Emerging Markets

Feature Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update When Central Banks Turn Hawkish It seems almost as though, when central bank governors gathered in Portugal for the ECB's annual confab in late June, they agreed to start sounding more hawkish. ECB President Mario Draghi's speech included the line: "The threat of deflation is gone and reflationary forces are at play." Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz went ahead and on July 12 announced Canada's first rate hike in seven years. Indeed, BCA's Central Bank Monitors (Chart 1) suggest that, with the exceptions of Japan and possibly the euro area, all major developed central banks need to tighten monetary policy. Does this matter for risk assets, such as equities? Historical evidence suggests not, as long as the central bank is tightening because it is confident about the outlook for growth and unconcerned about financial risks (rather than, for example, reacting to a sharp rise in inflation). Equity markets typically move up in the early stages of a tightening cycle (Chart 2); it is only when the central bank tightens excessively (usually later in the cycle) that risk assets start to anticipate that this will trigger a recession. Even in the U.S. which, after four rate hikes since December 2015, is the furthest advanced in tightening, the real effective Fed Funds Rate is still -0.3%, below the 0.3% that the Fed believes to be the neutral real rate at the moment (Chart 3). The Fed expects the neutral rate to rise to 1% in the longer run. Chart 1Most Central Banks Need To Tighten Most Central Banks Need To Tighten Most Central Banks Need To Tighten Chart 2Equities Usually Rise During Rate Hike Cycle Equities Usually Rise During Rate Hike Cycle Equities Usually Rise During Rate Hike Cycle Chart 3Fed Policy Is Still Accommodative Fed Policy Is Still Accommodative Fed Policy Is Still Accommodative But the order in which central banks tighten will be a major driver of currencies (as has been clear with the sharp appreciation of the CAD and AUD in recent weeks). Our current asset recommendations are based on the belief that the market has become too complacent about the speed at which the Fed will tighten (with futures pricing only 26 bp of hikes over the next 12 months), and too nervous about the ECB (Chart 4). As the market starts to understand that the Fed has fallen a little behind the curve, and that the ECB will remain cautious (given continuing weakness in peripheral economies, and a lack of underlying inflationary pressures), we expect to see the dollar begin to appreciate again. A key to all this is whether the recent softness in U.S. inflation data (core PCE inflation has fallen from 1.8% YoY to 1.4% since January) proves to be temporary. A rebound in inflation would allow the Fed to continue to hike without bringing the real rate close to the neutral level yet. It is worth remembering that inflation is a lagging indicator: the recent weakness is largely a reflection of last year's soggy GDP growth (Chart 5), as well as some transitory technical factors (particularly drug and wireless data prices). The recent dollar depreciation should also boost inflation via the import price channel over the coming months (Chart 6). Chart 4Markets Views On Fed And ECB Have Diverged Markets Views On Fed And ECB Have Diverged Markets Views On Fed And ECB Have Diverged Chart 5Inflation Lags GDP Growth Inflation Lags GDP Growth Inflation Lags GDP Growth Chart 6Dollar Deprecation Will Raise Prices Dollar Deprecation Will Raise Prices Dollar Deprecation Will Raise Prices However, with global equities having produced a total return of 35% since their recent bottom in February last year, and 17% year to date, valuations are unattractive and, on some measures, sentiment is quite optimistic (Chart 7). What catalysts are there left to give risk assets further upside? We see two. First, earnings. The Q2 U.S. results season has seen 77% of S&P 500 companies surprising on the upside at the sales line, with EPS rising 7% compared to the same quarter in 2016. Most of our indicators suggest that earnings have further to rise this year (Chart 8), yet the consensus EPS forecast for 2017 as a whole remains at just over 10%, where it has been since January. Strong earnings momentum is likely to remain a positive at least through the end of the year. Second, tax cuts. Our Geopolitical Strategy service1 remains optimistic that the U.S. Congress will pass tax legislation to come into effect in early 2018. The failure to repeal Obamacare means that the Republican Party will need a big legislative win going into the mid-term elections in November 2017. Tax cuts (which the market is no longer pricing in - Chart 9) is one policy on which there is little disagreement within the GOP. Chart 7Are Investors Getting Too Optimistic? Are Investors Getting Too Optimistic? Are Investors Getting Too Optimistic? Chart 8Earnings Can Still Surprise On Upside Earnings Can Still Surprise On Upside Earnings Can Still Surprise On Upside Chart 9No One Expects Tax Cuts Any More No One Expects Tax Cuts Any More No One Expects Tax Cuts Any More None of the recession indicators we highlighted in our most recent Quarterly 2 (global PMIs, the shape of the yield curve, or credit spreads) are pointing to a downturn in the next 12 months. So, given the environment described above, we are happy to remain overweight equities versus bonds, and to maintain our pro-risk and pro-cyclical tilts. But we continue to warn of the risk of a recession in 2019 - probably triggered by the Fed needing to tighten more aggressively - and might look to lower our risk profile in the first half of next year. Equities: We favor DM equities over EM. An appreciating dollar, rising interest rates, weak industrial metals prices this year and uncertain growth prospects for China all represent headwinds for EM equities. Our strong dollar view points to an overweight in U.S. equities in USD terms but, in local currencies, our preference is for euro area and Japanese equities. Both are relatively high-beta, have strongly cyclical earnings momentum, and central banks that are likely to stay dovish. In Japan, the falling popularity rating of the Abe administration might compel it to ramp up fiscal spending to boost the economy, which would help the Bank of Japan in its efforts to rekindle inflation. Chart 10Everyone Has Turned Bullish On The Euro Everyone Has Turned Bullish On The Euro Everyone Has Turned Bullish On The Euro Fixed Income: Our macro outlook, with faster rate hikes and rebounding inflation in the U.S., is very negative for rates. We are underweight government bonds, short duration and prefer inflation-linked bonds to nominal ones. Valuations in credit are no longer particularly attractive but, with a 100 bp spread for U.S. investment grade bonds and a 230 bp default-adjusted spread for high-yield, returns are likely to be satisfactory as long as the economic cycle continues to improve. Currencies: Our fundamental view of the dollar is that relative monetary policy and interest rates point to further appreciation, especially against the yen and euro. The timing of the dollar's rebound, though, is harder to pinpoint. The euro could rise further over the next couple of months. However, given speculators' large net long positions in the euro - a big turnaround from the start of the year (Chart 10) - the likely announcement by the ECB in September or October of a reduction in its asset purchases might be the catalyst for a reversal (as a classic "buy the news, sell the rumor" event), particularly if Mario Draghi dresses it up as a "dovish tapering." Commodities: Oil inventories have begun to draw down in line with our expectations (Chart 11). Continued discipline by OPEC producers until next March, combined with a slowdown in the growth of U.S. shale production (reflecting the weaker crude price this year) should bring inventories down further (despite production increases in such countries as Libya and Iran), and push the price of WTI above $55 a barrel by year end. Industrial commodity prices have rebounded somewhat in the past six weeks, mainly on the back of moderately brighter economic data out of China (Chart 12). But, given uncertain prospects about the sustainability of this growth, especially beyond the Communist Party Congress in the fall, and amid some signs of weakness in Chinese monetary and credit aggregates,3 we remain cautious about the outlook for metals prices over the next 12 months. Chart 11Oil Inventories Will Draw Down Further in Oil Inventories Will Draw Down Further in Oil Inventories Will Draw Down Further in Chart 12Tick-Up In Chinese Data? Tick-Up In Chinese Data? Tick-Up In Chinese Data? Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bca.research.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Asset Allocation, "Quarterly Portfolio Review," dated July 3, 2107, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd," dated July 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Recommended Asset Allocation

This week we are sending you two Special Reports (both included in this document) that were previously published in the May and June editions of The Bank Credit Analyst. Both reports discuss the long-term outlook for global bond yields. The first report emphasizes the importance of demographics and the second focuses on the outlook for productivity growth. We are also sending a Weekly Report published jointly by our Global Fixed Income Strategy and U.S. Bond Strategy services. Highlights The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Feature In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart I-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart I-1Global Disequilibria Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Chart I-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart I-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart I-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart I-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart I-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart I-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart I-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart I-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. Chart I-6Hollowing Out Hollowing Out Hollowing Out The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart I-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart I-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart I-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart I-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Economic Integration And Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart I-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock Macro Impact Of Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart I-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart I-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Chart I-9Working-Age Population To Shrink In G7 And China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Working-Age Population To Shrink in G7 and China Chart I-10Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Globalization Peaking? Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Chart I-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart I-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart I-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart I-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart I-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart I-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart I-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart I-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: Chart I-13Demographics And Capex Requirements Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart I-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart I-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart I-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink ...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table I-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table I-1Key Secular Drivers Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart I-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart I-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Chart I-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst MarkM@bcaresearch.com 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. Chart II-1Productivity Growth Has Slowed In Most Major Economies Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software Has ##br##Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-4The Contribution To Growth ##br##From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-5Math Skills Around The World Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-6The Best Educated EMs Have The Worst Demographic Outlooks Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Emerging Markets: Interest Rates Tend To ##br##Be Higher Where Productivity Growth Is Weak Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In ##br##The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated ##br##The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-14Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Income And Consumption By Age Cohort Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-17Examples Of Capital-Biased ##br##Technological Change Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-20A Winner-Take-All Economy A Winner-Take-All Economy A Winner-Take-All Economy Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks ##br##To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The recent "abnormal" weakness in both M1 and M2 is due to various one-off factors. Removing these factors, Chinese money supply growth rates have been largely stable. Money and credit growth is currently slower than historical norms, but is far from alarming. The one-off factors have created enormous noise in Chinese money and credit numbers in recent years, rendering the effectiveness of various money "impulse" indicators. As the Chinese financial sector becomes more diversified and financial intermediation less bank-centric, the significance of money supply will diminish over time. It is increasingly important to take a broader view on the overall economy than solely relying on money and credit numbers to make a judgment on China's business cycle. Feature China's growth figures have mostly surprised to the upside in recent months, with one disconcerting exception: a deceleration in money supply. M1 money growth, after a sharp spike in 2015-2016, has slowed considerably. Broad M2 appears even more worrisome, decelerating to 9.4% in June, a record low since the data became available in the early 1980s. Historically, growth rates of monetary aggregates have been excellent leading indicators for the Chinese economy. In this vein, the downturn in money supply clearly raises a red flag and deserves closer scrutiny. The Alphabet Soup Of Money Supply Chart 1Three Layers Of Money Supply Three Layers Of Money Supply Three Layers Of Money Supply The People's Bank of China (PBoC) reports three measures of money supply that differ in terms of liquidity, i.e. the ease to make payments (Chart 1). M0, or the most liquid form of money supply, consists of bank notes and coins in circulation. M1 adds demand deposits of enterprises and government entities on top of M0, which is China's narrow money supply that can be readily used to make payments. The broader M2, besides M1, also includes deposits from households, savings deposits from enterprises, government entities and non-bank financial institutions. As China's funding channels have become increasingly diversified in recent years, the PBoC has been considering even broader aggregates, dubbed "M2 plus" or M3, to incorporate new financial instruments, though no such measures have been published yet. Chinese M0 has historically demonstrated strong seasonal patterns associated with the Chinese Spring Festival (Chart 2). Typically demand for cash increases sharply during the holiday season for shopping and gifting, and the PBoC injects fresh cash into circulation ahead of the festival, and withdraws it afterwards. Chinese M0 growth has been downshifting in recent years, and the trend is set to continue going forward, especially as Chinese consumers increasingly adopt mobile-payment tools. Empirically, there has been little correlation between M0 and economic variables. Conventional monetary economics suggests that the growth of broader money supply is an important variable in predicting the outlook for the business cycle and inflation. The reasons behind the predictive power of money supply, however, have not been entirely clear. Some have attributed it to the "transaction motive" - if the corporate sector anticipates improvement in the business cycle, it increases holdings of liquid assets so that it can take quicker action to expand. Others, however, suggest that companies may also increase holdings of liquid assets as "precautionary move" - when businesses and households feel insecure about the growth outlook, they will hold on to more liquid assets as a safeguard against unexpected setbacks, and postpone investments and expenditures. Regardless, empirically Chinese M1 has been tightly linked with numerous economic and financial variables over the past two decades (Chart 3). We suspect the linkage is likely driven by bank loans, which in turn are driven by the authorities' monetary and credit policies. Easing monetary and credit policies encourage bank lending, which replenishes the corporate coffers to expand, and vice versa. Chart 2Not Much Economic Information In M0 Not Much Economic Information In M0 Not Much Economic Information In M0 Chart 3M1 As A Leading Indicator M1 As A Leading Indicator M1 As A Leading Indicator Therefore, M1 and bank lending have historically largely been in sync (Chart 4). In this vein, the recent divergence is a glaring exception: M1 accelerated sharply since early 2015 and has decelerated notably since mid-last year, while credit growth has been largely stable. The divergence, in our view, is likely due to the local government "debt swap" program that debuted in early 2015, when local governments were allowed to issue municipal bonds to pay back the liabilities borrowed by "local government financing vehicles (LGFVs)."1 Chart 5 shows a dramatic increase in outstanding "muni bonds" in early 2015, coinciding with a sharp increase in M1. We suspect the proceeds of muni-bond issuance were temporarily parked on LGFVs' balance sheets, boosting M1. Subsequently, the cash hoard has been gradually withdrawn to retire maturing loans, while muni bond issuances have moderated, leading to a slowdown in M1 growth. Chart 4M1 And Bank Credit M1 And Bank Credit M1 And Bank Credit Chart 5M1 Was Boosted By Muni-Bond Issuance M1 Was Boosted By Muni-Bond Issuance M1 Was Boosted By Muni-Bond Issuance The important point here is that the sharp swings in M1 growth since early 2015 likely reflect exogenous one-off factors rather than real changes in credit flows and business activity. Therefore, the latest slowdown in M1 is likely noise rather than a signal for impending growth deceleration. A Closer Look At M2 Chinese M2 is the broadest measure of Chinese money supply that includes cash in circulation and various forms of deposits in commercial banks. The scope of M2 has been gradually evolving over time. In 2001, investors' deposits in brokerage accounts were included in M2, and in October 2011 it was further expanded to cover non-bank financial institutions' (NBFI) deposits in commercial banks as well as households' deposits in their "housing provident fund" accounts. Both moves led to abrupt changes in the M2 growth rate. Chart 6M2 And Bank Credit M2 And Bank Credit M2 And Bank Credit As deposits and loans are by far the largest items on each side of commercial banks' balance sheets, historically China's M2 growth rate has tracked bank loans closely, as they both reflect changes in commercial banks' balance sheets. However, there are two episodes of notable divergences between these two variables (Chart 6). In the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Chinese commercial banks were reluctant to lend amid a deflationary shock, and the government opened the fiscal tap on infrastructure investments through bond issuances, which kept money supply largely stable. More recently, Chinese M2 has decelerated sharply since early 2016 to a new record low. Credit growth, on the other hand, has also drifted lower but has remained considerably more buoyant. A closer look at the component of M2 sheds lights on the recent divergence between money and credit. In its current form, M2 includes cash in circulation, deposits from non-financial sectors (households, enterprises and government agencies) and NBFIs (Chart 7), accounting for 4%, 80% and 10% of M2, respectively. Importantly, even though NBFI deposits with commercial banks only account for 10% of total M2, they have been much more volatile, creating greater swings in the overall monetary aggregates. NBFI deposits increased dramatically between 2014 and 2015, have slowed sharply since early 2016 and have actually been contracting in recent months. Indeed, the contraction in NBFI deposits has contributed to the lion's share of the recent M2 slowdown. Excluding NBFI deposits, the other two components of M2 have also moderated in recent months, but are not nearly as alarming (Chart 8). Chart 7Closer Look At M2 Closer Look At M2 Closer Look At M2 Chart 8Boom-Bust In NFIB Deposits Distorted M2 Growth Boom-Bust In NFIB Deposits Distorted M2 Growth Boom-Bust In NFIB Deposits Distorted M2 Growth In other words, the dramatic swings in NBFI deposits have distorted the M2 statistics in recent years. The massive increase in NBFI deposits in previous years stoked up concerns among the Chinese authorities about financial excesses that triggered the regulatory and liquidity crackdown - and their recent contraction is the intended consequence of the government's policy tightening efforts. This, in fact, is one of the key reasons that the PBoC's liquidity tightening appears to have de-escalated of late.2 What Does It All Mean? We are usually unwilling to bore clients with the technical details of economic data, preferring instead to focus on the big picture. However, understanding the intricacies is of critical importance in understanding the recent "abnormal" developments in China's money supply. Still, several big-picture observations can be made. First, the recent "abnormal" weakness in both M1 and M2 is due to various one-off factors. Removing these factors, Chinese money supply growth rates have been largely stable, albeit slower than historical norms, as overall economic growth has downshifted. Meanwhile, various credit measures - both bank lending and "total social financing" - have also been steady (Chart 9). More importantly, longer-term loans to households and businesses have accelerated notably since early this year, which likely underscores improvement in capital spending. In short, there are no signs that the economy is facing an immediate material downturn. Second, the one-off factors in Chinese money and credit data in recent years have had a particularly large impact on various money "impulse" indicators, which attempt to measure changes in money and credit flows, simply because even if these one-off factors are marginal to the total outstanding amount of money stock, they could easily overwhelm the "flows" in any given timeframe. In recent years Chinese money and credit numbers have been frequently distorted by these factors, such as the muni bond-debt swap program, market-intervention by the Chinese government to rescue the stock market collapse in 2015, and the boom-bust in financial excesses in the interbank market. All of these factors have created enormous noise in money and credit numbers, but the impact on the real economy should be much less dramatic. Chart 9Credit Growth Has Been Largely Stable Credit Growth Has Been Largely Stable Credit Growth Has Been Largely Stable Chart 10M1 Is No Longer An Important##br## Leading Indicator For The US M1 Is No Longer An Important Leading Indicator For The US M1 Is No Longer An Important Leading Indicator For The US Third, a closer look at China's monetary statistics suggests that money and credit growth has been in a gradual downtrend in recent years. This confirms our view that China's growth recovery since early 2016 was to a greater extent due to significant improvement in monetary conditions rather than a massive increase in money and credit stimuli.3 On this front, growth improvement will likely push the authorities to tighten, creating economic headwinds going forward.4 We maintain our positive assessment on China's cyclical outlook, but the PBoC policy and the country's overall monetary conditions need to be closely monitored. Finally, the predictive power of money and credit for business cycles is contingent on the role a country's banking system plays in the economy. For example, money supply was a reliable leading indicator for the U.S. economy before the 1980s, but its correlation to the business cycle has become increasingly weaker in the past several decades, as capital markets have become more developed and the dominance of banks has been reduced (Chart 10). Currently, Chinese banks still plays a far more important role in the economy than their American counterparts, and therefore, "counting the money" remains critical. However, as the Chinese financial sector becomes more diversified and financial intermediation less bank-centric, the significance of money supply will diminish over time. In fact, bank lending currently accounts for about 70% of "total social financing," down from about 90% a decade ago. For investors, it is increasingly important to take a broader view on the overall economy than solely relying on money and credit numbers to make a judgment on China's business cycle. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Game Changer?" dated March 31, 2015, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Financial Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength", dated June 22, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Chinese Slowdown: How Much Downside?" dated June 8, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes", dated July 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Strengthening income growth is apparent in DM and EM trade volumes, real wages in the U.S., and industrial commodity prices, chiefly oil and copper. This indicates inflation at the consumer level will move higher in the near future, most likely in 2H2018. We believe 10-year U.S. Treasury Inflation-Indexed securities (TIPS) trading below 0.52 do not reflect the risk of higher inflation and are, therefore, going long at tonight's close. Energy: Overweight. Crude oil prices rallied 4.6% this week, following the OPEC 2.0 meeting in St. Petersburg. Although ministers did not announce additional cuts to the 1.8mm b/d agreed at the end of last year, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih said the Kingdom would reduce August exports to 6.6mm b/d, which is more than 300k b/d below May's level, the latest month for which data are available from JODI. Given strong global demand, if this export reduction persists - and if others join the Kingdom - it would speed the drawdown in global inventories. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper pushed through $2.80/lb on the COMEX, a level not seen since May 2015. Underlying strength in EM economic activity - seen most recently in global trading activity (discussed below) - and a weaker USD are supporting base metals. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold fell below $1,257/oz earlier this week, and was trading ~ $1,250/oz going to press Wednesday. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge; the position is up 1.7% since it was initiated on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Harsh weather is impacting grains. The USDA rated 62% of the U.S. corn crop in the 18 states comprising 92% of total output good or excellent last week, down from 76% in 2016. For beans, the split was 58% last week vs. 71% last year. Feature The expansion in global trade that began toward the end of last year continues, which, based on our modeling, indicates inflation at the consumer level likely will move higher in the short run (Chart of the Week). Trade expansion, particularly in EM economies, is consistent with rising incomes, which, all else equal, will keep industrial commodities - oil and copper, in particular - well supported, given income and demand for these commodities are closely aligned.1 These fundamentals dovetail with other indications of stronger growth, particularly in DM economies, where trade volumes also are growing (Chart 2). In the U.S., for example, wage growth continues to outpace inflation, and monetary conditions remain benign (Chart 3). Our colleagues at BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy believe the Fed actually may be behind the curve in reacting to nascent inflationary pressures emerging in the U.S.2 Chart of the WeekRising EM Trade Volumes Consistent##BR##With Higher U.S. CPI Inflation Rising EM Trade Volumes Consistent With Higher U.S. CPI Inflation Rising EM Trade Volumes Consistent With Higher U.S. CPI Inflation Chart 2DM Trade Volumes Are Expanding##BR##At ~ 5% Pace ... DM Trade Volumes Are Expanding At ~ 5% Pace ... DM Trade Volumes Are Expanding At ~ 5% Pace ... Chart 3U.S. Labor Market Tightening,##BR##Financial Conditions Remain Loose U.S. Labor Market Tightening, Financial Conditions Remain Loose U.S. Labor Market Tightening, Financial Conditions Remain Loose Trade Growth Supports Higher Inflation U.S. CPI is highly correlated with EM trade volumes (imports and exports) as shown in the Chart of the Week. In recent research into inflation and trade, we also showed EM oil demand and world base metals demand are highly correlated with EM trade volumes.3 Chart 4EM Trade Volumes##BR##Continue To Strengthen Growth EM Trade Volumes Continue To Strengthen Growth EM Trade Volumes Continue To Strengthen Growth EM import growth continues to expand at a faster pace than DM growth (Chart 4). Year-on-year (yoy) EM import growth came in at 7.7%, a full 2 percentage points above DM growth. This is not to minimize DM growth - it finally broke out of its lethargy in May with a sharp advance of close to 6%, which will lift the trend rate of growth (the 12-month moving average, or 12mma) higher going forward. EM export growth in May was only slightly above DM growth for the month - 5.4% yoy vs. 5.2% yoy. These stout monthly trade performances will, in the next few months, offset the lethargic growth seen in EM and DM prior to the expansion begun at the end of 2016, as weaker monthly performance falls off the trend calculations. Over the year ended in May, within EM markets the annual trend in imports (the 12mma to May 2017) has barely grown more than 1% yoy, dragged down by a 6% contraction in the Middle East and Africa (MEA) and a 2.1% contraction in Latin American growth. The trend in EM - Asia's imports is up, rising 3.2% over the same period. For the year ended in May, imports into central and Eastern Europe were mostly flat; however, since November 2016, the trend turned sharply positive with 3.3% yoy growth. The trend in export volumes is expanding for in MEA and Latin America economies - 3.5% yoy trend growth (12mma) in MEA, and 4.4% growth in Latin America, which is slightly higher than the overall 2.2% rate of trend growth in EM exports. Still, lower oil and commodity prices, along with reduced volumes are curtailing an income recovery in these regions. Central and Eastern Europe's rate of export expansion leads EM generally at close to 4% yoy trend growth. Favor Gold And TIPS Ahead Of Higher Inflation As the labor market tightens and real-wage growth continues to outpace productivity growth, we expect U.S. inflation to pick up. Growth in trade volumes also will support growth in EM oil demand and world base metal demand, as noted above. This will feed into U.S. core PCE, the Fed's preferred inflation gauge (Chart 5). As we've highlighted in the past, there is very strong co-movement among these variables: We've found that, all else equal, a 1% increase in the non-OECD oil demand implies an increase in the core PCE of slightly less than 50bp. If the trend in overall EM trade volumes persists, the likelihood we will be increasing our estimate of non-OECD oil consumption for 2H17 and 2018 increases. U.S. CPI and EM trade volumes show similar co-movement properties, as the Chart of the Week shows. A 1% increase in EM import volumes translates into a 0.53% increase in the U.S. CPI, while a 1% increase in EM export volumes implies a 0.49% increase in the CPI. EM import volumes over the January - May 2017 interval have been growing at slightly more than 8% yoy, while exports have been growing at slightly more than 3%. Continued strength in the EM trade data implies U.S. CPI could grow well above what's currently being priced in inflation markets and by Fed policymakers. This leads us to favour gold and TIPS as inflation hedges. If we do get a larger-than-expected move in the U.S. CPI, gold should respond well. The modelling depicted in Chart 6 shows a 1% increase in the CPI translates into a 4.1% increase in gold. Chart 5Core PCE Will Pick Up##BR##As Commodity Demand Grows Core PCE Will Pick Up As Commodity Demand Grows Core PCE Will Pick Up As Commodity Demand Grows Chart 6Gold Will Pick Up##BR##Larger-Than-Expected CPI Moves Gold Will Pick Up Larger-Than-Expected CPI Moves Gold Will Pick Up Larger-Than-Expected CPI Moves For this reason we recommend getting long U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), which will appreciate as the U.S. CPI moves higher.4 We will be getting long as of tonight's close. We remain long low-risk calls spreads in Dec/17 WTI and Brent - long $50/bbl strikes vs. short $55/bbl strikes. We are up 39.3% and 32.9% on the Brent and WTI positions, respectively, from last week, and 47.2% and 89.2% since inception. U.S. Monetary Policy Remains A Huge Risk To EM Trade As we've noted in the past, U.S. monetary policy can have an outsized effect on EM trade volumes. In an update of an earlier model using U.S. M2 and the broad trade-weighted USD (TWIB), we find a 1% increase in the broad trade-weighted USD translates into a 1.1% drop in EM imports, while a 1% increase in U.S. M2 (broad money) implies an 85bp increase in EM imports (Chart 7).5 Chart 7EM Trade Volumes Highly Sensitive##BR##To U.S. Monetary Policy EM Trade Volumes Highly Sensitive To U.S. Monetary Policy EM Trade Volumes Highly Sensitive To U.S. Monetary Policy This demonstrates the feedback loop we've identified between U.S. monetary policy and EM trade. EM trade volumes affect inflation at a global level. We've found inflation in the U.S., EU and China to be co-integrated - i.e., these price gauges all follow the same long-term trend. Inflation and inflation expectations drive Fed policy, which drives the price formation of the USD - i.e., the FX rates included in the USD TWIB - and affect Fed policy on M2. These U.S. monetary variables, in turn, affect EM trade volumes. And so it goes ... Too-aggressive a tightening by the Fed as it normalizes its interest-rate policy regime could destabilize EM economies - either via too-sharp an appreciation in the USD TWIB, a larger-than-expected deceleration in M2 growth, or both - and negatively affect trade flows. At the end of the day, this would redound to the detriment of the U.S. economy, as the different feedback mechanisms kick in. This says the Fed's policy doesn't just affect the U.S. economy, or that EM economies essentially are on their own in the policy tools they deploy to adjust to Fed innovations. Like it or not, the Fed has to consider these types of feedback loops in its decision-making, since the Open Market Committee will be dealing with the fallout of its earlier policies. Bottom Line: EM trade volumes continue to grow yoy, continuing the trend that began at the end of last year. This performance, coupled with a tightening labor market in the U.S. and a still-loose financial backdrop, raises the odds inflation will exceed what's currently priced into market and Fed expectations. We are getting long U.S. 10-year TIPS at tonight's close, and remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 The income elasticity for industrial commodities in EM economies is ~ 1.0, according to the OECD. Please see "The Price of Oil - Will It Start Rising Again?" OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1031, p. 6 (2013). 2 Please see BCA's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It?," published on July 21, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Among other things, the Global Investment Strategy team notes labor-market slack is dissipating, real wages are increasing, and easier financial conditions are spurring credit growth. Our colleagues note, "The prospect of stronger growth over the next few quarters implies that the unemployment rate is likely to fall below 4% early next year, possibly breaking through the 2000 low of 3.8%." BCA's Global Investment Strategy believes U.S. inflation could move higher by 2H18. 3 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Reports titled "EM Trade Volumes Continue Trending Higher, Supporting Metals" and "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 29, and June 8, 2017. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 U.S. TIPS increase in value as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rises, and fall in value as the index declines. Please see "TIPS: Rates & Terms" on the UST's TreasuryDirect web page (https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/tips/res_tips_rates.htm). 5 This model covers 2000 to the present, using monthly data. The R2 for the cointegrating regression is 0.96. These variables do not explain EM exports, which are not cointegrated with U.S. monetary variables. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights To shed light on the dichotomies that have surfaced in China's money and credit variables, we have calculated a new credit-money. This new measure is currently corroborating a very downbeat outlook for Chinese growth and China-related plays. We do not mean that investors should put all of their faith in this new measure. Yet, other measures of money and credit such as M1, M2 and banks' total assets all point to an impending deceleration in economic growth in China. While many global investors take for granted that the central government will underwrite credit risk in the entire economy, the top leadership in Beijing is sending the opposite message, at least for now. A new fixed income trade: pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates. Feature Chart I-1China: A Business Cycle Top Is In The Making China: A Business Cycle Top Is In The Making China: A Business Cycle Top Is In The Making Typically, the phrase 'Follow The Money' is used in the investment community to advise in favor of chasing investment flows. Today, we use this phrase in the context of not following investor crowds, per se, but money growth - especially in China. Judging from market actions and elevated inflows into EM assets and investable Chinese stocks, we can infer that investor consensus on China/EM is rather bullish. In the meantime, China's money/credit growth is sending a bearish signal. Investors should heed the downbeat message from Chinese money/credit and not chase EM risk assets higher. To reconcile the different messages from various measures of Chinese money and credit aggregates (more on the differences below), we calculated a new measure of money/credit creation - commercial banks' total credit (referred to below as banks' credit-money). Banks' credit/-oney is the sum of commercial banks' claims on companies, households, non-bank financial institutions, and all levels of government, as well as commercial banks'' and PBoC's foreign assets. Also, we deduct government deposits at the central bank (see below for the rationale). This measure, a de-facto aggregate of credit/money originated by banks and the PBoC, is computed using the asset side of banks' balance sheets. The key message from this report is that mainland banks' credit-money growth has already decelerated meaningfully, and points to a considerable slump in China's business cycle and imports in the months ahead (Chart I-1). Notably, banks' credit-money growth is at the lowest level of the past 10 years, excluding the Lehman crisis. It is also well below 2015 lows when the economy was acutely struggling. Exploring Money And Credit Dichotomies In China There has lately been a puzzling divergence between the growth rates of banks' credit-money, M2, and total social financing (TSF) (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Dichotomy Among Various Credit And Money Aggregates In China Dichotomy Among Various Credit And Money Aggregates In China Dichotomy Among Various Credit And Money Aggregates In China In 2016, banks' credit-money growth accelerated to 20%, while the pick-up in M2, and bank loan growth was modest. At the same time, TSF and corporate and household credit growth was largely flat. Lately, M1 growth has slowed, M2 and banks' total asset growth have dropped to all-time lows, while banks' loan and total social financing have remained flat. So, what is the true picture of money and credit growth in China? What are these critical variables telling us about the growth outlook? Our measure of banks' credit-money should by and large match broad money (M2) because the former is calculated by adding up various assets, and the latter by aggregation of various liabilities. Indeed, both were correlated well in the past, but decoupled in 2013 (Chart I-3, top panel). There has been another money/credit paradox: banks' credit-money on the one hand, and TSF and banks' RMB loans on the other, also have decoupled since 2013 (Chart I-3, middle and bottom panels). Overall, neither M2 nor TSF and banks' RMB loans mirrored the surge in banks' money-credit origination in 2015 and 2016, as portrayed in Chart I-3. We have been relying on the M2 and TSF aggregates published by China's central bank. Their tame readings in 2016 were the main reason we underestimated the duration and magnitude of China's economic recovery in the past year or so, as well as its impact on the rest of EM and commodities. As to components of banks' credit-money, Chart I-4 demonstrates that the deceleration has been due to the claims on non-financial organizations (companies), non-bank financial institutions and government. In brief, the slowdown has been broad-based; only claims on households continue expanding at a robust rate of 25% from a year ago (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-3M2 And Total Social Financing Have Not ##br##Reflected Money Created by Banks M2 And Total Social Financing Have Not Reflected Money Created by Banks M2 And Total Social Financing Have Not Reflected Money Created by Banks Chart I-4Individual Components Of Commercial ##br##Banks' Money Origination Individual Components Of Commercial Banks' Money Origination Individual Components Of Commercial Banks' Money Origination We suspect burgeoning financial engineering in China, credit shenanigans, and the non-encompassing nature of the People's Bank of China's broad money (M2) calculation along with the local government debt swap conducted in 2015 have all distorted credit and money data in recent years, producing the above dichotomies. To shed light on these dichotomies and calculate what has been true money/credit origination in China, we have revisited the basics of money and credit creation and have attempted to make sense of the data and the underlying trends. Overall, we have the following observations and comments: New nominal purchasing power in any economy is created by banks when they originate new loans. Hence, measuring properly the amount of new credit/money origination is of paramount importance to forecasting business cycle dynamics in any country. As we argued in our trilogy of Special Reports on Money, Credit and Savings, banks do not need savings or deposits to originate loans.1 They simultaneously create an asset (a loan) and a liability (a deposit) when extending credit to a borrower, which creates purchasing power in the economy. Importantly, there is no need for someone to save (i.e., forego consumption) in order for a bank to create a new loan / originate new money. In the case of China, commercial banks have an enormous amount of deposits - not because households and companies save a lot but because the banking system altogether has originated a lot of credit/money. The household and national savings rates quoted by economists refer to excess production/overcapacity in the real economy and not deposits in the banking system. We have discussed this issue in the past2 and will revisit it in future reports. The restraining factors for banks to originate new credit/money are their capital, regulations, loan demand, and liquidity - but not deposits. Liquidity is banks' excess reserves at the central bank. Commercial banks create deposits but they cannot engender reserves at the central bank, i.e., liquidity. Only the central bank can expand or shrink the amount of liquidity/reserves commercial banks hold with it. Finally, commercial banks do not lend their reserves; they use the reserves to settle transactions with other banks. In turn, central banks do not create new money/purchasing power unless they lend to or buy assets from governments and non-bank entities or issue currency. Central banks have a monopoly over the creation of bank reserves and currency in circulation - high-powered money. A liquidity crunch at a bank occurs when a bank runs out of excess reserves at the central bank, and it cannot borrow/attract additional reserves. Nowadays, many central banks targeting interest rates supply reserves and lend to commercial banks unlimited amounts of reserves on demand to assure interbank rates stay close to their policy target rate. Therefore, in such settings one can infer that banks are not restrained by liquidity to produce new money/expand their assets. In the case of China, the PBoC's claims on banks have skyrocketed - they have surged by 4.5-fold since 2014 (Chart I-5) - entailing that the former has supplied a lot of liquidity to commercial banks. Such liquidity expansion by the PBoC has in turn allowed banks to create tremendous amounts of new money (new purchasing power). To put the amount of money/credit originated by Chinese commercial banks in context, we have calculated the ratio of their credit/money stock to China's nominal GDP and global nominal GDP (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The PBoC Has Injected A Lot Of##br## Liquidity/Reserves Into The System The PBoC Has Injected A Lot Of Liquidity/Reserves Into The System The PBoC Has Injected A Lot Of Liquidity/Reserves Into The System Chart I-6Chinese Banks' Colossal ##br##Money Creation Chinese Banks' Colossal Money Creation Chinese Banks' Colossal Money Creation The broad measure of banks' credit/money created presently stands at 250% of Chinese GDP and 32% of global GDP, or US$29 trillion. The latter compares with the U.S. Wilshire 5000 equity market cap of US$ 26 trillion at a time when American share prices are at all-time highs, and the median P/E ratio is at a record high as well. In 2016 alone, Chinese banks' originated RMB 21 trillion, or US$1.7 trillion in new money-credit. Since January 2009, when the credit boom commenced, mainland commercial banks have cumulatively generated RMB 141 trillion, or US$21.12 trillion, of new money/credit. Banks create new money/deposits when they lend or acquire assets. Exceptions are when banks lend to the central bank or to other commercial banks. In those circumstances, a bank draws on its reserves at the central bank, and no new money - and by extension purchasing power - is created. Fluctuations in reserves/liquidity affect purchasing power in an economy indirectly rather than directly. Expanding reserves/liquidity encourage banks money/credit creation and vice versa. In China, commercial banks' excess reserves at the PBoC are presently contracting and stand at historically low level relative to outstanding stock of credit/money (Chart I-7). This is one of the reasons why banks have been scaling back their credit/money origination. Chart I-7China: Banks' Liquidity/##br##Excess Reserves Are Thin China: Banks' Liquidity/Excess Reserves Are Thin China: Banks' Liquidity/Excess Reserves Are Thin The fiscal authorities play a unique role in money creation. Because of the authorities typically have accounts at both the central bank and commercial banks, they can alter the money supply by shifting deposits back and forth between their accounts at the central bank and commercial banks. By transferring deposits from a commercial bank to the central bank, the fiscal authorities can destroy money; by the same token, they can create money by doing the opposite. This is why when computing Chinese banks' credit-money aggregate we have deducted from the credit/money aggregate government deposits at the PBoC. Finally, there is a difference between credit-money originated by banks, and non-bank credit. Non-banks are financial intermediaries that transfer existing deposits into credit. By doing so they do not create new purchasing power. When banks lend or acquire various assets, they do generate new purchasing power - i.e., they create new deposits that did not exist before. This is why banks are not financial intermediaries. This is true for any country and financial system. For more detailed analysis on the difference between banks and non-banks, please refer to the linked paper.3 When examining leverage in the system, one should consider bank and non-bank credit. Yet, when looking to gauge the outlook for growth and inflation, one should consider new credit/money originated by banks. The purpose of this report is to examine and compute new credit-money that determine nominal economic growth in China rather than discuss leverage even though they are often interlinked. Therefore, we are focused on new credit-money originated by banks, and not on the amount of and changes in leverage in the economy. Bottom Line: Whether one prefers M2, banks' total assets or our new measure of banks' credit/money, the message is by and large the same: money-credit growth is slowing and is very weak. Credit-Money And Business Cycle Chart I-8Comparing Two Impulse Indicators Comparing Two Impulse Indicators Comparing Two Impulse Indicators How good is the bank credit-money in terms of being an indicator for China's business cycle? We have one caveat to mention before we illustrate its relevance: Banks' credit-money is a stock variable, and our goal is to gauge business cycle trends - i.e., changes in flow variables such as output, capital spending, profits and imports. Also, the first derivative of a stock variable is a flow, while the second derivative of a stock variable is a change in its flow. Therefore, we have calculated credit/money impulse as the second derivative of outstanding credit/money, or a change in annual change, to align it with the growth rate of flow variables. The following illustrates that banks' credit-money impulse has been an extremely good leading indicator for many economic and financial variables. The new impulse of banks' credit-money has since 2014 diverged from the nation's credit and fiscal impulse (Chart I-8). Nevertheless, the new credit-money impulse leads numerous business cycle variables such as nominal GDP, producer prices, electricity output, machinery sales, freight volumes, and manufacturing PMI (Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B). Chart I-9AChina's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (II) China's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (I) China's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (I) Chart I-9BChina's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (I) China's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (II) China's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (II) Not surprisingly, this impulse also leads property sales and starts as well as construction nominal GDP (Chart I-10). This impulse often precedes swings in the LMEX industrial metals index and iron ore prices (Chart I-11). Further, it is also a reasonably good indicator for EM EPS growth (Chart I-11, bottom panel). As discussed above, banks' new credit-money creation determines nominal - not real - growth. Chart I-10China: Property / Construction ##br##Are At A Major Risk China: Property / Construction Are At A Major Risk China: Property / Construction Are At A Major Risk Chart I-11Downbeat Message For Industrial ##br##Metals And EM Profits Downbeat Message For Industrial Metals And EM Profits Downbeat Message For Industrial Metals And EM Profits By expanding their assets, banks generate new purchasing power, but they do not have any control over whether this new purchasing power is used to boost real output or prices. The recovery of the past 12 months have in some cases boosted prices more than volumes. It might be that China is inching closer to an inflation inflection point. We are not saying that China has runaway inflation at the moment, but persistent enormous overflow of money-credit will inevitably produce higher inflation. If inflation does indeed rise materially, policymakers will have no choice but to tighten. Monetary tightening will be devastating for an economy with already high leverage. Bottom Line: The new measure of banks' credit-money is currently corroborating a very downbeat outlook for Chinese growth and China-related plays. Beijing's Priorities And Investment Implications It is generally believed in the global investment community that China's authorities will not allow the economy to slump - they will boost credit/money growth and fiscal spending to ensure solid growth. It is true that no government wants to see their economy crumble, and China is no exception. However, there are several reasons to expect growth to slump considerably before the government responds: The central bank has been guiding interest rates higher across the entire yield curve. Short-term interbank rates (7-day Interbank Fixing Rate) and 5-year AA domestic corporate bond yields have risen by about 100 and 200 basis points, respectively, since November 2016. In addition, financial regulators are clamping down on off-balance-sheet and fancy financial engineering practices of banks and other financial institutions. Monetary policy works with a time lag, and the current tightening along with the government's regulatory clampdown will impact economic growth in the months ahead. The sharp deceleration in banks' credit/money confirms this. Even though interest rates have recently stopped rising, the damage to banks' credit/money growth has been done as shown in Chart I-12. Business activity is lagging money/credit and will be next to suffer. The central government in Beijing has largely lost control over credit creation/leverage build-up since 2009. The top leadership in Beijing did not want credit to explode and speculative behavior to profligate. Two recent articles by Caixin news agency (links are in footnote4) corroborate that Beijing is unhappy with credit creation and allocation practices prevailing in the financial system as well as among SOEs and local governments. The top leadership appears decisive, at least for now, in clamping down on ballooning credit/money growth and the ensuing misallocation of capital and bubbles. Interestingly, while many global investors take for granted that the central government will underwrite credit risk in the entire economy, or at least among state-owned companies, Beijing is sending the opposite message for now. True, when an economy and financial system crumbles, the central government will undoubtedly step in. However, investors do not want to be on the long side of China-related markets when this occurs. Buying opportunities may occur at that point, but for now the risk-reward profile is extremely poor. The authorities in Beijing tolerated colossal money/credit creation and misallocation of capital when growth in the advanced economies was extremely feeble. Now, with DM economies expanding at a solid pace and China's growth having recovered, they are comfortable tightening. As for the resulting investment strategy conclusions, it is too late to chase this rally in EM risk assets and other China-related assets. We do not mean that investors should put all of their faith in our new measure of China's credit/money. Yet, other measures of money and credit such as M1, M2 or banks' total assets all point to an impending deceleration in economic growth in China. In EM ex-China, narrow (M1), broad money and private credit growth have been and remain lackluster (Chart I-13). As China's growth and imports slump, the majority of EM economies will be materially affected. Chart I-12China: Interest Rates And Money Creation China: Interest Rates And Money Creation China: Interest Rates And Money Creation Chart I-13EM Ex-China: Subdued Money / Credit Growth EM Ex-China: Subdued Money / Credit Growth EM Ex-China: Subdued Money / Credit Growth There is no change in our overall investment strategy. Specific country recommendations and positions across all asset classes are always presented at the end of our reports, presently on pages 18-19. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Caitlynn Qi Zeng, Research Assistant caitlynnz@bcaresearch.com Central Europe: A New Fixed-Income Trade In a Special Report titled Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak from June 21st 2017 - the link is available on page 20, we argued that labor shortages in central Europe have been pushing up wage growth, generating genuine inflationary pressures. The Polish, Czech and Hungarian economies are overheating, warranting imminent monetary policy tightening. We elaborated on the reasons why this is happening in that report and as such we will not go through it in detail again here. Based on this theme, our primary investment recommendation was in the currency market: go long the PLN and CZK versus the euro and/or EM currencies. This recommendation remains intact. Today we recommend a new trade based on the same theme: pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates (Chart II-1). The negative 143 basis points yield gap between Czech and Polish 10-year swap rates is unsustainable and it will mostly close for the following reasons: The relative output gap between the Czech Republic and Poland is showing that the Czech economy is overheating faster than in Poland (Chart II-2). This will eventually lead to inflation rising faster in Czech Republic than in Poland as per Chart II-2. Markedly, relative trend in headline inflation warrants shrinking swap spread between Czech and Polish swap rates (Chart II-3). In effect, the Czech National Bank (CNB) will be forced to hike rates at a faster pace and more than the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The CNB has been artificially depressing the value of its exchange rate by pegging it to the euro since November 2013. Despite the fact that the CNB abandoned its peg in April of this year, the CNB continues to artificially suppress the exchange rate by printing money and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Chart II-1Pay Czech / Receive Polish ##br##10-year Swap Rates Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Chart II-2Czech Economy Will Overheat ##br##Faster Than Poland's Czech Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Poland's Czech Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Poland's Chart II-3Inflation Dynamics Warrant ##br##Smaller Swap Spread Inflation Dynamics Warrant Smaller Swap Spread Inflation Dynamics Warrant Smaller Swap Spread Foreign exchange reserves, measured in euros, in the Czech Republic are growing at an astronomical 60% annually while growth and inflation are already in full upswing (Chart II-4, top panel). Due to the ongoing foreign currency accumulation - accompanied by insufficient sterilization - the CNB has generated an overflow of liquidity and money/credit in the Czech economy (Chart II-4, middle panels). Chart II-4Monetary Conditions Are Easier In ##br##Czech Republic Relative To Poland Monetary Conditions Are Easier In Czech Republic Relative To Poland Monetary Conditions Are Easier In Czech Republic Relative To Poland In turn, this liquidity overflow has led a real estate boom and has super-charged overall growth (Chart II-4, bottom panel). On the contrary, the NBP has been much less aggressive in easing monetary conditions. The policy rate in Poland is at 1.5% while it is 0.05% in Czech Republic. Therefore, any potential upside in inflation and bond yields will be more limited in Poland than in the Czech Republic. Even though both Czech and Polish economic growth are robust, the Czech economy is showing more imminent signs of overheating and inflationary outbreak than Poland. The CNB is further behind the curve than the NBP. When a central bank is behind the curve, its yield curve should be steeper than a central bank that is not. However, the 10/1-year swap curve is as steep in Poland as it is in the Czech Republic. With the policy rate at a mere 0.05%, the Czech economy is sitting on the verge of an inflationary precipice. The longer the CNB maintains such a low policy rate, the higher long-term bond yields will rise. The basis being that the longer policymakers wait, the more they will have to tighten to slow growth and bring down inflation. Finally, this relative trade offers a hefty 143 basis points carry and is thus very attractive. Investment Conclusions In the fixed income and currency space in central Europe, we have been and continue recommending the following relative positions: A new fixed income trade: pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates Continue betting on yield curve steepening in Hungary: Receive 1-year / paying 10-year Hungarian swap rates Long Polish and Hungarian 5-year local currency bonds / short South African and Turkish domestic bonds. Long PLN and CZK versus EM currencies and/or the euro - we are long the following crosses: PLN/HUF, PLN/IDR, CZK/EUR For dedicated EM equity investors, we continue to recommend overweighting central Europe within an EM equity portfolio. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016; "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016; "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017; links available on page 20. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017; link available on page 20. 3 Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. 4 Please see, "Local Officials Now Liable for Bad Debt-Management Decisions for Life", July 17th 2017, Caixin Global, available at http://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-07-17/101117307.html Please see, "Local Governments Find New Ways to Play Debt Game", July 14th 2017, Caixin Global, available at http://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-07-14/101116048.html Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The "Trump Put" rumbles on, spurring equities, driving U.S. Treasury yields down, and hurting the dollar; White House incompetence, which underpins the "Trump Put," is about quantitative and qualitative staffing decisions, not the Russia collusion investigation; Tax reform will happen, but Congress is now in charge; Watch for the next Fed Chair nomination, more dollar downside could be ahead; China has preempted the next financial crisis with new regulatory oversight; The death of Abenomics is overstated. Feature We introduced the "Trump Put" in a recent report as a risk to our view that President Trump would get his populist economic agenda through Congress.1 The Trump Put posits that White House disarray and congressional incompetence will combine with decent earnings growth and steady global growth to produce Goldilocks conditions for U.S. equities, while simultaneously weakening the USD and supporting Treasuries. Thus far, the Trump Put continues to be in effect (Chart 1). Our House Views of further yield-curve steepening and a stronger USD have suffered from the ongoing "gong show" that is the Trump administration. The saving grace has been our high-conviction bullish equity view (Chart 2).2 Chart 1The Trump Put: Good For Equities,##br## Bad For Everything Else The Trump Put: Good For Equities, Bad For Everything Else The Trump Put: Good For Equities, Bad For Everything Else Chart 2S&P 500 Does Not##br## Care About Russia S&P 500 Does Not Care About Russia S&P 500 Does Not Care About Russia That said, we maintain our high-conviction view that the GOP will pass tax legislation in Q1 2018. Why? First, the failure to repeal Obamacare means that congressional Republicans will enter the midterm election season with no legislative wins. That is extraordinary given Republican control of both chambers of Congress and the executive. The House GOP members will not want to face an angry electorate in primary elections a year from now, or the general election, without a single major accomplishment. Second, Trump's low popularity will be an albatross around the neck of GOP candidates in the November 2018 elections, with potentially ominous results (Chart 3). Trump needs to pass a major piece of legislation; GOP congressmen have an interest in lifting Trump's popularity. Third, the House has passed the FY2017 budget resolution, which includes reconciliation instructions for tax reform. Given that only one budget resolution can be effective at any one time, the Obamacare replacement effort will end with the current fiscal year, on October 1.3 Chart 3GOP Is Running Out Of Time The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn While we remain confident that some form of tax legislation will ultimately pass - either watered down tax reform or mere tax cuts - we are far less confident that it will be stimulative. In other words, it will be done according to the congressional, not the White House, blueprint. House Speaker Paul Ryan has long demanded revenue-neutral reform. The just-passed budget resolution calls for $203 billion in spending cuts in order to make tax cuts revenue-neutral. This is a reversion to form after the period earlier this year in which several fiscal conservatives, like Representatives Kevin Brady and Mark Meadows, intoned that they would be comfortable with tax reform that was not revenue-neutral. At the beginning of the year, it looked like Trump would be able to use his bully pulpit to cajole the Congressional Republicans into stimulative tax reform or tax cuts. Previous Presidents, including Obama with the Affordable Care Act, have been able to punish overly ideological legislators for the sake of pragmatism and/or expediency. Certainly Trump remains popular with GOP voters (Chart 4), suggesting that he might be able to do so as well. Chart 4Trump Retains Political ##br##Capital With GOP Voters The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Six months into his presidency, however, Trump remains a no-show in terms of leadership. This is not merely the result of distraction with the "Russian collusion" charges against his campaign team and inner circle. The White House is simply not playing its traditional coordinating role to shepherd key bills through Congress. Political insiders, even the ones close to Trump, are signaling privately and via the media that the White House is in disarray and understaffed both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is in no shape, in other words, to coordinate the legislative process and play the role of peacemaker between the different congressional factions. At the heart of the disarray is an elite dispute within the White House itself between what we call the "Goldman" and "Breitbart" factions of the administration. The Goldman Clique: Donald Trump has staffed his administration with several financial sector luminaries whom he met while building his business empire. At the head of this faction is Gary Cohn, Director of the National Economic Council and leading candidate for the next Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (more on that later). Other members are Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and the most recent addition to the administration, the new White House Communications Director Anthony "the Mooch" Scaramucci. This faction is pragmatic, un-ideological (Cohn and "the Mooch" are essentially Democrats), and focused on passing tax reform and pro-business regulation. They prefer tax reform to mere tax cuts, and want middle class tax cuts to be balanced with pro-business corporate tax reform. The Breitbart Clique: Most commentators see the Goldman clique as the more powerful of the two White House factions, but Trump owes his electoral victory to a campaign molded along the ideological bent in line with the Breitbart faction. This group is led by Chief Strategist Steven Bannon and policy advisor Steven Miller.4 Behind the scenes, Bannon and Miller have managed to staff the White House with several Breitbart alumni, such as presidential advisors Sebastian Gorka and Julia Hahn, and (until her departure this month) Security Council Deputy Chief of Staff Tera Dahl. Factional fighting is not new to the White House. For example, the Obama administration was divided between foreign policy hawks - Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates - and doves - National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power. White House policy is often a product of compromise between different factions, producing sub-optimal outcomes. The problem with the Trump administration, however, is that the Breitbart faction is severely outmatched and unqualified for the job of coordinating legislative policy. Putting aside its ideological zealotry, this faction consists mainly of journalists without policy experience. This inexperience came to light with Trump's original executive order banning entry into the U.S. of nationals of several countries, penned by Bannon and Miller, which would have barred green card holders from entry. While that order may or may not have been constitutional, it was clearly impractical and aggressive. Another clear problem for the Trump administration is that its current Chief of Staff, former RNC Chairman Reince Priebus, is weak and ineffective. Priebus was a compromise candidate between the two factions and someone seen as acceptable to Republicans in Congress. Since his appointment, however, he has been a no-show. It was his idea to focus on replacing Obamacare ahead of tax reform (despite the absence of a GOP blueprint for the former and the existence of a blueprint for the latter), and it was his idea to give the overmatched Sean Spicer the role of managing the press. The chief of staff should be a force of nature, capable of instilling fear into the president's congressional allies in order to get legislation moving and reduce cliquish in-fighting. A successful chief of staff is usually a controversial and abrasive figure, such as Rahm Emanuel at the beginning of President Obama's first term. He bullied and cajoled Democrats into passing Obamacare with legendary brutality. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy rarely delves into personality-driven analysis. It is too idiosyncratic, not systematic. However, as a country's political leadership becomes more "charismatic"5 - driven by personality rather than institutions - individuals, factions, and court intrigue matter more. What does all of this mean for investors? First, the White House is failing in its coordinating role. As such, Republicans in the House will take the lead on tax reform. Revenue neutrality will be emphasized. For this to change, the White House would have to reshuffle its personnel more extensively, including replacing Priebus. Second, if fiscal policy fails to take off, Trump will put greater stock in monetary policy. Our colleagues - who are economists, not political analysts - believe that the U.S. is likely to enter into recession in 2019, as the 2020 electoral campaign heats up. However, folks like Gary Cohn and Steve Mnuchin can see the same writing on the wall, and will probably try to avoid such a badly timed recession. Chart 5 shows that household debt has continued to decline as a share of disposable income; the share of national income going to labor has increased; and wage growth among lower-income workers who tend to spend most of their paychecks has accelerated. All of this should give consumers the wherewithal to spend more, warranting higher interest rates. Meanwhile, financial conditions have significantly eased due to USD weakness and declining bond-yields, which should boost growth in the second half of this year (Chart 6). Chart 5Households Have The ##br##Wherewithal To Spend More Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Chart 6Financial Conditions##br## Have Eased Financial Conditions Have Eased Financial Conditions Have Eased With Congress increasingly in charge of fiscal policy and a recession possible in 2019, we would expect Trump to do everything he can to ensure that the Fed retains its dovish bias when Chair Janet Yellen's term expires on February 3. This means that he is likely to favor a non-economist and a loyal adviser, like Gary Cohn, over any of the more traditional, and hawkish, Republican candidates. While there is some speculation regarding Cohn's policy preference, we are yet to find an insider (either of the FOMC or the White House) who denies that he is a dove. The intrigue should not last long. Both Yellen and Bernanke were nominated with considerable lead time: 114 days before the end of her predecessor's term for Yellen, and 91 days for Bernanke (Chart 7). We would therefore expect the next Fed Chair to be known by Thanksgiving. Is Cohn a controversial pick? Not really. As our colleague John Canally of BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy has pointed out, lack of Fed experience does not make Cohn particularly unique as a candidate. Since the late 1970s, presidents have tended to select the Fed Chair based on their relationship with a candidate, not previous central banking experience (Table 1).6 Cohn would only break the orthodoxy by being the first candidate to be appointed from across the ideological aisle, given that he is a Democrat. (Although several chairs have been reappointed by presidents from opposing political parties.) Chart 7How Long Does It Take To Confirm The Fed Chair? The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Table 1Characteristics Of Fed Chairs Since 1970 The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn A number of previous Fed chairs were selected for loyalty over academic merit or central banking experience. President Nixon's pick for the chair, Arthur Burns (Chair from 1970-1978), was the head of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and was a special counselor to Nixon before being appointed. William Miller (Chair from 1978-1979), although having served as an outside director for the Boston Fed, was appointed largely because of his work on the political campaigns of Hubert Humphrey and Jimmy Carter. Alan Greenspan (1987-2006) served as Chair of President Reagan's Social Security Commission in the early 1980s, Chair of President Ford's CEA, and advised Nixon's campaign in 1968. Only Volcker, Bernanke, and Yellen had previously held posts in the Federal Reserve System. The market cares about the appointment of the Fed chair. In 2013, for example, Larry Summers and Janet Yellen were in the running for the position, with Summers viewed as the more hawkish of the two. When he withdrew from the race on September 15, the market's expected pace of rate hikes plunged and long-dated TIPS breakevens surged on the expectations of a more dovish Fed (Chart 8). Given that the market is currently discounting just 27.4 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, down from the recent peak of 36 bps (Chart 9), there may not be much room to get more dovish.7 Chart 8Yellen Vs. Summers Drove Markets In 2013 Yellen Vs. Summers Drove Markets In 2013 Yellen Vs. Summers Drove Markets In 2013 Chart 9Market May Be Right? Market May Be Right? Market May Be Right? Nonetheless, President Trump may not want to gamble with his Fed appointments. If we are right to assume that he is an economic populist, and that his fiscally stimulative agenda is slipping away, then we would expect the White House to err on the side of Fed appointments that would be behind the proverbial curve. In addition to Yellen, Trump will have the opportunity to appoint a new Vice Chairman of the Fed in place of Stanley Fischer on June 12, 2018 (Diagram 1), as well as another candidate for the Board of Governors (after already having nominated Marvin Goodfriend and Randal Quarels). By mid-2018, the Fed will start to take on a new composition altogether. Diagram 1Federal Reserve Board Of Governors Calendar The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Staffing the Fed with doves fits at least two of President Trump's campaign promises. First, if the Fed were to fall behind the curve, nominal GDP would likely surprise to the upside. Second, the USD would continue its downward trajectory, helping rebalance America's trade deficit. As such, we take the potential nomination of Gary Cohn seriously. And we expect the market will as well. That said, a Cohn-led Fed would not be a fundamental break with the past. In fact, Yellen has herself intoned that the Fed may want to let inflation run above 2% in past speeches. In addition, Trump's first two nominees to the Fed do not fit a dovish mold. Conservative economist Marvin Goodfriend is a hawk and favors rule-based policymaking. Randal Quarels will focus on regulating the financial sector, or rather deregulating it, although his policy orientation is largely unknown. Furthermore, other potential Fed Chair nominees, such as Kevin Warsh and Richard Fisher, would be more hawkish than Yellen. And if they are not selected to replace Yellen, they could replace the current Vice-Chairman Fischer. As such, investors should not overreact to a Cohn appointment. However, currency markets might, given that the Trump White House has been highly unorthodox. Bottom Line: There is likely more downside to the USD over the rest of the year. China: A Preemptive Dodd-Frank Last week we argued that China is likely to escalate financial regulation considerably over the next 6-12 months.8 Essentially, the "financial crackdown" or "deleveraging campaign" seen in H1 of this year was just a dress rehearsal for what is to come. The larger policy shift will exert downward pressure on economic growth in H2 2017 and throughout 2018, essentially putting a cap of about 7% on China's growth rate. True, the Chinese government will strive to avoid letting the new regulatory push lead to a sharp slowdown, i.e., shattering its preexisting commitment to an average GDP growth rate of 6.5% per year through 2020. However, the risks lie to the downside over the next 18 months due to the combination of unaddressed structural imbalances, cyclically fading economic tailwinds, and further policy tightening. We have outlined the structural flaws before. In brief, they include: Demographics: The working-age population is declining, yet the social systems to improve productivity are not yet adequate. Economic model: The investment-led model has become inefficient, requiring China to add more and more debt in order to generate the same amount of growth, in a manner reminiscent of South Korea prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (Chart 10). The transition to consumer-led growth is incomplete, with households still reluctant to take over from corporates in driving spending. Financial transmission: China's banking sector has expanded quickly, leading to a rise in bad loans and "special mention" assets, as losses from large companies remain elevated (Chart 11). The shadow banking sector is highly leveraged, poorly regulated, and extremely risky, and has mushroomed since 2008. Fiscal system: Local governments lack stable sources of funding and therefore rely on SOE debt and manipulation of the land market in order to fund their 85% share of China's fiscal spending. The government's recent fiscal reforms (the VAT extension) have actually further deprived local governments of revenues. Inequality and social ills: Wealth inequality, social immobility, regressive taxation (Chart 12), and an inadequate social safety net have hindered the development of the consumer society as well as innovation and entrepreneurship. Centralized authoritarianism: The political system perpetuates the above ills by disallowing free speech, free association, free movement, and other freedoms that would encourage innovation and total factor productivity. Chart 10More And More Reliant On Debt For Growth More And More Reliant On Debt For Growth More And More Reliant On Debt For Growth Chart 11Bad Loans Rising Bad Loans Rising Bad Loans Rising Chart 12Communism Fails To Redistribute Income The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Meanwhile, we have several reasons for anticipating a larger, less accommodative policy shift over the next six-to-twelve months: Policy drift: China's economic policy has been adrift over the past year and a half, as reflected by elevated economic policy uncertainty. While President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign is no longer relevant in a macroeconomic sense - and this theoretically opens the way for him to pursue his ambitious economic reform agenda - he has so far chosen stimulus over restructuring due to the instability of 2015-16. Now, as the latest stimulus measures fade (Chart 13), the question of how to go forward is pressing, since to re-apply the same policy mix in 2018 would be to forgo his reform agenda until 2019 ... and probably once and for all. Warning signs: The central government's launch of a deleveraging campaign this year was risky and surprising. It was risky because central financial authorities in any country threaten a liquidity squeeze when they tighten financial conditions into large and rapidly growing leverage. It was surprising because the authorities chose to do so when a mistake could have upset political stability in advance of the midterm party congress. The implication is: (1) authorities intended a limited campaign from the beginning; (2) the newly appointed leaders of financial regulatory bodies are no-nonsense people.9 They take very seriously, as we do, China's systemic financial risks. They believe risky measures are necessary to prevent the dangerous credit excesses. The National Financial Work Conference: The conference concluded with Xi putting his imprimatur on a renewed policy focus on the financial sector: Reducing systemic risk, reducing speculation (lending to the real economy), and eventually putting the sector back on the path of liberalization. The specific outcomes amount to something like a preemptive Dodd Frank: The People's Bank of China will take on a larger role in identifying and monitoring systemically important institutions; it will also host a new inter-agency body - the Financial Stability and Development Committee (FSDC) - that will ostensibly ensure better cooperation and coordination between the regulators of banks, stock markets, insurance, etc. Finally, the meeting signaled that this year's deleveraging campaign would expand (beyond shadow banking, insurance companies, and private companies roving overseas) to affect over-leveraged SOEs and local government financing vehicles. Significantly, local government officials will be made accountable for excessive debt. This last point should not be underrated. At the height of the anti-corruption campaign, in late 2014, fiscal spending numbers remained depressed and government agency cash deposits continued rising even after the central government tried to encourage faster growth (Chart 14), suggesting that local officials were refraining from spending due to fears that they would be punished for it.10 We consider these announcements to be substantive - i.e., not the usual propaganda - even if they take some time to get off the ground. The financial conference was frowned upon by much of the mainstream media because some interpret the FSDC as failing to live up to the rumor that China would create a new "financial super-ministry." But the rise of super-ministries under the Hu Jintao administration resulted in very little substantive change to Chinese policy. By contrast, Xi Jinping signaled that the PBoC would be the chief instrument of the new financial regulatory push, and he has already shown he can operate exceedingly effectively through existing institutions - namely the Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC), which went from being an ineffective intra-party corruption watchdog to a nationwide vehicle for the party's most aggressive corruption investigations and personnel purges in recent memory. We are willing to bet that the PBoC's new powers, including the new financial stability committee, will be more aggressive than the merely status quo multiplication of administrative functions that the financial media and markets apparently expect. The changing of the PBoC's Guard: It is not a coincidence that greater regulatory powers are being planned for the PBoC in the final months of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan's term. Zhou has been in office since late 2002. He has been a cornerstone figure in China's financial stability and reform throughout this period, including during the global crisis and the various financial panics from 2010-16. He has allegedly desired a more muscular central bank to tackle the country's ballooning credit risks. By handing off the baton, he clears the way for a new, ambitious governor to succeed him, one who will maintain policy continuity while also taking the opportunity of the transition to implement a new and tougher regulatory framework. Consider that after Xi put the ambitious Guo Shuqing in charge of the China Banking Regulatory Committee in February, Guo immediately launched a notable crackdown on shadow banking.11 Guo is a possible contender for the central banker position; the other likely contenders have strong credentials in regulatory oversight as well as banking. The 19th National Party Congress: The midterm leadership reshuffle will mark Xi's consolidation of power, which will enable him to pursue his policy preferences more effectively in 2018-22. He could still be prevented by exogenous events, but domestic politics should be less of an obstacle for him going forward. Chart 13China's Economic##br## Tailwinds Fading China's Economic Tailwinds Fading China's Economic Tailwinds Fading Chart 14Anti-Corruption Campaign Hindered##br## Local Government Spending Anti-Corruption Campaign Hindered Local Government Spending Anti-Corruption Campaign Hindered Local Government Spending What about Xi's political capital within the top Communist Party bodies? We are in the thick of major decisions as we go to press. The highest level of leadership - the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) - is expected to have its members chosen, in secret, in August when the current PSC and other party heavyweights will likely convene at Beidaihe to settle the list. The fall of Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai in mid-July gives a few hints as to what might occur. Sun was ostensibly sympathetic with Xi, and until now the likeliest candidate for Premier Li Keqiang's replacement in 2022. His ouster means that four of the top five candidates on the PSC come from the rival camp to President Xi, i.e., the "Hu Jintao faction," which is rooted in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Lineup Of New Politburo Standing Committee Yet To Take Shape - Factions Evenly Balanced? The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn There are two likely pathways from here: either Sun's fall is part of a bargaining process and other CCYL members will soon be removed from the running for the PSC; or they will not be removed, which would mean that Xi gets along much better with the top CCYL members than is generally believed. The latter is unlikely, but possible, given that Xi and former President Hu Jintao did cooperate on critical power arrangements in the 2012 leadership transition. However, the most recent reports suggest that several CCYL members who were seen as rising stars (for 2022 leadership and beyond) have not received invitations to the party congress, including the current party secretary of the CCYL.12 If this proves to be the case, then it strongly suggests that Xi is continuing to undercut the CCYL. That, in turn, suggests that Xi will not tolerate the current scenario in which he stands to be outnumbered four-to-one on a five-member PSC. Instead, we should expect at least one major CCYL contender for the PSC to be removed in the coming months. This would enable Xi to gain the balance on a seven-member PSC. If the PSC is to be reduced to five members, then he would have to oust two major CCYL members - a more dramatic power play, but presumably within his reach given what he has achieved so far. Ultimately it is impossible to predict the PSC (and broader Politburo) membership precisely. All we can point out is that a failure by Xi to consolidate control on the top bodies - which is no longer our baseline view - would have bullish short-term but bearish long-term implications for growth. It would suggest, first, that Xi is weaker than he appears; second, that the aggressive financial regulatory drive outlined above, as well as other painful but necessary reforms, will be watered down as a result of resistance at top levels; third, that China is increasingly resisting the "creative destruction" that Xi threatens to bring about in the pursuit of making China more efficient. Bottom Line: A number of signs suggest that Chinese politics will become a headwind, rather than tailwind, to growth after the party congress. Xi's move to undercut the opposing CCYL faction ahead of the party congress confirms this view. His new policy will focus on deleveraging and financial sector restrictions. The commitment to stability will remain in place, however. Japan: Abe Is Not Yet Dead, Long Live Abenomics Shinzo Abe's approval rating has plummeted since June (Chart 15). His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has also seen its popularity fall. This has been notable in relation to the flat polling of the LDP's main coalition partner, New Komeito (Chart 16). Chart 15Abe's Luck Runs Out? The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Chart 16Ruling LDP Also In Trouble Ruling LDP Also In Trouble Ruling LDP Also In Trouble Abe has been buffeted by a combination of spiraling corruption scandals and the loss of the Tokyo Metropolitan legislature in the local election of July 2. As if this were not bad enough, the Japanese economy is set to slow down (Chart 17).13 Chart 17A Slowdown In Japan A Slowdown In Japan A Slowdown In Japan Our readers will recall that we think there is a deeper cause for Abe's sudden loss of popularity: his proposed constitutional revisions, which he laid out in detail in May. Ever since he secured a virtual two-thirds supermajority in the House of Councillors (the Upper House) in July 2016, we have maintained that he would push ahead with controversial constitutional revisions that aim to enshrine the Japanese military. We expected that these changes would sap Abe's support - as did the debate over the new national security law in 2015 (Chart 18), only bigger this time because the matter is constitutional.14 However, the Tokyo election loss does not portend the death of Abe, and regardless, Abenomics itself will survive. Why? Because it is Abe's constitutional and security agenda that is unpopular, not Abenomics. Understood as economic reflation with elements of restructuring, like wage growth, Abenomics will actually intensify over the next year and a half as a result of the new threats to Abe's and the LDP's popularity and agenda, to which they will respond. Abe is more deeply committed to this constitutional mission than to Abenomics. It is his most ambitious plan and his economic policy supports it. Revising the constitution is about Japan seizing its own destiny again as a sovereign nation and also locking in the American alliance by offering greater military assistance to the U.S. Hence, at this point, economic reflation is not only an end in itself but also a means to a constitutional end. First, note that Abe's coalition in the upper house is not as "super" of a super-majority as is widely believed. He needs the support of smaller right-wing parties that are sympathetic toward his constitutional revisions to cross the 162-seat threshold for a two-thirds vote in the upper House of Councillors to approve constitutional reforms. But the LDP's three partner parties that are in favor of revision, as well as at least one independent, could raise objections and that would sink the revisions (Diagram 3). There are others with misgivings. Economic slowdown is not a recipe for Diet members to make big political sacrifices on Abe's account, so we expect monetary and fiscal policy to remain easy. Chart 18Abe Loses Support When He Talks ##br##Security Instead Of Economy The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Diagram 3Super-Majority ##br##Barely Within Reach The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Second, if the constitutional changes pass the upper and lower houses of the Diet by two-thirds votes, they must pass a nationwide referendum. While there is majority support for revisions of some sort, there is a roughly 50-50 division on the question of altering Article 9 (Chart 19), the article that forbids Japan to maintain military forces. This is the bullseye of Abe's proposal. The need for 50% of the nation to vote "yes" is an even bigger reason for Abe to pull policy levers to keep the economy humming before a potential referendum date in December 2018. Finally, even in the unlikely scenario that Abe's approval rating drops into the mid-20s or below and the LDP ousts him, we do not expect the next LDP leader to alter Abenomics in any significant way. The frontrunners for Abe's replacement in the September 2018 LDP party leadership poll, such as Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, would likely soften their predecessor's policy on remilitarization and constitutional revision, but would also launch a substantively similar economic policy that the media would promptly dub "Kishidanomics," "Ishibanomics," or "Asonomics." Thus, on fiscal policy, the focus will remain on fiscal support and lifting wages and social spending. Rules calling for fiscal restraint will be relaxed. On monetary policy, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda is eligible for reappointment on April 8, 2018. So are his two deputies. Furthermore, the monetary policy committee members appointed since Kuroda have also been ultra-dovish like him.15 In short, the BoJ underwent a regime change in 2012 and will not revert back to the norms that prevailed before the global financial crisis, before the LDP lost power to a serious opposition party (2009), and before the shock to the national psyche that occurred during the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis. Further, Japanese households are only hardly net savers anymore (Chart 20), and have for five years voted for a more reflationary policy. And aside from the current path of stealth debt monetization, there is no other way of managing the nation's debt other than fiscal austerity, which is not an option for an increasingly elderly population dependent on government social spending. The era of BoJ unorthodoxy is here to stay, at least as long as the LDP is in power (December 2018), if not longer. Chart 19Revise The Constitution? Yes.##br## End Pacifism? Maybe. The Wrath Of Cohn The Wrath Of Cohn Chart 20Japanese No Longer ##br##Savers Who Fear Inflation Japanese No Longer Savers Who Fear Inflation Japanese No Longer Savers Who Fear Inflation Bottom Line: Abe's downfall is not assured, and would portend the end of Abenomics in name only. The next LDP government would maintain Abenomics, as it is driven by structurally limited options. Fade any selloff in Japanese equities. However, in the long run, Abenomics may prove a failure in terms of defeating deflation. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The 'Trump Put' Last?" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep," dated May 31, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 As a reminder to the uninitiated readers, Breitbart is a conservative magazine that has been a platform for a slew of unorthodox right-wing views more in line with modern nationalist European political movements than the American conservative movement. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration," dated July 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Every Which Way But Loose," dated July 18, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "Questions From The Road," dated July 1, 2015, and "Policy Mistakes And A Silver Lining," dated October 7, 2015, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see Gabriel Wildau, "China bank overseer launches 'regulatory windstorm,'" Financial Times, April 18, 2017, available at www.ft.com. 12 Please see Jun Mai, "Guess who's not invited to China's key Communist Party congress," South China Morning Post, July 23, 2017, available at www.scmp.com. 13 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "A Soft-Spoken Yellen," dated July 14, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see footnote 11 above. 15 The last two dissenters, Takehiro Sato and Takehide Kiuchi, stepped down when their terms expired on July 23, 2017. They were replaced by Goshi Kataoka and Hitoshi Suzuki, who are expected to support Governor Haruhiko Kuroda's dovish approach. Now all nine policy board members have been appointed by the Abe administration. Please see "Two new Bank of Japan policymakers join board," Japan Times, July 24, 2017, available at www.japantimes.co.jp.

Highlights China's strong second-quarter growth numbers released early this week confirmed the synchronized global growth upturn within the major economies. Our model is predicting an imminent increase in the PBoC's benchmark lending rate. Higher rates in China are reflective rather than restrictive. The PBoC will likely maintain a tightening bias, but this should not lead to major growth disappointments. The latest MFWC pledges "re-regulation" of the financial industry and remains committed to developing capital markets. Increasing supplies of equities through IPOs will put some downward pressure on stock prices - especially in the domestic small cap space. Feature The Bank of Canada hiked its policy rate by 25 basis points last week, the second major central bank to tighten after the Federal Reserve in the current cycle. While it is unclear whether central bankers maintain secret communication channels, effectively there appears to be a "coordinated recalibration" of monetary policies among major central banks, due largely to a synchronized growth upturn within the major economies. China's strong second-quarter growth numbers released early this week fit with this broad theme. There are rising odds that the People's Bank of China (PBoC) will join the proverbial global party with rate hikes. In addition, the Chinese authorities have pledged a tougher stance on the financial industry. Reflective Or Restrictive? China's latest data have shown across-the-board strength of late. Most indicators have surprised to the upside, rectifying our positive assessment.1 With the latest growth numbers, our model is predicting an imminent increase in the PBoC's benchmark lending rate (Chart 1). The model follows a modified version of "Taylor's Rule," in which external factors are also considered for open economies. In China's case, both improvement in growth and the Fed's interest rate hikes have played a strong role in setting the stage for higher policy rates in China. The model currently predicts 50 to 75 basis points in rate hikes by the PBoC. Historically, our interest rate model has done a reasonably good job in capturing the major turning points in China's policy rate cycles. This time around, the country's interest rate reforms may have complicated the model's predicting power. In short, the PBoC is in the process of diminishing the importance of the benchmark lending rate, while promoting market-based interest rates. The central bank has theoretically fully liberalized commercial bank interest rates since 2015, and therefore it is unclear whether it will abandon benchmark policy rates, which is viewed as an outdated tool. Instead, the PBoC has been trying to build an interest rate "corridor" in which it uses monetary and liquidity measures to guide market interest rates. The upper band of the interest rate corridor appears to be the interest rates of the PBoC's lending facilities - the cost for financial institutions to borrow from the central bank - while the lower band is the interest rate the PBoC pays on commercial banks' excess reserves (Chart 2). In this vein, the 6-month Medium Term Lending Facilities (MLF) interest rate has already been raised by 20 basis points since late last year, and interbank rates have been guided higher. Chart 1Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes Chart 2Interest Rate Corridor' ##br##Has Been Lifted Higher Interest Rate Corridor' Has Been Lifted Higher Interest Rate Corridor' Has Been Lifted Higher Chart 3Bank Loan Rate Is On The Rise Bank Loan Rate Is On The Rise Bank Loan Rate Is On The Rise Nonetheless, the upturn in our interest rate model justifies higher rates engineered by the PBoC. Regardless of whether the PBoC explicitly raises its policy lending rate, interest rates in China have already moved higher (Chart 3). Tighter liquidity and higher bond yields since late 2016 suggest that average bank lending rates should have increased by probably 50 basis points in recent months. Higher rates in China are a reflection of stronger growth rather than policy tightening to tame business activity, at least for now. After all, China's nominal GDP growth has rebounded from 6.4% in late 2015 to 11.1% in the second quarter of 2017 - a sharp turnaround in nominal business activity that calls for higher interest rates. Similarly, recent hawkish - or less dovish - rhetoric from other central banks all reflect improving growth where "emergency" levels of monetary accommodation are no longer needed (Chart 4). With the exception of Japan, BCA Central Bank Monitors, which measure pressure on central bankers to raise or reduce interest rates, have mostly climbed above zero of late, underscoring the need for tighter money among most developed countries. By the same token, it is premature to conclude that any policy tightening by the PBoC will lead to major growth problems in China. Chart 4Emergency' Levels Of Accommodation No Longer Needed Emergency' Levels Of Accommodation No Longer Needed Emergency' Levels Of Accommodation No Longer Needed Where does the RMB fit in? The PBoC's tightening bias suggests there is less incentive to target a lower exchange rate, both against the dollar and in trade-weighted terms. The central bank will continue to intervene to smooth out volatility. From investors' perspectives, the risk-return profile of taking a direct bet on the RMB is not attractive in either direction: we doubt there is meaningful upside in the RMB against the dollar in the near term, but the odds of significant RMB/USD depreciation have been further reduced. In other words, the RMB/USD exchange rate is still largely dominated by broader dollar performance, and the RMB is not a "high beta" currency to play the dollar. In short, we maintain our positive view on China's growth outlook, as discussed in greater detail in last week's bulletin. The PBoC will likely maintain a tightening bias, but this should not lead to major growth disappointments. Financial Reforms And Markets As growth has mostly surprised to the upside, policymakers' focus appears to have shifted to controlling financial risks, as highlighted by the key messages from the 5th National Financial Work Conference (NFWC) this past weekend. The NFWC convenes twice a decade, and usually sets the policy tone for the following years. Compared with the previous meeting five years ago that featured "deepening reforms and promoting development" as the key theme of the financial industry, the current session clearly strikes a more conservative tone. Top leadership declared that the financial sector must serve the needs of the "real economy," and that preventing systemic financial risks is the government's "eternal theme." Importantly, a cabinet level committee has been established to coordinate regulatory oversight on the financial industry - a task currently shared between the central bank and three regulators. The overall message from the latest NFWC is consistent with the regulatory crackdown on financial excesses since late last year.2 Overall, we share policymakers' sentiment that China's financial sector deregulation in recent years has gone too far.3 The dramatic leverage-fueled equity market boom-bust cycle in 2015 offered a crude awakening to the authorities against imprudent financial deregulation. Meanwhile, reform measures also ushered in a proliferation of institutions that prolonged financial intermediation channels. Without proper regulatory coordination, the authorities' attempts to reduce excesses has typically pushed speculative activity off the books of financial institutions, making it even more difficult to monitor and regulate. In fact, regulations on the financial sector have already been tightened of late. Derivatives, internet-based financing firms and asset-backed securities have all been put under much tighter regulatory scrutiny. The macro-prudential assessment (MPA) on financial institutions has been adopted since earlier this year - the latest MFWC suggests that "re-regulation" of the financial industry will continue in the coming years. The long-term impact of tighter control over the financial sector on the economy and financial markets remains to be seen. On one hand, imprudent financial deregulation and prolonged financial intermediation channels have done little to address the financing needs of small private enterprises, but have amplified risks and raised funding costs for the overall corporate sector - a suboptimal outcome that needs to be corrected. On the other hand, China's vast domestic savings need to be properly intermediated to the economy. We have long held the view that so long as the banking sector and debt instruments play the dominant role in financial intermediation, the accumulation of debt in the overall economy is all but inevitable.4 In this vein, any attempt to block financial intermediation aimed at "deleveraging" will prove both ineffective and counterproductive, with unintended consequences. An easier bet is that the authorities will remain committed to developing capital markets, both equities and corporate bonds, to provide alternative funding sources for the corporate sector. Procedures for initial public offerings (IPOs) and debt issuances will be simplified. The share of debt and equities in total social financing will continue to grow from a structural point of view (Chart 5). From investors' perspective, increasing supplies of equities through IPOs will put some downward pressure on stock prices - especially in the domestic small cap space, where multiples are unsustainably high and will continue to be de-rated (Chart 6). There are certainly some compelling growth stories among small caps that are worth cherry-picking, but overall investors should remain cautious for this asset class. Chart 5Debt And Equity Issuance##br## On A Structural Uptrend Debt And Equity Issuance On A Structural Uptrend Debt And Equity Issuance On A Structural Uptrend Chart 6Domestic Small Caps##br## Will Continue To Derate Domestic Small Caps Will Continue To Derate Domestic Small Caps Will Continue To Derate Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Outlook: A Mid-Year Revisit," dated July 13, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Legacies Of 2015," dated December 16, 2015, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports, "Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging!" dated June 15, 2016, and "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?" dated March 23, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Reduced demand in oil-exporting countries and higher supplies from distressed states is whittling down the amount of oil being removed from the market this year, based on our latest supply-demand balances. As a result, even though OECD inventories will be drawn down to their five-year average levels by year end, this average will be a higher end-point than we projected last month. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) continues to reassure markets through anonymous media leaks it will cut production further to accommodate higher Libyan and Nigerian production. This is not unexpected, but it still is speculative. Ecuador's opting out of OPEC 2.0's production cuts raises the odds other financially distressed non-Gulf producers also will head for the exits. Energy: Overweight. Crude oil prices remain supported by actual production cuts, and the promise of further reductions by KSA and possibly other OPEC 2.0 members. Base Metals: Neutral. Labor and management at the Zaldívar copper mine in Chile are negotiating, according to Metal Bulletin. Separately, a three-year deal was agreed at the Centinela copper mine in Chile last week. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold rallied on the back of lower inflation readings in the U.S., which suggested the Fed will back off aggressively pursuing its rates normalization policy. This would leave real rates low. Our strategic long portfolio hedge is up 1.0% since it was initiated May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. We maintain our bearish view on grains. Fears that extreme heat in the U.S. Midwest and Plains will not be sufficient to counter the still-high ending-stocks expectations published in the USDA's WASDE last week. Feature Higher oil production is seeping into global balances. Lower prices, which are stimulating demand in oil-importing markets, are reducing incomes and demand in oil-exporting provinces. As a result, the rate at which inventories will draw this year is slowing. Our latest supply - demand balances shown in Table 1 indicate the net 900k b/d physical deficit we expected for 2017 has been whittled down to just under 500k b/d, as a result of production increases in Libya and Nigeria, and slower demand growth in oil exporters generally (Chart of the Week). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply -##BR##Demand Balances (mm b/d) Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Chart of the WeekHigher Production And Lower Demand Reduce##BR##Physical Deficits Versus Last Month's Projections Higher Production And Lower Demand Reduce Physical Deficits Versus Last Month's Projections Higher Production And Lower Demand Reduce Physical Deficits Versus Last Month's Projections Ecuador, a small-ish OPEC member producing about 550k b/d, opted out of the Agreement negotiated by KSA and Russia to remove some 1.8mm b/d of production from the markets. This indicates weaker states that are party to the OPEC 2.0 Agreement are finding it impossible to maintain compliance with the cuts they've obliged themselves to undertake in the face of lower oil prices. As a result, they are compelled to increase production in an attempt to recover lost revenue (R), by increasing their quantity (Q) sold when prices (P) are weak, so as to maximize P*Q = R while they can. This only works if they are alone in increasing production while others - notably KSA, other Gulf states and Russia - restrict output to revive prices. Otherwise, if all the distressed states in the OPEC 2.0 coalition took the same action, markets would be flooded with oil. This was demonstrated in the mid-1980s during KSA's netback-pricing regime, when the Kingdom priced its oil as a function of prices received by refiners. This collapsed prices, and, eventually, reined in free-riding on KSA's production cuts.1 While few of these states, mostly outside the Gulf, are capable of significantly increasing production, at the margin, they can have an impact. Production Increases In OPEC, U.S. Partly Counter OPEC 2.0's Best Efforts Year-to-date to June, Iran and Libya have added 110k and 140k b/d of production to the market vs. their respective Oct/16 benchmark levels of 3.7mm and 550k b/d against which the OPEC 2.0 deal is being assessed. June production for these states was up 120k and 300k b/d for Iran and Libya, respectively, vs. October levels, while Nigeria's output was up 90k b/d (Chart 2). Libya and Nigeria are not parties to the OPEC 2.0 deal. Nonetheless, these states together with Iran added close to 500k b/d vs. their Oct/16 output levels in June, without an offsetting decline from members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition. Gulf OPEC ex Iran production is down some 850k b/d on average at 24.6mm b/d in 1H17 vs. Oct/16 levels, while non-Gulf OPEC production is down 215k b/d at 7.5mm b/d. We still see OPEC 2.0's production significantly below the EIA's estimate to March 2018 (Chart 3), which drives our view of inventory behavior. U.S. production also was higher in 1H17, as WTI prices rallied in response to the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting deal (Chart 4). For 1H17, U.S. crude oil production was up 230k b/d vs. 4Q16 levels, at 9.04mm b/d, led by higher shale-oil output. Chart 2Almost 500k b/d Added To Oct/16 Output##BR##By Iran, Libya, And Nigeria In June Almost 500k b/d Added To Oct/16 Output By Iran, Libya, And Nigeria In June Almost 500k b/d Added To Oct/16 Output By Iran, Libya, And Nigeria In June Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Cuts Drive##BR##Inventory Draws OPEC 2.0 Cuts Drive Inventory Draws OPEC 2.0 Cuts Drive Inventory Draws Chart 4U.S. Crude Production##BR##Grows In 1H17 U.S. Crude Production Grows In 1H17 U.S. Crude Production Grows In 1H17 Slower Demand Growth Reduces Storage Draw On the demand side, we've lowered our estimate of demand growth this year to close to 1.37mm b/d, down nearly 110k b/d vs. our earlier May estimate. This results from lower consumption in oil exporting states. The combination of stronger supply growth and weaker demand growth reduces our estimated physical deficit for this year to 470k b/d from close to 900k b/d in our May balances estimates. These revised supply - demand estimates still produce enough of a physical deficit to allow storage to fall to five-year average levels (Chart 5). However, with the drawdowns prolonged by slower supply losses and reduced demand, inventories are now projected to remain above 2.8 billion bbls versus our earlier estimate of inventories declining to ~2.75 billion barrels by end-2017 or early 2018. Chart 5OECD Storage Draws To Five-Year Average Levels, But Higher Supply And Lower Demand Keep This Level Higher Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Chart 5OECD Storage Draws To Five-Year Average Levels, But Higher Supply And Lower Demand Keep This Level Higher OECD Storage Draws To Five-Year Average Levels, But Higher Supply And Lower Demand Keep This Level Higher OECD Storage Draws To Five-Year Average Levels, But Higher Supply And Lower Demand Keep This Level Higher Net, at the end of this drawdown, storage will be higher than expected, even if it does make it to five-year average levels. This will leave less room for OPEC 2.0 members to implement a strategy to backwardate the forward WTI curve so as to slow the rate at which shale-oil rigs return to the field, which we've discussed in previous research.2 More Cuts Required By OPEC 2.0 Going into its St. Petersburg meetings next week, there are clearly defined issues to be addressed by OPEC 2.0. The foregoing suggests additional cuts will be needed to empty storage sufficiently by yearend for OPEC 2.0 to be able to move to the next phase of its plan to regain some influence over the evolution of oil prices, particularly the U.S. benchmark WTI price, which drives hedging and profitability of U.S. shale producers. Over the short term, this effort likely will be clearly supported by KSA's stated intention to reduce exports to the U.S. market (Chart 6). All else equal, this will result in sharper draws in the high-frequency U.S. weekly inventory data, by augmenting reduced shipments to the U.S. from OPEC overall (Chart 7). Chart 6KSA's To Reduce##BR##Exports To The U.S. KSA's To Reduce Exports To The U.S. KSA's To Reduce Exports To The U.S. Chart 7OPEC Exports To The U.S. To Fall Further##BR##When KSA Reduces Shipments OPEC Exports To The U.S. To Fall Further When KSA Reduces Shipments OPEC Exports To The U.S. To Fall Further When KSA Reduces Shipments More substantive price-support and inventory-draining measures, as noted at the top of this article, will have to involve further production cuts by OPEC 2.0. KSA again is signaling it is open to additional production cuts, in order to normalize oil inventories.3 We have no doubt the Kingdom's Gulf allies - particularly Kuwait and the UAE - will support KSA in this effort. We also expect Russia to be supportive of this effort. The size of the cuts likely will exceed 500k b/d, so as to offset the production gains of Libya and Nigeria. Iran's higher production discussed herein, and Iraq's recent assertiveness in claiming "the right" to increase its production given the size of its reserves, suggests a short and a long game for the leadership of OPEC 2.0. In the short-term, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria will be constrained by lack of funds to significantly increase production. Thus, OPEC 2.0 - mostly KSA and its allies - can cut production without triggering an immediate response from these states, which will allow storage to resume drawing at a faster rate. For OPEC 2.0 to have a meaningful effect on U.S. shale production, the stronger storage draws in the near term would have to be accompanied by forward guidance from KSA, Russia and their allies that production will be increased in the medium term - 6 months or so out - so that continued demand growth can be accommodated by higher supplies. This would require storage and production flexibility by OPEC 2.0's leaders. Should all of this fall in place, we would expect a backwardation to develop toward yearend, which would be the first step in a longer-term strategy by OPEC 2.0 to slow the rate at which horizontal rigs return to drilling in the shale fields. Bottom Line: Higher oil production from Libya, Iran and Nigeria, coupled with a slight downgrade in demand growth, will reduce the physical deficit we expected this year. This will, all else equal, reduce the rate at which OECD storage draws, and raise the level of five-year average inventory levels by yearend. We do not believe this is a favorable outcome for OPEC 2.0, particularly KSA and Russia, if they are intent on regaining some influence over the evolution of oil prices. For this reason, we believe KSA and its Gulf Arab allies will reduce production further to put the inventory draws back on track. We remain long low-risk calls spreads in Dec/17 WTI and Brent - long $50/bbl strikes vs. short $55/bbl strikes - and will look for opportunities to gain upside exposure once we get clear signaling from OPEC 2.0 leadership. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Sideshow In Vienna," published October 23, 2014, for a review of netback pricing by KSA. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Reports of April 6, 2017, entitled "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One," and March 30, 2017, entitled "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil" for a discussion of this strategy. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "Saudi Arabia still aims to reduce supply; weighs Nigerian, Libyan barrels," published by reuters.com on July 18, 2017. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Odds Continue To Favor Lower Oil Inventories Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights To change our EM strategy, we would need to change our view on China and accept that China's credit bubble - especially in combination with the ongoing policy tightening - does not constitute a material risk to mainland growth in the foreseeable future. We are simply not ready to make this call. It is a matter of time until mainland's growth relapses and China-related plays (including commodities and EM) enter a bear market. Even though the headline growth numbers out of China have so far remained solid, their second derivatives - change in growth rate - have turned negative. Asian export growth has already rolled over, and a slowdown will become pronounced in the months ahead. This will likely halt and reverse the EM rally. Having taken into consideration various factors, we believe it would be wrong to change our strategy at the moment. Feature The U.S. dollar has tumbled and EM risk asset prices have spiked following last week's testimony by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen to Congress. This week we review what has gone wrong with respect to our view, as well as weigh the pros and cons of altering strategy at this point. Our bearish view on EM has been contingent on two pillars: Our downbeat view on EM over the past year has rested on higher U.S. bond yields pushing up the U.S. dollar. This view played out in the second half of last year but has been wrong since early this year. We have continuously argued that EM risk assets are vulnerable due to China's growth relapse amid ongoing liquidity tightening and the lingering credit bubble. Even though the headline growth numbers out of China have so far remained solid, their second derivatives - change in growth rate - have turned negative (more details are provided in the section below). We maintain that our theme of slower mainland growth still has high odds of playing out later this year. We expect meaningfully weak data (on a first-, not second-derivative basis) out of China before year end. If equity markets are forward-looking, they should start pricing in such a scenario now. What has surprised us is the fact that EM investors have utterly and altogether ignored political woes in a number of EM countries, lower commodities prices and lingering structural and cyclical problems in many developing economies, as well as China's tightening amid the credit excesses. Instead, EM investors have singularly focused on downward surprises in U.S. inflation - even ignoring strong employment data in America. Remarkably, EM share prices historically plunged when U.S. inflation and inflation expectations dropped (Chart I-1). Hence, the year-to-date negative correlation between EM stocks and U.S. inflation is out of sync with the historical relationship. We review some other inconsistencies and contradictions below. Chart I-1U.S. Inflation And EM Stocks Were Historically Positively Correlated, But Not This Year U.S. Inflation And EM Stocks Were Historically Positively Correlated, But Not This Year U.S. Inflation And EM Stocks Were Historically Positively Correlated, But Not This Year Inconsistencies In Prevalent Narrative The purpose of this section is not to justify our investment strategy, which has been wrong-footed, but to elaborate on financial markets' nuances that have been much less clear-cut than popular financial market narratives imply. The reality is much more complicated than the following prevalent among investors narrative: low U.S. inflation entails little tightening by the Fed, resulting in a weak U.S. dollar and an EM rally. There are some contradictions in this story: If U.S. household consumption growth in nominal terms is as weak as portrayed by the latest retail sales and inflation readings (Chart I-2), how can U.S. corporate earnings continue to grow at a double-digit rate, as most investors currently expect? The only way this can happen is if productivity growth is really strong and profit margins continue to expand. Productivity is a black box that no one can measure accurately in real time. If underlying productivity growth is indeed robust, the bull market will persist and bears will be humiliated. The snag is that productivity assessment is a judgement call, and only time will reveal true productivity dynamics. Not having more insight, we have so far assumed that the official statistics on productivity in the U.S. and EM are generally right. If U.S. productivity data are close to reality, unit labor costs - calculated as wages divided by productivity - are rising faster than underlying inflation (Chart I-3, top panel). This entails that U.S. corporate profit margins should be contracting. The middle and bottom panels of Chart I-3 portray our macro proxy for U.S. corporate profit margins based on core PCE inflation and unit labor costs. Chart I-2The U.S.: Very Low Nominal Growth The U.S.: Very Low Nominal Growth The U.S.: Very Low Nominal Growth Chart I-3A Macro Proxy For U.S. Corporate Profit Margins Entails Shrinking Margins A Macro Proxy For U.S. Corporate Profit Margins Entails Shrinking Margins A Macro Proxy For U.S. Corporate Profit Margins Entails Shrinking Margins Overall, if low inflation and weak U.S. nominal retail sales data are a true representation of current U.S. economic conditions, the corporate profit outlook cannot be benign, and American stock prices should be lower - not higher. If lower inflation and nominal growth of recent months in the U.S. were an aberration, U.S. interest rate expectations will have to be revised higher and the U.S. dollar will rally. We are even more puzzled by the nature of the drop in U.S. bond yields, and EM financial markets' reaction to it. Typically, EM risk assets negatively correlate with real (TIPS) yields (Chart I-4), and positively correlate with the inflation component of U.S. bond yields (Chart I-1 on page 1). The decline in U.S. bond yields since the beginning of the year has been almost entirely driven by the inflation component, with U.S. real yields actually not dropping at all. Yet, EM risk assets have rallied sharply. This goes against the predominant correlation of the past several years and is very puzzling. In short, the historical correlations between EM stocks and currencies on one hand and U.S. real yields and inflation expectations on the other, have in the past six months reversed for no reason. If the weaker U.S. dollar and lower U.S. bond yields/rate expectations represent an unwinding of the "Trump trade", why has the S&P 500 - which has surged amid "Trump trade" - not yet corrected? Broadly speaking, if U.S. bond yields drop further and the greenback continues deprecating, it would signal a major relapse in U.S. growth and U.S. share prices will dive. On the contrary, if U.S. growth is solid, the dollar selloff is overdone and the greenback is close to a major bottom. In addition, EM risk assets have decoupled from commodities prices, as we have detailed many times since early this year. Also, as a side note, the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar decoupled from precious metals prices this whole year up until last week. These are non-trivial divergences that are by and large puzzling. Finally, EM net earnings-per-share revisions have rolled over, yet share prices have continued to move higher (Chart I-5). Such decoupling has simply never happened before. Chart I-4Another Breakdown In Correlations: ##br##EM Currencies And U.S. TIPS Yields Another Breakdown In Correlations: EM Currencies And U.S. TIPS Yields Another Breakdown In Correlations: EM Currencies And U.S. TIPS Yields Chart I-5EM EPS Net Revisions ##br##Have Failed To Turn Positive EM EPS Net Revisions Have Failed To Turn Positive EM EPS Net Revisions Have Failed To Turn Positive Besides, EM EPS net revisions have not turned positive throughout this 18-month rally. In short, analysts in aggregate have not upgraded their EPS estimates for EM companies at all. Bottom Line: There are a number of contradictions and inconsistencies that cannot be explained by the prevailing financial market narrative. What About Global Growth? One way to square the above inconsistencies is to argue that the drop in the U.S. dollar and the EM rally have little to do with U.S. dynamics and much to do with strength in the rest of the world, especially outside the U.S. This is coherent reasoning. We review global growth dynamics in this section and elaborate on China in the following one. Without disputing the fact that there has been a notable recovery in global growth and trade in the past year, we would like to emphasize that on a rate-of-change (second derivative) basis, global trade, and particularly Asian export growth, has already rolled over, and a slowdown will become pronounced in the months ahead. Consistently, the U.S. dollar should rise or EM risk assets should reverse their gains in the near future, if and as global trade/EM growth falters: The pace of export growth in key Asian manufacturing hubs such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore has already rolled over (Chart I-6). Both Taiwanese exports of electronic parts and the country's overall exports to China have rolled over - the latter two lead global export volumes and Chinese exports, respectively, by a few months, as shown in Chart I-7. Chart I-6Asian Export Growth Has Rolled Over Asian Export Growth Has Rolled Over Asian Export Growth Has Rolled Over Chart I-7Global Export Growth Has Peaked Global Export Growth Has Peaked Global Export Growth Has Peaked The reason why Taiwanese exports of electronic parts lead global trade cycles is because these parts are used in the assembly of final products, and producers order and receive these parts before final products are made and shipped. Similarly, a lot of Taiwanese exports to China serve as inputs into final products assembled in China and are shipped worldwide. This is why Taiwanese shipments to China lead mainland aggregate exports. Provided U.S. consumer spending has recently weakened, as depicted by core retail sales, U.S. imports are bound to slump sooner than later (Chart I-8). Consequently, Asian and European shipments to America are likely to roll over soon. Imports are more volatile than domestic demand, reflecting inventory re-stocking and de-stocking cycles. The decoupling between the not-so-strong U.S. final demand and robust imports suggests an inventory re-stocking cycle in the U.S. has recently been taking place. As such, this will be followed by a period of destocking, i.e., weaker imports, weighing on the rest of the world's shipments to the U.S.. A genuine area of global growth acceleration has been continental Europe. Undoubtedly, growth is extremely robust in these economies, and there is no reason for European economies to plunge into recession. That said, U.S. growth dynamics following the 2008 crisis have generally been "two steps forward, one step back." This has typically held true for post-crisis economic recoveries in all major economies. There is no reason why Europe's economic recovery will be any different. As such, having experienced "two steps forward" in the past year, European growth is more than likely to take a "one step back" - i.e., slow down a bit. In brief, if growth dynamics in Europe were to resemble that of the U.S. post-crisis era, mean reversion in European growth is overdue. Finally, global auto sales growth has rolled over decisively (Chart I-9, top panel). The deceleration is very broad-based including the U.S., Europe (Chart I-9, bottom panel) and China (please refer to Chart I-12 on page 10). Chart I-8Weak U.S. Retail Sales Entail ##br##U.S. Import Deceleration Weak U.S. Retail Sales Entail U.S. Import Deceleration Weak U.S. Retail Sales Entail U.S. Import Deceleration Chart I-9Global Vehicle Sales ##br##Growth Heading South Global Vehicle Sales Growth Heading South Global Vehicle Sales Growth Heading South Bottom Line: If the global growth recovery has been behind the U.S. dollar selloff and the EM rally, the forthcoming reversal in global trade will at minimum halt and reverse the EM rally. China is critical to our theme of slowdown in global trade. China's Growth: Looking Beyond Headlines China's headline growth numbers for GDP and industrial production have been on the strong side, but forward-looking variables such as money growth and various liquidity measures entail a major deceleration by the end of this year: Narrow and broad money growth - which have historically led the business cycle in China - have relapsed (Chart I-10). Although credit growth has not yet decelerated, money often leads or coincides with credit growth, suggesting a credit slowdown is forthcoming. Furthermore, commercial banks' excess reserves at the central bank are key to their lending capacity. The top panel of Chart I-11 demonstrates that China's money multiplier - the ratio of broad money-to-excess reserves, or banks' assets-to-excess reserves - have surged, implying that banks are over-extended. Chart I-10China: Money Leads Business Cycle China: Money Leads Business Cycle China: Money Leads Business Cycle Chart I-11China: Bank Loan Growth To Slow China: Bank Loan Growth To Slow China: Bank Loan Growth To Slow In addition, banks' shrinking excess reserves point to a rollover in bank loan growth in the months ahead (Chart I-11, bottom panel). The pace of growth in China's many economic indicators has already rolled over - i.e., their second derivative has turned negative. These include total and ex-oil imports, electricity output and auto production (Chart I-12). Finally, the central bank will continue to tighten liquidity. The recent softness in interest rates may have been temporary, as June is a month in which liquidity demand spikes, and the People's Bank of China probably did not want a replay of the June 2013 SHIBOR crisis. Notably, both core consumer prices and consumer services inflation measures in China are grinding higher (Chart I-13). This, along with "a mandate of preventing bubble formations," will all but ensure that the PBoC tightens further. Chart I-12China: The Pace Of Growth Has Already Rolled Over China: The Pace Of Growth Has Already Rolled Over China: The Pace Of Growth Has Already Rolled Over Chart I-13China: Inflation Is Rising China: Inflation Is Rising China: Inflation Is Rising Tighter liquidity/higher interest rates along with regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will cause credit growth to slow down considerably, weighing on the real economy. Bottom Line: In China, liquidity is tightening and interest rates are rising amid a credit bubble. Meanwhile, investors remain complacent, and the overwhelming majority of the global investment community believes that China will be able to deflate its financial bubbles and deleverage its corporate sector without a meaningful impact on the real economy. The reality is there has been no historical precedent of this occurring in any country. Strategy Considerations: The Dollar And China Hold The Key The greenback holds the key to EM strategy - not only because it mechanically drives the performance of EM financial markets, but also because it reflects many global financial and economic trends. Having taken into consideration various factors, we believe it would be wrong to change our strategy at a time when: There has already been capitulation by U.S. dollar bulls, the greenback is technically oversold and the Fed will soon commence reduction of its balance sheet. All of this makes us reluctant to change our view on the U.S. dollar and EM at the moment. Notably, the U.S. dollar is at a critical technical level against numerous currencies (Chart I-14A and I-14B). Chart I-14AThe U.S. Dollar Is At A Critical Technical Level (II) The U.S. Dollar Is At A Critical Technical Level (I) The U.S. Dollar Is At A Critical Technical Level (I) Chart I-14BThe U.S. Dollar Is At A Critical Technical Level (I) The U.S. Dollar Is At A Critical Technical Level (II) The U.S. Dollar Is At A Critical Technical Level (II) In short, it is too late to abandon a positive view on the dollar. We have been and remain much more certain about the U.S. dollar strength versus EM, commodities, and Asian currencies than against the euro. Meanwhile, EM financial markets are overbought, and implied volatility across most global financial markets in general and EM in particular is at record-low levels (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Implied Volatilities Are Depressed ##br##Across Most Asset Markets Implied Volatilities Are Depressed Across Most Asset Markets Implied Volatilities Are Depressed Across Most Asset Markets The Fed will shrink its balance sheet, and high-power U.S. dollar liquidity will diminish. Besides, the PBoC will continue to tighten liquidity and guide interest rates higher amid lingering credit excesses. These developments are at the margin bullish for the greenback, and invariably bearish for EM/China-related plays. China's industrial cycle has peaked and Asian exports have rolled over, as we have illustrated above. China's narrow money (M1) growth is slowing, and broad money (M2) growth is at an all-time low. Money leads business cycles in China. Our biggest concerns have been and remain continued strong flows to EM and how well risk assets have been trading. Past flows are no guarantee of future flows. However, both DM and EM risk assets have been trading really well. It is hard to know and forecast when this will change. That said, we maintain that the next 20% move in EM share prices and commensurate moves in other EM risk assets will be down - not up. Weighing the pros and cons, we are reluctant to alter our view and recommended strategy at the moment. To change our EM strategy, we would need to change our view on China and accept that China's credit bubble - especially in combination with the ongoing policy tightening - does not constitute a material risk to mainland growth in the foreseeable future. We are simply not ready to make this call. It is a matter of time until mainland growth relapses and China-related plays (including commodities and EM) enter a new bear market. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Chinese political risks are heating back up; The 19th National Party Congress will replenish President Xi's political capital; Xi will escalate financial deleveraging and reboot his reform agenda in 2018; Yet the Chinese leadership is becoming more populist - holding reforms back; Volatility is going up; go long Chinese equities versus EM, and long big banks versus others. Feature China's economy grew at a faster-than-expected 6.9% rate in the second quarter (Chart 1), the result of easing financial conditions, healthy external demand, and domestic stimulus efforts that have enabled the country to shake off a range of serious risks since 2015. Chart 1As Good As It Gets As Good As It Gets As Good As It Gets Chart 2Exports And Monetary Conditions = Reflation Exports And Monetary Conditions = Reflation Exports And Monetary Conditions = Reflation The nominal rate of growth is at the top of what one can reasonably expect out of China today; the upside is limited. Stimulus is likely to wane, while the RMB, exports, and financial conditions are likely to be less supportive going forward (Chart 2). Moreover, the latest improvements came at the expense of China's structural reform agenda, which would rebalance growth toward consumption and services while encouraging private entrepreneurship and cutting back state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Chart 3). As a result, risks are skewed to the downside. If China's total government and quasi-government fiscal-and-credit impulse rolls over, the recent improvements in industrial profits and domestic demand will come under threat (Chart 4). No surprise then that Chinese economic policy uncertainty remains elevated despite the growth recovery and stifling of capital outflows (Chart 5). Chart 3A Setback To##br## Economic Rebalancing A Setback To Economic Rebalancing A Setback To Economic Rebalancing Chart 4A Weaker Fiscal/Credit##br## Impulse Would Threaten Profits A Weaker Fiscal/Credit Impulse Would Threaten Profits A Weaker Fiscal/Credit Impulse Would Threaten Profits Chart 5Policy Uncertainty##br## Remains High Policy Uncertainty Remains High Policy Uncertainty Remains High The critical question going forward is: How will policymakers respond? Will they continue on the current path of waxing and waning stimulus combined with ad hoc reform efforts? Or will they attempt aggressive structural reforms to try to break out of the current cycle and escape the dreaded middle income trap?1 Between now and March of next year, China's political leaders will make a series of crucial decisions that have the potential to reshape the country's future over the long run. Though it is impossible to predict the precise outcome of the Communist Party's 19th National Party Congress - the crucial "midterm" leadership reshuffle set to take place in late October or November - there are nevertheless structural factors that will constrain the options available to the new leaders. Why Does The Party Congress Matter? The paradox of China's recovery from the turbulence of 2015-16 is that it coincided with the stagnation of President Xi Jinping's ambitious reform agenda, outlined to great fanfare at the 18th Central Committee's Third Plenum in 2013. Moreover, the impending 19th National Party Congress has implied that China would be even more vigilant than usual in maintaining stability. As we have argued, this meant that there would be neither dramatic reflation nor dramatic reform this year, which has (so far) been the case (Chart 6). Chart 6No Aggressive Stimulus Prior To Five-Year Party Congresses No Aggressive Stimulus Prior To Five-Year Party Congresses No Aggressive Stimulus Prior To Five-Year Party Congresses Now the party congress is approaching. In August, top leaders will convene at Beidaihe, a small seaside tourist village, to hammer out the final roster of the Chinese leadership for the next five years. Later the party congress delegates will mostly ratify this roster as well as any changes to the party's constitution. The historic average turnover of leaders in the Central Committee is significant, at about 60%. And this time around, almost the entire Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the supreme decision-making body in China, will retire. A new PSC will literally emerge from behind a curtain for the world to see for the first time. China will have a substantially new set of decision-makers. Xi Jinping, who will give a report on where the party stands, will remain the "core" leader. The post-Mao system of power transition is relatively young and not as institutionalized as one might think. Still, some clear rules and norms are in place. In even-numbered years, party congresses mark a changeover in the top leaders (Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in 2002, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in 2012), while in odd years they have served as a "midterm" reshuffle (as under Jiang Zemin in 1997, Hu in 2007, and now Xi). Crucially, the midterm reshuffle marks the point at which a leader "consolidates" his power over the party and state, after which he has a freer hand to push his policy agenda. The meeting is often preceded by the removal of key rivals, the promotion of key protégés, and the launching of a leader's priority policies. Witness the sudden ousting of Sun Zhengcai, Chongqing party boss, who was until this week the likeliest candidate to succeed Li Keqiang as premier in 2022.2 The question is political capital Xi will have after the congress. There is no chance of him becoming a lame duck, but there is potential for him to be checked if his followers make a poor showing on the PSC, the 25-member Politburo, and the 300-member Central Committee.3 China watchers will pore over the new membership rosters. Here are the important issues at stake: Institutionalization: Will Chinese politics become more or less institutionalized and predictable? Of particular importance is whether Xi retains existing age limits, term limits, the size of party bodies.4 Any drastic changes would suggest that Chinese power is becoming more personalized, "charismatic," and dictatorial.5 That would feed rumors that Xi intends to stay in power beyond his term limit of 2022. Succession: Will Xi and Premier Li Keqiang promote successors to take over their positions in 2022? They will be expected to elevate their favorites to the PSC, just as they were elevated by their predecessors in 2007.6 If the new PSC does not include two conspicuously younger officials who are clearly being groomed to take over the country in 2022, then political uncertainty will spike. It will suggest that Xi is following in Vladimir Putin's and Recep Erdogan's footsteps. Re-centralization: The size of the Politburo and PSC have fluctuated over the years. In 2012, Xi notably reduced the PSC from nine to seven members, which was the norm in the 1990s. This move was seen as a re-centralization of power after the 2002-12 nine-member PSC came to be seen as slower-moving, indecisive, and less effective. Now there is speculation that Xi will again reduce the PSC to five members, further concentrating power. We think this unlikely but the result would be in keeping with the trend of re-centralization. Factionalization: China only has one party, but the party is divided into factions. The Communist Youth League (CCYL) faction is the most coherent. It includes current Premier Li Keqiang, former President Hu Jintao, and at least four of the ten most likely candidates to ascend to the PSC this fall. It is also called simply the "Hu faction" (see Diagram 1) and is broadly associated with populist policies. By contrast, Xi Jinping, in addition to being part of an elite group of "princelings," or sons of revolutionary founders, is forming his own clique. It is very roughly allied with other "elitists" from former President Jiang Zemin's faction (hence the label "Jiang/Xi faction" in Diagram 1). Xi has recently criticized the CCYL and cut its funding - he is also believed to have taken the economic portfolio away from Li Keqiang. Hence the predominance of Xi's or Hu's faction on the PSC and Politburo will be important. And if Xi were to replace Li, that would be a sign of extreme factionalization and political risk. Diagram 1Lineup Of New Politburo Standing Committee Yet To Take Shape - Factions Evenly Balanced? China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress These issues can be debated ad nauseam, but for investors the chief takeaways are as follows: Chinese politics are not institutionalized: While we expect that Xi will largely adhere to party norms, we also expect him to make some tweaks. Unless he suffers a shocking setback at the party congress (very low probability), he is already lined up to be the most powerful leader in China through the 2020s. That is true even if he steps down from all formal positions as scheduled in 2022. Why? Because Chinese leaders - especially "core" leaders like Xi - continue to wield great power behind the scenes.7 In other words, many of China's underlying tendencies over the past five years (e.g. ideological purity, foreign policy ambition) will be with us for quite some time. Succession is what matters: We expect Xi to promote a successor. If he fails to do so, he will appear to be a true strongman who may stay in office after 2022. If the party congress points in that direction, then China's consensual political norms of the past thirty years will be in jeopardy. Rumors will say that Xi plans to revive the "chairman" position that Mao Zedong held and thus rule indefinitely. The factional balance in China will be upset and internal power struggle will ignite. Western governments will see China moving toward dictatorship. Capital flight pressure will intensify. Re-centralization will continue: China is in a re-centralization phase regardless of whether the PSC has five or seven members. Xi has charted this course and we expect it largely to continue due to his focus on regime security and international prestige. What matters is whether Xi is outnumbered by a rival faction on the PSC, since that could water down his policies or implementation. Factions do not predict policies: Factions reveal differences in the party that could weaken policy or stability, but they are limited in terms of predicting policy orientation. Xi has delayed difficult structural economic reforms with stimulus and promoted socially accommodative policies like his predecessor Hu Jintao.8 As such early expectations that Xi would be pro-market have dissipated. The real difference is that Xi has removed formidable enemies, giving him greater flexibility than Hu ever had. He may choose to use that flexibility for painful reforms in future, but he has notably refrained from doing so thus far. Chart 7Balance Of Institutions On China's Politburo China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress A victory for the CCYL would be an "upset" for Xi, hindering his dominance, but would also be status quo for China as a whole. It would call into question Xi's political capital and ability to drive through his preferred policies. China would be seen as less economically promising, though possibly more politically mature. Xi's effectiveness in his first five years leads us to believe that this will not happen. We think he will secure control of the top policymaking bodies. Yet, as stated above, we also think Xi will broadly adhere to party norms and not lay the groundwork to become "leader for life." Why? The Communist Party has developed an informal but empirically verifiable history of balancing the members of the top leadership so that different institutions, regions, and skill-sets are represented. Hence the representation of leaders on the Politburo with key backgrounds in the party bureaucracy, the state bureaucracy, the regional governments, and the military have been remarkably stable since the 1980s (Chart 7). The balance is even more jealously guarded on the PSC than on the Politburo. Hence, the party congress is most likely to be a determiner of which way the balance tilts (more on that below), rather than whether the balance is entirely overthrown. Our expectation is probably the best short-term political outcome for financial markets: Xi enhances his political capital through 2022, but does not jeopardize the stability of the Chinese political system by resurrecting a Maoist "cult of personality" and embroiling the country in a future succession crisis. The country is thus more politically mature and (potentially) more economically promising. Bottom Line: Chinese politics are not institutionalized. Dramatic changes are taking place as we go to press; more are likely to occur before and after the party congress. Nevertheless, we expect Xi to uphold most of the party's rules even as he clinches full control of the party for the next five-year term. He will push the envelope but not break it. This is marginally positive for Chinese H-shares. What Comes Afterwards? The party congress provides an important infusion of political capital with which policymakers can try to get things done. For instance, after the 1997 congress, Jiang launched a massive "reform and restructuring" campaign of banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that led to a spike in unemployment and bankruptcies to purge the system of inefficiencies (Chart 8). These policies ultimately transformed China - by one estimate they contributed about 20% of China's aggregate increase in total factor productivity through 2007.9 We expect the Xi administration to reinvigorate its policy agenda after this fall. The first five years of his presidency have centered on power consolidation - i.e. the sweeping anti-corruption campaign, breaking the fiscal and judicial independence of the provinces, and party purge. This campaign is likely to continue to some extent, but it has peaked in intensity (Chart 9) and the party congress should settle many of the most important power struggles, at least for a time. Chart 8China Embraced Creative Destruction In 1990s China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress Chart 9Anti-Corruption Campaign Has Peaked Anti-Corruption Campaign Has Peaked Anti-Corruption Campaign Has Peaked Hence the central leadership's policy effectiveness should intensify in 2018. This is significant because Xi's reform agenda is incredibly ambitious. Our clients will remember that, in a deliberate echo of Deng Xiaoping's famous "reform and opening up" measures launched at the Third Plenum in 1978, Xi Jinping announced a raft of major reforms at the latest Third Plenum in 2013.10 The intention was to push forward the next wave of China's development and make market forces "decisive" in China's economy, namely by: rebalancing growth toward consumers, services, and private investors; deregulating upstream and downstream markets; reforming the fiscal system to give local governments sustainable finances; injecting private capital, competition and market discipline into the state-owned corporate sector; and stabilizing the business environment and broader society by fighting pollution and establishing the rule of law. As mentioned, this agenda has since been compromised, with Xi reverting to infrastructure spending and credit growth to avoid confronting the socio-political blowback of painful adjustments. With limited reforms, total factor productivity has continued on its post-GFC decline throughout Xi's term (Chart 10). Xi has also gone easy on SOEs, the weakest link in China's economy, maintaining the time-tried policy of rolling up inefficient ones into bigger conglomerates rather than letting them fail. The market has not perceived any loss of policy support for SOEs (Chart 11). Chart 10Productivity Weak In Xi's First Term Productivity Weak In Xi's First Term Productivity Weak In Xi's First Term Chart 11SOE Reforms Put On Hold SOE Reforms Put On Hold SOE Reforms Put On Hold Will the party congress change any of this? Will Xi be less pragmatic - i.e. more concerned with building a legacy as a historic reformer - in the coming five years? We cannot predict the precise membership of the next PSC or Politburo - especially given the furious horse-trading taking place after Sun Zhengcai's fall. But looking at key trends in the PSC's membership in recent decades, and assuming the top five likeliest candidates for 2017, the following trends become apparent (see Charts 12A & 12B): Chart 12ALeadership Characteristics Of ##br##The Politburo Standing Committee China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress Chart 12BLeadership Characteristics Of ##br##The Politburo Standing Committee China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress From technocrats to generalists: The "fourth generation" of Chinese leaders (Hu Jintao's generation) will finally rotate out of top posts this year. This is the last generation to have gone to college prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), when schools and universities were disrupted, and to have largely studied natural sciences or engineering. Xi Jinping's "fifth generation" - and those beneath it - tend to come from educational backgrounds that are less technical and scientific and more legal and humanistic.11 The rise of the humanities may translate to a more ideologically doctrinaire outlook (pro-Communist Party, anti-West, anti-liberal) among the leadership, as opposed to the practicality of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Rule by provincial chieftains: Leaders with executive experience either as governors or party secretaries of the provinces have taken up an ever-greater share of the PSC and Politburo. This suggests that leaders have made tough decisions and have a broad conception of China that encompasses its vast regional, demographic, and economic disparities. They have dealt closely with poverty, ethnic minorities, border and security issues, and social instability. They are presumably less afraid to make decisions, or to crack heads, than central bureaucrats. The central government knows best: The share of leaders with experience at the top of the state bureaucracy is also rising. This means that leaders have experience administering key government agencies and ministries. They are not, however, "technocrats," as defined above - they are simply politicians capable of handling a policy portfolio that applies across the country. Fewer soldiers and business executives: PSC members with military experience have declined since Deng Xiaoping's era. Meanwhile, PSC members with experience as executives of state-owned enterprises have vanished since the days that one of them (Jiang Zemin) led China. But this does not portend sweeping privatization and liberalization.12 The bottom line is that China is being ruled more and more by politicians and less by business leaders and generals. This should also portend greater ideological purity and loyalty to the Communist Party. The heartland's revenge: Leaders who hail from the thickly populated and poorer provinces of central China have recently outnumbered those from the wealthy coastal provinces. But while PSC leaders increasingly come from the interior, their executive experience is still mostly in rich coastal areas. They straddle - and maybe know how to balance - the country's stark regional divide. In essence, China's political elite is gradually shifting toward greater "populism." The Han Chinese heartland has reasserted control of the Communist Party to which it gave birth in 1921. China's leaders, as a result of their provincial governing experience, are increasingly primed to maintain socio-political stability through redistribution or force rather than to promote economic efficiency via competition and liberalization (Chart 13). Chart 13More Social Spending Needed More Social Spending Needed More Social Spending Needed Further, these leaders have grown more aloof from the hard sciences and business acumen that gave rise to China's industrial prowess and are more intent on supporting the Communist Party's foundational myths and regime control - as well as keeping the country's rapid social and technological development under that control. What does this mean for Xi Jinping's second term? Xi is seen as an "elitist" both in his policy preferences - the demand for greater economic competition, efficiency, and technological advances - and in his personal background as a princeling. Yet these preferences will likely be compromised in his second term, as in his first, because the economic drivers of the "populist" trend will persist. Insofar as leadership characteristics are a reliable predictor, the radical liberalizing agenda of the Third Plenum - soon to be supplanted by another Third Plenum in 2018 - will only briefly benefit from an infusion of new energy, say in 2018-19, before being moderated, postponed, or watered-down. The leadership is increasingly aware of the need to maintain minimum levels of growth, development, and income redistribution for the sake of stability. The creative destruction of the late 1990s is no longer an option. Xi will still make an attempt to revive his reforms - and therein lies a risk to short-run growth, as China's cyclical growth is simultaneously set to slow in 2018. But he will fail to launch a transformative new period of productivity growth in China over the long run. Bottom Line: The final line-up of the Politburo and PSC will enable us to revise the above sketch of China's elite with new data. But the main trends and implications are unlikely to be altered. Not only is Xi Jinping aiming to stabilize and preserve the regime and re-centralize power, but so too is the Communist Party. Xi's reform agenda will undoubtedly be rebooted after the party congress - with non-negligible risks to short-term growth - but Xi will not ride roughshod over these institutional constraints. At least, not for very long. Whither China? The structural constraints that will stymie Xi's new reform push are well known. Capital formation has been well above the range staked out by other emerging economies during similar phases of national development (Chart 14). This is a source of instability: the investment-led economic model has expired and yet the country has not weaned itself off of capital-intensive policies. China's debt load and debt-servicing costs have exploded upward both because of the inefficiencies of the state sector (SOEs and state banks) and because local governments rely on SOEs (and their own shady financing vehicles) to generate growth. Household debt is low but rising rapidly (Chart 15). Chart 14Excess Investment Is A Real Problem Excess Investment Is A Real Problem Excess Investment Is A Real Problem Chart 15Corporate Debt: The Achilles Heel Corporate Debt: The Achilles Heel Corporate Debt: The Achilles Heel The central government's surprising "deleveraging campaign" this year - which was softened to avoid mistakes ahead of the party congress - shows that China's leaders do not expect the view that the country's financial risks are negligible due to the large pool of savings. Instead, this year's financial crackdown serves as a dress-rehearsal for what is likely to be a much stricter crackdown on the financial sector as Xi reboots reforms in 2018. Financial tightening alone is a major aspect of restarting the reform agenda. Tighter controls on banks and leverage will translate into greater market discipline. This will in turn maintain the pressure on the sector most in need of change - the SOEs. The key question is how much of an appetite Xi has for bankruptcies and unemployment, since traditionally Chinese governments have not had much. Today's manufacturing employment indicators are weak despite the past two years' stimulus and growth recovery (Chart 16). The Xi administration will push forward with "supply side reforms" meant to weed out excess capacity - including at least some redundant workers13 - but this is precisely where any reformist intentions are likely to be compromised after the initial burst. The Communist Party has also placed greater emphasis on improving living standards and per capita disposable income, which will further limit the regime's appetite for self-imposed deleveraging (Chart 17). The hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021 will mark another politically sensitive calendar year and hence another reason for the party to backtrack after a spell of greater economic discipline. Xi will want to leave on a high note in 2022. Furthermore, excessive tightening would pose enormous risks for Xi's outward-looking economic and foreign policy agendas: not only the highly touted international development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR), which require extensive Chinese investment, but also China's military rise in a region that is increasingly militarily competitive (Chart 18). Chart 16Employment Weak Despite Stimulus Employment Weak Despite Stimulus Employment Weak Despite Stimulus Chart 17Communist Party Expects Higher Incomes Communist Party Expects Higher Incomes Communist Party Expects Higher Incomes Chart 18Another Reason To Avoid Economic Slowdown Another Reason To Avoid Economic Slowdown Another Reason To Avoid Economic Slowdown Bottom Line: The Xi administration will renew its reform drive - particularly by curbing leverage, shadow banking, and local government debt. Growth risks are to the downside. But Beijing will eventually backtrack and re-stimulate, even as early as 2018, leaving the reform agenda in limbo once again. Investment Implications China's fundamental transition has already occurred. The demographic profile of the country no longer favors cheap labor or an ever-larger pool of savings that state authorities can easily direct into productivity-enhancing basic investments (Chart 19). The cost of capital is set to rise in the long run and that will put sustained pressure on the inefficient parts of the economy. "Reform" will become more an issue of withholding financial assistance, which the government will eventually be forced to grant out of concern for stability. As the pool of savings declines, the government faces the unprecedented challenge of moderating the wealth disparities that widened so rapidly during the boom years and that threaten regime stability (Chart 20). Chart 19The Savings Glut Is Coming To An End The Savings Glut Is Coming To An End The Savings Glut Is Coming To An End Chart 20Inequality: A Liability For The Party Inequality: A Liability For The Party Inequality: A Liability For The Party This will involve increasing the redistributive effect of taxes - which is remarkably low in China, and which in turn will generate higher levels of political tension between the haves and have nots, both households and regions. The Communist Party is only beginning to navigate these difficulties, which will stir up resentment among the large and ambitious middle class. Yet the middle class must be encouraged to thrive, as the rebalance of the Chinese economy cannot rest solely on the decline of investment. For that to occur, there needs to be a change in household, government, and corporate relations such that the government absorbs the excess debt created by corporations and instills greater efficiency among them, while devoting more resources to social wellbeing, thus enabling households to reduce precautionary savings. So far, Chinese households continue to save up for a rainy day (Chart 21), which leaves economic growth at the mercy of corporate borrowing and exports, the very dependencies that the Xi administration aims to reduce. Unfortunately for Xi, the chance to turn attention to these internal problems will coincide with bigger international challenges - especially tensions with the United States. We expect Sino-American distrust to worsen as long as China continues its more aggressive foreign policy and tries to carve out a sphere of influence in Asia. This is not a policy reliant on Xi's preferences alone but rather on China's growing domestic economic and security needs. In the event that Xi attempts to stay in power beyond 2022 - which we consider a low probability outcome - we expect U.S.-China confrontations to occur sooner than otherwise. Our long-term theme of global multipolarity will receive a steroid injection. There is no clear trend for Chinese H-shares around party congresses - sometimes they rally, sometimes they sell off (Chart 22). China's fiscal/credit impulse has ticked up and the coming slowdown may take time to develop, so we would not be surprised to see a rally leading into or following this year's congress. Chinese H-shares are cheap relative to their peers. Chart 21Chinese Still Saving For A Rainy Day Chinese Still Saving For A Rainy Day Chinese Still Saving For A Rainy Day Chart 22China Rallies Versus EM In Times Of Reform China Rallies Versus EM In Times Of Reform China Rallies Versus EM In Times Of Reform On the other hand, China's economic structure is worse than Xi found it. If he grabs the bull by the horns - as we think he will do - markets will sell off for fear of growth disappointments and policy mistakes, at least until investors are convinced it is safe to buy into China's long-term efficiency gains from reform. We recommend going long Chinese equities relative to EM. Xi's renewed reform drive will be attractive to EM dedicated investors in the context of un-reforming EMs like South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil, while EM will suffer from the negative short-term growth impact of Chinese reforms. This trade performed well during the major reforms of 1997-2002 and after the Third Plenum in 2014-15. Certainly we would bet against the continuation of extreme low volatility in Chinese assets, as measured by the CBOE China ETF Volatility Index. Both China's foreign and domestic political risks are understated. Finally, we recommend investors go tactically long Chinese Big Five banks versus small and medium-sized banks, a trade initiated by our fellow BCA Emerging Markets Strategy in October for a gain of 7.7% (Chart 23). Our EM Equity Sector Strategy has also lent credence to this view.14 The larger banks are better provisioned and prepared for credit losses and the financial tightening that we expect to come. Chart 23Big Banks Can Weather The Storm Big Banks Can Weather The Storm Big Banks Can Weather The Storm This trade has lost some altitude over the past month as a result of the perception that Chinese authorities would scale back their financial crackdown. However, the National Financial Work Conference held over the weekend of July 14-16 signaled that the Xi administration will expand its deleveraging campaign not only throughout the financial sector but also to SOEs and local governments to rein in China's formidable systemic risks. The new Financial Stability and Development Committee is likely to be more significant than market participants realize - Xi will have new political capital after this fall and is already shifting his attention to the sector. Moreover the announcement that the People's Bank of China will take a greater oversight role in the financial sector and for systemically important institutions is especially significant in light of the impending retirement of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, which will usher in a new chapter in the PBoC's governance. Fortifying the country against financial risk is a regime security issue, as well as a basis for eventual financial reform and liberalization, and we expect the coming regulatory tightening to have far-reaching consequences. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 The "middle income trap" is a concept in economics describing developing countries that fail to make the transition into developed economies, despite showing rapid developmental progress for a time, and thus remaining stuck in the "middle income" GDP per capita range. Please see Indermit Gill and Homi Kharas et al, "An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas For Economic Growth," World Bank (2007), available at siteresources.worldbank.org. For a recent review of the literature, please see Linda Glawe and Helmut Wagner, "The middle-income trap - definitions, theories and countries concerned: a literature survey," MPRA Paper 71196, dated May 13, 2016, available at mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de. 2 The dismissal of Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, for example, is seen as evidence of Jiang Zemin's consolidation of power ahead of the 15th National Party Congress, while the fall from grace of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006 is seen as proof of Hu Jintao's consolidation ahead of the 17th Party Congress in 2007. 3 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 For instance, this time around there are rumors that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the standard retirement age, and that he may even go so far as to oust Premier Li Keqiang. Such drastic changes are unlikely, particularly the latter, but certainly not unthinkable. 5 For our long-term investment theme of "charismatic leadership," please see our Strategic Outlook cited in note 3 above. 6 Please see Alice L. Miller, "China's New Party Leadership," Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 23 (Winter 2008), available at www.hoover.org. For this discussion of factions please also see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the Rise of the Zhejiang Clique,” Jamestown Foundation, May 11, 2016. 7 For instance, Jiang Zemin has continued to be a powerbroker to this day: Xi's vaunted anti-corruption campaign over the past five years has largely aimed at rooting out the influence of Jiang's faction. This includes the ouster of Sun Zhengcai this past week. And that is thirteen years after Jiang gave up a formal post! 8 Note that Xi rose to power as a princeling and member of Jiang Zemin's faction, as opposed to Hu Jintao and the CCYL. Yet Xi combined with Hu to oust the princeling Bo Xilai, and his anti-corruption campaign has largely focused on eradicating Jiang's influence. 9 Please see Chang-Tai Hsieh and Zheng (Michael) Song, “Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State Sector in China,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, March 19 2015, available at www.brookings.edu. At the seventeenth party congress in 2007, Hu also launched major reforms, aiming to reduce income inequality, urban-rural disparities, and lack of development in western China, but his efforts were cut short by the global financial crisis. Please see Hu Jintao, "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society," Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007, available at www.china.org.cn. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 11 There are obviously pros and cons to this change: the industrial era required leaders with technical skills; the modern era requires services, branding, and innovation. But, in the Chinese context, the humanities are not focused on critical thinking and questioning authority to the same extent as in the West. 12 In fact, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 13 Even the official unemployment measure, which hardly ever moves, is slated to rise from 4.02% to 4.5% this year. Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Messages From The People's Congress," dated March 9, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Special Report, "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow," dated June 15, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Please see also BCA EM Equity Sector Strategy Portfolio Update, "Ranking Model And China Banks," dated July 18, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com. Appendix China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress