Currencies

Dear Client, Next week I will be hosting a series of Roundtable discussions with BCA’s clients in both Europe and Asia. Our next report published on April 28th will be a recap of my observations from these meetings. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Highlights The sharp uptick in Chinese producer prices should be transitory, unlikely to trigger a policy response. There are two scenarios under which Chinese manufacturers’ profit margins will benefit: either Chinese exporters will raise export prices and pass input costs onto American customers, or the RMB will depreciate versus the US dollar and commodities prices will experience a setback. The second scenario is more likely in the next 3-6 months. After a pandemic-driven boost in 2020, US imports from China will likely moderate in the second half of 2021 and into 2022. President Biden’s grand infrastructure spending plan, even if approved later this year, will not be a game changer for China’s exports or economy. The strength in the USD may intensify in the near term, and Chinese policymakers will be happy to allow the RMB to depreciate mildly. Stay underweight Chinese stocks. Feature Last week’s China’s producer price index (PPI) was more elevated than the market expected. However, it does not warrant a policy response, given that the increase was mostly driven by supply constraints rather than an overheating domestic economy. Chinese manufacturers have had a tough time passing on mounting input prices to customers, which raises the question about how profit margins will be maintained. For exporters, the answer may be a combination of increasing export prices in USD terms and depreciating the RMB.  The rate of growth in US demand for Chinese export goods may moderate in the second half of 2021 and into 2022 after a pandemic-driven boost in 2020. China’s economic growth and interest rate differentials with the US will continue to narrow in the rest of this year. We expect the RMB to face headwinds against the USD, at least in the next quarter or two. Meanwhile, global investors should continue to underweight Chinese stocks. The PBoC Will Not React To Supply-Side Price Pressures Chart 1Marchs Strong PPI Does Not Reflect An Overheating Domestic Economy Marchs Strong PPI Does Not Reflect An Overheating Domestic Economy Marchs Strong PPI Does Not Reflect An Overheating Domestic Economy Despite above-expectation readings in China’s PPI, the domestic economy shows no signs of overheating. The upside pressure on producer prices reflects the impact of both the global rally in commodities and base effects (Chart 1). In March, strength in the PPI was also accentuated by seasonality due to a resumption in construction and real estate activity following the Chinese New Year holiday. While base effects and global supply bottlenecks will continue to buoy PPI prints throughout Q2, these effects are likely transitory and would not justify a policy response. At 0.4% year-over-year in March, core CPI remains significantly below the central bank’s 3% target and does not indicate any demand-side pressure. Instead, the inability for Chinese producers to pass on higher input prices to consumers highlights the relatively subdued state of domestic demand (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 2Current Macro Policy Works To Cap The Upsides In Both The Price And Quantity Of Money Current Macro Policy Works To Cap The Upsides In Both The Price And Quantity Of Money Current Macro Policy Works To Cap The Upsides In Both The Price And Quantity Of Money At this point there are little signs that rising producer prices are spilling over to consumer prices. We expect Chinese authorities to continue its current policy trajectory, which intends to keep a steady interbank rate while keeping money supply growth at or below the rate of nominal GDP expansion (Chart 2). China’s Deteriorating Terms Of Trade Chinese export prices climbed slightly in USD terms, but not by enough to offset the RMB’s relentless appreciation from the second half of last year, as indicated by falling export prices in RMB terms (Chart 3). A deteriorating terms of trade (ToT), defined as export prices relative to import costs, means that Chinese producers must export a greater number of units to purchase the same number of imports (Chart 4).  The declining ToT can be a powerful deflationary force for China’s manufacturing sector. Chart 3Chinese Export Prices Are Rising In USD Terms But Falling In Local Currency Terms Chinese Export Prices Are Rising In USD Terms But Falling In Local Currency Terms Chinese Export Prices Are Rising In USD Terms But Falling In Local Currency Terms Chart 4Terms Of Trade Have Been Falling Terms Of Trade Have Been Falling Terms Of Trade Have Been Falling Chart 5Chinese Output Prices Lead US Consumer Inflation By A Year Chinese Output Prices Lead US Consumer Inflation By A Year Chinese Output Prices Lead US Consumer Inflation By A Year While there are limited choices for China to improve its ToT, manufacturers could raise export prices in USD terms and “recycle” cost-push inflation back to the US. Chinese PPI normally leads US consumer inflation by 12 to 18 months (Chart 5). Hence, it is possible that the US will see import prices from China picking up more momentum by the middle of next year. The RMB’s performance is a key macro driver for manufacturing-related output prices. A depreciation in the RMB can be a meaningful reflationary force for manufacturers. There has been a clear negative correlation between the trade-weighted RMB and Chinese manufacturers' output prices and industrial profits, as shown in Chart 6. In this scenario, the USD will continue to appreciate against the RMB and possibly emerging market currencies, a headwind to global trade (Chart 7). Chart 6A Falling RMB Can Be Reflationary To Chinese Producers A Falling RMB Can Be Reflationary To Chinese Producers A Falling RMB Can Be Reflationary To Chinese Producers Chart 7A Stronger USD Will Be Headwinds For Global Trade A Stronger USD Will Be Headwinds For Global Trade A Stronger USD Will Be Headwinds For Global Trade Maintaining a strong RMB can partly mitigate the pain stemming from escalating commodity import prices.  However, in our view it is the least preferred option by policymakers. In previous cycles a rapidly strengthening RMB did not have a major impact on Chinese exporters' competitiveness, mainly because declines in commodities prices effectively offset a rising RMB (Chart 8 and Chart 9). Therefore, Chinese exporters did not need to boost prices in USD terms to maintain their profit margins. Chart 8RMB Appreciations Did Not Hurt Chinas Share In Global Trade RMB Appreciations Did Not Hurt Chinas Share In Global Trade RMB Appreciations Did Not Hurt Chinas Share In Global Trade Chart 9...Because Declines In Commodities Prices Were Able To Offset A Rising RMB ...Because Declines In Commodities Prices Were Able To Offset A Rising RMB ...Because Declines In Commodities Prices Were Able To Offset A Rising RMB Bottom Line: Chinese exporters can either raise prices and pass the inflation onto American customers, or the PBoC will allow further depreciation in the RMB to maintain Chinese producers’ competitiveness. Appreciating the RMB is the least preferred option. Don’t Count On A US Buying Spree  Market participants in China are pricing in large windfalls from the US$1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan and proposed US$2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan.1 A positive export tailwind in Q1 this year boosted China’s economic activity beyond what measures of domestic money and credit would have predicted, as shown in Chart 10. However, given the strongly positive relationship between the export sector and real investment in China, it is concerning that any deceleration in US demand for Chinese export goods would seriously challenge the sanguine view for China’s economy this year (Chart 11). Chart 10Export Strength Appears To Be Propping Up The LKI Export Strength Appears To Be Propping Up The LKI Export Strength Appears To Be Propping Up The LKI Chart 11China's Export Sector Is Highly Investment-Intensive From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? Moreover, US demand for Chinese export goods is subject to several countervailing forces, at least in the second half of 2021: The USD currently benefits from widening real interest differentials and stronger US growth relative to the rest of the world. For the next quarter or two, persistent strength in the USD and US Treasury yields will be headwinds to global trade and may cause a temporary setback for the global manufacturing sector (Chart 7 on Page 4). Residential and business investment in the US may not regain much vigor despite large stimulus checks. Our colleagues at BCA US Investment Strategy expect US residential investment to match the long-run trend growth, but the increase will be largely offset by below-trend growth in non-residential investment. More working-from-home options will continue to drive demand for single-family homes in the suburbs and beyond. On the other hand, demand will suffer for office space in central business districts and dwellings in urban centers. Brick-and-mortar retail construction is also going to crater. Consumption for goods in the US may also see below-trend growth in the second half of 2021 and into 2022, whereas the service sector will benefit most from the coming recovery in US business and social activities. Table 1 shows that goods spending rose in 2020 despite an overall decline in consumption, because households dramatically shifted their consumption into goods from services. As such, 2020’s pandemic-driven dividend for Chinese exporters is likely to become a drag on tradeable goods exports to the US in 2021 and/or 2022. Table 1US Consumer Spending Gap Is Almost Entirely On The Services Side From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? It is also important for investors to put the US$2.4 trillion infrastructure spending budget proposed in the American Jobs Plan into prospective. The US lags far behind China in infrastructure spending. In the past 10 years, US public infrastructure investment (federal and state combined) has declined to an average of about $450 billion.2 This compares with China’s US $1.9 trillion yearly spending on infrastructure (Chart 12). China currently consumes seven to eight times more industrial metals than the US (Chart 13). As such, even if the US infrastructure investment plan will be approved later this year, it is unlikely to be a game changer for global commodity prices or Chinese exports. Chart 12Infrastructure Spending, China Vs. The US From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? Chart 13US Consumption Of Industrial Metals Is Too Small Relative To China From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? From Deflation To Inflation … What’s Next? The proposed US$1.2 trillion spending on the US nation’s roads, bridges, green spaces, water, electricity, and universal broadband will be spread over the next eight years.  