Emerging Markets

Highlights The direct impact of recently proposed U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum is likely to be small, both for China and the world. In isolation, this development is not very relevant for investment strategy. However, the lessons learned from studying the game of Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that investors should be legitimately concerned about an iterative "tit-for-tat" exchange of retaliation between the U.S. and its major trade partners if the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressively protectionist trade policies. Recent data releases show that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. While the Caixin manufacturing PMI is a bright spot, it is not likely heralding a major turning point for the Chinese economy. Investors should closely watch three bellwethers to judge the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war. Barring a major deterioration on this front, or a sharp further slowdown in Chinese economic growth, investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs global. Feature The looming threat of U.S. protectionism came into full force over the past week, as President Trump stated that sweeping tariffs on all U.S. imports of steel and aluminum would soon be formalized. The tariff situation continues to evolve as we go to press, but the facts as they currently stand are the following: The proposed tariffs would be 25% on steel, and 10% on aluminum imports No exceptions are planned for any country, although statements from U.S. leadership on Monday suggested that Canada and Mexico may be exempt if NAFTA is renegotiated in the U.S.' favor Key European Union leaders threatened to retaliate against the U.S.' proposed tariffs, and the U.S. threatened to counter-retaliate China has taken a more cautious stance on the issue of retaliation, and is strongly seeking to negotiate with the Trump administration Minimal Direct Impact The developments over the past week raise two questions about China's economy that matter for investment strategy: What is the direct impact of the tariffs on China's exports likely to be? What is the implication for global growth? On the first question, the answer is fairly clear that the direct impact is likely to be small. The proposed tariffs do not disproportionately target China, and Chinese exports of steel and aluminum to the U.S. account for less than 0.2% of total exports (Chart 1). Exports of these products to all countries as a share of total exports is still quite small (panel 2). The second question is much more difficult to answer, and it has wide implications for both the Chinese economy and for investment strategy. When approaching the question, it is first important to note that the threat to the global economy from the imposition of the proposed tariffs comes from the potential for a series of retaliations from major trading partners, not the tariffs themselves. U.S. imports of steel and aluminum make up less than 1% of global goods exports, and Chart 2 presents a long-term history of average U.S. tariff rates along with our estimate of the impact of the U.S.' proposal. While the imposition of the announced tariffs would certainly change the trend that has been in place for some time, the rise is not very significant. Critically, even after the tariffs are imposed, U.S. tariffs rates will still be fractional when compared with those that prevailed during the early-1930s, when the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act materially exacerbated the Great Depression. Chart 1Chinese Steel And Aluminum Exports##br## Are Not Significant Chinese Steel And Aluminum Exports Are Not Significant Chinese Steel And Aluminum Exports Are Not Significant Chart 2We're A Long, Long Way Away##br## From Smoot-Hawley We're A Long, Long Way Away From Smoot-Hawley We're A Long, Long Way Away From Smoot-Hawley China's cautious stance towards retaliation is, at first blush, an encouraging development, but it may not be as hopeful of a sign as it seems. First, despite a general feeling among investors that China was the intended target of the U.S.' proposed tariffs, a global tariff on steel and aluminum is likely to disproportionately affect developed countries rather than China. It is therefore not surprising that China has signaled a somewhat conciliatory stance. In our view, the likelihood of Chinese retaliation is considerably higher if further tariffs are announced on goods that make up a larger share of their exports. In addition, as we noted above, the European Union has already highlighted some U.S. goods that may be subject to higher retaliatory tariffs in response to the news (which already elicited a threat of counter-retaliation from the U.S.), and both Canada and Mexico have also threatened retaliation if they are not granted an exemption from the proposed tariffs. In our view, these threats should be treated seriously, especially after revisiting the lessons of one of the most famous experiments in game theory. Bottom Line: The direct impact of proposed U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum is likely to be small, both for China and the world. Retaliation Risk And The Prisoner's Dilemma The dynamics of trade renegotiations can be examined, at least conceptually, through the lens of game theory. It is difficult to model these dynamics precisely because of the complexity of the relationship between trade and potential growth, but it is worth revisiting the lessons learned by the repeated playing of Prisoner's Dilemma, one of the most well-known examples of the application of game theory. To summarize, the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario describes two criminals who have been arrested, and whose statement to the authorities affects the manner in which punishment (if any) is distributed between the two of them. The standard payoff structure of the game is set up such that one prisoner is able to largely avoid punishment if (s)he accuses the other of the crime and the other prisoner remains silent, but that both prisoners receive a punishment if they both accuse each other that is greater than the punishment received if they both remain silent (Table 1). Given that tariffs and other forms of trade protectionism can only durably succeed at improving net domestic economic outcomes if they do not result in retaliation, from the perspective of trade renegotiation, accusing the other player in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma is tantamount to restricting trade, and remaining silent is equivalent to allowing existing trade relationships to persist. Table1In The Prisoner's Dilemma, It's Better To Return Defection With Defection China And The Risk Of Escalation China And The Risk Of Escalation The success of strategies employed in repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma was studied most famously by Robert Axelrod in 1980.1 The winning strategy (in both of Axelrod's tournaments) was "Tit for Tat", which follows two very simple rules: cooperate initially, and thereafter copy the other player's decision in the previous round. This strategy has three attributes that Axelrod showed to be highly successful when playing repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma: niceness (not being the first player to accuse/defect/renege), being provocable (responding to defections with in-kind retaliation), and forgiveness (not allowing one-time defections to impact future choices beyond a one-time retaliation). Chart 3 illustrates the performance of the "Tit for Tat" strategy in the first Axelrod tournament, along with the average scores of several other strategies. The most important lesson from both tournaments is summarized nicely in the chart: the average score of a series of "nice" strategies was considerably higher than those that were not nice. But Chart 4 also highlights that niceness is only a relatively successful strategy because of its ability to produce an optimal outcome with other nice strategies: all strategies, nice or not, tend to generate poor outcomes when played against strategies that are not nice. This is because the payoff structure of Prisoner's Dilemma is such that, compared with defection, co-operation makes a player worse off if their opponent defects. Chart 3In Repeated Games Of Prisoner's Dilemma,##br## "Nice" Strategies Pay Off... China And The Risk Of Escalation China And The Risk Of Escalation Chart 4...But Only Because They Do Well Against ##br##Other "Nice" Strategies China And The Risk Of Escalation China And The Risk Of Escalation In the context of global trade, this can be seen as the likelihood of outsized job losses (or the lack of job gains in a protected industry) from a failure to retaliate. The key point for investors is that the most basic lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that market participants should be legitimately concerned about retaliation from the U.S.' trade partners (and subsequent counter-retaliation) if it continues to pursue a protectionist agenda, because it can be a rational response for an individual country even if it leads to poor outcomes for everyone involved. In addition, three assumptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma game are not valid in the real world (or the current environment), which in two of these cases further increases the risk of an iterative exchange of retaliation: Chart 5The U.S. Has A Trade Deficit ##br##With Many Trading Partners The U.S. Has A Trade Deficit With Many Trading Partners The U.S. Has A Trade Deficit With Many Trading Partners In terms of the payoffs associated with the game, Prisoner's Dilemma assumes an equal starting position (of zero "points") on both sides, which is not the case in the current environment. The U.S. has a sizeable trade deficit with the world (Chart 5), and several important trading partners with the U.S. (especially China) maintain significant non-tariffs barriers to trade. Regardless of whether this inequity has been caused by an unfair trading relationship, in the parlance of Axelrod's tournaments, this implies that the U.S. strategy is likely to be not nice due to the perception on the part of the Trump administration of an unequal starting position. The implication is that the odds of an escalation of the imposition of relatively small tariffs into a full-blown trade war are higher than would normally be the case. Prisoner's Dilemma has clear and symmetric payoffs, which is also not the case in the current environment. The Trump administration apparently feels that the payoff to the U.S. of certain trade restrictions is a net positive even assuming retaliation, which raises the possibility of a negative outcome for the global economy. Worryingly, in our view the chances are high that calculations of the net benefit of any trade restriction are being done on a political basis, rather than an economic one. Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that the participants are unable to communicate, which is a limitation that does not exist in a real-world trade negotiation scenario. This lowers the probability that the U.S. and its major trading partners will engage in a spiraling tit-for-tat trade war relative to what the game of Prisoner's Dilemma would imply, even if the recently announced tariffs on steel and aluminum stand and major partners do retaliate. Bottom Line: The lessons learned from studying the game of Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that investors should be legitimately concerned about an iterative "tit-for-tat" exchange of retaliation between the U.S. and its major trade partners if the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressively protectionist trade policies. No Help From The Domestic Economy A protectionist agenda from the U.S. is also coming at an inconvenient time for Chinese policymakers, even if they were not blindsided by the move. Policymakers already have to contend with managing the impact of renewed reforms on economy's financial and industrial sectors, and the potential addition of the external sector to this list of problems needing attention is unwelcome. While a cooling of the economy was an inevitable result from the government's deleveraging campaign and shadow banking crackdown, Table 2 highlights how broadly leading economic indicators have decelerated. The table presents recent data points for several series that we identified in November Special Report as having leading properties for the Chinese business cycle,2 as well as the most recent month-over-month change, an indication of whether the series is currently above its 12-month moving average, how long this has been the case. Table 2No Convincing Signs Of An Impending Upturn In China's Economy China And The Risk Of Escalation China And The Risk Of Escalation Among the components of the BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator (an index designed to lead turning points in the Li Keqiang index), all six series are in a downtrend and 5 out of these 6 fell in January (the growth in M2 was the exception). A similar story is borne out in the housing price data, with a variety of diffusion indexes having also fallen in January.3 The Caixin Manufacturing PMI remains the one bright spot, having recently risen above its 12-month moving average and having risen in January, in stark contrast to the official PMI (which fell a full point). But as Chart 6 highlights, following the last four episodes when the Caixin PMI exceeded the official PMI by this magnitude, the subsequent trend in the average of the two was down in every case. The implication is that the outlier nature of the current Caixin PMI shown in Table 2 is just that, and not a heralding a major upturn in China's economy. Chart 6The Caixin PMI Is Probably The Noise, Not The Signal The Caixin PMI Is Probably The Noise, Not The Signal The Caixin PMI Is Probably The Noise, Not The Signal Bottom Line: Recent data releases show that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. While the Caixin manufacturing PMI is a bright spot, it is not likely heralding a major turning point for the Chinese economy. Conclusions For Investment Strategy Chart 7 illustrates the decision tree for Chinese stocks that we presented in our first report of the year. While there has been a modest further deterioration in the industrial sector, the pace of the decline is still consistent with the controlled slowdown scenario that we outlined in an October Weekly Report.4 As such, the recent softness in the data is not significant enough to cause us to change our recommended investment strategy. The key change over the past week has been the threat posed by U.S. protectionism to the global economy, which is the very first question to answer in our decision tree. The now high-beta nature of the Chinese stock market underscores that U.S. protectionism can significantly (negatively) impact the relative performance of Chinese equities if it destabilizes the global stock market, even if Chinese exports were to emerge from the exchange relatively unscathed. For now, we judge the likelihood of a full-blown tit-for-tat trade war to be a risk, and thus not a probable event. For now, market participants seem to agree: U.S. and global equities rebounded earlier this week in response to a feeling that the negative repercussions for global growth are likely to be minimal. Nonetheless, this is a risk that needs to be monitored closely, and to facilitate this our Geopolitical Strategy service has highlighted the following three bellwethers that they will be watching in order to judge the likelihood of a major escalation:5 Chart 7The Chinese Equity "Decision Tree" China And The Risk Of Escalation China And The Risk Of Escalation Tariff exceptions for allies: Given the national security basis for the steel and aluminum tariffs, it is likely that exceptions will be made for allies such as Canada and Europe. If yes, then the measure is unlikely to be part of a truly "America First" mercantilist strategy and is instead a veiled swipe at China to satisfy Trump's base ahead of the midterm elections NAFTA: Our geopolitical team has argued that the probability of NAFTA abrogation is around 50%.6 If the administration continues the negotiations in light of tariff announcements, however, it suggests that the revealed preference of the White House is less protectionist than it appears. Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft: The Trump administration is investigating Chinese technology transfer and IP theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. If China is found to have acted unfairly, penalties would likely include a combination of tariffs and restrictions on Chinese investment in the U.S. This might include an indemnity for cumulative losses from past violations, which would be rare, if not unprecedented, and which China would reject outright. This could produce across-the-board tariffs of a sort that the U.S. has not imposed since the Nixon shock. Chart 8China Is Outperforming Global In Ex-Tech Terms China Is Outperforming Global In Ex-Tech Terms China Is Outperforming Global In Ex-Tech Terms In the meantime, Chart 8 highlights that investable Chinese ex-technology stocks (proxied by the MSCI China Index ex-technology) remain in an uptrend versus their global peers, which underscores that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. This underscores that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. While the ongoing slowdown in China's economy is likely to cause earnings growth to decelerate over the coming year, the continued likelihood of decently positive earnings growth coupled with a sizeable valuation discount relative to global signals that Chinese ex-tech stocks are remain attractive on a risk/reward basis. Investors should stay overweight. Bottom Line: Investors should closely watch three bellwethers to judge the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war. Barring a major deterioration on this front, or a sharp further slowdown in Chinese economic growth, investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs global. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" and "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" by Robert Axelrod, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 Nos.1 and 3, March and September 1980. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of The Chinese Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, as discussed in our February 8 Weekly Report, we are keeping an eye on residential floor space sold given its history of leading China's housing market cycles. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War", dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto Populism", dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

We examined emerging market equity valuations as an asset class in Part 1 of this Special Report published on January 24; the link is available on page 18. The conclusions of the report were: That EM stocks are about one standard deviation above their fair value; Compared with DM equities, EM stocks are not cheap - their relative valuations are neutral. This follow-up report looks at individual country valuations to identify valuation opportunities within the EM equity universe. Composite Multiples Indicator (CMI) The Composite Multiples Indicator is an equal-weighted average of the following multiples: Trailing P/E ratio Forward P/E ratio Price-to-cash earnings (PCE) ratio Price-to-book value (PBV) ratio Price-to-dividend ratio. As we have argued for some time, looking at market cap-weighted equity valuation ratios for EM indexes is misleading. The basis is that some large-cap-weighted sectors optically look cheap for distinct reasons - including but not limited to low NPL provisions for banks, poor corporate governance among SOEs and high cyclicality and uncertainty over the outlook for commodities prices for energy and materials companies. Moreover, other segments such as certain technology stocks and private well-run companies command extremely high multiples. Therefore, as in Part 1, we focus on various valuation measures that are not market cap-weighted. Specifically, for each country's available sub-sectors, we calculate the following measures for each of the five multiples referred to above: 20% trimmed-mean ratio - this excludes the top 10% and bottom 10% sub-sectors - i.e., it removes outliers and then calculates an equal-weighted average. Median ratio takes the median value of sub-sectors; Equal-weighted ratio assigns an equal weight to each sub-sector regardless of market cap. Then, we standardize individual aggregates - the 20% trimmed-mean, the median and equal-weighted sub-sector ratios. Based on these three aggregates, we compute a Composite Multiples Indicator (CMI) for each country. Chart I-1 demonstrates the ranking of equity markets according to CMI. Based on these aggregate CMIs, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Chile are the most expensive, while Russia, Turkey, Colombia, Korea and Mexico are the cheapest. Chart I-1Equity Valuation Ranking Based On Multiples EM Equity Valuations (Part II) EM Equity Valuations (Part II) Appendix 1 on page 14 shows the aggregate CMI for the largest EM bourses in absolute terms. Among the above-mentioned five ratios, the most critical one in our opinion is the price-to-cash earnings. MSCI defines cash earnings as earnings per share including depreciation and amortization as reported by the company - i.e. depreciation and amortization expenses are added to calculate cash earnings. While this measure is not pertinent for banks, for non-financial companies it is the best proxy measure of operating cash flow. Hence, cash earnings are a superior measure of earnings power. Notably, when calculating the median, 20% trimmed-mean and equal-weighted ratios for all sub-sectors, the impact of banks is largely eliminated, as banks are just one sub-sector among about 50 others. Table I-1Ranking Based On Price-To-Cash ##br##Earnings Ratio EM Equity Valuations (Part II) EM Equity Valuations (Part II) The point is not that banks are unimportant, but rather that bank valuations should be dealt with separately. We reiterated the importance of banks and their profits in the EM universe and discussed why in certain EM countries banks' reported profits should be taken with a grain of salt in our February 14, 2018 Weekly Report; the link is available on page 18. Banks, somewhat more than other businesses, can substantially manipulate their profits by raising or lowering provisions for bad assets, leaving current multiple levels misleading. Table I-1 shows the ranking based on the average price-to-cash earnings ratio. According to this ranking, the most attractive markets are Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Hungary and Korea. By contrast, the least attractive are India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Brazil and China. A CMI can be thought of as a cyclical valuation measure, while the cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio is a structural valuation measure. Investors with time horizons longer than three years should put meaningful weight on CAPE ratios. The latter is, however, not useful for investment horizons that are 12-18 months or less. The CAPE ratio is a structural valuation indicator because it derives the secular trend in corporate earnings and computes the P/E ratio based on the latter. Hence, the cyclical earnings trajectory is ignored. In contrast, CMIs do not incorporate such an adjustment. Hence, they can be considered as a cyclical valuation measure. By combining cyclical (CMI) and structural (CAPE) valuation measures, we produced Chart I-2. It plots each country's CAPE ratio on the X axis and CMI on the Y axis. According to these metrics, Russia, Turkey, Korea, Colombia and Mexico are cheap. On the flip side, India, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia are expensive. Chart I-2Cyclical Versus Structural Valuation Ratios EM Equity Valuations (Part II) EM Equity Valuations (Part II) Adjusting Multiples For Local Interest Rates Equity multiples differ across countries because of a variety of factors. One of the most crucial factors defining the equilibrium of equity multiples are domestic nominal interest rates. Chart I-3 plots local currency government bonds on the X axis and the latest values for CMI on the Y axis. As expected, there is a loose inverse relationship between bond yields and equity multiples: lower bond yields are typically consistent with relatively higher multiples, and vice versa. Chart I-3Composite Multiples & Local Interest Rates EM Equity Valuations (Part II) EM Equity Valuations (Part II) The bourses that falls outside the main cluster can be regarded as being out of equilibrium valuation. The markets that fall into the left-bottom corner of the chart are relatively cheap. These include Russia, Korea, Taiwan, Central Europe, Malaysia, Colombia and Mexico. On the other end of the spectrum, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil and South Africa stand out as expensive. As we argued above, the price-to-cash earnings ratio is somewhat superior to other multiples. This is why another useful matrix to consider is the comparison of the average price-to-cash earnings ratio with nominal local bond yields, as shown in Chart I-4. According to these metrics, central European bourses are among the cheapest. Russia, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia are also attractive. Chart I-4Price-To-Cash EPS & Local Interest Rates EM Equity Valuations (Part II) EM Equity Valuations (Part II) Finally, taking into account both price-to-cash earnings ratios and nominal domestic bond yields, the most expensive equity markets are India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa and Brazil. Investment Conclusions Valuation of any asset class is an art rather than science. Having examined various cyclical and structural equity valuation measures and having incorporated local interest rates, we can draw the following conclusions: Chart I-5EMS's Fully-Invested Equity Portfolio ##br##Performance Versus The Benchmark EMS's Fully-Invested Equity Portfolio Performance Versus The Benchmark EMS's Fully-Invested Equity Portfolio Performance Versus The Benchmark Within the EM equity universe, Russia, central Europe and Korea stand out as the cheapest. There is also relative value in Turkey, Colombia and Mexico. India, Indonesia and Philippines are the most expensive markets. South Africa and Brazil are still somewhat expensive. Neutral valuations prevail in China, Taiwan, Peru and Chile. In China, the cheapness of banks is offset by elevated valuations of technology/new economy stocks. Our recommended country allocation within EM equities takes into consideration not only valuations but also many other parameters such as cyclical and structural outlooks for each economy, macro policies, banking system health, politics, currency and interest rate trends and other factors that we have visibility on. As such, we might recommend underweighting some markets that may look cheap, and overweighting others that appear expensive because of factors other than valuation. Our current overweights are Taiwan, Korean technology, Russia, central Europe, India, Thailand and Chile. Our underweights are Turkey, Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa and Peru. We are neutral on China, non-tech Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Colombia and Indonesia. Finally, Chart I-5 illustrates that our fully invested EM equity model portfolio has outperformed the EM benchmark by 57% since its initiation in May 2008. This translate into 450 basis points of compounded outperformance per year. More importantly, such outperformance has been achieved with very low volatility. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: Weighing The Pros And Cons Chart II-1Indonesian Stock Prices: ##br##Relative & Absolute Indonesian Stock Prices: Relative & Absolute Indonesian Stock Prices: Relative & Absolute Indonesian stocks have underperformed the emerging market (EM) equity benchmark considerably since early 2016, and may well be approaching the final stages of underperformance. Yet the jury is still out on the timing of a potential reversal (Chart II-1, top panel). In absolute U.S. dollar terms, Indonesian share prices are flirting with their previous highs, which will likely become a major resistance level (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Banks hold the key for this bourse, as they account for 40% of the MSCI Indonesia index and 27% of the Jakarta Composite Index. Their earnings also make up 48% of the MSCI index's total earnings. Indonesian bank share prices have rallied significantly in the past two years, but the underpinnings of this advance are questionable for reasons we elaborate on below. Cyclical Vulnerabilities... Indonesia's macro vulnerability arises from two sources: balance of payment (BoP) dynamics and banking system health. We will review the nation's BoP vulnerability only briefly, as we have frequently discussed the outlook for commodities prices, the U.S. dollar and fund flows to EM in our weekly reports. In short, we expect Chinese growth to decelerate meaningfully this year, which will likely cause commodities prices to fall significantly (Chart II-2). Falling commodities prices will in turn create headwinds for Indonesia. Notably, commodities account for around 35% of Indonesia's total exports. Chart II-3 further illustrates that changes in Indonesia's trade balance have historically been correlated with swings in its equity market. Chart II-2Indonesia's Coal Exports ##br##To China And Coal Prices Indonesia's Coal Exports To China And Coal Prices Indonesia's Coal Exports To China And Coal Prices Chart II-3Trade Balance Is ##br##A Threat To Share Prices Trade Balance Is A Threat To Share Prices Trade Balance Is A Threat To Share Prices We now explore the vulnerability of Indonesian bank stocks in greater detail. Banks: Dubious Profit Recovery While earnings of listed Indonesian banks have rebounded, this recovery is of poor quality and is likely unsustainable. This, along with banks' elevated equity valuations, make the outlook for their share prices negative. The top panel of Chart II-4 shows that banks' net interest income - a measure of a bank's ability to grow organically - has declined. This has occurred because bank loan growth has been sluggish and net interest margins have narrowed (Chart II-4, middle and bottom panel). Yet, banks have reported dramatic acceleration in profit growth in the past six months. This has been achieved through the lowering of non-performing loan (NPL) provisions (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Strong Bank Earnings: ##br##Not From Organic Growth... Strong Bank Earnings: Not From Organic Growth... Strong Bank Earnings: Not From Organic Growth... Chart II-5...But From Lowering Provisions ...But From Lowering Provisions ...But From Lowering Provisions Lowering provisions to boost profits is an unsustainable strategy for Indonesian banks, in our opinion. Chart II-6 shows that NPLs are too low when one considers the steep rise in leverage that has occurred since 2010. Chart II-6Private Credit Has Risen A Lot ##br##Since 2010, Yet NPLs Are Still Low Private Credit Has Risen A Lot Since 2010, Yet NPLs Are Still Low Private Credit Has Risen A Lot Since 2010, Yet NPLs Are Still Low Indonesian banks have benefited meaningfully from the rally in commodities prices in the past two years. Higher resource prices have not only slowed the formation of new NPLs but have also made some old NPLs current. However, if our negative view on commodities prices plays out, these loans may become non-performing again. Further, Indonesian commercial banks were also aided by the financial authority's (OJK) decision to relax credit restructuring rules in August 2015. This relaxation allowed banks to restructure some of the troubled loans on their balance sheets in a more favorable manner, allowing them to reduce provisions. The temporary relaxation expired in August 2017, and banks now have to revert to the previous and more rigorous methods of accounting for troubled loans. Altogether, the above developments will cause NPLs and provisions to rise anew. Importantly, the sum of NPLs and special-mention loans1 (SMLs) for Indonesia's largest seven banks stand at 6.6% (2.7% NPL + 3.9% SMLs). Taking India's experience as a roadmap for Indonesia, SMLs will ultimately become non-performing, and the workout of NPLs and SMLs could drag on for years. For example, the ratio of NPLs and stressed loans in India has now reached 12.2% of total loans for the whole banking system. We also believe Indonesian banks are under-provisioned. Provisions for bad loans at Indonesia's seven largest commercial banks stand at only 3.8% of total loans. In comparison, the sum of NPLs and SMLs makes up a 6.6% share of total loans. Odds are that Indonesian commercial banks will soon be forced to raise provisions, which will materially hit their profit growth. Chart II-7 shows that if banks in Indonesia were to raise provisions by 35% in 2018 - which would take them back to early 2017 levels - then banks' annual operating profit growth would drop from 21% to zero. This is a major threat to bank share prices.2 Chart II-7As Banks' NPL Provisions Rise, ##br##Bank Stocks Could Fall As Banks' NPL Provisions Rise, Bank Stocks Could Fall As Banks' NPL Provisions Rise, Bank Stocks Could Fall Furthermore, having rallied significantly in the past two years or so, Indonesian commercial banks' valuations are elevated. The price-to-book value (PBV) for the nation's banks that are included in the MSCI equity index stands at 2.8. Bottom Line: The recent profit recovery for Indonesia's commercial banks is unsustainable, and primarily driven by opportunistic reductions in provisions. ...But Room To Pursue Accommodative Policies Despite the cyclical challenges facing the Indonesian economy and banks, the authorities have accrued enough firepower that allows them to pursue counter-cyclical policies. First, Indonesia's central bank, Bank Indonesia (BI), used strong global growth and robust trade as an opportunity to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. This has provided BI with significant ability to defend the rupiah as and when it comes under depreciation pressure from slowing exports growth and potential capital outflows. Notably, BI has bought foreign exchange reserves more rapidly than the central banks of other vulnerable economies such as South Africa, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil (Chart II-8). As a result, the rupiah has not appreciated at all in the past 12 months, and has lagged other EM currencies. We consider this a positive sign as there will be less downside risk if the external environment worsens and EM exchange rates depreciate. Second, the Ministry of Finance has curbed government spending in the past two to three years (Chart II-9) at a time when strong global growth and rising commodities prices have been supporting Indonesia's overall growth. Chart II-8Bank Indonesia's Foreign ##br##Reserves Accumulation Bank Indonesia's Foreign Reserves Accumulation Bank Indonesia's Foreign Reserves Accumulation Chart II-9Government Has Been Prudent Indonesia's Government Has Been Prudent Indonesia's Government Has Been Prudent Consequently, the government's deposits at both the central bank and commercial banks have been rising rapidly (Chart II-10). This will allow the government to increase its expenditures without resorting to new borrowing. Because of these counter-cyclical policies, especially tight fiscal policy, the domestic demand recovery has been very muted (Chart II-11). On the flip side, and going forward, if the government raises expenditures, Indonesian domestic demand will be relatively resilient - even as and when commodities prices fall. Low inflation will also allow the authorities to stimulate when needed. Chart II-10Government Has Substantial Firepower Government Has Substantial Firepower Government Has Substantial Firepower Chart II-11Domestic Demand Recovery Has Been Muted Domestic Demand Recovery Has Been Muted Domestic Demand Recovery Has Been Muted On the whole, counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies will offset some of the potential external shocks that will emanate from slowing Chinese growth and falling commodities prices. This is positive for Indonesia's relative stock market performance going forward. Investment Conclusions For now, we recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to Indonesian equities. One or a combination of the following will likely lead us to upgrade this bourse to overweight: First, as and when the initial phase of commodities price declines transpires, and commodities currencies depreciate. This is a primary risk, and we will be more comfortable upgrading Indonesia if this scenario partially plays out. Second, Indonesia's relative performance vis-à-vis EM appears to be inversely related to the relative performance of Chinese stocks against that same benchmark (Chart II-12). It is hard to find scientific or even intuitive arguments behind this relationship, but it seems that portfolio flows have been rotating between Chinese and Indonesian bourses. Chart II-12Investors Rotating Between Chinese ##br##And ASEAN/Indonesian Equities Investors Rotating Between Chinese And ASEAN/Indonesian Equities Investors Rotating Between Chinese And ASEAN/Indonesian Equities Given this relationship, we would be looking for Chinese stocks to begin underperforming and equity flows rotating to Indonesia to feel confident in the potential reversal of the latter's underperformance. In short, we will be looking at the market's momentum as confirmation of our view before upgrading this bourse. Last week we reviewed our recommended allocation to EM local bonds and advocated a neutral position in Indonesian domestic bonds. This strategy remains intact. Prudent macro policies will act to offset a potential external shock to the Indonesian currency and local bonds. Indonesian sovereign credit also warrants a neutral allocation at present, with a possible upgrade on potential spread-widening. For currency traders, we continue to recommend a long PLN / short IDR trade. This is a bet on rising inflation and interest rates in central Europe on the one hand, and a negative view on commodities and fund flows to EMs on the other. As a part of our strategy of betting on depreciation in EM/commodities currencies, we are also maintaining our short IDR/long U.S. dollar position. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 Special mention loans (SML) are stressed loans that are not yet non-performing. 2 Notably, annual provision growth averaged 40% between 2015 and 2016 when banks were facing declining commodities prices and rising NPLs. Appendix 1: Composite Multiples Indicators Chart III-1, Chart III-2, Chart III-3, Chart III-4 Chart III-1 CHART 1 CHART 1 Chart III-2 CHART 2 CHART 2 Chart III-3 CHART 3 CHART 3 Chart III-4 CHART 4 CHART 4 Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Fiscal Stimulus To Prolong The Expansion The market swoon in early February should not induce investors to lower risk. The stock market correction (the first for almost two years) was triggered by a couple of inflation and wage readings that came in slightly above expectations, and was exacerbated by some technical factors such as automated trading by volatility-target funds. But, significantly, it was not accompanied by the usual signals of rising risk aversion: for example, credit spreads barely widened and the gold price was stable (Chart 1). Volatility is likely to remain high but, as our U.S. Investment Strategy service recently found, the VIX has not been a useful indicator of recessions and bear markets: many times over the past 30 years it has spiked higher without risk assets producing negative returns over the subsequent 12 months (Chart 2).1 Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Chart 1Sell-Off Didn't Trigger Risk Signals Sell-Off Didn't Trigger Risk Signals Sell-Off Didn't Trigger Risk Signals Chart 2Spike In Vix Is Not A Sell Signal Spike In Vix Is Not A Sell Signal Spike In Vix Is Not A Sell Signal Fiscal policy moves in the U.S. make us believe, rather, that the current economic expansion will last longer than we previously forecast. A combination of tax cuts plus recent spending proposals (including $165 billion on the military and $45 billion on disaster relief) will boost GDP by about 0.8% of GDP this year and 1.3% next, compared to the IMF's earlier forecast of a fiscal contraction this year (Chart 3).2 Add to that the boost from the 8% trade-weighted depreciation of the U.S. dollar over the past 12 months (which should add 0.3% to growth over two years), and it is difficult to imagine U.S. GDP growth turning down any time soon. Accordingly, BCA has shifted its recession call from the second half of 2019 to sometime in 2020. Of course, this is not all good news. The U.S. budget deficit is likely to increase to 5½% of GDP in 2019, which will put upward pressure on interest rates. The fiscal impulse will hit an economy already at full capacity, and so will be inflationary. The scenario we envisage is boom-and-bust, leading to a nastier recession than we had previously expected. Nonetheless, the boost to growth should be positive for risk assets over the next 12 months. Our model of earnings growth now suggests that U.S. EPS should continue to grow at close to a 20% rate for the rest of this year (Chart 4). Chart 3Fiscal Boost To U.S. Growth Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Chart 4Earnings Growth Gets A Boost Too Earnings Growth Gets A Boost Too Earnings Growth Gets A Boost Too How quickly will the Fed push back against the potentially inflationary implications of this higher growth? We have found a remarkable turnaround in investors' perceptions of inflation over the past few weeks. Whereas last year most argued that structural forces (online shopping, the gig economy etc.) meant that inflation would stay depressed, now many worry that it will quickly shoot above 2% and force the Fed to tighten policy aggressively. This has caused them to over-react, for example, to the (rather obvious) statement from the last FOMC minutes that "participants noted that a stronger outlook for economic growth raised the likelihood that further gradual policy firming would be appropriate." Our view remains that core PCE inflation - the Fed's favorite measure - is likely to move back gradually to 2% (from 1.5% currently), but not accelerate dramatically. Unit labor costs remain subdued (Chart 5), the continued rise in the participation rate means there is more slack in the labor market than implied by headline unemployment (Chart 6), and inflation expectations remain low. This should allow new Fed chair Jerome Powell to continue to withdraw accommodation at a measured pace. The market has already priced in that the Fed will tighten this year at least in line with its dots (Chart 7). We expect four, rather than the Fed's projected three, hikes this year, but this should not be too hard for the market to absorb. Chart 5Unit Labor Costs Don't Point To Jump In Inflation Unit Labor Costs Don't Point To Jump In Inflation Unit Labor Costs Don't Point To Jump In Inflation Chart 6 Still Some Slack In Labor Market Still Some Slack In Labor Market Still Some Slack In Labor Market Chart 7Market Has Caught Up To The Fed Market Has Caught Up To The Fed Market Has Caught Up To The Fed We have for some months now advised long-term, more risk-averse investors to consider dialing back risk, and the volatility in February was a good example of why. We would expect further such bouts of volatility. However, with a recession still probably two years away, and a combination of stronger-than-expected growth and a Fed reluctant to accelerate tightening, the next 12 months should remain positive for equities and other risk assets. Fixed Income: We now expect the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield to rise to 3.3-3.5%. This will come from a further 40 BP increase in inflation expectations (taking them back to a level compatible with the Fed achieving its inflation target) plus a rise in the real yield, as markets start to price in the end of secular stagnation (Chart 8). The rise in global yields will be exacerbated by increasing net supply, as fiscal deficits rise and central banks wind down QE (Chart 9). We are, accordingly, underweight duration, and prefer inflation-linked bonds to nominal ones. We will likely reduce our exposure to credit before we turn defensive on equities. But, for now, strong economic growth and higher oil prices mean spread product is likely to outperform government bonds. Chart 8Inflation Expectations And Real Yields To Rise Inflation Expectations And Real Yields To Rise Inflation Expectations And Real Yields To Rise Chart 9Net Government Bond Supply To Increase Net Government Bond Supply To Increase Net Government Bond Supply To Increase Currencies: Rising interest rate differentials have failed to cause the dollar to rally (Chart 10). FX markets are trading, rather, on valuations (the euro and yen are, indeed, undervalued), on current account positions (the euro zone and Japan have large surpluses), and on the narrative that U.S. twin deficits historically caused the dollar to weaken. Our FX strategists find this is true only when, as in 2001-3, U.S. real rates were falling; after the Reagan tax cuts in 1981, real rates rose, pushing up the dollar (Chart 11). The key, therefore, is how quickly the Fed reacts this time. The dollar currently has strong downward momentum (especially against the yen) and this could continue. But as global growth slows relative to the U.S., relative interest rates are likely to reassert themselves as a factor, causing the dollar to strengthen again. Chart 10Rising Rate Differentials Fails To Boost Dollar Rising Rate Differentials Fails To Boost Dollar Rising Rate Differentials Fails To Boost Dollar Chart 11Do Twin Deficits Matter For Dollar? Do Twin Deficits Matter For Dollar? Do Twin Deficits Matter For Dollar? Equities: Given the macro environment, we continue to recommend pro-cyclical equity tilts, with overweights in higher beta markets such as the euro zone and Japan, and cyclical sectors such as financials, energy, and industrials. Our underweight on EM equities is based on the risk of a slowdown in China (where tighter financial conditions point to a slowing of the industrial sector, Chart 12), the possibility of a U.S. dollar rebound, and the vulnerability of highly leveraged foreign-currency EM borrowers to a rise in U.S. interest rates. Commodities: Our energy team has further revised up their oil price forecast, on expectations that the OPEC agreement will be extended, which will cause a greater draw-down in oil inventories (Chart 13).3 They see Brent crude averaging $74 a barrel this year, with spikes above $80. However, the response of the U.S. shale industry will begin to kick in, pushing the price down to below $60 by end-2019. We are neutral on industrial commodities, which will benefit from stronger global growth but are at risk in the event of dollar appreciation and slowdown in China. Chart 12Tighter Monetary Conditions In China Tighter Monetary Conditions in China Tighter Monetary Conditions in China Chart 13Oil Inventories To Draw Down Further Oil Inventories To Draw Down Further Oil Inventories To Draw Down Further Please note that, due to the Easter holidays in some countries, the GAA Quarterly Portfolio will be published one day later than usual, on April 3. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Late Innings," dated 26 February 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 For details, please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "March 2018," available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0: Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices," dated 22 February 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights Seasonal environmental restrictions on Chinese aluminum output are due to ease going into spring, which will restore some of the output taken off line when inefficient smelters were shuttered last year. Global demand likely will slow later this year, largely because we expect GDP growth in China, which accounts for more than half of global aluminum consumption, to moderate in 2H18. In addition, expected U.S. tariffs and quotas will limit imports and revive output in that market. This will contribute to the easing of a tight global balance, and take some of the pressure off prices, but we do not expect a significant move lower. We remain neutral. Energy: Overweight. Our long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls - recommended last week on the back of our updated price forecast - closed with a 3.1% gain on Tuesday. We took profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, realizing a 20.7% gain since it was recommended January 18, 2018. Base Metals: Neutral. We are expecting a secular increase in aluminum supplies this year, on the back of Chinese environmental policies and more difficult global trading conditions. Precious Metals: Gold markets awaited Fed Chair Powell's Humphrey-Hawkins testimony beginning Tuesday, as vice chair for financial supervision, Randal Quarles, warned U.S. economic growth could exceed expectations the day before. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Argentina's drought looks like it will stress that country's grain harvests, and tighten markets at the margin. Feature Chart of the WeekAluminum In Large Deficit Last Year Aluminum In Large Deficit Last Year Aluminum In Large Deficit Last Year Easing of winter supply restrictions in China, as well as tighter controls on U.S. aluminum imports, will dominate the aluminum market in the near term. In both cases, the net effect likely will be an increase in global supply. The latter would also support aluminum's price in the U.S. market - as measured by the U.S. Midwest premium. These events will ease the global physical deficit in aluminum, which last year came in at its widest since 1995 (Chart of the Week). The current tight conditions are driven by Beijing's elimination of overcapacity, which, along with environmental reform policies implemented last year, led to a reduction in China's output. The price dynamics that dominated the aluminum market over the past couple years will shift as a result. This already can be seen in the behavior of prices on the LME and the SHFE: LME prices have been gyrating around $2,200/MT, while SHFE prices have dipped by more than 5% since the beginning of the year. Unwinding China's Supply-Side Policies? At first blush, it may not be apparent China's primary aluminum production sector experienced significant changes last year. After stalling at 1% year-on-year (y/y) growth in 2016, output grew 1.2% y/y in 2017, a sharp deceleration from the 16% y/y average growth rates registered between 2010 and 2015. However, the annual gain masked a 10% y/y increase in output in 1H17, which was almost completely reversed by the negative impacts of China's environmental policies and its efforts to eliminate overcapacity. These policy-led initiatives ultimately caused output to fall 7% y/y in 2H17 (Chart 2). The resulting 1 mm MT of production cuts in the second half of last year reflects China's 2017 supply-side policies. Beijing's strategy is two-fold: Chart 2Sharp Fall In 2H17 Output From China ... Sharp Fall In 2H17 Output From China ... Sharp Fall In 2H17 Output From China ... Eliminate outdated and unlicensed capacity by forcing it to close. This has removed an estimated 3-4 mm MT of annual capacity. The policy targets capacity lacking proper building and expansion permits, as well as the smelters that do not meet strict environmental standards. However, not all the shutdowns are permanent. Among this shuttered capacity is 2 mm MT of outdated smelter capacity belonging to China Hongqiao, which the company plans to replace with new capacity.1 The other major supply-side policy implemented by Beijing last year is a restriction on smelter activity during the mid-November to mid-March period. As is the case in the steel sector, this winter-curtailment policy seeks to reduce pollution during the smog-prone winter months. Aluminum smelters in the cities targeted in the winter plan were ordered to cut output by ~ 30% during this period. This policy is expected to be an annually recurring event until 2020. However, while 3 mm MT of annualized capacity would have been closed during the winter if the full 30% curtailment target had been met, reports surfaced in mid-December that compliance was low, and suggested only ~ 0.6 mm MT of capacity (just 20% of the goal, or 6% of the curtailment target) had been closed.2 The total aluminum annual capacity affected by both the winter environmental curtailments and capacity-reduction policies implemented last year could potentially reach 7 mm MT. China's total smelting capacity was a reported 40 mm MT in 2016. Lower Chinese Production ... And Consumption On a year-on-year basis, global primary aluminum production has been falling since August. This is, for the most part, true on a month-on-month basis, as well. The 12-month moving average for global aluminum production peaked in July, and has been coming down consistently since then. Although 2017 production came in higher than the previous year, this is due to a ~ 6% y/y increase in the first half, which preceded a ~ 4% y/y decline in output in the second half of the year. These dynamics are driven by China, which accounts for 55% of global primary production. Chinese firms raised primary output in 1H17, which was followed by a sharp contraction in 2H17. Chinese primary aluminum production peaked in June, recording an all-time record of 2.98 mm MT before falling in the subsequent months. On the other hand, primary production from the rest of the world has remained largely unchanged over the past two years, at 26 mm MT. Data from the International Aluminum Institute shows month-on-month production increases in China in December and January; however, output is still lower vs. the same period a year earlier. Chinese production drove global aluminum production higher in the past, but falling output from the world's leading producer now is causing global primary aluminum supply to contract. The impact of China's supply curtailments has been muted by lower demand for the metal (Chart 3). Again, lower consumption has been driven by the top-demand market - China - which typically consumes ~ 55% of the primary metal. Chinese primary consumption and production each came down by more than 1 mm MT y/y in the second half of last year. Falling aluminum demand in China is consistent with a slowdown in Chinese automobile production as well as fixed asset investments in infrastructure and transportation (Chart 4). Furthermore, China's scrap aluminum imports increased in 2H17, reflecting a preference for the secondary metal as the price of primary aluminum increased. Chart 3... Coincided With Falling Chinese Consumption ... Coincided With Falling Chinese Consumption ... Coincided With Falling Chinese Consumption Chart 4Slowdown In Chinese Demand Slowdown In Chinese Demand Slowdown In Chinese Demand A Divergence In Global Dynamics ... Despite the improved balance in China, the global primary aluminum balance in the rest of the world recorded a large deficit last year - the largest since 1995 (Chart 5). While both consumption and production in China came down by more than 1 mm MT in 2H17, consumption in the rest of the world increased by ~ 0.4 mm MT, even as production remained largely unchanged. This tightened the global market, as more stringent aluminum production policies in China meant that there was no flooding of Chinese aluminum to ease the deficit. In fact, the world excluding China deficit is the largest at least since the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) started collecting data in 1995. ... Is Reflected In Inventory Dynamics This also coincides with rising aluminum stocks on the Shanghai Futures Exchange and falling inventory on the LME. In fact, Chinese aluminum imports have been falling and were down almost 30% y/y in 2H17. At the same time, Chinese net exports picked up slightly (Chart 6). Chart 5Record Aluminum Deficit Outside China Record Aluminum Deficit Outside China Record Aluminum Deficit Outside China Chart 6Chinese Net Exports On The Rise Chinese Net Exports On The Rise Chinese Net Exports On The Rise In response to lower output, LME inventories have been falling since 2Q14, and they continued their descent last year, ending 2017 at roughly the same level as mid-2008. On the other hand, stocks at the SHFE have been rising steeply since the beginning of last year and are at record highs (Chart 7). Whether the tight global market fundamentals will persist depends on whether China's outdated capacity cuts prove to be temporary or permanent. Chart 7Dynamics Reflected In Stock Changes Dynamics Reflected In Stock Changes Dynamics Reflected In Stock Changes U.S. Tariffs And Quotas Would Offset Tight Markets In what appears to be an effort to revive U.S. aluminum and steel production, the U.S. Commerce Department launched an investigation into these domestic industries late last year. Last month, Commerce proposed tariffs and quotas that would impact all aluminum imports with the exception of aluminum scrap and aluminum powders. There appear to be two main objectives of this investigation: 1. Increase capacity utilization in the U.S. aluminum and steel industries; and 2. Penalize China for subsidizing its aluminum sector at the expense of those in other countries. Among the Commerce proposals: 1. A 7.7% tariff on all aluminum imports to the U.S. 2. A 23.6% tariff on all aluminum imports from certain countries, while other countries would be subject to quotas equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the U.S.3 3. A quota on all aluminum imports from other countries equal to a maximum of 86.7% of their 2017 exports to the U.S. In a memo issued last week, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed its support for the targeted tariffs (option 2 above), as well as a recommendation to postpone action on the aluminum sector. President Trump has until April 19 to make a decision on the aluminum recommendations. While he may not stick to the exact details outlined in the three options, our Geopolitical Strategists expect him to go through with implementing protectionist measures to limit aluminum imports. U.S. production of primary aluminum is at its lowest level since 1951 (Chart 8). To reach the 80% target of smelter capacity utilization envisioned by Commerce, the U.S. will have to add ~ 0.67 mm MT of supply. This represents just ~ 1.16% of world supply in 2016. Imports currently make up 90% of U.S. primary aluminum consumption. Chart 8U.S. Producers Took A Big Hit U.S. Producers Took A Big Hit U.S. Producers Took A Big Hit In fact, even if this amount of aluminum was supplied domestically in the U.S. last year, the world aluminum market would have remained in deficit. Furthermore, this additional supply would pale in comparison to the cuts China has already implemented in its aluminum sector last year. China's primary production in the August to December period last year came in 1.15 mm MT below the same period in 2016. Annual smelter capacity in the U.S. is estimated to be a combined 1.82 mm MT. Of this capacity, Alcoa has 0.34 mm MT of idle capacity, Century Aluminum has 0.27 mm MT, while ARG International's Missouri plant has 0.27 mm MT of idle capacity. U.S. producers have started communicating plans to restart idled capacity. According to Century Aluminum's CEO, the company's eastern Kansas operation, which shuttered more than half of its production, could ramp output at one of its smelters to full capacity of up to 0.27 mm MT by early next year. Similarly, Alcoa has committed to partially restarting production at its Warwick, Indiana, facility, which would bring 0.16 mm MT of capacity online by the second quarter of this year. However, imports are not the sole reason output in the U.S. aluminum sector is falling. High power costs also have contributed, but this is not addressed in the Department of Commerce's report. In any case, we would not be surprised to witness an increase in aluminum imports by U.S. consumers before a final decision is made. If import controls do in fact fall into place, prices in the U.S. - as reflected by the U.S. Midwest transaction premium - will likely increase. Bottom Line: Supply- and demand-side developments, mostly in China, which accounts for more than half of global production and consumption, will combine to ease a global supply deficit this year. Expected U.S. tariffs and quotas will limit imports and revive output in that market. This will take some pressure off prices, but, we do not expect levels to move significantly lower. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "China Hongqiao says to cut 2 mln T/year of outdated aluminum capacity," published on August 2, 2017, available at reuters.com. 2 Please see "Aluminum Under Pressure After China Smog Cutbacks Fall Short," published on December 20, 2017, available at reuters.com. 3 The countries noted are China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease

Highlights The political path of least resistance leads to fiscal profligacy - in the U.S. and beyond. The response to populism is underway. The U.S. midterm election is market-relevant. Gridlock between the White House and Congress does, in fact, weigh on equity returns, after controlling for macro variables. The Democratic Party's chances of taking over Congress have fallen, but remain 50% in the House of Representatives. A divided House and Senate is the worst combination for equities, but macro factors matter most. China is clearly rebooting its "reform" agenda as Xi Jinping becomes an irresistible force. We remain long H-shares relative to EM, for now. Emerging markets - including an improved South Africa - will suffer as politics become a tailwind for U.S. growth and a headwind for Chinese growth. Feature The bond market has been shocked into action this month by the twin realizations that the Republican-held Congress is not as incompetent as believed and that the Republican Party is not as fiscally conservative as professed. When combined with steady U.S. wage growth and rising inflation expectations (Chart 1), our core 2018 theme - that U.S. politics would act as an accelerant to growth - has been priced in by the bond market with impressive urgency.1 The tax cuts alone were not enough to wake the bond market. First, the realization that a tax cut would pass Congress struck markets in late October, when it became increasingly clear that the $1.5 trillion Tax Cuts And Jobs Act would indeed pass the Senate. Second, the bill's passage along strict party lines - including the slimmest of margins in the Senate thanks to reconciliation rules - convinced investors that there would be no further compromises down the pipeline. The real game changer was the realization that the political path of least resistance leads towards profligacy. This happened with the signing into law of the February 9 two-year budget compromise (the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018) that will see fiscal spending raised by around $380 billion.2 The deal failed to gain the support of a majority of Republicans in the House, despite House Speaker Paul Ryan's support, but 73 Democrats crossed the aisle to ensure its passage. They did so despite a lack of formal assurances that the House would consider an immigration bill. The three-day shutdown in late January has forced Democrats, who largely took the blame, to assess whether they care more about preserving their liberal credentials on fiscal policy or immigration policy. The two-year budget agreement is a testament to their concern for the former. The deal will see the budget deficit most likely rise to about 5.5% of GDP in FY2019, up from 3.3% in last year's CBO baseline forecast (Chart 2). Chart 1Rising U.S. Inflation Expectations Rising U.S. Inflation Expectations Rising U.S. Inflation Expectations Chart 2Fiscal Policy Gets Expansive Fiscal Policy Gets Expansive Fiscal Policy Gets Expansive Adding to the newly authorized fiscal spending could be a congressional rule-change that reintroduces earmarks - leading to a potential $20 billion additional spending per year. There is also a 10-year infrastructure plan that could see spending increase by another ~$200 billion over the next decade. The new budget compromise, combined with last year's tax cuts, will massively increase U.S. fiscal thrust beyond the IMF's baseline (Chart 3). The IMF's forecast, done before the tax cuts were passed, suggested that fiscal thrust would contract by about 0.5% of GDP this year, and would only slightly expand in 2019. Now we estimate that fiscal thrust will be a positive 0.8% of GDP in 2018 and 1.3% in 2019. These figures are tentative because it is not clear exactly how much of the spending will take place this year versus 2019 and 2020. Our colleague Mark McClellan, author of BCA's flagship The Bank Credit Analyst, has stressed that the impact on GDP growth will be less than these figures suggest because the economic multipliers related to tax cuts are less than those for spending.3 Our theme that the political path of least resistance will lead to profligacy is not exclusive to the U.S. After all, populism is not exclusive to the U.S, with non-centrist parties consistently capturing around 16% of the electoral vote in Europe (Chart 4). Chart 3The Budget Deal And Tax Cuts##br## Will Expand U.S. Fiscal Thrust Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Chart 4Populism Will Fuel Fiscal##br##Spending Beyond The U.S. Populism Will Fuel Fiscal Spending Beyond The U.S. Populism Will Fuel Fiscal Spending Beyond The U.S. Policymakers are not price-setters in the political marketplace, but price-takers. The price-setter is the median voter, who we believe has swung to the left when it comes to economic policy in developed markets after a multi-year, low-growth, economic recovery.4 Broadly speaking, investors should prepare for higher fiscal spending globally on the back of this dynamic. Aside from the U.S., the populist dynamic is evident in the world's third (Japan), fourth (Germany), and sixth (the U.K.) largest economies. Japan may have started it all, as a political paradigm shift in 2011-12 spurred a historic reflationary effort.5 Geopolitical pressure from China and domestic political pressures on the back of an extraordinary rise in income inequality, and natural and national disasters, combined to create the political context that made Abenomics possible. While the fiscal arrow has somewhat disappointed - particularly when PM Shinzo Abe authorized the 2014 increase in the consumption tax - Japan has still surprised to the upside on fiscal thrust (Chart 5). On average, the IMF has underestimated Japan's fiscal impulse by 0.84% since the beginning of 2012. Investors often understate the ability of centrist, establishment policymakers to rebrand anti-establishment policies - whether on fiscal spending or immigration - as their own. In January 2015, we asked whether "Abenomics Is The Future?"6 We concluded that rising populism in Europe would require a policy response not unlike the policy mix favored by Tokyo. Today, the details of the latest German coalition deal between the formally fiscally conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) means that even Germany has now succumbed to the political pressure to reflate. The CDU has agreed to fork over the influential ministry of finance to the profligate SPD and apparently spend an additional 46 billion euros, over the duration of the Grand Coalition, on public investment and tax cuts. Finally, in the U.K., the end of austerity came quickly on the heels of the Brexit referendum, the ultimate populist shot-across-the-bow. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, announced a shift away from austerity almost immediately, scrapping targets for balancing the budget by the end of the decade. The change in rhetoric has carried over to the new government, especially after the Labour Party pummeled the Tories on austerity in the lead up to the June 2017 election. The bond market action over the past several weeks suggests that investors have not fully appreciated the political shifts underway over the past several years. Bond yields had to "catch up" to the political reality essentially over the course of February. However, the structural upward trajectory is now in place. The end of stimulative monetary policy will accelerate the rise in bond yields. Quantitative easing programs have soaked up more than the net government issuance of the major economies. Chart 6 shows that the flow of the major economies' government bonds available for the private sector to purchase was negative from 2015-2017. This flow will now swing to the positive side as fiscal spending necessitates greater issuance and as central banks withdraw demand. Real interest rates may therefore be higher to the extent that government bonds will have to compete with private-sector issuance for available savings. Chart 5Japan's Abenomics Leads The Way To More Spending Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Chart 6Lots Of Bonds Hitting The Private Market Lots Of Bonds Hitting The Private Market Lots Of Bonds Hitting The Private Market Bottom Line: The U.S. electorate chose the populist, anti-establishment Donald Trump as president with unemployment at a multi-decade low of 4.6%. The message from the U.S. election, and the rise of anti-establishment parties in Europe, is that the electorate is restless, even with the post-Great Financial Crisis recovery now in its ninth year. Policymakers have heard the message, loud and clear, and are adjusting fiscal policy accordingly. Over the course of the next quarter, BCA's Global Investment Strategy expects the rapid rise in bond yields to peter out, but investors should use any bond rallies as an opportunity to reduce duration risk. BCA's House View calls for the 10-year Treasury yield to finish the year at about 3.25%.7 Our U.S. bond strategists expect the end-of-cycle level of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to be between 3.3% and 3.5%.8 Does The U.S. Midterm Election Matter? The three-day government shutdown that ended on January 22 has hurt the chances of the Democratic Party in the upcoming midterm election. The Democrats' lead in the generic congressional ballot has gone from a high of 13% at the end of 2017 to just 9% today (Chart 7). As Chart 8 illustrates, this generic ballot has some predictive quality. However, it also suggests that for Democrats, the lead needs to be considerably larger than for Republicans to generate the type of seat-swing needed to win a majority in the House of Representatives in 2018. Chart 7Democrats Have Lost Some Steam Democrats Have Lost Some Steam Democrats Have Lost Some Steam Chart 8Democrats Need Big Polling Lead To Win Majority Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China There are three reasons for this built-in advantage for the Republican Party in recent midterm elections. First, the Republicans dominate the rural vote, which tends to be overrepresented in any electoral system that draws electoral districts geographically. Second, redistricting - or gerrymandering - has tended to favor the Republican Party in the past several elections. While the Supreme Court has recently struck down some of the most egregiously drawn electoral districts, the overall impact of gerrymandering since 2010 overwhelmingly favors the GOP. Third, midterm elections tend to have a lot lower voter turnout than general elections, which hurts the Democrats who rely on the youth and minority vote. Both constituencies tend to shy away from participation in the midterm election. Does the market care who wins the House and Senate? On the margin, yes. If the current GOP control of the White House, House of Representatives, and Senate were to be broken, markets might react negatively. It is often stated that gridlock has a positive effect on stock prices, as it reduces the probability of harmful government involvement in the economy and financial markets. However, research by our colleague Jonathan LaBerge, which we have recently updated, suggests otherwise. After controlling for the macro environment, gridlock between the White House and Congress is actually associated with modestly lower equity market returns.9 This conclusion is based on the past century of data. For most of that period, polarization has steadily risen to today's record-setting levels (Chart 9). As such, the negative impact of gridlock could be higher today. Table 1 illustrates the impact of four factors on monthly S&P 500 price returns. The first two columns demonstrate the effect on returns of recessions and tightening monetary policy, respectively, whereas the last two columns measure the effects of executive/legislative disunity and reduced uncertainty in the 12-months following presidential and midterm elections.10 The table presents the beta of a simple regression based on dummy variables for each of the four components (t-statistics are shown in parentheses). Chart 9U.S. Polarization Has Risen For 60 Years U.S. Polarization Has Risen For 60 Years U.S. Polarization Has Risen For 60 Years Table 1Divided Government Is, In Fact, Bad For Stocks Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China As expected, the macro context has a much larger impact on stock returns than politically driven effects. The impact of political gridlock is shown to be negative regardless of timeframe. The takeaway for equity investors is that, contrary to popular belief, political gridlock is not positive for stock prices after controlling for important macro factors. Absolute results are similarly negative, with the average monthly S&P 500 returns considerably larger during periods of unified executive and legislative branches (Chart 10). Intriguingly, the less negative constellation of forces is when the president faces a unified Congress ruled by the opposing party. We would reason that such periods force the president to compromise with the legislature, which constitutionally has a lot of authority over domestic policy. The worst outcome for equity markets, by far, is when the president faces a split legislature. In these cases, we suspect that uncertainty rises as neither party has to take responsibility for negative policy outcomes, making them more likely. Chart 10A Unified Congress Is A Boon For Stocks Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China In the current context, gridlock could lead to greater political volatility. For example, a Democratic House of Representatives would begin several investigations into the Trump White House and could potentially initiate impeachment proceedings against the president. But as we pointed out last year, impeachment alone is no reason to sell stocks.11 The Democrats would not have the ability to alter President Trump's deregulatory trajectory - which remains under the purview of the executive - nor would they be likely to gain enough seats to repeal the tax cut legislation. Yet given President Trump's populist bias, center-left Democrats could find much in common with the president on spending. This would only reinforce our adage that the political path of least resistance will tend towards profligacy. The only thing that President Trump and the Democrats in Congress will find in common, in other words, will be to blow out the U.S. budget deficit. Bottom Line: The chances of a Democratic takeover following the midterm elections have fallen, but remain at 50% for the House of Representatives. A gridlocked Congress is mildly negative for equity markets, taking into consideration that macro variables still dominate. Nonetheless, investors should ignore the likely higher political volatility and focus on the fact that President Trump and the Democrats are not that far apart when it comes to spending. China: The Reform Reboot Is Here And It Is Still Winter He told us not to believe the people who say it's spring in China again. It's still winter. - Anonymous Chinese government official referring to Liu He, the top economic adviser.12 The one risk to the BCA House View of a structural bond bear market - at least in the near term - is a peaking of global growth and a slowdown in emerging markets. The EM economies, which normally magnify booms in advanced economies, particularly in latter stages of the economic cycle, are currently experiencing a relative contraction in their PMIs (Chart 11). BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy's "carry canary" indicator - which shows that EM/JPY carry trades tend to lead global industrial activity - is similarly flashing warning signs (Chart 12).13 Chart 11EM Economies Underperforming EM Economies Underperforming EM Economies Underperforming Chart 12Yen Carry Trades Signal Distress Yen Carry Trades Signal Distress Yen Carry Trades Signal Distress At the heart of the divergence in growth between EM and DM is China. Beijing has been tightening monetary conditions as part of overall structural reform efforts, causing a sharp deceleration in the Li Keqiang index (Chart 13). In addition, the orders-to-inventories ratio has begun to contract, import volumes are weak, and export price growth is slowing sharply (Chart 14). Chart 13Li Keqiang Index Surprises Downward Li Keqiang Index Surprises Downward Li Keqiang Index Surprises Downward Chart 14China's Economy Weakens... China's Economy Weakens... China's Economy Weakens... The Chinese slowdown is fundamentally driven by politics. Last April we introduced a checklist for determining whether Chinese President Xi Jinping would "reboot" his reform agenda during his second term in office. We define "reform" as policies that accelerate the transition of China's growth model away from investment-driven, resource-intensive growth. Since then, political and economic events have supported our thesis. Most recently, interbank lending rates have spiked due to China's new macro-prudential regulations and monetary policy (Chart 15), and January's total credit growth clocked in at an uninspiring 11.2% (Chart 16). Tight credit control in the first calendar month typically implies that credit expansion will be limited for the rest of the year (Chart 17). A strong grip on money and credit growth is entirely in keeping with the three-year "battle" that Xi Jinping has declared against systemic financial risk.14 Chart 15...While Policy Drives Up Interbank Rates ...While Policy Drives Up Interbank Rates ...While Policy Drives Up Interbank Rates Chart 16January Credit Growth Disappoints... January Credit Growth Disappoints... January Credit Growth Disappoints... Chart 17... And January Credit Is The Biggest Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China In short, we have just crossed the 50% threshold on our checklist, confirming that China is indeed rebooting its reform agenda (Table 2). Going forward, what matters is the intensity and duration of the reform push. Three events at the start of the Chinese New Year suggest that the market will be surprised by both. Table 2How Do We Know China Is Reforming? Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China First, the National People's Congress (NPC), which convenes March 5, is reportedly planning to remove term limits for the president and vice-president, thus enabling Xi Jinping to remain as president well beyond March 2023. Xi was already set up to be the most powerful man in China's politics through the 2020s,15 so we do not consider this a material change in circumstances: the material change occurred last October when "Xi Thought" received the status of "Mao Zedong Thought" in the Communist Party's constitution and reshaped the Politburo to his liking. The point is that Xi's position is irresistible which means that his policies will have greater, not lesser, effectiveness as party and state bureaucrats scramble to enact them faithfully.16 Chart 18Crackdown On Shadow Lending Has Teeth Crackdown On Shadow Lending Has Teeth Crackdown On Shadow Lending Has Teeth Second, the Communist Party is reportedly convening its "Third Plenum" half a year early this year - that is, in late February and early March, just before the annual legislative meeting that begins March 5. This is a symbolic move. The third plenum is known as the "reform plenum," and this year is the fortieth anniversary of the 1978 third plenum that launched China's market reform and opening up to the global economy under Deng Xiaoping. However, the last time China convened a third plenum - in 2013 when Xi first announced his agenda - the excitement fizzled as implementation proved to be slow.17 As we have repeatedly warned clients, China's political environment has changed dramatically since 2013: the constraints to painful structural reforms have fallen.18 If the third plenum is indeed held early, some key decisions on reform initiatives will be made as we go to press, and any that require legislative approval will receive it instantly when the National People's Congress convenes on March 5.19 This will be a "double punch" that will supercharge the reform agenda this year. It is precisely the kind of ambition that we have been expecting. Third, one of the most important administrative vehicles of this new reform push, the Financial Stability and Development Commission (FSDC), has just made its first serious move.20 On February 23, China's top insurance regulator announced that it is taking control of Anbang Insurance Group for one year, possibly two, in order to restructure it amid insolvency and systemic risks. Anbang's troubles are idiosyncratic and have received ample media attention since June 2017.21 Nevertheless, China's government has just seized a company with assets over $300bn. Clearly the crackdown on the shadow financial sector has teeth (Chart 18). Anbang's case will reverberate beyond the handful of private companies involved in shadow banking and highly leveraged foreign acquisitions abroad. Beijing's focus is systemic risk, not merely innovative insurance products. The central government is scrutinizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments as well as a range of financial companies and products. We provide a list of reform initiatives in Table 3. Table 3China Is Rebooting Economic Reforms Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China What is the cumulative effect of these three developments? Basically, they raise the stakes for Xi's policies dramatically this year. If Xi makes himself president for life, and yet this year's third plenum is as over-hyped and under-delivered as in 2013, then we would expect China's economic future to darken rapidly. China will lose any pretext of reform just as the United States goes on the offensive against Beijing's mercantilism. It would be time to short China on a long-term time line. However, it would also spell doom for our positive U.S. dollar outlook and bearish EM view. If, on the other hand, Xi Jinping couples his power grab with renewed efforts to restructure China's economy and improve market access for foreigners, then he has a chance of deleveraging, improving China's productivity, and managing tensions with the U.S. This is the best outcome for investors, although it would still be negative for Chinese growth and imports, and hence EM assets, this year. The next political indicator to watch is the March 5 NPC session. This legislative meeting will be critical in determining what precise reforms the Xi administration will prioritize this year. The NPC occurs annually but is more important this year than usual because it installs a new government for the 2018-23 period and will kick off the new agenda. In terms of personnel, there is much speculation (Table 4).22 Investors should stay focused on the big picture: four months ago, the news media focused on Xi Jinping's Maoist thirst for power and declared that all reform efforts were dead in the water. Now the press is filled with speculation about which key reformer will get which key economic/financial position. The big picture is that Xi is using his Mao-like authority in the Communist Party to rein in the country's economic and financial imbalances. His new economic team will have to establish their credibility this year by remaining firm when the market and vested interests push back, which means more policy-induced volatility should be expected. Table 4China's New Government Takes Shape At National People's Congress Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China The risk is that Beijing overcorrects, not that reforms languish like they did in 2015-16. Our subjective probability of a policy mistake remains at 30%, but we expect that the market will start to price in this higher probability of risk as the March political events unfold. As Liu He declared at Davos, China's reforms this year will "exceed the international community's expectations."23 The anti-corruption campaign is another important factor to monitor. In addition to any major economic legislation, the most important law that the NPC may pass is one that would create a new nationwide National Supervisory Commission, which will expand the Communist Party's anti-corruption campaign into every level of the state bureaucracy. In other words, an anti-corruption component is sharpening the policy effectiveness of the economic and financial agenda. In the aforementioned Anbang case, for instance, corporate chief Wu Xiaohui was stung by a corruption probe in June 2017 and is being tried for "economic crimes" - now his company and its counterparty risks are being restructured. The combination of anti-corruption campaign and regulatory crackdown has the potential to cause significant risk aversion among financial institutions, SOEs, and local governments. Add in the ongoing pollution curbs, and any significant SOE restructuring, and Chinese policy becomes a clear source of volatility and economic policy uncertainty this year that the market is not, as yet, pricing (Chart 19). On cue, perhaps in anticipation of rising domestic volatility, China has stopped updating its home-grown version of the VIX (Chart 20). Chart 19Market Expects No Political Volatility Yet Market Expects No Political Volatility Yet Market Expects No Political Volatility Yet Chart 20Has China Halted Its Version Of The VIX? Has China Halted Its Version Of The VIX? Has China Halted Its Version Of The VIX? We would not expect anything more than a whiff, at best, of policy easing at the NPC this March. For instance, poverty alleviation efforts will require some fiscal spending. But even then, the point of fiscal spending will be to offset credit tightness, not to stimulate the economy in any remarkable way. Monetary policy may not get much tighter from here, as inflation is rolling over amid the slowdown (Chart 21),24 but anything suggesting a substantial shift back to easy policy would be contrary to our view. More accommodative policy at this point in time would suggest that Xi has no real intention of fighting systemic risk and - further - that global growth faces no significant impediment from China this year. In such a scenario, the dollar could fall further and EM would outperform. We expect the contrary. We are long DXY and short EUR/JPY. We remain overweight Chinese H-shares within emerging markets, but we will close this trade if we suspect either that reform is a fig leaf or that authorities have moved into overcorrection territory. Otherwise, reform is a good thing for Chinese firms relative to EM counterparts that have come to rely on China's longstanding commodity- and capital-intensive growth model (Chart 22). Chart 21Monetary Policy May Not Tighten From Here Monetary Policy May Not Tighten From Here Monetary Policy May Not Tighten From Here Chart 22Tighter-Fisted China Will Hit EM Tighter-Fisted China Will Hit EM Tighter-Fisted China Will Hit EM Bottom Line: Xi Jinping has rebooted China's economic reforms. The new government being assembled is likely to intensify the crackdown on systemic financial risk. Reforms will surprise to the upside, which means that Chinese growth is likely to surprise to the downside amidst the current slowdown, thus weighing on global growth at a time when populism provides a tailwind to U.S. growth. What It All Means For South Africa And Emerging Markets We spent a full week in South Africa last June and came back with these thoughts about the country's economy and the markets:25 The main driving force behind EM risk assets, year-to-date, has been U.S. TIPS yields and the greenback (Chart 23). Weak inflation data and policy disappointments as the pro-growth, populist, economic policy of the Trump Administration stalled have supported the ongoing EM carry trade. The actual emerging market growth fundamentals and politics are therefore unimportant. Chart 23Weak Inflation And Dollar Drove EM Assets Weak Inflation And Dollar Drove EM Assets Weak Inflation And Dollar Drove EM Assets Chart 24Market Likes Ramaphosa, Unlike Zuma Market Likes Ramaphosa, Unlike Zuma Market Likes Ramaphosa, Unlike Zuma In the near term, South African politics obviously do matter. Markets have cheered the election of Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency of the African National Congress (ANC), a stark contrast to the market reaction following his predecessor's ascendancy to the same position (Chart 24). However, the now President Ramaphosa's defeat of ex-President Jacob Zuma's former cabinet minister and ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was narrow and has split the ANC down the middle. On one side is Ramaphosa's pragmatic wing, on the other is Dlamini-Zuma's side, focused on racial inequality and social justice. Chart 25Chronic Youth Unemployment Chronic Youth Unemployment Chronic Youth Unemployment Chart 26Few Gains In Middle Class Population Few Gains In Middle Class Population Few Gains In Middle Class Population For now, the ANC bureaucracy has served as an important circuit-breaker that will limit electoral choices in the 2019 election to the pro-market Ramaphosa, centrist Democratic Alliance, and radical Economic Freedom Fighters. From investors' perspective, this is a good thing. After all, it is clear that if the South African median voter had her way, she would probably not vote for Ramaphosa, given that the country is facing chronic unemployment (Chart 25), endemic corruption, poor healthcare infrastructure, and a desire for aggressive, and targeted, redistributive economic policies. South Africa stands alone amongst its EM peers when it comes to its tepid rise in the middle class as a percent of the population (Chart 26) and persistently high income inequality (Chart 27). We see no evidence that the electorate will welcome pro-market structural reforms. Chart 27Inequality Remains Very High Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China Nonetheless, Ramaphosa's presidency is a positive given the recent deterioration of South Africa's governance, which should improve as the new regime focuses on fighting corruption and restructuring SOEs. Whether Ramaphosa will similarly have the maneuvering room to correct the country's endemically low productivity (Chart 28) and still large twin deficits (Chart 29) is another question altogether. Chart 28A Distant Laggard In Productivity A Distant Laggard In Productivity A Distant Laggard In Productivity Chart 29Twin Deficits A Structural Weakness Twin Deficits A Structural Weakness Twin Deficits A Structural Weakness Will investors have time to find out the answer to those latter questions? Not if our core thesis for this year - that politics is a tailwind to U.S. growth and a headwind to Chinese growth - is right. In an environment where the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield is rising, DXY stabilizes, and Chinese economy slows down, commodities and thus South African assets will come under pressure. As our colleague Arthur Budaghyan, BCA's chief EM strategist, recently put it: positive political developments are magnified amid a benign external backdrop. Conversely, in a negative external environment, positive political transformations can have limited impact on the direction of financial markets. Bottom Line: Markets are cheering Ramaphosa's ascendancy to the South African presidency. We agree that the development is, all other things being equal, bullish for South Africa's economy and assets. However, the structural challenges are vast and we do not see enough political unity in the ANC to resolve them. Furthermore, we are not sure that the global macro environment will remain sanguine for long enough to give policymakers the time for preemptive structural reforms. To reflect the potential for a positive political change and forthcoming orthodox macro policies, we are closing our recommendation to bet on yield curve steepening in South Africa, which has been flat since initiation on June 28, 2017. However, we will maintain our recommendation to buy South African 5-year CDS protection and sell Russian, even though it has returned a loss of 17.08 bps thus far. We expect that Russia will prove to be a low-beta EM play in the next downturn, whereas South Africa will not be so lucky. On a different note, we are booking gains of 2525bps on our short Venezeulan vs. EM 10-yr sovereign bonds, as our commodity team upgrades its oil-price forecast for this year. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the Congressional Budget Office, "Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018," February 8, 2018, available at www.cbo.gov. 3 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "March 2018," dated February 22, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan's Political Paradigm Shift: Investment Implications," dated December 21, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Is Abenomics The Future?" dated February 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Structural Bear Market In Bonds," dated February 16, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds," dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Party On The QE2," dated November 8, 2010, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 We include the last factor in the regression because it could be that the market responds positively in the post-election period, irrespective of the election outcome, simply because political uncertainty is diminished. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see Tom Mitchell, "Xi's China: The Rise Of Party Politics," Financial Times, July 25, 2016, available at ft.com. See also BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at www.bcaresearch.com. 13 "Carry Canary" indicator tracks the performance of EM/JPY carry trades. These trades short the Japanese Yen and long an emerging market currency with a high interest rate (Brazilian real, Russian ruble, or South African rand), and as such they are highly geared to a positive global growth back-drop. Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues ... For Now," dated February 16, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 14 The other two battles are against pollution and poverty. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," dated October 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Consider that the standard political calendar would have called for Xi to make personnel adjustments at the second plenum (which was held in January), then to formalize those personnel changes at the legislature in March, and then to announce reform initiatives at the third plenum in the fall, leaving implementation until late in the year or even March 2019. Instead, all of this will be done by March of this year, leaving the rest of the year for implementation. 20 The Financial Stability and Development Commission was created last July at an important financial gathering that occurs once every five years. We dubbed it a "Preemptive Dodd Frank" at the time because of China's avowed intention to use it to tackle systemic financial risk. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. The FSDC's purpose is to coordinate the People's Bank of China with the chief financial regulators - the banking, insurance, and securities regulatory commissions (CBRC, CIRC, and CSRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). There is even a possibility under discussion (we think very low probability of happening) that the FSDC will preside above the central bank - though the precise organizational structure will remain unclear until it is formalized, probably during the March legislative session. 21 Anbang is part of a group of companies, including Foresea, Fosun, HNA, Ping An, and Dalian Wanda, that have been targeted over the past year for shady financial doings, corruption, excessive debt, and capital flight. In particular, Anbang was integral to the development of universal life products, which have been highly restricted since last year. These were not standard insurance products but risky short-term, high-yield shadow investment products. Investors could redeem them easily so there was a risk that purchasers could swamp insurance companies with demands for paybacks if investment returns fell short. This would leave insurance companies squeezed for cash, which in turn could shake other financial institutions. The systemic risk not only threatened legitimate insurance customers but also threatened to leave insurance companies unable to make debt payments on huge leveraged buyouts that they had done abroad. Anbang and others had used these and other shadow products to lever up and then go on a global acquisition spree, buying assets like insurance subsidiaries, hotels, and media/entertainment companies. The targeted firms are also in trouble with the central government for trying to divest themselves of China's currency at the height of the RMB depreciation and capital flight of 2015. They were using China's shadow leverage to springboard into Western assets that would be safe from RMB devaluation and Chinese political risk. The government wants outward investment to go into China's strategic goals (such as the Belt and Road Initiative) instead of into high-profile, marquee Western assets and brands. 22 Particularly over whether Xi Jinping's right-hand man, Liu He, will be appointed as the new central bank governor, to replace long-serving Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, and/or whether he will replace Vice Premier Ma Kai as chairman of the FSDC. It is important whether Liu He takes the place of central banker or chief reformer because those roles are so different. Making him PBoC chief would keep a reformer at the helm of a key institution at an important point in its evolution, but will raise questions about who, if anyone, will take charge of structural reform. Giving him the broader and more ad hoc role of Reformer-in-Chief would be reminiscent of Zhu Rongji at the historic NPC session in March 1998, i.e. very optimistic for reforms. Of course, Liu He is not the only person to watch. It is also important to see what role former anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan gets (for instance, leading U.S. negotiations) and whether rising stars like bank regulator Guo Shuqing are given more authority (he is a hawkish reformer). 23 Please see Xie Yu and Frank Tang, "Xi picks team of problem solvers to head China's economic portfolios," South China Morning Post, dated February 21, 2018, available at www.scmp.com. 24 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 25 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Africa: Crisis Of Expectations," dated June 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Feature China's foreign reserves have been subject to heavy scrutiny over the past few years. The country's multi-trillion-dollar official reserve assets, long viewed by both Chinese officials and the global investment community as an unproductive use of resources, suddenly became a lifeline for China's exchange rate stability following the August 2015 devaluation of the RMB. China's official reserves currently stand at roughly US$3.2 trillion, a massive drawdown from the US$4 trillion all-time peak reached in 2014. Over the years, BCA's China Investment Strategy service has run a series of Special Reports tracking the composition of China's foreign asset holdings.1 This year's update comes at a time when investors have become comfortable with the view that China has succeeded at stemming capital outflow, but headlines suggest that investors continue to scrutinize China's official reserves to assess any potential impact on U.S. Treasury yields.2 Today's report takes a close look at the U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) system data and various other sources to check the evolution of China's official reserves and foreign assets. As we have noted in previous versions of this report, there are some important caveats. First, Chinese holdings of U.S. assets reported by the TIC are not entirely held by the People's Bank of China in its official reserves. Some assets, particularly corporate bonds and equities, may be held by Chinese institutional investors. Meanwhile, it is well known that in recent years China has been using offshore custodians in some European countries, the usual suspects being Belgium, Luxembourg and the U.K., which disguises the true situation of the country's official reserve holdings. Finally, China's large conglomerates owned by the central government also hold vast amounts of foreign assets, or "shadow reserves". With these caveats, this week's report reveals some important developments in the past year: While China's official reserves have risen in U.S. dollar terms, the growth rate in SDR-denominated reserves remains modestly negative (Chart 1). This suggests that the recovery of the former has been due to a currency revaluation effect, and that a material easing in capital controls is not likely over the coming 6-12 months even if China has succeeded in stabilizing its reserve level. China still holds the largest amount of foreign reserves in the world, but its global share has dropped to about 40%, down from a peak of over 50% in 2014. Relative to mid-2016, the TIC data show Chinese holdings of U.S. assets have increased as a share of the country's total foreign reserves (Table 1). This flies in the face of concerns that Beijing is predisposed to slowing or stopping the purchase of U.S. Treasurys, and has occurred in spite of the currency revaluation effect that we noted above, which would have the tendency of boosting the share of holdings of non-U.S. assets. Indeed, measured in SDRs, China's holdings of non-U.S. assets since mid-2016 have fallen by a larger magnitude than holdings of U.S. assets. Table 1Chinese Foreign Exchange Reserves Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasurys have trended sideways since August 2017, but holdings of some other countries suspected to be China's overseas custodians have turned up or continued to rise (Chart 2). This likely means that Chinese holdings of U.S. assets are larger than reflected in the TIC data. Chart 1China Has Stabilized Its Reserve Level China Has Stabilized Its Reserve Level China Has Stabilized Its Reserve Level Chart 2U.S. Treasurys: How Much Does China Really Hold? U.S. Treasurys: How Much Does China Really Hold? U.S. Treasurys: How Much Does China Really Hold? China's holdings of U.S. risky assets have increased since mid-2016, after they were disproportionately liquidated in 2015/2016 as part of its reserve stabilization efforts, perhaps due to reduced political sensitivity when compared with selling U.S. Treasurys. Given that increasing the expected returns of the country's foreign assets has been a long-run policy goal, it will be interesting to see whether China's holdings of U.S. risky assets increase significantly over the coming year. The effect of the restrictions that China has placed on outward direct investment are evident in several places: slower growth in direct investment abroad as a share of total international position assets (relative to portfolio investment and overseas loans), a sharp re-orientation in outward investment towards "strategic" industries rather than "trophy" investments in tourism and entertainment, and an outright reduction in investment in Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)-related countries, despite the strategic importance of the initiative. While we expect a pickup in the growth rate of outward investment over the coming 6-12 months, we doubt that the increase will be sharp. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Demystifying China's Foreign Assets", dated December 15, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "China Officials Are Said To Be Wary Of Treasuries, Sparking Drop", dated January 10, 2018, Bloomberg News. China's official data shows that the country's total holdings of international assets have risen to around US$6.7 trillion last year, including foreign exchange reserves, direct investment, overseas lending and holdings of bonds and equities. Official reserves have declined sharply since 2016, and other holdings have increased steadily. Reserves assets dropped below half of total foreign assets in 2016, and their share continued to fall last year. In contrast, portfolio investment and overseas loans have gained significantly both in value terms and as a share of the country's total foreign assets. Chart 3 Chart 3 Chart 3 Chart 4 Chart 4 Chart 4 Despite the sharp decline, international investment positions by Chinese nationals, public and private combined, are still much more heavily concentrated in official reserve assets compared with other major economies. In other major creditor countries, outward direct and portfolio investment accounts for a much larger share of international assets than reserves. Official reserves in the U.S. are negligible. China's official reserves give the PBOC resources to maintain exchange rate stability, but they also lower the expected returns of the country's foreign assets. Encouraging domestic entities to acquire overseas assets directly has been a long-run policy. However, Chinese authorities became alarmed by the pace of Chinese nationals' overseas investment during the acute phase of capital outflow, and have continued to take restrictive measures to limit some projects. Chart 5 Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Our calculations shows that Chinese total holdings of U.S. assets reached US$1.62 trillion at the end of November 2017, including Treasurys, government agency bonds, corporate bonds, stocks and non-Treasury short-term custody liabilities of U.S. banks to Chinese official institutions, based on the TIC data (Table 1). Treasurys still account for the majority of the country's total holdings of U.S. assets, while corporate bonds and stocks are relatively insignificant. China's holdings of U.S. assets as a share of total reserves declined between the global financial crisis and 2014, but the trend has since reversed. The share of U.S. asset holdings currently accounts for 52% of Chinese official reserves, compared with a peak of over 70% in the early 2000s and a trough of 46% in 2014. China's overall holdings of foreign exchange reserves (including U.S. assets) declined massively in early 2016, and the recovery in level terms is entirely due to a currency revaluation effect. The U.S. dollar carries a 41.73% weight in the SDR (Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund), and it accounts for about 63% of total foreign reserves managed by global central banks. In our view, these two measures should be viewed as relevant benchmarks to gauge China's desired level of holdings of U.S. dollar-denominated assets in its official reserves. Chart 6 Chart 6 Chart 6 Chart 7 Chart 7 Chart 7 Long-term assets (defined as having a maturity greater than one year) make up the overwhelming majority of China's holdings of U.S. assets. Most of these long-term assets are in the form of government and agency bonds, corporate bonds and stocks. Chinese holdings of short-term U.S. assets have been negligible in recent years. During the global financial crisis in 2008/09, China massively increased its holdings of short-term U.S. assets, amid a global drive of "flight to liquidity" at the height of the crisis. Chart 8 Chart 8 Chart 8 Chart 9 Chart 9 Chart 9 In terms of risk classification, the majority of Chinese holdings of U.S. assets are risk-free assets, including Treasurys and government agency bonds. China's holdings of these assets have plateaued in recent years. As a share of China's total reserves, U.S. risk-free assets currently account for about 45%, down from about 65% in 2003. Meanwhile, the accumulation of U.S. risky assets has stabilized after a sharp drop in 2016. Changes in U.S. risky asset holdings largely reflect changes in equities, with corporate bonds steadily accounting for about 0.6% of total foreign assets. Chart 10 Chart 10 Chart 10 Chart 11 Chart 11 Chart 11 China currently holds US$1.18 trillion of Treasurys, which account for over 83.8% of total Chinese holdings of U.S. risk-free assets, or 37.7% of total Chinese foreign reserves. Notably, Treasurys as a share of Chinese foreign reserves have been relatively stable, ranging between 30% and 40% over the past decade. This may be the comfort zone for the Chinese authorities' asset allocation to U.S. government paper. China's holdings of U.S. government agency bonds have been roughly flat over the past year following a pickup from 2014-2016. Still, China's agency bond holdings are significantly lower than at their peak prior to the U.S. subprime debacle. Their share in Chinese foreign reserves has declined to 8% from a peak of close to 30% in 2008. Chart 12 Chart 12 Chart 12 Chart 13 Chart 13 Chart 13 Almost all of China's holdings of Treasurys are parked in long-term paper (with duration of more than one year). China's possession of short-term Treasurys has been negligible in recent years, but picked up fractionally in late 2016 (likely as part of the PBOC's increase in cash holdings to deal with capital outflows). Short-term Treasurys accounted for as high as 2.5% of Chinese reserves during the last U.S. expansion, yet remain essentially at zero today despite several rate hikes from the Fed. Chart 14 Chart 14 Chart 14 Chart 15 Chart 15 Chart 15 Chinese holdings of risky U.S. assets - corporate bonds and equities - account for 7% of China's total foreign reserves, a non-trivial decline from its peak of over 10% in 2015. The decline was mainly due to the sudden drop of holdings of equities is holding currently standing at about USD 200 billion. Chart 16 Chart 16 Chart 16 Chart 17 Chart 17 Chart 17 China remains the largest foreign creditor to the U.S. government. Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasurys account for about 10% of total outstanding U.S. government bonds, or around 19% of total foreign holdings of U.S. Treasurys, according to our calculation. About 51% of outstanding U.S. Treasurys are held by foreigners. China is also one of the largest foreign holders of U.S. of agency bonds. While its holdings only accounts for 3% of total outstanding agency bonds, they account for around 22% of the total held by foreigners. About 12% of agency and GSE-backed securities are currently held by foreigners. Chart 18 Chart 18 Chart 18 Chart 19 Chart 19 Chart 19 The flow of Chinese outward direct investment remains high, reaching US$270 billion in 2017, although investment slowed in dollar terms relative to 2016 by a small margin. Total overseas direct investments amount to US$ 1.7 trillion. China's overseas investments have been heavily concentrated in resource-rich regions and industries. Cumulatively, the energy sector alone accounts for almost half of China's total overseas investments, followed by transportation infrastructure, real estate and base metals, which clearly underscores China's demand for commodities. The overseas investments in property dropped about 26% in 2017 compared to the years before. China's outbound investment was originally led by state-owned enterprises. More recently, private Chinese enterprises have become more active in overseas investments and acquisitions. Chart 20 bca.cis_sr_2018_02_28_c20 bca.cis_sr_2018_02_28_c20 Chart 21 Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Chart 22 Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Demystifying China's Foreign Assets The U.S. remained one of the largest targets for Chinese investments in 2017, following Switzerland and the U.K. Investment in Switzerland was buoyed by the acquisition of a Swiss agribusiness firm, which has significant long-term implications for food security in China. Consistent with the breakdown in outbound investment by industry, Chinese investments in resource rich countries, such as Australia, Canada and Brazil have recently been much more muted. There is an outright reduction in investment in Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) related countries, despite the strategic importance of the initiative. Corporate China's interest in the global resource space has waned in the past year, with total investment in the energy and metals industries having peaked in 2016. There has been a dramatic increase in investment in the agriculture, finance and logistics industries. These investment deals are mainly driven by state-owned enterprises. Recent increases in investment in tourism and entertainment industries have decreased, which may reflect cautiousness on the part of the Chinese government in the wake of the sharp decline in foreign reserves that occurred in 2015 (and the massive overseas investments by private enterprises in recent years). Chart 23, 24 Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Demystifying China's Foreign Assets Chart 25 Chart 25 Chart 25 Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights This past week, oil ministers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - OPEC 2.0's putative leaders - separately indicated increased comfort with higher prices over the next year or so.1 This suggests they are converging on a common production-management strategy, which accommodates KSA's need for higher prices over the short term to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, and Russia's longer term desire to avoid reaching price levels where U.S. shale-oil production is massively incentivized to expand. We believe OPEC 2.0's production cuts will be extended to year-end, given signaling by Khalid Al-Falih, KSA's energy minister. As a result, we expect Brent and WTI crude oil prices to average $74 and $70/bbl this year, respectively (Chart Of The Week). These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl, which were premised on curtailed production slowly being returned to market beginning in July. For next year, the extended cuts could lift Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively. Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts will accelerate OECD inventory draws, which have been faster than expected. Higher prices caused by maintaining the cuts will lift U.S. shale production more than our earlier estimates. Backwardations in both Brent and WTI forward curves will remain steep in this regime, muting the impact of Fed policy on oil prices. Energy: Overweight. We are getting long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls on the back of our updated price forecast. We also are taking profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, which were up 27.4% as of Tuesday's close. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Commerce Department proposed "Section 232" tariffs and quotas on U.S. aluminum and steel imports, following national security reviews. President Trump has until mid-April to respond, and we expect him to go through with one of the three proposed options. Precious Metals: Gold remains range-bound around $1,350/oz, as markets wrestle with the likely evolution of the Fed's rate-hiking regimen. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA economists project grain and soybean prices to slowly rise over the next 10 years, according to agriculture.com. Feature Chart Of The WeekBCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts BCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts BCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts Over the past week, comments from Saudi and Russian oil ministers indicate they are more comfortable with maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018, which, along with strong global demand growth, raises the odds Brent crude oil prices will exceed $70/bbl this year, and possibly next. Whether this is the result of the Saudi's need for higher prices to support the Aramco IPO, or it reflects an assessment by OPEC 2.0's leaders that the world economy can absorb higher prices without damaging demand over the short term is not clear. Markets have yet to receive what we could consider definitive forward guidance from OPEC 2.0 leadership, indicating that recent signaling could be foreshadowing the coalition's new policy. We are raising the odds that it is, and are moving our Brent and WTI forecasts higher for this year and next. Lifting 2018 Brent, WTI Forecasts To $74 And $70/bbl Maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 will lift average Brent and WTI crude oil prices to $74 and $70/bbl, respectively, this year, based on our updated supply-demand balances modeling (Chart Of The Week). This is not definitive OPEC 2.0 policy guidance: KSA's and Russia's oil ministers indicated they expect such an outcome in separate statements, and not, as has been the case with previous announcements, at a joint press conference.2 We are assuming the odds strongly favor such an outcome, and give an 80% weight to it. The remaining 20% reflects our previous expectation that OPEC 2.0's production cuts would cease at end-June, and curtailed volumes would slowly be restored over 2H18. Resolving this in favor of the former expectation would lift our price expectations to $76 and $73/bbl for Brent and WTI this year, and $70 and $68/bbl next year. These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI prices this year, which were premised on curtailed OPEC 2.0 production slowly returning to market beginning in July, and a subsequent OECD inventory rebuilding. By maintaining production cuts to year-end, supply-demand balances remain tighter, which keeps inventories drawing for a longer period of time (Chart 2). Higher inventories would have increased the sensitivity of oil prices to the USD, which we showed in research on February 8th 2018. With OPEC 2.0's production cuts maintained throughout the year, OECD inventories will be more depleted by year-end (Chart 3). Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 would result in an additional 130mm bbls reduction to OECD inventories versus our prior modeling. This means Brent and WTI forward curves will be more backwardated than they would have been had the barrels taken off the market at the beginning of 2017 been slowly restored starting in July of this year, as we earlier expected. Chart 2Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Chart 3Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More A steeper backwardation in oil forward curves - i.e., the front of the curve trades premium to the deferred contracts - reduces the USD effects on oil, all else equal. In other words, supply-demand fundamentals dominate the evolution of oil prices when forward curves are more backwardated, and the influence of financial variables -the USD in particular - is muted.3 For next year, we assume the volumes cut by OPEC 2.0 are slowly restored to the market over 1H19, lifting Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl on average, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively.4 Higher Shale Output, Strong Global Demand We expect U.S. shale production increases by 1.15mm b/d from December 2017 to December 2018, and another 1.3-1.4mm b/d during calendar 2019. This dominates non-OPEC production growth this year and next (Chart 4, top panel). Due to the supply response of the shales to higher prices in 2018, global production levels would see a net increase from March 2019 and beyond. Our assumption OPEC 2.0 production cuts will be maintained through 2018 puts our OPEC production assessment 0.14mm b/d below U.S. EIA's estimates (Chart 4, bottom panel). On the demand side, we continue to expect non-OECD (EM) growth to push global oil consumption up by 1.7mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 5). Non-OECD demand is expected to account for 1.24mm b/d and 1.21mm b/d of this growth in 2018 and 2019, respectively (Table 1). Chart 4U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth Chart 5Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices Aramco IPO Driving OPEC 2.0's Short-Term Agenda In previous research, we noted what appeared to be a relatively minor divergence between the goals of KSA and Russia when it comes to the level prices each would prefer over the short term. Recent press reports - unattributed, of course - suggest Saudi Aramco officials prefer a Brent price closer to $70/bbl further along the forward curve (two years out) to support their upcoming IPO.5 This obviously would bolster Aramco's oil-export revenues - some 7mm b/d of its 10mm b/d of production are exported - and income, which shareholders would welcome. However, until this past week, Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, was signaling a range of $50 to $60/bbl works better for his constituents, i.e., shareholder-owned Russian oil companies. Novak recently amended his range to $50 to $70/bbl for Brent.6 These positions are not irreconcilable. One is shorter term (2 years forward) and the other is longer term, attempting to balance competitive threats over a longer horizon - e.g., from U.S. shale-oil producers, electric vehicles, etc. This most recent indication the leadership of OPEC 2.0 is comfortable with higher prices over the short term is an indication - at least to us - that these issues are being dealt with in a way that allows markets to incorporate forward guidance into pricing of crude oil over the next two years. Beyond that, however, markets will need to hear an articulated strategy containing a post-Aramco IPO view of the world, so that capital can be efficiently allocated. KSA and Russia are in a global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), and having a fully articulated strategy re how they will manage their production in fast-changing markets - where, for example, shale-oil approaches becoming a "just-in-time" supply option - will be critical. Signing a formal alliance by year-end would support this, but that, too, will require a level of cooperation that runs deeper than what OPEC 2.0 has so far demonstrated, impressive though it may be. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0 leadership is signalling production cuts will be maintained for the entire year, not, as we expected, left to expire at end-June with curtailed barrels slowly returned to the market over 2H18. While this does not appear to be official policy of the producer coalition yet, we are revising our price expectations in line with tighter markets this year, lower OECD inventories and continued backwardation in Brent and WTI forward curves. OPEC 2.0's shorter-term agenda, driven by KSA's IPO of Saudi Aramco, and its longer-term agenda - maintaining oil's competitive edge and accommodating U.S. shale-oil production (but not too much) - appear to be getting reconciled. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com  1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for OPEC/non-OPEC coalition led by KSA and Russia, has removed some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of oil production from the market beginning in 2017. 2 Please see, "Brent crude settles flat, U.S. oil up on short covering," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018, in which KSA's oil minister Khalid Al-Falih indicated OPEC would maintain production cuts throughout 2018. See also, "On the air of the TV channel 'Russia 24' Alexander Novak summed up the participation in the work of the Russian investment forum 'Sochi-2018,'" published by Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation on February 15th 2018. Lastly, please see "Saudi Arabia Is Taking a Harder Line on Oil Prices," published by bloomberg.com on February 19th 2018. 3 We discuss this in "OPEC 2.0 vs. The Fed," which was published on February 8th 2018 by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 These expectations are highly conditional. Toward the end of this year, KSA and Russia are indicating the OPEC 2.0 coalition will become a more formal organization, with members signing a long-term alliance. Among other things, OPEC 2.0 members would be expected to build buffer stocks to address any sudden supply outages, in order to maintain orderly markets. Please see "Oil producers to draft long-term alliance deal by end-2018: UAE minister," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. 5 Please see "For timing of Aramco IPO, watch forward oil price curve," published by reuters.com on February 19th 2018. 6 Please see reference in footnote 3 and "Russia's Novak says current oil price is acceptable," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017 OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices

Highlights Following the establishment of an interest rate corridor system in 2015, the 1-week interbank repo rate is the new de jure policy rate in China. However, the massive rise in interbank repo rate spreads that has occurred over the past 18 months means that the 3-month repo rate has become the new de facto policy rate. This is the key rate that investors should be watching in order to predict the impact of monetary policy on average or effective interest rates in the real economy. Roughly 3/4ths of the tightening in monetary policy that has occurred since late-2016 has actually been regulatory/macro-prudential in nature. This raises the possibility that interbank spreads may rise outside of the central bank's comfort zone, but the PBOC appears to have the appropriate tools to respond to such an event. Concerns that rising inflation and a recent surge in monthly bank lending may spur tighter monetary policy over the coming 6-12 months are a red herring. Recent trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease monetary policy than the need to tighten. Investors should continue to maintain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks, excluding the tech sector. Feature We examined the question of how to judge the stance of China's monetary policy in a Weekly Report published last month.1 In today's Special Report we answer seven questions about China's monetary policy framework, in order to clarify the transmission mechanism between the PBOC's interest rate corridor and the real economy and to help investors understand how to measure and track changes to the Chinese monetary policy landscape. Today's report makes several important conclusions. First, it underscores that while the 1-week interbank repo rate is the new de jure policy rate in China, a sharp rise in interbank spreads that began in late-2016 has caused the 3-month rate to become the de facto policy rate. This is the key rate that investors should be watching in order to predict the impact of monetary policy on average or effective interest rates in the real economy. Second, it highlights that roughly 3/4ths of China's monetary policy tightening since late-2016 has actually been caused by macro-prudential changes made by the PBOC, rather than due to direct interest rate hikes. Third, while the PBOC's rhetoric about inflation and the recent pickup in bank loans ostensibly suggests that further tightening is forthcoming, the reality is that recent trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease monetary policy than the need to tighten. From the perspective of investment strategy, our analysis continues to suggest that investors should maintain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks excluding the tech sector. We outlined how the outlook for monetary policy fits into our "decision tree" for Chinese stocks in our first report of the year,2 and we continue to expect that the PBOC will refrain from significant further tightening over the coming 6-12 months. Our answers to the seven questions below should provide investors with a strong sense of how to predict potential inflection points in Chinese monetary policy, and whether it remains supportive of our recommended investment strategy over the coming year. Q: What is the PBOC's new policy framework, and how does it differ from the bank's traditional monetary policy tools? A: The PBOC has established a corridor system similar to that of many other countries, and now aims to control market-based interest rates as opposed to the old system of regulated interest rates. Chart 1China's Policy Rate: New Vs Old China's Policy Rate: New Vs Old China's Policy Rate: New Vs Old The PBOC's long, ongoing effort to liberalize its interest rate environment reached a new stage in mid-2015, when the central bank shifted to a corridor system similar to that observed in several other countries. Like in other nations, the objective of the corridor is to guide short-term interest rates towards a particular policy rate, which since late-2016 has been officially recognized as the 1-week interbank repo rate. Chart 1 illustrates this corridor, which is bounded by the PBOC's 1-week reverse repo rate on the lower end and by the 1-week standing lending facility rate on the upper end. The chart also shows the benchmark lending rate, which is China's "old" policy rate. For global investors who are more familiar with U.S. monetary policy, this corridor is conceptually equivalent to the target range for the federal funds rate, with the 1-week interbank repo rate acting as the effective fed funds rate. The key difference between China's old and new monetary policy framework is that the former is based heavily on regulated interest rates (and changes in the reserve requirement ratio), whereas the latter rests on manipulating market-based interest rates using a variety of tools. China's "old" policy tools still exist and may be employed if Chinese policymakers wish to rapidly shift the monetary policy stance. But more importantly, they continue to influence the monetary environment in a way that is important for investors to understand, even if they are not the day-to-day focus of policymakers (see next question). Q: What is the relationship between the new PBOC policy rate and the old one? A: The PBOC's corridor system influences 3-month interbank repo rates, which directly impact how many loans are issued at an interest rate above the old, benchmark policy rate (and by what magnitude). Chart 1 highlighted that the midpoint of the PBOC's interest rate corridor has been consistently and meaningfully below that of the old benchmark lending rate over the past two years, but the adoption of the corridor system did not instantly ease monetary policy in China. The reason is that the vast majority of loans in China are issued at rates above the benchmark rate, and the link between the PBOC's old and new monetary policy framework appears to be how the interbank market influences the breadth and depth of this loan rate premium above the old benchmark. Chart 2A Strong Link Between 3-Month Repo Rates ##br##And Economy-Wide Rates A Strong Link Between 3-Month Repo Rates And Economy-Wide Rates A Strong Link Between 3-Month Repo Rates And Economy-Wide Rates Chart 2 highlights that there is a strong (and leading) relationship between changes in China's 3-month interbank repo rate and 1) changes in the percentage of loans issued above the benchmark rate and 2) the changes in the gap between the weighted-average interest rate and the benchmark rate. While the 1-week interbank repo rate has only increased by around 50 bps since late-2016, the 3-month rate has risen about 200 bps, which explains the extent of the rise in the share of loans issued at above-benchmark rates and the rise in average interest rates relative to the benchmark. This relationship is crucial for investors to understand, since we noted in our January 18 Weekly Report that the midpoint of the 2014-2016 range for average interest rates represents our best estimate of the threshold between easy and tight monetary policy in China.3 Charts 1 and 2 also underscore another very important point: while the 1-week interbank repo rate is the new de jure policy rate, the 3-month rate is the new de facto policy rate as long as interbank repo spreads remain elevated. Q: Why have 3-month interbank repo rates risen so much relative to the 1-week rate? Is this a sign of serious interbank stress? A: No, the rise has been intentionally caused by changes in macro-prudential policy. But the rise in spreads has made up a significant portion of monetary tightening in China since late-2016. By the standards of developed markets, China's interbank repo spreads are extraordinarily high. Chart 3 presents China's 3-month / 1-week interbank repo spread since the PBOC established its new monetary policy framework versus the U.S. 3-month / 1-week LIBOR and repo rate spreads. During the worst of the U.S. subprime financial crisis, these spreads peaked at 182 and 105 bps, respectively. By contrast, China's repo rate spread currently stands at 200 bps. Part of this difference is likely explained by the fact that repos in China tend to be conducted on a 'pledged' basis (where ownership of the collateral remains with the cash borrower but is pledged to the lender),4 but we strongly doubt that it explains a majority of the difference given how low Chinese interbank repo spreads were prior to Q4 2016. Chart 3Chinese Repo Rate Spreads Are Outsized##br## Compared With The U.S. Chinese Repo Rate Spreads Are Outsized Compared With The U.S. Chinese Repo Rate Spreads Are Outsized Compared With The U.S. As there are no other signs of an outright banking crisis in China, it follows that China's interbank repo spreads have risen due to a distortion in the market. We reject expectations of further increases in the interest rate corridor as an explanation, given that the rise in spreads has occurred at what is still the short-end of the interbank repo market and that it has persisted for more than a year in the face of very minor changes to the corridor. It is difficult to judge the ultimate cause of the rise in repo spreads with a high degree of confidence, because it began in late-November 2016 when global financial markets were in a high state of flux. Government bond yields rose globally following the U.S. election in early-November in response to (ultimately validated) expectations of stimulative fiscal policy from the Trump administration, and the 1-week repo rate itself was rising during the period. But to us, two pieces of evidence suggest that the rise in interbank repo spreads was caused by the PBOC's decision to include banks' off-balance sheet holdings of wealth management products into its macro-prudential assessment (MPA): The Timing of the MPA Decision: While the PBOC's inclusion of WMPs in its MPA only began in the first quarter of 2017, news that the PBOC had begun a trial of the program broke in mid-November, in advance of the sharp rise in spreads.5 The Rise In 7-Day Depository / Non-Depository Repo Spreads: Chart 4 shows the difference between the 7-day interbank repo rate for all financial institutions and that for depository corporations only (the latter being the new, de jure policy rate). The chart shows that the spread between these two same-maturity rates began a significant uptrend around the same time that the 3-month / 1-week repo spread started to rise. Since non-depository financial institutions appear to have been more active in issuing WMPs over the past several years, this rise in 7-day depository / non-depository repo spreads is consistent with a liquidity squeeze (in anticipation of an upcoming MPA "stress test") among heavy issuers of WMPs. Chart 4Repo Rate Spreads Have Risen ##br##Due To Shadow Banking Crackdown Repo Rate Spreads Have Risen Due To Shadow Banking Crackdown Repo Rate Spreads Have Risen Due To Shadow Banking Crackdown While the rise in the 3-month / 1-week interbank repo spread does therefore appear to represent a "liquidity event" that is squeezing some Chinese banks, it does not seem to meet the description of real banking "stress". True financial system stress tends to occur when banks become wary of lending to each other due to solvency concerns, whereas the current rise in interbank spreads has occurred entirely due to regulatory changes (i.e. the Xi administration's crackdown on shadow banking). As such, while the rise in spreads undoubtedly represents tighter monetary policy, we have already incorporated this development into our framework for China's economy and its financial markets and see no reason to make any changes to our recommended investment strategy unless interbank spreads were to rise sharply further from here. Q: What can the PBOC do to control interbank spreads if they rise significantly from current levels? A: It can use open market operations to inject liquidity into the banking system. Our discussion above highlights that most of the tightening in Chinese market interest rates that has occurred since late-2016 has been regulatory in nature rather than due to direct increases in the PBOC's new policy rate. In fact, since the 3-month interbank repo rate has risen approximately 200 bps because of a 150 bps rise in 3-month / 1-week repo spreads, then it would appear that a full 75% of China's recent monetary policy tightening is attributable to the PBOC's decision to crack down on WMP issuance and shadow lending more generally. This undoubtedly showcases the potential for macro-prudential policies to significantly influence monetary policy in China, but it also raises the question of whether the crackdown may unintentionally tighten financial conditions by more than the PBOC expects. For example, while the PBOC likely knew that increasing its scrutiny over WMPs would impact the interbank market, it is not likely that they were able to predict the magnitude of the impact with any precision. Chart 5The PBOC Has Ample Room ##br##To Inject Liquidity If Needed The PBOC Has Ample Room To Inject Liquidity If Needed The PBOC Has Ample Room To Inject Liquidity If Needed Chart 5 presents one monetary policy tool that the PBOC can use to try to reduce spreads in the interbank repo market were they to rise outside of the central bank's comfort zone. The chart shows the rolling 1-year net liquidity injection into the banking system from the PBOC's open market operations (OMOs), and highlights that the period of rising interbank repo spreads has generally corresponded with declining net liquidity injections. In fact, the chart shows that the PBOC injected no net liquidity into the banking system in 2017, which likely increased the magnitude of the rise in interbank repo spreads. More recently, net liquidity injections have fallen quite sharply, but this appears to have been caused by the PBOC's use of a different policy tool, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, to inject a substantial amount of liquidity to help meet cash demand during the Chinese New Year. In short, while it is possible that interbank repo spreads could rise significantly and unexpectedly from current levels, the fact that spreads have been elevated but stable over the past year when the PBOC injected no net liquidity into the banking system suggests that monetary authorities should be able to reign in any outsized rise back to levels within the central bank's comfort zone. Q: Is the PBOC likely to tighten aggressively further to control inflation? A: No. The PBOC specifically noted in their latest monetary policy report that inflation needs to be "closely watched", so further tightening to control inflation cannot be ruled out. However, several observations suggest that the risk of aggressive further tightening to control inflation is moderate at most: We have highlighted in past reports that Chinese core consumer prices have recently been correlated with past values of the Li Keqiang index, which has declined meaningfully from its high early last year (Chart 6). The most recent inflation release suggests that the rate of appreciation in core prices is indeed rolling over, suggesting that inflationary pressure is set to ease (rather than intensify) over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 7 presents the BCA China Regional CPI Diffusion Index, which is made up of headline inflation data from 31 first-level administrative divisions. The index is shown alongside overall headline inflation, and while it does confirm that there has been some increase in inflation pressure, the index has not decisively risen above the boom/bust line. Chart 8 illustrates the measure of household inflation expectations that the PBOC cited along with headline CPI. While it is true that the measure has increased, it has done so from a below-median level, and the relationship shown in the chart suggests that further increases would be needed simply to have headline CPI accelerate. Given that headline inflation is 150 bps below the central bank's stated target, it appears that the PBOC is exaggerating the risk of an inflationary breakout to maintain hawkish rhetoric as part of its efforts to reduce the presence of moral hazard in financial markets and the real economy.6 Chart 6Ebbing Inflationary Risk Ebbing Inflationary Risk Ebbing Inflationary Risk Chart 7No Decisive Outbreak No Decisive Outbreak No Decisive Outbreak Chart 8Rising, But From A Low Level Rising, But From A Low Level Rising, But From A Low Level To be clear, we agree that the PBOC will likely raise its interest rate corridor (potentially significantly) further if core inflation re-accelerates and the disinflationary impact of food & energy prices dissipates. However, we see low odds of such a scenario over the coming 6-12 months barring a material re-acceleration of the economy. Q: Does the spike in new RMB loans in January raise the risk of further monetary tightening? A: No. Credit trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease than the need to tighten. Chart 9 shows the monthly increase in new RMB loans, which rose massively in January. Some market commentators have suggested that the January increase in this series carries special significance for loan growth over the remainder of the year, and that the rise suggests that further monetary tightening is forthcoming. But a closer examination of the data highlights that these concerns are unfounded. Panel 2 of Chart 9 shows the domestic bank loan component of total social financing, which is nearly identical to the new RMB loans series shown in panel 1. When presented as the YoY growth rate of a stock rather than a monthly flow,7 it is clear that bank loan growth did not meaningfully accelerate in January. In fact, Chart 10 shows that the YoY growth rate of total social financing (adjusted for equity and municipal bond issuance) continues to decelerate, highlighting that credit trends in the Chinese economy are more consistent with the need to ease monetary policy rather than tighten. Chart 9A Sharp MoM Rise... A Sharp MoM Rise... A Sharp MoM Rise... Chart 10...But Not In YoY Terms ...But Not In YoY Terms ...But Not In YoY Terms Q: What market-based indicators can investors use to tell if Chinese monetary policy is becoming restrictive? A: Watch the correlation between the 3-month interbank repo rate and China's relative sovereign CDS spread vs Germany. Chart 11A Market-Based Indicator ##br##Of The Restrictiveness Of Monetary Policy A Market-Based Indicator Of The Restrictiveness Of Monetary Policy A Market-Based Indicator Of The Restrictiveness Of Monetary Policy Besides a generalized selloff in Chinese risky financial assets, one warning sign that investors can use to monitor whether monetary policy has become restrictive is the rolling 1-year correlation between the 3-month interbank repo rate and the relative sovereign CDS spread between China and a large, fiscally sound developed economy (such as Germany). Despite the fact that actual sovereign credit risk in China is extremely low, Chart 11 shows that the relative CDS spread has acted as a good bellwether for growth conditions in the Chinese economy. It shows that the correlation between this spread and the 3-month interbank repo rate was initially positive in late-2016 (representing concern on the part of investors that monetary policy is restrictive), but has since come back down into negative territory. Interestingly, the correlation was consistently positive from mid-2011 to mid-2014, when average lending rates averaged 7% or higher and the benchmark lending rate exceeded the IMF's Taylor Rule estimate by about 1%.8 So while this is but one measure that we will be tracking, it's performance over the past several years as an indicator for restrictive policy appears to accord with our ex-post understanding of the impact of monetary conditions on the Chinese economy. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'Decision Tree' For Chinese Stocks", dated January 4, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For more information on the structure of China's repo market, please see "The Chinese Interbank Repo Market" by Ross Kendall and Jonathan Lees, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, June 2017. 5 "China's tightened rules on wealth management products having little effect", Cathy Zhang, South China Morning Post, November 17, 2016 6 Please see our January 25 webcast for our geopolitical team's perspective on the potential impact of Governor Xiaochuan's approaching retirement on the PBOC's policy bias: https://gps.bcaresearch.com/webcasts/index/178# 7 We cumulate the social financing series using the best available estimates of the initial starting point of each component series. 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Tightening In China: How Much Is Too Much?" dated January 18, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The call on EM local bonds boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Forthcoming EM currency depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds. EM currencies positively correlate with commodities prices but not with domestic real interest rates. Widening U.S. twin deficits are not a reason to be long EM currencies. There has historically been no consistent relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. For investors who have to be invested in EM domestic bonds, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Feature The stampede into EM local currency bonds has persisted even amid recent jitters in global equity markets. Notably, surging U.S./DM bond yields have failed to cause a spike in EM local yields, despite past positive correlations (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? The main reason is the resilience of EM currencies. The latter have not sold off even during the recent correction in global share prices. In high-yielding EM domestic bond markets, total returns are substantially affected by exchange rates. Not only do U.S. dollar total returns on local bonds suffer when EM currencies depreciate, but also weaker EM exchange rates cause spikes in domestic bond yields (Chart I-2). Consequently, the call on EM local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets, boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Chart I-2EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields We are negative on EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar and the euro. The basis for our view is two-fold: Strong growth in the U.S. and higher U.S. bond yields should be supportive of the greenback vis-à-vis EM currencies; the same applies to euro area growth and the euro against EM exchange rates; Weaker growth in China should weigh on commodities prices and, in turn, on EM currencies. So far, this view has not played out. In fact, negative sentiment on the U.S. dollar has recently been amplified by concerns about America's widening fiscal and current account deficits. In fact, one might argue that EM local bonds stand to benefit from the potential widening in U.S. twin deficits and the flight out of the U.S. dollar. We address the issue of U.S. twin deficits first. Twin Deficits And The U.S. Dollar... The recent narrative that the dollar typically depreciates during periods of widening twin deficits is not supported by historical evidence. We are not suggesting that twin deficits lead to currency appreciation. Our argument is that twin deficits have historically coincided with both appreciation and depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Chart I-3 exhibits the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the fiscal and current account balances. It appears that there is no consistent relationship between the fiscal and current account balances and the exchange rate. Chart I-3No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar To produce a quantitative measure of the twin deficits, we sum up both the fiscal and current account balances. Chart I-4 demonstrates the relationship between the latter measure and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. This analysis encompasses the entire history of the floating U.S. dollar since 1971. Chart I-4Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar The vertical lines denote the tax cuts under former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1986, and under former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. As can be seen from Chart I-4, there is no stable relationship between the twin deficits and the greenback. In the 1970s, there was no consistent relationship at all; In the first half of the 1980s, the twin deficits widened substantially, but the dollar rallied dramatically. The tailwind behind the rally was tightening monetary policy and rising/high real U.S. interest rates; From 1985 through 1993, there was no consistent relationship between America's twin deficits and the currency; From 1994 until 2001, the greenback appreciated as the twin deficits narrowed, particularly the fiscal deficit; From 2001 through 2011, the dollar was in a bear market as the twin deficits expanded; From 2011 until 2016, the shrinking-to-stable twin deficits were accompanied by a U.S. dollar rally. Bottom Line: We infer from these charts that there has historically been no stable relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. ... And A Missing Variable: Interest Rates Twin deficits are often associated with rising inflation. In fact, a widening current account deficit can mask hidden price pressures. In particular, an economy that over-consumes - consumes more than it produces - can satisfy its demand via imports without exerting pressure on the economy's domestic productive capacity. Booming imports will lead to a widening trade deficit rather than higher consumer price inflation. Hence, in an open economy, over-consumption can lead to a widening current account deficit, rather than rising inflation. A currency is likely to plunge amid widening twin deficits if the central bank is behind the inflation curve. In such a case, the low real interest rates would undermine the value of the exchange rate. If the central bank, however, embarks on monetary tightening that is adequate, the currency can in fact strengthen amid growing twin deficits. In this scenario, rising real interest rates would support the currency. With respect to the U.S. dollar today, its future trajectory depends on the Fed, and the market's perception of its policy stance. If the market discerns that the Fed is behind the curve, the greenback will plummet. By contrast, if the market reckons that the Fed policy response is appropriate, and U.S. real interest rates are sufficiently high/rising, the dollar could in fact appreciate amid widening twin deficits. Specifically, the U.S. dollar was in a major bull market in the early 1980s, with Reagan's tax cuts in 1981 and the ensuing widening of the country's twin deficits doing little to thwart the dollar bull market (Chart I-4). In turn, the Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 were followed by a major dollar bear market. The main culprit between these two and other episodes was probably real interest rates. U.S. real interest rates/bond yields rose between 1981 and 1985, generating an enormous dollar rally. In the decade of the 2000s, by contrast, U.S. real interest rates fell and that coincided with a major bear market in the greenback (Chart I-4). Overall, the combination of U.S. twin deficits and real bond yields together, help better explain U.S. dollar dynamics than twin deficits alone. We agree that America's twin deficits will widen materially. That said, odds are that the Fed commits to further rate hikes and that U.S. bond yields continue to rise. In fact, not only are U.S. inflation breakeven yields climbing, but TIPS (real) yields have also spiked significantly. Rising real yields, which in our opinion have more upside, should support the U.S. dollar. As a final point, if the Fed falls behind the curve and the dollar continues to tumble, the markets could begin to fear a material rise in U.S. inflationary pressures. That scenario would actually resemble market dynamics that prevailed before the 1987 stock market crash. Although this is a negative scenario for the U.S. currency and is, by default, bullish for EM exchange rates and their local bonds, this is not ultimately an optimistic scenario for global risk assets. Bottom Line: Twin deficits are not solely sufficient to produce a currency bear market. Twin deficits accompanied by a central bank that is behind the inflation curve - i.e., combined with low/falling real interest rates - are what generate sufficient conditions for currency depreciation. EM Currencies And Commodities Many EM exchange rates - such as those in Latin America, as well as South African, Russian, Malaysian and Indonesian currencies - are primarily driven by commodities prices. Not surprisingly, the underlying currency index of the EM local bond benchmark index (the JPM GBI index) - which excludes China, India, Korea and Taiwan - positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-5). Hence, getting commodities prices right is of paramount importance to the majority of high-yielding EM local bonds. We have the following observations: First, investors' net long positions in both oil and copper are extremely elevated (Chart I-6). The last datapoint is as of February 16. Any rebound in the U.S. dollar or mounting concerns about China's growth could produce a meaningful drop in commodities prices as investors rush to close their long positions. Second, we maintain that China's intake of commodities is bound to decelerate, as decelerating credit growth and local governments' budget constraints lead to curtailment of infrastructure and property investment (Chart I-7). Chart I-5EM Currencies Positively Correlate ##br##With Commodities Prices EM Currencies Positively Correlate With Commodities Prices EM Currencies Positively Correlate With Commodities Prices Chart I-6Investors Are Very Long##br## Copper And Oil Investors Are Very Long Copper And Oil Investors Are Very Long Copper And Oil Chart I-7Slowdown In ##br##China's Capex Slowdown In China's Capex Slowdown In China's Capex Strong growth in the U.S. and EU will not offset the decline in China's intake of raw materials (excluding oil). China accounts for 50% of global demand for industrial metals. America's consumption of industrial metals is about 6-7 times smaller. For crude oil, China's share of global consumption is 14% compared with 20% and 15% for the U.S. and EU, respectively. We do not expect outright contraction in China's crude imports or consumption. The point is that when financial markets begin to price in weaker mainland growth or the U.S. dollar rebounds, oil prices will retreat as investors reduce their record high net long positions. Finally, even though EM twin deficits have ameliorated in recent years, they remain wide (Chart I-8). In turn, the majority of these countries have been financing their deficits by volatile foreign portfolio flows, as FDIs into EM remain largely depressed. If commodities prices relapse and EM currencies depreciate, there will be a period of reversal in foreign portfolio inflows into EM. While EM real local bonds yields are reasonably high, they are unlikely to prevent outflows if the U.S. dollar rallies. In the past, neither high absolute EM real yields nor their wide spreads over U.S. TIPS prevented EM currency depreciation (Chart I-9). Chart I-8AEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide Chart I-8BEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide EM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated But Are Still Wide Chart I-9EM Local Real Yields Do Not ##br##Drive Their Currencies EM Local Real Yields Do Not Drive Their Currencies EM Local Real Yields Do Not Drive Their Currencies EM Local Bonds: Country Allocation Strategy Chart I-10 attempts to identify pockets of value in EM domestic bonds. It exhibits the sum of current account and fiscal balances on the X axis, and domestic bond yields deflated by headline inflation on the Y axis. Chart I-10Identifying Pockets Of Value In EM Domestic Bonds EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits Markets in the upper-right corner should be favored as they offer high real yields and maintain healthy fiscal and current account balances. Bond markets in the lower-left corner should be underweighted. They have low inflation-adjusted yields and large current account and fiscal deficits. Based on these metrics as well as fundamental analysis, our recommended country allocation for EM domestic bond portfolios has been and remains: Overweights: Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Neutral: Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Hungary, Chile and Colombia. Underweights: Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia. The below elaborates on Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Russia Fiscal and monetary policies are extremely tight. While they are curtailing the economic recovery, they are very friendly for creditors. Interest rates deflated by both headline and core consumer price inflation are at their highest on record, government spending is lackluster, and the new fiscal rule has replenished the country's foreign currency reserves (Chart I-11). Besides, the government's budget assumption for oil prices is very conservative - in the low-$40s per barrel for this year and 2019. Commercial banks have been increasing provisions, even though the NPL ratio is falling. In fact, Russia is well advanced in terms of both corporate and household deleveraging as well as banking system adjustment. On the whole, having experienced two large recessions in the past 10 years and having pursued extremely orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, Russian markets have become much more insulated from negative external shocks than many of their peers. In brief, Russian financial markets have become low-beta markets,1 and they will outperform their EM peers in a selloff even if oil prices slide. Brazil Brazilian local bonds offer the highest inflation-adjusted yields. However, unlike Russia, Brazil has untenable public debt dynamics, and its politics remain a wild card. The public debt-to-GDP ratio is 16% in Russia and 80% in Brazil. The fiscal deficit in Brazil stands at a whopping 8% of GDP, and interest payments on public debt are equal to 6% of GDP. Without major fiscal reforms, Brazil's public debt will continue to surge and will likely reach almost 100% of GDP by the end of 2020. High real interest rates are not only holding back the recovery but are also making public debt dynamics unsustainable. Chart I-12 illustrates that nominal GDP growth is well below local government bond yields. Chart I-11Continue Favoring ##br##Russian Local Bonds Continue Favoring Russian Local Bonds Continue Favoring Russian Local Bonds Chart I-12Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful ##br##For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil needs either much higher nominal growth or major fiscal tightening to stem the surge in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The necessary fiscal reforms - social security restructuring or primary budget surpluses - are not politically feasible right now. Meanwhile, materially higher nominal growth can be achieved only if interest rates are brought down quickly and drastically and the currency is devalued meaningfully. Hence, the primary risk to Brazilian local bonds is the exchange rate. The currency is at risk from potentially lower commodities prices on the external side, and continuous public debt deterioration, debt monetization or drastic interest rate cuts on the domestic side. Remarkably, Chart I-13 demonstrates that historically real interest rates in Brazil do not explain fluctuations in the real. The currency, rather, positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Brazil: No Relationship Between##br## Real Yields And Currency Brazil: No Relationship Between Real Yields And Currency Brazil: No Relationship Between Real Yields And Currency Chart I-14The Brazilian Real And ##br##Commodities Prices The Brazilian Real And Commodities Prices The Brazilian Real And Commodities Prices It is possible that policymakers find an optimal balance between these adjustment paths, and financial markets continue to rally. However, with the current government lacking any political capital and great uncertainty surrounding the October presidential elections; the outlook is very risky, We recommend a neutral allocation to Brazilian local bonds for EM domestic bond portfolios. South Africa The South African rand and fixed-income markets have surged in the wake of Cyril Ramaphosa's win of the ANC leadership elections and his taking over of the presidency from Jacob Zuma. This has been devastating to our short rand and underweight local bonds positions. Chart I-15The South African Rand And Metals Prices The South African Rand And Metals Prices The South African Rand And Metals Prices There is no doubt that President Ramaphosa will adopt some market-friendly policies. This will constitute a major change from Zuma's handling of the economy in the past nine years. Yet the outlook for the rand is also contingent on global markets. If commodities prices do not relapse and EM risk assets generally perform well, the rand will continue strengthening, and local bond yields will decline further. However, if metals prices begin to drop and EM currencies sell off, it will be hard for the South African currency to rally further (Chart I-15). While we acknowledge the potential for positive political announcements and actions from the new political leadership, the main drivers of the rand, in our opinion, remain the trends in the U.S. dollar and commodities prices. Some investors might be tempted to compare South Africa to Brazil in terms of political headwinds turning into tailwinds. From a political vantage point, it is a fair comparison. Nevertheless, investors should put Brazil's rally into perspective. If commodities prices did not rise in 2016-2017, the Brazilian real would not have rallied. In brief, external tailwinds are as - if not more - important for EM high-yielding currencies than domestic political developments. Positive political developments are magnified amid a benign external backdrop. Conversely, in a negative external environment, positive political transformations can have limited impact on the direction of financial markets. To reflect the potential for a positive political change and forthcoming orthodox macro policies, we are closing our bet on yield curve steepening in South Africa. This position was stipulated by unorthodox macro policies of the previous government. This trade has been flat since its initiation on June 28, 2017. Weighing pros and cons, we are reluctant to upgrade the South African rand and its fixed-income market at the moment because of our negative view on metals prices and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Investment Conclusions The broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is at record oversold levels (Chart I-16). Given the forthcoming U.S. fiscal stimulus, the Fed will likely lift its dots and the greenback will rebound. This is bearish for EM currencies, especially if China's growth slows and commodities prices roll over, as we expect. EM exchange rate depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets. Foreign holdings of EM local bonds are elevated (Table I-1). Hence, risks of unwinding of some positions are not trivial. Chart I-16The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally Table I-1Foreign Ownership Of EM Local Bonds Is High EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits EM Local Bonds And U.S. Twin Deficits Nevertheless, as we have argued in the past, EM local bonds offer great diversification benefits to all type of portfolios, as their correlations with many asset classes are low. For domestic bond investors who have to be invested, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. As to the sovereign and corporate credit markets, asset allocators should compare these with U.S. corporate credit. Consistent with our negative view on EM currencies and equities vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts, we recommend favoring U.S. corporates versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Russia: Entering A Lower-Beta Paradigm," dated March 8, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Despite having the largest negative return of major markets during the global equity market correction, China's investable stock selloff appears to be normal after controlling for its risk characteristics. Taken together, the association between the global correction and volatility/valuation should be viewed as a sharp reduction in complacency in the market. Several factors make us cautious about China's outsized tech sector exposure in a world of reduced complacency. We recommend that investors retain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks while neutralizing exposure to the tech sector. Feature Chart 1An Average Size, But Very Rapid, ##br##Global Selloff An Average Size, But Very Rapid, Global Selloff An Average Size, But Very Rapid, Global Selloff Global equities have sold off quite sharply since the end of January, having declined a total of 9% in US$ terms from their January 26 high to last Friday's close (Chart 1). BCA addressed the rout in a Special Report last week,1 and noted that strong economic growth and positive earnings surprises are likely to keep the global equity bull market intact, a view largely supported by this week's stock market behavior. Still, the report also highlighted that investors need to adjust to the fact that realized volatility is likely to sustainably rise, even if forward-looking volatility measures (such as the VIX in the U.S.) are currently too elevated. More generally, we equate the return of volatility with a reduction in complacency, and in this week's report we explore the implications of lower complacency for investors with an overweight allocation towards Chinese equities. Our judgement is that the complacency risk for China's ex-tech equity market is low, but that the same cannot be said for China's technology stocks. We conclude by recommending two trades that investors can employ to retain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks, but with a neutralized exposure to the tech sector. Normal Underperformance For China Chart 2At First China Appears To Be Among ##br##The Worst Performers... After The Selloff: A View From China After The Selloff: A View From China At first blush, China's investable stock market fared quite poorly during the global stock market correction. Chart 2 lists 21 major country stock markets by the magnitude of their decline in US$ terms and highlights that China's selloff ranks at the very top of the list. But a simple comparison of stock market performance is misleading, as it fails to adjust for the different degrees of riskiness that are normally observed across global equity markets. For example, it is well known that emerging market equities have tended to be high beta relative to global stocks over the past decade, and we noted in a recent Special Report that Chinese investable stocks have become high beta even relative to emerging markets. In order to properly compare the performance of these markets during the global stock market selloff, we rely on the concept of "abnormal return" that is often employed in event study analysis. This approach involves calculating a counterfactual "normal" return for each market based on its rolling 1-year alpha and beta versus global stocks prior to the selloff, and then comparing it to the actual return. This difference, the "abnormal return" of each market, is shown in Chart 3, which highlights that China's performance during the selloff was perfectly normal after controlling for its risk characteristics. In fact, Chart 3 shows that many equity markets outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis, highlighting that the magnitude of the selloff in global stocks could actually have been worse. As for the underlying cause of the selloff, we showed in last week's Special Report that a crowded "short volatility" trade was undoubtedly a driving force: Chart 4 highlights that net long speculative positions on the VIX had fallen to a new low over the past six months, a circumstance that has now completely reversed. But Chart 5 shows that valuation also appears to have been a factor contributing to the selloff, by presenting the abnormal returns shown in Chart 3 as a function of the difference between the market's 12-month forward P/E and that of the global benchmark. While the fit is somewhat loose, the chart confirms that markets with higher (lower) forward P/E ratios were more likely to have negative (positive) abnormal returns over the two-week period. Chart 3...But Not After Adjusting##br## For Riskiness After The Selloff: A View From China After The Selloff: A View From China Chart 4The Low-Vol Trade Contributed ##br##To The Speed Of The Selloff... The Low-Vol Trade Contributed To The Speed Of The Selloff... The Low-Vol Trade Contributed To The Speed Of The Selloff... Taken together, the association between the selloff and volatility/valuation should be viewed as a sharp reduction in complacency in the market. While this does not necessarily bode poorly for global equities over the coming 6-12 months, there are some potential implications to explore for China's investable stock market. Chart 5...But Valuation Was Also A Factor After The Selloff: A View From China After The Selloff: A View From China Complacency Risk And Chinese Stocks The sharp reversal in global markets raises the question of whether Chinese equities are complacent about some looming risk. The obvious candidate for complacency risk in China would be focused on its economy, and the potential for a more substantial economic slowdown than is currently expected by market participants. However, we are unconvinced that Chinese ex-tech stocks are somehow neglecting the risks facing China's economy over the coming year. First, we have noted in previous reports that Chinese investable ex-tech stocks are extremely cheap versus global ex-tech stocks, highlighting that investors have priced in a degree of structural risk. Second, recent economic data releases from China do not suggest that the pace of the ongoing economic slowdown is accelerating, suggesting that there is no basis to expect a severe downturn over the coming year. But we acknowledge that the same cannot be said for China's tech sector. While Chinese tech stocks are not stretched on a technical basis (either versus the investable benchmark or versus global tech stocks), several observations make us cautious about China's outsized tech exposure in a world of reduced complacency: First, the growth rates of IBES 12-month trailing and forward earnings growth for global technology stocks are currently at the 80th and 85th percentiles, respectively (Chart 6). This suggests that a substantial amount of fundamental improvement has already been priced in to global tech stocks, raising the risk of earnings disappointment over the coming year. Given that China's tech sector weight (42%) is considerably above that of the global benchmark (18%), a global tech selloff would cause China's investable stock market to underperform even if Chinese tech performance is in line with that of the global tech sector. Second, relative to global technology stocks, the growth rates of China's 12-month trailing and forward earnings growth are also quite elevated, at the 80th and 70th percentiles, respectively (Chart 6 panel 2). This suggests that the tech earnings exuberance observed globally is even worse in China. Third, Chart 7 highlights that China's tech sector has been responsible for pushing our relative composite valuation indicator for China into overvalued territory over the past year. Relative to global ex-tech, China's ex-tech stocks are still significantly cheap; relative to global tech, China's tech stocks are significantly overvalued. Last, we have noted in past reports that China's tech sector appears to be a domestic consumer play, and thus unlikely to significantly underperform over the coming year. However, we also noted in last week's report on China's housing market that the optimism of the consumer sector may be somewhat unfounded if it is based on expectations of future gains in employment and/or income.2 While we do not expect a broad-based retracement in China's consumer sector, even a moderate decline in consumer confidence could spark a non-trivial selloff in Chinese tech stocks given the stretched fundamental picture highlighted above. Chart 6Tech Earnings Growth##br## Is Significantly Stretched Tech Earnings Growth Is Significantly Stretched Tech Earnings Growth Is Significantly Stretched Chart 7Tech Stocks Have Pushed China ##br##Into Overvalued Territory Tech Stocks Have Pushed China Into Overvalued Territory Tech Stocks Have Pushed China Into Overvalued Territory Investment Recommendations Given our observations about the complacency risk facing Chinese tech sector stocks, we are making the following changes to our investment recommendations: We are closing our overweight MSCI China Free versus the emerging markets benchmark trade for a 31% relative return. This has been a core trade for BCA's China Investment Strategy service and has provided investors with significant outperformance since its initiation in May 2012. We are opening two new trades as a replacement for the closed China / EM position: 1) long MSCI China investable ex-technology / short MSCI All Country World ex-technology, and 2) long MSCI China investable value / short All Country World value. These two new trades are a slight variation of a single theme, which is to retain cyclical exposure to investable Chinese stocks while neutralizing exposure to the tech sector. While style indexes such as value and growth normally do not have such a stark sector orientation, Chart 8 highlights that the relative performance of China value vs global value looks very similar to our internally-calculated ex-technology indexes for both markets. This is because MSCI's China growth index is almost entirely made up of tech sector stocks, meaning that a relative value play effectively mimics an ex-tech position. As a final point, we noted above that it is difficult to see how Chinese ex-tech equities are complacent about the ongoing slowdown in China's economy. Chart 9 supports this view by presenting a model for China's investable ex-tech 12-month trailing earnings in US$ terms, based on the Li Keqiang index. The model fit has been tight over the past decade, and is currently forecasting roughly 10% earnings growth over the coming year. This would clearly represent a significant deceleration from current levels, but it is still a decent earnings result that signals Chinese ex-tech stocks are attractive on a risk/reward basis given the sizeable valuation discount that is levied on China relative to global stocks. Chart 8China Ex-Tech And Value:##br## Similar Performance Vs Global China Ex-Tech And Value: Similar Performance Vs Global China Ex-Tech And Value: Similar Performance Vs Global Chart 9Positive Ex-Tech Earnings Growth Likely, ##br##Even With A Slowing Economy Positive Ex-Tech Earnings Growth Likely, Even With A Slowing Economy Positive Ex-Tech Earnings Growth Likely, Even With A Slowing Economy We remain alert to the possibility of a further, more pronounced slowdown in China's economy, but barring that Chinese ex-tech stocks appear to be a solid buy over the coming 6-12 months. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Return Of Vol", dated February 6, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Is China's Housing Market Stabilizing?", dated February 8, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations