the moment, 2 out of 9 indicators are bearish. Cross Asset Valuation Comparison Clients have asked our view on the appropriate order in which to scale out of risk assets. One way to approach the question is to compare valuation across asset classes. Presumably, the ones that are most overvalued are at greatest risk, and thus profits should be taken the earliest. It is difficult to compare valuation across asset classes. Should one use fitted values from models or simple deviations from moving averages? Over what time period? Since there is no widely accepted approach, we include multiple measures. More than one time period was used in some cases to capture regime changes. Table I-2 provides out 'best guestimate' for nine asset classes. The approaches range from sophisticated methods developed over many years (i.e. our equity valuation indicators), to regression analysis on the fundamentals (oil), to simple deviations from a time trend (real raw industrial commodity prices and gold). Table I-2Valuation Levels For Major Asset Classes February 2018 February 2018 We averaged the valuation readings in cases where there are multiple estimates for a single asset class. The results are shown in Chart I-9. Chart I-9Valuation Levels For Major Asset Classes February 2018 February 2018 U.S. equities stand out as the most expensive by far, at 1.8 standard deviations above fair value. Gold, raw industrials and EM equities are next at one standard deviation overvalued. EM sovereign bond spreads come next at 0.7, followed closely by U.S. Treasurys (real yield levels) and investment-grade corporate (IG) bonds (expressed as a spread). High-yield (HY) is only about 0.3 sigma expensive, based on default-adjusted spreads over the Treasury curve. That said, both IG and HY are quite expensive in absolute terms based on the fact that government bonds are expensive. Oil is sitting very close to fair value, despite the rapid price run up over the past couple of months. This makes oil exposure doubly attractive at the moment because the fundamentals point to higher prices at a time when the underlying asset is not expensive. Sequencing Around Past S&P 500 Peaks Historical analysis around equity market peaks provides an alternative approach to the sequencing question. Table I-3 presents the number of days that various asset classes peaked before or after the past major five tops in the S&P 500. A negative number indicates that the asset class peaked before U.S. equities, and a positive number means that it peaked after. Table I-3Asset Class Leads & Lags Vs. Peak In S&P 500 February 2018 February 2018 Unfortunately, there is no consistent pattern observed for EM equities, raw industrials, U.S. cyclical stocks, Tech stocks, or small-cap versus large-cap relative returns. Sometimes they peaked before the S&P 500, and sometime after. The EM sovereign bond excess return index peaked about 130 days in advance of the 1998 and 2007 U.S. equity market tops, although we only have three episodes to analyse due to data limitations. Oil is a mixed bag. A peak in the price of gold led the equity market in four out of five episodes, but the lead time is long and variable. The most consistent lead/lag relationship is given by the U.S. corporate bond market. Both investment- and speculative-grade excess returns relative to government bonds peaked in advance of U.S. stocks in four of the five episodes. High-yield excess returns provided the most lead time, peaking on average 154 days in advance. Excess returns to high-yield were a better signal than total returns. This leading relationship is one reason why we plan to trim exposure to corporate bonds within our bond portfolio in advance of scaling back on equities. But the 'return of vol' that we expect to occur later this year will take a toll on carry trades more generally. We are already underweight EM equities and bonds. This EM recommendation has not gone in our favor, but it would make little sense to upgrade them now given our positive views on volatility and the dollar. An unwinding of carry trades will also hit the high-yielding currencies outside of the EM space, such as the Kiwi and Aussie dollar. Base metal prices will be hit particularly hard if the 2019 U.S. recession spills over to the EM economies as we expect. We may downgrade base metals from neutral to underweight around the time that we downgrade equities, but much depends on the evolution of the Chinese economy in the coming months. Oil is a different story. OPEC 2.0 is likely to cut back on supply in the face of an economic downturn, helping to keep prices elevated. We therefore may not trim energy exposure this year. As for equity sectors, our recommended portfolio is still overweight cyclicals for now. Our synchronized global capex boom, rising bond yield, and firm oil price themes keep us overweight the Industrials, Energy and Financial sectors. Utilities and Homebuilders are underweight. Tech is part of the cyclical sector, but poor valuation keeps us underweight. That said, our sector specialists are already beginning a gradual shift away from cyclicals toward defensives for risk management purposes. This transition will continue in the coming months as we de-risk. We are also shifting small caps to neutral on earnings disappointments and elevated debt levels. The Dollar Pain Trade Market shifts since our last publication have largely gone in our favor; stocks have surged, corporate bonds spreads have tightened, oil prices have spiked, bonds have sold off and cyclical stocks have outperformed defensives. One area that has gone against us is the U.S. dollar. Relative interest rate expectations have moved in favor of the dollar as we expected at both the short- and long-ends of the curve. Nonetheless, the dollar has not tracked its historical relationship versus both the yen and euro. The Greenback did not even get a short-term boost from the passage of the tax plan and holiday on overseas earnings. Perhaps this is because the lion's share of "overseas" earnings are already held in U.S. dollars. Reportedly, a large fraction is even held in U.S. banks on U.S. territory. Currency conversion is thus not a major bullish factor for the U.S. dollar. The recent bout of dollar weakness began around the time of the release of the ECB Minutes in January which were interpreted as hawkish because they appeared to be preparing markets for changes in monetary policy. The European debt crisis and economic recession were the reasons for the ECB's asset purchases and negative interest rate policy. Neither of these conditions are in place now. The ECB is meeting as we go to press, and we expect some small adjustments in the Statement that remove references to the need for "crisis" level accommodations. Subsequent steps will be to prepare markets for a complete end to QE, perhaps in September, and then for rates hikes likely in 2019. The key point is that European monetary policy has moved beyond 'peak stimulus' and the normalization process will continue. Perhaps this is partly to blame for euro strength although, as mentioned above, interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar. Does this mean that the dollar has peaked and has entered a cyclical bear phase that will persist over the next 6-12 months? The answer is 'no', although we are less bullish than in the past. We believe there is still a window for the dollar to appreciate against the euro and in broader trade-weighted terms by about 5%. First, a lot of euro-bullish news has been discounted (Chart I-10). Positive economic surprises heavily outstripped that in the U.S. last year, but that phase is now over. The euro appears expensive based on interest rate differentials, and euro sentiment is close to a bullish extreme. This all suggests that market positioning has become a negative factor for the currency. Chart I-10Euro: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted EURO: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted EURO: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted Second, the chorus of complaints against the euro's strength is growing among European central bankers, including Ewald Nowotny, the rather hawkish Austrian central banker. Policymakers' concerns may partly reflect the fact that peripheral inflation excluding food and energy has already weakened to 0.6% from a high of 1.3% in April last year (Chart I-10, fourth panel). Third, U.S. consumer price and wage inflation have yet to pick up meaningfully. The dollar should receive a lift if core U.S. inflation clearly moves toward the Fed's 2% target, as we expect. The FOMC would suddenly appear to have fallen behind the curve and U.S. rate expectations would ratchet higher. Chart I-10, bottom panel, highlights that the euro will weaken if U.S. core inflation rises versus that in the Eurozone. The implication is that the Euro's appreciation has progressed too far and is due for a pullback. As for the yen, the currency surged in January when the Bank of Japan (BoJ) announced a reduction in long-dated JGB purchases. This simply acknowledged what has already occurred. It was always going to be impossible to target both the quantity of bond purchases and the level of 10-year yield simultaneously. Keeping yields near the target required less purchases than they thought. The market interpreted the BoJ's move as a possible prelude to lifting the 10-year yield target. It is perhaps not surprising that the market took the news this way. The economy is performing extremely well; our model that incorporates high-frequency economic data suggests that real GDP growth will move above 3% in the coming quarters. The Japanese economy is benefiting from the end of a fiscal drag and from a rebound in EM growth. Nonetheless, following January's BoJ policy meeting, Kuroda poured cold water on speculation that the BoJ may soon end or adjust the YCC. Recent speeches by BoJ officials reinforce the view that the MPC wants to see an overshoot of actual inflation that will lower real interest rates and thereby reinforce the strong economic activity that is driving higher inflation. Only then will officials be convinced that their job is done. Given that inflation excluding food and energy only stands at 0.3%, the BoJ is still a long way from the overshoot it desires. On the positive side, Japan's large current account surplus and yen undervaluation provide underlying support for the currency. Balancing the offsetting positive and negative forces, our foreign exchange strategists have shifted to neutral on the yen. The Euro remains underweight while the dollar is overweight. Similar to our dollar view, we still see a window for U.S. Treasurys to underperform the global hedged fixed-income benchmark as world bond yields shift higher this year. European government bonds will also sell off, but should outperform Treasurys. JGBs will provide the best refuge for bondholders during the global bond bear phase, since the BoJ will prevent a rise in yields inside of the 10-year maturity. Our global bond strategists upgraded U.K. gilts to overweight in January. Momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. FOMC Transition Monetary policy remains the main risk to a pro-cyclical investment stance, although not because of the coming change in the makeup of the FOMC. An abrupt shift in policy is unlikely. There was some support at the December 2017 FOMC meeting to study the use of nominal GDP or price level targeting as a policy framework, but this has been an ongoing debate that will likely continue for years to come. The Fed will remain committed to its current monetary policy framework once Powell takes over. Table I-4 provides a summary of who will be on the FOMC next year, including their policy bias. Chart I-11 compares the recent FOMC makeup with the coming Powell FOMC (voting members only). The hawk/dove ratio will not change much under Powell, unless Trump stacks the vacant spots with hawks. Table I-4Composition Of The FOMC February 2018 February 2018 Chart I-11Composition Of Voting FOMC Members 2017 Vs. 2018 February 2018 February 2018 In any event, history shows that the FOMC strives to avoid major shifts in policy around changeovers in the Fed Chair. In previous transitions, the previous path for rates was maintained by an average of 13 months. Moreover, Powell has shown that he is not one to rock the boat during his time on the FOMC. It will be the evolution of the economy and inflation, not the composition of the FOMC, that will have the biggest impact on markets at the end of the day. Recent speeches reveal that policymakers across the hawk/dove spectrum are moving modesty toward the hawkish side because growth has accelerated at a time when unemployment is already considered to be below full-employment by many policymakers. The melt-up in equity indexes in January did little to calm worries about financial excesses either. The Fed is struggling to understand the strength of the structural factors that could be holding down inflation. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 21, focusses on the impact of robot automation. While advances on this front are impressive, we conclude that it is difficult to find evidence that robots are more deflationary than previous technological breakthroughs. Thus, increased robot usage should not prevent inflation from rising as the labor market continues to tighten. The macro backdrop will likely justify the FOMC hiking at least as fast as the dots currently forecast. The risks are skewed to the upside. The median Fed dot calls for an unemployment rate of 3.9% by end-2018, only marginally lower than today's rate of 4.1%. This is inconsistent with real GDP growth well in excess of its supply-side potential. The unemployment rate is more likely to reach a 49-year low of 3.5% by the end of this year. As highlighted in last month's Report, a key risk to the bull market in risk assets is the end of the 'low vol/low rate' world. The selloff in the bond market in January may mark the start of this process. Conclusions We covered a lot of ground in this month's Overview of the markets, so we will keep the conclusions brief and focused on the risks. Our key point is that the fundamentals remain positive for risk assets, but that a lot of good news is discounted and it appears that we have entered a classic blow-off phase. This will be a transition year to a recession in the U.S. in 2019. Given that valuation for most risk assets is quite stretched, and given that the monetary taps are starting to close, investors must plan for the exit and keep an eye on our timing checklist. The main risk to our pro-cyclical portfolio is a rise in U.S. inflation and the Fed's response, which we believe will end the sweet spot for risk assets. Apart from this, our geopolitical strategists point to several other items that could upset the applecart this year:3 1. Trade China has cooperated with the U.S. in trying to tame North Korea. Nonetheless, President Trump is committed to an "America First" trade policy and he may need to show some muscle against China ahead of the midterm elections in November in order to rally his base. It is politically embarrassing to the Administration that China racked up its largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in Trump's first year in office. A key question is whether the President goes after China via a series of administrative rulings - such as the recently announced tariffs on solar panels and white goods - or whether he applies an across-the-board tariff and/or fine. The latter would have larger negative macroeconomic implications. 2. Iran On January 12, President Trump threatened not to waive sanctions against Iran the next time they come due (May 12), unless some new demands are met. Pressure from the U.S. President comes at a delicate time for Iran. Domestic unrest has been ongoing since December 28. Although protests have largely fizzled out, they have reopened the rift between the clerical regime, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Iranian hardliners, who control part of the armed forces, could lash out in the Persian Gulf, either by threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz or by boarding foreign vessels in international waters. The domestic political calculus in both Iran and the U.S. make further Tehran-Washington tensions likely. For the time being, however, we expect only a minor geopolitical risk premium to seep into the energy markets, supporting our bullish House View on oil prices. 3. China Last month's Special Report highlighted that significant structural reforms are on the way in China, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. The reforms should be growth-positive in the long term, but could be a net negative for growth in the near term depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. The risk is that the authorities make a policy mistake by staying too tight, as occurred in 2015. We are monitoring a number of indicators that should warn if a policy mistake is unfolding. On this front, January brought some worrying economic data. The latest figures for both nominal imports and money growth slowed. Given that M2 and M3 are components of BCA's Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and that nominal imports directly impact China's contribution to global growth, this raises the question of whether December's economic data suggest that China is slowing at a more aggressive pace than we expect. For now, our answer is no. First, China's trade numbers are highly volatile; nominal import growth remains elevated after smoothing the data. Second, China's export growth remains buoyant, consistent with a solid December PMI reading. The bottom line is that we are sticking with our view that China will experience a benign deceleration in terms of its impact on DM risk assets, but we will continue to monitor the situation closely. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 25, 2018 Next Report: February 22, 2018 1 According to Thomson Reuters/IBES. 2 Please see U.S. Equity Sector Strategy Special Report "White Paper: Introducing Our U.S. Equity Sector Earnings Models," dated January 16, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 For more information, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Also see "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018. II. The Impact Of Robots On Inflation Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. Technological advance in the past has not prevented improving living standards or led to ever rising joblessness over the decades, but pessimists argue that recent advances are different. The issue is important for financial markets. If structural factors such as automation are holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. We see no compelling evidence that the displacement effect of emerging technologies is any stronger than in the past. Robot usage has had a modest positive impact on overall productivity. Despite this contribution, overall productivity growth has been dismal over the past decade. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale as some claim, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Periods of strong growth in automation have historically been associated with robust, not lackluster, wage gains, contrary to the consensus view. The Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. This and other evidence suggest that it is difficult to make the case that robots will make it tougher for central banks to reach their inflation goals than did previous technological breakthroughs. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. Recent breakthroughs in technology are awe-inspiring and unsettling. These advances are viewed with great trepidation by many because of the potential to replace humans in the production process. Hype over robots is particularly shrill. Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. In the first in our series of Special Reports focusing on the structural factors that might be preventing central banks from reaching their inflation targets, we demonstrated that the impact of Amazon is overstated in the press. We estimated that E-commerce is depressing inflation in the U.S. by a mere 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. This Special Report tackles the impact of automation. We are optimistic that robot technology and artificial intelligence will significantly boost future productivity, and thus reduce costs. But, is there any evidence at the macro level that robot usage has been more deflationary than technological breakthroughs in the past and is, thus, a major driver of the low inflation rates we observe today across the major countries? The question matters, especially for the outlook for central bank policy and the bond market. If structural factors are indeed holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. However, if low inflation simply reflects long lags between wages and the tightening labor market, then inflation may suddenly lurch to life as it has at the end of past cycles. The bond market is not priced for that scenario. Are Robots Different? A Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service suggested that the "robot revolution" could be as transformative as previous General Purpose Technologies (GPT), including the steam engine, electricity and the microchip.1 GPTs are technologies that radically alter the economy's production process and make a major contribution to living standards over time. The term "robot" can have different meanings. The most basic definition is "a device that automatically performs complicated and often repetitive tasks," and this encompasses a broad range of machines: From the Jacquard Loom, which was invented over 200 years ago, on to Numerically Controlled (NC) mills and lathes, pick and place machines used in the manufacture of electronics, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), and even homicidal robots from the future such as the Terminator. Our Technology Sector report made the case that there is nothing particularly sinister about robots. They are just another chapter in a long history of automation. Nor is the displacement of workers unprecedented. The industrial revolution was about replacing human craft labor with capital (machines), which did high-volume work with better quality and productivity. This freed humans for work which had not yet been automated, along with designing, producing and maintaining the machinery. Agriculture offers a good example. This sector involved over 50% of the U.S. labor force until the late 1800s. Steam and then internal combustion-powered tractors, which can be viewed as "robotic horses," contributed to a massive rise in output-per-man hour. The number of hours worked to produce a bushel of wheat fell by almost 98% from the mid-1800s to 1955. This put a lot of farm hands out of work, but these laborers were absorbed over time in other growing areas of the economy. It is the same story for all other historical technological breakthroughs. Change is stressful for those directly affected, but rising productivity ultimately lifts average living standards. Robots will be no different. As we discuss below, however, the increasing use of robots and AI may have a deeper and longer-lasting impact on inequality. Strong Tailwinds Chart II-1Robots Are Getting Cheaper Robots Are Getting Cheaper Robots Are Getting Cheaper Factory robots have improved immensely due to cheaper and more capable control and vision systems. As these systems evolve, the abilities of robots to move around their environment while avoiding obstacles will improve, as will their ability to perform increasingly complex tasks. Most importantly, robots are already able to do more than just routine tasks, thus enabling them to replace or aid humans in higher-skilled processes. Robot prices are also falling fast, especially after quality-adjusting the data (Chart II-1). Units are becoming easier to install, program and operate. These trends will help to reduce the barriers-to-entry for the large, untapped, market of small and medium sized enterprises. Robots also offer the ability to do low-volume "customized" production and still keep unit costs low. In the future, self-learning robots will be able to optimize their own performance by analyzing the production of other robots around the world. Robot usage is growing quickly according to data collected by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) that covers 23 countries. Industrial robot sales worldwide increased to almost 300,000 units in 2016, up 16% from the year before (Chart II-2). The stock of industrial robots globally has grown at an annual average pace of 10% since 2010, reaching slightly more than 1.8 million units in 2016.2 Robot usage is far from evenly distributed across industries. The automotive industry is the major consumer of industrial robots, holding 45% of the total stock in 2016 (Chart II-3). The computer & electronics industry is a distant second at 17%. Metals, chemicals and electrical/electronic appliances comprise the bulk of the remaining stock. Chart II-2Global Robot Usage Global Robot Usage Global Robot Usage Chart II-3Global Robot Usage By Industry (2016) February 2018 February 2018 As far as countries go, Japan has traditionally been the largest market for robots in the world. However, sales have been in a long-term downtrend and the stock of robots has recently been surpassed by China, which has ramped up robot purchases in recent years (Chart II-4). Robot density, which is the stock of robots per 10 thousand employed in manufacturing, makes it easier to compare robot usage across countries (Chart II-5, panel 2). By this measure, China is not a heavy user of robots compared to other countries. South Korea stands at the top, well above the second-place finishers (Germany and Japan). Large automobile sectors in these three countries explain their high relative robot densities. Chart II-4Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Chart II-5Stock Of Robots By Country (II) (2016) February 2018 February 2018 While the growth rate of robot usage is impressive, it is from a very low base (outside of the automotive industry). The average number of robots per 10,000 employees is only 74 for the 23 countries in the IFR database. Robot use is tiny compared to total man hours worked. Chart II-6U.S. Investment In Robots U.S. Investment in Robots U.S. Investment in Robots In the U.S., spending on robots is only about 5% of total business spending on equipment and software (Chart II-6). To put this into perspective, U.S. spending on information, communication and technology (ICT) equipment represented 35-40% of total capital equipment spending during the tech boom in the 1990s and early 2000s.3 The bottom line is that there is a lot of hype in the press, but robots are not yet widely used across countries or industries. It will be many years before business spending on robots approaches the scale of the 1990s/2000s IT boom. A Deflationary Impact? As noted above, we view robotics as another chapter in a long history of technological advancements. Pessimists suggest that the latest advances are different because they are inherently more threatening to the overall job market and wage share of total income. If the pessimists are right, what are the theoretical channels though which this would have a greater disinflationary effect relative to previous GPT technologies? Faster Productivity Gains: Enhanced productivity drives down unit labor costs, which may be passed along to other industries (as cheaper inputs) and to the end consumer. More Human Displacement: The jobs created in other areas may be insufficient to replace the jobs displaced by robots, leading to lower aggregate income and spending. The loss of income for labor will simply go to the owners of capital, but the point is that the labor share of income might decline. Deflationary pressures could build as aggregate demand falls short of supply. Even in industries that are slow to automate, just the threat of being replaced by robots may curtail wage demands. Inequality: Some have argued that rising inequality is partly because the spoils of new technologies over the past 20 years have largely gone to the owners of capital. This shift may have undermined aggregate demand because upper income households tend to have a high saving rate, thereby depressing overall aggregate demand and inflationary pressures. The human displacement effect, described above, would exacerbate the inequality effect by transferring income from labor to the owners of capital. 1. Productivity It is difficult to see the benefits of robots on productivity at the economy-wide level. Productivity growth has been abysmal across the major developed countries since the Great Recession, but the productivity slowdown was evident long before Lehman collapsed (Chart II-7). The productivity slowdown continued even as automation using robots accelerated after 2010. Chart II-7Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Some analysts argue that lackluster productivity is simply a statistical mirage because of the difficulties in measuring output in today's economy. We will not get into the details of the mismeasurement debate here. We encourage interested clients to read a Special Report by the BCA Global Investment Strategy service entitled "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians." 4 Our colleague Peter Berezin makes the case that the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, radio, indoor plumbing and air conditioning. He argues that the real reason that productivity growth has slowed is that educational attainment has decelerated and businesses have plucked many of the low-hanging fruit made possible by the IT revolution. Cyclical factors stemming from the Great Recession and financial crisis are also to blame, as capital spending has been slow to recover in most of the advanced economies. Some other factors that help to explain the decline in aggregate productivity are provided in Appendix II-1. Nonetheless, the poor aggregate productivity performance does not mean that there are no benefits to using robots. The benefits are evident at the industrial level, where measurement issues are presumably less vexing for statisticians (i.e., it is easier to measure the output of the auto industry, for example, than for the economy as a whole). Chart II-8 plots the level of robot density in 2016 with average annual productivity growth since 2004 for 10 U.S. manufacturing industries (robot density is presented in deciles). A loose positive relationship is apparent. Chart II-8U.S.: Productivity Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 Academic studies estimate that robots have contributed importantly to economy-wide productivity growth. The Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that labor productivity growth rises by 0.07 to 0.08 percentage points for every 1% rise in the rate of robot density.5 This implies that robots accounted for roughly 10% of the productivity growth experienced since the early 1990s in the major economies. Another study of 14 industries across 17 countries by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) found that robots boosted annual productivity growth by 0.36 percentage points over the 1993-2007 period.6 This is impressive because, if this estimate holds true for the U.S., robots' contribution to the 2½% average annual U.S. total productivity growth over the period was 14%. To put the importance of robotics into historical context, its contribution to productivity so far is roughly on par with that of the steam engine (Chart II-9). It falls well short of the 0.6 percentage point annual productivity contribution from the IT revolution. The implication is that, while the overall productivity performance has been dismal since 2007, it would have been even worse in the absence of robots. What does this mean for inflation? According to the "cost push" model of the inflation process, an increase in productivity of 0.36% that is not accompanied by associated wage gains would reduce unit labor costs (ULC) by the same amount. This should trim inflation if the cost savings are passed on to the end consumer, although by less than 0.36% because robots can only depress variable costs, not fixed costs. There indeed appears to be a slight negative relationship between robot density and unit labor costs at the industrial level in the U.S., although the relationship is loose at best (Chart II-10). Chart II-9GPT Contribution To Productivity February 2018 February 2018 Chart II-10U.S.: Unit Labor Costs Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 In theory, divergences in productivity across industries should only generate shifts in relative prices, and "cost push" inflation dynamics should only operate in the short term. Most economists believe that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon in the long run, which means that central banks should be able to offset positive productivity shocks by lowering interest rates enough that aggregate demand keeps up with supply. Indeed, the Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. Also, note that inflation is currently low across the major advanced economies, irrespective of the level of robot intensity (Chart II-11). From this perspective, it is hard to see that robots should take much of the credit for today's low inflation backdrop. Chart II-11Inflation Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 2. Human Displacement A key question is whether robots and humans are perfect substitutes. If new technologies introduced in the past were perfect substitutes, then it would have led to massive underemployment and all of the income in the economy would eventually have migrated to the owners of capital. The fact that average real household incomes have risen over time, and that there has been no secular upward trend in unemployment rates over the centuries, means that new technologies were at least partly complementary with labor (i.e., the jobs lost as a direct result of productivity gains were more than replaced in other areas of the economy over time). Rather than replacing workers, in many cases tech made humans more productive in their jobs. Rising productivity lifted income and thereby led to the creation of new jobs in other areas. The capital that workers bring to the production process - the skills, know-how and special talents - became more valuable as interaction with technology increased. Like today, there were concerns in the 1950s and 1960s that computerization would displace many types of jobs and lead to widespread idleness and falling household income. With hindsight, there was little to worry about. Some argue that this time is different. Futurists frequently assert that the pace of innovation is not just accelerating, it is accelerating 'exponentially'. Robots can now, or will soon be able to, replace humans in tasks that require cognitive skills. This means that they will be far less complementary to humans than in the past. The displacement effect could thus be much larger, especially given the impressive advances in artificial intelligence. However, Box II-1 discusses why the threat to workers posed by AI is also heavily overblown in the media. The CEP multi-country study cited above did not find a large displacement effect; robot usage did not affect the overall number of hours worked in the 23 countries studied (although it found distributional effects - see below). In other words, rather than suppressing overall labor input, robot usage has led to more output, higher productivity, more jobs and stronger wage and income growth. A report by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)7 takes a broader look at automation, using productivity growth and capital spending as proxies. Automation is what occurs as the implementation of new technologies is incorporated along with new capital equipment or software to replace human labor in the workplace. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending, and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Indeed, the report demonstrates that occupational employment shifts were far slower in the 2000-2015 period than in any decade in the 1900s (Chart II-12). Box II-1 The Threat From AI Is Overblown Media coverage of AI/Deep Learning has established a consensus view that we believe is well off the mark. A recent Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service dispels the myths surrounding AI.8 We believe the consensus, in conjunction with warnings from a variety of sources, is leading to predictions, policy discussions, and even career choices based on a flawed premise. It is worth noting that the most vocal proponents of AI as a threat to jobs and even humanity are not AI experts. At the root of this consensus is the false view that emerging AI technology is anything like true intelligence. Modern AI is not remotely comparable in function to a biological brain. Scientists have a limited understanding of how brains work, and it is unlikely that a poorly understood system can be modeled on a computer. The misconception of intelligence is amplified by headlines claiming an AI "taught itself" a particular task. No AI has ever "taught itself" anything: All AI results have come about after careful programming by often PhD-level experts, who then supplied the system with vast amounts of high quality data to train it. Often these systems have been iterated a number of times and we only hear of successes, not the failures. The need for careful preparation of the AI system and the requirement for high quality data limits the applicability of AI to specific classes of problems where the application justifies the investment in development and where sufficient high-quality data exists. There may be numerous such applications but doubtless many more where AI would not be suitable. Similarly, an AI system is highly adapted to a single problem, or type of problem, and becomes less useful when its application set is expanded. In other words, unlike a human whose abilities improve as they learn more things, an AI's performance on a particular task declines as it does more things. There is a popular misconception that increased computing power will somehow lead to ever improving AI. It is the algorithm which determines the outcome, not the computer performance: Increased computing power leads to faster results, not different results. Advanced computers might lead to more advanced algorithms, but it is pointless to speculate where that may lead: A spreadsheet from 2001 may work faster today but it still gives the same answer. In any event, it is worth noting that a tool ceases to be a tool when it starts having an opinion: there is little reason to develop a machine capable of cognition even if that were possible. Chart II-12U.S. Job Rotation Has Slowed February 2018 February 2018 The EPI report also notes that these indicators of automation increased rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period that saw solid wage growth for American workers. These indicators weakened in the two periods of stagnant wage growth: from 1973 to 1995 and from 2002 to the present. Thus, there is no historical correlation between increases in automation and wage stagnation. Rather than automation, the report argues that it was China's entry into the global trading system that was largely responsible for the hollowing out of the U.S. manufacturing sector. We have also made this argument in previous research. The fact that the major advanced economies are all at, or close to, full employment supports the view that automation has not been an overwhelming headwind for job creation. Chart II-13 demonstrates that there has been no relationship between the change in robot density and the loss of manufacturing jobs since 1993. Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. Interestingly, despite a worsening labor shortage, robot density among Japanese firms is falling. Moreover, the Japanese data show that the industries that have a high robot usage tend to be more, not less, generous with wages than the robot laggard industries. Please see Appendix II-2 for more details. Chart II-13Global Manufacturing Jobs Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 The bottom line is that it does not appear that labor displacement related to automation has been responsible in any meaningful way for the lackluster average real income growth in the advanced economies since 2007. 3. Inequality That said, there is evidence suggesting that robots are having important distributional effects. The CEP study found that robot use has reduced hours for low-skilled and (to a lesser extent) middle-skilled workers relative to the highly skilled. This finding makes sense conceptually. Technological change can exacerbate inequality by either increasing the relative demand for skilled over unskilled workers (so-called "skill-biased" technological change), or by inducing companies to substitute machinery and other forms of physical capital for workers (so-called "capital-biased" technological change). The former affects the distribution of labor income, while the latter affects the share of income in GDP that labor receives. A Special Report appearing in this publication in 2014 focused on the relationship between technology and inequality.9 The report highlighted that much of the recent technological change has been skill-biased, which heavily favors workers with the talent and education to perform cognitively-demanding tasks, even as it reduces demand for workers with only rudimentary skills. Moreover, technological innovations and globalization increasingly allow the most talented individuals to market their skills to a much larger audience, thus bidding up their wages. The evidence suggests that faster productivity growth leads to higher average real wages and improved living standards, at least over reasonably long horizons. Nonetheless, technological change can, and in the future almost certainly will, increase income inequality. The poor will gain, but not as much as the rich. The fact that higher-income households tend to maintain a higher savings rate than low-income households means that the shift in the distribution of income toward the higher-income households will continue to modestly weigh on aggregate demand. Can the distribution effect be large enough to have a meaningful depressing impact on inflation? We believe that it has played some role in the lackluster recovery since the Great Recession, with the result that an extended period of underemployment has delivered a persistent deflationary impulse in the major developed economies. However, as discussed above, stimulative monetary policy has managed to overcome the impact of inequality and other headwinds on aggregate demand, and has returned the major countries roughly to full employment. Indeed, this year will be the first since 2007 that the G20 economies as a group will be operating slightly above a full employment level. Inflation should respond to excess demand conditions, irrespective of any ongoing demand headwind stemming from inequality. Conclusions Technological change has led to rising living standards over the decades. It did not lead to widespread joblessness and did not prevent central banks from meeting their inflation targets over time. The pessimists argue that this time is different because robots/AI have a much larger displacement effect. Perhaps it will be 20 years before we will know the answer. But our main point is that we have found no evidence that recent advances in robotics and AI, while very impressive, will be any different in their macro impact. There is little evidence that the modern economy is less capable in replacing the jobs lost to automation, although the nature of new technologies may be affecting the distribution of income more than in the past. Real incomes for the middle- and lower-income classes have been stagnant for some time, but this is partly due to productivity growth that is too low, not too high. Moreover, it is not at all clear that positive productivity shocks are disinflationary beyond the near term. The link between robot usage and unit labor costs over the past couple of decades is loose at best at the industry level, and is non-existent when looking across the major countries. The Fed was able to roughly meet its 2% inflation target in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, despite IT's impressive contribution to productivity growth during that period. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. The global output gap will shift into positive territory this year for the first time since the Great Recession. Any resulting rise in inflation will come as a shock since the bond market has discounted continued low inflation for as far as the eye can see. We expect bond yields and implied volatility to rise this year, which may undermine risk assets in the second half. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Brian Piccioni Vice President Technology Sector Strategy Appendix II-1 Why Is Productivity So Low? A recent study by the OECD10 reveals that, while frontier firms are charging ahead, there is a widening gap between these firms and the laggards. The study analyzed firm-level data on labor productivity and total factor productivity for 24 countries. "Frontier" firms are defined to be those with productivity in the top 5%. These firms are 3-4 times as productive as the remaining 95%. The authors argue that the underlying cause of this yawning gap is that the diffusion rate of new technologies from the frontier firms to the laggards has slowed within industries. This could be due to rising barriers to entry, which has reduced contestability in markets. Curtailing the creative-destruction process means that there is less pressure to innovate. Barriers to entry may have increased because "...the importance of tacit knowledge as a source of competitive advantage for frontier firms may have risen if increasingly complex technologies were to increase the amount and sophistication of complementary investments required for technological adoption." 11 The bottom line is that aggregate productivity is low because the robust productivity gains for the tech-savvy frontier companies are offset by the long tail of firms that have been slow to adopt the latest technology. Indeed, business spending has been especially weak in this expansion. Chart II-14 highlights that the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth has mirrored that of the capital stock. Chart II-14U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity Appendix II-2 Japan - The Leading Edge Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. The popular press is full of stories of how robots are taking over. If the stories are to be believed, robots are the answer to the country's shrinking workforce. Robots now serve as helpers for the elderly, priests for weddings and funerals, concierges for hotels and even sexual partners (don't ask). Prime Minister Abe's government has launched a 5-year push to deepen the use of intelligent machines in manufacturing, supply chains, construction and health care. Indeed, Japan was the leader in robotics use for decades. Nonetheless, despite all the hype, Japan's stock of industrial robots has actually been eroding since the late 1990s (Chart II-4). Numerous surveys show that firms plan to use robots more in the future because of the difficulty in hiring humans. And there is huge potential: 90% of Japanese firms are small- and medium-sized (SME) and most are not currently using robots. Yet, there has been no wave of robot purchases as of 2016. One problem is the cost; most sophisticated robots are simply too expensive for SMEs to consider. This suggests that one cannot blame robots for Japan's lack of wage growth. The labor shortage has become so acute that there are examples of companies that have turned down sales due to insufficient manpower. Possible reasons why these companies do not offer higher wages to entice workers are beyond the scope of this report. But the fact that the stock of robots has been in decline since the late 1990s does not support the view that Japanese firms are using automation on a broad scale to avoid handing out pay hikes. Indeed, Chart II-15 highlights that wage deflation has been the greatest in industries that use almost no robots. Highly automated industries, such as Transportation Equipment and Electronics, have been among the most generous. This supports the view that the productivity afforded by increased robot usage encourages firms to pay their workers more. Looking ahead, it seems implausible that robots can replace all the retiring Japanese workers in the years to come. The workforce will shrink at an annual average pace of 0.33% between 2020 and 2030, according to the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. Productivity growth would have to rise by the same amount to fully offset the dwindling number of workers. But that would require a surge in robot density of 4.1, assuming that each rise in robot density of one adds 0.08% to the level of productivity (Chart II-16). The level of robot sales would have to jump by a whopping 2½ times in the first year and continue to rise at the same pace each year thereafter to make this happen. Of course, the productivity afforded by new robots may accelerate in the coming years, but the point is that robot usage would likely have to rise astronomically to offset the impact of the shrinking population. Chart II-15Japan: Earnings Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 Chart II-16Japan: Where Is The Flood Of Robots? Japan: Where Is The Flood OF Robots? Japan: Where Is The Flood OF Robots? The implication is that, as long as the Japanese economy continues to grow above roughly 1%, the labor market will continue to tighten and wage rates will eventually begin to rise. 1 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "The Coming Robotics Revolution," dated May 16, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that this includes only robots used in manufacturing industry, and thus excludes robots used in the service sector and households. However, robot usage in services is quite limited and those used in households do not add to GDP. 3 Note that ICT investment and capital stock data includes robots. 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Centre for Economic and Business Research (January 2017): "The Impact of Automation." A Report for Redwood. In this report, robot density is defined to be the number of robots per million hours worked. 6 Graetz, G., and Michaels, G. (2015): "Robots At Work." CEP Discussion Paper No 1335. 7 Mishel, L., and Bivens, J. (2017): "The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On," Economic Policy Institute. 8 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "Bad Information - Why Misreporting Deep Learning Advances Is A Problem," dated January 9, 2018, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Rage Against The Machines: Is Technology Exacerbating Inequality?" dated June 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10 OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 05 (2016): "The Best Versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence Across Firms and the Role of Public Policy." 11 Please refer to page 27. III. Indicators And Reference Charts As we highlight in the Overview section, the earnings backdrop for the U.S. equity market remains very upbeat, as highlighted by the rise in the net earnings revisions and net earnings surprises indexes. Bottom-up analysts will likely continue to boost after-tax earnings estimates for the year as they adjust to the U.S. tax cut news. Our main concern is that a lot of good news is now discounted. Our Technical Indicator remains bullish, but our composite valuation indicator surpassed one sigma in January, which is our threshold of overvaluation. From these levels of overvaluation, the medium-term outlook for equity total returns is negligible. Our speculation index is at all-time highs and implied volatility is low, underscoring that investors are extremely bullish. From a contrary perspective, this is a warning sign for the equity market. Our Monetary Indicator has also moved further into 'bearish' territory for equities, although overall financial conditions remain positive for growth. It is also disconcerting that our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) shifted to a 'sell' signal for stocks, following five straight months on a 'buy' signal. This occurred because investors may be buying based on speculation rather than on a firm belief in the staying power of the underlying fundamentals. For now, though, our Willingness-to-Pay indicator for the U.S. rose sharply in January, highlighting that investor equity inflows are very strong and are favoring U.S. equities relative to Japan and the Eurozone. This is perhaps not surprising given the U.S. tax cuts just passed by Congress. The RPI indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Our U.S. bond technical indicator shows that Treasurys are close to oversold territory, suggesting that we may be in store for a consolidation period following January's surge in yields. Treasurys are slightly cheap on our valuation metric, although not by enough to justify closing short duration positions. The U.S. dollar is oversold and due for a bounce. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights A thorough audit of our trade book highlights that our country and sector allocation recommendations have been quite profitable for investors. Of the 12 active trades in our book, 11 have generated a positive return, including one with a 32% annualized rate of return. A review of the original basis and subsequent performance of our trades suggests that investors should close 6 out of 12 of our active positions, predominantly related to resource & construction and domestic stock market themes. We will be looking for opportunities to add new trades to our book over the coming weeks and months that have broad, "big-picture" relevance. Watch this space. Feature In this week's report we conduct a thorough audit of our trade book, by revisiting the original basis and subsequent performance of all 12 of our active trades. While these trades have been initiated at different points over the past five years, they can be broadly grouped into five different themes: Core Equity Allocation & General Pro-Risk Trades (4 Trades) Reform-Oriented Trades (2 Trades) Resource & Construction Plays (2 Trades) Domestic Stock Market Trades (2 Trades) Trades Linked To Hong Kong (2 Trades) Overall, our trade book performance has been excellent. Of the 12 active trades in our book, 11 have generated a positive return, including one with a 32% annualized rate of return (since December 2015). As a result of our trade book review, we recommend that investors close six trades and maintain six over the coming 6-12 months. The closed trades predominantly fall into the resource & construction and domestic stock market categories, although we also recommend closing our long China H-share / short industrial commodity trade as well as our long Hong Kong REITs / short Hong Kong broad market trade. We present our rationale for retaining or closing each trade below. Over the coming weeks and months we will be looking for opportunities to add new trades to our book. Stay tuned. Core Equity Allocation & General Pro-Risk Trades We have four open core equity allocation and pro-risk trades: Overweight MSCI China Investable stocks versus the emerging markets benchmark, initiated on May 2, 2012 Long China H-shares / short industrial commodities, initiated on March 16, 2016 Short MSCI Taiwan / Long MSCI China Investable, initiated on February 2, 2017 and Long China onshore corporate bonds, initiated on June 22, 2017 We recommend that investors stick with three of these trades, but close the long China H-shares / short industrial commodities position for the following reasons: Chart 1Be Overweight China Vs EM In This Environment Be Overweight China Vs EM In This Environment Be Overweight China Vs EM In This Environment Overweight MSCI China Investable Stocks Versus The EM Benchmark (Maintain) This trade represents one of the most important equity allocation calls for Chinese stocks, and is one of the ways that BCA expresses a view on the Chinese economy in our House View Matrix.1 While it hasn't always been the case, we noted in a recent Special Report that Chinese stocks have become a high-beta equity market versus both the global aggregate and the emerging market benchmark, even when excluding the technology sector.2 China's high-beta nature, the fact that EM equities remain in an uptrend (Chart 1), and our view that China's ongoing slowdown is likely to be benign and controlled all suggest that investors should continue to overweight Chinese stocks vs their emerging market peers. Long China H-Shares / Short Industrial Commodities (Close) We initiated this trade in March 2016, one month after Chinese stock prices bottomed following the significant economic slowdown in 2015. At that time it was not clear to global investors that a mini-cycle upswing in the Chinese economy had begun, and this pair trade was a way of taking a limited pro-risk bet. Given our view of a benign, controlled economic slowdown in China, this hedged trade is no longer needed, especially given the uncertain impact of ongoing supply side constraints in China on global commodity prices. As such, we recommend that investors close the trade, locking in an annualized return of 15.7%. Short MSCI Taiwan / Long MSCI China Investable (Maintain) Chart 2If The TWD Declines Materially, ##br##Upgrade Taiwan (From Short) If The TWD Declines Materially, Upgrade Taiwan (From Short) If The TWD Declines Materially, Upgrade Taiwan (From Short) We initiated our short MSCI Taiwan / long MSCI China investable trade last February, when the risk of protectionist action from the Trump administration loomed large. While there have been no negative trade actions levied against Taiwan this year, macro factors, particularly the strength of the currency, continue to argue for an underweight stance within the greater China bourses (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). We reviewed the basis of this trade in a report last month,3 and recommended that investors stick with the call despite significantly oversold conditions (Chart 2). A material easing in pressure on Taiwan's trade-weighted exchange rate appears to be the most likely catalyst to close the trade and to upgrade Taiwan within a portfolio of greater China equities. Long China Onshore Corporate Bonds (Maintain) Chinese corporate bond yields have risen materially since late-2016, largely in response to expectations of tighter monetary policy. These expectations have been validated, with 3-month interbank rates having risen over 200bps since late-2016. We argued last summer that the phase of maximum liquidity tightening was likely over, and that quality spreads and government bond yields would probably drop over the coming three to six months. While this clearly did not occur (yields and spreads rose), the total return from this trade has remained in the black owing to the significant yield advantage of these bonds versus similarly-rated bonds in the developed world. Chart 3 highlights that Chinese 5-year corporate bond spreads are also considerably less correlated with equity prices than their investment-grade peers in the U.S. This underscores that the rise in yields and spreads over the past year has reflected expectations of tighter monetary policy, not rising default risk. Our sense is that barring a significant improvement in China's growth momentum, significant further monetary policy tightening is improbable, meaning that corporate bond yields are not likely to rise much further. As a final point, as of today's report we are changing the benchmark for this trade from a BCA calculation based on a basket of 5-year AAA and AA-rated corporate bonds to the ChinaBond Corporate Credit Bond Total Return Index. Chart 3Chinese Corporate Spreads Aren't A Risk ##br##Barometer Like In The U.S. Chinese Corporate Spreads Aren't A Risk Barometer Like In The U.S. Chinese Corporate Spreads Aren't A Risk Barometer Like In The U.S. Reform-Oriented Trades We have two open trades related to China's rebooted reform initiative, both of which were initiated on November 16, 2017: Long China investable consumer staples / short consumer discretionary stocks and Long China investable environmental and social governance (ESG) leaders / short investable broad market These trades were recently opened, and we continue to recommend that investors maintain both positions: Long China Investable Consumer Staples / Short Consumer Discretionary Stocks (Maintain) The basis for the first trade stems from the current limitations of China's investable consumer discretionary index as a clear-cut play on retail-oriented consumer spending. We argued in our November 16 Weekly Report that Chinese investable consumer staples would be a better play on Chinese consumer spending owing to the material weight of the automobiles & components industry group in the discretionary sector, which may fare poorly over the coming year due to the environmental mandate of President Xi's proposed reforms. We argued in the report that this trade would likely be driven by alpha rather than beta, and indeed Chart 4 illustrates that staples continue to rise relative to discretionary against a backdrop of a rising broad market. Long China Investable ESG leaders / Short Investable Broad Market (Maintain) In the same report we recommended that investors overweight the China investable ESG leaders index, based on the goal of favoring firms that are best positioned to deliver "sustainable" growth in an era of heightened environmental reforms. The index overweights firms with the highest MSCI ESG ratings in each sector (using a proprietary MSCI ranking scheme), and maintains similar sector weights as the investable benchmark, which limits the beta risk of the trade. Chart 5 highlights that the trade is progressing in line with our expectations, suggesting that investors stick with the position over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 4Staples Vs Discretionary Isn't A Low Beta Trade Staples Vs Discretionary Isn't A Low Beta Trade Staples Vs Discretionary Isn't A Low Beta Trade Chart 5Likely To Continue To Outperform Likely To Continue To Outperform Likely To Continue To Outperform Resource & Construction Plays We have two open trades related to the resource sector: Long China investable oil & gas stocks / short global oil & gas stocks, initiated on April 26, 2014 and Long China investable construction materials sector / short investable broad market, initiated on December 9, 2015 We recommend that investors close both of these positions, based on the following rationale: Chart 6Similar Earnings Profile, ##br##But Weaker Dividend Payouts Similar Earnings Profile, But Weaker Dividend Payouts Similar Earnings Profile, But Weaker Dividend Payouts Long China Investable Oil & Gas Stocks / Short Global Oil & Gas Stocks (Close) This trade was initiated based on the view that the valuation gap between Chinese and global oil & gas companies is unjustifiable given that the earnings off both sectors are globally driven. Indeed, Chart 6 shows that the trailing EPS profiles of both sectors in US$ terms have been broadly similar over the past few years, and yet China's oil & gas sector trades at a 40% price-to-book discount relative to its global peers. However, panel 2 of Chart 6 highlights that this discount may represent investor concerns about earnings quality and/or state-owned corporate governance. The chart shows that while the earnings ROE for Chinese oil & gas companies is higher than that of the global average, the dividend ROE (dividends per share as a percent of shareholders equity) is considerably lower. While China's oil & gas dividend ROE has recently been rising, the gap remains wide relative to global oil & gas companies, suggesting that there is no significant re-rating catalyst that is likely to emerge over the coming 6-12 months. Close for an annualized return of 1.4%. Long China Investable Construction Material Stocks / Short China Investable Broad Market (Close) The relative performance of Chinese investable construction material stocks has been positive over the past two years, with the trade having generated an 8.1% annualized return since initiation. There are two factors contributing to our view that it is time for investors to book profits on this trade. The first is that China's investable construction materials are dominated by cement companies, which may suffer in relative terms from China's rebooted reform initiative this year.4 The second is that the relative performance of construction materials stocks is closely correlated with, and led by, the growth in total real estate investment (Chart 7). Residential investment makes up a significant component of total real estate investment, and Chart 8 highlights that a significant gap between floor space sold and completed has narrowed the inventory to sales ratio over the past three years. But the ratio remains somewhat elevated relative to its history which, when coupled with the ongoing growth slowdown in China and the deceleration in total real estate investment growth, implies a poor risk/reward ratio over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 7Cement Producers Trade Off Of Real Estate Investment Cement Producers Trade Off Of Real Estate Investment Cement Producers Trade Off Of Real Estate Investment Chart 8No Clear Construction Boom Is Imminent No Clear Construction Boom Is Imminent No Clear Construction Boom Is Imminent Domestic Stock Market Trades We have two open trades related to China's domestic stock market: Long China domestic utility sector / short domestic broad market, initiated on January 22, 2014 and Long China domestic food & beverage sector / short domestic broad market, initiated on December 9, 2015 Similar to our resource & construction plays, we recommend that investors close both of our recommended domestic stock market trades: Long China Domestic Utility Sector / Short Domestic Broad Market (Close) We initiated this trade in early-2014, following a comprehensive reform plan released in late-2013 by the Chinese government. The plan called for allowing market forces to play a decisive role in allocating resources, which we argued would grant utilities more pricing power, reduce their earnings volatility associated with policy risks, and lead to a structural positive re-rating. Chart 9 illustrates that this trade gained significant ground in 2014 and early-2015, even prior to the significant melt-up in domestic stock prices that began in Q2 2015. However, the trade has underperformed significantly since the middle of last year, which has been driven by a sharp deterioration in ROE. This decline in ROE appears to have been cost-driven, as coal is an important feedstock for Chinese utility companies and has risen substantially in price over the past two years. While domestic utilities are now significantly oversold in relative terms, we recommend that investors close this trade because the original reform-oriented basis has shifted significantly. The priorities that emanated from October's Party Congress were decidedly environmental in nature, meaning that coal prices may very well remain elevated over the coming 6-12 months (due to restricted supply). This means that a recovery in ROE would rest on the need to raise utility prices, which is a low-visibility event that will be difficult to predict. Close for an annualized return of 3%. Long China Domestic Food & Beverage Sector / Short Domestic Broad Market (Close) We initiated this trade in December 2015, based on this sector's superior corporate fundamentals and undemanding valuation levels. We argued that the anti-corruption campaign since late-2012 was likely the cause of prior underperformance, given that the group is dominated by a few high-end alcohol producers. The market overacted to the high-profile crackdown, and ultimately the fundamentals of the sector did not deteriorate materially. Our view has panned out spectacularly, with the trade having earned a 32% annualized return since inception5 (Chart 10 panel 1). While the group's ROE remains significantly above that of the domestic benchmark, valuation measures suggest that investors have more than priced this in (Chart 10 panel 2). The trade has mostly played out and we would not like to overstay our welcome. In addition, panel 3 illustrates that technical conditions are extremely overbought, suggesting that investors are being presented with an excellent opportunity to exit the position. Chart 9Sidelined By A Major Hit To ROE Sidelined By A Major Hit To ROE Sidelined By A Major Hit To ROE Chart 10Time To Book Profits Time To Book Profits Time To Book Profits Trades Linked To Hong Kong We have two open trades related to Hong Kong: Long U.S. / short Hong Kong 10-Year government bonds, initiated on January 15, 2014 and Short Hong Kong property investors / long Hong Kong broad market, initiated on January 21, 2015 We recommend that investors stick with the first and close the second, based on the following perspectives: Long U.S. / Short Hong Kong 10-Year Government Bonds (Maintain) Hong Kong has an open capital account and an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar, meaning that its monetary policy is directly tied to that of the U.S. Yet, Hong Kong's 10-year government bond yield is non-trivially below that of the U.S., which argues for a short stance versus similar maturity U.S. Treasurys. While it is true that the Hong Kong - U.S. 10-year yield spread does vary and can widen over a 6-12 month horizon, Chart 11 highlights that the relative total return profile of the trade (in unhedged terms) trends higher over time due to the carry advantage. Short Hong Kong REITs / Long Hong Kong Broad Market (Close) There are cross-currents facing the outlook for Hong Kong REITs vs the broad market, arguing for a neutral rather than an underweight stance. Close this trade for an annualized return of 3.6%. While the relative performance of global REITs is typically negatively correlated with bond yields, Chart 12 shows that the relationship with Hong Kong property yields has been positive and lagging (i.e. falling yields lead declining relative performance, and vice versa). Under this regime, a rise in U.S. government bond yields, as we expect, would suggest an improvement in the relative performance of Hong Kong REITs. Chart 11A Straightforward Carry Pick Up Trade A Straightforward Carry Pick Up Trade A Straightforward Carry Pick Up Trade Chart 12Rising Bond Yields Implies ##br##Positive HK REIT Performance Rising Bond Yields Implies Positive HK REIT Performance Rising Bond Yields Implies Positive HK REIT Performance Chart 13 highlights that periods of positive yield / REIT performance correlation have tended to occur when Hong Kong property prices are rising significantly relative to income, as they have been for the past several years. One interpretation of this dynamic is that when house prices are overvalued and potentially vulnerable, REIT investors react positively to an improvement in economic fundamentals (which tends to push yields up due to higher interest rate expectations). The risk of an eventual collapse of Hong Kong property prices is clear, but we cannot identify an obvious catalyst for this to occur over the coming 6-12 months. Importantly, the fact that property prices have continued to rise during a period of tighter mainland capital controls suggests that only a significant economic shock will be enough to derail the uptrend in prices, circumstances that we do not expect over the coming year. Finally, Chart 14 highlights that Hong Kong REITs are deeply discounted relative to book value when compared against the broad market. This suggests that at least some of the risks associated with the property market have already been priced in by investors. Chart 13Yields & REITs Positively Correlated ##br##When House Prices Are Overvalued Yields & REITs Positively Correlated When House Prices Are Overvalued Yields & REITs Positively Correlated When House Prices Are Overvalued Chart 14Hong Kong REITs Are Cheap Hong Kong REITs Are Cheap Hong Kong REITs Are Cheap Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.bcaresearch.com/trades 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: No Longer A Low-Beta Market", dated January 11, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Taiwan: Awaiting A Re-Rating Catalyst", dated December 14, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress", dated November 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please note that the total return from this trade had been erroneously reported for some time due a data processing error on BCA's part. The return since inception now properly sources the China CSI SWS Food & Beverage index from CHOICE. We sincerely regret the error and any confusion it may have caused. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The Beige Book released on January 17 keeps the Fed on track to raise rates at least three times this year and highlights the impact of the tax bill on the economy. BCA's Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book highlights several of the positive trends supporting our view of the economy, the tax bill and the Fed. The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 has the potential to generate significant supply-side benefits for consumers, shareholders and the broad economy. We decided to stay long the dollar after a lengthy internal debate, although we have revised down our view on the upside potential. Feature U.S. risk assets continued to outperform last week outside of the dollar, as S&P 500 firms started to report Q4 2017 results and provide guidance for Q1 2018 and beyond. BCA's Bank Lending Beige Book summarizes the most optimistic comments from the Big 5 banks. The Fed's Beige Book captured comments on the broad economy in December and early January that were equally ebullient. Both Beige books suggested that firms were planning to return their tax savings to shareholders in the New Year, and to continue to boost capex, which was stout even before the law was passed. Yet, despite the upbeat news, the dollar broke down last week, as the ECB sounded a hawkish note and the Japanese economy continued to improve. On balance, the Beige Book, the Q4 earnings season, the health of the U.S. economy (notably capital spending), all support BCA's stance on the U.S. stock-to-bond ratio, the Fed, duration and the dollar. However, the dollar has not behaved as we would have expected. Beige Book Barometer Bounces The Beige Book released on January 17 keeps the Fed on track to raise rates at least three times this year and highlights the impact of the tax bill on the economy. BCA's quantitative approach1 to the Beige Book's qualitative data points to underlying strength in GDP and a tighter labor market, but there is still a disconnect between the Beige Book's view of inflation and the market's stance. Moreover, references to the stronger dollar have disappeared from the Beige Book and business uncertainty is significantly reduced, reflecting the tax cut bill and President Trump's assault on regulation. Chart 1Latest Beige Book Supports##BR##The Fed's View On Rates, Economy Latest Beige Book Supports The Fed's View On Rates, Economy Latest Beige Book Supports The Fed's View On Rates, Economy Chart 1, panel 1 shows that at 66%, BCA's Beige Book Monitor stayed near its cycle highs in January, re-confirmation that the underlying economy was still upbeat in Q4 and early 2018. (The latest Beige Book covered the period from mid-November 2017 to January 8, 2018). The number of 'weak' words in the Beige Book returned to near four-year lows after ticking higher in the wake of last summer's hurricanes. Moreover, there were 12 mentions of the tax bill in the January Beige Book, up from only 3 in November (not shown). The tax bill was cast in a positive light in 75% of the remarks. In November, the references to either the tax bill (or tax reform) cited the consequent uncertainty as a constraint on growth. Based on the minimal references to a robust dollar in the past five Beige Books, the greenback should not be an issue in Q4 2017 or Q1 2018, which is in sharp contrast with 2015 and early 2016 when there was a surge in Beige Book mentions (Chart 1, panel 4). The last time that five consecutive Beige Books had so few remarks about a strong dollar was in late 2014. Business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) ticked up in the past few Beige Books as Congress debated the particulars of the tax bill. Nonetheless, comments of uncertainty in the Beige Book have dropped since Trump took office in early 2017. The implication is that the business community is correctly focused on policy and not politics in D.C. (Chart 1, panel 5). The disconnect with the Fed on inflation is evident in the Beige Book's number of inflation words (Chart 1, panel 3). Expressions regarding inflation rose to a four-month high in January and the disconnect persists between the still-elevated mentions of inflation and the soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The recent Beige Book backs BCA's view that the U.S. economy is poised to grow above its long-term potential in the first half of 2018. However, the Beige Book has done little to resolve the debate around why an economy growing above potential and a tightening labor market have not boosted inflation. Likewise, the latest Beige Book confirmed that at least initially, businesses and bankers across the U.S. welcomed the Tax Cut and Jobs Act. Bankers' Beige Book Returns Chart 2Banking System Shipshape Banking System Shipshape Banking System Shipshape BCA's Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book highlights several of the positive trends supporting our view: Pristine credit quality, a positive U.S. credit impulse, loosening U.S. banking regulatory requirements, and pent up demand for shareholder friendly activities. We introduced the Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book2 in early 2014 to interpret the health of the banking system based on comments from leaders of the Big Five banks during earnings season. Managements were upbeat on loan demand and credit quality as they unveiled Q4 results in the past two weeks, and most expressed optimism that the positive credit trends would continue to improve in 2018. Several bank executives shared their Fed rate hike expectations for this year, with most forecasting three or four increases. One institution planned for a flatter curve, while another noted that rising rates on both the short and long ends will benefit their operations. Chart 2 shows key banking related variables cited in the Bank Lending Beige Book. Appendix Table 1 shows the Big 5 Bank Lending Beige Book for Q4 2017. All five banks were uniformly upbeat in their assessments of the tax bill's impact on their operations, their customers' businesses or the overall economy. One bank noted that it took a repatriation charge in Q4, and another said it would return capital to shareholders via buybacks and dividends. A third said the bill will provide "immediate and ongoing benefit to our employees, customers, communities and our shareholders, as we invest a portion of our tax savings in each of these important constituencies." Bottom Line: The banking system is shipshape as 2018 begins and lenders are ready to extend credit to businesses and consumers to boost the economy despite higher rates. BCA's U.S. Equity strategists recommend an overweight position in the S&P 500's financial sector, with a high conviction overweight on banks.3 A Different Lens On Earnings Chart 3Corporate Health Has Improved##BR##Since Start Of 2017 Corporate Health Has Improved Since Start Of 2017 Corporate Health Has Improved Since Start Of 2017 The early December release of the U.S. flow of funds report allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) (Chart 3). The CHM's level improved slightly between Q2 and Q3, but the overall reading remains in 'deteriorating health' territory. The marginal improvement in Q3 was driven by rising profit margins. In addition, profit growth surged while debt moved up modestly in Q3. The CHM is a reliable indicator of the trend in corporate bond spreads which supports our corporate bond overweight. Given that corporate balance sheets are declining, the sole supports for corporate spreads are low inflation and accommodative monetary policy. We anticipate spreads will start to widen later this year when inflation climbs and policy turns more restrictive. BCA's U.S. Bond strategists remain overweight the U.S. high-yield bond market.4 Although spreads appear a bit more attractive than for investment-grade corporates, there is still not much room for spread compression in high-yields. We calculate that if the high-yield index spread tightens by another 117 bps, then junk bonds will be the most expensive since 1995. In an optimistic scenario where the index spread tightens 100 bps, bringing it close to all-time expensive levels, then we would expect junk excess returns to be in the range of 600 bps (annualized). Nonetheless, in view of the trends in corporate leverage, it is unlikely that there will be another 100 bps of spread tightening. More realistically, we expect excess returns between 200 bps and 500 bps (annualized) between now and the end of the credit cycle. Bottom Line: BCA's indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will monitor to gauge the end of the cycle. An abrupt end to the positive capex or earnings cycle would also be concerns for our upbeat view on credit. Repatriation Redux The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 has the potential to generate significant supply-side benefits for consumers, shareholders and the broad economy. There are several uses for corporate cash, including capital spending, M&A, increasing compensation to employees, paying down debt and returning capital to shareholders. Chart 4 shows that through Q3 2017, share buybacks and dividends ran slightly ahead of prior cycles, while capex was about average. Investors wonder how that mix may change under the new law. Corporate behavior in the wake of the 2004 overseas tax holiday5 provides some guidance. Chart 4Comparison Of Corporate Outlays Across Four Economic Expansion Phases Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme Corporations used cash generated from the 2004 tax break to return capital to shareholders. However, we found scant evidence that firms who benefited from the tax holiday increased capital spending, raised wages or hired more workers. A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) noted that a dollar increase in repatriations "was associated with an increase of almost $1 in payouts to shareholders."6 Moreover, a 2008 IRS paper7 concluded that nearly half of all the cash repatriated in 2004 and 2005 came from only the tech and pharma sectors. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) found that small firms tended to benefit less than large firms from the tax holiday.8 A paper9 by the left-leaning, U.S.-based think tank, the Center For Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), stated that several firms that benefitted the most from the 2004 law laid off workers soon after the tax law was enacted. In 2018, BCA expects firms to return capital to shareholders, boost capex and continue to bump up wages. Chart 5 shows that buybacks will probably augment S&P 500 EPS by around 2% this year, while panel 2 shows that there was a noticeable upswing to buyback announcements as 2017 ended. Aside from the post-recession bounce in buybacks in 2010, the last big swell in buyback announcements occurred in 2004 and 2005. That said, corporate balance sheets were in much better shape in 2004/2005 than they are today (Chart 3 again). The implication is that management teams may decide to pay down debt before returning the cash windfall back to shareholders. However, with rates still low, most firms will chose to distribute the cash to shareholders, despite high corporate debt levels. The positive reading on BCA's Capital Structure Preference Indicator supports our stance on buybacks (Chart 6, third panel). This Indicator is defined as the equity risk premium minus the default-adjusted yield in high-yield corporate bonds. When the indicator is above zero, there is financial incentive for firms to issue debt and buy back shares. Conversely, firms are incentivized to issue stock and retire debt when the indicator is below zero. The Indicator is currently positive, although not as high as it was in 2015. Moreover, Chart 7 shows that the dividend payout ratio rebounded from the 2007-2009 financial crisis, but has moved above its pre-crisis level. However, dividend distributions remain below their pre-crisis peak reached in the early 1990s. Chart 5Still Some Room##BR##To Run For Buybacks Still Some Room To Run For Buybacks Still Some Room To Run For Buybacks Chart 6Buybacks Adding Almost##BR##2 Percentage Points To EPS Growth Buybacks Adding Almost 2 Percentage Points To EPS Growth Buybacks Adding Almost 2 Percentage Points To EPS Growth Capital spending was already on a tear in late 2017, even before the tax bill passed. Industrial production, the PMI diffusion index and advanced-economy capital goods imports, all confirm strong underlying momentum in investment spending (Chart 8). Chart 7Corporations Poised To Return##BR##Capital To Shareholders Corporations Poised To Return Capital To Shareholders Corporations Poised To Return Capital To Shareholders Chart 8Capital Spending Helping##BR##To Drive Growth Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth Both BCA's real and nominal capex models, driven by surging capital goods orders along with elevated ISM data, roaring global exports and soaring sentiment on business spending, indicate strong investment in plant and equipment in the next few quarters (Chart 9). CEO confidence soared to a 13-year high in Q4, according to the latest Duke's Fuqua School of Business/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook (Chart 10, panel 1). Duke noted that "Among CFOs who responded to the survey after the Senate passed its version of the tax reform bill, optimism spiked to 73, which is the highest U.S. optimism ever recorded in the history of the survey."10 Chart 9Bright Outlook##BR##For Capital Spending Bright Outlook For Capital Spending Bright Outlook For Capital Spending Chart 10CEO Confidence And##BR##Capex Plans Surging CEO Confidence And Capex Plans Surging CEO Confidence And Capex Plans Surging Surveys by the Conference Board and Business Roundtable show a similar pattern. (panel 1 again). Notably, the soundings on all three surveys have climbed since Trump's election, but then retreated as his pro-business agenda stalled in the summer months. The dip in sentiment reflected the lack of legislative progress in Washington in the first 10 months of the Trump administration. The dip in CEO sentiment in Q2 and Q3 was in sharp contrast to the easing of policy concerns in the Fed's Beige Book (Chart 1, bottom panel). The upbeat numbers in the regional FRBs' surveys of capital spending intentions further support escalating capex spending in the next few quarters. The average readings from the New York, Philadelphia and Richmond Feds' capex survey plans are at an all-time high (Chart 10, panel 2). Moreover, the regional Feds' capex spending plans diffusion index is close to a cycle high, despite a modest pullback last summer (panel 3). Bottom Line: Stay overweight stocks versus bonds, and underweight duration. The tax bill will boost returns to shareholders via buybacks and dividends. In addition, rising capex will drive up GDP, employment and EPS in the coming quarters. Dollar View Revisited The dollar fell by 4% between mid-December and mid-January, amid a hawkish market interpretation of the ECB minutes, persistently strong growth in Japan and a key technical breakdown in the DXY index. The decline has some investors questioning BCA's bullish stance on the currency (Chart 11). We were correct on the direction of interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the other major economies, but this has not translated into a stronger dollar so far. We decided to stay long the dollar after a lengthy internal debate, although we have revised down our view on the upside potential. A lot of good news on the European and Japanese economies is now discounted and investors are quite pessimistic on the dollar (which is bullish the dollar from a contrary perspective) (Chart 12). Given this technical backdrop, we would expect at least a 5% rise in the trade-weighted dollar as expectations of Fed rate hikes rise this year. We are likely to exit our long dollar position if we get such an appreciation. Chart 11We Are Sticking With##BR##Our Long Dollar View We Are Sticking With Our Long Dollar View We Are Sticking With Our Long Dollar View Chart 12The Case For Crisis Era Monetary Stimulus##BR##In Europe And Japan Is Weakening The Case For Crisis Era Monetary Stimulus In Europe And Japan Is Weakening The Case For Crisis Era Monetary Stimulus In Europe And Japan Is Weakening Bottom Line: BCA's bullish dollar trade was initiated in October 2014 and although the DXY index is up 4% since that time, we are maintaining the trade. While downside risks remain, a unilateral decision by the Trump Administration to leave NAFTA will boost the U.S. dollar versus the Canadian dollar and the peso. Italy's upcoming spring Presidential election could prompt a rally in the dollar if the Eurosceptic parties outperform expectations. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", published on April 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Commitments", published January 20, 2014. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "High Conviction Calls", published November 27, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "January Effect", published January 9, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/4520 6 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15023 7 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf 8 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40178.pdf 9 https://www.cbpp.org/research/tax-holiday-for-overseas-corporate-profits-would-increase-deficits-fail-to-boost-the 10 http://www.cfosurvey.org/2017q4/press-release.html Appendix: Bankers Beige Book Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme Variations On A Theme

Highlights An increase in the "synthetic" supply of bitcoins via financial derivatives, along with the launch of bitcoin-like alternatives by large established tech companies, will cause the cryptocurrency market to collapse under its own weight. Other areas that could see supply-induced pressures over the coming years include oil, high-yield debt, global real estate, and low-volatility trades. In contrast, the U.S. stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. Investors should consider going long U.S. equities relative to high-yield credit, while positioning for higher volatility. Such an outcome would be similar to what happened in the late 1990s, a period when the VIX and credit spreads were trending higher, while stocks continued to hit new highs. A breakdown in NAFTA talks remains the key risk for the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso. Feature Bubbles Burst By Too Much Supply The "cure" for higher prices is higher prices. The dotcom and housing bubbles did not die fully of their own accord. Their demise was expedited by a wave of new supply hitting the market. In the case of the dotcom bubble, a flood of shares from initial and secondary public offerings inundated investors in 2000 (Chart 1). This put significant downward pressure on the prices of internet stocks. The housing boom was similarly subverted by a slew of new construction - residential investment rose to a 55-year high of 6.6% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 2). Chart 1Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Chart 2Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Is bitcoin about to experience a similar fate? On the surface, the answer may seem to be "no." As more bitcoins are "mined," the computational cost of additional production rises exponentially. In theory, this should limit the number of bitcoins that can ever circulate to 21 million, about 80% of which have already been created (Chart 3). Yet if one looks beneath the surface, bitcoin may also be vulnerable to a variety of "supply-side" factors. Chart 3Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined First, the expansion of financial derivatives tied to the value of bitcoin threatens to create a "synthetic" supply of the cryptocurrency. When someone writes a call option on a stock, the seller of the option is effectively taking a bearish bet while the buyer is taking a bullish bet. The very act of writing the option creates an additional long position, which is exactly offset by an additional short position. Moreover, to the extent that a decision to sell a particular call option will depress the price of similar call options, it will also depress the underlying price of the stock. This is simply because one can have long exposure to a stock either by owning it outright or owning a call option on it. Anything that hurts the price of the latter will also hurt the price of the former. As bitcoin futures begin to trade, investors who are bearish on bitcoin will be able to create short positions that cause the effective number of bitcoins in circulation to rise. This will happen even if the official number of bitcoins outstanding remains the same. Imitation Is The Sincerest Form Of Flattery An increase in synthetic forms of bitcoin supply is one worry for bitcoin investors. Another is the prospect of increased competition from bitcoin-like alternatives. There are now hundreds of cryptocurrencies, most of which use a slight variant of the same blockchain technology that underpins bitcoin. Chart 4Governments Will Want Their Cut Governments Will Want Their Cut Governments Will Want Their Cut So far, the proliferation of new currencies has been largely driven by technologically savvy entrepreneurs working out of their bedrooms or garages. But now companies are getting in on the act. The stock price of Kodak, which apparently is still in business, tripled earlier this week when it announced the launch of its own cryptocurrency. That's just a small taste of what's to come. What exactly is stopping giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google from issuing their own cryptocurrencies? After all, they already have secure, global networks. Amazon could start giving out a few coins with every sale, and allow shoppers to purchase goods from the online retailer using its new currency. It's simple.1 The only plausible restriction is a legal one: The threat that governments will quash upstart cryptocurrencies for fear that will drive down demand for their own fiat monies. As we noted several weeks ago, the U.S. government derives $100 billion per year in seigniorage revenue from its ability to print currency and use that money to buy goods and services (Chart 4).2 As large companies get into the cryptocurrency arena, governments are likely to respond harshly - sooner rather than later. This week's news that the South Korean government will consider banning the trading of cryptocurrencies on exchanges is a sign of what's to come. Who Else? What other areas are vulnerable to an eventual tsunami of new supply? Four come to mind: Oil: BCA's bullish oil call has paid off in spades. Brent has climbed from $44 last June to $69 currently. Further gains may not be as easily attainable, however. Our energy strategists estimate that the breakeven cost of oil for U.S. shale producers is in the low-$50 range.3 We are now well above this number, which means that shale supply will accelerate. This does not mean that prices cannot go up further in the near term, but it does limit the long-term potential for crude. Real estate: Ultra-low interest rates across much of the world have fueled sharp rallies in home prices. Inflation-adjusted home prices in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Europe are well above their pre-Great Recession levels (Chart 5). U.S. real residential home prices are still below their 2006 peak, but commercial real estate (CRE) prices have galloped to new highs (Chart 6). Rent growth within the U.S. CRE sector is starting to slow, suggesting that supply is slowly catching up with demand (Chart 7). Chart 5Where Low Rates Have ##br##Fueled House Prices Where Low Rates Have Fueled House Prices Where Low Rates Have Fueled House Prices Chart 6Commercial Real Estate Prices Have ##br##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 7Rent Growth Is Cooling Rent Growth Is Cooling Rent Growth Is Cooling Corporate debt: Low rates have also encouraged companies to feast on credit. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP in the U.S. and many other countries is close to record-high levels (Chart 8A and Chart 8B). Credit spreads remain extremely tight, but that may change as more corporate bonds reach the market. Chart 8ACorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Chart 8BCorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Low-volatility trades: A recent Bloomberg headline screamed "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash."4 The number of volatility contracts traded on the Cboe has increased more than tenfold since 2012. Net short speculative positions now stand at record-high levels (Chart 9). Traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting that volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility. In contrast to the aforementioned areas, the stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. The S&P divisor is down by over 8% since 2005. The number of U.S. publicly-listed companies has nearly halved since the late 1990s (Chart 10). This trend is unlikely to reverse any time soon, given the elevated level of profit margins and the temptation that many companies will have to use corporate tax cuts to step up the pace of share repurchases. Chart 9Low Volatility Is In High Demand Low Volatility Is In High Demand Low Volatility Is In High Demand Chart 10Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Bet On Higher Equity Prices, But Also Higher Volatility And Higher Credit Spreads The discussion above suggests that the relationship between equity prices and both volatility and credit spreads may shift over the coming months. This would not be the first time. Chart 11 shows that the VIX and credit spreads began to trend higher in the late 1990s, even as the S&P 500 continued to hit new record highs. We may be entering a similar phase now. Continued above-trend growth in the U.S. and rising inflation will push up Treasury yields. We declared "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" on July 5, 2016 - the exact same day that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%.5 Higher interest rates will punish financially-strapped borrowers, leading to wider credit spreads. Equity volatility is also likely to rise as corporate health deteriorates and the timing of the next downturn draws closer. Our baseline expectation is that the U.S. and the rest of the world will fall into a recession in late 2019. Financial markets will sniff out a recession before it happens. However, if history is any guide, this will only happen about six months before the start of the recession (Table 1). This suggests that global equities can continue to rally for the next 12 months. With this in mind, we are opening a new trade going long the S&P 500 versus high-yield credit. Chart 11Volatility Can Increase And Spreads ##br##Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase And Spreads Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase And Spreads Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed? Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed? Four Currency Quick Hits Four items buffeted currency and fixed-income markets this week. The first was a news story suggesting that China will slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt. China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) decried the report as "fake news." Lost in the commotion was the fact that China's holdings of Treasurys have been largely flat since 2011 (Chart 12). China still has a highly managed currency. Now that capital is no longer pouring out of the country, the PBoC will start rebuilding its foreign reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's largest and most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States. The second item this week was the Bank of Japan's announcement that it will reduce its target for how many government bonds it buys. This just formalizes something that has already been happening for over a year. The BoJ's purchases of JGBs have plunged over the past twelve months, mainly because its ¥80 trillion target is more than double the ¥30-35 trillion annual net issuance of JGBs (Chart 13). Chart 12China's Holdings Of Treasurys: ##br##Largely Flat Since 2011 China's Holdings Of Treasurys: Largely Flat Since 2011 China's Holdings Of Treasurys: Largely Flat Since 2011 Chart 13BoJ Has Been Reducing ##br##Its Bond Purchases BoJ Has Been Reducing Its Bond Purchases BoJ Has Been Reducing Its Bond Purchases Ultimately, none of this should matter that much. The Bank of Japan can target prices (the yield on JGBs) or it can target quantities (the number of bonds it owns), but it cannot target both. The fact that the BoJ is already doing the former makes the latter irrelevant. And with long-term inflation expectations still nowhere near the BoJ's target, the former is unlikely to change. What does this mean for the yen? The Japanese currency is cheap and its current account surplus has swollen to 4% of GDP (Chart 14). Speculators are also very short the currency (Chart 15). This increases the likelihood of a near-term rally, as my colleague Mathieu Savary flagged this week.6 Nevertheless, if global bond yields continue to rise while Japanese yields stay put, it is hard to see the yen moving up and staying up a lot. On balance, we expect USD/JPY to strengthen somewhat this year. Chart 14Yen Is Already Cheap... Yen Is Already Cheap... Yen Is Already Cheap... Chart 15...And Unloved ...And Unloved ...And Unloved The third item was the revelation in the ECB's December meeting minutes that the central bank will be revisiting its communication stance in early 2018. The speculation is that the ECB will renormalize monetary policy more quickly than what the market is currently discounting. If that were to happen, EUR/USD would strengthen further. All this is possible, of course, but it would likely require that euro area growth surprise on the upside. That is far from a done deal. The euro area economic surprise index has begun to edge lower, and in relative terms, has plunged against the U.S. (Chart 16). Unlike in the U.S., the euro area credit impulse is now negative (Chart 17). Euro area financial conditions have also tightened significantly relative to the U.S. (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area Economic ##br##Surprises Edging Lower Euro Area Economic Surprises Edging Lower Euro Area Economic Surprises Edging Lower Chart 17Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro ##br##Area Will Weigh On Growth Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro Area Will Weigh On Growth Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro Area Will Weigh On Growth Chart 18Diverging Financial Conditions ##br##Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Diverging Financial Conditions Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Diverging Financial Conditions Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Meanwhile, EUR/USD has appreciated more since 2016 than what one would expect based on changes in interest rate differentials (Chart 19). Speculative positioning towards the euro has also gone from being heavily short at the start of 2017 to heavily long today (Chart 20). Reasonably cheap valuations and a healthy current account surplus continue to work in the euro's favor, but our best bet is that EUR/USD will give up some of its gains over the coming months. Chart 19The Euro Has Strengthened More Than ##br##Justified By Interest Rate Differentials The Euro Has Strengthened More Than Justified By Interest Rate Differentials The Euro Has Strengthened More Than Justified By Interest Rate Differentials Chart 20Euro Positioning: From Deeply ##br##Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Lastly, the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso came under pressure this week on news reports that the U.S. will be pulling out of NAFTA negotiations. Of the four items discussed in this section, this is the one that worries us most. The global supply chain has become highly integrated. Anything that sabotages it would be greatly disruptive. At some level, Trump realizes this, but he also knows that his base wants him to get tough on trade, and unless he does so, his chances of reelection will be even slimmer than they are now. Ultimately, we expect a new NAFTA deal to be reached, but the path from here to there will be a bumpy one. Housekeeping Notes Our long global industrials/short utilities trade is up 12.4% since we initiated it on September 29. We are raising the stop to 10% to protect gains. We are also letting our long 2-year USD/Saudi Riyal forward contract trade expire for a loss of 2.9%. Given the recent improvement in Saudi Arabia's finances, we are not reinstating the trade. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 My thanks to Igor Vasserman, President of SHIG Partners LLC, for his valuable insights on this topic. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," dated December 22, 2017. 3 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017. 4 Dani Burger, "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash," Bloomberg, November 6, 2017. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Alert, "End Of The 35-year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!" dated January 12, 2018. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Chart 1Bond Bear On Pause? Bond Bear On Pause? Bond Bear On Pause? The start of a new year often brings optimism and nowhere is this more evident than in economic projections. In three of the past four years (2017 being the exception) Bloomberg consensus GDP growth expectations ended the year lower than where they began. A related pattern played itself out in the Treasury market. At the turn of each of the past four years the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index increased in December only to fall back in January. In two of those instances the January decline exceeded the December increase. Should we expect a similar January bond rally this year? Our favorite short-term indicators are not sending a strong signal (Chart 1). Net speculative futures positions weakly suggest that the 10-year yield will be lower in three months, but our auto regressive model suggests the Economic Surprise Index will still be in positive territory at the end of the month. In a recent report we showed that yields tend to rise in months where the Surprise Index is above zero.1 Perhaps most importantly, our 2-factor Treasury model shows that yields are significantly lower than is suggested by global economic fundamentals. Maintain below-benchmark duration. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 49 basis points in December and by 335 bps in 2017. At 94 bps, the average index spread is 28 bps tighter than at the beginning of 2017 and investment grade corporate spreads are extremely expensive compared to history (Chart 2). After adjusting for changes in the average duration of the index over time, we calculate that A-rated corporate spreads have only been tighter 5% of the time since 1989 (panel 2), and Baa-rated spreads have only been tighter 7% of the time (panel 3). Essentially, at this stage of the credit cycle we should expect excess returns no greater than carry. As for the credit cycle itself, we noted in our last report that with corporate balance sheets deteriorating, low inflation and still-accommodative monetary policy are the sole supports for corporate spreads.2 We expect spreads will start to widen later this year once inflation rises and policy becomes more restrictive. With excess returns likely to be lower in 2018 than in 2017, we should also expect a lower marginal return from increasing the riskiness within credit portfolios.3 For investors looking to scale back on credit risk, our model shows that Financials and Technology are the most attractive low-risk sectors. Energy, Basic Industry and Communications are all attractive high-risk sectors (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* January Effect January Effect Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* January Effect January Effect High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in December and by 602 bps in 2017. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 1 bp on the month and 66 bps in 2017. Though spreads appear somewhat more attractive than for investment grade corporates, there is still not much room for spread compression in high-yield. In fact, we calculate that if the high-yield index spread tightens another 117 bps, junk bonds will be the most expensive they have been since 1995. In an optimistic scenario where the index spread tightens 100 bps, bringing it close to all-time expensive levels, then we would expect junk excess returns to be in the range of 600 bps (annualized). Given trends in corporate leverage, another 100 bps of spread tightening should be viewed as unlikely. More realistically, we expect excess returns in the range of 200 bps to 500 bps (annualized) between now and the end of the credit cycle (Chart 3). Given our forecast for default losses, flat spreads translate to a 12-month excess return of 213 bps. An additional warning sign for junk spreads is that the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is hovering around 50 bps. We showed in a recent report that when the 2/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps, junk bonds underperform Treasuries in 48% of months, and average monthly excess returns (though still positive) are much lower than when the curve is steeper.4 MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 16 basis points in December and by 51 bps in 2017. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread narrowed 2 bps in December, the combination of a flat option-adjusted spread (OAS) and a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The Z-spread widened 2 bps in 2017, as an 8 bps OAS widening was offset by a decline of 6 bps in the compensation for prepayment risk. The substantial OAS widening in early 2017 was almost certainly caused by investors pricing-in the eventual run-off of the securities on the Fed's balance sheet. Now that run-off has begun we see no obvious catalyst for further OAS widening in the months ahead. Turning to the compensation for prepayment risk, with Treasury yields biased higher as the Fed continues to lift rates, we see little risk of a material increase in refinancing activity. This will ensure that overall MBS spreads stay capped near historically low levels (Chart 4). All in all, with MBS OAS looking more attractive relative to Aaa-rated credit than at any time since 2015 (panel 3), we think this is an opportune time for investors looking to de-risk their portfolios to shift some of their spread product allocation away from corporate bonds and into MBS. We already upgraded our recommended allocation to MBS from underweight to neutral in October, and will likely further increase exposure as we advance toward the end of the credit cycle. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in December, but outperformed by 216 bps in 2017. Sovereign bonds underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 36 bps in December, Foreign Agencies and Domestic Agencies underperformed by 8 bps and 1 bp, respectively. Local Authorities outperformed the benchmark by 17 bps, and Supranationals underperformed by 1 bp. Sovereign bonds were the best performers within the Government-Related index in 2017, delivering excess returns of 538 bps relative to duration-matched U.S. Treasuries. This outperformance was concentrated early in the year and was driven by the sharp depreciation of the U.S. dollar (Chart 5). With the market still priced for a relatively modest 63 bps of Fed rate hikes during the next 12 months, further sharp dollar depreciation appears unlikely. We recommend an underweight allocation to Sovereign debt. We remain overweight Local Authority and Foreign Agency bonds, sectors that delivered excess returns of 420 bps and 248 bps, respectively in 2017. Despite the outperformance, both of these sectors still offer attractive spreads after adjusting for credit rating and duration. We remain underweight Domestic Agency and Supranational bonds. Though both sectors offer low risk and high credit quality, they also only offer 15 bps and 17 bps of option-adjusted spread, respectively. We much prefer Agency-backed MBS and CMBS which are also relatively low risk and offer option-adjusted spreads of 28 bps and 42 bps, respectively. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 99 bps in December and by 332 bps in 2017 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 5% in December, and is 12% below where it began 2017 (Chart 6). The recent decline follows a sharp increase that was driven by fluctuating supply trends related to the passage of U.S. tax legislation. The final tax bill ends the practice of advance refunding municipal bonds. As a result, December set a new high of $55.6 billion for municipal issuance as issuers rushed to get their advance refunding deals to market before the bill was passed (panel 3). Now that the bill has passed, visible supply has evaporated and the average M/T yield ratio has fallen back to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean. The absence of advance refunding will bias municipal bond issuance lower in 2018, thus removing one potential risk for yield ratios. The M/T yield ratio for short maturity debt has risen considerably relative to the yield ratio for long maturity debt in recent months (panel 2), and the risk/reward trade-off now appears more balanced. We close our recommendation to favor long maturities versus short maturities on the Aaa Muni curve. The third quarter update of our Muni Health Monitor showed a slight improvement (panel 5), but still no clear reversal of trend. Although health remains supportive for now - and consistent with municipal upgrades outpacing downgrades - with yield ratios close to their lows we maintain an underweight allocation to Municipal bonds.  Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in December. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 13 bps on the month, and the 5/30 Treasury slope flattened 15 bps. The evolution of the Treasury curve in 2018 will come down to a trade-off between how quickly inflation rises versus how quickly the Fed lifts rates. For example, in a recent report we showed that the 10-year Treasury yield will likely settle into a range between 2.80% and 3.25% by the time that core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target.5 That same report shows that if that adjustment occurs relatively quickly, and the Fed has only lifted rates once or twice between now and then, then the 2/10 Treasury slope is much more likely to steepen than to flatten. Conversely, if the Fed lifts rates three or four more times between now and the time that inflation returns to target, then the curve is more likely to flatten. For our part, we think it is wise to maintain a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-neutral 2/10 barbell. Such a position profits from a steeper curve, and our model shows that the butterfly spread is currently priced for significant curve flattening (Chart 7). According to our model, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is discounting 27 bps of 2/10 flattening during the next six months.6 In other words, if the 2/10 slope steepens or flattens by less than 27 bps, then our recommended position will profit. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 41 basis points in December, but underperformed by 43 bps in 2017. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate went on a wild ride last year. It started 2017 at 1.95% and, driven by strong inflation prints and continued post-election euphoria, reached as high as 2.09% in January. The breakeven dropped to a low of 1.66% in June, as inflation started to disappoint in the second quarter, but has rebounded during the past couple of months and just recently broke back above 2%. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is currently 2.02%, above where it began 2017. According to our TIPS Financial Model, the recent widening in breakevens is in line with the message from other related financial market instruments (Chart 8). Specifically, oil prices, the trade-weighted dollar and the stock-to-bond total return ratio. Further, measures of pipeline inflation pressure continue to signal an increase in inflationary pressures (panels 3 and 4), and the trimmed mean PCE shows that the realized inflation data are forming a tentative bottom (bottom panel). The annualized 6-month rate of change in the trimmed mean PCE ticked up to 1.68% in November, higher than the 12-month rate of change (1.67%). The 1-month rate of change is higher still at 2.19%, annualized. We continue to see signs that inflation will start to rebound in the coming months, and this will cause long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to reach a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that inflation returns to the Fed's target. Remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities performed in line with the duration-equivalent Treasury index in December and outperformed by 92 basis points in 2017. In 2017, Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 79 bps and non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 217 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 1 bp in December, but tightened 21 bps in 2017. It now sits at 31 bps, only 4 bps above its all-time low (Chart 9). At 31 bps, Aaa-rated ABS now offer only a 3 bps spread advantage over Agency-backed MBS, and offer 11 bps less spread than Agency-backed CMBS. With consumer lending standards tightening and delinquency rates rising, we view no more than a neutral allocation to ABS as appropriate. On lending standards, the Fed's October Senior Loan Officer's Survey showed a continued tightening in lending standards on both credit cards and auto loans (panel 4), and also that demand for credit card and auto loans was essentially unchanged from the prior quarter. It also included a set of special questions regarding the reasons for changes in the supply and demand for consumer credit. Banks cited a less favorable or more uncertain economic outlook, a deterioration in existing loan quality and a general reduced risk tolerance as reasons for tightening the supply of credit. The hard data confirm that banks are seeing a deterioration in the quality of their consumer loan books (bottom panel). Although delinquencies remain depressed compared to history, with ABS spreads near all-time tights, rising delinquencies and tightening lending standards make for a poor risk/reward trade-off in the sector. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in December and by 201 bps in 2017. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 2 bps in December and 13 bps in 2017. At its current level of 64 bps, the index spread is about one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean, and only 13 bps above its all-time low reached in 2004 (Chart 10). With spreads at such low levels in an environment of tightening commercial real estate (CRE) lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, we continue to view the risk/reward trade-off in non-Agency CMBS as unfavorable. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in December and by 133 bps in 2017. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 3 bps in December and 13 bps in 2017. At its current level of 42 bps, the sector offers greater option-adjusted compensation than a position in Agency-backed MBS (28 bps) and Aaa-rated consumer ABS (31 bps). Such an attractive spread pick-up in a sector that benefits from Agency backing is surely worth grabbing.   Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.94% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.92%. PMIs across the world continue to surge. December PMI data show increases in the four largest economic blocs (U.S., Eurozone, China, Japan), and more broadly show that 86% of the 36 countries with available data currently have PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar continues to trend lower in response to strong growth in the rest of the world (bottom panel). This is also a bearish development for U.S. bonds. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.48%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Ill Placed Trust?", dated December 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Ill Placed Trust?", dated December 19, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Dear Client, This is our final publication for the year. We will be back on January 5th. On behalf of the entire Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and a Prosperous New Year! Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Global bonds have sold off in recent days, but the spread between long-term and short-term Treasury yields remains well below where it was at the start of the year. A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the ongoing U.S. business-cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. Nevertheless, three factors dilute the potentially bearish message from the curve. First, the yield curve has flattened largely because short-term rate expectations have risen thanks to better economic data. Second, both the 10-year/2-year and 10-year/3-month spreads are still above levels that have foreshadowed poor returns for risk assets in the past. This is particularly true for equities. Third, a structurally low term premium has distorted the signal from the yield curve. The U.S. yield curve is likely to steepen over the next six months, before flattening again in the lead-up to a recession in late-2019. We reveal the One Number that will kill bitcoin. Feature A Harbinger Of Recession? The U.S. yield curve has steepened in recent days, but is still much flatter than it was at the start of the year. The 10-year/3-month spread currently stands at 113 bps, down 84 bps year-to-date. The 10-year/2-year spread has fallen from 125 bps to 62 bps. Numerous academic studies have highlighted the importance of the yield curve as a leading indicator of recessions.1 In fact, every U.S. recession over the past 50 years has been preceded by an inverted yield curve (Chart 1). Chart 1An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession The converse has generally been true as well: Most inversions in the yield curve have coincided with a recession. The only two exceptions were in 1967 - when credit conditions tightened and industrial production decelerated, but the U.S. still managed to avoid succumbing to a recession - and in 1998, when the yield curve briefly inverted during the LTCM crisis. Considering that recessions and equity bear markets typically overlap (Chart 2), it is not surprising that investors have begun to fret about what a flatter yield curve may mean for their portfolios. Chart 2Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Don't Worry... Yet Chart 3U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher We would not be as dismissive of a flatter yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. Policymakers and investors alike have been too quick to downplay the signal from the yield curve in the past. In 2006, they blamed the "global savings glut" for dragging down long-term yields. In 2000, they argued that the federal government's budget surplus was reducing the supply of long-term bonds. In both cases, the bond market turned out to be seeing something more ominous than they were. That said, there are three reasons why we would discount some of the more bearish interpretations of what a flatter yield curve is telling us. First, the flattening of the yield curve has occurred mainly because of an increase in short-term rate expectations, rather than a decrease in long-term bond yields. The increase in rate expectations has been largely driven by stronger growth data. The economic surprise index has surged far into positive territory and analysts are now scrambling to revise up their 2018 and 2019 U.S. GDP growth projections (Chart 3). The Fed now sees growth of 2.5% in 2018 and an unemployment rate of 3.9% by the end of next year. Back in September, the Fed expected growth of 2.1% and an unemployment rate of 4.1%. Second, our research suggests that the slope of the yield curve only becomes worrisome for the economy when it falls to extremely low levels. This conclusion is reinforced by the New York Fed's Yield Curve Recession Model, which uses the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury rates to estimate the probability of a U.S. recession twelve months ahead.2 The model's current recession probability stands at a modest 11% (Chart 4). The last three recessions all began when the implied probability was over 25%. Chart 4NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low Third, the slope of the yield curve is weighed down by a structurally low term premium. The term premium measures the additional return investors can expect to receive by locking in their money in a 10-year Treasury note instead of rolling over a short-term Treasury bill for an entire decade. Historically, the term premium has been positive. Over the past few years, however, it has often been negative - meaning that investors have been willing to pay a premium to take on duration risk. Many commentators have attributed this peculiar state of affairs to central bank asset purchases, which they claim have artificially depressed long-term bond yields. There is some truth to this, but we think there is an even more important reason: Bonds today provide a good hedge against bad economic news. When fears of an economic slowdown mount, equities tend to sell off, while bond prices rise. This differs from the circumstances that existed in the 1970s and 1980s, when bad economic news usually meant higher inflation. To the extent that long-term bonds now serve as insurance policies against recessions, investors are more willing to accept the lower yields that they offer. Empirically, one can see this in the shift of the correlation between equity returns and bond yields. It was strongly negative up until the mid-1990s. Now it is strongly positive (Chart 5). A low term premium implies that the slope of the yield curve should be structurally flatter. That is exactly what we see today. Chart 6 shows that the 10-year/3-month spread would be well above its long-term average if the term premium were removed from the picture. This implies that investors have little to fear from the shape of today's yield curve, at least over the next six-to-twelve months. Chart 5Bond Prices Now Tend To Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Bond Prices Now Tend to Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Bond Prices Now Tend to Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Chart 6Stripping Out The Term Premium,##BR##The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Stripping Out The Term Premium, The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Stripping Out The Term Premium, The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Rising Odds Of A Recession In Late-2019 Beyond then, things start to get dicey. The Fed's end-2018 unemployment rate projection of 3.9% is 0.7 percentage points below its long-term estimate of the unemployment rate. This means that at some point in the future, the Fed will need to lift interest rates above their "neutral" level in order to push the unemployment rate up to its equilibrium level. That's a risky gambit. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 7). Modern economies are subject to feedback loops. Once economic conditions begin to deteriorate, households cut back on spending. This leads to less hiring and even less spending. Bad economic news begets worse news. Chart 7Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Implications For Equities And Credit A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the U.S. business cycle is entering the home stretch. Nevertheless, as we pointed out two weeks ago, the 7th-to-8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the juiciest for equity investors (Table 1).3 Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 8 shows that the term spread today is still at levels that have signaled positive equity returns in the past. In fact, today's term spread is close to levels that prevailed in the second half of the 1990s, a period that coincided with the greatest bull market in American history. This message is echoed by our forthcoming MacroQuant model, which continues to flag upside risks for stocks over the next 6-to-12 months (Chart 9). Chart 8Current Term Spread Is Still Pointing##BR##To Positive Equity Returns Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 9MacroQuant Still Positive##BR##On The Stock Market Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Globally, we favor euro area and Japanese equities (in local-currency terms) in the developed market sphere due to our expectation that the euro and yen will depreciate somewhat next year. Both the euro area and Japan also have greater exposure to cyclical sectors. This fits with our bias towards owning cyclicals over defensive stocks. Today's term spread is a bit more worrying for corporate credit. As our bond strategists have noted, a flatter yield curve is consistent with lower, though still positive, monthly excess returns for high-yield bonds (Chart 10).4 Again, the second half of the 1990s provides a potentially useful template: Despite a sizzling stock market, high-yield spreads actually widened as corporations loaded up on debt (Chart 11). The deterioration in our Corporate Health Monitor over the past five years suggests that a similar dynamic may be afoot (Chart 12). Chart 10Junk Monthly Excess Returns##BR##And The Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 11Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads##BR##Rose With Stock Prices Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads Rose With Stock Prices Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads Rose With Stock Prices Chart 12Corporate Health Has##BR##Been Deteriorating Corporate Health Has Been Deteriorating Corporate Health Has Been Deteriorating Yield Curve Should Steepen Over The Coming Months Of course, much depends on what happens to the yield curve going forward. We suspect that it will flatten again towards the end of next year. However, it is likely to steepen over the next six months. U.S. GDP growth will remain above trend next year, as wages start to rise more briskly and firms boost capital spending to meet rising demand for their products. Fiscal policy should also help. Tax cuts will lift growth by 0.2%-to-0.3% in 2018. Higher disaster relief efforts following the hurricanes and a pending agreement to raise caps on discretionary spending will also translate into increased federal government spending. Investors have largely overlooked this source of fiscal stimulus, but increased spending will contribute almost as much to growth next year as lower taxes. Unfortunately, all this additional growth, coming at a time when the output gap is all but closed, is likely to stoke inflationary pressures. Our Pipeline Inflation Pressure Index has risen sharply since early 2016, while the ISM prices paid index has shot up. The New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge has accelerated to an 11-year high of 3% (Chart 13). Historically, rising inflation expectations have led to a steeper yield curve (Chart 14). The implication is that investors should favor inflation-linked securities over government bonds. Chart 13U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building Chart 14Rising Inflation Expectations Lead To A Steeper Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve The One Number That Will Kill Bitcoin In a normal world, most reasonable people would regard a flatter yield curve and continued weak inflation readings as evidence that fiat money was, if anything, doing too good a job as a store of value. However, nothing is normal or reasonable about bitcoin.5 Chart 15Governments Will Want Their Cut:##BR##U.S. Seigniorage Revenue Governments Will Want Their Cut: U.S. Seigniorage Revenue Governments Will Want Their Cut: U.S. Seigniorage Revenue No one knows when the bitcoin bubble will burst. Only a tiny fraction of the public owns the virtual currency. The value of all bitcoin in circulation represents 0.35% of global GDP. At its peak in 1996, the value of all pyramid scheme assets in Albania amounted to almost half of GDP. Never underestimate the lure of easy money. While we do not know where the price of bitcoin will be ten months from now, we do have a good guess of where it will be ten years from today. And that price is zero, or thereabouts. When the U.S. Treasury issues a $100 bill, it gains the ability to buy $100 of goods and services with it. The government's cost is whatever it pays to print the bill, which is next to nothing. This so-called "seigniorage revenue" is set to reach $100 billion this year (Chart 15). That is the number that will kill bitcoin. There is no way the U.S. government will forsake this revenue in order to make room for bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Not when there are entitlements to pay and gaping budget deficits to finance. A variety of other countries have a love-hate relationship with bitcoin, partly because of their "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude towards the dollar. But that will change when they see their tax bases eroding as more commerce gets done in the anonymous world of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin's days are numbered. The only question is who will be holding the bag when the party ends. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Jonathan H. Wright, "The Yield Curve And Predicting Recessions," FEDs Working Paper No. 2006-7, May 3, 2006; Michael Owyang, "Is the Yield Curve Signaling a Recession?"Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, March 24, 2016; and Arturo Estrella and Mishkin, Frederic S., "The Yield Curve as a Predictor of U.S. Recessions," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, (2:7), June 1996. 2 Please see "The Yield Curve As A Leading Indicator: Probability of U.S. Recession Charts," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?" dated December 12, 2017. 5 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bitcoins And Fractals," dated December 21, 2017; Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" dated December 12, 2017; Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Blockchain And Cryptocurrencies," dated May 5, 2017. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

This will be the last U.S. Bond Strategy report of the year. The next publication will be on January 9 with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2018. Until then we extend our best wishes for a wonderful holiday and a Happy New Year. Highlights Duration: Rising core inflation will cause the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to increase, driven mostly by the inflation component. We target a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation is back close to the Fed's target, likely sometime in the middle of 2018. Yield Curve: The yield curve will steepen modestly during the next six months as inflation recovers and the Fed lifts rates only gradually. This mild steepening will transition to flattening once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have recovered to pre-crisis levels. Credit Cycle: Our indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but for now we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will be monitoring to gauge the end of the cycle. Feature Chart 1Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 As was widely anticipated, the Fed delivered the fifth rate hike of the cycle last week, bringing the target range for the fed funds rate up to 1.25% to 1.5%. What's more, neither the Summary of Economic Projections nor Janet Yellen's final post-meeting press conference gave much indication that the Fed is worried enough about inflation to deviate from its current pace of tightening. To wit, the Fed did not alter its median projections for inflation or the near-term pace of rate hikes. As in September, the Fed still expects core PCE inflation to rise from its current 1.45% to 1.9% by the end of 2018. It also still expects to lift rates three more times next year. However, the Fed did respond to recent strong growth and employment data by revising its projection for GDP growth higher and its projection for the unemployment rate lower (Chart 1). It also revised the post-meeting statement to indicate that it now believes the economy has reached full employment. In other words, the Fed believes there is no longer any slack in the labor market. This dichotomy between stronger growth and a tight labor market on the one hand and low inflation on the other gets to the heart of the first big challenge that incoming Fed Chairman Jay Powell will face next year. Specifically, how much faith should the Fed have in its framework for forecasting inflation? Chart 2 shows that Janet Yellen's Phillips Curve model of core inflation does not explain this year's decline.1 It also shows that inflation is close to 0.5% below fair value, almost the largest deviation since 1995 (Chart 2, panel 2). It is this deviation that prompted Chair Yellen to say the following at last week's press conference: [W]e've had an undershoot of inflation for a number of years. We absolutely recognize that. I think until this year [the] undershoot was understandable. In other words, until this year the Fed's model did a good job of explaining low inflation. But now that a large residual has opened up between inflation and the Fed's model, it is reasonable for both the market and the Fed to question whether the underlying relationship between inflation and economic growth has changed. The market has already rendered its verdict in the affirmative. The compensation for inflation priced into the 10-year Treasury yield is only 1.88%. Historically, a level between 2.4% and 2.5% suggests the market has faith in the Fed's 2% inflation target. Further, the yield curve has been flattening dramatically. The 2/10 Treasury slope is down to 51 bps, and the fed funds/10-year slope is down to 94 bps. In other words, the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another 3-4 rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target. The recent revisions to the Fed's own economic projections also suggest that the perceived relationship between economic growth and inflation has weakened. The Fed revised its projection for GDP growth higher and its projection for the unemployment rate lower, but left its projections for inflation and the fed funds rate unchanged. This can only mean that the Fed views the relationship between economic growth and inflation as having weakened since September. So how much longer can the Powell Fed tighten policy without inflation actually trending higher? This is the single biggest question for bond markets and we detailed the three possible answers in last week's report.2 The most likely scenario is that the Fed's Phillips Curve model starts to work again next year. Core inflation trends higher and this eases the flattening pressure on the yield curve allowing the Fed to continue tightening. In support of this outcome, pipeline inflation measures have hooked up in recent weeks, suggesting that core inflation is about to bottom (Chart 3). Chart 2The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model The Fed's Inflation Model Chart 3Pipeline Inflation Measures Pipeline Inflation Measures Pipeline Inflation Measures However, in the scenario where inflation does not move higher, the next most likely outcome is that risk assets sell off in the next couple months. This would lead to a tightening of financial conditions and would cause the Fed to react by adopting a more dovish policy stance. We showed in last week's report that risk off episodes in junk spreads become more frequent once the 2/10 Treasury slope breaks below 50 bps. It is also possible that the Fed proactively adopts a more dovish policy stance without having its hand forced by tighter financial conditions, but this now seems like the least likely outcome. Implications For Treasury Yields In the most likely scenario where core inflation trends higher during the next six months, Treasury yields will rise driven mostly by the inflation component (Chart 4). A return to the range of 2.4% to 2.5% on the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate would put between 52 bps and 62 bps of upward pressure on the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. This means that even if the real 10-year yield remains flat we should see the nominal 10-year yield in a range between 2.87% and 2.97% by the time that core inflation gets back to the Fed's target. But even a flat real 10-year yield seems like a fairly conservative assumption. We can think of the real 10-year yield as being driven by three main factors: (i) the fed funds rate itself, (ii) expectations for future changes in the fed funds rate and (iii) a term premium. In Chart 5 we show that a simple model based on these three factors does a good job explaining the fluctuations in the real 10-year Treasury yield.3 Chart 4Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Chart 5A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield The model works better prior to the Great Recession because we deliberately chose pre-crisis coefficients for our three independent variables. Chart 6 shows the coefficients for the three variables estimated over rolling 5-year intervals, and the dashed horizontal lines show the coefficients we chose for our model. It is clear from Chart 6 that the zero-lower bound caused the estimated coefficient on the fed funds rate to decrease and the estimated coefficient on the 12-month discounter to increase. We expect both will converge slowly back toward pre-crisis levels now that the fed funds rate is well off the zero bound. Chart 6Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound The key conclusion from this modeling exercise is that, even with fairly conservative assumptions, it is difficult to craft a reasonable scenario where the real 10-year Treasury yield declines during the next 12 months. The forecast in Chart 5 assumes that the Fed lifts rates three times next year - consistent with its median projections - but also that rate hike expectations fall so that by the end of 2018 the market only expects one further rate hike during the next 12 months. Finally, we assume that implied interest rate volatility stays flat at historically low levels. Even in that relatively benign scenario our model suggests that the real 10-year Treasury yield would drift higher during the next 12 months. This leads us to project a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation moves back close to the Fed's 2% target. Implications For The Yield Curve The slope of the yield curve during the next 6-12 months will depend both on how quickly core inflation rises and how quickly the Fed tightens policy. Table 1 shows different scenarios for the fed funds rate, the 2-year/fed funds slope - which can be thought of as the expected number of rate hikes during the next two years - and the 10-year Treasury yield. For example, if core inflation rises back close to the Fed's target by next June and the Fed has only delivered one or two more rate hikes during that time period, then it is very likely that the yield curve will have steepened, at least modestly. If the Fed gets three or four hikes off before inflation gets back to target, then it is much more likely that the yield curve will have flattened. We think a modest curve steepening is the most likely outcome for the next six months. This is premised on the view that core inflation will start to trend higher in the coming months, and will approach the Fed's target by the middle of next year. During that timeframe the Fed will only deliver one or two rate hikes, consistent with its median projection for three hikes in 2018. Once core inflation is back closer to target and the compensation for inflation priced into long-dated Treasury yields is back to its pre-crisis 2.4% to 2.5% range, then aggressive curve flattening becomes much more likely. Table 1Scenarios For The Number Of Fed Rate Hikes By The Time That Inflation Returns To Target Ill Placed Trust? Ill Placed Trust? Bottom Line: The Fed is playing a dangerous game by continuing to signal a gradual pace of rate hikes in the face of inflation data that have not kept pace with its projections. Ultimately we think the Fed's models will be proven correct during the next six months and core inflation will resume its gradual cyclical uptrend. Rising core inflation will cause the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to increase, driven mostly by the inflation component. We target a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation is back close to the Fed's target, likely sometime in the middle of 2018. The yield curve will steepen modestly during the next six months as inflation recovers and the Fed lifts rates only gradually. This mild steepening will transition to flattening once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have recovered to pre-crisis levels. Credit Cycle Update: Favorable For Now, But Will Turn In 2018 The U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) were released this month. This gives us the opportunity to update our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM), as well as our other indicators of non-financial corporate sector leverage. Recall that historically three conditions must be met before the credit cycle turns and a sustained period of corporate spread widening kicks in. They are: Corporate balance sheet health must be deteriorating Monetary