Debt Trends

Highlights We expect the U.S. House of Representatives to remain in GOP hands, but the Democrats could take razor-thin control of the Senate if Clinton wins the Presidency. The current, market-bullish status quo of divided government will continue. The chances of cooperation between a Clinton Administration and the House is actually quite good on some issues. We would expect House Republicans to give in to a modest infrastructure spending plan from Clinton, in exchange for corporate tax reform. There is now bipartisan support in the U.S. for removing the sequester, opening the door to some fiscal stimulus. A shift in focus from monetary to fiscal policy will be quite bullish for the dollar, which could rise by 10% in trade-weighted terms. The Japanese government appears to be preparing another shot of fiscal stimulus, which would be quite bearish for the yen and bullish for Japanese stocks when combined with the Bank of Japan's new yield curve policy. A number of headwinds that have held back U.S. growth this year will give way, generating 2½-3% real GDP growth in 2017. Positive growth surprises will encourage the FOMC to tighten in December and another five times over 2017/18. However, the speed of rate hikes will depend on how quickly the dollar appreciates. Dollar appreciation will undermine U.S. EPS growth next year. We view this as a headwind for stocks, but not something that will prevent modest gains in the S&P 500 next year. A key risk is that a surging dollar and a more hawkish FOMC sparks a correction in EM assets in the near term, spilling over into developed market bourses. Given elevated valuations, the risk/reward balance still favors a defensive strategy, with no more than a benchmark allocation to stocks. Several trends support our recommendation to maintain slightly below-benchmark duration within fixed- income portfolios. Among them, the annual growth rate in total central bank assets for the U.S., Euro Area, the U.K. and Japan is on the verge of peaking even assuming the ECB extends, which means that the period of maximum downward pressure on global term premia is over. Continue to overweight indexed bonds versus conventional issues. Oil prices should be able to hold up in the face of dollar strength given that we expect the tightening oil market will dominate. However, base metals will struggle. Feature As we go to press, Hillary Clinton is poised to win the Presidency of the United States following a tumultuous and divisive campaign. The key question now is the Senate race, where less controversial Republicans are contesting close elections. The GOP is at high risk of losing four Senate seats, with another three in play. Democrats need only four seats to take the Senate because, assuming that Clinton wins the presidency, Vice-President Tim Kaine would then cast the tie-breaking vote in that body. We expect the GOP to hold onto the House. This means that the current, market-bullish status quo of a divided government will continue. With the House remaining in Republican hands, and Democrats clinging to a potential razor-thin control of the Senate, the Clinton White House would be constrained on some of its most left-leaning policies. Unlike Obama, Clinton's victory will not be a popular sweep. She will likely receive less than 50% of the popular vote and will be the first candidate ever elected that has more voters saying they dislike her than like her (Chart I-1). Therefore, the odds are slim that Clinton will come to power with the same level of confidence and agenda-setting mandate as Obama did in 2008. Chart I-1Clinton And Trump: The Least Charismatic Candidates Ever November 2016 November 2016 Nonetheless, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service believes that the chances of cooperation between a Clinton Administration and the House is actually quite good on some issues. On corporate tax reform, it is difficult to see a reduction in effective tax rates, but a deal could be struck to broaden the tax base by closing various loopholes. This would be negative for some S&P 500 multinational corporations, but would benefit America's small and medium-sized enterprises. Paul Ryan and moderate Republicans understand that there has been a paradigm shift in America and that the median voter has moved to the left. As such, we would expect House Republicans to give in to a modest infrastructure spending plan from Clinton, in exchange for corporate tax reform. There is now bipartisan support for removing the sequester. Even a modest infrastructure plan could make a substantive difference for the economy given the high fiscal multipliers of government spending in an economy with low interest rates. The political shift to the left means that a Clinton-Ryan coalition will care less about the concerns of America's large corporations than previous governments, leading to policies that will result in higher effective tax rates on major corporations, a dollar bull market (in conjunction with tighter Fed policy, see below), and rising wages over the next four years. The election outcome will also be positive for bombed-out U.S. health care stocks. Even if the Democrats take the Senate, a Republican-held House will make it difficult for Clinton to push through legislation that does serious damage to the sector's pricing power. Health care stocks are oversold and cheap, at a time when consumer demand is solid and our pricing power proxy is rising much more quickly than overall corporate sector pricing. In terms of the macro implications, a shift in focus from monetary to fiscal stimulus will be quite bullish for the dollar. Below we discuss the important changes coming in the global investment landscape stemming from a renewed dollar bull phase. U.S. Growth: Expect Upside Surprises Any boost to U.S. infrastructure spending is unlikely to show up in GDP until the second half of next year. Nonetheless, there are other reasons to be more upbeat than the consensus on growth prospects for the first half as well. It is important to note that U.S. real final sales to private domestic purchasers, a good measure of underlying demand growth, has grown at almost 2½% over the past year, and was up 3.2% in the second quarter sequentially. A number of headwinds conspired to hold back the headline GDP growth figures, but these headwinds should moderate next year (Chart I-2): The five-quarter inventory correction is almost unprecedented in its length, but there are some high-frequency indicators (i.e. durable goods inventories and the inventory component of the ISM manufacturing index) that suggest that the correction is coming to an end (Chart I-3). Inventory destocking only needs to stabilize to boost GDP growth, since it is the change of the change in inventories that affects GDP growth. Chart I-2U.S. 2016 Growth Headwinds To Fade U.S. 2016 Growth Headwinds To Fade U.S. 2016 Growth Headwinds To Fade Chart I-3Inventory Rebuilding Has Commenced bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c3 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c3 Some of this year's slowdown reflects a pullback in the contribution of federal and state & local government spending. Nonetheless, this will not last long because state and local government revenues are trending higher and this sector spends all it takes in. As noted above, we also expect a boost from infrastructure spending at the federal level. Housing starts and residential investment hit a soft patch this year. The second quarter dip was mainly due to a warm winter, which pulled forward home-improvement spending. The NAHB homebuilders index heralds a rebound in housing activity in the coming months, in line with the improvement in household formation. Indeed, housing starts are still 20-25% below estimates of the amount of construction necessary to keep up with population growth. We also expect a little more capital spending once the election is out of the way, profits begin to expand again and industrial production growth improves early in the New Year. Moreover, the oil rig count has started to recover, suggesting that energy capex should stabilize and perhaps even improve. Overall corporate capital spending intentions have perked up (Chart I-4). The trade sector will be a drag on growth, especially if the dollar appreciates as we expect. Nonetheless, we believe that the unwinding of the other headwinds that have dogged the economy this year could provide real GDP growth of 2½-3% in 2017. Stronger-than-expected growth will have a positive impact on America's trading partners via import demand, but it is the response of the dollar that could really shake up global financial assets. The reasoning behind our strong dollar view is straightforward: interest rates differentials are the strongest predictor of currency trends on a 12-18 month horizon. Relative economic performance between the U.S. and the rest of the world suggests that interest rate differentials will move even further in favor the U.S. dollar. Chart I-5 highlights that the dollar tends to appreciate when U.S. interest rates are in the upper half of the interest rate distribution of the G10. With few central banks outside of the U.S. in a position to be able to lift interest rates, gently rising U.S. rates will keep the U.S. among the global developed market (DM) high-yielders for many years. Chart I-4Capex Plans Have Improved bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c4 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c4 Chart I-5U.S. Sitting Atop The Global Interest Rate Distribution Buoys The Dollar bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c5 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c5 Real interest rate differentials may shift even more than nominal rates in favor the dollar. Inflation expectations should rise in Europe and Japan to the extent that their respective currencies weaken and their economies receive a boost from improved U.S. import demand. But since neither central bank will allow much of an increase in local bond yields, rising inflation expectations will translate into lower real yields in the Eurozone and Japan. This will reinforce the dollar's bias to appreciate. The ECB could upset this forecast by announcing that it will taper the asset purchase program beginning in March of next year, but we believe it is more likely the central bank will extend the QE program for another six months. In Japan's case, the nominal yield curve is now fixed by the Bank of Japan out to 10-years. How Much Will The Dollar Appreciate? This is a difficult question. A central bank can tighten monetary conditions, but does not have control over how much of the tightening comes via interest rates and how much through currency appreciation. Our sense is that over the next couple of years the fed funds rate will need to rise to 2% in nominal terms (0% in real terms) and the dollar will appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms, to avoid an economic overheating and an overshoot of the inflation target. We expect the Fed to tighten in December, followed by two more quarter-point hikes in 2017. But, of course, an outsized dollar response to the initial rate hikes would temper the speed of Fed tightening. A 10% rise seems aggressive, but it would still leave the broad trade-weighted dollar index well below previous peaks. Wouldn't Such A Dollar Surge Kill Any Hopes Of A Recovery In U.S. Profits? Undoubtedly, dollar strength presents a direct and non-trivial risk to the earnings outlook. Our U.S. EPS model foresees a return to positive earnings growth early next year, and a full-year expansion of 5-6% (Chart I-6). This is based on three important assumptions: (1) industrial production returns to modest but positive growth next year; (2) oil prices are roughly unchanged from current levels, allowing profits in the energy patch to recover with a lag; and (3) nominal GDP growth accelerates modestly relative to labor compensation. Chart I-6The U.S. Profit Outlook bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c6 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c6 However, we assumed in the base case scenario presented in May that the dollar is unchanged. Re-running the model with a 10% dollar appreciation over the next year would shave about 2-3 percentage points off of EPS growth next year (Chart I-6). In other words, EPS would rise next year, but only modestly. Can The S&P 500 Rally In The Context Of Dollar Strength? Chart I-7Stocks Can Appreciate With The Dollar bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c7 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c7 An appreciating dollar is clearly a headwind, but it is the case that the S&P 500 rallied along with the dollar in the last three major dollar bull markets: 1978-1985, 1994-2002, and 2011 to today (Chart I-7). One could point to special factors in each episode. Nonetheless, our point is that if the dollar is appreciating because growth outside the U.S. is deteriorating, then the backdrop is negative for U.S. equities. But if the dollar is appreciating because the U.S. economic growth backdrop has brightened (with no deterioration elsewhere), then U.S. stocks can rally despite the negative impact of the dollar on profits. Indeed, the direction of causation reverses at times: it is the rally in U.S. risk assets (along with higher rates) that attracts foreign capital and pushes the dollar higher. A tax holiday on foreign retained earnings would also be positive for the dollar and risk assets. That said, the currency shifts we expect over the next year will favor Eurozone and Japanese stocks to the U.S. market in local currency terms. This is particularly so for Japan if more aggressive monetary and fiscal policies manage to sharply devalue the yen (see below). According to our models, a 5% depreciation of the euro and a 10% drop in the yen in trade-weighted terms would boost EPS growth next year by 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively, in the Eurozone and Japan (Chart I-8). Monetary policy divergence and relative valuation also support our recommendation to favor Japanese and Eurozone stocks versus the U.S. Chart I-8The Eurozone Profit Outlook The Eurozone Profit Outlook The Eurozone Profit Outlook What Does Our Dollar Outlook Mean For EM Assets? Continuing liquidity injections from the ECB and BoJ are positive for emerging market (EM) assets. Unfortunately, this will not shield emerging markets from a 10% dollar rise, especially if it is accompanied by another downleg in commodity prices (Chart I-9). A stronger greenback is likely to cause distress among over-leveraged EM borrowers given that 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. Chart I-10 illustrates that there have been no periods when EM share prices rallied amid strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar since the early 1980s. Meanwhile, the gap between EM and U.S. nonfinancials' return on equity (RoE) remains deeply negative, which historically has been associated with EM currency depreciation. Chart I-9Dollar Strength Is Negative For Commodities... bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c9 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c9 Chart I-10...And Emerging Markets ...And Emerging Markets ...And Emerging Markets The implication is that the recent rally in EM risk assets and currencies will not last. Investors should avoid this space. A dollar rally would also be a headache for the People's Bank of China (PBoC). Allowing the RMB to depreciate aggressively versus the dollar to avoid an appreciation in trade-weighted terms could ruffle political feathers in the U.S. and spark capital flight. The PBoC will likely manage the RMB's decline versus the dollar and allow it to appreciate in trade-weighted terms, while tightening capital account controls to prevent capital from fleeing the country. This outcome is slightly negative for the economy and could generate some financial market volatility as the process unfolds. We believe that China will be able to maintain GDP growth of around 6½% next year and that there will be no financial crisis related to China's high debt levels. Nonetheless, China's transition away from an investment-led to a consumer-led expansion means that the tailwind for commodity demand and EM exports will not return. FOMC: Some Like It Hot The probability of a Fed rate hike in December eased a little in recent days due to some disappointing economic data, such as the September readings on retail sales and the CPI, along with comments from Fed Chair Yellen on the benefits of allowing the economy to "run hot". Some others on the FOMC share her views, but many do not. As we highlighted in last month's Special Report,1 Yellen will not overrule the consensus on the FOMC. The appetite to test the limits of the supply side of the economy is simply not broad enough, as visions of the inflationary 1970s still loom large in some policymakers' minds. The Fed may end up being too slow in tightening policy and generate an overheated economy by accident, but the idea of purposefully engineering a temporary inflation overshoot is off the table. The hawkish shift in the consensus can be observed in the latest FOMC minutes. Not only did three members vote for a rate hike in September, but "several" members felt that a rate hike was a "close call". The remaining doves often point out that the Fed's preferred measure of inflation, core PCE, is still below the 2% target. However, this measure is an outlier; all other popular measures of underlying inflation are near or above 2% and are in a clear uptrend. Wage growth, although somewhat mixed across the various measures, is also trending up (Chart I-11). The doves already lost two members this year (Williams and Rosengren). More will jump ship if core PCE moves up in the coming months as we expect, although a 10% dollar appreciation by itself could shave almost a half point off of inflation next year (Chart I-12). Chart I-11U.S. Wage Pressure Is Growing bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c11 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c11 Chart I-12The Inflation Impact Of Dollar Strength bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c12 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c12 Recent data disappointments are a concern, but the bounce in both the ISM manufacturing and nonmanufacturing surveys in September, especially in the new orders components, is a sign that the soft patch will not endure. It would require a significant disappointment in the October and November payroll reports for the FOMC to stand pat at the December meeting. Beyond this year, our base-case outlook calls for five quarter-point rate hikes over 2017 and 2018, compared to only two rate hikes currently discounted in money markets. This forecast is uncertain because an even larger portion of the overall tightening in monetary conditions than we expect could come via the dollar. Indeed, there is a significant risk that dollar strength and Fed tightening sparks a correction in risk assets. The TINA phenomenon (There Is No Alternative) has forced many investors to take more risk they are comfortable holding. Valuations are also rich. This is the main reason why our investment recommendation is cautious, including only a benchmark allocation to equities in a balanced portfolio. We maintain that stocks will outperform bonds and cash on a 1-2 year horizon, although total returns will be depressed by historical standards. Moreover, we would not be surprised to see a 10% correction in the major equity bourses in the coming months. Investors with a short-term horizon should consider buying some insurance against this risk. What would it take for us to upgrade stocks to overweight? We would like to see significant fiscal stimulus in some combination of the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. It would be particularly bullish if the stimulus occurs outside the U.S., because a pickup in global growth would allow the Fed to tighten without driving the dollar significantly higher. This scenario would improve the outlook for equities inside and outside of the U.S. Finally, a 10% equity correction would create enough value that we would be quite tempted to upgrade the sector. Japan Prepares For The Next Step The dollar's ascent will be particularly acute versus the yen if we are right that more aggressive policy action looms in Japan. We argued in last month's Overview that fiscal stimulus will be particularly powerful in the context of the Bank of Japan's (BoJ) new policy framework. Instead of targeting a pace of asset purchases, the central bank is effectively fixing the yield curve by promising to hold the 10-year yield near to zero. By fixing the yield curve and by committing to maintain this policy until Japanese inflation moves above the 2% target, the BoJ is hoping to raise inflation expectations and drive down real bond yields. Fiscal stimulus in this environment would be quite effective because nominal yields would not be allowed to rise in response. Any increase in inflation expectations would flow directly into lower real yields and weaken the yen, thus reinforcing the initial thrust of fiscal policy. The timing and amount of additional fiscal spending is not clear, but the Japanese Diet is currently deliberating the third revision to the second supplementary budget. Government officials have signaled that there will be more coordination between monetary and fiscal policy in the future. The government is also debating ways to boost household income, including raising government wages, lifting the minimum wage and providing tax incentives for the private sector to be more generous on the wage front. Any efforts to boost income will add to upward pressure on actual inflation and inflation expectations. Given that the market is discounting inflation of only 0.26% per year on average over the next 20 years, the balance of risks favors an inflation rate that surprises to the upside. The resulting downward pressure on real interest rates, at a time when U.S. real rates will be rising, will depress the yen. Our currency experts expect the yen to weaken to 125 versus the dollar, representing a decline of roughly 10% in trade-weighted terms. We estimate that this would add about a half point to Japanese headline consumer price inflation next year (Chart I-12). A successful policy push would ultimately be quite bearish for JGBs. However, a critical element in the plan is that the BoJ prevents a premature rise in nominal yields. We do not expect any JGB selloff for at least a year. This means that, while total returns for JGBs will be poor (or negative for some maturities), the market will outperform the other major government bond markets in currency hedged terms if global yields rise in the coming months as we expect. The implication is that investors should favor JGBs over Bunds and, especially, Treasuries within global hedged bond portfolios. Also, stay long inflation protection in Japan, overweight the Nikkei and underweight the yen. Reason To Be Bond Bearish Chart I-13Reasons To Keep Duration Short bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c13 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c13 Our fairly hawkish view on the Fed is a key factor behind our recommendation to keep duration slightly short of benchmark within bond portfolios. More broadly, the global deflation beast is far from tamed, but the firming in selected commodity prices is reducing some of the downward pressure on inflation in the advanced economies. Oil prices have breached $50/bbl on hopes that OPEC-Russia talks will result in production cuts. Our commodity strategists do not expect any agreement to have much of a lasting impact on oil prices. Indeed, there is a risk that oil prices correct if the talks ultimately fail. However, we still expect WTI to trade between $40 and $65/bbl until 2020. The annual growth rate for the continuous commodity index has reached positive territory for the first time since 2014, which is translating into a more positive pricing environment for manufactured goods and overall headline inflation rates for both developed and emerging economies (Chart I-13, bottom panel). This has given inflation expectations a boost in the major markets, at a time when output gaps in developed countries are narrowing (the gap is near to being fully closed in the U.S.). Several other factors favor a below-benchmark duration stance at least for the near term (Chart I-13): Global growth is improving slowly. The global leading economic indicator (LEI) is rising and our diffusion index shows that 10 of 15 countries have rising LEIs. We expect the U.S. economy, in particular, to surprise to the upside. The prospect of even a little fiscal stimulus is bond bearish, following years of austerity in the major developed countries. The downward pressure on global term premia is dissipating as the BoJ has switched away from quantitative targets for asset purchases to fixing the yield curve. The ECB is likely to extend the QE program by another six months, but the central bank is unlikely to lift the pace of purchases from the current level. The annual percent change in total central bank assets for the U.S., Euro Area, the U.K. and Japan is on the verge of peaking even assuming the ECB extends, which means that the period of maximum downward pressure on global term premia is over (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Liquidity Growth Peaking Out bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c14 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s1_c14 The market expects that real short-term interest rates will stay in negative territory until at least the middle of the next decade, even in the U.S. There is plenty of room for the forward yield curve to reprice higher if growth turns out to be better than expected. This is particularly the case in the U.K., where fears of a post-Brexit economic bust and a fresh shot of stimulus from Bank of England sent the pound and gilt yields to extremely low levels. Our global bond and currency services recommend taking profits on overweight gilt/underweight sterling positions, and shifting in the opposite direction. Finally, bond sentiment indicators are still bullish, particularly in the U.S. Treasury market. Nonetheless, we are far from frothing bond bears. We do not believe that the fixed income market has moved into a secular bear phase, and would likely shift to benchmark or even above-benchmark duration if the 10-year Treasury yield reached 2%. Yields could eventually re-test the year's lows if there is a sharp equity correction. This is a market to be traded for now. Conclusions A more upbeat view on global and, especially, U.S. growth prospects is positive for risk assets, but the adjustment process could be painful as investors come to grips with what this means for the Fed. Extremely low Treasury yields imply that the consensus has "bought into" the Secular Stagnation thesis for the U.S., or at least to the view that America will never again be able to grow above 2%. The pickup in growth we expect will arrive at a time when there is accumulating evidence of an acceleration in wages, signaling that the labor market has reached full employment. A shift in focus away from monetary and toward fiscal stimulus, both inside and outside the U.S., is also bond-bearish. The bond market appears to be ignoring these trends so far, although rising inflation expectations suggest that we may be at the edge of a change in market expectations for growth, inflation and the Fed outlook. A significant shift up in the dollar would limit the bond market selloff, and it would be positive for the major economies outside of the U.S. Nonetheless, a 10% dollar appreciation would carry its own risks, including a hit to the U.S. profit outlook. On its own, dollar strength would not prevent the S&P 500 from rising, but there is a non-trivial risk that it wreaks havoc in the EM and commodity space for a time, reverberating back into developed markets. The bottom line is that investors should remain focused on capital preservation, with no more than an overall benchmark weighting in equities with a bias toward defensive sectors. Within bond portfolios, keep duration on the short side and favor high-quality spread product to government bonds in the major countries. High-yield bonds would benefit from stronger-than-expected economic growth in the U.S., but value is poor and balance sheets are deteriorating; the risk/reward balance is unattractive. European investment-grade bonds issued by domestic issuers are more attractive than the U.S. market because of improving balance sheet health. Favor real-return bonds to conventional issues in the major countries and add exposure to floating-rate notes. Our dollar view means that base metals should be avoided, despite the fact that we expect that China will be able to stabilize growth at around 6-7%. Oil should be able to hold up in the face of dollar strength given that we expect a tightening oil supply/demand backdrop. Both gold and silver would weaken if the dollar continues to appreciate and real bond yields rise in the near term. Nonetheless, rising inflation should overwhelm these negatives in the medium term. This implies that precious metals deserve a strategic place in investors' portfolios, although the near-term could be rough. Finally, we have received many questions on the risks posed by mushrooming U.S. student debt. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, takes an in-depth look. We conclude that student debt is a modest economic drag, but is not a source of risk to the government's finances and does not represent the next "subprime" crisis. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 27, 2016 Next Report: November 24, 2016 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Herding Cats at the Fed," October 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Student Loan Blues: Can't Repay What I Borrowed Incentives ingrained in the U.S. higher-education system have contributed to an alarming escalation in student debt over the last 15 years. About 43 million Americans owe a total of almost $1.2 trillion for their education, making student loans the second largest category of consumer debt next to mortgages. Some are comparing this trend to the housing subprime crisis, arguing that student debt is a major drag on growth at a minimum, and the source of another financial crisis at worst. Delinquency rates have surged and the 5-year cumulative default rate on student debt has reached almost 30%. Thankfully for the taxpayer, the recovery rate on defaulted student loans is extremely high, at around 80%. Sticker prices at most institutions have mushroomed, although few students pay the full fare. Rising tuition fees only explain about half of the surge in student debt. Education still pays, although the benefits have waned versus the costs. Moreover, students with debt lag significantly those with no debt in terms of wealth accumulation and home ownership after graduation. The rise in default rates have been due to the influx of non-traditional student borrowers after 2007, who come from lower income families and have had poorer educational and employment outcomes. However, the wave of such borrowers has faded, which means that overall delinquency and default rates will decline in the coming years. Debt service payments, while onerous for many families, are not a major drag on overall real GDP growth. The increased propensity of 18-35 year-olds to live with their parents has trimmed annual real GDP growth by 0.14% per year since 2007, although student debt is only one of many underlying causes. The student loan program is at worst only a minor drain on the Federal government's coffer because of the high recovery rate. The bottom line is that student debt is a social issue, and to a lesser extent, a macro issue. But it is not a financial stability issue. Student debt is not the next subprime. "We are not doing these young people any favors by giving them loans that they cannot afford, that they cannot discharge in bankruptcy, and that could be a drag on their financial well-being even into retirement". - Sheila Bair, former FDIC chief, Bloomberg interview, September 26, 2016 Ms. Bair was one of the first to warn about the risks posed by the U.S. subprime MBS market, well before Lehman went bust. Few were listening then, but more are listening now as she sounds the alarm bell regarding student loans. About 43 million Americans owe a total of almost $1.2 trillion for their education, making student loans the second largest category of consumer debt next to mortgages (Chart II-1). Ms. Bair notes that, like the MBS market before 2007, cheap and freely available credit is fueling prices (tuition in this case). Banks handed out mortgage loans to many who could not afford them in the 2000s, just as the Department of Education (DoE) is doing today with student loans. It is difficult to assess borrowers' ability to repay student loans. Some argue that the DoE is not even trying. The trajectory of student debt is indeed alarming (Chart II-2). In inflation-adjusted terms, the total value of loans outstanding has quadrupled since 2000, representing an annual average compound rate of 9.4%. The rise reflects both an increase in the number of borrowers and more borrowing per person. Average debt/person has jumped from $17,300 in 2007 to almost $28,000 in 2015 (amounts vary across data sources). Rising debt levels occurred across the family income distribution. Chart II-1Student Debt: The Next Subprime? bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c1 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c1 Chart II-2Student Loan Statistics bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c2 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c2 These figures understate the true debt levels because they include only loans that are made under the federal loan program, representing 81% of the total. The remainder are private loans, mostly originated by banks. Private loans do not enjoy the same borrower protection afforded to federal loans, and carry a significantly higher interest rate (average of almost 14% in 2016, compared to federal loan rates of 3.76%). The data on private loans are sparse due to limited reporting, but a study based on 2012 data showed that the average amount of debt for students with private loans was almost $40,000 at that time.1 Sticker Shock It is easy to blame rising tuition fees given soaring "sticker prices" at most institutions. The average posted fee for tuition and room & board has increased by 30% in inflation-adjusted terms since 2007 at public universities, and by 23% at private non-profit institutions (Charts II-3A & II-3B). However, due to grants, tuition discounts and tax credits for education, only a small fraction of students pay the posted rate. For the 2015/16 school year, the net price that the average student paid at a private non-profit institution was $26,400, far less than the almost $44,000 sticker price. Chart II-3ATuition & Fees: Public Institutions bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c3a bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c3a Chart II-3BTuition & Fees: Private Institutions bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c3b bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c3b Chart II-4The Distribution Of Student Debt November 2016 November 2016 The Brookings Institute estimates that only about 50% of the escalation in student debt in the past two decades can be explained by rising tuition costs.2 Another quarter reflects rising educational attainment; kids are staying in school longer to get a leg up in the highly competitive workplace. The remainder of the total rise in debt was left unexplained in the study. Other possible contributing factors include policy changes that expanded eligibility for federal loans programs, and the housing bust that made it more difficult for families to borrow against the value of their homes for education purposes. There was also a change in the background characteristics of borrowers after the Great Financial Crisis (see below). The share of students suffering with an extraordinary amount of debt is growing, although they still represent a small portion of the total for federal loans (Chart II-4). Five percent of student debtors owe more than $100,000 each, up from 2% in 2007. Another 10% hold between $50,000 and $100,000. About two-thirds of student borrowers owe less than $25,000. A Student Debt Crisis? Another Brookings paper provides estimates for the debt service burden associated with federal student loans. The burden is calculated as the median debt service payment divided by median earnings of employed borrowers for two years after entering the repayment period (Chart II-5).3 This ratio rose from about 4½% in 2004 to 7.1% in 2013. Unfortunately, more recent data are not available. The average interest rate on the outstanding loans has moderated since 2011, although not nearly as quickly as the drop in market interest rates.4 Nonetheless, the continued escalation in the stock of debt per person in recent years means that the debt service-to-income ratio has likely continued to escalate since 2013, despite the moderation in the average interest rate paid. The jump in student loan delinquencies has raised red flags regarding the number of borrowers in financial distress, feeding concerns that a student loan debt crisis is on the horizon. The 90-day delinquency rate for student loans has increased from about 7% in 2007 to 11% in 2012, where it has hovered ever since according to the Federal Reserve Bank of NY data (Chart II-1). However, since only about 55% of all loans are in the repayment period, the actual delinquency rate among those in repayment is almost double the official figures. Loans are considered to be in default when they are more than 270 days past due. Brookings estimates that the 5-year default rate for student loans entering the repayment period five years earlier reached 28% in 2014, up from 16% for the five-year period ending in 2007 (Chart II-6).5 Perhaps surprisingly, the default rate is still far below the peak rate of more than 40% in the late 1990s. Chart II-5Debt Service Burden Is Rising bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c5 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c5 Chart II-6Defaults Are Rising bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c6 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c6 Thankfully for the taxpayer, the recovery rate on defaulted student loans is extremely high, at around 80%.6 This is because borrowers are not able to discharge federal student debts during bankruptcy. Congress has passed legislation making it very difficult for borrowers to avoid repaying. The DoE has the authority to use a number of extraordinary collection means. These include garnishing a portion of borrower's wages or seizing any payment a borrower may receive from the federal government. Education Still Pays, But Not For Everyone Chart II-7Debt And Wages For 20-40 Year Olds bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c7 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c7 The good news is that education still pays for the average or median borrower. Chart II-7 shows that, while the average amount of student loans has escalated, it is still well below the average wage for those borrowers in the 20 to 40-year age group.7 The gap between wages and debt has narrowed over the past 15 years, but the increase in lifetime earnings potential still far exceeds the rise in accumulated debt for the average or median student. Of course, student loans have not paid off for everyone. News reports have highlighted plenty of examples of students that have graduated with crushing debt burdens and poor job prospects. Nonetheless, the Brookings study found that, for the vast majority, "the increase in borrowing would be made up for relatively early in the career of a worker with mean earnings".8 The Digest of Education Statistics show that, in 2013, the median annual earnings for full-time workers with a Bachelor's degree in the 25 to 34 age group was $48,530, compared with $30,000 for workers with just a high-school diploma. The bad news is that it is taking much longer to repay these debts. The mean term of repayment has increased from 7½% in 1992 to about 13½ years in 2010.9 Extended repayment and income-driven repayment plans can increase the loan term to 20, 25 or even 30 years. In some cases, borrowers will still be paying for their education when their children enter college!10 There is also evidence that the debt burden is causing some young adults to delay marriage and live with their parents for longer than they otherwise would. More Debt And Less Wealth Young student debtors also lag significantly relative to their peers in terms of wealth accumulation. A Pew Research Center study found that households headed by a young, college-educated adult without any student debt obligations have about seven times the typical net worth ($64,700) of households headed by a young, college-educated adult with student debt ($8,700; Chart II-8).11 Net worth is lower for those with student loans not just because their overall debt levels are higher; the value of their assets trailed as well. This gap is despite the fact that those households with a degree had almost double the annual income of those in the study that did not. Even comparing only households headed by young adults that did not attain a degree, accumulated wealth for those with student debt fell far short of those who avoided debt. One explanation is that money being absorbed by student debt repayment is unavailable to accumulate assets. A Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) of Boston study12 estimated that a 10% increase in student loan debt per household is associated with a 0.9% decline in the value of total wealth. Student loan burdens also mean that households end up relying more on other types of debt, such as auto loans and credit cards, according to the Pew study. Chart II-8Higher Debt, Lower Wealth... November 2016 November 2016 Table II-1...And Lower Homeownership November 2016 November 2016 Student debtors are also less likely to own a home after 2009 (Table II-1). Before 2009, the FRB of Boston study found that 30-year olds with a history of student loans had a higher homeownership rate than those without student debt. This makes sense because the boost to household income from obtaining more education should make it easier to quality for a mortgage. However, the relationship between student debt and homeownership switched after the Great Recession. The economy-wide homeownership rate has fallen sharply since home prices peaked in 2006, but the drop was more severe for those with student loans. This is probably due to the erosion in future income expectations following the recession for those with student debt, as well as more limited access to additional credit based on these individuals' existing debt loads (i.e. lower credit scores). Alternatively, student debtors may simply be reluctant to add to their overall leverage in light of the more uncertain economic outlook. A Fed study estimated that every 10% increase in student debt per person now results in a 1 percentage point drop in the homeownership rate for the first five years after graduation.13 Non-Traditional Borrowers Led The Surge In Delinquencies... While student debt burdens are unlikely to ameliorate anytime soon, the default rate should moderate in the coming years. Brookings (2015) conducted a detailed assessment of the characteristics of student loan borrowers and how they changed after 2007, by matching administrative data on federal student borrowers with earnings data from tax records. The study split the sample into "traditional" and "non-traditional" borrowers. Traditional borrowers are defined to be those attending 4-year public and private institutions because they tend to be typical in nature; they start college in their late teens, soon after completing high school, are dependent on their parents for aid purposes, pursue 4-year degrees and, frequently, head on to graduate study. This group historically represented the majority of federal borrowers and loan amounts. Non-traditional borrowers historically made up only a small portion of the total. These are defined to be those borrowing for 2-year programs (primarily community college) or to attend for-profit schools. The study found that non-traditional borrowers have largely come from lower-income families, tended to be older (i.e. not supported by parents), attended institutions with relatively low completion rates and faced poor labor market outcomes after leaving school (Chart II-9). Lower median wages and higher rates of unemployment meant that non-traditional borrowers tended to default on their student loans at a higher rate than traditional students. Student borrowing is counter cyclical; it tends to accelerate during recessions as unfavorable labor market conditions encourage people to return to school or to stay in school longer. The flow of new borrowers accelerated particularly sharply during the Great Recession, as intense pressure on State budgets led to cuts in scholarships by public institutions. Access to alternative credit markets was also curtailed during and after the Great Financial Crisis. Chart II-9Non-Traditional Students Had Poor Labor Market Experience November 2016 November 2016 Chart II-10Surge In Non-Traditional ##br##Borrowers After 2007 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c10 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c10 Student loan inflows (i.e. the number of new borrowers) and outflows (the number paying off loans) are shown in Chart II-10. Inflows trended higher from 2000 to 2007, while outflows were fairly flat, leading to an upward trend in the net inflows. Inflows subsequently surged during the recession, reaching a peak in 2010. The jump in new borrowers was concentrated among non-traditional students. The number of non-traditional borrowers grew to represent almost half of all new borrowers soon after the recession. The wave of students who had begun to borrow during the recession entered the repayment period in increasingly large numbers from 2011 to 2014. The early years of repayment are the most precarious because debtors are just starting their careers and their earnings are the most variable. The rise in the share of non-traditional borrowers largely explains the surge in the overall default rate since 2011. In contrast, the majority of traditional borrowers have experienced strong labor market outcomes and relatively low rates of default. Of all the students who left school, started to repay federal loans in 2011, and had fallen into default by 2013, about 70% were non-traditional borrowers. ...But The Worst Is Over The situation has since begun to reverse. Inflows and the net change in the number of borrowers has declined since 2012, particularly at 2-year and for-profit institutions. The moderation of the pace of inflows, the change in the composition of borrowers (less non-traditional), and efforts by the DoE to expand the use of income-based repayment programs will put downward pressure on delinquency and default rates in the coming years. Economic Impact Of Student Debt There are several channels through which rising student debt can affect overall economic growth. Spending by households with student debt will be curtailed both by the need to service the loans and by the fact that these households have lower levels of net worth. They are also less likely to own a home or form a small business. (1)Debt Service Burden And The Wealth Effect Table II-2 presents estimates of the value of aggregate debt service payments as a percent of GDP. This is based on the median debt service-to-earnings estimates from the Brookings Institute and median income for households where the head is less than 35 years of age in the Survey of Consumer Finances. If we assume that every dollar paid to service student loans is a dollar not spent on goods and services, then Table II-2 implies that the resulting drag on the level of real GDP has doubled from 0.17% of GDP in 2004 to 0.34% in 2013 (latest year available). However, it is the increase over time that matters for GDP growth, not the level. The rise of 0.17% was spread over nine years, suggesting that the drag on GDP growth was minimal. Moreover, this represents an overestimate of the actual drag, because households with student debt have leaned more heavily on other types of debt in an attempt to maintain their living standards. Table II-2The Debt Service Drag On GDP November 2016 November 2016 Lower levels of asset accumulation and net worth will also undermine consumer spending. However, we believe that accounting for both the "wealth effect" and the debt-service effect on GDP would be double counting. Chart II-11Spending On Education ##br##Not A Growth Driver bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c11 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c11 Education spending also provides a possible offset to the negative impact of debt service on GDP growth. However, in terms of household spending on education, in inflation-adjusted terms there has been virtually no growth in consumer spending on higher education over the past 15 years despite all the extra spending in nominal dollars (Chart II-11). Data on government spending specifically on higher education is not available, but spending on all levels of education including primary and secondary schools has declined as a fraction of real GDP since the early 2000's. The implication is that total spending on higher education by households and governments has not provided any offset to the drag on GDP growth from student debt since 2007. (2)Housing Market Earlier, we cited Fed estimates that every 10% increase in student debt per person results in a 1 percentage point drop in the homeownership rate for the first five years after graduation. The economy-wide homeownership rate has fallen by 5.5 percentage points since the beginning of 2007, reaching 62.9% in the second quarter of 2016. We estimate that rising student indebtedness could account for as much as 1½ percentage points of the total 5½ percentage point drop. This is based on the Fed's estimates, the rise in the share of student loan borrowers among the total number of households and the increase in student debt-per-person. Again, this estimate likely overstates the impact because we are implicitly assuming that every new student borrower since 2007 ultimately forms a new household upon graduation. Undoubtedly, a portion of student borrowers formed a household with other student borrowers. Even if this estimate is close to the truth, it is not clear that there is a large impact on GDP growth. The formation of new households will result in an expansion in the housing stock one-for-one (assuming no change in inventories). Whether they decide to rent or buy, this will boost the residential investment portion of GDP. Buying a home or condo often results in home renovation and purchases of new furnishings, thus providing the economy with a larger boost compared to new households that rent. Nonetheless, the difference is difficult to estimate and is probably small enough to ignore. Another way to approach the issue is to gauge the impact on the housing market of the greater propensity of 18-35 year olds to live with their parents. Those living at home jumped from 19.2 million in 2007 to 23.0 million in 2015. The proportion of those living at home of the total population of 18-35 year olds rose from 28% to 32%. If the ratio had not increased over the period, it would have resulted in an extra 2½ million young people leaving home. If we assume that one-quarter of them move in with someone else who is also leaving home, then it would result in an increase in the housing stock of more than 1.8 million units since 2007 (condos or single family homes). We estimate that the resulting boost to residential construction growth would have added an average 0.14 percentage points to real GDP growth each year since 2007. Of course, it is not clear how much of the "living at home" trend is due to student loans as opposed to low earnings or poor job prospects. This estimate thus overstates the direct impact of student loans on the housing market. Nonetheless, it is instructive that the living-at-home phenomenon has been a non-trivial drag on economic growth via new home construction. (3) New Business Creation Academic research has also linked rising student indebtedness to a slower pace of new business creation. Research by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia points out that approximately 60% of new jobs in the private sector are created by small business.14 The U.S. Small Business Administration states that small firms receive approximately three-quarters of their capital needs in the form of loans, credit cards and lines of credit, which often have a personal liability attached. Having student loans reduces one's debt capacity and thus the ability to obtain small business loans. The Fed study compared student loan data and new business formation across U.S. counties. The Fed estimates that an increase of one standard deviation in student debt results in a decrease of 70 in the annual pace of new small business creation, representing a decline of approximately 14½%. Chart II-12 shows the inverse correlation between student debt and new business formation across U.S. states. Chart II-12Student Debt Hinders Small Business Creation November 2016 November 2016 The impact of a slower pace of new business creation on overall economic growth is unclear. A student that does not create a new business for whatever reason will likely end up working for an already existing company that is growing, expanding the supply side of the economy anyway. True, small businesses create a lot of jobs, but they lose a lot too because the failure rate for these firms is high in the early years. Some claim that the less vibrant new business environment since 2007 reflects a less dynamic economy, helping to explain the dismal productivity record since that time. However, this flies in the face of the fact that the small business sector is less productive overall than large businesses. Chart II-13 demonstrates that there is a rough correlation between the new firm creation rate and real GDP growth per capita at the state level. However, it is not clear which one is driving the other. Our sense is that, while a less vibrant new business backdrop likely contributed to the poor post-Lehman economic record, it is far from the major driving factor. Chart II-13GDP Growth And Small Business Creation: Which One Is The Driver? bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c13 bca.bca_mp_2016_11_01_s2_c13 (4) The Federal Budget Could the surge in delinquency rates wind up costing the taxpayer a bundle? Eighty percent of all student loans are either made directly by or are backed by the federal government, generating a potentially large contingent liability. Fortunately for the taxpayer, the recovery rate on student loans is extremely high. Moreover, the Federal government makes money on the spread between the student loan rate and the rate at which it finances these loans (Treasury yields). Congress sets the loan rates and they are kept well above Treasury yields. Under Congressional accounting rules, the cost of a student loan is recorded in the federal budget during the year the loan is disbursed, taking into account the amount of the loan, expected payments to the government over the life of the loan, and other cash flows, all discounted to the present value using interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities. By this accounting rule, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Federal government will make a net profit of almost $200 billion over the 2013-2023 period.15 However, a more reasonable "fair value" accounting method, which includes the costs of collection and other items, shows that the student loan program will cost the taxpayer roughly $100 billion over the same period. Either way, the bottom line is that the student loan program is at worst only a minor drain on the Federal government's coffer. Delinquency and default rates are likely to moderate in the coming years. But even if default rates were to surge to new highs for some reason, the recovery rate is so elevated that the impact on the Federal budget balance would be lost in the rounding. Conclusion It seems clear that incentives ingrained in the U.S. higher-education system have contributed to an alarming escalation in student debt over the last 15 years. There has been a vicious circle in which increased federal loan limits supported institutions' ability to raise tuition fees, resulting in a greater need for federal loans. Some for-profit institutions have been criticized for offering shoddy education, for graduating too many students in disciplines for which job prospects are poor, and for encouraging students to load up on high-cost debt. The U.S. spends almost 80% more per pupil on higher education than the OECD average, and yet some argue that this has not resulted in better educational outcomes. The social impact of student leveraging is clearly negative. The benefits of education have narrowed relative to the costs. Financial stress has increased along with debt service burdens, especially for non-traditional borrowers, and repayment periods have been extended to an average of over 13 years. These trends have caused young people to delay marriage and home purchases. This is a serious political and social issue that needs to be addressed. That said, we do not agree with Ms. Bair that student debt is the next "subprime" crisis. Delinquency and default rates are likely to fall in the coming years. These loans have not been packaged into opaque financial instruments and distributed throughout the investment world. The vast majority of the loans are federally backed and the recovery rate is very high. Even if there is a wave of mass defaults, the federal deficit might rise slightly but there is no channel through which the shock can propagate through the financial system. The bottom line is that student debt is a social issue, and to a lesser extent, a macro issue. But it is not a financial stability issue. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 "Student Debt and the Class of 2015," Annual Report of the Institute for College Access & Success, October 2016. 2 Beth Akers and Matthew Chingos, "Is a Student Loan Crisis on the Horizon?" Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings, June 2014. 3 Adam Looney and Constantine Yannelis, "A Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2015. 4 Most federal student loans are at a fixed rate set by Congress. 5 Brookings (2015). 6 http://www.edcentral.org/edcyclopedia/federal-student-loan-default-rate… 7 The data are only available to 2010, but we have estimated figures to 2013. 8 Brookings (2014). 9 Brookings (2014). 10 Student loans generally have a 10-year term, but loans consolidated with the federal government are eligible for extended repayment terms based on the outstanding balance, with larger debts eligible for longer repayment terms. 11 "Young Adults, Student Debt and Economic Well-Being," Pew Research Center, May 14, 2014. 12 Daniel Cooper and J.Christina Wang, "Student Loan Debt and Economic Outcomes," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, October 2014. 13 Alvaro Mezza, Daniel Ringo, Shane Sherlund and Kamila Sommer, "On the Effect of Student Loans on Access to Homeownership," Finance and Economic Discussion Series of the Federal Reserve Board. 2016-2010. 14 Brent Ambrose, Larry Cordell, and Shuwei Ma, "The Impact of Student Loan Debt on Small Business Formation," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper, July 2015. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Equity markets ended the month slightly lower as investors come to grips with the economic and profit implications of the pending Fed rate hike and Brexit. While TINA is still in play, caution abounds, as highlighted by waning investor sentiment and continued weakness in our Equity Technical indictor. Rising bond yields and a stronger dollar contributed to a weakening in our Monetary Indictor, trends that no doubt contributed to the overall diminished appetite for risk over the month. Our Equity Valuation Indicators have improved somewhat, but still remain in overvalued territory. Net earnings revisions have become constructive and positive earnings surprises increasingly outpaced negative ones. Despite this, we would need to see a close to 10% price depreciation for U.S. equities to appear attractive, as outlined in Section 1. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators continue to send a positive message for stock markets. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. At the moment, the low levels of the WTP indicators suggest that flows have been stronger into bonds than into stocks. From a contrary perspective, this means that there is "dry powder" available if investors decide to move more aggressively into equity markets. The U.S. and Eurozone indicators appear to have bottomed out last month and continue their ascent. This should be bullish for both U.S. and Eurozone equities. The U.S. dollar notched a strong month with a gain of more than 3%. This has tightened financial conditions as can be seen in the decline of our Financial Conditions Index. The deviation from its 12-month moving average is even more pronounced, turning negative after several months of treading water in "easing" territory. Our Dollar Composite Technical indicator displayed a violent move higher, but has yet to breach a level consistent with previous episodes of overextension; the USD can rally further. The yen is showing signs of entering an extended period of depreciation. Net speculative positions are extremely elevated and the 40-week rate of change appears to have formed a trough, rebounding from all-time lows. In a similar vein, the euro is also displaying weakness as its 40-week rate of change is crossing into negative territory. As outlined in Section 1, we expect a 10% appreciation in the U.S. dollar, a 10% depreciation in the yen and a 5% depreciation of the euro in trade-weighted terms. The commodity complex ended the month flat, with a more robust global growth backdrop offsetting the negative impact of a strong U.S. dollar and higher rates. While the advance/decline line ticked up, a positive sign for a potential broad-based gain across currencies, gold had a less than stellar month. The outsized impact of financial variables (U.S. dollar strength and higher real rates) on the yellow metal led to a more than 5% price decline. Our Commodity Composite Technical Indicator surged deeper into overbought territory, indicating that it might be time to take some risk off the table. The balance of risks for commodities excluding oil is to the downside. As mentioned in Section 1, an appreciating U.S. dollar and elevated yields will eventually feed through to weakness in the space. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China

Highlights China's rising debt-to-GDP ratio is the mirror image of rising assets, due to a combination of rising capital intensity in the economy, falling returns on assets, falling profit margins and declining efficiency. The country's ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratio in recent years does not mean rising leverage. Rather, it is largely a reflection of the mounting difficulties in the Chinese corporate sector since the global financial crisis. The government's right choice is policy reflation via easing interest burdens, increasing aggregate demand and boosting corporate pricing power - combined with "supply-side" policies to improve corporate sector efficiency. Any harsh attempts to "delever" the broad corporate sector would amplify growth problems. Feature Of all the "China worries" among global investors, the leverage issue sits center stage. Conventional wisdom holds that China's corporate sector has become dangerously levered, which has increased broader financial fragility and economic vulnerability. The Chinese government shares similar concerns, with "deleveraging" a key policy objective for many years now. The Balance Sheet Of China Inc. However, the "debt bubble" discussion among investors and Chinese officials of late has been narrowly focused on China's debt-to-GDP ratio, particularly within the corporate sector. In a previous report, we discussed that Chinese companies' total liability-to-assets ratio, a conventional leverage measure, has not been particularly high, either from a historical perspective or compared with other countries.1 Specifically: From a micro perspective, our calculation shows that the median liability-to-assets ratio of domestically listed Chinese companies is currently 60%, or 29% for the interest-bearing debt-to-assets ratio, both of which have been little changed in the past 10 years. In fact, the leverage ratios of Chinese firms do not stand out in global comparison (Chart 1). Moreover, the median cash-to-assets ratio of Chinese firms is substantially higher than global peers, which means net debt levels are even smaller. For the macro economy, while total liabilities are hard enough to measure, measuring total assets becomes almost Mission Impossible, especially for households and the government. A reasonable proxy for the corporate sector is industrial firms' financial numbers published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Obviously industrial firms are a subset of the corporate sector, and corporate debt also includes borrowing by non-industrial firms. However, industrial firms tend to be more levered than other businesses, particularly service providers, and therefore their debt situation should be more "alarming" than the overall corporate sector. Chart 2 shows that the liabilities-to-assets ratio for all industrial firms currently stands at 57% - comparable to listed firms, a figure that has been in decline since the early 2000s. Chart 1The Balance Sheet Of China Inc. Rethinking Chinese Leverage Rethinking Chinese Leverage Chart 2The Debt-To-Asset Ratio Has Been Declining bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c2 bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c2 All of this stands in stark contrast to the consensus view of the highly indebted Chinese corporate sector, and raises some important questions. What is the true leverage situation in the Chinese corporate sector? Why has the rising "macro" leverage ratio, defined by debt-to-GDP, not been accompanied by a rising debt-to-assets ratio at the micro level? Rising Debt, Or Rising Assets? If debt-to-GDP is rising but debt-to-assets is not, then by extension assets-to-GDP is also rising. Indeed, as of 2015, liabilities of industrial firms totaled RMB 57 trillion, compared with RMB 96 trillion non-financial corporate sector debt, based on "total social financing" data, or 83% and 142% of Chinese GDP, respectively (Chart 3). As a share of GDP, both data series have been rising, but industrial firms' total liabilities have plateaued of late, while total "corporate sector" debt has continued to increase. Meanwhile, total assets of industrial firms currently amount to RMB 101 trillion (Chart 4). As a share of GDP, industrial firms' total assets have been rising much faster than liabilities, leading to a rapid decline in the liability-to-assets ratio of all industrial firms, as shown in Chart 2. Chart 3Rising Debt In The Corporate Sector... bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c3 bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c3 Chart 4... Reflects Rising Assets bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c4 bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c4 In other words, the corporate sector's rising debt-to-GDP ratio simply reflects rising assets. Therefore, the more important question is why assets as a share of GDP have also been rising. In our view, a rising assets-to-GDP ratio reflects two important developments: First, a rising assets-to-GDP ratio means the economy has become more capital intensive, which is a natural consequence of becoming more industrialized. As economic growth drives up the cost of labor, enterprises tend to invest in capital stock to replace workers, leading to a higher capital-to-labor ratio, and consequently higher productivity. Accumulating capital stock is the fundamental factor that enables lagging economies to catch up to those that are more advanced. Meanwhile, an economy with a larger industrial sector also tends to be more asset-heavy than an agriculture-based economy or a post-industrialization service-oriented economy. Second, from a national accounts point of view, GDP is the sum of total value-added at all stages of production within a country. Therefore, a rising assets-to-GDP ratio suggests that it takes more assets to generate the same unit of value-added. As far as the corporate sector is concerned, this implies that return on assets (ROA) has declined, which is confirmed by the industrial sector data: the ROAs of all industrial firms have indeed been falling since the global financial crisis (Chart 5). Further Decoding Leverage: A DuPont Approach Borrowing the wisdom of the "DuPont model" in analyzing return on equity (ROE), a country's debt-to-GDP ratio can be further broken down into the following components: Rethinking Chinese Leverage Rethinking Chinese Leverage As discussed above, if the economy's debt-to-GDP has been rising but its debt-to-assets ratio has not, then mathematically it means that the other three components, either individually or collectively, have also been rising (Chart 6). Chart 5Return On Assets Has Deteriorated bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c5 bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c5 Chart 6The DuPont Approach Of Debt-To-GDP bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c6 bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c6 Chinese companies' profits-to-GDP ratio increased in the early 2000s but has been falling since the global financial crisis, and therefore has not been a main reason behind the country's rising debt-to-GDP ratio in recent years. The assets-to-sales ratio has indeed been rising since 2011, which mathematically has contributed to the rising debt-to-GDP ratio. Assets-to-sales is the reciprocal of sales/assets, or asset turnover in textbook corporate finance (top panel, Chart 7). Falling asset turnover underscores declining efficiency with which a company is deploying its assets in generating revenue. Chart 7The Real Reasons Behind ##br## Rising Debt-To-GDP Ratio bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c7 bca.cis_sr_2016_10_27_c7 The sales-to-profit ratio has also been rising since 2011. Similarly, sales-to-profits is the reciprocal of profit-to-sales, or profit margin (bottom panel, Chart 7). In other words, rising sales-to-profits, or falling profit margins, has also contributed to the rising debt-to-GDP ratio in recent years. What Does All This Mean? From a balance sheet point of view, there is no clear evidence that the Chinese corporate leverage ratio has increased significantly in recent years, as widely perceived. The country's rising debt-to-GDP ratio is the mirror image of rising assets, due to a combination of rising capital intensity in the economy, falling returns on assets, falling profit margins and declining efficiency. Therefore, China's apparently ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratio in recent years does not mean rising leverage. Rather, it is largely a reflection of the mounting difficulties in the Chinese corporate sector since the global financial crisis. This is an important distinction, because it matters for policymakers on how to "delever" the economy. If the rising debt-to-GDP ratio is a true reflection of reckless borrowing and rising balance sheet leverage, then the authorities should be tightening monetary conditions and cutting credit flows. If, on the contrary, the rising debt-to-GDP ratio reflects slowing growth and deflationary damage inflicted on the corporate sector, then the right choice is policy reflation via easing interest burdens, increasing aggregate demand and boosting corporate pricing power - combined with "supply-side" policies to improve corporate sector efficiency. Any harsh attempts to "delever" the broad corporate sector would amplify growth problems, creating a vicious cycle that would lead to an even higher debt-to-GDP ratio. What the Chinese government intends to do remains to be seen. Early this month the State Council released a new document to guide the corporate sector to "delever", with several specific measures including the controversial "debt-equity" swap initiative, which allows banks to swap their corporate loans into equity holdings. There is little doubt that policymakers should not continue to feed "zombie" companies and evergreen hopeless loans. However, any efforts to help companies reduce deflationary pain should be helpful in terms of them honoring their debt obligations, and reducing overall credit risk in the system. Finally, the global investment community has been deeply troubled by China's debt situation in recent years, but the attention has been almost solely focused on the country's debt-to-GDP ratio. While this ratio is widely accepted as a leverage indicator at the macro level that allows for easier cross country comparisons, it is also well known for its major shortcomings. The ratio compares total debt in the economy, a stock concept, to economic output in a particular year, which is a flow concept and tends to be a lot more volatile. Therefore, it is necessary to take a broader view to assess the debt situation, such as on-balance-sheet debt ratios and the debt servicing capacity. Moreover, a country's debt situation should be put in context of country specific factors such as the savings rate, financial intermediation mechanisms and the current stage of the country's growth situation. We will continue to follow up on these issues in our future research. Stay tuned. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging! ", dated June 15, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Investors are overstating the legal and political constraints to "helicopter money"; The BoJ and BoE have few legal hurdles, whereas the ECB would have to get creative to stay within the existing law; Inflation-phobia in Germany will wane if the choice becomes euro survival; The BoJ has already laid the framework for debt monetization with its Sept. 21 decision; The risk is that debt monetization is a difficult policy to restrain once unleashed; Our long-term bet is bullish on an inflation comeback and Japanese risk assets. The helicopters are coming. The global appetite for outright debt monetization, i.e. "helicopter money," appears small today. However, the research philosophy at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy holds that policymakers respond readily to constraints and rarely get to pursue their preferences. As such, we approach every issue from the perspective of what policymakers have to do, not what they want to do. That is why we perked up when the Bank of Japan announced a new monetary policy framework on Sept. 21. The central bank says it will target the yield curve rather than the monetary base in its quest to increase inflation, reduce real interest rates, spur growth, and catapult Japan out of its long-lived liquidity trap. Assuming the policy evolves, as is typically the case, and comes to be accompanied by more ambitious fiscal spending, as we think will happen, it helps clear the way to debt monetization in all but name.1 Our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Investment Strategy, has shown how policymakers may end up dining at the trough of "money printing" (Charts 1 and 2).2 Chart 1As Long As Credit##br## Expands Faster Than Income ... bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c1 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c1 Chart 2... Debt Burdens Will Remain High bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c2 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c2 To summarize, Peter argues that: The BoJ and the ECB may find themselves in a situation where they have no choice but to implement heterodox monetary policy, and that may happen relatively soon. Negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has failed to increase inflation and demand, leaving intact the global deflationary tail risk and forcing policymakers and investors to ask, "What next?" Japan is stuck in a liquidity trap. Therefore orthodox monetary policy will not increase inflation and demand. Fiscal policy is needed (Charts 3 and 4). There are high political and economic constraints to raising tax rates in Japan. Hence there is little scope for fiscal stimulus that does not increase indebtedness. In the euro area, a return of the sovereign debt crisis cannot be discounted, once the lagged effects of the massive decline in bond yields and credit spreads, a weaker euro, and lower oil prices dissipate in the future. Helicopter money may become politically appealing as a way in which to boost inflation and demand in order to assuage the political costs of painful structural reforms. Chart 3Japan Is In##br## A Liquidity Trap Japan Is In A Liquidity Trap Japan Is In A Liquidity Trap Chart 4Fiscal Stimulus Will Not Drive Up##br## Interest Rates In A Liquidity Trap Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics We agree - and yet the politics can be tricky. In this analysis, we ask, What are the legal and political hurdles to debt monetization, and what are the political risks of pursuing such a policy? We believe that investors may be overstating the constraints to ultra-unorthodox monetary policy. However, we also share the view of our colleague Martin Barnes that debt monetization would entail significant "mischief," including higher political and geopolitical risks.3 Helicopter Shopping Monetary financing (i.e. "helicopter money") can be implemented in various ways.4 Whatever option is chosen, the chief advantage is that "Ricardian Equivalence" does not apply.5 This means that even as the government issues new debt, households and corporates will not restrict their spending and investing on the expectation that taxes will eventually have to go up. Debt monetization avoids this demand-suppressing phenomenon because central bank money is irredeemable, which leads to a permanent increase in the monetary base and should therefore lead to higher inflation and demand. Helicopter money is fiscal stimulus financed by monetary means (hence the term "monetary financing"). Even handing cash directly to households is ultimately a form of fiscal stimulus, equivalent to a tax cut. Critically, and unlike the latter, helicopter money does not involve any increase in government debt levels. There are several forms of monetary financing worth expanding on: Perpetual QE: The government issues government bonds and sells them to financial market participants in order to increase public expenditures or cut taxes. Beforehand, the central bank assures the public that it will buy the same amount of debt in the open market and will never sell it back again. Since bonds are normally redeemable, Ricardian Equivalence is avoided only if the central bank can credibly commit itself never to sell the purchased bonds to the open market. Then it does not matter whether the central bank cancels these bonds or rolls them over when they mature.6 Haircut on existing debt: Central banks could take a haircut on their existing holdings of government bonds, letting a large part of the public debt disappear and giving governments more scope for fiscal stimulus. This would result in a loss on the central bank balance sheet, which it would obviate by creating money out of thin air. Direct lending to government: Governments could issue perpetual zero-coupon bonds and sell them directly to the central bank. This would allow for fiscal stimulus financed by a permanent increase in the monetary base without a balance sheet loss for the central bank. Lending to a public institution: Instead of direct lending, governments could sell perpetual zero-coupon bonds to a public institution (like an infrastructure bank). The central bank would then purchase those bonds from this public institution on the secondary market. This would avoid legal prohibitions, such as those in the euro area, against direct financing of government expenditure. "Trillion dollar coin": Governments could mint a high-value coin and sell it to the central bank. This measure was discussed during the United States fiscal cliff negotiations in 2012 as a way for the president to avoid a debt crisis caused by political brinkmanship with the legislature. "Citizenship credit": Governments could issue "citizenship credits" to all households, which the central bank would then buy for a set price. This fictitious asset swap would result in increased household wealth and could thus have a larger effect on demand than the above measures.7 The evidence from past tax cuts and stimulus measures suggests that households will spend at least 20 cents of every dollar received.8 Pure helicopter drops: The most radical solution would be to print money and distribute it directly to households. In theory, this would lead to a balance sheet loss on part of the central bank because no asset would be received in return. But, in reality, as Peter Berezin points out, from the central bank's point of view "money" is merely a bond which never matures and pays no interest. By definition, such a bond has a present value of zero. From the perspective of the household receiving the money, a one-dollar bill has a present value of $1. The use of actual helicopters to deliver the cash is optional. Legal Constraints One of our guiding principles during the euro area sovereign debt crisis was to ignore any argument that relied purely on the legal architecture at hand. "Laws are meant to be broken," particularly by those who penned them in the first place. Nonetheless, legal architecture is important in so far as it suggests which type of monetary financing is more or less likely in which economy. Table 1 examines the legal constraints that major central banks face when trying to adopt the aforementioned strategies. Based on our subjective read of the "strictness" of the respective institutional constraints, we assign each central bank a number between one and four. The higher the number, the more difficult it is to implement helicopter money legally. Table 1Legal Constraints To Debt Monetization In Developed Markets Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Only direct lending to the government is strictly prohibited by most major central banks. For the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England not even this is the case, resulting in a very low legal constraint index score. In Japan, central bank governor Haruhiko Kuroda has recently said that "directly underwriting government bonds and monetizing fiscal deficits" is either illegal or "should not be done."9 However, the legal constraints seem relatively slight. Article 5 of Japan's Public Finance Law stipulates that "in special circumstances the BoJ shall be able to lend money within the amount approved by the Diet resolution." Articles 38.1 and 43.1 of the Bank of Japan Act allow the BoJ, in effect, to do whatever it deems necessary so long as it obtains the authorization of the prime minister and minister of finance. Hence, it is appropriate to conclude that legal constraints for the BoJ are minimal and that helicopter money could be implemented. This view is supported by the BoJ's Sept. 21 decision. The same conclusion can be drawn for the U.K. The existing "ways and means" facility is nothing other than direct government borrowing from the BoE. Even EU rules allow this facility, so the option remains open even if Brexit should ultimately fail to take place.10 The euro area is a more complicated case. Regarding the prohibition of debt monetization, Article 132.1 of the Treaty of Lisbon is very strict. However, Article 132.2 (the very next paragraph) provides a possible loophole, since it allows lending to a publicly owned credit institution.11 Therefore, a "European infrastructure fund" could be set up that would have access to the ECB's monetary financing and could deploy fiscal stimulus throughout the currency union. The ECB's Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility - which provides funding to solvent euro area credit institutions facing liquidity problems - could be another way to avoid prohibitions against direct monetary financing by the ECB.12 The responsibility for the supply of ELA funding lies with national central banks, not the ECB. The ECB can only stop an ELA facility already under way with a two-thirds majority vote in its Governing Council. The ECB has argued in previous opinions that the ELA cannot be used to subvert the Article 123 prohibition against monetary financing, but circumstances may eventually alter those opinions.13 Most critically, national central banks provide liquidity under the ELA in exchange for collateral whose terms they set themselves (such as haircuts based on quality). As such, the national central bank could provide its financial institutions - including, say, a public infrastructure bank - with printed money in exchange for snow globes and comic books. And the ECB could stand aside and watch it all happen, with the Austrian and German members of the ECB Board feigning opposition with token votes against the Governing Council. Another possible loophole for the ECB arises from its Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO). Under the guise of TLTRO, the ECB could provide perpetual zero-coupon loans to private banks while contractually binding them to extend these loans to any euro area citizen. Economist Eric Lonergan refers to this measure as cash transfers to households intermediated by banks.14 Finally, Article 20 of the Statutes of the ECB allows the Governing Council, by a two-thirds majority, to decide upon other operational methods of monetary control (besides the ones explicitly mentioned) in order to achieve price stability. In other words, if the ECB deems that its price stability mandate is threatened, it could vote itself the power to use helicopters. The alternative to stretching the existing law is to change it.15 Hence we will now assess the ease by which central bank rules can be changed. The possibility to amend the law is what earned the Fed a low legal constraint index in Table 1 above, since the key article has been amended several times in history. Furthermore, the proviso under which the Fed was allowed to purchase bonds directly from the Treasury was only ruled out in 1979.16 Far more difficult to change is the relevant part of the Lisbon Treaty, since that would require unanimity in the European Council and ratification by all member states, which would involve their domestic politics.17 This could be a major obstacle regarding any amendments to Article 132, as we elucidate below. Europeans will likely have to work within the rules available to them, which we think are quite malleable anyway. Finally, Sweden, unlike the United Kingdom, is bound to the Lisbon Treaty and receives no exception for direct lending to the government. Furthermore, the prohibition of monetary financing is also stated in the Sveriges Riksbank Act, making it even more complex to amend the law. The other two options - distributing cash to households and minting a high-value coin - are also of dubious legality in the Swedish case. Therefore, the Riksbank has in our view the highest legal constraints to helicopter money. Bottom Line: Legal constraints to debt monetization are far smaller than one would initially think. This is especially the case for the BoJ and BoE. The ECB would have to get creative in order to work within the law, but its statutes have wide enough holes for any helicopter to fly through. In addition, if one takes into account the raft of controversial, unconventional monetary and fiscal policies undertaken in the euro area in the recent past (Table 2), one is tempted to say, "Where there's a will, there's a way"! Table 2Europe: The Hurdle To Heterodoxy Is Low Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Political Constraints A policy as controversial as debt monetization requires political capital for implementation. In economies where legal and political constraints exist, a crisis will be necessary to overcome them. As such, we agree with our colleague Martin Barnes, who has argued that debt monetization is step three of a process where step two is a deep economic crisis.18 The constraints are not uniform across economies. Countries where households mostly struggle with the twin ills of debt and deflation would welcome higher inflation, but those where households are mostly savers would naturally not. On the other hand, even savers who depend on interest-bearing income for retirement would likely favor unorthodox monetary policy that allows interest rates to rise eventually. We therefore look at three broad factors when assessing the political constraints to monetary financing: Overall trust in monetary institutions; Household savings rate; Financial asset composition of households. Japan The two main factors that led to high saving rates in Japan, i.e. sharply rising incomes and favorable demography, have vanished (Chart 5). Japanese household savings rates have declined dramatically since the 1980s (Chart 6).19 Of course, Charts 7 and 8 show that the financial net worth of households is still massive and hence Japanese households may still prefer low inflation rates.20 But the population's aversion to inflation may not be as great as is assumed by conventional wisdom. Chart 5Japan's Demographic Dividend Is Over ... Japan's Demographic Dividend Is Over ... Japan's Demographic Dividend Is Over ... Chart 6... Leading To A Savings Rate Decline bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c6 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c6 Chart 7Japanese Households Are Still Wealthy Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Chart 8Japan: Public Debt Vs. Private Wealth bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c8 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c8 After all, Japanese households suffer in a low interest-rate environment because their financial assets are mainly composed of rate-sensitive products (Chart 9). Moreover, high government debt levels risk imperiling future entitlement spending. As such, the public may support policies that inflate away government debt so that the public sector can pay out pensions in future. Chart 9Only American Pensioners Are Ambivalent About The Pain Of Low Interest Rates Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics For the past four years, policies to boost inflation in Japan have received strong popular support. How else can we explain the continued political success of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his government, the most impressive run in twenty-first century Japan (Chart 10)? The inflation goal of Abenomics is clearly stated, not obfuscated by technocratic jargon, so it cannot simply be said that the public has been deceived. At the very least it suggests that the public understands the tradeoffs between inflation and deflation and is starting to favor the former over the latter as the household sector draws closer and closer to net debtor status. Europe The economies of the euro area have substantially different household saving rates. As such, political constraints to monetary financing are not equal across the currency union. Households in countries like Germany and France save a large fraction of their disposable income. In Spain and Italy, only a fraction of income is saved, whereas Greek and Portuguese households are net borrowers (Chart 11). Unsurprisingly, German trust in the ECB seems to be highly negatively correlated with increases in money supply (Chart 12). On the other hand, trust in the ECB in the peripheral states has recovered somewhat since the various efforts by the central bank to support their economies (Chart 13) through non-conventional monetary policy. Chart 10If Abenomics Is So Unpopular,##br## Why Is Abe Popular? bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c10 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c10 Chart 11Discrepancy In Savings##br## Rates In The Euro Area Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Chart 12Germans Fret About Easy Money bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c12 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c12 Chart 13Trust In ECB Recovering bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c13 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c13 Many pundits and commentators have also pointed out that Germans will not accept higher inflation rates due to traumatic history. The 1922-23 hyperinflation is often blamed for the eventual collapse of the Weimar Republic. But this is a false narrative. The Weimar Republic did not suffer hyperinflation because of money printing but because its manufacturing base was destroyed by the First World War. This massive supply loss was exacerbated by the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 as punishment for unpaid reparations. This was a German industrial region where much of its surviving capacity was located. The cumulative loss of supply caused a price shock that the central bank attempted to assuage with money printing. Money printing was therefore primarily a consequence of a massive decline in supply, leading to rampant price inflation. In fact, it was the austerity policies of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning following the Great Depression that led to the rise of populism in Germany, not the money printing undertaken a decade earlier. At the moment, this narrative may not be the dominant one in Germany. But historical interpretations can change on a dime when circumstances demand it. The fact remains that the ECB has effectively pursued an activist monetary policy despite the supposed resistance of Germany. How do we explain this? First, EU integration remains a geopolitical priority for Germany, as well as other European states. Individual European countries are no longer capable of exerting a significant global influence independently and have sought to aggregate geopolitical power as a result.21 Whether the project will succeed may be debatable, but the reality that it has sound geopolitical logic is not. Second, Germany's export-oriented economy is particularly vulnerable to protectionism and competitive currency devaluation by its top trade partners. These policies are precisely what Berlin would suffer if it were to abandon its currency-union peers by choosing "exit" over the printing press. Italy and France would immediately devalue their currencies against the new Deutschmark, and would likely impose outright trade barriers and tariffs subsequently. In short, if Germany will not help sustain the low financing costs of France and Italy through currency union, then it will be denied access to their markets. Founders of the EU understood this dynamic, which is why multiple (unsuccessful) attempts were made to peg European currencies, first to the U.S. dollar, and later to the Deutschmark, prior to the advent of the euro. We suspect that if the euro area's sovereign-debt crisis were to arise anew, German policymakers would have to explain the tradeoff between staying true to historical narratives on hyperinflation and sustaining Germany's export-addicted economy to their public. The contest is not even close. Historical revisions would be revised. In addition, German households are, much like their Japanese peers, dependent on high interest rates for saving (see Chart 9 above). As such, they may eventually relent to a set of unorthodox policies that raises interest rates in future. Nevertheless, regardless of German history and geopolitics, the reality is that the German public is not ready for monetary financing today. As such, we suspect that the ECB will only fire up the helicopters once the integrity of the euro area is threatened anew. Thankfully for ECB policymakers, Japan will likely have already undertaken such heterodox monetary policy by that time, allowing the ECB to piggyback on BoJ efforts. The U.S. In contrast to Japan and the euro area, deflation is not as much of a risk in the United States and interest rates have not been pushed into negative territory (Chart 14). Therefore, the case for debt monetization is much weaker. In addition, U.S. households are increasingly preferring saving instead of spending (Chart 15), a dynamic that may impede the transmission mechanism of helicopter drops, which ultimately rely on household spending. Chart 14Inflation Remains Low, But Has Bottomed Inflation Remains Low, But Has Bottomed Inflation Remains Low, But Has Bottomed Chart 15U.S. Households Prefer To Save bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c15 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c15 Despite their preferences for more savings, however, the actual savings rate for the bottom 90% households in terms of wealth is essentially zero. In fact, most U.S. households are concerned about poor job prospects, low wage growth, and high debt levels. How else can we explain the support for Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders?22 As such, the aggregate household savings rate may not be the best measure of political constraints to monetary financing in the U.S. It may overstate the preferences of the minority of the population that actually saves. The United Kingdom Chart 16Public Is Satisfied With BoE bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c16 bca.gps_sr_2016_09_26_c16 As in the U.S., interest rates remain positive in the U.K. In addition, growth is tolerable and the unemployment rate is near the BoE's definition of full employment (5%). Therefore, pressure for drastic measures is weak, albeit higher after the Brexit referendum shock than before. According to Chart 16, individuals are satisfied with the BoE and trust the bank to take the appropriate measures to achieve the inflation target, thus giving the BoE high political capital. British households would suffer under lower interest rates because they are heavily reliant on pension funds and life insurance for income (see Chart 9 above). Therefore, one could argue that they would rather support helicopter money than negative interest rates. Mark Carney, the BoE governor, has ruled out helicopter money even since the Brexit vote, arguing that the available stimulus tools are sufficient and "there's not a need for such flights of fancy here in the UK."23 Hence the chances of debt monetization may be low for now, assuming that the likely post-referendum recession is not very deep. However, they would increase if a shock were to hit the British economy. Just such a shock could occur after the U.K. formally exits the EU, which may still be two years away. Switzerland Swiss households save a high fraction of their net income (see Chart 6 above). In addition, the Swiss government's debt-to-GDP ratio is very low (34% as of 2015). Therefore, the current deflation is not as much of a burden for Switzerland as it would be for indebted countries. On the other hand, negative interest rates weigh heavily on pension funds, which account for a large fraction of households' financial assets (see Chart 9 above). Moreover, the overvalued Swiss franc drags on the Swiss economy. Instead of buying euros to stabilize the EUR/CHF exchange rate, the SNB could distribute this money to households. Swiss Trade, a powerful union representing the interests of 3,800 retail companies and over 10% of the Swiss labor force, has made this demand. So far, however, this kind of pressure from domestic interest groups has not made any difference. The situation could change if another sovereign-debt crisis were to hit the euro area and put further upside pressure on the Swiss franc, a safe haven asset. Sweden The Swedish population has great trust in national institutions, especially in the Riksbank.24 Its political capital is therefore large. Nevertheless, since there is no danger of deflation and the economy is doing well, it would be hard to justify such extreme policy measures. Moreover, Swedish households increased their savings rate drastically in the last few years (see Chart 6 above), making them more averse to inflation than they were a decade ago. In addition, there is no pressure for higher interest rates, since households are heavily invested in equities (see Chart 9 above), which profit from low interest rates. Political constraints are thus very high. Bottom Line: Our analysis shows that Japan has the lowest legal and political constraints to debt monetization, and recent events suggest it has begun laying the framework. In addition, if another euro crisis were to occur, the ECB and the SNB might be forced to join the BoJ in mustering the helicopters. On the other hand, it would be rather surprising in the short and medium term if the Fed, BoE, or Riksbank took concrete steps toward debt monetization. Uncharted Waters? Would helicopter money mark a dangerous voyage into uncharted waters? Not really. Western governments used debt monetization several times in the twentieth century. During the Second World War, various countries printed money to finance war costs. In the U.S., debt monetization continued after the war with the Fed purchasing government bonds directly from the Treasury from time to time. It was only in April 1979 that these purchases ceased.25 An even more striking example is Italy, which monetized its debt down to 1981: the Bank of Italy was actually forced by law to purchase all public debt not taken up by the market.26 In Canada, the Bank of Canada financed public debt down to the 1970s. Between 1935 and 1939, the BoC funded a remarkable two thirds of public debt and, during the Second World War, fiscal and monetary policy effectively merged. Inflation never exceeded 5% until the early 1970s, indicating that monetary financing can contribute to positive non-inflationary economic outcomes if conditions (and management) are right.27 Another example of a successful implementation of helicopter money is the expansionary policy undertaken by former Japanese Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo between 1932 and 1936. His debt monetization program is said to be the prime reason why Japan recovered so quickly from the Great Depression. At the same time, the example is instructive about the risks of helicopter money: Takahashi was ultimately assassinated by the military when he changed course on debt monetization, and the whole episode fed into Japan's slide into fascism.28 To these substantial risks, we will now turn. Bottom Line: Helicopter money is not merely theoretical. Major economies - including responsible ones like Canada and Italy - used debt monetization into the late twentieth century. Dangers Of Releasing The Kraken Chart 17Unlimited Resources ##br## Undermine Democracy Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics Democracy is a process by which various interest groups and segments of the population bargain over limited resources. Democracies are successful because they institutionalize the bargaining process so that it legitimizes the decisions over who gets what. Countries with unlimited resources tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 17). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse" and is well documented in political science. Essentially, countries that are endowed by massive natural resources can distribute the wealth to all interest groups and all segments of the population, thus obviating the need to institutionalize any part of their bargaining process. The ruling elite stays in power because it can keep buying off the population and stave off demands for representation.29 We are not saying that Japan or Europe would turn fascist because of helicopter money, but rather that it will be difficult to restrain the policy once it is unleashed. When resources become unlimited, how would democratically-elected policymakers manage to limit them? It is easy to tell various interest groups - pensioners, veterans, single mothers, low-income households - that they cannot receive what they want when the resources are limited. But the danger of helicopter money is that once the decision is taken to drop the cash from the air, the decision of who gets money for what will become extremely politicized and polarizing. Proponents argue that just as monetary policy has become independent of government, so too can fiscal policy. For example, the central bank could decide how much fiscal spending is needed to achieve its inflation target and then print the requisite amount, leaving it up to political decision-makers to decide how to divvy out the manna from heaven. The problem is that monetary policy has already become politicized in a number of countries, mainly in the emerging markets, and pressure has been mounting in the developed world. That pressure would become extraordinary once central banks start creating resources from thin air. The essence of representative government - popular control of fiscal powers - would erode. Our colleague Dhaval Joshi, Chief Strategist of European Investment Strategy, has also posited that the population could easily lose trust in institutions, even the currency itself, if the experiment gets out of control.30 This is unlikely in its first iteration, but it could happen if the process becomes politicized, which we think would happen. The other problem is that the effort to print money could become a source of geopolitical conflict if it produces a competitive debt monetization regime. For example, if the BoJ implements helicopter money and weakens the yen, China could counter by devaluing the renminbi. Since there are natural limits to how much money can be printed before inflation takes off, and neither country would want to destroy the value of its currency, the two sides might seek to counter helicopter devaluations via protectionism. Bottom Line: Debt monetization and helicopter money would short-circuit the democratic process itself. The entire point of representative government and democratic institutions is to allow for bargaining over limited resources. Once the option of unlimited resources becomes real, it will be very difficult to decide who gets to benefit. It would take a very strong government indeed - perhaps an authoritarian one - to impose limits. Investment Implications Debt monetization is not going to be fully implemented in any major economy until a serious economic crisis arrives. As such, this research effort is largely exploratory. We have presented a list of legal and political constraints that we believe will determine the sequence and the form of helicopter money in major economies. We agree with our colleague Peter Berezin that Japan may attempt some form of debt monetization in 2017-18. The monetary policy framework is already being laid. In the long term, the world is slowly moving away from its current deflationary paradigm. On the geopolitical front, we are seeing less, not more, globalization. Global multipolarity is a constraint to geopolitical stability, and this is as true today it has been over the past 200 years. We identified this trend in a 2014 Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization: All Downhill From Here," which we encourage our clients to re-read.31 On a shorter timeline, we are seeing policymakers move away from austerity and towards greater willingness to use fiscal policy. The U.S. presidential election is instructive, as the issues of budget deficits and debt sustainability have been completely ignored throughout the campaign, despite their prominence as recently as 2012. Other major economies, including Europe, are moving away from austerity. More government spending, less globalization, and more unorthodox monetary policy all point to the end of the current deflationary era. As a play on this theme, we would recommend that investors take long positions on Japanese and German inflations swaps. We also think that it is time to turn structurally bullish on gold.32 In addition, we recommend going short JPY/long USD, even though markets will initially test the BoJ and drive the yen higher. We are renewing our strategic long Japanese stocks trade, hedged for currency, to capitalize on the ongoing paradigm shift in Japan that we identified in 2012.33 Nicola Grass, Contributing Author Marko Papic, Managing Editor marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Specifically, the BoJ pledged to keep the 10-year JGB yield at around zero, at least until inflation stabilizes at a rate above 2%. This decision amounts to a commitment to correct past inflation undershoots and to keep 10-year yields at zero regardless of the supply of new debt. Please see "Japan: Don't Count Abenomics Out," in Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Who's Afraid Of Big Bad Trump," dated August 10, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Helicopter Money" A Semi-Hostile Q&A," dated May 13, 2016, "Escape from the Land of The Rising Yen," dated April 15, 2016, "Japan: On The Road to Debt Monetization," dated February 5, 2016, and Global Investment Strategy Outlook, "Ten Predictions For The Rest Of The Year," dated April 1, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. In addition, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Down the Rabbit Hole," dated April 15, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "The Case Against More Monetary Mischief," dated August 16, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 The term helicopter money refers to the statement by Milton Friedman in his 1969 paper "The Optimum Quantity of Money," where he proposes that a central bank could throw money out of a helicopter to increase inflation. 5 The "Ricardian Equivalence" theory suggests that individuals are forward looking and thus will assess that today's tax cuts or fiscal expenditure must be financed by tomorrow's higher tax burden. Since the intertemporal budget constraint is binding, rational individuals will not necessarily increase their current consumption even while benefiting from expansionary fiscal policy. 6 See Willem H. Buiter, "The Simple Analytics of Helicopter Money: Why It Works - Always," Economics E-Journal 8 (2014), pp. 1-38. Available at dx.doi.org. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Escape from the Land of The Rising Yen," dated April 15, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Laura Jaramillo and Alexandre Chailloux, "It's not all Fiscal: Effects of Income, Fiscal Policy, and Wealth on Private Consumption," IMF Working Paper 15/112 (May 2015), available at www.imf.org. 9 Please see Bank of Japan, "'Comprehensive Assessment' of the Monetary Easing: Concept and Approaches," dated September 5, 2016, available at www.boj.or.jp/en. 10 According to Protocol No. 15, Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty, the "Government of the United Kingdom may maintain its 'ways and means' facility with the Bank of England if and so long as the United Kingdom does not adopt the euro." 11 Article 132.2 of the Treaty of Lisbon: "Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the European Central Bank as private credit institutions." 12 ECB, "Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and monetary policy," dated 2016, available at www.ecb.europa.eu. 13 Please see ECB, "Opinion of the European Central Bank of 21 November 2008," dated November 21, 2008, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_74_f.pdf. 14 Eric Lonergan, "Legal helicopter drops in the Eurozone,"dated February 24, 2016, available at www.philosophyofmoney.net. 15 Various academics argue that an explicit allowance of monetary financing would not undermine the independence of central banks as long as governments decide how the money will be spent and central banks decide how much money to print. See Buiter (above, note 4) and Adair Turner, "The Case for Monetary Finance - An Essentially Political Issue," 16th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference (2015), available at www.imf.org. See also "Helicopter Ben" Bernanke, "Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan," Federal Reserve, Speech at Japan Society of Monetary Economics, dated May 31, 2003, available at www.federalreserve.gov. 16 Please see U.S. Code 355, "Purchase and sale of obligations of National, State, and municipal governments," Legal Information Institute, accessed 2016, available at www.law.cornell.edu. 17 Title 6, Article 48.6 of the Lisbon Treaty. 18 Please see footnote 3 above. 19 The longstanding Japanese household opposition to inflation has been shifting in recent years, as revealed by voter behavior since 2012. Yet some elements of the trend persist, as in the BoJ's public survey in April 2016, in which over 80% of respondents argued that a general price increase would be unfavorable. Please see Martin Feldstein, "Japan's Savings Crisis," Project Syndicate, dated September 24, 2010, available at www.project-syndicate.org. 20 See Bank of Japan, "Results of the 65th Opinion Survey on the General Public's Views and Behavior (March 2016 Survey)," dated April 18, 2016, available at www.boj.or.jp/en. 21 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Euro And (Geo)politics," dated February 11, 2015, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit," dated November 2011, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see Will Martin, "Carney: We Will Take 'Whatever Action Is Needed,'" Business Insider UK, dated August 4, 2016, available at uk.businessinsider.com, and Jake Cordell, "Mark Carney dismisses helicopter money as a 'compounding Ponzi scheme,'" City AM, dated April 19, 2016, available at www.cityam.com. 24 Please see European Commission, "Introduction Of The Euro In The Member States That Have Not Yet Adopted The Common Currency," Flash Eurobarometer 418 (May 2015), p.44, available at ec.europa.eu. 25 Kenneth Garbade, "Direct Purchases of U.S. Treasury Securities by Federal Reserve Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No.684, 2014, available at www.newyorkfed.org. 26 Guido Tabellini, "Central bank reputation and the monetization of deficits: The 1981 Italian monetary reform," Economic Inquiry 25 (1987), p.185-200, available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com. 27 Josh Ryan-Collins, "Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? A Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935-75," Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 848 (2015), available at www.levyinstitute.org. 28 Myung Soo Cha, "Did Korekiyo Takahashi Rescue Japan from the Great Depression?" Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper Series No. A395, dated September 30, 2000, available at hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp. 29 Please see Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Paper 5398 (December 1995), available at www.nber.org. 30 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Case Against Helicopters," dated May 5, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 31 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization: All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 32 Please see footnote 2 above. 33 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan's Political Paradigm Shift: Invest Implications," dated December 21, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

In China and the majority EMs, credit impulses will be negative over the next 12 months as and if their credit growth converges towards their current nominal GDP growth. These negative credit impulses will dampen EM/China growth and their corporate profits. In the next 12 months, the credit cycle is most vulnerable in China, Brazil, Turkey, and Malaysia and least vulnerable in central Europe, the Philippines, and Mexico.

Our primary argument for continued EM/China growth disappointments is that their credit growth is set to decelerate further and credit impulses will remain negative, depressing economic growth. Rising LIBOR could lead to a stronger U.S. dollar versus EM currencies. In Venezuela, the economic and financial situation will continue deteriorating hindering any further rally in its sovereign and corporate credit.

This week, we are sending a <i>Special Report </i>written by BCA's Chief Global Strategist Peter Berezin, discussing the end of the 35-year global bond bull market.

The fundamental reason behind the debt buildup in the Chinese economy is rooted in its high savings and banking-centric intermediation system. It is wrong to focus solely on the liability side of the economy. Viewed from a balance sheet perspective, China's debt situation is much less dire than commonly perceived.

The median voter theory is one of the few genuine theories of political science. It assumes that voters have limited policy priorities and that politicians want power. Therefore the latter will adjust their stances to satisfy the largest swath of voters. The median voter in the Anglo-Saxon world is shifting to the left, and regardless of what happens in the Brexit referendum or the U.S. election, this shift will be the most consequential development for markets.

The median voter theory is one of the few genuine theories of political science. It assumes that voters have limited policy priorities and that politicians want power. Therefore the latter will adjust their stances to satisfy the largest swath of voters. The median voter in the Anglo-Saxon world is shifting to the left, and regardless of what happens in the Brexit referendum or the U.S. election, this shift will be the most consequential development for markets.

Abenomics has disappointed, but not failed. The Bank of Japan could move to debt monetization next year, which would be positive for Japanese equities and negative for the yen.