East Europe & Central Asia

Highlights This past week, oil ministers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - OPEC 2.0's putative leaders - separately indicated increased comfort with higher prices over the next year or so.1 This suggests they are converging on a common production-management strategy, which accommodates KSA's need for higher prices over the short term to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, and Russia's longer term desire to avoid reaching price levels where U.S. shale-oil production is massively incentivized to expand. We believe OPEC 2.0's production cuts will be extended to year-end, given signaling by Khalid Al-Falih, KSA's energy minister. As a result, we expect Brent and WTI crude oil prices to average $74 and $70/bbl this year, respectively (Chart Of The Week). These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl, which were premised on curtailed production slowly being returned to market beginning in July. For next year, the extended cuts could lift Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively. Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts will accelerate OECD inventory draws, which have been faster than expected. Higher prices caused by maintaining the cuts will lift U.S. shale production more than our earlier estimates. Backwardations in both Brent and WTI forward curves will remain steep in this regime, muting the impact of Fed policy on oil prices. Energy: Overweight. We are getting long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls on the back of our updated price forecast. We also are taking profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, which were up 27.4% as of Tuesday's close. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Commerce Department proposed "Section 232" tariffs and quotas on U.S. aluminum and steel imports, following national security reviews. President Trump has until mid-April to respond, and we expect him to go through with one of the three proposed options. Precious Metals: Gold remains range-bound around $1,350/oz, as markets wrestle with the likely evolution of the Fed's rate-hiking regimen. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA economists project grain and soybean prices to slowly rise over the next 10 years, according to agriculture.com. Feature Chart Of The WeekBCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts BCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts BCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts Over the past week, comments from Saudi and Russian oil ministers indicate they are more comfortable with maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018, which, along with strong global demand growth, raises the odds Brent crude oil prices will exceed $70/bbl this year, and possibly next. Whether this is the result of the Saudi's need for higher prices to support the Aramco IPO, or it reflects an assessment by OPEC 2.0's leaders that the world economy can absorb higher prices without damaging demand over the short term is not clear. Markets have yet to receive what we could consider definitive forward guidance from OPEC 2.0 leadership, indicating that recent signaling could be foreshadowing the coalition's new policy. We are raising the odds that it is, and are moving our Brent and WTI forecasts higher for this year and next. Lifting 2018 Brent, WTI Forecasts To $74 And $70/bbl Maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 will lift average Brent and WTI crude oil prices to $74 and $70/bbl, respectively, this year, based on our updated supply-demand balances modeling (Chart Of The Week). This is not definitive OPEC 2.0 policy guidance: KSA's and Russia's oil ministers indicated they expect such an outcome in separate statements, and not, as has been the case with previous announcements, at a joint press conference.2 We are assuming the odds strongly favor such an outcome, and give an 80% weight to it. The remaining 20% reflects our previous expectation that OPEC 2.0's production cuts would cease at end-June, and curtailed volumes would slowly be restored over 2H18. Resolving this in favor of the former expectation would lift our price expectations to $76 and $73/bbl for Brent and WTI this year, and $70 and $68/bbl next year. These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI prices this year, which were premised on curtailed OPEC 2.0 production slowly returning to market beginning in July, and a subsequent OECD inventory rebuilding. By maintaining production cuts to year-end, supply-demand balances remain tighter, which keeps inventories drawing for a longer period of time (Chart 2). Higher inventories would have increased the sensitivity of oil prices to the USD, which we showed in research on February 8th 2018. With OPEC 2.0's production cuts maintained throughout the year, OECD inventories will be more depleted by year-end (Chart 3). Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 would result in an additional 130mm bbls reduction to OECD inventories versus our prior modeling. This means Brent and WTI forward curves will be more backwardated than they would have been had the barrels taken off the market at the beginning of 2017 been slowly restored starting in July of this year, as we earlier expected. Chart 2Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Chart 3Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More A steeper backwardation in oil forward curves - i.e., the front of the curve trades premium to the deferred contracts - reduces the USD effects on oil, all else equal. In other words, supply-demand fundamentals dominate the evolution of oil prices when forward curves are more backwardated, and the influence of financial variables -the USD in particular - is muted.3 For next year, we assume the volumes cut by OPEC 2.0 are slowly restored to the market over 1H19, lifting Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl on average, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively.4 Higher Shale Output, Strong Global Demand We expect U.S. shale production increases by 1.15mm b/d from December 2017 to December 2018, and another 1.3-1.4mm b/d during calendar 2019. This dominates non-OPEC production growth this year and next (Chart 4, top panel). Due to the supply response of the shales to higher prices in 2018, global production levels would see a net increase from March 2019 and beyond. Our assumption OPEC 2.0 production cuts will be maintained through 2018 puts our OPEC production assessment 0.14mm b/d below U.S. EIA's estimates (Chart 4, bottom panel). On the demand side, we continue to expect non-OECD (EM) growth to push global oil consumption up by 1.7mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 5). Non-OECD demand is expected to account for 1.24mm b/d and 1.21mm b/d of this growth in 2018 and 2019, respectively (Table 1). Chart 4U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth Chart 5Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices Aramco IPO Driving OPEC 2.0's Short-Term Agenda In previous research, we noted what appeared to be a relatively minor divergence between the goals of KSA and Russia when it comes to the level prices each would prefer over the short term. Recent press reports - unattributed, of course - suggest Saudi Aramco officials prefer a Brent price closer to $70/bbl further along the forward curve (two years out) to support their upcoming IPO.5 This obviously would bolster Aramco's oil-export revenues - some 7mm b/d of its 10mm b/d of production are exported - and income, which shareholders would welcome. However, until this past week, Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, was signaling a range of $50 to $60/bbl works better for his constituents, i.e., shareholder-owned Russian oil companies. Novak recently amended his range to $50 to $70/bbl for Brent.6 These positions are not irreconcilable. One is shorter term (2 years forward) and the other is longer term, attempting to balance competitive threats over a longer horizon - e.g., from U.S. shale-oil producers, electric vehicles, etc. This most recent indication the leadership of OPEC 2.0 is comfortable with higher prices over the short term is an indication - at least to us - that these issues are being dealt with in a way that allows markets to incorporate forward guidance into pricing of crude oil over the next two years. Beyond that, however, markets will need to hear an articulated strategy containing a post-Aramco IPO view of the world, so that capital can be efficiently allocated. KSA and Russia are in a global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), and having a fully articulated strategy re how they will manage their production in fast-changing markets - where, for example, shale-oil approaches becoming a "just-in-time" supply option - will be critical. Signing a formal alliance by year-end would support this, but that, too, will require a level of cooperation that runs deeper than what OPEC 2.0 has so far demonstrated, impressive though it may be. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0 leadership is signalling production cuts will be maintained for the entire year, not, as we expected, left to expire at end-June with curtailed barrels slowly returned to the market over 2H18. While this does not appear to be official policy of the producer coalition yet, we are revising our price expectations in line with tighter markets this year, lower OECD inventories and continued backwardation in Brent and WTI forward curves. OPEC 2.0's shorter-term agenda, driven by KSA's IPO of Saudi Aramco, and its longer-term agenda - maintaining oil's competitive edge and accommodating U.S. shale-oil production (but not too much) - appear to be getting reconciled. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com  1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for OPEC/non-OPEC coalition led by KSA and Russia, has removed some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of oil production from the market beginning in 2017. 2 Please see, "Brent crude settles flat, U.S. oil up on short covering," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018, in which KSA's oil minister Khalid Al-Falih indicated OPEC would maintain production cuts throughout 2018. See also, "On the air of the TV channel 'Russia 24' Alexander Novak summed up the participation in the work of the Russian investment forum 'Sochi-2018,'" published by Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation on February 15th 2018. Lastly, please see "Saudi Arabia Is Taking a Harder Line on Oil Prices," published by bloomberg.com on February 19th 2018. 3 We discuss this in "OPEC 2.0 vs. The Fed," which was published on February 8th 2018 by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 These expectations are highly conditional. Toward the end of this year, KSA and Russia are indicating the OPEC 2.0 coalition will become a more formal organization, with members signing a long-term alliance. Among other things, OPEC 2.0 members would be expected to build buffer stocks to address any sudden supply outages, in order to maintain orderly markets. Please see "Oil producers to draft long-term alliance deal by end-2018: UAE minister," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. 5 Please see "For timing of Aramco IPO, watch forward oil price curve," published by reuters.com on February 19th 2018. 6 Please see reference in footnote 3 and "Russia's Novak says current oil price is acceptable," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017 OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices

Highlights The call on EM local bonds boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Forthcoming EM currency depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds. EM currencies positively correlate with commodities prices but not with domestic real interest rates. Widening U.S. twin deficits are not a reason to be long EM currencies. There has historically been no consistent relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. For investors who have to be invested in EM domestic bonds, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Feature The stampede into EM local currency bonds has persisted even amid recent jitters in global equity markets. Notably, surging U.S./DM bond yields have failed to cause a spike in EM local yields, despite past positive correlations (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? The main reason is the resilience of EM currencies. The latter have not sold off even during the recent correction in global share prices. In high-yielding EM domestic bond markets, total returns are substantially affected by exchange rates. Not only do U.S. dollar total returns on local bonds suffer when EM currencies depreciate, but also weaker EM exchange rates cause spikes in domestic bond yields (Chart I-2). Consequently, the call on EM local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets, boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Chart I-2EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields We are negative on EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar and the euro. The basis for our view is two-fold: Strong growth in the U.S. and higher U.S. bond yields should be supportive of the greenback vis-à-vis EM currencies; the same applies to euro area growth and the euro against EM exchange rates; Weaker growth in China should weigh on commodities prices and, in turn, on EM currencies. So far, this view has not played out. In fact, negative sentiment on the U.S. dollar has recently been amplified by concerns about America's widening fiscal and current account deficits. In fact, one might argue that EM local bonds stand to benefit from the potential widening in U.S. twin deficits and the flight out of the U.S. dollar. We address the issue of U.S. twin deficits first. Twin Deficits And The U.S. Dollar... The recent narrative that the dollar typically depreciates during periods of widening twin deficits is not supported by historical evidence. We are not suggesting that twin deficits lead to currency appreciation. Our argument is that twin deficits have historically coincided with both appreciation and depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Chart I-3 exhibits the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the fiscal and current account balances. It appears that there is no consistent relationship between the fiscal and current account balances and the exchange rate. Chart I-3No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar To produce a quantitative measure of the twin deficits, we sum up both the fiscal and current account balances. Chart I-4 demonstrates the relationship between the latter measure and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. This analysis encompasses the entire history of the floating U.S. dollar since 1971. Chart I-4Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar The vertical lines denote the tax cuts under former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1986, and under former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. As can be seen from Chart I-4, there is no stable relationship between the twin deficits and the greenback. In the 1970s, there was no consistent relationship at all; In the first half of the 1980s, the twin deficits widened substantially, but the dollar rallied dramatically. The tailwind behind the rally was tightening monetary policy and rising/high real U.S. interest rates; From 1985 through 1993, there was no consistent relationship between America's twin deficits and the currency; From 1994 until 2001, the greenback appreciated as the twin deficits narrowed, particularly the fiscal deficit; From 2001 through 2011, the dollar was in a bear market as the twin deficits expanded; From 2011 until 2016, the shrinking-to-stable twin deficits were accompanied by a U.S. dollar rally. Bottom Line: We infer from these charts that there has historically been no stable relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. ... And A Missing Variable: Interest Rates Twin deficits are often associated with rising inflation. In fact, a widening current account deficit can mask hidden price pressures. In particular, an economy that over-consumes - consumes more than it produces - can satisfy its demand via imports without exerting pressure on the economy's domestic productive capacity. Booming imports will lead to a widening trade deficit rather than higher consumer price inflation. Hence, in an open economy, over-consumption can lead to a widening current account deficit, rather than rising inflation. A currency is likely to plunge amid widening twin deficits if the central bank is behind the inflation curve. In such a case, the low real interest rates would undermine the value of the exchange rate. If the central bank, however, embarks on monetary tightening that is adequate, the currency can in fact strengthen amid growing twin deficits. In this scenario, rising real interest rates would support the currency. With respect to the U.S. dollar today, its future trajectory depends on the Fed, and the market's perception of its policy stance. If the market discerns that the Fed is behind the curve, the greenback will plummet. By contrast, if the market reckons that the Fed policy response is appropriate, and U.S. real interest rates are sufficiently high/rising, the dollar could in fact appreciate amid widening twin deficits. Specifically, the U.S. dollar was in a major bull market in the early 1980s, with Reagan's tax cuts in 1981 and the ensuing widening of the country's twin deficits doing little to thwart the dollar bull market (Chart I-4). In turn, the Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 were followed by a major dollar bear market. The main culprit between these two and other episodes was probably real interest rates. U.S. real interest rates/bond yields rose between 1981 and 1985, generating an enormous dollar rally. In the decade of the 2000s, by contrast, U.S. real interest rates fell and that coincided with a major bear market in the greenback (Chart I-4). Overall, the combination of U.S. twin deficits and real bond yields together, help better explain U.S. dollar dynamics than twin deficits alone. We agree that America's twin deficits will widen materially. That said, odds are that the Fed commits to further rate hikes and that U.S. bond yields continue to rise. In fact, not only are U.S. inflation breakeven yields climbing, but TIPS (real) yields have also spiked significantly. Rising real yields, which in our opinion have more upside, should support the U.S. dollar. As a final point, if the Fed falls behind the curve and the dollar continues to tumble, the markets could begin to fear a material rise in U.S. inflationary pressures. That scenario would actually resemble market dynamics that prevailed before the 1987 stock market crash. Although this is a negative scenario for the U.S. currency and is, by default, bullish for EM exchange rates and their local bonds, this is not ultimately an optimistic scenario for global risk assets. Bottom Line: Twin deficits are not solely sufficient to produce a currency bear market. Twin deficits accompanied by a central bank that is behind the inflation curve - i.e., combined with low/falling real interest rates - are what generate sufficient conditions for currency depreciation. EM Currencies And Commodities Many EM exchange rates - such as those in Latin America, as well as South African, Russian, Malaysian and Indonesian currencies - are primarily driven by commodities prices. Not surprisingly, the underlying currency index of the EM local bond benchmark index (the JPM GBI index) - which excludes China, India, Korea and Taiwan - positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-5). Hence, getting commodities prices right is of paramount importance to the majority of high-yielding EM local bonds. We have the following observations: First, investors' net long positions in both oil and copper are extremely elevated (Chart I-6). The last datapoint is as of February 16. Any rebound in the U.S. dollar or mounting concerns about China's growth could produce a meaningful drop in commodities prices as investors rush to close their long positions. Second, we maintain that China's intake of commodities is bound to decelerate, as decelerating credit growth and local governments' budget constraints lead to curtailment of infrastructure and property investment (Chart I-7). Chart I-5EM Currencies Positively Correlate ##br##With Commodities Prices EM Currencies Positively Correlate With Commodities Prices EM Currencies Positively Correlate With Commodities Prices Chart I-6Investors Are Very Long##br## Copper And Oil Investors Are Very Long Copper And Oil Investors Are Very Long Copper And Oil Chart I-7Slowdown In ##br##China's Capex Slowdown In China's Capex Slowdown In China's Capex Strong growth in the U.S. and EU will not offset the decline in China's intake of raw materials (excluding oil). China accounts for 50% of global demand for industrial metals. America's consumption of industrial metals is about 6-7 times smaller. For crude oil, China's share of global consumption is 14% compared with 20% and 15% for the U.S. and EU, respectively. We do not expect outright contraction in China's crude imports or consumption. The point is that when financial markets begin to price in weaker mainland growth or the U.S. dollar rebounds, oil prices will retreat as investors reduce their record high net long positions. Finally, even though EM twin deficits have ameliorated in recent years, they remain wide (Chart I-8). In turn, the majority of these countries have been financing their deficits by volatile foreign portfolio flows, as FDIs into EM remain largely depressed. If commodities prices relapse and EM currencies depreciate, there will be a period of reversal in foreign portfolio inflows into EM. While EM real local bonds yields are reasonably high, they are unlikely to prevent outflows if the U.S. dollar rallies. In the past, neither high absolute EM real yields nor their wide spreads over U.S. TIPS prevented EM currency depreciation (Chart I-9). Chart I-8AEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide Chart I-8BEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide Chart I-9EM Local Real Yields Do Not ##br##Drive Their Currencies EM Local Real Yields Do Not Drive Their Currencies EM Local Real Yields Do Not Drive Their Currencies EM Local Bonds: Country Allocation Strategy Chart I-10 attempts to identify pockets of value in EM domestic bonds. It exhibits the sum of current account and fiscal balances on the X axis, and domestic bond yields deflated by headline inflation on the Y axis. Chart I-10Identifying Pockets Of Value In EM Domestic Bonds EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits Markets in the upper-right corner should be favored as they offer high real yields and maintain healthy fiscal and current account balances. Bond markets in the lower-left corner should be underweighted. They have low inflation-adjusted yields and large current account and fiscal deficits. Based on these metrics as well as fundamental analysis, our recommended country allocation for EM domestic bond portfolios has been and remains: Overweights: Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Neutral: Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Hungary, Chile and Colombia. Underweights: Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia. The below elaborates on Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Russia Fiscal and monetary policies are extremely tight. While they are curtailing the economic recovery, they are very friendly for creditors. Interest rates deflated by both headline and core consumer price inflation are at their highest on record, government spending is lackluster, and the new fiscal rule has replenished the country's foreign currency reserves (Chart I-11). Besides, the government's budget assumption for oil prices is very conservative - in the low-$40s per barrel for this year and 2019. Commercial banks have been increasing provisions, even though the NPL ratio is falling. In fact, Russia is well advanced in terms of both corporate and household deleveraging as well as banking system adjustment. On the whole, having experienced two large recessions in the past 10 years and having pursued extremely orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, Russian markets have become much more insulated from negative external shocks than many of their peers. In brief, Russian financial markets have become low-beta markets,1 and they will outperform their EM peers in a selloff even if oil prices slide. Brazil Brazilian local bonds offer the highest inflation-adjusted yields. However, unlike Russia, Brazil has untenable public debt dynamics, and its politics remain a wild card. The public debt-to-GDP ratio is 16% in Russia and 80% in Brazil. The fiscal deficit in Brazil stands at a whopping 8% of GDP, and interest payments on public debt are equal to 6% of GDP. Without major fiscal reforms, Brazil's public debt will continue to surge and will likely reach almost 100% of GDP by the end of 2020. High real interest rates are not only holding back the recovery but are also making public debt dynamics unsustainable. Chart I-12 illustrates that nominal GDP growth is well below local government bond yields. Chart I-11Continue Favoring ##br##Russian Local Bonds Continue Favoring Russian Local Bonds Continue Favoring Russian Local Bonds Chart I-12Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful ##br##For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil needs either much higher nominal growth or major fiscal tightening to stem the surge in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The necessary fiscal reforms - social security restructuring or primary budget surpluses - are not politically feasible right now. Meanwhile, materially higher nominal growth can be achieved only if interest rates are brought down quickly and drastically and the currency is devalued meaningfully. Hence, the primary risk to Brazilian local bonds is the exchange rate. The currency is at risk from potentially lower commodities prices on the external side, and continuous public debt deterioration, debt monetization or drastic interest rate cuts on the domestic side. Remarkably, Chart I-13 demonstrates that historically real interest rates in Brazil do not explain fluctuations in the real. The currency, rather, positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Brazil: No Relationship Between##br## Real Yields And Currency Brazil: No Relationship Between Real Yields And Currency Brazil: No Relationship Between Real Yields And Currency Chart I-14The Brazilian Real And ##br##Commodities Prices The Brazilian Real And Commodities Prices The Brazilian Real And Commodities Prices It is possible that policymakers find an optimal balance between these adjustment paths, and financial markets continue to rally. However, with the current government lacking any political capital and great uncertainty surrounding the October presidential elections; the outlook is very risky, We recommend a neutral allocation to Brazilian local bonds for EM domestic bond portfolios. South Africa The South African rand and fixed-income markets have surged in the wake of Cyril Ramaphosa's win of the ANC leadership elections and his taking over of the presidency from Jacob Zuma. This has been devastating to our short rand and underweight local bonds positions. Chart I-15The South African Rand And Metals Prices The South African Rand And Metals Prices The South African Rand And Metals Prices There is no doubt that President Ramaphosa will adopt some market-friendly policies. This will constitute a major change from Zuma's handling of the economy in the past nine years. Yet the outlook for the rand is also contingent on global markets. If commodities prices do not relapse and EM risk assets generally perform well, the rand will continue strengthening, and local bond yields will decline further. However, if metals prices begin to drop and EM currencies sell off, it will be hard for the South African currency to rally further (Chart I-15). While we acknowledge the potential for positive political announcements and actions from the new political leadership, the main drivers of the rand, in our opinion, remain the trends in the U.S. dollar and commodities prices. Some investors might be tempted to compare South Africa to Brazil in terms of political headwinds turning into tailwinds. From a political vantage point, it is a fair comparison. Nevertheless, investors should put Brazil's rally into perspective. If commodities prices did not rise in 2016-2017, the Brazilian real would not have rallied. In brief, external tailwinds are as - if not more - important for EM high-yielding currencies than domestic political developments. Positive political developments are magnified amid a benign external backdrop. Conversely, in a negative external environment, positive political transformations can have limited impact on the direction of financial markets. To reflect the potential for a positive political change and forthcoming orthodox macro policies, we are closing our bet on yield curve steepening in South Africa. This position was stipulated by unorthodox macro policies of the previous government. This trade has been flat since its initiation on June 28, 2017. Weighing pros and cons, we are reluctant to upgrade the South African rand and its fixed-income market at the moment because of our negative view on metals prices and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Investment Conclusions The broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is at record oversold levels (Chart I-16). Given the forthcoming U.S. fiscal stimulus, the Fed will likely lift its dots and the greenback will rebound. This is bearish for EM currencies, especially if China's growth slows and commodities prices roll over, as we expect. EM exchange rate depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets. Foreign holdings of EM local bonds are elevated (Table I-1). Hence, risks of unwinding of some positions are not trivial. Chart I-16The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally Table I-1Foreign Ownership Of EM Local Bonds Is High EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits Nevertheless, as we have argued in the past, EM local bonds offer great diversification benefits to all type of portfolios, as their correlations with many asset classes are low. For domestic bond investors who have to be invested, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. As to the sovereign and corporate credit markets, asset allocators should compare these with U.S. corporate credit. Consistent with our negative view on EM currencies and equities vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts, we recommend favoring U.S. corporates versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Russia: Entering A Lower-Beta Paradigm," dated March 8, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights This week's global equities sell-off spilled into oil markets, taking Brent and WTI down 2.7% and 3.7% as of Tuesday's close, in line with the S&P 500 decline, which began Friday. In line with our House view, we do not believe this will, in and of itself, deter the Fed from raising overnight rates four times this year. Nor do we believe oil-price weakness earlier this week reflects a breakdown in fundamentals. Any demand-dampening effects coming from a stronger USD in the wake of Fed rate hikes will have a muted effect on oil prices, provided OPEC 2.0 can maintain production discipline, and, critically, keep the Brent and WTI forward curves backwardated.1 Likewise, any demand stimulation coming from a weaker USD in the wake of a more measured Fed policy - e.g., two or three hikes - also will be muted by backwardation. Energy: Overweight. Fundamentally, we cannot see anything that warrants a change in our average-price forecast of $67 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI this year. Our long Jul/18 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI calendar spread, put on in expectation of continued backwardation in oil forward curves, is up 81.5% since Nov 2/17, when we recommended it. Base Metals: Neutral. Base metals also were caught up in the equities sell-off, with spot copper trading ~ $3.15 - $3.20/lb on the COMEX. As with oil, we do not see the equities sell-off as a harbinger of a bearish shift in base metals fundamentals. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold returns were relatively flat amid the equities sell-off with only a 0.6% loss. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 7.9% since it was recommended on May 4/17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. China opened an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation into U.S. sorghum imports, which the country's foreign ministry insisted was not related to recent U.S. tariffs on solar panels and washing machines. China accounts for ~ 80% of U.S. sorghum exports. Feature The global equity sell-off spilled into oil markets, with Brent and WTI prompt futures down 2.7% and 3.7% over the past week when the equity slide began (Chart of The Week). The proximate cause of the equities down leg appears to be the stronger-than-expected U.S. wage growth reported last week, suggesting inflationary pressures continue to build in the U.S. This prompted speculation the Fed would be inclined to increase the number of rate hikes it executes this year - going from a consensus view of three hikes to four - and that financial conditions would tighten. The equities sell-off this prompted then led to speculation the Fed would dial back the number of rate hikes it executes this year. We believe the Fed will look through the recent equity-market volatility, and will lift rates four times this year, in line with BCA's once-out-of-consensus House view. Chart of the WeekOil Prices Caught Up In Equities Sell-Off Oil Prices Caught Up In Equities Sell-Off Oil Prices Caught Up In Equities Sell-Off Chart 2Fundamentals Support Backwardation Fundamentals Support Backwardation Fundamentals Support Backwardation As far as oil markets are concerned, as long as the Brent and WTI forward curves remain backwardated (Chart 2), any impact from U.S. monetary policy on oil prices - chiefly through currency effects - will be muted. Demand-dampening effects coming from a stronger USD in the wake of Fed rate hikes will be dissipated in backwardated markets. Likewise, any demand stimulation coming from a weaker USD in the wake of fewer rate hikes policy at the Fed - e.g., two or three hikes - will be muted by backwardation. Fundamentals Dominate Oil-Price Evolution Chart 3Strong Fundamentals##BR##Force Inventories Lower Strong Fundamentals Force Inventories Lower Strong Fundamentals Force Inventories Lower Fundamentals point to continued tightening of crude oil markets in 1H18, the period we have the greatest visibility on: OPEC 2.0's production cuts are pretty much locked in to end-June, when the producer coalition again will meet to assess market conditions, and global demand growth will remain robust. Even with U.S. shale-oil output increasing, OECD inventories will continue to draw during this period (Chart 3). OPEC 2.0's goal of reducing OECD inventories to five-year average levels likely will be met late in 1H18 or early in 2H18, based on our global balances model. While it is possible OPEC 2.0 will extend its production cuts to year-end 2018, we don't believe it is likely. Voluntary production cuts by Russia and Gulf OPEC nations, combined with decline-curve losses in non-Gulf OPEC producers have removed ~ 1.4mm b/d from the market since January 2017. The bulk of these cuts have been made by KSA and Russia, which account for close to 1.0mm b/d of OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Based on our fundamentally driven econometric model, extending OPEC 2.0's cuts to year-end would lift average prices in 2018 from our current expectation of $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI to $71 and $67/bbl, respectively. Counterintuitively, we believe maintaining prices at this level for the entire year is not the desired outcome of OPEC 2.0's production-cutting strategy. Higher price levels will incentivize larger-than-expected shale-oil production gains than we currently are forecasting - ~ 1.0mm b/d in 2018 and 1.2mm b/d in 2019. In addition, they would breathe life into marginal production around the world, particularly in provinces where break-evens and services costs have fallen - e.g., the North Sea, Barents Sea and offshore Brazil. OPEC 2.0's Long Game KSA's and Russia's oil ministers, the leaders of OPEC 2.0, have stated they would prefer to see their coalition endure beyond end-2018, when their production-cutting deal expires. Be that as it may, they have yet to publicly articulate an agreed strategy for OPEC 2.0, either in terms of a preferred price level or price band, or a strategy that builds on the gains they've made in backwardating oil forward curves. Chart 4Stakes Are High For OPEC 2.0##BR##If No Post-2018 Strategy Emerges Stakes Are High For OPEC 2.0 If No Post-2018 Strategy Emerges Stakes Are High For OPEC 2.0 If No Post-2018 Strategy Emerges Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak recently suggested a preferred range for prices of $50 to $60/bbl for Brent, the international crude-oil benchmark. In the short term, KSA likely prefers a higher price - between $60 and $70/bbl for Brent - to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, which probably will occur later this year. As we near the end of 1H18, OPEC 2.0's leaders will have to provide some indication they are converging on a common production-management strategy. They will, we believe, have to begin behaving more like a central bank - i.e., providing the market forward guidance - and less like a loose alliance of like-minded producers lurching between stop-gap measures to support prices. Importantly, when they do provide such guidance, they will have to follow through on publicly stated goals, or risk losing credibility with markets. The stakes are fairly high. If, as we've modeled in our unconstrained case, OPEC 2.0 returns ~ 1.1 - 1.2 mm b/d of actual production cuts (ex-decline-curve losses) to the market beginning in 2H18, and U.S. shale and other producers respond to 2018's higher prices with aggressive production growth that carries through 2019, Brent and WTI prices could be pushing toward $40/bbl by the end of 2019 (Chart 4). Also note that if prices start to moderate in H2 2018, 2019 shale production growth may ultimately be less than the 1.2 MMb/d we have forecast, softening the decline in prices during 2019. Longer term, we believe KSA and Russia are aligned with Russia's preference, if for no reason other than to keep U.S. shale-oil production from realizing the run-away growth sustained higher prices almost surely would provoke. Such growth would accelerate the development of U.S. crude oil export capacity - already hovering around ~ 2mm b/d - and the competition for market share in markets OPEC 2.0 members are keen to defend. Higher prices also would improve the competitive position of non-hydrocarbon-based transportation - e.g., electric vehicles and hybrids - which works against OPEC 2.0's long-term goals. Backwardation Matters For OPEC 2.0 Price levels always will be an important policy variable for OPEC 2.0. Equally important, we believe, will be having a strategy that maintains a backwardated forward curve in the Brent and WTI markets. This is because OPEC 2.0 member states sell oil at spot-price levels - the highest point of a backwardated forward curve - while shale-oil producers hedge their revenues over a 1- to 2-year interval. Other than allowing prices to collapse once again, this is the most viable way of constraining U.S. shale production growth longer term. The steeper the backwardation in the WTI forward curve, in particular, the lower the average price level of the hedges producers are able to lock in when they hedge forward revenues. This translates directly into lower output, since producers cannot afford to field as many rigs at lower prices over the life of the hedge as they would be able to field at higher prices. The extent to which OPEC 2.0 can keep forward curves backwardated will determine the extent to which the USD influences oil prices, as well. Our recently concluded research reveals backwardation can mitigate FX effects on oil prices induced by U.S. monetary policy. There is a long-term equilibrium between the level of the USD's broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) and crude oil prices (Chart 5). Indeed, the USD TWIB is one of the key variables we use in our demand, supply and price models. A weak dollar spurs consumption - USD/bbl prices ex-U.S. are cheaper in local-currency terms, especially for fast-growing emerging markets - while production costs ex-U.S. are higher, which limits output growth at the margin. A stronger dollar restrains consumption and encourages production ex-U.S., at the margin. However, this long-term equilibrium is asymmetric. The strength of the correlation between the level of the USD and crude oil prices is such that as oil inventories fall - and backwardation becomes more pronounced - the USD becomes less important to the evolution of oil prices.2 This can be seen in the month-on-month (m-o-m) rolling correlation between prompt WTI futures and the USD TWIB plotted against the spread between 1st nearby WTI futures and 12th nearby WTI futures (Chart 6). Chart 5Long-Term Inverse Correlation##BR##Between USD TWIB And Crude Prices Long-Term Inverse Correlation Between USD TWIB And Crude Prices Long-Term Inverse Correlation Between USD TWIB And Crude Prices Chart 6Backwardated Forward Curves##BR##Limit USD's Effect On Oil Prices Backwardated Forward Curves Limit USD's Effect On Oil Prices Backwardated Forward Curves Limit USD's Effect On Oil Prices With the exception of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the higher the backwardation in crude oil forward curves, the smaller the USD-WTI correlation becomes.3 This suggests that, if OPEC 2.0 can maintain the backwardation in WTI and Brent in 2018, the correlation between crude oil prices and the USD TWIB likely will not go back to the large negative correlation typical of previous cycles. In other words, sustained backwardation will weaken the inverse relationship between WTI prices and the USD TWIB vs. the long-term average in place since 2000, which is roughly when oil prices became random-walking variables. We also looked at year-on-year change in U.S. commercial inventories vs. the USD-WTI prices correlation (Chart 7). Our analysis indicates that when inventories are building, the correlation between USD and WTI prices becomes negative, and when they are falling the correlation goes to zero or positive. This supports our earlier observation that when crude inventories fall, the USD becomes less important to the evolution of WTI prices, particularly spot prices. One more point that we should note: the inverse relationship between the USD and oil prices is a two-way street. In addition to a weaker USD helping to support higher oil prices, higher oil prices have also tended to weaken the USD by inflating the U.S. trade deficit through more expensive petroleum imports. However, over the past decade, the U.S. has reduced its volumes of petroleum imports by roughly 75%, from 12-13 MMB/d in 2007 to only 3-4 MM b/d today (Chart 8). Therefore, this feedback loop of higher oil prices weakening the USD, and lower oil prices strengthening the USD, is greatly reduced. Chart 7Tighter Inventories Limit##BR##USD's Effect On Oil Prices Tighter Inventories Limit USD's Effect On Oil Prices Tighter Inventories Limit USD's Effect On Oil Prices Chart 8Lower Imports Of Petroleum Help##BR##Insulate USD From Oil Price Moves Lower Imports Of Petroleum Help Insulate USD From Oil Price Moves Lower Imports Of Petroleum Help Insulate USD From Oil Price Moves The USD's influence on the evolution of oil prices essentially is an exogenous variable out of OPEC 2.0's control. To the extent it can minimize these effects by backwardating oil forward curves, the coalition reduces the impact of an essentially exogenous USD risk from its production-management strategy. Bottom Line: The Fed likely will view the equity sell-off as a transitory event, and proceed with four overnight-rate hikes this year, in line with our House view. Any read-through from Fed policy decisions to the USD TWIB will be muted by continued backwardation in crude oil forward curves. To the extent OPEC 2.0 can maintain backwardated forward oil curves, it reduces the impact of an essentially exogenous USD risk from its production-management strategy. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Jargon recap: OPEC 2.0 is the moniker we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. Its historic production-cutting Agreement to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market - via a combination of outright cuts and decline-curve run-off - has largely held, despite wide-spread skepticism. "Backwardation" is a term of art in commodities describing a forward curve in which prompt-delivered crude oil trades at a higher price than crude delivered in the future - e.g., a year hence. This is a reflection of a tight market - i.e., refiners are willing to pay more for oil delivered tomorrow or next month than they are willing to pay for oil delivered next year. The opposite of a backwardated market is a "contango" market, another term of art. 2 Generally, falling commodity inventories put a premium on prompt-delivered supply. As inventories fall, there is less readily available supply in place to meet unexpected supply outages. Under such conditions, refiners will attempt to conserve inventory and bid for flowing supply more aggressively, either to replace consumption out of inventory or to keep inventories at safe levels so as to minimize stockout risks. Either way, prompt-delivered supply becomes more valuable than deferred supply. Backwardation reflects this dynamic by keeping prompt-delivered prices above prices for deferred delivery. Backwardation is the market's way of incentivizing storage holders to release inventory to the market. It also is the source of returns for long-only commodity index products. 3 The GFC of 2008 - 09 was a global liquidity event, in which correlations between most tradeable assets went to 1.0 as prices collapsed. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table OPEC 2.0 Vs. The Fed OPEC 2.0 Vs. The Fed Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 OPEC 2.0 Vs. The Fed OPEC 2.0 Vs. The Fed

Highlights Slower global demand growth, coupled with surging production from the U.S. shales and higher OPEC 2.0 production, risks reversing the progress made in draining global commercial oil storage and tanking prices in 2019.1 Our updated balances modelling is in agreement with the backwardation in forward Brent and WTI curves, but, if anything, indicates the backwardation should be more pronounced: We are forecasting Brent and WTI prices next year will average $55 and $53/bbl, respectively, vs. $62.80/bbl and $57.40/bbl average prices for 2019's forward curves. For 2018, we are maintaining our $67 and $63/bbl expectation for Brent and WTI, although our modelling indicates higher prices are a distinct possibility, given our fundamental assumptions of falling supply and rising demand this year (Chart of the Week). Energy: Overweight. We liquidated our May and July Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads last week with gains of 110.1% and 129.0%. We will be liquidating our Dec/18 Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads at tonight's close; they were up 62.3% and 82.1% as of Tuesday. We remain long Jul/18 vs. Dec/18 WTI (up 47.4%), and long the S&P GSCI (up 8.5%), expecting backwardation. We will get long $55 Brent Puts vs. short $50 Brent Puts in 4Q19 at tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. We continue to expect base metals to remain well supported in 1H18 by environmental reforms in China, and supply uncertainty around contract renegotiations at the copper mines. The global expansion underpinning demand will compensate for slower Chinese growth in 2H18. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 8.5% since inception in May/17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Soybean markets rallied following last week's USDA WASDE report, but grains fell amid data indicating these markets will remain oversupplied. Feature If there is one truth in commodity markets it is this: The best cure for high prices is high prices, and vice versa. This is being dramatically demonstrated by OPEC 2.0 in its collective action to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market following disastrously low prices in 2015 - 16. Higher prices in 4Q17 and 1H18 oil futures are incentivizing a surge in U.S. shale output, and will give OPEC 2.0 comfort in slowly feeding output taken offline at the beginning of 2017 back into the market in 2H18 and 2019 (Chart 2). Higher prices and tightening monetary conditions globally will slow the rate of growth in demand next year (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekFundamentals##BR##Support Oil In 2018 Fundamentals Support Oil In 2018 Fundamentals Support Oil In 2018 Chart 2Non-OPEC Production##BR##Will Surge Non-OPEC Production Will SurgeV Non-OPEC Production Will SurgeV Chart 3Strong Consumption Growth In 2018,##BR##Tempered By Higher Prices In 2019 Strong Consumption Growth In 2018, Tempered By Higher Prices In 2019 Strong Consumption Growth In 2018, Tempered By Higher Prices In 2019 Given these fundamental inputs, we expect to see Brent averaging $55/bbl next year, and WTI averaging $53/bbl next year. Our forecast is highly uncertain, given the actual evolution of prices will, once again, depend on actions taken by OPEC 2.0 and the forward guidance provided by its leadership, KSA and Russia. Our forecast for 2018 - $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - remains unchanged. If anything, our unconstrained models (Chart of the Week) have more upside risk than our forecast suggests, largely from falling production and surging demand - not to mention unplanned production outages. Looking to the end of 2019 from today, the backwardation we expect is greater than what is being priced into the Brent and WTI forward curves presently. Growth In U.S. Shales Dominates Non-OPEC Gains We are expecting U.S. crude oil production growth will dominate the increase in non-OPEC output in 2018 and 2019 (Chart 2, top panel). U.S. shale-oil output rises by 970k b/d and another 1.18mm b/d, respectively, this year and in 2019. By our reckoning, this will lift total U.S. crude oil production to 10.22mm b/d this year, a record level of output, and to 11.44mm b/d on average next year. Total U.S. crude and liquids output therefore rises from just under 17mm b/d in 2018 to 18.5mm b/d by the end of 2019. If our estimates are correct, the U.S. will join Russia in producing more than 11mm b/d of crude oil next year, and may even exceed it. Russia is expected to raise production slightly. As one of the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, we expect Russia to maintain its 300k b/d production cut in 1H18, which will keep its overall liquids production steady at ~ 11.17mm b/d through June. In 2H18, Russia will gradually restore production to an average of 11.24mm b/d, reaching 11.4mm b/d by December. For 2019, we expect total Russian liquids production to average 11.35mm b/d, up ~ 140k b/d yoy. OPEC's return will be led by the Cartel's Gulf producers, which are expected to raise crude production 450k b/d this year and 350k b/d next year (Chart 2, bottom panel). Total production in Gulf OPEC states will reach 25.25mm b/d on average in 2019. This will, of course, be dominated by KSA, which we expect will lift crude production to ~ 10.36mm b/d in 2H18 after holding crude output steady at ~ 10mm b/d in 1H18 over-delivering vs. its quota under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement. For 2019, we expect KSA to maintain production above 10.1mm b/d.2 Non-Gulf OPEC producers, on the other hand, will see their production fall 140k b/d this year, and another 240k b/d next year, leaving it at 7.49mm b/d on average in 2019, in our estimation. The contribution of these states to the OPEC 2.0 production cuts has been "managing" their respective decline curves. It is highly unlikely they will see production surge following the expiration of the OPEC 2.0 agreement at the end of this year. Overall, we expect global crude and liquids production to reach 100mm b/d this year, and 102.2mm b/d next year (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Lower Oil Prices In 2019 Will Test OPEC 2.0 Lower Oil Prices In 2019 Will Test OPEC 2.0 Oil Demand Surges This Year, But Slows In 2019 The global economic expansion will lift oil demand above 100mm b/d this year to 100.3mm b/d. This will be led, as always, by non-OECD growth, which we expect to increase 1.24mm b/d this year to 52.8mm b/d (Chart 3, top panel). DM demand - i.e., OECD consumption - will increase 440k b/d this year, to 47.5mm b/d, based on our estimates. Overall global demand rises 1.68mm b/d this year, by our reckoning (Chart 3). We expect tighter financial conditions this year and next will, with the lags typical of monetary policy, slow the rate of growth in oil demand next year. This will be delivered by tightening monetary policy, led by the U.S. Fed, and a mild recession next year, most likely in 2H19. We expect global demand to grow 1.57mm b/d next year, rising to just under 102mm b/d. EM demand will grow 1.21mm b/d, while DM demand will be up 360k b/d next year. Tightening Balances Will Reverse In 2H18 The yeoman effort put forth by OPEC 2.0 in reducing output and draining commercial inventories globally will reach its apotheosis by the end of 1H18 (Charts 4). Thereafter, as production grows and demand begins to slow, our balances indicate inventories will start to grow again (Chart 5). Chart 4Supply-Demand Balances##BR##No Longer Tightening In 2019 ... Supply-Demand Balances No Longer Tightening In 2019... Supply-Demand Balances No Longer Tightening In 2019... Chart 5... Leading To##BR##Inventory Accumulation ... Leading To Inventory Accumulation ... Leading To Inventory Accumulation Markets likely will start focusing on the implications of OPEC 2.0 returning production to the market and the surge in shale in 2H18 and during 2019. Non-forecastable events notwithstanding - e.g., a breakdown in Venezuela's production and exports - markets will be looking to OPEC 2.0 leadership for guidance on how the coalition will manage member-state production from 2H18 forward. If the OPEC 2.0 coalition is allowed to dissolve - something we do not expect - and a production free-for-all resumes similar to that of 2015 - 16, another round of supply destruction, brought about by lower prices, likely will ensue. This would greatly restrict E&P and services companies' access to capital, should it occur, and would, once again, imperil the economies of OPEC 2.0. In addition, because such volatility would discourage investment once again, it would set up a powerful price rally in the early 2020s following the attendant collapse in capex and E&P spending, as occurred in the previous down-cycle. We doubt this is the desired outcome of the OPEC 2.0 leadership, particularly KSA, as the Kingdom will be looking to IPO Saudi Aramco later this year to fund its Vision 2030 diversification efforts. We also doubt this is the desired outcome of Russia, given the economic pain it endured in the 2015 - 16 episode. More Frequent OPEC 2.0 Guidance Expected Given these considerations, we expect KSA and Russia to increase the frequency of forward guidance, directing market participants toward a preferred price band. Right now, this looks like a $50 to $60/bbl range - the 2018 forecast given by Russia's Energy Minister Alexander Novak earlier this week.3 It would be incumbent on OPEC 2.0 leadership to guide markets to expect production and inventory responses consistent with such guidance. We think the combination of OPEC 2.0 production restraint and the powerful synchronized global growth already in place puts Energy Minister Novak's guidance out of range for this year, and we are sticking with our forecasts for Brent and WTI. However, beginning in 2H18, a 2019 Brent forecast in Novak's range appears reasonable, based on the fundamentals discussed above. And, our WTI forecast of $53/bbl also is reasonable, given the average marginal cost of producing in the most prolific fields in the U.S. are at or below $50/bbl, according to the Dallas Fed's periodic Energy Survey.4 We believe the massive drawdown in global oil inventories to be the first step in a longer-term strategy by OPEC 2.0 countries. Lower OECD commercial inventory levels will diminish their shock-absorbing capacity, leading to a higher responsiveness of oil prices to supply-demand shocks. This will allow the coalition to exert greater control over oil prices via rapid, flexible storage adjustments and spare capacity management. Therefore, this year's out-of-range prices will be tolerated by Russia and KSA to achieve their optimal level of global inventories. A $50-to-$60/bbl Brent range for OPEC 2.0 would be consistent with a longer-term strategy to maximize the period of time hydrocarbons are the primary transportation fuel in the world. This is the only way to achieve the development goals set out by leaders of various oil-exporting states seeking to diversify the economic underpinnings of these economies. To do so, they have to keep oil-based transportation competitive for decades. Too much volatility - i.e., frequent excursions between very high and very low prices - will severely limit the access to capital these societies need to pull off this diversification. Managing production in a way that limits this volatility and keeps oil competitive in transport markets therefore is critical. Bottom Line: High prices will cause crude oil production to surge this year and next, particularly in the U.S. shales, and demand growth to slow. We expect Brent prices to average $67/bbl this year and $55/bbl next year. WTI prices will average $63/bbl this year and $53/bbl next year. We expect OPEC 2.0 to increase the frequency of its forward guidance - and to follow through on production and inventory adjustment in a manner that supports a desired price range for Brent prices in 2019 and into the 2020s. Right now, that range looks like $50 to $60/bbl. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined to describe the oil-producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which was formed at the end of 2016 to rein in out-of-control global oil production by cutting production some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d last year (vs. a target of 1.8mm b/d). The coalition has been remarkably successful in maintaining production discipline in 2017 and extending their deal to the end of 2018 with an option to review quotas in June. We expect OPEC 2.0 to gradually return production taken off the market over the course of 2H18, which will, by next year, most likely reverse the draws seen in global inventories. 2 KSA's production should lift next year as pipeline repairs at its giant Manifa field are completed. Corrosion problems took some 300k of 900k b/d total production offline. In addition, there is another 500k b/d of capacity offline in the Neutral Zone shared with Kuwait. KSA's capacity likely will remain ~ 11.7mm b/d, versus its historical 12.5mm level, but as Energy Intelligence notes, it will have to balance actual production with spare capacity for the next year or so. Please see "A Headache for Aramco," published July 2017 by Energy Intelligence on its website. 3 Please see "CORRECTED-UPDATE 5-Brent oil falls by $1 but demand underpins near $70/barrel," published by uk.reuters.com on January 16, 2018. 4 In its December 2017 Dallas Fed Energy Survey, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas reported the WTI price shale operators needed to profitably drill a new well in Texas and Oklahoma averaged $49/bbl (simple, unweighted survey average). The lowest cost was in the Permian Midland formation ($46/bbl) and the highest costs was in so-called Other U.S. (shale) at $55/bbl. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Lower Oil Prices In 2019 Will Test OPEC 2.0 Lower Oil Prices In 2019 Will Test OPEC 2.0 Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Lower Oil Prices In 2019 Will Test OPEC 2.0 Lower Oil Prices In 2019 Will Test OPEC 2.0

Dear Client, This is our last report of 2017. We will be back on January 4, 2018, with our customary recap of recommendations made this year. We wish you and your loved ones the very best this lovely season has to offer. Sincerely, Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy Highlights With GDP growth accelerating in ~ 75% of countries monitored by the IMF, we expect commodity demand - particularly for crude oil and refined products - to remain strong in 2018. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will maintain its production discipline, which will force commercial oil inventories lower in 2018. As a result, we expect oil markets to continue to tighten in 2018, keeping upside risk to prices from unplanned production outages acute. This was clearly demonstrated in separate incidents in the U.S. and North Sea in the past two months, which removed more than 400k b/d from markets since November. Geopolitical risk will remain elevated, particularly in Venezuela, where operations at the state oil company were paralyzed after senior military officers assumed leadership positions there. Beyond 2018, we believe OPEC 2.0 will endure as a coalition. It will manage production and provide forward guidance consistent with a strategy to keep WTI and Brent forward curves backwardated. This will provide a supportive backdrop for the Saudi Aramco IPO, expected toward the end of next year, and will limit the volume of hedging U.S. shale-oil producers are able to effect. In turn, this will limit the number of rigs U.S. E&Ps can profitably deploy. Energy: Overweight. Our Brent and WTI call spreads in 2018 - long $55/bbl calls vs. short $60/bbl calls - are up an average 53.8%. We will retain these exposures into 2018. Base Metals: Neutral. We expect base metals to be supported through 1Q18, after which reform measures in China could crimp supply and demand, as we discuss below. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk, even though inflation remains quiescent (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. Fed policy will be critical to ag markets in 2018. We expect as many as four rate hikes next year, as the Fed continues with rates normalization (see below). Feature Our updated balances model indicates global oil markets will continue to tighten in 2018, as demand growth accelerates and OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - maintains production discipline (Chart of the Week). Earlier this week, IMF noted improving employment conditions globally, which will continue to support aggregate demand and the synchronized global expansion in manufacturing and trade (Chart 2 and Chart 3).1 This acceleration of GDP growth rates globally will continue to support income growth and commodity demand generally. Oil-exporters have not participated in the global economic expansion to the extent of other economies, according to the Fund, which can be seen in the trade data (Chart 3). However, imports by Middle East and African countries are moving higher, and look set to post year-on-year (yoy) growth in the near future. Chart of the WeekOil Balances Will Continue to Tighten In 2018 Oil Balances Will Continue to Tighten In 2018 Oil Balances Will Continue to Tighten In 2018 Chart 2Global Upturn Boosts Manufacturing, ##br##Commodity Demand... Global Upturn Boosts Manufacturing, Commodity Demand... Global Upturn Boosts Manufacturing, Commodity Demand... The combination of continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 and expanding incomes boosting demand will force crude and product inventories lower, particularly those in the OECD, which are the primary target of the producer coalition (Chart 4). Chart 3...And Global Trade ...And Global Trade ...And Global Trade Chart 4OECD Inventories Will Fall Below 5-year ##br##Average In BCA's Supply-Demand Assessment OECD Inventories Will Fall Below 5-year Average In BCA's Supply-Demand Assessment OECD Inventories Will Fall Below 5-year Average In BCA's Supply-Demand Assessment Unplanned Outages Mounting; Risk Remains Acute Unlike many forecasters, we continue to expect inventories to draw in 1Q18. This expectation is the direct result of our supply-demand modelling, and also is supported by our expectation that the risk of unplanned outages is increasing. This already has been demonstrated in the U.S. and U.K. North Sea, where more than 400k b/d of pipeline flows in November and December were lost. Of far greater moment, however, is the potential for unplanned outages in Venezuela. We believe the state-owned oil company there is one systemic malfunction away from shutting down exports entirely - e.g., a breakdown in pumping stations - as happened in 2002. Reuters reports the government of Nicolas Maduro appears to be consolidating power via an "anti-corruption" campaign, and is installing senior military officials with little or no industry experience in leadership roles inside PDVSA.2 Reuters notes, "The ongoing purge, in which prosecutors have arrested at least 67 executives including two recently ousted oil ministers, now threatens to further harm operations for the OPEC country, which is already producing at 30-year-lows and struggling to run PDVSA units including Citgo Petroleum, its U.S. refiner." The news service goes on to report, "Executives that remain, meanwhile, are so rattled by the arrests that they are loathe to act, scared they will later be accused of wrongdoing." We have Venezuela output at just under 1.90mm b/d, and expect it to decline to a little more than 1.70mm b/d by the end of 2018. Brent Expected To Average $67/bbl In 2018 We continue to forecast average Brent prices of $67/bbl and WTI at $63/bbl next year, given our assessment of global supply-demand balances, which drive our fundamental price forecasts: We expect global crude and liquids supply to average 100.23mm b/d in 2018, vs 100.01mm b/d expected by the U.S. EIA, while we have global demand coming in at 100.29mm b/d on average next year, vs the 99.97mm b/d expected by EIA (Chart 5 and Chart 6). Chart 5BCA's Expected Crude Oil Supply Vs. EIA's BCA's Expected Crude Oil Supply Vs. EIA's BCA's Expected Crude Oil Supply Vs. EIA's Chart 6BCA's Expected Demand Exceeds EIA's In 2018 BCA's Expected Demand Exceeds EIA's In 2018 BCA's Expected Demand Exceeds EIA's In 2018 Our expectations translate into a 2.55mm b/d increase in supply next year, vs a 1.67mm b/d increase in demand yoy (Table 1). Running the EIA's supply-demand assessments through our fundamental pricing models produces average Brent and WTI prices of $49/bbl and $47/bbl, respectively. EIA is expecting a 2.04mm b/d increase in supply next year, vs a 1.63mm b/d increase in demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018 Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018 In line with our House view, we are expecting some USD strengthening on the back of as many as four interest-rate hikes by the Federal Reserve in the U.S. (Chart 7). As we've noted in the past, we expect these effects to be felt more in 2H18. Along with higher U.S. shale-oil production driven by higher prices - we expect shale output to go up 0.97mm b/d next year to 6.64mm b/d - a stronger USD will keep Brent and WTI prices below $70/bbl next year. Oil Beyond 2018: OPEC 2.0 Endures OPEC 2.0 will remain an enduring feature of the oil market going forward, in our view. Allowing the coalition to fade away, and returning the global oil market to a production free-for-all once again serves neither KSA's nor Russia's interests. Following the IPO of Saudi Aramco toward the end of 2018, KSA will, we believe, want to maintain stability in the market, by demonstrating to capital markets that OPEC 2.0 can manage crude-oil supplies in a way that is not disruptive to its new-found investors. It is important to remember the Aramco IPO is only the beginning of the process of transforming KSA from a crude resource exporter into a vertically integrated global refining and marketing colossus. To eclipse Exxon as the world's largest refiner, Aramco would benefit from continued access to capital markets throughout the following decades, as well reliable cash flows to lower its cost of capital, service debt, and maintain whatever dividends it envisions. This cannot occur if oil markets are continually at risk of collapsing because production cannot be managed in a business-like manner. While Russia has not embarked on the same sort of transformation of its resource industry as KSA, it still has a very strong interest in maintaining stability in the crude oil markets, given its dependence on hydrocarbon exports. The Russian rouble moves in near-lock-step with Brent prices - since 2010, Brent prices explain ~80% of the movement in the rouble (Chart 8). It is obvious a collapse in global crude oil prices would, once again, have devastating effects on Russia's economy, as it did in 2009 and 2014. Such a collapse would trigger inflation domestically, as the cost of imports skyrockets, and threaten civil unrest as incomes and GDP are hobbled and foreign reserves evaporate. Chart 7Stronger USD Limits Oil-Price Appreciation In 2018 Stronger USD Limits Oil-Price Appreciation In 2018 Stronger USD Limits Oil-Price Appreciation In 2018 Chart 8Russia Cannot Afford An Oil Price Collapse Russia Cannot Afford An Oil Price Collapse Russia Cannot Afford An Oil Price Collapse Both KSA and Russia have a deep interest in maintaining oil's pre-eminent position as a transportation fuel for as long as possible. For this reason, neither wants to encourage prices that are too high - $100/bbl+ prices greatly encouraged the development of shale technology in the U.S. - nor too low, given the dire consequences such an outcome would have for both their economies. The common goals of KSA and Russia cannot be achieved by allowing OPEC 2.0 to dissolve, leaving member states to produce at will in the sort of production free-for-all that characterized the OPEC market-share war of 2014 - 15. To the extent possible, OPEC 2.0 must continue to manage member states' production in a manner that does not permit inventories to once again fill to the point where the only way to moderate over-production is to push prices through cash costs, so that enough output is shut in to clear the market. The most obvious way for these goals to be accomplished is by keeping markets relatively tight. This can be done by keeping commercial oil inventories worldwide low enough to keep Brent and WTI forward curves backwardated - particularly in highly visible OECD and U.S. storage facilities. A backwardated forward curve means the average price over a typical 2- or 3-year hedge horizon is lower than the spot price received by OPEC 2.0 producers. The deeper the backwardation, the lower the average price a U.S. shale producer can lock in by hedging. This limits the number of rigs that can be deployed by shale producers. This will require continual communication with markets to assure them sufficient spare capacity and easily developed production can be brought to market to alleviate any temporary shortage. In the meantime, OPEC 2.0 members with flexible storage will need to communicate these barrels will be readily available to the market. This management and forward-guidance should be easier for OPEC 2.0 to execute on, following its recent success in keeping some 1.0mm b/d of production off the market - largely in KSA and Russia - and member states' existing spare capacity and storage. We continue to expect the daily working dialogue of the OPEC 2.0 member states - most especially KSA and Russia - to deepen as time goes by, and for tactics and strategy to evolve as each gains comfort operating with the other. Whether OPEC 2.0 can pull this off remains to be seen. However, given the success of the coalition over the past two years, we are inclined to believe they will continue to develop a durable modus operandi supporting this outcome. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Opposing Forces: Stay Neutral Metals In 2018 Chart 9Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize ##br##Impact of China Slowdown Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize Impact of China Slowdown Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize Impact of China Slowdown While we expect more upside to metal prices in the first half of 2018, slowing growth in China and a stronger USD will prevent a repeat of this year's stellar performance. While a deceleration in China is - ceteris paribus - most definitely a headwind to metal prices, we believe the impact may pan out differently this time around. The silver lining comes from the Communist Party's commitment to environmental reforms, which, in many cases, will manifest themselves in the form of less supply of the refined product, or demand for the ores. Either way, this alone is a positive for metals. China's Environmental Reforms Will Dominate in 1Q18 China's commitment to cleaning its air is currently shaping up in the form of winter cuts in major steel- and aluminum-producing provinces. While policies are hard to predict, we will keep monitoring the development and implementation of reforms from within China to assess how they will impact the markets. Outcomes from the Annual National People's Congress in March will give us a clearer indication of what to expect in terms of policy. For now, we see these reforms putting a floor under metal prices, at least in the beginning of 2018. Robust Global Demand Offsets Stronger USD & Slower Chinese Growth Xi's reforms will turn into a headwind for metal prices as they begin to impact the real economy in 2H18. Signs of weakness have already emerged in measures of industrial activity such as the Li Keqiang and Chinese PMI (Chart 9). In addition, the real estate sector has been showing some weakness since the beginning of the year. Annual growth rates in real estate investment and floor-space started are decelerating - a worrisome sign. Nonetheless, domestic demand remains robust, and policymakers in Beijing are approaching economic reforms gradually and with caution. Consequently we do not expect a major policy mistake to derail the Chinese economy. While Chinese growth will likely slow from above trend levels, a hard landing is most probably not in the cards. Another bearish risk comes from a stronger USD. We see the Fed as more committed to interest-rate normalization than markets expect, and consequently would not be surprised to see up to four rate hikes next year. Inverting the yield curve is a policy mistake incoming Chair Jerome Powell will try to avoid; however, we expect inflation to bottom in the first half of next year, giving the Fed room to accelerate its path of rate hikes. This will result in a stronger USD, which is bearish for commodities priced in U.S. dollars. In any case, these bearish factors will likely be offset by strong global growth, supported by a robust U.S. economy. Bottom Line: Xi's reforms will dominate metal markets in 2018 as bullish supply side environmental reforms duel against bearish demand-side economic reforms. Robust global growth will neutralize the impact of downside pressures. Stay neutral, but beware of modest USD strength. Low Inflation Retards Gold's Advance Once again, reality confounded theory: Inflation failed to emerge this year, even as systematically important central banks remained massively accommodative, and some 70% of the economies tracked by the OECD reported jobless rates below the commonly used estimate of the natural rate of unemployment (Chart 10). Chart 10Massive Monetary Accommodation Failed ##br##To Spur Inflation In The U.S. Massive Monetary Accommodation Failed To Spur Inflation In The U.S. Massive Monetary Accommodation Failed To Spur Inflation In The U.S. These fundamentals should be inflationary and supportive of gold. To date, they haven't been. We Expect Inflation To Revive The global economy has endured decades of low inflation going back at least to the 1990s. This has been driven by numerous factors. First, the expansion of the global value chain (GVC) over the past three decades has synchronized inflation rates worldwide, as our research and that of the BIS has found. As a result, U.S. wages and goods' inflation are now more dependent on global spare capacity. With the global output gap now almost closed, this disinflationary force will dissipate.3 Second, most measures of labor-market slack are now pointing toward tighter conditions, which, we expect, will strengthen the Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment next year. Inflation is a lagging indicator: Wage inflation lags the unemployment rate, and CPI inflation lags wage inflation. Investors should expect inflation to show up in 2018.4 Lastly, one-off technical factors, which depressed inflation last year - e.g. drop in cellphone data charges and prescription drug prices - also will fade. Once these big one-offs are no longer in annual percent-change calculations, inflation rates will rise. The Fed's Choppy Waters Against this backdrop, the Fed is embarking on a rates-normalization policy, which we believe will result in U.S. central bank's policy rate being increased up to four times next year. The risk of a policy error is high. Should the Fed proceed with its rate hikes while inflation remains quiescent, real interest rates will increase. This would depress gold prices, and, at the limit, threaten the current economic expansion by tightening monetary conditions well beyond current levels, potentially lifting unemployment levels. If, on the other hand, the Fed deliberately keeps rate hikes below the rate of growth in prices - i.e., it stays "behind the curve" - it risks being forced to implement steeper rate hikes later in 2018 or in 2019 to get stronger inflation under control. This could tighten monetary conditions suddenly, and threaten the expansion, pushing the U.S. economy into recession. There's a lot riding on how the Fed navigates these difficult conditions. Geopolitical Risks Will Support Gold On the geopolitical side, the risks we've identified in our October 12, 2017 publication - i.e. (1) U.S.-North Korea tensions, (2) trade protectionism of the Trump administration, and (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East-- will add a geopolitical risk premium to gold prices, supporting the metal's role as a safe haven.5 Bottom Line: We remain neutral precious metals, but still recommend investors allocate to gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk. U.S. Policies Will Weigh On Ags In 2018 U.S. monetary and trade policy will dominate ags next year. Our modelling reveals that U.S. financial factors - real rates and the USD - are significant in explaining ag price behavior (Chart 11).6 Given that we expect the Fed to hike interest rates more aggressively than what the market is currently pricing in, we see grains as vulnerable to the downside. In addition, the risk that NAFTA is abrogated by the U.S. would weigh on ag markets, as Canada and Mexico are among the U.S.'s top three ag export destinations. Chart 11Bearish U.S. Monetary And Trade Policies ##br##Amid Healthy Inventories Will Weigh On Ags Bearish U.S. Monetary And Trade Policies Amid Healthy Inventories Will Weigh On Ags Bearish U.S. Monetary And Trade Policies Amid Healthy Inventories Will Weigh On Ags We expect ag markets will remain well supplied next year, and inventories will moderate the impact of supply-side shocks - most notably in the form of a La Nina event. The probability of a La Nina currently stands above 80%, and is expected to last until mid-to-late spring. U.S. Monetary Policy Is Relevant With U.S. inflation rates still subdued, there has been much talk about how soon the Fed will be able embark on its tightening cycle. A weaker-than-expected USD has been favorable for ag markets this year, and thus kept U.S. ag exports competitive. However, if and when the economy reaches the kink in the Philipps Curve, and inflation begins its ascent, the Fed will be able to proceed with its rate-hiking cycle. With the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge at a cycle high, we expect this scenario to unfold in the first half of 2018. This would give incoming Fed Chairman Jerome Powell ample room to hike rates which would - ceteris paribus - bear down on ag prices. FX Developments In Other Major Exporters Will Also Be Bearish The effects of higher U.S. interest rates are translated to ag markets via the exchange-rate channel. Commodities are priced in USD, thus a stronger USD vis-à-vis the currency of a major ag exporter will, all else equal, increase the profitability of farmers competing against U.S. exporters in international markets. Among the ag-relevant currencies, we highlight the Brazilian Real, EUR, Russian Rouble, and Australian Dollar as most likely to depreciate vis-à-vis the USD in 2018. Termination Of NAFTA Is A Risk For American Farmers U.S. farmers are keeping a close eye on NAFTA renegotiations, and rightly so. Canada and Mexico are the U.S.'s second and third largest agricultural export markets - accounting for 15% and 13% of U.S. agricultural exports in 2016, respectively. In fact, corn, rice, and wheat exports to Mexico accounted for 26%, 15%, and 11% share of U.S. exports of those commodities, respectively. However, as BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service points out, the long-run impact depends on the underlying reason for the termination of the trade agreement. If Trump is merely a "pluto-populist" - as they expect - NAFTA will simply be replaced by bilateral trade agreements, with no lasting economic disturbance. The risk is that Trump is a genuine populist. If this turns out to be the case, tariffs and a rejection of the WTO would make U.S. exports less competitive, and would become a bearish force in ag markets.7 The risk of a collapse in the NAFTA trade deal would be devastating for U.S. farmers. In fact, in a bid to reduce reliance on the U.S., Mexican Economic Minister Ildefonso Guajardo recently announced that they are working on a Mexico-European Union trade deal.8 In addition, Mexico signed the world's largest free trade agreement with Japan, and is currently exploring the opportunity to join Mercosur. Bottom Line: Weather-induced volatility is possible in the near term, as a La Nina event threatens to reduce yields. Nevertheless, U.S. financial conditions and trade policy will dominate ag markets in 2018. With markets underestimating the Fed's resolve regarding interest rate hikes, we see some upside to the USD. This will keep a lid on ag prices next year. 1 Please see "The year in Review: Global Economy in 5 Charts," published on the IMF Blog December 18, 2017. https://blogs.imf.org/2017/12/17/the-year-in-review-global-economy-in-5-charts/ 2 Please see "Paralysis at PDVSA: Venezuela's oil purge cripples company," published by reuters.com December 15, 2017. 3 The IMF estimates the median output gap for 20 advanced economies reached -0.1% in 2017 and will rise to +0.3% in 2018. Please see BIS https://www.bis.org/publ/work602.htm. The Bank for International Settlements in Basel describes the GVC as "cross-border trade in intermediate goods and services." 4 The U.S. unemployment has been under its estimated NAIRU for 9 consecutive months now. 5 Please see Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold," dated October 12, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Our modelling indicates that U.S. financial factors are important determinants of agriculture commodity price developments. More specifically, a 1% move in the USD TWI and a 1pp change in 5 year real rates are associated with a 1.4%, and an 18% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see "Mexico sees possible EU trade deal as NAFTA talks drag on," dated December 13, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018 Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q17 Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018 Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018 Trades Closed in Summary of Trades Closed in

Overweight Selected Companies Dear Client, This week I am away visiting clients in Australia, so we are sending you this report written by my colleague Oleg Babanov (Emerging Market Equity Sector Strategy). Oleg identifies select companies in Austria as excellent conduits to emerging market growth whilst maintaining high standards of corporate governance. Oleg also has a list of top stocks in Poland, Russia and Turkey. Please contact us if you would like to see those additional picks. Dhaval Joshi Highlights We are recommending an overweight position in select Austrian companies on a long-term (one year-plus) time horizon. Austrian-listed companies traditionally have high exposure to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and other Emerging Markets (EM), while offering superior corporate governance standards, which secures a premium to EM peers. At the same time, geographically diversified revenues stemming from developed and emerging markets support less-volatile earnings growth and outperformance over the long-term. Table 1Single-Stock Statistics On Select Austrian Companies* Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austrian Companies - EM Focused... Companies in Austria have traditionally been active in both Western Europe, with a main focus in Austria and Germany, as well as in the CEE region, providing investors with a unique access to both kind of markets. Sectors with high exposure include financials, with around 56% in emerging markets, consumer discretionary, with 46%, and materials with 45%. Furthermore, in terms of company count, pretty much every listed company in the materials as well as the real estate sector has exposure to emerging markets (Chart I-1A, Chart I-1B, Chart I-1C, Chart I-1D, Chart I-1E, Chart I-1F). Chart I-1AGeographical Revenue Breakdown Austria: ##br##Consumer Discretionary Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-1BGeographical Revenue Breakdown Austria: ##br##Financials Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-1CGeographical Revenue Breakdown Austria:##br## IT Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-1DGeographical Revenue Breakdown Austria:##br## Materials Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-1EGeographical Revenue Breakdown Austria: ##br##Real Estate Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chat I-1FGeographical Revenue Breakdown Austria:##br## Utilities Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards ...And With High Corporate Governance Standards The Austrian ATX equity index has significantly outperformed the MSCI EM index on both a long-term (+21% over five years and +27% over three years) and short-term time horizon (+12%) (Chart I-2A & Chart 1-2B). Chart I-2AFive-Year Performance: ##br##Austrian ATX Index Vs. MXEF Index Five-Year Performance: Austrian ATX Index Vs. MXEF Index Five-Year Performance: Austrian ATX Index Vs. MXEF Index Chart I-2BYTD Performance:##br## Austrian ATX Index Vs. MXEF Index YTD Performance: Austrian ATX Index Vs. MXEF Index YTD Performance: Austrian ATX Index Vs. MXEF Index We believe part of this outperformance is warranted by better corporate governance standards of Austrian companies, which score highly compared to their emerging market peers on all metrics, with the exception of environmental disclosure (Chart I-3A, Chart I-3B, Chart I-3C, Chart I-3D).1 Effectively such companies are offering investors access to emerging markets with less corporate risk, and better management and disclosure standards. Chart I-3AESG Disclosure Comparison Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-3BSocial Disclosure Comparison Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-3CEnvironment Disclosure Comparison Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Chart I-3DGovernance Disclosure Comparison Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Based on the findings above, we have created a portfolio of six companies from the consumer discretionary, financials, real estate and industrials sectors, combining exposure to emerging markets with a high ESG score and sound operational and financial performance (Table I-2). Table I-2Select Overweight Companies And ##br##12-Month Beta Vs. MSCI EM Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Sector Specifics Price performance over the past five years has been strong, with our overweight basket outperforming the broad MSCI EM index by 53% (Chart I-4). Valuations between Austrian banks and companies from other sectors are diverging. While non-bank companies are trading at a 16% premium to EM peers on a P/E basis, Austrian banks are trading at a 14% discount to the EM Banks Index on a price-to-book comparison (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Select Austrian Companies Outperforming##br## MSCI EM Index Select Austrian Companies Outperforming MSCI EM Index Select Austrian Companies Outperforming MSCI EM Index Chart I-5Valuations Are Diverging##br## Depending On Sector Valuations Are Diverging Depending On Sector Valuations Are Diverging Depending On Sector Nevertheless, Austrian companies display better bottom-line growth dynamics, helped by recovering performance on an operational level, translating into slightly higher profitability (Chart I-6A, Chart I-6B, Chart I-6C). Chart I-6AA Recovery In Operating Margins Of ##br##Austrian Companies In Late 2015... A Recovery In Operating Margins Of Austrian Companies In Late 2015... A Recovery In Operating Margins Of Austrian Companies In Late 2015... Chart I-6B...Has Helped EPS Growth To Outstrip EM ##br##Companies Since The End Of 2015... ...Has Helped EPS Growth To Outstrip EM Companies Since The End Of 2015... ...Has Helped EPS Growth To Outstrip EM Companies Since The End Of 2015... Chart I-6C...While Profitability Is Close ##br##To The EM Average ...While Profitability Is Close To The EM Average ...While Profitability Is Close To The EM Average Chart I-7ACash Flow Generation Is Subdued##br## Among Austrian Companies... Cash Flow Generation Is Subdued Among Austrian Companies... Cash Flow Generation Is Subdued Among Austrian Companies... Furthermore, despite negative cash flow generation for the select basket, Austrian companies have comfortable debt levels, and are paying out higher dividends than EM companies (Chart I-7A, Chart I-7B, Chart I-7C). Chart I-7B...With Debt Levels Close To The EM Average... ...With Debt Levels Close To The EM Average... ...With Debt Levels Close To The EM Average... Chart I-7C...And Dividend Yields Higher Than EM Peers ...And Dividend Yields Higher Than EM Peers ...And Dividend Yields Higher Than EM Peers The Overweight Basket Erste Group Bank (EBS AV) Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Erste Group Bank (EBS AV) (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Performance Since October 2016: ##br##Erste Group Bank vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: Erste Group Bank vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: Erste Group Bank vs. MSCI EM Erste Group Bank (EBS AV) reported better-than-expected third-quarter 2017 financial results on November 3. Net interest income stabilized, ticking up 1% year over year, mainly driven by the integration of Citigroup's consumer banking business in Hungary. Net interest margin was still under pressure, down 4 basis points year over year to 2.39%. Net fee and commission income expanded by 4%, supported by fee income, but was offset by trading income deterioration. Operating expenses grew by 3% year over year due to regulatory and IT project costs. With the decrease in provisions offsetting declining operating results, the bottom line rose by 8% year over year. Asset quality showed improvement, with the NPL ratio shrinking by a significant 111 basis points year over year to 4.3%. The company's tier-1 ratio grew by 2 basis points year over year to 13.4%. The market is estimating a 0.2% EPS CAGR over the next four years. We believe operating expenses should grow at a slower pace in the coming quarters, positively affected by decelerating regulatory and IT project investments. At the same time, we expect net interest income to continue to expand, driven by strong macro performance in the CEE region and countercyclical measures by the corresponding central banks. Raiffeisen Bank (RBI AV) Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Raiffeisen Bank (RBI AV) (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Performance Since October 2016:##br## Raiffeisen Bank vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: Raiffeisen Bank vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: Raiffeisen Bank vs. MSCI EM Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI AV) reported remarkable third-quarter 2017 financial results on November 14, solidly beating market expectations. Net interest income advanced by 4% year over year, with net interest margin up 4 basis points to 2.47%. Net fee and commission income climbed by 8% year over year, boosted by the bank's payment transfer business but offset by sluggish trading income as well as a one-off litigation cost in Slovakia. However, pre-provisional profit surged by 35% thanks to disciplined cost management. As a result, net income soared 46% year over year, substantially beating market expectations. Asset quality improvement was another positive. The NPL ratio came in at 6.7%, down 200 basis points year over year, aided by slower NPL formation and write-offs. The tier-1 capital ratio expanded by 100 basis points year over year to 13.4%. The market is estimating an 18% EPS CAGR over the next four years. We welcome the bank's digital transformation strategy in Romania. We believe the new version of the banking platform to be launched in 2018 will better support customers' needs and optimize the bank's transaction business. Andritz AG (ANDR AV) Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Andritz AG (ANDR AV) (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Performance Since October 2016:##br## Andritz vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: Andritz vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: Andritz vs. MSCI EM Andritz AG (ANDR AV) reported weak third-quarter 2017 financial results on November 3. Revenue contracted by 8% year over year, weaker across all business segments, especially in pulp and paper (-13%). This was reflected by a shrinkage in overall order intakes, down 9% year over year. In terms of geographic exposure, Andritz continues its sales expansion in Europe (+6%) and China (+25%). EBITDA fell 9% year over year, mainly dragged down by the materials business, despite this being moderately compensated by the separation business segment. EBITDA margin was also disappointing across the board, down 20 basis points year over year to 7.2%, except for the hydro segment (+154%). As a result, the bottom line declined by 20% year over year, missing market expectations. Andritz is trading at a forward P/E of 16.5x, while the market is estimating a 4.7% EPS CAGR over the next four years. Despite lower-than-expected third-quarter earnings, we remain bullish on the company, given its strong track record of business growth in difficult environments. Earlier this month, the company won a contract from SaskPower to refurbish a hydroelectric power station in Canada, with a total contract value of more than US$104 million. CA Immobilien Anlagen (CAI AV) Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards CA Immobilien Anlagen (CAI AV) (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Performance Since October 2016: ##br##CA Immobilien Anlagen vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: CA Immobilien Anlagen vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: CA Immobilien Anlagen vs. MSCI EM CA Immobilien Anlagen AG (CAI AV) reported better-than-expected third-quarter 2017 financial results on November 22. Revenue increased by 5.6% year over year, helped by a 10% increase in rental income, as occupancy rates increased in all three major regions (Germany, Austria and CEE). On the operating side, expenses fell by 5% year over year, while income jumped by 21.4% year over year, pushing operating margin higher to 45.8% from 39.8% for the same period last year. The EBITDA grew 11% year over year. As a result of strong top line performance and a further decline in costs, bottom line expanded by 25% year over year on adjusted basis. CA Immo is trading at a forward P/E of 19.5x, while the market is estimating a 6% EPS CAGR over the next three years. Among some of the highlights of this quarter was the successful reduction in financing cost (-22% compared to the first quarter 2017). The new property additions in Budapest and Prague have already positively contributed to the results, and focus is now shifting to the future pipeline, which is heavily tilted towards Germany (in terms of projects). We expect the positive earnings momentum to continue in 2018. UBM Development (UBS AV) Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards UBM Development (UBS AV) (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Performance Since October 2016:##br## UBM Development vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: UBM Development vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: UBM Development vs. MSCI EM UBM Development reported better-than-expected third quarter 2017 financial results on November 28. Quarterly revenue fell by 66.5% year over year, but nine-month output volume stood 18% higher, while operating expenses contracted by 66.7% year over year, helped by lower material costs. Nevertheless, operating income decreased by 70% compared to the same period last year, while operating margin finished 70 basis points lower at 7.9%. Pretax income was helped by a one off gain from affiliates, as a result, net profit climbed 10% compared to last year, and 24% for the first three quarters. On adjusted basis bottom line finished the quarter in negative territory. UBM Development is currently trading at a forward P/E of 10x, while the market is forecasting an EPS CAGR of 6.5% over the next three years. The company came close to reaching its debt reduction target of EUR 550 million, despite EUR 164 million of investments in the first half of the year. Improvements on the balance sheet should provide the company with cheaper financing in 2018. Furthermore, sales are on track, with another EUR 120 million of cash sales secured after the third quarter reporting period, bringing UBM close to its full achieving its full-year guidance. DO & CO (DOC AV) Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards Austria: High EM Exposure And Corporate Governance Standards DO & CO (DOC AV) (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Performance Since October 2016: ##br##DO & CO vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: DO & CO vs. MSCI EM Performance Since October 2016: DO & CO vs. MSCI EM DO & CO (DOC AV) announced first-half year financial results on November 16. Revenues dropped by 10% year over year, primarily dragged down by the international event catering segment. EBITDA contracted accordingly, down 13% year over year. However, EBITDA margin remained stable in the international event catering as well as the restaurants and lounges segments. The bottom line came in shy of expectations, shrinking by 18% year over year. We believe the inclusion of a new customer - Juventus soccer club - will boost the margin further in the second-half of the year. DO & CO is trading at a forward P/E of 17.5x, while the market is estimating a 7.2% EPS CAGR over the next four years. The company is fairly valued compared to its five-year average, but trades at up to a 30% discount to its international peers. We believe that DO & CO should be able to crystalize the effects of a strong 2018 pipeline, with new clients in the airline segment (e.g. Lufthansa, and Air China) and the opening of new locations in Los Angeles and Paris (and expansions in London and New York). On a longer-term perspective, the positive outcome on possible construction of a third airport in Turkey would also boost performance. How To Trade? The EMES team recommends gaining exposure to this theme through a basket of listed equities consisting of six overweight recommendations. The main goal is active alpha generation by excluding laggards and including out-of-benchmark plays, to avoid passive index-hugging via an ETF. Direct: Equity access through the tickers (Bloomberg): Erste Group Bank (EBS AV); Raiffeisen Bank (RBI AV); Andritz AG (ANDR AV); CA Immobilien Anlagen (CAI AV); UBM Development (UBS AV); DO & CO (DOC AV). ETFs: iShares Austria Capped ETF (EWO US) provides exposure to all described companies. Funds: Pioneer Funds Austria (VIENTPF AV); 3 Banken Osterrrech-Fonds (3BKOESI AV); Raiffeisen-Oesterreich-Aktien (OSTAKTT AV). Please note this trade recommendation is long term (1Y+) and based on an overweight trade. We do not see a need for specific market timing for this call (for technical indicators please refer to our website link). For convenience, the performance of both market cap-weighted and equal-weighted equity baskets will be tracked (please see upcoming updates as well as the website link to follow performance). Risks To Our Investment Case On a macro level, we see the main risks stemming from possible asset-purchase tapering by the European Central Bank, which could slow GDP growth in Eastern Europe as well as trigger FX weakness and a slowdown in property markets. Taking into account that exposure to this region is high, such a scenario would most likely cause earnings headwinds for the selected companies, especially in the banking sector. Separately, some of the companies have high exposure to Russia and Turkey. Both countries are prone to geopolitical turbulence, as seen in the past, which in turn can negatively affect economic development and negatively affect companies. Company specific risks include higher rates of projects under construction in the real estate sector, with risks of delays and higher input costs inflating budgets. For Andritz, we see the main risk in the slowdown of capex in the European auto segment (which it seems already happened in the second quarter), and the possible need for additional restructuring in the auto division. We also see some regulatory risk for the banking segment from adverse regulations, such as the bank tax introduction already seen in Hungary, or possible increases in bank taxes in Austria. Oleg Babanov, Associate Vice President obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com 1 BCA Estimates and Bloomberg Data

Highlights The Arabic title of this Special Report is "Against Wasta." Wasta roughly translates as reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. It "indicates that there is a middleman or 'connection' between somebody who wants a job, a license or government service and somebody who is in a position to provide it."1 While it has been helpful, it also has led to profound corruption. Feature The political sandstorm ripping through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) - visible in the lifting of the ban on women driving cars earlier this year, and, most recently in the consolidation of military and political power by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (often referred to as "MBS") over the past few weeks - must be seen as prelude to implementing Vision 2030, which will feature an ongoing battle against wasta in KSA. If successful, this could transform a feudal desert kingdom into a modern nation-state.2 When the storm passes, MBS will hold the military and political reins of power in the Kingdom. This will allow the Sudairi branch of the Saud family, led by MBS's father, King Salman, to execute on its Vision 2030 agenda to wean itself from an almost-complete dependence on oil-export revenues. To do so, the Kingdom's leadership must successfully navigate OPEC 2.0's production-cutting deal in the short term, and the IPO of Saudi Aramco in the long term.3 KSA's Leadership Is On A Mission Chart of the WeekMarkets Take KSA News In Stride Markets Take KSA News In Stride Markets Take KSA News In Stride It's fairly obvious KSA's leadership and Russian President Vladimir Putin are on the same page re extending OPEC 2.0's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting deal to end-2018, given the public statements of MBS and Putin supporting such a measure. While markets have been responsive to this messaging, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak is restraining a full-throttled embrace of this expectation, saying a decision to extend the deal might not come at OPEC's November 30 meeting, given the amount of data to be analyzed.4 Markets appear to be taking the recent news - particularly the headlines out of KSA - in stride, as the major safe-haven assets have been remarkably well-behaved (Chart of the Week). In our base case, we continue to expect the OPEC 2.0 deal to be extended to end-June, which will lift Brent and WTI prices to $65 and $63/bbl next year. If we do get an extension of the OPEC 2.0 deal to end-December - and the odds of this appear very high - our 2018 Brent and WTI average-price forecasts could increase by as much as $5/bbl.5 KSA, Russia Have A Transactional Relationship, Not An Alliance The public alignment of the views of the Saudi and Russian leaderships are important over the short term. However, this does not necessarily mean both states have achieved a general alignment of views on everything of common concern to them. The OPEC 2.0 coalition led by KSA and Russia - the two largest oil exporters in the world - is a transactional relationship, not an alliance. The coalition members negotiated a deal to remove 1.8mm b/d of oil from the market in order to drain global inventories, particularly in the OECD. This deal was negotiated under duress - Brent prices threatened to fall through the $20/bbl level at the beginning of 2016 in the wake of the market-share war declared by OPEC at the end of 2014.6 Such an outcome would have imperiled the very survival of the member states (Chart 2). The success of OPEC 2.0 has taken many by surprise: The overwhelming market consensus in the lead-up to the deal getting done was the coalition would never come about, and, if it did, it would never be able to maintain the discipline necessary to follow through on its goal to return OECD inventories to their five-year average. BCA was outside this consensus from the get-go.7 And we continue to expect OPEC 2.0's production discipline to be maintained into next year, with KSA and Russia leading by example (Chart 3). Chart 2Oil-Price Collapse Clobbered Reserves Oil-Price Collapse Clobbered Reserves Oil-Price Collapse Clobbered Reserves Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds As important as the management of OPEC 2.0 is to KSA, Russia and the oil markets, the Kingdom's leadership has a laser focus on its chief long-term goal: the Saudi Aramco IPO. In light of its Vision 2030 agenda, the most important decision the Kingdom's leadership will make will be whether to IPO Aramco on a Western bourse - e.g., the NY Stock Exchange - or whether the initial offering of KSA's crown jewel is placed directly with China's sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and two of that country's largest oil companies. KSA controls this evolution. Decisions made by its leaders will resound in the oil markets for years, if not decades, to come. KSA's Anti-Corruption Campaign And The Aramco Offering The recent arrest of Saudi royals and consolidation of power by the Sudairi branch of the Saud royal family - led by King Salman and his son, MBS - appear to be part and parcel of an anti-corruption campaign laid out in the Vision 2030 document last year. This campaign, like the formation of OPEC 2.0, is being undertaken to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco next year. Proceeds from the IPO will support KSA's diversification away from being almost wholly dependent on oil exports.8 King Salman, MBS and their closest advisors have concluded they must reform the system of wasta if the Kingdom is to offer anything resembling a prosperous future full of opportunity to its restive population, most of which - more than 50% - are members of MBS's 30-something demographic cohort (Chart 4). Chart 4KSA's Under-30 Cohort Needs Jobs KSA's Under-30 Cohort Needs Jobs KSA's Under-30 Cohort Needs Jobs The wasta system in the Middle East - like the "old-boy" networks in the West - can be positive, in that it can "lower transaction costs and reduce the problem of asymmetric information if, for example, the use of such connections can place disadvantaged groups or individuals into the workforce who might otherwise not have the same opportunity as others," according to Prof. Ramady. However, such a system can, and has, become corrosive to the evolution of society, and can stunt the evolution toward an innovative, dynamic society and economy. Prof. Ramady notes, "Fighting negative wasta is important for the countries that seek to truly implement a more equal opportunity and entrepreneurial knowledge-based economic base." This discontent with the status quo post-Arab Spring was apparent in 2016, when BCA's Geopolitical Strategy noted KSA was in the early stages of such reforms.9 From everything King Salman and MBS have said and done to date, this appears to be the agenda that is being enacted. The lifting of the ban on women driving in KSA to take effect next year; hosting investors and entrepreneurs in Riyadh in September - the so-called Davos in the Desert presentations; even the recent mass arrests and consolidation of power are part and parcel of this reform.10 Early indications of this agenda could be seen in April 2015, when KSA lowered the value of projects requiring approval by the Council of Ministers to SR100 million from SR300 million ($27 million from $80 million). The collapse in oil prices from more than $100/bbl in 2014 likely drove this decision, but, as Prof. Ramady notes, "the intention of the Saudi government was clear: that even 'small' projects (by Saudi standards) could now be scrutinised to avoid 'hidden costs' and corruption." Following the April 2015 reforms, King Salman told the Kingdom's Anti-Corruption Committee "that his government would have zero tolerance for corruption in the country and that he and other members of the royal family are not above the law and that any citizen can file a lawsuit against the king, crown prince or other members of the royal family. These were some of the strongest statements to be made by a Saudi monarch on the issue of combating corruption and nepotism." (Emphasis added.)11 The Aramco IPO The way KSA monetizes its crown jewel will have a profound effect on the evolution of the country's institutions and the oil markets. MBS's implementation of the anti-corruption campaign laid out by his father, King Salman, suggests an IPO on a western bourse is in the offing. Such a listing would impose regulatory and transparency requirements on Aramco that are fully consistent with the royal family's words and deeds since King Salman took power in January 2015. Monetizing 5% of what could potentially be the largest oil-producing and -refining enterprise in the world - the only asset capable of funding the transformation of an entire country of 32mm people - on a bourse that requires even a minimal level of transparency for investors means the government of KSA could demand similar transparency from every other firm and individual in the Kingdom. It gives the government license, so to speak, to develop and enforce the rule of law, consistent with King Salman's remarks to the Anti-Corruption Committee. This will resonate with the younger KSA elites, many of whom are tech-savvy, educated in the West and in MBS's 30-something cohort. This would be a huge gamble on the future and the Kingdom's ability to transform itself into an open monarchy. Success would transform a feudal kingdom into a modern nation-state with an enfranchised population that can advance based on entrepreneurial innovation and merit. The rule of law and transparency in business and governmental dealings would replace wasta, privilege and corruption. It also could expose the royal family to a palace coup, as Marko Papic, BCA's Chief Geopolitical strategist, notes in his most recent report "The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise," which we cite above. The stakes couldn't be higher. Listing on a Western bourse also would position Saudi Aramco squarely in the market and central to it, executing on its plan to become the dominant global oil refiner, and funding the Kingdom's diversification away from near-total dependence on oil exports. Lastly, it would allow KSA to retain its geopolitical optionality - playing competing global interests off each other when negotiating alliances and commercial deals. Implications Of An Aramco Private Placement If the Aramco shares are privately placed with China's SWF and the country's two largest oil companies, the pressure to reform likely would be lessened, as the Chinese government typically does not make reform demands on governments of resource-rich countries in which it is investing.12 Assuming China's SWF and/or the oil companies participating in its bidding consortium received a seat(s) on the Aramco board, China certainly would gain greater assurance over its crude oil and refined product supplies going forward. This is a critical concern with domestic production falling and demand for crude oil increasing (Chart 5). And it would give China an eventual interest in using military power to protect its investments in KSA, thus advancing and supporting its long-term evolution as a superpower.13 It also would, in all likelihood, expand the membership of the club trading oil in yuan, which now includes Russia and Iran, to KSA and its GCC allies and Iraq by 2020, if not sooner. This would represent ~ 39mm b/d of production (Chart 6), and 23mm b/d of exports. BP estimates just over 42mm b/d of crude oil are traded globally, meaning this petro-yuan producing coalition would account for 55% of total exports.14 Chart 5China Needs To Offset Declining Production China Needs To Offset Declining Production China Needs To Offset Declining Production Chart 6A Petro-yuan Would Be Formidable A Petro-yuan Would Be Formidable A Petro-yuan Would Be Formidable At some 9mm b/d, China accounts for ~ 21% of global crude oil imports. The combination of OPEC 2.0's crude production and exports with China's import volumes could make the OPEC 2.0 + 1 - the "+1" being China - the most potent force in the oil trading markets, if such a coalition can find a way to balance the competing interests of the world's largest exporters (KSA and Russia) with those of the world's largest importer (China). It also would put the petro-yuan bloc firmly in China's geopolitical orbit, allowing it to expand its sphere of influence deeply into the Persian Gulf, and the global oil market. Bottom Line: The recent turmoil in KSA must be seen as the opening moves in the transformation of a feudal desert kingdom into a modern nation-state. The evolution of the transformation is critically dependent on decisions made by KSA's leadership. How this breaks will profoundly affect the global oil markets and the Kingdom itself particularly in regard to how oil is priced - USD vs. yuan - and the effect new trading blocs have on market structure. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Ramady, Mohamed A., ed. (2016), "The Political Economy of Wasta: Use and Abuse of Social Capital Networking," Springer International Publishing Switzerland. Ramady is a professor of Finance and Economics at King Fahd in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The introduction of the book starts by quoting the proverb: To accept a benefit is to sell one's freedom. 2 Please see "The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise," published November 15, 2017, in BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy, for a full analysis of these issues. 3 OPEC 2.0 is our moniker for the OPEC and non-OPEC coalition of oil producers led by KSA and Russia, which agreed to remove 1.8mm b/d of oil production from the market at the end of last year. 4 Please see "Russia's Novak: Oil cut pact extension decision not necessarily at Nov meeting," published November 2, 2017, by reuters.com. Elevating the level of uncertainty as to when the OPEC 2.0 pact will be unwound is exactly the sort of forward guidance OPEC 2.0 leaders would need to convey to markets in order to backwardate the forward oil-price curve - i.e., keep longer-dated prices below prompt prices. A backwardated forward curve means U.S. shale producers realize lower prices on longer-dated hedges, which restrains the number of rigs they can deploy in the field. On Wednesday, Reuters also reported as spokesman for Rosneft, Russia's largest oil company, foresees difficulty in the wind-down of OPEC 2.0's production cuts - and the return to unrestrained production. Mikhail Leontyev said, "Speaking about the company's concerns, first of all it was about how to prepare for suspending measures to restrict production. This is a serious question. Sooner or later, of course, these measures will be lifted," Leontyev said. "Now or later, that's a separate question. It's a serious challenge, for which one needs to prepare." Roseneft is responsible for 40% of Russia's oil output; it is 50% owned by the Russian government. Please see "Russia's Rosneft says managing exit from OPEC+ deal is a serious challenge," published by reuters.com on November 15, 2017. 5 Please see "Oil Forecast Lifted As Markets Tighten," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, October 19, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Worth noting is the fact that should OPEC 2.0 not extend the expiry of the production-cutting deal markets likely would sell off quickly. This is because the leadership of the coalition - MBS and President Putin - have publicly embraced such a move; not doing so would be a disappointment to markets. Our modelling in the article cited here indicates the cuts have to be extended at least to end-June 2018, if the OPEC 2.0 goal of reducing OECD commercial oil inventories to their 5-year average levels is to be achieved. Also worth noting, if we do see the OPEC 2.0 cuts extended to end-2018, we likely will be widening our implied Brent vs. WTI spread to $4/bbl, given the transportation bottlenecks that are likely to emerge in the event of a further lift in U.S. prices: Pipeline infrastructure in the most productive shales, particularly the Permian Basin, cannot get oil to export facilities as quickly as it is produced. Please see "Transportation constraints and export costs widen the Brent-WTI price spread," published in the U.S. EIA's This Week in Petroleum series November 8, 2017. 6 We discuss this at length in our 2017 outlook. Please see "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy December 8, 2016. See also our "2016 Commodity Outlook: Neutral Across the Board," published December 17, 2016, for a detailed discussion of pricing dynamics as this time. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see the 2017 Outlook referenced above in footnote 6. 8 KSA officials believe the company is worth $2 trillion, based on their expectation a 5% IPO of the company would generate $100 billion. 9 Please see "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," the May 2016 issue of BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy. It is available at gps.bacresearch.com. 10 Please see "Saudi Arabia plans to build futuristic city for innovators," published October 24, 2017, by phys.org. 11 Please see footnote 1, p. ix. 12 Please see "Exclusive - China offers to buy 5 percent of Saudi Aramco directly: sources," published by reuters.com October 16, 2017. 13 We examined this in depth in our report entitled "OPEC 2.0: Fear and Loathing in Oil Markets," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy on April 27, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/oil/oil-trade-movements.html. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades ضد الواسطة ضد الواسطة Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table ضد الواسطة ضد الواسطة Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Middle Eastern geopolitics will add upside risk to our bullish oil view, but not cause a drastic supply shock; Saudi Arabia is at last converting from a feudal monarchy to a modern nation-state; The greatest risk is domestic upheaval, motivating Saudi internal reforms and power consolidation; Abroad, the Saudis are constrained by military weakness, relatively low oil prices, and U.S. foreign policy; Geopolitical risk premia are seeping back into oil prices, but OPEC 2.0 and the Saudi-Iranian détente are still intact. Feature Geopolitical and political turbulence in Saudi Arabia kicked into high gear in November, with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman apparently turning the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton into a luxury prison for members of the royal family.1 At the same time, rumors are swirling that the bizarre resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, allegedly orchestrated by Saudi Arabia, is a potential casus belli. In this scenario, Lebanon would become a proxy war for a confrontation between Sunni Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia (aided by Israel) and their Shia rivals, led by Iran and its proxy Hezbollah. To our clients around the world we say, "please take a deep breath." In this report, we intend to separate the signal from the noise. The Middle East has been a theater of paradigm shifts since at least 2011.2 Not all of them are investment relevant. In this report, we conclude that: Changes under way in the Middle East are the product of impersonal, structural forces that have been in place since the U.S. pulled out of Iraq in 2011; Saudi Arabia is engaged in belated, European-style nation-building, a volatile process that will raise tensions in the country and the region; Saudi Arabia remains constrained by a lack of resources and military capabilities, and unclear alliance structures. Iran, meanwhile, benefits from the status quo. As such, no major war with Iran is likely in the short term, although proxy wars could intensify. In the short term, we agree that the moves by Saudi leadership will increase tensions domestically and in the region. However, over the long term, the evolution of Saudi Arabia from the world's last feudal monarchy into a modern nation-state should improve the predictability of Middle East politics. Regardless of our view, one thing is clear: Saudi Arabia has an incentive to keep oil prices at the current $64 per barrel, or higher, as domestic and regional instability looms. As such, we believe that risks to oil prices are to the upside, but a global growth-constraining geopolitical shock to oil supply is unlikely. The Paradigm Shift: Multipolarity "Tikrit is a prime example of what we are worried about ... Iran is taking over [Iraq]."3 -- Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Foreign Minister, to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, March 5, 2015 Pundits, journalists, investors, and Middle East experts all make the same mistake when analyzing the region: they assume it exists on "Planet Middle East." It does not. The Middle East is part of a global system and its internal mechanic is not sui generis. Its actors are bit players in a much bigger game, which involves nuclear powers like the U.S., China, and Russia. Yes, the whims and designs of Middle East leaders do matter, but only within the global constraints that they are subject to. The greatest such constraint has been the objective and observable withdrawal of the U.S. from the Middle East, emblematized by a dramatic reduction of U.S. troops in the region (Chart 1). The U.S. went from stationing 250,000 troops in 2007 to mere 36,000 in 2017. The withdrawal was not merely a manifestation of President Barack Obama's dovish foreign policy. Rather, it was motivated by U.S. grand strategy, specifically the need to "pivot to Asia" and challenge China's rising geopolitical prowess head on (Chart 2). Chart 1U.S. Geopolitical Deleveraging U.S. Geopolitical Deleveraging U.S. Geopolitical Deleveraging Chart 2China's Ascendancy Challenges The U.S. China's Ascendancy Challenges The U.S. China's Ascendancy Challenges The U.S. As we expected, President Donald Trump has not materially increased the U.S. presence in the region since taking office.4 His efforts to eradicate the Islamic State have largely built on those of his predecessor. While he has rhetorically changed policy towards Iran, and taken steps to imperil the nuclear deal by decertifying it, he has not abrogated the deal. The U.S. president can withdraw from the nuclear deal without congressional approval, yet President Trump has merely passed the buck to Congress, which has until the end of the year to decide whether to re-impose sanctions. For Saudi Arabia, U.S. rhetoric and half measures do not change the fact that Iraq is now devoid of American troops and largely in the Iranian sphere of influence. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia enjoyed the best of both worlds for two decades: a Sunni-dominated but weakened Iraq serving the role of an impregnable buffer between itself and the much more militarily capable Iran. Since Iraq's paradigm shift in the wake of American invasion, the buffer has not only vanished but has been replaced by a Shia-dominated, Iranian-influenced Iraqi state (albeit still relatively weak). Unsurprisingly, Saudi military spending as a share of GDP nearly doubled from the 2011 U.S. withdrawal to 2015, and in absolute terms has risen from $48.5 billion in 2011 to $63.7 billion in 2016, revealing a deep concern in Riyadh that its northern border has become nearly indefensible (Chart 3). Chart 3Saudis React To U.S. Withdrawal The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise Meanwhile, Baghdad's heavy-handed political and military tactics produced an immediate reaction from the Sunni population.5 Militant Sunni insurgent groups, with material support from unofficial (and probably official) channels in Saudi Arabia and wider Gulf monarchies, began to fight back. Violence escalated and soon melded with the emerging civil war in Syria, which by early 2013 had taken on a sectarian cast as well. This led to the emergence of the Islamic State, which grew out of the earlier Sunni insurgence against the U.S. in the Al Anbar governorate. The military success of the Islamic State in 2014 against the inexperienced and demoralized Iraqi Army forced Baghdad to lean even more heavily on domestic Shia militias, and Iran, for survival. Islamic State militants reached the outskirts of Baghdad in September 2014 and were only beaten back by a combination of hardline Shia militias and Iranian advisers and irregular troops. From the Saudi perspective, this direct intervention by the Iranian military in Iraq was the final straw. Most jarring to the Saudis was the fact that the Americans acquiesced to the Iranian presence in Iraq and even collaborated with Iran. In fact, the overt presence of Iranian military personnel in Syria and Iraq drew no rebuke from the U.S. Some American officials even seemed to praise the Iranian contribution to the global effort against the Islamic State. Meanwhile, the nuclear negotiations continued undisturbed, right down to their successful conclusion in July 2015. Bottom Line: Global multipolarity and the rise of China has forced America's hand, and the dramatic withdrawal of military assets from the Middle East is the direct consequence. Saudi Arabia has suffered a dramatic reversal of geopolitical fortunes, with its crucial geographic buffer, Iraq, now dominated by its strategic rival, Iran. Saudi Arabia "Goes It Alone," And Fails Miserably "Saudi Arabia will go it alone."6 -- Mohammed bin Nawwaf Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi ambassador to the U.K., December 17, 2013 To counter growing Iranian influence across the region and its strategic isolation, Saudi Arabia relied on five general strategies, all of which have failed: Map 1Saudi Arabia's Shia-Populated Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise Asymmetric warfare: Saudi Arabia has explicitly and implicitly supported radical-Islamist Sunni militant groups around the region. Some of these groups were either directly linked to, or vestiges of, al-Qaeda. The Islamic State, which received implicit support from Saudi Arabia in its early days of fighting president Bashar al-Assad in Syria, eventually turned against Saudi Arabia itself. Its agents claimed multiple mosque attacks in the Shia-populated Eastern Provinces (Map 1), attacks intended to incite sectarian violence in this key oil-producing Saudi area. Saudi officials also became alarmed at a large number of Saudi youth who went to fight with Islamic State fighters across the region, some of whom are now back in the country (Chart 4). "Sunni NATO": Talk of a broad, Sunni alliance against Iran has not materialized. Despite the Saudis' best efforts, the main Sunni military powers - Egypt and Pakistan - have remained aloof of its regional efforts to isolate Iran. The best example is the paltry contribution of its Sunni peers to the ongoing war in Yemen, where anti-government Houthi rebels are nominally allied with Iran. Pakistan contemplated sending a brigade of 3,000 troops to the Saudi-Yemen border earlier this year, but has refused to join the fight directly. Egypt sent under 1,000 troops early in the war, but none since. Talk of a 40,000 Egyptian deployment to the Yemen conflict earlier this year has not materialized. If Pakistan and Egypt are unwilling to help Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, why would they be interested in directly confronting a formidable military power like Iran? Direct warfare: When supporting militants and spending money on allies did not work, Saudi Arabia decided to try its hand at direct warfare. In February 2015, it began airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The war, which costs Saudi Arabia over $70 billion a year, has gone badly for Saudi Arabia.7 Despite two years of intensive involvement by Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies, the capital Sanaa remains in Houthi hands. As far as we are aware, there has been no real Saudi ground troop commitment to the conflict. K-street: Despite its best efforts, and the vast resources spent on lobbyists in Washington, Saudi Arabia could not prevent the U.S. détente with Iran. What the Saudis failed to appreciate was multipolarity, i.e. how the U.S. pivot to Asia would affect Washington's policy toward the Middle East.8 Oil prices: At the fateful November 2014 OPEC meeting, Saudi Arabia refused to cut oil production in the face of falling prices, instead increasing production (Chart 5). Since late 2016, however, Saudi Arabia has reversed this aggressive bid for market share and orchestrated oil production cuts with Russia and OPEC states. Chart 4The Islamic State Movement Threatens Saudi Arabia The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise Chart 5Saudis Surged Production Into Falling Prices Saudis Surged Production Into Falling Prices Saudis Surged Production Into Falling Prices Each and every one of the above strategies has failed. The last one is the most spectacular: Saudi Arabia was forced to backtrack from its oil production surge and negotiate with long-time geopolitical rival Russia, which was courting the Saudis to relieve its budget pressures from low oil prices. Saudi Arabia not only accepted the need to work with Russia, but also acquiesced to Russia's geopolitical demands for détente in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. The latter will force Saudi Arabia at least tacitly to accept the continued leadership of President al-Assad in Syria. Furthermore, Saudi intervention in Yemen has gone nowhere. Pundits who claim that the Saudis are on the verge of a major military engagement in ______ (insert Middle East country), should carefully study the effectiveness of the Saudi military in Yemen. After over two years of Saudi bombardment, the Houthis are further entrenched in the country. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia's Sunni allies have not committed many ground troops to the effort, save for Sudan, which is impoverished and has no choice but to curry favor with its largest foreign donor. Bottom Line: The past six years have taught the Saudi leadership a series of hard lessons. Saudi Arabia cannot "go at it alone." On the contrary, the rise of the Islamic State - a messianic political entity claiming religious superiority to the Saudi kingdom - has alarmed the Saudi leadership and awoken it to a truly existential risk: domestic upheaval. Nation-Building, Saudi Style "What happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia. What happened in the region in the last 30 years is not the Middle East. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, people wanted to copy this model in different countries, one of them is Saudi Arabia. We didn't know how to deal with it. And the problem spread all over the world. Now is the time to get rid of it."9 -- Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, October 24, 2017 European nation-states developed over the course of five hundred years, from roughly the end of the Hundred Years' War between England and France to the unification of Italy and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Fundamentally, these efforts were about centralizing state power under a single authority by evolving the governance system away from feudal monarchy toward a constitutional, bureaucratic, and national system. The defining feature of feudalism was the separation of feudal society into three "estates": the clergy, the nobility, and the peasantry. The first two estates - the clergy and the nobility - had considerable rights and privileges. The king, who was above all three estates, nonetheless had to curry favor with both in order to raise taxes and wage wars. The state was weak and often susceptible to foreign influence via interference in all three estates. Saudi Arabia is one of the world's last feudal monarchies and it does not have five hundred years to evolve. Still, the best model for what is going on inside Saudi Arabia today is the European nation-building of the past. In brief, recent Saudi policies - from foreign policy assertiveness to domestic reforms - are intended to centralize power and evolve Saudi Arabia into a modern nation-state. Three parallel efforts, modeled on European history from the last millennia, are under way: Curbing the "first estate": Saudi Arabia has begun to curb the power of the religious establishment. In April 2016, it severely curbed the powers of the hai'a - the country's religious police. They no longer have the power to arrest. Instead, they have to report violations of Islamic law to the secular police; and they are only allowed to work during office hours.10 The state has even arrested a prominent cleric who opposed the change in hai'a powers, and has dismissed many other conservative clerics since King Salman came to power. Curbing the "second estate": The detention of members of the Saudi royal family at the Ritz Carlton is part of an ongoing effort to curb the powers of the "landed aristocracy" and bring it under the control of the ruling Sudairi branch of the royal family.11 This is not just palace intrigue, but a necessary step in harnessing the financial resources of the state, which are currently dispersed amongst roughly 2,000 members of the "second estate." Rallying the "third estate": Nationalism was used by European leaders of the nineteenth century to rally the plebs behind the state-building efforts of the time. Similarly, King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, are building a Saudi national identity. To do so, they are appealing to the youth, which makes up 57% of the country's population (Chart 6), as well as emphasizing the existential threat that Iran poses to the kingdom. Chart 6Still A Young Country Still A Young Country Still A Young Country We do not see these efforts as merely the reckless agenda of an impulsive thirty year-old, as Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is often derisively portrayed by his opponents. We see genuine strategy in every policy that has been initiated by Saudi leadership since King Salman took over in January 2015. Several efforts are particularly notable. Vision 2030: A Major Salvo Against The "First Estate" As we indicated in May 2016, we consider the Saudi "Vision 2030" reform blueprint to be a serious document.12 While its plan to address Saudi economic constraints is overly ambitious and vague, there are nonetheless several prominent themes that reveal the preferences of Saudi leaders: Education: The document emphasizes the link between education and economic development. Notably, there is no mention of religion. Gender Equality: Elevating the role of women in the economy will require relaxing many strict social and religious rules that impede gender equality. As if on cue, the Saudi leadership announced that it would soon end its policy of forbidding women to drive. Corruption: A new emphasis on government transparency and reducing corruption will undermine many powerful vested interests, including the religious elites. We were right to emphasize these three themes back in May 2016 as it is now obvious that King Salman and his son Mohammad bin Salman are following the prescriptions of their Vision 2030. What explains their reformist zeal? Over half of the Saudi population of almost 30 million is below 35 years of age. The youth population is facing difficulty entering the labor force, with unemployment above 30% (Chart 7). This rising angst is often expressed online, where the Saudi population is as interconnected as its peers in emerging markets (Chart 8). Saudi citizens have an average of seven social media accounts and the country ranks seventh globally in terms of the absolute number of social media accounts. Between a quarter and a fifth of the population uses Facebook, a quarter of all Saudi teenagers use Snapchat,13 and Twitter has the highest level of penetration in Saudi Arabia of any other country in the region.14 Chart 7A Potential National Security Risk A Potential National Security Risk A Potential National Security Risk Chart 8Saudi Youth Is As Internet Savvy As Others Saudi Youth Is As Internet Savvy As Others Saudi Youth Is As Internet Savvy As Others The idea that the royal family can take on the religious establishment on behalf of the youth seems far-fetched. Skeptics point out that the conservative Sunni Wahhabi religious movement lies at the foundation of the Saudi state. However, commentators who take this mid-eighteenth-century alliance as a key feature of modern Saudi Arabia often overstate its nature and influence. Not only is the Wahhabi hold on power potentially overstated, but Westerners may even overstate the country's religiosity as a whole. According to the World Values Survey, Saudi Arabia is less religious than Egypt and is on par with Morocco.15 Although Saudi Arabia has not appeared in the survey since 2004, it is fair to assume that, with the proliferation of social media and rise in the youth population, the country has not become more religious over the past decade (Chart 9). In addition, Saudis identify with values of self-expression over values of survival (as much as moderate Muslim Malaysians, for example), which is a sign of a relatively wealthy, industrial society. Chart 9Saudi Arabia: More Modern Than You Think The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Weekend At The Ritz: The "Second Estate" Is Put On Notice The ongoing effort to curb the power of the Saudi "second estate" is not just about court intrigue and political maneuvering. Without harnessing the economic resources of the wider Saudi aristocracy, the state would succumb to debilitating capital outflows. If the Saudi "second estate" decided to "vote" against King Salman and his son with their "deposits" - and flee the country - the all-important currency peg would collapse. Despite a pickup in oil prices, Saudi Arabia's currency reserves are falling rapidly and could soon dip below the total amount of local-currency broad money (Chart 10). Beneath that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to massive capital flight, which was clearly a very serious problem as of end-2016 (Chart 11). Chart 10KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 11KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist The peg of the Saudi riyal to the U.S. dollar is not just an economic tool. It is a crucial social stability anchor for an economy that imports nearly all of its basic necessities. De-pegging would lead to a massive increase in import costs and thus a potential political and social crisis. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has at its disposal considerable resources for the next two years. However, this is only the case if capital outflows do not pick up and oil prices continue to stabilize. The Russia-OPEC deal is in place to ensure the latter. The "weekend at the Ritz" is meant to ensure the former. But doesn't the crackdown against the wealth of 2,000 royal family members represent appropriation of private property? Not in the minds of King Salman and his reformist son. In fact, if the financial wealth of the royal family is used to fill the coffers of the Saudi sovereign wealth fund, there is no reason why members of the Saudi "second estate" cannot benefit from its future investment returns and essentially "clip coupons" for a living. In fact, prior to the anti-corruption crackdown against the "second estate," Saudi officials hosted a completely different event at the Ritz Carlton: a gathering of top international investors for a conference called "Davos in the Desert." Judging by the conversations we had with a number of participants at that event, the point was not to encourage investments in Saudi Arabia. Rather, it was to secure the services of top international managers as Saudi Arabia ramps up the investment activities of its Public Investment Fund (PIF). Investors should therefore consider the first weekend at the Ritz as the launch of a new international investment vehicle by Saudi officials and the second weekend at the Ritz as its capitalization by the wider "second estate." We expect that fighting corruption will remain a major domestic policy thrust going forward. A recent academic study, for example, takes on the difficult job of eradicating wasta - the concept that each favor or privilege in Saudi society flows through middlemen or connections.16 The volume has been edited by Mohamed A. Ramady, professor of Finance and Economics at King Fahd University in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and is undoubtedly supported by the royal family. Moreover, King Salman and his son have the example of Chinese President Xi Jinping's impressive power consolidation via anti-corruption campaign right in front of them and are unlikely to have embarked on this course with the expectation that it would be a short process. Iran As An Existential Threat: Harnessing The "Third Estate" Real reform is always and everywhere difficult, otherwise the desired end-state would already be the form. For the Saudi leadership, attacking both the first and second estate presents considerable risks. It is appropriate, therefore, to believe that a palace coup may be attempted against King Salman and his son.17 International tensions with Iran are a particularly useful strategy to distract the opposition and paint all domestic dissent as treasonous. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia does not face considerable strategic challenges from Iran. As mentioned, Iranian influence in Iraq is particularly threatening to Saudi Arabia as it gives Tehran influence over a key strategic buffer that also produces 4.4 million barrels of crude per day. Furthermore, Iran supported the 2011 uprising in Shia-majority Bahrain against the Saudi-allied al-Khalifa monarchy; it at least nominally supports the Houthi rebels in Yemen; it has directly intervened in Syria on behalf of President al-Assad; and it continues to support Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is safe to say that, since 2011, Iran has been ascendant in the Middle East and has surrounded Saudi Arabia with strategic threats on all points of the compass. But to what extent is the Saudi rhetoric on Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Qatar a real threat to the stability in the Middle East? We turn to this question in our next section. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia's domestic intrigue is far more logical than pundits and the media make it out to be. King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, are trying to build a modern nation state from what is today the world's last feudal monarchy. To do so, they have to enlist the support of the third estate - the country's large youth population - and curb the powers of its first and second estates - the religious establishment and the landed aristocracy. The process will be filled with risks and volatility, but is ultimately necessary for the long-term stability of the kingdom. Regional Risk Of War Is Overstated "[I am] positive there will be no implications coming out of this dramatic situation at all."18 -- Secretary of Defense James Mattis, asked about the Qatar crisis and the fight against ISIS, June 5, 2017 As this report goes to publication Saudi Arabia has accused Iranian-allied Hezbollah of forcing Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to run for his life. Hariri resigned while visiting Saudi Arabia. Although he claims that he is not being held against his will by Saudi authorities, his resignation is highly suspect. Saudi officials have also called a failed missile attack on Riyadh's airport, allegedly launched by Houthi rebels in Yemen, as a possible "act of war" by Iran. Meanwhile, Bahrain's Saudi-allied government has accused Iran of destroying an oil pipeline via terrorist action. The region's rumor mill - one of the most productive in the world - is in overdrive. What are the chances of increased proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran? We think that there is a good chance that Saudi Arabia will step up its military activity in the ancillary parts of the Middle East. In particular, we could see renewed Saudi military campaigns in Yemen and Bahrain. In isolation, these campaigns would add a temporary risk premium to oil prices. But given that Iran has no intention to become directly involved in either, we would expect Saudi moves to be largely for show. Over the long term, we do not see a direct confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia for three reasons. First, Saudi military capabilities are paltry and the kingdom has failed to secure the support of the wider Sunni world for its "Sunni NATO." We have already mentioned Saudi military failures in Yemen. Anyone who thinks that Saudi Arabia is ready to directly confront Iran must answer two questions. First, how does the Saudi military confront a formidable foe like Iran when it cannot dislodge Houthis from Yemen? Second, if Saudi Arabia is itching for a real conflict with Iran, why is it not saber-rattling in Iraq, a far more strategic piece of real estate for Saudi Arabia than any of the other countries where it accuses Iran of meddling? Chart 12Correlation Between Oil Prices And Military Disputes The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise Second, oil prices remain a constraint to war. The reality is that there is a well-known relationship between high oil prices and aggressive foreign policy in oil-producing states (Chart 12). Political science research shows that the relationship is not spurious. Chart 13 shows that oil states led by revolutionary leaders are much more likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes when oil prices are higher.19 While oil prices have recovered from their doldrums from two years ago, they are also a far cry from their pre-2014 highs. In fact, by our calculation, oil prices are still below the Saudi budget break-even price of oil, despite its best efforts to implement austerity (Chart 14). Chart 13More Oil Revenue = More Aggression The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise The Middle East: Separating The Signal From The Noise Chart 14Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Third, Saudi Arabia has failed to secure a clear security commitment from the U.S. While the Trump administration is far more open to supporting Saudi Arabia than the Obama administration, it still criticized the Saudi decision to ostracize Qatar. Secretary of Defense James Mattis made a visit to Qatar in September to offer American support. In a shocking reversal to over half-a-century of geopolitics, King Salman went to Moscow this October to deepen geopolitical relations with Russia.20 The visit included several business deals in the realm of energy and a significant promise by Saudi Arabia to purchase Russian arms in the future, including the powerful S-400 SAM system. Saudi Arabia is the world's third-largest arms importer and uses purchases as a tool of diplomacy, but has never purchased weapons from Russia in a significant way in the past. While many pundits have pointed to the Saudi-Russian détente as a sign of strength, we see it as a sign of weakness. It illustrates that Saudi Arabia is diversifying its security portfolio away from the U.S. It is doing so because it has to, not because it wants to. As U.S. petroleum imports continue to decline due to domestic shale production, Saudi Arabia is compelled to find new allies (Chart 15). The plan to hold an initial public offering for Aramco, and to target sovereign Chinese entities as major bidders for Aramco assets, fits this pattern as well. Chart 15Saudi Arabia Has To Diversify Its Security ##br##Portfolio As U.S. Oil Imports Decline Saudi Arabia Has To Diversify Its Security Portfolio As U.S. Oil Imports Decline Saudi Arabia Has To Diversify Its Security Portfolio As U.S. Oil Imports Decline However, diversifying the geopolitical security portfolio to include Russia and China will not mean that Saudi Arabia will have a blank check to wage direct war against Iran. Both Russia and China have considerable diplomatic and economic interests in Iran and are as likely to restrain as to enable Saudi ambition. Finally, talk of a Saudi-Israeli alliance against Hezbollah in Lebanon is as far-fetched as a direct Saudi-Iranian confrontation. Israel won the 2006 war against Hezbollah, but at a high cost of 157 soldiers killed and 860 wounded.21 The Israeli public grew tired of the one month campaign, showing political limits to offensive war. Furthermore, twelve years later, Hezbollah is even more deeply entrenched in Lebanon. Unless Saudi Arabia is willing to provide ground troops for the effort (see Yemen discussion above), it is unclear why Israel would want to enter the morass of Lebanese ground combat on behalf of Riyadh. Bottom Line: Constraints to Saudi offensive military action remain considerable: paltry military capability, fiscal constraints imposed by low oil prices, and a lack of clear support from the U.S. While rhetorical attacks on Iran serve the strategic goal of nation-building, we do not expect a major war between oil-producing states that would significantly raise oil prices over the medium term. The rhetoric and posturing will increase volatility and temporarily push up prices from time to time. Investment Implications Of Saudi Nation-Building First, on the question of OPEC 2.0, our baseline case is for the 1.8 million barrel-per-day production cuts to be extended through June 2018, drawing OECD inventories down toward their five-year average and creating the conditions for Brent and WTI prices to average $65 per barrel and $63 per barrel respectively next year.22 Moreover, both Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin have endorsed extensions through end-2018. These comments add bullish upside risk to prices, though they also alter perceptions and thus raise the short-term downside risk if no extension is agreed this month (which we think is the least likely scenario). Second, as to broader geopolitical risks in the Middle East, we believe they are rising yet again in the short and medium term, after the relative calm of 2017.23 We could see Saudi officials decide to ramp up military operations in Yemen or revive them in neighboring Bahrain. However, we do not see much of a chance of serious conflict in Lebanon or Qatar. The former would require an Israeli military intervention, which is unlikely given the outcome of the 2006 war. The latter would require American acquiescence, which is unlikely given the vital U.S. strategic presence in the country's Al Udeid military base. Nonetheless, even temporary military operations in any of these locales could add a geopolitical risk premium to oil markets. For example, the 2006 Lebanon-Israel War, which had no impact on oil production, generated a significant jump in oil prices (Chart 16). Chart 16Even The 2006 Israel-Lebanon War Produced A Risk Premium... Even The 2006 Israel-Lebanon War Produced A Risk Premium... Even The 2006 Israel-Lebanon War Produced A Risk Premium... Over the long term, how should investors make sense of the complicated Middle East geopolitical theater? Our rule of thumb is always to seek out the second derivative of any geopolitical event. In the context of the Middle East, by "second derivative" we mean that we are interested in whether the market impact of a new piece of information - of a new geopolitical event - will amount to more than just a random perturbation with ephemeral, decaying market implications. To determine the potential of new information to catalyze a persistent market risk premium or discount, we investigate whether it changes the way things change in a given region or context. For a geopolitical event in the Middle East to have such second derivative implications, and thus global market implications, we would need to see it have an impact on at least two of the following three factors: Oil supply: The event should impact current global oil supply either directly or through a clear channel of contagion. Geography: The event should occur in a geography that is of existential significance to one of the regional or global players. Sectarian contagion: The event should exacerbate sectarian conflict - Sunni versus Shia. When we consider the security dilemma between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Eastern Province in Saudi Arabia are two regions critical to global oil supply. Tellingly, neither has played a role in the recent spate of tensions between the two countries. Saudi Arabia has been very careful not to increase tensions with Iran in Iraq. In fact, the Saudi leadership has reached out to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who was received by King Salman in October in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. How should investors price domestic political intrigue in Saudi Arabia? In the long term, any failure of King Salman and his son to reform the country would be negative for internal stability, with risks to oil production if social unrest were to increase. In the short and medium term, however, even a palace coup would likely have no lasting impact on oil prices as it would be highly unlikely that an alternative leadership would imperil the kingdom's oil exports. On the contrary, a coup against King Salman could lead to lower oil prices if the new leadership in Riyadh decided to renege on their oil production cuts with Russia. The bottom line is that the geopolitical risk premium is likely to rise. The evolution of Saudi Arabia away from a feudal monarchy requires the suppression of the kingdom's first and second estates, a dangerous business that will likely be smoothed by nationalism and saber-rattling. Risks to oil prices, therefore, are to the upside. However, given the considerable constraints on Saudi Arabia's military and foreign policy capabilities, we do not foresee global growth-constraining oil supply risks in the Middle East. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 The latest news from Riyadh is that the nearby Courtyard by Marriott Hotel may have been enlisted by the Saudi authorities for the crackdown, in addition to the Ritz Carlton. If true, we can only imagine the horrors that the prisoners are subject to! 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift," dated November 13, 2013, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift (Update)," dated July 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "Iran 'taking over' Iraq, Saudis warn, blaming U.S. refusal to send troops against ISIS," The National Post, dated March 5, 2015, available at nationalpost.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Iran's influence in Iraq grew almost immediately following the American military withdrawal. Iraq's Shia Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, wasted no time revealing his allegiance to Iran or his sectarian preferences. Baghdad issued an arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi literally the day after the last American troops withdrew from the country, signaling to the Sunni establishment that compromise was not a priority. Persecution of the wider Sunni population soon followed, with counter-insurgency operations in Sunni populated Al Anbar and Nineveh governorates. 6 Please see Mohammed bin Nawwaf bin Abdulaziz al Saud, "Saudi Arabia Will Go It Alone," New York Times, dated December 17, 2013, available at nytimes.com. 7 Please see Bruce Riedel, "Saudi Arabia's Mounting Security Challenges," Al Monitor, dated December 2015, available at al-monitor.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Out Of The Vault: Explaining The U.S.-Iran Détente," dated July 15, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Martin Chulov, "I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince," The Guardian, dated October 24, 2017, available at www.theguardian.com. 10 Something tells us that most violations of Islamic law are likely to be committed after hours! 11 The Sudairi branch of the Saud dynasty refers to the issue of Saudi Arabia's founder Abdulaziz Ibn Saud with Hassa bint Ahmed Al Sudairi, one of Ibn Saud's wives and a member of the powerful Al Sudairis clan. The union produced seven sons, the largest faction out of the 45 sons that Ibn Saud fathered. As the largest grouping, the sons - often referred to as the "Sudairi Seven" - were able to consolidate power and unite against the other brothers. In addition to the current King Salman, the other member of the Sudairi faction who became a king was Fahd, ruling from 1982 to 2005. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," dated May 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 The app is used to transmit photos and videos between users that disappear from the device after being viewed in 10 seconds. It is highly unlikely to be used for religious education. It is highly likely to be used by teenagers for ... well, use your imagination. 14 Please see "Social Media In Saudi Arabia - Statistics And Trends," TFE Times, dated January 12, 2017, available at tfetimes.com; "Saudi social media users ranked 7th in the world," Arab News, November 14, 2015, available at arabnews.com. 15 The World Values Survey is used in academic political science research to track changes in global social and political values. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have summarized the key findings in Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005). For more information, please see http://worldvaluessurvey.org. 16 Please see Mohamed A. Ramady, ed., The Political Economy Of Wasta: Use and Abuse of Social Capital Networking (New York: Springer, 2016). 17 It would not be the first such coup in Saudi history. King Saud was deposed in 1962 by his brother, King Faisal. 18 Please see Nahal Toosi and Madeline Conway, "Tillerson: Dispute Between Gulf States And Qatar Won't Affect Counterterrorism," dated June 5, 2017, available at www.politico.com. 19 Please see Cullen S. Hendrix, "Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behaviour," Peterson Institute for International Economics, dated July 2014, available at www.iie.com. 20 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "King Salman Goes To Moscow, Bolsters OPEC 2.0," dated October 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see "Mideast War, By The Numbers," Associated Press, August 17, 2006, available at www.washingtonpost.com. 22 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil Forecast Lifted As Markets Tighten," dated October 19, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Forget About The Middle East?" dated January 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights EM currencies are fairly valued at the moment - they are neither cheap nor expensive. Unit labor cost-based REER is a superior currency valuation measure to those based on consumer and producer prices. Based on this measure, the U.S. dollar is not expensive - rather its valuation is neutral. When valuations are neutral, directional market indicators are more imperative than valuations. We expect directional indicators to favor the U.S. dollar and the euro versus EM currencies. In Turkey, inflation is breaking out - the currency, stocks and bonds will be under assault (page 9). The Philippines economy is overheating warranting policy tightening. Share prices are at risk (page 16). Feature EM currencies have recently begun to sell off. Does this represent a major reversal, or just a pause in a bull market? Our bias is that it is the former. In this week's report, we discuss the valuation aspect of foreign exchange markets. One of the oft-cited bullish arguments for EM currencies is that they are cheap. Similarly, the contention goes that the U.S. dollar is expensive. Our exchange rate valuation measures do not support these claims. According to our most favored currency valuation measure - the real effective exchange rate (REER) based on unit labor costs - the U.S. dollar is currently fairly valued (Chart I-1). More specifically, the greenback is not cheap, per se, but it is not expensive either. Meanwhile, the euro is at its fair value and the yen is undervalued (Chart I-2). The source of this data is the IMF. Below we elaborate in detail why we believe the unit labor cost-based REER valuation measure is superior to those based on consumer or producer prices. Chart I-1The U.S. Dollar Is Neither Cheap Nor Expensive The U.S. Dollar Is Neither Cheap Nor Expensive The U.S. Dollar Is Neither Cheap Nor Expensive Chart I-2The Euro Is Fairly Valued, The Yen Is Cheap The Euro Is Fairly Valued, The Yen Is Cheap The Euro Is Fairly Valued, The Yen Is Cheap As to EM currencies, there is no data on REER based on unit labor costs across all EM countries. The IMF and OECD have data for only a few developing countries, shown in Chart I-3A and Chart I-3B. With the exception of the Mexican peso and the Polish zloty, EM currencies shown in these charts are not cheap. Chart I-3AEM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap EM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap EM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap Chart I-3BEM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap EM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap EM Currencies Are Not Universally Cheap In the absence of unit labor cost-based REER for EM, we deduce EM currency valuations in a number of ways: First, if the U.S. dollar, the euro and yen are not expensive, EM currencies by definition cannot be cheap. Second, provided exchange rates of commodities-producing advanced countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway are still expensive, according to unit labor cost-based REER (Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B), it is fair to argue that currencies of commodities-producing EM economies probably are not cheap as well given they move in tandem with their advanced countries peers. Chart I-4ACAD Is At Fair Value, NOK Is Slightly Expensive AUD & NZD Are Expensive AUD & NZD Are Expensive Chart I-4BAUD & NZD Are Expensive CAD Is At Fair Value, NOK Is Slightly Expensive CAD Is At Fair Value, NOK Is Slightly Expensive Third, Chart I-5 illustrates consumer and producer prices-based REER for EM. Excluding China, Korea and Taiwan, the equity market cap-weighted EM REER based on the average of consumer and producer prices is at its historical mean (Chart I-5). This denotes that EM currencies are by and large fairly valued. Notably, the BRL is slightly above its fair value, according to the REER based on average of consumer and producer prices (Chart I-6, top panel). Similarly, the same measure for the RUB and ZAR is no longer depressed after the appreciation witnessed in both currencies over the past 18 months (Chart I-6, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-5EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Exchange Rates Valuations Are Neutral EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Exchange Rates Valuations Are Neutral EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Exchange Rates Valuations Are Neutral Chart I-6EM High-Yielding ##br##Currencies Are Not Cheap EM High-Yielding Currencies Are Not Cheap EM High-Yielding Currencies Are Not Cheap All in all, we conclude that EM currencies are fairly valued at the moment - they are neither cheap nor expensive. This message is also corroborated by current account profiles across EM economies. In many developing countries, current account balances have improved, but are still in deficit. Consistently, the U.S. current account deficit excluding oil is at 1.75%, and with oil is at 2.4% of GDP - not wide at all. So, the current account does not presage that the greenback is expensive. Importantly, when valuations are neutral, they do not necessarily prevent the market from either rallying or selling off. Neutral valuations in any market have little impact on the market outlook. Thereby, we conclude that valuations are not an impediment for both EM currencies and the U.S. dollar to move in any given direction. When valuations are neutral, directional market indicators are more imperative than valuations. The best directional indicators for EM currencies have been commodities prices and the EM business cycle. Chart I-7 illustrates the EM aggregate currency index has historically correlated with commodities prices and EM industrial production. If commodities prices relapse and the EM business cycle slows down, as we expect, EM currencies will depreciate. As to U.S. bond yields and the greenback, we believe U.S. interest rate expectations will rise and the U.S. dollar will strengthen, at least, relative to EM currencies. That said, there has been no historical correlation between high-yielding exchange rates such as the BRL and ZAR and their interest rate differential over the U.S. (Chart I-8). Chart I-7These Factors Drive ##br##EM Exchange Rates These Factors Drive EM Exchange Rates These Factors Drive EM Exchange Rates Chart I-8Interest Rate Differential And ##br##Exchange Rates: No Correlation Interest Rate Differential And Exchange Rates: No Correlation Interest Rate Differential And Exchange Rates: No Correlation The euro and European currencies have the least downside versus the U.S. dollar. Hence, we expect EM currencies to weaken materially versus both the dollar and the euro (Chart I-9). Bottom Line: EM currencies are neither cheap nor expensive. We expect commodities prices to relapse and U.S. interest rate expectations to rise. This warrants a material down leg in EM currencies. We continue recommending a short position in a basket of the following currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, MYR and IDR versus the U.S. dollar. Investors, who are not comfortable being long the U.S. dollar, can short these same EM currencies versus the euro. Our overweights within the EM currency space are the TWD, THB, RMB, RUB, MXN, PLN and CZK. The Superior Currency Valuation Measure Unit labor cost-based REER is a superior currency valuation measure to those based on consumer and producer prices. The key idea behind currency valuation measures in general is to gauge competitiveness. Rising consumer and producer prices relative to trading partners signifies deteriorating competitiveness, and usually entails more expensive currency valuations. However, nowadays, labor costs in many economies, especially advanced ones, represent the largest cost component, even for manufacturing businesses. Therefore, it makes sense to compare wages across trading partners, not consumer and producer prices. However, rising wages in a country relative to its trading partners do not always signify worsening competitiveness. Wages might be rising, but productivity of employees may well be growing faster than wages. Therefore, true labor costs for businesses are not wages, but unit labor costs. Unit labor costs equal wages divided by productivity. They show the labor cost per unit of output. To estimate an economy's true competitiveness, one should compare its unit labor costs relative to its trading partners. REER based on unit labor cost does that. Hence, this measure captures two critical variables to competitiveness: wages and productivity. On the whole, unit labor costs measure competitiveness better than consumer and producer prices. Therefore, we argue that REER based on unit labor costs is superior to those based on consumer and producer prices. For comparison purposes, Chart I-10 illustrates the two REER measures for the U.S. dollar. Chart I-9EM Currencies Versus The USD And Euro EM Currencies Versus The USD And Euro EM Currencies Versus The USD And Euro Chart I-10U.S. Dollar: Two Valuation Measures bca.ems_wr_2017_10_11_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2017_10_11_s1_c10 Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the greenback and the euro are fairly valued, while the Japanese yen is cheap. In addition, EM currency valuations are neutral and currencies of commodities producing advanced countries are modestly expensive. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Turkey: Ride The Sell-Off Turkish stocks were among the best performing equity markets worldwide in the January-August period of this year before relapsing by 16% in U.S. dollar terms since September 1st (Chart II-1). We remain bearish/underweight Turkish financial markets. A Genuine Inflation Breakout Despite the currency being stable since the beginning of the year, inflation has been rising. Core consumer price inflation has surpassed 10% for the first time in the past 14 years (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Turkish Stocks Have More Downside Turkish Stocks Have More Downside Turkish Stocks Have More Downside Chart II-2Turkey: Inflation Is Breaking Out Turkey: Inflation Is Breaking Out Turkey: Inflation Is Breaking Out The country's double-digit wage growth is not supported by productivity gains. The latter has been stagnant (Chart II-3, top panel). Consequently, unit labor costs have surged in both the manufacturing and services sectors (Chart II-3, bottom panel). This combination of strong wage growth paired with low productivity growth depresses companies' profit margins. This in turn will force businesses to raise prices. Provided stimulus-propelled domestic demand is robust, businesses will succeed in raising their prices leading to escalating inflation. Typically, when a country is witnessing heightening inflationary pressures, the natural policy response should be monetary and/or fiscal tightening. However, Turkish authorities have been doing the opposite - running loose monetary and fiscal policies: Government expenditure excluding interest payments have accelerated significantly (Chart II-4). The rise in government spending has been partially funded by commercial banks - the latter's holdings of government bonds have been growing, boosting money supply, as a result. Chart II-3Turkey: Surging Unit Labor Costs Turkey: Surging Unit Labor Costs Turkey: Surging Unit Labor Costs Chart II-4Turkey: Fiscal Expenditures Are Booming Turkey: Fiscal Expenditures Are Booming Turkey: Fiscal Expenditures Are Booming This year the Turkish authorities have been able to generate growth through the recapitalization of the Credit Guarantee Fund. The aim of this fund is to incentivize banks to lend by essentially assuming credit risk on loans extended to small and medium enterprises. Under this scheme, the government has effectively given a green light to flood the economy with credit, in turn, boosting economic growth. So far, the scheme has been responsible for the creation of TRY 200 billion, or 7% of GDP, worth of new credit out of the TRY 250 billion limit. This TRY 250 billion is considerable as it compares with a total of TRY 367 billion worth of loan origination by commercial banks last year. Turkey's banking system has been relying on enormous amounts of liquidity provisions by the central bank (Chart II-5, top panel) to sustain its ongoing credit boom and strong economic growth. On the whole, the central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system continue to increase rapidly. Interestingly, the nature of the central bank's funding of commercial banks has increasingly shifted away from open market operations and more towards direct lending to banks (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Adding all the liquidity facilities - the intraday, overnight and late window facilities - the Central Bank Of Turkey's outstanding funding to banks is TRY 86 billion, or 3% of GDP, abnormally elevated relative to the data series' history. This entails that monetary policy is loose even though the price of liquidity provided by the central bank to banks has been rising. Consistently, local currency bank loan growth stands at 25% (Chart II-6, top panel). Chart II-5Central Bank Of Turkey's Liquidity Injections Central Bank Of Turkey's Liquidity Injections Central Bank Of Turkey's Liquidity Injections Chart II-6Turkey Is Experiencing A Credit Binge Turkey Is Experiencing A Credit Binge Turkey Is Experiencing A Credit Binge On the whole, commercial banks are requiring more and more liquidity, and the CBT is continuously supplying it. These injections maintain liquidity in the banking system to a sufficiently high level that allow money/credit creation by commercial banks to continue mushrooming (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Fiscal and monetary policies are overly simulative and the country's twin - fiscal and current account - deficit is widening (Chart II-7). The widening current account deficit - which is a form of hidden inflation - substantiates the case of an inflation outbreak in Turkey. Remarkably, despite extremely strong exports due to the robust growth in the Euro Area, Turkey's current account deficit has been unable to narrow at all. This confirms excessive growth in domestic demand. In regard to currency valuation, Chart II-8 demonstrates that the lira is not cheap, especially according to unit labor cost-based REER. It is therefore questionable how long Turkish exports can remain competitive if unit labor costs continue mushrooming at a rapid pace. Chart II-7Turkey: Widening Twin Deficit Turkey: Widening Twin Deficit Turkey: Widening Twin Deficit Chart II-8The Lira Is Not Cheap The Lira Is Not Cheap The Lira Is Not Cheap Bottom Line: Despite high inflation, the Turkish authorities have opted to stimulate the economy further, aiming to boost short-term growth at all costs. The outcome will be an inevitable inflation outbreak. The Monetary Regime And Exchange Rate Chart II-9Excessive Money Printing Is Bearish For Lira Excessive Money Printing Is Bearish For Lira Excessive Money Printing Is Bearish For Lira The monetary regime in Turkey will lead to a major lira depreciation: The money multiplier - calculated as broad local currency money divided by banks' excess reserves at the central bank - has been rising sharply since 2012 (Chart II-9, top panel). This measure illustrates the degree of leverage banks have assumed. Also, the money multiplier reveals how much broad money/purchasing power banks have created per unit of liquidity provided by the central bank. To put into perspective the vast amount of money that has been created, the bottom panel of Chart II-9 demonstrates that the current net level of foreign exchange reserves (currently US$ 32 billion) covers only 11% of broad local currency money M3. Not only is excessive money creation bearish for the currency but it is also highly inflationary. As inflation rises, residents' desire to convert their deposits from local to foreign currency will increase, further exerting downward pressure on the lira. In fact, this is already happening - households' foreign currency deposits - measured in U.S. dollars - are growing at rapid annual pace of 13%. Given this inflationary backdrop and the risk of further depreciation, interest rates will have to rise. This will inevitably trigger another NPL cycle. Banks are very under-provisioned for non-performing loans (NPL). NPLs have not risen, and NPL provisions are also very low (Chart II-10). Both are set to rise considerably, and banks' capital and ability to expand credit will be severely undermined. Lastly, higher interest rates will be negative for loan growth and bank's profitability. Bank stocks are starting to roll-over. Given the extent to which they have decoupled from interest rates, we believe there is much more downside (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Turkey: A New NPL Cycle Will Start Turkey: A New NPL Cycle Will Start Turkey: A New NPL Cycle Will Start Chart II-11Turkish Bank Stocks Have Considerable Downside Turkish Bank Stocks Have Considerable Downside Turkish Bank Stocks Have Considerable Downside The current monetary policy stance is unsustainable. Inflation is breaking out and this is bearish for Turkish financial markets. Box 1 on page 15 addresses the geopolitical dimension of Turkey's recent spat with the U.S. Investment Conclusions We expect policy makers to remain behind the curve amid rising inflation and this will weigh on the lira. As such, we suggest currency traders who are not shorting the lira to do so at this time. We remain short the lira versus the U.S. dollar but the lira will continue to plummet versus the euro too. A weaker lira will undermine U.S. dollar and euro returns on Turkish stocks and domestic bonds. Dedicated EM equity investors as well as those overseeing EM fixed income and credit portfolios should continue to underweight Turkish assets within their respective EM universes. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com BOX 1 Turkey's Unstable Geopolitical Position On the political front, the recent spat with the U.S. over visas is just another sign of how far Turkey has descended into the geopolitical unknown. The U.S. has closed its visa offices as a response to the detention of a Turkish national working for the U.S. consulate in Istanbul by the local authorities. The arrest was made over alleged links to Fethullah Gulen, the cleric that Turkish authorities blame for the July 2016 botched coup. That Gulen remains the obsession of Turkish authorities is a clear sign that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to feel threatened. Whether the Gulen threat is real or imagined is not for us to determine. But it is clear that Turkey remains a deeply divided country. The April 2017 constitutional referendum giving the president greater powers barely passed, despite numerous reports of irregularities. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy posited following the vote, the referendum did nothing to reinforce Erdogan's power or reduce domestic tensions.1 It would only deepen his instinct to use "rally-around-the-flag" strategy by emphasizing external threats to quell domestic opposition. Now Turkey finds itself at the crossroad on three different fronts: Iraq: Neighboring Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has just held an independence referendum, prompting Erdogan to threaten military action against the Iraqi Kurds. Although no regional or global power overtly supports KRG's moves towards independence, Turkey is under pressure to respond in order to snuff out any secessionist ambitions by the Kurds in Turkey and Syria. Syria: President Erdogan has also threatened invasion of the self-declared Kurdish canton of Afrin in northwestern Syria. The enclave is held by the U.S.-allied People's Protection Units (YPG), which fought against the Islamic State in Syria. According to various news reports, Turkish troops are amassing on the border with Syria for the intervention. This could put the Turkish military in direct contact with Russian troops, which have a presence in Afrin. The West: Relations with the West, with whom Turkey remains in a formal military alliance (NATO) remain in the doldrums. Aside from the visa spat with the U.S., Turkey's relations with Europe, and Germany in particular, are at their lowest point in years. Bottom Line: In a month's time, Turkey may have invaded both Syria and Iraq while simultaneously hitting a low point in its relationship with traditional Western allies. At the very least, this complicated geopolitical environment will make it difficult for Ankara to focus on the economy. At its greatest, it is a recipe for geopolitical overreach, military disaster, domestic crisis, or any combination of all three. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "What About Emerging Markets?," dated May 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. The Philippines: An Overheating Economy Requires Policy Tightening Since early 2016, the Philippine stock market has been massively lagging the EM benchmark (Chart III-1, top panel). Similarly, the Philippine peso has been extremely weak, recording new lows versus the U.S. dollar, despite the broad-based EM currency rally (Chart III-1, bottom panel). In fact, the symptoms of this economy and its financial markets are consistent with an overheating economy that is expanding above potential, and where inflationary pressures are heightening. Going forward, inflation will keep rising and the central bank will have to tighten monetary policy meaningfully. These developments will weigh on Philippine growth and financial markets. Consumer price inflation, both headline and core, are rising briskly and currently stand at 3% - in the middle of the central bank's 2-4% target (Chart III-2). With the policy rate at 3%, this entails that real rates have dropped to zero. Chart III-1Philippine Stocks Relative ##br##To EM Have Underperformed Philippine Stocks Relative To EM Have Underperformed Philippine Stocks Relative To EM Have Underperformed Chart III-2Philippine Inflation ##br##Is Creeping Higher Philippine Inflation Is Creeping Higher Philippine Inflation Is Creeping Higher The Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) has kept monetary policy too easy for too long. It injected liquidity into the banking system on various occasions in 2013-2014 and 2016-2017 via its banking liquidity management tool - the Special Deposit Account (Chart III-3, top panel). These liquidity injections incentivized commercial banks to create enormous amounts of credit in the economy (Chart III-3, middle and bottom panels). Booming credit growth in turn is creating excessive purchasing power in the economy, resulting in a current account deficit for the first time since 2000. In addition, the fiscal deficit is now widening (Chart III-4). Chart III-3Credit Growth Is Rampant Credit Growth Is Rampant Credit Growth Is Rampant Chart III-4Philippines Twin Deficit Philippines Twin Deficit Philippines Twin Deficit On the wage front, non-agriculture workers' salaries are accelerating, pushing unit labor costs higher (Chart III-5). Remarkably, despite real GDP growth of about 6.5% since 2014, consumer staples EPS growth is on the verge of contracting. It seems that costs (including wages) have been mushrooming while productivity gains have been lagging. This also corroborates the overheating thesis. With Philippines' inflationary dynamics intensifying, the BSP will have to tighten monetary policy. In fact, the top panel of Chart III-3 shows that the BSP has already begun its tightening cycle by withdrawing some banking liquidity via its Special Deposit Account. In addition, interest rate hikes by the central bank are also an option. Monetary tightening amid very strong loan growth will lead a meaningful slowdown in the economy. Loan growth deceleration will affect primarily capital spending and the property market. Both segments are cooling off (Chart III-6). Chart III-5Philippines: Wages Are Accelerating Philippines: Wages Are Accelerating Philippines: Wages Are Accelerating Chart III-6Cyclical Slowdown On The Horizon Cyclical Slowdown On The Horizon Cyclical Slowdown On The Horizon Importantly, banks' net interest margins have been falling - a trend that will likely continue due to potential liquidity tightening and higher policy rates (Chart III-7, top panel). This, along with slow loan growth and rising NPL provisions, will intensify banks' EPS contraction (Chart III-7, bottom panel). Chart III-8 illustrates that both NPL and NPL provisions as a percent of total loans are at their lowest level since 1997. Higher borrowing costs following a decade-long lending boom, necessitates higher NPL provisions. Chart III-7Banks' Interest Rate Margins And Profits Banks' Interest Rate Margins And Profits Banks' Interest Rate Margins And Profits Chart III-8Bank NPLs To Rise Along With Provisions Bank NPLs To Rise Along With Provisions Bank NPLs To Rise Along With Provisions NPLs are likely to emanate from the real estate and construction sectors. Loans to these two sectors account for 20% of total bank loans. Hence, higher interest rates are negative for banks and real estate stocks which, together, account for 40% of the Philippines MSCI index market cap. If the central bank decides not to tighten, however, the economy will continue to overheat and bond yields - as well as the currency - will sell-off. Such a scenario is equally bearish for the equity market. Philippines equity valuations are elevated and, hence, are not priced for any of these scenarios. For dedicated EM equity investors, we continue recommending a neutral allocation to this bourse. We are reluctant to underweight this stock market because the Philippines remains less leveraged to China and the commodities cycle vis-à-vis other emerging markets (EM). Besides, it has already considerably underperformed the EM equity benchmark. Therefore, it might not underperform substantially relative to other EM countries - if and when commodities start selling off as a result of a growth slowdown in China. Within ASEAN, we favor Thailand, underweight Malaysia and are neutral on the Philippines, Indonesia, and India relative to the EM equity benchmark. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Feature Valuations, whether for currencies, equities, or bonds, are always at the top of the list of the determinants of any asset's long-term performance. This means that after large FX moves like those experienced this year, it is always useful to pause and reflect on where currency valuations stand. In this context, this week we update our set of long-term valuation models for currencies that we introduced in February 2016 in a Special Report titled, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets". Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials and proxies for global risk aversion.1 The models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and EM FX markets. Twice a year, we provide clients with a comprehensive update on all of these long-term models in one stop. These models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their purpose is therefore threefold. First, they provide guideposts to judge whether we are at the end, beginning, or middle of a long-term currency cycle. Second, by providing strong directional signals, the models help us judge whether any given move is more likely be a countertrend development or not, offering insight on potential longevity. Finally, they assist us and our clients in cutting through the fog and understanding the key drivers of cyclical variations in a currency's value. The U.S. Dollar Chart 1The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone After its large 7.5% fall in trade-weighted terms since the end of 2016, the real effective dollar is now trading at a 2% discount vis-à-vis its fair value based on its principal long-term drivers - real yield differentials and relative productivity between the U.S. and its trading partners (Chart 1). The U.S. dollar's equilibrium - despite having been re-estimated higher earlier this year due to upward revisions by the Conference Board to its U.S. productivity series - has flattened as of late, as real rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have declined. While 2017 has been an execrable year for dollar bulls, glimmers of hope remain. First, the handicap created by expensive valuations has been purged. Second, the excessive bullishness toward the greenback that prevailed earlier this year has morphed into deep pessimism. Third, U.S. real interest rates have fallen as investor doubts that the Federal Reserve will be able to increase interest rates as much as it wants to in the face of paltry inflation have surged. However, the U.S. economy is strong and at full capacity, suggesting that inflation will hook back up at the end of 2017 and in the first half of 2018. This should once again lift the U.S. interest rate curve, the dollar's fair value, and the dollar itself. That being said, this story is unlikely to become fully relevant over the next three months. The Euro Chart 2The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising On a multi-year time horizon, the euro is driven by the relative productivity trend of the euro area with its trading partners, its net international investment position, terms-of-trade shocks and rate differentials. Thanks to its powerful rally this year, the euro's discount to its fair value has narrowed from 7% in February to 6% today (Chart 2). This narrowing is not as great as the rally in the trade-weighted euro itself as its fair value has also improved, mainly thanks to continued improvement in the euro area's net international position - a development driven by the euro zone's current account of 3% of GDP. Nonetheless, the EUR's current discount to fair value is still not in line with previous bottoms, such as those experienced in both early 1985 or in 2002. We do expect a new wave of weakness in the EUR to materialize toward the end of the year and in early 2018 as markets once again move to discount much more aggressive tightening by the Fed than what will be executed by the European Central Bank: U.S. inflation is set to move back towards the Fed's target, but European inflation will remain hampered by the large amount of labor market slack still prevalent in the European periphery. What's more, euro area inflation is about to suffer from the lagged effects of the tightening in financial conditions that have been created by a higher euro. However, the fact that the euro's fair value has increased implies it is now very unlikely for the EUR/USD to hit parity this cycle. The Yen Chart 3The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The yen's long-term equilibrium is a function of Japan's net international investment position, global risk aversion, and commodity prices. The JPY discount to this fair value has deepened this year, despite the fall in USD/JPY from 118 to 108 (Chart 3). This is mainly because the euro and EM as well as commodity currencies have all appreciated against the Japanese currency. Low domestic inflation has been an additional factor that has depressed the Japanese real effective exchange rate. While valuations point to a higher yen in the coming year, this will be difficult to achieve. The Bank of Japan remains committed to boosting Japanese inflation expectations. To generate such a shock to expectations, the BoJ will have to keep policy at massively accommodative levels for an extended period. As global growth remains robust, global bond yields should experience some upside over the next 12 months. With JGB yields capped by the Japanese central bank, this will create downside for the yen. However, because the yen is so cheap, it is likely to occasionally rally furiously each time a risk-off event, such as any additional North Korean provocations, puts temporary downward pressure on global yields. The British Pound Chart 4The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The pound has fallen 6% against the euro this year, the currency of its largest trading partner. This has dragged down the GBP's real effective exchange rate to a large 11% discount to its fair value, the largest since the direct aftermath of the Brexit vote (Chart 4). Because Great Britain has entered a paradigm shift - the exit from the European Union will change the nature of the U.K. relationship on 43% of its trade - assessing where the pound's fair value lies is a more nebulous exercise than normal. However, signs are present that the pound is indeed cheap. British inflation remains perky, the current account has narrowed to 4% of GDP, and despite large regulatory uncertainty, net FDI into the U.K. has hit near record highs of 7% of GDP. Movements in cable are likely to remain a function of the gyrations in the U.S. dollar. However, at this level of valuation, the pound is attractive against the euro on a long-term basis. We had a target on EUR/GBP at 0.93, which was hit two weeks ago. This cross is likely to experience downside for the next 12 months. The biggest risk for the pound remains British politics - and not Brexit itself but its aftershock. The EU has made clear the transition process will be long, leaving time for the British economy to adjust. However, the conservative party has been greatly weakened, and Jeremy Corbyn's popularity is increasing. This raises the specter that, in the not-so-distant future, a Labour government could be formed. Under Corbyn's leadership, this would be the most left-of-center administration in any G10 country since François Mitterrand became French president in 1981. The early years of the Mitterrand presidency were marked by a sharp decline in the franc as he nationalized broad swaths of the French private sector, increased taxes and implemented inflationary policies. Keep this in mind. The Canadian Dollar Chart 5The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The loonie's fair value is driven by commodity prices, relative productivity trends, and the Canadian net international position. In February, the CAD was trading in line with its fair value. However, after its blistering rally since May, when the Bank of Canada began to hint that policy could be tightened this year, the Canadian dollar is now expensive vis-à-vis its long-term fundamental drivers (Chart 5). In a Special Report two months ago, we argued that the BoC was one of the major global central banks best placed to increase interest rates.2 With the Canadian economy firing on all cylinders, and with the output gap closing faster than the BoC anticipated in its July Monetary Policy Statement, the two interest rate hikes recorded this year so far make sense, and another one is likely to materialize in December. However, while the CAD could continue to rise until then, traders have moved from being massively short the CAD to now holding very sizeable net long positions. Additionally, interest rate markets are now discounting more than two hikes in Canada over the next 12 months, while expecting less than one full hike in the U.S. over the same time frame. If this scenario were to pan out, the tightening in monetary conditions emanating from a massive CAD rally would likely choke the Canadian recovery. Instead, we expect U.S. rates to increase more than what is currently embedded in interest rate markets, thus limiting the downside in USD/CAD. We prefer to continue betting on a rising loonie over the next 12 months by buying it against the euro and the Australian dollar. The Australian Dollar Chart 6The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The fair value of the Aussie is driven by Australia's net international position and commodity prices. Even with the tailwind of stronger metal prices, the AUD's rallies have been beyond what fundamentals justify, leaving it at massively overvalued levels (Chart 6). This suggests the AUD is at great risk of poor performance over the next 24 months. Timing the beginning of this decline is trickier, and valuations offer limited insight. One of the key factors that has supported the AUD has been the large increase in fiscal and public infrastructure spending in China this year - a move by Beijing most likely designed to support the economy in preparation for the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, where the new members of the Politburo are designated. As this event will soon move into the rearview mirror, China may abandon its aggressive support of the industrial and construction sectors - two key consumers of Australia's exports. The other tailwind behind the AUD has been the very supportive global liquidity backdrop. Global reserves growth has increased, dollar-based liquidity has expanded and generalized risk-taking in global financial markets has generated large inflows into EM and commodity plays.3 While U.S. inflation remains low and investors continue to price in a shy Fed, these conditions are likely to stay in place. However, a pick-up in U.S. inflation at the end of the year is likely to force a violent re-pricing of U.S. interest rates and drain much of the global excess liquidity, especially as the Fed will also be shrinking its balance sheet. This is likely to be when the AUD's stretched valuations become a binding constraint. The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD Natural resources prices, real rate differentials and the VIX are the key determinants of the kiwi's fair value, highlighting the NZD's nature as both a commodity currency and a carry currency. Both the fall in the VIX and the rebound in commodities prices are currently causing gradual appreciation in the New Zealand's dollar equilibrium exchange rate. However, despite these improving fundamentals, the real trade-weighted NZD has fallen this year, and now trades in line with its fair value (Chart 7). Explaining this performance, the NZD began 2017 at very expensive levels, even when compared to the already-pricey AUD. Also, despite a very strong New Zealand economy, the Reserve Bank Of New Zealand has disappointed investors by refraining from increasing interest rates, as the expensive currency has tightened monetary conditions on its behalf. Going forward, the recent weakness in the real effective NZD represents a considerable easing of policy, which could warrant higher rates in New Zealand. As a result, while a tightening of global liquidity conditions could hurt the NZD in addition to the AUD, the kiwi is likely to fare better than the much more expensive Aussie, pointing to an attractive shorting opportunity in AUD/NZD over the next 12 months. The Swiss Franc Chart 8The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy Switzerland's enormous and growing net international investment position continues to be the most important factor lifting the fair value of the Swiss franc. The recent sharp rally in EUR/CHF has now pushed the Swissie into decisively cheap territory (Chart 8). The decline in political risk in the euro area along with the lagging economic and inflation performance of the Swiss economy fully justify the discount currently experienced by the Swiss franc: money has flown out of Switzerland, and the Swiss National Bank is doing its utmost to keep monetary policy as easy as it can. For a small open economy like Switzerland, this means keeping the exchange rate at very stimulative levels. The continued growth in the SNB's balance sheet is a testament to the strength of its will. For the time being, there is very little reason to bet against SNB policy; the CHF will remain cheap because the economy needs it. However, this peg contains the seeds of its own demise. The cheaper the CHF gets, the larger the economic distortions in the Swiss economy become. Already, Switzerland sports the most negative interest rates in the world. This directly reflects the large injections of liquidity required from the SNB to keep the CHF down. These low real rates are fueling bubble-like conditions in Switzerland real estate and are threatening the achievability of return targets for Swiss pension plans and insurance companies, forcing dangerous risk-taking. But until core inflation and wage growth can move and stabilize above 1%, these conditions will stay in place. The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside Even after its recent rebound, the Swedish krona continues to trade cheaply, even if its long-term fair value remains on a secular downward trajectory (Chart 9). Yet the undemanding valuations of the SEK hide a complex picture. It is approximately fairly valued against the GBP and expensive against the NOK, two of its largest trading partners. However, the SEK is cheap against the USD and the euro. We expect the SEK to continue appreciating. While Swedish PMIs have recently softened, the Swedish economy is running well above capacity, and the Riksbank resources utilization indicator suggests the recent surge in inflation has further to run. Moreover, Sweden is in the thralls of a dangerous real-estate bubble that has pushed nonfinancial private-sector debt above 228% of GDP. With many amortization periods on new mortgages now running above 100 years, the Swedish central bank is concerned that further inflating this bubble could result in a milder replay of the debt crisis experienced in the early 1990s. The shift in leadership at the Riksbank's helm at the beginning of 2018 is likely to be the key factor that prompts the beginning of the removal of policy accommodation in that country. We like buying the krona against the euro. The USD/SEK tends to be a high-beta play on the greenback, and thus is very much a call on the USD. However, EUR/SEK displays a much lower correlation, and thus tends to be a more effective medium to isolate the upcoming tightening in monetary policy we expect from the Riksbank. The Norwegian Krone Chart 10The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The Norwegian krone remains the cheapest commodity currency in the world, along with the Colombian peso (Chart 10). The slowdown in Norwegian inflation and a very negative output gap of 2% of GDP implies that the Norges Bank will remain one of the most accommodative central banks in the G10. Thus, the NOK should remain cheap. However, we continue to like buying the krone against the euro. EUR/NOK has only traded above current levels when Brent prices have been below US$40/bbl. Not only is Brent currently trading above US$50/bbl, but the outlook for oil remains bright: production is in control as the agreement between Russian and OPEC is still in place. Additionally, the recent carnage and refinery shutdowns caused by hurricane Harvey should result in large drawdowns to finished-products inventories in the coming months. This will contribute to an anticipated normalization in global excess petroleum inventories, which have been the most important headwind to oil prices. Finally, the fact that the Brent curve is now backwardated also represents a support for oil prices, as this creates a "positive carry" for oil investors. The Yuan Chart 11The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis Despite the recent strength in both the trade-weighted RMB and the yuan versus the U.S. dollar, the renminbi still trades at a discount to its long-term fair value (Chart 11). Confirming this insight, China continues to sport a sizeable current account surplus, and its share of global exports is still on an expanding path. With the RMB being cheap, now that China is once again accumulating reserves instead of spending them to create a floor under its currency, the downside risk to the CNY has decreased significantly. Thus, since the People's Bank of China targets a basket of currencies when setting the yuan's value, to legitimize any bullish view on USD/CNY one needs to have a bullish view on the USD. While we do anticipate the dollar to rally toward the end of the year, our expectation that it will remain flat until then implies that we do not see much upside for now to USD/CNY. However, our bullish medium-term USD view, along with the cheapness of the CNY, suggests that the RMB could continue to appreciate on a trade-weighted basis going forward. While Chinese policymakers have highlighted their desire to make their currency a more countercyclical tool, the recent stability in Chinese inflation implies there is no need to let the CNY depreciate to reflate China. In fact, at this point, elevated PPI readings would argue that the Chinese authorities do have a built-in incentive to let the CNY appreciate on a trade-weighted basis for the coming six to 12 months. The Brazilian Real Chart 12The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity Hampered by poor productivity trends, which weigh on the Brazilian current account balance, the fair value of the real remains quite depressed, even as commodity prices have sharply rebounded since early 2016. In fact, the violent rally in the BRL over the same timeframe has made it one of the most expensive currencies tracked by our models (Chart 12). This level of overvaluation points to poor returns for the BRL on a one-to-two-year basis, however, it gives no clue to timing. The strong sensitivity of the Brazilian real to EM asset prices implies that the BRL is unlikely to weaken significantly so long as EM bonds remain well-bid. Moreover, because the BRL still offers an elevated carry, until U.S. interest rate expectations turn the corner, U.S. market dynamics will continue to put a floor under the real. However, this combination suggests the BRL could become one of the prime casualties of any rebound in U.S. inflation. Such a development would cause global liquidity to fall, hurting EM bonds in the process and making the BRL's high-risk carry much less attractive. Confirming this danger, the fact that the USD/BRL has not been able to breakdown for more than a year despite the weakness in the USD suggests momentum under the BRL is rather weak. The Mexican Peso Chart 13Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury In the direct aftermath of Trump's electoral victory, the Mexican peso quickly became one of the cheapest currencies in the world. However, the peso's 25% rally versus the U.S. dollar since January has eradicated this valuation advantage to the point where it is now one of the most expensive major currencies in the world (Chart 13). As the peso was collapsing through 2016, the Mexican central bank fought back, increasing interest rates. The massive surge in the prime lending rate points to a protracted period of weakness in the growth of nonfinancial private credit, which should weigh on consumption and investment. Actually, the growth in retail sales volumes has already begun to weaken. This could force the Banxico to cut rates, especially as inflation will slow in the face of peso's rebound this year. Lower Mexican rates, in the face of stretched long positioning in MXN by speculators, could be the key to generating a weakening in the peso over the next 12 months. To see real fireworks in the peso, one would need to see a resumption in the U.S. dollar bull market. Mexico has external debt equivalent to 66% of GDP, the highest among large EM nations. This makes the Mexican economy especially vulnerable to a strong dollar, as such a move would imply a massive increase in debt servicing costs. Thus, while the MXN may not be as vulnerable as the BRL, it could still suffer greatly if global liquidity becomes less generous next year. The Chilean Peso Chart 14CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices The Chilean peso real effective exchange rate is driven by the country's productivity trend relative to its trading partners and the real price of copper - which proxies Chilean terms-of-trade. Thanks to the CLP's rally since the winter of 2015, the real peso is at a four-year high and is now in expensive territory (Chart 14). We expect copper to see downside from now until the end of the year, pulling down the CLP with it. Current dynamics in the Chinese real estate market and the Chinese credit cycle, which tend to be leading indicators of industrial metals prices, point to an upcoming selloff. Moreover, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to tighten, and are set to continue doing so. This will weigh on Chinese credit growth and capex, creating headwinds for copper and the peso. That being said, the CLP will likely outperform the BRL and the ZAR. M1 money growth is back in positive territory after contracting last year, while industrial activity seems to have hit a bottom and is now picking up. Moreover, since Chile's economy does not have the credit excesses of its other EM peers, we expect the CLP to show more resilience than other currencies linked to industrial metals. The Colombian Peso Chart 15COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM The real COP's fair value is driven by Colombia's relative productivity trends and the price of oil, the country's main export. The fall in oil prices since the beginning of the year have caused a small decline in the fair value of the COP. Nevertheless, the peso is still one standard deviation below fair value (Chart 15). This partly reflects the premium demanded by investors to compensate for Colombia's large current account deficit of 6.3% of GDP. Overall the COP looks attractive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Historically a discount of 20% or more, like what the peso has today, marks a bottom in the real effective exchange rate. Furthermore, our Commodity and Energy Strategy Service expects Brent prices to climb to US$60/bbl towards the end of year, as OPEC's and Russia's production controls translate into oil inventory drawdowns. This should further increase the value of the COP against the ZAR and the BRL. Domestic dynamics also point to outperformance of the peso against other EM currencies. As opposed to countries like Brazil, where private debt stands at nearly 85% of GDP, Colombia has a more modest 60% leverage ratio - the byproduct of an orthodox banking system. Thus, the peso should be able to withstand a liquidity drawdown in EM better than its peers. The South African Rand Chart 16Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand South Africa's dismal productivity trend continues to be the greatest factor pulling the rand's long-term fair value lower. Due to this adverse trend, while the ZAR has been broadly stable this year, it is now slightly more expensive than it was in February (Chart 16). Not captured by the model, the political risks in South Africa remain elevated, creating a further handicap for the rand. The story behind the ZAR is very similar to the one underpinning the gyrations in the BRL. Both currencies, thanks to their elevated carries and deep liquidity - at least by EM currency standards - will continue to be buoyed by very generous global liquidity conditions. However, global real rates seem dangerously low and could move sharply higher, especially when U.S. inflation picks up at the end of the year and in early 2018. Such a move would cause the currently very supportive reflationary conditions to dissipate. This would put the expensive ZAR in a very precarious position. An additional danger for the ZAR is the price of gold. Gold and precious metals have also benefited from these generous global liquidity conditions. This has helped the South African terms of trade. However, gold is likely to be a key victim if U.S. interest rates rise because it is negatively correlated with both real interest rates and the U.S. dollar. Thus, while we do not see much upside for the expensive ZAR for the time being, it is likely to suffer greatly once U.S. inflation turns around, suggesting the ZAR possesses a very poor risk/reward ratio. The Russian Ruble Chart 17The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The RUB is currently trading at a very large premium to fair value (Chart 17). The risk created by such an overvaluation is only likely to materialize once U.S. inflation turns the corner and U.S. interest rates pick up - a scenario we've mentioned for late 2017 and early 2018. This risk is most pronounced against DM currencies, the U.S. dollar in particular. The RUB remains one of our favorite currencies within the EM space, especially when compared to other EM commodity producers. The Russian central bank is pursuing very orthodox policy, despite the fall in realized inflation, and is maintaining very elevated real interest rates in order to fully tame inflation expectations. Moreover, oil prices are likely to experience upside in the coming months as oil inventories are drawn down. This could result in an increase in the ruble's equilibrium exchange rate, which would help correct some of the RUB's overvaluation. The Korean Won Chart 18KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions The fair value of the Korean won continues to be lifted by the combined effect of lower Asian bond spreads and Korea's current account surplus. Yet, the KRW is trading at an increasingly large discount to its equilibrium (Chart 18). At first glance, this seems highly surprising as global trade is growing at its fastest pace in six years - a situation that always benefits trading nations like South Korea. Instead, political developments are to blame. Not only is North Korea ramping up its tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear devices, but also Seoul is within range of Pyongyang's conventional artillery. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect the current standoff to result in military conflict. Ultimately, North Korea is no match for the military might of the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, the capacity for Pyongyang's actions to shock financial markets is exhibiting diminishing returns. This suggests the risk premium imbedded in the won should dissipate. However, the won will remain very exposed to dynamics in the USD, global liquidity and global trade. Instead, a lower-risk way for investors to take advantage of the KRW's cheapness is to buy it against the Singapore dollar. While just as exposed to global liquidity as the won, the SGD is currently trading at a premium to fair value. The Philippine Peso Chart 19The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The fair value of the Philippine peso is driven by the country's net international investment position and commodity prices. After falling 6% this year, the real effective PHP now trades at a 13% discount to its fair value (Chart 19). A deteriorating current account, which is now in deficit, has fueled a selloff in the peso, making the Philippine currency one of the worst performing in the EM space. Worryingly, this has occurred alongside faltering foreign exchange reserves. However, the deficit is mainly the mirror image of large capital inflows, fueled by the government's ambitious infrastructure spending. Remittances are growing again and, with a weaker peso, will support consumer spending going forward. Employment had a setback last year, but is growing again. Higher investment and consumer spending will likely push rates up. As inflation rebounded alongside commodity prices last year, it is now at its 3% target. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas will need to rein in inflationary pressures to avoid overheating the economy. While the Philippines economy should expand further, the 'Duterte Discount' remains in place. Negative net portfolio flows reflect negative investor sentiment, as policy uncertainty remains elevated. The Singapore Dollar Chart 20SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive The fair value of the Singapore dollar is driven by commodity prices. This is because the exchange rate is the main policy tool used by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. As a result, when commodity prices rise, which leads to inflationary pressures, MAS tightens policy by spurring appreciation in the SGD. The opposite holds true when commodity prices weaken. Based on this metric, the SGD is currently 4.2% overvalued (Chart 20). Domestically, dynamics are quite mixed. Retail sales have picked up. However, both manufacturing and construction employment are contracting and labor market slack is increasing, pointing to continued subdued wage growth. Additionally, property prices are contracting and vacancy rates are on the rise, led by the commercial property sector. Thus, the recent pickup in inflation could soon vanish, especially as it has been driven by the rebound in oil prices in 2016. This combination suggests that Singapore still needs easy monetary conditions. USD/SGD closely follows the DXY. While the Fed will be able to increase interest rates by more than the 35 basis points priced over the next 24 months, Singapore still needs a lower exchange rate to maintain competitiveness and alleviate deflationary pressures. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 21The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The HKD remains quite expensive. However, being pegged to the USD, its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 21). The fall in the greenback has driven the HKD - which itself has fallen 0.75% versus the U.S. dollar - lower against the CNY and other EM currencies. If the U.S. dollar does resume its uptrend over the next six months, the valuation improvement in the HKD will once again dissipate. However, this does not spell the end of the HKD peg. With reserves of US$414 billion, or 125% of GDP, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has the firepower to support the peg, which has been one of the cornerstones of Hong Kong economic stability since 1983. Instead, the HKMA will tolerate deep deflationary pressures that will cause a fall in the real effective exchange rate. This is the path that Hong Kong picked in the 1990s, and it will be the path followed again in the face of any broad-based USD appreciation. This suggests that Hong Kong real estate prices could experience significant downside in the coming years. The Saudi Riyal Chart 22The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Saudi riyal remains prohibitively expensive, even as its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 22). The SAR is afflicted by similar dynamics as the HKD: its peg with the USD means the greenback's gyrations are the main source of variation in the SAR's real effective exchange rate on a cyclical basis. However, on a structural horizon, the fair value of the riyal is dominated by Saudi Arabia's poor productivity. An economy dominated by crude extraction and processing and living on one of the most sizable economic rents in the world, Saudi Arabia has not endured the competitive pressures that are often the source of productivity enhancement in most nations. Additionally, Saudi capital expenditures are heavily skewed to the oil sector, a sector whose output growth has been limited for many decades by natural constraints. We do not believe the current valuation premium in the riyal will force the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority to devalue the SAR versus the USD. Saudi Arabia, like Hong Kong, possesses copious foreign exchange reserves, and growth has improved now that oil prices have rebounded. Additionally, the KSA is also likely to tolerate deflationary pressures. Not only has it done so in the past, but Saudi Arabia imports most of its household products, especially its food needs. A fall in the SAR would cause a large amount of food inflation, representing a massively negative price shock for a very young population. This is a recipe for disaster for the royal family of a country with no democratic outlet. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 For a more detailed discussion of the various variables incorporated in the models, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed discussion on the global liquidity environment, please Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar-Bloc Currencies: More Than Just China", dated August 18, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades