Emerging Markets

Highlights This week, we are reprising and updating "The Other Guys In The Oil Market" from our sister service Energy Sector Strategy (NRG), because it so well captures the state of oil production outside the U.S. shales, Middle East OPEC and Russia. "The Other Guys" account for ~ half of global supply. Next week, we'll publish a joint report with NRG analyzing today's OPEC meeting. The aptly named "Other Guys" account for ~ 42mm b/d of production, which they are struggling to maintain at current levels, let alone increase. These producers supply nearly half of global production, and have been stuck in a pattern of slow decline for years despite high oil prices. Beginning in 2019, we expect production declines to accelerate. This will put enormous pressure on the three primary growth regions, which markets likely will start pricing in toward the end of next year. Energy: Overweight. OPEC 2.0 is expected to extend its 1.8mm b/d of production cuts to the end of 1Q18 at its meeting in Vienna today. Going into the meeting, markets were being guided to expect even deeper cuts. Our long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short $45/bbl puts, and our long Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 Brent positions are up 75.0% and 509.5% respectively, following their initiation on May 11, 2017. Base Metals: Neutral. Steel and iron-ore prices are getting a boost from China's anti-pollution campaign, which is expected to run through the end of this month. This was launched ahead of the anti-pollution campaign we expected after the Communist Party Congress in the fall. Iron ore delivered to Qingdao is up 3.1% since May 9, when Reuters reported the campaign began.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold was well bid earlier in the week on the back of a weaker USD. Our long gold position is up 1.9%, while our long volatility trade, which we will unwind at tonight's close, is down 98.5%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The weaker USD takes some pressure off wheat and beans over the short term, and might prompt a short-covering rally. We remain bearish, however, as the USD likely will bottom in the near future.2 Feature U.S. Onshore, Middle East OPEC (ME OPEC), and Russia combine to produce ~43 MMb/d of oil plus another ~11 MMb/d of other liquids (NGLs, biofuels, refinery gains, etc.). Combined, these producers increased crude production by 5 MMb/d plus another 1 MMb/d of other liquids production over the past three years (2014-2016), creating the oversupply that crashed prices. We expect these producers to add another 1.60 MMb/d of oil plus 1.14 MMb/d of other liquids by 2018 (over 2016 levels), dominated by nearly 2.0 MMb/d of oil and NGLs from the U.S. shales. Oil production from the other 100+ global oil producers also represents about ~42 MMb/d, but on balance has been slowly eroding since 2010, failing to grow even when oil prices were $100+/bbl. Despite some 2017 recovery from Libya, we expect total production to continue to fall in both 2017 and 2018. The few recently expanding producers among the Other Guys are running out of growth. Canada, Brazil, North Sea and GOM account for ~13 MMb/d of oil production in 2016, adding ~1.5 MMb/d over the past three years (2014-2016). North Sea production is projected to resume declines starting in 2017; GOM will reach it peak production sometime in 2017 or 2018, then start to ebb; large new Canadian oil sands projects will add ~310k b/d in 2017-2018, but scarce additions are scheduled beyond that; and Brazil's once-lofty growth plans have slowed to a crawl in 2016-2018. Global deepwater drilling activity and exploration spending have collapsed, lowering the reserve base, and undermining the stability of current production levels. Outside Of Just Three Regions, Oil Supply Picture Looks Worrisome Often overlooked in our discussions about world oil markets are the supply contributions of over 100 geographic regions. This collection of suppliers (which we will call the "Other Guys") is defined as all producing regions in the world other than: 1) U.S. Onshore (shales, specifically), 2) OPEC's six Middle East members, and 3) Russia. The Other Guys deliver nearly half of global production, try to maximize production every day (even OPEC nations among the Other Guys have not had production constrained by quotas), and still have endured consistent, albeit modest, production declines over the past six years. Chart 1Outside Of A Very Few Regions,##BR##Oil Production Has Struggled Outside Of A Very Few Regions, Oil Production Has Struggled Outside Of A Very Few Regions, Oil Production Has Struggled At the end of 1Q17, oilfield-services leader Schlumberger voiced sharp concerns regarding stability of supplies from these ignored producers, warning that aggregate capital expenditures within these regions will sustain an unprecedented third straight year of decline in 2017, with total spending only about half of 2014 levels. Chart 1 shows the divergent production histories of the three growing regions versus the rest of the world. Chart 1 also shows production of the Other Guys excluding the especially dramatic declines/volatility of Libyan production. Even though these producers benefitted from the same incentives and profitability from high oil prices as the three growing regions, as a group, they have been unable to expand production. As oil prices have plunged, drilling activity in these nations has also plummeted, raising concerns that production declines could start accelerating in the near future. Chart 2 shows that oil-directed drilling activity among the international components of the Other Guys (Chart 2 excludes GOM and highly-seasonal Alaska and Canada) has crashed by ~40%, from an average of over 800 rigs during the five-year period of 2010-2014 to under 500 rigs for the past year. Offshore drilling has collapsed even a little more sharply for these producers than overall oil-directed drilling, falling ~43% from an average of over 280 rigs to only 160 today (Chart 3, excludes GOM). Chart 2Other Guys' Drilling##BR##Has Collapsed 40% Other Guys' Drilling Has Collapsed 40% Other Guys' Drilling Has Collapsed 40% Chart 3International Offshore Drilling Is Down Over 40%,##BR##Boding Poorly For The Stability Of Future Production International Offshore Drilling Is Down Over 40%, Boding Poorly For The Stability Of Future Production International Offshore Drilling Is Down Over 40%, Boding Poorly For The Stability Of Future Production Offshore Production Declines To Accelerate Chart 4Other Guys' Offshore Drilling Has Collapsed Other Guys' Offshore Drilling Has Collapsed Other Guys' Offshore Drilling Has Collapsed As a particularly worrisome trend for the Other Guys' production stability, offshore drilling activity has collapsed in some of the most important offshore oil producing regions in the world, including the GOM, North Sea, West Africa, and Brazil (Chart 4). Considering the multi-year lag between drilling activity and the start of oil production, and the large well size and quick declines associated with offshore wells, the oil production impacts of this drilling collapse that started two years ago have not really been felt yet. When these regions get past the wave of new production from 2015-2017 project additions (projects started during 2011-2014), they will face a dearth of new projects maturing in 2018-2022 due to this collapse in drilling, with new production likely to be inadequate to offset the declines of legacy production. Brazil, the North Sea, West Africa, and GOM together account for about 12 MMb/d of oil production (Chart 5). These four offshore regions have benefitted from intense investment from 2010-2015 as shown by the surging rig counts during that period in Chart 4. This investment/drilling drove 1.1 MMb/d of oil production growth in Brazil, the GOM, and the North Sea from 2013 to 2016, without which total production from the Other Guys would have declined by 1.4 MMb/d rather than just 0.3 MMb/d. Despite strong investment, production in West Africa merely held flat outside of Nigeria during 2013-2016 while falling by 0.4 MMb/d within Nigeria (mostly in 2016 due to pipeline disruptions from saboteurs). Chart 5Offshore Production Will Stop Expanding, Then Decline The Other Guys In The Oil Market, Redux The Other Guys In The Oil Market, Redux Brazil offshore drilling activity over the past year is less than half of levels during 2010-2013. As a result, production growth will moderate significantly over the next few years, expanding far less (250k b/d in 2018 vs. 2016, based on our balances data) than the rapid 470,000 b/d step-up in production during 2013-2014. While Brazil still has a rich endowment of pre-salt reserves, marshalling capital and the International Oil Companies' (IOCs) focus to resurrect development activity will take years. We expect no growth during 2019-2020. The North Sea has seen production cut in half from the time of peak production in 1999 until 2013. Production declines were briefly halted and re-expanded by ~300,000 b/d during 2014-2016 due to a concerted drilling effort and brownfield maintenance program incentivized and financed by $100/bbl oil prices. Drilling has since declined 35% from average 2010-2014 levels, and production is expected to resume its downward trend in 2017-2018. Overall oil-directed offshore drilling in the GOM has been cut by over 50% from 2013-2014 levels. Based on our field-by-field analysis published in January, we estimate GOM oil production will hit a peak in a year and a half or less and then will succumb to declines due to lack of new drilling. West Africa has suffered production declines for the past several years due to both geologic challenges as well as more recent (2016-2017) political/sabotage related disruptions in Nigeria. With offshore drilling activity plummeting 70%-80%, we expect production declines will accelerate and it will take years of increased drilling to yield new production that can stem the declines. The collapse in Nigerian drilling, from 10 rigs in 2010-2013 to only 2-3 rigs over the past year, likely means that Nigerian production is incapable of returning to 2015 levels even if its recent sabotage issues are resolved. In aggregate, as shown in Chart 5, we expect production from these four offshore regions to stagnate during 2017-2018 (North Sea and West Africa decline while Brazil and GOM expand) before declining by ~0.5 MMb/d in each 2019-2020 due to the dramatic curtailment of investment during 2015-2017. SLB Talks Its Book, But Makes A Strong Point At an industry conference at the end of March, Schlumberger (again) railed against the inadequacy of the cash flow-negative U.S. shale industry to single-handedly supply enough production growth to satisfy continuing global demand growth, especially once the Other Guys start seeing more pronounced negative production effects from the sharply reduced investments over 2015-2017. "The 2017 E&P spend for this part of the global production base...is expected to be down 50% compared to 2014. At no other time in the past 50 years has our industry experienced cuts of this magnitude and this duration." - Paal Kibsgaard, CEO of SLB. SLB highlighted an analysis of depletion rates constructed with data from Energy Aspects. (The March 27 presentation can be found at www.slb.com). Annual depletion rates (annual production/proved developed reserves) in the GOM had spiked to over 20% in 2016 from a long-term level of only ~10% during 2000-2013. Similarly, depletion rates in the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea also surged from ~10% to ~15% over the past three years. In both the GOM and the North Sea, oil production had recently been expanded, but proved developed reserves declined. Due to such low drilling investments during 2015-2016, producers have replaced only about half of the oil reserves that they've produced in the GOM and North Sea over the past three years (2014-2016). Eventually, this lack of investment in cultivating tomorrow's resources will catch up to the industry, and production will decline. Investors must take SLB's commentary with a grain of salt, as they could be construed as sour grapes. The immense pull of new capital spending to the U.S. shales has substantially benefitted SLB's primary competitors more than it has benefitted SLB (SLB is much more focused on international and offshore projects). Still, investors are too complacent about the stability of non-U.S. production. SLB's analysis and warnings of accelerating production declines should not be ignored. Bottom Line: Outside of the three regions of sharply growing production (U.S. onshore, ME OPEC and Russia) that investors are focused on, the other half of global production has been stagnant to declining despite high oil prices and high levels of drilling during 2010-2015. Now that drilling and capex in these regions has declined by 40%-50%, production declines should accelerate in coming years. Offshore production, especially, has not seen enough drilling to replace reserves, and is poised to decline within the next 2-3 years. The accelerating declines of the "Other Guys" will allow more room for growth from U.S. shales, ME OPEC and Russia. Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President, Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see "China steel hits nine-week peak amid crackdown, lifts iron ore," published by reuters.com May 22, 2017. 2 Please see the feature article in last week's edition of BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy entitled "Bloody Potomac," in which our colleague Mathieu Savary lays out the case for an imminent USD rebound. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 The Other Guys In The Oil Market, Redux The Other Guys In The Oil Market, Redux The Other Guys In The Oil Market, Redux The Other Guys In The Oil Market, Redux

Feature EM risk assets refuse to sell off - regardless of new information and developments that historically would have caused these markets to tumble. Indeed, political turmoil and changes in Brazil and South Africa - two high-beta EM markets - have so far had limited impact on flows and market dynamics. Moreover, while our Reflation Confirming Indicator has rolled over, EM share prices have not reacted at all (Chart I-1). EM stocks have also decoupled with the equal-weighted average of global mining and energy equity indexes (Chart I-2). Chart 1Reflation Confirming Indicator And ##br##EM Stocks Reflation Confirming Indicator And EM Stocks Reflation Confirming Indicator And EM Stocks Chart 2Commodities Share Prices And ##br##EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence Commodities Share Prices And EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence Commodities Share Prices And EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence We do not subscribe to the thesis that EM assets have permanently decoupled from both commodities and their domestic credit cycles, and that tried and tested indicators no longer work. Technology and social media share prices have been instrumental to this latest decoupling, as we wrote in last week's report.1 This group of stocks is in a full-blown mania phase, and it is hard to know when this will end. Yet, exponential price moves always occur at the end of a bull market, and are typically followed by bear markets. As we elaborated in last week's report, the investment call on social media and internet stocks is a bottom-up - not macro - call. Top-down analysis can add some value on the semiconductor cycle, and we suggested last week that it is likely topping out. This week new data releases support the thesis that Asian/global trade in general and the semiconductor cycle in particular are already decelerating. Korean exports data for the first 20 days of May, Japanese preliminary manufacturing PMI for May, and Taiwanese manufacturing output volume growth for April have all decelerated (Chart I-3). Finally, one technical piece of evidence that this rally is late is relative weakness in the equal-weighted MSCI equity indexes. In the EM space, the equally-weighted individual stock index has fared poorly against the EM market cap-weighted index since May 2016 (Chart I-4, top panel). In the U.S., the same measure of market breadth has deteriorated since December 2016 (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart 3Asia's Manufacturing Growth ##br##Is Already Decelerating Asia's Manufacturing Growth Is Already Decelerating Asia's Manufacturing Growth Is Already Decelerating Chart 4The EM And U.S. Equity Rally ##br##Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks The EM And U.S. Equity Rally Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks The EM And U.S. Equity Rally Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks Bottom Line: EM financial markets are in the midst of irrational exuberance. The rally is late, but it is impossible to time the top. The forthcoming selloff will be large and protracted. Beware Of China's Budding Growth Slump Interest rates have risen in China sufficiently enough to cause a major growth slowdown in the mainland economy (Chart I-5). Liquidity tightening amid a lingering credit bubble could not be a more dangerous combination. In this context, financial markets are extremely complacent on EM/China plays. China's liquidity tightening continues, and is bound to create a decisive growth relapse in the months ahead, as well as dampen exports in countries that sell to China (Chart I-6). Chart 5China Growth To Slump China Growth To Slump China Growth To Slump Chart 6Exports To China To Slump Exports To China To Slump Exports To China To Slump Not only is the People's Bank of China (PBoC) guiding interest rates higher, but there is an ongoing regulatory crackdown on the financial system. Regulators are forcing banks to bring Wealth Management Products (WMPs) and other off-balance-sheet items onto their balance sheets. As a result, banks' capital adequacy and risk matrixes will deteriorate, and they will be forced to slow down credit creation. Chart 7EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out Remarkably, policymakers are determined to get things under control. According to The Wall Street Journal,2 key policymakers have issued strongly worded statements. "Strong medicine must be prescribed," said Guo Shuqing, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CRBC), according to people familiar with the matter. "If the banking industry gets into a mess," he added, "I will resign." He was appointed as the head of the CRBC last October, and likely has a mandate from the President to tackle speculative excesses in the financial system. In its first quarter Monetary Policy Implementation Report,3 the PBoC repeatedly used the phrase "preventing bubbles." Besides, in his statements, the chairman of the PBoC has frequently emphasized the need to normalize credit growth and curb speculative activities. The former head of the insurance regulator, who has been "accommodating" and "tolerant" of risky activities by insurance companies, was jailed last fall for corruption. These are strong indications confirming that policymakers are determined to curb speculative financial activities. Provided how entrenched and large various speculative financial schemes and the credit bubble have become in China, it will be impossible to tackle speculative excesses without a slowdown in overall credit growth and associated harm to the real economy. This is not to say that policymakers are tightening with intentions to cause a growth collapse. Policymakers in all countries always tighten to cap inflation or credit excesses or normalize interest rates - i.e., they never tighten to cause a major shock to the real economy. This applies to Chinese policymakers at the moment, especially ahead of the party Congress later this year. That said, when the existing imbalances in the economy or financial system are sufficiently large, even minor tightening can cause a financial accident or growth relapse. It is not within policymakers' powers to predict or prevent it. They may alter their policy after the fact, but markets will sell off considerably beforehand. We do not know exactly how financial dynamics in China will evolve in the months ahead, but we are certain that the market consensus is too complacent and that EM asset prices are at major risk. Bottom Line: It is impossible to predict financial accidents (stress among specific institutions) but we are certain that China's credit growth and, consequently, capital spending are bound to slow considerably in the coming months. This bodes ill for producers of commodities and industrial goods both within and outside China. Accordingly, EM risk assets will suffer the most. As a final note, EM ex-technology share prices have not yet broken out and we do expect them to relapse from the current levels (Chart I-7). Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?," dated May 17, 2017, link available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Lingling Wei and Chao Deng, "China's War on Debt Causes Stocks to Drop, Bond Yields to Shoot Up and Defaults to Rise," May 5, 2017, The Wall Street Journal. 3 Please refer to http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/3307990/3307409/index.html (In Chinese only). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Brazilian President Michel Temer has been accused of crimes much worse than what got his predecessor impeached; Further instability is likely, with low probability that Temer's impeachment would restart reforms; Only a technocratic government, or brand new election, could produce a market-friendly outcome. Odds are that Brazil's public debt load will continue to escalate, and that in two years or so the debt-to-GDP ratio will spiral out of control. Without structural reforms and higher commodities prices, Brazilian financial markets are looking into the abyss. Stay put on Brazilian financial markets. Feature Investors cheered the impeachment of Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff, bidding up Brazilian assets for over a year despite the challenging macroeconomic context. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services have repeatedly cautioned investors not to buy the hype. Brazil was already "priced for political perfection" on May 12, 2016 when Rousseff was removed from office to face trial by the senate over fiscal accounting irregularities.1 And yet, the political context has been far from perfect. As we wrote last May: "It is highly unlikely that the political dysfunction within Brazil's political class will end with a Temer administration, at least not anytime soon." The latest corruption revelations have directly implicated acting president Michel Temer of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) as well as Senator Aecio Neves, the leader of centrist and investor-friendly Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and a key Temer ally in Congress. The market has placed a massive bullish bet in the abilities of the tentative Temer-Neves (PMDB-PSDB) entente cordiale to push through largely unpopular fiscal reforms through Congress. These reforms, none of which have passed yet (!), are now likely to stall until either an early election is called (best case scenario) or until the current government's mandate expires in October 2018. We have expected Brazil's political rally to dissipate. As we argued in 2016, without a new election, the interim government has no mandate for painful structural reforms. We are sticking to this view today. What Is Going On In Brazil? According to revelations in the Brazilian press, President Temer was caught in an audio recording asking the chairman of JBS Group - the world's largest meatpacker - to continue making payments to the former President of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Cunha, who was jailed for corruption in 2016. Cunha, a former Temer ally and member of PMDB, was indicted in the large scale "Operation Car Wash" corruption scandal involving the state-owned oil company Petrobras. The payments by JBS were allegedly meant to ensure that Cunha did not spill the beans on his co-conspirators. Cunha had previously disclosed that he possessed compromising information about several senior politicians linked to the Petrobras scandal. JBS Chairman Joesley Batista, himself under investigation, recorded a conversation with Temer on March 7 as part of his plea bargain negotiations with law enforcement officials. According to press reports, Temer asked Batista to continue payments to ensure Cunha's silence. As part of the same investigation, Senator Aecio Neves - the darling of the Brazilian investment community who narrowly lost the presidential election to Rousseff in 2014 - was filmed soliciting two million reals ($638,000) from Batista. This is not his first brush with the law, Neves was also under corruption investigation when he was the governor of the state of Minas Gerais. Neves's apartment has since been raided by the police as the corruption probe against Brazilian politicians reaches a fever pitch. How serious are the charges against the Temer and his ruling coalition? They are deadly serious. As an aside, we have been puzzled that investors have never posed the following question: how was it possible that the entire political and especially congressional system is so corrupt but Temer - the long-serving head of the largest party in the congress and one of the most shrewd politicians in Brazil - has not been involved in this corruption scheme. President Dilma Rousseff, former leader of the left-wing Workers Party (PT) and successor to President Inácio "Lula" da Silva, was impeached and removed from power for a lot less. There was never any actual evidence that Rousseff was personally involved in Operation Car Wash, at least at the time of her impeachment. In fact, the strongest legal case against Rousseff was that she failed to uphold the so-called Fiscal Responsibility Law. Essentially, Rousseff was impeached and removed from power because she stimulated the economy for political gain. A charge that practically every president in Brazil's history has been guilty of (if not every leader in the world!). Temer and Neves are accused of much greater crimes. If the reporting of the Brazilian press is accurate, Neves personally profited and continues to profit from Operation Car Wash. And Temer is then directly involved, to this day, in obstruction of justice and witness intimidation. These are not crimes by association or mere technicalities resulting from politically charged fiscal profligacy. Rather, they are serious crimes that could end with lengthy jail terms, let alone removal from power. Rousseff claimed that her removal from power was a coup d'état. She was correct to characterize it as such. Unlike in the U.S., where a president removed from power is replaced with the vice president from the same party, in Brazil vice presidents are often appointed from a coalition partner. As such, Vice President Temer replaced Rousseff and proceeded to alter Brazilian policy in a dramatic fashion. He abandoned the PMDB legislative alliance with left-wing PT, turned to the centrist PSDB for votes in Congress and proceeded to enact orthodox, conservative, supply-side reforms. While these are absolutely the reforms that Brazil needs, we never accepted the view that they are reforms that Brazilians want. In fact, Rousseff won the 2014 election against Neves, with Temer as her running mate, by campaigning on a populist platform against precisely these types of supply-side reforms. Bottom Line: We hate to tell our clients "we told you so," but Temer's 180-degree turn in policy was never going to work. Not without an election that bolsters his political mandate to enact painful structural reforms. We also cautioned our clients that corruption in Brazilian Congress was endemic and severe and would therefore not magically disappear with Rousseff's removal from power. As such, "impeachment was no panacea,"2 especially not when many members of Congress voting against Dilma were under investigation for corruption themselves! The high level of corruption is not because of a moral failing particular to Brazilian mentality. Rather, corruption is a feature of Brazil's fractured and regionalized politics that depend on side-payments and pork barreling to grease the wheels of legislative process. Rousseff's crimes appear paltry when compared to the (yet unproven) allegations against Temer and Neves. J-Curve Of Structural Reforms Amidst the 2016 political crisis, we argued that the only positive outcome for Brazilian politics and markets in the long-term would be a new election (Figure I-1).3 Why? Because we understood how painful fiscal reforms would have to be to deal with Brazil's disastrous fiscal position (Chart I-1). Without a new election, the interim Temer administration would not have the political capital to enact painful reforms. Figure I-1Brazil: Our Take On Possible Political Scenarios ##br##Before Former President Rousseff Was Impeached Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Chart I-1Brazil's Fiscal Position Brazil's Fiscal Position Brazil's Fiscal Position The market has disagreed with us for a full year now. However, the rally based on political hopes was always unsustainable. First, investors have misunderstood the nature of political corruption in Brazilian politics and just how intrinsic the problem has been. In retrospect, Rousseff may have been the least corrupt major politician in Brazil! Second, investors have ignored the message of our J-Curve of structural reforms (Diagram I-1). Diagram I-1Structural Reforms Are Painful: ##br##Stylized Representation Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Reform is always and everywhere painful, otherwise it would be the form. Every government pursuing reforms has to get through the "danger zone" on our J-curve of structural reform. As reforms are passed and enacted, they begin to "bite." This is when the protests against reforms mount and the government loses its political capital. If the policymakers in charge of the reform effort are already starting with low political capital - as the Temer and his congressional coalition most certainly did in August 2016 - than the "danger zone" is essentially insurmountable. We have disagreed with the market as it has confused Rousseff's removal from power with widespread support for reforms that amount to economic austerity. As we often repeated in client meetings, "a vote for impeachment is not a vote for austerity." With general election only roughly one year away in October 2018, we doubted that the Temer administration would have the political capital to push through such reforms. After all, every government wants to be reelected and pursuing painful reforms ahead of the elections is not feasible election winning strategy. What has the Temer coalition managed to do thus far? It must have done a lot, given the positive market performance over the past 12 months? False. The market has rallied despite remarkably shoddy evidence of actual reforms. As we predicted in our analyses throughout 2016, the post-Rousseff Brazilian policymakers have been dogged by lack of political capital. Out of five major reform efforts, only two have passed - oil-auction legislation (Production Sharing Agreement Bill) and a fiscal-spending cap. We do not wish to claim that the latter is insignificant but as we discuss below they are insufficient to stabilize Brazil's public debt load. The main three reform efforts that would have significant long-term effect on Brazil's fiscal sustainability - social security reform, labor reform, and tax reform - have stalled and are now likely to fail (Table I-1). Table I-1President Temer's Proposed Structural Reforms & Their Status Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Brazilian Senator Ricardo Ferraço, of the centrist PSDB, in charge of drafting the labor reform report for the Senate, has already canceled the work on the proposal. Ferraço issued a statement that said, "the institutional crisis we are facing is devastating and we need to prioritize finding a solution. Everything else is secondary now." This is a major blow against labor reforms, which already passed the lower house in April. We suspect that it will largely be impossible to restart and, more importantly, pass the reforms without an election that gives a new government a political mandate. Alternatively, a technocratic government led by technocrats without political ambitions, could try to enact reforms until the next election. Without a new election or a technocratic government, members of centrist PSDB and center-left PMDB will start to distance themselves from the allegedly corrupt Temer administration. It makes no political sense for Congressmen like Ferraço to sacrifice their own political capital on the cross of austerity just a year from the start of the electoral campaign in the summer of 2018. Bottom Line: The results made clear by Figure I-1 are not surprising and were eminently forecastable. However, the market ignored the structural realities of Brazilian politics, as well as the theoretical foundation of successful structural reforms, and charged ahead regardless. Without fiscal reforms outlined in Table I-1, however, Brazil will likely end up in a debt trap very soon. A Perilous Fiscal Situation Brazil's fiscal position and public debt remain on an unsustainable trajectory. In fact, there has been limited fiscal improvement compared to what financial markets have priced in. In particular: The constitutional amendment by Brazilian President Michel Temer's government that introduced a cap on government spending was a dilution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law adopted in 2000 which stipulated that the government had to run primary fiscal surpluses. Capping government expenditure growth to the inflation rate de facto represents a relaxation of structural fiscal policy. Under the new fiscal rules, the government is targeting not the primary fiscal deficit (and, by extension, public debt), but only government expenditures. This implies that in a case where government revenues fall short of projections, the government is not obliged to rein in spending. On the whole, Temer's government has relaxed rather than tightened structural fiscal rules. While this makes sense because the economy is in a depression and needs fiscal relief, it has been bad news for government creditors. As a final point, the former President Dilma Rousseff was impeached for violating this exact same law that the current government has now relaxed. The fiscal balance has stabilized around 9% of GDP in the past year, but this has been due to one-off temporary measures. With nominal GDP growth at around 5%, the bulk of the 16% rise in collected income taxes from a year ago came from one-off measures such as the repayment of funds by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to the government, taxes on foreign asset repatriation and other temporary actions (Chart I-2). In short, Temer's government has resorted to one-off measures to improve the country's fiscal position. Unless the economy and tax collection recover strongly in the next 12 months, Brazil's fiscal position will worsen substantially, and public debt servicing will become unsustainable. Furthermore, the federal government's transfers to states have surged as the latter are facing their own fiscal crises due to revenue shortfalls. Local governments are reluctant to curb spending amid the ongoing depression, and will continue to pressure the federal government for more transfers. This will worsen public debt dynamics. Importantly, the social security deficit, presently at 2.4% of GDP, will continue to escalate without meaningful reforms (Chart I-3). According to IMF estimates,4 the social security deficit will reach 14% of GDP by 2021 if no reforms are implemented. This is assuming robust economic recovery this year and solid growth in the years ahead. Given social security reforms are unlikely to occur and economic growth will continue to underwhelm amid heightened political uncertainty, odds are that the impact of the social security deficit on the public debt dynamics will be worse than the IMF projections suggest. Moreover, the gap between local currency interest rates and nominal GDP growth remains extremely wide (Chart I-4). To offset this, the government has to run primary surpluses. The primary deficit is currently 2.3% of GDP. Chart I-2Income Tax Collection Has Been ##br##Boosted By One-Off Measures Income Tax Collection Has Been Boosted By One-Off Measures Income Tax Collection Has Been Boosted By One-Off Measures Chart I-3Brazil's Social Security System ##br##Is On Unsustainable Track Brazil's Social Security System Is On Unsustainable Track Brazil's Social Security System Is On Unsustainable Track Chart I-4An Untenable Gap An Untenable Gap An Untenable Gap That said, tightening fiscal policy amid the ongoing economic depression is politically suicidal. Finally, our public debt simulation suggests that unless economic growth recovers strongly, Brazil's public debt-to-GDP ratio will rise above 90% of GDP by the end of 2019 - in both our baseline and most pessimistic scenarios. Notably, our baseline scenario assumes nominal GDP growth of 5.5% in 2017, and 7% in both 2018 and 2019 (Table I-2). These are not bearish assumptions, but and could prove optimistic given the escalating political crisis. This debt simulation assumes that interest rates will stay above 10%, but it also assumes no bailout for public banks and state-owned companies, or a rise in transfers to state governments. Table I-2Brazil: Public Debt Sustainability Scenarios 2017-2019 Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Brazil: Politics Giveth And Politics Taketh Away Bottom Line: Odds are that Brazil's public debt load will continue to escalate, and that in two years or so the debt-to-GDP ratio will spiral out of control. The Economy, Corporate Profits And Markets There has been no recovery in either the economy or corporate profits (excluding commodities companies). Brazilian share prices have rallied massively in the past 17 months, yet profits in companies leveraged to the domestic business cycle have continued to shrink. Specifically, EPS for consumer staples companies and banks have dropped a lot in local currency terms, despite the equity market rally (Chart I-5). It is normal that share prices lead profits by six to 12 months, but the current rally in Brazil is already 16 months old. In short, the discrepancy between share prices and EPS is unprecedented and unsustainable. Ongoing profit weakness is consistent with a lack of recovery in domestic demand, which is corroborated by the macro data: retail sales volumes, manufacturing production and capital goods imports have not grown at all; their pace of contraction has simply moderated (Chart I-6). Chart I-5No Recovery In Corporate Profits ##br##In Non-Commodities Sectors No Recovery In Corporate Profits In Non-Commodities Sectors No Recovery In Corporate Profits In Non-Commodities Sectors Chart I-6No Recovery In Economy No Recovery In Economy No Recovery In Economy In Brazil, key to its financial markets is the exchange rate. If and when the currency appreciates, interest rates will decline and share prices will rally and the economy will eventually revive - and vice versa. In turn, the exchange rate is driven not by the interest rate differential versus the U.S., as shown in Chart I-7, but by commodities prices, with which it strongly correlates (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Interest Rate Differential And ##br##Exchange Rate: No Correlation Interest Rate Differential And Exchange Rate: No Correlation Interest Rate Differential And Exchange Rate: No Correlation Chart I-8BRL Is Sensitive To Commodities Prices BRL Is Sensitive To Commodities Prices BRL Is Sensitive To Commodities Prices BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team believes commodities prices have peaked and will decline in the months ahead. This, along with renewed political turmoil, warrants a bearish stance on the Brazilian currency. While the central bank has large foreign currency reserves and could sell U.S. dollars to support the real, this cannot preclude a selloff in the nation's financial markets. Selling foreign currency by a central bank entails withdrawing local currency from the banking system, tighter local liquidity and higher interest rates. Hence, a central bank can defend the exchange rate from depreciation if it tolerates higher interbank rates. Higher interest rates will, however, be devastating for Brazil. If the central bank of Brazil, having used its international reserves to defend the currency, decides to inject local currency liquidity into the system to bring down local rates, the outcome will be currency depreciation. In a nutshell, a central bank cannot control both the exchange rate and local interest rates if the nation has an open capital account structure. Remarkably, Chart I-9 contends that in Brazil, the exchange rate correlates with central bank lending to commercial banks. If the central bank lends to commercial banks, the currency depreciates, and vice versa. Facing the choice between currency depreciation and higher local rates, the Brazilian central bank will choose the former because of its perilous public debt situation as well as the imperative of a revival in credit growth. Hence, the Brazilian central bank is unlikely to defend the currency on a sustainable basis. If the currency depreciates, local bonds, sovereign and corporate U.S. dollar credit and share prices will sell off too. Bottom Line: Without structural reforms and higher commodities prices, Brazilian financial markets are looking into the abyss. Investment Recommendations Politics has fueled the rally in Brazilian assets since early 2016, and now politics taketh away. With the political tailwinds reversing, investors will have nothing left to base their decisions on but the terrible macroeconomic picture. We maintain our bearish stance on Brazilian financial markets: We continue to short the BRL versus both the U.S. dollar and the Mexican peso. The real is not cheap at all while the peso offers good value (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Central Bank's Liquidity Provision ##br##To Banks Vs. Exchange Rate Central Bank's Liquidity Provision To Banks Vs. Exchange Rate Central Bank's Liquidity Provision To Banks Vs. Exchange Rate Chart I-10BRL Is Not Cheap, MXN Is BRL Is Not Cheap, MXN Is BRL Is Not Cheap, MXN Is Dedicated EM equity and credit investors should continue underweighting Brazil in their respective portfolios. Finally, local rates will be under upward pressure as the currency depreciates. We remain offside this market. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Santiago E. Gomez, Consulting Editor santiago@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Brazil: Priced For Political Perfection," dated May 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Brazil: Impeachment Is No Panacea," dated April 26, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Brazil's Political Honeymoon Is Over," dated August 18, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Cuevas et al., IMF Working Paper: Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging in Brazil, March 2017

Highlights U.S. fiscal stimulus will be priced back into markets; Northeast Asia is consumed with domestic politics for now; China's financial crackdown raises risks, but so far looks contained; South Korea's relief rally will lead to buyer's remorse; Japan's constitutional reforms portend more reflation. Feature The market has lost faith in U.S. fiscal stimulus. The bond market has given back all of the expectations of faster growth and higher inflation (Chart 1). Hopes of populist, budget-busting tax cuts appear to have been dashed by the Putin-gate scandal and alleged White House obstruction of justice. As a result, the DXY has fallen to pre-election levels, while the Goldman Sachs high tax-rate basket of equities has fallen to its lowest level relative to the S&P 500 since February 2016 (Chart 2). We continue to believe that tax reform, or just tax cuts, will happen this year or early next year and that the market will have to re-price fiscal stimulus and budget profligacy at some point this year.1 As such, we are not ready to close our tactical recommendations of going long the high-tax rate basket relative to S&P 500 (down 1.62% since April 5) or playing the 2-year / 30-year Treasury curve steepener (down 11.4 bps since November 1). Republicans in Congress will push through tax reforms or cuts for the sake of remaining competitive in the upcoming midterm elections. And we doubt their commitment to budget discipline. That said, it is not clear that the equity market needs tax reforms to continue its upward trajectory. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is predicting growth of 4.1% in the second quarter while the NY Fed's Nowcast is forecasting 2.3%. BCA U.S. Equity Strategy's earnings model continues to predict continued healthy profit growth for the remainder of the year both in the U.S. and abroad (Chart 3).2 In fact, if expectations of stimulus in the U.S. fully dissipate, the USD will take a breather - giving global stocks a boost - and the Fed will be able to take it easy on tightening U.S. rates, easing global monetary conditions. Chart 1Market No Longer##br## Believes In Trump Stimulus... Market No Longer Believes In Trump Stimulus... Market No Longer Believes In Trump Stimulus... Chart 2...Or Trump ##br##Tax Cuts ...Or Trump Tax Cuts ...Or Trump Tax Cuts Chart 3Corporate Profit ##br##Outlook Still Strong Corporate Profit Outlook Still Strong Corporate Profit Outlook Still Strong Perhaps far more important for global and U.S. risk assets is global growth. And the fulcrum of global growth has been China's economic performance. As the only country willing to run pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy, China has had a disproportionate impact on global growth since 2008. As such, we turn this week to the geopolitics and politics of Northeast Asia. China: How Far Will Deleveraging Go? Chinese financial policy tightening caught the market by surprise this year. The running assumption was that policy would be fully accommodative in order to ensure stability ahead of the all-important nineteenth National Party Congress in October or November.3 However, it is possible that the assumption is flawed. First, as we have pointed out in the past, China does not have a record of proactive economic stimulus ahead of party congresses (Chart 4). Second, President Xi Jinping may be far more secure in his position than is understood. Chart 4Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Mid-Term Party Congresses In China Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Mid-Term Party Congresses In China Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Mid-Term Party Congresses In China The crackdown on the financial sector in recent months suggests that Xi's administration has a greater appetite for risk ahead of the party congress than is generally believed: The administration is continuing to tamp down on the property sector. The PBoC has drained liquidity and allowed interbank rates to rise (Chart 5). The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has launched inspections and new regulations on wealth management products and the shadow lending sector. The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) has imposed new restrictions, including preventing insurers from selling new policies. One can make a good case that these measures will be limited so as not to cause excessive disruption in the financial system. All of the key Communist Party statements, from Premier Li Keqiang's recent comments to those made by the economic leadership in December, at the beginning of this tightening cycle, have emphasized that stability remains the priority.4 The PBoC's measures have been marginal; other measures have mostly to do with supervision. Notable personnel changes affecting the top economic and financial government positions fall under preparations for the party congress and do not necessarily suggest a new ambitious policy initiative is under way.5 Moreover, the government has already stepped back a bit in the face of the liquidity squeeze. One of the signs of the PBoC's tighter stance was its discontinuation of its Medium-Term Lending Facility in January, but this has since been reinstated.6 And throughout May the PBoC has injected increasing amounts of liquidity into the interbank system, marking an apparent tactical shift (Chart 6). Furthermore, government spending is already growing again after a brief contraction. Chart 5People's Bank Tightens Marginally... People's Bank Tightens Marginally... People's Bank Tightens Marginally... Chart 6...But Keeps Interbank Rates On A Leash ...But Keeps Interbank Rates On A Leash ...But Keeps Interbank Rates On A Leash In light of these decisions, it seems policy tightening is intended not to be stringent but merely to keep the financial sector - especially the shadow banking sector - in check during a year in which the assumption is that regulators' hands are tied. After all, an unchecked expansion of leverage throughout the year could interfere with the stability imperative. There are two major risks to this view. First, there is the danger of unintended consequences: China is overleveraged: The fundamental problem for China is that there is too much leverage in the system and there has not been a bout of deleveraging for several years (Chart 7). Much of the leverage is off-balance sheet as a result of the rapid growth in shadow lending. There are complex and opaque webs of counterparty risk. When authorities crack down, they cannot be certain that their actions will not spiral out of control. Recently, heightened scrutiny of "mutual guarantees," a type of shadow lending between corporations, led to the default of a company in Shandong that prompted a local government bailout, and more such credit events have occured.7 Policymakers are human: It is a fallacy to assume that Chinese policymakers are omnipotent. The mishaps of 2015-16 put a point on this. A state-backed newspaper has recently reiterated that its "deleveraging" campaign is not finished - the government could accidentally push too far.8 The rise in bond yields has already inverted the yield curve, causing the five-year bond yield to rise higher than the ten-year (Chart 8). This is a red flag and warrants caution.9 Quick fixes have negative side-effects: China escaped the last round of financial jitters, in 2015-16, by using its time-tried technique of credit and fiscal spending to boost the property market and build infrastructure, while imposing draconian capital controls. The growth rebound came at the expense of more debt, less economic rebalancing, and less financial openness. Chart 7China Is Massively Overleveraged China Is Massively Overleveraged China Is Massively Overleveraged Chart 8China's Yield Curve Has Inverted China's Yield Curve Has Inverted China's Yield Curve Has Inverted Second, there is the risk that Xi Jinping's calculus ahead of the party congress is not knowable. It may well be the case that Xi's position in the party is strengthened by a disruptive financial crackdown. The party congress is already under way: The party congress runs all year; it is not merely a one-off event this fall. Senior party officials will come up with a list of candidates for promotion in June or July. Then the PSC and former PSC members will likely meet behind the scenes to hash out their final list, which the Central Committee will ratify in the fall. If financial jitters were supposed to be strictly avoided for the party congress, then the current crackdown would never have begun. The outcomes are uncertain: The negotiations for the Politburo and PSC are not a foregone conclusion no matter how well positioned Xi appears to be as the "core" of the Communist Party. A simple assessment of the current Politburo suggests that the factions are evenly balanced when it comes to the current Politburo members capable of filling the five positions on the new PSC. Two of these positions should go to President Xi's and Premier Li Keqiang's successors, likely to be of opposing factions, while there will probably be three remaining slots that will have to be divvied up among an equal number of candidates from the two main factions (Table 1). Xi may still need to win some battles for influence behind the scenes in order to stack the Central Committee, Politburo, and PSC with his people for 2017 and beyond.10 His anti-corruption campaign has slowed down but is not over (Chart 9). This is all the more imperative for him since his retirement could be rattled by future enemies, given that he has removed the longstanding impunity of former PSC members. Table 1Lineup Of New Politburo Standing Committee Yet To Take Shape - Factions Evenly Balanced Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Despite these risks, we still tend to think that for China, as for the world, political risks are overstated in 2017 and understated in 2018.11 If Xi deliberately courts instability this year, as opposed to merely staying vigilant over the financial sector, then it will mark a major break from the norms of Chinese politics. The true risk to China's stability - aside from the unintended consequences discussed above - arises after the party congress, when Xi's political capital is replenished and he can attempt to reboot his policy agenda. Previous presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin both launched reform pushes after their midterm congresses in 2007 and 1997, respectively. Hu's reform drive was cut short by the global financial crisis, while Jiang's was large-scale and disruptive and paved the way for a decade of higher potential GDP. Having consolidated power in the party, bureaucracy, and military, and tightened controls over the media, Xi Jinping will be in a position in 2018 to launch sweeping reforms should he choose to do so. Presumably these reforms would follow along the lines of those he outlined in the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee back in 2013 - they would be pro-market reforms focused on raising productivity by transferring more wealth to households and SMEs at the expense of state-owned enterprises and local governments.12 To illustrate the process of structural reform, we have often used the notion of the "J-Curve" in Diagram 1. This shows that painful reforms deplete political capital, creating a "danger zone" for political leaders in which they lose popularity as economic pain hurts the public. Xi's work over the past five years to fight corruption and rebuild the party's public image have given him the ability to start the J-Curve process from a higher point than otherwise would have been the case. He will start at point D in the diagram, instead of point A, which means that the low point E may not embroil him as deeply in the danger zone of serious political instability as point B. Chart 9Embers Still Burning In ##br##Anti-Corruption Campaign Embers Still Burning In Anti-Corruption Campaign Embers Still Burning In Anti-Corruption Campaign Diagram 1The J-curve Of##br## Structural Reform Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets But there is still no guarantee that he intends to expend his political capital in this way. The current round of financial tightening could be preliminaries for bigger moves next year - or it could be just another mini-cycle in the ongoing process of "managing" China's massive leverage. If China decides to execute a major deleveraging campaign, either now or next year, it will have a negative effect on global commodity demand (particularly base metals), on commodity exporters, on emerging markets in general, and ultimately on global growth. It would be beneficial for Chinese growth in the long run but negative in the short run, and in terms of Chinese domestic risk assets would open up opportunities for investors to favor "new (innovative) China" versus "old (industrial) China." Bottom Line: We remain long Chinese equities versus Taiwanese and Hong Kong equities for now, but are wary of any sign of doubling down on policy tightening in the face of more frequent and intense credit events. That would indicate that the Chinese leadership has a higher risk appetite than anyone expects and may be willing to induce serious financial disruption before the party congress. Korea: Drunk On Moonshine The Korean election is over and with it much of the heightened uncertainty that accompanied the impeachment and removal from office of President Park Geun-hye over the past year. The new president, Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party, performed right around the polled expectations at 41% of the vote (Table 2). His competitor on the right wing, Hong Jun-pyo, outperformed expectations, though he still trailed well behind at 24%, giving Moon a large margin of victory by Korean standards that will help provide him with political capital (Chart 10). Table 2South Korean Presidential Election Results Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Chart 10Moon Will Have A Honeymoon Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Moon's election will bring relief to markets on both the domestic and geopolitical front. On the domestic front, he is proposing a series of policies that will cumulatively boost fiscal thrust and growth. On the geopolitical front, he will revive the "Sunshine Policy" (now "Moonshine Policy") of engagement with North Korea, reducing the appearance that the peninsula is slipping into war.13 The power vacuum in South Korea was a key driver of North Korea's belligerence in 2016, as the lead-up to South Korean elections has been in the past (Chart 11). South Korean presidents typically enjoy a substantial honeymoon period in which they are able to drive policy. The fact that the election occurred seven months early, as a result of the impeachment, gives Moon a notable boost to this period - he has seven months longer than he would have had before he faces any potential check from voters in the 2020 legislative elections. That is not to say that Moon has free rein. Ahn Cheol-soo's People's Party holds 40 seats in the National Assembly and is therefore in a "kingmaker" position - able to provide either the ruling Democratic Party or the fractured right-wing opposition with a majority of seats (Diagram 2). The People's Party is already criticizing Moon's call for increasing government spending by around 0.7% of GDP to fulfill his campaign pledges. True, the People's Party leans to the left and rose to power as a result of the median voter's shift to the left in the 2016's legislative elections. This may limit its ability to obstruct Moon's agenda at first. Nevertheless, it poses a substantial constraint on Moon's agenda through 2020. Chart 11Bull Market For##br## North Korean Threats Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Diagram 2Center-Left People's Party##br## Is The Korean Kingmaker Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Markets are relieved but not ebullient. The impeachment rally is over and eventually markets will realize that while Moon's agenda is pro-growth, it is not necessarily pro-corporate profits (Chart 12). He is promising to introduce a higher minimum wage, to convert temporary labor contracts into permanent ones, to increase social spending, and to toughen up labor and environmental regulation (Table 3). He has also appointed the so-called "chaebol sniper" as his point man in leading the reform of the country's chaebol industrial giants. On one hand, South Korea definitely needs corporate governance reform; on the other, the process will add uncertainty and Moon's approach may not be market-positive.14 Chart 12Relief Rally Likely To Disappoint Relief Rally Likely To Disappoint Relief Rally Likely To Disappoint Table 3South Korean President's Campaign Proposals Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets To get an indication of what kind of impact Moon's economic agenda may have, it is helpful to compare that of his mentor, Roh Moo-hyun, president from 2002-7. Roh gave a boost to consumption, both government and private, and saw a relative drop off in fixed capital accumulation, which fits with the broad agenda of supporting workers and households and removing privileges for Korea's traditional export-oriented industrial complex (Chart 13). Roh proved very beneficial for the financial sector, wholesale and retail trade, and health and social work. Education and public administration received some support but were flat overall (Chart 14 A & B). If Moon follows in Roh's footsteps, he will be beneficial for the domestic-oriented economy. Chart 13South Korea's Left Wing##br## Boosts Domestic Consumption South Korea’s Roh Moo-Hyun Boosted Domestic Consumption South Korea’s Roh Moo-Hyun Boosted Domestic Consumption Chart 14ASouth Korea's Left Wing Boosts Finance,##br## Domestic Trade, And Health Care (I) South Korea’s Roh Moo-Hyun Boosted Finance, Domestic Trade, And Health Care (I) South Korea’s Roh Moo-Hyun Boosted Finance, Domestic Trade, And Health Care (I) Chart 14BSouth Korea's Left Wing Boosts Finance,##br## Domestic Trade, And Health Care (II) South Korea’s Roh Moo-Hyun Boosted Finance, Domestic Trade, And Health Care (II) South Korea’s Roh Moo-Hyun Boosted Finance, Domestic Trade, And Health Care (II) Abroad, the Moonshine Policy is likely to have some success, at least in the medium term. The Trump administration is pursuing a strategy comparable to the U.S.'s nuclear negotiations with Iran from 2011-15, in which it tries to rally a coalition to impose tougher sanctions on the rogue state with the purpose of entering into a new round of negotiations that will actually generate concrete results. The "arc of diplomacy" will take time to get going and could last several years - it is essentially a last-ditch effort to convince North Korea to pause its nuclear and missile advances. The tail risk of conflict on the Korean peninsula will be moved out to the end of this effort, perhaps around the end of Trump's term.15 Meanwhile, Moon is already patching up trade relations with China, according to reports, after the latter imposed sanctions on Korea for deploying the U.S. THAAD missile defense system (Chart 15). He will also seek joint infrastructure projects with China and Russia to connect the peninsula. China has a vested interest in Moon's success because it is attempting to demonstrate to the Trump administration that it is cooperating on North Korean security. Chart 15China Likely To Ease##br## Sanctions On South Korea China Likely To Ease Sanctions On South Korea China Likely To Ease Sanctions On South Korea Chart 16South Korean Inflation##br## And Credit Impulse Weak South Korean Inflation And Credit Impulse Weak South Korean Inflation And Credit Impulse Weak The geopolitical risk to markets is, first, that North Korea miscalculates the threshold of other nations' patience, continues with provocations, and eventually causes an incident that derails the new negotiations. This is possible given the North's record of belligerent acts and the fact that both the Trump administration and the Abe administration could cut diplomacy short in the face of a truly disruptive provocation for domestic political reasons. Second, there is a risk that Trump decides to escalate North Korean tensions again, whether to distract from domestic scandals or to reinforce the military deterrent in the event that China and South Korea appear to be giving North Korea a free pass in another round of useless talks. If Moon pursues a unilateral détente with North Korea, without adequate coordination with the U.S., and pushes for the removal of THAAD missiles, then the U.S. and South Korea are headed for a period of higher-than-normal alliance tensions that could become market-relevant.16 Bottom Line: We remain short KRW/THB. Core inflation and domestic demand remain weak in Korea, which reinforces the central bank's recent decision to stick to an accommodative monetary policy. Credit growth is cyclically weak, which reinforces the fact that rate cuts are still on the table (including the possibility of a surprise rate cut like in mid-2016) (Chart 16). Finally, the KRW has been relatively strong compared to the currencies of Korea's competitors (Chart 17). Chart 17South Korean Won Has Outpaced The Yuan And Yen South Korean Won Has Outpaced The Yuan And Yen South Korean Won Has Outpaced The Yuan And Yen In terms of equities, the top six chaebol have come under scrutiny, but Samsung has rallied despite lying at the center of the corruption scandal. The others have not performed well amid the economic slowdown. We see no opportunity at present to short the chaebol in relation to the broader market. Broadly, however, Moon's policies will add burdens to large internationally competitive industrials while boosting small and medium-sized enterprises. We also remain short the Korean ten-year government bond versus the two-year (see Chart 12, panel three, above). Moon's policy bent will subtract from a 1% budget surplus (2016) and worsen the long-term trajectory of the country's relatively low public debt (39% of GDP). Insofar as his foreign policy succeeds, it entails a larger future debt burden as a result of efforts to integrate with North Korea, which is relevant to long-term bonds well before reunification appears anywhere on the horizon. At bottom, we are structurally bearish South Korea because of rising headwinds both to U.S.-China relations and to the broader globalization process that has benefited South Korea so much in the recent past. Japan: Is Militarism The Final Act Of Abenomics? Japan has reached peak political capital under Shinzo Abe. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, with its New Komeito coalition partner, continues to play in a totally different league from its competitors - there is no political alternative at the moment (Chart 18). The ruling party has a de facto two-thirds supermajority in both houses of the Diet. Abe himself is more popular than any recent prime minister, and has retained that popularity over a longer period of time (Chart 19). He has secured permission from his party to stay on as its president until 2021, though he faces general elections in December 2018 to stay on as prime minister. Chart 18Japan: Liberal Democrats Still Supreme Japan: Liberal Democrats Still Supreme Japan: Liberal Democrats Still Supreme Chart 19Shinzo Abe Remains The Man Of The Hour Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Political capital is a fleeting thing, so Abe must use it or lose it. This is why we have insisted that he would press forward rapidly with attempts to revise Japan's constitution, his ultimate policy goal, which he has now confirmed he will do. His proposed deadline is July 2020 for the new provisions coming into force.17 Constitutional revision is not only about enshrining the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) so as to normalize the country's defense policy. It is also about Japan becoming an independent nation again, capable of forging its own destiny outside of the one foreseen by the American framers of the post-WWII constitution. Though Abe has specific constitutional aims, any change to the constitution will demonstrate that change is possible and break a taboo, advancing Abe's broader goal of nudging the Japanese public toward active rather than passive policies.18 Hence Japanese politics are about to heat up in a big way. Abe has already done a trial run in his passage of a new national security law in September 2015. This law allowed the government to reinterpret the constitution so as to achieve many of his chief military-strategic aims (e.g. allowing the JSDF to come to the aid of allies in "collective self-defense"). Over the course of that year, Abe's popularity flagged, as public opinion punished him for shifting attention away from the economic reflation agenda that got him elected so as to focus on his more controversial, hawkish security agenda (Chart 20). Nevertheless, Abe stuck to the security agenda, in the face of some of the largest protests in Japan's post-Occupation history, and managed to shift back to the economy in time to notch another big victory in the upper house elections of 2016. We expect a similar process to unfold this time, though with bigger stakes and far less of a chance that Abe can "pivot" again. Under no circumstances do we see him reversing the constitutional drive now that he has the rare gift of supermajorities in the Diet; rather, he is going to spend his political capital. After all, there is no telling what could happen in the 2018 election. What are the market implications of this agenda? There may be some hiccups in consumer and business sentiment as a result of the rise in activism, political opposition, and controversy that is already beginning and will intensify as the process gets under way. Abe will be accused of putting the economy on the backburner. Abenomics is already of questionable success (Chart 21) and it will come under greater criticism as Abe shifts attention elsewhere, especially if global headwinds gain strength. Chart 20Abe Loses Support When He Talks##br## Security Instead Of Economy Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Chart 21Abenomics: ##br##Progress Is Gradual Abenomics: Progress Is Gradual Abenomics: Progress Is Gradual However, we recommend investors fade this narrative and buy Japan. Abe's constitutional changes must receive a simple majority in a nationwide popular referendum in order to pass - and Abe does not clearly have what he needs at the moment (Chart 22). This means that he cannot, in reality, afford to put Abenomics on the back burner, but instead must err on the side of monetary dovishness, fiscal stimulus, and reflation in order to win support for the non-economic agenda. There has been virtually no talk of fiscal stimulus this year, yet the policy setting is conducive to increasing spending as necessary. The Bank of Japan has explicitly embraced a monetary regime designed to allow for greater "coordination" with fiscal policy (Chart 23).19 There is no reason whatsoever to believe Abe is backing away from this stance. (Incidentally, the next consumption tax hike is not slated until October 2019, and could be delayed again.) Geopolitics are also fairly supportive of the Abe administration. First, the Korean situation is currently alarming enough to help justify the constitutional changes yet not alarming enough to provoke outright conflict. Abe is also making headway toward a historic improvement of relations with Russia, allowing Japan's military to pivot from the north to the south and west (i.e. China and North Korea). The chief risk for Abe is if North Korea surprises on the dovish side and new international diplomatic efforts appear so fruitful as to reduce domestic support for remilitarization. China, South Korea, and possibly North Korea will encourage the latter dynamic, while drumming up global criticism of Japan for warmongering. Meanwhile Japan will try to remind the domestic public and the U.S. that North Korea remains a clear and present danger and tends to take advantage of negotiations. Given the relatively positive geopolitical backdrop for Abe, the biggest risk to his agenda is an exogenous economic shock. Even then, if that shock stems from China and causes Beijing to rattle-sabers as a domestic distraction, then it will benefit Abe's remilitarization agenda. What would hurt Abe is if global growth sags but China and North Korea lay low. It is too soon to say that they will do this, but it is unlikely. Trump is also a wild card whose threats of "tough" policy toward China and North Korea may reemerge in 2018, in time to help Japan make constitutional changes that the U.S. generally supports. Bottom Line: Go long Japan. While there is no correlation between Japan's defense-exposed equity sector performance and the current government's remilitarization efforts, there is a clear case to be made that nominal GDP and defense spending will both be going up as a result of constitutional and economic policies (Chart 24). Abe will double down on reflation for at least as long as is necessary to maintain popular approval of his government ahead of a historic constitutional referendum. Chart 22Revise The Constitution? Yes.##br## End Pacifism? Maybe. Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets Chart 23Japanese Reflation ##br##Will Continue Japanese Reflation Will Continue Japanese Reflation Will Continue Chart 24Expect Higher Nominal##br## Growth And Defense Spending Expect Higher Nominal Growth And Defense Spending Expect Higher Nominal Growth And Defense Spending Housekeeping: Play Pound Strength Through USD, Not EUR We are closing our short EUR/GBP position, open since January 25, for a loss of 1.77%. This trade has largely been flat. We put it on as a way to articulate our view that Brexit political risks are overstated and that the pound bottomed on January 16. The political call was right, but the pound has largely moved sideways versus the euro since then. We maintain our short USD/GBP, which is up 4.63% since March 29, as a way to articulate the same view that Brexit (and the upcoming U.K. elections) are not a risk. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump Thumps The Markets," dated May 19, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The party congress, which occurs every five years and marks the "midterm" of President Xi Jinping's administration, will see a sweeping rotation of Communist Party officials, including on the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). 4 Please see "China able to keep its financial markets stable, Premier Li says," Reuters, May 14, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. For the December meeting, see "China's monetary policy to be prudent, neutral in 2017," Xinhua, December 16, 2016, available at www.chinadaily.com. 5 Finance Minister Xiao Jie, Commerce Minister Zhong Shan, NDRC Chairman He Lifeng, and China Banking Regulatory Commission Chairman Guo Shuqing have all recently been appointed, but they replaced leaders due to retire as part of the party congress reshuffle. Only the new China Insurance Regulatory Commission Chairman Xiang Junbo and the new Director o f the National Bureau of Statistics Wang Baoan were replaced for reasons other than retirement, having been stung by the anti-corruption campaign. By March 2018 the world should have a better sense of Xi's economic and financial "team" for 2018-22. 6 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Zouping government, in Shandong, intervened into the case of Qixing aluminum company's insolvency in order to transfer control to Xiwang, a corn oil and steel producer that had given a mutual guarantee to Qixing. The Zouping authorities arrested the son of Qixing's chairman to force the transfer. Please see "Bond Buyers Blacklist Some Chinese Provinces After Run Of Defaults," Bloomberg, April 26, 2017, available at www.bloomberg.com. 8 Please see "China Deleveraging To Continue As Goals Not Yet Achieved: State Paper," Reuters, May 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 9 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Signs Of An EM/China Growth Reversal," dated April 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Signal From Commodities," dated May 19, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Xi may yet go after another big "tiger," Zeng Qinghong, the right-hand man of former President Jiang Zemin. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated in 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Tracking The Reform Progress," dated October 22, 2014, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 13 "Moonshine Policy" is a phrase we regrettably did not coin, but we discussed its coming in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "What About Emerging Markets?" dated May 3, 2017, and "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Moon has nominated Kim Sang-jo, a professor of economics at Hansung University in Seoul, to head his Fair Trade Commission. Kim is a long-time advocate for shareholders against the family-controlled chaebol and led a prominent law suit against Samsung. Past efforts at reforming the chaebol led by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun focused on improving balance sheets, protecting minority shareholders' rights, limiting the total amount of investment, and improving corporate management and accountability. It remains to be seen how Moon (and Kim Sang-jo, assuming his nomination is confirmed) will proceed, but the effort will bring domestic challenges to the top industrial conglomerates' operating environment at least initially. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 South Korea's special envoy Hong Seok-hyun claims that Trump told him at the White House that he will work closely with Moon and is willing to try engagement with Pyongyang, conditions permitting, though he is not interested in talks for the sake of talks. This fits with our view that the U.S. saber-rattling this year was designed to make the military option more credible before pursuing a new round of diplomacy. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, and Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 So, for instance, if it should happen that, over the course of the coming debates, Abe is forced to drop his proposed revisions to the pacifist Article 9, he may still achieve changes to the amendment-making procedure in Article 96. The latter would be even more important for Japan's future, since it would make it easier for Japan to change the constitution for whatever reason in the coming decades. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Client, In addition to this Special Report, I am sending you our usual Weekly Report focusing on the market implications from the brewing crisis in the Trump White House. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Chart 1Commodity Prices: A Halting Comeback Commodity Prices: A Halting Comeback Commodity Prices: A Halting Comeback Commodity prices have managed to stage a halting comeback over the past two weeks, but still remain well below their highs for the year. Concerns over the Chinese economy, a withdrawal of speculative demand, and strong supply growth have all weighed on commodity prices. All three of these forces should ebb over the coming months. This should provide a more benign cyclical backdrop for commodities and commodity-related investment plays. We went long the December 2017 Brent futures contract two weeks ago. The trade is up 7.8% since then. Stick with it. The cyclical recovery in commodity prices will benefit DM commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, and NOK. Go short EUR/CAD. Feature What's Been Weighing On Commodities? Commodity prices have managed to stage a halting comeback over the past two weeks, but still remain well below their highs for the year (Chart 1). We see three reasons why commodities have struggled to gain traction over the past few months: Fears that the Chinese economy is losing growth momentum have intensified. Traders have soured on the commodity complex, causing speculative demand to fizzle. Skepticism about OPEC's ability to maintain production discipline has been running high. All three of these forces should ebb over the coming months. This should provide a more benign cyclical backdrop for commodities and commodity-related investment plays. Global Growth: An Uneven Picture After a strong end to 2016, global growth so far this year has been mixed. The euro area has continued to hum along, with real GDP increasing by 2% in Q1 on an annualized basis. Japanese growth clocked in at 2.2% in Q1. This marked the fifth consecutive quarter of positive growth - the first time this has happened in 11 years! In contrast, U.K. growth slowed to 1.2% in Q1, while the U.S. registered a disappointing 0.7% growth print. As discussed in the Weekly Report that accompanies this Special Report, the U.S. economy is likely to bounce back over the remainder of the year, notwithstanding the ongoing soap opera that has become the Trump presidency. However, even if that happens, traders have become increasingly concerned that stronger U.S. growth will be offset by weaker growth in China. China Growth Risks Back In Focus All four Chinese purchasing manager indices fell in April (Chart 2). This week's data releases saw below-consensus growth in industrial production, retail sales, and fixed asset investment. Tighter financial conditions have contributed to the recent growth shortfall (Chart 3). The PBoC has drained excess liquidity over the past few months, causing overnight rates to rise. Corporate bond yields have surged while Chinese small cap stocks have taken it on the chin. The slowdown in Chinese growth is a cause for concern, but some perspective is in order. The economy began the year on a strong footing. Nominal GDP increased by 11.8% in Q1, compared with 9.6% in Q4 of 2016. Real GDP rose by 6.9% in the first quarter, comfortably above the government's target of 6.5%. A modest slowdown from these levels is not surprising. Most indicators point to an economy that is still expanding at a decent clip. Export growth is accelerating and our China team's model suggests that this will remain the case, thanks to solid global demand and a competitive RMB (Chart 4). America's latest anti-dumping measures on some Chinese steel products are irrelevant from a big picture point of view, as U.S. steel imports from China only account for a mere 1% of Chinese steel output. Chart 2China: PMIs Falling Across The Board China: PMIs Falling Across The Board China: PMIs Falling Across The Board Chart 3Financial Conditions Have Tightened In China Financial Conditions Have Tightened In China Financial Conditions Have Tightened In China Chart 4China: The Rebound In Exports Should Continue China: The Rebound In Exports Should Continue China: The Rebound In Exports Should Continue Meanwhile, fixed investment is benefiting from an upturn in the profit cycle. Chart 5 shows that excavator sales, railway freight traffic, and the PBoC's Entrepreneur Confidence Index - all leading indicators for Chinese capex - are surging. Even the housing market is well positioned to withstand some policy tightening. Land purchases by developers have rebounded and the most recent central bank survey showed that households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high in the first quarter (Chart 6). Chart 5Positive Signs For Chinese Capex... Positive Signs For Chinese Capex... Positive Signs For Chinese Capex... Chart 6...And The Housing Market ...And The Housing Market ...And The Housing Market Efforts Focused On Containing Financial Risk Most of the government's tightening measures have been designed to reduce financial sector risks while inflicting as little collateral damage on the economy as possible. So far, this strategy appears to be working: While broad credit growth has slowed from a high of 25.7% in January 2016 to 15.5% in April of 2017, almost all of that was due to a deceleration in borrowing by non-bank financial institutions. The pace of lending to nonfinancial private borrowers and the government - the so-called "real economy" - has barely fallen from last year. In fact, medium- and long-term loans to the corporate sector, a key driver of overall capital spending, have accelerated (Chart 7). The inversion of the Chinese yield curve largely reflects these macroprudential measures. The spread between 10-year and 5-year government bond yields turned negative last week, the first time this has ever happened (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Credit Growth To The Real EconomyBarely Affected By Tightening Measures China: Credit Growth To The Real Economy Barely Affected By Tightening Measures China: Credit Growth To The Real Economy Barely Affected By Tightening Measures Chart 8Chinese Yield Curve Inversion Chinese Yield Curve Inversion Chinese Yield Curve Inversion Some pundits have interpreted this development as an omen of a coming recession. However, there is a less dramatic explanation: Up until recently, non-bank financial institutions have been issuing so-called wealth management products like crazy. According to Moody's, the outstanding value of these products soared from U.S. $72 billion in 2007 to $4.2 trillion in the first quarter of 2017. The crackdown on shadow banking has forced many participants to liquidate their positions which, in many cases, included substantial leveraged holdings of government bonds. Since 5-year bonds are less liquid than their 10-year counterparts, yields on the former have increased more than on the latter. The Commodity Connection While the data is sketchy, it appears that Chinese non-bank financial institutions have been major players in the commodities market. As funding to these institutions - and their clients - dried up, panic selling of commodity futures contracts ensued. This withdrawal of Chinese investment demand for commodity markets began at time when, globally, long speculative positions were highly elevated. Chart 9 shows that net long spec positions as a share of open interest for energy and industrial commodities reached the highest levels in over a decade earlier this year. Today, speculative positioning has returned to more normal levels. This reduces the risk of a further downdraft in commodity prices. At the same time, the Chinese authorities appear to be relaxing some of their earlier tightening measures. The PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility (MLF) earlier this week. It also made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months on Tuesday. This follows the release of stronger-than-expected credit numbers for April, as well as Premier Li Keqiang's call over the weekend for "striking a balance" between enhancing financial stability and maintaining growth. Adding to the newfound easing bias, general government fiscal spending is now recovering (Chart 10). Chart 9Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning To More Normal Levels Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning To More Normal Levels Commodities: Long Speculative Positions Returning To More Normal Levels Chart 10China: Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend China: Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend China: Fiscal Spending Is On The Mend Oil Supply Should Tighten Chart 11Oil Inventories Should Decline Oil Inventories Should Decline Oil Inventories Should Decline Tighter supply conditions in various parts of the commodity complex should reinforce the upward pressure on prices stemming from firming demand. This is especially true for crude oil. Saudi Arabia and Russia announced earlier this week that they will support an extension of output cuts through to March 2018. Despite a sharp recovery in shale output, BCA's energy strategists expect global production to increase by only 0.5 MMB/d in 2017 compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. Consequently, oil inventories should fall over the remainder of this year. Inventory draws will continue through 2018, albeit at a slower pace than in 2017 (Chart 11). Larger-than-expected declines in U.S. oil inventories over the past two weeks, along with a steep reduction in the volume of oil held in tanker ships (so-called "floating storage"), suggest that this trend has already begun. Some Investment Implications Fading fears about a China slowdown and a tighter supply picture will lift commodity prices over the remainder of the year. We went long the December 2017 Brent futures contract two weeks ago. The trade is up 7.8% since then. We are targeting a further 10% in upside from current levels. The cyclical recovery in commodity prices will benefit the stocks and bonds of companies within the resource sector. It will also benefit DM commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, and NOK. In addition, rising commodity prices will provide a tailwind to emerging markets, although Fed rate hikes and the occasional political scandal (here's looking at you, Brazil!) will take some bloom off the rose. The prospect of higher commodity prices supports our recommendation to be overweight euro area stocks relative to U.S. equities. The IMF estimates that the European economy is three-times more sensitive to changes in EM growth than the U.S. (Chart 12).1 If higher commodity prices give emerging markets a boost, this will help Europe's large industrial exporting companies. Calculations by JP Morgan suggest that petrostate sovereign wealth funds hold five times more European equities than U.S. stocks, even though European stocks account for less than half the global market capitalization of U.S. stocks.2 These funds are especially exposed to European financials and consumer discretionary names. Higher oil prices would give them greater scope to add to their favorite positions. What about EUR/USD? The run-up in the euro over the past few weeks was partly driven by the unwinding of sizable short hedges that traders put on in the lead up to the French elections. At this point, euro positioning has moved from being highly bearish to broadly neutral. Going forward, fundamentals will play the dominant role. On the one hand, an outperforming euro area equity market should attract foreign capital into the region, giving the common currency a boost. On the other hand, interest rate differentials will continue to move in favor of the dollar. As we discussed last week, the Fed is likely to raise rates by more than the 38 basis points that markets are currently pricing in over the next 12 months.3 In contrast, the ECB is likely to stand pat, given that the rate of labor underutilization is still 18% in the euro area, 3.5 percentage points higher than in 2008 (Chart 13). If anything, rising inflation expectations in the euro area could cause real short-term rates to decline, putting downward pressure on the euro. Chart 12Europe Is More Sensitive To EM The Signal From Commodities The Signal From Commodities Chart 13Labor Market Slack In The Euro Area Remains High The Signal From Commodities The Signal From Commodities Our research indicates that real interest rate differentials are by far the most important drivers of currency returns over cyclical horizons of around 12 months. The decline in the dollar over the past few weeks has occurred alongside an increase in real rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners. Notably, two-year real rate differentials have widened by 47 basis points versus the euro area since the end of March, even though the dollar has actually weakened against the euro over this timeframe (Chart 14). Thus, a period of "catch-up strength" for the dollar is in order. We continue to expect EUR/USD to reach parity by the end of the year. With all this in mind, we are opening a new trade today: Short EUR/CAD (Chart 15). Chart 14Widening Real Rate Differentials Support The Dollar Widening Real Rate Differentials Support The Dollar Widening Real Rate Differentials Support The Dollar Chart 15Play The Cyclical Recovery In Oil Via The EUR/CAD Play The Cyclical Recovery In Oil Via The EUR/CAD Play The Cyclical Recovery In Oil Via The EUR/CAD Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "IMF Multilateral Policy issue Report: 2014 Spillover Report," IMF, dated July 29, 2014. 2 Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou, Nandini Srivastava, Jigar Vakharia, and Mika Inkinen, "Flows & Liquidity," J.P.Morgan Global Asset Allocation (January 29, 2016). 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Dilemma," dated May 12, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. The recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. Feature Chinese domestic stocks and bonds have taken a beating of late as the authorities ramped up scrutiny to rein in excesses in the country's financial sector. While it is warranted to control accumulated financial risk - especially associated with shadow banking activity - the "campaign" style administrative crackdown has caused widespread confusion and mini-panics among domestic investors. The actions and corresponding reactions illustrate the authorities' primitive control tools, which are increasingly at odds with the rapidly developing financial sector, and how blanket actions can spur undue financial volatility and provoke unintended consequences. For now, we expect the economic fallout to be limited, unless the financial crackdown causes further spikes in interest rates and a sudden halt in credit flows. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher in the absence of a major policy mishap that short-circuits the broad growth improvement and the profit cycle upturn. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless, while the more richly valued bubbly segments of the market will continue to deflate. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. What Do They Want To Achieve? Policymakers' primary focus has been on cracking down on excessive speculation in financial markets and restricting lending activities that are not in compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Financial sector deregulation in recent years has increasingly blurred the lines between banks, insurance companies, brokers and trust companies, and regulators are constantly challenged to monitor all the increasingly sophisticated moving parts. From the banking sector's point of view, regulators are concerned that lenders have been aggressively boosting their exposure to other banks and non-bank financial institutions instead of providing credit to the "real economy." Overall commercial banks' claims on other banks and non-bank financial institutions have increased from 12% of their total assets in 2006 to over 25% as of January 2017, while their liabilities to other banks and non-bank financial firms have increased from 7% to 12% (Chart 1). Smaller banks are even more dependent on interbank financing for loanable funds. Interbank transactions and repo activities account for about 14% of smaller lenders' total source of funding, compared with 2% for large banks (Chart 2). Some small banks regularly borrow at lower costs through the interbank market or use negotiable certificate of deposits to purchase "wealth management products" offering higher returns issued by other banks or financial institutions. The duration mismatch leads to constant pressure to roll over these short-term financial instruments. The increasing interdependence among the country's financial institutions also creates the risk of a chain reaction in the financial system should some type of credit event erupt. Chart 1Increasing Interdependence Among Financial Institutions China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications The Chinese authorities have long regarded preventing systemic financial risk as a top priority, and the recent growth improvement has provided a window of opportunity for some housecleaning without a major adverse impact on the economy. Therefore, it is unlikely that regulators will back off from tightening regulatory supervision going forward. Overall, the authorities will continue to discourage overtrading within the financial system, and enforce full disclosure of off-balance-sheet items and shadow lending activities. The saving grace is that tightened macro prudential measures have already begun to curtail banks' aggressive expansion to non-bank financial institutions. Commercial banks' claims to these firms have slowed sharply since last year's peak (Chart 3). Meanwhile, the recent rise in interbank rates should also further discourage the perceived "risk-free" funding arbitrage to play the interest rate gap between long- and short-dated financial assets. All of this reduces the pressure of an escalation in the regulatory crackdown. Chart 2Smaller Banks Depend More On##br## Wholesale Funding Smaller Banks Depend More On Wholesale Funding Smaller Banks Depend More On Wholesale Funding Chart 3Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms ##br##Has Been Scaled Back Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms Has Been Scaled Back Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms Has Been Scaled Back Should Investors Be Concerned? In essence, banks' rising claims to other financial institutions means a lengthening of the credit intermediation channel, in which financing goes from credit providers through multiple layers of intermediaries to reach final borrowers in the real economy. In other words, banks, instead of lending directly to borrowers, channel loans to trust companies or securities brokers, who in turn transfer the funds to the real economy through "shadow banking" activities such as trust loans or various forms of "wealth management products", typically at higher rates. From this perspective, cracking down on lending excesses within the financial system in of itself should not have a material impact on credit flows to final corporate borrowers. In fact, streamlining the financial intermediation channel holds the promise of increasing accessibility to bank credit for the corporate sector and reducing its funding cost, which should benefit the overall economy in the long run. In the near term, liquidity tightening and the regulatory crackdown could push up interest rates and disrupt credit flows, which should be closely monitored to assess near-term negative impact on the economy. So far, the impact does not appear material. Chart 4Regulatory Crackdown ##br## Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Regulatory Crackdown Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Regulatory Crackdown Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Interbank rates have increased by about 100 basis points across the board since the beginning of this year, and 10-year government bond yields have risen by 50 basis points - both of which pale in comparison to the significant improvement in overall business activity. Nominal GDP growth expanded by 11.8% in the first quarter, compared with 9.6% in Q4, 2016. Furthermore, the central bank early this week re-started its medium-term lending facility (MLF), which was designed to avoid liquidity overkill in the domestic financial sector. Overall, the risk of overtightening of liquidity is not high. The regulatory crackdown since early this year has not had a meaningful impact on credit expansion. Banks' claims to other financial institutions have slowed sharply, but overall loan growth has been rather stable. Importantly, medium- and long-term loans to the corporate sector, pivotal for overall capital spending, have in fact accelerated (Chart 4). In short, increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. We expect the authorities to remain highly vigilant and avoid policy overkill. Reading Market Tea Leaves There have been some notable divergences among different classes of Chinese stocks (Chart 5). Chinext, the domestic small-cap venture board, has suffered heavy losses of late, while large-cap A shares have been much more resilient. Meanwhile, offshore Chinese shares have barely felt any pressure at all. H shares have moved higher of late, while Chinese firms listed in the U.S. have decisively broken out. The divergence between onshore and offshore Chinese stocks' performance confirms the recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Barring major policy mistakes, we expect the Chinese economy to stay buoyant, as discussed in detail in our recent report.1 As such, a few investment conclusions can be drawn. Tighter liquidity will likely continue to place downward pressure on domestic stock prices, but the downside is limited by overall buoyant activity and improving profits. We expect the broad-A share market will remain narrowly range-bound. Overseas-listed Chinese shares are not subject to domestic liquidity constraints, and will likely continue to grind higher supported by growth improvement, profit recovery and low valuation multiples. The small-cap Chinext market has long been viewed as the more speculative segment of the domestic financial market, with higher multiples and greater volatility than large-cap A shares. As such, this market will remain vulnerable to domestic liquidity tightening. Even after the most recent selloff, the bourse's trailing price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio are still at 38.4 and 4.6, respectively, much higher than for broader onshore and offshore Chinese stocks. The recent selloff in the onshore corporate bond market has also been driven by liquidity pressure, which in our view is overdone. While it's true that economic acceleration justifies higher yields, corporate spreads have also widened sharply, which is at odds with the broad growth acceleration and profit recovery. In addition, after the most recent selloff, Chinese corporate spreads are significantly higher than in most other major markets (Chart 6). In the near term, tighter liquidity may continue to induce more selling pressure in the domestic bond market. Cyclically we expect Chinese corporate bond spreads to narrow. Chart 5Diverging Market Trends Diverging Market Trends Diverging Market Trends Chart 6The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate ##br##Spreads Is Overdone The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate Spreads Is Overdone The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate Spreads Is Overdone Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" dated May 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Unsurprisingly, OPEC 2.0's leadership agreed on the need to extend the coalition's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting agreement to end-March 2018. Leaders of the coalition - the energy ministers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will recommend as much when the coalition meets next week in Vienna. Meanwhile, sequential production in U.S. shales during the first four months of the year is up just under 100k b/d, based on the EIA's latest estimates. This was led by surging Permian production. We expect shale-oil production growth to continue, and are revising our year-end 2017 light-tight-oil (LTO) production estimate for the four main shale-oil plays to 5.66mm b/d, up from our earlier assessment of 5.39mm b/d. We also are lifting our year-end 2018 estimate of shale production to 6.64mm b/d. This means December-to-December LTO production will increase ~ 1mm b/d by Dec/17 and by another ~1mm b/d by Dec/18. Energy: Overweight. As of last Thursday's close, we are long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. $45/bbl puts at -$1.16/bbl, and long Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 Brent at -$0.21/bbl. These positions were up 16.4% and 242.9%, respectively. Base Metals: Neutral. The physical deficit in zinc appears to be widening slightly, based on supply-demand estimates from the International Zinc Study Group. Usage totaled 2.282mm MT in Jan-Feb 2017 vs. refined production of 2.28mm MT. For 2016, usage was 13.89mm MT vs. supply of 12.67mm MT. Precious Metals: Neutral. Metal refiner Johnson Matthey expects a 790k oz. palladium deficit this year, up from a little over 160k oz. last year. Separately, the World Platinum Investment Council expects platinum supply to fall 2% this year to 7.33mm oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported corn planting stood at 71% for the week ended May 14, vs. an average of 70% over the 2012 - 16 period. We remain bearish. Feature The determination of the leaders of OPEC 2.0 to clear the storage overhang could not have been made more clear, following comments earlier this week from KSA's and Russia's energy ministers the coalition's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting agreement would be extended to end-March 2018. This is three months beyond earlier speculation the deal would be extended to year-end 2017. Chart of the WeekBalances Chart Balances Chart Balances Chart Still, when dealing with a political organization of any sort - and OPEC 2.0 is nothing if not a political entity - our bias is to assume less-than-complete compliance with production cuts, and an earlier return to pre-agreement production levels than proffered by the leadership of the coalition. Hence, in our updated balances model (Chart of the Week), in addition to assuming higher U.S. production out of the shales, we have Russian production returning to a level just below 11.30mm b/d by October 2017, up roughly 150k b/d from the 11.15mm b/d we assume they'll be producing until the end of September. We also assume Iraq's production will move up to 4.45mm b/d (up 50k b/d) beginning in January, and that Iran will be steadily, yet slowly, increasing production by 5-10k b/d per month beginning this month. The only assumption we're making for staunch compliance to the OPEC 2.0 accord after our assumed extension to year-end 2017 at next week's Vienna meeting is that KSA and its GCC allies - Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE - will continue to abide by their voluntary production cuts. This group has maintained solidarity on past production-management deals, we expect them to do so again in this round. Of course, the other members of the coalition could vote against this proposal next week, and instead decide to end the production deal in June under its original conditions. Or, they could agree to extend the deal, but only until year-end 2017. Regardless of whichever policy decisions are agreed to during next week's meeting, come November, when OPEC meets again, they might tweak/change those agreements to reflect their updated outlook at that time. Given this uncertainty, we believe the assumptions we've made are realistic, but we will be monitoring conditions closely so that we can modify our view quickly. Shale Coming On Strong Part of OPEC 2.0's desire to extend its deal likely is the improvement in the performance of shale-oil producers in the U.S. In its latest Drilling Productivity Report (DPR), the EIA noted that sequential production in the first four months of the year has risen ~ 100k b/d per month in the U.S. shales. This surge was led by higher Permian production, which accounted for ~ three-quarters of the increased output (Chart 2). Interestingly, rig-weighted production per rig dropped for the first time in April 2017, but it still is high at 732 b/d, down from 735 b/d in March. We will be watching this closely to see if it is the beginning of a trend of stagnating productivity amid a rapid expansion of industry activity. The resurgence in the shales can be seen in the year-on-year (yoy) growth in total production in the seven basins the EIA tracks, which broke back above 5.0mm b/d in February and crossed into positive yoy growth in March (Chart 3). Net, we expect 2017 global supply to average 97.65mm b/d, for an increase 610k b/d this year, and for demand to average 98.3mm b/d, for an increase of 1.5mm b/d. EM demand, which we proxy using non-OECD consumption, accounts for 1.27mm b/d of this year's global demand growth, and continues to lead overall growth in oil demand (Chart 4, panel 2). Of this, China and India account for 350k and 210k b/d, respectively, of the growth in EM demand. Chart 2Permian Basin Leads##br##U.S. Shale's Resurgence Permian Basin Leads U.S. Shale's Resurgence Permian Basin Leads U.S. Shale's Resurgence Chart 3Year-On-Year LTO Production##br##Breaks Out In 1Q17 Year-On-Year LTO Production Breaks Out In 1Q17 Year-On-Year LTO Production Breaks Out In 1Q17 Chart 4EM Growth Continues##br##To Lead Global Demand EM Growth Continues To Lead Global Demand EM Growth Continues To Lead Global Demand China, India Lead EM Oil Consumption Non-OECD countries represent more than 50% of global oil consumption. Indeed, within the ~1.6mm b/d global oil demand growth we expect for 2017 and again in 2018, slightly more than 87% of it comes from EM economies. Table 1 below shows the average yoy growth by year for different regions - DM and EM - and countries from 2011 to 2018. Over this period, almost all of the world's oil-demand growth comes from non-OECD countries. From 2011-2018, the average p.a. demand growth for non-OECD countries is 2.79%, while for OECD countries it is only 0.12%. Table 1EM Leads Oil-Demand Growth Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Looking more closely at the composition of the EM economies, we see that, on average, between 2010 and 2018 Chinese oil consumption accounts for 24% of non-OECD demand, while the Indian oil consumption represents 8.3%, for a combined total of 32.37% of non-OECD average consumption. These two countries alone contributed on average to around 50% of the world oil consumption growth from 2010 to 2018. China has been the fastest-growing oil market in the world since the early 2000s. However, since 2015, when it emerged as an important growth market on the world stage, India's consumption has been increasing at a faster pace than China's. One of the reasons for this likely is the desire of the Chinese government to resume its pivot to a more service-oriented economy, which is less commodity-intensive than the export-oriented economy dominated by heavy industry. India, meanwhile, is looking to increase its manufacturing output, lifting it from the low-teens to 25% of GDP by 2022 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "Make in India" campaign. This change in the composition of global oil-demand growth is reducing demand for residual fuel oil and distillates. Indeed, IEA data continues to show a steady decline in yoy consumption for these two types of fuel in China, with residual fuel oil consumption down 26.5% yoy in 2016, and gasoil and diesel (distillates) consumption down close to 3% yoy. By contrast, gasoline consumption, is up more than 8% yoy along with jet fuel and kerosene. LPG demand (propane and butane, along with other light ends) and ethane demand (a petrochemical feedstock) is surging, up 24% in 2016, according to the IEA. In relative terms, China will remain the main driver of global oil consumption. At ~ 12.5mm b/d, China's oil demand is close to three times as high than India's. However, India likely will surpass China in terms of its contribution to global oil demand growth in coming years. A combination of structural and policy-driven factors points toward a possible sustainable growth path for Indian oil consumption for the coming years (oil consumption per capita is increasing, as is vehicle usage, particularly motorcycles (Chart 5); and, the government's desire to increase the share of the manufacturing to 25% of GDP by 2022 will boost oil demand growth as well). Chart 5India Passenger Car Sales Are Soaring India Passenger Car Sales Are Soaring India Passenger Car Sales Are Soaring Recent studies assessing the "take-off" of an economy look at its per capita oil consumption in transportation, in particular, given that this sector accounts for more than half of the world's oil consumption (63% according to IEA Energy Statistics 2014). The theory boils down to the following: As income grows, a larger share of the population becomes vehicle owners. This is referred to as the "motorization" of an economy. In India, the transportation sector represents around 40% of total oil consumption.1 According to Sen and Sen (2016), the level of vehicle-ownership per capita is still low in India compared to other economies that have experienced similar take-offs. The government's targeted increase in manufacturing as a share of GDP to 25% under the "Make In India" program (from a current level of ~ 15%) would, according to the Sen and Sen (2016) formulation, lead to an increase in oil consumption. The "Make in India" campaign was launched in 2014 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and aims to transform the country's manufacturing sector into a powerhouse for growth and employment. Other key objectives of this campaign include a target of 12-14% annual growth in the manufacturing sector, and the creation of 100 million new jobs by 2020 in the sector.2 In 2017Q1, India's liquid fuels consumption declined by 3% yoy. This decline was, for the most part, caused by the government's "demonetization" program, which was designed to streamline the economy and reduce rampant black-market transactions. The government chose to invalidate the 500- and the 1,000-rupee banknotes, the most-used currency denominations in the economy (around 86% of the total value of currency in circulation). This represented a huge shock to the average citizen, since it limited the purchasing power of a large part of the consumer economy for an extended period of time and impacted India's overall economic activity. Recent data show Indian oil and liquids consumption up 3% in April (yoy), and its money supply is almost back to its pre-demonetization levels, according to the EIA. This suggests economic activity and liquid-fuel consumption will get back to their previous levels. Bottom Line: We believe OPEC 2.0's deal will be extended at next week's Vienna meeting to March 2018. However, after September, we are expecting compliance to fall off meaningfully, leaving KSA and its allies as the only producers adhering to their voluntary cuts past year-end 2017. Even so, we expect the storage overhang to be worked off - mostly this year - but also into next. Even though U.S. shale production is surprising on the upside, the commitment of a majority of OPEC 2.0 to production cutbacks at least through September of this year will force the storage overhang to draw down by year end. KSA and its core allies will maintain production discipline to March 2018, which will keep storage from refilling too quickly during the seasonally weak consumption period in the first quarter next year. We continue to expect oil forward curves to backwardate by December 2017, and remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent. In addition, we remain long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts, expecting prices to rally toward $60/bbl by the time Brent delivers in December. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant Commodity & Energy Strategy hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Sen, Amrita; Anupama Sen (2016), "India's Oil Demand: On the Verge of 'Take-Off'?". Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 2 Some of the recent policies to enhance the manufacturing growth include: Government subsidies of up to 25% for specific manufacturing sub-sectors; area-based incentives to increase the manufacturing development in key regions; allowances for companies that invest a predetermined amount in new plant and machinery; deductions for additional wages paid to new regular employees; deductions for R&D expenditures; and other incentives aimed at promoting the manufacturing sector and improving the India's ease of doing business to attract foreign direct investments. Please see http://www.makeinindia.com/article/-/v/direct-foreign-investment-towards-india-s-growth. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts

Highlights Venezuela's economic implosion accelerated with the oil price crash. The petrodollar collapse is suffocating consumption as well as oilfield investment, creating a "death spiral" of falling production. The military has already begun assuming more powers as Maduro becomes increasingly vulnerable, and will likely take over before long. OPEC's cuts may help Maduro delay, but not avoid, deposition. Civil unrest/revolution could cause a disruption in oil production, profoundly impacting oil markets. Feature The wheels on the bus go round and round, Round and round, Round and round ... The story of Venezuela's decline under the revolutionary socialist government of deceased dictator Hugo Chavez is well known. The country went from being one of the richest South American states to one of the poorest and from being reliant on oil exports to being entirely dependent on them (Chart 1). The straw that broke the back of Chavismo was the end of the global commodity bull market in 2014 (Chart 2). Widespread shortages of essential goods, mass protests, opposition political victories, and a slide into overt military dictatorship have ensued.1 Chart 1Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Chart 2Commodity Bull Market Ended Commodity Bull Market Ended Commodity Bull Market Ended The acute social unrest at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 raises the question of whether Venezuela will cause global oil-supply disruptions that boost prices this year.2 One of the reasons we have been bullish oil prices is the fact that the world has little spare production capacity (Chart 3). This means that political turmoil in Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, or other oil-producing countries could take enough supply out of the market to accelerate the global rebalancing process and drawdown of inventories, pushing up prices. Image Image The longer oil prices stay below the budget break-even levels of the politically unstable petro-states (mostly $80/bbl and above), the more likely some of them will be to fail. Venezuela, with a break-even of $350/bbl, has long been one of our prime candidates (Chart 4).3 Venezuela is on the verge of total regime collapse and a massive oil production shutdown. This is not a low-probability outcome. However, the fact that the military is already taking control of the situation, combined with our belief that OPEC and Russia will continue cutting oil production to shore up prices, suggest that the regime may be able to limp along. Therefore a continuation of the gradual decline in oil output is more likely than a sharp cutoff this year. Investors should stay short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds and be aware of the upside risks to global oil prices. A Brief History Of PDVSA State-owned oil company PDVSA is the lifeblood of Venezuela. It once was a well-run company that allowed foreign investment with a reasonable government take, but now it is shut off from direct foreign investment. In 1996-1997, prior to Chavez being elected in late 1998, Venezuela was a rampant cheater on its OPEC quota, producing 3.1-3.3 MMB/d versus a quota of ~2.4 MMB/d in 1996 and ~2.8 in 1997. The oil-price crash that started in late 1997 and bottomed in early 1999 (remember the Economist's "Drowning In Oil" cover story on March 4, 1999 predicting $5 per barrel crude prices?) was a critical event propelling the rise of Chavez (Chart 5). One of the planks in Chavez's platform was that Venezuela had to stop cheating on OPEC quotas because that strategy had helped cause the oil-price decline and subsequent economic misery. Without the oil-price crash, Chavez would not have had such strong public support in the run-up to the 1998 elections, which he won. Chavez did in fact rein in Venezuela's production to 2.8 MMB/d in 1999, which had a positive impact on oil prices and reinforced OPEC. In 2002 and 2003, there were two labor strikes at PDVSA and a two-day coup that displaced Chavez. When Chavez returned to power, he fired 18,000 experienced workers at PDVSA and replaced them with political loyalists. Since then, the total number of employees at PDVSA has swelled from about 46,000 people in 2002, when PDVSA was producing 3.2 MMB/d, to about 140,000 people today, when it is producing slightly below 2 MMB/d. Average oil revenue per employee was over $500,000/person in 2002 at $20 oil, versus about $100,000/person today at $50 oil. Suffice it to say, PDVSA is stuffed to the gills with political patronage, and a strike or a revolution inside PDVSA against President Nicolas Maduro is unlikely. However, if opposition forces manage to seize control of government, the Chavistas in control of PDVSA may attempt to shut down operations to deprive them of oil revenues and blackmail them into a better deal going forward. Chart 5Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Image Venezuela is estimated to have the world's largest proved oil reserves at about 300 billion barrels (Chart 6). In addition, there are 1.2-1.4 trillion barrels estimated to rest in heavy-oil deposits in the Orinoco Petroleum Belt (at the mouth of the Orinoco river) that is difficult to extract and has barely been touched. Chart 7Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster These reserves are somewhat similar to Canada's oil sands. It is estimated that 300-500 billion barrels are technically recoverable. In the early 2000s, there were four international consortiums involved in developing these reserves: Petrozuata (COP-50%), Cerro Negro (XOM), Sincor (TOT, STO) and Hamaca (COP-40%). However, Chavez nationalized the Orinoco projects in 2007, paying the international oil companies (IOCs) a pittance. XOM and COP contested the taking and "sued" Venezuela at the World Bank. XOM sought $14.7 billion and won an arbitrated decision for a $1.6 billion settlement in 2014. Venezuela continues to litigate the case and the amount awarded to investors has apparently been reduced by a recent ruling. Over the past decade, as Venezuelan industry declined due to dramatic anti-free market laws, including aggressive fixed exchange rates absurdly out of keeping with black market rates, the government nationalized more and more private assets in order to get the wealth they needed to maintain profligate spending policies. The underlying point of these policies is to garner support from low-income Venezuelans, the Chavista political base. In addition to the Orinoco nationalization, the government appropriated equipment and drilling rigs from several oilfield service companies that had stopped working on account of not being properly paid. In 2009, Petrosucre (a subsidiary of PDVSA) appropriated the ENSCO 69 jackup rig, although the rig was returned in 2010. In 2010, the Venezuelan government seized 11 high-quality land rigs from Helmerich & Payne, resulting in nearly $200MM of losses for the company. These rigs were "easy" for Venezuela to appropriate because they did not require much private-sector expertise to operate. As payment failures continued, relationships with the country's remaining contractors continued to be strained. In 2013, Schlumberger (SLB), the largest energy service company in the world, threatened to stop working for PDVSA due to lack of payment in hard currency. PDVSA paid them in depreciating Venezuelan bolivares, but tightened controls over conversion into U.S. dollars. Some accounts receivables were partially converted into interest-bearing government notes. Promises for payment were made and broken. SLB has taken over $600MM of write-downs for the collapse of the bolivar (Haliburton, HAL, has taken ~$150MM in losses). With accounts receivable balances now stratospherically high at approximately $1.2 billion for SLB, $636 million for HAL (plus $200 million face amount in other notes), and $225 million for Weatherford International, the service companies have already taken write-offs on what they are owed and have refused to extend Venezuela additional credit. Unlike the "dumb iron" of drilling rigs, the service companies provide highly technical proprietary goods and services, from drill bits and fluids to measuring services. The lack of these proprietary technical services diminishes PDVSA's ability to drill new wells and properly maintain its legacy production infrastructure. Venezuela's production started falling in late 2015 - well before OPEC and Russia coordinated their January 2017 production cuts (Chart 7). Drought contributed to the problem in 2016 by causing electricity shortages and forced rationing of electricity (60-70% of Venezuela's electricity generation is hydro); water levels at key dams are still very low, but the condition has eased a bit in 2017. After watching crude oil production fall from 2.4 MMB/d in 2015 to 2.05 MMB/d in 2016, OPEC gave Venezuela a production quota of 1.97 MMB/d for the first half of 2017, which is about what they were expected to be capable of producing. In essence, Venezuela was exempt from production cuts, like other compromised OPEC producers Libya, Nigeria and Iran. So far, Venezuela has produced 1.99 MMB/d in the first quarter, according to EIA. Venezuela's falling production is not cartel behavior but indicative of broader economic and political instability. Venezuela is losing control of oil output, the pillar of regime stability. Bottom Line: The double-edged sword for energy companies is that if the regime utterly fails, the country's 2MM b/d of production may be disrupted. However, if government policy shifts - whether through the political opposition finally gaining de facto power or through the military imposing reforms - Venezuela could ramp up its production, perhaps by 1MMB/d within five years, and more after that if Orinoco is developed. How Long Can Maduro Last? Chavez's model worked like that of Louis XIV, who famously said, "après nous, le déluge." Chavez benefited from high oil prices throughout his reign and died in 2013 just before the country's descent into depression began (Chart 8). He won his last election in 2012 by a margin of 10.8%, while Maduro, his hand-picked successor, won a special election only half a year later by a 1.5% margin, which was contested for all kinds of fraud (Chart 9). Chart 8A Hyperflationary Depression A Hyperflationary Depression A Hyperflationary Depression Image Thus Maduro has suffered from "inept successor" syndrome from the beginning, compounding the fears of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that the succession would be rocky. Maduro lacked both the political capital and the originality to launch orthodox economic reforms to address the country's mounting inflation and weak productivity, but instead doubled down on Chavez's rapid expansion of money and credit to lift domestic consumption (Chart 10).4 Chart 10Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Chart 11Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not The economic collapse was well under way even before commodities pulled the rug out from under the government.5 Remarkably, the recovery in export revenue since 2010 did not occasion a recovery in foreign exchange reserves - these two decoupled, as Venezuela chewed through its reserves to finance its growing domestic costs (Chart 11). This means Venezuela's ability to recover even in the most optimistic oil scenarios is limited. Another sign that the economic break is irreversible is the fact that, since 2013, private consumption has fallen faster than oil output - a reversal of the populist model that boosted consumption (Chart 12). Chart 12Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Chart 13Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Critically, the external environment turned against Maduro and PSUV as oil prices declined after June 2014. In November 2014 Saudi Arabia launched its market-share war against Iran and U.S. shale producers, expanding production into a looming global supply overbalance. Brent crude prices collapsed to $29/bbl by early 2016 (Chart 13). This pushed Venezuela over the brink.6 First, hyperinflation: Currency in circulation - already expanding excessively - has exploded upward since 2014. The 100 bolivar note has exploded in usage while notes of lower denominations have dropped out of usage. Total deposits in the banking system are growing at a pace of over 200%, narrow money (M1) at 140%, and consumer price index at 150% (see Chart 10 above). Real interest rates have plunged into an abyss, with devastating results for the financial system. The real effective exchange rate illustrates the annihilation of the currency's value. Monetary authorities have repeatedly devalued the official exchange rate of the bolivar against the dollar (Chart 14). However, the currency remains overvalued, which creates a huge gap between the official rate and the black market rate, which currently stands at about 5,400 bolivares to the dollar. Regime allies have access to hard USD, for which they charge high rents, and the rest suffer. Chart 14Official Forex Devaluations Official Forex Devaluations Official Forex Devaluations Chart 15Domestic Demand Collapses Domestic Demand Collapses Domestic Demand Collapses Second, the real economy has gone from depression to worse: Exports peaked in October 2008, nearly recovered in March 2012, and plummeted thereafter. Imports have fallen faster as domestic demand contracted (Chart 15). Venezuela must import almost everything and the currency collapse means staples are either unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. Venezuelan exports to China reached 20% of total exports in 2012 but have declined to about 14% (Chart 16). This means that Venezuela has lost a precious $10 billion per year. The state has also been trading oil output for loans from China, resulting in an ever higher share of shrinking oil output devoted to paying back the loans, leaving less and less exported production to bring in hard currency needed to pay for production, imports, and debt servicing. Both private and government consumption are shrinking, according to official statistics (Chart 17). Again, the consumption slump removes a key regime support. Chart 16Chinese Demand Is Limited Chinese Demand Is Limited Chinese Demand Is Limited Chart 17Public And Private Consumption Shrink Public And Private Consumption Shrink Public And Private Consumption Shrink Third, Venezuela is rapidly becoming insolvent: Venezuela's total public debt is high. It stood at 102% of GDP as of August 2014, and GDP has declined by 25%-plus since then. Total external debt, which becomes costlier to service as the currency depreciates, was about $139 billion, or 71% of GDP, in Q3 2015 (Chart 18). It has risen sharply ever since the fall in export revenues post-2011. The destruction of the currency by definition makes the foreign debt burden grow. Chart 18External Debt Soars... External Debt Soars... External Debt Soars... Chart 19...While Forex Reserves Dwindle ...While Forex Reserves Dwindle ...While Forex Reserves Dwindle The regime's hard currency reserves are rapidly drying up - they have fallen from nearly $30 billion in 2013 to just $10 billion today (Chart 19). Without hard cash, Venezuela will be unable to meet import costs and external debt payments. In Table 1, we assess the country's ability to make these payments at different oil-price and output levels. Assuming the YTD average Venezuelan crude price of $44/bbl, export revenue should hit about $32 billion this year, while imports should hover around $21 billion, leaving $11 billion for debt servicing costs of roughly $10 billion (combining the state's $8 billion with PDVSA's $2 billion). Thus if global oil prices hold up - as we think they will - the regime may be able to squeak by another year. Image In short, the regime could have about $11 billion in revenues left at the end of the year if the Venezuela oil basket hovers around $44/bbl and production remains at about 2 MMB/d. That is a "minimum cash" scenario for the regime this year, though it by no means guarantees regime survival amid the widespread economic distress of the population. Chart 20Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue If production drops to 1.25 MMb/d or lower as a result of the economic crisis - or if Venezuelan oil prices settle at $28/bbl or below - the regime will be unable to meet its import costs and debt payments. It will have to sell off more of its international assets as rapidly as it can (Chart 20), restrict imports further, and eventually default. Moreover, the calculation becomes much more negative for Venezuela if we assume, conservatively, $10 billion in capital outflows, which is far from unreasonable. Outflows could easily wipe out any small remainder of foreign reserves. So far, the government has chosen to deprive the populace of imports rather than default on external debt, wagering that the military and other state security forces can suppress domestic opposition for longer than the regime can survive under an international financial embargo. This strategy is fueling mass protests, riots, and clashes with the National Guard and Bolivarian colectivos (militias). An extension of the OPEC-Russia production cuts in late May, which we expect, will bring much-needed relief for Venezuela's budget. Thus, there is a clear path for regime survival through 2017 on a purely fiscal basis, though it is a highly precarious one - the reality is that the state is bound to default sooner or later. Moreover, the socio-political crisis has already spiraled far enough that a modest boost to oil prices this year will probably be too little, too late to save Maduro and the PSUV in its current form. As we discuss below, the question is only whether the military takes greater control to perpetuate the current regime, or the opposition is gradually allowed to take power and renovate the constitutional order. Bottom Line: Even if oil production holds up, and oil prices average above $44/bbl as we expect, the country's leaders will have to take extreme measures to avoid default. Domestic shortages and military-enforced rationing will compound. As economic contraction persists, social unrest will intensify. Will The Military Throw A Coup? Explosive popular discontent this year shows no sign of abating. It is a continuation of the mass protests and sporadic violence since the economic crisis fully erupted in 2014. However, as recession deepens - and food, fuel, and medicine shortages become even more widespread - unrest will spread to a broader geographic and demographic base. Protests since September 2016 have drawn numbers in the upper hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million on two occasions. Security forces have increasingly cracked down on civilians, raising the death toll and provoking a nasty feedback loop with protesters. Reports suggest that the poorest people - the Chavista base - are increasingly joining the protests, which is a new trend and bodes ill for the ruling party's survival. Already the public has turned against the United Socialist Party, as evinced by the December 2015 legislative election results and a range of public opinion polls, which show Maduro's support in the low-20% range. In the 2015 vote, the opposition defeated the Chavistas for the first time since 1998. The Democratic Unity Roundtable won a majority of the popular vote and a supermajority of the seats in the National Assembly. Since then, however, Maduro has used party-controlled civilian institutions like the Supreme Court and National Electoral Council - backed by the military and state security - to prevent the opposition's exercise of its newfound legislative power. Key signposts to watch will be whether Maduro is pressured into restoring the electoral calendar. The opposition has so far been denied local elections (supposedly rescheduled for later this year) and a popular referendum on recalling Maduro. So it has little reason to expect that the government will hold the October 2018 elections on time. The government is likely to keep delaying these votes because it knows it will lose them. In the meantime, the opposition has few choices other than protests and street tactics to try to pressure the government into allowing elections after all. Further, oil prices are low, so the regime is vulnerable, which means that the opposition has every incentive to step up the pressure now. If it waits, higher prices could give Maduro a new infusion of revenues and the ability to prolong his time in power. The question at this point is: will the military defect from the government? The military is the historical arbiter of power in the country. Maduro - who unlike Chavez does not hail from a military background - has only managed to make it this far by granting his top brass more power. Crucially, in July 2016, Maduro handed army chief Vladimir Padrino Lopez control over the country's critical transportation and distribution networks, including for food supplies. He has also carved out large tracts of land for a vast new mining venture, supposed to focus on gold, which the military will oversee and profit from.7 What this means is that the government and military are becoming more, not less, integrated at the moment. The army has a vested interest in the current regime. It is also internally coherent, as recent political science research shows, in the sense that the upper-most and lower-most ranks are devoted to Chavismo.8 Economic sanctions and human rights allegations from the U.S. and international community reinforce this point, making it so that officials have no future outside of the regime and therefore fight harder for the regime to survive.9 Still, there are fractures within the military that could get worse over time. Divisions within the ranks: An analysis of the Arab Spring shows that militaries that defected from the government (Egypt, Tunisia), or split up and made war on each other (Syria, Libya, Yemen), exhibited certain key divisions within their ranks.10 Looking at these variables, Venezuela's military lacks critical ethno-sectarian divisions, but does suffer from important differences between the military branches, between the army and the other state security forces, and between the ideological and socio-economic factions that are entirely devoted to Chavismo versus the rest. Thus, for example, it is possible that Bolivarian militias committing atrocities against unarmed civilians could eventually force the military to change its position to preserve its reputation.11 Popular opinion: Massive protests have approached 1 million people by some counts (of a population of 31 million) and have combined a range of elements within the society - not only young men or violent rebels/anarchists. Also, public opinion surveys suggest that supporters of Maduro have a more favorable view of the army, and opponents have a less favorable view.12 This implies that Maduro's extreme lack of popular support is a liability that will weigh on the military over time. Military funds shrinking: Because of the economic crisis, Maduro has been forced to slash military spending by a roughly estimated 56% over the past year (Chart 21). The military may eventually decide it needs to fix the economy in order to fix its budget. Image Autonomous military leader: That General Lopez has considerable autonomy is another variable that increases the risk of military defection or fracture. As the country slides out of control Lopez will likely intervene more often. He already did so recently when the Chavista-aligned Supreme Court tried to usurp the National Assembly's legislative function. The attorney general, Luisa Ortega Diaz, broke with party norms by criticizing the court's ruling. Maduro was forced to order the court to reverse it, at least nominally restoring the National Assembly's authority. Lopez supposedly had encouraged Maduro to backtrack in this way, contrary to the advice of two notable Chavistas, Diosdado Cabello and Vice President Tareck El Aissami. Ultimately, military rule for extended periods is common in Venezuelan history. Chavez always deeply integrated the party and military leadership, so the regime could persist through greater military assertion within it, or the military could take over and initiate topical political changes. Finally, if Lopez is ready to stage a coup, he may still wait for oil prices to recover. It makes more sense to let the already discredited ruling party suffer the public consequences of the recession than to seize power when the country is in shambles. Previous coup attempts have occurred not only when oil prices were bottoming but also when they bounded back after bottoming (Chart 22). It would appear that the Venezuelan military is as good at forecasting oil prices as any Wall Street analyst! For oil markets, the military's strong grip over the country suggests that even if Maduro and the PSUV collapse, the party loyalists at PDVSA may not have the option of going on strike. The military will still need the petro dollars to stay in power, and it will have the guns to insist that production keeps up, as long as economic destitution does not force operations to a halt. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that the military will expand its overt control over the country. As long as the leaders avoid fundamental economic reforms, the result of any full-out military coup against Maduro may just mean more of the same, which would be politically and economically unsustainable. Chart 22Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Chart 23Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Investment Implications Any rebound in oil prices as a result of an extension of OPEC's and Russia's production cuts at the OPEC meeting on May 25 will be "too little, too late" in terms of saving Maduro and the PSUV. They may be able to play for time, but their legitimacy has been destroyed - they will only survive as long as the military sustains them. To a great extent, the ruling party has already handed the keys over to the military, and military rule can persist for some time. Hence oil production is more likely to continue its slow decline than experience a sudden shutdown, at least this year. This is because it is likely that military control will tighten, not diminish, when Maduro falls. Incidentally, the military is also more capable than the current weak civilian government of forcing through wrenching policy adjustments that are necessary to begin the process of normalizing economic policy - such as floating the currency and cutting public spending. But any such process would bring even more economic pain and unrest in the short term, and it has not begun yet. Even if the ruling party avoids defaulting on government debts this year - which is possible given our budget calculations - it is on the path to default before long. We remain short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds versus emerging market peers. This trade is down 330 basis points since initiation in June 2015, but Venezuelan bonds have rolled over and the outlook is dim (Chart 23). Within the oil markets, our base case is that global oil producers have benefitted and will benefit from the marginally higher prices derived from Venezuela's slow production deterioration. Should a more sudden and severe production collapse occur, the upward price response would be much more acute. A sustained outage of Venezuelan production would send oil prices quickly towards $80-$100/bbl as a necessary price signal to curb demand growth, creating a meaningful recessionary force around the globe. Oil producers, specifically U.S. shale producers that can react quickly to these price signals, would stand to benefit temporarily from the higher prices, but would again suffer from falling oil prices in the inevitable post-crisis denouement. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 For the military takeover, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Energy Spring," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com; BCA Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "The Other Guys In The Oil Market," dated April 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Venezuelan Chavismo: Life After Death," dated April 2, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, and Monthly Report, "The Reflation Era," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing Political And Financial Landscapes In Argentina, Venezuela And Brazil," dated January 6, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 For Lopez's taking control, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. For the gold mine, please see Edgardo Lander, "The Implosion of Venezuela's Rentier State," Transnational Institute, New Politics Papers 1, September 2016, available at www.tni.org. 8 The junior officers have advanced through special military schools set up by Chavez, while the senior officials have been carefully selected over the years for their loyalty and ideological purity. Please see Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Venezuelan Military Culture," FIU-USSOUTHCOM Military Culture Series, May 2016, available at www.johnpolga.com. 9 Please see David Smilde, "Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy," Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, available at www.foreign.senate.gov. 10 Please see Timothy Hazen, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During The Arab Uprisings," doctoral dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, December 2016, available at ecommons.luc.edu. 11 Civilian deaths caused by the National Guard and Chavez's loyalist militias triggered the aborted 2002 military coup. Please see Steven Barracca, "Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," Third World Quarterly 28: 1 (2007), pp. 137-54. 12 See footnote 8 above.

Highlights The structural theme of overweighting technology stocks within the overall equity benchmark, and relative to other cyclical sectors such as commodities and machinery stocks, remains intact. However, in absolute terms, EM tech/semi share prices have become overbought and have already priced in a lot of good news. They will likely sell off soon due to the potential slowdown in the pace of semiconductor demand. Continue overweighting EM tech stocks, Taiwanese and Korean bourses within EM equity portfolios. We also reiterate our long-standing long tech / short materials strategy. Feature EM technology stocks have surged to all-time highs (Chart I-1, top panel), contributing significantly to the ongoing EM rally. In fact, excluding tech stocks, EM share prices have not yet surpassed a major technical hurdle, as shown in the bottom panel of Chart I-1. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) team has been recommending that investors overweight tech stocks since June 8, 2010. In our report titled, How To Play EM Growth In The Coming Decade,1 we contended that the structural bull market in commodities was over, and that in the coming decade (2010-2019) the winners would be health care and technology (Chart I-2). We also identified a potential mania candidate - i.e., a segment that was poised for exponential price gains. We reasoned that the fusion between technology and health care - health care equipment stocks - could experience exponential price moves. This strategy has paid off exceptionally well. Consistently, within the EM equity benchmark, we have been overweighting Taiwanese and Korean tech stocks since 2007 and 2010, respectively (Chart I-3). Chart I-1EM Tech Stocks Have ##br##Surged To All Time Highs EM Tech Stocks Have Surged To All Time Highs EM Tech Stocks Have Surged To All Time Highs Chart I-2EMS Strategy Since 2010: ##br##Long Tech / Short Materials EMS Strategy Since 2010: Long Tech / Short Materials EMS Strategy Since 2010: Long Tech / Short Materials Chart I-3Taiwanese & Korean Tech ##br##Stocks Relative To Overall EM Taiwanese & Korean Tech Stocks Relative To Overall EM Taiwanese & Korean Tech Stocks Relative To Overall EM After such enormous gains, a relevant question is whether technology share prices will continue to rally in absolute terms, boosting the EM equity benchmark, or whether their absolute performance and/or relative performance will roll over. Chart I-4EM Tech Stocks Are Overbought EM Tech Stocks Are Overbought EM Tech Stocks Are Overbought Before we proceed in laying out our analysis, a caveat is in order: we can offer thematic long-term views on various sectors, but investors should realize the investment calls on many technology, internet and social media companies are driven by bottom-up - not macro - views. From a top-down perspective, we can offer little insight on whether EM internet and social media stocks such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu are cheap or expensive, whether their business models are or are not proficient, or what their profit outlooks might be. The reason is that these and other global internet/social media companies' revenues are not driven by business cycle dynamics and top-down analysis is less imperative in forecasting their performance. In this report we will shed some light on the business cycle in the global/Asian semiconductor industry. The latter is subject to both business cycle swings as well as sector-specific factors. Again, sector-unique factors for the semi industry are also beyond our top-down approach. The five largest constituents of the EM MSCI tech sector are Samsung (4.3% of EM MSCI market cap), Tencent (4.0%), Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (3.5%), Alibaba (3.0%), and Baidu (1.0%). Chart I-4 shows their share prices. In short, they have become a large part of the EM benchmark and are also extremely overbought, increasing the risk of correction. Technology's Structural Bull Market Is Intact... Even though EM tech prices have skyrocketed in both absolute and relative terms, odds are that the structural bull market has further to run. There are no structural excesses in the technology sector that would warrant a bust for now. Even in China, credit/leverage excesses are concentrated in the old industries, not among the tech and new economy segments. Demand for tech products in general and semiconductors in particular is not very dependent on the credit cycle in EM. In both developed market (DM) and EM economies, spending on many tech gadgets is contingent on income gains rather than credit growth. Our bearish view on EM/China growth is primarily due to our expectations of a credit downturn that will affect spending that is financed by credit. Investment expenditures driven by credit are much more important for commodities and industrial goods than technology products. While the share prices of technology and new economy companies are overbought and may be expensive, global/EM economic demand growth will be skewed toward new industries and technologies rather than commodities. In brief, the outlook for global tech spending remains positive, both cyclically and structurally. Having outperformed all other sectors by a large margin, the EM technology sector presently accounts for 26% of the EM MSCI benchmark, while at its previous structural peak in 2000 its market share stood at 22% (Chart I-5, top panel). During the 1999-2000 tech bubble, the U.S. and DM tech sector’s share of market cap reached 34% and 24% of the U.S. MSCI and DM MSCI benchmark market caps, respectively (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). Despite being stretched, it is possible that the technology sector's market cap will rise further before another structural top transpires. Hence, we are not yet ready to call the top in the tech's share of the overall market cap either in EM or DM. From a very long-term perspective (since 1960), the relative performance of the U.S. technology sector against the S&P 500 has not yet reached two standard deviations above its time trend, as it did in the year 2000 during the tech bubble. Conversely, the same measure for energy, materials and machinery stocks is not yet depressed enough to warrant a mean reversion bet (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Tech Stocks Market Cap Share ##br##Of Overall Equity Benchmarks Tech Stocks Market Cap Share Of Overall Equity Benchmarks Tech Stocks Market Cap Share Of Overall Equity Benchmarks Chart I-6Relative Performance Of ##br##U.S. Sectors Vs. S&P 500 Relative Performance Of U.S. Sectors Vs. S&P 500 Relative Performance Of U.S. Sectors Vs. S&P 500 Finally, secular leadership rotations within global equities typically occur during market downturns. Chart I-7 shows that commodities stocks and tech leadership changed in 2001 and 2008. It is possible that new sectoral leadership will emerge in global equities during the next bear market/severe selloff. However, it is too early to bet on it now. The current character of equity markets - which favors technology over commodities - will persist. Bottom Line: The structural theme of overweighting technology stocks within the overall equity benchmark and relative to other cyclical sectors such as resources/commodities and machinery stocks remains intact. ...But The Semi Cycle Upswing Is Advanced The semiconductors industry is cyclical, and as such business cycle analysis is pertinent here. The rest of the technology sector, however, is not correlated with overall business cycles. Therefore, there is little value that macro analysis can deliver on the outlook for non-semi tech areas. This is why this section is focused on semiconductors rather than the overall tech sector. There is no basis as to why semiconductor/tech cycles should correlate with commodities cycles. However, when they do, the amplitude of global business cycle fluctuations rises. Indeed, Asian exports and global trade tumbled in 2015 and have subsequently improved over the past 12 months for the following reason: the 2015 downturn and the ensuing recovery in the semiconductor cycle overlapped with similar swings in commodities and Chinese capital goods demand (Chart I-8). This has increased the amplitude of the global business cycle's swings in the past two years. Chart I-7Secular Leadership ##br##Rotation: Tech Vs. Energy Secular Leadership Rotation: Tech Vs. Energy Secular Leadership Rotation: Tech Vs. Energy Chart I-8Chinese Capital Goods Imports & ##br##Global Semiconductor Cycle Chinese Capital Goods Imports & Global Semiconductor Cycle Chinese Capital Goods Imports & Global Semiconductor Cycle We remain bearish on Chinese capital spending in general and construction in particular. This entails weaker demand for commodities and industrial goods. Yet we are not bearish on Chinese demand for semiconductors and tech devices. The semiconductor cycle has experienced a mini boom in the past 12-18 months. Demand for electronic products in the U.S. has been exceptionally strong (Chart I-9, top panel). Moreover, European production and sale of overall high-tech products as well as computer and electronic products have been robust (Chart I-9, bottom panel). In China, retail sales of communication appliances have also been extremely healthy (Chart I-10, top panel). By extension, the mainland's production of electronics has also boomed (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Chart I-9DM Demand For Tech Is Strong... DM Demand For Tech Is Strong... DM Demand For Tech Is Strong... Chart I-10...And So Is China's ...And So Is China's ...And So Is China's One soft spot for semi demand, however, could emanate from the global auto sector. U.S. auto sales have begun to contract, and auto production will likely shrink as well (Chart I-11, top panel). In addition, the growth rate of auto sales in both China and Europe may have reached a peak (Chart I-11, middle and bottom panels). Annual vehicle sales have reached 25 million units in China, and 17 million vehicles in both the U.S. and euro area. Overall global auto production is set to decelerate and this will weigh on semiconductor demand given that autos consume a lot of electronics. In addition, there are several other indications that suggest a mini-slowdown will likely transpire in the global semiconductor sector later this year: Taiwan's narrow money (M1) growth impulse has historically been correlated with the tech-heavy TSE index and has led export cycles (Chart I-12). This money impulse currently heralds a major top and relapse in both share prices and exports. Chart I-11Global Auto Production Global Auto Production Global Auto Production Chart I-12Taiwanese M1 Money Impulse Is Signaling A ##br##Growth Slowdown And Risk To Stocks Taiwanese M1 Money Impulse Is Signaling A Risk To Stocks Taiwanese M1 Money Impulse Is Signaling A Risk To Stocks The semiconductor shipments-to-inventory ratio has peaked in Korea and Taiwan (Chart I-13). This indicates that the best of the semi upswing may be behind us. Consistently, both global semiconductor producers' and semiconductor equipment stocks' forward EPS net revisions have already surged, and are elevated. This implies that a lot of earnings optimism has been priced in. Historically, when forward earning net revisions have reached these levels, global semi share prices have rolled over or entered a consolidation period (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Korea's & Taiwan's Semi ##br##Cycle Is Topping Out Korea's & Taiwan's Semi Cycle Is Topping Out Korea's & Taiwan's Semi Cycle Is Topping Out Chart I-14Semiconductors' Forward EPS ##br##Revisions Are Elevated Semiconductors' Forward EPS Revisions Are Elevated Semiconductors' Forward EPS Revisions Are Elevated Bottom Line: We expect a moderation in semi demand, but not recession. Semi share prices may react negatively to slower demand growth as the former have become extremely overbought and have already priced in a lot of good news. Investment Conclusions Semiconductor stocks have become overbought and a marginal slowdown in demand might be enough to cause a shake-out. The same is true for the overall tech sector. That said, we continue to recommend that investors overweight EM tech stocks, Taiwanese and Korean bourses within the EM equity portfolios. We also reiterate our long-standing long tech / short materials strategy. Remarkably, the KOSPI and Taiwanese TSE indexes - highly leveraged to semiconductors - have rallied to their previous highs (Chart I-15). In the past, they failed to break above these levels and we expect them to struggle again. If these equity indexes pull back and tech stocks correct, the overall EM stock index will roll over too. The rest of EM equity universe has much poorer fundamentals than tech companies. Financials and commodities sectors make 25% and 7% of the EM MSCI benchmark's market cap, respectively. The former is at risk from credit slowdown in EM and the latter is at a risk from lower commodities prices (Chart I-16). Chart I-15KOSPI & TSE Have Reached ##br##Major Resistances KOSPI & TSE Have Reached Major Resistances KOSPI & TSE Have Reached Major Resistances Chart I-16Industrial Metals ##br##Prices To Head Lower bca.ems_wr_2017_05_17_s1_c16 bca.ems_wr_2017_05_17_s1_c16 On the whole, we believe the recent divergence of EM risk assets from commodities prices and the EM/China credit cycles does not represent a structural regime shift in EM fundamentals, it rather reflects complacency in the marketplace. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor aymank@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "How The Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade", dated June 8, 2010, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlight Once-ebullient oil markets are overwrought. Fears that an economic slowdown in China will spill over into EM - the engine of global commodity demand growth - along with a very weak 1Q17 U.S. GDP performance, will keep oil markets focused on downside risks to prices. On the supply side, high-frequency inventory data from the U.S. suggests visible OECD stocks remain high, seemingly impervious to OPEC 2.0's best efforts to drain them. Steadily rising U.S. shale output also weighs on prices. Markets appear to be looking right through the choreographed comments on production cuts from leaders of OPEC 2.0, which suggest these cuts will definitely be extended to year-end 2017, and possibly into 2018. We doubt the demand picture is anywhere close to a fundamental downshift, expecting, instead, continued robust demand. We also expect the extension of OPEC 2.0's production cutbacks to year-end 2017 to significantly drain storage, even as shale output continues to grow. If anything, recent market action has presented an opportunity re-establish length, and to position for backwardation toward year-end. Energy: Overweight. The stop-loss on our Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts vs. $65/bbl calls was elected May 4/17, leaving us with a loss of $1.54/bbl (-327.7%). We are reinstating the position as of tonight's close, anticipating Brent will reach $60/bbl by year-end. We also stopped out of our Dec/17 Brent long vs. Dec/18 Brent short on May 4/17, with a $0.50/bbl loss (-263.2%). We will re-establish this position as well basis tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. LME and COMEX stock builds are keeping copper under pressure, offsetting possible renewed labor unrest. This is keeping us neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. We were made long spot gold at $1230.25/oz basis last Thursday's close as a hedge against inflation risk, and a possible equities correction. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA data indicate a favorable start to the grain planting season. We remain bearish. Feature Softer Chinese PMIs spooked commodity markets, coming as they did on the heels of a very visible and much-reported weakening of base metals and iron ore prices emanating from Chinese markets (Chart of the Week).1 Financial markets fear weaker Chinese growth could presage weaker EM growth, which is the engine of commodity growth generally.2 With U.S. GDP coming in weak as well - registering a paltry growth of 0.7% in 1Q17 - markets started re-calibrating oil demand estimates for this year in light of still-high inventory levels. Adding to the market's agita, visible oil inventories in the OECD remain stubbornly high, thwarting OPEC 2.0's best efforts to drain them via their closely followed production cuts. By Wednesday of this week, this potent combination shaved some 9.6% off 1Q17 average prices, taking international benchmarks Brent and WTI below $50/bbl. Dubai prices have largely been spared similar carnage, as Gulf OPEC states continue to reduce supplies of heavier sour crude availabilities (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekChina PMIs Weaken As Monetary##BR##Conditions Tighten Slightly China PMIs Weaken As Monetary Conditions Tighten Slightly China PMIs Weaken As Monetary Conditions Tighten Slightly Chart 2Oil Prices##BR##In Retreat Oil Prices In Retreat Oil Prices In Retreat OPEC 2.0 Responds To Weaker Prices OPEC 2.0 - our moniker for the producer group comprised of OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC, led by Russia - was not oblivious to these concerns. Indeed, earlier this week KSA Oil Minister Khalid al-Falih said the group would "do whatever it takes" to drain stocks and normalize global inventories (Chart 3). The OPEC 2.0 leadership is well aware that failure to do so would again expose these petro-states to the risk of a price collapse, as, absent production discipline, oil inventories once again would fill. This would force prices through producers' cash costs until enough production was knocked off-line to drain the storage overhang.3 Comments by leaders of OPEC 2.0 regarding the extension of its 1.8mm b/d production cuts this year and into next year are consistent with a strategy we laid out earlier, part of which includes the use of forward guidance to convince markets the supply side will tighten in the future.4 The other critical part of the strategy is for OPEC 2.0 to keep the front of the Brent curve at or below $60/bbl, using their own production, spare capacity and storage, and guiding to higher supply in the future, which would keep markets backwardated in 2018 once visible storage returns to five-year average levels. A persistent and deep backwardation - on the order of 10% p.a. - would, based on our modelling, slow the return of rigs to U.S. shale fields. In addition, the combination of a front-end forward curve capped at $60/bbl and persistent backwardation would keep depletion rates elevated, as cash-strapped producers - e.g., non-Gulf OPEC producers with high fiscal breakeven oil prices - are forced to forego maintenance capex. Taken together, this would give OPEC 2.0 a stronger hand in guiding prices - provided the coalition can hold together and maintain production discipline. We continue to expect an extension of the 1.8mm b/d OPEC 2.0 cuts will backwardate markets once inventories normalize later this year, even with strong growth from U.S. shales.5 Indeed, we expect this combination of fundamentals will clear the storage overhang by end-2017, and produce draws of more than 1mm b/d on average from April - December (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA,##BR##Russia: "Whatever It Takes" OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA, Russia: "Whatever It Takes" OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA, Russia: "Whatever It Takes" Chart 4Steady Demand,##BR##Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Steady Demand, Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Steady Demand, Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Wobbly Oil Demand Is Transitory The 1Q17 demand-side scares emanating from China and the U.S. are transitory. Chart 5Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending##BR##Picked Up This Year In China Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending Picked Up This Year In China Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending Picked Up This Year In China Following their return from the mainland, our colleagues on BCA's China Investment Strategy desk note that monetary conditions still are fairly stimulative, and are unlikely to cause the economy to roll over.6 Most of the deterioration in economic growth results from a slowing in the depreciation of China's trade-weighted RMB, following a years-long appreciation from 2012 to 2015, which did dampen growth. In addition, while fiscal stimulus was reduced at the end of 2016, the government "quickly reversed course" as direct spending and investment in infrastructure picked up substantially (Chart 5). Our China Investment Strategy colleagues note China's fiscal spending is pro-cyclical - it increases as the economy improves and tax revenues increase. The government shows no sign of wanting to wind this down: "China's policy setting remains expansionary, a major departure from previous years when the Chinese economy was under the heavy weight of policy tightening while external demand also weakened. Looking forward, there is little chance that the Chinese authorities will commit similar policy mistakes that could lead to a major growth downturn. Barring a major policy mistake of aggressive tightening, Chinese growth should remain buoyant." The impact of Chinese demand on global oil demand is increasing, based on econometric work we've recently completed. From 2000 to end-April 2017, a 1% increase in Chinese oil demand has translated into a 0.64% ncrease in Brent prompt prices. During this period, the impact of non-OECD demand ex China was more than two times that of China's - a 1% increase there could be expected to lead to a 1.3% increase in Brent prices. China's impact on Brent prices in the post-GFC world more than doubled, while the impact of non-OECD demand ex-China increased marginally. Since the Global Financial Crisis, a 1% increase in China's oil consumption has produced a 1.4% increase in Brent prices, while a similar increase in EM ex-China has translated into a 1.8% increase in Brent prices.7 Turning to the U.S., we believe, along with the Fed, the weak patch in GDP in 1Q17 is transitory. Following the report on the quarter's weak 0.7% GDP growth, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics surprised markets with a reading of 4.4% unemployment (U3 measure), and an equally impressive U6 measure of 8.6%, which takes it almost to pre-GFC levels. We expect robust U.S. labor-market conditions will keep demand for refined products in the U.S. robust, which will support oil prices there going forward. Globally, the U.S. EIA expects oil consumption will grow 1.6mm b/d this year - unchanged from last year. This is above our 1.4mm b/d estimate for the year. If the EIA's demand estimate is accurate, we can expect a sharper draw (+200k b/d) in global inventories than the average 860k b/d we currently are projecting, all else equal (Chart 4). This would lead to a sharper and earlier backwardation in prices that we currently expect. We will be re-estimating our balances model next week. Investment Implications We continue to expect the global storage overhang to clear by year-end, given the extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to at least year-end 2017. Wobbly demand is a transitory phenomenon, and we expect a recovery in the balance of the year. Given our expectation, we are re-establishing our long year-end Brent exposure, and are going short a $45/bbl Dec/17 Brent put vs. long a $65/bbl Dec/17 Brent call at tonight's close. We had a -$1.00/bbl stop-loss on this position, which was elected May 4/17 and resulted in a 1.54/bbl loss (-327.7%). We stopped out of our long Brent front-to-back position - long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - in anticipation of backwardation. We also will be looking to re-establishing this position at tonight's closing levels, and for a good entry point to re-establish the same position in WTI. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Iron-ore (62% Fe) prices are down 33.5% after peaking this year at close to $91/MT in March. The LMEX base metals index is down 7.7% from its 2017 peak in February. Regular readers of Commodity & Energy Strategy will recall we've been bearish iron ore and steel for months, and have remained neutral base metals. Please see "China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals," and "Copper's Price Supports Are Fading," in the January 19, and March 23, 2017, issues of Commodity & Energy Strategy. They are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 In the May 5, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy, our colleague Mathieu Savary notes, "The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing." Please see "The Achilles Heel of Commodity Currencies" in the May 5 FES, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy April 20, 2017, for a further discussion of the logic behind these cuts. 4 This aligns with a strategy we laid out last month, which uses forward guidance to convince markets to anticipate tighter supply further out the curve. By leading markets to anticipate lower crude oil availabilities in the future - while storage is drawing - OPEC 2.0 is setting the stage for forward curves to remain backwardated. Please see "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 "Backwardation" refers to a futures forward-price curve in which contracts for prompt delivery are higher than prices for deferred delivery. This indicates merchants and refiners are willing to pay more for a commodity delivered close in time versus in the future. It is the opposite of a "contango" curve, in which deferred prices exceed prompt prices. 6 Please see "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" in BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report published May 5, 2017. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 These coefficients are all significant at less than 0.01. R2 coefficients of determination for these cointegrating regressions, which include the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) all exceed 0.90, indicating that the USD TWIB and Brent prices share a common long-term trend, and that FX effects remain important in assessing oil prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong