East Europe & Central Asia

Highlights So What? Our “Black Swan” risks for the year reveal several potential wars. Why? While we think it is premature to expect armed conflict over Taiwan, an outbreak of serious tensions is possible. Russia and Ukraine may have a shared incentive to go renew hostilities this year. Saudi Arabia has received a “blank cheque” from Donald Trump, so it may continue to be provocative. Everyone has forgotten about the Balkans … but tensions are building. A “Lame Duck” Trump could stage a military intervention in Venezuela. Feature Over the past three years, we have compiled a list of five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s list of “Ten Surprises for 2018,” we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.”1 Instead, we believe that the market is seriously underpricing these risks by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Furthermore, some of our events below are obscure enough that it is unclear how exactly to price them. But before we get to our list of the five things that keep us up at night,2 a quick note on the question for financial markets in 2019: Will the economic policy divergence between the U.S. and China continue? At the moment, momentum is building behind the narrative that both the U.S. and China have decided to reflate. In anticipation of this narrative switch, we closed our long DM / short EM equity trade on December 3, 2018 for a 15.70% return (originally opened on March 6, 2018). How sustainable is the EM outperformance relative to DM? Will the rest of the world “catch up” to U.S. growth momentum, thus hurting the U.S. dollar in the process? The global central bank – the Fed – is already expected to “back off,” even though members of the FOMC have simply pointed out that they remain data-dependent. Granting our BCA House View that the U.S. economy remains in decent health, U.S. economic data will continue to come in strong through the course of the year. This means that there is scope for a hawkish Fed surprise for the markets, given that the interest rate market already has dovish expectations, anticipating 4.33 basis points and 16.74 basis points of cuts over the next 12 and 24 months respectively (Chart 1). Chart 1 Meanwhile, the global demand engine – China – may disappoint in its reflationary efforts. We refer to China as the “global demand engine” because the combined imports and capex of China and other emerging markets dwarf that of the U.S. and EU (Chart 2 and Chart 3).3 Chinese imports alone make up $1.6 trillion, constituting 23% of the $7 trillion total of EM imports and about half of EM investment expenditures. Given that large swaths of EM are high-beta to the Chinese economy, the EM-plus-China slice of the global demand pie is leveraged to Beijing’s reflationary policies. Chart 2EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart 3EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chinese policymakers have gestured toward greater support for the economy. The communiqué published following the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) in December called for a broad stabilization of aggregate demand as a focus of macro policy over the course of 2019. The language was still not very expansionary, but Beijing has launched stimulus despite relatively muted communiqués in the past. The massive stimulus of early 2016, for instance, followed a mixed CEWC communiqué in December 2015. So everything depends on the forthcoming data. Broad money and credit growth improved marginally in December, while the State Council announced that local government bond issuance could begin at the start of the year rather than waiting until spring. Meanwhile, a coordinated announcement by the People’s Bank of China, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and Reform Commission declares that a larger tax cut is forthcoming – that is, in addition to the roughly 1% of GDP household tax cuts that went into effect starting late last year. Monetary policy remains very lax with liquidity injections and additional RRR cuts. Before investors become overly bullish, however, we would note that Chinese policymakers are focusing their reflationary efforts on fiscal spending and supply-side reforms like tax cuts. The problem with the latter is that household tax cuts will not add much to global demand, given that consumer goods make up just 15% of China’s imports (Table 1). The vast majority of Chinese imports stem from the country’s capital spending. Table 1China’s Consumer-Oriented Stimulus Will Boost Different Imports Than Past Stimulus Five Black Swans In 2019 Five Black Swans In 2019 Fiscal spending, meanwhile, is as large as the overall credit origination in the Chinese economy (Chart 4). But without a revival in credit growth, more spending will mainly serve to stabilize the economy, not light it on fire. It is likely that part of the fiscal pump-priming will be greater issuance of local government bonds. However, even the recently announced 1.39 trillion RMB quota for new bonds this year is not impressive. And even a 2 trillion RMB increase would only be equivalent to a single month of large credit expansion (Chart 5). Chart 4China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending   Chart 5 As such, tactically nimble investors could profit from a reflationary narrative that sees both the global central bank – the Fed – and the global fiscal engine – China – turning more dovish and supportive of growth. However, we agree with BCA’s Emerging Markets Chief Strategist Arthur Budaghyan, who is on record saying that “Going Tactically Long EM Is Akin To Collecting Pennies In Front Of A Steamroller.” The bottom line for investors is that 2019 is the first year in a decade where the collective intention of policymakers – across the world – is to prepare for the next recession, rather than to prevent a deflationary relapse. This cognitive shift may be slight, but it is important. The Fed and Beijing are engaged in a macroeconomic game of chicken. Each camp is trying to avoid having to over-reflate at the end of the cycle. For the Fed, the goal is to have room to cut rates sufficiently when the recession finally hits. For China, the goal is to ensure that its leverage does not get out of hand. Into this uncertain macroeconomic context we now insert the five Black Swans for 2019. To qualify for our list, the events must be: Unlikely: There must be less than a 20% probability that the event will occur in the next 12 months; Out of sight: The scenario we present should not be receiving media coverage, at least not as a serious market risk; Geopolitical: We must be able to identify the risk scenario through the lens of BCA’s geopolitical methodology. Genuinely unpredictable events – such as meteor strikes, pandemics, crippling cyber-attacks, solar flares, alien invasions, and failures in the computer program running the simulation that we call the universe – do not make the cut. Black Swan 1: China Goes To War With Taiwan One could argue that a military conflict between China and Taiwan in 2019 should not technically qualify for our list, as there has been chatter in the media about such an outcome. Indeed, our recent travels across Asia revealed that clients are taking a much greater interest in our longstanding view – since January 2016 – that Taiwan is the premier geopolitical Black Swan. We established this view well before President Trump won the election and received a congratulatory call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, breaking diplomatic practice since 1979. Now, at the beginning of 2019, the exchange of barbs between the Chinese and Taiwanese presidents has raised tensions anew (Chart 6).4 Chart 6Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Nonetheless, Taiwan makes the cut here because we doubt that most of our global clients take the issue seriously. Furthermore, we are concerned that – with fair odds of a U.S.-China trade truce lasting through 2019 – cross-strait tensions could fall out of sight. The basis of our view is that there is a unique confluence of political developments in Beijing, Washington, and Taipei that is conducive toward a diplomatic or military incident that could escalate tensions: Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in addition to taking the presidency in 2016, won control of the legislature for the first time ever (Chart 7). This means that domestic political constraints on President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration are lower than usual. Tsai has angered Beijing by seeking stronger relations with the U.S. and refusing to endorse the 1992 Consensus, which holds that there is only “One China” albeit two interpretations. China’s General Secretary Xi Jinping has removed term limits and placed greater emphasis on the reunification of Taiwan. Xi has consolidated power domestically and has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy throughout his term, including in the South China Sea, where greater naval control would enable China to threaten Taiwan’s supply security. Xi’s blueprint for his “New Era” includes the reunification of China, and some have argued that there is a fixed timetable for reunification with Taiwan by 2050 or even 2035.5 Some recent military drills can be seen as warnings to Taiwan. U.S. President Trump called the One China Policy into question at the outset of his term in office (only later reaffirming it), and has presided over an increase in U.S. strategic pressure against China, such as the trade war and freedom of navigation operations, including in the Taiwan Strait. Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton and Assistant Defense Secretary Randall Schriver are seen as Taiwan hawks, while the just-concluded Republican Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which imply an upgrade to the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s democracy and security.6 Chart 7 These three factors suggest that, cyclically, there is larger room than usual for incidents to occur that initiate a vicious cycle of tensions. The odds of a full-fledged war are still very low – the U.S. has reaffirmed the One China Policy in its recent negotiations with Beijing, which seem to be progressing, while China has not changed its official position on Taiwan. Beijing’s reunification timetable still has a comfortable 30 years to go. The Chinese economy has not collapsed, so there is no immediate need for Beijing to dive headlong into a nationalist foreign policy adventure that could bring on World War III. However, the odds of diplomatic incidents, or military saber rattling, that then trigger a dangerous escalation and a multi-month period of extremely elevated tensions are much higher than the market recognizes. This is because the U.S. and China may still see strategic tensions flare even if they make progress on a trade deal, while a failure on the trade front could spark a spillover into strategic areas. Any cross-strait incident would be relevant to global investors – and not just Taiwanese assets, which would suffer the brunt of economic sanctions – because the slightest increase in the odds of a full-scale war would be extremely negative for global risk appetite. Over the next 12 months, we would mostly expect Beijing to eschew high-profile provocations. The reason is that President Tsai is unpopular and the recent local elections in Taiwan saw her DPP lose seats to the more China-friendly Kuomintang (Chart 8). An aggressive posture could revive the DPP ahead of the January 2020 presidential election, the opposite of what Beijing wants.7 Chart 8 On the other hand, Beijing could decide to ignore the 1996 precedent and choose outright military intimidation. Or it could attempt to meddle in Taiwan’s domestic politics, as it has been accused of doing in the recent local elections.8 Meanwhile, the U.S. and Taiwan are the more likely instigators of an incident over these 12 months, knowingly or not. Washington and Taipei have a window of opportunity to achieve a few concrete objectives while Presidents Tsai and Trump are still in office – which cannot be guaranteed after 2020. A similar window of opportunity caused a market-relevant spike in China-South Korea tensions back in 2015-17, when the United States, seeing that the right-wing Park Geun-hye administration was falling out of power, attempted to rush through the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea. As a result, China imposed economic sanctions on its neighbor (Chart 9). Chart 9China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Something similar could transpire over the next year if the U.S. sends a high-level official – say, Bolton, or Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, or even Vice President Mike Pence – to hold talks in Taiwan. Or if the U.S. stages a major show of force in the Taiwan Strait, as it threatened in October, or U.S. naval vessels call on Taiwanese ports. The U.S. could also announce bigger or better arms packages (Chart 10), such as submarine systems, which have been cleared by the Department of State. Given the elevated U.S.-China and China-Taiwan tensions overall, such an incident could cause a bigger escalation than the different participants expect – and even more so than the market currently expects. Chart 10U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing Bottom Line: Cyclically, the period between now and the inauguration of the next Taiwanese president in May 2020 brings heightened risk of a geopolitical incident. Depending on what happens in 2020, tensions could rise or fall for a time. Yet structurally, as Sino-American strategic distrust continues to build, Taiwan will continually find itself at the center of the storm. Black Swan 2: Russia And Ukraine Agree To Go To War Tensions are mounting between Russia and Ukraine in the run-up to the March 31 Ukrainian presidential election. Incumbent President, Petro Poroshenko, has been trailing in the polls for a year. His rival is the populist Yulia Tymoshenko, who has been leading both first-round and second-round polling. Both Poroshenko and Tymoshenko have, at various points in their careers, been accused of being pro-Russian. Poroshenko’s business interests, as with most successful Ukrainian businesspeople, include considerable holdings in Russia. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, was imprisoned from 2011 to 2014 for negotiating a gas imports contract with Russia that allegedly hurt Ukrainian interests. With the most pro-Russian parts of Ukraine either cleaved off (Crimea) or in a state of lawlessness (Donetsk and Luhansk), the median voter in the country has become considerably more nationalist and anti-Russian. It therefore serves no purpose for any politician to campaign on a platform of normalizing relations with Moscow. In this context, the decision by the Patriarchate of Constantinople – the first-among-equals of the Christian Orthodox churches – to grant autocephaly (sovereignty) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in January is part of the ongoing evolution of Ukraine into an independent entity from Russia. This process could create tensions, particularly as parts of the country continue to be engaged in military conflict (Map 1). From Moscow’s perspective, the autocephaly grants Ukraine religious – and therefore some semblance of cultural – independence from Russia. This solidifies the loss of a 43-million person crown jewel from the Russian sphere of influence. Chart Moscow is also not averse to stoking tensions. Although President Putin’s mandate will last until 2024, his popularity is nearly at the lowest level this decade. Orthodox monetary and fiscal policy, along with pension reforms, have sapped his political capital at home. In 2014, tensions over Ukraine spurred nationalist sentiment in Russia, rapidly increased popular support for both Putin and his government (Chart 11). Putin may calculate that another such recapitalization may be needed. Chart 11Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression The danger is therefore that domestic politics in both Ukraine and Russia may create a window of opportunity for a skirmish this quarter. Perhaps something akin to the naval tensions around the Kerch Strait that ultimately cost President Putin a summit with President Trump at the G20 meeting in December. While these incidents may benefit both sides domestically, and may even appear carefully orchestrated, they could also get out of hand in unpredictable ways. Bottom Line: While both Kiev and Russia may see a short-termed conflict as domestically beneficial, such an outcome could have unforeseen consequences. At the very least, it could sap already poor business confidence in neighboring Europe, as it did in 2014-2015. Black Swan 3: Saudi Arabia With A Blank Cheque One of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the twentieth century was Berlin’s decision to give its ally Austro-Hungary a “blank cheque.” Austro-Hungary was an anachronism at the turn of the century – a multiethnic empire held together by allegiance to a royal family. As such, the ideology of nationalism represented an existential threat, particularly given that 60% of the empire’s population was neither Austrian nor Hungarian. Following the assassination of its crown prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a pan-Slavist terrorist in Sarajevo, Vienna decided that a total destruction of Serbia was necessary for geopolitical and domestic political reasons. Today, Saudi Arabia is in many ways an anachronism itself. It is the world’s last feudal monarchy. Its leaders understand the risks and have begun an ambitious and multifaceted reform effort. Unlike Austro-Hungary, Saudi Arabia has learned to embrace nationalism. Riyadh is using the war in Yemen, as well as targeted actions against its own royal family and the religious establishment, to build a modern nation-state. The problem is that, much as nationalism was an ideological kryptonite for Vienna, democratic Islamism is an existential problem for Riyadh and its peers among the Gulf monarchies. Neighboring Qatar, a tiny peninsular kingdom enjoying an oversized geopolitical influence due to its natural gas wealth, has supported various groups across the Middle East that believe that democracy and conservative Islam are compatible. Turkey and Qatar have often cooperated in this effort, as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey has served as a model for many such Islamist parties in the region. Why Qatar hitched its geopolitical wagon to democratic Islamism is not clear. Perhaps its leaders felt that it was the only option unclaimed by an energy-rich sponsor. Regardless, Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and other such groups has clearly irked Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, enough for them to kick Qatar out of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 2017, with the pro-Saudi Trump administration ascendant in the White House, Riyadh felt emboldened enough to break off all diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose an economic blockade. Since 2014, another dynamic has emerged in the region that raises further concerns: a scramble for material resources brought on by the end of +$100 per barrel oil prices. Saudi public expenditures have been steadily rising since 2008, both due to population growth, social welfare spending in the wake of Arab Spring rebellions, and astronomical defense spending to counter the rising influence of Iran. And yet, 2014 saw oil prices plunge to decade lows in a matter of months. Saudi Arabia’s fiscal breakeven oil price has doubled, in a decade, from under $40 per barrel to $83 per barrel in 2018 (Chart 12). Meanwhile, Qatar’s GDP is a quarter of that of Saudi Arabia, even though its population is less than 2% of Saudi Arabia’s. Chart 12Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Rumors that the U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis prevented a Saudi invasion of Qatar in 2018 have largely been dismissed by the mainstream media. But should they be? If allegedly “rogue elements” of the Saudi intelligence establishment can dismember a journalist in a consulate, why couldn’t “rogue elements” of its military stage a coup – or an outright invasion – in neighboring Qatar? Such an outcome would truly be extraordinary, but so was the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, President Trump offered an extraordinary level of support for Riyadh by issuing what we can only refer to as a “blank cheque” following Khashoggi’s murder. In the November 20 statement, President Trump essentially created a new policy doctrine of standing with Saudi Arabia “no matter what.”9 Two weeks later, Riyadh “thanked” the U.S. President by slashing the OPEC oil output by 1.2 million barrels per day. From this dynamic, it appears that Washington has made a similar strategic blunder in 2018 that Berlin did in 1914. A weakened, stressed, and threatened ally has been given a “blank cheque” by its stronger ally. Such a sweeping offer of support may lead to unintended consequences as the weaker ally feels that its material and geopolitical constraints can be overcome. In Saudi Arabia’s case, that could mean a more aggressive policy towards Qatar, or perhaps Iran. Particularly now that the White House has seen several realist members of the Trump cabinet – such as Mattis and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – replaced by Iran hawks and Trump loyalists. Bottom Line: A combination of less independent-minded cabinet members in the White House and a clear “blank cheque” from President Trump to Saudi Arabia could cause geopolitical risk to re-emerge in the Middle East. In the near term, this could increase the geopolitical risk premium on oil prices – as measured by the residual in Chart 13. Chart 13 Black Swan 4: The Balkans Become A Powder Keg … Again Bismarck famously said in 1888 – 26 years before the outbreak of the Great War, that “one day the great European War will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” The Balkans are far less geopolitically relevant today than in the early twentieth century. They are also exhausted following a decade-long Yugoslav rigor mortis in the 1990s which yielded at least three regional wars and now six (or seven, depending who is counting) independent states. The problem is that tensions have not disappeared. Two frozen conflicts remain. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sovereign country made up of two political entities, with the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska agitating for independence and aligning with Russia. Second, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo took a turn for the worse late last year as Kosovo imposed an economic embargo on trade with Serbia and called for the creation of a military. Has anything really changed over the course of the decade? We think there are three causes for alarm: Tensions between Russia and the West have become serious, with both camps looking to score tactical and strategic wins across the globe. With the Syrian Civil War all but over, a new battleground may emerge. While Republika Srpska is essentially an outright ally of Russia, Serbia continues to try to straddle the fine line between an EU enlargement candidate and geopolitical neutrality. However, this high-wire act is becoming untenable as… Enlargement fatigue sets in the EU. There is no doubt that the EU enlargement process froze Balkan conflicts. Countries like Serbia and Kosovo have an incentive to be on their best behavior so long as the prospect of eventual EU membership remains. But in the current environment of introspection, the EU may not have enough of a coherent geopolitical vision to deal with the Balkans without a crisis. The global economic cycle may be ending, leading to a global recession in the next 12-to-24 months. While our BCA House View remains that the next recession will be a mild one in the U.S., we think that EM and, by extension, frontier markets could be the eye of the storm in the next downturn. As investors abandon their “search for yield” in riskier geographies, they could exacerbate poor governance, political tensions, and geopolitical cleavages that have been frozen in place by the last economic cycle. Finally, U.S. policy towards the Balkans is unclear. In the past, the U.S. asked all countries in the region to accept the status quo and prepare for EU integration. But with the U.S. now adopting an antagonistic view towards the EU bloc, it is unclear what Washington’s message to the Balkans will be. After all, Trump has personally encouraged all other world leaders to don their own version of the “America First” slogan. The only problem in a place like the Balkans is that “Serbia first” – or Croatia and Kosovo first – is unlikely to go down smoothly in the neighborhood, given the last twenty – or even hundred – years. Bottom Line: The powder keg that is the Balkans has not been dried for decades. However, several tailwinds of stability are gone, replaced with macro headwinds. A renewed conflict on Europe’s doorstep could be the next great geopolitical crisis. If this were to occur, we would bank on greater European integration, especially in terms of military and foreign policy. However, it could also mark the first break in U.S.-EU foreign policy if the two decide to pick opposing sides in the region. Black Swan 5: Lame Duck Trump For our final Black Swan, we are sticking with one of our 2018 choices: a “Lame duck” presidency. “Lame duck” presidents – leaders whose popularity late in their terms have sunk so low that they can no longer affect policy – are said to be particularly adventurous in the foreign arena. While this adage has a spotty empirical record, there are several notable examples in recent memory.10 American presidents have few constitutional constraints when it comes to foreign policy. Therefore, when domestic constraints rise, U.S. presidents can seek relevance abroad. President Trump may become the earliest, and lamest, lame duck president in recent U.S. history. While his Republican support remains strong (Chart 14), his overall popularity is well below the average presidential approval rating at this point in the political cycle (Chart 15). Now there is also a Democrat-led House of Representatives to stymie his domestic policy and launch independent investigations into both his administration’s conduct and his personal finances and dealings. Chart 14 Chart 15 We would also add the Senate to the list of problems for President Trump. The electoral math was friendly towards the Republicans in 2018, with Democrats defending 10 Senate seats in states that President Trump won in 2016. In 2020, however, two-thirds of the races will be for Republican-held seats. As such, many Republican senators may begin campaigning early by moving away from President Trump. What kind of adventures would we expect to see President Trump embark on in 2019? Last year, we identified “China-U.S. trade war,” “Iran jingoism,” and “North Korea” as potentials. In many ways, 2018 was the year when all three mattered. Going forward, however, we think that trade war and the Middle East might take a backseat. First, the bear market in equities has raised the odds of a recession. As such, the potential cost of pursuing the trade war further has been increased. So has an aggressive policy towards Iran that dramatically boosts oil prices. Furthermore, President Trump has signaled that he is willing to withdraw from the Middle East, calling for a full withdrawal from Syria and telegraphing one from Afghanistan. Instead, we see President Trump potentially following in the footsteps of previous U.S. administrations and finding relevance in Latin America. A military intervention in Venezuela, to ostensibly support a coup against the current regime, would find little opposition domestically. First, there is no doubt that Venezuela has become a genuine humanitarian disaster. Second, its oil output is on a downward spiral already, with only 1 million b/d of production at risk due to a potential military conflict (Chart 16). Third, the new Bolsonaro administration in Brazil may even support an intervention, as well as neighboring Colombia. This is a change from the last twenty years, in which Latin American countries largely stuck together, despite ideological differences, in opposition to U.S. interference in the continent’s domestic affairs. Chart 16On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral Finally, even the anti-Trump U.S. foreign policy establishment may support an intervention. Not only is there the issue of human suffering, but Russia and China have used Venezuela as an anchor to build out influence in America’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, the potential promise of Venezuela’s eventual energy production is another reason to consider an American intervention (Chart 17). Chart 17 Bottom Line: American presidents rarely decide to go softly into that good night. It is very difficult to see President Trump become irrelevant. With tensions with China carrying a high economic cost and military interventions in the Middle East remaining politically toxic in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan wars, perhaps President Trump will decide to go “retro,” in the sense of a throwback Latin America intervention.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see, Blackstone, “Byron Wien Announces Ten Surprises For 2018,” dated January 2, 2018, available at blackstone.com. 2 A shoutout to another doyen of the financial industry, Alastair Newton! 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “Deciphering Global Trade Linkages,” dated September 27, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “Highlights of Xi’s speech at Taiwan message anniversary event,” China Daily, January 2, 2019, available at www.chinadaily.com.cn; and “President Tsai Issues Statement On China’s President Xi’s ‘Message To Compatriots In Taiwan,’” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), January 2, 2019, available at english.president.gov.tw. 5 Please see Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” section 3.12, October 18, 2017, available at www.xinhuanet.com; and Deng Yuwen, “Is China Planning To Take Taiwan By Force In 2020?” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2018, available at beta.scmp.com. 6 Please see United States, H.R. 535, Taiwan Travel Act, 115th Congress (2017-18), available at www.congress.gov and S. 2736, Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, 115th Congress (2017-18), available at www.congress.gov. 7 This is precisely what occurred when China chose missile tests in 1995-96 and drove voters toward the very candidate, Lee Teng-hui, that Beijing least desired. The popular Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je may run for president in 2020, and Beijing may see him as preferable to President Tsai. He has spoken of China and Taiwan as being part of the same family and he has held city-to-city talks between Shanghai and Taipei despite the shutdown in direct talks between Beijing and Taipei. 8 Please see Andrew Sharp, “Beijing likely meddled in Taiwan elections, US cybersecurity firm says,” Nikkei Asian Review, November 28, 2018, available at asia.nikkei.com. 9 Please see “Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia,” The White House, dated November 20, 2018, available at whitehouse.org. 10 President Clinton launched the largest NATO military operation against Yugoslavia amidst impeachment proceedings against him, while President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. troops to Somalia a month after losing the 1992 election. Ironically, President George H. W. Bush intervened in Somalia in order to lock in the supposedly isolationist Bill Clinton, who had defeated him three weeks earlier, into an internationalist foreign policy. President George W. Bush ordered the “surge” of troops into Iraq in 2007 after losing both houses of Congress in 2006; President Obama arranged the Iranian nuclear deal after losing the Senate (and hence Congress) to the Republicans in 2014.   Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights So What? Our best and worst calls of 2018 cast light on our methodology and 2019 forecasts. Why? Our clients took us to task for violating our own methodology on the Iranian oil sanctions. Sticking to our guns would have paid off with long Russian equities versus EM. We correctly called China’s domestic policy, the U.S.-China trade war, Europe, the U.S. midterms, and relative winners in emerging markets. Feature It has been a tradition for BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, since our launch in 2012, to highlight our best and worst forecasts of the year.1 This will also be the final publication of the year, provided that there is no global conflagration worthy of a missive between now and January 9, when we return to our regular publication schedule. We wish all of our clients a great Holiday Season. And especially all the very best in 2019: lots of happiness, health, and hefty returns. Good luck and good hunting. The Worst Calls Of 2018 A forecasting mistake is wasted if one learns nothing from the error. This is why we take our mistakes seriously and why we always begin the report card with our zingers. Our overall performance in 2018 was … one of our best. The successes below will testify to this. However, we made three notable errors. A Schizophrenic Russia View Our worst call of the year was to panic and close our long Russian equities relative to emerging markets trade in the face of headline geopolitical risks. In early March, we posited that Russia was a “buy” relative to the broad EM equity index due to a combination of cheap valuations, strong macro fundamentals, orthodox policy, and an end to large-scale geopolitical adventurism. This call ultimately proved to be correct (Chart 1). Chart 1Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End What went wrong? The main risk to our view, that the U.S. Congress would pursue an anti-Russia agenda regardless of any Russian sympathies in the Trump White House, materialized in the wake of the poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal with a Novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom. As fate would have it, the incident occurred just before our bullish report went to clients! The ensuing international uproar and sanctions caused a selloff. Our bullish thesis did not rest exclusively on geopolitics, but a thaw in West-Russia relations did form the main pillar of the view. Our Russia Geopolitical Risk Index, which had served us well in the past, was pricing as low of a level of geopolitical risk as one could hope for in the post-Crimea environment (Chart 2). Naturally the measure jumped into action following the Skripal incident. Chart 2Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal The timing of our call was therefore off, but we should have stuck with the overall view. The U.S. imposed preliminary sanctions that lacked teeth. While Washington accepted the U.K.’s assessment that Moscow was behind the poisoning, the weakness of the sanctions also signaled that the U.S. did not consider the incident worthy of a tougher position. There are now two parallel sanction processes under way. The first round of sanctions announced in August gave Russia 90 days to comply and adopt “remedial measures” regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons. On November 9, the U.S. State Department noted that Russia had not complied with the deadline. The U.S. is now expected to impose a second round of sanctions that will include at least three of six punitive actions: Opposition to development aid and assistance by international financial institutions (think the IMF and the World Bank); Downgrading diplomatic relations; Additional restrictions on exports to Russia (high-tech exports have already been barred by the first round of sanctions); Restrictions on imports from Russia; A ban on landing rights in the U.S. for Russian state-owned airlines; Prohibiting U.S. banks from purchasing Russian government debt. While the White House was expected to have such sanctions ready to go on the November 9 deadline, it has dragged its feet for almost two months now. This suggests that President Trump continues to hold out for improved relations with President Putin. A visit by President Putin to Washington remains possible in Q1 2019. As such, we would expect the White House to adopt some mix of the first five items on the above list, hardly a crushing response from Moscow’s perspective. The U.S. Congress, however, has a parallel process in the form of the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018 (DASKAA). Introduced in August by Senator Lindsey Graham, a Russia hawk, the legislation would put restrictions on Americans buying Russian sovereign debt and curb investments in Russian energy projects. The bill also includes secondary sanctions on investing in the Russian oil sector, which would potentially ensnare European energy companies collaborating with Russia in the energy sector. There was some expectation that Congress would take up the bill ahead of the midterm election, but nothing came of it. Even with the latest incident – the seizing of two Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait – we have yet to see action. While we expect the U.S. to do something eventually, the White House approach is likely to be tepid while the congressional approach may be too draconian to pass into law. And with Democrats about to take over the House, and likely demand even tougher sanctions against Russia, the ultimate legislation may be too bold for President Trump to sign into legislation. The point is that Russia has acted antagonistically towards the West in 2018, but in small enough increments that the response has been tepid. Given the paucity of Russian financial and trade links with the U.S., Washington’s sanctions would only bite if they included the dreaded “secondary sanction” implications for third party sovereigns and firms – particularly European, which do have a lot of business in Russia. This is highly unlikely without major Russian aggression. We cannot completely ignore the potential for such aggression in 2019, especially with President Putin’s popularity in the doldrums (Chart 3) and a contentious Ukrainian election due for March 31. However, we outlined the constraints against Russia in 2014, amidst the Ukrainian crisis, and we do not think that these constraints have been reduced (they may have only grown since then). Chart 3Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Regardless of the big picture for 2019, we could have faded the risks in 2018 and stuck to the fundamentals. Russia is up 17.2% against EM year-to-date. The lesson here, therefore, is to find re-entry points into a well-founded view despite market volatility. Chart 1 shows that Russian equities climbed the proverbial “wall of worry” relative to EM in 2018. Doubting Jair Bolsonaro Our list of mistakes keeps us in the EM universe where we underestimated Jair Bolsonaro’s chances of winning the presidency in Brazil. The answer to the question we posed in the title of our September report – “Brazil: Can The Election Change Anything?” – was a definitive “yes.” Since the publication of that report, BRL/USD is up 2.9% and Brazilian equities are up 18.5% relative to EM (Chart 4). Chart 4Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already To our credit, the question of Bolsonaro’s electoral chances elicited passionate and pointed internal debate. But our clients did not see the internal struggle, just the incorrect external output! A bad call is a bad call, no matter how it is assembled on the intellectual assembly line. That said, we still think that our report is valuable. It sets out the constraints facing Bolsonaro in 2019. He has to convince the left-leaning median voter that meaningful pension reform is needed; bully a fractured Congress into painful structural reforms; and overcome an unforgiving macro context of tepid Chinese stimulus and a strong USD. If the Bolsonaro administration wastes the good will of the investment community over the next six months, we expect the market’s punishment to be swift and painful. In fact, Chart 4 notes that the initial Bolsonaro rally has already lost most of its shine. Brazilian assets are still up since the election, but the gentle slope could become a steep fall if Bolsonaro stumbles. The market is priced for political perfection. To be clear, we are not bearish on Bolsonaro. We believe that, relative to EM, he will be a positive for Brazil. However, the market is currently betting that he will win by two touchdowns, whereas we think he will squeak by with a last-second field goal. The difference between the two forecasts is compelling and we have expressed it by being long MXN/BRL.2 Not Sticking To Our Method In The Case Of Iran Throughout late-2017 and 2018 we pointed out that President Trump’s successful application of “maximum pressure” against North Korea could become a market-relevant risk if he were emboldened to try the same strategy against Iran. For much of the year, this view was prescient. As investors realized the seriousness of President Trump’s strategy, a geopolitical risk premium began to seep into oil prices, as illustrated in Chart 5 by the red bar. Chart 5 Every time we spoke to clients or published reports on this topic, we highlighted just how dangerous a “maximum pressure” strategy would be in the case of Iran. We stressed that Iran could wreak havoc across Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and even drive up oil prices to the point of causing a “geopolitical recession in 2019.” In other words, we stressed the extraordinary constraints that President Trump would face. To their credit many of our clients called us out on the inconsistency: our market call was über bullish oil prices, while our methodology emphasized constraints over preferences. We were constantly fielding questions such as: Why would President Trump face down such overwhelming constraints? We did not have a very good answer to this question other than that he was ideologically committed to overturning the Iranian nuclear deal. In essence, we doubted President Trump’s own ideological flexibility and realism. That was a mistake and we tip our hat to the White House for recognizing the complex constraints arrayed against it. President Trump realized by October how dangerous those constraints were and began floating the idea of sanction waivers, causing the geopolitical risk premium to drain from the market (Chart 6). To our credit, we highlighted sanction waivers as a key risk to our view and thus took profit on our bullish energy call early. Chart 6Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices That said, our clients have taken the argument further, pointing out that if we were wrong on Trump’s ideological flexibility with Iran, we may be making the same mistake when it comes to China. However, there is a critical difference. Americans are more concerned about conflict with North Korea than with Iran (Chart 7), while China is the major concern about trade (Chart 8). Chart 7 Chart 8 Second, railing against the Iran deal did not get President Trump elected, whereas his protectionist rhetoric – specifically regarding China – did (Chart 9). Getting anything less than the mother-of-all-deals with Beijing will draw down Trump’s political capital ahead of 2020 and open him to accusations of being “weak” and “surrendering to China.” These are accusations that the country’s other set of protectionists – the Democrats – will wantonly employ against him in the next general election. Chart 9Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Ultimately, if we have to be wrong, we are at least satisfied that our method stood firm in the face of our own fallibility. We are doubly glad to see our clients using our own method against our views. This is precisely what we wanted to accomplish when we began BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy in March 2012: to revolutionize finance by raising the sophistication with which it approaches geopolitics. That was a lofty goal, but we do not pretend to hold the monopoly on our constraint-based methodology. In the end, our market calls did not suffer due to our error. We closed our long EM energy-producer equities / EM equities for a gain of 4.67% and our long Brent / short S&P 500 for a gain of 6.01%. However, our latter call, shorting the S&P 500 in September, was based on several reasons, including concerns regarding FAANG stocks, overstretched valuations, and an escalation of the trade war. Had we paired our S&P 500 short with a better long, we would have added far more value to our clients. It is that lost opportunity that has kept us up at night throughout this quarter. We essentially timed the S&P 500 correction, but paired it with a wayward long. The Best Calls Of 2018 BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy had a strong year. We are not going to list all of our calls here, but only those most relevant to our clients. Our best 2018 forecast originally appeared in 2017, when in April of that year we predicted that “Political Risks Are Understated In 2018.” Our reasoning was bang on: U.S. fiscal policy would turn strongly stimulative (the tax cuts would pass and Trump would be a big spender) and thus cause the Fed to turn hawkish and the USD to rally, tightening global monetary policy; Trump’s trade war would re-emerge in 2018; China would reboot its structural reform efforts by focusing on containing leverage, thus tightening global “fiscal” policy. In the same report we also predicted that Italian elections in 2018 would reignite Euro Area breakup risks, but that Italian policymakers would ultimately be found to be bluffing, as has been our long-running assertion. Throughout 2018, our team largely maintained and curated the forecasts expressed in that early 2017 report. We start the list of the best calls with the one call that was by far the most important for global assets in 2018: economic policy in China. The Chinese Would Over-Tighten, Then Under-Stimulate Getting Chinese policy right required us, first, to predict that policy would bring negative economic surprises this year, and second, once policy began to ease, to convince clients and colleagues that “this time would be different” and the stimulus would not be very stimulating. In other words, this time, China would not panic and reach for the credit lever of the post-2008 years (Chart 10), but would maintain its relatively tight economic, financial, environmental, and macro-prudential oversight, while easing only on the margin. Chart 10No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 This is precisely what occurred. BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy’s “China Play Index,” which is designed to capture any reflation out of Beijing, collapsed in 2018 and has hardly ticked up since the policy easing announced in July (Chart 11). Chart 11Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Our view was based on an understanding of Chinese politics that we can confidently say has been unique: From March 2017, we highlighted the importance of the 2017 October Party Congress, arguing that President Xi Jinping would consolidate his power and redouble his attempts to “reform” the economy by reining in dangerous imbalances. We explicitly characterized the containment of leverage as the most market-relevant reform to focus on. We stringently ignored the ideological debate about the nature of reform in China, focusing instead on the major policy changes afoot. We identified very early on how the rising odds of a U.S.-China conflict would embolden Chinese leadership to double-down on painful structural reforms. Will China maintain this disciplined approach in 2019? That is yet to be seen. But we are arming ourselves and clients with critical ways to identify when and whether Beijing’s policy easing transforms into a full-blown “stimulus overshoot”: First, we need to see a clear upturn in shadow financing to believe that the Xi administration has given up on preventing excess debt. Assuming that such a shift occurs, and that overall credit improves, it will enable us to turn bullish on global growth and global risk assets on a cyclical, i.e., not merely tactical, horizon (Chart 12). Chart 12A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift Second, our qualitative checklist will need to see a lot more “checks” in order to change our mind. Short of an extraordinary surge in bank and shadow bank credit, there needs to be a splurge in central and especially local government spending (Table 1). The mid-year spike in local governments’ new bond issuance in 2018 was fleeting and fell far short of the surge that initiated the large-scale stimulus of 2015. Frontloading these bonds in 2019 will depend on timing and magnitude. Table 1A Credit Splurge, Or Government Spending Splurge, Is Necessary For Stimulus To Overshoot BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card Third, we would need to see President Xi Jinping make a shift in rhetoric away from the “Three Battles” of financial risk, pollution, and poverty. Having identified systemic financial risk as the first of the three ills, Xi needs to make a dramatic reversal of this three-year action plan if he is to clear the way for another credit blowout. Trade War Would Reignite In 2018 It paid off to stick with our trade war alarmism in 2018. We correctly forecast that the U.S. and China would collide over trade and that their initial trade agreement – on May 20 – was insubstantial and would not last. In the event it lasted three days. Our one setback on the trade front was to doubt the two sides would agree to a trade truce at the G20. However, by assigning a subjective 40% probability, we correctly noted the fair odds of a truce. We also insisted that any truce would be temporary, which ended up being the case. We may yet be vindicated if the March 1 deadline produces no sustainable deal, as we forecast in last week’s Strategic Outlook. That said, correct geopolitical calls do not butter our bread at BCA. Rather, we are paid to make market calls. To that end, we would point out that we correctly assessed the market-relevance of the trade conflict, fading S&P 500 risks and focusing on the effect on global risk assets. Will this continue into 2019? We think so. We do not see trade conflict as the originator of ongoing market turbulence (Chart 13) and would expect the U.S. to outperform global equities again over the course of 2019 (Chart 14). This view may appear wrong in Q1, as the market digests the Fed backing off from hawkish rhetoric, the ongoing trade negotiations, and the likely seasonal uptick in Chinese credit data in the beginning of the calendar year. Chart 13Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Chart 14U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance However, any stabilization in equity markets would likely serve to ease financial conditions in the U.S., where economic and inflation conditions remain firmly in tightening territory (Chart 15). As such, the Fed pause is likely to last no more than a quarter, maybe two at best, leading to renewed carnage in global risk assets if our view on Chinese policy stimulus – tepid – remains valid through the course of 2019. Chart 15If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On Europe (All Of It… Again) In 2017, our forecasting track record for Europe was stellar. This continued in 2018, with no major setbacks: Populism in Italy: Our long-held view has been that Europe’s chief remaining risks lay in Italian populists coming to power. We predicted in 2016 that this would eventually happen and that they would then be proven to be bluffing. This is essentially what happened in 2018. Matteo Salvini’s Lega is surging in the polls because its leader has realized that a combination of hard anti-immigrant policy and the softest-of-soft Euroskepticism is a winning combination. We believe that investors can live with this combination. Our only major fault in forecasting European politics and assets this year was to close our bearish Italy call too early: we booked our long Spanish / short Italian 10-year government bond trade for a small loss in August, before the spread between the two Mediterranean countries blew out to record levels. That missed opportunity could have also made it on our “worst calls” list as well. Chart 16 Pluralism in Europe: To get the call on Italy right, we had to dabble in some theoretical work. In a somewhat academic report, we showed that political concentration was on the decline in the developed world (Chart 16), but especially in Europe (Chart 17). Put simply, lower political concentration suggests that a duopoly between the traditional center-left and center-right parties is breaking down. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argued that Europe’s parliamentary systems would enable centrist parties to adopt elements of the populist agenda, particularly on immigration, without compromising the overall stability of European institutions. As such, political pluralism, or low political concentration, is positive for markets. Chart 17 Immigration crisis is over: For centrist parties to be able to successfully adopt populist immigration policy, they needed a pause in the immigration crisis. This was empirically verifiable in 2018 (Chart 18). Chart 18European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over Merkel’s time has run out: Since early 2017, we had cautioned clients that Angela Merkel’s demise was afoot, but that it would be an opportunity, rather than a risk, when it came. It finally happened in 2018 and it was not a market moving event. The main question for 2019 is whether German policymakers, and Europe as a whole, will use the infusion of fresh blood in Berlin to reaccelerate crucial reforms ahead of the next global recession. Brexit: Since early 2016, we have been right on Brexit. More specifically, we were corrent in cautioning investors that, were Brexit to occur, “the biggest loser would be the Conservative Party, not the EU.” As with the previous two Conservative Party prime ministers, it appears that the question of the U.K.’s relationship with the EU has completely drained any political capital out of Prime Minister Theresa May’s reign. We suspect that the only factor propping up the Tories in the polls is that Jeremy Corbyn is the leader of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition. We have also argued that soft Brexit would ultimately prove to be “illogical” and that “Bregret” would begin to seep in, as it now most clearly has. We parlayed these rising geopolitical risks and uncertainties by shorting cable in the first half of the year for a 6.21% gain. Malaysia Over Turkey And India Over Brazil Not all was lost for our EM calls this year. We played Malaysia against Turkey in the currency markets for a 17.44% gain, largely thanks to massively divergent governance and structural reform trajectories after Malaysia’s opposition won power for the first time in the country’s history. Second, we initiated a long Indian / short Brazilian equity view in March that returned 27.54% by August. This was a similar play on divergent structural reforms, but it was also a way to hedge our alarmist view on trade. Given India’s isolation from global trade and insular financial markets, we identified India as one of the EM markets that would remain aloof of protectionist risks. We could have closed the trade earlier for greater gain, but did not time the exit properly. Midterm Election: A Major Democratic Victory Our midterm election forecast was correct: Democrats won a substantial victory. Even our initial call on the Senate, that Democrats had a surprisingly large probability of picking up seats, proved to be correct, with Republicans eking out just two gains in a year when Democrats were defending 10 seats in states that Trump carried in 2016. What about our all-important call that the election would have no impact on the markets? That is more difficult to assess, given that the S&P 500 has in fact collapsed in the lead-up to and aftermath of the election. However, we see little connection between the election outcome and the stock market’s performance. Neither do our colleagues or clients, who have largely stopped asking about the Democrats’ policy designs. In 2019, domestic politics may play a role in the markets. Impeachment risk is low, but, if it rears its head, it could prompt President Trump to seek relevance abroad, as his predecessors have done when they lost control of domestic policy. In addition, the Democratic Party’s sweeping House victory may suggest a political pendulum swing to the left in the 2020 presidential election. We will discuss both risks as part of our annual Five Black Swans report in early 2019. U.S. domestic politics was a collection of Red Herrings during much of President Obama’s presidency, and has produced strong tailwinds under President Trump (tax cuts in particular). This may change in 2019, with considerable risk to investors, and asset prices, ahead.     Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      For our 2019 Outlook, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, “2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge,” dated December 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our past Strategic Outlooks, please visit gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      In part we like this cross because we also think that Mexico’s newly elected president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is priced to lose by two touchdowns, whereas he may merely lose by a last-second field goal.    

Highlights So What? Our best and worst calls of 2018 cast light on our methodology and 2019 forecasts. Why? Our clients took us to task for violating our own methodology on the Iranian oil sanctions. Sticking to our guns would have paid off with long Russian equities versus EM. We correctly called China’s domestic policy, the U.S.-China trade war, Europe, the U.S. midterms, and relative winners in emerging markets. Feature It has been a tradition for BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, since our launch in 2012, to highlight our best and worst forecasts of the year.1 This will also be the final publication of the year, provided that there is no global conflagration worthy of a missive between now and January 9, when we return to our regular publication schedule. We wish all of our clients a great Holiday Season. And especially all the very best in 2019: lots of happiness, health, and hefty returns. Good luck and good hunting. The Worst Calls Of 2018 A forecasting mistake is wasted if one learns nothing from the error. This is why we take our mistakes seriously and why we always begin the report card with our zingers. Our overall performance in 2018 was … one of our best. The successes below will testify to this. However, we made three notable errors. A Schizophrenic Russia View Our worst call of the year was to panic and close our long Russian equities relative to emerging markets trade in the face of headline geopolitical risks. In early March, we posited that Russia was a “buy” relative to the broad EM equity index due to a combination of cheap valuations, strong macro fundamentals, orthodox policy, and an end to large-scale geopolitical adventurism. This call ultimately proved to be correct (Chart 1). Chart 1Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End What went wrong? The main risk to our view, that the U.S. Congress would pursue an anti-Russia agenda regardless of any Russian sympathies in the Trump White House, materialized in the wake of the poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal with a Novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom. As fate would have it, the incident occurred just before our bullish report went to clients! The ensuing international uproar and sanctions caused a selloff. Our bullish thesis did not rest exclusively on geopolitics, but a thaw in West-Russia relations did form the main pillar of the view. Our Russia Geopolitical Risk Index, which had served us well in the past, was pricing as low of a level of geopolitical risk as one could hope for in the post-Crimea environment (Chart 2). Naturally the measure jumped into action following the Skripal incident. Chart 2Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal The timing of our call was therefore off, but we should have stuck with the overall view. The U.S. imposed preliminary sanctions that lacked teeth. While Washington accepted the U.K.’s assessment that Moscow was behind the poisoning, the weakness of the sanctions also signaled that the U.S. did not consider the incident worthy of a tougher position. There are now two parallel sanction processes under way. The first round of sanctions announced in August gave Russia 90 days to comply and adopt “remedial measures” regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons. On November 9, the U.S. State Department noted that Russia had not complied with the deadline. The U.S. is now expected to impose a second round of sanctions that will include at least three of six punitive actions: Opposition to development aid and assistance by international financial institutions (think the IMF and the World Bank); Downgrading diplomatic relations; Additional restrictions on exports to Russia (high-tech exports have already been barred by the first round of sanctions); Restrictions on imports from Russia; A ban on landing rights in the U.S. for Russian state-owned airlines; Prohibiting U.S. banks from purchasing Russian government debt. While the White House was expected to have such sanctions ready to go on the November 9 deadline, it has dragged its feet for almost two months now. This suggests that President Trump continues to hold out for improved relations with President Putin. A visit by President Putin to Washington remains possible in Q1 2019. As such, we would expect the White House to adopt some mix of the first five items on the above list, hardly a crushing response from Moscow’s perspective. The U.S. Congress, however, has a parallel process in the form of the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018 (DASKAA). Introduced in August by Senator Lindsey Graham, a Russia hawk, the legislation would put restrictions on Americans buying Russian sovereign debt and curb investments in Russian energy projects. The bill also includes secondary sanctions on investing in the Russian oil sector, which would potentially ensnare European energy companies collaborating with Russia in the energy sector. There was some expectation that Congress would take up the bill ahead of the midterm election, but nothing came of it. Even with the latest incident – the seizing of two Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait – we have yet to see action. While we expect the U.S. to do something eventually, the White House approach is likely to be tepid while the congressional approach may be too draconian to pass into law. And with Democrats about to take over the House, and likely demand even tougher sanctions against Russia, the ultimate legislation may be too bold for President Trump to sign into legislation. The point is that Russia has acted antagonistically towards the West in 2018, but in small enough increments that the response has been tepid. Given the paucity of Russian financial and trade links with the U.S., Washington’s sanctions would only bite if they included the dreaded “secondary sanction” implications for third party sovereigns and firms – particularly European, which do have a lot of business in Russia. This is highly unlikely without major Russian aggression. We cannot completely ignore the potential for such aggression in 2019, especially with President Putin’s popularity in the doldrums (Chart 3) and a contentious Ukrainian election due for March 31. However, we outlined the constraints against Russia in 2014, amidst the Ukrainian crisis, and we do not think that these constraints have been reduced (they may have only grown since then). Chart 3Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Regardless of the big picture for 2019, we could have faded the risks in 2018 and stuck to the fundamentals. Russia is up 17.2% against EM year-to-date. The lesson here, therefore, is to find re-entry points into a well-founded view despite market volatility. Chart 1 shows that Russian equities climbed the proverbial “wall of worry” relative to EM in 2018. Doubting Jair Bolsonaro Our list of mistakes keeps us in the EM universe where we underestimated Jair Bolsonaro’s chances of winning the presidency in Brazil. The answer to the question we posed in the title of our September report – “Brazil: Can The Election Change Anything?” – was a definitive “yes.” Since the publication of that report, BRL/USD is up 2.9% and Brazilian equities are up 18.5% relative to EM (Chart 4). Chart 4Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already To our credit, the question of Bolsonaro’s electoral chances elicited passionate and pointed internal debate. But our clients did not see the internal struggle, just the incorrect external output! A bad call is a bad call, no matter how it is assembled on the intellectual assembly line. That said, we still think that our report is valuable. It sets out the constraints facing Bolsonaro in 2019. He has to convince the left-leaning median voter that meaningful pension reform is needed; bully a fractured Congress into painful structural reforms; and overcome an unforgiving macro context of tepid Chinese stimulus and a strong USD. If the Bolsonaro administration wastes the good will of the investment community over the next six months, we expect the market’s punishment to be swift and painful. In fact, Chart 4 notes that the initial Bolsonaro rally has already lost most of its shine. Brazilian assets are still up since the election, but the gentle slope could become a steep fall if Bolsonaro stumbles. The market is priced for political perfection. To be clear, we are not bearish on Bolsonaro. We believe that, relative to EM, he will be a positive for Brazil. However, the market is currently betting that he will win by two touchdowns, whereas we think he will squeak by with a last-second field goal. The difference between the two forecasts is compelling and we have expressed it by being long MXN/BRL.2 Not Sticking To Our Method In The Case Of Iran Throughout late-2017 and 2018 we pointed out that President Trump’s successful application of “maximum pressure” against North Korea could become a market-relevant risk if he were emboldened to try the same strategy against Iran. For much of the year, this view was prescient. As investors realized the seriousness of President Trump’s strategy, a geopolitical risk premium began to seep into oil prices, as illustrated in Chart 5 by the red bar. Chart 5 Every time we spoke to clients or published reports on this topic, we highlighted just how dangerous a “maximum pressure” strategy would be in the case of Iran. We stressed that Iran could wreak havoc across Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and even drive up oil prices to the point of causing a “geopolitical recession in 2019.” In other words, we stressed the extraordinary constraints that President Trump would face. To their credit many of our clients called us out on the inconsistency: our market call was über bullish oil prices, while our methodology emphasized constraints over preferences. We were constantly fielding questions such as: Why would President Trump face down such overwhelming constraints? We did not have a very good answer to this question other than that he was ideologically committed to overturning the Iranian nuclear deal. In essence, we doubted President Trump’s own ideological flexibility and realism. That was a mistake and we tip our hat to the White House for recognizing the complex constraints arrayed against it. President Trump realized by October how dangerous those constraints were and began floating the idea of sanction waivers, causing the geopolitical risk premium to drain from the market (Chart 6). To our credit, we highlighted sanction waivers as a key risk to our view and thus took profit on our bullish energy call early. Chart 6Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices That said, our clients have taken the argument further, pointing out that if we were wrong on Trump’s ideological flexibility with Iran, we may be making the same mistake when it comes to China. However, there is a critical difference. Americans are more concerned about conflict with North Korea than with Iran (Chart 7), while China is the major concern about trade (Chart 8). Chart 7 Chart 8 Second, railing against the Iran deal did not get President Trump elected, whereas his protectionist rhetoric – specifically regarding China – did (Chart 9). Getting anything less than the mother-of-all-deals with Beijing will draw down Trump’s political capital ahead of 2020 and open him to accusations of being “weak” and “surrendering to China.” These are accusations that the country’s other set of protectionists – the Democrats – will wantonly employ against him in the next general election. Chart 9Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Ultimately, if we have to be wrong, we are at least satisfied that our method stood firm in the face of our own fallibility. We are doubly glad to see our clients using our own method against our views. This is precisely what we wanted to accomplish when we began BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy in March 2012: to revolutionize finance by raising the sophistication with which it approaches geopolitics. That was a lofty goal, but we do not pretend to hold the monopoly on our constraint-based methodology. In the end, our market calls did not suffer due to our error. We closed our long EM energy-producer equities / EM equities for a gain of 4.67% and our long Brent / short S&P 500 for a gain of 6.01%. However, our latter call, shorting the S&P 500 in September, was based on several reasons, including concerns regarding FAANG stocks, overstretched valuations, and an escalation of the trade war. Had we paired our S&P 500 short with a better long, we would have added far more value to our clients. It is that lost opportunity that has kept us up at night throughout this quarter. We essentially timed the S&P 500 correction, but paired it with a wayward long. The Best Calls Of 2018 BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy had a strong year. We are not going to list all of our calls here, but only those most relevant to our clients. Our best 2018 forecast originally appeared in 2017, when in April of that year we predicted that “Political Risks Are Understated In 2018.” Our reasoning was bang on: U.S. fiscal policy would turn strongly stimulative (the tax cuts would pass and Trump would be a big spender) and thus cause the Fed to turn hawkish and the USD to rally, tightening global monetary policy; Trump’s trade war would re-emerge in 2018; China would reboot its structural reform efforts by focusing on containing leverage, thus tightening global “fiscal” policy. In the same report we also predicted that Italian elections in 2018 would reignite Euro Area breakup risks, but that Italian policymakers would ultimately be found to be bluffing, as has been our long-running assertion. Throughout 2018, our team largely maintained and curated the forecasts expressed in that early 2017 report. We start the list of the best calls with the one call that was by far the most important for global assets in 2018: economic policy in China. The Chinese Would Over-Tighten, Then Under-Stimulate Getting Chinese policy right required us, first, to predict that policy would bring negative economic surprises this year, and second, once policy began to ease, to convince clients and colleagues that “this time would be different” and the stimulus would not be very stimulating. In other words, this time, China would not panic and reach for the credit lever of the post-2008 years (Chart 10), but would maintain its relatively tight economic, financial, environmental, and macro-prudential oversight, while easing only on the margin. Chart 10No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 This is precisely what occurred. BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy’s “China Play Index,” which is designed to capture any reflation out of Beijing, collapsed in 2018 and has hardly ticked up since the policy easing announced in July (Chart 11). Chart 11Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Our view was based on an understanding of Chinese politics that we can confidently say has been unique: From March 2017, we highlighted the importance of the 2017 October Party Congress, arguing that President Xi Jinping would consolidate his power and redouble his attempts to “reform” the economy by reining in dangerous imbalances. We explicitly characterized the containment of leverage as the most market-relevant reform to focus on. We stringently ignored the ideological debate about the nature of reform in China, focusing instead on the major policy changes afoot. We identified very early on how the rising odds of a U.S.-China conflict would embolden Chinese leadership to double-down on painful structural reforms. Will China maintain this disciplined approach in 2019? That is yet to be seen. But we are arming ourselves and clients with critical ways to identify when and whether Beijing’s policy easing transforms into a full-blown “stimulus overshoot”: First, we need to see a clear upturn in shadow financing to believe that the Xi administration has given up on preventing excess debt. Assuming that such a shift occurs, and that overall credit improves, it will enable us to turn bullish on global growth and global risk assets on a cyclical, i.e., not merely tactical, horizon (Chart 12). Chart 12A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift Second, our qualitative checklist will need to see a lot more “checks” in order to change our mind. Short of an extraordinary surge in bank and shadow bank credit, there needs to be a splurge in central and especially local government spending (Table 1). The mid-year spike in local governments’ new bond issuance in 2018 was fleeting and fell far short of the surge that initiated the large-scale stimulus of 2015. Frontloading these bonds in 2019 will depend on timing and magnitude. Table 1A Credit Splurge, Or Government Spending Splurge, Is Necessary For Stimulus To Overshoot BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card Third, we would need to see President Xi Jinping make a shift in rhetoric away from the “Three Battles” of financial risk, pollution, and poverty. Having identified systemic financial risk as the first of the three ills, Xi needs to make a dramatic reversal of this three-year action plan if he is to clear the way for another credit blowout. Trade War Would Reignite In 2018 It paid off to stick with our trade war alarmism in 2018. We correctly forecast that the U.S. and China would collide over trade and that their initial trade agreement – on May 20 – was insubstantial and would not last. In the event it lasted three days. Our one setback on the trade front was to doubt the two sides would agree to a trade truce at the G20. However, by assigning a subjective 40% probability, we correctly noted the fair odds of a truce. We also insisted that any truce would be temporary, which ended up being the case. We may yet be vindicated if the March 1 deadline produces no sustainable deal, as we forecast in last week’s Strategic Outlook. That said, correct geopolitical calls do not butter our bread at BCA. Rather, we are paid to make market calls. To that end, we would point out that we correctly assessed the market-relevance of the trade conflict, fading S&P 500 risks and focusing on the effect on global risk assets. Will this continue into 2019? We think so. We do not see trade conflict as the originator of ongoing market turbulence (Chart 13) and would expect the U.S. to outperform global equities again over the course of 2019 (Chart 14). This view may appear wrong in Q1, as the market digests the Fed backing off from hawkish rhetoric, the ongoing trade negotiations, and the likely seasonal uptick in Chinese credit data in the beginning of the calendar year. Chart 13Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Chart 14U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance However, any stabilization in equity markets would likely serve to ease financial conditions in the U.S., where economic and inflation conditions remain firmly in tightening territory (Chart 15). As such, the Fed pause is likely to last no more than a quarter, maybe two at best, leading to renewed carnage in global risk assets if our view on Chinese policy stimulus – tepid – remains valid through the course of 2019. Chart 15If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On Europe (All Of It… Again) In 2017, our forecasting track record for Europe was stellar. This continued in 2018, with no major setbacks: Populism in Italy: Our long-held view has been that Europe’s chief remaining risks lay in Italian populists coming to power. We predicted in 2016 that this would eventually happen and that they would then be proven to be bluffing. This is essentially what happened in 2018. Matteo Salvini’s Lega is surging in the polls because its leader has realized that a combination of hard anti-immigrant policy and the softest-of-soft Euroskepticism is a winning combination. We believe that investors can live with this combination. Our only major fault in forecasting European politics and assets this year was to close our bearish Italy call too early: we booked our long Spanish / short Italian 10-year government bond trade for a small loss in August, before the spread between the two Mediterranean countries blew out to record levels. That missed opportunity could have also made it on our “worst calls” list as well. Chart 16 Pluralism in Europe: To get the call on Italy right, we had to dabble in some theoretical work. In a somewhat academic report, we showed that political concentration was on the decline in the developed world (Chart 16), but especially in Europe (Chart 17). Put simply, lower political concentration suggests that a duopoly between the traditional center-left and center-right parties is breaking down. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argued that Europe’s parliamentary systems would enable centrist parties to adopt elements of the populist agenda, particularly on immigration, without compromising the overall stability of European institutions. As such, political pluralism, or low political concentration, is positive for markets. Chart 17 Immigration crisis is over: For centrist parties to be able to successfully adopt populist immigration policy, they needed a pause in the immigration crisis. This was empirically verifiable in 2018 (Chart 18). Chart 18European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over Merkel’s time has run out: Since early 2017, we had cautioned clients that Angela Merkel’s demise was afoot, but that it would be an opportunity, rather than a risk, when it came. It finally happened in 2018 and it was not a market moving event. The main question for 2019 is whether German policymakers, and Europe as a whole, will use the infusion of fresh blood in Berlin to reaccelerate crucial reforms ahead of the next global recession. Brexit: Since early 2016, we have been right on Brexit. More specifically, we were corrent in cautioning investors that, were Brexit to occur, “the biggest loser would be the Conservative Party, not the EU.” As with the previous two Conservative Party prime ministers, it appears that the question of the U.K.’s relationship with the EU has completely drained any political capital out of Prime Minister Theresa May’s reign. We suspect that the only factor propping up the Tories in the polls is that Jeremy Corbyn is the leader of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition. We have also argued that soft Brexit would ultimately prove to be “illogical” and that “Bregret” would begin to seep in, as it now most clearly has. We parlayed these rising geopolitical risks and uncertainties by shorting cable in the first half of the year for a 6.21% gain. Malaysia Over Turkey And India Over Brazil Not all was lost for our EM calls this year. We played Malaysia against Turkey in the currency markets for a 17.44% gain, largely thanks to massively divergent governance and structural reform trajectories after Malaysia’s opposition won power for the first time in the country’s history. Second, we initiated a long Indian / short Brazilian equity view in March that returned 27.54% by August. This was a similar play on divergent structural reforms, but it was also a way to hedge our alarmist view on trade. Given India’s isolation from global trade and insular financial markets, we identified India as one of the EM markets that would remain aloof of protectionist risks. We could have closed the trade earlier for greater gain, but did not time the exit properly. Midterm Election: A Major Democratic Victory Our midterm election forecast was correct: Democrats won a substantial victory. Even our initial call on the Senate, that Democrats had a surprisingly large probability of picking up seats, proved to be correct, with Republicans eking out just two gains in a year when Democrats were defending 10 seats in states that Trump carried in 2016. What about our all-important call that the election would have no impact on the markets? That is more difficult to assess, given that the S&P 500 has in fact collapsed in the lead-up to and aftermath of the election. However, we see little connection between the election outcome and the stock market’s performance. Neither do our colleagues or clients, who have largely stopped asking about the Democrats’ policy designs. In 2019, domestic politics may play a role in the markets. Impeachment risk is low, but, if it rears its head, it could prompt President Trump to seek relevance abroad, as his predecessors have done when they lost control of domestic policy. In addition, the Democratic Party’s sweeping House victory may suggest a political pendulum swing to the left in the 2020 presidential election. We will discuss both risks as part of our annual Five Black Swans report in early 2019. U.S. domestic politics was a collection of Red Herrings during much of President Obama’s presidency, and has produced strong tailwinds under President Trump (tax cuts in particular). This may change in 2019, with considerable risk to investors, and asset prices, ahead.     Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      For our 2019 Outlook, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, “2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge,” dated December 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our past Strategic Outlooks, please visit gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      In part we like this cross because we also think that Mexico’s newly elected president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is priced to lose by two touchdowns, whereas he may merely lose by a last-second field goal.    

Highlights Turkish commercial banks have been ramping up purchases of local currency government bonds. Given that commercial banks create new money “out of thin air” when they buy assets from non-bank entities, should investors interpret this phenomenon positively or negatively? Under the backdrop of a severe recession, we view this phenomenon as a stabilizing factor that can provide moderate relief - a painkiller rather than a poison. Meanwhile, record-wide net interest rate spreads as well as rising purchases of government bonds yielding around 20% are positive for banks’ earnings amid an otherwise dismal economic outlook. To express a selective positive bias toward this depressed and still fundamentally challenged market versus other EMs, we recommend a relative equity trade: long Turkish banks / short EM banks, currency unhedged. Feature On August 15, 2018, we upgraded our stance on Turkish markets from underweight to neutral and closed our shorts in the currency and bank stocks after having been bearish/underweight for several years.1 Our rationale was that Turkish equity and currency valuations had become cheap, and its financial markets oversold. Yet we stated that the adjustment in interest rates and ensuing economic slowdown were still pending – preventing us from going overweight. Are Turkish interest rates now sufficiently high to put a floor under the currency? In other words, is monetary demagoguery – relentless bank lending promoted by the authorities amid high inflation – a thing of the past?2 At first glimpse, the answer appears to be no. Turkish banks have been aggressively buying local currency government bonds – at a time when foreigners have been selling their holdings (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Turkish Banks Have Been Buying Local Government Bonds Turkish Banks Have Been Buying Local Government Bonds Turkish Banks Have Been Buying Local Government Bonds As we demonstrate in Box I-1 on page 9, commercial banks in all countries create new money when they purchase any asset, including any security, from non-bank entities. One can argue that the Turkish banks’ creation of money “out of thin air” holds the potential to trigger renewed currency depreciation. Furthermore, banks’ financing of the government depresses government bond yields, bringing down market-determined local currency interest rates. On the other hand, there is also evidence that banks have drastically curtailed financing to the real economy, which is causing a severe collapse in domestic demand. This has already squeezed imports and has started to narrow the current account deficit - a necessary condition for macro and exchange rate stabilization (Chart I-2). As such, it seems Turkey’s necessary macro adjustment is already under way. Chart I-2Turkey: Current Account Deficit Is Narrowing Turkey: Current Account Deficit Is Narrowing Turkey: Current Account Deficit Is Narrowing These two dynamics – (1) banks financing the government by creating money “out of thin air” and (2) banks inhibiting financing to households and companies – are conflicting. While many economists refer to this phenomenon as a crowding out of the private sector by the government, we disagree with this analytical framework. Please refer to Box I-1 on page 9 for a more detailed discussion. Our assessment of these dynamics is as follows: In the current context of rapidly shrinking domestic demand, banks’ financing of the government is a mitigating factor in the ongoing macro adjustment. Commercial banks’ financing of the public sector via bond purchases caps market-determined interest rates and allows the government to spend, therefore diminishing the blow to the real economy. Consequently, the expansion of Turkish banks’ purchases of government bonds is a silver lining in an otherwise harsh macro adjustment. So long as this phenomenon is not prolonged indefinitely and does not cause the currency to plunge anew, it is an acceptable strategy for both banks and the government. In fact, it could form a fertile ground for Turkish banks’ stock prices to start rising from the ashes, at least relative to other emerging markets. Fiscal Deficit Financing By Banks: Poison Or Painkiller? Diagnosing a patient in critical condition and prescribing the right medicine is a complex task. Assessing monetary conditions in a financial crisis-stricken economy and determining the correct policy mix is no different. While monetary tightening may be the right medicine for some parts of the economy, monetary easing can be appropriate for others parts. In fact, this is what is currently happening in Turkey. There is a dichotomy occurring between monetary easing for the government (in the local currency bond market) and monetary tightening for companies and households. Chart 3 demonstrates that local currency broad money growth now slightly exceeds bank loan growth. One of the reasons for this is that banks are literally creating money by purchasing government securities. With a low likelihood of default and a yield of 20%, government securities are currently attractive for Turkish banks. On the surface, government deficit financing via money creation by banks might seem like a recipe for higher inflation. Yet, we have to put this phenomenon in the context of current cyclical economic conditions in Turkey. The economy is on the precipice of a major recession which will likely produce a major deflationary shockwave. Money and credit growth in real terms is negative (Chart I-3, bottom panel). In addition, government expenditures in real terms are now contracting, suggesting that fiscal policy is tight (Chart I-4). Furthermore, government debt levels are low – total public debt stands at 31% of GDP. This means that fiscal expansion is a lever that authorities can and should be using. Chart I-3Turkey: Money And Loan Growth Are Negative In Real Terms Turkey: Money And Loan Growth Are Negative In Real Terms Turkey: Money And Loan Growth Are Negative In Real Terms Chart I-4Turkey: Fiscal Policy Is Tight Turkey: Fiscal Policy Is Tight Turkey: Fiscal Policy Is Tight Hence, we infer that banks’ financing of government expenditures are not excessive from a macro perspective; particularly when considering the currently heightened recessionary crosscurrents. Bottom Line: The expansion of Turkish banks’ purchases of government bonds are capping local bond yields and, on the margin, allowing the government to support the economy. Given the backdrop of a severe recession, we view this as a stabilizing factor – a painkiller rather than a poison. Monetary Tightening In The Real Economy Commercial banks have substantially tightened financing to companies and households. Interest rates on bank loans to businesses and consumers have risen much more than the central bank’s policy rate. The former are now 850 basis points higher than the latter (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-5Turkey: Tight Monetary Conditions In The Real Economy Turkey: Tight Monetary Conditions In The Real Economy Turkey: Tight Monetary Conditions In The Real Economy In real terms (deflated by core CPI), commercial bank loan interest rates are now 8% (Chart I-5, bottom panel). High real bank loan rates charged to households and companies will cause domestic demand to collapse – despite a real policy rate at zero. Provided economic activity is already shrinking, it will be difficult for debtors to achieve a hurdle real rate of 8%. This is already producing a collapse in loan demand and a material retrenchment in consumer and business spending. A statistical regression of economic activity variables on the change in borrowing costs demonstrates that the Turkish economy is in for a severe recession across all sectors, with capital expenditures being the hardest hit (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Turkey: The Recession Will Be Severe Turkey: The Recession Will Be Severe Turkey: The Recession Will Be Severe A cheapened currency and high borrowing costs are the correct medicine for the nation’s deep economic imbalances – i.e. its large and persistent current account deficits. In fact, the real economy has already been adjusting: the current account excluding oil is starting to narrow (refer to Chart I-2 on page 2). This together with cheap valuations may help put a floor under the lira (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Turkish Lira Is Cheap The Turkish Lira Is Cheap The Turkish Lira Is Cheap Bottom Line: Interest rates on bank loans have increased much more than the central bank policy rate and are sufficiently high in real terms, foreshadowing a severe, but necessary, domestic demand contraction. Go Long Turkish Banks / Short EM Banks There appears to be a relative tactical opportunity to go long Turkish banks while shorting EM banks. Relative share prices in dollar terms between Turkish and EM banks are at an all-time low (Chart I-8). Odds are that Turkish banks will outperform for the time being. Chart I-8Long Turkish Banks / Short EM Banks Long Turkish Banks / Short EM Banks Long Turkish Banks / Short EM Banks Not only are Turkish banks charging a large spread on loans relative to the policy rate, they are also enjoying a wide net interest rate spread – lending rates minus deposit rates. In fact, Turkish banks’ net interest rate spread is presently the highest in recorded history (Chart I-9, top panel). This is very positive for banks’ net interest margins (NIM) – net interest income as percent of loans - and earnings (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Chart I-9Turkish Banks' Margins Are Widening Turkish Banks' Margins Are Widening Turkish Banks' Margins Are Widening In addition, banks’ purchases of government bonds allows them to expand their balance sheets and earn a yield that is around 20%. Given the government’s low credit risk, this is also positive for banks’ profits. On the negative side, non-performing loans (NPLs) are set to surge. Therefore, any investment consideration should take into account banks’ equity erosion due to surging NPLs. Turkish banks are presently extremely under-provisioned, as illustrated in Chart I-10. Yet their share prices have already plunged substantially, discounting a higher level of NPLs than banks have acknowledged and provisioned for. Chart I-10Turkey: NPLs Are Set To Surge Turkey: NPLs Are Set To Surge Turkey: NPLs Are Set To Surge We have performed a credit stress test for the Turkish banking system. The scenario analysis shown in Table I-1 illustrates that banks’ share prices are already pricing in a significant amount of bad news regarding the NPL cycle. For example, in a scenario where the non-performing credit assets (NPCA) ratio rises to 20% from its current 3.5% level, bank stocks would be fairly valued at current levels. Table I-1Credit Stress Test For Turkish Banks Turkish Monetary Demagoguery: A Thing Of The Past? Turkish Monetary Demagoguery: A Thing Of The Past? Considering that the NPL-to-total-loan ratio reached 18% after the 2001 currency crisis, we believe 20% is a reasonable estimate. The key difference between now and the 2001 crisis is that woes in 2001 were related to unsustainable government debt, while Turkey’s present problems stem from excessive private debt. This valuation part of the stress test assumes that the fair value for the price-to-book value (PBV) ratio adjusted for all credit losses is 1.3 - the average PBV ratio for EM banks since 2011. In short, banks’ stock prices are currently trading close to their fair value assuming 20% NPCA (Table I-1). In all scenarios, we assume a recovery rate of 40%. In terms of structural valuations, using our model for the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio, Turkish banks are currently trading at two standard deviations below their fair value in absolute terms, and two-and-half standard deviations relative to the other EM banks (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Turkish Bank Stocks Are Cheap Turkish Bank Stocks Are Cheap Turkish Bank Stocks Are Cheap Given that we expect an additional selloff in EM risk assets, Turkish bank stocks will likely relapse in absolute terms. This is why we recommend a market-neutral bet. In short, we expect more downside in the share price of EM banks than in Turkish ones for now. Investment Conclusions Given our overarching negative view on emerging markets as a whole, we are reluctant to be bullish on Turkish risk assets in absolute terms. The basis behind why we are not upgrading our stance on Turkey’s overall stock index is as follows: Non-financials companies are about to experience severe profit shrinkage as the recession deepens. Conversely, contraction in banks’ earnings will be mitigated by a very wide NIM and an increased financing of the government at yields above 20%. In addition, we expect EM currencies and high-yielding local bonds to resume their selloff, and corporate and sovereign credit spreads to widen. Given Turkey has historically been a high-beta market, it is difficult to bet on its financial markets outperforming EM peers in a bear market. Finally, the recent rebound in Turkish markets was from quite oversold levels and is currently facing its first technical resistance (Chart I-12). Chart I-12The Lira And Local Government Bonds Are Facing Their First Technical Resistance The Lira And Local Government Bonds Are Facing Their First Technical Resistance The Lira And Local Government Bonds Are Facing Their First Technical Resistance Overall, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to Turkey for EM dedicated equity investors, as well as local currency bond and credit portfolios. Nevertheless, to express a selective positive bias toward this depressed market versus other EMs, we recommend a relative equity trade: Long Turkish banks / short EM banks, currency unhedged. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Box 1 How Banks Create Money By Purchasing Assets From A Non-Bank Entity We demonstrate, in a stylized example, how a commercial bank (Bank 1) creates a new deposit in the banking system – which consists of two banks (Bank 1 and Bank 2) - when it purchases a bond from an investor (Investor A) that is a non-bank. For simplicity, we presume that this is the only transaction in the banking system on that day. All numbers we cite here are local currency values and all transactions take place in local currency. We assume at the beginning of Day 1 that both Bank 1 and Bank 2 each have excess reserves (ERs) of 1000 and existing deposits of 1000 (Figure I-1). Hence, the overall banking system ERs amount to 2000 and total deposits are equal to 2000. Figure I-1Begining Of Day 1 Balance Sheet & Transactions Turkish Monetary Demagoguery: A Thing Of The Past? Turkish Monetary Demagoguery: A Thing Of The Past? As Bank 1 purchases a bond at the price of 300 from Investor A, the following balance sheet accounting entries take place (these entries are shown in red in Figure I-1): Bank 1 acquires a bond and its assets now include a bond valued at 300. Investor A has an account at Bank 2, so to pay for this purchase Bank 1 transfers 300 from its ERs to Bank 2’s ERs account at the central bank. Bank 1 ERs decline by 300. Hence, its assets and liabilities have not changed – it has just swapped 300 in ERs with 300 in bond (Figure I-1). Bank 2 credits Investor A’s deposit account by 300. Hence, Investor A received a deposit valued at 300 that it previously did not have. This is a new deposit for the whole banking system that was created “out of thin air”. Bank 2’s ERs and hence its total assets have risen by 300. This rise in Bank 2’s assets is balanced by the increase of its deposit by 300 (Figure I-2). In brief, this deposit is nothing more than an accounting entry to balance Bank 2’s assets and liabilities. Yet, deposits represent money and give their holders purchasing power. Figure I-2End Of Day 1 Balance Sheet Turkish Monetary Demagoguery: A Thing Of The Past? Turkish Monetary Demagoguery: A Thing Of The Past? Assuming that during the day there was no other transaction in this banking system, the latter’s ERs have remained unchanged at 2000 yet its total deposits have risen from 2000 to 2300. A new deposit worth 300 was created without the central bank providing any funding (new ERs) to the banking system. Money supply is the sum of all deposits in the banking system and commercial banks create deposits “out of thin air” when they lend to non-banks or purchase assets from non-banks. As such, banks do not need to reduce private sector lending to fund the government. In other words, no “crowding out” of the private sector needs to take place for banks to buy government bonds.   Footnotes 1      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Alert "Turkey: Booking Profits On Shorts," dated August 15, 2018, the link available on page 14. 2      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Turkey's Monetary Demagoguery," dated June 1, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com   Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights So What? A collapse in Venezuelan oil production could cause Brent prices to average $92/bbl next year. Why? Venezuelan oil output is in freefall. Years of mismanagement constrain its production potential, severely denting government revenues. External debt is sky-high. Venezuela faces challenges in repaying its obligations. China and Russia are unlikely to provide the large-scale subsidies necessary to stabilize the regime over a long period. The United States is unlikely to lift sanctions anytime soon. Rather they may expand them. Feature "PDVSA is red, red from top to bottom." - Former Energy Minister Rafael Ramí­rez "It has been an interesting activity, working without payment." - Sergio Requensa, President of the Corporation of Intermediary Industries, on volunteer groups trying to boost oil output. Global oil prices have fallen by 28.5% since their peak on October 4. While the world awaits OPEC 2.0's meeting on December 6 in Vienna, it is important to remember that global spare capacity is low while serious supply risks loom in many corners of the world. One such risk is the deterioration of Venezuela's economic, political and social situation, which has already precipitated steady declines in oil production (Chart 1). The odds of halting or reversing this trend are razor thin. The Nicolás Maduro government has managed to hobble along, but there is no firm basis for projecting a stabilization either of the regime or oil output. Although it is possible that Venezuela will secure enough ad hoc funding to survive another year, we have no solid grounds for arguing that it will. Chart 1On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral In our dominant scenario of steadily declining Venezuelan output, we forecast Brent to average $82/bbl in 2019. The event of a complete collapse could push Brent prices as high as $92/bbl next year (Chart 2). Chart 2A Production Collapse Would Trigger A Price Spike A Production Collapse Would Trigger A Price Spike A Production Collapse Would Trigger A Price Spike Venezuelan Production In Freefall While Venezuelan authorities have stopped reporting official economic data, declining oil production offers clear evidence of a deepening crisis. Venezuela is a founding member of OPEC and was once one of the most prosperous Latin American countries. Decades of gross mismanagement have pushed the country into crisis. Estimated to hold the world's largest crude oil reserves (Chart 3), Venezuela's potential role in global oil markets is massive. Its oilfields have, in the past, accounted for 4% of global oil supply, but have dwindled down to 1% so far this year (Chart 4). Nevertheless, Venezuela's role should not be underestimated. Price risks could be to the upside - on the back of a collapse in output - or to the downside in the unlikely event of production restoration. For now, we project monthly declines will average 35k b/d over the coming year, ending at 681k b/d by the end of 2019. Chart 3Venezuala's Potential Is Unrivaled... Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Chart 4...But Not Captured By Its Dwindling Production Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Continued deterioration in supply comes on the back of decades of economic mismanagement at the hands of former President Hugo Chávez and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela. The failed 2002 coup attempt and related labor strikes at Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) - the state-owned oil and gas company - led to the firing of thousands of employees and their replacement with Chávez loyalists, Chavistas. This event politicized the country's economic engine, catalyzing a steady loss in capital and technical expertise. Furthermore, regulations imposed on the energy sector are unfavorable to international investors. For example, the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law stipulated a massive rise in royalties paid by foreign companies - increasing from a range of 1%-17% to 20%-30%. Today, taxes per barrel in Venezuela are the highest among the major producers and form the largest cost component per barrel of oil and gas (Chart 5). Chart 5High Tax Rate Is Unattractive Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Other damaging state actions include: A law requiring PDVSA to hold at least 60% equity in joint ventures with foreign firms investing in the Venezuelan oil sector; The nationalization of the Orinoco Belt - a highly fertile region home to the world's largest petroleum deposits; Government expropriation of foreign assets; Payment failures to international oil service companies. These events ultimately culminated in today's production freefall, which has continued despite the rebound in oil prices after 2015. Needless to say, falling revenues are deadly for petro states. Caracas relies on oil sales for 95% of the government's revenue. Falling rig counts are an ominous sign (Chart 6). Chart 6An Ominous Sign An Ominous Sign An Ominous Sign To make matters worse, export figures actually understate the dire economic situation. The U.S. EIA estimates that roughly half of Venezuela's oil exports are not generating cash! The Venezuelan government has mortgaged much of its production in exchange for loans from China and Russia in recent years. Under these loans-for-oil schemes, the government secured emergency funding to keep its ailing economy afloat, but sacrificed the long-term ability to ensure its own liquidity. This arrangement also includes shipments to the Vadinar refinery in India, which is owned by Russia's Rosneft (Chart 7). Chart 7U.S. Exports Are Main Source Of Revenue U.S. Exports Are Main Source Of Revenue U.S. Exports Are Main Source Of Revenue This leaves exports to the U.S. as the main source of revenue for the Venezuelan government. The result is a Catch-22: With fewer oil barrels to go around, Venezuela can either satisfy its foreign creditors to keep open the possibility of future lines of credit, or it can sell to the U.S. in return for badly needed cash. For the moment, Venezuela is opting for cash. Despite having been cut by ~20% since last year, exports to the U.S. appear to have hit a floor. According to EIA data, after coming in at 13.21mm bbl in February, they have rebounded slightly averaging 19mm bbl/month since June. This is occurring despite ongoing production declines. This is ultimately unsustainable, as the evidence of mismanagement goes beyond production facilities: A breakdown in domestic refining facilities has necessitated an increase in Venezuela's imports of U.S. crude. The lighter oil is needed as a diluent - to blend with Venezuela's heavy crude, facilitating transportation. This is forcing Venezuela's economy to divert scarce hard currency to these imports. In fact, imports have picked up even amid declining oil production and the deepening economic crisis. Earlier this year, PDVSA's Caribbean assets fell under risk of being handed over to ConocoPhillips as compensation for Chavez's 2007 nationalization of Conoco's facilities. These Caribbean assets include storage facilities, refineries, and export terminals on the islands of Bonaire, Curacao, St. Eustatius, and Aruba. Terminals there account for 17% of the company's exports - mainly destined for Asia (Table 1). To prevent this transfer, Venezuela has agreed to pay the American company $2 billion in compensation, $345 million of which has been paid. If these payments cannot be met, the Caribbean assets will be in jeopardy once again - and Conoco is by no means the only company preparing lawsuits to claim assets in the event of further defaults. Table 1Caribbean Assets At Risk Of Seizure Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Similarly, CITGO - PDVSA's U.S. refiner and crown jewel - is at risk to being handed over to creditors. A loss of control of CITGO would disrupt one of the most reliable sources of cash for Venezuela. While U.S. sanctions prevent CITGO from sending dividends to Venezuela, it is so far still allowed to purchase Venezuelan crude. CITGO's assets include three U.S. refineries with a total capacity of 750k b/d. To complicate matters, several creditors are claiming stakes in the refiner: Crystallex International, a Canadian mining company whose Venezuelan assets were nationalized in 2011, is making claims on CITGO. In August, a U.S. federal judge ruled in favor of Crystallex, giving it permission to seize shares of PDV Holding Inc., which owns CITGO. However, the judge also issued a temporary stay on Crystallex - which is planning to auction the shares - until an appeal is decided. If the appeal is in favor of Crystallex it will encourage additional asset grabs by aggrieved foreign companies. PDVSA has offered bond investors a 51% claim on CITGO to push back maturing payments to 2020. The remaining 49% of CITGO was put up as collateral for a $1.5 billion loan from Rosneft. The risk - which intensifies with each missed payment - is that as Venezuela defaults on its debts, more of its facilities will be seized, further reducing its production, refining, and export potential. This would ultimately accelerate the total collapse of Venezuelan output. Bottom Line: Venezuelan oil production is steadily crumbling. Almost two decades of mismanagement have preceded this outcome and, as such, it cannot be reversed easily. We expect monthly declines to average 35k b/d, with the probability of a complete collapse in output rising with each passing day. A Macroeconomic Mess Venezuelans today are paying the price for the unsustainable external debt amassed over the past decade (Chart 8). Estimates of external debt place it around a staggering $150-$200 billion! Sovereign and PDVSA bonds due next year are estimated to be about $9 billion (Chart 9). This does not even account for payments due from other forms of debt (Table 2). Chart 8Debt Levels Are Unsustainable Debt Levels Are Unsustainable Debt Levels Are Unsustainable Chart 9It's Payback Time Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Table 2Yikes! Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Total reserves leave little room for optimism (Chart 10). They now stand at less than $10 billion, down from $43 billion less than a decade ago. Chart 10Reserves Cannot Lend Support Reserves Cannot Lend Support Reserves Cannot Lend Support In projecting the country's ability to make payments in 2019, we looked at several oil-price and production scenarios. All scenarios point to default, as shown in Table 3. Even in the optimistic scenario in which production is flat (which is highly unlikely given that it has been declining at an average monthly rate of 47k b/d so far this year), the country needs $14.8 billion in foreign exchange reserves to cover rising PDVSA expenses plus debt-service costs and its total import bill. This will put Venezuela $6 billion in the red. Table 3All Roads Lead To Default Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop This forecast would become even more somber if we were to include payments due on other forms of debt (e.g. private bonds, loans, etc), for which there is no published repayment schedule. Stability is entirely out of reach for the Venezuelan government alone. Maduro's recovery plan announced earlier this year will do nothing to combat the root of the crisis. For instance, the launch of a cryptocurrency - the "petro" - that is backed by five billion barrels of oil reserves, to which the bolivar will be pegged, is not a viable solution.1 In fact, Venezuela's policy options are extremely limited. Only a massive show of support from China and Russia can realistically bring about a substantial improvement. This would require a commitment to pay: (1) debt servicing and import costs; (2) the operating costs of PDVSA and the funds needed to preserve CITGO and other critical assets; (3) the funding of new investment required to revive the oil sector. Over the past decade, China and Russia have provided loans worth ~ $60 billion and ~ $20 billion, respectively. Of these loans, an estimated $28.1 billion and $9.1 billion remain outstanding for China and Russia, respectively.2 Venezuela has paid off not quite half of its debts to these powerful patrons. The last Chinese loan was in 2016. China stopped the credit tap throughout 2017 and most of 2018 amid Venezuelan instability. While China expressed its intention to extend a $5 billion loan in September, this amount is small by comparison with the double-digit billions of loans and direct investment that China provided annually from 2009-15. It would not cover Venezuela's shortfall of funding in our three scenarios even if it were devoted entirely to paying immediate obligations. Moreover, the Chinese loan has not been finalized.3 Thus, China's diplomatic "return" to Venezuela suggests that Beijing is not willing to provide the large-scale subsidies necessary to stabilize the regime over a long period. Indeed, China's state oil firm Sinopec has joined other foreign companies in suing Venezuela for unpaid debts!4 Moreover, Chinese and Russian funds are hardly likely to exceed the large amount invested over the past decade - and those amounts did not prevent Venezuela from falling into its current crisis. Russia is no longer capable of fully financing a satellite state in the way the Soviet Union financed Cuba in the twentieth century. It is hoping that China will foot most of the bill. While China is probably able to do so in cash terms, it is so far unwilling to pay the strategic price of setting up a Soviet-style power struggle with the United States in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.5 Indeed, plowing tens of billions of additional dollars into Venezuela may be unwise if the U.S. reverts back to its tried and tested strategy of directly intervening in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries. Venezuela, being in South America and on the Atlantic coast, is too far away for China to secure in the event of a showdown with the United States. As such, Beijing must understand that any investment in Venezuela could one day become stranded capital in a traditionally American sphere of influence. In fact, China is concentrated on building its own sphere of influence in Asia. While Venezuela is nominally part of the expansive Belt and Road Initiative, the latter is ultimately directed at making China's outward investment more coherent and expanding influence on the Eurasian continent. Neither of these aims is all that favorable for Venezuela. While China certainly wants privileged access to Venezuelan oil, it does not "need" Venezuelan crude for supply security in the way that is often implied. It frequently re-sells the oil on global markets. Nevertheless, Russia and China can offer debt restructuring and relief. Out of the $9 billion outstanding that is owed to Russia, Moscow has agreed to restructure $3.15 billion to be paid over ten years. Other such restructuring deals could be forthcoming (although, notably, China did not agree to a restructuring when Maduro visited in September). Restructuring will not work with U.S. bondholders. The U.S. imposed sanctions on August 24, 2017 seem to prevent U.S. holders of Venezuelan bonds from participating in such arrangements. The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control is unlikely to lift sanctions anytime soon.6 More likely, the United States will expand sanctions, as U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton indicated in a speech in Miami on November 2. There he dubbed Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua the "troika of tyranny" in the western hemisphere. Possible sanctions include: First, the Trump administration has moved to restrict purchases of Venezuelan gold, as the government has been increasing exports to Turkey (and likely China).7 Trump is considering putting Venezuela on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which will cut off aid and loans. Second, the financial sanctions announced in 2017 could be expanded to cover existing debts, the trading of government and PDVSA bonds on secondary markets, and CITGO's newly issued debt - all areas that the Department of Treasury has so far exempted. Third, sanctions on tanker insurance could impede Venezuela's ability to transport its oil to international destinations. Venezuela does not have the tanker capacity to ship its own oil. Fourth, in the most extreme case, restrictions on U.S. imports of crude oil could punish the Maduro administration. The U.S. is reluctant to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and deal with its second-round effects. But it could ultimately use its leverage as importer to insist that its companies are compensated, one way or another, for Venezuelan defaults. Technically alternative buyers could absorb Venezuela's heavy crude, but the loss of the U.S.'s cash-generating imports would pile more pressure onto an already wobbling regime. Bottom Line: Venezuela has been relying on ad hoc funding to survive thus far. Loans in exchange for oil are now eating up its revenues. President Maduro's recovery plan does not address the root causes of the ongoing macroeconomic mess. All scenarios point to insolvency. A Regime Change Is In Order Hyperinflation and the absence of basic necessities have left Venezuelans pessimistic about their country's future (Chart 11). This is not surprising: A staggering 87% of households are estimated to be below the national poverty line, most of whom are in extreme poverty. GDP per capita is half the level it was only a decade ago (Chart 12). These are the ingredients of a revolutionary brew. Chart 11The Outlook Isn't Rosy The Outlook Isn't Rosy The Outlook Isn't Rosy Chart 12Purchasing Power Has Been Slashed By Half Purchasing Power Has Been Slashed By Half Purchasing Power Has Been Slashed By Half The deepening humanitarian and economic crisis is causing one of the largest outflows of emigrants in recent years. According to the United Nations, 2.6 million Venezuelans live abroad and 1.9 million of them have left since 2015 (Chart 13). Chart 13Venezuelans Are Fleeing Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop Venezuela: What Cannot Go On Forever Will Stop The crisis has naturally translated into a massive shift in public opinion against the regime (Chart 14). Maduro's reelection for a second term in May occurred in an environment in which the opposition boycotted the elections and voter turnout was reported at just 46.1%, hardly half of the 80% rate in 2013. Venezuelans have also lost faith in the armed forces and police, which have buttressed the current regime (Chart 15). Chart 14Maduro Lacks Support Maduro Lacks Support Maduro Lacks Support Chart 15Loss Of Faith In Security Institutions Loss Of Faith In Security Institutions Loss Of Faith In Security Institutions Opposition parties do not have the power to force a transition to a new government, but under today's extreme circumstances they are not as divided as they were in the past. They all support regime change, domestic resistance, and international pressure. All have refused to participate in any dialogue unless it is to discuss the terms of Maduro's resignation. This means that a fracture within the regime, or an external factor like U.S. action, could tip the balance. Could a military coup provide the way out of the current morass? Ultimately, yes, in the sense that the military is the ultimate arbiter of Venezuelan society over the course of history. But short-term investors should not hold their breath. The Maduro regime has managed to survive as long as it has by ceding ever more power to the army, meaning that, in a sense, the coup has already occurred. Food distribution and oil production are now directly under the control of the military. Once the regime becomes completely fiscally defunct, military leaders may pin the blame on Maduro and reshape or expunge the Socialist Party. The timing, however, is nearly impossible to predict other than to emphasize that the current situation is unsustainable and we do not believe that Beijing will ride to the rescue. One foreboding sign is that Maduro has authorized hikes to domestic gasoline prices, which are heavily subsidized. A hike of this nature prompted the Caracazo social unrest in 1989, which helped motivate the attempted coups of 1992. Another option may be direct U.S. action. While the U.S. has been reluctant to intervene in Latin America since the short-lived, albeit successful, 1989 intervention in Panama, President Trump did raise the idea of a "military option" in August 2017.8 While Trump's comments were largely ignored, and subsequently opposed by the Pentagon itself, the reorientation of U.S. policy towards confronting China may convince the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment to view Venezuela through the prism of a new Cold War. As such, and especially if the humanitarian crisis grows, investors should not completely dismiss the possibility of a U.S. military-backed coup in Venezuela.9 Bottom Line: Opposition parties are not as divided as they were in the past, in a sign that the current regime is failing to maintain control. Given the unsustainability of the economic situation and the military's ever-growing role, odds are in favor of an army takeover at some point. The relevant takeaway for investors is that things will have to get worse before that occurs - adding pressure on global oil supply and leading to additional debt defaults. Investment Implications Declining Venezuelan oil production will continue weighing on global supply. We model monthly production declines of 35kb/d as the dominant scenario in our supply-demand balances. On this basis, we expect Brent to average $82/bbl in 2019 and WTI to trade $6/bbl below that. A complete collapse in Venezuelan production next year could push prices much higher - up to $92/bbl and $86/bbl for Brent and WTI, respectively. While an eventual production collapse is inevitable, Venezuela may be able to hobble along for another year through ad hoc funding. Thus, a premium will be priced into global oil markets in 2019 on the back of falling Venezuelan production - and the risk of its collapse. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Associate pavelb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The U.S. is already considering sanctions targeting the cryptocurrency. Please see Franco Ordonez, "Top lawmakers in Congress push tough new measures against Venezuela," September 24, 2018, available at www.mcclatchydc.com. For the text of an earlier proposal please see "Venezuela Humanitarian Relief, Reconstruction, and Rule of Law Act of 2018," introduced into the Senate by Senator Robert Menendez (D, NJ) on the foreign relations committee, S. 3486 at www.congress.gov. 2 Please see "Venezuela: Deuda externa per capita del sector público," Prodavinci, available at especiales.prodavinci.com. 3 Please see "China y Rusia desconfían del régimen chavista y aumentan la supervisión de sus inversiones en Caracas," PD América, October 31, 2018, available at www.periodistadigital.com. 4 Please see Jonathan Wheatley, "Sinopec settles with Venezuela's PDVSA, ending 5-year dispute," Financial Times, December 12, 2017, available at www.ft.com. 5 The Monroe Doctrine was reinforced specifically in relation to Venezuela by the "Roosevelt Corollary" in 1902-03. Recently the United States has reasserted the Monroe Doctrine in the face of a widespread perception that China has gained strategic ground on the continent, namely in Venezuela. Please see Vice President Mike Pence, "Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China," the White House, October 4, 2018, available at www.whitehouse.gov. 6 On the contrary, sanctions are expanding. Please see U.S. Treasury Department, "Treasury Targets Venezuelan President Maduro's Inner Circle and Proceeds of Corruption in the United States," September 25, 2018, available at home.treasury.gov. 7 Please see the White House, "Executive Order Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela," November 1, 2018, available at www.whitehouse.gov. 8 Please see Jeremy Diamond, "Trump asked advisers about invading Venezuela in 2017," CNN, July 5, 2018; and Dan Merica, "Trump says he won't rule out military option in Venezuela," CNN, August 11, 2017, both available at www.cnn.com. 9 Even the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, has refused to rule out any options, including military intervention. Pro-Maduro commentators have claimed that the U.S., along with Colombia and other enemies of the regime, supported the apparent attempt to assassinate Maduro by drones in August this year. Please see "Venezuela President Maduro survives 'drone assassination attempt,'" BBC, August 5, 2018, available at www.bbc.com. The New York Times has also reported that the Trump administration sent officials to "listen" to rebel Venezuelan military officers proposing a coup attempt. Please see Ernesto Londono and Nicholas Casey, "Trump Administration Discussed Coup Plans With Rebel Venezuelan Officers," NYT, September 8, 2018, available at www.nytimes.com. We Read (And Liked)... The Great Leveler: Violence And The History Of Inequality From The Stone Age To The Twenty-First Century Professor Walter Scheidel's opus - The Great Leveler - introduces the "Four Horsemen" of equality: warfare, revolution, state collapse, and pandemics.10 These four factors, he argues, explain all significant levelling of wealth and income throughout history. And by history, Scheidel really means all of human history. The thesis behind The Great Leveler is that only through the "aid" of the Four Horsemen has wealth ever been distributed more evenly in human societies. In every grand passage in history, one of the four terrible afflictions has tipped the scales away from capital and landholders and in favor of laborers. Otherwise, when there is not war, revolution, state collapse, or pandemics, capital and landholders acquire sufficient wealth and political capital to stave off any attempts at leveling. Scheidel's focus on World War I and II is particularly interesting. He controversially argues that the prosperity and equality that prevailed in the western world after these wars was to a great extent the product of government measures imposed in order to win the conflict. These included nationalization, direct intervention in production, fiscal policy, and inflationary monetary policy. Mass mobilization necessary to wage and win a total war left western societies, and Japan, "levelled" by the time the wars ended. BCA Research was honored to have Professor Scheidel attend our annual Investment Conference in Toronto this September. In the talk, he warned the room full of investors to "be careful what you wish for," since the suppression of inequality has "only ever brought forth sorrow." Furthermore, Scheidel rejected the hypothesis that wealth and income inequality bring about their own demise. They usually grow unchecked until one of the Four Horsemen appears exogenously. The takeaway from Scheidel's work is that income and wealth inequality are, according to the scales of human history, essentially part of human existence. As such, one should neither fret too much about them nor worry that they will lead to serious efforts to curb them. There are two weaknesses in this argument. First, the book is primarily a treatise on medieval history. The vast amount of empirical evidence that Scheidel has carefully collected occurred before societies became democratic, and specifically before universal suffrage. While Scheidel focuses on the effects of the world wars in the twentieth century as the causes of modern leveling, he barely mentions the role played by the spread of the electoral franchise during and after the conflicts. And it is true that democracy has not prevented the rise of income inequality in much of the developed world since the 1980s - that is, since the laissez-faire revolution. However, the end to that story is yet to be written. Which brings us to the second weakness: Scheidel dismisses GINI coefficient data on income inequality. It does not support his thesis. For example, his tables show that the "market GINI" of many western European countries is as high as that in the United States. However, after accounting for redistributive effects, it is in many cases significantly lower. Instead, Scheidel focuses on the wealth accruing to the top 1%. But again, continental European countries have experienced much lower concentration of wealth than the laissez-faire economies of the U.K. and the United States. Yes, there is growth in concentration even in the social democracies of Europe, but it is at a much slower pace than in the countries that have been the most committed adherents of the Reagan-Thatcher revolution. The greatest failing of Scheidel's thesis is that it lacks nuance when it comes to the modern era. Its parsimony over the course of human history is astounding and commendable - it is what makes this a true magnum opus of social science. However, the real world is rarely as parsimonious. The facts are quite different from the theory. Chart 1 shows that the wealth accruing to the top 10% of income distribution in France was higher in the 1950-1970 era than in the U.S., and much higher than in the United Kingdom. Then, the supply-side revolution took hold in the Anglo-Saxon world, while France pursued policies that sought to reverse the causes of the May 1968 social angst. The shift in wealth distribution was jarring. Chart 1No Horsemen Here, Just Social Democracy No Horsemen Here, Just Social Democracy No Horsemen Here, Just Social Democracy From this one example we can draw two conclusions. First, Scheidel is wrong when he says that the march of income inequality is inevitable. It clearly has not been in western Europe in recent memory. Second, Scheidel is also wrong when he argues that the march of income inequality is irreversible. France was once a right-of-center country ruled by elites who saw revenues accrue to their capital and wealth holdings. Then, all hell broke loose in the country, with teenage Baby Boomers joining up with common workers in a (relatively) bloodless socialist revolution. Rather than adopt laissez-faire capitalism with vigor, French policymakers adopted wealth and income taxes that reversed the rising share of income accruing to the top 10%. Only today, after decades of a deliberately orchestrated and significant leveling, are policymakers in France looking in a different direction. Scheidel claims that his book is pessimistic, but that of course depends on the audience. Our audiences tend to be made up of investors, i.e. of savers. As such, Scheidel's thesis is in fact joyous! A historical opus that proves, without a doubt, that income inequality is irreversible short of apocalypse!? Sounds too good to be true! It is. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 10 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 504 pages.

Highlights Gold's performance during the "Red October" equities sell-off, coupled with that of the most widely followed gold ratios (copper- and oil-to-gold), indicates investors and commodity traders are not pricing in a sharp contraction in global growth. These ratios are, however, picking up divergent trends in EM and DM growth (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields Gold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields Gold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields In the oil markets, the Trump Administration appears to have blinked on its Iran oil-export sanctions. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days (Chart 2).1 The higher-than-expected number of waivers indicates the Trump Administration is aligned with our view that the global oil market is extremely tight, despite the recent production increases from OPEC 2.0 and the U.S.2 The U.S. State Department, in particular, apparently did not want to test the ability of OPEC spare capacity - mostly held by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) - to cover the combined losses of Iranian exports, Venezuela's collapse, and unplanned random production outages. No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Chart 2Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Energy: Overweight. Iran's exports are reportedly down ~ 1mm b/d from April's pre-sanction levels of ~ 2.5mm b/d. We assume Iran's exports will fall 1.25mm b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Close to 45k MT of copper was delivered to LME warehouses last week, according to Metal Bulletin's Fastmarkets. This was the largest delivery into LME-approved warehouses since April 7, 1989. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is trading close to fair value, while the most widely followed gold ratios - copper- and oil-to-gold - indicate global demand is holding up. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's crop report shows the corn harvest accelerated at the start of November, reaching 76% vs. 68% a year ago. Feature Gold Ratios Suggest Continued Growth Gold is trading mostly in line with our fair-value model, based on estimates using the broad trade-weighted USD and U.S. real rates (Chart 3).3 Safe-haven demand - e.g., buying prompted by the fear of a global slowdown or a deepening of the global equity rout dubbed "Red October" in the press - does not appear to be driving gold's price away from fair value. Neither is rising volatility in the equity markets. Chart 3Gold Trading Close To Fair Value Gold Trading Close To Fair Value Gold Trading Close To Fair Value This assessment also is supported by the behavior of the widely followed gold ratios - copper-to-gold and oil-to-gold - which have become useful leading indicators of global bond yields and DM equity levels following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). From 1995 up to the GFC, the gold ratios tracked changes in the nominal yields of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds fairly closely. During this period, bond yields led the ratios as they expanded and contracted with global growth, as seen in Chart 4. Post-GFC, this relationship has reversed, and the gold ratios now lead global bond yields. Chart 4Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC To understand this better, we construct two variables to isolate the common growth-related and idiosyncratic factors driving these ratios over the long term, particularly following the GFC.4 The common factor is labeled growth vs. safe-haven in the accompanying charts. It consistently tracks changes in global bond yields and DM equities, which also follow global GDP growth closely. If investors were fleeing economically sensitive assets and buying the safe haven of gold, the correlation between these variables would fall. As it happens, the strong correlation held up well following the "Red October" equities rout, indicating investors have not become overly risk-averse or fearful global growth is taking a downturn. When regressing our proxy for global 10-year yields and the U.S. 10-year yields on the growth vs. safe-haven factor, we found this factor explains a significantly larger part of the variation in global yields than U.S. bond yields alone (Chart 5).5 This common factor also is highly correlated with DM equity variability (Chart 6). Chart 5Gold Ratios' Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields ... Gold Ratios" Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields... Gold Ratios" Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields... Chart 6... And DM Equities ... And DM Equities ... And DM Equities The second, or idiosyncratic, factor we constructed, captures the fundamental drivers that impact each of the gold ratios through supply-demand fundamentals in the copper and oil markets, and EM vs. DM economic performance. The latter is proxied using EM equity returns relative to DM returns.6 This analysis shows oil outperforms copper in periods of rising DM and slowing EM economic growth (Chart 7). Our analysis also indicates this idiosyncratic factor explains the divergence of the gold ratios seen in 2018: Copper demand is heavily influenced by EM demand, particularly China, which accounts for ~ 50% of global copper demand, but less than 15% of global oil demand. Oil demand - some 100mm b/d - is much more affected by the evolution of global GDP. Chart 7Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors At the moment, this idiosyncratic factor is driving both ratios apart because of: Relative economic underperformance of EM vs. DM, which favors oil over copper; and Persistent fears of escalating Sino-U.S. trade tensions, which are weighing on copper. Price-supportive supply-shocks in the oil market (sanctions on Iranian oil exports, falling Venezuelan production) and still-strong demand continue to drive oil prices. These dynamics likely will remain in place for the foreseeable future (1H19), which will favor oil over copper. Gold Ratios As Leading Indicators To round out our analysis, we looked at causal relationships between the performance of financial assets - EM and DM stocks and bonds - and the gold ratios.7 From 1995 to 2008, the causality ran from stocks and bond yields to our growth vs. safe-haven factor for the gold ratios. However, since 2009, causality has gone from the common factor to bond yields (Table 1). Table 1Granger-Causality Results Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market In our view, this suggests that the widely traded industrial commodities - copper and oil being the premier examples of such commodities - convey important economic information on the state of the global economy, as a result of their respective price-formation processes.8 It also suggests that in the post-GFC world, commodity markets assumed a larger role in discounting the impacts on the real economy of the numerous monetary experiments of central banks in the post-GFC era. Bottom Line: Our analysis of the factors driving the copper- and oil-to-gold ratios supports our view that demand for cyclical commodities - mainly oil and metals - is still strong. The behavior of our idiosyncratic factor leads us to favor oil over copper due to the rising EM vs. DM divergence, and the price-supportive supply dynamics in the oil market.   Waivers On U.S. Sanctions Roil Oil Markets A week ago, we cautioned clients to "expect more volatility" on the back of news leaks the Trump administration was considering granting waivers to importers of Iranian crude oil, just before the sanctions kicked in this week. We certainly got it. Since hitting $86.1/bbl in early October, Brent crude oil prices have fallen $15.4/bbl (18%), as markets attempt to price in how much Iranian oil is covered by the sanctions and when importers can expect to see it arrive. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days. This was a higher-than-expected number of waivers than we - and, given the volatility in prices - the market was expecting. This pushed down the elevated risk premium, which had been supporting prices over the past few months.9 The combined imports of these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d, according to Bloomberg estimates. The loss of these volumes in a market that was progressively tightening as OPEC 2.0 brought more of its spare capacity on line - while the USD continued to strengthen - likely would have driven the local-currency cost of fuel steadily higher (Chart 8). Because they are a de facto supply increase - albeit temporary, based on Trump Administration statements - they also will restrain price hikes in EM generally, barring an unplanned outage in 1H19 (Chart 9). Chart 8Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms \ Chart 9Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Although it is obvious Iranian sales will recover some of the ~ 1mm b/d of exports lost in the run-up to the re-imposition of sanctions, it is not clear how much will be recovered. We believe the 180-day effective period for the waivers most likely was sought by KSA and Russia to give them time to bring on additional capacity to cover Iranian export losses. Markets will find out just how much spare capacity these states have in 1H19. By 2H19, additional production out of the U.S. from the Permian Basin will hit the market, as transportation bottlenecks are alleviated. This will allow U.S. exports to increase as well. However, it's not clear how much of this can get to export markets, given most of the dredging work needed to accommodate very large crude carriers (VLCCs) in the U.S. Gulf Coast has yet to be done. This could explain why the WTI - Cushing vs. WTI - Midland differentials are narrowing, while WTI spreads vs. Brent remain wide (Chart 10). Chart 10WTI Spreads Diverge WTI Spreads Diverge WTI Spreads Diverge It is important to note the market still is exposed to greater-than-expected declines in Venezuela's production, and to any unplanned outage anywhere in the world. OPEC spare capacity is 1.3mm b/d, according to the EIA and IEA, and most of that is in KSA. Russia probably has another 200k b/d or so it can bring on line. These production increases both are undertaking are cutting deeply into spare capacity, as the Paris-based International Energy Agency noted in its October 2018 Oil Market Report: Looking ahead, more supply might be forthcoming. Saudi Arabia has stated it already raised output to 10.7 mb/d in October, although at the cost of reducing spare capacity to 1.3 mb/d. Russia has also signaled it could increase production further if the market needs more oil. Their anticipated response, along with continued growth from the US, might be enough to meet demand in the fourth quarter. However, spare capacity would fall to extremely low levels as a percentage of global demand, leaving the oil market vulnerable to major disruptions elsewhere (p. 17). Bottom Line: We expected continued crude-oil price volatility, as markets sort out the U.S. waivers on Iranian oil imports. The supply side of the market remains tight, and spare capacity is being eroded by production increases. We believe OPEC 2.0 will use the 180 days contained in the waivers to mobilize additional production. How much of this becomes available is yet to be determined. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "As U.S. starts oil sanctions against Iran, major buyers get waivers," published by reuters.com November 5, 2018. 2 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia. Please see "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity" for our most recent supply-demand balances and price assessments, published October 25 by Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We use the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) and U.S. inflation-adjusted real rates as explanatory variables in these models. As Chart 3 indicates, actual gold prices are in line with these variables. 4 The first factor accounts for ~ 80% of the variation in the gold ratios. The second idiosyncratic factor, which captures (1) supply-demand fundamentals in the oil and copper markets, and (2) divergences in global growth using EM vs. DM equities as proxies, accounts for the remaining ~ 20% of the variation. 5 Throughout this report, we proxy global yield by summing the yield on the 10-year German Bunds, Japanese Government Bonds and U.S. Treasurys. Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "The 'Rule Of 4' For Equities And Bonds," dated August 2, 2018. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com. The adjusted R2 in the global yield model is 0.94 compared to 0.88 for the U.S. Treasury model. 6 Using MSCI Emerging Market Index and MSCI Word Index price index. 7 To conduct this analysis, we use a statistical technique developed by the 2003 Nobel laureate, Clive Granger. The eponymous Granger-causality test is used to see whether one variable (i.e., time series) can be said to precede the other in terms of occurrence in time. This test measures information in the variables, particularly the effect of information from the preceding variable on the following variable. Please see Granger, C.W.J. (1980). "Testing for Causality, Personal Viewpoint,"Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2 (pp. 329 - 352). 8 This assessment is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the literature on which is countably infinite at this point. Sewell notes: "A market is said to be efficient with respect to an information set if the price 'fully reflects' that information set (Fama, 1970), i.e. if the price would be unaffected by revealing the information set to all market participants (Malkiel, 1992). The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient." The EMH has been debated and tested for decades. Please see Sewell, Martin (2011). "History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis," Research Note RN/11/04, published by University College London (UCL) Department of Computer Science. 9 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," published October 25, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market Gold Ratios Wave Off "Red October" ... Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market

Highlights In the Philippines, inflation is breaking out while the central bank is well behind the curve. Financials markets remain at risk. As a play on surging interest rates: Go short Philippine property stocks. We appraise and modify our investment strategy across all central European markets in general and Hungary in particular - where a monetary policy shift is in the making. A new trade: We recommend paying 3-year swap rates in Hungary and receiving 3-year swap rates in the euro area. Feature The Philippines: Short Real Estate Stocks Philippine stocks are on the verge of a major breakdown (Chart I-1, top panel). Meanwhile, local currency bond yields are surging (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Chart I-1Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown The Philippine economy continues to overheat, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has fallen well behind the curve. The top panel of Chart I-2 shows that both headline and core inflation measures are rising precipitously and have breached the central bank's upper target of 4% by a wide margin. Chart I-2The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve Odds are that inflation will continue to climb higher. Overall domestic demand remains reasonably strong. Noticeably, both the current and fiscal accounts are in deficit and widening (Chart I-3). A current account deficit is a form of hidden inflation. The basis is that it gauges the degree of excess domestic demand relative to the productive capacity of the economy. Chart I-3The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The roots of these macro problems stem from ultra-easy monetary and fiscal policies pursued by Filipino authorities. The BSP has kept borrowing costs low and for much longer than was warranted, and has been slow to hike rates. As a result, credit has been booming relentlessly (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Bank Loans Have Boomed... Bank Loans Have Boomed... Bank Loans Have Boomed... The fiscal authorities, on the other hand, have vigorously pursued growth-at-all-costs programs. Government spending is now growing at an annual rate of 22% (Chart I-5). Chart I-5...So Have Government Expenditures ...So Have Government Expenditures ...So Have Government Expenditures Consequently, these populist policies have created excessive domestic demand that has stoked an inflation breakout. Given Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's reluctance to cut back on fiscal expenditures, it will be up to the monetary authorities to tighten sufficiently enough to curb inflation.1 The currency was depreciating against the U.S. dollar in 2017, even as its EM peers rallied. A falling currency amid strong economic growth is generally a symptom of an overheating economy; it signals that real interest rates are low and the central bank is behind the curve. Today, the monetary authorities need to hike borrowing rates aggressively, otherwise the currency will plunge much further. The country's financial markets are quickly approaching a riot point, and local currency bond yields are already selling off as creditors are rebelling (see bottom panel of Chart I-1 on page 1). Another option the BSP could take to defend the peso without hiking rates much is to sell foreign exchange reserves. Doing so, nevertheless, will still lead to higher domestic interest rates - especially at the short end of the curve. When a central bank sells its dollar reserves, it absorbs local currency liquidity - i.e. commercial banks' excess reserves at the central bank decline. Interbank rates then rise, which pushes up short-term rates and potentially long-term ones too. This is how financial markets naturally force macro adjustments on an overheating economy when policymakers are reluctant to act. As such, Filipino share prices are now facing a major risk. Higher domestic rates amid strong loan growth will cause the economy to decelerate significantly. Certain interest rate-sensitive sectors such as vehicle sales are already shrinking. The property sector - the segment of the economy that has benefited the most from the credit binge - will be the next shoe to drop: The supply of residential real estate buildings has been booming - floor space built has risen 2.4-fold since 2003. As interest rates continue to rise, real estate and construction loans - which are still growing at a 19% annual rate - will slump. Higher borrowing costs will hurt real estate prices. Meanwhile, rent growth will decline as the economy decelerates. The slowdown in the property sector will take a heavy toll on real estate development and management companies: First, these firms' revenues and income - property sales, rental and other types of income - will decelerate significantly (Chart I-6, top panel). Chart I-6Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Second, higher interest rates will raise their interest expenses (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Remarkably, Philippine real estate stocks have remained quite resilient, despite the broad selloff in financial markets. While the former are down by 18% in dollar terms from their early 2018 peak, Chart I-7 suggests rising interest rates herald a much more pronounced drop in their prices. Chart I-7Filipino Property Stocks Are On A Cliff Filipino Real Estate Stocks Have Been Quite Resilient Filipino Real Estate Stocks Have Been Quite Resilient Besides, these property companies are also still expensive. Their price-to-book value (PBV) currently stands at 2.9. Between the years 2000 and 2005, their PBV averaged 1.6. We are therefore initiating a new trade: Short Philippine real estate stocks in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Crucially, the real estate sector makes up 27% of the Philippines MSCI index, and will therefore have a significant impact on the Philippine stock market. As to bank stocks - the other large segment of the equity market - a couple of points are in order. Commercial banks in the Philippines are exposed to the real estate sector. Hence, a slowdown in the property sector will culminate in the form of higher NPLs and provisions for bad loans on banks' balance sheets. Real estate and construction loans account for 25% of total bank loans. Crucially, NPLs and provision levels - at 1.3% and 1.9%, respectively - are very low, and have so far not risen. This is unsustainable given the magnitude of the ongoing credit boom and rising interest rates. Higher provisions will cause banks' profits and share prices to suffer materially. This will come on top of plunging net interest margins (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed As to equity valuations, this bourse is not cheap, neither in absolute terms nor relative to the EM equity benchmark - both valuation measures are neutral (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Overall, the outlook for Philippine equities as a whole remains unattractive both in absolute terms, as well as relative to the EM benchmark. Bottom Line: EM equity portfolios should continue underweighting this bourse. We are also initiating a new trade: Going short Philippine real estate stocks in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Strategy For Central European Markets Our presiding macroeconomic theme for central Europe - which we first elaborated on in a Special Report titled, Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak2 - has been as follows: An accommodative policy stance in the context of strong growth and tight labor markets warrants higher inflation. Our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - is continuing to surge across all central European countries as well as in Germany. This foreshadows higher wage growth ahead (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Furthermore, monetary policy in central European countries remains accommodative - policy rates are negative in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Consistently, private credit (bank loan) growth and domestic demand remain robust. Today, we appraise and modify our investment strategy across all central European markets in general and Hungary in particular, where a policy shift is in the making. Hungary: Moving Away From Ultra-Accommodative Monetary Policy? Last month, the NBH (National Bank of Hungary) modified its monetary policy statement to include a new paragraph explaining that the council is prepared for the gradual normalization of monetary policy, depending on the outlook for inflation.3 Given our view that inflation in Hungary will continue to rise, the NBH is likely to move away from ultra-accommodative monetary policy sooner rather than later. Besides mounting inflationary pressures, several factors lead us to believe that the NBH is more comfortable normalizing policy today than in the past: First, after seven years of deleveraging, private credit is finally on the rise, and money supply growth is booming (Chart II-2, top and middle panel). Chart II-2Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Second, capital expenditures are recovering and business confidence is making new highs (Chart II-3, top and middle panel). Furthermore, construction is firing on all cylinders (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Chart II-3Hungary: Capex Is Robust Hungary: Capex Is Robust Hungary: Capex Is Robust Lastly, core consumer inflation is rising and the real deposit rates is at -2%, the lowest in 20 years (Chart II-2, bottom panel). Given the genuine need for rate normalization in Hungary and the central bank's readiness to do so, we are adjusting our strategy: We are taking profits of 72 basis points on our Hungarian yield curve steepening trade that we initiated on June 21, 2017. Hungary's yield curve is already the steepest yield curve in Europe. The slope of the 10/1-year yield curve is 320 basis points in Hungary, versus 200 in Poland, 100 in the Czech Republic and 105 in Germany. We are closing our long PLN / short HUF trade with a 7.7% gain since its initiation on September 28, 2016 (Chart II-4). The cross rate is close to an all-time high and will likely reverse. Chart II-4Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF A new trade: We recommend paying 3-year swap rates in Hungary and receiving 3-year swap rates in the euro area (Chart II-5). Chart II-5A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates First, not only is final domestic demand in Hungary much more robust than in the euro area, but Hungary's output gap is positive while the euro area's is still negative (Chart II-6,top and middle panel). This foreshadows a widening gap in inflation between Hungary and the euro area (Chart II-6, bottom panel). As this transpires, policy rate expectations will rise faster and by more in Hungary than in the euro area. Chart II-6Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Second, ultra-accommodative monetary policy in Hungary has served its purpose and has generated an overflow of liquidity. In effect, with broad money supply in Hungary now growing considerably faster than in the euro area, the NBH will likely tighten its policy at a faster pace and by more than the ECB (Chart II-7). This warrants a widening 3-year swap rate differential between Hungary and the euro area. Chart II-7Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Third, as global trade continues to slump, affecting German manufacturing, the European Central Bank will be fast to reiterate its readiness to keep policy accommodative longer than expected. This could push back expectations of the first ECB rate hike. Finally, Italy remains a risk and European banks are exposed to weakening developing countries. With euro area bank share prices plunging close to their 2008 and 2012 lows, the ECB will be both slow and cautious in signaling rate normalization in the immediate future. While Hungary is a very open economy and will feel the pinch from a slowdown in European manufacturing, its currency may depreciate further against the euro as it typically does amid global risk-off periods. A cheap currency will reduce the NBH's worries about the pass-through of a global slowdown and disinflation into its domestic economy. In short, given that both economies have different inflationary backdrops, Hungarian interest rate expectations will increasingly diverge from those of the euro area. As such, fixed-income investors should bet on a rising 3-year swap rate differential between Hungary and the euro area. Our Other Positions In Central European Markets Within the fixed income and currency space: Stay overweight CE3 within EM dedicated fixed-income portfolios. Predicated on our view that the epicenter of the ongoing global growth slowdown is China, emerging Asian and commodity leveraged markets are at much bigger risk than their Central European counterparts. Consistent with this theme, stay short IDR versus PLN. Book profits of 109 basis points on the following trade initiated on July 26, 2017: Pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates (Chart II-8). In line with our expectations,4 the Czech National Bank has been responding to rising domestic inflationary pressures and has been tightening monetary policy faster than the National Bank of Poland. There now remains little upside in Czech rates relative to Polish ones, so we are booking profits. Chart II-8Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Stay long CZK against the EUR. Widening growth and inflation gaps between the Czech Republic and the euro area justify higher rates and a stronger currency in the former relative to the latter. Regarding the equity space: Stay long CE3 banks / short euro area banks. CE3 banks are less leveraged and have a higher return on assets than euro area banks. Continue overweighting CE3 within EM dedicated equity portfolios. CE3 stocks have staged a double bottom relative to their emerging market peers, both in common and local currency terms (Chart II-9). Given emerging markets are saddled with credit excesses, unresolved economic imbalances and looming currency weakness, central Europe is likely to continue outperforming. Chart II-9CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM A summary of all our trades and asset allocations can be found on page 14 and 15. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Philippines: Duterte's Money Illusion," dated April 25, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak," dated June 21, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 http://www.mnb.hu/en/monetary-policy/the-monetary-council/press-releases/2018/press-release-on-the-monetary-council-meeting-of-18-september-2018 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd," dated July 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights This Special Report was written with our colleagues in BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy, led by Marko Papic. In it, we explore the evolution of Russia's role in European natural gas markets vis-a-vis the fast-growing U.S. natural gas production and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export capabilities. So what? Rise of U.S. LNG exports to Europe will benefit gas producers and LNG merchants with access to U.S. supplies. Russia will grow ever-more dependent on China, while retaining a market share in Europe. Why? Exports of U.S. LNG to Europe are set to surge over the next decade. Russia will not be completely displaced, as American LNG fills the gap in European natural gas production. But U.S. LNG will lead to the end of oil-indexing of long-term natural gas contracts, hurting Russian state coffers on the margin... ... And forcing Russia further into the arms of China. Also... A tighter Trans-Atlantic partnership - soon to involve a deep energy relationship - and a budding Sino-Russian alliance will further divide the world into two camps, producing a Bifurcated Capitalism that may define this century. Feature Russia's obituaries have been written and re-written many times since the end of the Cold War. And yet, Moscow continues to play an outsized role in global affairs that is belied by quantitative measures of its power (Chart 1). Chart 1From Bipolarity To Multipolarity From Bipolarity To Multipolarity From Bipolarity To Multipolarity How so? The fall of the Soviet Union was precipitated by the country's sclerotic managed economy, its failure to escape the middle income trap, and its disastrous military campaign in Afghanistan. But before it died, the Soviet Union sowed the seeds for its resurrection. The $100-130 billion (in 2018 USD) spent on building a natural gas pipeline infrastructure into Western Europe was the elixir that revived Russian power. Just as Russia emerged from its lost decade in the 1990s, it caught a break. Western Europe's natural gas demand rose. At the same time, China's epic industrialization created a once-in-a-century commodity bull market (Chart 2). With demand for its resources buoyed on both sides of the Eurasian landmass, Russia once again saw revenue fill its coffers (Chart 3). With material wealth came the ability to rebuild its hard power and put up a fight against an expansionary Western alliance encroaching on its sphere of influence. Chart 2Chinese Industrialization... Chinese Industrialization... Chinese Industrialization... Chart 3...Filled Russian Coffers ...Filled Russian Coffers ...Filled Russian Coffers Is there an existential risk to Russia's business model looming in the form of surging U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capability (Chart 4)? Not yet. Thanks to a massive drop in European domestic production, U.S. LNG exports will fill a growing supply gap, but will not replace Russia's natural gas exports in the medium term. All the same, the once-lucrative European market no longer holds as much promise as it once did with the arrival of the U.S. LNG supplies. Chart 4U.S. LNG Exports Will Surge American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? In order for Russian natural gas exports to Europe to be permanently displaced, Europe would have to build out new LNG capacity beyond 2020, restart domestic production by incentivizing shale development, or turn to alternative energy sources with large base-load potential, such as nuclear power. None of these are on the horizon. With ~15% of its government revenue sourced from natural gas sales, Russia is as much of a one-trick pony as there is in macroeconomics. While we do not foresee that pony heading off to the glue factory, Russia will face some considerable risks in the future, starting with the shift away from the rigid oil-indexed contracts it favors (which lock the price of natural gas to that of oil). As such, the risk to Russia is not that it loses market share in Europe's energy market, but that this market share yields much smaller income in the future, as gas-on-gas pricing competition increases. The U.S. Shale Revolution Goes Global Our commodity team has presented a compelling case for why investors should expect an increase in U.S. LNG exports beyond the current EIA forecast.1 Increasing volumes of associated natural gas production in the Permian Basin in west Texas, which will have to be transported from the basin so as not to curtail oil production, will drive a large part of the expected growth in LNG exports. Our commodity team expects that a major LNG export center will be developed in south Texas, in Corpus Christi, over the next five years, just as the U.S. surpasses 10 Bcf/d of exports in the middle of the next decade.2 At the same time, global LNG demand is expected to rise at an impressive 1.7% annual rate to 2040 (Chart 5). A few key markets will lead this trend (Chart 6). Based on BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy calculations, world LNG export capacity is expected to go from 48 Bcf/d in 2017 to 61 Bcf/d by 2022 (Chart 7). The majority of the new capacity (53%) will come from the U.S., while 18% will come from Australia and 15% from Russia. Chart 5Global LNG Demand Growth Likely Outpaces Current Expectations American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? Chart 6Supply - Demand Imbalances Will Fuel LNG Demand Globally American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? Chart 7LNG Export Capacity Growth American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? The pickup in Australian export capacity is already impressive. While being a relatively small natural gas producer - the eighth largest, accounting for 3% of world output - it has already become the second largest LNG exporting country in the world with over 7.5 Bcf/d of exports. The bulk of new liquefaction facilities will be operational in 2019. Most of Australia's LNG trade lies with Asia, given its geography. The U.S., whose LNG export terminals will be located in the Gulf of Mexico, only has 3 Bcf/d of liquefaction capacity today. Most of its LNG exports also go to Asia (Table 1), but that may change as the current capacity expansion will see exports rise to just over 9 Bcf/d in 2020.3 Furthermore, American gas will compete with surging Australian LNG exports and a build-up of Russian pipeline export capacity to China, which is set to start delivering gas to the country in 2019. Table 1U.S. LNG Exports By Country American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? Europe, on the other hand, has massive regasification capacity slack and thus requires only minimal capex to begin importing large volumes of U.S. LNG. Europe has 23 Bcf/d regasification capacity, with a very low utilization rate of just 27%. This means that it has ~ 16 Bcf/d capacity available, more than enough to absorb all of expectant U.S. ~ 6-7 Bcf/d exports in the next couple of years.4 Bottom Line: The U.S. shale revolution is going global, with U.S. LNG exports set to surge over the next 5-10 years. While some of that capacity will find its way to Asia, those markets will also be flooded with Australian LNG and Russian piped natural gas. Europe, on the other hand, is filing just a quarter of its LNG import capacity, making a Trans-Atlantic gas alliance a match made in heaven. From Cold War To Gas War? If half of the currently proposed, pre-FID, LNG export projects were built in the U.S., American capacity would grow to potentially ~26 Bcf/d by 2030. Europe would need only one or two extra LNG import terminals to build over the next two decades to absorb this volume, as its current capacity is able to import nearly every molecule coming out of North America (Chart 8). Chart 8Europe Has Plenty Of Regasification Capacity American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? Will this new U.S. LNG displace Europe's imports of Russian natural gas? The short answer is no. By 2030, Europe's supply-gap (i.e. domestic supply minus domestic consumption) is estimated to reach 36 Bcf/d. The U.S. could cover a large part of this gap if only half of the proposed pre-FID projects are constructed. However, if Europe's demand remains stable over this period, Europe will still import roughly 20 Bcf/d of Russian natural gas, which in 2017 amounted to 35% of Europe's natural gas consumption. If the U.S. fills 100% of the increase in Europe's supply-gap, it means new Russian natural gas production (the IEA and BP expect Russian production to keep increasing until 2030) will not be sent to Europe. Hence, even if it does not displace old Russian exports, it will limit Russia's ability to export its new natural gas. Europe's demand for natural gas is not likely to be stable. Despite sclerotic growth and generally weak population growth, European governments have tried to incentivize natural gas consumption due to its low emission of CO2 (Table 2). As such, investors should expect further displacement of coal and nuclear power generation in favor of natural gas. Table 2Natgas Emits Less CO2 American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? Thus, U.S. exports will simply replace Europe's domestic production, which is facing considerable declines. The U.K. North Sea production will decrease 5% annually due to the lack of capex and the large number of fields reaching a mature state. Meanwhile, the Netherlands is phasing-out its Groningen field by 2030. Finally, Norwegian gas production is likely to stagnate after reaching record levels in 2017. The second reason that Europe will not be able to sever its relationship with Russia is that its LNG import terminals are largely located in countries that are not massively dependent on Russian imports (Map 1). The two major LNG terminals serving Central and Eastern Europe are the Swinoujscie terminal in Poland - finished in 2015 - and the Adria project in Croatia, to be completed in 2020. Map 1European Natural Gas Geography American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? The Polish LNG terminal will do little to alleviate the dependency of countries further East - Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia - from Russia as it currently satisfies only one third of Poland's natural gas needs, and is projected to reach 50% by 2022 once the expansion is completed. This could significantly cut Russian exports to Poland, but not completely end them.5 The Croatian LNG terminal will likely make a very small dent in the overall reliance of the Balkans on Russian natural gas, as once it satisfied Croatian demand, little will be left over for the rest of the region. Beyond these two terminals, Europe will have to invest in pipeline infrastructure in order to reverse the flow of pipelines currently taking gas from the East to the West. At some point in the distant future, we could see a scenario where American natural gas flows even through Cold War era, Soviet-built pipelines deep into Central and Eastern Europe. But given the steep declines in West European natural gas production, this day will come after 2030. Bottom Line: Dreams of displacing Russian natural gas in Europe with American are overstated. European imports of U.S. LNG are likely to skyrocket, but that will merely replace the massive decline in West European and North Sea production. What does that mean for geopolitics? It means that Russia will continue to have a role to play in Europe, but its share of European imports will decline. As such, Europe will have options. If it builds more LNG import terminals, it could expand those options beyond American LNG imports. However, Russian geopolitical influence will not be displaced completely. Russian Coffers Will Take A Hit Although Russian natural gas will continue to course through Europe's veins, its state coffers are nonetheless going to take a hit. European governments are actively diversifying away from Russia via U.S. LNG imports, and buyers generally are shortening the tenor of contracts as they seek more flexible pricing.6 The growth in the global LNG market, fueled by surging U.S. production, will ultimately allow Asian and European markets to diversify away from oil-indexed pricing - which tends to be priced higher than gas-on-gas pricing - and expand access to U.S. supplies.7 The EU has co-financed or committed to co-finance LNG infrastructure projects valued at ~ 640mm euros to secure U.S. LNG. Ultimately, as more and more U.S. LNG moves toward Europe, markets will move toward short- and long-term contracts priced in USD/MMBtu (indexed to Henry Hub, LA, prices), much like Brent crude oil priced in USD/bbl. European markets have already seen this shift, as illustrated in Chart 9. Chart 9European Gas-On-Gas Pricing Is Rising American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? The totality of U.S. export prices is determined by gas-on-gas pricing - i.e., gas priced in USD/MMBtu as a function of gas supply-demand fundamentals. These contracts are without the restrictions found in many oil-indexed contracts. In the U.S., the presence of a deep futures market delivering natural gas to Henry Hub, LA, allows flexible long-term financing and short- and long-term contracting that can be hedged by buyers and sellers. According to Royal Dutch Shell, the spot LNG market doubled from 2010 to 2017, accounting for ~ 25% of all transactions, most of it due to the prodigious increase in U.S. LNG supply. While in Europe the share of LNG spot and short-term deals is small relative to the overall market, it is growing (Chart 10). With U.S. LNG volumes becoming increasingly available in Europe, market participants will be inclined to turn to the LNG spot market to buy or sell outside contracted volumes. This will deepen the development of European natgas markets: in any fully developed market, spot trading is followed by forward contracting, then futures trading using contracts settling against a spot price.8 Chart 10Expect More LNG Spot Trading American Pipes, Russian Gripes? American Pipes, Russian Gripes? Russia is a low-cost gas producer in Europe and will be committed to maintaining its market in Europe. However, with U.S. LNG export capacity potentially reaching ~14 Bcf/d by 2025, from ~3 Bcf/d today, it is entirely likely that Russia will find itself in a price war defending existing market share in Europe at lower prices. Its preferred way of doing business, via oil price indexed contracts, will be challenged overnight by a surge in U.S. LNG imports. Bottom line: The EU and its member states are actively diversifying gas supply sources away from Russia via U.S. LNG purchases. This will lower the marginal price of all gas bought and sold in Europe, all else equal, resulting in lower margins for all sellers of gas and better prices for consumers. Ultimately, the European natural gas market will resemble every other fully developed commodity market, operating on razor-thin margins. This means whatever rents were available in this market will be dissipated as competition increases. Investment And Geopolitical Implications The immediate investment implication of these developments is that gas producers and LNG merchants with access to U.S. shale-gas supplies, processing trading, and risk-management capabilities should be favored in this evolving market. Beyond the short term, however, we expect several ongoing geopolitical developments to be ossified by the flood of American LNG steaming towards European shores: Sino-Russian alliance deepens: As Russian natural gas exports to Europe stagnate, its pipeline infrastructure build-out will increase its exports to China to 3.8 Bcf/d by 2019. China will become the growth market for Russian energy producers, deepening the move between the two former Cold War foes to stabilize their relationship. Although it may seem obvious that Russia would retain leverage in such a relationship - given that it can "turn off the lights" to Beijing at whim - we actually think that Beijing will hold all the cards.9 Europe will have an incentive to keep diversifying its natural gas supplies. Meanwhile, Chinese demand is likely to keep growing. As such, China will become Russia's main option for revenue growth. And as the old adage goes, the customer is always right. Trans-Atlantic alliance deepens: Despite the fears that the "Trump Doctrine" would lead to American isolationism - fears that we shared in 2017 - the growing U.S.-European LNG connection will ensure that the Trans-Atlantic alliance - forged 70 years ago in blood - will be saved via brisk energy trade.10 A growing European energy deficit with the U.S. will also resolve - or at least alleviate - the main source of marital problems in the relationship: Europe's trade surplus. Bifurcation of capitalism: A key theme of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy is that the age of globalization will yield to the world's segmentation into spheres of influence.11 A deepening Trans-Atlantic alliance, when combined with a budding Sino-Russian relationship, will lead to a Bifurcated Capitalism system where the Trans-Atlantic West faces off against the Eurasian East. What would such a Bifurcated Capitalism mean for investors? Time will tell. But it may mean that thirty years of global capitalism (1985 to roughly today) may give way to something more common in human history: a world dissected into spheres of influence where flows of capital, goods, and people within spheres are relatively smooth and unencumbered, yet flows between the spheres are heavily impeded. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy pavelb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "U.S. Set To Disrupt Global LNG Market," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy October 4, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "The Price of Permian Gas Pipeline Limits," by Stephen Rassenfoss, in the Journal of Petroleum Technology, published July 19, 2018. 3 Following a two-year pause in project Final Investment Decisions (FIDs) from 2016 to 2017, potential FIDs in 2018 and 2019 could increase the U.S. capacity to ~ 14 Bcf/d by 2025. This will make the U.S. the second-largest exporter of LNG in the world, surpassing Australia. This new wave of investment is yet to be finalized. Therefore, final decisions in 2H18 and 2019 will be crucial to determine the medium-term potential of U.S. LNG. 4 Cheniere Energy, the largest U.S. LNG exporter, expects ~ 50% of its exports to go to Europe, according to S&P Global Platts. Please see "US LNG vs Pipeline Gas: European Market Share War?" published April 2017 by Platts. 5 Additionally, if the Baltic Pipe Project, moving gas from Norway to Poland, reaches FID in 2019, this would help Poland diversify its energy supply from Russia, as the country would cover close to all its domestic demand via its production + LNG and new pipeline imports. 6 Please see "US and Russia step up fight to supply Europe's gas," published by the Financial Times August 3, 2017. See also "Russia's gas still a potent weapon," also published by the FT, re the so-called collateral damage suffered by Europe when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2009. 7 For the EU, supply diversification is a particularly important goal. On July 25, 2018, the European Commission and the U.S. issued a joint statement, in which the EU agreed to import more LNG from the U.S. "to diversify and render its energy supply more secure. The EU and the U.S. will therefore work to facilitate trade in liquefied natural gas," according to a press release issued August 9, 2018, by the Commission. Re Japan's diversification strategy, please see "Feature: US LNG sources fit with Japan's desire for route diversity: minister," published by S&P Global Platts September 27, 2018. 8 Please see Darrell Duffie, Futures Markets (1988), Prentice-Hall; and Jeffrey C. Williams, The Economic Function of Futures Markets (1986), Cambridge University Press. Longer-term deals already are being signed under flexible Henry Hub futures-based indexing terms in the U.S. This is occurring because the U.S. LNG market is able to tap into futures liquidity that supports hedging by natgas producers and consumers. Please see "Vitol-Cheniere Pact Shows Long-Term LNG Deals Aren't Dead," published by bloomberg.com September 17, 2018. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Embrace Of The Dragon And The Bear," dated April 11, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Trump Doctrine," dated February 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, and Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.