Emerging Markets

Highlights Brazilian growth will recover modestly in 2017, but it will be insufficient to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio. With interest rates still at double digits, public debt dynamics will become unsustainable as the ratio reaches or surpasses 85-90% of GDP over the next couple of years. The central bank has been financing the government by buying local currency bonds. Going forward, the path of least resistance, and most likely scenario, is direct or indirect public debt monetization by the central bank of Brazil. This will allow the nation to avoid fiscal stress/crisis but the price for it will be large exchange rate depreciation. In the end, investors will lose capital in Brazilian financial markets in U.S. dollar terms. Feature Brazil's financial markets have rallied sharply over the past 12 months, even as the economy has continued to disappoint. Growth has fallen short of even our downbeat expectations, yet the tremendous rally in its financial markets had sent our bearish strategy wide of the mark. In the past year, we have argued that even if the Brazilian economy recovers, it is likely headed towards a public debt trap because the recovery will be muted and the starting point of fiscal accounts/government debt is already quite poor. So, has Brazil achieved escape velocity - i.e., has growth gained enough momentum to thwart concerns about public debt sustainability? Escape Velocity Chart I-1Despite A Strengthening Global Economy, ##br##Brazilian Growth Is Relapsing Despite A Strengthening Global Economy, Brazilian Growth Is Relapsing Despite A Strengthening Global Economy, Brazilian Growth Is Relapsing It is tempting to conclude that the rally in Brazilian markets has been so powerful that the country has broken away from its five-year bear market, and hence that public debt sustainability is not an issue at all. In other words, financial markets seem confident that Brazil has achieved escape velocity. We do not think so. Notably, in recent months Brazil's economy has surprised to the downside, despite the ongoing improvement in global growth: Brazil's manufacturing PMI overall index has rolled over decisively, despite broad-based strength in the global business cycle (Chart I-1). More importantly, export prices in general, and iron ore and soybean prices in particular, have rallied a lot in the past year. Hence, the external sector has been a positive force for the economy, yet the latter has failed to revive. Having appreciated dramatically, the currency is no longer cheap. This is confirmed within Brazil's trade dynamics since export volumes are slipping relative to import volumes. As fiscal spending growth has until now been decent, the epicenter of the retrenchment has clearly been household consumption and business investment (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Brazilian Households Are ##br##Still Feeling Massive Pain... Brazilian Households Are Still Feeling Massive Pain... Brazilian Households Are Still Feeling Massive Pain... Chart I-3...As Is The ##br##Business Sector ...As Is The Business Sector ...As Is The Business Sector Household debt-service costs remain elevated at 22% of disposable income (Chart I-4). This, and ongoing job losses, are keeping a lid on consumer spending. Manufacturing production is still collapsing, and capacity utilization is at a 20-year low (Chart I-3, bottom panel). This is not a sign of a competitive exchange rate or vibrant manufacturing sector. Due to the economic contraction, Brazil's primary and overall fiscal deficits have reached 2.5% and 8.9% of GDP (Chart I-5), respectively, despite the authorities' attempts to secure considerable one-off revenues. Chart I-4Brazil: Elevated Household Indebtedness ##br##Will Prevent A Consumption Rebound Brazil: Elevated Household Indebtedness Will Prevent A Consumption Rebound Brazil: Elevated Household Indebtedness Will Prevent A Consumption Rebound Chart I-5Brazil's Fiscal Accounts Brazil's Fiscal Accounts Brazil's Fiscal Accounts Remarkably, the level of Brazil's real GDP has already contracted by 7.6% from its peak in 2014, producing the worst depression in more than 116 years (Chart I-6). Bottom Line: Not only has Brazil failed to achieve escape velocity, but also its growth dynamics have underwhelmed even the most pessimistic of forecasts. As a result, public debt dynamics have become unsustainable. Fiscal And Credit Impulses In 2017 Going forward the outlook for Brazil's economy will hinge on credit and fiscal impulses: If government spending rises by 6.3% in 2017, which is equivalent to the 2016 IPCA inflation rate as mandated by the fiscal spending cap (known as PEC 55), the federal fiscal spending impulse in 2017 will be 79 billion BRL, or 1.23% of GDP (calculated using our 2017 nominal GDP estimate) (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-6Brazil's Worst Recession In 116 Years Brazil's Worst Recession In 116 Years Brazil's Worst Recession In 116 Years Chart I-7Fiscal And Credit Impulses Fiscal And Credit Impulses Fiscal And Credit Impulses The impact of fiscal policy on growth is defined by government spending and taxes. Odds are that taxes need to be hiked to achieve the 2017 budget targets. Unless growth recovers strongly, doubtful in our view, there are non-trivial odds of impending tax hikes. The latter will counteract the positive fiscal impulse from government expenditures. The credit impulse is calculated as an annual change in credit growth, or the second derivative of the outstanding stock of credit. If we assume private and public banks' credit growth will be 0% and -5%, respectively, in 2017 overall loan growth will contract by 2.5%, and the credit impulse will be 0.54% of GDP (Chart I-7, middle panel). Even though interest rates are declining, real (inflation-adjusted) rates remain high at 5.4%, and banks' balance sheets are impaired by mushrooming NPLs following the credit boom years. This will preclude a revival in loan growth in the banking system. Aggregating the fiscal spending and credit impulses together, there will be about a 2% boost to nominal GDP growth in 2017 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). However, as it is likely that taxes will rise, the overall combined effect on the economy will be less than that. Bottom Line: Odds are that the aggregate fiscal and credit impulse will be only mildly positive in 2017 - assuming no tax hikes. This portends only moderate nominal GDP growth in 2017. Government Debt Simulation Revisited The Brazilian economy will probably recover and our baseline view assumes real GDP growth will be modestly positive for 2017. However, the recovery will not be vigorous enough to halt the exponential rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Table I-1 presents a scenario analysis for Brazil's public debt. Table I-1Brazil: Public Debt Sustainability Scenarios 2016-2019 Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? We considered three scenarios: base case, optimistic and pessimistic. For each scenario, we have made assumptions for nominal GDP growth, nominal government revenue growth, nominal government expenditure growth (based on the fiscal spending cap), and on the average (or blended) interest rate on all local currency public debt. Chart I-8Brazil's Is Headed Towards ##br##A Public Debt Crisis Brazil's Is Headed Towards A Public Debt Crisis Brazil's Is Headed Towards A Public Debt Crisis In our base case scenario, the public debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 84% in 2018 and 91% in 2019 (Chart I-8). With double-digit interest rates, the 91% public debt load spirals out of control. In short, even in our base case scenario, which assumes a return to modest growth in 2017 and a decent recovery in economic activity in 2018 and 2019, Brazil is unlikely to avoid a debt trap. For the base case, we use the following assumptions For nominal GDP growth in 2017 we use the most recent Brazilian Central Bank Survey year-end forecast of real GDP growth of 0.5% plus our estimate of 5% inflation to arrive at 5.5%. In 2018, we assume real GDP growth of 2.5% plus 4.5% inflation to arrive at 7%. And in 2019 we also assume growth of 7%. For nominal government revenue growth, we use 5% in 2017 and 8% for both 2018 and 2019, as we assume government revenue reasonably tracks nominal GDP growth. A caveat: the actual 2016 federal government revenue growth number of 4.3% was heavily boosted by non-recurring revenues such as privatization revenue, repayment by the national development bank (BNDES) of 100 billion BRL, tax amnesty/repatriation programs, and so on. In brief, the government used all means at its disposal to boost its revenue via one-off items. As these are non-recurring and impossible to predict, we did not attempt to account for them. Yet, in future, these non-recurring sources of fiscal revenue will be harder to come by. To be consistent, we do not incorporate one-off expenditures, such as financial support for local governments, or recapitalization of public banks and state-owned companies. In a nutshell, we assume potential one-off public sector revenues will offset one-off expenditures. With the dire state of the economy, and likely need for bailouts and financial assistance from the federal government, this is a reasonable assumption. Besides, with most states and local governments near bankruptcy, staving off insolvency remains a much more urgent matter that will likely drain central government coffers in the near term. As to nominal government expenditures, since these are capped by the previous year's inflation rate due to the fiscal spending cap (or PEC 55), we use 6.3% growth in 2017 (i.e. 2016 IPCA inflation), and 5% in both 2018 and 2019, respectively. Investors, however, should keep in mind that the spending cap only applies to primary expenditures. Critically, it does not include interest on public debt, spending on education and health in 2017, and nonrecurring expenditures. If anything, federal government spending will likely exceed the 2017 cap as the government may spend more on healthcare and education to offset overall fiscal austerity. Table I-2Composition Of Brazilian Federal Debt Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity? For the average, or blended, interest rate on public debt, we used calculations by Dr. Jose Carlos Faria, Chief Brazil Economist at Deutsche Bank.1 We use Dr. Faria's assumptions for local currency average interest rate on public debt in 2017, 2018 and 2019, for our pessimistic scenario. The impact of lower policy interest rates (i.e. the central bank's SELIC rate) on the public debt service is a drawn out process because not all debt is rolled/re-priced over every year. Table I-2 illustrates the breakdown of Brazil's public debt by type. Therefore, the impact of declining interest rates on public debt dynamics will be slow. Bottom Line: With interest rates still in the double digits, Brazil's public debt dynamics will become unsustainable if the ratio reaches or surpasses 85-90% of GDP. The odds are substantial that this limit will be breached in the next few years. The best cure for debt sustainability is growth. So far, however, Brazil has failed to achieve growth strong enough to stabilize its public debt trajectory. A Word On Social Security Reform It is widely accepted that pension (social security) reform is desperately needed to help keep Brazil's public debt on a sustainable path. It does appear that reforms will be passed this year, as they have good momentum in Congress. That said, it will take many years for the positives of pension reforms to kick in and help the fiscal accounts, and in turn improve Brazil's public debt profile. According to the IMF,2 it will take roughly until 2020-2025 to see any decrease in social security expenses as a percentage of GDP, even if the reforms involve an increase in the retirement age, a benefits freeze, and a removal or change of the indexation of pensions to the minimum wage (and/or a change to the minimum wage formula). Bottom Line: The benefits of social security reform will only come into effect after 2020-30 or so, if passed in full. Therefore, they will not prevent Brazil's public debt-to-GDP ratio from surpassing the 85-90% mark in 2019. A Way Out: Debt Monetization? Chart I-9Brazil's Central Bank Has Been ##br##Expanding Its Local Currency Assets Brazil's Central Bank Has Been Expanding Its Local Currency Assets Brazil's Central Bank Has Been Expanding Its Local Currency Assets Being strangled by economic contraction, high debt/fiscal deficits, and a lack of political capital to embark on painful fiscal austerity, the path of least resistance for any country in general and Brazil in particular is debt monetization. That would lead to a considerable exchange rate depreciation. There are already hints that the central bank has been funding the government since 2014. In particular: The Brazilian central bank's domestic currency assets have expanded dramatically - by 640 BRL billion, or 10% of GDP - since January 2015 (Chart I-9). Most of this balance sheet expansion - 460 BRL billion or 7% GDP has been due to the rise in the central bank's holdings of federal government securities (Chart I-10). On the liability side of the central bank's balance sheet, a considerable rise has occurred in Banco Central do Brasil repos with commercial banks and deposits received from financial institutions. The amount of outstanding repos and these deposits has risen by 220 BRL billion since January 2015 (Chart I-11). Chart I-10The Central Bank Has Been ##br##Accumulating A Lot Of Public Debt... The Central Bank Has Been Accumulating A Lot Of Public Debt... The Central Bank Has Been Accumulating A Lot Of Public Debt... Chart I-11....But Withdrawing Liquidity Via ##br##Repos & Deposits Received ...But Withdrawing Liquidity Via Repos & Deposits Received ...But Withdrawing Liquidity Via Repos & Deposits Received Essentially, the central bank has purchased 460 BRL billion of government securities since January 2015 and, hence, injected a lot of liquidity into the banking system. Then, Banco Central do Brasil simultaneously withdrew liquidity via repo agreements and deposits received from financial institutions. This has basically sterilized half of the central bank's government bond purchases, i.e. the operation withdrew half of the liquidity expansion that was first made. Without the central bank intervention to buy 460 BRL billion of government securities in the past two years, the 626 BRL billion and 557 BRL billion overall fiscal deficits in 2015 and 2016, respectively, would not have been financed and local bond yields would have risen. Chart I-12The BRL Is Expensive Again The BRL Is Expensive Again The BRL Is Expensive Again Looking ahead, as the fiscal accounts continue bleeding, public debt burden will rise to around 85% of GDP and the banking system - wounded by non-performing loans - will struggle to expand its balance sheet further. In turn, the central bank might be tempted to continue monetizing the government's debt without, however, sterilizing its operations. In such a scenario, the currency will depreciate meaningfully. Markedly, Brazil's real effective exchange rate has risen above its historical mean and is somewhat expensive (Chart I-12). Brazil needs lower interest rates, more abundant banking system liquidity and a cheaper currency to embark on a sustainable recovery. The latter is required to avoid the fiscal debt trap. The exchange rate depreciation is an important relieve valve. Given that only 4% of government debt is denominated in foreign currency, a deprecation of the Brazilian real is the least painful solution. Bottom Line: Going forward, the only way for Brazil to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio is to boost nominal GDP growth. This can be achieved by reducing interest rates aggressively, injecting large amounts of liquidity into the wounded banking system and devaluing the currency. Unless financial markets in Brazil sell off, there is a non-trivial probability that the authorities will embark on outright or covered public debt monetization. This would allow the country to avoid fiscal stress/crisis. Yet, the price will be large exchange rate depreciation. Chart I-13Stay Underweight Brazil ##br##Versus The EM Equity Benchmark Stay Underweight Brazil Versus The EM Equity Benchmark Stay Underweight Brazil Versus The EM Equity Benchmark Investment Implications We have been wrong on Brazilian markets in the past 12 months, but we do not see a reason to alter our view. The currency will plunge due to the ongoing debt monetization, and foreigners will not make money in Brazilian financial markets in U.S. dollar terms. We reiterate our short positions in the BRL versus the U.S. dollar, ARS and MXN. Stay long CDS and underweight Brazilian credit within EM sovereign and corporate credit portfolios. Continue underweighting this bourse within an EM equity portfolio (Chart I-13). Interest rate cuts will continue, but with the BRL set to depreciate considerably versus the U.S. dollar in the next 12 months - as we expect - buying local bonds for the U.S. dollar based investors is not the best strategy. Santiago E. Gomez, Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 These figures come from the appendix on page 9 of the Deutsche Bank report titled, "Brazil at a Debt Crossroad - Again", dated January 23, 2017. 2 Please refer to the following IMF report on Brazil, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16349.pdf Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors appear complacent. Foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks has reached a new record high. Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares. Feature Taiwan's economy and financial markets have shown remarkable resilience of late. Last week's advance GDP release confirmed that the Taiwanese economy continued to accelerate in the final quarter of the year. The Taiwanese dollar (TWD) is among the few currencies that have strengthened since early last year, not only in trade-weighted terms but also against the mighty greenback. Taiwanese stocks have been a bright spot in the emerging market universe, which has been plagued with structural challenges and political instability in recent years. Taiwan's remarkable strength of late is notwithstanding the sudden deterioration in its relationship with mainland China since the DPP party regained power last year, and more recently brewing trade tensions among the major global economies kicked off by the Trump Administration. This highlights the growing disconnect between Taiwan's macro outlook and its financial asset performance, offering a particularly poor risk-return profile. We remain underweight Taiwan among the greater China bourses, and recommend a short position in the TSE versus Chinese H shares. Macro Risks Are Rising... In a nutshell, three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. First, Taiwan is among the most open economies in the world, and will suffer disportionally in any disruption in global trade (Chart 1). Although having fallen sharply since the global financial crisis, exports of goods and services still account for over 60% of Taiwan's GDP, among the highest of the major economies. Therefore, Taiwan's growth outlook is almost completely dictated by global demand, making it particualrly vulnerable at times of rising global uncertainty. Indeed, Taiwan's growth acceleration since mid-last year has been entirely driven by a synchronized acceleration in overseas demand. Both China and the U.S. have been strengthening, which will likely continue to support Taiwan's growth outlook in the near term.1 However, the strength in the Taiwanese currency is worrisome, as the exchange rate has historically been tightly correlated with overseas new orders and domestic producer prices. Chart 2 shows that the strong TWD has the potential to lead to a sudden deterioration in deflation as well as new export orders. Chart 1Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Chart 2TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports Second, the cross-strait relationship has already deteriorated notably, and a vicious feedback loop appears to be developing. On the one hand, the Chinese authorities are worried that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen will not uphold the "1992 Consensus" that forms the foundation of cross-straight integration,2 and will step up efforts to contain her "pro-independence" initiatives. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government, faced with increasing pressure from the mainland, feels the urge to reach out to a broader global audience, which in turn may be perceived by Beijing as provocative. President Tsai's controversial phone call with Donald Trump, her stop-over visit to the U.S. en route to South America and the attendance of the government's delegation to President Trump's inauguration have only further reinforced Beijing's suspicion - and propelled forward a self-feeding negative dynamic in the cross-strait relationship that is difficult to reverse. The consequence of a military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan is unimaginably costly, and still extremely unlikely. However, the economic ties between the two will continue to cool. A telltale sign is that number of mainland Chinese visitors to Taiwan has already dropped precipitously since early last year, causing visible stress in Taiwan's tourism industry (Chart 3). Furthermore, exports to China account for over 40% of total Taiwanese exports, far higher than to any other market, and its trade surplus with China accounts for 5% of Taiwanese GDP - both of which are at risk should cross-strait tensions continue to rise (Chart 4). Moreover, the deteriorating relationship with the mainland is also hurting domestic confidence. Chart 5 shows that Taiwanese consumer confidence has historically been tightly linked with stock market performance, but a widening gap has developed since early last year when stocks began to rebound but confidence continued to weaken, which we suspect is to some extent attributable to the DPP party's dealings with the mainland. Weakening confidence bodes poorly for consumption, making the economy even more vulnerable to external shocks. Chart 3Cross - Strait Relationship ##br##Has Cooled Sharply Cross - Strait Relationship Has Cooled Sharply Cross - Strait Relationship Has Cooled Sharply Chart 4China Trade ##br##Is Crucial For Taiwan China Trade Is Crucial For Taiwan China Trade Is Crucial For Taiwan Chart 5Cooling China - ties##br## Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Cooling China - ties Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Cooling China - ties Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Finally, tensions between China and the U.S. are bound to rise under President Trump, and Taiwan may fall victim to the "clash of the Titans." Trump has openly questioned the "One China" policy that fundamentally underpins the Sino-U.S. relationship. John Bolton, a top adviser to President Trump, has even recommended positioning U.S. troops in Taiwan to counter the mainland. It is likely that Trump is using the "Taiwan card" as a bargaining chip to win concessions from China on trade-related issues.3 However, these remarks are dangerously provocative. Any miscalculation could lead to a drastic escalation in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and the Taiwanese economy will suffer profoundly. Even if trade tensions are contained between China and the U.S., Taiwan will also suffer because it is a critical part of the highly complex and integrated supply chain in the global technology and electronics industries. It is premature and overly alarmist to predict any "war-like" scenario, but stakes are exceedingly high for Taiwan, and any move in this direction should be monitored extremely carefully. ...But Investors Appear Complacent Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors still appear comfortable in Taiwanese stocks. Foreign capital has continued to flock to Taiwan, despite gloomy sentiment among global investors on emerging markets overall. Net foreign purchases of Taiwanese stocks, historically tightly linked with fund flows to U.S. emerging market mutual funds, have rebounded sharply, while EM mutual fund sales have weakened, a rare divergence historically (Chart 6). Cumulative foreign net purchases of Taiwanese stocks have pushed foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks to 37%, a new all-time high (Chart 7). Foreign fund flows have been a key reason behind the relative strength of both Taiwanese stocks and its exchange rate of late. Chart 6Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Chart 7Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Granted, Taiwan's macroeconomic conditions are largely stable, characterized by its massive current account surplus, small fiscal deficit and low government debt - which make it stand out in an otherwise perilous, crisis-prone EM world. However, we suspect large foreign flows to Taiwan in recent years are also due to the tech-heavy nature of its stock market. Chart 8 shows the relative performance of global tech stocks bear a strong resemblance to Taiwan's relative performance against the EM benchmark after the global financial crisis. In other words, investors are largely attracted to the Taiwanese market as a way to play the global tech rally rather than because of any specific macro factors unique to Taiwan. This also means that investors could be blindsided by any escalation of trade or geopolitical tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the large percentage of foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks risks a disorderly unwinding and sudden exodus - and an ensuing sharp spike in volatility. The last episode of military tension between Taiwan and the mainland in the mid-1990s offers the only precedent in terms of how financial markets might respond. China reacted to the U.S. visit of Taiwan's then President Lee-Teng-hui with aggressive saber-rattling by mobilizing troops and firing missiles, which led to the "third Taiwan Strait Crisis" (Chart 9). Even though the crisis officially lasted from July 1995 to March 1996, Taiwanese stocks tumbled well in advance when the tensions first began to emerge. In fact, the crisis itself, and the resolution of it, marked the bottom in Taiwanese stock prices. Chart 8Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Chart 9The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension Long H Shares, Short Taiwan Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable bourse in the Greater China region. A short position of the TSE versus Chinese H shares offers an attractive risk-return profile. Chinese stocks have long been punished by various macro concerns, and are likely under-owned by global investors. Investor sentiment on Taiwan, on the other hand, appear to be unduly complacent, and Taiwanese stocks have likely been overweighted and over-owned. Chinese stocks are much less exposed to global trade than their Taiwanese counterparts. Even though tech stocks are the largest sectors for both markets, the largest Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu are mainly software and service providers, and derive the majority of their revenue from the domestic market.4 In contrast, Taiwanese tech companies, also the largest constituents in the Taiwanese index, such as TSMC, Hon Hai and Largan, are all hardware producers, and are overwhelmingly dependent on the global market, making them more vulnerable to any disruption in global trade flows. Valuations of Taiwanese stocks are not particularly demanding by global comparison, but they are trading at a premium to their mainland peers (Chart 10, bottom panel). Moreover, the recent improvement in Taiwanese earnings will be tested, given the strength of the TWD and deterioration in terms of trade (Chart 11). Historically, Taiwanese earnings have been highly cyclical and prone to sharp swings, led by global business cycles. Technically speaking, the multi-year underperformance of Chinese investable shares against the Taiwanese market has become very advanced and appears to have formed an enduring bottom (Chart 10, top panel). Chart 10Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: ##br##Valuation And Technical Perspective Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: Valuation And Technical Perspective Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: Valuation And Technical Perspective Chart 11Taiwanese Earnings Improvement##br## Will Be Tested Taiwanese Earnings Improvement Will Be Tested Taiwanese Earnings Improvement Will Be Tested Bottom Line: Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares as a trade. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The "1992 Consensus" refers to the outcome of a meeting in 1992 between China and Taiwan's then ruling party KMT. The terms means that both sides recognize there is only one "China": both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, but both sides agree to interpret the meaning of that one China according to their own definition. 3,4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard," dated January 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The U.S. has two geopolitical imperatives: domination of the world's oceans and ensuring the disunity of Eurasia; The Trump Doctrine, as currently defined, has no room for transatlantic alliances; President Trump is pursuing both mercantilism and an isolationist foreign policy; This combination imperils the transatlantic alliance and thus the American anchor in Eurasia; If pursued to its logical conclusion, the Trump Doctrine will end American global hegemony. Feature "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the world." - Sir Halford John Mackinder Geopolitics is parsimonious and predictive because it posits that states are imprisoned by their geography. For academia, geopolitics is too parsimonious. And the professors are correct! Mountainous terrain combined with ethno-linguistic heterogeneity has destined Afghanistan and Bosnia to centuries of conflict, but Switzerland seems to be doing just fine. As such, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy, despite our name, very rarely relies on pure geopolitics for its analysis. The world is just too complex and geopolitics operates on long time horizons that are rarely investment-relevant. Geography is not destiny. Rather, geography is the ultimate constraint, an immutable factor that can only be conquered with a massive effort or new technology that comes but once in a generation. To fight geography is folly, even for a hegemon. The Trump Doctrine, as it has taken shape thus far, looks to be just such a folly. In this analysis, we explain why and what the investment relevance may be for the U.S. and the world. We still think the U.S. is likely to regain power in relative terms, but Trump's "charismatic authority" and foreign policy pose a risk to this view. American Geopolitical Imperatives There are two notable "fathers" of geopolitics: Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford John Mackinder. They both dedicated their life to elucidating great power "Grand Strategy," the implicit but real geopolitical imperatives, rooted in geography, from which a country derives its day-to-day foreign policy. For Mahan, a U.S. Navy Admiral and lecturer at the Naval War College, the imperative of the U.S. was to build a navy to dominate the oceans, the global "commons" that is indispensable to modern trade, economy, and thus "hard power."1 A strong navy is the defining characteristic of a great power. It affords the hegemon military supremacy over vital trade routes and ensures that global commerce operates in its interest. If this sounds like present-day U.S. "Grand Strategy," it is because Mahan had a great influence on American policymakers in the early twentieth century. Theodore Roosevelt supported Mahan's thinking, which included building the Panama Canal. Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, and similar work by British strategists, provided a historical and strategic framework for the naval race between the U.K. and Germany that ultimately contributed to the start of World War I.2 Mackinder, a British geographer and academic, focused on the Eurasian landmass, rather than the oceans.3 In his view - perhaps colored by Britain's history of fending off invaders from the continent - Eurasia had sufficient natural resources (Russia), population (China), wealth (Europe), and a geographic buffer from naval powers (the seas surrounding it) to become self-sufficient. Hence any great power that managed to dominate Eurasia, or "the World Island" as Mackinder coined it, would have no need for a navy as it would become a superpower by default (Map 1). Map 1The World According To Mackinder The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine American Grand Strategy is today a combination of both Mahan's and Mackinder's thinking. The U.S. has had two explicit geopolitical imperatives since the end of World War II: Dominate the world's oceans (Mahan); Prevent any one power from dominating Eurasia (Mackinder). To accomplish the first, the U.S. has expended an extraordinary amount of resources to build and operate the world's greatest blue-water navy. To accomplish the second, the U.S. has entered two world wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and spent a good part of the twentieth century containing the Soviet Union. In addition, Washington has fostered a close transatlantic alliance to ensure that Europe, its anchor in Eurasia, remains aligned with the U.S. These were not arbitrary decisions made by a corrupt, Beltway elite looking to enrich itself with the spoils of globalization. These were decisions made by American leaders looking to expand American power, establish global hegemony, and retain it against rivals for centuries to come. Both imperatives are necessary for the U.S. to remain a hegemon. And U.S. hegemony is the foundation of the global monetary and financial system. Not least, it underpins the role of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency. Bottom Line: The U.S. has two geopolitical imperatives: domination of the world's oceans and ensuring the disunity of Eurasia. The Trump Doctrine: America First, Second, And Third Every U.S. president tries to enshrine a foreign policy "doctrine" during their presidency. There is no single document that does the job of elucidating the doctrine; scholars and journalists weave the ideas together from speeches, policy decisions, resource allocation, and rhetoric. This early in the Trump presidency, it is not fair to determine what his foreign policy doctrine will be. Already, with Trump's executive orders on immigration and refugees, it is clear that there is a process of trial and error underway, with the administration reversing its position on green card holders (U.S. permanent residents). We therefore take liberty in projecting the little information we have forward. Chances that we are wrong are high and our conviction level is low. Nevertheless, we have two broad conclusions. If the Trump Doctrine develops as these early clues suggest, then it will either be rejected by Congress and the American policy establishment, or it will initiate the collapse of the geopolitical and economic institutions of our era, ushering in something profoundly different. We see no alternatives. So what are the early outlines of the Trump Doctrine? We see three factors that stand out: Isolationism: Long-term alliances and commitments abroad must have a clear, immediate, and calculable benefit for the U.S. economic "bottom line." Therefore, Japan and South Korea should pay more for the benefits of U.S. alliance, and NATO is a drain on American resources. All alliances and American commitments are negotiable. Mercantilism: The U.S. has no permanent allies, only trade balances that must be positive. Trump has not only threatened China and Mexico with protectionism, but also longstanding allies like Germany and Japan.4 Any country that sports a significant trade surplus with the U.S. is in Washington's crosshairs (Chart 1). Chart 1Trump's Hit List The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine Sovereignty: Trump said in his inaugural address, "it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first" and that America does "not seek to impose our way of life on anyone." This is a stark departure from ideologically-driven foreign policies of both the Bush and Obama White House. However, there is an ideology underpinning Trump's foreign policy: nationalism. Professor Ted Malloch, tipped as the next U.S. Ambassador to the EU, revealed in a BBC interview that the new U.S. President "is very opposed to supranational organizations, he believes in nation states." This statement makes explicit what many of Trump's speeches have implied. Under the tenets of this inchoate Trump Doctrine, NATO and the EU are not just nuisances, but are positively detrimental to U.S. interests. This marks a profound shift in U.S. foreign policy thinking, if it stands. First, both NATO and the EU break the ideological tenet of nationalism. They are international organizations that pool sovereignty for some predetermined common goal. Given that the common goal has nothing to do with the immediate, domestic and economic goals of the U.S., the two organizations are not worth supporting, under this interpretation of the emerging Trump Doctrine. Second, NATO demands a U.S. overseas commitment with little material gain in return. This is not a new argument. President Obama complained about the failure of NATO member states to pay their fair share (2% of GDP on defense) for collective self-defense (Chart 2). However, Obama's intention was to cajole European allies to boost defense spending; NATO's existence was not in question. Trump does not see a point in America paying for Germany's defense, especially when Germany sports a sizeable trade surplus with the U.S. Chart 2NATO States That Need To 'Pay Up' The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine Third, the EU runs a large current account surplus in general and a trade surplus with the U.S. in particular (Chart 3). For the Trump administration, the EU is therefore a rival, perhaps more so even than Russia, which, when viewed through a purely mercantilist lens, is not a foe. Trump's foreign policy is based on an understanding that the world is multipolar and that the U.S. is in relative geopolitical decline. Our data supports President Trump's assertion (Chart 4). In that way, Trump's doctrine is similar to that of the Obama presidency. Both recognize that the U.S. can no longer act unilaterally and that it must retrench from its global responsibilities. But while Obama sought to enhance U.S. power by relying on allies and supranational organizations, Trump seeks to withdraw into Fortress America and geopolitically deleverage. Such a deleveraging, when combined with mercantilism, may cause America's traditional allies to try harder for its approval, like Trump assumes, or it may push America's traditional allies away from Washington's orbit. Chart 3Mercantilism Makes The EU A 'Bad Guy' Mercantilism Makes The EU A 'Bad Guy' Mercantilism Makes The EU A 'Bad Guy' Chart 4American Power In Relative Decline American Power In Relative Decline American Power In Relative Decline Bottom Line: President Trump believes in a "what can you do for me" world.5 This world has no room for twentieth-century alliances, which did not anticipate the disenchantment and polarization of the American public (or the benefit of Trump's wisdom!) in their original design. Transatlantic Drift The most important feature of the Trump Doctrine is that it seeks to replace transatlantic links between the U.S. and Europe with bilateral, ad-hoc alliances. The one such alliance that has received much media attention is the thaw between the U.S. and Russia. To be clear here, we are very much aware that many U.S. presidents have had deep disagreements with Europe and that every president since Reagan has tried to thaw relations with Russia early in his presidency. However, Trump is different in that he is the first U.S. president to: Openly question the very existence of NATO; Openly oppose European integration;6 Openly engage in mercantilist trade policies towards allies while simultaneously undermining geopolitical alliances with them. The problem with this course of action is that other countries will pursue alternative economic and security relationships to hedge against America's perceived lack of commitment, or outright hostility. Japan and South Korea, for example, concerned that they may face tariffs and a drop in U.S. military support, will need to turn more friendly toward China to avoid conflict and access new consumer markets. The same goes for Europe, with Germany and others eager to substitute for the U.S. by selling more to China amid U.S.-China trade conflicts.7 Thus, if we are to take the Trump Doctrine to its conclusion, we end up with an American foreign policy that pushes Eurasia towards the kind of integration - if not exactly alliance - that Mackinder feared. Since greater Eurasian coordination could eventually develop into a dynamic of its own, this process directly contravenes the second tenet of American grand strategy: Prevent any one power from dominating Eurasia. But wait, Trump supporters will cry, Trump is going to throw a wrench in Eurasian coordination by allying with Russia! No, he won't. Russia and America will not be allies. At best, they will be friends with benefits. The two countries have no shared economic interests. Russia sees both Europe and China as its economic partners. The former for supply of badly needed technology and investment (Chart 5), the latter as an energy market and another source of investment (Chart 6).8 Chart 5Russia Needs European Technology ... The Trump Doctrine The Trump Doctrine Chart 6... And Chinese Energy Demand ... And Chinese Energy Demand ... And Chinese Energy Demand Russian policymakers may be cheering Trump for the moment, but that is only because he brings relief from the extremely anti-Kremlin policies of the Obama (and potentially Hillary Clinton) presidency. The Kremlin will take advantage of the change in the White House. Bear in mind, all that Russian policymakers know of the U.S. in recent memory is conflict and realpolitik: It was the U.S. that pushed for NATO to expand into Ukraine and Georgia. Chancellor Angela Merkel, in fact, vetoed those plans at the 2008 NATO Summit; It was the Bush Administration that pushed for Kosovo's independence in 2008; Both the Bush and Obama administrations sought to construct a ballistic missile defense shield on Russia's doorstop in Central and Eastern Europe. If Trump stumbles in the next four years, who is to say that Moscow won't have to deal with an antagonistic Washington by the end of 2020? Trump's olive branches will not alter Russian thinking about the country's long-term interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin is going to do what is good for Russia, no matter how much he may think that Trump is a great guy to party with. And what is good for Russia is deeper economic integration with China and Europe. In fact, with the U.S. becoming an energy producer - and potentially a significant LNG exporter soon - America may become Russia's competitor for Europe's natural gas demand. Trump, his supporters and advisors, may believe that the twentieth century is over and that post-WWII American alliances have atrophied. They have! Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is no surprise that NATO is having an identity crisis when it no longer has a peer enemy to defend against. But geography has not changed. The U.S. is still far from Eurasia and Eurasia is still the "World Island." The Trump Doctrine ignores the entire twentieth century during which the U.S. had to intervene in Europe twice, and Asia three times, at a huge cost of blood and treasure, due to the threat of the continent unifying under a single hegemon. The international organizations that the U.S. set up after the Second World War, including NATO and the EU but also the UN, IMF, and others, were created to ensure that the U.S. did not have to intervene in Europe again. The security alliance and commercial system in Asia Pacific served a similar purpose. Bottom Line: Trans-oceanic alliances and organizations are not vestiges of a past that has changed, but vestiges of a geography that is immutable. The Trump Doctrine, such as it is, threatens to undermine an imperative of American hegemony. If pursued to its professed conclusion, it will therefore end American hegemony. Eurasian Alliance How can Europe, Russia, and China overcome their vast differences and unite in an anti-American alliance? It is not easy, but nor is it impossible. Russian point of view: The U.S. remains Russia's chief strategic threat. Sino-Russian distrust and tensions are overstated, as we discussed in a 2014 Special Report.9 Russia depends on China and Germany for 32% of its imports and 17% of its exports (Chart 7). It is deeply integrated with both economies. The U.S., meanwhile is about as relevant for the Russian economy as Poland in terms of imports and as Belarus in terms of exports. China's point of view: The U.S. is also China's chief strategic threat - and probably the only thing standing between China and regional hegemony over the course of this century. For China, integrating with the denizens of Eurasia makes a lot of sense. First, it would allow China to avoid the folly of competing with the U.S. in direct naval and maritime conflict. Overland transportation routes - which Beijing seeks to develop via its ambitious "The Silk Road Economic Belt" project - will bypass China's contentious and cramped South and East China Seas. Second, Europe has everything China needs from the U.S. (technology, aircraft, IT), and could offer them at discount rates due to a weak euro and general economic malaise (entire continent is for sale, at a discount!). Third, neither Europe nor Russia care what China does with its neighborhood in East Asia. If China wants to take some shoal from the Philippines, Berlin and Moscow will be okay with that. Europe's point of view: The European Union has never spent much time thinking seriously about the U.S. as a threat to its existence. The possibility, at very least, will promote efforts at economic substitution. Europe and Russia must overcome their differences over Ukraine in order to cooperate again. However, as we pointed out above, it was not Europe that sought to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, it was the United States. Europe needs Russian energy and Russia needs Europe's technology and investment. As long as they delineate where each sphere of influence begins and ends, which they have done before (in 1917 and 1939 if anyone is still counting!) they will be fine. Finally, trade with emerging markets is already more important for the EU than with the U.S. (Chart 8). And China remains a major potential growth market for EU products. Chart 7U.S. No Substitute For Russian Partners U.S. No Substitute For Russian Partners U.S. No Substitute For Russian Partners Chart 8Europe Relies On EM More Than U.S. Europe Relies On EM More Than U.S. Europe Relies On EM More Than U.S. We do not think that a formal EU-Russia-China axis is around the corner, or even likely. However, if the U.S. should pursue a policy of undermining its transatlantic and transpacific alliances, cheerleading the dissolution of the EU, and treating foes and allies equally when it comes to trade protectionism, the probability that it faces a united front from Eurasia increases. We are not sure that the Trump Administration understands this, or even cares. From what we can tell right now, the Trump White House is singularly focused on trade and commercial matters. It is mercantilist, pure and simple. But geopolitics is not a single dimension. It is like a game of three-dimensional chess. Foreign policy and security are on the top chess board, trade and economic matters are in the middle, and domestic politics are played on the bottom board. When the Trump administration threatens the "One China" policy or encourages EU dissolution because the bloc has "overshot its mark," it corners its counterparts on the geopolitical and political chess boards for the sake of trade and commercial interests. This is a mistake. Europe and China will give up chess pieces on the economic board to preserve their position on the geopolitical and political boards. In other words, Trump's strategy of tough-nosed negotiations - which he learned in the global real estate sector - will only strengthen opposition against the U.S. in the real world. We don't think that Trump is playing three-dimensional chess. He is singularly focused on America's economy and commercial interests and his own domestic political coalition. This is unique in post-World War Two American foreign policy. Ronald Reagan, who cajoled Japan and West Germany into the 1985 Plaza Accord, did so because both Berlin and Tokyo understood they owed their security to America. If Reagan threatened to withdraw America's security commitment to either, he would not have gotten the economic deal he wanted. Bottom Line: If pursued to its logical conclusion, the Trump Doctrine will end U.S. hegemony. Trump's foreign policy has raised a specter, however faint at present, which has not been seen since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Russia and Germany in 1939: a united Eurasian continent marshalling all its human, natural, and technological resources against the U.S. The last time that happened, 549,865 U.S. lives were needed to preserve American hegemony, not to mention the global cost in blood and treasure. Investment Implications In our 2017 Strategic Outlook we posited that investors should get used to the revival of charismatic authority.10 We borrow the concept from German sociologist Max Weber, who identified it in his seminal essay, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule."11 Weber argues that legal-rational authority flows from the institutions and laws that define it, not the individuals holding the office. Today, we are seeing the revival of charismatic authority, which Weber defined as flowing from the extraordinary characteristics of an individual. Such leaders are difficult to predict as they often rise to power precisely because of their opposition to the institutions and laws that define the legal-rational authority. The Trump Doctrine is one example of how charismatic authority can lead to uncertainty. Twentieth century institutions may be flawed, but they have underpinned and continue to underpin American hegemony. The U.S. cannot, at the same time, maintain global hegemony, pursue mercantilist commercial policy, and seek to undermine its global alliances. The Trump White House threatens to push allies and foes, pursuing their own interests, to work in concert to isolate the United States. Perhaps President Trump and his advisors are comforted by the fact that the U.S. has always profited from global chaos. The U.S. benefits from being surrounded by two massive oceans, Canada, and the Sonora-Chihuahuan deserts. Following both the First and Second World Wars, the U.S.'s relative geopolitical power skyrocketed (Chart 9). This is why Trump's election led us to believe that global multipolarity would peak in the coming year and set the stage for an American revival.12 Chart 9The U.S. Benefits From Global Chaos The U.S. Benefits From Global Chaos The U.S. Benefits From Global Chaos However, to maintain primacy while sowing global discord, the U.S. needs more than just Anglo-Saxon allies in the world. It needs an anchor in Eurasia, which is and always will be Europe. Without an anchor, Trump's policies will not sow discord, they will create concord, and unite the "World Island" against America. That is why it is important to see how the Trump Doctrine develops in terms of real policy, as opposed to a year's worth of mostly campaign statements. Already the administration has made some appropriate noises about standing "100% behind NATO" and having an "ironclad commitment" to Japan. But make no mistake, Trump's open doubts have reverberated farther and deeper than these minimal reassurances. It is critical to monitor how the Trump administration approaches NATO, the EU, and bilateral negotiations with key partners. We are already seeing evidence of serious coordination - particularly between Germany and China - that could be a counterweight to U.S. power in the marking. These two outcomes - renewed U.S. hegemony, or U.S. downfall - are essentially binary and it is too soon to know which will prevail. What is the probability of downfall? It is low, but rising. If Trump does not adjust his foreign policy - or, barring that, if the U.S. Congress or American foreign policy, defense, and intelligence establishment do not "correct" Trump's course - then U.S. hegemony will begin to unravel. And with it will go a range of "certainties" underpinning global economic growth and trade, including the U.S. dollar's reserve currency status. If America loses its hegemony, one victim may be the U.S. dollar's role as a safe haven asset. The notion that the greenback is a safe-haven asset even when the chief global risks emanate from the U.S. will be tested. We recommend that long-term investors diversify into other currencies, including the Swiss franc, euro, and, of course, gold. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest Of America In Sea Power: Present And Future (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1918). 2 Mahan, The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, 15th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1949). 3 Halford John Mackinder, Democratic Ideals And Reality: A Study In The Politics Of Reconstruction, 15th ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996). 4 Trump has surprised U.S. ally Japan by coupling it with China in some of his statements threatening tariffs. Meanwhile Peter Navarro, chief of the new National Trade Council, has recently accused Germany of currency manipulation and structural trade imbalances. Please see Shawn Donnan, "Trump's top trade adviser accuses Germany of currency exploitation," Financial Times, January 31, 2017 available at www.ft.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Trump has said that the U.K. was "smart" to leave the EU, and has expressed indifference to the existence of the EU and a belief that "others will leave" following the U.K. Please see "Full Transcript of Interview with Donald Trump," The Times of London, January 16, 2017, available at www.thetimes.co.uk. Also, the aforementioned Professor Malloch, potential U.S. Ambassador to the EU, said in his interview with the BBC that "Trump believes that the European Union has in recent decades been tilted strongly and most favorably towards Germany" and that "the EU has overshot its mark." 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Embrace Of The Dragon And The Bear," dated April 11, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see Max Weber, "The Three Types Of legitimate Rule," Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4 (1) (1958): 1-11. Translated by Hans Gerth. Originally published in German in the journal Preussiche Jahrbücher 182, 1-2 (1922). 12 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Table 1Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update The Reflation Trade Continues It is wrong to think that the recent rally in risk assets is mainly due to the election of President Donald Trump. Yes, since November 8, U.S. equities have risen by 7% and global equities by 3%. But the rally began as long ago as February last year, and since then U.S. and global equities have risen by 25% and 20% respectively. A more useful narrative is that the U.S. went through a "mini-recession" in late 2015/early 2016 (as indicated by the manufacturing ISM and credit spreads, Chart 1). Since then, assets have moved as they typically do in the first year of a cyclical recovery: small caps, cyclicals and value stocks have outperformed, bond yields risen, and equity multiples expanded in anticipation of a recovery in earnings. Expectations of Trump's fiscal stimulus and deregulation merely gave that momentum an extra boost. Our view is that global economic growth is likely to continue to accelerate. With the U.S. now at full employment, wage growth should rise further (Chart 2). Trump's policies are igniting animal spirits among companies, whose capex intentions have jumped sharply (Chart 3). U.S. real GDP growth this year could be 2.5-3%, somewhat above the consensus forecast of 2.3%. Meanwhile, Europe is growing above trend, and China will continue for a while longer to see the effects from last year's massive monetary stimulus (Chart 4). Chart 1One Year On From A Mini Recession One Year On From A Mini Recession One Year On From A Mini Recession Chart 2Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Chart 3Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Chart 4China's Reflation Still Coming Through China's Reflation Still Coming Through China's Reflation Still Coming Through In the short term, a correction is possible: the rally looks technically over-extended, and investors have begun to notice that in addition to "good Trump" (tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending), there is also a "bad Trump" (market unfriendly measures such as immigration control, confrontation with China, and arbitrary interference in companies' investment decisions). But, on a 12-month view, our expectations of accelerating growth and only a moderate rise in inflation imply that the "sweet spot" for risk assets will continue, and so we maintain the overweight on equities and underweight on bonds we instituted in late November. What could end the reflation trade? The main risks we see (and the reasons we don't think they are serious enough to derail the rally for now) are: Extreme moves by the new U.S. administration. The biggest risk is a confrontation with China over trade. Our view is that Trump will use the threat of recognizing Taiwan to force concessions out of China. A precedent is the way the U.S. handled its trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s (note that new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer was deputy USTR at the time). China is unlikely to accept significant currency appreciation, understanding how this caused a bubble in Japan. But it might agree to voluntary export restrictions, to increasing investment in the U.S., opening the Chinese market more to foreign companies, and to stimulating domestic consumption, as Japan did in the 1980s (Chart 5). This may even chime with how Xi Jinping wants to reform the economy, though missteps by the U.S. could force him into a nationalistic position. Fiscal policy fails. The details of tax cuts are complex: alongside lowering the headline rate of corporate tax to 15% or 20%, for example, Republicans are discussing a border-adjustment tax, one-year depreciation, and an end of the tax offset for interest payments. Infrastructure spending won't happen quickly either, not least since it is disliked by Republican fiscal hawks (who are much less averse to tax cuts). BCA's geopolitical strategists, however, believe that Trump will able to get a program of personal and corporate tax cuts through Congress by August. Economic (and earnings) growth stumble. While corporate and consumer sentiment have picked up recently, hard data has not yet. U.S. 4Q GDP growth of only 1.9%, for example, was disappointing. Earnings growth will need to recover this year to justify elevated multiples. EPS growth for the S&P500 stocks in Q4 2016 looks to have been around 4% YoY according to FactSet. Stocks might fall if earnings do not come in somewhere close to the 12% that the bottom-up consensus forecasts for 2017. Inflation risks rise, triggering the Fed and the European Central Bank to rush to tighten monetary policy. Core U.S. PCE inflation, at 1.7% YoY, is not far below the Fed's 2% target and inflation could accelerate as fiscal policy stimulates an economy where slack has already disappeared. However, it is likely to take some time for inflation expectations to rise, and over the past few months core PCE inflation has, if anything, slowed (Chart 6). We expect the Fed to raise rates three times this year (compared to market expectations of twice) but not to move faster than that. German inflation, at 1.9% YoY, is starting to get uncomfortably high too, but the ECB will probably continue to set policy with more focus on the periphery, especially Italy. Chart 5When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's Chart 6Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Equities: We prefer U.S. equities over European ones in common currency terms. This is partly because we expect further U.S. dollar appreciation. But we also remained concerned about the structural weakness in the European banking system, and by the higher volatility of eurozone equities. Moreover, European earnings will not be boosted by currency depreciation as much as will Japanese earnings, since the euro has hardly weakened on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 7). We continue to like Japanese equities (with a currency hedge). The Bank of Japan remains committed to an overshoot of its 2% inflation target, which should weaken the yen and boost earnings. We are underweight Emerging Market equities: structural vulnerabilities remain, and the inverse correlation with the U.S. dollar is intact. Chart 7Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Fixed Income: For now, U.S. 10-year Treasury bonds are at around fair value. But we expect the yield to rise moderately further, as growth and inflation pick up, to about 3% by year-end. Yields on eurozone government bonds will also rise, but not by as much. This means that global sovereigns could produce a YoY negative return for the first time since 1994. In the U.S. we continue to prefer TIPS over nominal bonds: inflation expectations are still 30-40 bps below a normalized level (Chart 8). With risk assets likely to outperform, we recommend exposure to spread product, but find investment grade bonds more attractively valued than high-yield. Currencies: Short term, the dollar has probably overshot and could correct. But growth and interest rate differentials (Chart 9) suggest that the dollar will appreciate further until such time as Europe and Japan can contemplate raising rates. Additionally, if the proposal of a border-adjustment tax looks like becoming reality, the dollar could appreciate sharply: a BAT of 20% would theoretically be offset by a 25% rise in the dollar. The yen is likely to depreciate further (perhaps back to JPY125 against the dollar) as the Bank of Japan successfully maintains its target of a 0% 10-year government bond yield. The euro will fall by less, especially if the market begins to worry about ECB tapering in the face of rising inflation. Chart 8TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise Chart 9Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Commodities: The supply/demand picture for industrial metals looks roughly balanced for the year, with Chinese demand likely to remain robust, suppliers more disciplined, but the stronger dollar acting as a headwind. In the oil market, Saudi Arabia and Russia seem to be sticking to their commitment to cut supply, but U.S. shale oil producers are filling the gap, with the rig count up 23% in Q4 over the previous quarter. We continue to expect crude oil to average US$55 a barrel for the next two years. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Highlights The DXY correction has a bit more to run as G10 economic surprises are likely to roll over. EM-related plays like commodity currencies can rally for a few more months, but the outlook for 2017 is troublesome. China is at risk of a deceleration. Global liquidity is tightening. Protectionism is rising. Feature Dollar Correction: It Ain't Over 'til It's Over Can the dollar correction advance further, or is the dollar bull market about to resume? We prefer to position ourselves for additional dollar weakness in the coming months. Despite persistently high bond yields, the DXY is still softening. It is being dragged down by a euro supported by strong economic news such as this week's Belgian business confidence, our favorite bellwether for the euro area. The pound too continues to show some vigor, which is also a byproduct of economic data pointing toward better growth (Chart I-1). We expect the support for the greenback from higher Treasury yields to be temporary. Momentum in U.S. 10-year government bond yields is driven by G10 economic surprises (Chart I-2). Currently, economic surprises are flirting with the upper end of their distribution of the past 12 years. Chart I-1The British Economy Is Picking Up The British Economy Is Picking Up The British Economy Is Picking Up Chart I-2G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields G10 Economic Surprises Drive Treasury Yields Accentuating the odds of a rollover in surprises are two factors: First, as bond yields and risk-asset prices attest, investors are revising their growth expectations upward, lifting the hurdle for data to surprise to the upside. Second, having expanded for 10 months, the global credit impulse has experienced its longest upswing in a decade. Yet, the increase in global borrowing costs, along with the widening in cross-currency basis swap spreads, points to tightening global liquidity conditions, a poison for the credit cycle (Chart I-3). As credit slows, the economy will deteriorate. Chart I-3The Credit Cycle Is Stretched The Credit Cycle Is Stretched The Credit Cycle Is Stretched This means that the key factor that has supported the stronger dollar in recent months - higher U.S. yields - will begin to dissipate, putting downward pressure on the USD. Finally, our dollar capitulation index, after hitting overbought conditions, is now falling. Moreover, it currently stands below its 13-week moving average, conditions under which the greenback has recorded an average 8.1% annualized weekly loss since 1994, and an average 5.3% annualized weekly loss since 2011 (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Negative Momentum For The Dollar Negative Momentum For The Dollar Negative Momentum For The Dollar We continue to play this correction by shorting USD/JPY. As we have pointed out before, USD/JPY remains a function of the level of global bond yields (Chart I-5). Additionally, a negative surprise in global growth is likely to hurt risk assets. To conclude with the favorable backdrop for the yen, the high degree of uncertainty created by the seemingly erratic policy changes of the new Trump administration suggests that equity implied volatility remains too low. After all, we do not know what changes will hit global tax regimes, what the Fed policy will look like, nor how protectionist Trump will really be. Imbedding a premium for these risks will require higher equity implied vols. A higher VIX tends to support the yen against the USD (Chart I-6). Chart I-5USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields USD/JPY And G10 Bond Yields Chart I-6The Yen Likes Uncertainty The Yen Likes Uncertainty The Yen Likes Uncertainty Bottom Line: The correction in the dollar should continue, as bond yields still have downside on a one- to three-month basis. The yen remains the best-placed currency to take advantage of these dynamics, especially if risk assets experience a correction. Focus - Emerging Markets and Liquidity: A March To The Scaffold This week, we re-examine our bearish view on emerging markets, a key theme underpinning our bearish stance on commodity currencies. EM assets, and therefore commodity currencies, have outperformed our expectations, reflecting the percolation of previous positive economic surprises in EM relative to the U.S. (Chart I-7). EM and commodity currencies are priced for perfection, with the risk-reversals on EM currencies displaying elevated levels of optimism (Chart I-8). For EM and commodity currencies to rally further, EM economies need to continue to outperform durably. This requires the Chinese economy and the global liquidity backdrop to only improve further. Can this happen? Chart I-7Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has ##br##Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Surprise Beat In EM Versus The U.S. Has Helped EM And Commodity Currencies Chart I-8EM And Commodity Currencies ##br##Priced For Perfection EM And Commodity Currencies Priced For Perfection EM And Commodity Currencies Priced For Perfection While the next month or two may continue to generate generous returns for EM-related plays, the rest of 2017 may not prove as kind. The China Syndrome Let's begin with China. The recent upsurge in metal prices has reflected an improvement in Chinese economic activity (Chart I-9). As we have pinpointed before, the Keqiang index is near cycle highs, and, Chinese railway freight volumes have been growing at their fastest pace since 2010. This situation is unlikely to continue much longer. The upsurge in Chinese commodity intake - metals in particular - has been fueled by a vigorous rebound in Chinese real estate construction. However, Chinese real estate price appreciation has hit dangerous levels, and the authorities are already leaning against it, with the PBoC increasing rates by 10 basis points this week. The roll-over in Chinese real estate activity should deepen Chart I-10), hurting commodity prices - particularly iron ore, steel and copper - and commodity currencies along the way. Chart I-9China's Rebound Explains ##br##The Metals Rally China's Rebound Explains The Metals Rally China's Rebound Explains The Metals Rally Chart I-10The Risk Of A China Real Estate ##br##Slowdown Is Growing The Risk Of A China Real Estate Slowdown Is Growing The Risk Of A China Real Estate Slowdown Is Growing Moreover, some of the upswing in Chinese economic activity was also related to large amounts of fiscal stimulus in that nation. In mid-2015, the Middle Kingdom was inching ever closer to a hard landing, prompting a panicked Beijing to boost fiscal support and to speed up the roll-out of US$1.2 trillion of infrastructure public-private partnerships. Today, this fiscal hand-out is fading (Chart I-11). This could once again cause industrial activity and investments to weaken as Chinese capacity utilization remains near recession troughs. The recent disappointing investment growth reading in the latest Chinese GDP release could be a harbinger of this reality. Finally, as we have highlighted last week, Chinese monetary conditions have massively improved as Chinese producer-price inflation rebounded, pushing down Chinese real rates in the process. However, with commodity price inflation set to slow - courtesy of a dissipating base effect and of last year's dollar rally - Chinese PPI should roll over, pulling up real rates and tightening monetary conditions (Chart I-12). A tightening in Chinese monetary conditions represents a big problem for EM as it portends a slowdown in economic activity (Chart I-13). This will ultimately lead to a big drag on DM commodity producers, as EM commodity intake decreases, pushing down the likes of the AUD, CAD, and NZD as their terms of trade suffer. Chart I-11Fading Chinese##br## Fiscal Stimulus Fading Chinese Fiscal Stimulus Fading Chinese Fiscal Stimulus Chart I-12Commodity Inflation Will Peak, ##br##So Will Chinese Inflation Commodity Inflation Will Peak, So Will Chinese Inflation Commodity Inflation Will Peak, So Will Chinese Inflation Chart I-13Tightening China Monetary Conditions##br## Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Tightening China Monetary Conditions Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Tightening China Monetary Conditions Will Hurt EM Economic Activity Bottom Line: In early 2016, global markets were not positioned for a rebound in Chinese economic activity. Yet, Chinese industrial activity improved, resulting in a rebound in EM assets, commodity prices, and commodity currencies. The crackdown on real estate activity, the removal of Chinese fiscal stimulus, and the expected tightening in Chinese monetary conditions should result in a reversal of these trends, hurting commodity producers and their currencies in the process. Global Liquidity In Retreat While China represents a problem for EM plays and commodity currencies, deteriorating global liquidity could prove an even stronger hurdle. Our tactical expectation of a lower dollar and lower rates may support EM plays temporarily, but the cyclical outlook remains grim. To begin with, EM economies are dependent on global liquidity as they run a current account deficit expected to hit US$140 billion in 2017, or US$400 billion if China is excluded. Moreover, they sport large external debts of US$4.8 trillion, excluding Taiwan and China. Especially worrisome are the large funding requirements of many EM countries, especially for Turkey, Malaysia, and Colombia. (Chart I-14). Chart I-14EM Debt Vulnerability Ranking Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Why is this a problem? Two reasons: Global Interest rates and the dollar. Global Interest rates, driven by higher Treasury yields, are rising as the U.S.'s economic slack vanishes, suggesting that the current tightening campaign by the Fed will be durable (Chart I-15). Higher U.S. rates lift the U.S. dollar against EM currencies, tightening EM liquidity conditions. But an unrelated shock is also putting exogenous upward pressure on the dollar. This force is the widening in LIBOR spreads (Chart I-16). This is the result of the regulation-related 90% melt down in the asset under management of U.S. prime money-market funds, an important source of global dollar liquidity. Moreover, U.S. banks, with their balance sheets under pressure by the binding constraints of Basel III, have not been able to fill the gap. Chart I-15The Fed has A Green Light To Hike The Fed has A Green Light To Hike The Fed has A Green Light To Hike Chart I-16Stresses In The Libor Market Remain Stresses In The Libor Market Remain Stresses In The Libor Market Remain The end result has been a widening of cross-currency basis swap spreads, which usually tends to boost the dollar (Chart I-17). This phenomenon increases the hedging costs to foreign investors of holding U.S. dollar assets. These investors become increasingly tolerant of purchasing U.S. assets unhedged, pushing up the value of the dollar in the process. This is best illustrated by the fact that net portfolio investments in the U.S. moved from a deficit of US$300 billion in Q1 2015 to a surplus of more than US$550 billion. Yet, hedges put in place, as approximated by the BIS's volume of OTC FX derivatives, have flat-lined since 2013 (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Widening Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Equals A Higher Dollar Chart I-18Hedging Activity is Receding Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism A rising dollar and LIBOR stresses are tightening global dollar liquidity, creating a big problem for EM. Wider-than-normal cross-currency basis swap spreads have been associated with declining global trade (Chart I-19). The stronger dollar plays a role, as it hurts the price of globally-traded good prices. Also, higher borrowing costs result in a mild disintermediation of global trade flows. As physical exports are 26% of EM GDP versus 13% for the U.S., this represents a huge drag on EM currencies, especially versus the USD. As a corollary, it is also a problem for the small open commodity producing DM economies like Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. Furthermore, the strength in the dollar associated with LIBOR shocks further hurts EM domestic economies by impeding EM credit growth (Chart I-20). The combined assault of a stronger dollar and higher rates increases the cost of EM foreign debt. Also, according to the BIS, between 2002 and 2014, 55% of EM commodity producers' debt issuance has been in USD.1 When the dollar rises, they see both their borrowing costs rise and the prices of the products they sell fall. Altogether, these forces preempt capex and credit accumulation in EM nations. Chart I-19Tightening Global Liquidity##br##Is Bad For Trade Tightening Global Liquidity Is Bad For Trade Tightening Global Liquidity Is Bad For Trade Chart I-20A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper##br## EM Credit Growth A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper EM Credit Growth A Stronger Dollar Will Hamper EM Credit Growth Bottom Line: The global liquidity backdrop is deteriorating. DM rates are rising cyclically, which is lifting the dollar. Moreover, a global dollar shortage is also supporting the greenback, further hurting EM liquidity conditions. Thus, we expect EM growth to deteriorate, hurting EM assets and commodity currencies. Protectionism The final issue affecting EM economies is the rise of protectionism, especially in the United States. EM - Asia and China in particular - have been the main beneficiaries of globalization (Chart I-21). Currently, they are in the line of sight of President Trump. Thus, we expect that any potential trade war between the U.S. and the rest of the world will focus on EM economies and China. Chart I-21EM And Asia Are In Trump's Line Of Sight Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism EM are much more dependent on the U.S. than the other way around. As an example, China's exports to the U.S account for 3.5% of Chinese GDP, while U.S. exports to China account for less than 1% of U.S. GDP. EM economies have a lot more to lose from a trade war than the U.S. Because of this imbalance in relative trade-exposures, EM economies are at risk from the border-adjustment tax being discussed in the U.S. These taxes would be very deflationary for EM economies as they could force a downward adjustment in EM labor costs and further depress capex in these nations. To ease these adjustments, falling EM exchange rates would be required. Once again, commodity currencies would suffer from these developments. First, lower capex in EM hurts Australian, New Zealand, or Canadian terms of trade. Second, lower EM exchange rates means that that exports from the dollar bloc to EM would suffer. Finally, and most perversely, lower EM exchange rates will give EM commodity producers an advantage versus DM producers, in that a stronger U.S. dollar means their local-currency costs are falling. EM commodity producers would keep producing more than warranted, putting additional downward pressure on commodity prices and stealing market shares from the dollar bloc producers. This is not a pretty picture. Bottom Line: EM should bear the brunt of the pain of any rise in U.S. protectionism. The tight link between EM economies and DM commodity producers suggests that this pain should adversely affect the AUD, the CAD, and the NZD. Risks To Our View Chart I-22Chinese Tariffs Are Falling Chinese Tariffs Are Falling Chinese Tariffs Are Falling The biggest risk to our view is a redoubling of Chinese fiscal stimulus. The threat of U.S. tariffs and trade sanctions is obviously deflationary and negative for the Chinese economy. We know this, as do the relevant powers in Beijing. A tool to mitigate any of these negative repercussions on the Chinese economy might be for Beijing to press on the gas pedal once more. Additionally, as our colleague Yan Wang wrote in this week's China Investment Strategy, key members of the new U.S. administration have been on record saying that the threat of tariffs is not an end game, but rather a negotiating tool to extract concessions from U.S. trade partners, implying a potentially more pragmatic stance from the U.S. than current rhetoric suggests.2 Moreover, the Chinese side of the negotiation table is also more open minded than most observers fear. China has been cutting its own tariffs and could continue to do so (Chart I-22). Moreover, Premier Li Keqiang has made a new pledge to move faster toward opening and liberalizing Chinese markets for access by foreign companies. A deal may be less elusive than feared. Finally, regarding the global liquidity deterioration, the recent rebound in gold and silver prices may be a harbinger of improving liquidity conditions globally. We doubt that the economic situation will let this rally be durable, but it remains something to monitor. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Bruno Valentina, and Hyun Song Shin, "Global Dollar Credit And Carry Trades: A Firm-level Analysis", BIS, Working Papers, August 205. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard", dated January 6, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed this week. The labor market saw both continuing and initial jobless claims rise above expectations. However, the economy is still near full employment and the Fed will not respond to this news. Furthermore, the Beige Book, released last week, also highlights that the U.S. economy remains resilient with employment and pricing activity particularly strong. This week the DXY broke through the key 100 level, as the market continues to reprice capricious assumptions of Trump's policies. Nevertheless, it has rebounded since then. The dollar is unlikely to see any real movement until the administration releases concrete information about its policies. For the time being, the Fed also seems to be on the sidelines in anticipation of more information. Report Links: U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017 - January 20, 2017 Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Although the euro area has seen a brighter economic environment as of late, this week's data has been mixed: German and overall euro area services and composite PMI underperformed, while manufacturing PMI outperformed consensus. The IFO Business Climate and Expectations both underperformed consensus, while the Current Assessment remained in line with consensus. All measures still remain over 100. Finally, Belgian Business Confidence accelerated sharply. The ECB is unlikely to change its dovish stance. The euro will therefore see little upside. The recent uptrend in EUR/USD is due to dollar weakness, but the recent downtrend in EUR/GBP and EUR/SEK indicate that the market is not necessarily hopeful that the ECB will reach its inflation target anytime soon. Report Links: GBP: Dismal Expectations - January 13, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data indicates that last year's sharp depreciation of the yen is helping the Japanese economy: Exports increased by 5.4% YoY, crushing expectations of 1.2% growth. Nikkei Manufacturing PMI reached 52.8, also beating expectations. In November machinery orders grew by more than 10% YoY. The BoJ will be more resolute on its radical monetary measures, as recent data shows that their approach is working. This will prove very bearish for the yen on a cyclical basis, given that the cap in Japanese rates will cause the rate differential between the U.S. and Japan to widen. In the short term, USD/JPY will resume its correction. We estimate that USD/JPY will cease to be attractive as a short opportunity at around 110. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 On Tuesday, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, requiring a parliamentary vote to authorize the exit of the U.K. from the European Union. This news is an added boon for cable, which has surged by almost 5% after bottoming at 1.20 about 10 days ago. As political risks start to dissipate, and the currency trades more on economic fundamentals, the pound should become a more attractive buy, particularly against the euro, given that the U.K. economy should outperform the market's dismal expectations. Recent data supports this view: Average earning growth outperformed expectations in November. GDP growth was 2.2% YoY in Q4, also outperforming expectations. Furthermore, short-term technicals point to a stronger pound. EUR/GBP has broken through its 100-day moving average, which indicates that momentum should continue to drive this cross downwards for the time being. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Two weeks ago, we argued that the rally in AUD lacks fundamental domestic causes. This week, the momentum of the recent AUD rally, caused by rising iron ore and copper prices, has seemingly paused. Exacerbating this change of pace is recent data which indicates a weak economic backdrop: the RBA trimmed mean CPI, and the more common CPI measure, underperformed consensus at both a quarterly and yearly pace. This could be due to depressed consumer sentiment, as the labor market remains mired in a slump, with the unemployment rate increasing to 5.8%, and total hours worked falling. Given recent data, it is likely that markets reprice growth prospects in Australia. U.S. trade policies could also potentially curtail global trade, painting a bearish picture for AUD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The Kiwi has appreciated 4.4% since the start of 2017. Although this rally might eventually be limited against the U.S. dollar, the NZD will likely have more upside against its crosses, particularly the AUD. Indeed it seems that low inflation, one of the only sore spots for the RBNZ in an otherwise stellar kiwi economy, has turned the corner, surging to 1.3% on the latest reading Wednesday. More importantly, not only did inflation beat expectations but it also surpassed 1% for the first time since 2014. This is a significant development, given that persistently low inflation in New Zealand was keeping the dovish bias of the RBNZ. With this hurdle gone, and an economy that continues to be the best performing in the G10, this dovish bias should disappear, which will ultimately lift the NZD against its crosses. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Despite the dissipating oil slump, potential risks may weigh on Canada's future. These risks are likely to emanate from an international sphere. Key concerns revolve around U.S. policies: recent statements have increased yields and tightened financial conditions, but global trade worries are not fully priced in. Recent news indicates that Trump has no ill-intentions aimed at Canada, however, protectionist policies could hurt global trade, indirectly curtailing Canadian exports. A U.S. corporate tax cut can also deviate investment from Canada to the U.S. The recent appreciation in the CAD against major currencies can also hurt Canadian competitiveness going forward. As oil is likely to remain relatively stable in the near future, we may again see a disassociation of CAD with oil, and a continued tight relationship with interest rate spreads. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Yesterday, EUR/CHF fell below the crucial 1.07 level. As we have recommended many times, any time that this cross falls below this threshold, it becomes an excellent buying opportunity. The SNB has not been shy to intervene in the currency markets, and they have been very clear that they will not tolerate any currency strength past a certain threshold as it could add additional deflationary pressures to an economy that has not had a positive inflation rate since 2014. We have identified a level of 1.07 for EUR/CHF as this threshold. Moreover given that the euro is the currency of reference for interventions, the behavior of USD/CHF should roughly mirror the behavior of the dollar against the Euro. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The Norwegian Krone has rallied along other commodity currencies so far this year, in spite of the meek performance of oil over this timeframe. This surge might prove unsustainable in the short term, as USD/NOK is very close to oversold territory. In the long term, the outlook for the NOK is more positive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Rising oil prices resulting from the OPEC cuts should supercharge the already high inflationary pressures in the Norwegian economy. This factor will eventually push the Norges Bank off its dovish bias, and the NOK higher in the process. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 The Swedish economy seems to be finally benefitting from last year's weaker krona; PPI numbers came in at 2.1% MoM, and 6.5% YoY, higher than previous numbers. This will feed into CPI in the near future. Additionally, 1-year, 2-year, as well as the important 5-year Prospera Inflation Expectations have all picked up, with the 5-year at 2%, in line with the Riksbank's target. The bank is aware of the krona's recent strength against major currencies, and realizes that it is important that the appreciation slows. In the short term, the SEK could continue to rally on the back of the dollar's correction and the Swedish economic outperformance vis-à-vis the euro area. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

The Tactical Asset Allocation model can provide investment recommendations which diverge from those outlined in our regular weekly publications. The model has a much shorter investment horizon - namely, one month - and thus attempts to capture very tactical opportunities. Meanwhile, our regular recommendations have a longer expected life, anywhere from 3-months to a year (or longer). This difference explains why the recommendations between the two publications can deviate from each other from time to time. Highlights In January, the model outperformed global equities and the S&P 500 in USD terms, but underperformed in local-currency terms. For February, the model cut its weighting in stocks and increased its allocation to bonds (Chart 1). Within the equity portfolio, the weightings to both the U.S. and emerging markets were decreased. The model boosted its allocation to French bonds at the expense of Swedish and Canadian paper. The risk index for stocks, as well as the one for bonds, deteriorated in January. Feature Performance In January, the recommended balanced portfolio gained 1.4% in local-currency terms, and 3.6% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 2). This compares with a gain of 3.2% for the global equity benchmark and a 2% gain for the S&P 500 index. Given that the underlying model is structured in local-currency terms, we generally recommend that investors hedge their positions, though we provide other suggestions on currency risk exposure from time to time. The performance of bonds was a detractor from the model's performance in local currency terms in January. Chart 1Model Weights Model Weights Model Weights Chart 2Portfolio Total Returns Portfolio Total Returns Portfolio Total Returns Weights The model decreased its allocation to stocks from 57% to 53%, and upgraded its bond weighting from 43% to 47% (Table 1). Table 1Model Weights (As Of January 26, 2017) Tactical Asset Allocation And Market Indicators Tactical Asset Allocation And Market Indicators The model increased its equity allocation to France, Italy, and Sweden by one point each. Meanwhile, weightings were cut by 2 points in the U.S., and by 1 point in Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Emerging Asia, and Latin America. In the fixed-income space, the allocation to French paper was increased by 6 points and the U.K. by 1 point. The model cut its exposure to Swedish bonds by 2 points and Canadian bonds by 1 point. Currency Allocation Local currency-based indicators drive the construction of our model. As such, the performance of the model's portfolio should be compared with the local-currency global equity benchmark. The decision to hedge currency exposure should be made at the client's discretion, though from time to time we do provide our recommendations. The dollar weakened in January and our Dollar Capitulation Index fell close to neutral levels. Uncertainty over the size of the fiscal push by the U.S. administration could prolong the dollar's consolidation phase, especially if coupled with any negative economic surprises. However, this would only be a pause since continued monetary policy divergence should translate into another leg up in the dollar bull market (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation Capital Market Indicators The deterioration of the value and cyclical components led to a higher risk index for commodities. The model continues to shun this asset class (Chart 4). The risk index for global equities increased to a 3-year high in January due to the deterioration in the value indicator. While the global risk index for global bonds also deteriorated, it remains firmly in the low-risk zone. The model slightly decreased its allocation in equities to the benefit of bonds (Chart 5). Chart 4Commodity Index And Risk Commodity Index And Risk Commodity Index And Risk Chart 5Global Stock Market And Risk Global Stock Market And Risk Global Stock Market And Risk Following the latest uptick in the risk index for U.S. equities, the allocation to this asset class was trimmed. U.S. stocks have been propped up by the growth-positive aspects of the new U.S. administration's policies and are at risk should this optimism deflate (Chart 6). The risk index for Canadian equities improved slightly in January as the better readings in the liquidity and momentum indicators offset continued worsening in value. That said, the overall risk index remains at the highest level in this business cycle. This asset remains excluded from the portfolio (Chart 7). Chart 6U.S. Stock Market And Risk U.S. Stock Market And Risk U.S. Stock Market And Risk Chart 7Canadian Stock Market And Risk Canadian Stock Market And Risk Canadian Stock Market And Risk The risk index for U.K. equities deteriorated, reaching a post-Brexit high. For the first time in over two years, the value component crossed into expensive territory (Chart 8) The model trimmed its allocation to Emerging Asian stocks following the slight uptick in the risk index. While the global reflationary pulse should bode well for this asset class, rumblings about protectionism threaten to de-rate growth expectations (Chart 9). Chart 8U.K. Stock Market And Risk U.K. Stock Market And Risk U.K. Stock Market And Risk Chart 9Emerging Asian Stock Market And Risk Emerging Asian Stock Market And Risk Emerging Asian Stock Market And Risk The unwinding of oversold conditions was the main reason behind the deterioration in the risk index for bonds in January. However, the latter is still in the low-risk zone as the bond-negative reading from the cyclical indicator remains overshadowed by the ongoing oversold conditions in the momentum indicator (Chart 10). The risk index for U.S. Treasurys deteriorated in January on the back of a less-stretched momentum indicator. While the cyclical backdrop is bond-bearish, there is arguably more room for scaling down optimism over the economy than there is to having an even more upbeat outlook. As a result, any resumption of the rise in Treasury yields could end up being very gradual (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Bond Yields And Risk Global Bond Yields And Risk Global Bond Yields And Risk Chart 11U.S. Bond Yields And Risk U.S. Bond Yields And Risk U.S. Bond Yields And Risk The risk index for euro area government bonds also deteriorated in January, but unlike the U.S., it is in the high-risk zone. There are notable differences in the risk readings within euro area markets (Chart 12). Given the upcoming presidential elections, France is next in line in terms of investors' focus on political risks. French bonds are heavily oversold based on the momentum indicator, pushing the overall risk index lower. An unwinding of the risk premium would bode well for French bonds, which the model upgraded in January (Chart 13). Chart 12Euro Area Bond Yields And Risk Euro Area Bond Yields And Risk Euro Area Bond Yields And Risk Chart 13French Bond Yields And Risk French Bond Yields And Risk French Bond Yields And Risk The risk index for Spanish government bonds ticked down slightly reflecting minor improvements in all three of its components. However, it remains much higher than the risk index for the French paper, which is preferred by the model (Chart 14). With the risk index little changed in January, Swiss government bonds remain in the high-risk zone. The model continues avoiding this asset which possesses negative yields (Chart 15). Chart 14Spanish Bond Yields And Risk Spanish Bond Yields And Risk Spanish Bond Yields And Risk Chart 15Swiss Bond Yields And Risk Swiss Bond Yields And Risk Swiss Bond Yields And Risk Currency Technicals The dollar depreciated after the 13-week momentum measure indicated last month that the greenback could face near-term resistance. Further consolidation cannot be ruled out, but the 40-week rate of change measure is not signaling an end to the dollar bull market. The monetary policy divergence between the Fed and its peers provides underlying support for the dollar, while heightened uncertainty on the fiscal front implies more volatility going forward (Chart 16). EUR/USD was not able to stay below 1.05. The short-term rate-of-change measure is approaching neutral levels, which could test the EUR/USD bounce. A risk-off episode or continued solid economic data are two factors that could provide some support for the euro in the near term (Chart 17). The 40-week rate of change measure for GBP/USD continues to hover near the most oversold level since 2000 (excluding the great recession). Meanwhile, the 13-week momentum measure crossed into positive territory, but is not extended. The pound will remain event-driven and possibly range-bound in the near term as the mood bounces within the hard Brexit / soft Brexit spectrum (Chart 18). Chart 16U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* Chart 17Euro Euro Euro Chart 18Sterling Sterling Sterling Miroslav Aradski, Senior Analyst miroslava@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Undue pessimism about global growth is giving way to unbridled optimism. Chinese growth has accelerated. However, there is a risk that the economy hits a speed bump later in 2017, as fiscal policy becomes less accommodative, monetary policy is tightened in an effort to curb capital outflows, and recent steps by the authorities to crack down on rampant speculation in the property sector begin to bite. The threat of a trade war will also loom large. U.S. fiscal policy will remain stimulative, but may fail to live up to expectations: There is little appetite among Republicans for increasing infrastructure spending; the multiplier effects from the proposed tax changes are likely to be small; and many GOP leaders are already chomping at the bit to take an ax to government spending. Fortunately, the U.S. economy has enough momentum to continue growing solidly above trend, even if fiscal policy disappoints. This will allow the Fed to raise rates three times this year, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. Developed market equities are overbought and vulnerable to a correction, but will be higher 12 months from now. Favor Europe and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. Stay underweight EM. Feature Global Growth Is Accelerating, But Headwinds Persist The global economy is on the mend. Measures of current activity are rebounding, as are a variety of leading economic indicators (Charts 1 and 2). Chart 1Global Economy ##br##Springing Back To Life Global Economy Springing Back To Life Global Economy Springing Back To Life Chart 2Global Leading Economic ##br##Indicators Are Improving Global Leading Economic Indicators Are Improving Global Leading Economic Indicators Are Improving Investors have taken notice: Market-based inflation expectations have risen, as have growth-sensitive commodity prices. Earnings growth expectations have surged, rising in the U.S. to nearly the highest level in a decade. Cyclical stocks have also bounced back, after having lagged the overall market for five years (Chart 3). We agree with the market's positive re-rating of global growth prospects, but worry that undue pessimism is starting to give way to excessive optimism. Two potential developments in particular could end up giving investors pause: A slowing of China's economy later this year. The possibility that U.S. fiscal policy will end up being less stimulative than expected. China: Living On Borrowed Time? Chinese growth has been surprising to the upside of late (Chart 4). Timely indicators such as excavator sales and railway freight traffic, which are well correlated with industrial activity, have been rising at a fast clip. Manufacturing inventory levels have come down, corporate profitability has improved, and producer price inflation has turned positive. The labor market has also picked up steam, as evidenced by the expansion in the employment subcomponents of the PMI indices. Chart 3Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Chart 4Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Looking out, however, there are reasons to worry that the economy will weaken anew. Growth in government spending slowed from a high of 25% in November 2015 to nearly zero in December (Chart 5). Recent efforts by policymakers to clamp down on rampant property speculation could also cause the economy to cool. Meanwhile, capital continues to flee the country (Chart 6). This has put the government in a no-win situation: Raising domestic interest rates could entice more people to keep their money at home, but such a step could increase debt-servicing costs and undermine the country's creaky financial system. Chart 5China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off Chart 6China: Ongoing Capital Outflows China: Ongoing Capital Outflows China: Ongoing Capital Outflows A Problem Of Inadequate Demand There is no shortage of commentary discussing the problems that ail China. Much of the analysis, however, has focused on the country's inefficient allocation of resources and other supply-side considerations. While these are obviously important issues, they overlook what has actually been the most significant binding constraint to growth: a persistent lack of aggregate demand. It has been this deficiency of demand - the flipside of a chronic excess of savings - that has kept the economy teetering on the edge of deflation. If a country suffers from excess savings, there are only three things that it can do. First, it can try to reduce savings by increasing consumption. The Chinese government has been striving to do that by strengthening the social safety net in the hopes that this will discourage precautionary savings. However, this is a slow process which will take many years to complete. Second, it can export those excess savings abroad by running a current account surplus. This would allow the country to save more than it invests domestically through the famous S-I=CA identity. The problem here is that no one wants to have a large current account deficit with China. Certainly not Donald Trump. Third, it can channel those excess savings into domestic investment. This is what China has done by pressing its banks to extend credit to state-owned companies and local governments. Remember that debt is the conduit through which savings is transformed into investment. From this perspective, China's high debt stock is just the mirror image of its high savings rate. The problem is that China already invests too much. Chart 7 shows that capacity utilization has been trending lower over the past six years and is back down to where it was during the Great Recession. The good news is that as long as there is plenty of savings around, Chinese banks will have enough liquid deposits on hand to extend fresh credit. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that borrowers taking on this debt will be able to repay it. This has made the Chinese economy increasingly sensitive to changes in financial conditions. And that sensitivity has, in turn, made global financial markets more fragile. Chart 8 shows that global equities have sold off whenever China stresses have flared up. The risk of another such incident remains high. Chart 7China: Capacity Utilization Back ##br##To Pre-Recession Levels China: Capacity Utilization Back To Pre-Recession Levels China: Capacity Utilization Back To Pre-Recession Levels Chart 8When China Has a Cold, ##br##Global Equities Sneeze When China Has a Cold, Global Equities Sneeze When China Has a Cold, Global Equities Sneeze China Trade War: The U.S. Holds The Trump Card Chart 9China Would Suffer More ##br##From A Trade War With The U.S. China Would Suffer More From A Trade War With The U.S. China Would Suffer More From A Trade War With The U.S. Adding to the pressure on China is the prospect of a trade war with the United States. Donald Trump has flip-flopped on almost every issue over the years, but he's been perfectly consistent on one: trade. Trump has always been a mercantilist at heart, and nothing that has happened since the election suggests otherwise. It is sometimes argued that the damage to the U.S. economy from a trade war with China would be so grave that Trump would not dare initiate one. This is wishful thinking. Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.5% of Chinese GDP, while U.S. exports to China account for only 0.6% of U.S. GDP (Chart 9). And much of America's exports to China are intermediate goods that are processed in China and then re-exported elsewhere. Blocking these exports would only hurt Chinese companies. Yes, China could threaten to dump its huge holdings of U.S. Treasurys. However, this is a hollow threat. The yield on Treasurys is largely determined by the expected path of short-term interest rates, which is controlled by the Federal Reserve. To be sure, the dollar would weaken if China started selling Treasurys. But why exactly is that a problem for the U.S.? Donald Trump wants a weaker dollar! In short, the U.S. would not lose much by provoking a trade war with China. Where does this leave us? The most likely outcome is that China blinks first and takes more concerted steps to open up its market to U.S. goods. This would hand Donald Trump a major political victory. However, the path from here to there is likely to be a very rocky one, which means that the reflation trade could suffer a temporary setback. A Trumptastic Fiscal Policy? Getting tough with China was one of Trump's key campaign promises; increasing infrastructure spending and cutting taxes was another. Unfortunately, investors may end up being disappointed both by how much fiscal stimulus is delivered and by the bang for the buck that it generates. For starters, much of Trump's proposed infrastructure program may never see the light of day. The $1 trillion ten-year program that he touted during the campaign was scaled back to $550 billion on his transition website. And even that may be too optimistic. Most Republicans in Congress have little interest in expanding public infrastructure spending. They opposed a big public works bill in 2009 when millions of construction workers were out of a job, and they will oppose one now. The public-private partnership structure that Trump's plan envisions will also limit the universe of projects that can be considered. Most of America's infrastructure needs consist of basic maintenance, rather than the sort of marquee projects that the private sector would be keen to invest in. Granted, the definition for what counts as public infrastructure could be expanded to include such things as hotels and casinos, to cite two completely random examples. But even if one ignores the obvious governance problems that this would raise, such a step could simply crowd out private investment that would otherwise have taken place. The reason that governments invest in infrastructure to begin with is because there are certain categories of public goods that do not lend themselves well to private ownership. To purposely exclude such goods from consideration, while devoting public funds to projects that the private sector is already perfectly capable of doing, is the height of folly. Trump And Taxes House Republicans are pursuing a sweeping tax reform agenda. There is much to like about their proposal. In particular, the shift to a cash flow destination-based tax system could encourage new investment over time, while making it more difficult for firms to carry out a variety of tax-dodging strategies. However, as with many major policy initiatives, the Republican tax proposal could generate significant near-term economic dislocations. Most notably, as we discussed in detail last week, the inclusion of a border adjustment tax could lead to a sharp appreciation in the dollar.1 This would benefit foreign holders of U.S. assets, but hurt debtors with dollar-denominated loans. Such an outcome could put stress on emerging markets, potentially undermining the global reflation trade. Trump's proposed cuts to personal income taxes may not boost spending by as much as some might hope. The Tax Policy Center estimates that the top one percent of income earners will see their after-tax incomes increase by 13.5%, while those in the middle quintile of the distribution will receive an increase of only 1.8% (Table 1). Since the very rich tend to save much of their income (Chart 10), measures which boost their disposable income may not translate into a substantial increase in spending. In fact, cutting the estate tax, as Trump has proposed, could actually depress spending by reducing the incentive for older households to blow through their wealth before the Grim Reaper (and The Taxman) arrive. Table 1Trump's Proposed Tax Cuts Would Largely Favor The Rich Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade Chart 10Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Spending Cuts On The Horizon? Then there is the question of whether Congressional Republicans will try to take an ax to government spending. The Hill reported last week that several senior members of Trump's transition team have proposed a plan to cut federal spending by $10.5 trillion over the next 10 years.2 The plan contains many of the same elements as the Republican Study Committee's Blueprint for a Balanced Budget, which called for $8.6 trillion in cuts over the next decade. Separately, Representative Sam Johnson of Texas, the chairman of the House Ways and Means subcommittee on Social Security, has introduced legislation seeking large cuts to pension benefits. Under his plan, workers in their mid-thirties earning $50,000 per year would see a one-third reduction in lifetime Social Security payments.3 Paul Ryan and other Congressional Republicans have also begun to argue that the goal of health care reform should be to guarantee "universal access" to high-quality medical care, rather than "universal coverage." This is a bit like arguing that the goal of transportation policy should be to ensure that everyone has access to a Bentley, provided that they can pony up $200,000 to buy one. It remains to be seen whether President Trump will acquiesce to these changes. He has repeatedly insisted that no one will lose medical coverage under his administration. However, one of his first actions in office was to loosen the mandate that requires healthy individuals to purchase insurance under the Affordable Care Act. Such a measure, however well intentioned, could greatly undermine the Act. If healthy people can wait until they are sick to sign up for insurance, only sick people will sign up. In order to cover their costs, insurance providers would have to raise premiums, ensuring that even fewer healthy people sign up. Such a vicious "adverse selection cycle," as economists call it, could lead to the collapse of health insurance exchanges, which currently provide coverage for 12.7 million Americans. Our guess is that Trump will ultimately put the kibosh on any plan to radically cut government spending or curtail Medicare and Social Security benefits. Say what you will of Trump, he has proven to be a skilled political operator for someone who has never been elected to public office. He knows that people were chanting "build the wall" at his rallies, not "cut my Medicare." Indeed, it is possible that Trumpcare will ultimately look a lot like Obamacare but with more generous subsidies for health care providers. Nevertheless, the path to this more benign investment outcome will be a bumpy one, suggesting that market volatility could rise in the months ahead. Investment Conclusions Chart 11DM Stocks Are Overbought DM Stocks Are Overbought DM Stocks Are Overbought Markets tend to swing from one extreme to another. This time last year, investors were fixated on secular stagnation. Now they are convinced that we are on the edge of a new global economic boom. Neither position is justified. Global growth has picked up, and this should provide a tailwind to risk assets over the next 12 months. However, as this week's discussion makes clear, there are still plenty of headwinds around. This suggests that the recovery will be a halting affair, with plenty of setbacks along the way. The surge in developed market equities since the U.S. presidential election has pushed stocks deep into overbought territory (Chart 11). A correction is likely over the next few weeks. We expect global equities to fall by 5%-to-10%, paving the way for higher returns over the remainder of the year. Once that recovery begins, European and Japanese stocks will outperform their U.S. counterparts in local-currency terms. We continue to expect EM equities to lag DM. In contrast to stocks, bond yields have already moved off their highs. As we discussed in our Strategy Outlook in early January, the transition from deflation to inflation will be a protracted one.4 Nevertheless, the path of least resistance for yields is to the upside. The Fed is likely to raise rates three times this year, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. This should be enough to keep the dollar bull market intact. We expect the trade-weighted dollar to rise another 5% by year-end, with the risk tilted to the upside if Congress ends up approving a border adjustment tax. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Alexander Bolton, "Trump Team Prepares Dramatic Cuts," The Hill, dated January 19, 2017. 3 Please see Stephen C. Goss memorandum to Sam Johnson, "Estimates Of The Financial Effects On Social Security Of H.R. 6489, The 'Social Security Reform Act Of 2016,' Introduced On December 8, 2016 By Representative Sam Johnson," Social Security Administration, Office Of The Chief Actuary (December 8, 2016). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation," dated January 6, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Trump administration will likely at least initially negotiate with China on trade issues rather than rush to meaningful punitive measures. Bilateral negotiations will likely focus on correcting China's allegedly unfair trade practices and increasing market access for American firms. It is, however, not difficult to find common ground that China is able or even willing to accommodate. A more inward looking U.S. generates a mutual desire among China and other economies to work more closely, potentially creating a new "globalization process" with distinct Chinese characteristics. Feature Fears of a trade war between the U.S. and China are now firmly on investors' radar screens, with President Donald Trump's inauguration speech last week doing little to assuage concerns. Even though he fell short of his campaign promise to label China as a currency manipulator in his first days in office, there is little doubt that trade tensions between the world's two largest economies will rise going forward. The challenge for investors is that U.S. trade policy under the new administration has simply become unpredictable. This week's report lays out our base case scenario for how things might evolve. Threat Or Policy? The biggest unknown at the moment is whether President Trump's threats to impose sanctions on Chinese goods are a mere negotiating tactic in order to gain concessions, or a real policy choice and direction. Unless one assumes that Trump will completely resort to radical and reckless policies that intentionally lead to a loss-loss situation for both the U.S. and China, we suspect the Trump administration will at least initially negotiate with China on trade issues rather than rush to meaningful punitive measures. Chart 1Exports Also Matter For the U.S. Exports Also Matter For the U.S. Exports Also Matter For the U.S. First, the grand strategy of President Trump on trade is to reduce America's massive and growing current account deficit. However, basic economics suggests that a country's current account deficit is fundamentally determined by its domestic savings and domestic capital spending. A deficit country, like the U.S., means its domestic savings fall short of its domestic investment, and therefore it needs to import capital from abroad to fill the gap. On the contrary, surplus countries, like China, have domestic savings in excess of their domestic investments, and therefore "export" capital abroad. In the U.S.'s case, the fact that the dollar is the main global reserve currency has allowed it to run chronic current account deficit without experiencing a balance-of-payments crisis. Unless 'Trumponomics' fundamentally changes the savings and investment balance in the U.S. economy, protectionism will not shrink the U.S. current account deficit. Punitive tariffs against Chinese goods will only shift America's deficit to China's competitors, often higher-cost producers, thus likely jacking up prices and hurting American consumers. Second, the U.S., although much less dependent on global trade than most countries, is not as isolated as commonly perceived. Exports of goods and services account for about 13% of U.S. GDP, compared with 22% for China and a global average of 30% (Chart 1). Moreover, exports as a share of the Chinese economy have almost halved since the global financial crisis, while exports' share in the U.S. economy has continued to climb to near all-time high levels. Major disruptions in global trade certainly hurt China more, but they would have also removed a major economic driver for the U.S. in recent years, which contradicts Trump's pro-growth objective. Chart 2China's Growing ATP Demands Offers Potential ##br##For U.S. Manufacturing Jobs China's Growing ATP Demands Offers Potential For U.S. Manufacturing Jobs China's Growing ATP Demands Offers Potential For U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Third, Trump's economic white paper released in September prepared by Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross,1 both now senior administration staff, explicitly states that "tariffs will be used not as an end game but rather as a negotiating tool to encourage our trading partners to cease cheating," and "If, however, the cheating does not stop, Trump will impose appropriate defensive tariffs to level the playing field." Moreover, in the confirmation hearing process, Treasury Secretary nominee Steven Mnuchin hinted that he would go through the existing statutory process on the currency manipulation issue, which reduces the odds of naming China as a manipulator, as China currently does not fit the Treasury's criteria.2 All of this means the Trump administration will at least try to negotiate with the Chinese on trade-related issues. Finally, creating manufacturing jobs is one of President Trump's primary goals, and some advanced-technology products (ATP) and industries have been singled out in the September economic white paper that the administration intends to promote, such as aerospace, chemicals, electronics, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, railroad rolling stock, and robotics. On the other hand, high-tech products have been a growing share in China's total imports, and its demand for global ATP will continue to increase as its economy becomes more sophisticated (Chart 2). Since the early 2000s, however, the U.S. has been losing market share in China's high-tech imports. In this vein, re-gaining market share for American ATP goods in Chinese imports may be a crucial part of Trump's job creation plan. Bottom line: Cooperation rather than confrontation is the rational policy choice of President Trump, given the prevailing economic circumstances. What Trump Wants, And Can China Budge? If tariffs are indeed used as a negotiation chip, it is important to understand what specific concessions the Trump administration will seek from China, which so far have not been made clear. In the September economic white paper, Trump's senior advisors laid out the "sins" that China has committed to gain unfair trade advantages, including "currency manipulation, theft of intellectual property, forced technology transfers, a widespread reliance upon both 'sweat shop' labor and pollution havens, illegal export subsidies, and massive dumping of select products such as aluminum and steel below cost." Moreover, President Trump has openly complained that Chinese tariffs on certain goods are prohibitively high for foreign producers, and that American firms have been much more restricted in doing business in certain industries in China than vice versa. Therefore, bilateral negotiations, if any, will likely focus on correcting China's allegedly unfair trade practices and increasing market access for American firms. It is, however, not difficult to find common ground that China is able or even willing to accommodate on the issues. On currency manipulation. The RMB is now under significant downward pressure, and the People's Bank of China may not be against the idea of cooperating with the U.S. to support the yuan and weaken the greenback. On intellectual property and technology transfers. China's attitude towards technology and intellectual property rights has changed dramatically in recent years, not only because of improving legal procedures, but more importantly because of the growing awareness of IPR protection among the Chinese business community. China's patent applications have skyrocketed in recent years, which naturally pushes the country's IPR practices towards the western standard (Chart 3). Chinese patent applications topped 1 million in 2015, by far the largest in the world and almost as many as the next three largest applicants, the U.S., Japan and Korea, combined. In short, China has developed a keen self-interest for better IPR protection, simply because it now has a lot more to protect than in the past. On "sweat shop" and pollution havens. There is little doubt among Chinese leadership that China has long passed the "sweat shop" model. Cheap labor-intensive sectors account for an increasingly smaller share in China's total industrial output and exports, and they will be further marginalized as the country's income level continues to rise (Chart 4). In fact, Chinese entrepreneurs have been leading the exodus of moving production capacities in these industries to lower-cost countries. Moreover, pollution has become an overwhelming social issue in major metropolitan centers, and there is a growing sense of urgency in Chinese society to take immediate action on environmental protection. In other words, there is not much interest among the Chinese leadership to protect these "sweat shops" and pollution havens that the Trump administration is complaining about. Chart 3China's Developing Self-Interest In IPR protection China's Developing Self-Interest In IPR protection China's Developing Self-Interest In IPR protection Chart 4"Sweat Shops" Are Already Marginalized "Sweat Shops" Are Already Marginalized "Sweat Shops" Are Already Marginalized On illegal export subsidies and dumping of base metals. It is an open secret that the Chinese government subsidizes certain labor-intensive industries in growth downturns to prevent excessive job losses. It is important to note, however, that the government has systemically phased out subsidies as a lifeline for the corporate sector. Government subsidies for loss-generating enterprises, which accounted for over 20% of fiscal expenditures in the early 1990s, have now essentially disappeared (Chart 5). In addition, the Chinese government has also been trying to weed out excess capacity in the base metal industries such as steel and aluminum that President Trump has singled out for "massive dumping." Moreover, the anti-dumping measures adopted by the Obama administration targeting these Chinese products have already dramatically curtailed Chinese sales in the U.S. market in recent years. For example, the U.S. accounts for a mere 1% of Chinese steel exports, down from almost 10% in 2010 (Chart 6). It is possible that the Trump administration will continue to target industries it perceives as illegally subsidized by the Chinese government. However, the macro implications of such measures should not be significant. On further market access and lower tariffs for American goods. Even though state-owned enterprises still enjoy a monopoly in certain industries, the big picture of China's economic progress has been characterized by deregulation, privatization and increasing openness. Last week, the State Council released a new plan to further open up to foreign investment, removing or easing restrictions on foreign investment in rail equipment, motorbikes, ethanol fuel, shale gas, oil sands and other mineral resources sectors. It is also aiming to lower restrictions on foreign investment in financial services, such as the banking, securities, investment management, futures, insurance, credit ratings and accounting sectors, as well as in telecom, the Internet, culture, education and transportation. The latest push on "opening up" appears to be timed to supplement President Xi Jinping's speech at the Davos World Economic Forum last week - and possibily to offer an olive branch to the newly inagurated U.S. president - it nonetheless fits with the long-standing strategy of China's economic reforms. Chart 5Subsidies Are ##br##No Longer Vital Subsidies Are No Longer Vital Subsidies Are No Longer Vital Chart 6Chinese Steels Are No Longer ##br##Dumped In The U.S. Chinese Steels Are No Longer "Dumped" In The U.S. Chinese Steels Are No Longer "Dumped" In The U.S. Meanwhile, China's average tariff rate has declined dramatically in the past two decades (Chart 7), and is now not much higher than the global average and developed nation levels (Chart 8). Chinese tariffs on certain consumer goods are indeed punitively high. However, excessively high tariffs have only pushed Chinese consumers to travel overseas to buy these products, which has done little to help domestic producers. There have long been proposals among Chinese policy circles to cut tariffs and taxes to boost consumption and create local jobs. Chart 7Chinese Tariffs Have Already Collapsed... Chinese Tariffs Have Already Collapsed... Chinese Tariffs Have Already Collapsed... Chart 8...But Still Room For Improvement Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Dealing With The Trump Wildcard In short, on all the pressure points that could lead to trade disputes between the U.S. and China, the positions on both sides are not as deeply divided as perceived. China may have different perspectives by varying degrees, and may push back on specific issues, but the country's economic reform is not fundamentally against what Trump demands. This offers a hopeful starting point of bilateral engagement and negotiations. The primary risk to the negotiations is that Trump attempts to punish China retroactively for the cumulative effect of its past transgressions on the above issues, or makes ultimatums on the speed of the reform process that China either cannot or will not accept. Globalization With Chinese Characteristics? Regardless of whether the Trump's administration simply wants to deal "fairly" or intends to start a trade war, China will inevitably continue to push for a more predictable global growth environment for its exporters. A more inward-looking U.S. casts a long shadow on global trade, but it will also generate a mutual desire among China and other economies to work more closely, potentially creating a new "globalization process" with distinct Chinese characteristics. First, similar to existing trade agreements that intend to eliminate tariffs and other trade and investment barriers, China will continue to explore bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTA) with its main trade partners. China currently has 19 FTAs under construction, among which 14 agreements have been signed and implemented. President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) will also push other countries to participate in China-led free-trade initiatives as the only other viable alternative. In fact, China is a far bigger trade partner of TPP signatories than the U.S. (Chart 9). It will not be surprising to see the pace of negotiations for the "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)" accelerate. Second, besides tariff reductions, China also aims to extend its trade reach through expansion of transportation infrastructure via the ambitious "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) mega project. The OBOR promises to link China, Eurasia, South Asia, Oceania and North Africa with railway, highway and seaports, and has been quietly gaining momentum since it was unveiled in October 2013. Routine railway freight between China and western European countries has already been established, adding to existing air and maritime trade routes. The Silk Road Fund, a state-owned fund of the Chinese government to foster investment in countries along the OBOR, is already in operation. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a China-led international financial institution to aid the OBOR strategy, was established in December 2015 with 57 member countries, and is expected to add another 25 soon. With promises of improving infrastructure, it should be easier for China to sell its version of "globalization" to other countries. The impact of the OBOR will likely become increasingly visible going forward. Finally, China has been offering capital and technical aid to lesser-developed resource-rich countries, particularly in Africa (Chart 10). Unlike financial aid from other developed countries, which is often associated with governance and human right demands, Chinese investment in these regions is mostly offered with no political conditions attached, something that has generated a great deal of controversy. Some have accused China of being "neo-colonialist" to exploit the continent's natural resources, while others support the initiatives to build and upgrade local infrastructure such as roads, railways and telecom systems, as they will benefit Africa's manufacturing sector and the welfare of the local population. Regardless, China is likely to continue to push forward on these investment projects, which will also intensify the trade links between China and these countries. Chart 9China Matters More For TPP Countries China Matters More For TPP Countries China Matters More For TPP Countries Chart 10China's Strengthening Ties With Africa China's Strengthening Ties With Africa China's Strengthening Ties With Africa How Will The Market Respond? Brewing trade tensions between the world's two largest economies are undoubtedly negative for both the global economy and financial markets. A full-fledged trade war conjures up dreadful images of the 1930s Great Depression, which is full-stop bearish for risk assets. Investors should certainly hedge against such a scenario with a small portion of their portfolios, with long positions on the dollar, gold, and the VIX. Chart 11Industrial Stocks Will Remain Depressed Industrial Stocks Will Remain Depressed Industrial Stocks Will Remain Depressed Table 1Chinese H Shares Are Mostly Domestic Driven Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Barring such an extreme scenario, targeted tariffs and low-profile trade disputes will hurt specific industries and companies, but the impact on the broader market should not be significant. Specifically, Chinese H share-listed companies are heavily concentrated in domestic businesses (Table 1). Some heavyweights in the H-share index such as financials, telecom and utilities are mostly domestic driven. The industrial sector, which is more exposed to global demand, has already been chronically underperforming (Chart 11), and will likely continue to struggle amid growing global uncertainty. However, industrials are only about 5% of total China investable market cap, much smaller than both the Chinese A-share index and the U.S. market (Table 2). From this perspective, A shares are more vulnerable to trade disruptions given their higher weight in industrial stocks. The IT sector accounts for almost a third of the MSCI China Free index, but the largest constituents of the Chinese tech sector such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu derive almost all of their revenue from domestic sources (Table 2). Some smaller Chinese hardware producers with heavy exposure to global markets are vulnerable, but they represent a negligible share in the Chinese investable index. Table 2Top Ten Chinese Tech Firms And Their Foreign Exposure Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 "Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts" available at https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Trump_Economic_Plan.pdf 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China As A Currency Manipulator?" dated November 24, 2016 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights U.S. policy uncertainty has increased again early in the New Year. President Trump's inaugural speech highlighted that he has not tempered his "America First" policy prescription. The Trump/GOP agenda is still a moving target, but three key risks have emerged for financial markets. A border tax could see a 10% rise in the U.S. dollar. It would also be bearish for global bonds and EM stocks. Position accordingly. Second, President Trump has his sights on China. U.S. presidents face few constraints on the trade and foreign policy side. Investors seem to be under-appreciating the risk of a trade war. Third, the plan to slash Federal government spending could completely offset the fiscal stimulus stemming from the proposed tax cuts and infrastructure spending. The good news is that the major countries, including China, appear to have entered a synchronized growth acceleration. There is more to the equity market rally than a "sugar high". The global profit recession is over and the rebound has been even more impressive than we predicted. As long as any U.S. protectionist policies do not derail the growth acceleration, corporate EPS in the major countries should rival (traditionally overly-optimistic) bottom-up expectations in 2017. The Fed will hike three times this year, one more than is discounted. The Bank of Japan will continue to target a 10-year JGB yield of 0%, but the ECB will begin hinting at another taper in the fall. Our bond team tactically took profits on a short-duration position, but expect to move back to below-benchmark duration before long. The U.S. policy backdrop is very fluid but, for now, the new Administration has boosted confidence and thereby reinforced a global cyclical upswing. As long as protectionist policies implemented this year do not unduly undermine U.S. growth (our base case), then stocks will beat bonds by a wide margin. Investors should consider long VIX positions, but add to equity exposure on dips. Feature It has become a cliché to describe the economic and financial market outlook as "unusually uncertain". Since 2007, investors have had to deal with rolling financial crises, deleveraging, recession, deflation pressures, quantitative easing, negative interest rates, re-regulation, a collapse in oil prices and Brexit. Chart I-1Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Now, there is Donald Trump. The new President's inaugural speech highlighted that he has not tempered his "America First" policy prescription. Protectionism, de-regulation and tax reform are high on the agenda but details are scant, leaving investors with very little visibility. There are many policy proposals floating around that have conflicting potential effects on financial markets. Which ones will actually be pursued and how will they be prioritized? Is the U.S. prepared to fight a trade war? Is a border tax likely? Will President Trump push for a "Plaza Accord" deal with China? Even the prospect for fiscal stimulus is a moving target because the Trump Administration is reportedly considering a plan to slash Federal spending by $10 trillion over the next decade! Some have described the global equity rally as just a "sugar high" that will soon fade. No doubt, some of the potentially growth-enhancing parts of the Trump agenda have been discounted in risk assets. Given the highly uncertain policy backdrop, it would be easy to recommend that investors err on the side of caution if the U.S. and global economies were still stuck in the mud. The level of the S&P 500 appears elevated based on its relationship with the policy uncertainty index (shown inverted in Chart I-1). Nonetheless, what complicates matters is that there is more to the equity rally than simply hope. Both growth and profits are surprising to the upside in what appears to be a synchronized global upturn. If one could take U.S. policy uncertainty out of the equation, risk assets are in an economic sweet spot where the deflation threat is waning, but inflation is not enough of a threat to warrant removing the monetary punchbowl. Indeed, the Fed will proceed cautiously and official bond purchases will continue through the year in Japan and the Eurozone. We begin this month's Overview with two key protectionist policies being considered that could have important market implications. We then turn to the good news on the economic and earnings front. The conclusion is that we remain positive on risk assets and bearish bonds on a 6-12 month investment horizon. It will likely be a rough ride, but investors should use equity pullbacks to add exposure. Protectionism Risk #1 A U.S. border tax has suddenly emerged on the U.S. policy program. More formally, it is called a destination-based cash flow tax. Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference the between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred the U.S.). The mechanics are fairly complicated and we encourage interested clients to read a Special Report on the topic from BCA's Global Investment Strategy service.1 The result would be a significant increase in taxes on imported goods and a reduction in taxes paid by exporters. One benefit is that the border tax would generate a large amount of revenue for the Treasury, which could be used to offset the cost of corporate tax cuts. Another benefit is that the tax change would eliminate the use of international "transfer pricing" strategies that allow American companies to avoid paying tax. In theory, the dollar would appreciate by enough to offset the tax paid by importers and the tax advantage gained by exporters, leaving the trade balance and the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy largely unchanged. A 20% border tax, for example, would require an immediate 25% jump in the dollar to level the playing field! In reality, there are reasons to believe that the dollar's adjustment would not be fully offsetting. First, much depends on how the Fed responds. Second, some central banks would take steps to limit the dollar's ascent. To the extent that the dollar did not rise by the full amount (25% in our example), then the border tax would boost exports and curtail imports. The resulting tailwind for U.S. growth would eventually be reflected in higher inflation to the extent that the economy is already near full employment. The result is that a border tax would be bullish the dollar and bearish for bonds. Our base case is that a 20% border tax would lift the dollar by about 10% over a 12-month period, above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. The 10-year Treasury yield could reach 3% in this scenario. Subjectively, we assign a 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. It appears that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. proceeds with this new tax, suggesting that the risks to the dollar and bond yields are to the upside. This is another reason to underweight U.S. bonds relative to Bunds on a currency-hedged basis. For stocks, any growth boost from the border tax would benefit corporate profits, at least until the Fed responded with a faster pace of rate hikes. It is another story for EM equities as a shrinking U.S. trade deficit implies less demand for EM products and shrinking international dollar liquidity. A border tax could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war, souring investor sentiment towards EM stocks. Another major upleg in the U.S. dollar could also spark a financial crisis in some EM countries with current account deficits and substantial dollar-denominated debt. Protectionism Risk #2 Chart I-2Trade War Risk Is Elevated Trade War Risk Is Elevated Trade War Risk Is Elevated While President Trump wants a smaller trade deficit generally, he has his sights on China because of the elevated U.S. bilateral trade deficit (Chart I-2). His choices for Commerce Secretary, National Trade Council and U.S. Trade Representative are all China critics. U.S. presidents face few constraints on the trade and foreign policy side. He can order tariffs on specific goods, or even impose a surcharge on all dutiable goods, as Nixon did in 1971. Congress is unlikely to be a stumbling block. Trump's election was a signal that the U.S. populace wants protectionist policies. His electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. We expect the Trump Administration to give a largely symbolic "shot across China's bow" in the first 100 days, setting the stage for formal trade negotiations in the subsequent months. The initial shot will likely rattle markets. A calming period will follow, but this will only give a false sense of security. The U.S. is in a relatively good negotiating position because China's exports to the U.S. are much larger than U.S. exports to China. However, tensions over the "One China" policy and international access to the South China Sea will greatly complicate the trade negotiations. The bottom line is that there is little hope that U.S./China relations will proceed smoothly.2 A long position in the VIX is prudent given that the market does not appear to be adequately discounting the possibility of a trade war. Synchronized Global Growth Upturn While the U.S. policy backdrop has become more problematic for investors, the global economic and profit picture has brightened considerably. We were predicting a pickup in global growth before last November's election based on our leading indicators and the ebbing of some headwinds that had weighed on economic activity early in 2016. As expected, the manufacturing sector is bouncing back after a protracted inventory destocking phase. The stabilization in commodity prices has given some relief to emerging market manufacturers. The drag on global growth from capex cuts in the energy patch is moderating even though the level of capital spending will contract again in 2017. Moreover, the aggregate fiscal thrust for the advanced economies turned positive in 2016 for the first time in six years. The major countries, including China, appear to have entered a synchronized growth acceleration. The pick-up is confirmed by recent data on industrial production, purchasing managers' surveys and the ZEW survey (Chart I-3). The global ZEW composite has been a good indicator for world earnings revisions and the global stock-to-bond return ratio. The synchronized uptick in global coincident and leading economic data, including business and consumer confidence, suggests that there is more going on than a simple post-election euphoria. Euro Area sentiment measures hooked up at the end of 2016 and the acceleration in growth appears to be broadly based (Chart I-4). A simple model based on the PMI suggests that Eurozone growth could be as much as 2% this year, which is well above trend. Chart I-3Positive Global Indicators bca.bca_mp_2017_02_01_s1_c3 bca.bca_mp_2017_02_01_s1_c3 Chart I-4Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates While Japan will not be a major contributor to overall global growth given its well-known structural economic impediments, the most recent data reveal a slight uptick in consumer confidence, business confidence and the leading economic indicator (Chart I-5). We have noted the impressive rebound in China's leading and coincident growth indicators for some time. Some indicators are consistent with real GDP growth well in excess of the 6.7% official growth figure for 2016 Q4. Both the OECD leading indicator and our proprietary GDP growth model are calling for faster growth in 2017 (Chart I-6). A potential increase in trade or even military tensions between China and the U.S. is a potential risk to this sunny picture. Nonetheless, given what we know about the underlying economy at the moment, China looks poised to deliver another year of solid growth. Chart I-5Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Chart I-6Upside Risk To China's Growth Upside Risk To China's Growth Upside Risk To China's Growth In the U.S., President Trump appears to be stirring long-dormant animal spirits. CEOs are much more upbeat and several regional Fed surveys indicate a surge in investment intentions (Chart I-7). Spending on capital goods has the potential to soar given the historical relationship with the survey data shown in Chart I-8 (the caveat being that Congress will need to deliver). Even the long depressed small business sector is suddenly more optimistic. The December reading of the NFIB survey showed a spike in confidence, with capital expenditures, hiring plans and overall optimism returning to levels not seen in this expansion. Chart I-7Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Chart I-8...Which Will Spark Capital Spending ...Which Will Spark Capital Spending ...Which Will Spark Capital Spending There is a good chance that a deal between the White House and Congress on tax reform will occur in the first half of 2017, including a major tax windfall for the business sector that would boost the after-tax rate of return on equity. Nonetheless, past research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles only get underway once businesses see clear evidence that consumer demand is on the upswing. In other words, consumers need to move first. On that score, a number of cyclical tailwinds have aligned for household spending. Credit scores have largely been repaired since the recession and income growth is on track to accelerate (Chart I-9). Despite a moderation in monthly payrolls, overall income growth is likely to stay perky, now that wage gains are on an upward path. And, importantly, various surveys highlight an improvement over the past year in consumer confidence about long-term job prospects. The propensity to spend rather than save is higher when households feel secure in their jobs. Chart I-10 highlights that the saving rate tends to decline when confidence is elevated. The wealth effect from previous equity and housing price gains has been a tailwind for some time but, until now, consumers have held back because it seemed to many that the recession had never ended. Chart I-9Share Of Home Mortgage Borrowers ##br##Who Recovered Pre-Delinquency Credit Score After Foreclosure February 2017 February 2017 Chart I-10Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend In other words, there are increasing signs that the scar tissue from the Great Recession is finally fading, at a time when tax cuts are on the way. We expect that U.S. real GDP growth will be in the 2½-3% range this year with risks to the upside, as long as the Trump Administration does not start a trade war that undermines confidence. Corporate Earnings Liftoff Chart I-11Profits Are Bouncing Back Profits Are Bouncing Back Profits Are Bouncing Back The good news on the economy carries over to corporate earnings. The profit recession is over and the rebound has been even more impressive than we predicted (Chart I-11). Eurozone EPS "went vertical" near the end of 2016. Blended S&P 500 Q4 bottom-up estimates reveal a huge increase in EPS last year to $109 (4-quarter trailing), providing an 8.5% growth rate for 2016 as a whole. The 4-quarter trailing growth figure will likely surge again to 16% in 2017 Q1, even if the sequential EPS figure is flat. Some of the growth acceleration is technical, reflecting a particularly sharp drop in profits at the end of 2015 (which will eventually fall out of the annual growth calculation). Of course, a spike in energy earnings on the back of higher oil prices made a major contribution to the overall growth rate, but there is more to it than that. Consumer Discretionary, Financials and Health Care all posted solid earnings figures last year. Earnings momentum has also picked up in Materials, Real Estate and Utilities, although profit growth in these sectors is benefiting from favorable comparisons. Dollar strength has pushed the U.S. earnings revisions ratio slightly into negative territory, while revisions have surged into positive terrain in the other major markets (Chart I-12). The sharp upturn in our short-term EPS indicators corroborates the more upbeat earnings outlook for at least the next few months (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Earnings Revisions Earnings Revisions Earnings Revisions Chart I-13Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Our medium-term profit models also paint a constructive picture for equities. These are top-down macro models that include oil prices, exchange rates, industrial production (to capture top-line dynamics), and the difference between nominal GDP and labor compensation (to capture margin effects). Given our more optimistic economic view, the model forecasts for 2017 EPS growth have been revised higher for the global aggregate and each of the major developed markets (Chart I-14). The U.S. is tricky because of the impact of comparison effects that will add volatility to the quarterly growth profile as we move through the year. We are now calling for a 10% gain for 2017 as a whole, which is just shy of the roughly 12% increase expected by bottom-up analysts. This is impressive because actual market expectations are typically well below the perennially-optimistic bottom-up estimates. A 10% EPS growth figure might seem overly optimistic in light of the dollar appreciation that has occurred since last November. Some CEOs will no doubt guide down 2017 estimates during the current earning season. However, in terms of EPS growth, the annual change in the dollar matters more than its level. Chart I-15 shows that the year-over-year rate of change in the dollar is moderating despite the recent rise in the level. This is reflected in a diminishing dollar drag on EPS growth as estimated by our model (bottom panel in Chart I-15). We highlighted in the December 2016 monthly report that it does not require a major growth acceleration to overwhelm the negative impact of a rising dollar on earnings. Chart I-14Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Chart I-15Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS The models for Japan and the Eurozone point to 2017 EPS growth in the mid-teens. Both are roughly in line with bottom-up estimates which, if confirmed this year, would be quite bullish for stock indexes. Keep in mind that these projections do not include our base case forecast that the U.S. dollar will appreciate by another 5% this year (more if a border tax is enacted). Incorporating a 5% dollar appreciation would trim U.S. EPS growth by 1 percentage point and add the same amount to profit growth in Japan and the Eurozone. The bottom line is that we expect corporate profits to be constructive for global bourses this year. Within an overweight allocation to equities in the advanced economies, we continue to favor the European and Japanese markets versus the U.S. As we discussed in the 2017 Outlook, political risks in the Eurozone are overblown. Currency movements and relative monetary policies will work against U.S. stocks on a relative (currency hedged) basis. FOMC: Hawks Gradually Winning The Debate Fed officials are in a state of quandary over how the policies of the incoming Administration will affect the growth and inflation outlook. Nevertheless, the last FOMC Minutes confirmed that the consensus on the Committee is still shifting in a less dovish/more hawkish direction. The tone of the discussion was decidedly upbeat, especially on the manufacturing and capital spending outlook. "Most" of the meeting participants felt that the U.S. economy has reached full employment, although there is still an ongoing debate on the benefits and costs of allowing the unemployment rate to temporarily move below estimates of full employment. Running the economy "hot" for a while might draw more discouraged workers back into the workforce and thereby expand the supply side of the economy. Other members, however, highlight that past attempts by the Fed to fine tune the economy in this way have always ended in recession. Our view is that the FOMC will not follow the Bank of Japan's example and explicitly target a temporary inflation overshoot. Conversely, the Fed will not attempt to pre-emptively offset any forthcoming fiscal stimulus either (if indeed there is any net fiscal stimulus). Policymakers will watch the labor market and, especially, wage and price inflation to guide them on the appropriate pace of rate hikes. Core PCE inflation is roughly 30 basis points below target and has only edged erratically higher over the past year. The pickup in shelter inflation has been largely offset by falling core goods prices, reflecting previous dollar strength. We expect shelter inflation to soon flatten off, but goods prices will continue to contract if the dollar rises by another 5% this year. Year-ago comparison effects will also depress the annual rate of change over the next couple of months. However, the key to the underlying inflation trend will be wage pressures, which are most highly correlated with the non-shelter part of the service component. Up until recently, the structural and cyclical forces acting on wage gains were pulling in the same downward direction. Structural factors include automation and population aging; as high-paid older workers leave the workforce, the vast majority of new entrants to full-time employment do so at below-median wages, putting downward pressure on median earnings growth.3 These structural factors will not disappear anytime soon, but the cyclical forces have clearly shifted. The main measures of U.S. wage growth are all trending higher. Excess labor market slack appears to have been largely absorbed. Only the number of people working part time for economic reasons suggests that there is some residual slack remaining. To what extent will cyclical wage pressures exert upward pressure on inflation? That will depend on the ability of companies to raise prices in order to protect profit margins. Wage inflation trends do not lead, and sometimes diverge from, inflation in goods and services. Theory suggests that there is a two-way relationship between wages and prices. Sometimes inflation starts in the labor market and spills over into consumer prices (cost-push inflation), and sometimes it is the other way around (demand-pull inflation). At the moment, the corporate sector appears to have limited ability to pass on rising wage costs. Balancing off the opposing factors, we believe that core PCE inflation will grind higher and should be near the 2% target by year end. This would end the Fed's debate over whether to run the economy hot, helping to keep upward pressure on Treasury yields. Bond Bear To Return Chart I-16Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Global yields troughed a full four months before the U.S. election. As discussed above, the U.S. and global economies were showing signs of increased vigor even before Trump won the Presidency. The new President's policies reinforce the bond-bearish backdrop, especially protectionism and fiscal stimulus, at a time when the economy is already near full employment. Long-term inflation expectations imbedded in bond yields have shifted up in recent months across the major markets. Real yields have been volatile, but generally have not changed much from late last year. We remain modest bond bears over a 6-12 month horizon. Inflation and inflation expectations will continue to grind higher in the major markets and we expect the FOMC to deliver three rate hikes in 2017, one more than is discounted in the Treasury market. A rise in 10-year TIPS breakevens into a range that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target (2.4%-2.5% based on history) would be a strong signal that the Fed will soon lift the 'dot plot.' ECB bond purchases will limit the increases in the real component of core European yields, but any additional weakness in the euro would result in a rise in European inflation. The ECB was able to announce a tapering of monthly purchases last year while avoiding a bond rout by extending the QE program to the end of 2017, but this will be more difficult to pull off again if inflation is on the rise and growth remains above-trend this year. We expect the ECB to provide hints in September that it will further taper its QE program early in 2018. Thus, the Eurozone bond market could take over from U.S. Treasurys as the main driver of the global bond bear market late in 2017. The Japanese economy is also performing impressively well, reducing the probability of a "helicopter drop" policy. The dollar's surge has depressed the yen and lifted inflation expectations, relieving some pressure on PM Abe to ramp up fiscal spending beyond what is already included in the supplementary budgets. In any event, the BoJ will keep the 10-year yield pinned near to zero, limiting the upside for bond yields to some extent in the other major bond markets. That said, we are neutral on JGBs, not overweight, because most of the yield curve is in negative territory. We remain overweight Bunds versus both Treasurys and JGBs on a currency-hedged basis. In terms of the duration call, our bond strategists felt in early December that the global bond selloff had progressed too far, too fast (Chart I-16). They recommended temporarily taking profits on short-duration positons and shifting to benchmark, which turned out to be excellent timing. Yields have drifted lower since then and the technicals have improved enough to warrant shifting back to below-benchmark duration. Investment Conclusions Chart I-17A Better Growth ##br##Backdrop For USD Strength A Better Growth Backdrop For USD Strength A Better Growth Backdrop For USD Strength Equity markets have gone into a holding pattern as investors weigh heightened U.S. policy risk against the improving profit and global macro backdrop. The latter appears to have broken the Fed policy loop that had been in place for some time. Expectations for a less dovish Fed helped to drive the dollar and Treasury yields higher late in 2016. But, rather than sparking a correction in risk assets as has been the case in recent years, stock indexes surged to new highs (Chart I-17). The difference this time is that there has been a meaningful improvement in the growth and profit outlook that has overwhelmed the negative impact of a stronger dollar and higher borrowing rates. The protectionist policies currently being considered are clearly dollar bullish, and bearish for global bonds and EM stocks. Investors should be positioned accordingly. It is more complicated for stocks. The passing of a major tax reform package would no doubt buttress the budding revival in private sector animal spirits, but a nasty trade war has the potential to do the opposite. The multitude of policy proposals floating around greatly complicate asset allocation. It is a very fluid situation but, for now, the new Administration has boosted confidence and thereby reinforced a global cyclical upswing. As long as protectionist policies implemented this year do not unduly undermine global growth (our base case), then corporate earnings growth will be solid in 2017 and stocks will beat bonds by a wide margin. We wish to be clear, though, that equities are on the expensive side in most of the main markets. This means that overweighting equities and underweighting cash and bonds in a balanced global portfolio is essentially playing an equity overshoot. It may end badly, but the overshoot is likely to persist for as long as the economic and profit upswing persists. Investors should consider long VIX positions, but add to equity exposure on dips. Our view on corporate bonds is unchanged this month. Poor value and deteriorating corporate balance sheet health make it difficult to recommend anything more than a benchmark position in the U.S. relative to Treasurys. However, investors can pick up a little spread in the Eurozone corporate bond market, where balance sheet health is better and the ECB is soaking up supply. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 26, 2017 Next Report: February 23, 2017 1 U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue for 2017. BCA Global Investment Strategy service, January 20, 2017. 2 For more information, please see: Trump, Day one: Let the Trade War Begin. BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, January 18, 2017. 3 For more information in the structural and cyclical wage pressures, please see: U.S. Wage Growth: Paid in Full? U.S. Investment Strategy Service, November 28, 2016. II. Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg? The spike in bond yields since the U.S. election has focussed investor attention on the economic implications of higher borrowing costs. In this world of nose-bleed debt levels, it seems self-evident that certain parts of the global economy will be ultra-sensitive to rising rates. The "cash flow" effect on debt service is a headwind for growth as rising interest payments trim the cash available to spend on goods and services. Some market commentators believe that the Fed will not be able to raise interest rates much because the cash-flow effect will be so severe this time that it will quickly derail the economic expansion. However, a number of factors make projecting interest payments complicated, such that back-of-the-envelope estimates are quite misleading. In order to provide a sense of the size of the cash-flow effect, in this Special Report we estimate the sensitivity of interest payments to changes in borrowing rates in the corporate, household and government sectors for four of the major economies. The key finding is that interest burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, over the next couple of years even if borrowing rates increase immediately by 100 basis points from today's levels. It would require a 300 basis point jump to really "move the dial". Interest rate shocks are more dramatic for the Japanese government interest burden due to the size of the JGB debt mountain, but much of the interest payments would simply make the round trip to the Bank of Japan and back again. We are not downplaying the risks posed by the rapid accumulation of debt since the Great Recession. Rather, our aim is to provide investors with a sense of the debt-service implications of a further rise in borrowing rates. Our main point is that the cash-flow effect of higher interest rates should not be included in the list of reasons for believing that Fed officials will be quickly thwarted if they proceed with their rate hike plan over the next couple of years. Investors are justifiably worried that the bond selloff will get ahead of itself, spark an economic setback and a corresponding flight out of risk assets. After all, there have been several head fakes during this recovery during which rising bond yields on the back of improving data and optimism were followed by an economic soft patch and a risk-off phase in financial markets. In this world of nose-bleed debt levels, it seems self-evident that certain parts of the global economy will be ultra-sensitive to rising rates. Indeed, global debt has swollen by 41½ percentage points of GDP since 2007 (Chart II-1). Households, corporations and governments tried to deleverage simultaneously to varying degrees in the major countries since the Great Recession and Financial Crisis, but few have been successful. Households in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland have managed to reduce the level of debt relative to income. U.K. and Japanese corporations are also less geared today relative to 2007. Outside of these areas, leverage has generally increased in the private and public sectors (see Chart II-2 and the Appendix Charts beginning on page 37). The astonishing pile-up of debt in China has been particularly alarming for the investment community (Chart II-3). Chart II-1Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Chart II-2Leverage In Advanced Economies Leverage In Advanced Economies Leverage In Advanced Economies Chart II-3China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up Governments can be excused to some extent for continuing to run fiscal deficits because automatic stabilizers require extra spending on social programs when unemployment is high. Fiscal policy was forced to at least partially offset the drain on aggregate demand from private sector deleveraging, or risk a replay of the Great Depression. More generally, history shows that it is extremely difficult for any one sector or country to deleverage when other sectors and countries are doing the same. The slow rate of nominal income growth makes the job that much harder. Borrowing Rates And The Economy There are several ways in which higher borrowing rates can affect the economy. Households will be incentivized to save rather than spend at the margin. Borrowing costs surpass hurdle rates for new investment projects, causing the business sector to trim capital spending. Uncertainty associated with rising rates might also undermine confidence for both households and firms, reinforcing the negative impact on demand. Banks, fearing a growth slowdown ahead and rising delinquencies, may tighten lending standards and thereby limit credit availability. These negative forces are normally a headwind for growth, but not something that outweighs the positive Keynesian dynamics of rising wages, profits and employment until real borrowing rates reach high levels. However, if the neutral or "equilibrium" level of interest rate is still extremely low today, then it may not require much of a rise in market rates to tip the economy over. A lot depends on confidence, which has been quite fragile in the post-Lehman world. The "cash flow" effect on debt service is another headwind for growth as rising interest payments trim the cash available to spend on goods and services. For the government sector, a swelling interest burden will add to the budget deficit and may place pressure on the fiscal authorities to cut back on spending in other areas. Some market commentators believe that the Fed will not be able to raise interest rates much because the cash-flow effect will quickly derail the expansion in the U.S. and potentially in other countries as the Treasury market selloff drags up yields across the global bond market. This is an argument that has circulated at the beginning of every Fed tightening cycle as far back as we can remember. Some even predict that central banks will be forced to use financial repression for an extended period to prevent the interest burden from skyrocketing and thereby short-circuiting the economic expansion. Back-of-the-envelope estimates that simply apply a 100 or 200 basis point increase in borrowing rates to the level of outstanding debt, for example, imply a shocking rise in the debt service burdens. Fed rate hikes could be analogous to the iceberg that took down the Titanic in 1912. Key Drivers Of Interest Sensitivity However, back-of-the-envelope calculations like the one described above paint an overly pessimistic picture for three reasons. First, the starting point for debt service burdens in the corporate, household and government sectors is low (Chart II-4). These burdens have generally trended down since 2007 because falling interest rates have more than offset debt accumulation, with the major exception of China.1 Second, the maturity distribution of debt means that it takes time for interest rate shifts to filter into debt servicing costs. For example, the average maturity of corporate investment-grade bond indexes in the major economies is between 3 and 12 years (Chart II-5). The average maturity of government indexes range from 7½ to 16 years. Moreover, the majority of household debt is related to fixed-rate mortgages. Even a significant portion of consumer debt is fixed for 5-years and more in some countries. Households have been extending the maturity structure of their debt in recent decades (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Chart II-4Debt Service Has Generally Declined Debt Service Has Generally Declined Debt Service Has Generally Declined Chart II-5Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Third, even following the backup in yield curves since the U.S. election, current interest rates on new loans are still significantly below average rates on outstanding household loans, corporate debt and government debt. The implication is that most older loans and bonds coming due over the next few years will be rolled over at a lower rate compared to the loans and bonds being replaced. This will even be true if current yield curves shift up by 100 basis points in many cases (except for the U.S. where current yields are closer to average coupon and loan rates). In this Special Report, we estimate the sensitivity of interest payments to changes in borrowing rates in the corporate, household and government sectors for four of the major economies. We could not include China in this month's analysis because data limitations precluded any degree of accuracy, but the sheer size of China's debt mountain justifies continued research in this area. The key finding is that interest burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, over the next couple of years even if borrowing rates rise immediately by 100 basis points from today's levels. It would require a 300 basis point rise in yield curves to really "move the dial" in terms of the cash-flow impact on spending. An interest rate shock of that size would be particularly dramatic for the Japanese government interest burden given the size of its debt mountain, but much of the interest payments would simply make the round trip to the Bank of Japan and back again. Consumer Sector U.S. households have worked hard at deleveraging since their net worth was devastated by the housing bust. Still, the overall debt-to-income level is elevated by historical standards. U.S. household leverage has generally trended higher since the Second World War and has been a source of angst for investors as far back as the late 1950s. Yet, we find no evidence that U.S. consumers have become more sensitive to changes in borrowing rates over the decades.2 This counter-intuitive result partially reflects the fact that consumers have partially insulated themselves from rising interest rates by adopting a greater proportion of fixed-rate debt. The bottom panel of Chart II-6 presents the two-year change in debt service payments expressed as a percent of income (i.e. the swing or the "cash flow" effect). The fact that these swings have not grown over time suggest that the cash-flow effect of changes in interest rates on debt service has not increased.3 Chart II-6U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates Another way to demonstrate this point is to compare disposable income growth with a measure of "discretionary" disposable income that subtracts debt service payments (Chart II-6, top panel). This is the amount of money left over after debt servicing to purchase goods and services. The annual rate of growth in disposable income and discretionary income are nearly identical. In other words, growth in spending power is determined almost exclusively by changes in the components of income (wages, hours and employment). Moreover, the fact that some households are net receivers of interest income provides some offset to rising interest payments for other households when rates go up. This conclusion applies to households in the other major countries as well. Charts II-7 to II-10 present projections for household interest payments as a percent of GDP under three scenarios: no change in yield curves, an immediate 100 basis point parallel shift up in the yield curve and a 300 basis point shift. Assuming an immediate increase in yields across the curve is overly blunt, but the scenarios are only meant to provide a sense of how much interest payments could rise on a medium-term horizon (say, one to five years). The exact timing is less important. Chart II-7U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-8U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-9Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-10Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Unsurprisingly, household interest payments as a fraction of GDP are flat-to-slightly lower in "no change" interest rate scenario for the major countries. The interest burden increases by roughly 1 percentage point in the 100 basis point shock, although the level remains well below the pre-Lehman peak in the U.S., U.K. and Eurozone. In Japan, the interest payments ratio returns to levels last seen in the late 1990s, although this is not particularly onerous. A 300 basis point shock would see interest burdens ramp up to near, or above, the pre-Lehman peak in all economies except in the U.K. For the latter, borrowing rates would still be below the 2007 peak even if they rise by 300 basis points from current levels. This scenario would see the household interest burden surge well above 3% of GDP in Japan, a level that exceeds the entire history of the Japanese series back to the early 1990s. Also shown in the bottom panel of Chart II-7, Chart II-8, Chart II-9, Chart II-10 is the associated 2-year swing in interest expense as a percent of GDP under the three scenarios. The 2-year swing moves into positive (i.e. restrictive) territory for all economies under the 100 basis point shock, although they remain in line with previous monetary tightening cycles. It is only for the 300 basis point scenario that the cash-flow effect appears threatening in terms of consumer spending power over the next two years. Corporate Sector The starting point for interest payments and overall debt-service in the corporate sector is also quite low by historical standards, although less so in the U.S. Falling interest rates have been partially offset by the rapid accumulation of American company debt in recent years. We modeled national accounts data for non-financial corporate interest paid using the stock of corporate bonds, loans and (where relevant) commercial paper, together with the associated interest or coupon rates. The model simply sums interest payments across these types of debt to generate a grand total, after accounting for the maturity structure of the loans and debt. Chart II-11, Chart II-12, Chart II-13 and Chart II-14 present the three yield curve scenarios for corporate interest payments. The interest burden is flat-to-somewhat lower if yield curves are unchanged, as old loans and bonds continue to roll over at today's depressed levels. Even if market yields jump by 100 basis points tomorrow, the resulting interest burdens would rise roughly back to 2012-2014 levels in the U.S., Eurozone and the U.K., which would still be quite low by historical standards. The resulting two-year cash-flow effect is modest overall. The rate increase feeds into corporate interest payments somewhat more quickly in the Eurozone and Japan because of the relatively shorter average maturity of the corporate debt market, but a shock of this size does not appear threatening to either economy. Chart II-11U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-12U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-13Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-14Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection It is a different story if yields rise by 300 basis points. The interest ratio approaches previous peaks set in the 2000s in the U.S. and Eurozone. The interest ratio rises sharply for the U.K. corporate sector as well, although it stays below the 2000 peak because interest rates were even higher 17 years ago. Japanese companies would also feel significant pain as the interest ratio rises back to where it was in the late 1990s. Government Sector Government finances are not at much risk from a modest increase in bond yields either (Chart II-15). We focus on the level of the interest burden rather than the cash-flow effect for the government sector since changes in interest payments probably have less impact on governments' near-term spending plans than is the case for the private sector. Chart II-15Government Sector Interest Payment Projection Government Sector Interest Payment Projection Government Sector Interest Payment Projection As discussed above, Treasury departments in the U.K., Eurozone and Japan have taken advantage of ultra-low borrowing rates by extending the average maturity of public debt. The average maturity of the Barclays U.K. government bond index has extended to 16 years, while it is close to 10 years in Japan and the Eurozone (Chart II-5). The U.S. Treasury has not followed suit; the Barclays U.S. index is about 7½ years in maturity. The lengthy average maturity means that index coupon rates will continue to fall for years to come if rates are unchanged in the U.K., Japan and the Eurozone, resulting in a declining interest burden. Even if rates rise by another 100 basis points, the interest burden is roughly flat as a percent of GDP for the U.K. and Eurozone, and rises only modestly in Japan. The limited impact reflects the fact that the starting point for current yields is well below the average coupon on the stock of government debt. In contrast, the U.S. interest burden is roughly flat in the "no change" scenario, and rises by a half percentage point by 2025 in the 100 basis point shock scenario. Keep in mind that we took the neutral assumption that the stock of government debt grows at the same pace as nominal GDP growth. This assumes that governments deal effectively with the impact of aging populations on entitlement programs in the coming years. As many studies have shown, debt levels will balloon if entitlements are not adjusted and/or taxes are not raised to cover rising health care and pension costs. We do not wish to downplay this long-term risk, but we are focused on the impact of higher interest rates on interest expense over the next five years for the purposes of this Special Report. As with the household and corporate sectors, the pain becomes much more serious in the event of a 300 basis point rise in interest rates. Interest payments rise by about 1 percentage point of GDP in the U.S. and U.K. to high levels by historically standards. It takes a decade for the full effect to unfold, although the ratios rise quickly in the early years as the short-term debt adjusts rapidly to the higher rate environment. For the Eurozone, the roughly 100 basis points rise takes the level of the interest burden back to about 2003 levels (i.e. it does not exceed the previous peak). Given Japan's extremely high government debt-to-GDP ratio, it is not surprising that a 300 basis point rise in interest rates would generate a whopping surge in the interest burden from near zero to almost 5% of GDP by the middle of the next decade. Nonetheless, this paints an overly pessimistic picture for two reasons. First, the Bank of Japan is likely to hold short-term rates close to zero for years as the authorities struggle to reach the 2% inflation target. This means that only long-term JGB yields have room to move higher in the event of a continued global bond selloff. Second, 40% of the JGB market is held by the central bank and this proportion will continue to rise until the Bank of Japan's QE program ends. Interest paid to the BoJ simply flows back to the Ministry of Finance. The net interest payments data used in our analysis are provided by the OECD. These data net out interest payments made between all arms of the government except for the central bank. The implication is that rising global bond yields in the coming years will not place the Japanese government under any fiscal strain. The same is true in the U.S., U.K. and Eurozone, where the respective central banks also hold a large portion of the stock of government debt (although this conclusion does not necessarily apply to the peripheral European governments). Conclusion The spike in bond yields since the U.S. election has focussed investor attention on the economic implications of higher borrowing costs given the sea of debt that has accumulated. As discussed in our 2017 BCA Outlook, we believe that the secular bond bull market is over but foresee only a gradual uptrend in yields in the coming years. Inflation is likely to remain subdued in the major countries and bond supply will continue to be absorbed by the ECB and Bank of Japan. The stock of government bonds available to the private sector will drop by $750 billion in 2017 for the U.S., Eurozone, Japan and the U.K. as a group. This follows a contraction of $546 billion in 2016. Forward guidance from the BoJ and ECB will also help to cap the upside for global bond yields. Still, we believe that the combination of gradually rising U.S. inflation, Fed rate hikes and the Trump fiscal stimulus plan will push Treasury yields above current forward rates in 2017. Other bond markets will outperform in local currency terms, but will suffer losses via contagion from the U.S. Despite the dizzying amount of debt accumulated since the Great Recession, it does not appear that debt service will sink the economies of the advanced economies as the Fed continues to normalize U.S. monetary policy. Debt service will rise from a low starting point and the swing in interest payments as a percent of GDP is unlikely to exceed previous cycles on a 2-year horizon for a 100 basis point rise in yields. The level of the interest payments/GDP ratio should not exceed previous peaks in most cases. The picture is much more threatening if yields were to surge by 300 basis points over the next couple of years, although this scenario would require an unexpected acceleration of inflation in the U.S. and/or the other advanced economies. We are not making the case that the buildup of debt is benign. Academic research has linked excessive leverage with slower trend economic growth and a higher risk of financial crisis. For governments, elevated debt can result in a rising risk premium that will crowd out spending in important areas, such as health and pensions, in the long run. For consumers and the corporate sector, excessive leverage could result in financial distress and a spike in defaults in the next downturn, reinforcing the contraction in output. The Bank for International Settlements agrees: "Increased household indebtedness, in and of itself, is not likely to be the source of a negative shock to the economy. Rather the primary macroeconomic implication of higher debt levels will be to amplify shocks to the economy coming from other sources, particularly those that affect household incomes, most notably rises in unemployment." 4 Debt lies at the heart of BCA's longstanding Debt Supercycle thesis. For several decades, the willingness of both lenders and borrowers to embrace credit was a lubricant for economic growth and rising asset prices and, importantly, underpinned the effectiveness for monetary policy. During times of economic and/or financial stress, it was relatively easy for the Fed and other central banks to improve the situation by engineering a new credit upcycle. That all ended with the 2007-09 meltdown. Since then, even zero policy rates have been unable to trigger a strong revival in private credit growth in the major developed countries because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. Growth headwinds finally appear to be ebbing, at least in the U.S., prompting the FOMC to begin the process of "normalizing" short-term interest rates. The U.S. economy could suffer another setback in 2017 for a number of reasons. Nonetheless, the key point of this report is that the cash-flow effect of rising interest rates should not be included in the list of reasons for believing that Fed officials will be quickly thwarted if they proceed with their rate hike plan over the next couple of years. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 For China, the BIS only provides an estimate of the debt service ratio for the household and non-financial corporate sectors combined. 2 See: U.S. Consumer Titanic Meets the Fed Iceberg? The BCA U.S. Fixed Income Analyst, July 2004. 3 The absence of a rise in volatility of the cash flow effect is partly due to the decline in, and the volatility of, interest rates after the 1980s. 4 Guy Debelle, "Household Debt and the Macroeconomy," BIS Quarterly Review, March 2004. Appendix Charts Chart II-16, Chart II-17, Chart II-18, Chart II-19 Chart II-16U.S. Debt By Sector U.S. Debt By Sector U.S. Debt By Sector Chart II-17U.K. Debt By Sector U.K. Debt By Sector U.K. Debt By Sector Chart II-18Japan Debt By Sector Japan Debt By Sector Japan Debt By Sector Chart II-19Euro Area Debt By Sector Euro Area Debt By Sector Euro Area Debt By Sector III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equities have been in a holding pattern so far in 2017, consolidating the gains made at the end of last year. Our key equity indicators are mixed at the moment. The Valuation indicator continues to hover at about a half standard deviation on the expensive side. The effect of the rise in global equity indexes late last year on valuation was offset by a surge in profits. Stocks are not cheap but, at this level, valuation not a roadblock to further price gains. Our Monetary indicator deteriorated further over the past couple of months, driven by a stronger dollar and higher bond yields. A shift in this indicator below the zero line would be negative for stock markets. Sentiment is also frothy, which is bearish from a contrary perspective, although our Technical indicator is positive. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators continue to send a positive message for stock markets. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The WTP indicators have all turned higher from a low level for the Japanese, the European and the U.S. markets. This suggests that investors, after loading up on bonds last year, have "dry powder" available to buy stocks as risk tolerance improves. The U.S. WTP has risen the fastest and is closing in on the 0.95 level. Our tests show that, historically, investors would have reaped impressive gains if they had over-weighted stocks versus bonds when the WTP was rising and reached 0.95. The WTPs suggest that the U.S. market should outperform the Eurozone and Japanese markets in the near term, although for macro reasons we still believe the U.S. will lag the other two. We expect the global stock-to-bond total return ratio to rise through this year. The latest selloff has pushed U.S. Treasurys slightly into "inexpensive" territory based on our Valuation model. Bonds are still technically oversold and sentiment remains bullish, suggesting that the consolidation phase may last a little longer. Nonetheless, we expect to recommend short-duration positions again once the overbought conditions unwind. The U.S. dollar is near previous secular peaks according to our valuation measure. Nonetheless, policy divergences are likely to drive the U.S. dollar to new valuation highs before the bull market is over. Technically overbought conditions have almost unwound, clearing the way for the next leg of the dollar bull run. Commodities have been on a tear on the back of improving and synchronized growth across the major countries (and some dollar weakness very recently). The commodity price outlook is clouded by the prospect of a border tax, which could send the U.S. dollar soaring. The broad commodity market is also approaching overbought levels. The cyclical growth outlook is positive for commodity demand, although supply factors favor oil to base metals. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights President Trump is as protectionist as Candidate Trump; USD shortage to tighten global financial conditions; Go Long MXN/RMB as a tactical play on U.S.-China trade war; Brexit risks are now overstated; EU will not twist the knife. EUR/GBP is overbought; go short. Feature "We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it's going to be America First." U.S. President Donald Trump, January 20, 2017, Inaugural Address What are the investment implications of an "America First" world? First, it may be useful to visualize the "America Second" world that President Trump is looking to leave in the rear-view mirror. Chart 1 shows the cost of hegemony. Since the Nixon shock in 1971, the U.S. has seen its trade balance deepen and its military commitments soar, in absolute terms. For President Donald Trump, the return on American investment has been low. Wasteful wars, crumbling infrastructure, decaying factories, stagnant wages, this is what the U.S. has to show for two decades of hegemony. Chart 1United States: The Cost Of Hegemony The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? On the other hand, the U.S. has enjoyed the exorbitant privilege of its hegemonic position. In at least one major sense, America's allies (and China) are already paying for American hegemony: through their investments in U.S. dollar assets. Chart 2 illustrates this so-called "exorbitant privilege." Despite a deeply negative net international investment position, the U.S. has a positive net investment income.1 Chart 2The "Exorbitant Privilege" The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Being the global hegemon effectively lowers U.S. borrowing costs and domestic interest rates, giving U.S. policymakers and consumers an "interest rate they do not deserve." That successive administrations decided to waste this privilege on redrawing the map of the Middle East and giving the wealthiest Americans massive tax cuts, instead of rebuilding Middle America, is hardly the fault of the rest of the world! Foreigners hold U.S. assets because of the size of the economy, the sustainability and deep liquidity of the market, and the perceived stability of its political system. More importantly, they hold U.S. assets because the U.S. acts as both a global defender and a consumer of last resort. If Washington were to raise barriers to its markets and become a doubtful provider of security, states may gradually see less of a payoff in holding U.S. assets and decide to diversify more rapidly. Investors can interpret Trump's "America First" agenda broadly as an effort to dramatically reduce the U.S. current account deficit. Certainly we see his statements on renegotiating NAFTA, facing off against China on trade, and encouraging U.S. exports with tax legislation as parts of a broad effort aimed at improving the U.S. trade balance. If the U.S. were to pursue these protectionist policies aggressively, the end result would be a massive shortage of U.S. dollars globally, a form of global financial tightening. The rest of the world is not blind to the dangers of an America focused on reducing its current account deficit. According to the reporting of Der Spiegel magazine, Chancellor Angela Merkel sent several delegations to meet with the Trump team starting in 2015! No doubt Berlin was nervous hearing candidate Trump's protectionist talk, given that Germany runs one of the largest trade surpluses with the U.S. (Chart 3). In the last such meeting, taking place after the election was decided, Trump's son-in-law and White House advisor, Jared Kushner, asked the Germans a point-blank question, "What can you do for us?"2 In the 1980s, the U.S. asked West Germany and Japan the same question. The result was the 1985 Plaza Accord that engineered the greenback's depreciation versus the deutschmark and the yen (Chart 4). Recent comments from Donald Trump suggest that he would like to follow a similar script, where dollar depreciation does the heavy lifting in adjusting the country's current account deficit.3 Chart 3Trump's Black List Trump's Black List Trump's Black List Chart 4The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Trump administration may have dusted off the Reagan playbook from the 1980s, but the world is playing a different game in 2017. First, the Soviet Union no longer exists and certainly no longer has more than 70,000 tanks ready to burst through the "Fulda Gap" towards Frankfurt. President Trump will find China, Germany, and Japan less willing to help the U.S. close its current account deficit, particularly if Trump continues his rhetorical assault on everything from European unity to Japanese security to the One China policy. Second, China, not U.S. allies Germany and Japan, has the largest trade surplus with the U.S. It is very difficult to see Beijing agreeing to a coordinated currency appreciation of the RMB, particularly when it is being threatened with a showdown over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Third, even if China wanted to kowtow to the Trump administration, it is not clear that RMB appreciation can be engineered. The country's capital outflows have swelled to a record level of $205 billion (Chart 5) and the PBoC has continued to inject RMB into the banking system via outright lending to banks and open-market operations (Chart 6). Unlike Japan in 1985, China is at the peak of its leveraging cycle and thus unwilling to see its currency - and domestic interest rates - appreciate. At best, Beijing can continue to fight capital outflows and close its capital account. But even this creates a paradox, since the U.S. administration can accuse it of currency manipulation even if such manipulation is preventing, not enabling, currency depreciation!4 Chart 5China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows Chart 6PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity To conclude, the world is (re)entering a mercantilist era and sits at the Apex of Globalization.5 The new White House is almost singularly focused on bringing the U.S. current account deficit down. It intends to do this by means of three primary tools: Protectionism: The Republicans in the House of Representatives have proposed a "destination-based border adjustment tax," which would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. (It would levy the corporate tax on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs, thus giving a rebate to exporters who make revenues abroad while incurring costs domestically.)6 While the proponents of the new tax system argue it is equivalent to the VAT systems in G7 economies, the change would nonetheless undermine America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." In our view, it would be the opening salvo of a global trade war. Dirigisme: President Trump has not shied away from directly intervening to keep corporate production inside the U.S. He has also insisted on a vague proposal to impose a 35% "border tax" on U.S. corporates that manufacture abroad for domestic consumption. (Details are scant: His Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has denied an across-the-board tax of this nature, but has confirmed that one would apply to specific companies.) Structural Demands: Trump's approach suggests that he wishes to force structural changes on trade surplus economies in order to correct structural imbalances in the American economy - and in this process he is not adverse to lobbing strategic threats. While he holds out the possibility of charging China with currency manipulation, in fact he can draw from a whole sheet of American trade grievances not limited to the currency to demand major changes to their trade relationship. The fundamental problem for the global economy is that in order to reduce the U.S. current account deficit, the world must experience severe global tightening. Dollars held by U.S. multinationals abroad, which finance global credit markets, will come back to the U.S. and tighten liquidity abroad. And emerging market corporate borrowers who have overextended themselves borrowing in U.S. dollars will struggle to repay debts in appreciating dollars. These structural trends are set to exacerbate an already ongoing cyclical process. As BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out, global demand for U.S. dollars is rising faster than the supply of U.S. dollars.7 Our EM team's first measure of U.S. dollar liquidity is "the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held in custody for official and international accounts." The second measure "is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreign residents." As Chart 7 and Chart 8 illustrate, both calculations indicate that dollar liquidity is in a precipitous decline already. Meanwhile, foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is contracting, while the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreigners has stalled (Chart 9). Chart 7Dollar Liquidity Declining... Dollar Liquidity Declining... Dollar Liquidity Declining... Chart 8... Any Way You Look At It ... Any Way You Look At It ... Any Way You Look At It Chart 9Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Chart 10It Hurts To Borrow In USD It Hurts To Borrow In USD It Hurts To Borrow In USD Concurrently, U.S. dollar borrowing costs continue to rise (Chart 10). Our EM team expects EM debtors with U.S. dollar liabilities to either repay U.S. dollar debt or hedge it. This will ultimately increase the demand for U.S. dollars in the months ahead. Near-term U.S. dollar appreciation will only reinforce and accelerate the mercantilist push in the White House and Congress. President Trump and the GOP in the House will find common ground on the border-adjustment tax, which Trump recently admitted he did not understand or look favorably upon. The passage of the law, or some such equivalent, has a much greater chance than investors expect. So does a U.S.-China trade war, as we argued last week.8 How should investors position themselves for the confluence of geopolitical, political, and financial factors we have described above? The world is facing both the cyclical liquidity crunch that BCA's Emerging Markets Team has elucidated and the potential for a secular tightening as the Trump administration focuses its efforts on closing the U.S. current account deficit. Five investment implications are top of our mind: Chart 11Market Response To Trump Win On High End Market Response To Trump Win On High End Market Response To Trump Win On High End Chart 12Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Buy VIX. The S&P 500 has continued to power on since the election, buoyed by positive economic surprises, strong global earnings, and the hope of a pro-business shift in the White House. The equity market performance puts the Trump presidency in the upper range of post-election market outcomes (Chart 11). However, with 10-year Treasuries back above fair value, the VIX near 12, and EM equities near their pre-November high, the market is pricing none of the political and geopolitical risks of an impending trade war between the U.S. and China, nor is it pricing the general mercantilist shift in Washington D.C. (Chart 12). As a result, we recommend that clients put on a "mercantilist hedge," like deep out-of-the-money S&P 500 puts, or VIX calls. For instance, a long VIX 20/25 call spread for March expiry. Long DM / Short EM. Mercantilism and the U.S. dollar bull market are the worst combination possible for EM risk assets. We therefore reiterate our long-held strategic recommendation of being long developed markets / short emerging markets. Overweight Euro Area Equities. Investors should overweight euro area equities relative to the U.S. As we have discussed in the 2017 Strategic Outlook, political risks in Europe this year are a red herring.9 We will expand on the upcoming French elections in next week's report. Meanwhile, investors appear complacent about protectionism and what it may mean for the S&P 500, which sources 44% of its earnings abroad. European companies, on the other hand, could stand to profit from a China-U.S. trade war. Chart 13Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Chart 14Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Long MXN/RMB. As a tactical play on the U.S.-China trade war, we recommend clients go long MXN/RMB (Chart 13). The peso is now as cheap as it was in early 1995, at the heights of the Tequila Crisis, as per the BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy model (Chart 14). While Mexico remains squarely in Trump's crosshairs on immigration and security, the damage to the currency appears to be done and has ironically made the country's exports more competitive. In addition, Trump's pick for Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, has informed his NAFTA counterparts that "rules of origin" will be central to NAFTA re-negotiation. This can be interpreted as the U.S. using every tool at its disposal to impose punitive measures on China, including forcing NAFTA partners to close off the "rules of origin" loophole.10 But the reality is that the U.S. trade deficit with its NAFTA partners is far less daunting than that with China (Chart 15). Meanwhile, we remain negative on the RMB for fundamental reasons that we have stressed in our research. Small Is Beautiful. We continue to recommend that clients find protection from rising protectionism in small caps. Small caps are traditionally domestically geared irrespective of their domicile. Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, also points out that small caps in the U.S. will benefit as the new administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, which will benefit small caps disproportionally to large caps given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Moreover, small companies will benefit most from any cuts in regulations, most of which have been written by multinationals in order to create barriers to entry (Chart 16). Of course, we could just be paranoid! After all, much of Trump's proposed policies - massive tax cuts, infrastructure spending, major rearmament, the border wall - would increase domestic spending and thus widen the current account deficit, not shrink it. And all the protectionism and de-globalization could just be posturing by the Trump administration, both to get a better deal from China and Europe and to give voters in the Midwest some political red meat. Chart 15China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Chart 16Small Is Beautiful Small Is Beautiful Small Is Beautiful But Geopolitical Strategy analysts get paid to be paranoid! And we worry that much of Trump's promises that would widen U.S. deficits are being watered down or pushed to the background. Yes, we have held a high conviction view that infrastructure spending would come through, but now it appears that it will be complemented with significant spending cuts. The next 100 days will tell us which prerogatives the Trump Administration favors: rebuilding America directly, or doing so indirectly via protectionism. If the former, then the current market rally is justified. If the intention is to reduce the current account deficit, look out. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Brexit: A Brave New World Miranda: O brave new world! Prospero: 'Tis new to thee. — Shakespeare, The Tempest The U.K. Supreme Court ruled on January 24 that parliament must have a say in triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which enables the U.K. to "exit" the European Union. This decision, as well as Theresa May's January 17 "Brexit means exit" speech, caught us in London while visiting clients. Reactions were mixed. The pound continues to rally. January 16 remains the low point in the GBP/USD cross since the vote to leave on June 23 last year (Chart 17). Chart 17Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Should investors expect more downside to the pound or do the recent events mark a bottom in political uncertainty? The market consensus suggests that further volatility in the pound is warranted for three reasons: Europeans will seek to punish the U.K. for Brexit, to set an example to their own Euroskeptics; Prime Minister May's assertion that the U.K. would seek to exit the common market is negative for the country's economy; Legal uncertainties about Brexit remain. We disagree with this assessment, at least in the short and medium term. Therefore, the pound rally on the day of May's speech was warranted, although we agree that exiting the EU Common Market will ultimately be suboptimal for the country's economy. First, by setting out a clean break from the EU, including the common market, Prime Minister May has removed a considerable amount of political uncertainty. As we pointed out in our original net assessment of Brexit, leaving the EU while remaining in its common market is illogical.11 Paradoxically, the U.K. stood to lose rather than regain sovereignty if it left the EU yet remained in the common market (Diagram 1). Diagram 1The Quite Un-British Lack Of Common Sense Behind Soft Brexit The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Why? Because membership in the common market entails a financial burden, full adoption of the acquis communautaire (the EU body of law), and acceptance of the "Four Freedoms," including the freedom of movement of workers. Given that the Brexit vote was largely motivated by concerns of sovereignty and immigration (Chart 18), it did not make sense to vote to leave the EU and then seek to retain membership in the common market. Apparently May and her cabinet agree. Chart 18It's Sovereignty, Stupid! The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Second, now that the U.K. has chosen to depart from the common market, the EU no longer needs to take as hostile of a negotiating position as before. The EU member states were not going to let the U.K. dictate its own terms of membership. That would have set a precedent for future Euroskeptic governments looking for an alternative relationship with the bloc, i.e. the so-called "Europe, à la carte" that European policymakers dread. But now that the U.K. is asking for a clean exit, with a free trade agreement to be negotiated in lieu of common market membership, the EU has less reason to punish London. An FTA arrangement will be beneficial to EU exporters, who want access to the U.K. market, and it will send a message to Euroskeptics on the continent that there is no alternative to full membership. Leaving the EU means leaving the market and falling back - at best - to an FTA-level relationship that the EU shares with Mexico and (most recently) Canada. Third, leaving the EU and the common market are political, not legal, decisions, and the lingering legal battles are neither avoidable nor likely to be substantive. Theresa May had already stolen thunder when she said that the final deal with the EU would be put to a vote in parliament. The Supreme Court ruling - as well as other legal hangups - could conceivably give rise to complications that bind the government's hands, but most likely parliament will pass a simple bill or motion granting permission for the government to invoke Article 50. That is because the referendum, and public opinion since then, speak loud and clear (Chart 19). The Conservative Party remains in a comfortable lead over the Labour Party (Chart 20), which itself is not opposing the referendum outcome. In addition, the House of Commons has already approved the government's Brexit timetable by a margin of 372 seats in a 650-seat body - with 461 ayes. That is a stark contrast with a few months ago when around 494 MPs were said to be against Brexit. Chart 19No 'Bremorse' Or 'Bregret' The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Chart 20Tories Still Triumphant Tories Still Triumphant Tories Still Triumphant The bigger question comes down to the parliamentary vote on the deal that is to be negotiated over the next two years. Could the Parliament vote down the final agreement with the EU? Absolutely. However, it is unlikely. The economic calamity predicted by many commentators has not happened, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: The combination of the Supreme Court decision and Prime Minister May's speech has reduced political uncertainty regarding Brexit. The EU will negotiate hard with the U.K., but the main cause of consternation - the U.K. asking for special treatment with respect to the common market - is now off the table. Yes, the EU does hold all the cards when it comes to negotiating an FTA agreement, and the process could entail some alarming twists and turns (given the last-minute crisis in the EU-Canada FTA). But we do not expect EU-U.K. negotiations to imperil the pound dramatically beyond what we've already seen. Will Leaving The Common Market Hurt Britain? Does this mean that Brexit is "much ado about nothing?" In the short and medium term, we think the answer is yes. In the long-term, leaving the EU Common Market is a suboptimal outcome for three reasons: Trade - Net exports rarely contribute positively to U.K. growth (Chart 21) and the trade deficit with the EU is particularly deep. As such, proponents of Brexit claim that putting up modest trade barriers against the EU could be beneficial. However, the U.K. has a services trade surplus with the EU (Chart 22). While it is not as large as the trade deficit, there was hope that the eventual implementation of the 2006 EU's Services Directive would have opened up new markets for U.K.'s highly competitive services industry and thus reduced the trade deficit over time. As the bottom panel of Chart 22 shows, the U.K.'s service exports to the rest of the world have outpaced those to the EU, suggesting that there is much room for improvement. This hope is now dashed and the EU may go back to putting up non-tariff barriers to services that reverse Britain's modest surplus with the bloc. Free Trade Agreements rarely adequately cover services, which means that the U.K.'s hope of expanding service exports to a new high is probably gone. Chart 21U.K. Is Consumer-Driven U.K. Is Consumer-Driven U.K. Is Consumer-Driven Chart 22Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Foreign Investment - FDI is declining, whether for cyclical reasons or because foreign companies fear losing access to Europe via the U.K. It remains to be seen how FDI will respond to the U.K.'s renunciation of the common market, but it is unlikely to be positive (Chart 23). The U.K.'s financial sector will also be negatively impacted since leaving the common market will mean that London will no longer have recourse to the EU judiciary in order to stymie European protectionism.12 This is unlikely to destroy London's status as the global financial center, but it will impact FDI on the margin. Labor Growth - The loss of labor inflow will be the biggest cost of Brexit. A decrease of immigration from the EU could reduce the U.K.'s labor force growth by a maximum of two-thirds, translating to a 25% loss in the potential GDP growth rate (Chart 24). While the U.K. is not, in fact, closing off all immigration, labor-force growth will decline, and potential GDP with it. Chart 23FDI To Suffer From Brexit? FDI To Suffer From Brexit? FDI To Suffer From Brexit? Chart 24Labor Growth Suffers Most From Brexit The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? In addition, the EU Common Market forces companies to compete for market share in the developed world's largest consumer market. This competition is supposed to accelerate creative destruction and thus productivity, while giving the winners of the competition the spoils, i.e. a better ability to establish "economies of scale." In a 2011 report, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) published an econometric study that compared four scenarios: the U.K. remains in the common market as the EU fully liberalizes trade; the U.K. remains in the EU's single market, but does not fully liberalize trade with the rest of the EU; the U.K. leaves the common market; the U.K. enters NAFTA.13 Of the four scenarios, only the first leads to an increase in wealth for the U.K., with 7.1% additional GDP over ten years. U.K. exports would increase by 47%, against 38.1% for its imports. Wages of both skilled and unskilled workers would increase as well. Meanwhile, the report finds that closer integration with NAFTA would not compensate for looser U.K. ties with the EU. In fact, the U.K. national income would be 7.4% smaller if the U.K. tied up with NAFTA instead of taking part in further trade liberalization on the continent. Why rely on a 2011 report for the assessment of benefits of the common market? Because it was written by a competent, relatively unbiased international body and predates the highly politicized environment surrounding Brexit that has since infected almost all think-tank research. And yet the more recent research echoes the 2011 report in terms of the negative consequences of leaving the common market.14 In addition, the BIS study actually attempts to forecast the benefit of further removing trade barriers in the single market, which is at least the intention of the EU Commission. That said, our concerns regarding the U.K. economy are long-term. It may take years before the full economic impact of leaving the common market can be assessed. In addition, much of our analysis hinges on the Europeans fully liberalizing the common market and removing the last remaining non-tariff barriers to trade, particularly of services. At the present-day level of liberalization, the U.K. may benefit by leaving. In addition, we do not expect a balance-of-payments crisis in the U.K. any time soon. The U.K. current account is deeply negative, unsurprisingly so given the deep trade imbalance with the EU and world. However, our colleague Mathieu Savary, Vice-President of BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, has pointed out that the elasticity of imports to the pound is in fact negative, a very surprising result. This reflects an extremely elevated import content of British exports. A lower pound is therefore unlikely to be the most crucial means of improving the current-account position. Certainly leaving the common market will not improve the competitiveness of British exports in the EU. Chart 25The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy But this raises a bigger question: why does the U.K. have to improve its current account deficit? As our FX team points out in Chart 25, despite having a current-account deficit of nearly 6% of GDP, the U.K. runs a basic balance-of-payments surplus of 12%, even after the recent fall in FDI inflows. The reason for the massive balance-of-payments surplus is the financial account surplus of 6.17% of GDP, a feature of the U.K. being a destination for foreign capital, which flows from its status as a global financial center and prime real estate destination. In other words, leaving the common market will not change the fundamentals of the U.K. balance of payments much. The country will remain a global financial center and will still run a capital account surplus, which will suppress the country's interest rates, buoy the GBP, and give tailwinds to imports of foreign goods. Meanwhile, exports will not benefit as they will face marginally higher tariffs as the country exits the EU Common Market. At best, new tariffs will be offset by a cheaper GBP. As such, leaving the common market is not going to be a disaster for the U.K. Nor will it be a panacea for the country's deep current account deficit. And that is okay. The U.K. will not face a crisis in funding its current account deficit. What is clear is that for the time being, the U.K. economy is holding up. Our forex strategists recently argued that U.K.'s growth has surprised to the upside and that the improvement is sustainable: Monetary and fiscal policy are both accommodative (Chart 26); Inflation is limited; Tight labor market drives up wages and puts cash in consumers' pockets (Chart 27); Credit growth remains robust (Chart 28). Chart 26Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Chart 27British Labor Market Tightening British Labor Market Tightening British Labor Market Tightening Chart 28U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good This means that the political trajectory is set for the time being. "Bremorse" and "Bregret" will remain phantoms for the time being. Bottom Line: Leaving the common market is a suboptimal but not apocalyptic outcome for the U.K. The combination of decent economic performance and lowered political uncertainty in the near term will support the pound. Given the pound's 20% correction since the June referendum, we believe that the market has already priced in the new, marginally negative, post-Brexit paradigm. The Big Picture It is impossible to say whether the long-term negative economic effects of Brexit will affect voters drastically enough and quickly enough for Scotland, or parliament, to act in 2018 or 2019 and modify the government's decision to pursue a "Hard Brexit." It seems conceivable if something changes in the fundamental dynamics outlined above, but we wouldn't bet on it. At the moment even a new Scottish referendum appears unlikely (Chart 29). Scottish voters have soured on independence, perhaps due to a combination of continued political uncertainty in the EU (Scotland's political alternative to the U.K.) and a collapse in oil prices (arguably Scotland's economic alternative to the U.K.). The issue is not resolved but on ice for the time being. Chart 29Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) More likely, the government will get its way on Brexit and the 2020 elections will mark a significant popular test of the Conservative leadership and the final deal with the EU. Then the aftermath will be an entirely new ballgame for the U.K. and all four of its constituent nations. If Britain's new beginning is founded on protectionism and dirigisme - as the government suggests - then the public is likely to be disappointed. The "brave new world" of Brexit may prove to be rather mundane, disappointing, and eerily reminiscent of the ghastly 1970s.15 Hence the Shakespeare quote at the top of this report. The political circumstances of Brexit resemble the U.K. landscape before it joined the European Economic Community in 1973: greater government role in the economy, trade protectionism, tight labor market, higher wages, and inflation. Yet this was a period when the U.K. economy underperformed Europe's. The U.K.'s eventual era of outperformance was contingent on the structural reforms of the Thatcher era and expanded access to the European market (Chart 30). It remains to be seen what happens when the U.K. leaves the market and rolls back Thatcherite reforms. The weak pound and proactive fiscal policy will fail to create a manufacturing revolution. That is because most manufacturing has hollowed out because of automation, not foreign workers stealing Britons' jobs. Moreover, as for the pound, it is important to remember that currency effects are temporary and any boost to exports that the weak pound is generating will be short-lived, as with the case of China in the 1990s and the EU in the past two years (Chart 31). Chart 30U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? Chart 31Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting In addition, we would argue that, in an environment of de-globalization - in which tariffs are rising, albeit slowly for the time being (Chart 32) - the EU Common Market provides Europe with a mechanism by which to protect its vast consumer market. The U.K. may have chosen the precisely wrong time in which to abandon the protection of continental European protectionism. It could suffer by finding itself on the outside of the common market as global tariffs begin to rise significantly. Chart 32Protectionism On The March The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? What about the restoration of the "Special Relationship" between the U.K. and the U.S.? Could moving to the "front of the queue" on negotiating an FTA with the world's largest economy make a difference for the U.K.? Perhaps, but as the BIS study above indicates, an FTA with North America or the U.S. alone is unlikely to replace the benefits of the common market. In addition, it is difficult to imagine how a protectionist U.S. administration that is looking to massively decrease its current account deficit will help the U.K. expand trade with the U.S. By contrast, Trump's election in the United States poses massive risks to globalization, both through his protectionism and the strong USD implications of his core policies. This will reverberate negatively across the commodities and EM space. In such an environment, the U.K. may not be able to make much headway in its "Global Britain" initiatives to conclude fast trade deals with EM economies that stand to lose the most in the de-globalization era. Bottom Line: As a trading nation, the U.K. is likely to lose out in a prolonged period of de-globalization. Membership in the EU could have served as a bulwark against this global trend. Investment Implications We diverge from our colleagues in the Foreign Exchange Strategy and European Investment Strategy when it comes to the assessment of political risk looming over Brexit.16 The decision to leave the common market will alleviate the pressure on Europeans to seek vindictive punishment. Earlier, the U.K. was forcing them to choose between making an exception to the rules and demonstrating the negative consequences of leaving the bloc. Now the U.K. is self-evidently taking on its own punishment - the economic burden of leaving the common market - and the EU will probably deem that sufficient. Will the EU play tough? Yes, especially since the EU retains considerable economic leverage over Britain (Chart 33). But the stakes are far smaller now. Furthermore, investors should remember that core European states - especially France and Germany - remain major military allies of the U.K. and will continue to be deeply intertwined economically. As such, we believe that the pound has already priced in the new economic paradigm and that the expectations of political uncertainty ahead of the U.K.-EU negotiations may be overdone. We therefore recommend that investors short EUR/GBP outright. Our aforementioned forex strategist Mathieu Savary argues that, on an intermediate-term basis, the outlook for this cross is driven by interest rate differentials and policy considerations. Due to the balance-sheet operations conducted by the BoE and ECB, interest rates in the U.K. and the euro area do not fully reflect domestic policy stances. Instead, Mathieu uses the shadow rates. Currently, shadow rates unequivocally point toward a lower EUR/GBP (Chart 34). In fact, balance-sheet dynamics point toward shorting EUR/GBP. Chart 33EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation Chart 34Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP For full disclosure, Mathieu cautions clients to wait on executing a short EUR/GBP until after Article 50 is enacted. By contrast, we think that political uncertainty regarding Brexit likely peaked on January 16. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 While the U.S. runs a massively negative net international investment position, its net international income remains positive. In other words, foreigners receive a much lower return on U.S. assets while the U.S. benefits from risk premia in foreign markets. 2 Please see Spiegel Online, "Donald Trump and the New World Order," dated January 20, 2017, available at Spiegel.de. 3 In a widely-quoted interview with The Wall Street Journal, Donald Trump said that the U.S. dollar is "too strong." He continued that, "Our companies can't compete with [China] now because our currency is too strong. And it's killing us." Please see The Wall Street Journal, "Donald Trump Warns on House Republican Tax Plan," dated January 16, 2017, available at wsj.com. 4 We would note that the Trump administration and its Treasury Department have considerable leeway over how they choose to interpret China's foreign exchange practices. In 1992, when the U.S. government last accused China of currency manipulation, it issued a warning in its spring report before leveling the accusation in the winter report. The RMB did not depreciate in the meantime but remained stable, and Treasury noted this approvingly; however, Treasury chose 1989 as the base level for its assessment, and found manipulation. The Trump administration could use much more aggressive interpretive methods than this to achieve its ends. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, and Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options," dated January 11, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Critics, including Trump supporters, claim that NAFTA sets too low of a threshold for the domestic content of a good deemed to have originated within the NAFTA countries. Goods that are nearly 40% foreign-made can thus be treated as NAFTA-made. This is one of many contentious points in the trade deal. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 In 2015, the U.K. took the ECB to court over its decision to require financial transactions denominated in euros to be conducted in the euro area, i.e. out of the City, and won. This avenue of legal redress will no longer be available for the U.K., allowing EU member states to slowly introduce rules and regulations that corral the financial industry - or at least to the parts focused on transactions in euros - out of London. 13 Please see Bank of International Settlements, "The economic consequences for the U.K. and the EU of completing the Single Market," BIS Economics Paper No. 11, dated February 2011, available at www.gov.uk. 14 Please see Her Majesty's Government, "H.M. Treasury Analysis: The Long-Term Economic Impact Of EU Membership And The Alternatives," Cmnd. 9250, April 2016, available at www.gov.uk. and Jagjit S. Chadha, "The Referendum Blues: Shocking The System," National Institute Economic Review 237 (August 2016), available at www.niesr.ac.uk. 15 We were going to use "grey" to describe Britain in the 1970s. However, our colleague Martin Barnes, BCA's Chief Economist, insisted that "grey" did not do the "ghastly" 1970s justice. When it comes to the U.K. in the 1970s, we are going to defer to Martin. 16 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “May’s Brexit Speech: No Substance,” dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar