Disasters/Disease

Highlights As an introduction to a series of BCA Special Reports on the investment consequences of climate change, we review the science around the subject and suggest a framework for analyzing its implications. The scientific consensus is that global warming is a reality and most likely human-induced. However, the uncertainty around the magnitude of the impact of climate change is large. The consequences of climate change are delayed, uncertain and global. But, for investors, the prudent course of action is to accept the scientific consensus – and the impact it will have on policymakers – and hedge or invest appropriately.  Feature Chart 1Climate Change Global Perception Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has called climate change “the tragedy of the horizon.” It is now perceived as a major threat across the globe (Chart 1). As such, it is essential to assess its macro and market consequences. In this introduction to our Climate Change Special Series, we review the existing literature and suggest a framework to assess the market relevance of this phenomenon. Going forward, we will produce a series of market-driven reports designed to help investors both mitigate the risk to their portfolios and identify opportunities arising from climate change. We intend to cover topics such as green financing, energy, and the geopolitical aspect of climate change, just to cite a few.  These reports will incorporate both quantitative and qualitative analysis to generate actionable investment recommendations. What Is Climate Change? Climate science is not new. The initial understanding of the effect of heat-trapping gases on global temperature dates back to Joseph Fourier’s early 1800s study of planetary temperature. Subsequent research showed the importance of the greenhouse effect, a phenomenon whereby greenhouse gas molecules (e.g. CO2, CH4, N2O) absorb infrared radiation emitted from Earth before reemitting it in all directions, including back to the Earth’s surface, thus making it harder for this energy to leave the planet. This excess of energy stored in the planet, above its normal energy balance, causes temperature increases. The distribution of environmental damages caused by global warming will not be uniform around the world. The rate of warming and other climate changes will differ across regions due to climate processes and feedbacks linked to local conditions.1 Regardless, up to 14% of the global population will experience above 2°C (3.6°F) warming – a level seen by scientists as a trigger for permanent damages and changes – even if the increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST) were limited to 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 (CarbonBrief, 2018). The consequences of climate change are delayed, uncertain and global.  Even under the maximum policy effort scenario, studies assign 60% odds to an increase greater than 2°C (3.6°F) (Nordhaus, 2018). The longer policymakers, companies and investors delay tackling this issue, the less likely the world will stay below the 2°C threshold and the more rapid and abrupt the transition to a low-carbon economy will eventually be. A sudden transition will be more disruptive to the economy and damaging to investors. Defining The Issue: The Earth’s Atmosphere As A Global Common The Earth’s atmosphere - specifically its function as a sink for CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHG) - falls within the problem of the global commons.2 It is a natural resource requiring global cooperation for its sustainable use and provision. Problematically, the consequences of climate change are delayed, uncertain and global.  Delayed because the burden of climate change policies mainly falls on current generations, whereas the benefits of lower climate damage accrue to future generations, leading every generation to think it can survive the issue and let the next generations handle it. Uncertain because the list of harms from climate change lengthens with the advance in climate-science studies. We learn more and more about the extent to which human activities are at fault and the extent of the damage that will befall the planet. Global because it does not matter whether the emissions take place in China, Europe, or the U.S. since GHG mix immediately once in the atmosphere. In that sense, it is a collective-action problem in which every country’s interest is to shift the abatement costs onto its neighbor. The global aspect is crucial. The optimal emission level of one country does not follow the global social optimal. Hence, every country has an incentive to emit as much GHG as possible now, before any consequences occur (Combes, 2016). What We Know So Far: Historical Data Both climate-alarmist and climate-denier groups have captured the public debate.This polarization clouds the underlying facts about current trends and the difference between what is unlikely, likely, or very likely to happen. The resulting lack of consensus will lead to over- or under-adaptation by the various economic agents, depending on their interests. FACT 1: GLOBAL WARMING IS A REALITY Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) have risen steadily since the industrial revolution and at a brisk pace relative to the previous 12,000 years (Chart 2). Chart 2GHG Global Emissions GHG Global Emissions GHG Global Emissions Global Mean Surface Temperature - It rose by an estimated 1°C (1.8°F) from 1901 to 2016. According to NASA data, the 10 warmest years recorded in the past 139 years all occurred after 2005 (Chart 3). Chart 3Global Land And Ocean Temperature Global Land And Ocean Temperature Global Land And Ocean Temperature Global Mean Sea level - It has risen by an estimated 20.3cm (8 inches) since 1900 due to the expansion of waters and meltwater from shrinking ice sheets. Almost half of this rise happened in the last 25 years (Chart 4). Glacier and Ice Sheet - The melting of ice sheets will reduce the earth’s reflectivity, accelerating the warming process (Chart 5). The record low of sea ice extent in the Arctic and Antarctic was observed in 2012 and 2017, respectively. Chart 4Global Mean Sea Level Global Mean Sea Level Global Mean Sea Level Chart 5Glacier And Ice Sheet Glacier And Ice Sheet Glacier And Ice Sheet Precipitation - Historical changes in precipitation are much more volatile and region-specific than temperature and sea level changes. Moreover, there is a lack of data covering the period before 1951, which leads to low confidence in estimates of precipitation for this period and medium confidence post-1951. Annual average precipitation for global land areas increased slightly over the period 1901–2008, and the magnitude of observed changes varies across different datasets (Hartmann, 2013). Extreme Weather Events - These are defined, in a meteorological sense, as events at the “edges of the complete range of weather experienced in the past.” The frequency and severity of extreme weather events has been linked to global warming (Table 1) (Scott, 2016). Table 1Extreme Weather Events (1950 - Present) Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction FACT 2: CLIMATE CHANGE IS HUMAN-INDUCED The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – considered the world’s most authoritative scientific body on climate change – concluded in 2013 that the probability that global warming was human-induced was at least 95% (Table 2).  Table 2Evolution Of The Assessments Of Human Influence On Climate Change Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Chart 6Global Warming & Global GHG Emissions Global Warming & Global GHG Emissions Global Warming & Global GHG Emissions Since the late nineteenth century, GHG emissions – mainly CO2 – and global land and ocean mean temperature have shared a common steep upward trend (Chart 6). A recent study by Mann et al. estimates that in the absence of GHG emissions, the odds that 13 out of the 15 warmest years ever measured would all have happened in the current century are extremely small.3 More recently, a report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) concluded that “[I]n many cases, it is now possible to make and defend quantitative statements about the extent to which human-induced climate change has influenced either the magnitude or the probability of occurrence of specific types of events or event classes.”  According to most recent peer-reviewed studies, at least 97% of actively publishing climate scientists now accept human-caused climate warming (Cook, 2016). While science is not a matter of popular vote, this level of consensus among experts suggests that for investors the most prudent course of action is to accept the scientific consensus and hedge or invest appropriately. Projections & Assumptions Chart 7Global Emissions Projections Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate economics deals with conditional projections based on unknown probability distributions, implying a high level of uncertainty. The level of confidence around the nearer segments of the projections is relatively elevated. Conversely, at the far end of the projected period, by 2100 for most studies, the uncertainty increases drastically. According to the United Nations Environment Programs’ 2018 Emissions Gap report,  the 2°C (3.6°F) target drafted in the Paris Agreement in 2015 would require global emissions to be capped at 40 gigatons of CO2 equivalent by 2030. Throughout our Climate Change Special Series, we will rely on the following assumptions based on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the summary estimates from around 150 academic papers, the majority of which were published in 2018 (CarbonBrief, 2018).  Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Global emissions rose in 2017 and are now ~14 GtCO2e above the required level by 2030. Current pledges are insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goals (Chart 7). Key factors driving changes in anthropogenic GHG emissions are mainly economic and population growth. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions vary over a wide range, depending on both socio-economic development and climate policy – which are fundamentally uncertain. Climate economics deals with conditional projections based on unknown probability distributions, implying a high level of uncertainty. The majority of models indicate that scenarios meeting levels similar to RCP2.6 (a scenario that aims to keep global warming likely below 2°C (3.6°F) above pre-industrial temperatures) are characterized by substantial net negative emissions by 2100, on average 2 GtCO2e per year.   Chart 8Global Mean Surface Temperature Projections Global Mean Surface Temperature Projections Global Mean Surface Temperature Projections Global Mean Surface Temperature - Under all assessed emission scenarios, surface temperature is projected to rise over the twenty-first century. The change over the 2016-2035 period will be very similar to 1986-2005, and will likely be in the range of 0.3°C to 0.7°C (0.5°F to 1.3°F). Beyond that, the mean temperature rise across IPCC scenarios for 2046-65 and 2081-2100 is estimated to be 1.4°C (2.5°F) and 2.2°C (4°F), respectively (Chart 8). These estimates imply that there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales. Global Mean Sea Level - It has been established that the likelihood sea levels will rise in more than 95% of the ocean area is very high. Under all IPCC scenarios, the rate of sea level rise will very likely exceed the observed rate during 1971-2010. About 70% of the coastlines worldwide are in fact projected to experience sea level change within +/- 20% of the global mean. Precipitation - There are likely more land regions where the number of heavy precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased. Recent detection of increasing trends in extreme precipitation and discharge in some catchments implies greater risks of flooding at regional scale (medium confidence). These changes will not be uniform, with high latitudes and the equatorial Pacific more likely to experience an increase in annual mean precipitation while many mid-latitude and subtropical dry regions are likely to experience a decrease in mean precipitation. It remains a challenge to determine long-term trends in precipitation for the global oceans. Extreme Weather Events - Projections on extreme weather events can only infer the probability distribution of such events, i.e. more or less likely to happen. With a 1°C (1.8°F) additional warming, risks from extreme weather events are high (medium confidence from IPCC). More importantly, we can say with high confidence that these risks increase progressively with further warming.     Embracing Uncertainty The uncertainty around the magnitude of the impact of climate change is large. Yet, bounded uncertainty is informational. We can extract the following important, actionable conclusions: Projections for economic variables are relatively more uncertain than for geophysical variables. The link between GHG emissions and rising temperature is more certain than the level of emissions, output, and damages (Nordhaus, 2018).  Therefore, the largest uncertainty comes from economic growth and the level of emissions. We do not rely on estimates of global GDP impacts. On the other hand, it is easier to build scenarios for geophysical variables and obtain investment-relevant information from these projections. Simulating the path of future emission allows us to map this onto future temperature, sea level, and extreme weather variations. Economic models suggest that the higher the uncertainty, the larger the weights on low-probability/high-impact scenarios. This implies a positive risk premium due to risk aversion and favors stricter mitigation policies as insurance to shattering outcomes. As climate models are fine-tuned and continuously point to large damage uncertainty, the desired strength of policy could increase. Win-Win or “no-regrets” investments are the most likely at first.4 The Kaya Identity provides a simple framework to project future GHG emissions to visualize the uncertainty associated with different assumptions. The identity links future emissions to observable macroeconomic variables (see the Appendix for more details): F = P * (G/P) * (E/G) *(F/E) Where F denotes global CO2 emissions from human sources, P represents global population, G equals global GDP, and E is global energy consumption. The identity provides a useful framework for policymakers. To reduce emissions, there needs to be a reduction in one or more of the identity's components. Altering demographic trends and reducing global GDP per capita are very unlikely to happen given the damaging impact it could have – both for individuals and politicians’ careers!  At a global level, this leaves us with energy efficiency and carbon intensity of energy as the only key and viable options to reduce CO2 emissions.  Why Does It Matter To Investors? Markets are probably still underpricing climate-related risks because the effects only materialize gradually and in the long term – exceeding most investors’ investment horizon. Investors such as pension funds, insurers, wealth managers, and endowments need to be responsive to the threat posed by climate change. They typically have multi-decade time horizons, with portfolio exposure across the global economy. Their increasing interest in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) measures fits well within this context.5 It reflects a need for more transparency and more stringent investing standards. Determining which firms or sectors will either win or lose the “green race” will be of the outmost importance to investors. Businesses are still navigating the financial and operational implications of climate change. To some extent, this can already be assessed based on the readiness of firms and sectors to adapt to a green economy – looking at the number of environmental technology patent applications, for example. Markets are probably still underpricing climate-related risks. The financing needed to mitigate climate change represents yet another opportunity for investors. Green bonds and sustainability-linked debt instruments are more widespread than ever. Sustainable debt issuance reached record levels last year, with a total of $260 billion issued, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance data. Year-to-date issuance has nearly reached $180 billion.  Green bonds offer two main benefits to issuers:  corporate branding that sends a strong signal to the market of their commitment to climate change, and a wider investor base. Our series of market-driven reports are intended to both identify the risks and opportunities arising from climate change in order to help investors mitigating the risk to their portfolios. They will rely on the simple framework we present below. Climate Change Framework In future reports in our Climate Change Special Series, we will summarize our findings using a comprehensive analytical framework developed by Batten (2018) to assess the impact of climate change via physical and transition risks with respect to the type of shock induced by each type of risk. Physical Risks Physical risks are the most visible and immediate source of risk to investors and the financial sector. They can be defined as those risks that arise from the interaction between climate-related events and human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt— e.g. the volatility in food prices following a drought or a flood.6 An increase in climate-induced physical risks – such as heat waves, floods and storm – will have a direct effect on insurers. If these risks are uninsured, the deterioration of the balance sheets of affected households and corporations is likely to hurt the banking system. Electrical utilities, real estate and transportation infrastructure are other physical assets at risk of capital losses. Transition Risks Chart 9Public Opinion Of Policy Options To Tackle Climate Change Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Transition risks can be defined as the risks of economic dislocation and financial losses associated with the transition to a lower-carbon economy. Detrimental effects manifest themselves through three possible channels: Reduced production and consumption of high carbon products, especially energy produced using fossil fuels, potentially leading to stranded assets. Improvement in the energy efficiency of existing products and processes – energy intensity. Moving to low-carbon energy production – that is reducing carbon intensity. Lower energy intensity and carbon intensity, highlighted in the Kaya Identity above, can be achieved through technological innovation. The relationship between climate change and policy or regulatory framework is manifold, as policymakers will need both to respond to the consequences of climate change and to shape future GHG emissions. The primary responsibility for strategic planning rests with governments, which have a variety of policy options at their disposal (Chart 9).  Table 3 provides a useful template to link both physical and transition risks to the type of shocks they can induce, and importantly, how it can ultimately turn into financial and geopolitical risks. Table 3A Simple And Useful Template To Summarize Our Findings Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate change can impact demand (from investment, consumption or trade) or supply (labor, capital stock, technology or other inputs). For example, transition risks such as distortions from asymmetric climate policies across countries could directly impact trade or investment (FDI). This is what is commonly referred to as the pollution haven hypothesis, which states that more stringent environmental regulations induce polluting industries to relocate to countries with relatively lax environmental regulations. Ensuing reports in the Climate Change Special Series will include this template as a mean to summarize our findings. APPENDIX The Kaya Identity And Uncertainty Feedback Loop7 Diagram 1The Uncertainty Feedback Loop Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction The Kaya Identity links observable macroeconomic and demographic variables to GHG emissions: CO2 = P * (Y / P) * (E / Y) * (CO2 / E) Where denotes P global population, Y global GDP, and E primary energy consumption.    It highlights the large degree of uncertainty around the macroeconomic impact on GHG emissions – especially at the end of the forecast period when additional uncertainty emanates from the feedback loop illustrated in Diagram 1. Historical Trend In CO2 Emissions From 1990 to 2014 CO2 emissions growth was 2.1% p.a.8: Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Global CO2 emissions during this period were pushed higher by population growth (1.3% p.a.) and rising rates of GDP per capita (1.9% p.a.). This was partly offset by declining energy intensity (-1.3% p.a.) (Chart 10). Chart 10Kaya Identity Components: Global Level Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction The extent of the impact of these variables on CO2 emissions is region-specific. Therefore, when the identity is expressed at an aggregate and global level, it can lead to inaccuracies in long-term scenario analysis since it does not account for dependencies across the variables and does not differentiate between high population growth in countries with low vs. high GDP per capita growth, or between high GDP per capita growth from countries with high vs. low carbon intensity energy sources.  Using The Kaya Identity To Project Future GHG Emissions Population - The UN currently expect the population to grow by an average 0.4% p.a. through 2100 in its medium variant scenario. GDP per capita - The OECD projects GDP per capita will grow 2.2% p.a. between 2018 and 2060. Energy Intensity - We assume a 1.5% p.a. decline in energy intensity over the 2018-2100 period – the trend over the past decade. Carbon Intensity - In line with scenario B2 of the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), we assume a 0.4% p.a. Combined, this leads to a 21% increase in CO2 emission by 2050, and a 63% increase by 2100. Accounting for other scenarios for each component results to a wide range of potential cumulative CO2 emissions; a median temperature between 2.6°C and 4.8°C by 2100 (Table 4). It is noteworthy that a rise in temperature above 2°C by 2100 is almost certain under all these scenarios. Table 4Scenarios Using The Kaya Identity Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Emission Reduction Possibilities Table 5Policy Approach Per Factor Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction To reduce CO2 emissions, policies aimed at reducing the growth rate of one or more of the Kaya Identity’s components will be needed (Table 5). Assuming a constraint-free world, reducing average population and income growth rates to 0% from the projected 0.4% and 2.1% would reduce cumulative emission by 60% in 2100 vs. the baseline. Economic growth is the main driver of emissions growth. For instance, post-GFC, Europe’s emissions have been subdued due to poor economic growth. However, the constraints on these variables exist and are binding. These are not the area of focus to tackle climate change. Consequently, this leaves energy efficiency and carbon intensity of energy as the only viable options to reduce GHG emissions. In order to avoid breaching the 2°C target, the IPCC estimates CO2 concentration needs to be capped below 400 ppm by 2100. This can only be achieved by significant improvements to energy efficiency. Economic theory suggests that given that energy is a cost of production, energy efficiency will continue to improve. However, the required pace of reduction in energy intensity surpasses the incentive provided by the price mechanism. The externalities of an energy intensive economy are delayed and uncertain. Thus, these are not fully included in the cost-benefit analysis of investing in new technology. As a result, policies aimed at reducing the carbon intensity of global energy input will be an important source of CO2 reduction. This includes decreasing the carbon intensity of fossil fuels – e.g. switching coal to natural gas and developing carbon capture and storage technology – and reducing the share of fossil fuels in the energy mix – e.g. switching fossil fuel energy to renewables. We will expand on alternative sources of energy in a subsequent report. Importantly, the policy response should differ between regions. The drivers of emissions are heterogeneous and policies should fit the regional reality. The Kaya Identity can also be applied at the country or regional level. Chart 11The Kaya Identity Applied At The Country Level Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction U.S. - Elevated income growth offset by increasing energy efficiency (Chart 11, panel 1). Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction China - Robust income growth drove CO2 emissions higher (Chart 11, panel 2). Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Europe - Falling energy intensity and carbon intensity led to a decline in emissions (Chart 11, panel 3). Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction Climate Change Special Series: An Introduction References Fourier, J. (1827). Mémoire sur les Températures du Globe Terrestre et des Espaces Planétaires, Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, 7, 569-604. ‘Global’ warming varies greatly depending where you live, published by CarbonBrief on July 2, 2018. Nordhaus, William (2018). Projections and Uncertainties about Climate Change in an Era of Minimal Climate Policies, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(3): 333-360. Edenhofer, O. et al. (2015), The Atmosphere as a Global Common, The Oxford Handbook of the Macroeconomics of Global Warming. Hardin, Garrett (1968), The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162, no. 3859: 1243–1248. Jean-Louis Combes et al. (2016), A review of the economic theory of the commons, Revue d’économie du développement, Vol 27.  Climate Science as Culture War, Stanford Social Innovation Review (Fall 2012). The Fourth National Climate Assessment: Volume 2 Impact, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2018) and Climatic Research Unit temperature database Hartmann et al. (2013), Observations: Atmosphere and Surface. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Scott, P. (2016), How climate change affects extreme weather events, Science 352(6293):1517-1518. Mann et al. (2016), The Likelihood of Recent Record Warmth, Scientific Reports 6:19831. Fischer, E. M., and R. Knutti, Anthropogenic Contribution to Global Occurrence of Heavy-Precipitation and High-Temperature Extremes, Nature Climate Change 5 (April 27, 2015): 560. Cook et al. (2016), Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming, Environmental Research Letters 11, 4:048002. The impacts of climate change at 1.5C, 2C and beyond, CarbonBrief (2018). The Emissions Gap Report 2018, United Nations (2018). Batten, Sandra (2018), Climate change and the macro-economy: a critical review, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 706. Robert S.J. Tol (2019), Climate Economics: Economic Analysis of Climate, Climate Change and Climate Policy, Cheltenham, U.K. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For instance, Canada is estimated to be warming at twice the global rate. 2 The term “global commons” is used to define common resources or environmental issues crossing national boundaries. They have either no well-defined property right (no individual or nation has private control of their use) or lack an international enforcement mechanism to control their use (Edenhofer, 2015). The market failures associated with common pool resources (CPR) were popularized in Garret Hardin’s famous 1968 paper “Tragedy of the Commons”. 3 The likelihood is between 1 in 5,000 and 1 in 170,000 chances. 4 No-regret strategies are cost-effective under multiple climate change and policy response scenarios. Win-win actions provide beneficial externality while contributing to adaptation to various climate change scenarios. Under uncertainty, these strategies are the most likely to be implemented to begin the adaptation process rather than a riskier wait-and-see approach. Please see “Examples of ‘no-regret’, ‘low-regret’ and ‘win-win’ adaptation actions,” published by climate exchange. It is available at climatexchange.org.uk. 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “ESG Investing: No Harm, Some Benefit,” dated November 21, 2018, and available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Special Reports, “Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change,” dated October 23, 2019, and available at bca.bcaresearch.com 7 This section is largely inspired from Robert S.J. Tol (2019), Climate Economics: Economic Analysis of Climate, Climate Change and Climate Policy, Cheltenham, U.K. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 8 Lowercase letters denote annual growth rates of each component.

The steady expansion of global population and rising per-capita calorie consumption has directly translated to growing demand for agricultural products of all types. However, these demand-side pressures increasingly will be met with disruptions to global supply of agricultural commodities, as the impact of climate change raises uncertainty. In any given year, the aggregate decisions of farmers all over the world – i.e., the choice of which crops to plant and how much acreage to dedicate to each crop – determine the supply and market prices of ags. In this competitive market, each farmer attempts to maximize his or her welfare by planting the crops that are expected to yield the greatest profit. The collective action of these producers in reaction to perceived demand generally leads to stable prices, especially for staple commodities such as grains and oilseeds, which differ from industrial commodities in that they are not highly correlated with global business cycles. Demand trends are long-term and slow moving, and typically do not result in abrupt price pressures, as farmers have time to adjust and adapt to changing consumer preferences. Unforeseen, weather-induced supply-side shocks, therefore, are the main source of sudden price changes in ag markets. Such a shock was dramatically on display during the drought-induced crop failures in major grain and cereal producing regions in the most recent global food crisis of 2010/11. While this massive supply shock was not the first of its kind (Chart 1), it highlighted the vulnerability of ag markets to weather risks and specifically the evolving environment under climate change. A 2019 study quantifies the impact of shifting weather patterns on the agricultural market, finding that year-to-year changes in climate factors during the growing season explain 20%-49% of change in corn, rice, soybean, and wheat yields, with climate extremes accounting for 18%-43% of this variation.1 In theory, the impact can manifest in several ways, sometimes contradictory: Chart 12010/11 Shock Highlights Ag Vulnerability To Weather 2010/11 Shock Highlights Ag Vulnerability To Weather 2010/11 Shock Highlights Ag Vulnerability To Weather Extreme weather events: An increase in the frequency and intensity of droughts or floods which threaten to wipe out crops or reduce yields, creating unpredictable supply shocks. The gradual rise in temperature: Each crop has cardinal temperatures – defined by the minimum, maximum and optimum – that determine its boundaries for growth. Increases in temperatures induced by global warming may push the boundary, reducing yields in some regions. Changes in precipitation patterns: In many areas precipitation is projected to increase – both in short bursts and over longer periods. This will lead to greater soil erosion resulting in deterioration in the quality of soil. In other regions, precipitation will decrease, and drought is expected to become more frequent.2 Moreover, the interaction of these factors – along with other region-specific variables – will amplify the impact on crops: Rising temperatures and greater precipitation will result in greater amounts of water in the atmosphere, producing increased water vapor and greater cloud cover. This will reduce solar radiation, and will harm crop productivity. Elevated atmospheric carbon dioxide and CO2 fertilization: Greater CO2 concentrations brought on by continued growth in air pollution are positive for crops as they stimulate photosynthesis and plant growth. However, the impact differs across crops with plants such as soybeans, rice and wheat set to benefit relatively more than plants such as corn.3 Moreover, elevated atmospheric CO2 levels can help crops respond to environmental stresses and reduce yield losses due to ozone and crop water loss through partial stomatal closure and a reduction in ozone penetration into leaves. Temperature changes and the magnitude and intensity of precipitation impact soil moisture and surface runoff. Indirect effects of climate change – weeds, pests and pathogens – also present challenges as they require changes to management practices and may raise farming costs required. The confluence of these factors, and the region- and crop-specific nature of these variables, makes it impossible to estimate the impact of evolving climate conditions on ag products with great accuracy. Nevertheless, our research suggests that the impact of climate change on ag markets will create opportunities in this evolving and highly uncertain market. Abrupt Shocks Amid Gradual Warming: The Long And Short View The impact of climate change on agriculture markets is already evident in increasing intensity and frequency of extreme-weather events. The impact of climate change on agriculture markets is already evident in the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme-weather events such as heatwaves, floods, and droughts. Charts 2A, 2B, and 2C, illustrate the impact of major weather events in crop-producing regions of the U.S. on yields, production and acreage for the crop year in which the events took place. While the individual losses are a function of the magnitude of the event, the events highlighted translate to a 16%, 10%, and 7% decline in corn, soybean, and wheat yields, respectively. These supply disruptions generally do not extend beyond the event year, as the new crop year offers farmers a clean slate to raise output and maximize profits. Chart 2AExtreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Corn Supplies Extreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Corn Supplies Extreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Corn Supplies Chart 2BExtreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Soybean Supplies Extreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Soybean Supplies Extreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Soybean Supplies Chart 2CExtreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Wheat Supplies In A Big Way Extreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Wheat Supplies In A Big Way Extreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Wheat Supplies In A Big Way Chart 3Climate-Induced U.S. Supply Shocks Associated With Price Spikes Climate-Induced U.S. Supply Shocks Associated With Price Spikes Climate-Induced U.S. Supply Shocks Associated With Price Spikes Given that the U.S. is a major global supplier of these crops, extreme weather events and the subsequent supply reductions lead to non-negligible price pressures (Chart 3). While crop conditions thus far have failed to deteriorate in trend (Chart 4), greater frequency and intensity of weather events raise the probability of a decline in overall crop and could lower supply. Chart 4Crop Conditions Have Generally Held Up Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Expanding the analysis to other major crop-producing regions of the world, we find that once again, extreme-weather events are associated with a decline in yields and production in the corresponding crop year (Chart 5). This exercise also indicates that the impact of droughts is significantly more pronounced than the impact of floods.4 The net impact of rising temperatures over the coming decade is not a clear negative. While the weather-induced supply shocks described above are unpredictable, abrupt, and have an immediate impact on output and prices, the gradual warming of temperatures is a slow-moving process. Consequently, the impact will manifest in the form of gradual changes that are difficult to capture and quantify, especially given the mitigating effect of CO2 fertilization – i.e., higher yields resulting from higher CO2 in the atmosphere. Nonetheless, rising temperatures will become a serious risk in crop-planting regions both in the U.S. and globally (Chart 6). While rising temperatures are expected to bring about increasingly more wide-ranging supply disruptions (Chart 7), the net impact over the coming decade is not a clear negative. Chart 5Weather Events, Especially Droughts, Hurt Global Supplies Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Chart 6Rising Global Temperatures Will Pose A Serious Risk … Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change   One study expects the positive impact of CO2 fertilization on yields to overwhelm the negative effect of rising temperatures over the coming decade (Table 1). Elsewhere, studies forecast different responses, with some predicting incremental yield gains over the coming decade before temperatures rise to levels that overwhelm the benefits of greater CO2. Similarly, according to the FAO’s assessment, the net negative impact of climate change on global crop yields will only become apparent with a high degree of certainty post-2030.5 Chart 7… Especially Above The 2 ℃ Mark Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Table 1Estimates For The Response Of Global Average Crop Yields To Warming And CO2 Changes Over The Next Decades Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Bottom Line: Given that rising crop yields have been the main vehicle through which global ag supply grew to meet expanding demand, the risks posed to yields due to climate change are non-trivial. The impact will manifest itself in the form of two simultaneous trends: the gradual rise in temperatures alongside more frequent and severe weather events. While the latter will threaten immediate supply, the former is a slower moving process, and its net negative impact is unlikely to manifest before 2030. The Winners … And Losers Rising temperatures are expected to result in a negligible impact on ag markets over the coming decade; yet this finding is not uniform across all regions. The FAO study cited above finds that by 2030, the projected impact on crop yields will be slightly net negative in developing countries. However, in developed countries, the effect will be net positive. In terms of global supply, the impact of climate change over the coming decade is expected to remain relatively contained, affecting certain regions at various times without causing major global disruptions. That said, as global warming and extreme weather persist, the ramifications will begin to extend beyond individual regions, and will cause supply shocks on a global scale. In part, this can be explained by a greater potential for net reductions in crop yields in warmer, low-latitude areas and semi-arid regions of the world.6 This non-uniform impact will create relative winners and losers. Producers located in temperate regions – where climate change does not yet pose as serious a threat – are set to profit from their increased role in global supply. Conversely, tropical regions are much more vulnerable to climate change. This is especially true for those whose economies are highly dependent on agriculture (Chart 8). Chart 8Agricultural Economies In Tropical Regions Are Most Vulnerable Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change On net, the overall economies of DM countries – which generally are not economically dependent on agriculture and are located in northern regions – will be relatively more insulated from the impact of climate change on the agriculture sector. Aside from the impact on producers, the implications on consumers are also region-dependent. Clearly the direct impact of climate change on global agriculture will be higher food prices, which directly impacts the food component of inflation generally. As a result, consumers who spend a large share of their income to food – generally consumers in lower income countries – will be hardest hit (Chart 9). Chart 9Higher Food Prices Disproportionately Hurt Consumers In Lower Income Countries Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change In theory, a food supply shock is transitory, and given that food is usually excluded from core inflation gauges targeted by central banks, monetary policy should not react to these price spikes. All the same, aside from this direct impact on inflation, food inflation can also pass-through into other components of the CPI basket, for example through wage pressures or inflation expectations. This would lead to a more persistent impact on core inflation, forcing policy makers to react to these transitory forces, complicating the monetary policy response function for these countries. Given that inflation expectations are less well-anchored in lower income economies and that food makes up a larger share of consumption expenditures in these economies, they are most vulnerable to weather-induced food shocks. Individuals who spend a large share of their income on food are set to suffer most. In countries where food prices are highly subsidized, the impact of higher global food prices will not immediately translate to higher domestic prices. This explains why there is no one-to-one relationship between global food prices and domestic food prices (Chart 10). Instead, the higher prices are absorbed by the governments, resulting in an expansion in government expenditures. This distorts the local food market, as it prevents demand from adjusting to the higher prices, and could potentially result in an undershoot in inventories that makes global markets even more vulnerable to further supply shocks Chart 10Subsidies Partially Insulate Against International Shocks Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Bottom Line: The implications of climate change on ag producers are non-uniform. While higher-latitude regions are set to benefit, at least in the short-run, low-latitude countries with economies that are highly dependent on the agriculture sector will suffer most. On the consumer side, individuals who spend a large share of their income on food are set to suffer most. While consumers in countries that subsidize the crops will be protected from the immediate inflation risk, they may feel a delayed impact due to an increase in budget expenditures needed to cover the larger import bill. Mitigation Efforts While the potential impact of climate change on the agriculture sector can be large, it will be at least partially managed through adoption of mitigation policies (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Adaptation Reduces Vulnerability Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change A key question in determining the extent of this behavior is whether warming temperatures and the increased occurrence and intensity of extreme events will be sufficient to justify a major acceleration of investment in agriculture. These efforts would range from simple management changes on the part of farmers to technological advances that raise the productivity of farming or reduce the vulnerability of farmers to climate change. For example, farmers across the U.S. have been planting corn and soybeans earlier in the spring, resulting in an advancement in planting dates (Chart 11). The earlier planting has also been accompanied by a longer growing season with the average number of days in the season increasing. Farmers are also adapting by altering their decisions on which crops to plant. For example, since soybean and corn are planted in many of the same regions of the U.S., farmers often plant more soybeans than corn when experiencing weather shocks. Chart 11Farmers Are Planting Earlier In The Season Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change The agriculture sector is also using more efficient machinery that can plant and harvest crops much faster as well as developing heartier seeds and more potent fertilizers. In turn, farmers will alter their decision making by selecting crop varieties or species that are more resistant to heat and drought. Or they will change fertilizer rates, amounts and timing of irrigation, along with other water-management techniques. Farmers also are making wider use of integrated pest and pathogen management techniques, in order to raise the effectiveness of pest, disease, and weed control. Given that the number of firms in the agriculture sector are fewer in developed markets than in the rest of the world, management decisions can be more easily implemented in the former. On the other hand, emerging market countries where ag output is driven by numerous individual farmers will have a more difficult time implementing policies. Individual farms may not have the means to support themselves, which raises the potential impact of climate change. What is more, climate-change mitigation efforts may require projects, programs, or funds set aside by the government to support these efforts. This is more likely to occur in wealthier developed countries. Bottom Line: Adaptation and mitigation measures on the part of farmers have the potential to reduce the impact of climate change. That said, farmers in richer countries with the funds and institutions in place to support the ag sector likely will fare better. Investment Implications Over the coming decade, the ramifications of climate change are likely to be contained to a regional level. Although global supply will be vulnerable to regional disruptions, the impact will, in part, be mitigated by inventories, which have been rising for years. These stocks will create a buffer against unpredictable supply shocks (Chart 12). Chart 12Higher Inventories Needed To Buffer Against Unpredictable Shocks Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change However, given that the global soybean market resembles an oligopoly with Brazil, the U.S., and Argentina accounting for 81% of global supply, global soybean prices will be more vulnerable to supply events in these regions than other crops (Chart 13). At the other end of the spectrum, global wheat markets will be relatively more insulated from isolated weather events impacting any one major producer as each of these regions contributes a relatively small share to global wheat output. This analysis also finds that yields and supply generally recover in the crop year following an extreme climate event. This implies that while the extent of damage from these events can be severe, they are not persistent unless the increasing frequency of extreme events leads to a secular change. Aside from the price impact, the weather and temperature changes will manifest in the form of greater volatility in supply, translating to greater price volatility. Options-implied volatilities for corn, wheat and soybeans have been on a general downtrend since the two major global food scares in 2007/08 and 2010/11 (Chart 14). We expect the trend to reverse going forward as the frequency of weather events will create greater price uncertainty. Chart 13Soybeans Most Vulnerable To Shocks Affecting Major Producers Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change   Chart 14Volatility Will Go Up Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst U.S. Bond Strategy JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy, Research Associate Global Asset Allocation AmrH@bcaresearch.com Isabelle Dimyadi, Research Associate Isabelled@bcaresearch.com     Appendix Table 2Extreme Weather Events In The U.S. Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change   Footnotes 1      Please see Vogel et al, The effects of climate extremes on global agricultural yields, Environ. Res. Lett 14 054010, 2019. 2      As a consequence of greenhouse gas emissions precipitation is expected to increase in high altitude regions such as much of the U.S. and decrease in subtropical regions such as the southwest U.S., Central America, southern Africa, and the Mediterranean basin. 3           Plants can be broken down into either C3 or C4 based on the way they assimilate atmospheric CO2 into different physiological components. While rising CO2 causes C3 plants to raise the rate of photosynthesis and reduce the respiration rate, C4 plants do not experience a rise in photosynthesis since photosynthesis is already saturated. For example, studies show that soybean yields increased 12%-15% under 550 ppm vs. 370 ppm CO2 concentrations while corn experienced negligible yield increases. 4      Please see Lesk C., P. Rowhani, and N. Ramankutty, Influence of extreme weather disasters on global crop production, Nature, 529(7584), 84-87, 2016. 5      Please see The State Of Food And Agriculture: Climate Change, Agriculture, And Food Security, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2016. 6      Please see Stevanovic et al., The impact of high-end climate change on agricultural welfare, Sci-Adv 2(8), 2016.

Dear Client, I am currently traveling in Europe visiting clients. This week, in lieu of a regular report, I am sending along a research report written by my colleague at BCA Global Asset Allocation. The topic covers one of the more fascinating "alternative" parts of the fixed income universe - catastrophe bonds. I trust that you will find this report insightful and useful. Best regards, Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy Highlights Catastrophe bonds ("cat bonds") have recently been receiving a lot of investor attention because, after this summer's large hurricanes, they are now attractively priced. We explain the mechanics of this market, and analyze cat bonds' historic risk-return characteristics. Cat bonds have historical annualized returns of 7.4%, with volatility of only 3.0%, making them an attractive risk-adjusted investment. However, they are exposed to "cliff risk", creating a return distribution with negative skew and large excess kurtosis. But cat bonds offer interesting portfolio diversification benefits, since financial and economic shocks have minimal impact on cat bond returns. The reinsurance market tends to be cyclical, with premiums rising following a catastrophe and decreasing during a period of calm. Feature Introduction In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused $17 billion in losses, more than twice the value of the insured property, and forced many insurers into bankruptcy. As the global economy has grown in size since then, the monetary value of insured events has risen steadily. However, increasing regulatory hurdles in the form of higher reserve requirements have led to capacity constraints (Chart 1) in the traditional insurance industry. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina, which caused $108 billion in losses, strengthened the case for the introduction of catastrophe bonds and other insurance-linked securities that helped ease financial burdens in the insurance industry, for several reasons. First, catastrophe bonds give access to the deepest, most liquid, and efficient sources of capital. Second, the securitization of reinsurance capital has created a secondary market where risk exposures can be transferred within the investor community. Third, insurance firms have the ability to move some exposures off their books, thereby allowing them to underwrite larger risks that they would otherwise lack the capacity to cover. According to S&P Global Ratings, the market for cat bonds and other insurance-linked securities is estimated to be about $86 billion. Other insurance-linked securities include industry loss warranties (ILW), collateralized reinsurance contracts, and reinsurance sidecars. Cat bonds are the only insurance-linked securities that publicly trade on a secondary market. The recent increase in natural catastrophes has led to surging supply in the cat bond market. Record issuance in the first and second quarters of 2017 has pushed the size of the outstanding cat bond market to over $30 billion (Chart 2) for the first time. This comes after a period prior to this year with fewer catastrophes and where bond pricing has been stable, which led to increased deal sizes. In this Special Report, we run through the mechanics of the cat bond structure and market. We analyze historical risk-return characteristics (Chart 3) and compare them to other major asset classes. Since insurance-linked securities are known to have very low correlation with other assets, we test their potential diversification benefits within a traditional portfolio. Finally, we analyze their historical performance in periods of financial market stress and rising interest rate environments, which are two of the biggest worries for investors. Our conclusions are that: Chart 1Capacity Constraints A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 2Record Issuance In 2017 A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 3Risk-Return Profile Risk-Return Profile Risk-Return Profile The reinsurance market is cyclical, with premiums increasing following a catastrophe and decreasing following a period of calm. Realized volatility in the cat bond market is low. However, returns have a negative skew with an extremely fat-tailed distribution relative to other traditional assets. The addition of cat bonds to a traditional multi-asset portfolio has tremendous diversification benefits. The largest improvement to risk-adjusted returns comes from substituting equities with cat bonds. Financial crises have minimal impact on cat bond returns. However, depending on the magnitude of catastrophe losses, there could be varied regional impacts. Investors can customize the risk-return profile by altering the attachment and exhaustion points, and also by diversifying across trigger types. Mechanics Of Cat Bonds Despite the increasing popularity of cat bonds, their non-conventional structure is understood by only a limited number of investors. A better understanding of the characteristics of this financial instrument makes analyzing risk and return more straightforward. The key features (Chart 4) of a catastrophe bond are as follows. An insurer looking to reduce certain exposures will create a special purpose vehicle (SPV), also known as the issuer, to assist with the transaction. The issuer/SPV sells reinsurance protection to the sponsoring firms and simultaneously issues a cat bond to the investor. The proceeds from the bond sale are managed in a segregated collateral account to generate the floating-rate component of the coupon payable to investors. The fixed component of the coupon is financed through reinsurance premiums paid by the sponsoring firm to the issuer or SPV. Traditionally, cat bonds used a total return swap where a counterparty guaranteed the liquidity and performance of a collateral account. This forced investors and sponsors to rely on the creditworthiness of the swap provider. In 2007, two cat bonds that used Lehman Brothers as a swap counterparty were forced into default because of illiquid collateral assets and mismatched maturities. Nowadays, the assets managed in the collateral account are invested only in U.S. Treasury money market funds or structured notes from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The final settlement of the bond is binary: 1) if no trigger event occurs before the bond maturity, the SPV returns the principal to investors along with the final coupon; 2) if a catastrophe hits and the bond is triggered, the principal in the collateral account is used to settle the claims of the sponsoring firms. Cat bonds are typically used to cover a piece of risk exposure in the sponsor's book. For example, a cat bond could cover indemnities exceeding $1 billion up to $1.2 billion, making the bond issue size equal to $200 million. The $1 billion is called the attachment point, and the $1.2 billion is called the exhaustion point, at which point the principal is exhausted and investors are not liable for any further claims. The tranche with the higher attachment point will be of higher quality, but with a lower rate of return. The reinsurance industry is cyclical, which makes contract pricing more volatile than investors might expect. The Rate on Line (Chart 5) index can be seen as a yield on the insurance contracts underwritten in the industry. Market conditions can be split into two phases: Chart 4Mechanics Of Cat Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 5Cyclical Reinsurance Premiums Cyclical Reinsurance Premiums Cyclical Reinsurance Premiums Soft Market: Following many years of limited or minor catastrophes, reinsurance premiums are pressured downward and bond prices rise. In these circumstances, demand for cat bonds will be limited as coupon income will be less attractive. Hard Market: A major catastrophe will significantly erode the capital available in the insurance industry, thereby creating a supply shortage that pushes up reinsurance premiums. In these conditions, cat bond issuance will rise, driven by attractive coupon income. Investors can manage the premium cycle by slightly increasing risk at the portfolio level in a softening market (falling premiums) and reducing risk in hardening market (rising premiums). The recent catastrophes should drive up reinsurance premiums, but the sheer weight of money searching for yields in the current environment might make the uplift surprisingly modest compared to the past. Given that cat bonds have a binary payout feature, investors need to understand the trigger type (Table 1) used in the contract. In the early days, most bonds were issued with an indemnity trigger, but the type of trigger (Chart 6) has become more varied over time. The type of trigger used in the cat bond has the following impacts: If the trigger used in the bond takes longer to settle, the investor can be involved in a long drawn-out legal battle with the sponsoring firm looking to settle claims. This could in turn force the bond beyond maturity and keep investor funds locked up at significantly lower rates of return. Table 1Understanding Trigger Types A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 6Choosing The Right Trigger Type A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Investors also need to understand the level of basis risk sponsoring firms are exposed to with different trigger types. In the context of cat bonds, basis risk is when the settlement payout from cat bonds differs from the actual portfolio losses incurred by sponsoring firms. If they have basis risk, investors will have to deal with moral hazard, where sponsoring firms will have incentive to underwrite excessive risks. Historical Risk & Return Investing in catastrophe bonds is essentially a "short gamma" strategy, where investors are selling insurance and collecting premium with the hope of options not being triggered during the maturity of the bond. Attractive historical returns (Table 2) have been the result of lower-than-expected principal write-downs given limited catastrophes. In the early years, cat bonds as an asset class were not fully understood by the broader market, creating a "novelty premium" up until 2010. Subsequently, low interest rates have had a profound impact on all traditional assets, making cat bond yields relatively attractive. Realized volatility has been extremely low since the investor collects regular coupons in the absence of a catastrophe that triggers a payout. This makes risk-adjusted returns very attractive compared to other major assets. However, because of the extreme tail risk, there exists a big negative skew along with high excess kurtosis. Cat bonds are exposed to "cliff risk" - the likelihood that the tranche's notional value will be exhausted once settlement claims reach the attachment point. The two main sources of risk that investors need to be mainly concerned about, however, are: 1) insurance risk that cat bonds assume, and 2) credit risk associated with the collateral account. An attractive feature of cat bonds is that poor performance tends to be self-correcting, as seen in the reinsurance cycle. Following a particularly destructive natural disaster, a number of factors such as increased insurance demand, the reduced capacity of insurance firms, and upward revisions to probability models serve to increase insurance premiums and potential returns to insurance-linked securities. For example, after the 2011 Japanese Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, insurance premiums were pushed up by around 50% for earthquake risk and 20% for other catastrophe risk. The likelihood of incurring negative returns is far lower than the chance of benefitting from positive returns. Cat bonds have achieved positive monthly returns 92% of the time (Table 3). The recent hurricane season in the U.S. was the first time returns turned negative on a 12-month basis. Table 2Historical Risk-Return Analysis (January 2002 - November 2017) A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Table 3Only Fifteen Months Of Negative Returns A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Finally, there have been many comparisons between cat bonds and high-yield credit. While high-yield debt performance is tied to market and economic cycles lasting about 10 years, that of cat bonds is tied to low probability catastrophes. Frequency of loss in junk bonds is greater than it is for cat bonds. However, the potential principal loss is greater for cat bonds, because they have almost zero recovery value. Diversification & Portfolio Impact Cat bonds' performance is linked to factors such as natural disasters, longevity risk, or life insurance mortality, and not to broader financial market risks. However, in periods of economic stress, markets experience a flight to quality and correlations between risk assets increase. Therefore, the benefits of portfolio diversification dissolve when they are needed most. This is not the case with cat bonds, however, as correlations with other assets (Table 4) have remained stable over time. This makes them a potentially useful diversification instrument in multi-asset portfolios. Table 4Cross-Asset Correlation (January 2002 - November 2017) A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds To test this, we perform a typical portfolio analysis whereby we add cat bonds to a conventional portfolio and investigate the impact on the return and risk of the portfolio (Chart 7). Starting with the most traditional allocation of 60% equities and 40% bonds, we augment the portfolio with a 10% allocation to cat bonds and come up with the following results: Replacing equities with cat bonds leads to the largest reduction in portfolio volatility, and a small decrease in annualized returns. This new portfolio generates equity-like returns, but with a smaller correlation with stocks. Replacing traditional fixed income with cat bonds leads to a large increase to annualized returns, while the impact on volatility is virtually non-existent. The largest positive impact on risk-adjusted returns occurs when cat bonds replace equities, because the reduction in volatility is substantially greater than the increase in returns when cat bonds replace traditional bonds. We also ranked the MSCI All-Country World equity and Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Bond indices from worst to best monthly returns and then overlaid the corresponding cat bond returns for each ranked month (Chart 8). This technique removes randomness from the time series in order to view the relative randomness of the other. We have the following findings: Cat bonds have had only three months that delivered a return less than -2%. These were -2.1% in September 2005 during Hurricane Katrina, -3.6% in March 2011 during the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and -5.8% in September 2017 after the severe hurricanes in Texas, Florida and the Caribbean. Other than catastrophe-related events, cat bond returns have been stable. Cat bonds displayed no reaction when equities had their most negative months. But they tend to have relatively stronger returns when equities also have positive months. Cat bonds performed well in both good and bad months for traditional fixed income. This shows that causes of traditional bond market losses and cat bond principal loss have little or no bearing on one another. Since cat bonds have a large negative skew and high excess kurtosis, investors can potentially lose all their capital if the bonds are triggered. When allocating to cat bonds, investors need to maintain a well-diversified position in order to minimize the risk of complete capital wipeout. This can be done by carefully picking bonds covering different perils (i.e. earthquakes, wind, extreme mortality), regions and trigger types (Chart 9). As a broader range of perils come to the market, investors will find increasing avenues for diversification within the asset class. Investors can also benefit from very low correlations within the cat bond universe, where returns from cat bonds covering a specific peril have no bearing on returns from cat bonds covering another peril. Chart 7Portfolio Diversification A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 8Attractive Monthly Returns A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 9Diversifying Across Perils, Coupon Rate And Expected Loss A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Financial Market Stress Having established that underlying market developments have no bearing on cat bond performance, we want to address two further important questions: 1) do financial crises affect cat bond returns? 2) do natural catastrophes trigger financial crises? Looking at previous global market crisis scenarios dating back to 2008 (Chart 10), we see that cat bonds had positive absolute returns during all crisis periods. The only period with negative cat bond returns was during the 2008 Lehman Brothers' collapse, when the bank was the swap counterparty for two bonds that defaulted. Large natural catastrophes do not affect broader capital markets, but do tend to have a large local impact. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, with damages totaling $108 billion, became the costliest hurricane to date in the U.S. The hurricane triggered a cat bond, and the index was down 2.1%, but there was no noticeable lingering impact on the U.S. economy. On the other hand, the earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku on March 11, 2011 had devastating effects. With damages exceeding $300 billion (approximately 5% of Japanese GDP), the cat bond index dropped 3.6%, and Japanese equities collapsed 7.3%. Moreover, a big earthquake in a major city or region such as Tokyo or California could have the capacity to trigger a global recession. Finally, looking at past major catastrophes (Chart 11), we see that existing cat bond prices do not fully recover to their pre-catastrophe levels. Accordingly, picking up bonds at a discount may not generate the expected return as price levels struggle to fully recover. Chart 10Outperformance Across The Board A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 11Not A Full Recovery Not A Full Recovery Not A Full Recovery Interest Rate & Inflation Hedge Traditional bonds with fixed coupon payments underperform in a rising rate environment. Since cat bonds receive a floating-rate coupon along with the fixed premium, they are largely immune to rising rates. When central banks hike rates, the principal of the bonds invested in money market assets will produce a higher return, thereby offering investors a powerful shield against possible inflation, as well. Since the total coupon received by investors includes a fixed and floating component, cat bonds have a lower modified duration relative to similar maturity traditional bonds. Conclusion Despite their abnormal return distributions, we recommend investors allocate capital from their "alternatives" bucket toward cat bonds. Against a backdrop of low yields and investor complacency, cat bonds are highly attractive given their potential for consistently robust returns and, perhaps most importantly, tremendous diversification benefits. Still, allocations should be relatively small given the illiquid nature of the cat bond market, and diversification among bonds and issuers is critical due to the potential for large losses in the event that a cat bond is triggered. Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Catastrophe bonds ("cat bonds") have recently been receiving a lot of investor attention because, after this summer's large hurricanes, they are now attractively priced. We explain the mechanics of this market, and analyze cat bonds' historic risk-return characteristics. Cat bonds have historical annualized returns of 7.4%, with volatility of only 3.0%, making them an attractive risk-adjusted investment. However, they are exposed to "cliff risk", creating a return distribution with negative skew and large excess kurtosis. But cat bonds offer interesting portfolio diversification benefits, since financial and economic shocks have minimal impact on cat bond returns. The reinsurance market tends to be cyclical, with premiums rising following a catastrophe and decreasing during a period of calm. Feature Introduction In 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused $17 billion in losses, more than twice the value of the insured property, and forced many insurers into bankruptcy. As the global economy has grown in size since then, the monetary value of insured events has risen steadily. However, increasing regulatory hurdles in the form of higher reserve requirements have led to capacity constraints (Chart 1) in the traditional insurance industry. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina, which caused $108 billion in losses, strengthened the case for the introduction of catastrophe bonds and other insurance-linked securities that helped ease financial burdens in the insurance industry, for several reasons. First, catastrophe bonds give access to the deepest, most liquid, and efficient sources of capital. Second, the securitization of reinsurance capital has created a secondary market where risk exposures can be transferred within the investor community. Third, insurance firms have the ability to move some exposures off their books, thereby allowing them to underwrite larger risks that they would otherwise lack the capacity to cover. According to S&P Global Ratings, the market for cat bonds and other insurance-linked securities is estimated to be about $86 billion. Other insurance-linked securities include industry loss warranties (ILW), collateralized reinsurance contracts, and reinsurance sidecars. Cat bonds are the only insurance-linked securities that publicly trade on a secondary market. The recent increase in natural catastrophes has led to surging supply in the cat bond market. Record issuance in the first and second quarters of 2017 has pushed the size of the outstanding cat bond market to over $30 billion (Chart 2) for the first time. This comes after a period prior to this year with fewer catastrophes and where bond pricing has been stable, which led to increased deal sizes. In this Special Report, we run through the mechanics of the cat bond structure and market. We analyze historical risk-return characteristics (Chart 3) and compare them to other major asset classes. Since insurance-linked securities are known to have very low correlation with other assets, we test their potential diversification benefits within a traditional portfolio. Finally, we analyze their historical performance in periods of financial market stress and rising interest rate environments, which are two of the biggest worries for investors. Our conclusions are that: Chart 1Capacity Constraints A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 2Record Issuance In 2017 A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 3Risk-Return Profile Risk-Return Profile Risk-Return Profile The reinsurance market is cyclical, with premiums increasing following a catastrophe and decreasing following a period of calm. Realized volatility in the cat bond market is low. However, returns have a negative skew with an extremely fat-tailed distribution relative to other traditional assets. The addition of cat bonds to a traditional multi-asset portfolio has tremendous diversification benefits. The largest improvement to risk-adjusted returns comes from substituting equities with cat bonds. Financial crises have minimal impact on cat bond returns. However, depending on the magnitude of catastrophe losses, there could be varied regional impacts. Investors can customize the risk-return profile by altering the attachment and exhaustion points, and also by diversifying across trigger types. Mechanics Of Cat Bonds Despite the increasing popularity of cat bonds, their non-conventional structure is understood by only a limited number of investors. A better understanding of the characteristics of this financial instrument makes analyzing risk and return more straightforward. The key features (Chart 4) of a catastrophe bond are as follows. An insurer looking to reduce certain exposures will create a special purpose vehicle (SPV), also known as the issuer, to assist with the transaction. The issuer/SPV sells reinsurance protection to the sponsoring firms and simultaneously issues a cat bond to the investor. The proceeds from the bond sale are managed in a segregated collateral account to generate the floating-rate component of the coupon payable to investors. The fixed component of the coupon is financed through reinsurance premiums paid by the sponsoring firm to the issuer or SPV. Traditionally, cat bonds used a total return swap where a counterparty guaranteed the liquidity and performance of a collateral account. This forced investors and sponsors to rely on the creditworthiness of the swap provider. In 2007, two cat bonds that used Lehman Brothers as a swap counterparty were forced into default because of illiquid collateral assets and mismatched maturities. Nowadays, the assets managed in the collateral account are invested only in U.S. Treasury money market funds or structured notes from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The final settlement of the bond is binary: 1) if no trigger event occurs before the bond maturity, the SPV returns the principal to investors along with the final coupon; 2) if a catastrophe hits and the bond is triggered, the principal in the collateral account is used to settle the claims of the sponsoring firms. Cat bonds are typically used to cover a piece of risk exposure in the sponsor's book. For example, a cat bond could cover indemnities exceeding $1 billion up to $1.2 billion, making the bond issue size equal to $200 million. The $1 billion is called the attachment point, and the $1.2 billion is called the exhaustion point, at which point the principal is exhausted and investors are not liable for any further claims. The tranche with the higher attachment point will be of higher quality, but with a lower rate of return. The reinsurance industry is cyclical, which makes contract pricing more volatile than investors might expect. The Rate on Line (Chart 5) index can be seen as a yield on the insurance contracts underwritten in the industry. Market conditions can be split into two phases: Chart 4Mechanics Of Cat Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 5Cyclical Reinsurance Premiums Cyclical Reinsurance Premiums Cyclical Reinsurance Premiums Soft Market: Following many years of limited or minor catastrophes, reinsurance premiums are pressured downward and bond prices rise. In these circumstances, demand for cat bonds will be limited as coupon income will be less attractive. Hard Market: A major catastrophe will significantly erode the capital available in the insurance industry, thereby creating a supply shortage that pushes up reinsurance premiums. In these conditions, cat bond issuance will rise, driven by attractive coupon income. Investors can manage the premium cycle by slightly increasing risk at the portfolio level in a softening market (falling premiums) and reducing risk in hardening market (rising premiums). The recent catastrophes should drive up reinsurance premiums, but the sheer weight of money searching for yields in the current environment might make the uplift surprisingly modest compared to the past. Given that cat bonds have a binary payout feature, investors need to understand the trigger type (Table 1) used in the contract. In the early days, most bonds were issued with an indemnity trigger, but the type of trigger (Chart 6) has become more varied over time. The type of trigger used in the cat bond has the following impacts: If the trigger used in the bond takes longer to settle, the investor can be involved in a long drawn-out legal battle with the sponsoring firm looking to settle claims. This could in turn force the bond beyond maturity and keep investor funds locked up at significantly lower rates of return. Table 1Understanding Trigger Types A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 6Choosing The Right Trigger Type A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Investors also need to understand the level of basis risk sponsoring firms are exposed to with different trigger types. In the context of cat bonds, basis risk is when the settlement payout from cat bonds differs from the actual portfolio losses incurred by sponsoring firms. If they have basis risk, investors will have to deal with moral hazard, where sponsoring firms will have incentive to underwrite excessive risks. Historical Risk & Return Investing in catastrophe bonds is essentially a "short gamma" strategy, where investors are selling insurance and collecting premium with the hope of options not being triggered during the maturity of the bond. Attractive historical returns (Table 2) have been the result of lower-than-expected principal write-downs given limited catastrophes. In the early years, cat bonds as an asset class were not fully understood by the broader market, creating a "novelty premium" up until 2010. Subsequently, low interest rates have had a profound impact on all traditional assets, making cat bond yields relatively attractive. Realized volatility has been extremely low since the investor collects regular coupons in the absence of a catastrophe that triggers a payout. This makes risk-adjusted returns very attractive compared to other major assets. However, because of the extreme tail risk, there exists a big negative skew along with high excess kurtosis. Cat bonds are exposed to "cliff risk" - the likelihood that the tranche's notional value will be exhausted once settlement claims reach the attachment point. The two main sources of risk that investors need to be mainly concerned about, however, are: 1) insurance risk that cat bonds assume, and 2) credit risk associated with the collateral account. An attractive feature of cat bonds is that poor performance tends to be self-correcting, as seen in the reinsurance cycle. Following a particularly destructive natural disaster, a number of factors such as increased insurance demand, the reduced capacity of insurance firms, and upward revisions to probability models serve to increase insurance premiums and potential returns to insurance-linked securities. For example, after the 2011 Japanese Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, insurance premiums were pushed up by around 50% for earthquake risk and 20% for other catastrophe risk. The likelihood of incurring negative returns is far lower than the chance of benefitting from positive returns. Cat bonds have achieved positive monthly returns 92% of the time (Table 3). The recent hurricane season in the U.S. was the first time returns turned negative on a 12-month basis. Table 2Historical Risk-Return Analysis (January 2002 - November 2017) A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Table 3Only Fifteen Months Of Negative Returns A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Finally, there have been many comparisons between cat bonds and high-yield credit. While high-yield debt performance is tied to market and economic cycles lasting about 10 years, that of cat bonds is tied to low probability catastrophes. Frequency of loss in junk bonds is greater than it is for cat bonds. However, the potential principal loss is greater for cat bonds, because they have almost zero recovery value. Diversification & Portfolio Impact Cat bonds' performance is linked to factors such as natural disasters, longevity risk, or life insurance mortality, and not to broader financial market risks. However, in periods of economic stress, markets experience a flight to quality and correlations between risk assets increase. Therefore, the benefits of portfolio diversification dissolve when they are needed most. This is not the case with cat bonds, however, as correlations with other assets (Table 4) have remained stable over time. This makes them a potentially useful diversification instrument in multi-asset portfolios. Table 4Cross-Asset Correlation (January 2002 - November 2017) A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds To test this, we perform a typical portfolio analysis whereby we add cat bonds to a conventional portfolio and investigate the impact on the return and risk of the portfolio (Chart 7). Starting with the most traditional allocation of 60% equities and 40% bonds, we augment the portfolio with a 10% allocation to cat bonds and come up with the following results: Replacing equities with cat bonds leads to the largest reduction in portfolio volatility, and a small decrease in annualized returns. This new portfolio generates equity-like returns, but with a smaller correlation with stocks. Replacing traditional fixed income with cat bonds leads to a large increase to annualized returns, while the impact on volatility is virtually non-existent. The largest positive impact on risk-adjusted returns occurs when cat bonds replace equities, because the reduction in volatility is substantially greater than the increase in returns when cat bonds replace traditional bonds. We also ranked the MSCI All-Country World equity and Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Bond indices from worst to best monthly returns and then overlaid the corresponding cat bond returns for each ranked month (Chart 8). This technique removes randomness from the time series in order to view the relative randomness of the other. We have the following findings: Cat bonds have had only three months that delivered a return less than -2%. These were -2.1% in September 2005 during Hurricane Katrina, -3.6% in March 2011 during the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and -5.8% in September 2017 after the severe hurricanes in Texas, Florida and the Caribbean. Other than catastrophe-related events, cat bond returns have been stable. Cat bonds displayed no reaction when equities had their most negative months. But they tend to have relatively stronger returns when equities also have positive months. Cat bonds performed well in both good and bad months for traditional fixed income. This shows that causes of traditional bond market losses and cat bond principal loss have little or no bearing on one another. Since cat bonds have a large negative skew and high excess kurtosis, investors can potentially lose all their capital if the bonds are triggered. When allocating to cat bonds, investors need to maintain a well-diversified position in order to minimize the risk of complete capital wipeout. This can be done by carefully picking bonds covering different perils (i.e. earthquakes, wind, extreme mortality), regions and trigger types (Chart 9). As a broader range of perils come to the market, investors will find increasing avenues for diversification within the asset class. Investors can also benefit from very low correlations within the cat bond universe, where returns from cat bonds covering a specific peril have no bearing on returns from cat bonds covering another peril. Chart 7Portfolio Diversification A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 8Attractive Monthly Returns A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 9Diversifying Across Perils, Coupon Rate And Expected Loss A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Financial Market Stress Having established that underlying market developments have no bearing on cat bond performance, we want to address two further important questions: 1) do financial crises affect cat bond returns? 2) do natural catastrophes trigger financial crises? Looking at previous global market crisis scenarios dating back to 2008 (Chart 10), we see that cat bonds had positive absolute returns during all crisis periods. The only period with negative cat bond returns was during the 2008 Lehman Brothers' collapse, when the bank was the swap counterparty for two bonds that defaulted. Large natural catastrophes do not affect broader capital markets, but do tend to have a large local impact. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, with damages totaling $108 billion, became the costliest hurricane to date in the U.S. The hurricane triggered a cat bond, and the index was down 2.1%, but there was no noticeable lingering impact on the U.S. economy. On the other hand, the earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku on March 11, 2011 had devastating effects. With damages exceeding $300 billion (approximately 5% of Japanese GDP), the cat bond index dropped 3.6%, and Japanese equities collapsed 7.3%. Moreover, a big earthquake in a major city or region such as Tokyo or California could have the capacity to trigger a global recession. Finally, looking at past major catastrophes (Chart 11), we see that existing cat bond prices do not fully recover to their pre-catastrophe levels. Accordingly, picking up bonds at a discount may not generate the expected return as price levels struggle to fully recover. Chart 10Outperformance Across The Board A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds Chart 11Not A Full Recovery Not A Full Recovery Not A Full Recovery Interest Rate & Inflation Hedge Traditional bonds with fixed coupon payments underperform in a rising rate environment. Since cat bonds receive a floating-rate coupon along with the fixed premium, they are largely immune to rising rates. When central banks hike rates, the principal of the bonds invested in money market assets will produce a higher return, thereby offering investors a powerful shield against possible inflation, as well. Since the total coupon received by investors includes a fixed and floating component, cat bonds have a lower modified duration relative to similar maturity traditional bonds. Conclusion Despite their abnormal return distributions, we recommend investors allocate capital from their "alternatives" bucket toward cat bonds. Against a backdrop of low yields and investor complacency, cat bonds are highly attractive given their potential for consistently robust returns and, perhaps most importantly, tremendous diversification benefits. Still, allocations should be relatively small given the illiquid nature of the cat bond market, and diversification among bonds and issuers is critical due to the potential for large losses in the event that a cat bond is triggered. Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Storms set a low bar for Q3 EPS. BCA's Beige Book Monitor near cycle highs despite storms. Investors should fade the Q3 housing weakness. Latest Survey Of Consumer Finances highlights student loan debt issue. Feature Chart 1Q3 GDP Growth Has Held Up##BR##Remarkably Well Despite Hurricane Impact Q3 GDP Growth Has Held Up Remarkably Well Despite Hurricane Impact Q3 GDP Growth Has Held Up Remarkably Well Despite Hurricane Impact U.S. equities hit fresh all-time highs again last week, undeterred by the downward adjustment in Q3 earnings estimates in part due to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Investors appear to be looking through any near-term hit to economic growth and profits. Trump's tax plan cleared a key hurdle in Congress and tax cuts would surely give the market a boost if they are eventually passed. Bond yields and the dollar edged higher on speculation that President Trump will choose John Taylor as the next Fed Chair, who many believe will be a hawk. While we agree that investors should look through the hurricane effects, we worry that equity markets appear increasingly frothy. While the storms will cast a shadow over the Q3 earnings reports, the economic data has held up remarkably well. At 2.7% and 1.5%, the Atlanta Fed GDP Now and New York Fed's Nowcast for Q3 have recouped nearly all the ground they lost in the immediate aftermath of the storms (Chart 1). The Fed's Beige Book revealed a stout underlying economy despite the most weather related disruptions since superstorm Sandy in 2012. The Beige Book and most of the other economic data released in the past few weeks, aside from the inflation data, support a December rate hike. Markets are pricing in a near 100% chance of a 25bps hike at the December 12-13 FOMC meeting. The impact of Harvey and Irma have also lowered expectations for housing and residential investment in Q3, but housing is poised to rebound in the coming quarters even if the Fed raises rates once this year and three more times as we expect next year. The Fed's latest Survey of Consumer Finances will raise more concern over student loan debt, but also show that households' low cash balances and elevated allocation to equities match consumers' elevated confidence readings. Q3 Earnings Outlook Clouded By Storms Hurricanes Harvey and Irma may temporarily undermine corporate profits in a few industries in the third quarter. The annual growth rate of the 4-quarter moving total was poised to peak anyway, given more demanding year-ago comparisons (Chart 2). Still, EPS growth is peaking at a high level and should decelerate only slowly through 2018 toward a level more commensurate with 3.5-4% nominal GDP growth. We thus expect the earnings backdrop to remain a tailwind for the equity market, albeit a smaller tailwind. This forecast excludes any positive impact on growth from tax cuts. The announcement of tax cuts would be positive for EPS and the S&P 500 price index in the short term, although this would also bring forward Fed rate hikes. Rising oil prices are turbocharging earnings in the energy patch and we expect this to continue. Indeed, BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service raised its 2018 target price for both Brent and WTI last week to $65.15/bbl and $62.95/bbl, respectively. These estimates are up by $5.51 and $5.98/bbl from our forecast last month.1 The soft industrial production readings in September would be a concern for BCA's profit forecast, absent the storms' impact (industrial production is included in our top-down EPS model). However, the Fed noted that "the continued effects of Hurricane Harvey and, to a lesser degree, the effects of Hurricane Irma combined to hold down the growth in total production in September by 1/4 percentage point. For the third quarter as a whole, industrial production fell 1.5 percent at an annual rate; excluding the effects of the hurricanes, the index would have risen at least 1/2 percent." Moreover, strong readings in September and October on both the New York and Philadelphia Fed's manufacturing indices imply that the aftermath of the storms did not extend beyond Texas and Florida, and suggest a rebound in IP in Q4. The elevated readings on the Cass Freight index in recent months support that view (Chart 3). Chart 2Strong EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon Strong EPS Growth Ahead, Will Start To Slow Soon Strong EPS Growth Ahead, Will Start To Slow Soon Chart 3Storms Impacted IP In Q3 Storms Impacted IP In Q3 Storms Impacted IP In Q3 Bottom Line: The earnings season is underway and forecasts have collapsed to a mere 4.2% year-over-year growth rate for Q3. They were as high as 5.5% at the start of Q3. Financials are heavily weighing on the outlook and the sector's profits are expected to contract by 9%. While the insurance sub-sector may be behind the bulk of the negative EPS revisions owing to the hurricanes, such extreme pessimism is unwarranted and the bar is set extremely low for both financials and the overall market. Based on the September and October Beige Books, corporate managements will not be too concerned with the dollar during this earnings reporting season. The Beige Book: Beyond The Storms The Beige Book released on October 18 supports the Fed's stance that the hurricanes will not alter the U.S. economy's medium-term trajectory and will keep the Fed on track to boost rates by another 25 basis points in December. BCA's quantitative approach2 to the Beige Book's qualitative data points to underlying strength in GDP and a tighter labor market, but there is still a disconnect between the Beige Book's view of inflation and the market's stance. Moreover, the stronger dollar has disappeared from the Beige Book and despite the lack of progress in Washington on Trump's pro-business agenda, business uncertainty is down. In addition, the prospects for commercial and residential real estate remain bright. Chart 4Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook##BR##On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation Beige Book Monitors Support Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation At 63%, BCA's Beige Book Monitor stayed near its cycle highs in October, providing more confirmation that the underlying economy remained upbeat in Q3 despite Hurricanes Harvey and Irma (Chart 4). The latest Beige Book covered the period from mid-September to October 6. Hurricane Harvey hit Texas and Louisiana in late August while Irma made landfall in Florida in early September and moved on to neighboring southeastern states through mid-month. While there were only four mentions of "weather", "hurricane" was used 58 times and "storm" nine times. The total 71 puts the weather impact on the Beige Book at its highest since superstorm Sandy struck the northeastern U.S. in Q4 2012 (Chart 4, panel 2). Based on the Beige Book, the dollar should not be an issue in the Q3 or Q4 earnings seasons. The greenback is no longer a concern for small businesses and bankers, which is in sharp contrast to 2015 and early 2016 when there was a surge in Beige Book mentions of a strong dollar (Chart 4, panel 4). In October, there were no remarks at all. The past three Beige Books (July, September and October) have seen only a single reference to a stronger dollar. The last time that three consecutive Beige Books had so few mentions was in late 2014. Remarkably, business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) has moved lower in 2017. The implication is that the business community is ignoring the lack of progress by Washington policymakers on Trump's agenda (Chart 4, panel 5). Echoing the market's disagreement with the Fed on inflation, a significant discrepancy in the Beige Book was evident in the number of inflation words (Chart 4, panel 3). Expressions of inflation dipped to a 7-month low in October. However, a disconnect persists between the still-elevated mentions of inflation and the soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The recent Beige Book backs BCA's view that the hurricanes will not derail the economy. Indeed, the September reading on our Beige Book monitor in early October suggests that the economy rebounded smartly as the effects of the storms waned in late Q3 and early Q4. However, the Beige Book has done little to resolve the debate around why an economy growing above potential and a tightening labor market have not boosted inflation. Moreover, the October Beige Book all but warned investors to fade the Q3 weakness in the housing data. Housing Woes Continue In Q3 The weakness in residential investment in Q3 is temporary and housing has not peaked for the cycle. The monthly data on housing in August and September were affected by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Housing starts for September were weaker than anticipated and below August's readings. Specifically, the 9% m/m drop in September's starts in the South followed the 5% drop in August. Existing home sales posted a modest month-over-month gain in September after a three month decline. Nonetheless, October's 68 reading on homebuilder sentiment was four points above September's reading and the highest since May (Chart 5). Rising rates are not a threat to housing affordability, even if the Fed is able to lift rates in line with its dot plot. Chart 6 shows the influence of higher rates on housing affordability and effective mortgage rates under two scenarios. A 200-basis point increase in mortgage rates (Chart 6, panel 1) would push the housing affordability index below its long-term average for the first time in nine years. BCA assigns a low probability to a rate jump given the Fed's commitment to gradually increase rates. A more plausible path for mortgage rates in the next year is a 100bps rise (Chart 6, panel 3). Under this scenario, the affordability index would deteriorate, but remain a tailwind for housing. Chart 5Solid Housing##BR##Fundamentals In Place Solid Housing Fundamentals In Place Solid Housing Fundamentals In Place Chart 6Housing Affordability Under##BR##Various Rate Assumptions Housing Affordability Under Various Rate Assumptions Housing Affordability Under Various Rate Assumptions The historically low reading on Bloomberg's Housing and Real Estate Surprise Index also suggests that housing is poised to rebound in the coming quarters (Chart 7). The last time that the index was as low as the -1.2 reading in mid-October was in late 2013 amid the taper tantrum, and prior to that in late 2008/early 2009. Moreover, the gap between Bloomberg's overall Economic Surprise Index and the Housing Surprise index has never been wider. Therefore, the weakness in the housing data is a weather-related anomaly. Chart 7Big Disconnect Between Housing Surprise And Economic Surprise Big Disconnect Between Housing Surprise And Economic Surprise Big Disconnect Between Housing Surprise And Economic Surprise It is important to assess whether residential investment has peaked for the cycle. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing provided seven quarters of warning before a downturn commenced.3 While housing's contribution to overall economic growth plunged in Q2 and Q3, we expect housing to provide fuel for the next few years as pent up demand is worked off from the depressed household formation rate since the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, BCA does not anticipate that rising rates will be a serious threat to housing in the next 12 months. The implication from our upbeat view on housing is that the next recession is still several years away. Reliable leading indicators of a recession such as the LEI, the yield curve and the 26-week change in claims, are not signaling a downturn (Chart 8). BCA's recession model puts the probability in the next 12 months at a meager 2%. Only one of the eight components signal a downturn. Furthermore, neither the St. Louis Fed's nor the Atlanta Fed's recession indicators is in the danger zone. BCA does not expect a buildup in the types of imbalances that previously led to economic declines. Instead, a recession may be triggered by a Fed policy mistake,4 a terrorist attack that disrupts economic activity over a large area for an extended time, or a widespread natural disaster. Chart 8Odds Of A Recession In Next Year Remain Low Odds Of A Recession In Next Year Remain Low Odds Of A Recession In Next Year Remain Low Bottom Line: In the next 12 months, investors should remain positioned for stocks to outperform bonds and rising rates. While markets have entered a more dangerous late-cycle "blow off" phase,5 housing's contribution to GDP has not peaked for the cycle, which means that recession is still more than a year away. Housing will rebound in Q4 after an appalling performance in Q2 and Q3. A healthy housing market will continue to support the consumer. Surveying The Consumer Table 1Household Balance Sheets Prior##BR##To Recessions And Today Lowered Expectations Lowered Expectations The Fed's latest triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) shows that the consumer is less sensitive to housing, holds less cash and more equities than in the past. However, the report also shows that households that own interests in small businesses may disproportionately benefit from the GOP's corporate tax cut proposal. The SCF data supply a detailed examination of consumer health, not provided by the macro data. Nonetheless, key household- and consumer-related spending, which are saving- and balance sheet-related concepts in the SCF, closely track similar statistics in the macro datasets such as the Flow of Funds and the NIPA accounts.6 Table 1 shows household balance sheets in 1989, 1998, 2007, a year or two before the recessions and bear markets of 1990, 2001 and 2008-2009. The latest (2016) is also shown. Households are more sensitive to business conditions than ever before. Households in 2016 hold less cash (as a percentage of financial assets) than in any other pre-recession year, while consumers' equity holdings are the highest on record. Consumers' mix of nonfinancial assets showed that while housing was still the largest single asset (42.4% in 2016), the share of household assets devoted to primary residences was the lowest on record. Vehicles were only 4.8% of a household's nonfinancial assets in 2016, a new low. In contrast, individuals' equity in business (34%) was the highest ever. The implication is that a plunge in housing prices would be as detrimental to consumers today as it was in the mid-2000s. Hence, households' higher exposure to business ventures suggests that a tax cut that favors small businesses over individuals may shore up household finances. Despite improvement in many areas of consumer finances, the household exposure to student loans in 2016 was alarmingly high (Table 2). On the surface, the SCF data do little to ease fears that student loans will compromise household balance sheets and lead to the next recession. The mean student loan debt per household in 2016 was $34,200, 37% higher than in 2007, and more than triple the 1989 level. While 22% of families had student debt in 2016, a slight improvement from 2013, only 9% of families had student debt in 1989. Moreover, educational debt accounts for 8% of household debt. While that figure is dwarfed by the 67% of family debt in housing, a scant 4% of family debt was related to student loans prior to the last recession in 2007.7 Furthermore, 42.6% of families with education debt report that they have student loan debt of more than $25,000, a sharp upsurge from 2007 and more than double the percentage reporting $25,000 or more in 1989.8 Table 2Nearly Half Of All Families With Education Debt Have Student Loan Debt Of At Least $25,000 Lowered Expectations Lowered Expectations That said, BCA's view remains that student debt is a modest drag on economic growth, and is not a threat to U.S. government finances nor does it represent the next subprime crisis.9 John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil Forecast Lifted As Markets Tighten," October 19, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Disconnected," September 11, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks and the Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015086pap.pdf 7 Sourced from 1989-2016 Survey of Consumer Finances Database at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm. Historic Tables - Table 16 - Amount of debt of all families, distributed by purpose of debt. 8 Jeffrey P. Thompson and Jesse Bricker, "Does Education Loan Debt Influence Household Financial Distress? An Assessment Using The 2007-09 SCF Panel," October 16, 2014, Federal Reserve. 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Student Loan Blues: Can't Replay What I Borrowed," November 2016. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Finally, an upside surprise on inflation. Recent significant developments reinforce BCA's bullish view on crude oil. Investors should consider the Monthly Report on personal income and spending, and not the quarterly GDP data, to gauge hurricanes' impact on economy. While the Fed will consider impact of Harvey and Irma, policy will ultimately be made on health of underlying economy. Feature Chart 1Rally For Risk Assets##BR##A Week Before The FOMC Rally For Risk Assets A Week Before The FOMC Rally For Risk Assets A Week Before The FOMC Risk assets and oil prices rose last week along with Treasury yields ahead of this week's FOMC meeting. Both the S&P 500 and the Dow hit new highs last week as the dollar moved lower. The stock-to-bond ratio also climbed, approaching the highs it reached earlier this year (Chart 1). All of this occurred amid an absence of any meaningful news on corporate earnings, aside from Apple's launch of the latest iPhone. Q3 earnings season is still a month away. Our base case projects stocks outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months, but in early September we recommended that clients be prudent, pare back any overweight positions and hold some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. The most significant movement in assets prices last week came in the U.S. Treasury market. Aided by hints of some progress on tax cuts in Washington less damage than initially feared from Hurricane Irma's impact on Florida, and despite another rocket launch by North Korea, the 10-year Treasury yield moved from near 2.0% in the first week of September to 2.20% on September 15. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service notes1 that bond markets are priced as though the link between growth and inflation is broken. We expect they will be proven wrong as inflation regains its uptrend during the next few months. Finally A Surprise On Inflation Chart 2Does One Month Make A Trend? Does One Month Make A Trend? Does One Month Make A Trend? After five months of downside surprises, U.S. core CPI met expectations in August. It is still too soon say that this is enough for the Fed to raise rates again this year. To get a better sense of the underlying trends, we like to break core CPI into three sub-groups: shelter, core goods and core services ex-shelter and medical care. Shelter, which accounts for over 40% of core CPI, rose 0.4% m/m in August. This was the biggest contributor to core CPI during the month. Our shelter model suggests that this strength is unlikely to persist. On the flip-side, core goods prices (25% of core CPI) fell 0.1% m/m. Given the weakness in the dollar, core goods prices should soon begin to rise. To some degree, a slowdown in shelter and a pick-up in core goods could offset each other over the coming months (Chart 2). Therefore, a sustained pick-up in overall core inflation requires an upturn in core services ex-shelter and medical. This sub-component of core CPI is the most tightly correlated with wage inflation. There was a slight tick higher in annual core services ex-shelter and medical inflation in August. However, it is still near a 25-year low of just 1.1%. Bottom Line: Following five months of persistent downside surprises, the 0.2% m/m increase in core CPI during August was a welcomed change for the Fed. However, one month does not make a trend and Fed will need to see more evidence of inflation turning the corner before raising interest rates again. Any rise in oil prices would also give inflation a lift, although it would affect the headline more than the core inflation rate. Bullish Oil Supply And Demand Recent significant developments reinforce BCA's bullish view on crude oil. The International Energy Agency (IEA) revised its forecasts for global oil demand. Oil consumption will be 100,000 bpd higher this year than the IEA's previous projection. Furthermore, renewed turmoil in Libya curbed production by 300,000 bpd from a 4-year high of more than 1 million bpd. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service states that while predicting OPEC compliance is tricky, little to no cheating will occur. At worst, Saudi Arabia will step in and curtail production if Libya and/or Iraq begins to pump oil above quota. Finally, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the U.S. lowered its estimated shale oil output by 200,000 bpd for this year's third quarter. The decreased estimation confirms BCA's assertion that the EIA has overestimated the pace of the shale production response during 2017. Chart 3Drawdown In Global Oil##BR##Inventories Is Underway Drawdown In Global Oil Inventories Is Underway Drawdown In Global Oil Inventories Is Underway Taken together, these factors will help to improve the global net demand/supply balance by 600,000 bpd, if the current situation remains unchanged. As a result, global oil inventories will continue to be drawn down (Chart 3). Severe weather in the U.S. has temporarily distorted the energy markets. Crack spreads have widened in the U.S. as product inventories have declined along with Brent - WTI spreads. Nonetheless, BCA's commodity strategists remain bullish on crude oil, forecasting a rise in WTI to over $55/bbl and Brent to $60/bbl by year-end. Looking to next year, crude prices could go higher with an extension of the OPEC/Russian production cuts beyond March 2018 and continued strong growth in global oil demand. A sudden jump in the U.S. dollar could risk BCA's bullish view. Bottom Line: There is a disagreement between the market's view of the fundamentals of the global oil balance, which is guided by the EIA data, and BCA's view that is driven by the OPEC 2.0 framework.2 Oil prices could spike higher if the market adheres to the OPEC framework. BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service recommends an overweight to the S&P 500 Energy Sector and initiated an overweight in the Oil and Gas Refining and Marketing sub-group on September 11, 2017.3 Hurricane Redux Turning to the U.S. hurricane destruction, history shows that natural disasters have only a passing effect on the U.S. economy, the financial markets and the Fed.4 Ultimately, the macro environment in place before the storm will reassert itself. Nonetheless, it may be a few months before investors determine the long-term impact of the storms on Houston, Florida and nearby southern states. The U.S. data gathering agencies (BEA, BLS and Census) have processes to ensure that the storm's sway is reflected in the economic data. In the past, all three have produced post-disaster evaluations and will likely release the same type of information in the months ahead. Most of the storms' effects will be felt in the September data, but have already affected the initial claims data for the last week in August and the first week of September. The storms will also buffet the Q3 GDP (due out in late October). However, GDP data may not provide a comprehensive picture; GDP is not directly affected by natural disaster losses involving property, plants, equipment and structures. However, GDP can take a direct hit from the loss of productive capacity linked to a storm. The BEA notes that "while GDP may be affected by the actions that consumers, businesses, and governments take in response to a disaster, these responses are generally not separately identifiable, and they may be spread out over a long period of time." Investors should consider the monthly report on personal income and spending, and even more, the regional accounts by state, and not the quarterly GDP data, for details on the storms' economic fallout. Only hurricanes Katrina and Rita warranted a mention in the Q3 2005 GDP release, and none of the other major storms since that time have been noted by the agency. On the other hand, the personal income and spending reports released after all the major hurricanes since 2005 have provided key specifics on incomes. For example, the BEA stated that "work interruptions" linked to Hurricane Sandy reduced wages by $18 billion in October 2012 when the storm hit the northeastern U.S. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also tends to note a storm's influence on other primary income categories including personal rental incomes, proprietors' incomes, and other current transfer receipts (i.e. insurance payments received). Table 1Total Federal Spending And Total Economic Damage For Selected Hurricanes, 2000 To 2015 Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week A 2016 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report found that federal spending after major hurricanes can add as much as 0.6% to GDP growth (Table 1). CBO notes that most of the economic impact is in the first year after a storm, with most of those expenditures helping victims to obtain food and shelter, fund search and rescue operations, and protect critical infrastructure. Federal outlays for public infrastructure occur after the first year and provide a much smaller lift to GDP (Chart 4). Chart 4Federal Government Outlays For Hurricane Relief Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week The severe weather in the U.S. has raised the odds that the Trump administration and Congress will make progress on fiscal policy this fall. We think that the outlines of a tax bill will emerge in the next month or so, and while the probability of passing legislation this year is still low, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects the market to react when it sees the bill. The implication for investors is that the President Trump trades (Chart 5) that have unwound since the start of the year may soon become profitable again. The recent agreement between Trump and the Democrats to extend the debt ceiling and avoid a government shutdown support our stance. Chart 5Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Bottom Line: The hurricanes may have a bearing on the economic data for the next few months. Investors should closely monitor the input data to GDP, but not GDP itself. However, we do not anticipate that any economic disruptions from the storms will have a meaningful influence on near-term Fed monetary policy. Disasters And The Fed The hurricanes will probably play a supporting role in the Fed's outlook on the economy, inflation and labor market at this week's meeting. The FOMC statement will mention the storms and Fed Chair Yellen may include them in her opening remarks. Moreover, the news conference will provide another opportunity to discuss the issue. For example, the FOMC statement released in mid-December 2012, six weeks after Sandy, stated that "economic activity and employment have continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent months, apart from weather-related disruptions". Fed staff noted that manufacturing production was held down by Sandy and that household spending, notably vehicle sales, declined in October due to the storm (Table 2). Similarly, the wrath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was noted in FOMC statements and minutes in the fall and early winter of 2005. For example, in the statement released at the meeting after Katrina hit in August 2005, the FOMC observed: "The widespread devastation in the Gulf region, the associated dislocation of economic activity, and the boost to energy prices imply that spending, production, and employment will be set back in the near term." Fed policymakers made similar observations in the aftermath of other natural and man-made disasters in the past 25 years (Table 2). Table 2FOMC Reaction To Disasters, Natural And Man Made Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Bottom Line: Fed officials will consider the disruptions to the economy and economic data caused by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, but ultimately make policy decisions based on the underlying strength of the economy, labor market and inflation. FOMC Preview The FOMC will initiate shrinking its balance sheet at this week's meeting, but neither BCA nor the market anticipate that the Fed will bump up rates. Moreover, the Fed will need more evidence that inflation, inflation expectations and/or inflation surprise has turned higher before resuming its rate hike regime. Furthermore, there is still a significant disconnect between the market and the Fed concerning rates for the next 12 months, and how that gap closes could be crucial for the financial markets, especially the bond market. At 43 basis points, the gap between the June dot plots and the market on the Fed funds rate in the next 12 months remains near its widest level of the year. The market is currently predicting only 30 bps in increases in the next 12 months. However, an uptick in inflation could quickly change that view (Chart 6). Despite the disagreement on rates, the Fed and the market are mostly aligned on the economy, the labor market and inflation, at least in 2017. For the first time, the FOMC will provide projections for 2020 at this week's meeting. At 4.4% in August, the unemployment rate is a mere tenth above the Fed's end-2017 forecast, but it is 0.2% below the central bank's latest estimate of full employment (4.6%). The Fed's measure of full employment has declined in recent years and we would not be shocked to see a drop again this week. The consensus outlook for the unemployment rate matches the Fed's path through the end of 2018 (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Chart 6Big Disagreement Between The Fed ##br##And The Market On Rates Big Disagreement Between The Fed And The Market On Rates Big Disagreement Between The Fed And The Market On Rates Chart 7The Fed Vs. The Market The Fed Vs. The Market The Fed Vs. The Market Chart 8The FOMC's "Long Run"##BR##Forecasts Since 2012 The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 The FOMC's "Long Run" Forecasts Since 2012 The economy is on pace this year to grow at the Fed's 2.2% projection but is running above the FOMCs long-run calculation of 1.8%, which is the low point since the Fed started publishing these long-run projections in 2009. The consensus forecast for GDP in 2018 and 2019 is slightly above the upper end of the Fed's range set in June (Chart 7 and Chart 8). The Fed and the market are relatively close on inflation this year, but there is still a wide gap in 2018 and beyond. In June, the Fed lowered its inflation forecast for 2017 to 1.6% from 1.9% in March. PCE inflation is at only 1.4% (year-to-date in 2017), so there is not much disagreement in this regard. The market does not agree with the Fed's view that inflation will return to 2.0%, and this is a key reason why the 10-year Treasury yield recently touched a new post-election low at 2.0%, although geopolitical tensions also played a role. The central bank's view of inflation in the long run has not deviated from 2.0% since 2012. Bloomberg consensus estimates for core inflation for this year and next are below the low end of the Fed's forecast range (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Market participants and some Fed officials are still concerned that the traditional Phillips curve model may be broken and that inflation may never accelerate even with an unemployment rate that is below the Fed's estimate of full employment. (Please see a BCA Special Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?").5 Who Will Be The Next Fed Chair? As some investors consider the Fed's next policy move, others are taking a longer view and thinking about Fed Chair Yellen's replacement. Yellen's term as Chair will end in February 2018, and the markets have not yet shown any concerns about her potential replacement. Until last month, the frontrunner to replace Yellen was Gary Cohn, the Chairman of President Trump's National Economic Committee; his appointment would conform to some historical precedents but violate others.6 Several new names have emerged as possible Fed nominees as Cohn fell out of favor in the White House in early September. Kevin Warsh, Glen Hubbard and John Taylor, are all high-profile economists with links to the GOP, but Warsh stands out because he served on Trump's Strategic and Policy forum before it disbanded in August, and was a Fed Governor in the early 2000s (Table 3). Hubbard, who is currently an academic, was President George W. Bush's chief economist. However, he has not worked with Trump and has no Fed experience. John Taylor is well known in monetary policy circles, but has no Fed or government background, nor has he served with Trump. Taylor advocates for rules-based monetary policy.7 Another possible name, Larry Lindsey, an advisor to George W. Bush's campaign in 2000, a Fed Governor in the 1990s, and worked in the Reagan White House but he has no connection to Trump. He has recently spoken in favor of the House tax plan. Table 3Characteristics Of Fed Chairs Since 1970 Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week Stormy FOMC Meeting This Week The other two names under consideration - Richard Davis and John Allison - may have difficulty winning confirmations by the Senate. Both men were CEOs at major banks although neither have directly served Trump, nor been at the Fed or in government. Allison, a former president of the Libertarian Cato Institute, has argued that the Fed should be abolished and blamed the Fed for the financial crisis. The timing of Trump's announcement on Yellen's replacement may be critical. As a reminder, names floated by the Obama White House in the summer of 2013 were mainly rejected by the markets. Yellen's official announcement came in early October 2013. In August 2009, President Obama reappointed Bernanke for a second four-year term. Bernanke was initially nominated to be Fed Chair by George W. Bush in October 2005. If the appointment comes in October and the nominee is perceived to be hawkish, the risk is that markets may begin to price in the regime change sometime in the next few months. As we noted in the sections above, there is already a wide discrepancy between the Fed and the market over the pace and timing of rate hikes in the coming year. BCA's fair value model for the 10-year Treasury yield (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) currently places fair value at 2.67%.8 Moreover, our 3-factor version of the model (which includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.68%. Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Bottom Line: Markets will be increasingly concerned in the next six weeks about the next Fed Chair and his or her policies. While the reappointment of Fed Chair Yellen for another term would please the markets, several other possible successors would not. We anticipate that the President will make a choice within the next month. Taking a longer view, the next Fed chair will oversee the policy response to the next recession and its aftermath. Investors should understand how the next Chair views the Fed's role in the business cycle. Economy Focus: Some Good News From The Quarterly Services Survey Even with the increasingly dominant role of the service sector's contribution to the economy (~69% of GDP), most of the high-frequency data are related to the manufacturing sector (~12% of GDP) (Chart 9, top panel). However, the Quarterly Services Survey (QSS), initiated in 2003-2004 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), measures the services sector of the economy, including companies of all sizes (small- and medium-sized). It produces the most timely revenue data, on a quarterly basis, within the flourishing service sector. The dataset is used primarily by the BEA to estimate a more accurate picture of the national accounts, notably personal consumption and the intellectual property segment of private fixed investment. The survey is also essential for FOMC policymakers as it is very useful to track current economic performance. Even more, during the financial crisis, the BEA "aggressively responded to policymakers' needs for data on financial services". The QSS is a significant source of revisions to real GDP, as about 42% of the quarterly estimates of PCE for services is now based on QSS data. The "key services statistics" include information services; health care services; professional, scientific, and technical services; administrative and support and waste management and remediation services (Chart 9). For the first half of 2017, upward revisions to second and third estimates to real GDP stemmed from revisions to PCE services and nonresidential fixed investment, namely: health care services, financial & insurance services and intellectual property products (specifically software) and other services accounted for by cellular telephone services. The most recent QSS for 2017Q2 showed U.S. selected services total revenue rising by 3.2% over the last quarter and 6.2% over the last four quarters (in nominal terms and non-seasonally adjusted data only available). The strongest growth came from revenues of Other Services (9.4% QoQ% and 18.4% YoY) followed by Arts, Entertainment & Recreation and Administration, Support & Waste Management. Sales in Finance & Insurance and Health Care & Social Assistance, which make up about 50% of total service revenues, are advancing at a sturdy pace, as is revenue in Information services (Chart 9). Chart 9Growth For Service Sector##BR##Industries Is Broad-Based Growth For Service Sector Industries Is Broad-Based Growth For Service Sector Industries Is Broad-Based Chart 10QSS Survey Heralds Some##BR##Upward Revision To Real GDP QSS Survey Heralds Some Upward Revision To Real GDP QSS Survey Heralds Some Upward Revision To Real GDP Bottom Line: Given that the majority of service industries from the QSS sample survey continue to show upward momentum, perhaps we will see some upward revision to real consumer spending for services for the third estimate of real GDP next week (Chart 10). We continue to expect U.S. GDP growth to match or exceed the Fed's modest target for 2017. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Open Mouth Operations", published September 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance", published September 14, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Still Goldilocks", published September 11, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Shelter From The Storm", published September 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?", published August 31, 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration", published July 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Trump And The Fed", published March 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On", published September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights U.S. product inventories - particularly gasoline and distillates - will show sharp declines over the balance of September, as refining capacity continues to trail demand in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. U.S. crude inventories will accumulate as refineries slowly come back on line. This will keep the Brent vs. WTI spreads and crack spreads elevated, as refiners outside the U.S. Gulf scramble for crude (Chart of the Week).1 Global product storage facilities will be drained to more normal levels responding to this imbalance. It is understandable that the significance of the increased frequency of messaging from OPEC 2.0's leadership re its willingness to extend production cuts beyond March 2018 would be secondary to hurricane recovery. Nonetheless, we advise investors to stay focused on OPEC 2.0's evolution, particularly next year, as it develops a modus operandi for providing forward guidance to markets and investors. Energy: Overweight. Brent futures are backwardated to January 2018, reflecting a tight market as refiners, particularly in Europe, scramble for barrels to meet U.S. and Latin American product demand. We remain long Brent and WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl call spreads in Dec/17, which are up 183.8% and 30.2%, respectively, since inception. Base Metals: Neutral. Our tactical COMEX copper short initiated last week is up 3.4%. Precious Metals: Neutral. The Dec/17 COMEX Gold contract gapped lower earlier in the week, as a strengthening USD, and a 15 - 0 vote Monday by the UN Security Council to adopt sanctions proposed by the U.S. against N. Korea took some of the luster off the metal. Our long strategic portfolio hedge is up 8.0% since it was initiated May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains appear to be finding support around current levels. We are bearish, but do not advise shorting the complex, especially with erratic weather as a backdrop. Feature Chart of the WeekBrent - WTI Spread,##BR##Cracks Reflect Refining Scramble Brent - WTI Spread, Cracks Reflect Refining Scramble Brent - WTI Spread, Cracks Reflect Refining Scramble The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, the putative leaders of what we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, are taking every opportunity to signal their willingness to consider an extension of their production-cutting agreement beyond March 2018, when it is scheduled to expire.2 We believe this to be part and parcel of an evolving forward guidance strategy, which KSA and Russia will deploy to signal their production intentions over the near term. This is consistent with our view such a strategy is necessary to keep the producer coalition durable, and to work out an even larger plan to begin messaging firms and institutions allocating capital to oil and natural gas markets globally. This is critical for KSA, which will be looking to IPO Saudi ARAMCO next year, and Russia, which is preparing for elections in March and still relies heavily on hydrocarbon exports to fund its government.3 The last thing either needs is out-of-control oil production tanking the market, as it almost did at the beginning of 2016. Other members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) - e.g., Gulf Arab producers and non-OPEC states like Mexico and Kazakhstan - benefit from an oil-production-management framework as well. The significance of OPEC 2.0's emerging forward guidance strategy could be lost amid the devastation of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, which is understandable. But it will be critical to understanding the coalition's strategy regarding how it intends to manage its own production, now that U.S. shale is the marginal barrel in the world, even after Hurricane Harvey disrupted production and refining in Texas, and U.S. crude and product exports from the Gulf. Thus far, OPEC 2.0 continues to deliver on its production cuts, and global demand - which we expect will dip by less than 1mm b/d over the next few weeks due to the hurricanes - remains strong. In a month or two, we expect hurricane recovery efforts will restore lost refining capacity and product demand. As rebuilding goes into high gear, we expect product demand to get a significant boost. OPEC 2.0 Maintains Discipline We will be updating our oil supply/demand balances next week, but so far it appears KSA and Russia are honoring their commitments to restrain production. This allows them to maintain credibility with their respective OPEC and non-OPEC allies within OPEC 2.0, and with the market in general (Chart 2). KSA, in particular, has led the way among OPEC members of the coalition, according to a tally done by S&P Global's Platts, which put KSA's average crude oil production over the January - August 2017 period at 9.97mm b/d vs. its quota of 10.06mm b/d. This is up slightly over the 9.93mm b/d average production for January - June 2017 reported by JODI. KSA's August production reported in the September OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report was 9.95mm b/d. For the January - August 2017 period, Russia's total crude and liquids production averaged 11.22mm b/d, according to U.S. EIA estimates. For the May - August period, it averaged 11.16mm b/d, putting total output 300k b/d below its October 2016 level, against which OPEC 2.0 benchmarks. Russia committed to reducing output by 300k b/d under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement as part of an overall effort to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market to end-March 2018. Russia's crude oil production averaged 10.38mm b/d over the January - June 2017 period, according to JODI data, vs. an October level of 10.51mm b/d. For 2Q17, Russia's average production reported to JODI was 10.31mm b/d, or 200k b/d below its Oct/16 output. Overall OPEC compliance of members with quotas was 112% of agreed volumes last month, meaning OPEC members with quotas under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement are producing 630k b/d below agreed volumes, according to Platts.4 Seven of the OPEC states still covered by the Agreement are producing below quota. Iraq leads in over-production at 4.46mm b/d on average in the January - August period, or 82k b/d over quota. Overall, however, production discipline is holding (Chart 3, panel 2). Chart 2KSA, Russia Leading##BR##OPEC 2.0 By Example KSA, Russia Leading OPEC 2.0 By Example KSA, Russia Leading OPEC 2.0 By Example Chart 3Production Discipline, Strong Demand##BR##Will Continue To Support Prices Production Discipline, Strong Demand Will Continue To Support Prices Production Discipline, Strong Demand Will Continue To Support Prices Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0's forward guidance to markets, firms and institutions allocating capital in the energy sector has featured frequent re-statements of the coalition's leaders' willingness to extend their production cuts if inventories have not drawn sufficiently by March 2018, when their Agreement is due to expire. We believe this reflects the desire of OPEC 2.0's leadership to maintain the coalition as a long-term production-coordinating body. This will allow the major oil producing nations to communicate production plans and allay investor fears of out-of-control production in the future. Global Demand Will Remain Strong We have noted repeatedly global economic growth has been firing on all cylinders, which will keep global oil demand robust for at least the balance of 2017, and likely into 2018 (Chart 3, panel 3). This is particularly evident in global trade data, which we also will be updating next week.5 Global economic data continue to support this thesis: All 46 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year, the first time this has happened since 2007, according to BCA's Global Investment Strategy (GIS).6 In addition, BCA's Global Investment Strategy notes U.S. growth projections have been broadly stable, but these likely will be revised higher. The easing in U.S. financial conditions since the start of the year should boost real GDP growth over the next few quarters, which, along with the expected boost to product demand coming on the back of hurricane-recovery efforts, will continue to be bullish for refined product demand. Global Product Inventory Draws Will Accelerate OPEC 2.0's efforts to draw global inventories - particularly in the OECD - received an unexpected assist from hurricanes Harvey and Irma. We expect the trend of drawdowns seen over the past few months to accelerate (Chart 4). This will return global product inventories to more normal levels, and, with crude oil inventories accumulating, favor refiners as they scramble to meet demand. Our colleagues at BCA's Energy Sector Strategy upgraded U.S. refiners last week to overweight in line with their view Harvey has the "potential to finally normalize bloated refined product inventories. Over two weeks since the hurricane made landfall, the industry still has 1.0 MMb/d of refining capacity shut down (5 refineries), 2.15 MMb/d of capacity not operating but working on restarting operations (6 refineries), and 1.4 MMb/d of capacity operating below full capacity (5 refineries). Over the past 16 days, at least 55 million barrels of refined product have not been generated, which will result in increased crude inventories and shrinking refined product inventories, benefitting refiners" (Chart 5).7 Chart 4OECD Oil Inventory Declines Will Accelerate OECD Oil Inventory Declines Will Accelerate OECD Oil Inventory Declines Will Accelerate Chart 5Refinery Outages From Harvey Persist Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance Over the short term, Brent crude - and related streams pricing off Brent - and products will remain bid, keeping refiner crack spreads elevated, as operations return to normal, and Florida emerges from the economic damage and dislocations caused by Irma. Typically, product demand falls immediately after severe storms, and recovers as rebuilding begins and progresses. We will be updating our balances model next week to reflect the effects of hurricanes and the continued indications of strong global growth. Bottom Line: Demand for refined products will dip slightly - likely less than 1% of global demand - as hurricane-ravaged markets recover. As rebuilding progresses, product demand likely will be boosted. This will drain OECD product inventories in the short term, providing an unexpected assist to OPEC 2.0's efforts to bring global stocks down to five-year average levels. This evolution will favor refiners, as well. OPEC 2.0's forward guidance to markets continues to evolve. In recent weeks, it has featured frequent re-statements of the coalition's leaders' willingness to extend their production cuts if inventories have not drawn sufficiently by March 2018. We believe this messaging is designed to allay fears of another production-free-for-all of the sort that threatened to take global benchmark crude oil prices below $20/bbl last year. It is too early to expect OPEC 2.0 will replace the original OPEC Cartel. But, we believe KSA and Russia are signaling their common desire to make OPEC 2.0 a durable feature of budgeting and investment considerations over the medium term. Actions speak louder than words, in this regard. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 A "crack spread" refers to the difference in refined-product prices and crude oil prices. It takes its name from the "cracking" long-chain hydrocarbon bonds in crude oil required to produce refined products like gasoline and diesel fuel. The Brent - WTI spread is the price difference in USD/barrel ($/bbl) between the global benchmark crudes. 2 Please see, for example, "Saudi Arabia Says It's Open to Another OPEC Cuts Extension," updated on bloomberg.com September 11, 2017; "Saudi, UAE agree extension of oil cuts may be considered - statement," published on the same day on reuters.com's U.K. service; and "Russia's Novak says to consider extension of oil cut deal if glut persists" published on reuters.com September 6, 20107. We have repeated noted markets are looking for OPEC 2.0 to provide forward guidance, if the principals to the deal intend to maintain a durable coalition. Please see, e.g., "KSA's Tactics Advance OPEC 2.0's Agenda," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report August 10, 2017, and available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 The U.S. CIA estimates Russia exported 5.1mm b/d of crude oil in 2016, roughly half of crude production. This squares with exports reported by the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI), a transnational agency headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Last year, Russia also exported 223 billion cubic meters of natural gas. KSA exported 7.65mm b/d of crude oil last year, according to JODI, or close to 75% of KSA's production. 4 Please see S&P Global Platts OPEC Guide published September 7, 2017, online. 5 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation," published on July 27, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Central Bank Showdown," published on September 8, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Rebalancing Recommendations," published on September 13, 2017. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A supply/demand imbalance has created a playable opportunity in the niche refining energy sub-index. Increase exposure to overweight. Safe haven demand is supporting gold mining equities, but shifting macro forces suggest that it will soon be time to move to the sidelines. Global gold miners are now on downgrade alert. Recent Changes Lift the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index to overweight today. Put the global gold mining equity index (ticker GDX:US) on downgrade alert. Table 1 Still Goldilocks Still Goldilocks Feature The S&P 500 moved laterally last week as sustained geopolitical uncertainty offset encouraging economic data. Synchronized global growth coupled with the related global liquidity-to-growth transition remain the dominant macro themes. Dovish Fed speeches triggered a recalibration of market rate hike expectations and a lower 10-year Treasury yield. As long as lower bond yields reflect a less hawkish Fed rather than a deflationary relapse, they should underpin stock prices. Encouragingly, the latest ISM manufacturing survey catapulted higher to a level last seen in early 2011, diverging steeply from the bond market, as manufacturing optimism reigns supreme (Chart 1). The labor market confirmed this data. The most cyclical parts of the U.S. economy are firing on all cylinders, with manufacturing and construction job creation comprising 1/3 of nonfarm payroll growth last month (Chart 2). This is the highest reading since July 2011. Chart 1Unsustainable Divergence Unsustainable Divergence Unsustainable Divergence Chart 2Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Manufacturing Flexing Its Muscle Meanwhile, despite the Trump administration's shortcomings, America's CEOs are going against the grain. Capex is up smartly for the second consecutive quarter adding to real GDP growth and our capital spending model remains upbeat heralding additional outlays for the remaining two quarters of the year (Chart 3). Similarly, regional Fed surveys of capex intentions point to a sustainable pickup in capital spending in the coming months (Chart 3). Still generationally low interest rates, a less hawkish sounding Fed, coupled with a tamed greenback (Chart 4) and synchronized global growth have combined to revive animal spirits. The implication is that profit growth rests on solid foundations, a message corroborated by our S&P 500 EPS growth model (Chart 5). Chart 3CapEx To The Rescue CapEx To The Rescue CapEx To The Rescue Chart 4Dollar... Dollar… Dollar… Chart 5...And EPS Model Waving Green Flag …And EPS Model Waving Green Flag …And EPS Model Waving Green Flag Adding it up, the macro backdrop remains favorable for stocks. In fact, it represents a goldilocks equity scenario. This week we continue to add some cyclicality to our portfolio by further boosting a niche energy play. We also update our view on a portfolio hedge. Buy Refiners For A Trade In early July, we lifted refiners to neutral and locked in impressive gains for our portfolio, but three reasons kept us at bay and prevented us from turning outright bullish on this niche energy sub-sector.1 Namely, all-time high refining production, high refined product stocks and breakneck pace refinery runs were offsetting the nascent recovery in gasoline consumption, rising crack spreads and a mini V-shaped recovery in industry shipments. Net, we posited that a balanced EPS outlook would prevail in coming quarters. Hurricane Harvey has significantly changed this calculus and now clearly refiners are in a sweet earnings spot for at least the remainder of the year, compelling us to lift exposure to overweight. Severe refinery shutdowns are likely to return industry production levels to what prevailed early in the decade, representing a major, albeit temporary, setback (Chart 6). This production curtailment will result in sizable petroleum products inventory drawdowns and a likely halt (if not reversal) in refined product net exports in order to satisfy domestic demand. The longer it takes for refinery production to return to normalcy, the greater the inventory whittling down. Historically, relative share price momentum has been inversely correlated with inventory growth and the Harvey-related inventory clear-out is heralding additional relative performance gains (bottom panel, Chart 7). It is notable that both industry net exports and inventories had already been receding since the beginning of 2017, suggesting that hurricane Harvey will only accelerate a downtrend that was already in place. Chart 6Hurricane Related Blues... Hurricane Related Blues… Hurricane Related Blues… Chart 7... Are A Boon For Crack Spreads … Are A Boon For Crack Spreads … Are A Boon For Crack Spreads Taken together, this represents an ultra-bullish pricing power backdrop for the U.S. refining industry, at a time when capacity additions are also likely to, at least, pause for breath (bottom panel, Chart 6). Chart 8Brisk Demand Brisk Demand Brisk Demand Indeed, refining margins have jumped recently and will likely remain elevated as the Brent/WTI spread is widening anew (middle panel, Chart 7). Surging crack spreads are synonymous with higher earnings for this extremely capital-intensive and high operating leverage industry. Nevertheless, the refining supply disruptions only tell half the story. Refined product demand is exploding higher, pushing all-time highs and signaling that a substantial supply/demand imbalance is in the works (top panel, Chart 8). Typically this gets resolved via higher gasoline prices, further boosting industry EPS prospects (third panel, Chart 8). As a result, we expect a re-rating phase in relative valuations in the coming months, reversing the year-to-date deflation in the relative price-to-sales ratio. The second panel of Chart 8 shows that relative valuations and refined product consumption move in lockstep, and the current message is to expect a catch up phase in the former. In sum, a playable rally in refiners is in the offing on the back of a budding profit recovery that has yet to filter through analysts' EPS estimates (bottom panel, Chart 8). The longer-than-usual hurricane Harvey-related refining production disruptions, along with the spike in refined product demand, have created an exploitable opportunity. Bottom Line: Boost the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing index (PSX, VLO, MPC, ANDV) to overweight. What To Do With Gold Mining Equities? Gold and gold mining equities serve as great portfolio hedges especially in times of duress. Recent geopolitical jitters surrounding North Korea along with inaction in Washington and the substantial year-to-date selloff in the U.S. dollar have served as catalysts for gold to shine anew, hitting one-year highs. So is it time to trim exposure to shiny metal equities? The short answer is not yet. Real yields are sinking courtesy of a moderately less hawkish Fed (top panel, Chart 9). The probability of a December Fed hike has now collapsed to 30%, and the 5th hike this cycle is only priced in for next June. This is keeping a bid under gold and gold miners, as zero yielding bullion and near-zero yielding gold mining equities appear at the margin relatively more appealing. The equity risk premium has also stopped falling owing largely to the lower 10-year Treasury yield (bottom panel, Chart 9), representing another source of support for global gold miners. Meanwhile, policy uncertainty in the U.S. and around the globe is hooking up especially given North Korea's unpredictability, Washington's polarization, the upcoming German elections and, most importantly, the looming Chinese Congress. Historically, the policy uncertainty index and relative performance have been joined at the hip and the current message is positive for bullion related stocks (middle panel, Chart 9). Similarly, the Philly Fed's Partisan Conflict Index2 ("The Partisan Conflict Index tracks the degree of political disagreement among U.S. politicians at the federal level by measuring the frequency of newspaper articles reporting disagreement in a given month. Higher index values indicate greater conflict among political parties, Congress, and the President.") and bullion enjoy a tight positive correlation since the early 1980s (Chart 10), likely warning that the precious metal's run has more upside in the short term. Chart 9Shining Shining Shining Chart 10Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Increase In Partisanship Is Bullish Gold Moreover, demand for safe haven assets remains upbeat as evidenced by recent flows into gold-related ETFs. Positioning in the commodity pits are also signaling that more gains are in store for gold and the relative share price ratio (Chart 11). Nevertheless, there are some pockets of weakness that are pointing to a more cautious stance toward this portfolio hedge. The improving U.S. economic backdrop is weighing on gold mining equities (ISM manufacturing shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 12). Not only U.S. growth, but also synchronized global growth suggests that eventually demand for bullion will subside. In fact, global growth expectations continue to perk up (GDP expectations shown inverted, Chart 12), and G10 economic surprises are also shooting higher, anchoring gold and gold related equities (economic surprise index shown inverted, top panel, Chart 12). Chart 11Safe Haven Demand Comeback Safe Haven Demand Comeback Safe Haven Demand Comeback Chart 12Not All The Glitters Is Gold Not All The Glitters Is Gold Not All The Glitters Is Gold Tack on the inevitable liquidity withdrawal once the Fed starts to wind down its balance sheet later this month, and the handoff from liquidity-to-growth represents a bearish backdrop for gold and gold mining equities. Chart 13 shows that the Fed's balance sheet is positively correlated with bullion's relative performance versus the broad commodity complex, warning that the recent push toward multi-decade highs in relative performance are on borrowed time. Finally, our relative EPS model for the global gold mining index encapsulates most of these macro forces and suggests that relative profit growth will gravitate lower in the coming months (Chart 14). Chart 13Watch The Fed's Balance Sheet Watch The Fed’s Balance Sheet Watch The Fed’s Balance Sheet Chart 14EPS Model Is Outright Bearish EPS Model Is Outright Bearish EPS Model Is Outright Bearish Bottom Line: While our confidence in maintaining the gold-related equity portfolio hedge has fallen a notch, we are staying patient before moving to the sidelines. Put the global gold mining index (ticker GDX:US) on downgrade alert. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the July 10, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Report titled "SPX 3,000?", available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/partisan-conflict-index Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights Beijing's continued focus on reducing excess industrial capacity in the lead-up to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party will keep iron ore and steel markets buoyant for the balance of the year. The trajectory of prices further out the curve will, however, depend greatly on how quickly China's reflationary policies wane next year. Energy: Overweight. U.S. gasoline inventories could fall by 7-10mm barrels in the first week following the storm (data to be reported today by the EIA), and another 5-10mm barrels (or more) over the next month, depending on how long it takes to restart all of the refineries knocked offline by Hurricane Harvey, according to estimates in BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy. Current gasoline inventories sit about 20 million barrels above the 2011-2015 average, which, based on our calculations, could be completely evaporated within a month, materially changing the U.S. gasoline market and related crack spreads.1 Base Metals: Neutral. Following our analysis last month, we are recommending a tactical short Dec/17 COMEX copper position at tonight's close, expecting the market to correct in line with the fundamentals we highlighted.2 Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. The metal will be supported by low real interest rates and safe-haven demand. The position was recommended May 4, 2017, and is up 8.7%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Another bumper crop is being priced into corn this year. Expectations for higher corn yields this year - ranging from 166.9 bushels/acre (bpa) to 169.2 bpa vs. 169.5 bpa expected by the USDA - will keep prices under pressure. We remain bearish.3 Feature In reaction to Chinese economic and environmental policies, iron ore and steel each rallied by ~78% in 2016. While steel continued its ascent in 2017 - gaining a further ~20% in the year-to-date (ytd), iron ore broke away from this trend and plummeted by more than 40% between mid-February and mid-June (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekSteel And Iron Ore Diverged Earlier This Year Steel And Iron Ore Diverged Earlier This Year Steel And Iron Ore Diverged Earlier This Year Although iron ore has since reversed its path and regained most of the loss, the divergence between steel and the ore from which it is produced comes down to a difference in fundamentals. Increased supplies of iron ore at a time of healthy inventories were bearish in H1. On the other hand, closures of both steel capacity as well as coal capacity kept the steel market tight. While China's supply-side policies have been the force behind the strength in both to date, Chinese demand - which accounts for ~50% of global iron ore and steel consumption, and steel production - will take center stage next year. The speed at which China's reflationary policies wane will determine the long-term trajectory of steel and iron ore markets. Granted while there are some early signs of a potential slowdown in China's economy, we do not expect this to hit metals generally in the near term. As Beijing continues its focus on reducing excess capacity in the steel sector, and as policymakers prepare for the 19th National Congress later this year, we expect steel and iron ore to remain buoyant in H2. China's Steel Production Paradox Eliminating Excess Steel Capacity At The Forefront Of Reform Agenda... The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) - China's top economic planning authority - has made clear that reducing overcapacity is at the forefront of its reform priorities. More concretely, Beijing aims to cut steel capacity by up to 100-150mm MT over the five-year period between 2016 and 2020. It has already made progress towards that end - shuttering a reported 65mm MT last year - and is on track to meet its targeted 50mm MT of steel capacity cuts by the end of 2017. Additionally, in January the central government announced its intention to eliminate all steel capacity from intermediate frequency furnaces (IFF) by the end of June 2017. So it is no surprise that steel has been performing so well. However, this narrative is inconsistent with Chinese data. ...Yet Chinese Production Is At All-Time Highs Steel production from China this year has been soaring, growing by more than 5% year-on-year (yoy) in the first seven months of 2017. In fact, latest production data from July came in at 74mm MT, marking a more than 10% yoy increase, and an all-time record high for monthly production (Chart 2). And since ~50% of global steel is produced in China, this has translated into strong global steel production figures in 2017. Production grew by 4.75% yoy in the first seven months of 2017, the most since 2011 and almost five times as much as the five-year average yoy increase for that period. In fact, the China Iron and Steel Association recently announced that the strength in steel prices does not reflect underlying fundamentals and is instead due to speculation and a misunderstanding of the market impact of China's policies. In an effort to deter speculation, China's commodity exchanges implemented several restrictions in August, including increasing margins on futures contracts and limiting positions (Chart 3).4 Chart 2Record Steel Production##BR##Amid Chinese Capacity Cuts Record Steel Production Amid Chinese Capacity Cuts Record Steel Production Amid Chinese Capacity Cuts Chart 3Pure Speculation Or Not?##BR##Beijing Cracking Down On Market Speculation Pure Speculation Or Not? Beijing Cracking Down On Market Speculation Pure Speculation Or Not? Beijing Cracking Down On Market Speculation It Comes Down To The Nature Of IFFs This paradox of record high production at a time of capacity closures comes down to the nature of IFF capacity that was shutdown. While for the most part, old, outdated and unproductive facilities were targeted for closure last year, the shift in focus towards IFFs had a different effect on the market in 2017. IFFs use scrap steel, rather than iron ore, as a raw material, which is melted through an induction furnace to produce low-quality steel. Because this steel fails to meet government specifications for high-quality steel, it is considered "illegal" and, although it is used to satisfy steel demand, it is not included in official production data. Thus, efforts to shut-down these producers are not evident in China's production figures. However, IFF steelmaking capacity is estimated to be 80-120mm MT a year, and accounts for ~10% of steel production capacity in China. In terms of output, this substandard steel accounts for almost 4% of Chinese production. Thus, traditional steelmaking facilities have been required to fill the supply void caused by IFF closures, raising the official production figures. Steel Exports Take A U-Turn As "Illegal" Capacity Is Shuttered Moreover, Chinese exports have reversed their trend and are on the decline. Steel exports registered a ~30% yoy fall in the first seven months of this year (Chart 4). This is further evidence that the capacity closures have had a real impact on actual steel production, and that domestic consumers have turned to steel that is typically exported, in order to fulfill their demand for the metal. Furthermore, as authorities crack down on IFFs, demand for scrap steel - the main raw material in IFFs - has declined. Amid waning demand, scrap steel prices fell by 9% in H1 before regaining almost 6% in July. This follows a ~70% rally last year (Chart 5). Chart 4Exports Are Down As##BR##Capacity Is Shutdown Exports Are Down As Capacity Is Shutdown Exports Are Down As Capacity Is Shutdown Chart 5Scrap Steel Rally Takes A Break##BR##As Demand From IFFs Eliminated Scrap Steel Rally Takes A Break As Demand From IFFs Eliminated Scrap Steel Rally Takes A Break As Demand From IFFs Eliminated Coking Coal Cost Push As part of its environmental protection plans, China's policymakers announced plans to replace 800mm MT of outdated coal mining capacity with 500mm MT of "advanced" capacity by 2020. Last year, coal-mining capacity closures exceeded the 250mm MT target, reversing the slump in coal prices and leading an almost 225% rally in coke futures. Coking coal, or metallurgical coal, is a key ingredient in the steelmaking process. Although coke dipped since its December high, it has rallied by 34% in the past two months. Thus, Chinese steel mills are now producing in an environment of higher input costs, which will translate to higher prices for the finished good. China's Capacity Closures Likely Peaked Given that China has set June 30, 2017 as the target for eliminating induction furnace-based steelmaking, we do not expect IFF shutdowns to continue impacting the steel market. Additionally, while excess steel capacity is conventionally estimated to be 325-350mm MT in China, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) argues that this estimate does not account for the need for a certain amount of excess capacity. Instead, they cite 130mm MT as a more reasonable figure of Chinese excess steel capacity. According to PIIE estimates, this means that by the end of the year, China will have eliminated almost all of its excess capacity, and will be very close to the quantity of capacity closures it aims to achieve by 2020. Consequently, we do not expect shutdowns to continue driving up steel prices. However, plans to halve blast-furnace production at Northern China mills to reduce pollution during the winter will weigh on near term Chinese production and the steel market. Bottom Line: Chinese authorities are closing in on their targeted capacity shutdowns. We do not expect this reduction in capacity to continue impacting steel markets in the long term. Near-term supply dynamics will be driven by efforts to reduce winter pollution. IFF Closures Spur Demand For Iron Ore Chart 6Mid-Year China Inventories At Record High Mid-Year China Inventories At Record High Mid-Year China Inventories At Record High With the elimination of IFFs, which take in scrap steel as the main input, we expect greater demand for iron ore from traditional steel mills as they work toward filling the supply gap left by the loss of the so-called illegal steel. While steel prices have been on a consistent uptrend since 2016, iron ore - which usually moves in tandem with steel - diverged from its main demand market earlier this year, before resuming its rally in Q2. The deviation earlier this year was due to increased supplies from Australia and Brazil amid record levels of Chinese inventories (Chart 6). This has reversed, and iron ore has resumed its climb. Stronger demand for iron ore is consistent with import data, which shows that China has been hungry for Australian and Brazilian iron ore. However, since the average iron ore production cost in China - estimated at more than 60 USD/MT, or roughly three (3) times the cost of iron-ore production in Brazil and Australia - is greater than in other regions, many Chinese mines go offline during periods of low prices. By the same token, elevated prices tempt high-cost Chinese producers back online, increasing global supply. Bottom Line: Since the closure of induction furnaces has shored up demand for iron ore, pulling prices up with it, we do not anticipate further drops in prices. However, if prices remain elevated, increased production from China amid well stocked global markets will keep a tight lid on iron ore prices. Chinese Appetite Will Determine Long-Run Market Performance While steel and iron ore are currently well supported, their near term strength is in large part due to China's reflation policies which have revived demand. Given that it is a sensitive political year, we do not foresee downturns in the Chinese economy this year. Authorities will want to go into the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in mid-October with solid economic data as a backdrop. However, waning Chinese growth would be a long-run negative for the markets (Chart 7). Specifically, official government data indicate: 1. There are early warning signs that the property market in China may be losing momentum. New floor space started, and new floor space completed contracted in July, while growth in floor space under construction and floor space sold have been easing. Furthermore, while total real estate investment has been growing at an average monthly rate of almost 9% yoy since the beginning of the year, July figures show a marked slowdown, at less than 5% yoy growth. We would not be surprised to see the property market winding down as China begins to tighten its real estate policies. 2. Chinese automobile production has slowed significantly from all-time highs recorded at the end of last year. The monthly average 4% yoy growth in the five months to July is a significant deceleration from the 10% yoy average witnessed during the same period last year. 3. However, infrastructure investment has been strong, recording its all-time high in June, and a 20% yoy increase in July. With the National Congress scheduled in October, we do not expect a slowdown in infrastructure spending this year. In addition, August manufacturing PMI data in China came in above expectations, and registered a slight increase from the previous month (Chart 8). The index has remained relatively stable since the beginning of the year, after gaining strength last year. Chart 7Despite Signs Of Fizzling,##BR##Slowdown Not Expected In 2017 Despite Signs Of Fizzling, Slowdown Not Expected In 2017 Despite Signs Of Fizzling, Slowdown Not Expected In 2017 Chart 8Accomodative Policies Will##BR##Keep Near Term Demand Solid Accomodative Policies Will Keep Near Term Demand Solid Accomodative Policies Will Keep Near Term Demand Solid Bottom Line: Although we expect China's appetite for steel will begin to wane as the economy unravels from its reflationary policies, steel demand will remain strong in 2017. Chinese authorities will want to ensure solid growth in the run-up to the National Congress scheduled for mid-October. Thus, the near-term focus will remain on supply, and the impact of its reforms on ferrous metals. Post-Harvey Rebuilding Will Spur Steel Demand Hurricane Harvey is expected to impact steel markets in three main ways: 30-35% of all U.S. steel imports come through Port Houston. However, the port resumed operations as of September 1 and there is no longer a threat posed on steel imports. The disruption in freight service resulting from Harvey is expected to temporarily push up trucking rates in the next few weeks. This will give U.S. steel firms, which have long been suffering from cheaper Chinese imports, an advantage and opportunity to fill the demand void which will be bullish for U.S. steel. Harvey will have a longer-run positive impact on steel markets through the demand that will be generated from the infrastructure rebuilding process. Still, increased demand for steel will be partially mitigated by a rise in scrap steel supply, in the aftermath of destruction. While it is still too early to measure the extent of damage and the impact of the rebuilding process on steel markets, estimates from the storm's damage run as high as USD 120 billion. Texas's governor estimated the damage to be much greater - between USD 150-180 billion. This compares to USD 110 billion from Hurricane Katrina, the most devastating storm to hit the U.S. prior to Harvey. Bottom Line: While it is still too early to determine the full extent of destruction, the infrastructure rebuilding phase will spur demand for steel. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Upgrading Refining Sector As Harvey Clears Out Inventories," published September 6, 2017 It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Copper's Getting Out Ahead Of Fundamentals, Correction Likely," published August 24, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "GRAINS - Corn lower as U.S. yield forecasts rise; soy, wheat climb," published by reuters.com on September 1, 2017. 4 Please see "Shanghai exchange urges steel investors to act rationally, hikes fees" published by reuters.com on August 11, 2017. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018 Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018 Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Some caution warranted here. Hurricane Harvey's impact on the economy and markets. Tensions in North Korea will linger. NIPA and S&P now telling same story on profits, margins. Is the August employment report enough for the Fed? Feature The impact of Hurricane Harvey will ripple through the economic data in the coming months, but will not impact the overall trajectory of the economy or the Fed. However, elevated equity valuations, escalating tensions in North Korea, a widening disconnect between the bond market and the Fed and profit growth that is poised to peak in the second half of the year warrants careful attention from investors. Nonetheless, we remain slightly overweight stocks and favor stocks over bonds. Caution On Risk Assets We recommend that clients be prudent, paring back any overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. BCA research has demonstrated that U.S. Treasuries, Swiss bonds and JGBs were the best performers during a crisis (Chart 1). The same is true for the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, such that the currency exposure should not be hedged in these cases. The dollar is more nuanced. It tends to perform well during financial crises, but not in geopolitical crises or recessions. Chart 1Gold Loves Geopolitical Crises Shelter From The Storm Shelter From The Storm Gold tends to perform well in geopolitical events, although not in recessions or financial crunches. Our base case projects stocks outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months. BCA's dollar and duration positions have disappointed so far this year. Much hinges on U.S. inflation. Investors appear to have adopted the stance that structural headwinds to inflation will forever dominate the cyclical pressures. Therefore, the bond market is totally unprepared for any upside shocks on the inflation landscape. Admittedly, a rise in bond yields may not be imminent, but the risks appear to be predominantly to the upside. Harvey's Lingering Aftermath History shows that natural disasters such as Hurricane Harvey have a temporary effect on the U.S. economy, the financial markets and the Fed. Ultimately, the macro environment in place before the storm will reassert itself. Nonetheless, it may be a few months before investors determine the long-term impact of the record rainfall and flooding in Houston. Chart 2 shows the ranking of Harvey's preliminary damage estimate of $30B versus other storms of similar magnitude. We are still several weeks away from the peak of the Atlantic hurricane season (mid-September) and two of the most destructive storms in the past 25 years made landfall in mid-to-late October (Wilma and Sandy). Chart 2Economic Impact From Major Hurricanes Economic Impact From Major Hurricanes Economic Impact From Major Hurricanes Chart 3 shows the performance of key economic, inflation and financial market indicators in the past two years and also around five major hurricanes since 1992. Most of the activity-related economic statistics are volatile in the aftermath of the storms and then they recover. The Citi economic surprise index initially moves higher after a storm, and then fades (Chart 3A). There are big swings in housing starts and industrial production and employment growth slows. Inflation tends to climb post-landfall (Chart 3B). In prior episodes, core PCE and core CPI have accelerated along with gasoline prices. Consumer confidence dips initially, but then recovers. Wages are volatile, but tend to accelerate after several months. Chart 3C shows that stocks drift lower for several months following hurricanes and subsequently recoup the losses. The stock-to-bond ratio also moved lower, but regains its pre-storm heights about two months later. Treasury yields fall after storms, but we note that yields have been in a secular decline for 25 years. Chart 3AMajor Hurricane Impact##BR##On Activity Data Major Hurricane Impact On Activity Data Major Hurricane Impact On Activity Data Chart 3BMajor Hurricane Impact On##BR##Sentiment And Inflation Data Major Hurricane Impact On Sentiment And Inflation Data Major Hurricane Impact On Sentiment And Inflation Data Chart 3CMajor Hurricane Impact On##BR##Financial Markets & The Fed Major Hurricane Impact On Financial Markets & The Fed Major Hurricane Impact On Financial Markets & The Fed Hurricane Harvey will not shake the Fed. Nonetheless, the central bank will acknowledge the disaster in the FOMC statement, the FOMC minutes, and/or in Fed Chair Janet Yellen's news conference. We are unchanged in our view that policymakers will begin to pare its balance sheet later this month and bump up rates again in December, assuming that core inflation shows some signs of strength between now and then. History shows (Chart 3C) that, on average, the Fed funds rate tends to move higher in the months after storms hit, but the primary message is that the Fed just continues to do whatever it was doing before the storm. The Fed cut rates in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 in what turned out to be the final rate reduction of the cycle that began in 1989. Ivan hit in September 2004, but the monetary authority raised rates in the final three FOMC meetings of 2004, including at the meeting only a week after the hurricane made landfall. Similarly, the Fed clung to its rate hike regime after Wilma in October 2005. In 2008, Ike arrived in Texas two days before Lehman Brothers collapsed in mid-September. The Fed, which had been cutting rates since September 2007, lowered rates in the final months of 2008. The Fed announced QE3 in late summer 2012 and continued with the program after Sandy came ashore at the end of October 2012. Harvey will be a game changer in some respects: the devastation reduces the odds of a government shutdown or of failing to increase the debt ceiling. We have maintained that there were extremely low odds that the debt ceiling would not be raised. We stated that there was a 25% chance of a government shutdown between October 1, when the current funding expires, and sometime in mid-October when the debt ceiling will hit according to the Congressional Budget Office. However, it would be unfathomable to shut down the government and force the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to cease operations. The resulting outrage would damage the Republicans, especially in Texas. Bottom Line: Harvey may have a near-term impact on the economy, but the Fed will stick to its plan. The catastrophe makes it increasingly likely that the debt ceiling will be raised and a resolution will be passed to keep the government operating into the new fiscal year. Thus, equity investors can safely ignore these two risks, and focus on the key risk in the outlook: North Korea. North Korea Could Linger Over Markets BCA believes that the probability of a war on the Korean Peninsula is very low,1 but it may take a while before the uncertainty in Northeast Asia is resolved. Between now (escalating tensions) and then (a negotiated settlement), there will be more provocations and market volatility. There are long-standing constraints to war. The first is a potentially high death toll: Pyongyang can inflict massive civilian casualties in Seoul with a conventional artillery barrage. Furthermore, U.S. troops, and Japanese forces and civilians, would also suffer. Secondly, China is unlikely to remain neutral. Strategically, China will not tolerate a U.S. presence on its border with North Korea. Nevertheless, Washington must establish a credible threat of military action if it is to convince Pyongyang that negotiations offer a superior outcome. It is unclear how long it will take Trump to convince North Korea that the threat of a U.S. preemptive strike is credible. Chart 4 shows the arc of diplomacy2 that the U.S. took with Iran between 2010 and 2014. From an investor perspective, it will be difficult to gauge whether the brinkmanship and military posturing are part of this territorial threat display or evidence of real preparations for an actual attack. More market volatility may occur, but for the time being, we do not think that the tensions in the Korean peninsula will end the bull market in global equities. Positions in traditional safe-haven assets, such as gold, U.S. Treasuries, Swiss francs and (perhaps) Japanese yen, should be considered as hedges against increased market swings. Chart 4Arc Of Diplomacy: Tensions Ramp Up As Nuclear Negotiations Begin Shelter From The Storm Shelter From The Storm Update: Equity Valuations, Sentiment And Technicals U.S. equity valuations are stretched, but elevated valuations alone are not enough to prompt a sell-off in stocks. The BCA valuation indicator is in overvalued territory, where it has been since late 2013. History shows3 that stocks can stay overvalued for extended periods, even when the Fed is raising rates, but policy is still accommodative as it is today. BCA's composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines extremely over-valued (Chart 5). However, this is due to the components that compare equity prices with bond yields. The other three elements of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is stretched (Chart 5 panels 2, 3 and 4). That said, equities are attractively priced relative to competing assets, such as corporate bonds and Treasuries (Chart 6). Chart 5U.S. Equities##BR##Are Overvalued... U.S. Equities Are Overvalued... U.S. Equities Are Overvalued... Chart 6...But Look Less Expensive##BR##Relative To Competing Assets ...But Look Less Expensive Relative To Competing Assets ...But Look Less Expensive Relative To Competing Assets Valuation is not a reliable tool to time market turning points and, absent a significant deterioration in the economic, profit and margin environment, we do not forecast a sustained pullback in stocks. Looking beyond BCA's tactical 6-12 month window, above-average market multiples alone imply below-average returns for stocks across a strategic time horizon. Chart 7No Strong Signal From##BR##Sentiment Or Technicals No Strong Signal From Sentiment Or Technicals No Strong Signal From Sentiment Or Technicals BCA's technical and sentiment indicators are not at extremes (Chart 7). The BCA technical indicator, while above zero, is not at a level that in the past has triggered a stock pullback. Similarly, the BCA investor sentiment composite index, while at the top end of its bull market range, is not at an extreme. Moreover, only 50% of the stocks in the NYSE composite are above their 10-week moving average, a level which has not been previously associated with major equity sell-offs. Bottom Line: The solid earnings backdrop remains in place for U.S. stocks as measured by either the S&P or the national accounts. We anticipate that profit growth has peaked according to S&P 500 data on a 4-quarter moving total basis due to tough comparisons although it will slip only modestly in the second half of the year. Next year will see EPS growth drop back into the mid-single digit range. The consensus estimate for 2018 EPS growth is 11%. While valuations are elevated, neither sentiment nor technical indicators are flashing red. We recommend stocks over bonds in the next 6-12 months, but acknowledge that risks to BCA's stance are climbing. A Reconnection In Q2 The Q2 data show that the NIPA and S&P earnings measures have reconnected. In our July 3, 2017 Weekly Report "Summer Stress Out"4 we highlighted the apparent disconnect between the S&P and NIPA, sales earnings and margin data through Q1 2017. The release of the Q2 corporate profits data in the national accounts and the end the Q2 S&P 500 reporting season allow us to provide an update. The year-over-year reading on the NIPA earnings measure ticked up in Q2 while the S&P-based metric ticked down. That said, while there are marked differences in annual growth rates between the two measures, the levels were close to the same point in the second quarter of 2017 (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 9 shows that a wide difference persists between corporate sales measured by S&P and the national accounts. Margins calculated on the S&P basis climbed in Q2 while NIPA margins held steady. Even so, a modest gap still remains between NIPA margins at 15.2% and S&P margins at 13.2%. Most of the divergence is related to the denominator of the calculation. The NIPA denominator is corporate sector Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a value-added concept that is different from sales. It is not clear why, but GDP has grown much faster than sales since the end of 2014. Chart 8S&P And NIPA##BR##Profit Comparison S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison Chart 9Denominator Explains##BR##S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence We believe that the S&P statistics are painting a more accurate picture because sales are easier to measure while value-added is more complicated. The slow growth of sales is not a bullish point for stocks. Nonetheless, it does not appear that financial engineering has distorted bottom-up company data to such an extent that the S&P readings are falsely signaling strong profit growth. We expect the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, the profit backdrop is positive for stocks for now. Is The August Jobs Report Enough For The Fed? Chart 10Labor Market Conditions##BR##Favor Risk Assets Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets Labor Market Conditions Favor Risk Assets U.S. payrolls expanded by 156,000 in August. Relative to the underlying growth rate in the labor force, this is still a healthy pace of jobs growth. Nevertheless, it fell short of expectations for a 180,000 increase and the prior two months saw a cumulative downward revision of 41,000. The August data were not impacted by Hurricane Harvey. Aggregate hours worked, a measure of total labor inputs based on changes in employment and the workweek, fell by 0.2% m/m. That said, aggregate hours worked are up 1.3% at a quarterly annualized rate thus far in Q3. This is consistent with GDP growth of a bit over 2%, which has been the trend in the current economic expansion. Meanwhile, wage gains remain muted. Average hourly earnings rose just 0.1% m/m. Annual wage inflation has been steady at 2.5% for several months now (Chart 10, bottom panel). If productivity is expanding modestly around 1%, the current pace of wage gains would suggest that unit labor costs are growing around 1.5%. This will make it difficult for general price inflation to accelerate to the Fed 2% target. Nonetheless, the reacceleration in the 3-month change in average hourly earnings from 1.9% in January 2017 to 2.6% in August supports the Fed's view on inflation. Finally, the unemployment rate ticked up to 4.4% from 4.3%. This was because the separate household survey showed a 74,000 drop in employment. The participation rate held steady at 62.9% in August. Bottom Line: While falling short of expectations in August, U.S. employment growth remains solid and job gains are continuing at a pace consistent with the 2% GDP growth rate of recent years. However, muted wage gains mean that progress to the Fed's 2% inflation target is looking suspect. We anticipate that the Fed will announce the process of running down its balance sheet at the September FOMC meeting. Rate hikes are on hold at least until the December FOMC meeting, and even then only if core inflation shows some signs of strength in the next few months. U.S. risk assets should continue to benefit from moderate growth, low inflation and a "go slow" approach by the Fed. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?", August 16, 2017. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets? ,"May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Sizing Up The Second Half", July 10, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Summer Stress Out", July 3, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.