The additional $150 billion per annum to the US public infrastructure investment will only boost the US spending from 24% to about 32% of China’s annual infrastructure investment. Furthermore, the fiscal multiplier effect from the extra public spending on investment from the US private sector and overall economy may not be as positive as the market has priced in, depending on the size of corporate tax hikes in the final bill. Bottom Line: After a pandemic-driven boost in 2020, growth in US imports from China will likely moderate in the second half of 2021 and into 2022. The proposed infrastructure spending plan in the US will benefit Chinese exports, but the magnitude of the windfall may be disappointing. Investment Implications As discussed in a previous report, rising US bond yields will have a muted effect on their Chinese counterparts. Tightened regulations on the real estate industry and a new round of environmental protection laws in China will continue to suppress the domestic credit demand.  As a result, interest rate differentials between China and the US will continue to narrow. The strength in the USD has not run its course and the RMB will face slight depreciation pressures in Q2 and possibly into Q3. A declining RMB will provide reflationary benefits to China’s industrial profits, but with about a six-month time lag. In the meantime, we recommend global investors to continue underweighting Chinese stocks (Chart 14A and 14B). Chart 14AContinue Underweighting Chinese Stocks Continue Underweighting Chinese Stocks Continue Underweighting Chinese Stocks Chart 14BContinue Underweighting Chinese Stocks Continue Underweighting Chinese Stocks Continue Underweighting Chinese Stocks   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1According to the OECD, recent US stimulus will boost US GDP growth by almost 3 percentage points in the first full year (from 2021Q2 to 2022Q2). The knock-on effect from the stimulus on other economies is projected to be significant, including a half percentage point addition to China’s GDP during the same period. 2The Congressional Budget Office estimated that combined federal, state and local spending on infrastructure was (in 2019 dollars) $441 billion as of 2017. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Global Inflation: The case for maintaining a strategic overall allocation to inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) versus nominal government debt in dedicated global fixed income portfolios remains intact. Global growth expectations are accelerating as vaccinations increase, spare capacity is increasingly being absorbed across the developed world and central banks (led by the Federal Reserve) continue to show no inclination to tighten policy anytime soon. Inflation-Linked Bond Allocations: ILB valuations, however, are no longer uniformly cheap across all countries. Real yields are now moving in a less coordinated fashion as markets try to sort out the timing and pace of eventual future central bank tightening. We recommend shifting inflation-linked bond exposure from Canada to Germany, as both markets have similar valuations but the Bank of Canada is likely to turn less dovish well ahead of the ECB. Feature Chart of the WeekMarkets Remain Unconcerned About An Inflation Overshoot Markets Remain Unconcerned About An Inflation Overshoot Markets Remain Unconcerned About An Inflation Overshoot The global reflation trade over the past year has been highly rewarding to investors. Equity and credit markets worldwide have delivered outstanding returns on the back of highly stimulative monetary and fiscal policies implemented to deal with the negative economic effects of COVID-19. The global INflation trade has also paid off for investors in inflation-linked bonds (ILBs), which have outperformed nominal government debt across the developed economies dating back to last spring. The rising trend for global inflation breakevens remains intact, but is approaching some potential resistance points. A GDP-weighted average of 10-year breakeven inflation rates among the major developed economies is just shy of the 2% level that has represented a firm ceiling over the past decade (Chart of the Week). At the same time, the Bloomberg consensus forecast for headline CPI inflation for that same group of countries calls for an increase to only 1.8% by year-end before slowing to 1.7% in 2022. The latest forecasts from the IMF are similar, calling for headline inflation in the advanced economies to reach 1.6% in 2021 and 1.7% in 2022. If those modest forecasts for realized inflation come to fruition, then there is likely not much more upside in inflation breakevens, in aggregate. Country selection within the ILB universe will become more important over the next 6-12 months, as divergences in growth, realized inflation and central bank reactions will lead to a more heterogeneous path for global inflation breakevens. Underlying Inflation Backdrop Still Supports Rising Breakevens On a total return basis, ILBs enjoyed an extended run of success prior to this year. The cumulative total return of the asset class (in local currency terms) between 2012 and 2020 was a whopping 61% in the UK, 25% in Canada, 22% in the US and 21% in the euro area (aggregating the individual countries in the region with inflation-linked bonds). However, the absolute performance of ILBs has been more disperse on a country-by-country basis so far in 2021. ILBs are down year-to-date in Canada (-6.2%), the UK (-5.0%) and the US (-1.4%). On the other hand, euro area ILBs have delivered a positive total return of +0.5% so far in 2021. Real bond yields have climbed off the lows in the US, UK and, most notably, Canada where the overall index yield on the Bloomberg Barclays inflation-linked bond index is now in positive territory for the first time since before the pandemic started (Chart 2). At the same time, real bond yields have been drifting lower in the euro area. These real yield moves are related to shifting perceptions of central bank responses to the global growth upturn. For example, pricing in overnight index swap (OIS) curves have pulled forward the timing and pace of future interest rate increases in the US and Canada – i.e. real policy rates will become less negative - while there has been comparatively little change in euro zone rate expectations. While the absolute returns for ILBs have become less correlated, the relative trade between nominal and inflation-linked government bonds in all countries remains intact. 10-year breakeven inflation rates have been steadily climbing in the US and UK, while depressed Japanese breakevens have crept modestly higher (Chart 3). Even Europe, where inflation has remained subdued for years, has seen a significant shift higher in inflation breakevens. (Chart 4). The turn in breakevens has occurred alongside a major change in investor perceptions of future inflation, with surveys like the ZEW showing an overwhelming majority of financial professionals expecting higher inflation in the US, Europe and the UK. Chart 2A Fading Bull Market In Inflation-Linked Bonds A Fading Bull Market In Inflation-Linked Bonds A Fading Bull Market In Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 3A Solid Recovery In Inflation Expectations A Solid Recovery In Inflation Expectations A Solid Recovery In Inflation Expectations Chart 4European Inflation Expectations Starting To Normalize European Inflation Expectations Starting To Normalize European Inflation Expectations Starting To Normalize Inflation forecasts have shifted in response to faster global growth expectations on the back of vaccine optimism and aggressive US fiscal stimulus. Yet inflation forecasts remain modest compared to the huge growth figures expected for 2021 and 2022. In its latest World Economic Outlook published last week, the IMF upgraded its global real GDP forecast to 6.0% for 2021 and 4.4% for 2022. This represented an increase of 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively, from the last set of forecasts published back in January. While growth upgrades occurred across all major developed and emerging economies, the biggest upgrades came in the US and Canada, for both 2021 and 2022. As a result, the IMF projects the output gap in both countries to turn positive over 2022 and 2023, and be nearly closed in core Europe, Australia and Japan (Chart 5). The IMF is not projecting a major inflation surge on the back of those upbeat growth forecasts, though. While headline inflation in the US is expected to climb to 2.3% in 2021 and 2.4% in 2022, the same measure in Canada is only projected to rise to 1.7% and 2.0% over the same two years. European inflation is expected to remain subdued, reaching only 1.4% this year and drifting back to 1.2% in 2022 despite real GDP growth averaging 4.1% over the two-year period. The IMF attributes the benign inflation outcomes, even in the face of booming growth rates and the rapid elimination of output gaps, to the structural disinflationary backdrop for so-called “non-cyclical” inflation (Chart 6). The IMF defines this as the components of inflation indices that are less sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. The IMF estimates show that the contribution from non-cyclical components to overall inflation in the advanced economies had fallen to essentially zero at the end of 2020. Chart 5A Big Expected Narrowing Of Output Gaps How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart 6Non-Cyclical Components Still Weighing On Global Inflation Non-Cyclical Components Still Weighing On Global Inflation Non-Cyclical Components Still Weighing On Global Inflation There is considerable upside risk for the more cyclical components of inflation that could result in inflation overshooting the IMF projections (Chart 7). Chart 7Cyclical Backdrop Is Inflationary Cyclical Backdrop Is Inflationary Cyclical Backdrop Is Inflationary For example, in the US, the Prices Paid component of the ISM Manufacturing index remains elevated at post-2008 highs, while the year-over-year change in the Producer Price Index soared to 6% in March. Across the Atlantic, the European Commission business and consumer surveys have shown a big surge in the net balance of respondents expecting higher inflation in manufacturing and retail trade. Previous weakness in the US dollar and surging commodity prices are playing a major role in this rapid pick-up in price pressures seen in many countries. Given the current backdrop of strong global growth expectations, with actual activity accelerating as vaccinations increase and more parts of the global economy reopen, inflation pressures are unlikely to fade in the near term. With realized inflation rates set to spike due to base effect comparisons to the pandemic-fueled collapse one year ago, the upward pressure on global ILB inflation breakevens will persist in the coming months – especially with breakevens still below levels that would prompt central banks to turn less dovish sooner than expected. Bottom Line: The case for maintaining a strategic overall allocation to inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) versus nominal government debt in dedicated global fixed income portfolios remains intact. Global growth expectations are accelerating as vaccinations increase, spare capacity is increasingly being absorbed across the developed world and central banks (led by the Federal Reserve) continue to show no inclination to tighten policy anytime soon. Assessing Value In Developed Market Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 8USD Outlook Now More Mixed USD Outlook Now More Mixed USD Outlook Now More Mixed Although the current backdrop remains conducive to a continuation of the rising trend in global ILB breakevens, there are factors that could begin to slow the upward momentum. The future path of the US dollar is now a bit less certain (Chart 8). While the DXY index is still down 7.4% compared to a year ago, it is up 2.4% so far in 2021. Shorter-term real interest rate differentials between the US and the other major developed markets remain dollar-bearish. At the same time, longer-term real yield differentials have risen in favor of the US (middle panel). Furthermore, US growth is outperforming other developed economies, typically a dollar-bullish factor (bottom panel). Given the usual negative correlation between the US dollar and commodity prices, a loss of downside dollar momentum could also slow the pace of commodity price appreciation. This represents a risk to additional global ILB outperformance versus government bonds. Our GDP-weighted aggregate of 10-year ILB breakevens for the major developed economies is currently just under 2% - levels more consistent with oil prices over $80/bbl than the current price closer to $60/bbl (Chart 9). Chart 9Breakevens Consistent With Much Higher Oil Prices Breakevens Consistent With Much Higher Oil Prices Breakevens Consistent With Much Higher Oil Prices Given some of these uncertainties over the strength of any future inflationary push from a weaker US dollar and rising commodity prices, a broad overweight allocation to ILBs across the entire developed market universe may no longer generate the same strong returns versus nominal government bonds seen over the past year. With the “easy money” already having been made in the global breakeven widening trade, country allocation within the ILB universe has now become a more important dimension for bond investors to consider. To assess the relative attractiveness of individual ILB markets, we turn to a few valuation tools. Our regression-based valuation models for 10-year ILB breakevens in the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Canada and Australia are all presented in the Appendix on pages 14-17. The two inputs into the model are the annual rate of change of the Brent oil price in local currency terms (as a measure of shorter-term inflation pressure) and a five-year moving average of realized headline CPI inflation (as a longer-term trend that provides a structural “anchor” for breakevens based off actual inflation outcomes). We first presented these models in April 2020, but we have now made a change in response to some of the unprecedented developments witnessed over the past year.1 Despite the strong visual correlation between the level of oil prices and inflation breakevens in most countries, we chose to use the annual growth of oil prices, rather than the level, in our breakeven models. This is because we found it more logical to compare a rate of change concept like inflation (and breakevens) to the rate of change of oil. However, the oil input into our breakeven models could produce nonsensical results during periods of extreme oil volatility that did not generate equivalent swings in breakeven inflation rates. A good example of that occurred in 2016, when the annual rate of change of the Brent oil price briefly surged toward 100%, yet 10-year US TIPS breakevens did not rise above 2% (Chart 10). An even bigger swing in oil prices has occurred over the past year, with oil prices up over +200% compared to the collapse in prices that occurred one year ago. Putting such an extreme move into our US model would have pushed the “fair value” level of the 10-year TIPS breakeven to 4% - an implausible outcome given that the 10-year breakeven has never risen to even as high as 3% in the entire 24-year history of the TIPS market. Chart 10Pass-Through Of Extreme Oil Moves Has Limits Pass-Through Of Extreme Oil Moves Has Limits Pass-Through Of Extreme Oil Moves Has Limits To deal with this problem, we have truncated the rate of change of oil prices in all our breakeven models at levels consistent with past peaks of breakevens. Going back to the US example, we have “capped” the rate of change of the Brent oil price at +40%, as past periods when oil price momentum was greater than 40% did not translate into any additional increase in TIPS breakevens. We then re-estimated the model using this truncated oil price series to generate fair value breakeven levels. Chart 11A Mixed Impact Of USD Moves On Non-US Breakevens A Mixed Impact Of USD Moves On Non-US Breakevens A Mixed Impact Of USD Moves On Non-US Breakevens We did this for all eight of our individual country breakeven models and in all cases, truncating extreme oil moves improved the accuracy of the model. Interestingly, we did not truncate the downside momentum of oil prices, as there was no obvious “cut-off” point where periods of collapsing oil prices did not generate equivalent declines in breakevens. Oil prices remain the most critical short-term variable to determine ILB breakeven valuation. While it is intuitive to think that currency movements should also have a meaningful impact on inflation (both realized and expected), the effect is not consistent across countries. For example, euro area breakevens appear to be positively correlated to the euro, while Japanese breakevens rarely rise without yen weakness (Chart 11). One other factor to consider when evaluating the value of breakevens is the possible existence of an inflation risk premium component during periods of higher uncertainty over future inflation. Such uncertainty could result in increased demand for ILBs from investors driving up the price of ILBs (thus lowering the real yield) relative to nominal yielding bonds, leading to wider breakevens that do not necessarily reflect a true rise in expected inflation. A simple way to measure such an inflation risk premium is to compare market-based breakevens to survey-based measures of inflation forecasts taken from sources like the Philadelphia Fed's Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Bank of Canada’s Survey Of Consumer Expectations. The assumption here is that the survey-based measures represent a more accurate (or, at least, less biased) depiction of underlying inflation expectations in an economy. We present these simple measures of inflation risk premia, comparing 10-year breakevens to survey-based measures of inflation expectations, in Chart 12 and Chart 13. Breakevens had been trading well below survey-based measures of inflation expectations after the negative pandemic growth shock in 2020 in all countries shown. After the steady climb in global breakevens seen over the past year, those gaps have largely disappeared, with breakevens now trading slightly above survey based inflation expectations in the US, UK and Australia. Chart 12No Major Inflation Risk Premia In These Markets No Major Inflation Risk Premia In These Markets No Major Inflation Risk Premia In These Markets Chart 13Canadian & Australian Breakevens In Line With Inflation Surveys Canadian & Australian Breakevens In Line With Inflation Surveys Canadian & Australian Breakevens In Line With Inflation Surveys Chart 14Assessing The Value Of Breakevens Assessing The Value Of Breakevens Assessing The Value Of Breakevens In Chart 14, we show the valuation residuals from our 10-year ILB breakeven models, along with two other measures of potential breakeven valuation: a) the distance between current breakeven levels and their most recent pre-pandemic peaks; and b) the difference between breakevens and the survey-based measures of inflation expectations. The model results show that breakevens are furthest below fair value in France, Japan and Germany, and the most above fair value in the UK and Australia. The message of undervaluation from our models is confirmed in the other two metrics for France, Japan, Germany, Canada and Italy. The overvaluation message for Australia is consistent across all three valuation metrics, while the signals are mixed for US and UK breakevens. In Japan, while the combined signals of all three valuation metrics indicate that breakevens are far too low, the very robust positive correlation between Japanese breakevens and the USD/JPY exchange rate implies that a bet on wider breakevens requires a much weaker yen. In Canada, while the 10-year breakeven does appear cheap, the real yield has also climbed faster than any of the other countries over the past several months as markets have rapidly repriced a more hawkish path for the Bank of Canada. Recent comments from Bank of Canada officials have leaned a bit hawkish, hinting at a possible taper of its bond-buying program, as the central bank appears unhappy with the renewed boom in Canadian housing values. An early tightening of monetary conditions would likely cap any additional upside in Canadian inflation breakevens. In Europe, the undervaluation of breakevens is more compelling. The ECB is likely to maintain its dovish policy settings into at least 2023, even if growth recovers later this year as increased vaccinations lead to the end of lockdowns. As shown earlier, European breakevens can continue to rise even if the euro is also appreciating versus the US dollar, especially if growth is recovering and oil prices are rising. Euro area breakevens are likely to continue drifting higher over at least the rest of 2021. Currently in our model bond portfolio, we have allocations to ILBs out of nominal government bonds in the US, France, Canada and Italy, with no allocations in Germany, Japan, Australia or the UK. After assessing our valuation measures, we are comfortable with the ILB exposure in France and Italy and lack of positions in the UK and Australia. We still see the upside case for US breakevens, with the economy reopening rapidly fueled further by fiscal policy, and the Fed likely to maintain its current highly dovish forward guidance until much later in 2021. We are reluctant to add exposure to Japanese ILBs, despite attractive valuations, as we are not convinced that USD/JPY has enough upside potential to help realize that undervaluation of Japanese breakevens. Thus, as a new change to our model portfolio this week that reflects our assessment of ILB breakeven valuations and risks, we are closing out the exposure to Canadian ILBs and adding a new position in German ILBs of equivalent size (see the model bond portfolio tables on pages 18-19). Bottom Line: ILB valuations are no longer uniformly cheap across all countries. Real yields are now moving in a less coordinated fashion as markets try to sort out the timing and pace of eventual future central bank tightening. We recommend shifting inflation-linked bond exposure from Canada to Germany, as both markets have similar valuations but the Bank of Canada is likely to turn less dovish well ahead of the ECB.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart A1Our US 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A2Our UK 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A3Our France 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A4Our Italy 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A5Our Japan 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A6Our Germany 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A7Our Canada 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Chart A8Our Australia 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? Recommendations How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? How Much More Juice Is Left In The Global Inflation Breakeven Trade? The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The Swiss economy will benefit from the pickup in global growth. The recent weakness in the franc has been a welcome development for the Swiss National Bank, but technicals suggest a coiled spring rally in CHF is likely. However, as a low-beta currency, the Swiss franc will lag the upturn in other pro-cyclical currencies over the longer term. We remain long EUR/CHF as a tactical trade but maintain tight stops at 1.095. Long CHF/NZD and CHF/GBP positions look attractive at current levels. Similar to our short EUR/JPY position, this is an excellent portfolio hedge. Feature Chart I-1The Swiss Economy Is On The Mend The Swiss Economy Is On The Mend The Swiss Economy Is On The Mend The Swiss economy has recovered smartly. As of March, the manufacturing PMI was at 66.3, the highest since 2006. If past manufacturing sentiment is prologue, the Swiss economy is about to experience its biggest rebound in decades (Chart I-1). This will quell any deflationary fears about domestic conditions in Switzerland and begin to re-anchor inflation expectations upwards. This will also be a very welcome development for the SNB. The Swiss franc has been one of the worst performing currencies this year, but that might be about to change. For one, dollar sentiment has been reset with the rise in the DXY index this year. Second, the global economy is transitioning from disinflationary to a gentle tilt towards inflation. This will lift global prices, including import prices into Switzerland. Rising import prices will ease the need for the SNB to maintain emergency monetary settings. Finally, the weakness in the currency has eased financial conditions for Swiss concerns. The Reopening Trade Most economies are entering into a third wave of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Swiss economy is no exception. However, the Swiss authorities have been able to bring the number of new infections down to levels below the euro area in general and Sweden in particular. Vaccinations are progressing smoothly with almost 20% of the population inoculated as of today. This provides a coiled springboard to lift the Swiss economy into robust growth later this year. Switzerland is one of the most open economies in the G10. Exports of goods and services account for over 65% of Swiss GDP, much higher than the euro area (Chart I-2). The constituent of Swiss exports tends to be defensive (medical goods, gold, watches, jewelry) so the franc does not necessarily outperform in a global growth upswing, but definitely does better than the dollar which anchors a more closed economy. Inflation dynamics in Switzerland will be particularly beholden to improvement in the private sector. As we show in Chart I-1, employment should remain robust in the months ahead, which will support wages. Import prices in Switzerland are also about to catapult upwards, which will help lift the consumer price basket (Chart I-3). For a small, open economy like Switzerland, the exchange rate often dictates the trend in domestic inflation, and the weakness in the franc has been a beneficial cushion for good prices. The rise in global tradeable prices is also acting as a catalyst. For the first time in many years, the pendulum might be swinging towards a worry about inflation in SNB corridors. Chart I-2Switzerland Has A Huge Exposure To Trade Switzerland Has A Huge Exposure To Trade Switzerland Has A Huge Exposure To Trade Chart I-3Swiss Inflation Will Rise Swiss Inflation Will Rise Swiss Inflation Will Rise Particularly, a rise in Swiss inflation will lessen the need for the SNB to keep rates at the -0.75 level in place for over half a decade. It will also lessen to need for the SNB to fight against franc strength.  Global Developments In A CHF Context There are some additional tailwinds to a strong CHF in today’s context. Volatility has collapsed, with the VIX index well below 20. If one could predict with absolute certainty what will happen with global growth, equity prices, bond yields, or even Covid-19, then low volatility makes sense. However, in the current context of elevated valuations, high uncertainty and a precarious health landscape, it almost makes perfect sense that volatility should rise. The franc tends to do well in an environment where volatility is rising (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Swiss Franc Tracks The VIX The Swiss Franc Tracks The VIX The Swiss Franc Tracks The VIX Chart I-5Long-Term Support On CHF/NZD Has Held Long-Term Support On CHF/NZD Has Held Long-Term Support On CHF/NZD Has Held In fact, from a broad picture perspective, a rotation from US growth outperformance to other parts of the globe that are also stimulating their domestic economies could be met with higher dollar volatility. This has historically been beneficial for the Swiss franc (Chart I-6). Ergo, being long the franc could constitute a “heads, I win; tails I do not lose too much” proposition. Rising global growth and a lower dollar will help the franc, but so will a rise in volatility. Chart I-6CHF/NZD Tracks Dollar Volatility CHF/NZD Tracks Dollar Volatility CHF/NZD Tracks Dollar Volatility Our Geopolitical Strategy team has also been recommending long Swiss franc positions since February as they believe the Biden administration faces several imminent and serious foreign policy tests, namely over Russia’s military buildup on the Ukraine border, China’s military pressure tactics against Taiwan, and Middle East tensions ahead of any revived US-Iran nuclear deal. They see a 60% chance of some kind of crisis – if not war – over the Taiwan Strait and any of these other issues could also motivate safe haven demand for the rest of this year.  With regard to CHF/GBP, an upside surprise for the Scottish National Party in the May 6 parliamentary election could also hurt the pound since it would herald a second Scots independence referendum in the not-too-distant future. Trading Dynamics As A Safe Haven Chart I-7CHF And The Copper/Gold Ratio CHF AND THE COPPER/GOLD RATIO CHF AND THE COPPER/GOLD RATIO Switzerland ticks off all the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. Its large net international investment position of over 100% of GDP generates huge income inflows. Meanwhile, rising productivity over the years has led to a structural surplus in its trading balance and a rising fair value for the currency. Consequently, the franc has tended to have an upward bias over the years, supercharged during periods of risk aversion. This makes the franc a useful constituent of any currency portfolio. More specifically, the franc has tracked the gold-to-copper ratio in recent years. Copper is a good barometer for global economic health while gold is a good proxy for the demand for safety. If the overarching theme is that complacency reigns across markets, a nudge towards safety will benefit flows into the franc (Chart I-7). The current interest-rate regime could also affect the franc-dollar relationship. Global yields have risen. To the extent that we are due for some reprieve, the franc will benefit, given its “low beta” status. Meanwhile, net portfolio flows into Switzerland suffered from the Trump tax cuts that pushed US affiliates in Switzerland to repatriate investments. President Biden’s tax reform will halt and/or reverse this process. SNB Action And Market Implications The past weakness in the franc has been a welcome development for the SNB. In fact, since the start of this year, Swiss central bankers have not had to ramp up asset purchases. Both the dollar and the euro have been relatively strong (Chart I-8). In other words, global dynamics have eased monetary conditions for the Swiss authorities. The latest Article IV report from the IMF also justifies the SNB’s monetary stance. Currency intervention was cited as a viable tool should the SNB do a policy review, especially given the potential inefficacies from QE due to the small bond market in Switzerland. Herein lies the key takeaway for the franc – while it could appreciate in an environment where the dollar resumes its downtrend, it will likely lag other pro cyclical currencies over the longer term. This is because the SNB will be loath to see the franc unanchor inflation expectations. We are long EUR/CHF on this basis, but are keeping tight stops at 1.095. Three key factors suggest this trade could still work well in the coming 12-18 months. Rising interest rates benefit EUR/CHF (Chart I-9). With interest rates in Switzerland well below other countries, the Swiss franc rapidly becomes a funding currency for carry trades. Carry trades, especially towards peripheral bonds in Europe hurt the franc. Chart I-8A Weaker Franc Is Doing The Heavy Lifting For The SNB A Weaker Franc Is Doing The Heavy Lifting For The SNB A Weaker Franc Is Doing The Heavy Lifting For The SNB Chart I-9EUR/CHF Tracks German ##br## Yields EUR/CHF Tracks German Yields EUR/CHF Tracks German Yields The Swiss trade balance has suffered in the face of a global slowdown. It will also lag the European rebound (Chart I-10). In a downturn, commoditized goods prices are the first to drop and recover, while more specialized goods prices eventually gain ground later. Swiss goods are not easily substitutable which is a benefit, but prices are also slower to adjust. Our models suggest the franc is still about 5% overvalued versus the euro. Over the history of the model, this has been a modest premium, but allows the euro to outperform the Swiss franc (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Structural Appreciation In The Swiss Franc Structural Appreciation In The Swiss Franc Structural Appreciation In The Swiss Franc Chart I-11EUR/CHF Is Still Cheap EUR/CHF Is Still Cheap EUR/CHF Is Still Cheap Economically, the SNB has to walk a fine line between a predominantly deflationary backdrop in Switzerland and a rising debt-to-GDP ratio that pins it among the highest in the G10 (Chart I-12). Too little stimulus and the economy runs the risk of entering a debt-deflation spiral, as inflation expectations are revised downwards. Too much stimulus and the result will be a build-up of imbalances, leading to an eventual bust. Chart I-12Lots Of Private Debt In Switzerland Lots Of Private Debt In Switzerland Lots Of Private Debt In Switzerland Today, the SNB is in a sweet spot. Almost every other G10 country is providing the fiscal and monetary stimulus necessary to lift Switzerland from its deflationary paradigm. Investment Conclusions Chart I-13Structural Appreciation In The Franc Still Possible Structural Appreciation In The Franc Still Possible Structural Appreciation In The Franc Still Possible Our long-term fair value models suggest the Swiss franc is currently cheap versus the dollar (Chart I-13). This makes it attractive from a strategic perspective. Usually, the Swiss franc tends to be more of a dormant currency, gently appreciating towards fair value but periodically interspersed with bouts of intense volatility. Interestingly, we may be entering such a riot point. The VIX is low and countries are reintroducing lockdowns, yet overall sentiment remains unequivocally bullish. Finally, Switzerland ticks off all the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. As such, while the dollar has benefited from its reserve status, the franc remains an appropriate hedge in any currency portfolio. In a nutshell, our recommendations are as follows: USD/CHF will stay under parity. EUR/CHF can hit 1.2. NZD/CHF is a sell in the short-term. So is GBP/CHF. The Scandinavian currencies will outperform the franc on a 12-18 month horizon.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 US economic data has been spectacular this week: Starting with the jobs report, the US added 916K jobs in March versus a consensus of 660K jobs. The unemployment rate fell from 6.2% to 6% and wages increased by 4.2% year-on-year. The boost to domestic demand dented the trade balance. The deficit widened from $68.2bn to $71.1bn in February. The FOMC minutes were a non event for markets. The DXY index is giving back some of the gains it accumulated this year, rising over 1% this week. With the US 10-year yield now facing strong resistance near the 1.7% level, the case for a stronger USD is fading. As consensus forecasts coagulate towards a stronger USD, positioning has also been reset towards USD long positions auguring for some volatility in the months ahead. Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area are mending: The Sentix investor index catapulted from 5 to 13.1 in April. The Eurozone remains the unsung hero in this recovery. PPI increased to 1.5% year-on-year in February from 0% last month. The euro rose by 1.2% against the dollar this week. To be clear, there are still stale euro longs among more fundamental holders of the currency. This suggests the flushing out of weak hands has more to go. However, the balance of evidence suggests euro area data could reward long positions later this year.  Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been improving: PMI indices remain under 50, but reflect a possible coiled-spring rebound underway. Consumer confidence rebounded from 33.8 to 36.1 in March. The Eco Watchers survey was also encouraging. Sentiment rebounded from 41.3 to 49 in March. The Japanese yen rose by 1.24% against the US dollar this week, and remains the strongest G10 currency in recent trading days. Falling yields have seen Japanese investors retreat from overseas markets such as the UK, pushing up the yen. Speculative positioning is also net yen bearish, which is constructive from a contrarian standpoint. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been positive: Car registrations are picking up smartly, suggesting durable demand might be returning to the UK. Registrations rose 11.5% year-on-year in March versus -35.5% the year before. The UK construction PMI hit a high of 61.7, the highest since 2014. The pound fell by almost 2% versus the euro this week. The violent correction in EURGBP might be a harbinger of the rotation brewing for both UK and US assets versus their global counterparts. Stay tuned. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: The RBA kept rates unchanged at 0.1%. Both the services and manufacturing PMIs remained at an expansionary 55.5 level. The Aussie rose by 0.4% this week. We like the AUD, and are long AUD/NZD as a trade. However, the outperformance of the US economy is also handsomely rewarding AUD/MXN shorts. Mexico benefits a lot more from a pick-up in the US economy than Australia. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data out of New Zealand have been positive: The ANZ commodity price index ticked up by 6.1% in March. ANZ Business confidence deteriorated in March. The activity outlook fell from 16.6 to 16.4 and confidence fell from -4.1 to -8.4. The New Zealand dollar rose by 60bps against the US dollar this week. New Zealand will start taking the back seat in the coming economic rotation as other economies play catch up. The improvement in kiwi terms of trade has been a boon for the currency, and will limit downside on NZD. However, shorting the NZD at the crosses remains an attractive proposition. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Canada this week: The Bloomberg Nanos confidence index continues to suggest that Canadian GDP will surprise to the upside. The index rose from 63.7 to 64.1 last week. Demand for Canadian goods remains robust. The trade surplus came in at C$1.04bn in February. The Ivey purchasing managers’ index catapulted to 72.9 from 60 in March. The Canadian dollar was flat against the US dollar this week. While this might come as a surprise, three reasons explain this performance. First, the loonie is one of the best-performing G10 currencies this year and some specter of rotation was in play this week. Second, the correction in oil prices hurt the loonie. Finally, should US economic optimism become more widespread, other currencies could benefit. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: Sight deposits were relatively flat at CHF700bn last week. The Swiss Franc rose by 2% against the US dollar this week. This week’s piece is dedicated to the possibility that the franc has a coiled-spring rebound in the near term. Safe-haven currencies are now benefitting from the drop in yields, while the franc has underperformed other currencies this year. This is welcome news for the SNB.  We have been long EUR/CHF on this expectation, and recommend investors stick with this trade. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week: The March DNB manufacturing PMI came in at 56.1 from 57.5. Industrial production rose by 5.9% year-on-year versus expectations of a 1.5% increase. The NOK rose by 0.75% against the dollar this week. Norway has handled the Covid-19 crisis admirably and it is an added boon that oil prices, a key export and income valve for Norway, are rising smartly. This has prompted the Norges bank to rapidly bring forward rate hike expectations. This leaves little scope for the NOK to fall durably. We are long the Norwegian krone as a high-conviction bet against both the dollar and the euro. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data releases were above expectations: The Swedbank manufacturing PMI came in at 63.7 in March versus expectations of 62.5. Industrial orders came in at 8.5% year-on-year versus expectations of 5.3% in February. The Swedish krona rose by 2% this week ranking it as the best performing G10 currency. Sweden needs to do a better job at containing the Covid-19 crisis, which will unlock tremendous value in the krona. As a positive, the global manufacturing cycle continues humming and will buffeting Swedish industrial production. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Cryptocurrencies are the ‘digital gold’. Long-term investors should hold cryptocurrencies and gold in inverse proportion to their volatilities. On this basis, cryptocurrencies should take around a quarter of the $15 trillion anti-fiat asset market, taking the bitcoin price to around $120,000. Own a diversified basket of cryptocurrencies, including an eco-friendlier ‘proof of stake’ cryptocurrency such as Ethereum. As cryptocurrencies take a larger share of the anti-fiat market, gold’s massive anti-fiat premium versus silver and platinum will collapse. Structural recommendation: overweight silver and platinum versus gold. Structurally underweight gold miners, both versus other miners and versus the market. Feature Feature ChartEach Time People Thought Bitcoin Was In A Bubble, They Were Wrong Each Time People Thought Bitcoin Was In A Bubble, They Were Wrong Each Time People Thought Bitcoin Was In A Bubble, They Were Wrong This Special Report presents the long-term investment case for cryptocurrencies. It is the transcript of twenty questions and answers that made up a recent conversation with a sceptical client. 1.     I am sceptical of cryptocurrencies. Specifically, I think that bitcoin is dirty, slow, volatile, and impractical. Are you going to convince me otherwise? Yes, I’m going to tell you that those criticisms are misunderstandings, or, at least, irrelevant to the long-term investment case. 2.     Ok, let me ask the $57,000 question. Is bitcoin in a bubble? No, bitcoin is not in a bubble. Though to be clear, its price could fall sharply from its current overbought position. Bitcoin’s price has collapsed by 80 percent on three separate occasions: in 2011, 2014, and 2018. Each time, people said the bitcoin bubble had burst, and each time they were wrong. Each time, bitcoin recouped its losses within a couple of years and went on to new highs. On a long-term horizon, I expect the same to happen again (Feature Chart). Cryptocurrencies Are The ‘Digital Gold’ 3.     So, what is the long-term investment case for owning bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies? Cryptocurrencies are the ‘digital gold’. So long as we have a fiat money system, there will be demand for an ‘anti-fiat’ asset that is a hedge against a debasement of the fiat money system. For decades, the dominant anti-fiat asset has been gold. But cryptocurrencies are the new kid on the block threatening gold’s dominance. So far, cryptocurrencies account for just 10 percent of the $15 trillion anti-fiat market. As this share doubles or trebles, it arithmetically requires a doubling or trebling of cryptocurrency prices. 4.     New cryptocurrencies seem to appear every day. How can the limitless number of cryptocurrencies be compared with gold, whose supply is limited? Although the number of cryptocurrencies is unlimited, the total cryptocurrency money supply is limited by the amount of energy expended to mine them. As a useful analogy, each cryptocurrency is like a separate gold miner. While there could be an unlimited number of gold miners, there could not be an unlimited supply of gold. 5.     But a cryptocurrency has no intrinsic value, right? Right, but a fifty pound note has no intrinsic value either. It’s just a bit of paper. The value of a fifty pound note – or any fiat money for that matter – is the trust that you place in the government and the central bank to maintain its value. Likewise, the value of a bitcoin is the trust that you place in the blockchain to maintain its long-term value – so it’s really like an alternative trust system to the trust you place in the fiat monetary system. In fact, the blockchain is often called ‘the trust machine’. 6.     Yet gold does have an intrinsic value. I can always melt it down and wear it as valuable jewellery, which makes it a superior anti-fiat asset, right? No, this is a misunderstanding. Gold does have an intrinsic value, but it is a small fraction of its $1700/oz price. Gold’s intrinsic value is a small fraction of its $1700/oz price. The proof comes from comparing the precious metal price ratios with their (inverse) mining ratios. For the other precious metals – silver and platinum – the price ratio lines up broadly with the mining ratio, as it should (Chart I-2). But gold is the outlier, trading at a massive premium to its mining ratio. For example, the gold/silver price ratio at 70 compares with a mining ratio of 7.5, a near tenfold premium (Chart I-3). So, most of gold’s value comes from its status as the dominant anti-fiat asset. Chart I-2Platinum To Silver Trades Broadly In Line With Its Mining Ratio Platinum To Silver Trades Broadly In Line With Its Mining Ratio Platinum To Silver Trades Broadly In Line With Its Mining Ratio Chart I-3Gold To Silver Trades At A Massive Premium To Its Mining Ratio Gold To Silver Trades At A Massive Premium To Its Mining Ratio Gold To Silver Trades At A Massive Premium To Its Mining Ratio 7.     Hasn’t the gold/silver price ratio always been this elevated? No, through the many centuries that gold and silver had equal monetary status, the gold/silver price ratio tracked its mining ratio of around 15. Gold’s massive premium arose only when it became the dominant anti-fiat asset – first, when the gold standard collapsed in 1931 and then, when the Bretton Woods ‘pseudo gold standard’ collapsed in 1971. Proving that most of the current value of gold is its value as the dominant anti-fiat asset (Chart I-4).  Chart I-4Gold’s Massive Premium Is Due To Its Status As The Dominant Anti-Fiat Asset Why Cryptocurrencies Are Here To Stay And Bitcoin Is Worth $120,000 Why Cryptocurrencies Are Here To Stay And Bitcoin Is Worth $120,000 8.     But unlike gold, cryptocurrencies trade like extreme risk-assets, so are they suitable for a conservative investor, like me? Conservative investors like you have no qualms holding gold even though it can suffer significant drawdowns, such as a 30 percent loss in 2013 and a near 20 percent loss through the past six months (Chart I-5). Of course, cryptocurrencies can suffer even bigger drawdowns, but this can be addressed by position sizing. Specifically, holding $1 of cryptocurrency for every $3 of gold will equalise the drawdown risks from the two anti-fiat assets. Chart I-5Gold Can Suffer Significant Drawdowns Gold Can Suffer Significant Drawdowns Gold Can Suffer Significant Drawdowns Countering The Counterarguments 9.     Now we come to the elephant in the room. Even if I accept that cryptocurrencies are the ‘digital gold’, mining these cryptocurrencies consumes as much energy as a small country. Isn’t this a huge problem? No, this is another misunderstanding. There is nothing wrong with using energy, and it is up to the market – rather than governments or self-proclaimed experts – to decide how to allocate our energy consumption. Remember that we are becoming less energy-intensive in other parts of our lives, so if the market deems that a certain proportion of energy consumption is well served to secure a superior anti-fiat asset, then that’s fine. Thinking more broadly, intermediation functions like banking and legal services account for around two percent of world GDP, while energy production accounts for five percent. So, if the blockchain could carry out that intermediation more efficiently and securely, then society could justify the blockchain consuming two fifths of the world’s energy. 10.   Ok, but what about the dirty energy that cryptocurrency mining consumes, and the damage it does to the environment? Yes, dirty energy is a problem but let’s address it by banning or taxing dirty energy! And let’s have a fair comparison. Gold mining might consume less energy than cryptocurrency mining, but it devastates the environment via the 99 percent of extracted ore that is dumped as waste, landscape destruction, acid mine drainage, and mercury production. Not to mention the tremendous energy needed to transport gold. None of these dirty issues apply to cryptocurrencies. Ultimately, the blockchain is a force for good because, unlike the internal combustion engine or mining, it can be a hundred percent environmentally friendly. Moreover, compared to the usual ‘proof of work’ protocol to secure a transaction, the emerging ‘proof of stake’ protocol removes the advantage to the most powerful computers, and thereby consumes much less energy. 11.    But the fiat currency system does just fine. And gold does just fine for those who want an anti-fiat currency asset. So, isn’t bitcoin just a ‘solution in search of a problem’? Almost every innovation is a ‘solution in search of a problem!’ Before aeroplanes, weren’t we doing just fine with ships and trains? And before the internet, weren’t we doing just fine with information disseminated by governments and major media and publishing companies? Then the internet decentralised and democratised information, and transformed every aspect of our lives. In the same way, the blockchain, which decentralises and democratises trust, can also transform every aspect of our lives. The same criticisms that are being thrown at the blockchain today were being thrown at the internet in the early 1990s. The same criticisms that are being thrown at the blockchain today were being thrown at the internet in the early 1990s. That the internet was slow, impractical, used mostly by criminals for nefarious purposes, that no reputable company would use it, that nobody would put their personal data or credit card details on it, and so on. I guess this shows that most people cannot comprehend an innovation until they experience its transformative impact. 12.   Ok, I’m all for innovation, but isn’t central bank digital currency a better alternative to cryptocurrency? Absolutely not! The whole point of an anti-fiat asset is that it must be completely immune to government and central bank manipulation. 13.   I still have some worries. First, can’t governments just ban cryptocurrencies? It would be something that I would expect in North Korea, but not in a liberal democracy like the UK or the US. Apart from anything else, it would be counterproductive – because the act of banning the anti-fiat asset would be the very act that would cause a surge in its demand! The better course for governments is to demonstrate, in fair competition, that fiat money is as trustworthy as anti-fiat money. 14.   Ok, what about governments taxing cryptocurrency transactions? Again, I think that the best course of action is for governments not to penalise anti-fiat money. But even if they did impose a transaction tax, it wouldn’t diminish cryptocurrencies’ anti-fiat status. After all, most people don’t own gold to carry out day-to-day transactions with it! 15.    One last worry: could quantum computing wipe out the blockchain and cryptocurrencies? The mathematical protocols would have to become orders of magnitude more difficult, but the over-arching concept of a decentralised peer-to-peer network to validate ownership and transactions would remain.  The Investment Conclusions 16.   Ok, let’s get to the investment conclusions. First, how should I value bitcoin and the cryptocurrency asset-class? The immediate question is, what share of the $15 trillion anti-fiat market should cryptocurrencies take? Our answer is that, in order to equalise drawdown risk, investors should hold cryptocurrencies and gold in inverse proportion to their drawdown magnitudes (or volatility). As cryptocurrency drawdowns tend to be three times as large as gold drawdowns, this means holding $1 of cryptocurrency for every $3 of gold (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6Drawdowns Suffered ##br##By Bitcoin... Drawdowns Suffered By Bitcoin... Drawdowns Suffered By Bitcoin... Chart I-7...Tend To Be Three Times As Large As Drawdowns Suffered By Gold ...Tend To Be Three Times As Large As Drawdowns Suffered By Gold ...Tend To Be Three Times As Large As Drawdowns Suffered By Gold In other words, based on current volatilities, cryptocurrencies should take around a quarter of the anti-fiat market, or around double the current market share. Assuming a constant market size, and a uniform uplift to all cryptocurrencies, this would double all cryptocurrency prices, taking bitcoin to around $120,000. Cryptocurrencies should take around a quarter of the anti-fiat market, or around double the current market share. Of course, as cryptocurrencies become more established and their volatilities diminish, their share of the anti-fiat market can rise, taking their prices even higher.  17.   Will all cryptocurrencies succeed? No. Just as gold miners take market share from each other, cryptocurrencies will also take market share from one another. Hence, it is important to own a diversified basket of cryptocurrencies. At the very least, it is important to have some exposure to an eco-friendlier ‘proof of stake’ cryptocurrency such as Ethereum. Given its greener credentials, ‘proof of stake’ may take the dominant market share in the coming years.   18.   Will cryptocurrencies eventually replace fiat money? Not necessarily. As previously explained, fiat money and cryptocurrencies are just competing trust systems. So long as governments and central banks maintain our trust in fiat money, there is no reason to replace fiat money. 19.   Does this have any implications for inflation? Yes. With cryptocurrencies as a competing trust system, the only way for governments and central banks to maintain our trust in fiat money is not to debase its value. In other words, cryptocurrencies are the new vigilantes to prevent rampant inflation. 20.   What are the structural implications for gold and other precious metals? As cryptocurrencies take a larger share of the anti-fiat market, gold’s massive anti-fiat premium versus silver and platinum will collapse. Hence, a compelling long-term position is to overweight silver and platinum versus gold (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Structurally Overweight Silver And Platinum Versus Gold Structurally Overweight Silver And Platinum Versus Gold Structurally Overweight Silver And Platinum Versus Gold Long-term equity investors should underweight gold miners, both versus other miners and versus the market.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com​​​​​​​

Feature The selloff in Chinese stocks since mid-February reflects a rollover in earnings growth and multiples. Lofty valuations in Chinese equities driven by last year’s massive stimulus means that stock prices are vulnerable to any pullback in policy supports (Chart 1A and 1B). Chart 1AGrowth In Chinese Investable Earnings And Multiple Expansions Has Rolled Over Growth In Chinese Investable Earnings And Multiple Expansions Has Rolled Over Growth In Chinese Investable Earnings And Multiple Expansions Has Rolled Over Chart 1BEarnings Outlook Still Looks Promising In The Onshore Market, But May Soon Peak Earnings Outlook Still Looks Promising In The Onshore Market, But May Soon Peak Earnings Outlook Still Looks Promising In The Onshore Market, But May Soon Peak After diverging in the past seven to eight months, Chinese stocks have started to gravitate towards deteriorating monetary conditions index. The market may be beginning to price in a peak in economic as well as corporate profit growth (Chart 2). Defensive stocks in China’s onshore and offshore equity markets have also outperformed cyclicals since February, which confirms that investors expect earnings growth will slow in the coming months (Chart 3). A tighter monetary policy stance, coupled with increased regulations targeting the real estate, banking, and tech sectors have further dampened investors’ appetite for Chinese stocks. Chart 2A-Share Prices Start To Gravitate Towards Tightening Monetary Conditions A-Share Prices Start To Gravitate Towards Tightening Monetary Conditions A-Share Prices Start To Gravitate Towards Tightening Monetary Conditions Chart 3Defensives Have Prevailed Over Cyclicals In Both Onshore And Offshore Markets Defensives Have Prevailed Over Cyclicals In Both Onshore And Offshore Markets Defensives Have Prevailed Over Cyclicals In Both Onshore And Offshore Markets The official PMIs bounced back smartly in March following three consecutive months of decline. However, the strong PMI readings do not change our view that the speed of China’s economic recovery is near its zenith. PMIs in the first two months of the year are typically lower due to the Lunar New Year (LNY), and the improvement in March’s PMI did not exceed seasonal rebounds experienced in previous years. Weakening fixed-asset investments also indicate that economic activity is moderating. We remain cautious on the 6 to 12-month outlook for Chinese stocks, in both absolute and relative terms. Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     China’s NBS manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs in March beat market expectations with sharp rebounds after moderating in the previous three months. The improvement in the PMIs will likely provide authorities with confidence to stay the course on policy normalization. The methodology calculating PMI indexes reflects the net reported improvement in business activities relative to the previous month and there was a notable decline in PMIs in February, due to the LNY holiday and travel restrictions related to the spread of COVID-19.  Additionally, the average reading of China’s official composite PMI in Q1 this year was 2.2 percentage points lower than in Q4 last year and weaker than the Q1 PMI figures in most of the pre-pandemic years. Moreover, Chinese Caixin manufacturing PMI, which focuses on smaller and private corporates, declined further in March as it continued its downward trend started in December 2020. Chart 4Q1 PMIs Slowed By More Than Seasonal Factors Q1 PMIs Slowed By More Than Seasonal Factors Q1 PMIs Slowed By More Than Seasonal Factors Chart 5Caixin PMI Shows Further Deterioration Among Private-Sector Manufacturers Caixin PMI Shows Further Deterioration Among Private-Sector Manufacturers Caixin PMI Shows Further Deterioration Among Private-Sector Manufacturers Growth in credit expansions in February was better than expected, supported by a substantial increase in corporates’ demand for medium- and long-term loans. Travel restrictions during this year’s LNY led to a shorter holiday, a faster resumption in manufacturing activity after the break and stronger credit demand in February. China’s Monetary Policy Committee meeting last week reiterated the authorities’ hawkish policy tone and removed dovish language prevalent in last month’s National People’s Congress, such as “maintaining the consistency, stability, and sustainability in monetary policy” and “not making a sudden turn in policymaking.” Given the strong headline economic and credit data in January and February, the authorities will be unlikely to slow normalizing monetary policy. Therefore, the risk of a policy-tightening overshoot remains high. The PBoC has continued to drain net liquidity in the interbank system since early this year, evidenced by falling excess reserves at the central bank. Excess reserves normally lead the credit impulse by about six months, signaling that the latter will continue to decelerate in the months ahead. In turn, the credit impulse normally leads the business cycle by six to nine months, meaning that China’s cyclical economic recovery will likely peak in the first half of 2021. Chart 6Corporates Demand For Longer-Term Bank Loans Resumed Their Upward Trend Early This Year Corporates Demand For Longer-Term Bank Loans Resumed Their Upward Trend Early This Year Corporates Demand For Longer-Term Bank Loans Resumed Their Upward Trend Early This Year Chart 7Falling Excess Reserves Leads To A Deceleration In Credit And Economic Growth Falling Excess Reserves Leads To A Deceleration In Credit And Economic Growth Falling Excess Reserves Leads To A Deceleration In Credit And Economic Growth Robust industrial activities and improving profitability helped to boost profit growth in January and February. The bounce in producer prices also drove up returns in industrial output, particularly in upstream industries loaded with commodity producers. Nevertheless, weak final demand is limiting the ability of Chinese producers to pass on higher prices to domestic consumers, highlighted in the divergence between Chinese PPI and CPI. In addition, China’s domestic demand for commodities and industrial metals may reach its cyclical peak in mid-2021, following ongoing credit tightening and reduced economic activity. Commodity inventories have surged to historical highs due to soaring imports (which far exceeded consumption) during 2H20. Inventory destocking pressures will weigh on commodity prices with China’s domestic demand reaching its cyclical peak. Disinflation/deflation pressures may re-emerge in 2H21, which will pose downside risks to China’s industrial profits. Chart 8Industrials Posted A Strong Rebound In The First Two Months of 2021 Industrials Posted A Strong Rebound In The First Two Months of 2021 Industrials Posted A Strong Rebound In The First Two Months of 2021 Chart 9Surging Commodity Prices Helped To Boost Upstream Industry Profits Surging Commodity Prices Helped To Boost Upstream Industry Profits Surging Commodity Prices Helped To Boost Upstream Industry Profits Chart 10Domestic Final Demand Remains Sluggish Domestic Final Demand Remains Sluggish Domestic Final Demand Remains Sluggish Chart 11Decelerating Chinese Credit Growth Poses Downside Risks To Global Commodity Prices Decelerating Chinese Credit Growth Poses Downside Risks To Global Commodity Prices Decelerating Chinese Credit Growth Poses Downside Risks To Global Commodity Prices Chart 12Chinas Raw Material Inventory Restocking Cycle May Be Near A Cyclical Peak Chinas Raw Material Inventory Restocking Cycle May Be Near A Cyclical Peak Chinas Raw Material Inventory Restocking Cycle May Be Near A Cyclical Peak Chart 13Real Estate And Infrastructure Investment Losing Steam In 2021 Real Estate And Infrastructure Investment Losing Steam In 2021 Real Estate And Infrastructure Investment Losing Steam In 2021 Investments in infrastructure and real estate drove China’s economic recovery in the second half of 2020. However, growth momentum in both sectors has slowed because of retreating government spending in infrastructure and tightening regulations in the property sector. Both home sales and housing prices, especially in tier-one cities, rose significantly in January-February this year, deepening authorities’ concerns over bubble risks in the property market. The share of mortgages, deposits and advanced payments as a source of funds for property developers reached an all-time high in February. Following the LNY, the authorities introduced a slew of new restrictions on the housing market to curb excessive demand. These were in addition to placing limits on bank lending to both property developers and household mortgages. All of these measures will weigh on housing supply and demand, and the impact is already evident in falling land purchases and housing starts. At the same time, property developers are rushing to complete existing projects. The tighter regulations on real estate financing will likely weaken growth in real estate investment and construction activities in the second half of this year. Chart 14Housing Prices In Top-Tier Cities Have Been On A Tear … Housing Prices In Top-Tier Cities Have Been On A Tear Housing Prices In Top-Tier Cities Have Been On A Tear Chart 15… But Bank Lending To Developers And Mortgage Loans Continue Downward Trend But Bank Lending To Developers And Mortgage Loans Continue Downward Trend But Bank Lending To Developers And Mortgage Loans Continue Downward Trend Chart 16Property Developers Are Rushing To Sell And Complete Existing Projects Property Developers Are Rushing To Sell And Complete Existing Projects Property Developers Are Rushing To Sell And Complete Existing Projects Chart 17Forward-Looking Indicators Suggest A Slowdown In Housing And Construction Activities Forward-Looking Indicators Suggest A Slowdown In Housing And Construction Activities Forward-Looking Indicators Suggest A Slowdown In Housing And Construction Activities   Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The Eurozone economy and assets remain beholden to the global manufacturing cycle. This sensitivity reflects the large share of output generated by capex and exports. Yet, the second half of 2021 and first half of 2022 could see euro area growth follow the beat of its own drum. This is a consequence of the unique role of consumption in the COVID-19 recession. European growth will therefore outperform expectations, even if economic momentum slows outside of Europe. Consequently, the euro and Eurozone equities will outperform for the coming 12 to 18 months. Feature For the past 20 years, investors have used a simple rule of thumb to understand European growth and markets. Europe is a derivative of global growth because of its large manufacturing sector and torpid domestic economy. A reductionist approach would even argue that China’s economy is what matters most for Europe. Is this model still valid to analyze Europe? In general, this approach still holds up well. However, the nature of the 2020 COVID-19 recession suggests that the European economy could still accelerate in the second half of the year, despite a small slowdown in the Chinese economy and global manufacturing sector. The Origin Of The Pro-Cyclicality Narrative Investors in European markets have long understood that Eurozone equities outperform when the global manufacturing cycle accelerates. This pro-cyclicality of European stocks is a consequence of their heavy weighting toward cyclical and value stocks, such as industrials, consumer discretionary and financials. Chart 1German/US Spreads: Global Manufacturing Cycle German/US Spreads: Global Manufacturing Cycle German/US Spreads: Global Manufacturing Cycle Historically, European yields have also moved in a very pro-cyclical fashion. Over the past 30 years, periods when German 10-year yields rose relative to that of US Treasury Notes have coincided with an improvement in the global manufacturing sector as approximated by the ISM Manufacturing survey (Chart 1). Investors also understand that the euro is a pro-cyclical currency. Some of this behavior reflects the counter-cyclicality of the US dollar. However, if German yields rise more than US ones when global growth improves and European equities outperform under similar conditions, the euro naturally attracts inflows when the global manufacturing sector strengthens. Chart 2China Is A Key Determinant Of European Activity China Is A Key Determinant Of European Activity China Is A Key Determinant Of European Activity Ultimately, the responsiveness of the euro and European assets to global growth is rooted in the nature of the European economy. Trade and manufacturing account for nearly 40% and 14% of GDP, respectively, compared to 26% and 11% for the US. This economic specialization has made Europe extremely sensitive to the gyrations of the Chinese economy, the largest contributor to fluctuation in the global demand for capital goods. As Chart 2 highlights, European IP and PMI outperform the US when China’s marginal propensity to consume (as approximated by the growth in M1 relative to M2) picks up. Is The Pro-Cyclical Narrative Still Valid? Despite the euro area debt crisis and the slow health and fiscal policy response of European authorities to COVID-19, evidence suggests that the Eurozone’s pro-cyclicality is only increasing. Chart 3Europe Is Becoming More Sensitive To The Rest Of The World Europe Is Becoming More Sensitive To The Rest Of The World Europe Is Becoming More Sensitive To The Rest Of The World Europe Is Becoming More Sensitive To The Rest Of The World Europe Is Becoming More Sensitive To The Rest Of The World Europe Is Becoming More Sensitive To The Rest Of The World A simple statistical analysis confirms this hypothesis. A look at the beta of European GDP growth against the Global PMI reveals that the sensitivity of Eurozone growth and German growth to the Global PMI has steadily increased over the past 20 years (Chart 3, top panel). Moreover, the beta of euro area growth to the global PMI is now higher than that of the US, despite a considerably lower potential GDP growth, which means that a greater proportion of the Eurozone’s GDP growth is affected by globally-driven fluctuations. The bottom panel of Chart 3 shows a more volatile but similar relationship with Chinese economic activity. Correlation analysis confirms that Europe remains very sensitive to global factors. Currently, the rolling correlation of a regression of Eurozone GDP growth versus that of China stands near 0.7, which is comparable to levels that prevailed between 2005 and 2012. The correlation between German and Chinese GDP growth is now higher than at any point during the past two decades. Chart 4The Declining Role Of Consumption The Declining Role Of Consumption The Declining Role Of Consumption The increasing influence of global economic variables on the European economy reflects the evolution of the composition of the Eurozone’s GDP. Over the past 11 years, the share of consumption within GDP has decreased from 57% to 52%. For comparison’s sake, consumption accounts for 71% of US GDP. The two sectors that have taken the primacy away from consumption are capex and net exports, whose combined share has grown from 22% to 26% of GDP (Chart 4). This shift in the composition of GDP echoes the structural forces facing the Eurozone. An ageing population, a banking system focused on rebuilding its balance sheet, and the tackling of the competitiveness problems of peripheral economies have hurt wage growth, consumption and imports. Meanwhile, exports have remained on a stable trend, thanks to both the comparative vigor of the euro area’s trading partners and a cheap euro. Therefore, net exports expanded. Capex benefited from the strength in European exports. A Granger causality test reveals that consumption has little impact on fixed-capital formation in the euro area. However, the same method shows that fluctuations in export growth cause changes in investment. This makes sense. The variance in exports is an important contributor to the variability of Eurozone profits (Chart 5). Thus, rising exports incentivize the European corporate sector to expand its capital stock to fulfill foreign demand. The expanding share of output created by exports and capex along with the role of exports as a driver of capex explains why Europe economic activity is bound to remain so sensitive to the fluctuations in global trade and manufacturing activity. Moreover, the capex/exports interplay even affects consumption. As Chart 6 shows, the growth of euro area personal expenditures often bottoms after the annual rate of change of the new orders of capital goods has troughed, which reflects the role of exports as a driver of European income. Chart 5Profits And Exports Profits And Exports Profits And Exports Chart 6Consumption Doesn't Move In A Vacuum Consumption Doesn't Move In A Vacuum Consumption Doesn't Move In A Vacuum Bottom Line: European economic activity remains a high beta play on global and Chinese growth. The decrease in consumption to the benefit of exports and capex explains why this reality will not change anytime soon. 2021, An Idiosyncratic Year? In 2021, consumption will be the key input to the European economic performance, despite the long-term relationship between European GDP and foreign economic activity. This will allow European growth to narrow some of its gap with the US and the rest of the world in the second half of this year and the first half of 2022, even if the global manufacturing sector comes off its boil soon. The 2020 recession was unique. In a normal recession, capex, real estate investment, spending on durable goods and the manufacturing sector are the main contributors to the decline in GDP. This time, consumption and the service sector generated most of the contraction in output. These two sectors also caused the second dip in GDP following the tightening of lockdown measures across Europe last winter. Once the more recent wave of lockdowns is behind us, consumption will most likely slingshot to higher levels. More than the US, where the economy has been partially open for months now, Europe remains replete with significant pent-up demand. Obviously, fulfilling this demand will require further progress in the European vaccination campaign, something we recently discussed. Chart 7The Money Supply Forecasts A Rapid Recovery The Money Supply Forecasts A Rapid Recovery The Money Supply Forecasts A Rapid Recovery The surge in M1 also points to a sharp rebound in consumption once governments lift the current lockdowns (Chart 7). M1 is a much more reliable predictor of economic activity in Europe than in the US, because disintermediation is not as prevalent in the Eurozone, where banks account for 72% and 88% of corporate and household credit, respectively, compared to 32% and 29% in the US. We cannot dismiss the explosion in the money supply as only a function of the ECB’s actions. European banks are in much better shape today than they were 10 years ago. Non-performing loans have been steadily decreasing. A rise in delinquencies is likely in the coming quarters due to the pandemic; however, the EUR3 trillion in credit guarantees by governments will limit the damages to the private sector’s and banking system’s balance sheets. Moreover, the Tier-1 capital ratio of the banking system ranges between 14% for Spain and 17% for Germany, well above the 10.5% threshold set by Basel-III (Chart 8). In this context, the pick-up in money supply mirrored credit flows. Thus, even if some of that credit reflects precautionary demand, the likelihood is high that a significant proportion of the built-up cash balances will find its way into the economy. Another positive sign for consumption comes from European confidence surveys. Despite tighter lockdown measures, consumer confidence has sharply rebounded, which historically heralds stronger consumption. Moreover, according to the ECB’s loan survey, stronger consumer confidence is causing an improvement in credit demand, which foreshadows a decline in savings intentions, especially now that wage growth is stabilizing (Chart 9). Nonetheless, there is still a risk that the advance in wages peters off. The recent wage agreement reached by Germany’s IG Metall union in North Rhine Westphalia was a paltry 1.3% annual pay raise, and once the Kurzarbeit programs end, the true level of labor market slack will become evident. However, for consumption to grow, all that we need to see now is stable wage growth, even if at a low rate.  Chart 8European Banks Are Feeling Better European Banks Are Feeling Better European Banks Are Feeling Better Chart 9Confidence Points To Stronger Consumption Confidence Points To Stronger Consumption Confidence Points To Stronger Consumption Beyond consumption, Europe’s fiscal policy will be positive compared to the US next year. The NGEU plan will add roughly 1% to GDP in both 2021 and 2022. As a result, the Eurozone’s net fiscal drag should be no greater than 1% of GDP next year. This compares to a fiscal thrust of -7% in the US in 2022, even after factoring in the new “American Jobs Act” proposed by the Biden Administration last week, according to our US Political Strategy team. Bottom Line: The revival in European consumption in the second half of 2021 and the first half of 2022 will allow the gap between European and global growth to narrow. This dynamic will be reinforced next year, when the fiscal drag will be lower in Europe than in the US. These forces will create a rare occasion when European growth will improve despite a deceleration (albeit a modest one) in global manufacturing activity. Investment Conclusions The continued sensitivity of the euro area economy to the global industrial and trade cycle indicates that over the long-term, European assets will remain beholden to the gyrations of global growth. In other words, the euro and European stocks will outperform in periods of accelerating global manufacturing activity, as they have done over the past 30 years. The next 12 to 18 month may nonetheless defy this bigger picture, allowing European assets to generate alpha for global investors. Chart 10The Euro Will Like Idiosyncratic European Growth The Euro Will Like Idiosyncratic European Growth The Euro Will Like Idiosyncratic European Growth First, the gap between US and euro area growth will narrow over the coming 12 to 18 months, thus the euro will remain well bid, even if the maximum acceleration in global industrial activity lies behind. As investors re-assess their view of European economic activity and the current period of maximum relative pessimism passes, inflows into the euro area will accelerate and the euro will appreciate (Chart 10). Hence, we continue to see the recent phase of weakness in EUR/USD as transitory. Second, European equities have scope to outperform US ones over that window. Some of that anticipated outperformance reflects our positive stance on the euro. However, a consumption-driven economic bounce will be positive for European financials as well. Such a recovery will let investors ratchet down their estimates of credit losses in the financial system. Moreover, banks are well capitalized, thus the ECB will permit the resumption of dividend payments. Under these circumstances, European banks have scope to outperform US ones temporarily, especially since Eurozone banks trade at a 56% discount to their transatlantic rivals on a price-to-book basis. An outperformance of financials will be key for Europe’s performance. Chart 11German/US Spreads Near Equilibrium? German/US Spreads Near Equilibrium? German/US Spreads Near Equilibrium? Finally, we could enter a period of stability in US/German yield spreads over the coming months. The ECB remains steadfast at limiting the upside in European risk-free rates, as Christine Lagarde reiterated last week. However, BCA’s US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, believes US yields will enter a temporary plateau, as the Federal Reserve will not adjust rates until well after the US economy has reached full employment. Hence, the Fed is unlikely to let the OIS curve bring forward the date of the first hike currently priced in for August 2022 on a durable basis, which also limits the upside to US yields. Thus, looking at core CPI and policy rate differences, US yields have reached a temporary equilibrium relative to Germany (Chart 11).   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com