policy must be restrictive Bank lending standards must be tightening Chart 7 provides a snapshot of the current state of affairs for these three criteria. Chart 7Credit Cycle Indicators Credit Cycle Indicators Credit Cycle Indicators Chart 8Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Balance Sheet Health The CHM is our number one indicator of non-financial corporate sector balance sheet health (Chart 7, panel 2). It has been signaling "deteriorating health" since 2015, but ticked down in the third quarter and has been moving slowly back toward "improving health" territory since the beginning of the year. It is worth mentioning that in order to get a leading signal from our CHM we use de-trended versions of the Monitor's underlying components. The six financial ratios that we combine to calculate the CHM are shown in their not de-trended forms in Chart 8. We also show a not de-trended version of the overall Monitor in the second panel of Chart 7. Notice that while the traditional (de-trended) CHM has been signaling "deteriorating corporate health" since 2015, the not de-trended version remains in "improving health" territory. Box: Corporate Health Monitor Components The BCA Corporate Health Monitor is a normalized composite of six financial ratios, calculated for the non-financial corporate sector as a whole. These six ratios are defined as follows: Profit Margins: After-tax cash flow as a percent of corporate sales Return on Capital: After-tax earnings plus interest expense, as a percent of capital stock Debt Coverage: After-tax cash flow less capital expenditures, as a percent of all interest bearing debt Interest Coverage: EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization) divided by the sum of interest expense and dividends Leverage: Total debt as a percent of market value of equity Liquidity: Working Capital, excluding inventories, as a percent of market value of assets The unusual length of the current recovery has caused the not de-trended and de-trended versions of the CHM to diverge by much more than in prior cycles. While this almost certainly means that the negative signal from our traditional (de-trended) Monitor came too early this cycle, we should also expect the negative signal from the not de-trended version of our model to arrive too late. So while the truth lies somewhere in between the de-trended and not de-trended versions, we are fairly confident in saying that the condition of "deteriorating corporate health" has already been met for this cycle. Restrictive Monetary Policy Panels 3 and 4 of Chart 7 show two different indicators for the stance of monetary policy. The first is the real effective fed funds rate relative to the Laubach-Williams (2003) estimate of its equilibrium level. According to this measure, monetary policy moved into restrictive territory following last week's rate hike. However, a much simpler indicator for the stance of monetary policy is the slope of the yield curve. While the slope of the yield curve is not flashing red just yet, it has been rapidly flattening and is approaching levels that signaled a restrictive stance of monetary policy in prior cycles. In last week's report we showed that monthly excess returns to high-yield bonds have averaged only 12 bps when the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is between 0 bps and 50 bps, and that monthly excess returns have been negative 48% of the time in those periods.4 Tightening Bank Lending Standards The Federal Reserve's most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks continue to modestly ease standards on commercial & industrial (C&I) loans (Chart 7, bottom panel). We traditionally view this third condition as more of a confirming indicator of the turn in the credit cycle. That is, tighter bank lending standards are typically preceded by deteriorating corporate health and restrictive monetary policy. An Additional Measure Of Corporate Sector Leverage In addition to the components of our CHM, we also track a measure of gross leverage for the non-financial corporate sector, calculated as total debt divided by EBITD (Chart 9). Historically, the trend in corporate bond spreads has followed the trend in gross leverage, or at the very least, deviations in direction between spreads and leverage have tended not to last very long. Chart 9Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Our measure of gross leverage ticked higher in Q3, EBITD grew at an annualized rate of 4.1% but this was not enough to offset the 5.4% annualized increase in corporate debt. Overall, gross leverage has been roughly flat this year even though corporate spreads have tightened. Going forward, our leading indicators are still consistent with mid-single digit profit growth. If that view pans out then the pace of debt accumulation will need to fall in order for leverage to decline. We will be watching this measure of leverage closely during the next couple of quarters, if leverage continues to increase then we will be quicker to call the end of the credit cycle. Bottom Line: Our indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but for now we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will be monitoring to gauge the end of the cycle. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 The Phillips Curve model of inflation shown in Chart 2 is re-created from Janet Yellen's September 2015 speech: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 We use our 12-month fed funds discounter to measure rate hike expectations and the MOVE implied volatility index as a proxy for the term premium. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights 2018 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. Country Allocations: Divergences in likely central bank policy moves in 2018 will lead to more cross-country bond market investment opportunities. In our model portfolio, we are maintaining underweight positions in the U.S., Canada and the Euro Area, keeping a moderate overweight in low-beta Japan, and adding small overweights in the U.K. and Australia (where rate hikes are unlikely). Spread Product: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Feature Two weeks ago, we published our "Key Views" report, outlining the main fixed income investment implications deriving from the 2018 BCA Outlook.1 In this, our final report of 2017, we translate those Key Views into direct allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. As we always remind our clients, our model portfolio is intended as a vehicle to communicate our opinions on the relative attractiveness and trade-offs between fixed income countries and sectors. That is to say, the portfolio not only includes our traditional individual country and sector recommendations, but attaches actual weightings to those views within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. The main takeaway from our Key Views is that bond market performance, and ideal asset allocation, is likely to look very different as the year progresses (Table 1). The first half of the year will see continued strong global growth and slowly rising inflation, but with central banks only slowing shifting to a less accommodative policy stance. This will create an environment where global bond yields will rise but with credit markets outperforming government bonds. The story will play out differently in the latter half, however, as worries over global growth expectations for 2018 will create more market volatility - albeit with lower cross-asset correlations as central banks act in a less-coordinated fashion than in recent years. Table 1A Pro-Risk Recommended Portfolio In H1/2018, Looking To Get Defensive Later In The Year Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Top-Down Bond Portfolio Implications Of Our Key Views The main predictions for 2018 in our Key Views report from December 5th were the following: A more bearish backdrop for bonds, led by the U.S.: Faster global growth, with rebounding inflation expectations, will trigger tighter overall global monetary policy. This will be led by Fed rate hikes and, later in 2018, ECB tapering. Global bond yields will rise in response, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Growth & policy divergences will create cross-market bond investment opportunities: Global growth in 2018 will become less synchronized compared to 2016 & 2017, as will individual country monetary policies. Government bonds in the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes will happen, will underperform, while bonds in the U.K. and Australia, where rates will likely be held steady, will outperform. The most dovish central banks will be forced to turn less dovish: The ECB and BoJ will both slow the pace of their asset purchases in 2018, in response to strong domestic economies and rising inflation. This will lead to bear-steepening of yield curves in Europe, mostly in the latter half of 2018. The BoJ could raise its target on JGB yields, but only modestly, in response to an overall higher level of global bond yields. The low market volatility backdrop will end through higher bond volatility: Incremental tightening by central banks, in response to faster inflation, will raise the volatility of global interest rates. This will eventually weigh on global growth expectations over the course of 2018, and create a more volatile backdrop for risk assets in the latter half of the year. The first step in translating these themes into allocations into our model bond portfolio is to determining the ideal top-down asset allocation parameters for the start of the 2018: Maintain a moderate overall level of portfolio risk. Both bond yields (Chart 1) and credit spreads (Chart 2) are at the low end of their historical ranges since 2000. This suggests that bond market returns will be much lower than in recent years, simply because initial valuations are not cheap. Coming at a time when bond volatility is also at historically depressed levels, and with central banks starting to slowly take away the monetary punch bowl, keeping overall portfolio risk at modest levels is prudent. Within the GFIS model bond portfolio, that means keeping our tracking error versus our custom benchmark performance index well below our maximum target level of 100bps (Chart 3). Chart 1Historical Range Of Bond Yields For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Chart 2Historical Range Of Global Credit Spreads, 2000-2017 Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration. The combination of solid global growth, rising inflation and a slower pace of bond buying by the major central banks all suggest that bond yields will move higher in 2018. We will continue to target a recommended portfolio duration that is one year short versus our benchmark index (Chart 4). Chart 3Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Chart 4Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Maintain an overweight stance on corporate credit over government bonds, focusing on the U.S. Although spreads are tight in so many asset classes, the global growth and monetary backdrop remains supportive for the outperformance of credit over government bonds. We recommended focusing on U.S. corporate credit, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY), where growth momentum remains solid and Fed policy is not yet restrictive. After setting those broad portfolio parameters, our recommendations get more interesting in terms of country allocations. Bond yields within the developed markets have become highly correlated to inflation expectations in the past few years (Chart 5). This is no surprise given how strongly central banks have tied their monetary policy decisions to their own inflation forecasts, and to market-based and survey-based inflation expectations. Inflation is likely to move higher next year alongside tight global labor markets and higher oil prices. If the bullish views on oil from BCA's commodity strategists comes to fruition, this implies that both market-based inflation expectations can rise and yield curves can bear-steepen. The key to the latter will be how fast central banks respond to faster rates of inflation. Yield curve steepness remains highly correlated to the level of REAL interest rates. Curves steepen when real interest rates decline and vice versa. Lower real rates can happen in two ways - bullishly, if central banks cut policy rates faster than inflation is falling; or bearishly, if central banks do not hike rates as fast as inflation is rising. We see the latter as being the likely story in 2018, which will lead to steeper government bond yield curves but through higher yields and rising inflation expectations. In Chart 6, where we plot the level of real central bank policy rates (deflated by 10-year CPI swaps as a measure of inflation expectations) vs. the 2-year/10-year bond yield curves. If global inflation expectations merely follow the path implied by our bullish oil forecast (Brent crude average $65/bbl in 2018), and central banks did not respond with rate hikes, then this would generate lower real interest rates (the "x" in each panel of the chart) and steepening pressure on yield curves. Chart 5Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More##BR##By Inflation Expectations Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More By Inflation Expectations Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More By Inflation Expectations Chart 6Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves##BR##From Inflation In 2018 Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves From Inflation In 2018 Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves From Inflation In 2018 We don't see all central banks responding the same way to an oil-driven move higher in inflation. Lower unemployment rates, and other measures of diminished economic slack, will be needed to give policymakers confidence that their economies can tolerate higher interest rates. Judging central banks along these lines will create more interesting country bond allocation decisions in 2018 (Chart 7). Specifically, we see a greater likelihood that the Fed and Bank of Canada (BoC) can actually raise interest rates next year. It will be much harder for the Bank of England (BoE) to raise rates given sluggish domestic economic growth, lingering Brexit uncertainty and the fact that market-based inflation expectations have already peaked. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will also be unable to hike rates next year given the lack of core inflation pressures and with an unemployment rate that is still much higher than previous cyclical troughs. This leads us to add moderate portfolio overweights in the U.K. and Australia to the government bond portion of our model bond portfolio, while maintaining our current underweight stances for the U.S. and Canada (Chart 8). The ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) will be nowhere near a point where interest rate hikes would be considered, although the decisions those banks make with their asset purchase programs will be a bigger issue for their bond markets in 2018. Chart 7Tight Labor Markets Will##BR##Influence Bond Returns Tight Labor Markets Will Influence Bond Returns Tight Labor Markets Will Influence Bond Returns Chart 8Monetary Policy Divergences##BR##Will Drive Country Allocation Monetary Policy Divergences Will Drive Country Allocation Monetary Policy Divergences Will Drive Country Allocation Bottom Line: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. The Asset Allocation Implications Of Slower Central Bank Asset Purchases The big risk factor for global bonds in 2018 will be how markets respond to less buying from the Fed, ECB and BoJ. As the growth rate of the expansion of the major balance sheets slows, bond yields have the potential to rise through two channels: higher term premia on longer maturity bonds and the market pulling forward the expected future path of interest rates. This will become a major issue for Euro Area bond markets in the 2nd half of 2018, as the ECB will be forced by strong domestic growth and rising inflation pressures to announce a full taper of its asset purchase program by the end of 2018. This will come on top of a slower pace of buying by the BoJ (who is now targeting a price target on bond yields rather than a quantity target), and the Fed allowing some run off of its massive balance sheet. The result is that the growth rate of the major developed market central bank balance sheets is likely to slow to a low single-digit pace in 2018 (Chart 9), creating upside potential for global yields. The case for significant underweights in Euro Area fixed income will be much stronger later next year when the ECB will be forced to prepare the market for a taper. But in the first half of 2018, the impact of the ECB's purchases will continue to dampen Euro Area bond yields. At the same time, Japanese yields will remain pegged near 0% by BoJ buying. In terms of our model bond portfolio, we are maintaining an overweight stance on low-beta Japan given our views on rising global bond yields, while keeping aggregate Euro Area bond weightings close to neutral (and looking to go more aggressively underweight later in the year as the ECB taper talk ramps up). Bond markets that are less propped up by ultra-accommodative central banks will create a more volatile market backdrop for global fixed income as the year progresses. That is hardly a provocative statement, of course, given the starting point of utterly low realized bond market volatility (Chart 10). As discussed earlier, our views for 2018 lead us to recommend a more moderate portfolio risk level in 2018. The potential for higher central-bank driven market volatility fits with that expectation. Chart 9Global Yields Will Rise As##BR##Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Global Yields Will Rise As Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Global Yields Will Rise As Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Chart 10The Low Bond Vol Regime##BR##Looks Stretched The Low Bond Vol Regime Looks Stretched The Low Bond Vol Regime Looks Stretched A slower pace of central bank bond buying also has another implication for portfolio construction. With the wave of central bank liquidity becoming a less dominant factor, cross-asset correlations should diminish. We can see that by looking at the average correlation between sectors within our model bond portfolio benchmark index (Chart 11). We have found that the correlation is itself highly correlated to the breadth of global economic growth, as measured by our leading economic indicator diffusion index (top panel). But the average correlation is also linked to the growth rate of central bank balance sheets (bottom panel), which is a by-product of massive asset purchases reducing global macroeconomic risks and forcing investors to plow into similar asset classes to chase acceptable returns. Slightly less coordinated global growth, and less active central banks, should result in lower market correlations in 2018. At the same time, as central banks shift to a less accommodative stance - especially in the U.S. - the uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart 12). This will likely lead us to cut our recommended overweight allocations to U.S. IG and HY corporate debt in our model portfolio later in 2018. To begin the year, however, we are keeping an overweight stance until the Fed is forced to signal a shift to a more hawkish stance because of rising U.S. inflation. Chart 11Expect Lower Global Bond##BR##Correlations In 2018 Expect Lower Global Bond Correlations In 2018 Expect Lower Global Bond Correlations In 2018 Chart 12The Link Between U.S. Growth,##BR##Bond Vol & Credit Spreads The Link Between U.S. Growth, Bond Vol & Credit Spreads The Link Between U.S. Growth, Bond Vol & Credit Spreads Bottom Line: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Summing It All Up Chart 13Aiming For Moderate Carry##BR##In Our Model Portfolio Aiming For Moderate Carry In Our Model Portfolio Aiming For Moderate Carry In Our Model Portfolio On Page 12, we show our model bond portfolio allocations after making some changes to reflect our key views for 2018. We are doing some tweaks to our existing recommendations: modestly increasing our overweight U.S. IG corporates allocation at the expense of U.S. Treasuries; reducing our underweight in the Euro Area by reducing the large Italy underweight; adding exposure to the U.K. and Australia; while cutting our large overweight in Japan. The latter was there as a desire to get more defensive on the portfolio's duration stance, but having such a large allocation has left our portfolio with no yield advantage versus the custom benchmark index (Chart 13). With the changes we are making this week, the model bond portfolio will have a yield that is 12bps over that of our custom index. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 Key Views: BCA's Outlook & What It Means For Global Fixed Income Markets", dated December 5th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns