Debt Trends

Highlights The degree of external debt stress in EM is primarily contingent on the magnitude of both currency depreciation and economic downtrend. So long as EM currencies depreciate against the greenback, EM FX debt stress will mount, and EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads will widen. This will occur irrespective of whether U.S. Treasury yields rise or drop. Global fixed-income portfolios should underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to U.S. investment-grade corporate credit. Within EM sovereign credit, our overweights are Russia, Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Poland, Hungary and Argentina. Our underweights are Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia, Indonesia and Venezuela. Feature A Primer On EM External Debt Concerns about EM external debt have re-surfaced as EM currencies have depreciated. In this week's report we offer a qualitative analysis on the drivers of EM external debt risks, as well as present quantitative vulnerability rankings for developing countries. External or foreign currency1 debt is borrowing (loans and bonds) by governments, banks/financial institutions and companies that is denominated in foreign currency. In this vein, foreigners' holdings of local currency bonds or non-residents' deposits in local banks do not constitute external debt. Debt Becomes A Problem In Downturns Investors often ask how worrisome the situation with EM external debt currently is - specifically, who might default, and when? There are no easy answers to these questions. The reason is that the responses to these questions are often contingent on the magnitude of both EM currency depreciation and economic slowdown. Debt stress recedes in economic upswings and rises in economic downturns (Chart I-1). The reason is that debtors' cash flows shrink in downturns and grow in economic expansions. In Chart I-1 we use Germany's IFO manufacturing business expectations as a proxy for global trade; it has been a great leading indicator for global exports.2 It also correlates well with EM credit spreads. Chart 1-1Global Manufacturing Cycle And EM Sovereign Credit Spreads Global Manufacturing Cycle And EM Sovereign Credit Spreads Global Manufacturing Cycle And EM Sovereign Credit Spreads When dealing with foreign currency (FX) debt, the exchange rate becomes a critical factor in terms of affecting creditworthiness. Local currency depreciation increases (appreciation reduces) the burden of foreign debt servicing for debtors whose revenues are in domestic currency. This is why when currencies depreciate, both foreign debt burdens (the degree of indebtedness) and debt servicing stresses mount. Among EM companies issued U.S. dollar bonds, there are a few exporters. Many of them are in fact commodities producers. Although their export revenues are in U.S. dollars, their export proceeds fluctuate enormously as commodities prices swing. Typically, when the U.S. dollar rallies, commodities prices drop. Chart I-2 exhibits sector weights in the EM J.P. Morgan CEMBI Corporate Bond Index. The largest issuers are banks/financials, which along with real estate companies account for 37% of the index. Resources - oil/gas, metal mining, pulp and paper - make around 26% of the index. This confirms that only a few non-commodities exporters have issued foreign currency bonds. Chart I-2Financials And Resource Producers Make Up More Than 60% Of EM Corporate Bond Index A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt We expect revenue growth for EM debtors (both governments and companies/banks) to recede as EM economic growth slumps. Chart I-3 illustrates that manufacturing PMI for EM has declined, pointing to a further relapse in EM corporate profits and share prices. The feedback loop between EM growth and currencies works both ways. First, EM currencies are pro-cyclical - they appreciate during economic recoveries and depreciate during business-cycle downturns (Chart I-4, top panel). Chart I-3EM Manufacturing PMI Is In A Downtrend Financials And Resource Producers Make Up More Than 60% Of EM Corporate Bond Index Financials And Resource Producers Make Up More Than 60% Of EM Corporate Bond Index Chart I-4EM Currencies Are Pro-Cyclical EM Currencies Are Pro-Cyclical EM Currencies Are Pro-Cyclical Second, in the case of many vulnerable developing economies, plunging currencies push up local interest rates. This in turn reinforces growth deceleration in these economies. Notably, EM manufacturing growth has begun to downshift since early this year while their currencies have only started plunging - and interest rates rising - since early April. Hence, the latest drop in the EM manufacturing PMI cannot be attributed to the recent hikes in EM policy rates. Interest rates impact growth with a time lag longer than a few weeks. Rather, it has been cracks in global growth primarily and higher U.S. interest rates partially that have caused EM currencies to plunge in recent months (Chart I-4, bottom panel). There is also a strong positive correlation between commodities prices and EM currencies (Chart I-5, top panel). Not only do commodities producers' currencies plunge when commodities prices decline, but non-commodity dependent countries' currencies also exhibit a positive correlation with resource prices. For example, the Korean won and commodities prices often move in tandem (Chart I-5, bottom panel). The underlying factor driving various EM currencies and commodities prices is the global business cycle. This common denominator explains why all EM exchange rates - including those of non-commodity producers - are positively correlated with resource prices. On the whole, global growth downturns not only hurt EM country/company revenues, but also weigh on their currencies - making foreign currency debt more difficult to service. Altogether, this triggers a widening in EM sovereign and corporate spreads and weighs on capital flows to EM, exacerbating the cycle. Contrary to the mainstream view, neither nominal nor real EM interest rate differentials over the U.S. rates explain the trend in EM currencies, as shown in Chart I-6. Further, neither the level nor the change in interest rate differentials explains trends in EM exchange rates. On the contrary, it is the trend in EM exchange rates that drives local interest rates in high-yielding EM. This is why gauging currency movements correctly is of paramount importance to investors in various EM asset classes. Chart I-5All EM Currencies Correlate ##br##With Commodities Prices All EM Currencies Correlate With Commodities Prices All EM Currencies Correlate With Commodities Prices Chart I-6Nominal And Real Interest Rates Differential ##br##Over U.S. Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies Nominal And Real Interest Rates Differential Over U.S. Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies Nominal And Real Interest Rates Differential Over U.S. Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies On the whole, exchange rate trends are critical to the creditworthiness of debtors with large FX liabilities: currency appreciation improves and deprecation worsens their ability to service debt. Given EM currencies are pro-cyclical and their depreciation often leads to higher domestic interest rates, the ability of EM FX debtors to service their external liabilities fluctuates with both the global business cycle and their own domestic economic performance. This is why we pay a lot of attention to the global business cycle trajectory as well as that of EM and China. Bottom Line: Apart from some basket cases like Venezuela, which is careening toward debt default, the degree of external debt stress in EM is primarily contingent on the magnitude of currency depreciation. We expect EM currencies to continue to plunge, heightening debt stress and warranting a widening in EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads. What Is More Imperative: Exchange Rates Or Interest Rates? EM debtors with dollar debt are much more vulnerable to an appreciating dollar than rising U.S. interest rates. Table I-1 illustrates this point using the following hypothetical simulation: We consider a conjectural Brazilian debtor with $1,000 in debt with five years remaining to maturity, and a starting point exchange rate of 4 BRL per USD. Table I-1A Hypothetical Simulation: FX Debt Burden Is More Sensitive To Exchange Rate Than Borrowing Costs A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt In our example, a 5% depreciation in local currency against the dollar boosts the overall debt burden by 200 BRL (please refer to row 2 of Table I-1). This does not include the rise in local currency costs of interest payments. It reflects only the increased burden of principal. Chart I-7EM Credit Spreads Have Higher Correlation ##br##With EM FX Than U.S. Bonds Yields EM Credit Spreads Have Higher Correlation With EM FX Than U.S. Bonds Yields EM Credit Spreads Have Higher Correlation With EM FX Than U.S. Bonds Yields An equivalent rise in debt servicing costs in local currency will require a 100-basis-point increase in U.S. dollar borrowing costs. In brief, U.S. dollar rates should rise by 100 basis points for interest payments to increase by BRL 200 over a five-year period, the time remaining to maturity. This simulation reveals that a 5% dollar appreciation versus local currency is as painful as a 100 basis points rise in U.S. dollar rates and is more burdensome if the cost of coupon payments is accounted for. Provided there are higher odds of 5% currency depreciation in many EMs than a 100-basis-point rise in U.S. dollar borrowing costs, we infer that EM FX debtors' creditworthiness is more sensitive to exchange rates than to U.S. Treasury yields. As Chart I-7 clearly demonstrates, EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads correlate much more strongly with EM exchange rates than with U.S. bond yields. Consequently, the trend in EM exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar is much more important for EM credit spreads than fluctuations in U.S. bond yields. As to the currency composition of EM FX debt, about 82% of EM external debt is in U.S.-dollar terms. Bottom Line: So long as EM currencies depreciate against the greenback, EM FX debt stress will mount, and EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads will widen. This will occur irrespective of whether U.S. Treasury yields rise or drop. EM FX Debt: A Quantitative Snapshot In this section, we present a snapshot of EM ex-China FX debt and its composition, and discuss China's external debt separately. As of the end of 2017, EM ex-China external debt of $5.32 trillion was comprised of the following: government borrowings of $1.53 trillion; non-financial company borrowings of $1.7 trillion; financial organization/bank borrowings of $1.17 trillion; and inter-company loans of $0.77 trillion (Table I-2). Since early 2016, EM external debt has risen only marginally by $400 billion, largely due to borrowing by governments and companies (Chart I-8). Table I-2EM External Debt Snapshot A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Chart I-8Evolution Of EM External Debt Evolution Of EM External Debt Evolution Of EM External Debt Please note that all of these data are from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) joint external debt hub and dated as of December 31, 2017. There was a non-trivial issuance of foreign currency bonds by EM issuers in the first quarter of this year that is not included in these calculations. At $1.7 trillion, China's foreign currency debt is substantial. China's banks/financial institutions and non-financial companies account for $850 billion and $460 billion of the nation's total external debt, respectively (Table I-2). Yet, the mainland's foreign currency debt is small relative to both the size of its GDP (only 11%), but not small relative to exports (60%) and the nation's FX reserves (47%). Further, China's strong corporate leverage is domestic not external - companies' local currency borrowing stands at RMB 132 trillion, equivalent to $20 trillion. Often debt stress arises when short-term debt - due in the next year - is large. Table I-3 presents the distribution of short-term debt for EM ex-China and China. Table I-3EM: Short-Term (Due In 2018) FX Debt A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt For EM ex-China, the short-term FX debt due in 2018 is $491 billion for banks/financials and $396 billion for non-financial companies. For China, the same measure is $670 billion for banks/financials and $333 billion for non-financial companies (Table I-3). These are large amounts and, as such, escalating funding stress is likely, especially if EM/China growth disappoints and the dollar continues climbing. How does the current EM FX indebtedness for the private sector (banks and companies) compare with FX indebtedness before the EM crises of the late 1990s? Table I-4 reveals foreign debt as a share of GDP was not large before the 1996 EM/Asian crises, except for Thailand. However, as EM currencies plunged in 1997-'98, foreign debt burdens skyrocketed. This underscores the above discussion that debt vulnerability is not static. Rather, it is a dynamic concept, changing as the key variables fluctuate. This also confirms the importance of exchange rate trajectory in FX debt vulnerability. Table I-4EM Private Sector FX Debt: 1996 Versus Today A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Vulnerability Assessment On a macro level, foreign debt vulnerability can be measured by both foreign debt service obligations (FDSO) and foreign funding requirements (FFR). FDSOs are the sum of interest payments and amortization of all types of external debt in the next 12 months. FFRs are calculated as the current account deficit plus FDSO in the next 12 months. It measures the amount of foreign capital inflows required in the next 12 months for a country to cover any shortfall in current account transactions as well as to service its foreign currency debt (both principals and interest). Given these data from BIS are as of December 31, 2017, the next 12 month is for the entire 2018, which is technically not 12 months from today. Exports are a country's foreign currency earnings (cash flow) that can be used to service FX debt. Central banks' FX reserves are a stock of liquid foreign currency assets that can be used by the central bank to plug the gap in balance of payments, if needed. Chart I-9 and Chart I-10 rank countries in terms of their FDSO as a share of exports of goods and services, and FFR as a share of central bank FX reserves, respectively. Not surprisingly, Turkey, Argentina and Indonesia are the most vulnerable in both measures. Chart I-9FX Debt Vulnerability Ranking 1: Foreign Debt Service Obligations ##br##(FX Debt Service In Next 12 Months) A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Chart I-10FX Debt Vulnerability Ranking 2: Foreign Funding Requirements ##br##(FX Debt Service In Next 12 Months Plus Current Account Balance) A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Chart I-11 combines these two measures on a scatter plot to identify the most- and least-vulnerable countries. In addition to Turkey, Argentina and Indonesia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Peru also appear quite vulnerable. In the meantime, Thailand, Russia and Korea are the least vulnerable. Chart I-11Combining FX Debt Vulnerability Ranking 1 And 2 A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt To also identify investment opportunities, we compare the FDSO/exports ratio with corporate spreads across EM countries (Chart I-12), and the FFR/FX reserves ratio with sovereign spreads across EM countries (Chart I-13). Chart I-12EM Corporate Spreads: Fundamentals Versus Valuations A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Chart I-13EM Sovereign Spreads: Fundamentals Versus Valuations A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt With respect to corporate spreads, Chart I-12 displays that after adjusting for their respective fundamentals, corporate spreads in Brazil, Indonesia, Peru, Chile and Colombia are too tight. Turkey seems to be fairly valued at the moment, while Russia, Mexico and South Africa are cheap in relative terms. In terms of sovereign spreads, Chart I-13 reveals that sovereign credit is overpriced relative to fundamentals in Chile, Indonesia, Mexico and Colombia. Turkey has a neutral valuation, while Brazil, Russia and South Africa offer relative value. A caveat of this analysis is that it is static. If EM currencies continue to plummet, EM external debt matrices will worsen. In countries where their currencies depreciate more, debt vulnerability will rise and current pricing of sovereign and corporate credit will likely become inadequate. For example, if the South African rand depreciates considerably, in turn underperforming its EM peers - which is our view - its corporate and sovereign FX debt vulnerability will rise, and credit spreads will have to be re-priced both in absolute terms, as well as relative to the EM benchmark. More detailed numerical information on EM FX debt is presented in the Appendix on page 16. Investment Conclusions EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads will continue widening, pushing up their respective bond yields in the process. Rising EM corporate and sovereign U.S. dollar bond yields are typically bearish for EM stocks. This does not only hold for vulnerable EMs running current account deficits, but for emerging Asia as well. Although the selloff in emerging Asian equities has so far been moderate, rising high-yield corporate bond yields in Asia point to trouble for the regional bourses (Chart I-14). Chart I-14A Message From Emerging Asian High-Yield Corporate Bonds A Message From Emerging Asian High-Yield Corporate Bonds A Message From Emerging Asian High-Yield Corporate Bonds Furthermore, emerging Asian high-yield corporate bonds have begun underperforming their investment grade peers. This typically warrants lower share prices in Asia (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Emerging Asia: Beware Of Junk Outperforming ##br##Investment Grade Corporate Credit Emerging Asia: Beware Of Junk Outperforming Investment Grade Corporate Credit Emerging Asia: Beware Of Junk Outperforming Investment Grade Corporate Credit Global fixed-income portfolios should underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to DM corporate credit in general, and U.S. investment-grade corporate credit in particular. As we have discussed in the past, asset allocators should not compare EM U.S. dollar bonds (EM credit markets) to EM local currency bonds or EM equities. EM U.S. dollar bonds should be compared to U.S. corporate bonds. Within the EM sovereign credit space, our overweights are Russia, Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Poland, Hungary and Argentina. This investment strategy combines low-beta markets with some high-beta ones where either fundamentals are healthy - such as in Russia and Mexico - or where valuation is attractive - such as in Argentina. Our recommended underweights are Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia, Indonesia and Venezuela. Finally, Colombia, Chile, Peru and India warrant a neutral allocation within an EM credit portfolio. Modifications to our past allocation/positions are as follows: Close short Turkey / long Philippines sovereign credit trade. We also downgraded Philippines to neutral on April 25 consistent with our analysis elaborated in our Special Report.3 We moved Russia from overweight to neutral after the new sanctions were announced in April but we are now moving it back to overweight. Move Peruvian sovereign credit from overweight to neutral. Close long Peru / short Brazil sovereign credit and long Peru sovereign / short Peru corporate positions. Close long Argentina / short Venezuela sovereign credit but maintain long Argentina / short Brazil sovereign credit position. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 For the purposes of this report, we use external and foreign currency debt interchangeably. 2 The chart showing the correlation between German IFO manufacturing business expectations was published as Chart 1 in last week's report titled "Will Emerging Asia De-Couple Or Re-Couple?"; the link is available on page 23. 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "The Philippines: Duterte's Money Illusion," dated April 25, 2018, link available on page 23. Appendix: A Snapshot Of EM FX Debt External Debt Statistics A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Government External Debt Ranking A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Non-Financial Corporate External Debt Burden A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Financials External Debt Burden A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Outstanding External Inter-Company Loans A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Short-Term External Debt Statistics (Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Short-Term External Debt Composition A Primer On EM External Debt A Primer On EM External Debt Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Private debt raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017. Aggregate AUM has grown from $244 billion in 2007 to $664 billion in 2017. Private debt enjoys a higher yield and return, along with lower defaults, than traditional corporate bonds. This is driven by stronger covenants and collateral structures. Unlike traditional corporate debt with fixed coupons, most private debt has floating-rate coupons making it an attractive interest-rate hedge. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are low risk-low return capital-preserving strategies. Distressed and venture debt are more aggressive plays on operationally troubled firms and start-ups. Investors should allocate to private-debt funds with global exposure, to diversify away from U.S. corporate cash flow risk and increase exposure to different credit cycles. Business Development Companies (BDCs) are a liquid alternative to direct lending that provide impressive yield, but at the cost of higher volatility. Feature Introduction Private debt involves lending by institutional investors to middle-market companies in the form of investment-grade senior-secured debt, or subordinated debt. This space has experienced explosive growth: assets under management (AUM) have increased to $664 Bn in 2017 from $244 Bn in 2007. The key supply and demand factors driving this growth are: Chart 1Banking Sector Consolidation Banking Sector Consolidation Banking Sector Consolidation Bank Consolidation: For a couple of decades the U.S. banking industry has been consolidating, creating fewer but larger (Chart 1) commercial banks. These larger banks prefer to lend to larger rather than mid-market companies. Regulation: Following the financial crisis, increased regulation (for example, Dodd Frank and the Basel capital adequacy rules) forced commercial banks to reduce lending to the mid-market segment. This led to the rise of non-bank institutional lending. Search For Yield: With global bond yields depressed, institutional investors with target returns turned to alternate sources of income. This has created a new source of demand for private debt. Liquidity: The Volcker Rule, which banned proprietary trading in bond markets, reduced liquidity. ICG, a specialist asset manager, estimated that it took seven times as long for investors to liquidate bond portfolios in 2015 as it did in 2008. This made private debt's illiquidity relative to public markets less clear than previously.1 In this report, we run through the basics of private debt, and analyze past performance and fundraising cycles. In the following sections, we analyze different private-debt strategies and explain how investors can benefit from allocating to these. We close with a brief word on Business Development Companies (BDCs). Our conclusions are that: Private debt has returned an average net IRR of 13.0% from 1989-2015. This compares to an annualized total return of 7.0% and 7.2% for equities and corporate bonds respectively. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are intended to be capital preservation strategies that offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. Investors should allocate to these strategies from their alternative credit bucket. Distressed debt and venture debt are intended to be return-maximizing strategies that offer larger gains, but with a higher probability of losses. Investors should allocate to these strategies from their private equity bucket. In the late stages of an economic cycle, investors should deploy capital defensively through first-lien and other senior debt positions. In contrast, a recession would create opportunities for distressed strategies and within deeper parts of the capital structure. Unlike private equity and other private investments, private debt investors start receiving positive cash flow immediately and are charged management fees only on invested capital. This reduces the "J curve" effect. A note on the data we use in this report. All the returns and fund data are based on the private debt online platform from Preqin Ltd. Given the uncertainty around the investment horizon and cash flows of a private debt fund, it is hard to create a traditional total return index. Instead, we use the concept of internal rate of return (IRR) to understand past realized returns. (See Appendix for more detail on how the data is collected). The Private Debt Market Private debt funds raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017, surpassing the previous high of $100 billion in 2015. Total assets under management (AUM) have reached $664 Bn (Chart 2). There has been a trend towards the creation of larger funds, just as in private equity. Additionally, it took managers only 14 months to close fund-raising in 2017 versus 19 months in 2016, another testament to investors' strong appetite for this asset class. Finally, 58% of funds exceeded their target size. Below we describe key characteristics of this asset class. (In the Appendix, we explain in detail the key terms, and methodologies used to measure performance.) Chart 2Strong Investor Demand Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Chart 3Private Debt Market Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Return And Risk: Table 1 shows the past realized return for each private debt strategy and the range of outcomes that investors can expect from allocating to them. Distressed and venture debt produce a higher average IRR, but with greater dispersion in returns. Compared to traditional corporate credit, private debt enjoys a higher yield and return, along with lower default rates and credit loss.2 This is because public bonds are mostly unsecured obligations with standard indentures, whereas private debt investors have more control over terms and conditions such as covenants and collateral structures. Additionally, private debt can improve performance (Chart 3) by diversifying the sources of risk and return,3 and gives access to more esoteric exposures such as illiquidity and manager skill. Illiquidity premia are generated from both asymmetric information flow about target companies and also the low frequency of transactions. Another attractive feature is the ability to customize deals with favorable security packages and cash flow patterns to meet unique liability and payment schedules. Finally, many of the more aggressive private debt strategies provide investors with the option to convert to equity ownership, thereby further improving risk-return dynamics with an equity upside. Table 1Capital Preservation Vs. Return Maximizing Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Unlike most traditional corporate bonds with fixed coupon payments, most private debt investments have floating-rate coupons making them attractive hedges in rising-rate environments. Additionally, cash distributions to investors include both interest and principal repayments, and are mostly quarterly. Unlike traditional bullet repayment structures, periodic principal repayments reduce the average effective duration of the investment, and reduce refinancing risk. Finally, risk levels in the private debt space are highly dependent on the investment strategy; we address this issue in the next section. Diversification: Another important aspect of private debt is its ability to provide uncorrelated returns. Cross-asset class correlations have been rising since the start of easy monetary policy early this decade. The core risk exposure in a private-debt investment comes from idiosyncratic firm-specific sources, which is not the case with publicly traded corporate credit. Investors can gain exposure to different industries and customized duration horizons in the private space. Since deal origination is highly dependent on manager skills and relationships, private debt gives access to firms or projects that are not available via any index. Finally, private debt was the only group in the private space that did not experience a contraction in AUM during the financial crisis. Fund managers also had no challenges deploying capital - as seen by falling dry powder during the period. Chart 4Europe Will Be The Growth Engine Europe Will Be The Growth Engine Europe Will Be The Growth Engine Global Allocation: Investors looking to build a durable private-debt mandate will benefit tremendously from global allocation. This helps diversify away from the key risk factor of U.S. corporate cash flow, and also exposes returns to multiple credit cycles. Currently, North America is the largest and most developed private-debt market with issuance almost 4-5 times that of Europe. But looking forward, given the low level of non-bank penetration (Chart 4) in the lending market, Europe is likely to be the next growth engine. Investing in Europe versus the U.S. will have a few different characteristics: 1) lower leverage at the fund level; 2) a larger PIK4 (pay in kind) and smaller cash-pay5 component; 3) origination fees making up a greater portion of overall return. There has also been growth in the emerging markets/Asian private-debt space. Investors can expect an additional return of 4-6% relative to the U.S. and Europe for similar risk. A high level of idiosyncratic risk make these credits very attractive from a diversification perspective. For example, Australian and Korean authorities have very strict regulations on banks, thereby opening the door for alternative lenders. Moreover, the onshore and offshore markets created by capital controls in China increase the need for mezzanine and bridge financing. Deal Origination: For middle-market lending, there are three channels for sourcing deals: 1) sponsored, 2) direct (non-sponsored), and 3) capital markets. In the sponsored channel, private-debt funds can benefit by investing alongside control-focused private equity investors which also provide equity capital injections. In the non-sponsored or direct channel, private-debt funds have to maintain continuous communication and relationships with management teams, and this requires more involvement in terms of due diligence and portfolio monitoring. The capital markets channel involves participation in a third-party investment and comes with terms that have already been negotiated. Chart 5Compressing Fee Structures Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Chart 6Manager Selection Is Key Manager Selection Is Key Manager Selection Is Key Fee Structure: Fees (Chart 5) and administrative costs are important for an asset class where up to 25% of gross returns can be swallowed by costs. Compared to private equity, direct lending helps mitigate the effect of the "J-curve", as these funds typically charge management fees on invested capital, and carry over a hurdle rate. Increasing competition and rising dry powder have pushed management fees to the lowest level in 10 years. Finally, fees for direct-lending funds are much lower than other strategies because of the lack of equity components and a lower risk-return profile. Manager Selection: The heterogeneity in private debt means that picking the right general partner (GP) can have a big impact on returns (Chart 6). Like the entire private capital space, there is great dispersion between top-quartile managers and the rest. Additionally, there has also been a performance differential between first-time and returning managers. It is critical to conduct extensive due diligence. The private debt space consists of multiple strategies with different risk-return implications for a portfolio. Looking back at Table 1, these strategies can be split into the following two groups: Capital Preservation Strategies: These strategies offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. A more conservative risk-return profile means investors should allocate to these strategies from their alternative credit bucket. Direct lending and mezzanine debt fall under this group. Return Maximizing Strategies: These strategies offer larger gains but with a higher probability of deals going bust. A more aggressive risk-return profile means investors should allocate to these strategies from their private equity bucket. Distressed debt and venture debt fall under this group. Private Debt Strategies Direct Lending Chart 7Direct Lending Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Loans are made to middle-market companies without an intermediary bank or broker (Chart 7). This is done by going directly to private-equity sponsors or owner-operators of middle-market firms. Institutional lenders are more actively involved than commercial banks, offering customized financing solutions. The loans are mostly structured as term loans with 5-7 years maturity, and an emphasis on smaller loan sizes.6 These investors are sold with the intention of generating high current income with low volatility and losses. Most are senior secured loans underwritten as a multiple of EBITDA.7 Prospective investors compare direct lending to its public-market equivalent: syndicated leveraged loans. Direct lending offers a yield premium along with lower leverage levels, higher coverage ratios, and more conservative deal terms. Banking regulations such as Basel III and the new Federal Reserve loan guidelines will reduce banks' willingness to refinance the $180 Bn - $240 Bn of existing mid-market loans, which will give direct lenders a larger market to service. Additionally, with North American private equity dry powder at $530 Bn,8 there will be increased demand for direct lending to fund leveraged buyouts (LBOs). However, the direct lending space has grown 10-fold, from being an $18 Bn market in 2007 to $180 bn at the end of 2017. Investors looking to deploy capital in current market conditions may be skeptical. A recent development in the direct lending space, following the financial crisis, has been the creation of unitranche loans. This structure combines a senior and junior credit position into one blended loan and interest rate. The risk profile is a single lien that is often a senior first-lien position. Investors can benefit from advantageous pricing: the interest rate received falls between the rate of senior debt and subordinated debt. Deals originated through the private-equity sponsored channel have become very competitive. Investors should look at non-sponsored channel deals which are less crowded and make up a smaller fraction of the mid-market space. These are normally smaller and require more active due diligence, but potentially offer higher risk-adjusted returns compared to sponsored deals. Mezzanine Debt Chart 8Mezzanine Debt Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Directly originated loans that are subordinate to senior secured notes but senior to equity (Chart 8). These loans are secured by assets and are used to finance leveraged buyouts, recapitalize the balance-sheet, and for corporate acquisitions. They generally fill a funding gap due to insufficient capital from other sources. Most mezzanine loans are evaluated and structured based on the ongoing cash flow and enterprise value of the company, as opposed to asset-based lending which focuses on the liquidation value of assets. An added advantage is the ability to customize debt terms to match the cash flow profile of each company by changing the timing and amounts of current and deferred payments. This includes incurrence9 and maintenance10 covenants, unlike covenant-lite large-cap corporate issues. Given their subordinate position in the capital structure, investors can expect higher returns compared to direct lending (but at a higher risk, since these are highly leveraged situations). Coupon income is generally fixed-rate and paid in cash, and investors also enjoy call protection. Investors in this group mostly focus on total return versus income return in direct lending. This is because there exists an additional upside with the equity kicker,11 which means mezzanine holders enjoy features of both debt and equity. Additionally, not only do investors benefit from current payments in the form of cash interest and principal repayments, but also deferred payments through payment in kind (PIK) and bonus exit payments.12 The key risk with this investment is its junior position in the capital structure, putting the lender in first-loss position after the value of company drops by more than equity value. These investments tend to underperform when distressed managers outperform: environments of rising defaults, higher corporate leverage, and economic slowdown. Such events are bad for junior bondholders and reduce possible equity upside. Distressed Debt Chart 9Distressed Debt Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Investing in this group (Chart 9) can take a number of different forms depending on the manager's return and risk target and investment horizon. Investors are usually less familiar with the process and require fund managers with legal expertise to handle possible bankruptcy proceedings. In 2016, global non-performing loans reached 4%13 of total gross loans. The distressed market has changed substantially. In the early 2000s, funds could make attractive returns by effectively trading in and out of debt. Recently, fund managers have had to focus on restructuring and operational turnarounds which require private-equity like exposure. Since attractive opportunities in this space come less frequently, investors need to look for managers that are good at sourcing deals. What differentiates performance between different distressed managers is what they do with the securities after purchase. Most large returns will be generated through negotiation and restructuring, and only a smaller portion from "pull-to-par"14 investing. A key driver of returns is the accurate assessment of a borrower's enterprise value. Investors will have access to both a contractual coupon yield and also substantial capital appreciation driven by pull-to-par from a refinancing or settlement. Loan-to-own strategy. Taking an activist role with a target company will involve the possibility of converting to equity during bankruptcy proceedings. This also gives investors access to restricted information about the target and considerable leverage at the negotiating table. At the other end of the spectrum, managers target non-control15 transactions and acquire their debt at a discount to par with the hope of par refinancing driven by positive improvements at the firm. Investors should commit capital to distressed assets when fundamentals are solid and defaults are relatively low before the onset of the upturn in the economic cycle. Additionally, investors should analyze current political and economic trends to pinpoint where the next distressed opportunity will arise. Fund managers that keep ample dry powder waiting to be deployed will benefit from picking assets at beaten-down valuations. A classic example was following the 2014 oil bear market, when distressed managers with sufficient dry powder were able to source attractive deals. Additionally, investors looking to further customize risk-return dynamics can look to deploy capital to the growing distressed market in Asia. Along with years of rapid growth in China, there is a growing problem of bad corporate debt. However, investing in these new markets with different legislative mechanisms may require partnering with a local asset manager. Venture Debt CHart 10Venture Debt Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer These are loans (Chart 10) to early-stage firms backed by venture capital. Family businesses seeking capital, but not willing to surrender control and ownership, will opt for venture debt. The loan is usually secured by intellectual property, receivables, and other intangible assets such as trademarks and copyrights. Venture debt is typically raised immediately after an equity round in order to minimize borrowing costs. For every four-to-seven venture equity dollars, one dollar will be financed by venture debt. The core function of venture debt is to extend the "cash runway",16 thereby achieving the next milestone/valuation driver. There are two structures of venture debt financing: 1) receivables financing - a firm will borrow against its receivables (at a 15-20% discount) to meet cash flow needs; and 2) equipment financing - structured as a lease for the purchase of equipment. In the first case, investors can expect a higher risk-return profile compared to the second given the more unpredictable nature of cash flows. Return stream consists of cash interest, PIK income, and equity warrants. The equity kicker is generally 10-25% of the loan value which gives investors an option to participate in subsequent equity rounds. Another interesting feature is that capital distributions are reinvested and recycled, maximizing IRR over the fund's life. In short, investors can expect some private equity-like upside with a baseline return from a debt component. With private-equity upside comes similar downside. The business of venture lending is very cyclical since it involves young businesses. During tough times, additional rounds of equity injection might be required to reduce cash burn. Additionally, there exists tremendous variability across vintage years, therefore it is important for investors to pick the right time to enter this space. Special Situations Chart 11Special Situations Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer Managers in this space do not have a specific mandate and can cover a wide range of complex strategies targeting specific industry or geographic opportunities (Chart 11). Deal sourcing is harder since most opportunities are event-driven. The more popular types include rescue financing, balance-sheet restructuring, and non-performing loans (NPLs). Generally, most attractive opportunities for special situations arise at the beginning of a distressed cycle. Special-situation funds can be thought of as liquidity providers in situations of both micro and macro dislocations. In the case of the recent energy crisis in 2015, managers provided bespoke restructuring solutions for oil producers' capital structures as their debt matured. On the other hand, managers could also acquire a diversified portfolio of NPLs across sectors. Given that deal flow is highly dependent on firm specific or aggregate industry dislocations, investors need to pick managers with strong performance across multiple economic cycles and across the entire capital structure. Key risks depends on the type of mandate. For a manager with a niche focus, investors need to be wary about the strategy attracting increased attention, eventually decreasing the range of opportunities. For managers with a broad mandate, the risk lies with miscalculating a new and unfamiliar opportunity. Business Development Companies (BDCs) - A Liquid Alternative To Direct Lending Chart 12BDCs: Higher Yield, Higher Volatility BDCs: Higher Yield, Higher Volatility BDCs: Higher Yield, Higher Volatility BDCs are U.S. closed-end exchange-traded investment vehicles with an aggregate market cap of $33 billion17 specialising in private non-syndicated secured and unsecured middle-market corporate debt with daily liquidity (Chart 12). These structures were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980 to stimulate private investment in middle-market firms which had suffered during the stagflation that followed the 1973-1974 recession. These entities have legal and tax similarities with real-estate investment trusts (REITs) and master limited partnerships (MLPs): 1) annual distribution of 90% of income to shareholders, and 2) preferential tax treatment. Underlying assets are mostly directly originated middle-market loans with an increased use of covenants. They tend to have an average maturity of five years with a floating-rate coupon and origination fees which give 0.25% in additional income. Additionally, the maximum debt-to-equity leverage allowed is 1:1. Finally, investors can expect a fee structure of 1.5%/20%, with an 8% hurdle rate. One of the biggest attractiveness of BDCs is the high dividend yield relative even to other high-yielding assets such as REITs and MLPs. Additionally, BDCs have a positive yield spread versus high-yield bonds despite holding higher quality assets. This in turn leads to lower loss rates for BDCs compared to high-yield credit. However the annualized volatility of BDCs is far greater than equities, corporate and junk bonds. Conclusion Creating a well-balanced private-debt program requires deploying capital across the credit/economic cycle. Investors should strategically deploy capital to generate a meaningful yield over cash, while retaining agility to be able to move into higher risk/return assets when market sentiment recovers and opportunities arise. In a late-cycle phase, investors should deploy capital to senior debt direct lending with attractive asset coverage and strong current income. In a recessionary phase, investors should move into distressed assets and into deeper parts of the capital structure which will benefit from future expansion as the cycle improves. In an early cycle phase, investors should move into mezzanine debt and other equity-linked strategies with the potential to deliver strong performance through capital appreciation. Aditya Kurian Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com Appendix Private Debt: An Investment Primer Private Debt: An Investment Primer 1 http://www.icgam.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Rise of Private Debt as an institutional asset class Amin Rajan GENERIC.pdf 2 American Society of Actuaries. 3 From 2012 to 2017, the middle market exhibited stronger revenue and employment growth than the S&P 500. In 2017, the average revenue growth rate for middle-market companies was 8% compared to 5.3% for the S&P 500. Source: National Center for the Middle Market. 4 Under PIK, interest is paid by increasing the principal amount through capitalization of interest when it is due. 5 "Cash pay component" is the part of the quarterly payments received by private debt investors that are in the form of cash. 6 Average loan size for middle-market direct lending is $20M - $30M. 7 Direct lending funding is provided in terms of either Debt/EBITDA or Net Debt/EBITDA so that investors can better analyze a borrower's repayment capacity. 8 With dry powder of $530 Bn, and assuming a 60% debt, 40% equity capital structure, this implies over $750 Bn of future financing opportunities in sponsored buyouts. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. 9 If a borrower takes an action (dividend payment, acquisition), the resulting position would need to remain in compliance with the loan agreement. 10 The borrower needs to meet certain financial tests every reporting period in order to remain qualified for the loan. 11 Mezzanine debt providers often have the option to convert to equity at a future date, thereby participating in any upside. 12 A variable payment calculated as a percent of the change in the value of the company over the duration of the mezzanine facility. 13 Source: The World Bank. 14 Investors buying distressed debt trading at a discount in the hope of selling it at par when the company recovers and its bonds return to face value. 15 When the total position in the firm is too small to gain board or management representation. 16 When funding each round, venture capitalists look at how much cash the company is expected to burn to reach the next milestone, with each round typically designed to fund 12 to 14 months. If this expected cash burn phase extends beyond that period and the firm runs out of cash, venture debt could be used as a cash runway until the next round of venture capital funding. 17 Source: http://cefdata.com/bdc/

Dear Client, I will be visiting clients next week. Instead of our Weekly Report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by my colleagues Matt Gertken and Ray Park. The report addresses the North Korean situation and argues that a positive, if not perfect, diplomatic solution will result from U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The U.S. can withstand further rate hikes. Neither economic nor financial imbalances are especially elevated, while fiscal stimulus will offset much of the sting from tighter monetary policy. Unfortunately, America's resilience to higher rates does not extend to the rest of the world. A stronger dollar is undermining emerging markets, which are already under pressure from slower Chinese growth and the looming prospect of trade wars. The crisis in Italy will further restrain the ECB from withdrawing monetary support. Investors focused on capital preservation should remain underweight Italian bonds. More speculatively-minded investors could consider opening a long position in BTPs versus bunds, but not before the Italian 10-year yield has reached 4%. EUR/USD came within a whisker of our 1.15 target this week. We will book profits on our long DXY trade recommendation if the dollar index reaches 96. A defensive posture is appropriate for now, but risk assets should recover later this year as the global economy finds its footing. This could set the scene for a blow-off rally in stocks. Feature Gauging The Pain Threshold From Higher Rates Chart 1Market Expectations Slightly Below Fed Dots Market Expectations Slightly Below Fed Dots Market Expectations Slightly Below Fed Dots After the recent turbulence, the market is pricing in 100 basis points of Fed rate hikes between now and the end of 2020 (Chart 1). Such a pace of rate hikes would be quite slow by historic standards. In past tightening cycles, the Fed would typically raise rates by about 50 basis points per quarter. Investors expect the real fed funds rate to peak at around 1%, well below the historic average of 3%-to-5%. Underlying these expectations is the presumption that the neutral rate of interest - the rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation - is quite low, and that the Fed will not have to raise rates much above neutral to cool the economy. According to the April FOMC minutes, "a few" participants thought that the fed funds rate was already close to its equilibrium level. There are many reasons to think that R-star has fallen over time, but in practice, the margin of error around estimates of the neutral rate is huge. Thus, rather than getting bogged down over technical issues, investors would be well served by taking a more practical approach and asking what they should be on the lookout for to determine whether interest rates have moved into restrictive territory. The State Of The U.S. Housing Market Housing has historically been the most important interest rate-sensitive sector, so much so that Ed Leamer entitled his 2007 Jackson Hole symposium paper "Housing Is The Business Cycle."1 Given the recent runup in mortgage yields, it is not too surprising that the latest data on U.S. housing has been on the weak side (Chart 2). Mortgage applications for purchase have come off their highs. Housing starts, building permits, and new and existing home sales all declined in April. Homebuilder sentiment improved a tad, but this was due to an increase in the current sales component; future sales expectations were flat on the month. The share of respondents who indicated that now was a good time to buy a home in the latest University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment survey declined to 69% in May, continuing its slide from a peak of 83% in December 2014. Still, we would not fret too much about the state of the U.S. housing market (Chart 3). Construction activity has been slow to increase this cycle, which has pushed vacancies to ultra-low levels. Home prices have been rising briskly, but are still 13% below their 2006 peak once adjusted for inflation. On both a price-to-rent and price-to-income basis, home prices do not appear overly stretched. Mortgage servicing costs, expressed as a share of disposable income, are near all-time lows. The homeownership rate has also been trending higher, thanks to faster household formation and an improving labor market. Chart 2U.S. Housing: Higher Mortgage##br## Rates Are A Headwind... U.S. Housing: Higher Mortgage Rates Are A Headwind... U.S. Housing: Higher Mortgage Rates Are A Headwind... Chart 3...But Don't##br## Fret Yet ...But Don't Fret Yet ...But Don't Fret Yet Household Debt Is Not Yet At Worrying Levels Lenders also remain circumspect (Chart 4). Mortgage debt has barely grown as a share of disposable income throughout the recovery, and is still 31 percentage points below 2007 levels. The average FICO score for new mortgages stands at a healthy 761, well above pre-recession standards. The Urban Institute Housing Credit Availability Index, which measures the percentage of home purchase loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, is nowhere close to dangerous levels. This is particularly the case for private-label mortgages, whose default risk has hovered at just over 2% during the past few years, down from a peak of 22% in 2006. A dwindling share of loan originations since the financial crisis has involved adjustable rate mortgages (Chart 5). This has made the housing market more resilient to Fed rate hikes. Other parts of the household credit arena look more menacing, but not so much that they threaten to short-circuit the economy. Banks have been tightening lending standards on auto loans since Q2 of 2016 and credit card loans since the second quarter of last year. This should help moderate the increase in default rates that has been observed in those categories (Chart 6). Chart 4Mortgage Debt Is Not ##br##A Cause For Concern Mortgage Debt Is Not A Cause For Concern Mortgage Debt Is Not A Cause For Concern Chart 5Housing Market: More Resilient To ##br##Rate Hikes Than It Used To Be Housing Market: More Resilient To Rate Hikes Than It Used To Be Housing Market: More Resilient To Rate Hikes Than It Used To Be Chart 6Lenders Are More ##br##Circumspect These Days Lenders Are More Circumspect These Days Lenders Are More Circumspect These Days Student debt has continued to trend higher, but the vast majority of these loans is backstopped by the government. While the Treasury's own finances are on an unsustainable trajectory, this is more of a long-term concern than a short-term problem. If anything, fiscal stimulus over the next two years will allow the Fed to raise rates more than it could otherwise without endangering the economy. Corporate Borrowing: High But Not Extreme Like a river, market liquidity tends to flow along the path of least resistance, rather than towards those who happen to be the most thirsty. While the household sector was piling on debt during the 2001-2007 boom, the U.S. corporate sector was still recovering from the hangover produced by the capex boom in the late 1990s. A decade later, corporate balance sheets were in good shape. Spurred on by ultra-low interest rates, corporate debt levels began to rise. Today, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP is near a record high. Valuations for corporate assets have reached lofty levels. In inflation-adjusted terms, commercial real estate prices are 4% above their pre-recession peak (Chart 7). U.S. equities also trade at a historically elevated multiple to earnings, sales, and book value (Chart 8). There are bright spots, however (Chart 9). Thanks to lofty corporate profits, the ratio of corporate debt-to-EBITDA is in the middle of its post-1990 range based on national accounts data. Interest payments-to-EBIT are near historic lows. Corporate bonds now represent 60% of total corporate liabilities. Bonds tend to have much longer maturities than bank loans, which provides a buffer against default risk. Although the picture is not as benign if one performs a bottom-up analysis of publicly-listed companies, the overall message is that the U.S. corporate sector can handle higher rates. Corporate stresses will eventually rise, but it will likely take a recession for this to happen, which we don't expect until 2020. Chart 7Commercial Real Estate Prices: ##br##Above Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices: Above Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices: Above Pre-Recession Levels Chart 8U.S. Equities##br## Are Overvalued U.S. Equities Are Overvalued U.S. Equities Are Overvalued Chart 9Corporate Debt Is High,##br## But So Are Profits Corporate Debt Is High, But So Are Profits Corporate Debt Is High, But So Are Profits Cyclical Spending Still Subdued The discussion above suggests that U.S. interest rate-sensitive sectors can withstand further rate hikes. This conclusion is buttressed by the observation that the cyclical sectors of the economy - the ones that tend to weaken the most during recessions - have yet to reach levels that make them vulnerable to a sharp retrenchment. Chart 10 shows that the sum of business capital spending, residential and commercial construction, and consumer discretionary goods purchases is still well below levels that have preceded past recessions. Along the same lines, the private sector financial balance - the difference between what the private sector earns and what it spends - is currently in surplus to the tune of 2.2% of GDP. This compares to deficits of 5.4% of GDP in 2000 and 3.8% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 11). Further monetary tightening, to the extent that it prevents any brewing imbalances in the real economy and financial markets from worsening, may be just what the doctor ordered. Chart 10Cyclical Spending Still Below Levels##br## Preceding Past Recessions Cyclical Spending Still Below Levels Preceding Past Recessions Cyclical Spending Still Below Levels Preceding Past Recessions Chart 11U.S. Private Sector Financial##br## Balance Is Healthy U.S. Private Sector Financial Balance Is Healthy U.S. Private Sector Financial Balance Is Healthy The Sneeze Felt Around The World The U.S. is not an island unto itself. Even if a bit outdated, the old adage which says that when the U.S. sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold, still rings true. As such, focusing on the neutral rate only as it pertains to the U.S. is a bit too parochial. There may be a lower "shadow" neutral rate which, if breached, causes pain outside the U.S. before it causes pain in the U.S. itself. Emerging markets are particularly sensitive to changes in U.S. financial conditions. About 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. A stronger dollar and higher U.S. interest rates make it more difficult for EM borrowers to service their debts. While EM foreign-currency debt has declined as a share of total debt outstanding, this is only because the past decade has seen a boom in local debt issuance (Chart 12). As a share of GDP, exports, and international reserves, U.S. dollar debt is at levels not seen in over 15 years (Chart 13). Most emerging markets entered 2018 with strong growth momentum. Recent tracking estimates point to some deceleration in GDP growth, but nothing too alarming (Chart 14). That could begin to change. EM financial conditions have started to tighten, which is likely to weigh on activity. BCA's Emerging Market and Geopolitical Strategy teams have flagged the prospect of policy-inducing tightening in China. Trade tensions also seem to be escalating again following President Trump's decision this week to curb Chinese investment in the U.S., impose a 25% tariff on $50 billion of Chinese imports, and slap tariffs on foreign steel. All this could put an additional dent in global growth. While this publication does not expect a full-blown EM crisis, a period of EM underperformance over the next few months is likely. Chart 12EM Borrowers Like Local Credit, ##br##But Don't Dislike Foreign-Currency Debt EM Borrowers Like Local Credit, But Don't Dislike Foreign-Currency Debt EM Borrowers Like Local Credit, But Don't Dislike Foreign-Currency Debt Chart 13EM Dollar##br## Debt Is High EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Dollar Debt Is High Chart 14EM Growth Decelerating,##br## But Not Dramatically... Yet EM Growth Decelerating, But Not Dramatically... Yet EM Growth Decelerating, But Not Dramatically... Yet Italy: If You Are Gonna Do The Time, You Might As Well Do The Crime Even if emerging markets avoid another major crisis, one can always count on Europe to try to fill the void. The Italian 10-year bond yield is up over 100 basis points since the middle of April. Assuming a fiscal multiplier of one, a standard Taylor Rule equation says that Italy would need 2% of GDP in fiscal stimulus per year to offset the tightening in financial conditions brought upon by the recent increase in borrowing costs.2 That is 20% of GDP in stimulus over the next decade to pay for a fiscal package that has yet to be implemented by a government that does not yet (and may never) exist. At this point, investors are basically punishing Italy for a crime – defaulting and possibly jettisoning the euro – it has yet to commit. If you are going to get reprimanded for something you have not done, you have more incentive to do it. The market realizes this, which is why it is locked in a vicious circle where rising yields make default more likely, leading to even higher yields (Chart 15). The fact that GDP per capita in Italy is no higher now than when the country adopted the euro in 1999, and Italian public support for euro area membership is lower than elsewhere, has only added fuel to investor concerns (Chart 16). Chart 15When A Lender Of Last Resort Is Absent, Multiple Equilibria Are Possible Who Suffers When The Fed Hikes Rates? Who Suffers When The Fed Hikes Rates? Chart 16Italy: Neither Divine Nor A Comedy Italy: Neither Divine Nor A Comedy Italy: Neither Divine Nor A Comedy As we go to press, rumours are swirling that the Five Star Movement and Lega may be able to form a government after agreeing to appoint a less euroskeptic finance minister than the one the Italian President previously rejected. Regardless of whether this happens, investors are likely to remain on edge. Support for Lega has risen by seven percent since voters went to the polls in March. Populism is here to stay. All this suggests that the brewing crisis in Italy will not blow over easily. Investors focused on capital preservation should remain underweight Italian bonds. More speculatively-minded investors should consider opening a long position in BTPs versus bunds, but not before the Italian 10-year yield reaches 4%. At that point, the risk-reward trade-off from owning Italian debt would be too good to ignore. Until the Italian bond market reaches a capitulation point, the euro will remain under pressure. The Italian sovereign debt market is the biggest in Europe and the fourth largest in the world after the U.S., Japan, and China. If foreign investors continue to shun Italian debt, that will reduce capital inflows into the euro area. This means less demand for the common currency. Investment Conclusions The softening of global growth this year, along with tensions in emerging markets and Italy, have lit a fire under the dollar. Our long DXY trade is up 10.7% inclusive of carry. We continue to think that the path of least resistance for the dollar is up, but we will be looking to book gains on our trade recommendation once the dollar index reaches 96. That's roughly 2% above current levels. Slower global growth is bad news for cyclical equities. European and Japanese equities have a greater tilt towards cyclical sectors, so it is likely that their stock markets will underperform the U.S. over the next few months. This is particularly the case for Europe, where banks have come under pressure due to slower domestic growth, rising bond yields in Italy and Spain, and heightened exposure to emerging markets. For now, our MacroQuant model, which is designed to capture short-term movements in the stock market, is recommending a somewhat below-benchmark allocation to equities. Looking further out, our 12-month cyclical view on stocks remains modestly constructive, reflecting our expectation that the next major recession in developed markets is still two years away. Keep in mind that even the EM crisis in the 1990s did not plunge the U.S. into recession. On the contrary, the crisis restrained the Fed from raising rates too quickly. The resulting dose of liquidity led to a massive blow-off rally in equities, which took the S&P 500 up 68% between October 1998 and March 2000. European stocks did even better during that period, outperforming their U.S. peers by 40% in local-currency terms. We may be heading for a similar sequence of events. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Edward E. Leamer, "Housing Is The Business Cycle," Proceedings, Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, (2007). 2 The original Taylor Rule introduced by John Taylor in 1992 assigns a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap. Thus, a one hundred basis-point rise in interest rates would be necessary to offset a 2% of GDP increase in output. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The big danger of higher bond yields is to the $380 trillion edifice of global risk-assets, rather than to the global economy per se. Buy a small portfolio of 30-year government bonds, given that higher bond yields are now hurting equities and 30-year yields are close to resistance levels. The ongoing drama of Italian politics is an irritation, rather than an existential risk to the euro area, as long as Italian populists correctly focus their fire on EU fiscal rules rather than the single currency. Nevertheless, we prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX, given the latter markets' outsize exposure to banks, a sector in which we remain underweight. Feature When travellers from the U.K. find themselves in Continental Europe or the U.S. they frequently make a potentially fatal error. Trying to cross a busy street, they look right instead of left... Your author has made this error several times and lived to tell the tale, but there is an important moral to the story. However carefully you look, you won't spot the oncoming truck if you are looking in the wrong direction! Chart of the WeekEquities And Bonds Are Both Offering A Paltry 2% Equities And Bonds Are Both Offering A Paltry 2% Equities And Bonds Are Both Offering A Paltry 2% Look At the Markets, Not The Economy The global long bond yield is up around 60bps from the lows of last September, and it would be natural to ask if this poses a danger to the economy. Credit sensitive economic sectors are understandably feeling a headwind, and global growth has indisputably decelerated (Chart I-2). Yet there is no sense of an oncoming truck. Chart I-2Credit Sensitive Sectors Are Feeling A Headwind Credit Sensitive Sectors Are Feeling A Headwind Credit Sensitive Sectors Are Feeling A Headwind But are we looking in the wrong direction? While higher bond yields do not yet threaten the global economy, the big danger is to the $380 trillion edifice of global risk-assets.1 In the space of a few weeks, the correlation between bond yields and equities has suddenly and viciously reversed. When the 10-year T-bond yield was below 2.65%, the correlation was a near perfect positive, r = +0.9 (Chart I-3) but above 2.85%, it has flipped to a near perfect negative, r = -0.8 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Below A 2.65% T-Bond Yield, Equities And##br## Bond Yields Were Positively Correlated The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way Chart I-4Above A 2.85% T-Bond Yield, Equities And ##br##Bond Yields Have Been Negatively Correlated The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way In 2000, 2008 and 2011, the right direction to look was at the financial markets. Recall that it was instabilities in the financial markets - the bursting of the dot com bubble, the mispricing of U.S. subprime mortgages, and the widening of euro area sovereign credit spreads - that spilled over into economic downturns. In any case, for investment strategy, whether such financial instabilities do or do not spill over into the real economy is a secondary concern. The primary concern must always be to identify financial market vulnerabilities - and opportunities. Rich Valuations Are In A Precarious Equilibrium The single most important determinant of an investment's long term return is not the investment's cash flows per se, it is the price that you pay for the cash flows. This is the fundamental lesson of investment. An investment's cash flows might be growing strongly, but if you overpay for the cash flows - for example, in a bubble - you will end up with a negative return. Conversely, cash flows might be collapsing, but if you buy them at an overly depressed price, you will end up with a positive return. It turns out that the long term prospective return from most investments is well-defined. For government bonds, it is the yield to maturity;2 for equities and other risk-assets it is empirically well-defined by the starting valuation, which tends to be an excellent predictor of the prospective long term return (Chart I-5). Chart I-5World Equities Are Priced To Generate 2% A Year World Equities Are Priced To Generate 2% A Year World Equities Are Priced To Generate 2% A Year For the long term prospective return from bonds, the main determinant is central bank policy, and specifically the expected path for interest rates. For the long term prospective return from equities, the main determinant is the return that the market demands relative to that on offer from bonds. What establishes this relative return? The answer is relative riskiness, specifically the potential for short term losses versus short term gains, technically known as negative skew. Investors hate negative skew - the potential to experience larger short term losses than gains. Hence, investors demand relative returns that are commensurate with the investments' relative negative skews. This brings us to the crux of the matter. At low bond yields, bonds become much more risky: their returns take on negative skew. Intuitively, this is because the lower bound to interest rates forces a very unattractive asymmetry on bond returns: prices can fall a lot, but they can no longer rise a lot. At a bond yield of 2%, theoretical and empirical evidence shows that bonds and equities possess the same negative skew (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6At A 2% Bond Yield, 10-Year Bonds Have##br## The Same Negative Skew As Equities... The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way Chart I-7...So At A 2% Bond Yield, Equities ##br##Must Also Offer A 2% Return The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way The Danger Of Looking The Wrong Way Right now, the negative skews on bonds and equities are roughly the same, so investors are accepting roughly the same long term return from global equities as they can get from global bonds - a paltry 2% (Chart of the Week). This justifies an equity valuation as rich as at the peak of the dot com bubble. The trouble is that the valuation justification for $380 trillion of global risk-assets would crumble if the bond yield were to rise meaningfully. But which bond yield? As asset-classes tend to move as global rather than regional assets, the yield that matters is the global long bond yield. Given the large spread in yields across major bonds, a global yield of 2% equates to around 3% in the U.S. and 1% in Europe. This may explain why these are the yield levels at which the correlation between bond yields and equities has suddenly and viciously reversed. This brings us to the investment opportunity: 30-year government bonds. In recent years, 30-year yields have failed to sustain breaks through upper bounds: 3.2% for T-bonds; 2.0% for U.K. gilts; 1.4% for German bunds; and 0.9% for JGBs. Indeed, looking at these yields since 2015 it is hard to discern a bear market in 30-year government bonds (Charts I-8- I-11). Chart I-8Resistance At 3.2% Resistance At 3.2% Resistance At 3.2% Chart I-9Resistance At 2.0% Resistance At 2.0% Resistance At 2.0% Chart I-10Resistance At 1.4% Resistance At 1.4% Resistance At 1.4% Chart I-11Resistance At 0.9% Resistance At 0.9% Resistance At 0.9% With higher bond yields now hurting equities, and 30-year yields close to resistance levels, it is a good time to buy a small portfolio of 30-year government bonds. What Unites Italy With Japan? Italy and Japan are the only two major economies in which private indebtedness is considerably less than public indebtedness (Chart I-12 and Chart I-13). In the case of Italy, the very low private indebtedness means that its total indebtedness - as a share of GDP - is actually less than that in the U.K., France, Spain and Sweden. Chart I-12Private Indebtedness Is Less Than ##br##Public Indebtedness In Italy... Private Indebtedness Is Less Than Public Indebtedness In Italy... Private Indebtedness Is Less Than Public Indebtedness In Italy... Chart I-13...And In ##br##Japan ...And In Japan ...And In Japan The other thing that unites Italy with Japan is that their banking systems were left undercapitalised and in a 'zombie' state for years. Which, to a large extent, explains why private indebtedness has been declining in both economies. When somebody in the private sector pays down debt, say €100, and the banking system does not reallocate that €100 to a new private sector borrower, aggregate demand will contract by €100. To prevent this demand recession, the government must step in to borrow and spend the €100. Moreover, because the private sector is deleveraging, what seems to be fiscal largesse does not lead to crowding out, inflation, or surging interest rates. Instead, government borrowing and spending turns out to be a very sensible economic policy. On this basis, Japan countered its aggressive private sector deleveraging with equally aggressive public sector leveraging and thereby kept its economy motoring along. By contrast, Italy had its hands tied by the EU fiscal compact - which mistakenly looks at public indebtedness in isolation rather than in combination with private indebtedness. Hence, the Italian government was prevented from recapitalizing its banking system, and the Italian economy stagnated for a decade (Chart I-14 and Chart I-15). Chart I-14The Italian Government Was Prevented ##br##From Recapitalising The Banks... The Italian Government Was Prevented From Recapitalising The Banks... The Italian Government Was Prevented From Recapitalising The Banks... Chart I-15...And The Italian Economy ##br##Stagnated For A Decade ...And The Italian Economy Stagnated For A Decade ...And The Italian Economy Stagnated For A Decade In this sense, the populist parties in Italy - The League and 5 Star Movement - have correctly identified that Italy's problem is not the euro per se, but the EU's fiscal dogma. Both parties have dropped calls for a referendum on Italy's membership of the euro area, but have doubled down on their intentions to ignore the EU's misguided fiscal rules, such as the 3 per cent limit on budget deficits. As long as Italian populists correctly focus their fire on EU rules rather than the single currency, investors should view the ongoing drama of Italian politics as an irritation, rather than an existential risk to the euro area. Nevertheless, for the time being, we prefer France's CAC over Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX. This is less a function of politics, and more a function of the latter markets' outsize exposure to banks, a sector in which we remain underweight. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Global equities and high yield and EM debt is worth around $160 trillion and global real estate is worth $220 trillion. 2 Assuming no default risk and no reinvestment risk. Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that SEK/EUR is at a key technical turning point, and due a countertrend rally. As we already have a long SEK/GBP position open, we are not doubling up with SEK/EUR. In other trades, we are pleased to report that long USD/Chilean peso hit its 2.7% profit target, and is now closed. This leaves us with four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-16 SEK/EUR SEK/EUR The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

There is scant evidence that the character of the equity market advance is changing and the fact that weak balance sheet stocks are no longer outperforming strong balance sheet stocks is giving us pause (Chart 1). Chart 1Time To Pause And Reflect Time To Pause And Reflect Time To Pause And Reflect Using the Goldman Sachs equity baskets - that utilize the 'Altman Z-score' framework to select stocks - via Bloomberg, we find that the weak balance sheet over strong balance sheet share price ratio leads the broad market at both peaks and is coincident at troughs. The most recent peak occurred in early 2017 and it is rather surprising that a proxy for this ratio using the fixed income market, i.e. the total return high yield bond index versus the total return investment grade bond index, is moving in the opposite direction and not confirming the equity market's message (Chart 2). This begs the question: Which market signal is right, stocks or fixed income, and what are the equity sector investment implications? But before trying to answer these questions, we first zoom out and look at the broad U.S. debt picture. How Will It All End? In our travels and conference calls one common question keeps coming up: What will end all this? The short answer is that rising interest rates will eventually deal a blow to the debt overhang and the expansion will give way to a fresh deleveraging cycle. In other words, a whiff of inflation will entice the Fed to keep on raising the fed funds rate to the point where the business cycle turns down. As demand falters, a decreasing cash flow backdrop will not be able to service the debt overload, as both coupon payments and principal repayments will become a big burden. This will ignite a jump in the default rate, a message the yield curve is already sending (Chart 3). Chart 2Which Market Is Right? Which Market Is Right? Which Market Is Right? Chart 3Has The Junk Default Rate Troughed? Has The Junk Default Rate Troughed? Has The Junk Default Rate Troughed? Peering back to the onset of the GFC, a U.S. financial sector debt crisis engulfed the world. Subsequently, this morphed into a government sector debt problem in the Eurozone and more recently into a non-financial corporate sector debt overhang mostly in the commodity complex and the emerging markets. Debt Supercycle Lives On The investment world is obsessed with China's excess debt uptake and that is a valid concern. However, investors should also be aware that U.S. debt has not been fully purged. Rather, it has moved around between different domestic sectors. The debt supercycle lives on.1 The implication is that an interest rate-induced debt bubble pricking would be deflationary, and thus identifying the U.S. domestic sector most exposed to such risk is important. Chart 4 breaks down U.S. total debt into the four largest sectors using flow of funds data. While households and the financial sector have significantly de-levered, the government and the non-financial business sector have been picking up the slack and aggressively re-levering. While the Trump Administration has embarked on a two-year fiscal policy easing period that will add to the government debt profile, the nonfinancial corporate debt overhang is more vulnerable and thus troublesome in our view (fed funds rate shown inverted, Chart 5). Worrisomely, since the GFC, nonfinancial corporates have been issuing debt and partially using this debt to retire equity and pay handsome dividends. According to the flow of funds data, the cumulative nonfinancial net equity retirement figure stands near $4tn over the past decade (middle panel, Chart 6). Undoubtedly, this has been a large contributor to equity market returns (top panel, Chart 6), and will likely gain further momentum this year on the back of the tax repatriation holiday. Some sell side equity retirement estimates for the S&P 500 hover around $800bn for calendar 2018 or roughly twice the past decade's annual average. AAPL's recent announcement of a $100 billion share repurchase program confirms that the buyback bonanza is persevering and will continue to boost equities. Clearly, such breakneck equity retirement pace is unsustainable and will converge down to a lower trend rate in 2019 and beyond, especially given the drying liquidity as the Fed continues to pursue a tighter monetary policy. Chart 4Debt Is Moving Around Debt Is Moving Around Debt Is Moving Around Chart 5Tight Monetary Policy Pricks Bubbles, And... Tight Monetary Policy Pricks Bubbles, And… Tight Monetary Policy Pricks Bubbles, And… Chart 6...Threatens To End The Equity Retirement Binge …Threatens To End The Equity Retirement Binge …Threatens To End The Equity Retirement Binge Introducing BCA's Sector Insolvency Risk Monitor (IRM) The purpose of this Special Report is to identify debt soft spots and outliers in the U.S. GICS1 equity sectors. What follows is a financials statement-heavy analysis of sector indebtedness. We introduce the 'Altman Z-score' sector analysis that gauges sector credit strength, with a rising score indicating improving health and a declining Z-score signifying deteriorating health.2 In absolute terms, a score below 1.8 warns of a possible credit event, whereas any reading above 3 signals that bankruptcy risk is very low (see appendix below). Our analysis includes our flagship Bank Credit Analyst's Corporate Health Monitor framework that breaks down corporate health in the different sectors3 (see appendix below). We also sift through a number of different stock market reported ratios/data to gauge each sector's health, with net debt-to-EBITDA and interest coverage at the forefront of our analysis, and try to identify outliers (see appendix below). Finally, with the invaluable help of BCA's Chief Quantitative Strategist, David Boucher, we created our new insolvency risk monitor (IRM) per U.S. equity sector incorporating the respective 'Altman Z-scores', BCA's corporate health monitor readings and net debt-to-EBITDA ratios. In more detail, we ranked each sector (ex-financials and real estate) on a monthly basis on each of these three measures. Then we used a simple average of the ranked measures per sector to come up with the final sector ranking. We also selected the median sector ranking per measure and used the average of the three metrics as a proxy for the broad market.4 This way we were able to compare each sector IRM to the overall market. Note that the IRMs are designed so that a higher IRM ranking means better solvency. Charts 7 & 8 summarize the results and showcase this new all-inclusive relative ranking alongside relative share price performance. Chart 7Unsustainable... Unsustainable… Unsustainable… Chart 8...Divergences ...Divergences ...Divergences Sector Outliers Consumer discretionary stocks are the clearest outliers and the message from the relative IRM is to expect a significant underperformance phase in the coming quarters (top panel, Chart 7). AMZN's juggernaut is blurring the discretionary landscape given its 20% index weight, and artificially boosting relative share prices. Ex-AMZN, this early cyclical sector is behaving similar to previous episodes when the Fed embarked on a tightening interest rate cycle. We reiterate our recent downgrade to a below benchmark allocation.5 Consumer staples equities are steeply deviating from their increasing relative IRM score, underscoring that investors are unduly punishing staples stocks (second panel, Chart 8). We maintain our overweight stance and treat this sector as a small portfolio hedge to our otherwise general dislike of defensives (as a reminder we are underweight both the S&P health care and the S&P telecom services sectors). Chart 9Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand The utilities share price ratio is also deviating from the IRM relative reading (fourth panel, Chart 8). The implication is that extreme bearishness toward the sector is overdone and we reiterate our mid-February upgrade to a neutral stance.6 Energy stocks have fallen behind the energy IRM rebound reading (top panel, Chart 8). We expect a catch up phase on the back of the global capex upcycle, still improving debt profile, favorable underlying commodity supply/demand dynamics and firming oil prices. The S&P energy sector remains a high-conviction overweight. The niche materials sector is also trailing the sector's slingshot IRM recovery. Keep in mind that, as expected, the materials IRM is one of the most volatile series (second panel, Chart 8). Materials manufacturers are capital intensive and high operating leverage businesses and despite the debt dynamic betterment since the recent global manufacturing recession, this sector is still saddled with a large amount of debt that makes it extremely sensitive to the ebbs and flows of global economic growth. We continue to recommend a benchmark allocation. The remaining sectors' (tech, health care, telecom services and industrials) relative share prices are moving in tandem with their respective IRM readings (Charts 7 & 8). In addition, we have complied all the cyclical and defensive IRMs in two distinct series and the relative IRM ratio is giving the all-clear sign to continue to prefer cyclicals over defensives on a 9-12 month time horizon (Chart 9). So What? In sum, the IRM is one new additional metric we are using to gauge the validity of our sector positioning and should not be used in isolation. To answer our original question, while the weak balance sheet versus strong balance sheet stock underperformance is alarming and we will continue to closely monitor this stock price ratio, it is premature to change our constructive overall equity market view on a 9-12 month horizon. We therefore continue to recommend a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. Finally, for completion purposes, the appendix below shows a number of debt-related indicators we track, including the absolute 'Altman Z-score' and corporate health monitor readings, in two charts per sector along with the cyclicals over defensives compilation and the overall market (ex-financials). Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 For a primer on the debt super cycle please refer to Box 1 in the BCA Special Year End Issue: "Outlook 2013: Fewer Storms, More Sunny Breaks," dated December 19, 2012, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Altman Z-Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E. Where: A = working capital / total assets, B = retained earnings / total assets, C = earnings before interest and tax / total assets, D = market value of equity / total liabilities and E = sales / total assets. Source: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/altman.asp 3 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Report, "U.S. Corporate Health Gets A Failing Grade," dated January 28, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 We refrained from using the top down computed S&P 500 'Altman Z-Score' and net debt-to-EBITDA as the financials sector really skewed the results and therefore opted to use the median sector 'Altman Z-score' and net debt-to-EBITDA as a proxy for the broad market because using the mean also skewed the results largely because of the tech sector. Staying consistent in our analysis, we also used the median sector BCA corporate health monitor to proxy the broad market. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Reflective Or Restrictive?" dated March 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Manic-Depressive?" dated February 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Appendix U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market I U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market I U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market I U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market II U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market II U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market II U.S. S&P Industrials I U.S. S&P Industrials I U.S. S&P Industrials I U.S. S&P Industrials II U.S. S&P Industrials II U.S. S&P Industrials II U.S. S&P Energy I U.S. S&P Energy I U.S. S&P Energy I U.S. S&P Energy II U.S. S&P Energy II U.S. S&P Energy II U.S. S&P Consumer Staples I U.S. S&P Consumer Staples I U.S. S&P Consumer Staples I U.S. S&P Consumer Staples II U.S. S&P Consumer Staples II U.S. S&P Consumer Staples II U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Tech I U.S. S&P Utilities I U.S. S&P Utilities II U.S. S&P Utilities II U.S. S&P Utilities II U.S. S&P Utilities II U.S. S&P Utilities II U.S. S&P Materials I U.S. S&P Materials I U.S. S&P Materials I U.S. S&P Materials II U.S. S&P Materials II U.S. S&P Materials II U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary I U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary I U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary I U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary II U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary II U.S. S&P Consumer Discretionary II U.S. S&P Telecom Services I U.S. S&P Telecom Services I U.S. S&P Telecom Services I U.S. S&P Telecom Services II U.S. S&P Telecom Services II U.S. S&P Telecom Services II U.S. S&P Health Care I U.S. S&P Health Care I U.S. S&P Health Care I U.S. S&P Health Care II U.S. S&P Health Care II U.S. S&P Health Care II U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives I U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives I U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives I U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives II U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives II U.S. S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives II

Highlights Both the euro's undervaluation and the euro area's massive trade surplus constitute disequilibria, which cannot persist in the long term. Hence, the trade-weighted euro will structurally appreciate... ...and euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos. Banks are not a sector to buy and hold for the long term, but rather a sector to own for periodic cyclical rallies. We anticipate the next such cyclical opportunity will arise later this year. Feature Yanis Varoufakis, the former Finance Minister of Greece, recently highlighted EU institutions' obsession with protecting their credibility at all costs. Once set on a course, EU institutions tend to suffer a blinkered tunnel-vision. A big fan of Shakespeare, Varoufakis likened this resistance to change course - no matter the repercussions - to Lady Macbeth's declaration that "what's done cannot be undone."1 As Mario Draghi prepares to take the stage again, we recall the final line of his last performance on March 8 as an echo of Lady Macbeth. Asked to justify the ECB's obsession with the 2 per cent inflation point-target, Draghi declared that "there are serious costs about changing course on credibility". We fully understand the ECB's desire to protect its credibility. The trouble is that it is set on a course that is incredibly difficult to accomplish: a single mandate to sustain a 2 per cent inflation point-target, based on a consumer price basket that omits one of the largest items of household expenditure - housing itself. Chart of the WeekAs The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters Euro Area Inflation Is Running Higher Than The HICP Suggests Homeowners will testify that the cost of maintaining their homes constitutes one of their largest expenses. Which makes the omission of this cost from the euro area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) completely ludicrous. Using the experience of U.S. inflation which does include owner occupiers' housing costs, we estimate that a price basket that correctly included home maintenance costs would outperform the HICP by an average of 0.5 percentage points a year (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Including Owner Occupiers' Housing Costs ##br##Adds 0.5% To Inflation Including Owner Occupiers' Housing Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Including Owner Occupiers' Housing Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Recognizing this error, the U.K.'s Office For National Statistics recently changed its main inflation index from the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), acknowledging that "the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's home are an important component of household expenditure that are not included in the CPI... Therefore the CPIH is the most comprehensive measure of inflation." We expect the BoE's target for 2 per cent inflation to switch eventually to the CPIH too, albeit it remains the CPI for the time being. However, a 1 to 3 per cent 'variation band' around the CPI inflation target does give the BoE considerable breathing space. By comparison, the ECB's target for 2 per cent inflation excluding owner occupiers' housing costs and excluding a variation band gives it a significantly more difficult task than its peer central banks. The crucial point is that the ECB's ultra-loose policy is to a large extent a function of a tunnel-vision pursuit of an HICP inflation rate which significantly understates true inflation. As true inflation is higher than suggested, it means that true real interest rates are lower than suggested. And as currency markets feel true real interest rate differentials - rather than those derived from the faultily constructed HICP - it means that markets have undervalued the euro. This has resulted in an over-competitive euro area, and a massive trade surplus (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Euro Area Trade Surplus Is A Mirror-Image ##br##Of The Undervalued Euro The Euro Area Trade Surplus Is A Mirror-Image Of The Undervalued Euro The Euro Area Trade Surplus Is A Mirror-Image Of The Undervalued Euro Both the currency undervaluation and the associated trade surplus constitute disequilibria, which cannot persist in the long term. We have no strong conviction for the very near term move in the euro, but there are two longer term implications: the trade-weighted euro will structurally appreciate by about 10%; and euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos (Chart of the Week). Japanese Lessons For Europeans: The Homework A few weeks ago in Japanese Lessons For Europeans we made some counterintuitive observations about Japan's post-bubble economic experience.2 Most notably, we showed that on a real GDP per head basis, Japan has outperformed every other major economy over the past twenty years. Our finding was based on real GDP divided by working age (15-64) population because we wanted to capture real productivity gains - which rely mainly on the productive population. The counterintuitive finding elicited a couple of questions. One question was whether the result changes if we were to divide by the total population rather than the working age population. The answer is, not really. Dividing by total population, Japan would no longer be top of the leader board, but the broad result would still hold. Japan has performed impressively, and we fail to see the so-called 'lost decades' (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Japan Has Performed Impressively On ##br##Real GDP Per Working Age Population... Japan Has Performed Impressively On Real GDP Per Working Age Population... Japan Has Performed Impressively On Real GDP Per Working Age Population... Chart I-5...And Real GDP Per##br## Total Population ...And Real GDP Per Total Population ...And Real GDP Per Total Population Still, some people pointed out that Japan's public indebtedness now equals 210% of its GDP, up from 120% at the start of the century. So a second question was whether Japan's impressive performance is entirely due to its fiscal largesse. The answer is, not exactly. What matters is the change in total indebtedness - public plus private. As a share of GDP, public indebtedness is up by 90% but private indebtedness is down by 40%. So total indebtedness is up by 50% of GDP, considerably less than the increases elsewhere in the developed world. For example, over the same period, the U.K.'s total indebtedness is up by 100% of GDP. Moreover, even the level of Japan's total indebtedness as a share of GDP - at 370% - is not that different to other major economies. In Belgium, it is 340%; in France it is 305%; in Canada it is approaching 300% (Charts I-6-Chart I-17). Chart I-6Japan: Total Debt Up From 315% ##br##To 370% Of GDP Japan: Total Debt Up From 315% To 370% Of GDP Japan: Total Debt Up From 315% To 370% Of GDP Chart I-7U.S.: Total Debt Up From 185% ##br##To 250% Of GDP U.S.: Total Debt Up From 185% To 250% Of GDP U.S.: Total Debt Up From 185% To 250% Of GDP Chart I-8Canada: Total Debt Up From 225%##br## To 290% Of GDP Canada: Total Debt Up From 225% To 290% Of GDP Canada: Total Debt Up From 225% To 290% Of GDP Chart I-9Australia: Total Debt Up From 150% ##br##To 235% Of GDP Australia: Total Debt Up From 150% To 235% Of GDP Australia: Total Debt Up From 150% To 235% Of GDP Chart I-10U.K.: Total Debt Up From 180%##br## To 280% Of GDP U.K.: Total Debt Up From 180% To 280% Of GDP U.K.: Total Debt Up From 180% To 280% Of GDP Chart I-11Switzerland: Total Debt Up From 245%##br## To 270% Of GDP Switzerland: Total Debt Up From 245% To 270% Of GDP Switzerland: Total Debt Up From 245% To 270% Of GDP Chart I-12Germany: Total Debt Down From 185%##br## To 180% Of GDP Germany: Total Debt DOWN From 185% To 180% Of GDP Germany: Total Debt DOWN From 185% To 180% Of GDP Chart I-13France: Total Debt Up From 190%##br## To 305% Of GDP France: Total Debt Up From 190% To 305% Of GDP France: Total Debt Up From 190% To 305% Of GDP Chart I-14Italy: Total Debt Up From 195%##br## To 265% Of GDP Italy: Total Debt Up From 195% To 265% Of GDP Italy: Total Debt Up From 195% To 265% Of GDP Chart I-15Spain: Total Debt Up From 165% ##br##To 270% Of GDP Spain: Total Debt Up From 165% To 270% Of GDP Spain: Total Debt Up From 165% To 270% Of GDP Chart I-16Belgium: Total Debt Up From 260% ##br## To 340% Of GDP The ECB's Shakespearean Act Continues... The ECB's Shakespearean Act Continues... Chart I-17Sweden: Total Debt Up From 210% ##br##To 275% Of GDP Sweden: Total Debt Up From 210% To 275% Of GDP Sweden: Total Debt Up From 210% To 275% Of GDP Public Sector Leveraging Must Counterbalance Private Sector Deleveraging People who take on debt tend to be young, while those who pay down debt tend to be older. As population pyramids in developed economies shift to older cohorts, there are fewer people who wish to take on debt and more people who wish to pay it down. Specifically, the 50-70 age cohort tends to use pre-retirement income and retirement lump-sum payments to extinguish any outstanding mortgage debts. Consider an older person with an income of €1000 who wishes to pay down €100 of debt. It follows that the person will spend €900. Ordinarily, the banking sector will then reallocate the paid-down €100 to, say, a younger person who wants to borrow it. When the borrower spends the €100, aggregate expenditure totals €1000, which equals the original income. And all is well and good. However, in a world where there is an excess of people who wish to pay down debt versus those that wish to borrow, it might not be possible to reallocate the paid-down €100 to a new borrower in the private sector, even with interest rates at ultra-low levels. In this case, the only way to prevent a contraction in expenditure - a recession - is if the government steps in to borrow and spend the aforementioned €100 to keep the economy's expenditures at €1000. Moreover, because the private sector is paying down debt, what seems to be fiscal largesse does not lead to crowding out, inflation, or surging interest rates. The above illustration describes the structural situation in many developed economies at the moment. And it explains why we should not look at the evolution of indebtedness in the public sector and the private sector separately, but rather in combination. This is another important Japanese lesson for Europeans. A final observation is that if the private sector is deleveraging, private indebtedness as a share of GDP tends to drift lower. This necessarily means that banks total assets' are growing slower than overall sales in the economy. As banks' asset growth is their main driver of long-term profit growth, it also means that banks struggle to outperform the market on a sustained basis. This has been the experience in Japan since 1990 and in the euro area since 2008 (Chart I-18). Chart I-18When The Private Sector Pays Down Debt, Banks Structurally Underperform When The Private Sector Pays Down Debt, Banks Structurally Underperform When The Private Sector Pays Down Debt, Banks Structurally Underperform With private indebtedness declining as a share of GDP in many major economies, we conclude that banks are not a sector to buy and hold for the long term, but rather a sector to own for periodic cyclical rallies. We anticipate the next such cyclical opportunity will arise later this year. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 From Yanis Varoufakis's 2018 Rose Shakespeare Lecture. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Japanese Lessons For Europeans" April 5, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* It was a mixed week for our trades. Long USD/ZAR is approaching the end of its 3 month maximum holding period comfortably in profit. Against this, the recent intense volatility in the metals market closed the pair-trade long lead/short nickel at its stop-loss. We are not initiating any new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-19 USD/ZAR USD/ZAR The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Slower nominal GDP growth explains virtually all of the increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio over the past ten years. The authorities were unwilling to restrain debt growth as it became obvious that nominal income was decelerating because this would have only exacerbated the economic downturn. Excess private-sector savings forced the Chinese government to rely on debt-financed investment by state-owned companies (SOE) and local governments in order to keep aggregate demand elevated. Financial deregulation also encouraged debt accumulation. Debt growth linked to speculative activity can be curbed without endangering the economy, but a lasting solution to the surplus savings problem will require consumers to spend more. This will take a while. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of SOE and local government debt onto its own balance sheet. The risk to investors is that this "debt nationalization" happens reactively rather than proactively. Feature If there are too many pro-cyclical factors in the economy, cyclical fluctuations are magnified and there is excessive optimism during the period, accumulating contradictions that could lead to the so-called Minsky Moment. - Zhou Xiaochuan, Former Governor of the People's Bank of China, October 19, 2017 The Calm Before The Storm? Stability begets instability. That is the nature of business cycles, Hyman Minsky famously argued. Rising confidence leads to excessive risk-taking, higher asset prices, and mounting economic imbalances. Eventually the mood sours. Like Wile E. Coyote running off a cliff, investors look down and see that there is nothing but thin air between them and the ground below. Panic ensues. Is China on the verge of its own Minsky Moment? A glance at the evolution of its debt-to-GDP ratio would certainly say so. But before running towards the exit door, consider the following: People have been fretting about spiraling Japanese government debt levels for over twenty years now. And yet, interest rates remain at rock-bottom levels in Japan. China's Savings Glut In many respects, China finds itself facing similar problems to those that have haunted Japan. The simultaneous bust in equity and real estate prices in 1990 sent Japan's private sector into a prolonged deleveraging cycle (Chart 1). In order to prop up demand, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government had to absorb the excess savings of the private sector with its own dissavings. The abundance of domestic private-sector savings forestalled a financial crisis, but it also led to today's gross government debt-to-GDP ratio of 240%. Like Japan, China suffers from a dearth of spending, or equivalently, an abundance of savings. The IMF estimates that Chinese gross national savings reached 46% of GDP in 2017. While this is down from a peak of 52% of GDP in 2008, it is still abnormally high for any major economy, even by emerging market standards (Chart 2). Chart 1 Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 2China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards By definition, whatever a country saves must either be invested domestically or channeled abroad via a current account surplus. China's savings rate has edged lower over the past ten years, but its current account surplus has dropped even more, falling from nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to 1.4% of GDP at present. As a result, investment as a share of GDP has actually risen to 44%, a three-point increase since 2007 (Chart 3). The decline in China's current account surplus was inevitable (Chart 4). In 2007, China accounted for 6% of global GDP in dollar terms. Today it accounts for 15%. Having a massively undervalued currency, as China had in 2007, is just not politically tenable anymore, especially with Donald Trump in the White House. Simply put, China has become too big to continue exporting its way out of its problems. Chart 3Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Chart 4Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Debt As The Conduit Between Savings And Investment How does a country transform savings into investment? In an economy like China where the stock market at times appears to be little more than a casino, the answer is that credit markets must play the dominant role. Households or firms with surplus savings park their funds in banks or other financial institutions. These institutions channel the savings to willing borrowers. Debt ends up being the natural byproduct of surplus savings. China is still a relatively poor country with a lot of catch-up potential. Capital-per-worker is a fraction of what it is among advanced economies (Chart 5). Even with its bleak demographics, China would need to grow by around 6% per year over the next few years just to converge with South Korea in output-per-worker by 2050 (Chart 6). All this means that China needs to invest more than most other economies, which is only possible if it saves more than other economies. Chart 5China Has More Catching Up To Do (1) Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Chart 6China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) Unfortunately, one can have too much of a good thing. The fact that China's capital stock-to-output ratio has risen dramatically in recent years means that the economy is already investing too much. And the optimal amount of investment will only fall over time as potential GDP growth continues to decelerate. Unless savings come down, China will find itself increasingly awash in excess capacity. Chart 7If Only GDP Growth Did Not ##br## Decelerate Over The Past Ten Years Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Slower trend growth will also make deleveraging more difficult to achieve. The overall stock of nonfinancial debt grew at an annualized rate of 18.8% between 2008 and 2017. Notably, this growth rate was not much higher than the one of 16.5% between 2003 and 2007 - a period when the debt-to-GDP ratio was broadly stable. The main difference between the two periods lies in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, not in the numerator: Nominal GDP expanded at an annualized rate of 11.2% between 2008 and 2017, a sizable retreat from the pace of 18.4% between 2003 and 2007. Chart 7 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio today would be virtually identical to its end-2007 level had nominal GDP continued to grow at its 2003-2007 pace over the past ten years. Financial Deregulation Has Exacerbated The Debt Problem The Chinese government's reluctance to crack down on credit growth was motivated by the desire to support aggregate demand. However, in turning a blind eye to what was happening in credit markets, a lot of debt was generated that was not directly tied to the intermediation of savings into investment. Chart 8Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt can be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of goods or services. Debt can also be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of pre-existing assets. Crucially, while the former typically requires additional "savings" (i.e., someone needs to reduce their spending relative to their income), the latter does not.1 Granted, savings can still play an indirect role in facilitating debt-financed asset purchases. Financial assets are typically backed by something of value. A mortgage is backed by a piece of property. A corporate bond is backed by both the tangible and intangible capital that a firm possesses. The more a country has been able to save over time, the larger its capital stock will be. China, of course, has been saving like crazy for years. It is thus no surprise that its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared as its capital stock has expanded (Chart 8). Financial deregulation in China has allowed a large share of its capital stock to repeatedly shift hands. Debt has often been created in the process. The problem is that debt-financed asset purchases drive up asset prices, sometimes to unsustainable levels. And the higher the price of the asset, the greater the risk that it will not yield enough income to cover the borrowing costs. When asset prices are rising, borrowers and lenders are apt to disregard this risk, figuring that they can always sell the asset at a high enough price to pay back the loan. But once prices start falling, reality sets in very quickly. Stability begets instability. Consumers Need To Step Up The authorities are keenly aware of the risks discussed above. This is the key reason why they are clamping down on the shadow banking system, which has increasingly become the main source of speculative lending in China. We expect the pressure on shadow banks to persist in 2018. This will continue to weigh on credit growth. The more vexing challenge is how to reduce excessive household savings. The government's current strategy of cramming down the capital stock by taking out excess capacity from sectors such as steel, coal, and solar may be better than nothing, but it still pales in comparison to a strategy of encouraging consumer spending. Higher consumer spending would obviate the need for state-owned companies and local governments to keep people employed in make-work projects. The good news is that there are plenty of ways that China can boost household consumption. Government spending on education, health care, and pensions as a share of GDP is close to half of the OECD average (Chart 9). Increasing social transfer payments would give households the wherewithal to spend more. Unlike in most countries, the poor in China are net savers (Chart 10). Expanding the social safety net would discourage precautionary savings. Chart 9Chinese Social Welfare Spending ##br##Is Lagging The OECD Average Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Chart 10Low Income Households Are Net ##br##Savers In China Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? The Chinese income tax structure is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 11).2 A more progressive tax system would boost spending among poorer households. It would also curb inequality, which has increased sharply over the past few decades (Chart 12). The saving rate among the richest 10% of Chinese earners is close to 50%. Policies that shift income from the rich to the poor would reduce overall household savings. Chart 11High Tax Burden For ##br##Low Income Households In China Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Chart 12Shifting Income To Poorer Households Would Reduce ##br##China's Household Savings Rate Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Debt Nationalization Is Inevitable Chart 13Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking,##br## And China Is No Exception Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking, And China Is No Exception Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking, And China Is No Exception Realistically, reforms aimed at encouraging consumption will take a while to implement. In the meantime, debt levels are likely to keep rising. Much of China's debt burden remains on the books of state-owned companies and local governments. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of this debt onto its own balance sheet. This would ease concerns about a mass wave of defaults. The key question for investors is whether this de facto "debt nationalization" is done proactively or reactively in response to a crisis. If the latter occurs, investors should steer clear of Chinese assets, as well as China-related plays such as commodities and commodity currencies. If the former pans out, global risk assets could rally. While the truth will fall somewhere between those two extremes, our bet is that the proactive view will prove closer to the mark, at least relative to market expectations (keep in mind that Chinese banks are trading below book value, so a lot of bad news has already been priced in). The Chinese authorities talk a lot about the importance of reducing moral hazard, but in practice, they have shown very little tolerance for defaults. Just as they did in the early 2000s, government leaders could commission state-owned asset management companies to purchase distressed debt from banks and other lenders at inflated prices. Chinese financials, which are nearly 70% of the H-share index, will benefit. Will investors balk at the prospect of the Chinese government blowing out the budget deficit in order to rescue insolvent borrowers? There might be some short-term panic, but as has been the case with Japan, as long as there are plenty of excess domestic savings to go around, the risk of a debt crisis will remain minimal. Indeed, the issuance of more government debt would help alleviate what has become a critical problem for Chinese savers: The lack of safe, liquid domestic assets available for purchase. What is true, from a longer-term perspective, is that the combination of higher debt and slower growth will eventually create a strong incentive for the Chinese government to inflate away debt. As in many other countries, China's "support ratio" -- broadly defined as the ratio of workers-to-consumers -- has peaked (Chart 13). As the growth of output and income falls behind consumption growth, China's savings glut will become a thing of the past. Rather than raising rates, the PBOC will just let the economy overheat. Such a day of reckoning is probably still at least five years away, but eventually inflation will return to China. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment A true "Minsky moment" in China - one where the financial sector seizes up due to spiraling fears of bankruptcies and defaults - is not in the cards. Nevertheless, China's economy is slowing, and growth is likely to decelerate further over the next few quarters as the authorities restrain credit growth and the property market continues to cool. The slowdown in Chinese growth is occurring at the same time as the economic data has been deteriorating around the world. The equity component of our MacroQuant model - which is highly sensitive to changes in the direction of growth - has been in bearish territory for two straight months (Chart 14). Our base case remains that global growth will stabilize over the next few months at an above-trend pace. Global bond yields are still near record-low levels and fiscal policy is moving in a more stimulative direction (Chart 15). It would be odd for the global economy to deteriorate sharply in such an environment. Chart 14MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Trade protectionism is an obvious risk to this sanguine cyclical view. BCA has long argued that globalization is under threat from the combination of rising populism and the end of America's role as the world's sole superpower. However, the retreat from globalization will occur in fits and starts. Just as investors were overly complacent about protectionism a few months ago, they have become overly alarmist now. Both the U.S. and China have a strong incentive to reach a mutually-satisfying agreement over trade. President Trump has been able to shrug off the decline in equities because his approval rating has actually risen during the selloff (Chart 16). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks continue to fall - Trump will change his tune. Chart 15Global Economy Buttressed By ##br##Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Global Economy Buttressed By Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Global Economy Buttressed By Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Chart 16Trump's Approval Rating Has ##br##Actually Risen During Equity Selloff Trump's Approval Rating Has Actually Risen During Equity Selloff Trump's Approval Rating Has Actually Risen During Equity Selloff For its part, the Chinese government is also looking to strike a deal. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year. This is already less than the $150 billion in Chinese goods that Trump has targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Bottom Line: The near-term picture for global equities and other risk assets is murky, but the 12-month cyclical outlook is still reasonably upbeat. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For instance, if someone buys stock on margin or takes out a second mortgage on their house, new debt is created without anyone having to cut back on spending. In the context of China, imagine a financial institution which funds the purchase of a building by issuing a certificate of deposit or by selling a "wealth management" product. Both the asset and liability side of the financial institution's balance sheet go up (i.e., new debt is created). Suppose further that the company that sold the building puts the proceeds into a certificate of deposit or wealth management product. The entire transaction is self-financing. The example above illustrates that debt can go up in some situations even if everyone's spending habits remain the same. The need to intermediate savings is one source of debt growth, but it does not have to be the only one. 2 Please see "People's Republic Of China: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report, dated August 15, 2017.

Highlights Slower nominal GDP growth explains virtually all of the increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio over the past ten years. The authorities were unwilling to restrain debt growth as it became obvious that nominal income was decelerating because this would have only exacerbated the economic downturn. Excess private-sector savings forced the Chinese government to rely on debt-financed investment by state-owned companies (SOE) and local governments in order to keep aggregate demand elevated. Financial deregulation also encouraged debt accumulation. Debt growth linked to speculative activity can be curbed without endangering the economy, but a lasting solution to the surplus savings problem will require consumers to spend more. This will take a while. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of SOE and local government debt onto its own balance sheet. The risk to investors is that this "debt nationalization" happens reactively rather than proactively. Feature If there are too many pro-cyclical factors in the economy, cyclical fluctuations are magnified and there is excessive optimism during the period, accumulating contradictions that could lead to the so-called Minsky Moment. - Zhou Xiaochuan, Former Governor of the People's Bank of China, October 19, 2017 The Calm Before The Storm? Stability begets instability. That is the nature of business cycles, Hyman Minsky famously argued. Rising confidence leads to excessive risk-taking, higher asset prices, and mounting economic imbalances. Eventually the mood sours. Like Wile E. Coyote running off a cliff, investors look down and see that there is nothing but thin air between them and the ground below. Panic ensues. Is China on the verge of its own Minsky Moment? A glance at the evolution of its debt-to-GDP ratio would certainly say so. But before running towards the exit door, consider the following: People have been fretting about spiraling Japanese government debt levels for over twenty years now. And yet, interest rates remain at rock-bottom levels in Japan. China's Savings Glut In many respects, China finds itself facing similar problems to those that have haunted Japan. The simultaneous bust in equity and real estate prices in 1990 sent Japan's private sector into a prolonged deleveraging cycle (Chart 1). In order to prop up demand, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government had to absorb the excess savings of the private sector with its own dissavings. The abundance of domestic private-sector savings forestalled a financial crisis, but it also led to today's gross government debt-to-GDP ratio of 240%. Like Japan, China suffers from a dearth of spending, or equivalently, an abundance of savings. The IMF estimates that Chinese gross national savings reached 46% of GDP in 2017. While this is down from a peak of 52% of GDP in 2008, it is still abnormally high for any major economy, even by emerging market standards (Chart 2). Chart 1 Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 2China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards By definition, whatever a country saves must either be invested domestically or channeled abroad via a current account surplus. China's savings rate has edged lower over the past ten years, but its current account surplus has dropped even more, falling from nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to 1.4% of GDP at present. As a result, investment as a share of GDP has actually risen to 44%, a three-point increase since 2007 (Chart 3). The decline in China's current account surplus was inevitable (Chart 4). In 2007, China accounted for 6% of global GDP in dollar terms. Today it accounts for 15%. Having a massively undervalued currency, as China had in 2007, is just not politically tenable anymore, especially with Donald Trump in the White House. Simply put, China has become too big to continue exporting its way out of its problems. Chart 3Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Chart 4Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Debt As The Conduit Between Savings And Investment How does a country transform savings into investment? In an economy like China where the stock market at times appears to be little more than a casino, the answer is that credit markets must play the dominant role. Households or firms with surplus savings park their funds in banks or other financial institutions. These institutions channel the savings to willing borrowers. Debt ends up being the natural byproduct of surplus savings. China is still a relatively poor country with a lot of catch-up potential. Capital-per-worker is a fraction of what it is among advanced economies (Chart 5). Even with its bleak demographics, China would need to grow by around 6% per year over the next few years just to converge with South Korea in output-per-worker by 2050 (Chart 6). All this means that China needs to invest more than most other economies, which is only possible if it saves more than other economies. Chart 5China Has More Catching Up To Do (1) Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Chart 6China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) Unfortunately, one can have too much of a good thing. The fact that China's capital stock-to-output ratio has risen dramatically in recent years means that the economy is already investing too much. And the optimal amount of investment will only fall over time as potential GDP growth continues to decelerate. Unless savings come down, China will find itself increasingly awash in excess capacity. Chart 7If Only GDP Growth Did Not ##br## Decelerate Over The Past Ten Years Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Slower trend growth will also make deleveraging more difficult to achieve. The overall stock of nonfinancial debt grew at an annualized rate of 18.8% between 2008 and 2017. Notably, this growth rate was not much higher than the one of 16.5% between 2003 and 2007 - a period when the debt-to-GDP ratio was broadly stable. The main difference between the two periods lies in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, not in the numerator: Nominal GDP expanded at an annualized rate of 11.2% between 2008 and 2017, a sizable retreat from the pace of 18.4% between 2003 and 2007. Chart 7 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio today would be virtually identical to its end-2007 level had nominal GDP continued to grow at its 2003-2007 pace over the past ten years. Financial Deregulation Has Exacerbated The Debt Problem The Chinese government's reluctance to crack down on credit growth was motivated by the desire to support aggregate demand. However, in turning a blind eye to what was happening in credit markets, a lot of debt was generated that was not directly tied to the intermediation of savings into investment. Chart 8Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt can be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of goods or services. Debt can also be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of pre-existing assets. Crucially, while the former typically requires additional "savings" (i.e., someone needs to reduce their spending relative to their income), the latter does not.1 Granted, savings can still play an indirect role in facilitating debt-financed asset purchases. Financial assets are typically backed by something of value. A mortgage is backed by a piece of property. A corporate bond is backed by both the tangible and intangible capital that a firm possesses. The more a country has been able to save over time, the larger its capital stock will be. China, of course, has been saving like crazy for years. It is thus no surprise that its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared as its capital stock has expanded (Chart 8). Financial deregulation in China has allowed a large share of its capital stock to repeatedly shift hands. Debt has often been created in the process. The problem is that debt-financed asset purchases drive up asset prices, sometimes to unsustainable levels. And the higher the price of the asset, the greater the risk that it will not yield enough income to cover the borrowing costs. When asset prices are rising, borrowers and lenders are apt to disregard this risk, figuring that they can always sell the asset at a high enough price to pay back the loan. But once prices start falling, reality sets in very quickly. Stability begets instability. Consumers Need To Step Up The authorities are keenly aware of the risks discussed above. This is the key reason why they are clamping down on the shadow banking system, which has increasingly become the main source of speculative lending in China. We expect the pressure on shadow banks to persist in 2018. This will continue to weigh on credit growth. The more vexing challenge is how to reduce excessive household savings. The government's current strategy of cramming down the capital stock by taking out excess capacity from sectors such as steel, coal, and solar may be better than nothing, but it still pales in comparison to a strategy of encouraging consumer spending. Higher consumer spending would obviate the need for state-owned companies and local governments to keep people employed in make-work projects. The good news is that there are plenty of ways that China can boost household consumption. Government spending on education, health care, and pensions as a share of GDP is close to half of the OECD average (Chart 9). Increasing social transfer payments would give households the wherewithal to spend more. Unlike in most countries, the poor in China are net savers (Chart 10). Expanding the social safety net would discourage precautionary savings. Chart 9Chinese Social Welfare Spending ##br##Is Lagging The OECD Average Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Chart 10Low Income Households Are Net ##br##Savers In China Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? The Chinese income tax structure is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 11).2 A more progressive tax system would boost spending among poorer households. It would also curb inequality, which has increased sharply over the past few decades (Chart 12). The saving rate among the richest 10% of Chinese earners is close to 50%. Policies that shift income from the rich to the poor would reduce overall household savings. Chart 11High Tax Burden For ##br##Low Income Households In China Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Chart 12Shifting Income To Poorer Households Would Reduce ##br##China's Household Savings Rate Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Debt Nationalization Is Inevitable Chart 13Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking,##br## And China Is No Exception Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking, And China Is No Exception Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking, And China Is No Exception Realistically, reforms aimed at encouraging consumption will take a while to implement. In the meantime, debt levels are likely to keep rising. Much of China's debt burden remains on the books of state-owned companies and local governments. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of this debt onto its own balance sheet. This would ease concerns about a mass wave of defaults. The key question for investors is whether this de facto "debt nationalization" is done proactively or reactively in response to a crisis. If the latter occurs, investors should steer clear of Chinese assets, as well as China-related plays such as commodities and commodity currencies. If the former pans out, global risk assets could rally. While the truth will fall somewhere between those two extremes, our bet is that the proactive view will prove closer to the mark, at least relative to market expectations (keep in mind that Chinese banks are trading below book value, so a lot of bad news has already been priced in). The Chinese authorities talk a lot about the importance of reducing moral hazard, but in practice, they have shown very little tolerance for defaults. Just as they did in the early 2000s, government leaders could commission state-owned asset management companies to purchase distressed debt from banks and other lenders at inflated prices. Chinese financials, which are nearly 70% of the H-share index, will benefit. Will investors balk at the prospect of the Chinese government blowing out the budget deficit in order to rescue insolvent borrowers? There might be some short-term panic, but as has been the case with Japan, as long as there are plenty of excess domestic savings to go around, the risk of a debt crisis will remain minimal. Indeed, the issuance of more government debt would help alleviate what has become a critical problem for Chinese savers: The lack of safe, liquid domestic assets available for purchase. What is true, from a longer-term perspective, is that the combination of higher debt and slower growth will eventually create a strong incentive for the Chinese government to inflate away debt. As in many other countries, China's "support ratio" -- broadly defined as the ratio of workers-to-consumers -- has peaked (Chart 13). As the growth of output and income falls behind consumption growth, China's savings glut will become a thing of the past. Rather than raising rates, the PBOC will just let the economy overheat. Such a day of reckoning is probably still at least five years away, but eventually inflation will return to China. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment A true "Minsky moment" in China - one where the financial sector seizes up due to spiraling fears of bankruptcies and defaults - is not in the cards. Nevertheless, China's economy is slowing, and growth is likely to decelerate further over the next few quarters as the authorities restrain credit growth and the property market continues to cool. The slowdown in Chinese growth is occurring at the same time as the economic data has been deteriorating around the world. The equity component of our MacroQuant model - which is highly sensitive to changes in the direction of growth - has been in bearish territory for two straight months (Chart 14). Our base case remains that global growth will stabilize over the next few months at an above-trend pace. Global bond yields are still near record-low levels and fiscal policy is moving in a more stimulative direction (Chart 15). It would be odd for the global economy to deteriorate sharply in such an environment. Chart 14MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Is China Heading For A Minsky Moment? Trade protectionism is an obvious risk to this sanguine cyclical view. BCA has long argued that globalization is under threat from the combination of rising populism and the end of America's role as the world's sole superpower. However, the retreat from globalization will occur in fits and starts. Just as investors were overly complacent about protectionism a few months ago, they have become overly alarmist now. Both the U.S. and China have a strong incentive to reach a mutually-satisfying agreement over trade. President Trump has been able to shrug off the decline in equities because his approval rating has actually risen during the selloff (Chart 16). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks continue to fall - Trump will change his tune. Chart 15Global Economy Buttressed By ##br##Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Global Economy Buttressed By Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Global Economy Buttressed By Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Chart 16Trump's Approval Rating Has ##br##Actually Risen During Equity Selloff Trump's Approval Rating Has Actually Risen During Equity Selloff Trump's Approval Rating Has Actually Risen During Equity Selloff For its part, the Chinese government is also looking to strike a deal. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year. This is already less than the $150 billion in Chinese goods that Trump has targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Bottom Line: The near-term picture for global equities and other risk assets is murky, but the 12-month cyclical outlook is still reasonably upbeat. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For instance, if someone buys stock on margin or takes out a second mortgage on their house, new debt is created without anyone having to cut back on spending. In the context of China, imagine a financial institution which funds the purchase of a building by issuing a certificate of deposit or by selling a "wealth management" product. Both the asset and liability side of the financial institution's balance sheet go up (i.e., new debt is created). Suppose further that the company that sold the building puts the proceeds into a certificate of deposit or wealth management product. The entire transaction is self-financing. The example above illustrates that debt can go up in some situations even if everyone's spending habits remain the same. The need to intermediate savings is one source of debt growth, but it does not have to be the only one. 2 Please see "People's Republic Of China: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report, dated August 15, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Hong Kong's leverage burden is a corporate sector rather than a household sector problem. But this corporate sector debt is highly concentrated in the finance and real estate industries, meaning that investors should be legitimately concerned over Hong Kong's extremely elevated debt service ratio. Our BCA Hong Kong Debt Risk Monitor serves as an important tool to help investors gauge the risk of a serious credit-driven downturn in the region. While the risk from excessive leverage is real, the current message from our DRM is that the odds of a deleveraging event over the coming year are low. Due to the importation of U.S. monetary policy, Hong Kong may "enjoy" easy monetary policy on a permanent basis. This suggests that Hong Kong's private sector may continue to leverage itself even in the face of rising interest rates, setting up the potential for a cataclysmic future recession. Stay neutral Hong Kong stocks versus the global benchmark over the coming 6-12 months. While equities may rise in relative terms if earnings momentum converges with that of the global benchmark, it is not a sufficiently compelling prospect to outweigh the significant structural risk facing the region. Feature Hong Kong has appeared in the headlines of the financial press for two reasons over the past few months. The first is due to the recent weakness in the Hong Kong dollar (HKD), a topic that we addressed last week.1 The second was prompted by the BIS' March 2018 Quarterly Review, which noted that mainland China, Hong Kong, and Canada stood out among 26 jurisdictions as being the most vulnerable to a banking crisis according to their research. The BIS's warning is rooted in the fact that Hong Kong is a highly leveraged economy, but there are two additional reasons for investors to be cautious about the region: China's industrial sector is slowing, and monetary policy is tightening due to the region's direct link to U.S. interest rates. While Hong Kong has avoided the full brunt of rising U.S. rates over the past year thanks to plentiful interbank liquidity (which has limited the rise in 3-month HIBOR), we noted in last week's report that the weakness in the HKD likely means that gap between interbank rates and the base rate cannot get much wider. This means that further Fed rate hikes over the coming year are likely to feed more fully into tighter Hong Kong monetary conditions. In this report we review the extent and disposition of Hong Kong's indebtedness, and develop an indicator for investors to monitor in order to gauge the risk of a serious private sector deleveraging event. We conclude that while it is too early to position aggressively against Hong Kong stocks, the risk from excessive leverage is real and is very likely to eventually cause a serious credit-driven downturn. For now, however, that appears to be a story for another day, and as we explain below, potentially a distant one. Breaking Down Hong Kong's Debt Chart 1 presents the basis for concern about Hong Kong's debt. The chart shows the BIS' nonfinancial private sector debt service ratio ("DSR", which includes both households and nonfinancial corporations) for the G10 countries alongside that of China, Hong Kong, and Canada. The chart shows that Hong Kong's DSR has risen nearly to 26%, a full 10 percentage points higher than the G10 average, and is now the highest among the 32 economies that the BIS has debt service data for. One important point to note is that among the three countries that the BIS recently singled out for concern, the disposition of Hong Kong's private sector debt is more similar to that of China than Canada. Chart 2 highlights that the private sector debt in China and Hong Kong is predominantly owed by the nonfinancial corporate sector, whereas in Canada the debt is more equally split among the two sectors, with households owing more in total. Chart 1Hong Kong's Debt Burden Hits##br## A New High Hong Kong's Debt Burden Hits A New High Hong Kong's Debt Burden Hits A New High Chart 2Unlike In Canada, Hong Kong's Leverage##br## Is A Corporate Sector Problem Unlike In Canada, Hong Kong's Leverage Is A Corporate Sector Problem Unlike In Canada, Hong Kong's Leverage Is A Corporate Sector Problem Normally we would be inclined to suggest that the skew in Hong Kong's debt towards the corporate sector makes it less risky than in other jurisdictions where elevated leverage is a household sector problem. The rationale is that while corporations can (and often do) misallocate their capital, firm borrowing is usually employed to acquire income-producing assets, with problems arising only when the value of those assets (or their potential to generate income) declines sharply. Household leverage problems, on the other hand, are almost always the result of a sharp rise in residential mortgage credit, and our view is that the purchase of residential property is fundamentally an act of consumption rather than a true investment. In addition, the past experiences of several countries have shown that housing-related leverage busts are particularly pernicious, in that the resulting recessions tend to be followed by long periods of subpar economic growth. But unlike in China where the majority of nonfinancial corporate sector debt is held on the balance sheets of state-owned enterprises, Hong Kong's corporate debt does not have de-facto state backing and appears to be enormously concentrated in the real estate and financial sector. Over 80% of Hong Kong's total nonfinancial sector debt (which includes households) is provided by domestic banks, and Chart 3 shows that among bank loans to firms, 35% have been granted to property building & construction companies and another 22% to "financial concerns" and stockbrokers. This high concentration of corporate sector debt in the real estate sector means that investors should be legitimately concerned over Hong Kong's extremely high DSR. On the household side, we have made the case in a previous report that a replay of another spectacular housing bust (similar to what occurred in 1997) is highly unlikely despite the fact that Hong Kong house prices have vastly outstripped income over the past decade2 (Chart 4). Chart 3Loans To Businesses Are Highly Concentrated ##br##And Exposed To Property Loans To Businesses Are Highly Concentrated And Exposed To Property Loans To Businesses Are Highly Concentrated And Exposed To Property Chart 4Lofty House Prices Are A Red Herring: ##br##The Risk Is On The Business Side Lofty House Prices Are A Red Herring: The Risk Is On The Business Side Lofty House Prices Are A Red Herring: The Risk Is On The Business Side This suggests that, despite extremely elevated residential property prices, investors should be more concerned about a shock that will destabilize the commercial real estate market. Hong Kong households would not likely escape the impact of such a shock, since commercial and residential real estate prices move strongly in tandem (Chart 5). But in terms of watching for a "tipping point" that could push Hong Kong's private sector into a balance sheet recession, the trigger seems more likely to occur in the market for the former, rather than the latter. Bottom Line: Hong Kong's leverage burden is a corporate sector rather than a household sector problem. But this corporate sector debt is extremely concentrated in the finance and real estate industries, meaning that investors should be legitimately concerned over Hong Kong's extremely high debt service ratio. Chart 5Still, Households Will Be Hurt##br## If CRE Prices Fall Still, Households Will Be Hurt If CRE Prices Fall Still, Households Will Be Hurt If CRE Prices Fall Chart 6The BIS' Warning Thresholds ##br##Don't Seem To Apply To Hong Kong The BIS' Warning Thresholds Don't Seem To Apply To Hong Kong The BIS' Warning Thresholds Don't Seem To Apply To Hong Kong Timing The Onset Of A Balance Sheet Recession Our analysis above supports the recent warnings from the BIS that the risk of a banking crisis / private sector deleveraging event in Hong Kong is nontrivial. This raises the obvious question of how to gauge the timing of such an event in order for investors to properly position their exposure towards Hong Kong's financial markets. The BIS has itself investigated this question, and has published several reports on its "Early Warning Indicator" (EWI) approach.3 Table 1 presents a list of these indicators for several countries, and highlights that the two of the most informative measures (the credit-to-GDP gap4 and the overall debt service ratio) are flashing red for Hong Kong. In fact, Table 1 served as the basis for the BIS' warning in their most recent Quarterly Review that we noted above. The BIS' EWI research has focused on identifying thresholds for these measures that can predict a banking crisis within a three-year window based on the historical record. But in the case of Hong Kong, it is not clear that these thresholds apply. Chart 6 shows the credit-to-GDP gap and overall private sector DSR along with the more stringent BIS threshold noted in Table 1, and highlights that these measures have been flashing red for 4-8 years. Based on this approach, Hong Kong should have experienced a banking crisis long ago. Table 1BIS Early Warning Indicators For Stress In Domestic Banking Systems Hong Kong's Private Sector Debt: There Will Be Blood, But Not Today Hong Kong's Private Sector Debt: There Will Be Blood, But Not Today Rather than relying on the BIS' framework, we have instead constructed our own private-sector debt risk monitor for Hong Kong. In contrast to the BIS' measures, which have been specifically constructed to predict a banking crisis, the goal of our indicator is to help predict a serious credit-driven downturn regardless of its character (i.e. we abstract from whether the result of the downturn is a full-blown financial crisis or simply a prolonged period of economic stagnation). Chart 7Low Risk Of A Serious Credit-Driven ##br##Downturn, For Now Low Risk Of A Serious Credit-Driven Downturn, For Now Low Risk Of A Serious Credit-Driven Downturn, For Now Chart 7 presents our BCA Hong Kong Debt Risk Monitor (DRM) and its five equally-weighted components, a summary of which is provided below. All series have been scaled such that an increase in the DRM represents higher risk. Alpha: We have highlighted the importance of examining the alpha as well as the beta of regional equity returns in a previous report,5 and we include a composite indicator of Hong Kong's rolling alpha versus the global benchmark as a measure of Hong Kong-specific stock performance that adjusts for Hong Kong's riskiness. While this component of our DRM was quite elevated in early-2016 (signaling weak Hong Kong stock performance), it is presently in line with its historical average, and thus is not flashing a warning sign. Property Prices: Given the high concentration of Hong Kong's corporate sector debt in the real estate sector, our DRM includes the deviation of office & retail property prices from their 9-month moving average. Similar to the first component of our indicator, Hong Kong property prices are roughly in line with their trend and are not signaling serious economic weakness. Credit Impulse: The third component of our DRM is a simple bank credit impulse, calculated as the flow of credit over the past year as a percent of GDP. While this component has fallen well into "low risk" territory, over the past year, there are some tentative signs of a reversal that investors should monitor. Monetary Policy Stance: The fourth component of our DRM is a structural variable that attempts to measure whether U.S. (and thus Hong Kong) interest rates are either consistent or out of alignment with economic conditions in Hong Kong. This component is an average of two measures of the stance of monetary policy: 1) the difference between U.S. 10-year government bond yields and Hong Kong nominal GDP growth, and 2) the difference between the base rate and a Taylor Rule estimate for the region (with the latter acting purely as an estimate of the cyclical equilibrium interest rate).6 The chart shows that despite the onset of tighter monetary policy in the U.S. over the past few years, our gauge of Hong Kong's policy stance suggests that conditions are still easy, and that material further increases would likely be required in order to see this component rise to +1 sigma territory. Debt Service Ratio: The final component of our DRM is the BIS' total private sector DSR shown in Chart 6, acting as a second structural variable that captures the underlying debt servicing risk that the BIS has warned about. We extent the BIS' series back to the early-1990s on a best efforts basis, by adjusting the product of Hong Kong's prime rate and the total private sector debt-to-GDP ratio to best align with the official DSR series over the course of its history. Our extended series suggests that Hong Kong's debt servicing burden is indeed the highest that it has been over the past three decades, underscoring that our DRM is likely to rise materially if the cyclical factors included in the indicator deteriorate. The overall message of our DRM is that a threat to Hong Kong's economy from excessive debt does not appear to be imminent, despite the underlying risks highlighted by the BIS. While the risk from excessive leverage is real and is very likely to eventually cause a serious credit-driven downturn, the odds of this occurring over the coming 6-12 months appear to be low. Bottom Line: Our BCA Hong Kong Debt Risk Monitor serves as an important tool to help investors gauge the risk of a serious credit-driven downturn in the region. While the risk from excessive leverage is real, the message from our DRM is that the odds of a deleveraging event over the coming year are low. The Spooky Implications Of The Natural Interest Rate Gap Interestingly, at least part of the benign reading of our DRM is due to the fourth component of the indicator, our gauge of Hong Kong's monetary policy stance, which suggests that there is ample room for further rate increases. In fact, in our view this observation carries much deeper significance than many may initially perceive, as it may explain why the BIS' early warning indicator thresholds have not worked in the case of Hong Kong, and why the region may avoid a debt crisis for a further significant period (but ultimately experience a much more painful collapse when it finally arrives). At root, the reason that U.S. 10-year Treasury yields remain exceedingly low relative to U.S. nominal GDP growth is because investors believe that real U.S. policy rates are likely to be much lower on average over the next 10-years than they have been historically (Chart 8). Abstracting from calendar-based cyclical considerations (such at the timing of the next U.S. recession), this fundamentally reflects the prevalent view among fixed-income investors that the U.S. natural rate of interest (or "r-star") has likely permanently declined. If true, this is of enormous importance for Hong Kong, as it suggests that the region will permanently "enjoy" easy monetary policy. This is because the substantial leveraging that has occurred in Hong Kong in response to low interest rates implies that there has been no impairment (yet) to Hong Kong's natural rate of interest (Chart 9). Chart 8A Low Estimate Of R-Star Has Depressed##br## U.S. Bond Yields A Low Estimate Of R-Star Has Depressed U.S. Bond Yields A Low Estimate Of R-Star Has Depressed U.S. Bond Yields Chart 9No Evidence Of A Low R-Star##br## In Hong Kong No Evidence Of A Low R-Star In Hong Kong No Evidence Of A Low R-Star In Hong Kong In some ways the dynamic we are describing is not new: the importation of easy monetary policy from the U.S. via competitive currency devaluation over the past decade has been a well-known phenomenon that was quite prominent during the early phase of the global economic recovery. But the fixed exchange rate regime in Hong Kong means that this process cannot be avoided without abandoning the peg, an event that itself could trigger a deleveraging event via a sharp decline in asset prices. The key point for investors is that if the U.S. natural rate of interest has indeed fallen materially and permanently below potential GDP growth, then Hong Kong will not experience tight monetary conditions even once the Fed has normalized short-term interest rates, unless it raises them well above equilibrium levels. This suggests that Hong Kong's private sector may perpetually leverage itself until debt service burdens reach some, as yet, unknown maximum level, precipitating what would likely become a cataclysmic recession. The fact that no crisis erupted in late-2015/early-2016 when the cyclical components of our DRM deteriorated significantly suggests that this level may be materially higher than is presently the case. Bottom Line: Due to the importation of U.S. monetary policy, Hong Kong may "enjoy" easy monetary policy on a permanent basis. This suggests that Hong Kong's private sector may continue to leverage itself even in the face of rising interest rates, setting up the potential for a cataclysmic future recession. Investment Implications: Stay Neutral, For Now Chart 10Room For A Rise In Relative Earnings Momentum Room For A Rise In Relative Earnings Momentum Room For A Rise In Relative Earnings Momentum The picture painted by our above analysis suggests that a benign cyclical outlook for Hong Kong is arrayed against a negative (and potentially horrific) structural outlook. How should investors position towards Hong Kong equities in response? First, as noted above, our Debt Risk Monitor does not signal that there is an imminent threat facing the Hong Kong economy that would herald the potential for a major deleveraging event over the near-term. Second, while Hong Kong's earnings momentum is stretched in absolute terms, Chart 10 highlights there is room for a catchup versus global stocks, which could boost relative performance over the coming year. Third, relative valuation and technical conditions are at neutral levels (Chart 11), and thus do not provide any compelling basis to avoid Hong Kong stocks. But to us, the weight of this modestly positive assessment over the coming year is overshadowed by the structural outlook, meaning that we continue to recommend a neutral allocation towards Hong Kong stocks over the coming 6-12 months. The most investment-relevant conclusion from our analysis is that investors will one day be able to earn significant risk-adjusted returns from underweighting / shorting Hong Kong stocks once a serious credit-driven downturn begins. As an example, Chart 12 shows the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Hong Kong's relative performance, a period where our DRM rose sharply and persistently into "high risk territory". It took 12½ years for Hong Kong to rise to a new high in relative total return terms, and it has yet to do so in price terms. Chart 11Neutral Relative Valuation And ##br##Technical Conditions Neutral Relative Valuation And Technical Conditions Neutral Relative Valuation And Technical Conditions Chart 12One Day, Shorting Hong Kong Stocks##br## Will Be Enormously Profitable One Day, Shorting Hong Kong Stocks Will Be Enormously Profitable One Day, Shorting Hong Kong Stocks Will Be Enormously Profitable So while the economic and financial market conditions are not yet in place to act on a bearish structural view, we will be closely watching our Debt Risk Monitor over the coming months and years for signs of a significant deterioration, as it will likely provide a major opportunity for investors to earn outsized returns. Stay tuned! Bottom Line: Stay neutral Hong Kong stocks versus the global benchmark over the coming 6-12 months. While equities may rise in relative terms if earnings momentum converges with that of the global benchmark, it is not a sufficiently compelling prospect to outweigh the significant structural risk facing the region. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Stocks: Trade Frictions Make For A Tenuous Overweight", dated March 28, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Hong Kong Housing Bubble: A Replay Of 1997?", dated June 29, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 For example, please see "Evaluating early warning indicators of banking crises: Satisfying policy requirements" by Mathias Drehmann and Mikael Juselius, BIS Working Paper No. 421, August 2013. 4 The BIS defines the credit-to-GDP gap as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run trend, derived using a one-sided (i.e. backward-looking) Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 5 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China: No Longer A Low-Beta Market", dated January 11, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Our Taylor Rule estimate for Hong Kong is constructed in a fashion similar to what we showed for China in our January 18 Weekly Report, using a neutral policy rate estimate of 5%. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Consumer spending is well supported despite weak readings on household purchases in early 2018. The recent rollover in M&A activity does not signal a top in equity markets nor warns that a recession looms. Although the labor market is tight in many areas, labor costs are not poised to blast off, but neither will they roll over. Feature Investors began to worry last week about a slowing U.S. economy sending prices of risk assets and Treasury yields lower. The threat of a wider trade spat with China was also a concern, along with the latest round of political intrigue at the White House. Oil fell more than 1% on supply concerns. While the U.S. economic surprise index moved lower since the start of the year, BCA's view is that the U.S. economy is poised to grow well above potential in the first half of the year. Consumer spending is well supported despite weak readings on household purchases in early 2018. The FOMC will provide a new set of economic forecasts and dot plots at this week's meeting. BCA expects the Fed to raise rates this week and three additional times this year. Although the labor market is tight in many areas, labor costs are not poised to blast off, but neither will they roll over. According to our U.S. Equity Strategy service's "buy the dip" cycle-on-cycle analysis, a retest of the recent equity lows typically occurs in the first month following the initial shock, suggesting that the S&P 500 is already out of the woods.1 The return of vol may keep a lid on the SPX for a while longer, but our strategy since February 8 is to buy the dips as we do not foresee an end to the business cycle in 2018. Moreover, the recent weakness in M&A activity is not a sign that the bull market is finished. Despite the dip below 2.90% last week, BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy services pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96%.2 Assuming a 3% terminal fed funds rate, our U.S. Bond Strategy team expects the 10-year Treasury yield to peak somewhere between 3.08% and 3.59%.3 Too Cold? Chart 1Weak February Retail Sales At Odds##BR##With Strong Consumers Fundamentals Weak February Retail Sales At Odds With Strong Consumers Fundamentals Weak February Retail Sales At Odds With Strong Consumers Fundamentals The Tax Cut and Jobs Act put extra cash into consumers' pockets and helped to lift consumer confidence to a cycle high. Household net worth is at a record level, the labor market is strong and wage growth is accelerating, albeit modestly at this point in the cycle. Despite the favorable backdrop, consumers are on the sidelines in early 2018 (Chart 1). Moreover, early March's unusually harsh winter weather in the Northeastern U.S. may prolong consumers' malaise for another month. The retail sales control group, which feeds into GDP calculations, rose a scant 0.1% m/m in February. The reading was well below the consensus of a 0.5% m/m gain. Headline retail sales dipped by 0.1%, well short of expectations (+0.4%). Auto sales (-0.9%) declined for the fourth month in a row in February. It is clear that the surge in auto sales in the wake of last fall's hurricanes pulled up demand. The weakness in February's spending was broadly based, with 7 of 13 major retail sales categories showing month-over-month declines. However, the recent weakness in consumer outlay masks the robust activity in the past 12 months. Overall retail sales are up a solid 4.1% from a year ago, while sales in the retail control group rose by 4.3%. In addition, sales are higher in 12 of the 13 main categories in the past year, led by non-store retailers (+10.1%), miscellaneous store retailers (+7.5%), clothing (+4.9%) and building materials (+4.6%). As a result of the tepid consumer spending readings in early 2018, the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model has projected Q1 real GDP growth of just 1.8%, adjusted downward from 2.5% on March 9 (Chart 2). At the start of this month, the Atlanta Fed pegged Q1 GDP at 3.5%. Accordingly, some investors are concerned that household spending is nearing a peak and a recession may be imminent. We see it differently. BCA's stance is that consumer spending should continue to grow by at least 2% in 2018. U.S. consumer health has improved markedly in the past year, driving BCA's Consumer Health Indicator into positive territory (Chart 3). Higher equity prices, a stout labor market and an acceleration in real incomes are behind the improvement. Consumer spending growth tends to accelerate when the Health Indicator is rising. The improvement supports BCA's view of a stronger U.S. economy alongside a global synchronized recovery, at least in the next 12 months. Chart 2Q1 GDP Estimates Have Moved Sharply Lower Q1 GDP Estimates Have Moved Sharply Lower Q1 GDP Estimates Have Moved Sharply Lower Chart 3The Consumer Is In Good Shape The Consumer Is In Good Shape The Consumer Is In Good Shape Household net worth in 2017Q4 was at a record high, the result of stable house prices and frothy equity markets, according to the latest Flow of Funds data for 2017Q4 (Chart 4). Moreover, the composition of households' balance sheet is less alarming today than at prior peaks, because equities and real estate relative to household income or total assets are more reasonable. Furthermore, debt levels are tamer today than in 2006. Households may be less vulnerable to unexpected shocks (Chart 4 again) in light of their more resilient balance sheets. BCA's view is that financial vulnerabilities from the household sector are well contained. Household borrowing is increasing modestly at an annual pace of 4%, in sharp contrast with a 12% rate in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s. A broad measure of household solvency, such as the household debt-to-income ratio, is within the range of the past few years and back to pre-recessionary readings. Furthermore, liquidity buffers (liquid assets-to-liabilities) are almost as high as the levels that preceded the equity market boom/bust in 1999-2000 (Chart 5). Chart 4Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Chart 5Household Sector Buffers Are Solid Household Sector Buffers Are Solid Household Sector Buffers Are Solid Nevertheless, risks may dampen the pace of consumer spending. Debt-to-income ratios have bottomed for the cycle (Chart 5 again) and banks are tightening their lending standards. The result is that consumer delinquency rates are on the upswing, notably in credit cards and autos (Chart 6). Moreover, the personal savings rate cannot sustainably remain around its recovery low of 3.2% (Chart 7, last panel). Chart 6Consumer Loan Metrics Consumer Loan Metrics Consumer Loan Metrics Chart 7Key Supports For Consumer##BR##Spending Remain In Place Key Supports For Consumer Spending Remain In Place Key Supports For Consumer Spending Remain In Place At 2.8%, annual wage compensation growth remains sluggish and far from the 3-4% rate per year that the Fed stated would be consistent with an economy closer to 2% inflation (Chart 7, panel 4). Moreover, households are still unlikely to binge on more debt to smooth out their expenditures as they did in the middle years of the first decade of the 2000s. A further acceleration in consumer spending would occur only alongside steady improvement in the labor market and improving household confidence on future employment and income gains. Bottom Line: Consumers' good mood and healthy balance sheets have not translated into firmer spending growth so far in 2018. Nonetheless, even with below-average consumer spending, the U.S. economy is expanding above the Fed's estimate of potential GDP, the labor market is tightening and inflation is grinding higher. The Fed remains on track to hike rates four times this year. The outlook for the U.S. consumer remains bright because of solid fundamental tailwinds such as strong employment growth, stable disposable incomes, frothy household net worth and buoyant confidence. Consumer headwinds to monitor are households' historically low saving rates, still tepid wage inflation and escalating delinquency rates. Too Hot? U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) volume peaked along with U.S. equity prices in the late 1990s and in 2007. Some investors are concerned that the recent rollover in deal volume is a signal that a recession or an equity market top is nigh. Deal volume in dollars and relative to market cap peaked in 1999, again in 2007, and more recently in mid-2015, before a 13% pullback in the S&P 500 in late 2015 and early 2016. Since then, merger activity has moved lower. The decline in corporate combinations accompanied a sizeable rally in equity markets and robust U.S. and global economies. Although not shown on the chart, deal volume surpassed its late 1980s' pinnacle in 1995, five years before equity markets reached record highs in 2000. The recent peak in corporate takeovers (July 2017) relative to GDP matched those prior highs, but remained below the 1999, 2007 and 2015 tops as a percentage of market cap. Furthermore, last summer's zenith in global or cross-border M&A, a better indicator of market zest than U.S.-only activity, did not eclipse the peaks in 2007. Even at last summer's high, measured against both global GDP and market cap, worldwide corporate combinations remained below their 2015 top and well below their 2007 peak. At just 6.5% in early 2017, the GDP-based metric was significantly under the 2007Q3 pinnacle of 10%. That said, it is difficult to analyze this in context as the time series does not reach back to the late 1990s, which were boom years for M&A. Moreover, Phase I of the Fed funds rate cycle4 (the Fed is tightening, but policy is still accommodative) supports accelerating M&A activity (Chart 8A). Corporate combinations also climb during Phase II (Fed tightening, but policy is restrictive). However, M&A activity peaked at the end of Phase II in 2000 and 2007 (Chart 8B). BCA's view is that we will remain in Phase I until at least the end of 2018 and that Phase II may not be over until the end of 2019 or later. Chart 8AM&A Activity In Phase I Of The Fed Cycle... M&A Activity In Phase I Of The Fed Cycle... M&A Activity In Phase I Of The Fed Cycle... Chart 8BM&A Activity In Phase II Of The Fed Cycle... M&A Activity In Phase II Of The Fed Cycle... M&A Activity In Phase II Of The Fed Cycle... Bottom Line: The recent rollover in M&A activity does not signal a top in equity markets nor warn that a recession looms. Overall net equity withdrawal (which includes the net impact of IPOs, share buybacks and M&A) is not out of line with previous economic expansions (Chart 9). Stay overweight stocks versus bonds as the U.S. economic expansions becomes a decade-long phenomenon. Chart 9Comparison Of Corporate Outlays Across Four Economic Expansion Phases Goldilocks Goldilocks Just Right Wage inflation remains in a gradual upward trend, accelerating just enough to nudge up price inflation and prompt the Fed to hike rates four times this year. Although the labor market is tight in many areas, labor costs are not poised to blast off, but neither will they roll over. However, the January reading (+2.8 yoy) on average hourly earnings (AHE) stoked fears of the former, while the February reading (+2.6%) raised concerns of the latter. Chart 10 confirms that most measures of labor market slack have returned to normal. Moreover, the latest soundings on the job market from the National Federation of Independent Business suggest that small business owners have the most job openings in at least 18 years (Chart 11, panel 1). In addition, key concerns have shifted to the quality of the job applicants (panel 2) and the cost of labor (panel 3), away from taxes and over-regulation. Chart 10Labor Market Slack##BR##Is Disappearing Labor Market Slack Is Disappearing Labor Market Slack Is Disappearing Chart 11Hiring And Labor Costs A##BR##Key Concern For Small Businesses Hiring And Labor Costs A Key Concern For Small Businesses Hiring And Labor Costs A Key Concern For Small Businesses Those concerns were underscored in the Federal Reserve's January and February Beige books. Table 1 shows industries with labor shortages; in the year ended February, the gain in average hourly earnings in all but 3 of the industries was faster than average. Moreover, in all but 1 of these categories, labor market conditions are now the tightest since before the onset of the 2007-2009 recession. A recent Fed study5 examines the labor shortages in the manufacturing sector in more detail. The Beige Books noted that many businesses are having trouble finding low-skilled (and to a lesser extent, middle-skilled) workers, with a few mentions of the challenges of finding/retaining highly skilled employees, especially in STEM job functions. Chart 12 shows the wage gains for supervisory staff, a proxy for skilled (panel 1) and non-supervisory employees, and an imperfect proxy for low-skilled workers (panel 2). Both metrics are rising, but the skilled worker proxy accelerated more than the low-skilled metric. Moreover, at 3.1%, the latest reading on supervisory employees is nearly double the pace of non-supervisory personnel. The Atlanta Fed's Wage Tracker provides another lens on wage gains by skill level. Chart 13 shows that wage inflation among skilled positions is running well above average. Raises among mid- and low-skilled labor lag far behind. Notably, wages in all three have rolled over since late 2016. Table 1Labor "Shortages" Identified##BR##In The Beige Book Goldilocks Goldilocks Chart 12Supervisory Vs. Production##BR##Wage Inflation Supervisory Vs. Production Wage Inflation Supervisory Vs. Production Wage Inflation Chart 13Wage Inflation##BR##By Skill-Level Wage Inflation By Skill-Level Wage Inflation By Skill-Level Chart 14 argues that slightly faster compensation growth is imminent. The top panel shows that more than 80% of U.S. states register unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment. In the past, rates over 60% have been associated with wage pressures. The percentage climbed above 60% in January. The bottom panel of Chart 14 demonstrates the relationship between state unemployment rates and wage gains in each state. Chart 1480%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU 80%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU 80%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU Bottom Line: The labor market is back to normal, but is not overly tight, as shown in Chart 10. Wages and employment costs are in an uptrend, yet firms are still reluctant to give large pay increases to their labor force. That said, against the backdrop of fiscal stimulus, real GDP growth will remain well above potential, which means that the unemployment rate is headed to 3½% or even below. At some point, the labor market will overheat. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Reflective Or Restrictive", published March 12, 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "From Headwinds To Tailwinds", published March 6, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", published February 20, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Lingering In The Policy Sweet Spot," September 26, 2016 and "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," December 23, 2013. Both available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/evaluating-labor-shortages-in-manufacturing-20180309.htm