East Europe & Central Asia

Highlights Senate Republicans would be suicidal not to agree to a fiscal relief bill before the election. Democrats are still offering a $2.2 trillion package. Grassroots Republican voters will forgive Republicans for blowing out the budget deficit but they will never forgive them for throwing away control of the White House and Senate. Nevertheless financial markets face more downside until a deal is reached. We are booking gains on several of our tactical risk-off trades but will hold our strategic risk-on trades, as we are still constructive over a 12-month period. Turkey is stepping back from its foreign adventurism in the face of constraints. Our GeoRisk Indicator for Turkey has rolled over. Feature Financial markets continue to sell off in the face of a range of risks, including new threats of COVID-19 restrictions in Europe, an increase in daily new cases of the disease in the United States (Chart 1), and the US Congress’s problems passing a new round of fiscal relief. Chart 1Increase In COVID-19 Cases Among Factors Weighing On Markets Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 2Congress Will Pass Stimulus ~$2-$2.5 Trillion Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Since May, when the Democrats passed the $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, we have maintained that “stimulus hiccups” would roil the market. However, we also argued that Congress would eventually pass a new package – probably in the range of $2-$2.5 trillion (Chart 2).1 The latter part of this view remains to be seen and has come under pressure from investors who fear that Congress could fail to produce a bill entirely. We are sticking with our guns. GOP senators will recognize that they face sweeping election losses; House Democrats will not be able to reverse course and deprive households of badly needed assistance. However, stock investors might sell more between now and the final deal, which must be done by around October 9 so that lawmakers can go back to their home states to campaign for the November 3 election. Moreover the fiscal deal might not come in time to save the Republicans’ re-election bid in the White House and Senate, which raises further downside risk due to the Democratic agenda of re-regulation and tax hikes. And the election’s aftershocks could also be market-negative. For example, President Trump could also escalate the conflict with China, whether as the “comeback kid” or as a lame duck. Therefore this week we are booking some gains. We will not recommend a tactical risk-on position until our fiscal view is confirmed and we can reassess. US Fiscal Stimulus Is Coming Chart 3Republicans Highly Unlikely To Win House Of Representatives Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Why would Democrats agree to a stimulus bill given that it could help President Trump and the Republicans get re-elected? Democrats are afraid to deprive households of relief amid a crisis merely to spite the president and score election points. Around 28-43 of Democrats in the House of Representatives face re-election in districts that are competitive or could become competitive. Republicans need a net gain of 20 seats to retake the House (Chart 3). If Democrats offer to cooperate yet Republican senators balk, then the latter will take the blame for any failed deal and ensuing financial turmoil. The experience of other fiscal cliffs bears this out. The debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013 and the government shutdowns of 2013 and 2018-19 all suggest that net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues (Charts 4A and 4B). This is a risk for the ruling GOP. All Democrats have to do is remain open to compromise. Net presidential and congressional approval ratings suffer when partisanship prevents compromise on major fiscal issues – a risk for the ruling GOP. Chart 4AFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 4BFiscal Failures Pose A Risk To Ruling GOP Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Confirming this reasoning, Democrats joined with Republicans this week to pass a continuing resolution to maintain government spending levels through December 11, thus avoiding a government shutdown. Clearly the two parties can still cooperate despite record levels of partisanship. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ruled out using government shutdown as a weapon to hurt the Republicans, fearing it would backfire. And just last week vulnerable House members pressured Pelosi into stating that the House will remain in session in October until a fiscal relief bill is passed. Democrats remain committed to their current plan – solidifying their grip on the House and demonstrating that they can govern, and that government can do more for households, by passing bills. This is still the strategy even if the risk is that these bills give Trump a marginal benefit. The Democratic demand is for a very large fiscal package – House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is today offering $2.2 trillion, a compromise from the initial $3.4 trillion bill (Table 1). A smaller bill is harder to negotiate because it would cut the House Democrats’ spending priorities for their constituents, including around $1 trillion in state and local government aid, while still giving Trump a bounce in opinion polls for boosting pandemic relief. This is unacceptable – and this is how a policy mistake could happen. Table 1What A Fiscal Compromise Will Look Like Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 5Senate Republicans Face A Hotly Contested Election Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 6Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Republican Senators' Hung Up On Future Deficit Concerns Senate Republicans face a hotly contested election – with 23 of them up for re-election versus only 12 Democrats. However, 30 of them are not up for re-election this year (Chart 5). These senators fear the eventual return of deficit concerns among the Republican base so they are bargaining to limit emergency spending (Chart 6). Until they can be cajoled by their fellow senators and the White House, they pose a risk to the passage of new stimulus. But this risk is overrated. Ultimately Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the Senate Republicans will capitulate. It is political suicide if they do not. The GOP will lose control of the Senate and the White House if premature fiscal tightening sparks a bloody September-October selloff just ahead of the election (Charts 7Aand 7B). Chart 7AStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 7BStocks Sell, Bonds Rally … When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Stocks Sell, Bonds Rally... When Congress Goes Off Fiscal Cliff Chart 8Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Trump Compares Poorly To Other Presidents Re-Elected Amid Recession Only three out of six presidents in modern times have been re-elected when a recession struck during the election year yet ended prior to the fall campaign. These were William McKinley in 1900, Teddy Roosevelt in 1904, and Calvin Coolidge in 1924.2 Trump faces the same scenario, but financial markets are signaling that Trump is not faring as well as these three predecessors (Chart 8). The Senate races are all on a knife’s edge (Chart 9). American politics are highly nationalized – partisan identification overrides regional concerns. President Trump has also personalized his political party, making the election a referendum on himself (Chart 10). These trends suggest the Senate will fall to the party that wins the White House. Chart 9The Senate Races Are All On A Knife’s Edge Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Consumer confidence is weak and bodes ill for the incumbent president and party (Chart 11). Chart 10Trump Has Personalized Partisan Politics Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Chart 11Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP Consumer Confidence Bodes Ill For Trump And GOP A failure to provide stimulus will ensure that sentiment worsens for the rest of the campaign and overshadows some underlying material improvements that are the Republicans’ only saving grace. Wage growth is recovering in line with the V-shape recovery in blue and purple states, including purple states that voted for Trump (Chart 12). The manufacturing rebound – and a surge in loans – is creating the conditions for the “Blue Wall” of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin to re-elect President Trump (Chart 13). A fiscal failure will blot out this positive news. Chart 12Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Fiscal Failure Would Blot Out Economic Improvements Chart 13Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Blue Wall' Could Re-Elect Trump On Economic Improvement Republicans’ standing offer is for a $1.3 trillion bill. The bipartisan “Problem Solver’s Caucus” has separately proposed a $1.5 trillion package that could be converted. McConnell has shown he can muster his troops by producing 52 Republican votes on a skinny relief bill on September 10. The Senate will go on recess on Friday, October 9 and the House is committed to staying until a bill is done. Negotiations cannot drag on much longer than that, however, because lawmakers need to go back to their home states and districts to campaign for the election. The equity selloff suggests policymakers will need to respond sooner anyway. Is there a way for Trump to bypass Congress and provide stimulus unilaterally? Chart 14Gridlock In 2020-22 Is Possible Under Trump Or Biden Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Trump is only too happy to run against a “do-nothing Congress,” which is how Harry Truman pulled off his surprise victory in 1948. He could use executive orders to redirect federal funds that have already been appropriated. However, he has already provided stimulus by decree – delaying payroll tax collections and calling on states to provide unemployment insurance – and yet the market has sold off anyway. That is because these measures are half-baked – they lack the size and the force of an act of Congress. They require coordination with states and firms, which face uncertainty over the legality of the measures and have little incentive to make sacrifices for an administration that may not last more than a few months. In short, if Trump tries to stimulate by decree, it is an election gimmick that will not satisfy market participants who need to look beyond the next 39 days to the critical question of whether US fiscal authorities understand the needs of the economy and can coordinate effectively. Congressional failure will cast a pall over the outlook given that there is still a fair chance the election could produce gridlock for the 2020-22 period, under Trump or Biden (Chart 14). Bottom Line: Financial markets face more downside until Senate Republicans capitulate to Pelosi’s demand of a bill around $2-$2.5 trillion. We think they will, but that is not an argument for getting long now – Republicans could capitulate too late to save the market from a deeper selloff. Investors should book profits now and buy when the deal is clinched. What About The Supreme Court? The Supreme Court battle over the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg may increase the risk of miscalculation in the stimulus negotiations, but not by much. Subjectively we would upgrade that risk from 25% to 33%. Republicans will fill the vacant seat before the election. So far they have the votes – even if Senator Mitt Romney changes his mind, there is still a one-seat buffer. However, a win on the high court has a mixed impact on financial markets. It may increase the odds of a Democratic Party sweep, which is initially a net negative for equities. But House Democrats will become less inclined to compromise on the size of the fiscal bill that we expect. They will say “take it or leave it” on the $2.2 trillion offer. The lowest we can see Democrats passing is $1.9 trillion. If the GOP fails to budge, the equity selloff will be aggravated by the implication that Democrats will win a clean sweep and thus gain the power to raise corporate and capital gains taxes next year. We have put 55%-60% odds on a clean sweep, but the market stands at 49%, so there is room for the market to adjust (Chart 15). As for the Supreme Court itself, a Republican nomination is legitimate regardless of the election timing, though the decision to go forward this close to the election reveals extreme levels of polarization. The Republican pick could energize the Democrats in the election, as occurred with the nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh just ahead of the 2018 midterms. A Democratic overreaction could mobilize conservatives, but this will be moot if the stock market collapses. If the presidential election is contested or disputed, Trump’s court nominee pick could cast the decisive vote, although, once nominated, a justice may not rule in accordance with his or her nominator’s wishes. The Supreme Court battle raises the risk of stimulus miscalculation to 33%. In a period of “peak polarization,” one should expect the Supreme Court battle to escalate further from here (Chart 16). Democrats are likely to remove the filibuster if they win the Senate. This would theoretically enable them to create four new seats on the court, which they could then fill with liberal judges. Franklin Roosevelt attempted to pack the court in 1937 when it got in the way of the New Deal and his plan only narrowly failed due to the unexpected death of a key ally in the Senate. Chart 15A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff A Democratic Sweep Would Aggravate The Equity Selloff Chart 16Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Supreme Court Battle Will Escalate Amid Extreme Polarization Not only might the court decide the election outcome, but future controversial legislation could live or die by the court’s vote, as occurred with Obamacare in 2012 (Chart 17). In the event that Democrats achieve a clean sweep, the conservative court will be their only obstacle and they will possess the means to remove it. Chart 17Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Supreme Court Battle Will Prove Market Relevant In Event Of Democratic Sweep Bottom Line: Earlier we saw a 25% chance that stimulus would fail – now we give it a 33% chance. However, the size of the stimulus is now even more likely to fall within the $2-$2.5 trillion range we have signaled in previous reports. The Supreme Court will become a major factor in domestic economic policy uncertainty if Democrats win a clean sweep of government. Turkey Hits Constraints In East Med – For Now … Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policy assertiveness has once again put Turkey in conflict with NATO allies. Tensions escalated last month after Greece signed a maritime boundary deal with Egypt that Athens said nullified last November’s Libya-Turkey agreement (Map 1). Map 1Turkey Testing Maritime Borders In the East Med Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) In response, Turkey issued a navigational warning (which was renewed thrice) and dispatched its seismic research vessel, the Oruc Reis, to explore for hydrocarbons in disputed areas of the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus. In shows of force, Turkey and Greece both deployed their navies to the area last month, raising the risk of an armed confrontation.3 The motivation for Erdogan’s hard power tactics is multi-pronged. Chart 18Erdogan’s Foreign Adventurism Reflects Domestic Weakness Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) On a domestic level, Erdogan’s East Med excursions are an attempt to rally domestic support, where he and his party have lost ground (Chart 18). Given that popular opinion in Turkey indicates that the majority see the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a “kin country” and that they do not expect Turkey to be accepted into the EU, Ankara’s East Med strategy is likely to find support. On an international level, Turkey is flexing its muscles against the West. Erdogan has inserted Turkish forces into conflicts in Syria and Libya, confronting NATO allies there, and authorized the provocative purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system at the expense of membership in the US F-35 program. The East Med gambit is another challenge to the West by testing EU unity. Specifically Erdogan is demonstrating that Turkey is willing to use military force to reject any unilateral attempts by foreign powers to impose maritime borders on Turkey – for instance through the EU’s Seville map.4 By demonstrating maritime strength, Turkey hopes to twist the EU’s arm into agreeing to a more favorable maritime partition plan in the East Med. As such the conflict is part of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” strategy to expand its sphere of influence and secure energy supplies.5 Turkey is extremely vulnerable as a geopolitical actor because it depends on imports for three-quarters of its energy needs.6 With energy accounting for 20% of its import bill, these imports are weighing on the current account balance (Chart 19). Turkey’s exclusion from regional gas agreements has thus been a blow to its self-sufficiency goals. Meanwhile Greece, Italy, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Jordan have recently formalized their cooperation through the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Organization. Turkish agitation in the East Mediterranean is an attempt to prevent others from exploiting gas resources there so long as its demands remain unmet. Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. While the EU has yet to impose sanctions or penalties, Erdogan has now backtracked. Oruc Reis returned to Antalya on September 13, despite official statements that it would continue its mission. Turkish and Greek military officials have been meeting at NATO headquarters. And following talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU President Charles Michel, Erdogan’s office announced on September 22 that Turkey and Greece were prepared to resume talks. The postponement of the European Council’s special meeting to discuss Turkish sanctions to October 1-2 plays to Turkey’s favor by giving more time for talks. Chart 19Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Turkey's Energy Dependence A Geopolitical Vulnerability Erdogan’s retreat demonstrates Turkey’s constraints in its challenge to the EU. The possibility of damaging sanctions was too much at a time of economic vulnerability. Given Turkey’s dependence on the EU for export earnings and FDI inflows, the impact of sanctions on Turkey’s economy cannot be overstated (Chart 20). Chart 20EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy EU Sanctions Could Destroy Turkey's Economy Turkey is also facing constraints diplomatically as two of its regional rivals – the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel – have agreed to normalize relations and strengthen ties under the US-mediated Abraham Accords (Table 2). The UAE already dispatched F-16s to Crete to participate in joint training exercises in a show of support to Greece. Table 2The Abraham Accords Unify Turkey’s Regional Rivals Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Details about the potential sanctions have not been released. However, EU Minister of Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell has indicated that penalties could be levied not only on individuals, but also on assets, ships, and Turkish access to European ports and supplies. This could include banks financing energy exploration or even entire business sectors, such as the energy industry. Moreover, the EU could play other damaging cards such as halting EU accession talks, or limiting its customs union with Turkey, which Ankara hopes to modernize. Chart 21EU Needs Turkey’s Cooperation To Stem Flow Of Migrants Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump (GeoRisk Update) It is also in Europe’s interest to de-escalate the conflict. Sanctions on Turkey could accelerate Ankara’s re-orientation towards Russia and possibly China, expediting its transition to a hostile regional actor. In addition, Turkey has not shied away from using the 2016 migration deal, whereby Turkey has become the gatekeeper of Middle Eastern migrants fleeing to Europe, as a bargaining chip (Chart 21). Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu outright stated that Turkey will respond to EU sanctions by reneging on the deal, which could result in an influx of refugees into the EU and new challenges for Europe’s political establishment. Erdogan’s retreat is also likely a response to pressure from Washington. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lent some support to Greece and Cyprus during his September 12 visit to Cyprus. While the US has distanced itself from recent developments in the East Med, leaving German Chancellor Angela Merkel to play the role of mediator, a deterioration in Ankara’s relations with NATO allies could accelerate Turkey’s de-coupling from the West. Some within Washington are already calling for a relocation of the US strategic Incirlik air base to Greek islands. Erdogan’s retreat from a hawkish stance is in line with similar behavior elsewhere. For instance, despite having taken delivery of all parts and completed all necessary tests, Turkey has yet to activate its Russian S-400 missile defense system. It is wary of US sanctions. Similarly, Ankara has paused its Libyan offensive toward the eastern oil crescent in face of the risk of an outright military confrontation with Egypt. In each case, Erdogan appears to be at least temporarily recognizing the limits to his foreign adventurism. Nevertheless, the recent de-escalation does not mark the end of the conflict. Rather it demonstrates that both sides have hit constraints and are pausing for a breather. Chart 22Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk Erdogan's Tactical Retreat Will Pull Down Turkish Risk The tactical retreat will provide some relief for the lira, which hit all-time lows against the dollar and euro, and thus pull down our Turkey GeoRisk indicator (Chart 22). But it does not guarantee that the Turkish risk premium will stay low. Talks between Greece and Turkey are unlikely to result in substantial breakthroughs. Instead the conflict will resurface – perhaps when Turkey is in a stronger economic position at home and the EU is distracted elsewhere, whether with internal political issues or conflicts with Russia, the UK, or any second-term Trump administration. Bottom Line: The recent de-escalation of East Med tensions does not mark the end of a bull market in Turkey-EU tensions. These tensions arise from geopolitical multipolarity – Turkey’s ability to act independently in foreign policy without facing an overwhelming, unified US-EU response. However, Turkey’s vulnerability to European economic sanctions shows that it faces real constraints. A major attempt to flout these constraints is a sell signal for the lira, as European sanctions could then become a reality. We remain negative on the lira, but will book gains on our short trade. Investment Takeaways We are booking gains on some of our tactical risk-off trades, given that we ultimately expect the US Congress to approve a new fiscal package. We are closing our long VIX December 2020 / short VIX January 2021 trade, which captured concerns about a contested election in the United States, for a gain of 4%. Volatility will still rise and a contested election is still possible, but the fiscal risk has gone up, COVID-19 cases have gone up, and Trump’s polling comeback has softened. The 4% gain does not include leverage or contract size. We were paid to put on the trade and now will be paid to exit it, so we are booking gains (Chart 23). Chart 23Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility Book Gains On Bet On Near Term Volatility We are closing our short “EM Strongman Basket” of Turkish, Brazilian, and Philippine currencies for a gain of 4.5%. The trade has performed well but Turkey is not only recognizing its constraints abroad but also recognizing constraints at home by raising interest rates to defend the lira. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s approval rating has surged and our GeoRisk indicator has topped out. The latest readings on our GeoRisk Indicators provide confirmation of our major themes, views, and trades. The charts of each country’s indicator can be found in the Appendix. Short China, Long China Plays: Geopolitical risk continues on the uptrend that began with Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and has not abated with the Phase One trade deal. Policymakers will remain entirely accommodative on fiscal and quasi-fiscal (credit) policy in the wake of this year’s recession. New financial regulations do not herald a return of the deleveraging campaign in any way comparable to 2017-18. The October Politburo meeting on the economy could conceivably sound a hawkish note, which could conveniently undermine sentiment ahead of the US election, but if this occurs then we would not expect follow-through. China plays and commodity plays should benefit, such as the Australian dollar, iron ore prices, and Brazilian and Swedish equities. Yet we remain short the renminbi, which has recently flagged after a fierce rally. Trump is negative for the RMB and Biden will ultimately be tough on China, contrary to the market consensus. Short Taiwan: US-China strategic relations have collapsed over the course of the year but financial markets have ignored it due to COVID-19 and stimulus. The only thing keeping US-China relations on an even keel is the Trump-Xi gentleman’s agreement, which expires on November 3 regardless of the election outcome. While outright military conflict over Taiwan cannot be ruled out, Beijing is much more likely to impose economic sanctions prior to any attempt to take the island by force. This has been our base case since 2016. Our GeoRisk indicator is just starting to price this risk so it remains highly underrated from the perspective of the Taiwanese dollar and equities. We are short and there is still time to put on shorts. Long South Korea: The rise in Korean geopolitical risk since the faltering of US-North Korean diplomacy in 2019 has peaked and fallen back, as expected. Pyongyang has not substantively tested President Trump during the election year and we still do not think he will – though a showdown would mark an October surprise that could boost Trump’s approval rating. South Korean political risk should continue falling and we are long Korean equities. Short Russia: Russian geopolitical risk has exploded upward, as we expected. We have been bearish on the Russian ruble and local currency bonds, though we should note that this differs from our Emerging Markets Strategy view based on macro fundamentals. Our reasoning predates the escalation of tensions with the EU over Belarus, but Belarus highlights the negative dynamic: Vladimir Putin in his fourth term is concerned about domestic social and political stability, and this concern is especially heightened after the global pandemic and recession. Therefore he has little ability to tolerate unrest in the former Soviet sphere. Moreover, he has a window of opportunity when the US administration is distracted, and not unfriendly, whereas that will change if the Democrats take over. If Democrats win, they will not try another diplomatic “reset” with Russia; they believe engagement has failed and want revenge for Putin’s undermining the Obama administration and 2016 election interference. The Nordstream 2 pipeline and Russian local currency bonds are at risk of new sanctions. The Democrats will also increase their efforts at cyber warfare and psychological warfare to counter Russia’s use of such measures. If Trump wins, the upside for Russia is limited as Trump’s personal preferences have repeatedly lost to the US political and military establishment when it comes to Russia. The US has remained vigilant against Russian threats and has increased support for countering Russia in eastern Europe and Ukraine. Chart 24Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions Russia Is At Risk of US Sanctions In Belarus, President Lukashenko has been sworn in as president again, and he will not step down unless Russia and its allies orchestrate a replacement who is friendly toward Russian interests. Russia will not allow a pro-EU, pro-NATO government by any stretch of the imagination. The likeliest outcome is that Russia demonstrates its security and military superiority in a limited way, while the US and Europe respond with sanctions but not with military force. There is no appetite for the US or EU to engage in hot war with Russia over Belarus, which they have little hope of re-engineering in the Western image. We are short Russian currency and local bonds on the risk of sanctions stemming from either the US election cycle or the Belarus confrontation or both. We note that local currency bonds are not pricing in the risks that our geopolitical risk indicators are pricing (Chart 24). Long Europe: Our European geopolitical risk indicators show that the EU remains a haven of political stability in an unstable time. European integration is accelerating in the context of security threats from Russia, the potential for sustained economic conflict with the US (if Trump is re-elected), and economic competition with an increasingly authoritarian and mercantilist China. Europe’s latent strengths, when acting in unison, are brought out by the report on Turkey above. However, the 35% chance that the UK fails to reach a trade deal at the end of this year will still push our European risk indicators up in the near term.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   We Read (And Liked) … Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework For Predicting The Future What better way to revive the hallowed tradition of BCA Geopolitical Strategy book reviews than to give clients a sneak preview of our founder Marko Papic’s literary debut, Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future?7 Long-time readers will know much of this book – it is the distillation of a decade of Marko’s work at BCA Research and, more recently, Clocktower Group. Here is the story of European integration – perhaps Marko’s greatest call, from back in 2011. Here is the story of multipolarity and investing. Here is the apex of globalization. Here is the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of dirigisme. Here is the end of Chimerica. Attendees of the BCA Research Academy will also recognize much in Marko’s formal exposition of his method. The categories of material constraints that bind policymakers. The practical application of the median voter theorem. The psychological lessons from Richards Heuer and Lee Ross. The occasional dash of game theory – and the workingman’s critique of it. The core teaching is the same: “Preferences are optional and subject to constraints, whereas constraints are neither optional nor subject to preferences.” There is also much that is new, notably Marko’s analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is bound to generate controversy for classifying the whole episode as an example of mass hysteria comparable to the Salem witch trials, but which is as well-researched and well-argued as any section in the book. I was fortunate to learn the geopolitical method with Marko under the guidance of George Friedman, Peter Zeihan, Roger Baker, Fred Burton, Scott Stewart, and other colleagues at Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) in Austin, Texas from the era of the Iraq troop surge, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the Lehman Brothers collapse. We both owe a lot to these teachers: the history of geopolitics, intelligence analysis, open source monitoring, net assessments, and, of course, forecasting. What Marko did was to take this armory of geopolitical analysis – which we both can testify is best taught in practice, not universities – and to put it to use in the financial context, where political analysis was long treated as optional and anecdotal despite the manifest and growing need for a rigorous framework. A hard-nosed analyst will never cease to be amazed by the gaps that emerge between the consensus view on Wall Street and a careful, disciplined net assessment of a nation or political movement. By the same token, the investor, trader, or economist will never cease to be amazed by the political analyst’s inability to grasp the concept of “already priced in” or “the second derivative.” What needed to be done was to master the art of macro investing and geopolitics. Marko took this upon himself. It was audacious and it provoked a lot of skepticism from the dismal scientists and the political scientists alike. But Geopolitical Alpha, the concept and the book, is the consequence – and we are now all the better for it. Marko is fundamentally a post-modern thinker. His methodological hero is Karl Marx for the development of materialist dialectic, the back-and-forth debate between economic forces that humans internalize in the form of competing ideologies. His foil is the humanist and republican, Niccolo Machiavelli – not for his amoral approach, but for prizing the virtue of the prince in the face of outrageous fortune. Human agency is Marko’s favorite punching bag – he excels at identifying the ways in which individuals will be frustrated despite their best efforts by the cold, insensitive walls of reality around them. If there is a critique of Marko’s book, then, it is that he gives short shrift to the classical liberal tradition – or as I like to think of it, the balance-of-power tradition. The idea that hegemony, or unipolarity, leads to a stable social and political environment conducive to peace and prosperity has a lot going for it. But it also partakes of an older tradition of thought that envisions a single, central political order as necessarily the most stable and predictable – a tradition that can be ascribed to Plato as well as Marx. You can see the positive implication for financial markets. But what if this tradition is only occasionally right – what if it too is subject to historical cycles? If that is the case, then the Beijing consensus is a mirage – and the US’s reversion to a blue-water strategy (not only under President Trump, but also under a future President Biden, according to his campaign agenda) does not necessarily herald the “end [of] American dominance on the world stage.” The classical tradition behind the Greco-Roman, British, and American constitutional systems, including their naval strategies, envisioned a multipolar order that was somewhat less stable but more durable, and this tradition has proven immensely beneficial for the creation of technology and wealth. Of course, Marko is very much alive to this tradition and, despite his critique of the ancients, shows himself to be highly sensitive to the interplay of virtue and fortune. Throughout the work, the analytical style can be characterized as restless energy in the service of cool, chess-playing logic. Marko is generous with his knowledge, merciless in drawing conclusions, and outrageously funny in delivery. He attacks the questions that matter most to investors and that experts too often leave shrouded in finely wrought uncertainty. He also shows himself to be a superb writer as well as strategist, interspersing his methodological training sessions with vivid anecdotes of a lifelong intellectual journey from a shattered Yugoslavia to the heights of finance. The bits of memoir are often the best, such as the intro to Chapter Six on geopolitics. To paraphrase a great author, Marko writes because he has a story to tell, not because he has to tell a story. The tale of the mysterious consulting firm Papic and Parsley will do a great public service by teaching readers precisely how skeptical of mainstream news journalism they should be. It isn’t enough to say that we read Geopolitical Alpha and liked it – the sole criterion for a review in this column. Rather, the book and its author are the reason this column exists. And Geopolitical Alpha is now the locus classicus of market-relevant geopolitical analysis.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We favored the upper side of the range, first $2.5 trillion, and subsequently something closer to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s demand of $2.2 trillion. We have speculated that Republicans may get her to settle at $1.9 trillion. 2 Two of these cases were unique in that a vice president took over from a president who died and then won re-election – unlike Trump’s scenario. 3 On August 12 a Greek Navy frigate collided with a Turkish vessel guiding the Oruc Reis. Athens called the incident an accident while Ankara referred to it as a provocation. 4 The so-called Seville Map was prepared at the request of the European Union by researchers at the University of Seville, attempts to clarify the exclusive economic zones of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The US announced on September 21 that it does not consider the Seville map to have any legal significance. 5 The Blue Homeland or Mavi Vatan doctrine announced in 2006 intends to secure Turkish control of maritime areas surrounding its coast (Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea) in order to secure energy supplies and support Turkey’s economic growth. 6 Erdogan’s claim that gas from the recently discovered Sakarya gas field would reach consumers by 2023 is likely overly optimistic and unrealistic. The drilling costs and commercial viability of the field are yet to be determined. Thus, the find does not impact dynamics in the East Med. 7 New Jersey: Wiley, 2021. 286 pages. Section II: GeoRisk Indicators China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

China: The Recovery And Equity Dichotomy China’s economic recovery has been gathering steam, and policymakers have become reasonably confident about the growth outlook. In fact, transaction activity in the property market has recovered to year-ago levels, auto sales and construction starts have bottomed following a 18 to 20-month contraction (Chart I-1). In line with this economic revival, authorities issued a statement following last week’s Politburo meeting contending that monetary policy should aim “to maintain adequate growth of money supply and credit.” This statement is a change in the monetary policy stance in May when the stated objective was to “significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year.” This change in language highlights that authorities have become more comfortable with the recovery and are now becoming a bit concerned about amplifying credit and property market excesses. There will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. In short, there will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. Policymakers will therefore be in a wait-and-see mode for now, monitoring how economic conditions improve as the enacted stimulus works its way into the economy. Odds are high that the business cycle recovery will continue in China for now. Chart I-2 shows that the amount of credit and fiscal stimulus has been considerable, and that broad money and bank assets impulses remain in uptrend. All these should support the recovery into early next year. Chart I-1China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway Chart I-2China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy As to the risks to Chinese growth emanating from depressed demand in the rest of the world, they are not substantial. First, global demand has already bottomed. Second, China’s total exports account for 17% of GDP, while investment expenditures and consumer spending account for 42% and 38% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-3). Hence, rising capital expenditures and household spending will offset the drag from exports. Finally, China exports many household and medical goods that are currently in very high demand worldwide due to the lockdowns and the pandemic. As a result, Chinese exports have recently done a bit better than global shipments in volume terms (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports Chart I-4Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments As to domestic growth drivers, output has been rising faster than consumer demand. Furthermore, capital spending and production by state-owned enterprises has been much stronger than that of private enterprises. However, with the stimulus in full force, both consumer demand and private investment will pick up in the second half of this year. An Equity Market Dichotomy Chart I-5Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks On the surface, the strong rally in Chinese equity indexes has validated the economic recovery thesis. However, a closer examination of the equity performance of various equity sectors reveals that the rebound in cyclical sectors has been rather tame and that the large gains in the equity indexes have been primarily due to tech and new economy businesses, benefiting from working and shopping from home, and to health care stocks (Chart I-5). Chart I-6 illustrates that industrials, materials, autos and real estate stocks are only modestly above their March lows. More importantly, large bank stocks trading in Hong Kong are reaching new lows in absolute terms (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks Is such lackluster performance by Chinese cyclical stocks a warning sign to its business cycle recovery? Not necessarily. In our opinion, poor performance of cyclical stocks and banks in China reflects the long-term ramifications of repeated episodes of credit frenzy. A credit-driven growth recovery is always a double-edged sword for both borrowers and creditors. Companies that borrow and invest in new projects accumulate debt. Critically, it is unclear whether these investments will produce new recurring cash flows that would allow the debtors to service their debt. Hence, many companies that take on more debt and invest in financially non-viable projects undermine shareholder value. China has again doubled down on the same policies it has been deploying since the 2008 Lehman crisis. Namely, it has encouraged another boom in money and credit creation, as well as in infrastructure investment. Another outcome of this is that excess money creation leaks into the property market, further fueling the real estate bubble. As for banks, if debtors are unable to service their debt, bank shareholders will be at risk too. This does not mean that banks will be liquidated, but that their shareholders will be diluted. It is critical to put this round of stimulus into perspective: it comes amid already elevated debt levels, following a decade-long credit frenzy and a two decade-long capital spending boom (Chart I-7). Therefore, we doubt that the latest round of investments will be able to substantially increase shareholder value. On the whole, we believe the rally in Chinese stocks outside secular growth plays – such as Alibaba, Tencent – is cyclical not structural. The basis is that while more credit produces a cyclical recovery, it often undermines shareholder value. Chart I-6 on page 4 illustrates that Chinese cyclical stocks and bank share prices have been flat-to-down in the past 10 years despite recurring stimulus.   Finally, the near-term risks for Chinese stocks do not stem from the domestic economy, but from geopolitics and a correction in US FAANG stocks. President Trump may escalate the confrontation with China in order to “rally the nation behind the flag” if his polling does not improve ahead of the November elections. Chart I-8 illustrates that the Americans’ view of China has deteriorated significantly in recent years. This might be exploited by President Trump to boost his re-election chances. A heightened confrontation could produce a correction in Chinese stocks. Chart I-7China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger Chart I-8Americans’ Perception Of China Has Deteriorated In Recent Years China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Also, if the FAANG mania is either paused or reversed, then Chinese tech and mega-cap stocks will correct, pulling down the broad Chinese equity indexes. Bottom Line: The current round of stimulus in China has made the credit, money and property excesses even larger. As we have written over the years, easy money and credit generally fuel a misallocation of capital. Ultimately, this slows productivity growth on the macro level and destroys shareholder value on the company level.   Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Nevertheless, given that the cyclical recovery in China will endure for now, we continue overweighting Chinese investable stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Finally, we are closing our short CNY/long USD position given the change in our USD outlook on July 9. This position has produced a 4.2% loss since its initiation on December 9, 2015. A Stress Test For Bank Stocks Chart I-9China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Chart I-9 demonstrates that the risk-weighted assets of smaller banks have risen much faster, and are presently larger, than those of large banks. We have performed a new stress test for both the Big Five and small & medium listed banks. Concerning large banks, our base-case scenario calls for risk-weighted non-performing assets to rise to 13% of total. Accordingly, their equity will be diluted by 46% if they were to provision for these losses (Table I-1). Consequently, the true (adjusted) price-to-book (PBV) ratio will be 1.1. Assuming that the fair value of these large banks corresponds to a PBV ratio of one, then Big Five banks remain moderately (10%) overpriced. For small banks, our baseline scenario assumes a risk-weighted non-performing asset ratio of 13%. If these banks were to provision for these write offs, their equity will be diluted by 61%, pushing the adjusted PBV ratio to 2 (Table I-2). If we use a PBV fair value ratio of 1.3, then small and medium listed banks are substantially overpriced. Table I-1Stress Test Of 5 Large Banks China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Table I-2Stress Test Of The Other 25 Listed Medium & Small Banks China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Chart I-10Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Bottom Line: Chinese banks stocks could rebound, but their structural outlook has deteriorated further following another round of credit binge. Among banks stocks, we reiterate our strategy of favoring large banks over smaller ones (Chart I-10).  Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com  Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: Struggling To Recover Indonesian stocks and the rupiah have rebounded in line with global risk assets. However, the rebound might be waning. The rupiah has begun weakening anew against the US dollar despite a major weakness in the latter. Relative to EM, Indonesian equities are underperforming again (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Crumbling Economic Activity And Insufficient Stimulus Indonesia is experiencing its worst recession since the Asian Crisis in 1997. Consumer income has dwindled and consumer confidence collapsed (Chart II-2, top panel). In turn, passenger car and truck sales have contracted by 90% and 84%, respectively, from a year ago (Chart II-2, second and third panel). Meanwhile, domestic cement consumption plunged by 17% (Chart II-2, bottom panel). In the meantime, the Coronavirus pandemic is not subsiding and will continue weighing on the Indonesian economy. The authorities have been attempting to prop up domestic demand. Yet the total fiscal stimulus announced so far – which amounts to $48 billion or 4.3% of GDP – is unlikely to be enough, given the harsh nature of this recession. For instance, the commercial banks loan impulse has already dipped to -2.7% of GDP (Chart II-3, top panel). Provided that demand for credit stays weak and banks continue to be reluctant to lend, the credit impulse will drop even further. As a result, the negative credit impulse will offset the fiscal thrust. Chart II-2Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Chart II-3Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High   On the monetary policy front, Bank Indonesia (BI) has been aggressively cutting its policy rate and injecting banking system liquidity into the market. The BI has been also purchasing government bonds on the secondary and primary markets, de facto conducting quantitative easing. Still, the ongoing monetary easing has not translated into lower lending rates for the real economy. In particular, although the BI lowered its policy rate by 200 basis points since July 2019, bank lending rates have only fallen by 100 basis points (Chart II-3, middle panel). This is a major sign that the monetary transmission mechanism is broken. Furthermore, the commercial banks’ lending rate, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, remains elevated (Chart II-3, bottom panel). This is severely hurting credit demand (Chart II-3, top panel). The deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. As a result, the deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. The top panel of Chart II-4 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation. Meanwhile, both core and headline inflation have undershot the central bank’s target (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Very low inflation and crumbling real growth have caused nominal GDP growth to drop below borrowing rates (Chart II-5). This is hitting borrowers’ ability to service their debt and is leading to swelling non-performing loans (NPLs). Chart II-4Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Chart II-5Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates   Bank Stocks Remain At Risk The outlook for bank stocks that make up 48% of the Indonesia MSCI equity index is bleak. Chart II-6 shows that non-performing loans and special-mention loans (which are composed of doubtful loans) were rising before the pandemic shock. This has forced commercial banks to boost their bad loans provisioning, which has hurt their profitability. Additionally, Indonesian commercial banks’ net interest margins (NIM) have been falling sharply (Chart II-7). This has occurred because, on the revenues side, interest earnings have mushroomed as debtors have halted their interest payments while, on the expenditures side, commercial banks were forced to keep on paying interests to depositors. To protect their profitability, commercial banks have kept their lending rates stubbornly high. However, doing so will end up backfiring – as elevated lending rates punish borrowers and end up causing NPLs to rise, leading to more profit weakness. Chart II-6Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Chart II-7Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling   Crucially, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat – which now account for a whopping 37% of the Indonesia MSCI market cap – are vulnerable. Both commercial banks are heavily exposed to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and small and medium (SME) companies. Particularly, 40% of Bank Central Asia’s loan book is linked to SOEs and government-led projects across electricity, ports, airports and cement among other sectors. Meanwhile, 68% of Bank Rakyat’s loan book is leveraged to the SME sector and 20% to large companies, including SOEs. Worryingly, both SOEs and SMEs have been undergoing stress. Their profitability and debt servicing ability were questionable even before the COVID-19 pandemic. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): The debt servicing ability for these companies has deteriorated. The debt-to-EBITDA ratio has risen considerably while the EBITDA coverage of interest expenses is set to fall from already low levels (Chart II-8). Small & Medium Enterprises (SME): The debt serviceability of the top 40% of the MSCI-listed small cap stocks is also deteriorating. The top panel of Chart II-9 shows that these companies’ debt-to-EBITDA has risen substantially, and that the EBITDA-to-interest expense ratio has plunged (Chart II-9, bottom panel). Chart II-8Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Chart II-9Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity   Chart II-10Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps All in all, both Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat are set to experience a considerable new NPL cycle emanating from the poor profitability of SOEs and SMEs. Importantly, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat’s respective NPLs at 1.3% and 2.6% were relatively low at the start of this year and have much room to rise. Neither are their valuations appealing. At a price-to-book value of 4.4 Bank Central Asia is expensive. As for Bank Rakyat while its multiples are not as high as Bank Central Asia’s (which is trading at a price-to-book value of 1.8), it is not particularly cheap either, considering its enormous exposure to Indonesia’s struggling SME sector.  Bottom Line: The outlook for bank stocks is murky (Chart II-10). Apart from banks, the rest of the Indonesian stock market has been performing very poorly and there is no obvious evidence that this will change (Chart II-10, bottom two panels). Investment Conclusions Continue underweighting the Indonesian stock market. Bank stocks remain at risk. Moreover, there is evidence that retail investors have been active in the stock market as of late. When the stock market does relapse, retail investors will likely rush to sell their holdings, thereby magnifying the equity selloff. Dedicated EM local currency bonds and credit portfolios should continue underweighting Indonesia. Investors in Indonesia’s corporate US dollar bonds should tread carefully as the largest issuers are those SOEs that have experienced deteriorating creditworthiness. Chart II-11Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies If the US dollar continues to depreciate, the rupiah could stabilize and rebound but it will underperform other EM and DM currencies. Return on capital (ROC) is the ultimate driver of EM currencies. Given the magnitude of the recession Indonesia is in and the slow recovery it will experience, its ROC will remain weak. This will weigh on the rupiah (Chart II-11). We continue shorting the rupiah against an equally weighted basket of the euro, Swiss franc and Japanese yen. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkey: The Ramifications Of A Money Plethora Turkey is facing another currency turmoil. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Chart III-1 demonstrates that narrow money (M1) and broad money (M3) are booming at 90% and 50%, respectively, from a year ago. These measures exclude foreign currency deposits. Bank loan annual growth has surged to 45% and commercial bank purchases of government bonds are skyrocketing (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Turkey's Money Overflow Turkey's Money Overflow Turkey's Money Overflow Chart III-2Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks     In turn, the Central Bank of Turkey’s (CBRT) funding of commercial banks has surged (Chart III-3). By providing ample liquidity the CBRT has enabled commercial banks to engage in a credit frenzy and levy of government debt. The latter has capped local currency bond yields at a time when the private sector and foreign investors have been reluctant to finance the government bond given its current yields. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Consistent with this expanding money bubble, inflation in Turkey remains in a structural uptrend (Chart III-4). Core and service sector consumer price inflation is close to 12% and will rise even further due to the overflow of money in the economy. Besides, residential property prices are already soaring, in local currency terms, as residents are fleeing from liras. Chart III-3Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Chart III-4Structurally Rising Inflation Structurally Rising Inflation Structurally Rising Inflation   Still, the central bank refuses to acknowledge these inflationary pressures and to tighten its policy stance. Monetary authorities remain well behind the inflation curve. The policy rate, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), is -2%. In the past, when real policy rates have dropped to this level, the exchange rate has often tumbled, as in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2018 (Chart III-5). Chart III-5Numerous Headwinds For The Lira Numerous Headwinds For The Lira Numerous Headwinds For The Lira In regard to balance of payments, the current account deficit is widening again due to the plunge in exports and tourism revenues and the recovering imports (Chart III-5, bottom panel). Historically, a widening current account deficit has weighed on the currency. Lastly, the central bank is not in the position to defend the exchange rate much longer. Not only has it depleted its own reserves but it has also used up $70 billion of commercial banks deposits and entered a $55 billion foreign exchange swap. Hence, its is massively short on US dollars. Bottom Line: As part of our broader currency strategy, on July 9, we replaced our short Turkish lira versus the US dollar position with a short in TRY versus a basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This switch has proved to be very profitable and we continue recommending it. Consequently, investors should continue underweighting Turkish stocks, local currency bonds and credit markets relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed-income investors should consider betting on higher inflation expectations, i.e. going long domestic inflation adjusted yields and shorting nominal yields. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The tech sector faces mounting domestic political and geopolitical risks. We fully expected stimulus hiccups but believe they will give way to large new fiscal support, given that COVID-19 is weighing on consumer confidence. Europe’s relative political stability is a good basis for the euro rally but any comeback in opinion polling by President Trump could give dollar bulls new life. DXY is approaching a critical threshold below which it would break down further. The US could take aggressive actions on Russia and Iran, but China and the Taiwan Strait remain the biggest geopolitical risk. Feature Near-term risks continue to mount against the equity rally, even as governments’ combined monetary and fiscal policies continue to support a cyclical economic rebound. Chart 1Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Testimony by the chief executives of Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet to the US House of Representatives highlighted the major political risks facing the market leaders. There are three reasons not to dismiss these risks despite the theatrical nature of the hearings. First, the tech companies’ concentration of wealth would be conspicuous during any economic bust, but this bust has left pandemic-stricken consumers more reliant on their services. Second, acrimony is bipartisan – conservatives are enraged by the tendency of the tech companies to side with the Democratic Party in policing the range of acceptable political discourse, and they increasingly agree with liberals that the companies have excessive corporate power warranting anti-trust probes. Executive action is the immediate risk, but in the coming one-to-two years congressional majorities will also be mustered to tighten regulation. Third, technology is the root of the great power struggle between the US and China – a struggle that will not go away if Biden wins the election. Indeed Biden was part of the administration that launched the US’s “Pivot to Asia” and will have better success in galvanizing US diplomatic allies behind western alternatives to Chinese state-backed and military-linked tech companies. US tech companies struggle to outperform Chinese tech companies except during episodes of US tariffs, given the latter firms’ state-backed turn toward innovation and privileged capture of the Chinese domestic market (Chart 1). The US government cannot afford to break up these companies without weighing the strategic consequences for America’s international competitiveness. The attempt to coordinate a western pressure campaign against Huawei and other leading Chinese firms will continue over the long run as they are accused of stealing technology, circumventing UN sanctions, violating human rights, and compromising the national security of the democracies. China, for its part, will be forced to take counter-measures. US tech companies will be caught in the middle. Like the threat of executive regulation in the domestic sphere, the threat of state action in the international sphere is difficult to time. It could happen immediately, especially given that the US is having some success in galvanizing an alliance even under President Trump (see the UK decision to bar Huawei) and that President Trump’s falling election prospects remove the chief constraint on tough action against China (the administration will likely revoke Huawei’s general license on August 13 or closer to the election). Massive domestic economic stimulus empowers the US to impose a technological cordon and China to retaliate. Combining this headline risk to the tech sector with other indications that the equity rally is extended – the surge in gold prices, the fall in the 30-year/5-year Treasury slope – tells us that investors should be cautious about deploying fresh capital in the near term. Republicans Will Capitulate To New Stimulus Just as President Trump has ignored bad news on the coronavirus, financial markets have ignored bad news on the economy. Dismal Q2 GDP releases were fully expected – Germany shrank by 10.1% while the US shrank by 9.5% on a quarterly basis, 32.9% annualized. But the resurgence of the virus is threatening new government restrictions on economic activity. US initial unemployment claims have edged up over the past three weeks. US consumer confidence regarding future expectations plummeted from 106.1 in June to 91.5 in July, according to the Conference Board’s index. Chart 2Global Instability Will Follow Recession A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Setbacks in combating the virus will hurt consumers even assuming that governments lack the political will to enforce new lockdowns. The share of countries in recession has surged to levels not seen in 60 years (Chart 2). Financial markets can look past recessions, but the pandemic-driven recession will result in negative surprises and second-order effects that are unforeseen. Yes, fresh fiscal stimulus is coming, but this is more positive for the cyclical outlook than the tactical outlook. Stimulus “hiccups” could precipitate a near-term pullback – such a pullback may be necessary to force politicians to resolve disputes over the size and composition of new stimulus. This risk is immediate in the United States, where House Democrats, Senate Republicans, and the White House have hit an all-too-predictable impasse over the fifth round of stimulus. The bill under negotiation is likely to be President Trump’s last chance to score a legislative victory before the election and the last significant legislative economic relief until early 2021. The Senate Republicans have proposed a $1.1 trillion HEALS Act in response to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, passed in mid-May. As we go to press, the federal unemployment insurance top-up of $600 per week is expiring, with a potential cost of 3% of GDP in fiscal tightening, as well as the moratorium on home evictions. Congress will have to rush through a stop-gap measure to extend these benefits if it cannot resolve the debate on the larger stimulus package. If Democrats and Republicans split the difference then we will get $2.5 trillion in stimulus, likely by August 10. Compromise on the larger package is easy in principle, as Table 1 shows. If the two sides split the difference between their proposals in a commonsense way, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1, then the result will be a $2.5 trillion stimulus. This estimate fits with what we have published in the past and likely meets market expectations for the time being. Table 1Outline Of Fifth US COVID Stimulus Package (Estimate) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Whether it is enough for the economy depends on how the virus develops and how governments respond once flu season picks up and combines with the coronavirus to pressure the health system this fall. A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the amount of spending necessary to keep the budget deficit from shrinking in the second half of the year comes much closer to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion bill (Table 2), which suggests that what appears to be a massive stimulus today could appear insufficient tomorrow. Nevertheless, $2.5 trillion is not exactly small. It would bring the US total to $5 trillion year-to-date, or 24% of GDP! Table 2Reducing The Budget Deficit On A Quarterly Basis Will Slow Economy A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) While a compromise bill should come quickly, the Republican Party is more divided over this round of stimulus than earlier this year. Chart 3US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 First, there is some complacency due to the fact that the economy is recovering, not collapsing as was the case back in March. Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that US personal income is much better off, thus far, than it was in the months following the 2008 financial crisis, even though the initial pre-transfer hit to incomes is larger (Chart 3). Second, the Republican Party is reacting to growing unease within its ranks over the yawning budget deficit, now the largest since World War II (Chart 4). Chart 4If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose Chart 5Consumer Confidence Sends Warning Signal To Republicans A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) If Republicans are guided by complacency and fiscal hawks, they will cook their own goose. A failure to provide government support will cause a financial market selloff, will hurt consumer confidence, and will put the final nail in the coffin of their own chance of re-election as well as President Trump’s. Consumer confidence tracks fairly well with presidential approval rating and election outcomes. A further dip could disqualify Trump, whereas a last-minute boost due to stimulus and an economic surge could line him up for a comeback in the last lap (Chart 5). These constraints are obvious so we maintain our high conviction call that a bill will be passed, likely by August 10. But at these levels on the equity market, we simply have no confidence in the market gyrations leading up to or following the passage of the bill. Our conviction level is on the cyclical, 12-month horizon, in which case we expect US and global stimulus to operate and equities to rise. Bottom Line: Political and economic constraints will force Republicans to join Democrats and pass a new stimulus bill of about $2.5 trillion by around August 10. This is cyclically positive, but hiccups in getting it passed, negative surprises, and other risks tied to US politics discourage us from taking an overtly bullish stance over the next three months. Yes, US-China Tensions Are Still Relevant Chart 6Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Financial markets have shrugged off US-China tensions this year for understandable reasons. The pandemic, recession, and stimulus have overweighed the ongoing US-China conflict. As we have argued, China is undertaking a sweeping fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimulus – despite lingering hawkish rhetoric – and the size is sufficient to assist in global economic recovery as well as domestic Chinese recovery. What the financial market overlooks is that China’s households and firms are still reluctant to spend (Chart 6). China’s Politburo's late July meetings on the economy are frequently important. Initial reports of this year’s meet-up reinforce the stimulus narrative. Hints of hawkishness here and there serve a political purpose in curbing market exuberance, both at home and in the US election context, but China will ultimately remain accommodative because it has already bumped up against its chief constraint of domestic stability. Note that this assessment also leaves space for market jitters in the near-term. The phase one trade deal remains intact as President Trump is counting on it to make the case for re-election while China is looking to avoid antagonizing a loose cannon president who still has a chance of re-election. As long as broad-based tariff rates do not rise, in keeping with Trump’s deal, financial markets can ignore the small fry. We maintain a 40% risk that Trump levels sweeping punitive measures; our base case is that he goes to the election arguing that he gets results through his deal-making while carrying a big stick. At the same time, our view that domestic stimulus removes the economic constraints on conflict, enabling the two countries to escalate tensions, has been vindicated in recent weeks. Chinese political risk continues on a general uptrend, based on market indicators. The market is also starting to price in the immense geopolitical risks embedded in Taiwan’s situation, which we have highlighted consistently since 2016. While North Korea remains on a diplomatic track, refraining from major military provocations, South Korean political risk is still elevated both for domestic and regional reasons (Chart 7). Chart 7China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward The market is gradually pricing in a higher risk premium in the renminbi, Taiwanese dollar, and Korean won, and this pricing accords with our longstanding political assessment. The closure of the US and Chinese consulates in Houston and Chengdu is only the latest example of this escalating dynamic. While the US’s initial sanctions on China over Hong Kong were limited in economic impact, the longer term negative consequences continue to build. Hong Kong was the symbol of the Chinese Communist Party’s compatibility with western liberalism; the removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy strikes a permanent blow against this compatibility. China’s decision to go forward with the imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong – and now to bar pro-democratic candidates from the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which will probably be postponed anyway – has accelerated coalition-building among the western democracies. The UK is now clashing with China more openly, especially after blocking Huawei from its 5G system and welcoming Hong Kong political refugees. Australia and China have fought a miniature trade war of their own over China’s lack of transparency regarding COVID-19, and Canada is implicated in the Huawei affair. Even the EU has taken a more “realist” approach to China. Across the Taiwan Strait, political leaders are assisting fleeing Hong Kongers, crying out against Beijing’s expansion of control in its periphery, rallying support from informal allies in the US and West, and doubling down on their “Silicon Shield” (prowess in semiconductor production) as a source of protection. Intel Corporation’s decision to increase its dependency on TSMC for advanced microchips only heightens the centrality of this island and this company in the power struggle between the US and China. China cannot fulfill its global ambitions if the US succeeds in creating a technological cordon. Taiwan is the key to China’s breaking through that cordon. Therefore Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or even military conflict. The base case is that Beijing will impose economic sanctions first, to undermine Taiwanese leadership. The uncertainty over the US’s willingness to defend Taiwan is still elevated, even if the US is gradually signaling a higher level of commitment. This uncertainty makes strategic miscalculations more likely than otherwise. But Taiwan’s extreme economic dependence on the mainland gives Beijing a lever to pursue its interests and at present that is the most important factor in keeping war risk contained. By the same token, Taiwanese economic and political diversification increases that risk. A “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” that involves trade war and sanctions is our base case, but war cannot be ruled out, and any war would be a major war. Thus investors can safely ignore Tik-Tok, Hong Kong LegCo elections, and accusations of human rights violations in Xinjiang. But they cannot ignore concrete deterioration in the Taiwan Strait. Or, for that matter, the South and East China Seas, which are not about fishing and offshore drilling but about China’s strategic depth and positioning around Taiwan. Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or military conflict. The latest developments have seen the CNY-USD exchange rate roll over after a period of appreciation associated with bilateral deal-keeping (Chart 8). Depreciation makes it more likely that President Trump will take punitive actions, but these will still be consistent with maintaining the phase one deal unless his re-election bid completely collapses, rendering him a lame duck and removing his constraints on more economically significant confrontation. We are perilously close to such an outcome, which is why Trump’s approval rating and head-to-head polling against Joe Biden must be monitored closely. If his budding rebound is dashed, then all bets are off with regard to China and Asian power politics. Chart 8A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation Bottom Line: China’s stimulus, like the US stimulus, is a reason for cyclical optimism regarding risk assets. The phase one trade deal with President Trump is less certain – there is a 40% chance it collapses as stimulus and/or Trump’s political woes remove constraints on conflict. Hong Kong is a red herring except with regard to coalition-building between the US and Europe; the Taiwan Strait is the real geopolitical risk. Maritime conflicts relate to Taiwan and are also market-relevant. Europe, Russia, And Oil Risks Europe has proved a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk, as we have contended. The passage of joint debt issuance in keeping with the seven-year budget reinforces the point. The Dutch, facing an election early next year, held up the negotiations, but ultimately relented as expected. Emmanuel Macron, who convinced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to embrace this major compromise for European solidarity, is seeing his support bounce in opinion polls at home. He is being rewarded for taking a leadership position in favor of European integration as well as for overseeing a domestic economic rebound. His setback in local elections is overstated as a political risk given that the parties that benefited do not pose a risk to European integration, and will ally with him in 2022 against any populist or anti-establishment challenger. We still refrain from reinitiating our long EUR-USD trade, however, given the immediate risks from the US election cycle (Chart 9). We will reevaluate if Trump’s odds of victory fall further. A Biden victory is very favorable for the euro in our view. Chart 9EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity We are bullish on pound sterling because even a delay or otherwise sub-optimal outcome to trade talks is mostly priced in at current levels (Charts 10A and 10B). Prime Minister Boris Johnson has the raw ability to walk away without a deal, in the context of strong domestic stimulus, but the long-term economic consequences could condemn him to a single term in office. Compromise is better and in both parties’ interests. Chart 10APound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Chart 10BPound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Two other risks are worth a mention in this month’s GeoRisk Update: Chart 11Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: In recent reports we have maintained that Russian geopolitical risk is understated by markets. Domestic unrest is rising, the Trump administration could impose penalties over Nordstream 2 or other issues to head off criticism on the campaign trail, and a Biden administration would be outright confrontational toward Putin’s regime. Moscow may intervene in the US elections or conduct larger cyber attacks. US sanctions could ultimately target trading of local currency Russian government bonds, which so far have been spared (Chart 11). Iran: The jury is still out on whether the recent series of mysterious explosions affecting critical infrastructure in Iran are evidence of a clandestine campaign of sabotage (Table 3). The nature of the incidents leaves some room for accident and coincidence.1 But the inclusion of military and nuclear sites in the list leads us to believe that some degree of “wag the dog” is going on. The prime suspect would be Israel and/or the United States during the window of opportunity afforded by the Trump administration, which looks to be closing over the next six months. Trump likely has a high tolerance for conflict with Iran ahead of the election. Even though Americans are war-weary, they will rally to the president’s defense if Iran is seen as the instigator, as opinion polls showed they did in September 2019 and January of this year. Iran is avoiding goading Trump so far but if it suffers too great of damage from sabotage then it may be forced to react. The dynamic is unstable and hence an oil price spike cannot be ruled out. Table 3Wag The Dog Scenario Playing Out In Iran A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Chart 12Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil markets have the capacity and the large inventories necessary to absorb supply disruptions caused by a single Iranian incident (Chart 12). Only a chain reaction or major conflict would add to upward pressure. This would also require global demand to stay firm. The threat from COVID-19 suggests that volatility is the only thing one can count on in the near-term. Over the long run we remain bullish crude oil due to the unfettered commitment by world governments to reflation. Bottom Line: The euro rally is fundamentally supported but faces exogenous risks in the short run. We would steer clear of Russian currency and local currency bonds over the US election campaign and aftermath, particularly if Trump’s polling upturn becomes a dead cat bounce. Iran is a “gray swan” geopolitical risk, hiding in plain sight, but its impact on oil markets will be limited unless a major war occurs. Investment Implications The US dollar is at a critical juncture. Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor argues that if the DXY index breaks beneath the 93-94 then the greenback has entered a structural bear market. The most recent close was 93.45 and it has hovered below 94 since Monday. Failure to pass US stimulus quickly could result in a dollar bounce along with other safe havens. Over the short run, investors should be prepared for this and other negative surprises relating to the US election and significant geopolitical risks, especially involving China, the tech war, and the Taiwan Strait. Over the long run, investors should position for more fiscal support to combine with ultra-easy monetary policy for as far as the eye can see. The Federal Reserve is not even “thinking about thinking about raising rates.” This combination ultimately entails rising commodity prices, a weakening dollar, and international equity outperformance relative to both US equities and government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Raz Zimmt, "When it comes to Iran, not everything that goes boom in the night is sabotage," Atlantic Council, July 30, 2020. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The implementation of an oil-price hedging strategy by Russia’s government – consisting of put buying a la Mexico’s strategy for putting a floor under government revenues – would force us to re-consider our bullish view. On the one hand, systematically hedging forward revenues when deferred prices met the government’s budget threshold – currently $42.40/bbl for Urals crude oil – would tangibly increase Russia’s impact on forward price discovery.  This could become one of the tools available to OPEC 2.0 that allow it to influence the shape of the forward curve, perhaps supporting a backwardation benefiting member states.  On the other, hedging government revenues could free Russia and its oil companies from supporting the OPEC 2.0 framework, thus returning the swing-producer responsibilities for balancing the market to OPEC. Significant obstacles stand in the way of implementing a hedging program by the Russian government.  Hedging even volumes in futures could overwhelm the supply of liquidity in these markets, particularly in the deferred contracts: Average daily Brent volumes are ~ 700mm b/d for the entire market.1 Feature OPEC 2.0’s mostly successful production management scheme is a key factor driving our bullish view of oil. The coalition led by KSA and Russia is keeping output constrained while global demand recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. This will tighten global supply-demand balances and reduce inventories (Chart of the Week). This dynamic drives our expectation that prices will remain around current levels for 2H20 – at ~ $44/bbl for Brent – and, based on our modeling, push prices to $65/bbl on average next year. At the end of the day, OPEC 2.0 is a quasi-cartel operating under a Declaration of Cooperation signed by the original cartel and non-OPEC producers led by Russia in late 2016 and renewed and expanded periodically since then. Without this cooperation, it is highly doubtful oil prices would have recovered from the demand-destruction visited upon the market by the COVID-19 pandemic as quickly as they have. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Underpins Our Bullish Oil View OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Underpins Our Bullish Oil View OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Underpins Our Bullish Oil View Nor is it likely the inventory overhang dogging markets since the end of the 2014-16 market-share war launched by KSA, then compounded by waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions in November 2018 by the US, could have been addressed as effectively as they were prior to the pandemic’s arrival. In all likelihood, a punishing continuation of low prices would have been required to destroy enough production globally – in OPEC and ex-OPEC – into 2017 for prices to finally recover. OPEC 2.0’s Days Numbered? We have long argued the OPEC 2.0 framework benefitted Russia and KSA more than unrestrained production, which, left unchecked, would keep prices closer to $30/bbl than $70/bbl. The leadership of Russia’s oil sector has been a reluctant participant in the coalition’s production-management scheme. This was apparent in every meeting of OPEC 2.0 up to an including it March 2020 meeting in Vienna, where an extension of the coalition’s production cut advanced by KSA was nixed by Russia. A brief market-share war followed just as the COVID-19 pandemic started advancing beyond China’s borders, resulting in lockdowns and unprecedented demand destruction. OPEC 2.0 was then reconstituted, and the production cuts it agreed have restored balance to the market. However, this balance is tentative. On the demand side, a second wave of the pandemic is spreading, and with it the risk widespread lockdowns again are mandated. This would lead to another round of demand destruction if the scale of the lockdowns approached that of the first wave seen in 1H20. This is not our base case, but it is a risk we have been highlighting repeatedly in our reports. We find KSA’s GDP increases ~ 1% when EM oil consumption goes up by one percent, while Russia’s GPD increases by ~ 0.5%. On the supply side, we have long argued the OPEC 2.0 framework benefitted Russia and KSA more than unrestrained production, which, left unchecked, would keep prices closer to $30/bbl than $70/bbl.2 In the current arrangement, KSA and Russia are able to grow their GDPs as they see fit, with KSA apparently targeting EM sales, which will grow as those economies grow, and Russia apparently pursuing a strategy that centers on making its barrels available to trading markets and EM buyers (Charts 2A and 2B).3 Chart 2AKSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... Chart 2B... As Does Russia ... As Does Russia ... As Does Russia This arrangement can endure as long as the OPEC 2.0 members' revenues – particularly those of its leadership – are at risk from uncontrolled production – e.g., another market-share war. A New Game? If, however, one or both of OPEC 2.0's leaders is able to hedge its revenue, the game changes. If it is Russia, as President Putin has suggested, and the government is able to hedge the ~ 40% or so of the federal budget covered by oil and gas revenues, the game changes profoundly (Chart 3). The only motive for Russia to participate in the OPEC 2.0 framework is to keep prices from collapsing below the level assumed for budgeting purposes. This is $42.40/bbl for Urals, the benchmark Russian crude traded in global markets (Chart 4). At present, OPEC 2.0 production discipline is contributing to holding prices just above this level, as member states calibrate their output consistent with the recovery in global demand. Chart 3Russia's Budget Relies Heavily On Oil & Gas Revenues Russia's Budget Relies Heavily On Oil & Gas Revenues Russia's Budget Relies Heavily On Oil & Gas Revenues Chart 4OPEC 2.0 Cuts Contribute To Stronger Urals Crude Price OPEC 2.0 Cuts Contribute To Stronger Urals Crude Price OPEC 2.0 Cuts Contribute To Stronger Urals Crude Price Of course, if Russia were able to hedge the oil and gas revenues funding its budget, this production discipline would not be needed in the short term – it could produce at will knowing there is a floor under revenue. Crude-oil futures and options markets cannot handle the volume Russia likely would require to fully hedge the oil and gas revenues funding its budget. That’s a big IF, however. The demand destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in the first five months of this year was responsible for the loss of up to 25% of Russia’s oil, gas and coal exports, which translated into a 50% loss of export revenues and a 25% decline in budget as prices and volumes fell, according to the Carnegie Moscow Center.4 Russia’s GDP is expected to fall by 6% this year, according to the World Bank, in the wake of the pandemic.5 Crude-oil futures and options markets cannot handle the volume Russia likely would require to fully hedge the oil and gas revenues funding its budget. Brent futures and options open interest on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) total 3.34 billion barrels on July 21, 2020 (Chart 5). This is spread across the whole term structure. Worthwhile considering that just 1mm b/d of production hedged for 1 year = 365mm bbls = ~ 11% of total Brent open interest. Such a large concentration of open interest accounted for by one entity – even if it is a bona fide government – would, perforce, raise regulators concerns over market manipulation.6 Chart 5Russia's Hedging Volumes Likely Would Swamp Futures Markets Russia's Hedging Volumes Likely Would Swamp Futures Markets Russia's Hedging Volumes Likely Would Swamp Futures Markets Broadening OPEC 2.0’s Tool Kit The successful implementation of a hedging strategy by Russia would force us to re-consider our bullish oil view. Even though we view the likelihood Russia’s government will adopt a full revenue hedging program to be low, we think the argument that it – and KSA – could hedge discrete exposures over time makes sense. These markets exist to process information via trading activities. If there are discrete exposures Russia hedges that keep Brent forward curves backwardated, for example, this would affect the hedging economics of US shale producers protecting their revenues one to three years into the future (Chart 6). Hedging in future while keeping production in the prompt-delivery months in line with OPEC 2.0 quotas would support a backwardation. Prices in the deferred part of the curve would be lower than at the front, which would produce less revenue for hedgers, while higher prices in the front of the curve would redound to OPEC 2.0 member states’ benefit, whose term contracts and spot sales typically reference spot prices. Chart 6Discrete Hedging Could Support Backwardation Discrete Hedging Could Support Backwardation Discrete Hedging Could Support Backwardation This would tangibly increase Russia’s impact on forward price discovery. Indeed, hedging could become one of the tools available to OPEC 2.0 that allow it to influence the economics of oil production by US shale producers, among others. Bottom Line: The successful implementation of a hedging strategy by Russia would force us to re-consider our bullish oil view – there would be little or no need for the Russian government to demand its producers adhere to an OPEC 2.0 production quota if the government is able to hedge its revenue. (Whether those producers choose to hedge is another matter entirely.) We do not give a high probability to the Russian government adopting a Mexico-style hedging program to put a floor under its budget revenues. We cannot dismiss the possibility that discrete exposures could be hedged to support a backwardated forward curve structure going forward, however.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent prices have been remarkably steady at ~ $43/bbl in July, balancing expectations of a sustained global economic recovery and the risk of a second wave of lockdowns. Rising COVID-19 cases in the US pose a risk to oil demand as the US still represents ~ 20% of global demand. Brent futures spreads – 1ST vs. 12th – moved from -$1.38/bbl to -$3.29/bbl, suggesting the pace of drawdowns in inventories slowed in recent weeks. Nonetheless, we continue to expect a persistent supply deficit in 2H20 and 2021, pushing prices above $60/bbl next year.7 Base Metals: Neutral Base metals are mostly flat since last week after moving up 23% since March. A continuation of recent trends is largely dependent on China’s economic outlook as it represents ~ 50% of global BM demand. The IMF expects China’s GDP to reach its pre-crisis level somewhere this quarter and to resume trend growth afterward (Chart 7). Monetary policy needs to remain accommodative for such a recovery to occur. Historically, policymakers in China have favored easy monetary policy for at least three quarters following a crisis. This implies the accommodative stance should be maintained until year-end, supporting metals’ prices.8 Precious Metals: Neutral We are putting a stop-loss of $1,850/oz on our long gold recommendation at tonight’s close (Chart 8). We remain constructive on the gold market, but believe the market is out over its skis presently, as investors have realized central banks globally likely will not move to raise rates this year, or perhaps even next year. The Fed, in particular, has been consistently signaling its intent to remain accommodative in its effort to reflate the US economy.9 Ags/Softs:  Underweight The USDA this week reported 72% of the corn crop was in good to excellent condition for the week ended July 26 in the 19 states accounting for 91% of the crop last year. For beans, 72% of the crop was reported in good to excellent condition, up sharply from last year’s level of 54% in the 18 states accounting for 96% of the crop. Chart 7 Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Chart 8 Gold Is Due For A Breather Gold Is Due For A Breather   Footnotes 1     Russia came close to setting up an oil-hedging program in 2009, following the collapse of oil prices during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Please see Russia considers oil price hedges modeled on Mexico’s system published by worldoil.com July 22, 2020. 2     See, e.g., How Long Will The Oil-Price Rout Last?, which we published March 9, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    In previous research, we found KSA real GDP (in 2010 constant USD published by the World Bank) benefits more than Russia when EM GDP growth expands, while Russia benefits more from increases in Brent prices. For this report we updated that analysis and looked only at EM oil consumption, while including lagged USD and Brent crude oil prices as common regressors. We find KSA’s GDP increases ~ 1% when EM oil consumption goes up by one percent, while Russia’s GPD increases by ~ 0.5%. Please see our earlier research report entitled Sussing Out OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts, U.S. Waivers On Iran Sanctions, which we published on April 11, 2019, when KSA and Russia again were contesting the necessity of production cuts. 4    Please see The Oil Price Crash: Will the Kremlin’s Policies Change?, by Tatiana Mitrova, which was published by the Carnegie Moscow Center July 8, 2020. Russia presently exports ~ 5mm b/d of oil, which is down from earlier levels of ~ 5.5mm b/d due to the OPEC 2.0 cuts it is observing. We do not have the disposition of revenue sources funding Russia’s budget (primarily oil and gas), and therefore cannot calculate the precise hedging volume Russia’s government would need to cover to provide a floor for all of its fiscal obligations. 5    Please see Recession and Growth under the Shadow of a Pandemic published by the Bank July 6, 2020. 6    Russia’s central bank came out against the hedging proposal, citing the lack of liquidity available for large-scale programs. Please see Russia central bank opposes using wealth fund to hedge oil revenues, governor says published by uk.reuters.com July 24, 2020. 7     Please see Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside, which we published last week. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8    Please see Chinese Stocks: Stay Invested published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy July 22, 2020. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 9    Please see What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy July 28, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in Summary of Closed Trades Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging

Dear Clients, This month we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center.  He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Chart II-1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart II-1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart II-2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics August 2020 August 2020 Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart II-2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart II-3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart II-3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka August 2020 August 2020 Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table II-1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table II-1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks August 2020 August 2020 Chart II-4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US August 2020 August 2020 Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart II-4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Chart II-5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation August 2020 August 2020 Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart II-5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. Chart II-6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions August 2020 August 2020 The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart II-6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Chart II-7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise August 2020 August 2020 Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial  proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart II-7). Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart II-8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart II-9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart II-8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart II-9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities August 2020 August 2020   US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map II-1). Map II-1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered August 2020 August 2020 Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart II-10). Chart II-10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security August 2020 August 2020 We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart II-11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart II-12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. Chart II-11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Chart II-12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector   These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Appendix Table II-1Major Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade August 2020 August 2020 Works Cited Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan.  “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul.  “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser.  “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019.  Putin, Vladimir.  “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948).

Highlights The tech sector is in a manic phase. This mania has further room to run because inflation will remain low for at least the next two years and global central banks will maintain very easy policy conditions, which will cap the upside in bond yields. Tech will have its day of reckoning when inflation can rise and the sector’s weight will drag down the market. Bubbles are prone to severe corrections; this one is no exception. In the near term, tech earnings will probably miss lofty embedded expectations. The falling dollar is a problem for the sector and the election season introduces great risks. In the near term, inflation breakeven rates, the silver-to-gold ratio and the deep cyclicals-to-defensives ratio will all rise further. Industrials have a window to outperform technology. Feature The S&P 500 continues its ascent, increasingly driven higher by surging tech stocks. The extreme resilience of a few tech titans has resulted in an incredibly concentrated equity market, in which the capitalization of Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple and Facebook equals that of 224 deep and early cyclical stocks in the S&P 500. Such a narrow market raises three questions: is the tech sector in a bubble? What will pop this bubble? If the tech bubble bursts, will the S&P 500 shrug it off or decline with giant technology firms? We believe that tech stocks are in a bubble and the mania will expand further as long as inflation remains low and monetary conditions stay accommodative, despite occasional pullbacks. Moreover, the broad market will suffer when the bubble eventually bursts. Each Decade Has Its Bubble BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy team recently demonstrated that each decade in the past 60 years has experienced its own financial excess (Chart I-1).1 Three forces fueled each of these manias: an extended phase of easy monetary policy; a narrative that drove funds towards fashionable assets; and an extended period of superior returns that accentuated the inevitability of participating in the bubble. Chart I-1Each Decade Has Its Bubble August 2020 August 2020 In the 1960s, the mania surrounded the so-called “Nifty 50” stocks, as exemplified by Disney. The Nifty 50 were large-cap companies with solid franchises and a proven track record of dividend growth. Meanwhile, the period of low inflation from 1960 to 1966 allowed the US Federal Reserve to keep the unemployment rate below NAIRU, which indicated that policy was accommodative. When inflation began to rise in 1966, the Fed lifted interest rates to 7.75% in 1973, and the bubble evaporated with the recession started that year. In the 1970s, the mania involved precious metals, such as gold and silver. Precious metals benefited from the 33% fall in the dollar, the surge in inflation from 2.9% in 1970 to 14.7% in 1980, and the Fed’s incapacity to get ahead of the inflation curve through most of the decade. Then-Fed Chair Paul Volcker burst this bubble when he boosted interest rates to 19% in 1981 to kill off inflation, which also started the 93% dollar rally that culminated in 1985. Tech stocks are in a bubble and the mania will expand further as long as inflation remains low and monetary conditions stay accommodative. In the 1980s, the mania centered on Japan. The Japanese economy experienced a miraculous post-war expansion, with real GDP per capita surging by a cumulative average growth rate of 7% between 1945 and 1980. By the mid-1980s, the prevailing belief was that Japanese firms would dominate every industry. Moreover, after the Ministry of Finance allowed the yen to surge following the September 1985 Plaza Accord, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) cut interest rates by 2.5%, creating very easy domestic monetary conditions. This lax policy setting unleashed a surge in credit and asset valuations that pushed up the Nikkei-225 five times by the end of the decade and resulted in an 860% increase in the value of Japanese banks. The BoJ lifted interest rates by 3.5 percentage points between 1987 and 1990. The market peaked in December 1989 and the Nikkei collapsed by 82% during the next 19 years. In the 1990s, tech stocks and the NASDAQ captured investors’ imagination. The internet, computing power and software, all drove an increase in productivity growth to a two-decade high and investors understood that the sector’s earnings prowess was only beginning. Moreover, as inflation fell through the 1990s, then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan kept policy rates more or less flat for four years before cutting the fed funds rate by 75 basis points in 1998. Additionally, around the turn of the millennium, the Fed increased the size of its balance sheet by $90 billion as a precautionary measure against Y2K. Consequently, with the ensuing euphoria, investors pushed the NASDAQ’s valuation to a P/E ratio of 72, extrapolating far into the future much-too-strong earnings growth. The bubble imploded when the Fed normalized policy. We are not even thinking about thinking about raising rates. In the 2000s, the dominant story was the unstoppable upswing of the Chinese economy, the nation’s rapid urbanization and insatiable thirst for commodities. The lack of investment in commodity extraction through the 1990s exacerbated the rally in natural resources. The easy Fed policy implemented in the wake of the tech crash of 2000 to 2003, and the dollar’s 40% plunge between 2002 and 2008 added to the bullish mix in favor of resources. Commodity indices surged and iron ore, which derives a particularly large share of demand from construction in China, increased 12-fold between 2000 and 2011. The rise in the broad trade-weighted dollar that began in 2011 along with a slowdown in Chinese growth initiated in 2010 ultimately quashed commodities. Is The Tech Bubble About To End? Chart I-2The Drivers Of The Tech Bubble The Drivers Of The Tech Bubble The Drivers Of The Tech Bubble Historically, bubbles often abort at the end of the decade in which they materialize. Will the ongoing mania suffer the same fate as its predecessors? For now, the pillars of the tech bubble remain intact. The strength of tech stocks reflects both their superior ability to generate cash flow growth and the structural decline in bond yields (Chart I-2). It is easy to understand why superior cash flow growth would result in strong tech performance, but the role of lower yields is not obvious. Tech stocks derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred earnings and the terminal value of those cash flows. These distant profits are sensitive to fluctuations in the discount rate and, therefore, their present value soars when bond yields fall. The ability of tech to generate expanding earnings remains intact. Companies have curtailed capital expenditures due to the COVID-19 crisis, but they continue to spend on their software and hardware needs (Chart I-3). The growing prevalence of work-from-home arrangements and the proliferation of global cyberattacks (see Section II) will only feed the tech sector’s profit outperformance. Crucially, easy money and low interest rates will endure for an extended period. As Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated, “We are not even thinking about thinking about raising rates.” Our BCA Fed Monitor confirms this message (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Robust Tech Spending Robust Tech Spending Robust Tech Spending Chart I-4Easy Money As Far As The Eye Can See Easy Money As Far As The Eye Can See Easy Money As Far As The Eye Can See   Chart I-5Inflation Is The Tech Slayer Inflation Is The Tech Slayer Inflation Is The Tech Slayer Ultimately, much will depend on inflation. As BCA Research’s Equity Sector Strategy service recently demonstrated, the tech sector abhors rising inflation.2 Even during the seemingly unstoppable technology surge in the 1990s, the sector’s outperformance ended following an increase in core CPI (Chart I-5). Tech’s business model is optimized for deflationary conditions, especially when compared with other cyclical industries. Moreover, rising inflation puts upward pressure on interest rates and ultimately requires greater real interest rates to control accelerating CPI increases. Climbing real interest rates disproportionally hurt growth stocks, due to their heightened sensitivity to discount rates. Inflation will stay low as long as the labor market remains far from full employment. The slow progress in employment indicators suggests that the unemployment rate will be above NAIRU for at least two to three years (Chart I-6). Moreover, our Global CPI diffusion Index is also consistent with extended muted inflation (Chart I-7, top panels). The slowdown in money velocity and the weakness in the demand (as approximated by the smoothed growth rate of retail sales relative to average weekly earnings) will only exacerbate low inflation in the coming year or two (Chart I-7, bottom panels). Chart I-6Far From Full Employment Far From Full Employment Far From Full Employment Chart I-7For Now, Disinflation Dominates For Now, Disinflation Dominates For Now, Disinflation Dominates   In this context, valuations have room for more expansion. The NASDAQ may be pricey, but it is far from the 1990s’ nosebleed levels when nominal 10-year yields stood at 6.8% compared with today’s 0.55%, and 10-year TIPS yielded 4.3% and not their current -0.9%. In effect, both the equity risk premium and long-term expected growth rates embedded in tech stocks are much more conservative than in the late 1990s. The equity risk premium and long-term expected growth rates embedded in tech stocks are much more conservative than in the late 1990s. Finally, investors have largely missed the rally in stocks, which implies that a large proportion of the gains in tech stocks have not accrued to many investors. Since 2010, companies have been the main buyers of stocks while households and pension plans have constantly sold the asset class (Chart I-8). Additionally, investor sentiment remains firmly bearish and cash holdings of investors and households have surged in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart I-9). Thus, there is a lot of pent-up demand for financial assets. TINA (‘there is no alternative’) will invite investors to pour funds into equities with 10-year yields stuck near 0.6% and short rates at zero. Tech stocks will benefit from this trend. Chart I-8Households And Pension Plans Have Divested Households And Pension Plans Have Divested Households And Pension Plans Have Divested Chart I-9Not A Generalized Euphoria... Not A Generalized Euphoria... Not A Generalized Euphoria...     Practical Considerations For Investors Bubbles are highly dangerous for investors. A lack of participation in a mania often results in disastrous underperformance for institutional investors, but staying invested in the bubbly asset too long can be even more lethal for a portfolio’s performance. This dichotomy means that as long as there is low inflation and accommodative policy, we cannot underweight or overweight tech stocks. BCA Research’s equity strategists are neutral on tech, but within the sector they overweight the more defensive software and services components relative to the high-beta hardware and equipment industry groups.3 Three potential risks that can crystalize a period of correction in tech stocks over the remainder of 2020. Another risk inherent to bubbles is that they are often volatile; the current tech exuberance will not be different. In the second half of the 1990s, the NASDAQ experienced ten 10% or more corrections and tumbled by more than 20% in 1998 before leaping to new highs. Currently, we monitor three potential risks that can crystalize a period of correction in tech stocks over the remainder of 2020. Risk 1: Tech Earnings Do Not Meet The Hype Chart I-10...But A Localized Euphoria ...But A Localized Euphoria ...But A Localized Euphoria Today, tech stocks are vulnerable to a sharp pullback because investors are willing to bid up these shares in light of their perceived high growth rate (Chart I-10). This sector-specific euphoria increases the likelihood that if second-quarter tech earnings disappoint, then a significant correction will occur in widely held companies. The stock prices of Microsoft, Netflix and Snapchat have been punished following disappointing Q2 results. Retail investors indirectly amplify the risk created by potential earnings disappointments. Users of free trading apps (e.g.: Robinhood) are the marginal buyers, but more importantly their order flows are sold to large institutional houses who front-run these small players. Large investors with immense buying power can swing the price of the stocks popular with retail investors. Hence, when small investors unload due to bad news, a selling deluge ensues. Risk 2: A Weak Dollar Tech stocks thrive with a strong dollar because it is synonymous with low inflation and low yields. Consequently, a rising USD puts upward pressure on tech multiples. Moreover, a depreciating dollar is linked to robust global growth, which lifts the earnings prospects of other deep cyclical stocks more than tech equities, hurting the latter’s relative performance. The US election also creates a serious risk for tech stocks. The dollar is falling prey to a confluence of factors. The outlook for the US balance-of-payments is deteriorating sharply as the twin deficit explodes higher. Moreover, the national savings rate will remain in a downtrend after 2020 (Chart I-11). The US fiscal deficit will narrow from its current level of at least 18% of GDP, but it will not return for many years to the 4.6% of GDP that prevailed in 2019. The unemployment rate will stay above NAIRU for at least two to three years and the median voter increasingly favors economic populism. These two forces will generate high levels of spending. Meanwhile, a negative nominal output gap will weigh on tax revenues. Concerning private savings, the household savings rate will normalize from its April high of 33% of disposable income because consumer confidence will improve, thanks to strong consumer balance sheets and a limited decline in household net worth (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Vanishing US Savings Vanishing US Savings Vanishing US Savings Chart I-12Household Balance Sheets Are Alright Household Balance Sheets Are Alright Household Balance Sheets Are Alright   Chart I-13Forget The Breakup Songs For Now Forget The Breakup Songs For Now Forget The Breakup Songs For Now A poor balance of payments would not be a hurdle for the dollar if US real interest rates were high and foreign investors had confidence in the US economy, but neither of these conditions exists. US real interest rates have fallen relative to the rest of the world and the economic impact of the second wave of COVID-19 infections in the US partly explains the strength in the euro. Moreover, the recently agreed EUR750 billion of common bond issuance by the EU will curtail the probability of a euro breakup, which will compress European risk premia (Chart I-13). This development is highly positive for the euro, which could quickly move toward the 1.20 to 1.25 zone. The global economic recovery amplifies the negative impulse for the dollar. We have often argued that the USD is a countercyclical currency (Chart I-14).4  Hence, the recent uptick in Chinese stimulus and the positive outlook for the global industrial cycle bodes poorly for the US dollar. Moreover, a weak dollar can unleash a feedback loop that supercharges global growth. According to the Bank for International Settlements, foreign issuers have emitted $12-$14 trillion of USD-denominated liabilities. A weak dollar would diminish the cost of servicing this debt and ease global financial conditions, which would boost the world’s economic outlook. The brightening outlook would further feed the dollar’s weakness and underpin its momentum behavior (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Shifting international flows create the last major headwind for the US dollar. Fund repatriation by US economic agents has been a critical driver of the dollar since 2014. The USD rallied in tandem with a surge of repatriation in the wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, despite the lack of appetite for US assets by foreigners (Chart I-15). Now that the effect of the tax cuts has passed, repatriations are dwindling from their 2019 peak. Meanwhile, foreign investors’ appetite for dollar assets is not returning, especially as flows into US Treasurys are collapsing (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-14The Dollar Feedback Loop The Dollar Feedback Loop The Dollar Feedback Loop Chart I-15Flows Are Turning Against The Greenback Flows Are Turning Against The Greenback Flows Are Turning Against The Greenback   The dollar’s recent rally runs the risk of a short-term pause. Our USD Capitulation Index is at a level consistent with a short-term rebound (Chart I-16). Nonetheless, the list of dollar-bearish factors noted above suggests that any rebound in the dollar would be temporary. Risk 3: The Election Run-Up The US election also creates a serious risk for tech stocks. President Trump’s approval rating remains in tatters despite the vigorous rebound in equities since March 23 (Chart I-17). His support at this stage of the presidential cycle clearly lags that of previous presidents who were re-elected (Chart I-17, bottom panel). Consequently, our Geopolitical Strategy team assigns a subjective probability of 35% that he will remain in the White House next January.5 This creates two problems for investors. When cornered, President Trump often lashes out at foreign economies, which leads to geopolitical tensions. The heated rhetoric toward China will likely worsen in the coming three months, which raises the prospect of another leg in the US-Sino trade war, with negative effects for tech firms that extract 58% of their revenues from abroad. Furthermore, if former Vice-President Joe Biden clinches the presidency, then the Senate will turn Democrat. The Democrats will likely reverse Trump’s corporate tax cuts, which would hurt all stocks and prompt some liquidation in tech holdings. Chart I-16A Temporary Dollar Bounce Is Likely A Temporary Dollar Bounce Is Likely A Temporary Dollar Bounce Is Likely Chart I-17President Trump"s Disapproval Rating Is A Danger President Trump"s Disapproval Rating Is A Danger President Trump"s Disapproval Rating Is A Danger   The tech industry remains an attractive target for populist ire because of its wide profit margins and elevated concentration and market power. During the run-up to November 3rd, investors will be reminded that politicians on both sides of the aisle want to regulate tech. Investors will need to raise the equity risk premium for the sector as these voices get louder. Implications For The Broad Market The strength of the tech sector will be tested in the coming two quarters. Any short-term interruption to the mania prompted by the three aforementioned risks will cause a correction in the S&P 500 because the tech sector (including Google, Amazon, Facebook and Netflix) represents 40% of the index’s market capitalization (Chart I-18). As our equity strategist recently highlighted, without its five largest components (Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Facebook), the S&P 500 would have increased by only 23% in the past five years instead of its current 54% return. To add color to those numbers, these five tech titans have added $4.8 trillion to the S&P 500 market capitalization versus $3.8 trillion added by the next 495 companies.6   Any short-term interruption to the mania will cause a correction in the S&P 500. Despite this risk, we continue to anticipate that the S&P 500 will find a floor between 2800 and 2900.7 Some crucial factors underpin equities. Global monetary policy remains extraordinarily accommodative, China is stimulating aggressively, Washington will not let a large fiscal cliff destroy the recovery ahead of a presidential election, and the weaker dollar has a reflationary impact on global economic activity. Additionally, we still expect the second wave of COVID-19 to be less deadly than the first and result in much more limited lockdowns compared with March and April. BCA’s neutral stance on tech remains appropriate even after the short-term dynamics discussed above are factored in. The absence of inflationary pressures in the next two years or so and the position of global central banks that they will maintain loose monetary conditions until inflation has overshot a 2% target indicate that conditions persist for an expanding tech mania. Moreover, the dollar’s weakness is unlikely to last more than 12 to 18 months. The US still possesses a higher trend growth rate than the rest of the G-10 and sports a higher neutral rate of interest (Chart I-19). Additionally, China will ultimately rein in its ongoing credit expansion, which will hurt the global industrial cycle. Hence, the deterioration of interest rate differentials between the US and the rest of the world is temporary. Chart I-18The 1% Vs The 99% The 1% Vs The 99% The 1% Vs The 99% Chart I-19The US Still Has Stronger Trend Growth The US Still Has Stronger Trend Growth The US Still Has Stronger Trend Growth   The Return Of The Inflation Trade Chart I-20Will Yields Move Up? Will Yields Move Up? Will Yields Move Up? To navigate what will remain a trendless but volatile market until the presidential election, we still favor trades levered to the global economic recovery. Inflation breakeven rates can climb further. The inflation trade is back in fashion, with an increase in gold and commodity prices. The weakness in the dollar and the fall in real interest rates are both reflationary, and they will accelerate the uptick in inflation expectations, especially because global central banks have promised to stay behind the inflation curve as the economy recovers. Mounting inflation expectations will also create some near-term upside risks for nominal bond yields. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), an average of the ISM manufacturing survey and its prices paid component have provided useful early signals for yields. This indicator has turned sharply higher (Chart I-20). Moreover, commercial banks are quickly accumulating securities on their balance sheets, which is creating a lot of liquidity. Banks have been able to increase their book value despite generous loan-loss provisions, therefore, they will be able to transform this liquidity into loans when the economic outlook clears enough to ease credit standards. Bond yields will sniff out this situation ahead of time. Central banks want to maintain loose monetary conditions, but there is a limit to how much additional easing they will tolerate as the economy recovers and fiscal support remains generous. Hence, while inflation breakeven rates can move up, the decline in real yields has reached an advanced stage. In this context, if central banks do not provide further accommodation and inflation expectations go up, then real interest rates will cease to decline and nominal rates will start to drift higher. Silver will continue to outperform gold. While we have been positive on gold and gold stocks since June 2019,8 more recently we have strongly favored silver. Industrial uses constitute a larger share of the demand for silver than that of gold. As a result, the silver-to-gold ratio is highly pro-cyclical. While gold is vulnerable to an increased improvement in economic sentiment (Chart I-21), silver will continue to shine in an environment where inflation expectations increase further and economic activity is recovering. We continue to like global deep cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. We continue to like global deep cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. The pickup in China’s economic activity, as captured by our China Economic Diffusion Index, remains consistent with upside to this trade (Chart I-22). Domestic growth will accelerate further in the second half of 2020 because China’s credit flows continue to increase as a share of GDP, especially when companies have yet to spend the funds borrowed in the second quarter. Additionally, infrastructure spending will continue to expand as local governments have only issued 50% of their annual quota of special bonds (Chart I-22, bottom panel). Chart I-21A Risk For Gold A Risk For Gold A Risk For Gold Chart I-22China Is On The Go China Is On The Go China Is On The Go   An outperformance of deep cyclicals relative to defensive equities is also consistent with higher inflation expectations, a rising silver-to-gold ratio and a weaker US dollar (Chart I-23). The near-term outlook also supports buying industrial equities relative to tech stocks. While we have been positive on both materials and industrials, the former has lagged tech. However, our BCA Technical Indicator for US industrial stocks is massively oversold relative to the tech sector (Chart I-24). In light of a declining dollar, rising inflation breakeven rates, strengthening commodity prices and accelerating Chinese credit flows, the probability that industrials outperform tech for three to six months is rapidly escalating. Chart I-23The Inflation Trades The Inflation Trades The Inflation Trades Chart I-24Long Industrials / Short Tech Long Industrials / Short Tech Long Industrials / Short Tech   Our relative profits indicator between the industrial and tech sectors is rebounding from depressed readings. The global economic recovery will lift industrials’ revenues more than it will help the tech sector’s income because it will allow weak industrial production levels to improve relative to stable IT spending. Moreover, the industrial wage bill is well contained compared with the tech wage bill. The probability that industrials outperform tech for three to six months is rapidly escalating. Finally, our valuation indicator also favors industrials. Relative to tech stocks, industrial equities are trading at their largest discount since the aftermath of the GFC, suggesting that there is little downside left in this price ratio, at least as long as the dollar is correcting. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst July 30, 2020 Next Report: August 27, 2020   II. Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Dear Clients, This month we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center.  He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Chart II-1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart II-1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart II-2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics August 2020 August 2020 Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart II-2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart II-3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart II-3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka August 2020 August 2020 Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table II-1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table II-1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks August 2020 August 2020 Chart II-4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US August 2020 August 2020 Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart II-4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Chart II-5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation August 2020 August 2020 Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart II-5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. Chart II-6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions August 2020 August 2020 The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart II-6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Chart II-7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise August 2020 August 2020 Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial  proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart II-7). Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart II-8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart II-9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart II-8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart II-9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities August 2020 August 2020   US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map II-1). Map II-1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered August 2020 August 2020 Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart II-10). Chart II-10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security August 2020 August 2020 We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart II-11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart II-12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. Chart II-11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Chart II-12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector   These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Appendix Table II-1Major Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade August 2020 August 2020 Works Cited Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan.  “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul.  “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser.  “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019.  Putin, Vladimir.  “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948). III. Indicators And Reference Charts We continue to favor stocks at the expense of bonds, but the risk of a tech-led correction has only grown. Moreover, the number of new COVID-19 cases in the US remains elevated and similarly disturbing trends are beginning to take shape in Europe. The recovery could hit a temporary pothole. Finally, as the November election approaches, political and geopolitical risks will come back on investors’ radar screens. Nonetheless, global monetary conditions remain highly accommodative and the risk of inflation in the short-term is minimal. Also, fiscal policy is extremely loose, and despite some procrastination, Congress will pass another large package by August 10, which will protect the economy against a violent relapse. Hence, the worst outcome over the coming three to five months is for the S&P 500 to retest of the 2800-2900 zone. On a cyclical basis, the same indicators that made us willing buyers of stocks since late March remain broadly in place. Stocks are expensive, but monetary conditions are extremely accommodative. Our Speculation Indicator continues to send a benign signal, which indicates that from a cyclical perspective, the market is not especially vulnerable. Finally, our Revealed Preference Indicator continues to flash a strong buy signal. Tactical indicators suggest that equities must digest the gains made since March 23. Both our Tactical Strength Indicator and the share of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving average are elevated. Additionally, positioning in the derivatives market indicates some degree of vulnerability. Nonetheless, these risks must be put into perspective. Our Composite Sentiment Indicator is not flagging a top in the market and the AAII survey shows a predominance of bears over bulls. As a result, any correction should be limited to 10%. According to our Bond Valuation Index, Treasurys remain extremely expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator continues to lose momentum. Guided by the FOMC’s communications, the market has decided that the recovery will lift inflation but that the Fed will stand pat. Consequently, yields are not moving up, but real rates are declining as inflation expectations inch higher. This trend is likely to be at a late stage, and the passage of additional fiscal support as well as a weak dollar will put a floor under real yields. In this context, Treasury yields should begin to rise in the closing months of 2020. The dollar breakdown has now fully taken shape. The greenback is expensive and its counter-cyclicality is a major handicap during a global economic recovery. Additionally, the US twin deficits are increasingly problematic. Fiscal deficits remain exceptionally wide and the household savings rate will not remain as elevated as it is today. The current account deficit is therefore bound to widen. The continued low level of real interest rates will complicate financing this deficit and to equilibrate the funding of US liabilities, the dollar will depreciate. Technically, our Composite Technical Indicator for the dollar has also broken down, which warns that a period of cyclical weakness has begun for the greenback. Nonetheless, our Dollar Capitulation Index is now in oversold territory, and a countertrend bounce is very likely in the coming weeks. Commodities are gaining traction. The Advance / Decline line for the Continuous Commodity Index has broken out to the upside, which suggests that the CCI could punch above its pre-COVID levels by yearend. A weak dollar, low real yields and a global industrial recovery are highly positive for natural resource prices. Within that asset class, gold has made new all-time highs. Gold is especially sensitive to lower real rates and a weak dollar. Sentiment and positioning for the yellow metal are stretched. Any rebound in economic sentiment could push real rates higher, which would cause gold to correct meaningfully in the near future, even if it remains in a cyclical uptrend. A dollar rebound is another tactical risk for gold. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM Equities: Concentration And Mania Risks," dated July 16, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report "Revisiting Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs," dated June 1, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report “US Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell," dated June 22, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report “January 2020," dated December 20, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "What Is The Risk Of A Contested US Election?," dated July 27, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Equity Strategy Insight Report "S&P 5 Versus S&P 495," dated July 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report "July 2020," dated June 25, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Highlights The epicenter of the new Middle East crisis is the Shia Crescent, which threatens global oil supply. However, the escalation of conflict in the Mediterranean is also relevant to global investors. The crises in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean are escalating as President Erdogan makes a last attempt to benefit from his relationship with Trump before US elections in November. A breakup between Turkey and NATO is not our base case, but European sanctions against Turkey are likely. Turkish risk will rise. A revival in Libyan oil production would not be a meaningful risk to the recovery in oil markets. Stay strategically long Brent crude oil. Libya could become a “Black Swan” for market participants exposed to southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. We remain short our EM Strongman Currency Basket versus other emerging market currencies. Feature Dear Clients, This week we present to you a special report on Turkey by my colleague Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor, Geopolitical Strategy. Roukaya argues that President Erdogan is at a crossroads in which he will confront major military and economic constraints to his foreign policy adventurism. On Monday, July 27 you will receive a special report that I co-wrote with Anastasios Avgeriou, chief strategist of our US Equity Strategy. In this report we continue our analysis of the equity sector implications of the upcoming US election. Anastasios also provides analysis of two cyclical sectors that you may find of interest. On Friday, July 31 we will send you our regular monthly GeoRisk Update, which surveys our proprietary, market-based geopolitical risk indicators and what they imply for your portfolio. We trust you will enjoy these reports and look forward to your feedback. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Shia Crescent' Flailing Under Maximum Pressure And COVID-19 Shia Crescent' Flailing Under Maximum Pressure And COVID-19 Shia Crescent' Flailing Under Maximum Pressure And COVID-19 The Middle East is suffering a wave of instability after the COVID-19 crisis just as it did in the years after the 2008 financial crisis. The crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen were never resolved and now new crises are emerging from Egypt and Turkey to Iran and Iraq. By contrast with the “Arab Spring” of 2011, the epicenter of the political earthquake this time around is likely to be the “Shia Crescent,” i.e. Iran, Iraq, eastern Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon. The US policy of maximum pressure on Iran, which is intensifying in the lead-up to the US election, has weakened Iran and its sphere of influence (Chart 1). Chart 2Dominant Arab States Also Face Struggles Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Meanwhile the pandemic and collapse in oil prices have destabilized the predominantly Arab states (Chart 2). Authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that consolidated power after the Arab Spring are more stable than they were but still vulnerable to external and internal forces. These cyclical developments are occurring against the backdrop of structural changes like the US’s energy independence and strategic pivot to Asia, which have created a power vacuum in the Middle East. The pivot to Asia is rooted in US grand strategy and has proceeded across partisan administrations, so it will continue. Indeed US-China tensions are escalating rapidly in 2020 despite the financial market’s lack of interest. Turkey and Russia are scrambling to take advantage of the US’s withdrawal and gain greater influence through regional proxy wars. This year has seen a marked escalation of their involvement in Libya, where the war is re-escalating and drawing in Egypt, Europe, and Gulf Arabs. At minimum a Mediterranean conflict could affect oil prices as well as Turkish, Russian, and other regional financial assets. At maximum it could affect European assets, which are exposed to geopolitical risk in Turkey and North Africa. The Shia Crescent is the crisis’s epicenter, but Libya is also investment relevant. Bottom Line: The epicenter of the new Middle East crisis is the Shia Crescent, which threatens global oil supply. However, the escalation of conflict in the Mediterranean is also relevant to global investors, primarily through its potential to impact European assets. Re-Escalation In Libya The Libyan crisis has been escalating since the beginning of the year and is on the verge of turning into a major multilateral conflict. The risk now is that Egypt, another regional power, will intervene in Libya against Turkey in a battle for North African hegemony (Map 1). Map 1Libya Could Become A "Black Swan" Event Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Several incidents since we outlined Egypt’s red lines on the Libyan conflict suggest that Cairo and Ankara will clash in Libya (Table 1). Table 1Egypt And Turkey Up The Ante In Libya Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints While Egypt has declared Sirte and al-Jufra as red lines, threatening military intervention if crossed, Turkey is calling for the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) withdrawal from these regions as a precondition for a ceasefire (Map 2). Egypt is allied with General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, which is based in Benghazi and holds parliament in Tobruk. Map 2Libya’s Battlefront Is Closing In On The Oil Crescent Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints The next move is now in Turkey’s hands. The escalation depends on whether it insists on moving forward toward Egypt’s red line. Turkey’s recent movements do not suggest it is backing down. True on July 21, and again on July 22, top officials from Turkey’s foreign ministry referred to a political solution as being the only solution in Libya. However, these statements were made while Turkey held diplomatic meetings with Niger and Malta that could be aimed at establishing airbases there.1 At its core, the conflict in Libya is a clash between the two dominant geopolitical forces in the Middle East. On the one hand, Turkey and Qatar are independent economic forces to Saudi Arabia and supporters of political Islam. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt form an economic bloc and support Saudi religious authority and political authoritarianism. Bottom Line: The crisis in Libya is heading toward an Egypt-Turkey confrontation. Be ready for an escalation. Egypt Has More To Lose Than Turkey In Libya Both Egypt and Turkey are nearing a point of no return in Libya. A last-minute change of heart from either side would be increasingly more humiliating, both domestically and regionally. Chart 3Defeat In Libya Would Accelerate Erdogan’s Decline Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints While Egypt’s geographic proximity to Libya makes it more interested in what goes on there and will give it a home advantage in any military confrontation, Egypt’s military may be overstretched as it is also at risk of conflict with Ethiopia over water resources.2 For Egypt, a victory would resuscitate its position as a regional power, bringing about a new era of greater Egyptian regional leadership. It would silence domestic skeptics who argue Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule is based on the illegitimate ousting of Egypt’s only democratically elected leader. It would squash any prospect of a revival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and validate authoritarian rulers in the region. It could also annul the recent Libya-Turkey maritime demarcation agreement – a positive for Egypt’s natural gas ambitions. A loss would be a wake-up call for Egypt’s military, which has been spending scarce funds on costly equipment. It may also result in a change in leadership in Egypt or at the very least weaken al-Sisi’s domestic power and Egypt’s regional clout. The regime would persist over the short and medium term, but it would suffer a loss of legitimacy and the underground domestic opposition would intensify, creating a long-term threat. A complete defeat of LNA forces would pose a major security risk. Haftar’s LNA acts as a buffer between Egypt and unfriendly militias in Western Libya. Turkey does not have a vital national strategic interest in Libya and therefore the constraint pushing against on a protracted conflict is stronger than it is for Egypt. Given that Turkey is a democracy, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has more to lose in the case of a military defeat. It would accelerate the decline in his popular support and that of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Chart 3). A conflict with Egypt is therefore a gratuitous gamble. However, victory would vindicate Erdogan’s efforts to create a strongman regime and revive memories of the great Ottoman empire.3 Such an accomplishment could mark a major turning point for Erdogan. His domestic blunders would be forgiven and he would be able to claim that he is one of the great leaders of Turkey. Given that Turkey lacks strategic necessity in Libya, and a defeat could dislodge Erdogan in 2023, one should expect Turkey not to cross Egypt’s red lines. However, Erdogan’s rule has been characterized by hubris, nationalism, and foreign assertiveness to distract from domestic economic mismanagement. Therefore we cannot have a high conviction that Turkey will bow to its political and military constraints. The risk of a large conflict is underrated. Bottom Line: Egypt has greater national interests at stake in Libya than Turkey. The implication is that Turkey should recognize Egyptian red lines. However, Turkey’s decision to intervene in Libya suggests that Erdogan could overreach. Libya could become a “Black Swan” for market participants exposed to southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. Will Turkey Break With NATO? Since signing the maritime and military cooperation agreements with Libya on November 27, Turkey has raised its stakes in Libya. Ankara has sent more armed drones, surface-to-air missile defense systems, naval frigates, a hundred officers, and up to 3,800 Syrian fighters. It has rolled back all of the strategic gains that the Libyan National Army made in 2019. The timing of the recent escalation is significant. The US election cycle offers Erdogan a chance to increase Turkey’s foreign assertiveness with minimal US retaliation. US-Turkish relations have been icy for years. Turkey is an ascendant regional power that is pursuing an increasingly independent national policy, while the US is no longer as dominant of a global hegemonic power capable of enforcing discipline among minor allies. The US alliance with the Kurds in Syria and Iraq has alienated Turkey. The 2016 Turkish coup attempt also increased the level of distrust between the two states. However, President Trump’s personal and political affinity for President Erdogan has resulted in a permissive policy toward Turkey. Trump seeks to distance the US from conflicts in Syria and Libya inherited from his predecessor. He has little commitment to the Kurds. More broadly he has embraced geopolitical multipolarity and avoided telling Erdogan what to do. The Trump administration has not retaliated against Turkey for purchasing Russia’s S400 missile defense system or for pursuing expansive maritime-territorial claims near Cyprus. Even though the Turkish arms purchase makes it eligible for sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the Trump administration has yet to impose sanctions. Senator Lindsey Graham, who is close to the Trump administration, suggested in July 2019 that sanctions could be avoided if Turkey did not activate the system.4 Turkey, for its part, has yet to activate the system three months after the April target date for activation. Turkey blames the delay on COVID-19. With regard to Libya, the Trump administration has remained largely on the sidelines. It has promised to reduce American commitment to overseas conflicts and has criticized the Obama administration’s intervention in Libya in 2011 to bail out the European allies. Officially the US is aligned with Fayez al-Sarraj’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), but so far its role has been minimal, refraining from providing any military support. Moreover, Washington’s key allies in the region – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, even France – support the Libyan National Army. Libya could become a “Black Swan” event. It is Haftar’s other main backer – Russia – that would present an incentive for greater American involvement. The US African Command reports that two thousand Russian mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group have fought in Libya. The US also reported in June that at least 14 MiG29 and Su-24 Russian warplanes were sent to Libya via Syria, believed to be located in the al-Jufra airbase. Moreover, the US State Department has accused Russia of printing billions of fake Libyan dinars to fund Haftar’s forces.5 The Trump administration has been permissive toward Russia as well as Turkey, letting them work out deals with each other, but US electoral politics could prompt Trump to make shows of strength against Russia to fend off criticism. Thus the months in the lead up to the US elections offer the Turkish leader what may be a closing opportunity to increase the country’s foreign assertiveness with minimal US retribution. If Trump loses, Erdogan may face a less sympathetic Washington. By contrast France, also a NATO ally, has taken a stronger position against Ankara over its involvement in Libya. Relations with other eastern Mediterranean countries have also been rocky due to Turkey’s exclusion from gas deals in the region and drilling in disputed waters near Cyprus and Greece. France has a commercial interest in Libya’s oil industry and backs Haftar’s Libyan National Army to some extent.6 Citing aggressive behavior by Turkish warships after an encounter in the Mediterranean, France suspended its involvement in NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian on July 1.7 France has also demanded EU sanctions against Turkey – both for its drilling activities around Cyprus as well as for its role in Libya.8 Still, Europeans have little appetite for direct intervention in Libya. The leaders of France, Italy and Germany have threatened sanctions against foreign states that violate the arms embargo in Libya. This warning comes after EU foreign ministers agreed to discuss the possibility of another set of sanctions against Turkey in their August meeting if Turkey persists in converting the Hagia Sophia from a museum to a mosque. Despite the fracturing within NATO, the alliance will not break up. Turkey’s geographic proximity to Russia, large number of troops, and military strength make it an essential member of the defense treaty (Chart 4). Chart 4NATO Will Not Break With Turkey Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Instead, the Europeans will retaliate against Erdogan’s foreign adventurism through sanctions, while maintaining the NATO alliance. This acts as a cyclical rebuke without damaging the secular relationship. Europe will use sanctions to retaliate against Turkey’s provocations. The Europeans will be particularly rattled if Turkey succeeds in its North African endeavor and amasses significant regional power as a result. Victory in Libya would make Turkey the gatekeeper to two major migrant entry points to the European continent, providing Ankara with leverage in its negotiations with Europe (Chart 5). It would also increase the likelihood that Turkey increases its assertive behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy are seeking to develop a natural gas hub. Chart 5Turkish Victory In Libya Would Rattle Europe Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Although Erdogan shows no signs of backing down, constraints suggest that Erdogan may pull back from being perceived as overly provocative. The Turkish economy is highly dependent on Europe in trade and capital flows (Chart 6). Thus unlike American sanctions, which have little bearing on the Turkish economy short of radical financial measures, European sanctions suppress any chance of an economic recovery. Chart 6European Sanctions Would Reverse Turkey's Recovery European Sanctions Would Reverse Turkey's Recovery European Sanctions Would Reverse Turkey's Recovery Chart 7Erdogan Risks Popularity By Overstepping In Libya And East Med Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Turkey’s frail economy and crackdown on opposition parties could weigh on Erdogan’s approval, which is losing its COVID-induced bounce (Chart 7). Thus, as in the case of Egypt, Erdogan should recognize these constraints and reduce his foreign assertiveness. If he does not, then he will hit up against material constraints that will harm the Turkish economy. Bottom Line: The Libyan crisis is escalating as Erdogan makes a last attempt to benefit from his relationship with Trump before US elections in November. Washington’s detached stance in Libya highlights that its foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere – in Asia and Iran. Meanwhile, Europe is divided over Libya. A breakup between Turkey and NATO is not our base case, but new European sanctions against Turkey are not unlikely. A Turkish victory in Libya would lead to a significant escalation in tensions between Turkey and the West. Investment Implications Turkish geopolitical risk is set to rise in the lead up to the November US elections as Turkey becomes increasingly embroiled in foreign conflicts – in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and most recently in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict (Chart 8). Ankara’s more provocative stances raise the risk of sanctions from the US and more significantly from the EU. This would hurt Turkish risk assets at a time of already heightened vulnerability. If Turkey manages to secure a victory in Libya, it would benefit economically from construction and energy contracts there. However, it would also result in a significant uptick in geopolitical tensions in the Middle East as the West and the West’s regional allies will be disturbed by Ankara’s expanding influence. Stay short our EM Strongman Currency Basket composed of the Turkish lira, Philippine peso, and Brazilian real versus other emerging market currencies. Even though the lira is already cheap against the US dollar, it faces more downside due to the risks highlighted in this report and the massive growth in money supply in Turkey. Similarly, the prospect of a military confrontation will raise the equity risk premium priced in Egyptian stocks. Egypt will continue underperforming emerging markets as long as it remains invested in an unsettled conflict in Libya (Chart 9). Chart 8Turkish Risk Will Rise Turkish Risk Will Rise Turkish Risk Will Rise Libyan oil exports are unlikely to stage a major revival anytime soon (Chart 10). Although the Libyan National Oil Company lifted force majeure on July 10, Haftar’s Libyan National Army reintroduced the blockade a day later. Clashes are also occurring near oil facilities in the Brega region where Syrian, Sudanese, and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries currently have a presence. Chart 9Egyptian Risk Assets Will Underperform Egyptian Risk Assets Will Underperform Egyptian Risk Assets Will Underperform Chart 10Libyan Oil Handicapped By Haftar’s Blockade Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman Bid Hits Constraints Chart 11Stay Bullish Euro Over The Long Run Stay Bullish Euro Over The Long Run Stay Bullish Euro Over The Long Run Even in the best-case scenario, in which force majeure is promptly lifted, the blockade damaged both the reservoirs and oil and gas infrastructure, preventing a resurgence of exports to pre-January levels. The Libyan National Oil Company warned that unless oil production restarts immediately, output will average 650,000 barrels per day in 2022. This is significantly less than the over 1 million barrels per day just prior to the blockade, and the 2.1 million barrels per day Libya had planned to produce by 2024. In any case these figures pale in comparison to the production curtailments currently in place by OPEC 2.0, which are set to decrease to 8.3 million barrels per day beginning in August from 9.6 million barrels per day now. Given OPEC 2.0’s demonstrated commitment to production discipline, a revival in Libyan oil production is not a meaningful risk to the recovery in oil markets. We remain strategically long Brent crude oil, which is up 78% since inception in March. This trade could experience near-term volatility due to any hiccups in global economic stimulus or risk-off events from geopolitical risks. But over a 12-month time frame we expect oil prices to rise higher. BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy strategists expect Brent prices to average $44/bbl in 2H2020, and $65/bbl in 2021. The recent rise in the euro is rooted in global macro and structural factors but a major Mediterranean crisis and/or other geopolitical risks we have highlighted surrounding the US election cycle could create headwinds in the short term. Over the long run we are bullish euro (Chart 11).   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 In Niger, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met with his Nigerien counterpart and stated the two states’ willingness to boost bilateral relations in agriculture, mining, energy, industry, and trade. A day earlier, Turkey and Qatar’s defense ministers met with Libya’s minister of interior in Ankara to discuss the situation in Libya. And on July 20, a trilateral meeting was held between Turkey’s defense minister, Libya’s interior minister, and Malta’s minister of home affairs and national security. The inclusion of Malta – located just north of Libya in the Mediterranean – is perplexing. The three discussed defense cooperation and efforts toward regional stability and peace. These recent meetings could suggest that Turkey is negotiating agreements to fortify its strategic approaches to Libya. This could involve greenlighting airbases in Niger and Malta in exchange for economic support and Qatari funding. 2 The latest developments suggest that the Egypt-Ethiopia conflict is de-escalating. On July 21, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed tweeted that Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan had reached a “common understanding on continuing technical discussions on filling.” But Ethiopia will have an opportunity if Egypt becomes embroiled in Libya. 3 The Turks ruled Tripolitania from the mid-1500s until Italy’s 1912 victory in the Italo-Turkish War. Surveys conducted by Metropoll reveal that the share of Turks with a positive perception of Turkey’s active role in Libya shot up to 58% in June from 35% in January. 4 Senate Majority Whip John Thune has even proposed using the US Army’s missile procurement account to buy the Russian missiles from Turkey, thus reducing tensions between the two NATO allies. This is unlikely to occur because it would look politically weak in the US, while Turkey would face Russian pressure. The US suspended Turkey from the F35 Joint Strike Fighter program, banning it from purchasing F35s, and removing it from the aircraft’s production program. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated that the US would only consider allowing Turkey back into the F35 Joint Strike Program if the Russian defense system were moved out of the country. The Turkish purchase of the Russian defense system was partly driven by the need to work with Russia and partly driven by Erdogan’s desire to reduce the risk of another coup attempt. Ankara was indefensible against the Turkish Air Force’s F-16s during the 2016 coup attempt since its military relies heavily on US built missile defense. 5 Moscow has denied all allegations of involvement in Libya. 6 US-made javelin missiles purchased by France were found at the pro-Haftar base in Gharyan in June last year, raising suspicion that France was backing Haftar’s offensives. 7 On June 10, French frigate Courbet approached a Tanzanian-flagged ship heading to Libya in suspicion that it was violating the UN arms embargo. France accused three Turkish vessels that were escorting the Tanzanian vessel of harassment by targeting the Courbet’s fire control radars. Turkey denied harassing the Courbet and maintains that the Tanzanian vessel was transporting humanitarian aid to Libya. A NATO investigation into the incident was inconclusive. 8 The EU agreed to impose sanctions on two Turkish oil company officials in February in protest against Turkish drilling activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. However these sanctions are mostly just political symbolism.