Emerging Markets

Highlights Mexico and China are not the only countries that could suffer from U.S. trade protectionism. Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are also at risk. The global inflationary versus deflationary impact of U.S. trade protectionism will depend on the magnitude of exchange rate adjustments. Currencies will adjust to redistribute the inflationary and deflationary impact of U.S. tariffs and Border Adjustment Taxes between the U.S. and the rest of the world. Go long three-month volatility in the KRW, the MYR and the THB. The Turkish lira has approached our target of TRY/USD 3.9. Investors should book profits for now and reinstate short if the lira rebounds to 3.5 Feature Chart I-1Are Share Prices Discounting ##br##U.S. Trade Protectionism? Are Share Prices Discounting U.S. Trade Protectionism? Are Share Prices Discounting U.S. Trade Protectionism? The odds of a considerable rise in U.S. trade protectionism have ratcheted up since President Donald Trump's victory in early November, yet global share prices have been sanguine about it. Equities have instead focused on the positives of Trump's agenda such as fiscal stimulus and deregulation. Does this mean that the marketplace is overly complacent? One can argue that potential trade wars are a well-known risk, and as such are already discounted in share prices. It is also possible to argue that the equity markets did not fall at all ahead of and following Trump's victory to discount potential negatives from trade protectionism. The only market that has reacted to discount looming trade restrictions is Mexico, specifically the peso and its fixed-income markets. However, the ramifications of U.S. trade protectionism will reverberate well beyond Mexico. Global ex-U.S. share prices have not corrected at all to discount the potential negatives (Chart I-1). Unless the U.S. dollar surges, U.S. manufacturers will likely benefit from protectionist measures. However, U.S inflation and interest rates will rise in this scenario, weighing on equity valuation multiples. Overall, the majority of America's trade partners are at risk. In this week's report, we assess the vulnerability of various EM countries to the U.S. trade assault. U.S. trade restrictions will take the form of either import tariffs, a Border Adjustment Tax (BAT),1 or a mix of both. We conclude that buying volatility of select EM currencies is one way to profit from budding U.S. protectionism. Vulnerability To A U.S. Trade Assault Below we analyze which EM economies are most at risk from U.S. import tariffs and BAT. Given it is impossible to know whether the U.S. will adopt import tariffs, a BAT, or some combination of the two, we evaluate the impact on developing countries from both measures. Import tariffs: To assess each country's exposure to potential import tariffs, we examine the size of export shipments to America relative to that country's GDP. Table I-1 shows that Mexico, Canada, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand have the largest exports to the U.S. as a share of their economy. For Mexico, Canada and Malaysia, we exclude oil shipments to the U.S., as it is not clear whether oil will be subject to import tariffs. BAT: The principal variable gauging a country's vulnerability to a BAT is its trade balance with the U.S. This is because a BAT is both a penalty on imports into the U.S. as well as a subsidy on American exports. Hence, this analysis has to take into consideration not only a country's shipments to the U.S. but also American producers' exports to that country. Table I-2 shows the size of each country's trade balance with the U.S. as a share of its GDP. Table I-1Vulnerability To U.S. Import Tariffs EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism Table I-2Vulnerability To BATs EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism Again, for Mexico, Canada and Malaysia, we exclude the oil trade balance with the U.S. from the calculation. 3. Combined vulnerability ranking. Lack of clarity on trade policy specifics the U.S. is going to adopt means that we may need to synthesize the above analysis, combining the vulnerability ranking on both measures into one. Chart I-2 plots trade balances on the X axis and exports to the U.S. on the Y axis. It appears Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand are the most vulnerable, based on both criteria. Chart I-2Vulnerability To U.S. Import Tariffs And Border Adjustment Taxes EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism Another way to generate a vulnerability ranking is to calculate an aggregate score based on Tables I-1 and I-2 because either import tariffs, a BAT or some combination of the two will be adopted by the U.S. The aggregate vulnerability score is presented in Chart I-3. Chart I-3U.S. Trade Protectionism Vulnerability Ranking EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism According to the overall vulnerability score, Mexico, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea are the most exposed to potential U.S. trade protectionism measures. By contrast, Turkey, Brazil and Chile are the least exposed. Bottom Line: Mexico and China are not the only countries that could suffer from U.S. trade protectionism. Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are also at risk. On the flip side, Turkey and Brazil are the least exposed to a U.S. trade assault. We remain short many EM exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar including the Malaysian, Korean and Colombian currencies, and reiterate these positions today. Traders who are not positioned this way or have been stopped out should consider reinstating these trades (the full list of our currency recommendations). As for the Mexican peso, it has undershot relative to other EM currencies. We have not been bullish on the MXN versus the USD, though in recent months have recommended going long the MXN versus the BRL and ZAR. These trades have so far produced large losses, but we expect the MXN to recover some of those losses on its crosses. Are Trade Barriers Inflationary Or Deflationary? We consider three scenarios: Chart I-4U.S.: Rising Unit Labor Costs ##br##Warrant Higher Core Inflation U.S.: Rising Unit Labor Costs Warrant Higher Core Inflation U.S.: Rising Unit Labor Costs Warrant Higher Core Inflation 1. Without an exchange rate adjustment (U.S. dollar appreciation), import tariffs and BATs will be inflationary for the U.S. and deflationary for the rest of the world. In this scenario, the prices of imported goods will rise in U.S. dollars and U.S. consumers will end up paying for the tariff/border taxes or exporters will see their U.S. dollar revenues plummet or some combination of the two. U.S. manufacturers will become competitive with higher prices of imported goods, and U.S. employment and resource utilization will mount, heightening domestic inflationary pressures. Even though non-energy imports make up only 11% of U.S. GDP, the inflationary impact of trade protectionism will be pervasive. The reason being that it will tighten the resource utilization in the American economy in general, and the labor market in particular. Currently, the U.S. labor market is tight, wages are accelerating and unit labor costs are rising (Chart I-4). Further strength in demand due to potential fiscal stimulus, import substitution, and a further revival of confidence, will lead to even higher wage inflation and an acceleration in unit labor costs. This, along with rising prices for imported goods, will produce higher inflation. That said, it is likely that American consumers cannot handle a drastic price hike in imported goods, so higher selling prices will entail less demand. For the rest of the world, the same scenario will be very deflationary. Countries with large exports to the U.S. will experience a plunge in their shipments to America, income/profit growth will tank, and domestic demand will dwindle. In aggregate, this scenario will be inflationary for the U.S. and deflationary for the rest of the world - there will be meaningful losses in global output. 2. With "full" exchange rate adjustments, the import tariffs and BATs will be neutral for the U.S. and the rest of the world. But for this to occur, the U.S. dollar has to overshoot. Chart I-5Exchange Rates Have##br## Made A Difference Exchange Rates Have Made A Difference Exchange Rates Have Made A Difference In this scenario, imported goods prices in U.S. dollars will remain the same, given tariffs/BATs are entirely offset by a strong dollar. For exporters, their U.S. dollar revenues will plunge but their currency depreciation will restore the value of shipments to the U.S. in local currency terms (Chart I-5). In brief, the "full" currency depreciation will reflate exporter economies in local currency terms. Given that the rate of tariffs or BATs will likely exceed 15-20%, potential U.S. dollar appreciation will need to be dramatic to produce this scenario. In turn, the considerable dollar appreciation will cap inflationary pressures in the U.S. There will be little, if any, impact on global output. 3. With "partial" exchange rate adjustment (moderate dollar appreciation), the impact of tariffs or BATs will be split between U.S. consumers facing somewhat higher prices for imports and exporters who will suffer declines in revenues in local currency terms, though not as much as in the case of no currency deprecation. Consequently, this scenario will be mildly inflationary for the U.S. and modestly deflationary for the rest of the world. Yet, there will also be a small loss of global output - i.e., global GDP growth will be negatively impacted. Odds favor scenarios two and three - i.e., the greenback is set to appreciate, but it is not clear whether it will rise enough to entirely offset the impact of import tariffs or BATs and preclude decline in global growth. Bottom Line: The inflationary versus deflationary impact of U.S. trade protectionism will depend on exchange rate adjustments and their magnitude - i.e., currencies will move to redistribute the inflationary and deflationary impact of U.S. tariffs and BATs. Overall, the U.S. dollar is set to appreciate meaningfully and probably overshoot before topping out. Go Long EM FX Volatility Given central banks outside the U.S. - both in DM ex-U.S. and EM - are attempting to keep interest rates low, odds favor considerable appreciation in the U.S. dollar, or at least a material rise in exchange rate implied volatility. When monetary authorities control interest rates, the entire burden of adjustment falls on exchange rates. In brief, exchange rates have to move a lot - the U.S. dollar would have to overshoot - to prevent a hit to global output. Investors should consider betting on higher exchange rate volatility. In spite of rising odds of U.S. trade protectionism, EM and DM currency volatility has so far remained surprisingly tame (Chart I-6). We feel there is a trade opportunity here, and today we recommend investors go long select EM exchange rate volatilities. Chart I-7 plots the U.S. trade vulnerability score on the X axis, and exchange rate volatility - more specifically, the standardized 3-month implied currency volatility - on the Y axis. According to Chart I-7, it appears that by historical standards, the current level of volatility of MYR, THB and KRW are low when considering these countries' vulnerability to U.S. trade protectionism. Therefore, investors should go long 3-month implied volatility for the KRW, the MYR and the THB. Chart I-6Exchange Rate Volatility In ##br##Historical Perspective Exchange Rate Volatility In Historical Perspective Exchange Rate Volatility In Historical Perspective Chart I-7Go Long Currency VOLs in Korea, ##br##Malaysia, And Thailand EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism In addition, the volatility in these Asian currencies will rise and the RMB depreciate further. Bottom Line: To capitalize on a potential rise in global currency volatility, traders should go long three-month volatility in the KRW, the MYR and the THB. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Taking Profits On Turkish Shorts For Now In our December 7, 2016 Special Report 2 we argued that the odds of the lira being vigorously defended by the authorities or some sort of capital controls being implemented in Turkey would increase as the exchange rate approached USD/TRY 3.9. Given the exchange rate has come close to that level, we recommend that traders book profits on our Turkish short positions. The idea is to protect profits and capital in the case of capital controls. It is impossible to know whether the Turkish authorities will opt for capital controls, as it is a political decision. Yet, the risk is non-trivial. Furthermore, the rhetoric from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggests3 he views foreign investors as the main culprits for the nation's current financial debacle. President Erdogan will not shy away from hurting foreign investors via the introduction of capital controls and create the perception of financial stability. The central bank has been very active in recent weeks. Apart from hiking the overnight lending rate this week, it has recently curtailed liquidity injections into the banking system: Chart II-1Turkey: A Decline in Liquidity Provision Turkey: A Decline in Liquidity Provision Turkey: A Decline in Liquidity Provision On January 10, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) announced that it will place borrowing limits of TRY $22 billion in the Interbank Money Market, effectively limiting the volume of liquidity the central bank provides to commercial banks. Given the lira continued to slide, three days later, the CBT decided to move the interbank money market borrowing limit even lower at TRY $11 billion, effective January 16. That said, since January 10, the CBT has injected TRY $9.5 billion, on average per day, via the overnight window, and TRY $27 billion via the late liquidity window, albeit at higher interest rates than at the overnight window. Hence, the CBT has still injected a meaningful amount of liquidity into the banking system, but it has done so at higher interest rates. All in all, the CBT has curtailed liquidity injections in order to avoid further lira depreciation (Chart II-1, top panel). As a result, interest rates have risen sharply (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Yet, it is not certain that the central bank has tightened liquidity enough. Going forward, there are two main risks: either the CBT's liquidity tightening will be too little, and therefore the lira will continue to plunge, or, there will be considerable liquidity tightening, which will stabilize the exchange rate, but cascade the economy into major recession. Both scenarios are bearish for foreign investors holding Turkish stocks and credit. As we have discussed at length in previous reports, monetary authorities can control either the exchange rate or interest rates, but not both simultaneously. The CBT has been trying unsuccessfully to exercise control over both. To stabilize the exchange rate, the CBT has to drastically curtail its injections of local currency liquidity into the system. In such a case, however, interest rates will surge. Continued attempts to cap interest rates entail a further collapse in the lira's value. The only other option is to introduce capital control (i.e. close the capital account) in order to get control over both interest rates and the currency. Higher interest rates are not politically acceptable, as they will push the economy into deep recession. The reason being that domestic credit growth has been enormous in recent years, and higher interest rates will suffocate the economy. Yet not hiking the policy rate, or allowing interbank interest rates to rise, will all but ensure a deeper crash in the exchange rate. With the industrial sector already showing signs of weakness and the consumer sector flat, a decrease in loan growth will send the already weak economy into recession (Chart II-2). Yet, mushrooming money and credit growth, along with very high inflation in Turkey, justify higher interest rates: Local currency money and credit growth is too strong (Chart II-3). Unless these slow down, the lira will continue to decline. Chart II-2Turkey: Economy Is Heading##br## Into Recession Turkey: Economy Is Heading Into Recession Turkey: Economy Is Heading Into Recession Chart II-3Money/Credit Creation ##br##Has Been Too Rampant Money/Credit Creation Has Been Too Rampant Money/Credit Creation Has Been Too Rampant Genuine inflationary pressures are too ubiquitous: manufacturing and service sector wages have grown by about 20% over the past 12 months (Chart II-4). In brief, such genuinely high inflation, coupled with still low rates, are bearish for the currency. Robust credit and income/wage growth are supporting import demand, and the current account deficit is wide. This is another bearish factor for the exchange rate. In short, the lira has further room to fall. Remarkably, according to the real effective exchange rates based on unit labor costs as well as consumer prices, the lira is still not very cheap, making it vulnerable to further depreciation (Chart II-5) Chart II-4Turkey: 20% Wage Inflation Turkey: 20% Wage Inflation Turkey: 20% Wage Inflation Chart II-5The Turkish Lira Can Get Cheaper The Turkish Lira Can Get Cheaper The Turkish Lira Can Get Cheaper Even more surprising, despite a more than 20% depreciation against the U.S. dollar last year, foreign investors' holdings of Turkish equities and government bonds has not dropped significantly (Chart II-6). Finally, bank share prices in local currency terms have risen despite the spike in interest rates (Chart II-7). This entails that this bourse, which is dominated by bank stocks, is not pricing in risks from higher interest rates. Chart II-6Will Foreigners Capitulate On Turkish Assets? Will Foreigners Capitulate On Turkish Assets? Will Foreigners Capitulate On Turkish Assets? Chart II-7Bank Share Prices Have Held Up So Far Bank Share Prices Have Held Up So Far Bank Share Prices Have Held Up So Far Investment Recommendations: Currency and fixed income traders should take profits on our short TRY / long USD trade, as well as our short 2-year Turkish bond trade. These have returned a 24% and a 20%, respectively, since January 17, 2011 and June 1, 2016. That said, investors should consider shorting the lira versus the U.S. dollar again if the exchange rate rebounds to TRY/USD 3.5. We recommend equity traders book profits on our short Turkish banks position, which has registered a return of 60% since June 4, 2013. Dedicated EM equity and fixed income investors (both credit and local-currency bonds) should continue to underweight Turkey. Absolute-return and non-dedicated EM investors should minimize their exposure to Turkish financial markets. Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Global Investment Strategy Special Report, titled "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017", dated January 20, 2017, available at www.gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Turkey: Military Adventurism And Capital Controls", dated December 7, 2016 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 President Erdogan, speaking at the 34th meeting with village chiefs at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, said "Everyone already sees and knows the attacks that Turkey has been subjected to also have an economic aspect. There is no difference between a terrorist who has a weapon or bomb in his hand and a terrorist who has dollars, euros and interest in terms of aim. The aim is to bring Turkey to its knees, to take over Turkey and to distance Turkey from its goals. They are using the foreign exchange rate as a weapon". Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear client, This week, we are sending you an abbreviated version of our weekly bulletin as we are also publishing a piece written by our colleague Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President for our Global Investment Strategy service. This report, titled “U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017”, deals in great details with the Republican tax plans. In this report, Peter analyses the economic and financial market implications of the plan and concludes it is likely to be an additional support to the dollar bull market if it gets implemented in full, but not one without repercussions. I trust you will find this report very interesting and relevant. Best regards, Mathieu Savary Feature After continuing to sell off, the dollar regained some composure toward the end of the week. Not only did an elevated CPI print for December contribute to this rally, but so did Fed Chair Janet Yellen's comment that the U.S. economy was getting closer to the FOMC objectives and that the Fed was now closer to being capable of raising rates multiple times a year between now and 2019. Chart 1Froth Had Dissipated##br## From Treasury Yields Froth Had Dissipated From Treasury Yields Froth Had Dissipated From Treasury Yields Additionally, we had been expecting a correction in the dollar as we worried that U.S. bond yields would retrace some of their ascent. The pullback materialized and U.S. bond yields traded in line with our fair value estimate earlier this week (Chart 1). This meant that much of the froth in the dollar had dissipated. Based on these developments, is it time to buy the dollar again? On a cyclical basis, the dollar will make new highs in 12-18 months. However, short-term considerations remain complex. There are two President Trump out there: "Good Trump" and "Bad Trump". Good Trump is a president that talks about deregulation and tax cuts as well as various stimulus measures. This is the president that turbo charged the dollar after the election on hopes of a stronger U.S. economy. Bad Trump is the campaign Trump, the populist president that wants to revive protectionism and that promotes acrimonious international relations between the U.S. and the rest of the world, China in particular. The markets had expected Good Trump to be the first Trump to emerge, yet, the new president seems to have elected to present his Bad Trump profile first. In a way, this makes sense. Trump is focusing on the more economically painful parts of his program, campaign promises wanted by his electorate. This way, Good Trump can swoosh in and save the day by helping the economy closer to the mid-term election in late 2018, in the aim of solidifying the Republican control of Congress. With the 10-year yield back above fair value, the VIX near 12, and EM equities near their pre-November high, the market is not pricing in any flare up of tensions with China, nor any deflationary shock that could emanate from such tensions (Chart 2). Investors were hoping that the talks of stimulus and deregulation would come first, instead they are getting a president that bullies corporations and build up tensions in Asia. The deflationary nature of the tension comes from the reality that while the Chinese economy has improved, China remains handicapped by a large debt load and a low demand for credit. It is ill equipped to handle foreign shocks. Moreover, the easing in Chinese monetary conditions will soon lose steam. Chinese monetary conditions eased because Chinese real rates fell from nearly 12% to -2% on the back of a powerful rebound in the Chinese producer prices (PPI) (Chart 3). This improvement in PPI was itself a byproduct of a rebound in commodity inflation. However, this rebound is soon behind us. Commodity prices troughed in Q1 2016, and have recently slowed their pace of ascent. This means that in the coming months, Chinese PPI will rollover as well and Chinese real borrowing costs will rise again (Chart 4). Chart 2All Must ##br##Go Well All Must Go Well All Must Go Well Chart 3Can Chinese Monetary ##br##Conditions Improve Further? Can Chinese Monetary Conditions Improve Further? Can Chinese Monetary Conditions Improve Further? Chart 4The Commodity Rebound Was A Key Factor##br## Behind The Chinese PPI Rebound The Commodity Rebound Was A Key Factor Behind The Chinese PPI Rebound The Commodity Rebound Was A Key Factor Behind The Chinese PPI Rebound This could prove problematic for China where loan demand remains very tepid, pointing to a potential down leg in Chinese industrial activity (Chart 5). This also raises the specter of renewed devaluation pressures on the Chinese yuan, as this would create another valve to alleviate deflationary pressures in the Chinese economy (Chart 6). Further RMB weakness would be welcomed neither by Trump, nor by the markets. Chart 5Chinese Loan Demand ##br##Remains Moribund Chinese Loan Demand Remains Moribund Chinese Loan Demand Remains Moribund Chart 6The RMB Is Another Relief Value For##br## Chinese Deflationary Pressures The RMB Is Another Relief Value For Chinese Deflationary Pressures The RMB Is Another Relief Value For Chinese Deflationary Pressures Taking all these factors into account, we remain warry of betting on a strong dollar against the euro and the yen in the coming weeks, at least not until bonds become cheap on our fair value gauge, reflecting these Chinese deflationary risks and a higher geopolitical risk premium. Chart 7EUR/GBP Is Misaligned##br## With Fundamentals EUR/GBP Is Misaligned With Fundamentals EUR/GBP Is Misaligned With Fundamentals Also, this means that we could see a dichotomy emerge between the narrow dollar (DXY) and the broad dollar. While lower bond yields are supportive of the euro and the yen, they do very little for EM and commodity currencies. In fact, EM and commodity currencies are highly leveraged to the Chinese economy and will be vulnerable to any flare up of tensions between China and the U.S., especially after currencies like the AUD and the CAD had already rallied 5% and 4% respectively since the last week of 2016. Thus, we would recommend investors favor risk-off currencies like the euro, the Swiss franc, and the yen at the expense of the AUD, NZD, CAD, and NOK. For the GBP, last week, we published an optimistic take on the British economy. We are looking to short EUR/GBP as rate differentials are still widely bearish of that cross (Chart 7). However, we warned that in anticipation of the actual triggering of article 50 of the Lisbon treaty, the GBP could come under duress. A risk-off event would only strengthen this case. Thus, we remain confident in our preferred strategy to short EUR/GBP once it hits 0.93. Bottom Line: The dollar correction is advanced but is now likely to become more differentiated. Tensions created by a protectionist and bellicose Trump are likely to push bonds into expensive territory. While the attending bond rally could support the euro, the Swiss franc, and the yen against the dollar, these same tensions are likely to support the dollar against EM and commodity currencies. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights China's supply-side structural reforms will focus mainly on its coal and steel markets this year. In addition, environmental policies will become stricter in 2017, as Beijing puts more weight on environmental protection than economic development. As as result, supply growth will slow, particularly in steel markets, which will be good news for global steel producers and bad news for iron ore exporters in Australia and Brazil. While we are more bearish on iron ore than steel due to supply-side reforms and stricter environmental policies, we remain cautious getting short iron ore, given the Dalian Commodity Exchange's iron-ore futures are backwardated (prompt prices exceed deferred prices). This indicates buyers are willing to pay more for prompt delivery (e.g., next week) than they are for deferred delivery (e.g., next year). Energy: Overweight. The Saudi-Russia production deal will slow the rate of growth in supply relative to demand, which will tighten physical markets. This will cause inventories to draw, and the backwardation in crude to deepen. Our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI recommendation is up 700%. We are long at +$0.04/bbl, and will risk the spread going to -$0.05/bbl. We will take profits at $0.50/bbl. Base Metals: Neutral. Supply-side reforms, coupled with environmental restrictions will slow the growth of steel production in China this year, benefiting producers ex-China. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold markets will become increasing volatile, with the Fed likely to keep any rate-hike decision on hold until it has greater clarity re the incoming Trump administration's fiscal policy intentions. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's most recent supply-demand balances continue to paint a bearish picture for grains, with global ending stocks expected to grow. Feature China will continue its supply-side structural reforms this year, focusing mainly on its coal and steel markets. China environmental policies will become stricter in 2017. This year will mark the first time the central government puts more weight on environmental protection over economic development in evaluating officials' performance since 1949, when the People's Republic of China was established. Supply growth will be slower than last year due to continuing reforms, and stricter environmental policies in the country. Among base metals and bulks, the steel and iron ore markets will be most affected. This will be good news for global steel producers and bad news for global iron ore producers. We are more bearish on iron ore than steel strategically, due to these supply-side reforms, stricter environmental policies, scrap steel substitution, and rising global iron ore supply. That said, we remain cautious getting short iron ore, given the Dalian Commodity Exchange's iron-ore futures are backwardated (prompt prices exceed deferred prices). This indicates buyers are willing to pay more for prompt delivery (e.g., next week) than they are for deferred delivery (e.g., next year). We are downgrading nickel from bullish to neutral, both tactically and strategically. We also are downgrading our tactically bullish stance on aluminum to neutral, as the Indonesian government on January 12 unexpectedly allowed exports of nickel ore and bauxite under certain conditions. China's Supply-Side Reforms In 2017 In 2016, steel prices rallied more than 90% from year-end 2015 levels, but Chinese crude steel and steel products production rose a mere 0.4% and 1.3% yoy, respectively. Back in 2009, when steel prices rose about 30% from November 2008 to August 2009, production grew 12.9% and 17.8% yoy for Chinese crude steel and the output of steel products, respectively (Chart 1). Chart 1China: A Slower Steel Production##br## Recovery Than In 2009 China: A Slower Steel Production Recovery Than In 2009 China: A Slower Steel Production Recovery Than In 2009 One reason for these disparate performances can be found in the massive production cuts made in China last year to crude steel capacity. In February 2016, China's central government announced that it planned to cut 100 to 150 million metric tons (mmt) of crude steel capacity over the five-year period of 2016-2020. While the country aimed to cut 45 mmt in 2016, the actual reduction accelerated in 2016H2 making the full year decrease much larger. According to the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA), 70 mmt of crude steel capacity was taken off line last year, equivalent to 6.2% of total crude steel production capacity in China. This explains, in part, the much slower crude steel production recovery last year when compared to the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) recovery in 2009. How much crude steel production capacity will China cut in 2017? Even though last year's 70 mmt capacity cut means about half of the five-year 100-150 mmt capacity-cut target was already achieved, the Chinese government does not show any sign of moderating its desire to see additional cuts. The Chinese Central Economic Work Conference (December 14-16, 2016) emphasized that 2017 will be a year to deepen supply-side structural reforms. Although the central government still has not finalized its 2017 target, we believe a further 40-50 mmt cut in 2017 is possible. For example, China's largest steel producing province - Hebei - has already announced its 2017 crude steel capacity reduction target, which will be 14.39 mmt, similar to its 2016 target of 14.22 mmt. We would note here that the actual cut for the Hebei province in 2016 was 16.24 mmt, much higher than the target, indicating officials will seek to err on the high side when it comes to taking production off line. In December 2016, the country launched a nationwide crackdown on production of so-called shoddy steel, also known as ditiaogang in Chinese - low-quality crude steel made from scrap metal, which is commonly used to produce substandard construction steel products. This material accounts for about 4% of Chinese crude steel output. Last week, the Chinese government ordered a full ban on "shoddy steel" production to be completed before June 30, 2017. This month, 12 inspection groups were sent to major shoddy steel producing provinces to oversee the implementation of the directive. In 2017, the Chinese government also plans to: rein in new steel production capacity; scrutinize new projects; push for more mergers; and generally tighten supervision in the steel sector. In early January, China's top economic planner - the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) - toughened its tiered electricity pricing to limit availabilities to outdated steel producers, and to advance its goal of capacity cuts. According to the NRDC website, the new measures raised the price paid by "outdated" steelmakers by 66.7% to 0.5 yuan per kWh, effective on Jan. 1, 2017. Outdated steelmakers, in the government's reckoning, are those scheduled to be phased out - for example, those shoddy steel producers - most of which are privately owned small- or medium- scale mills. Bottom Line: A further capacity cut will limit Chinese steel production growth in 2017. China's Environmental Policies In 2017 In 2016, the Chinese government increased the frequency at which it sent environmental inspection teams to major metal-producing provinces and cities, to ensure the smelters and refiners comply with state environmental rules. Factories that failed to meet environmental standards were ordered to permanently or temporarily shut down, depending on the severity of their violations. This year, with persistent and intensifying smog becoming a greater threat to the health of China's population, environmental policies will only get stricter, resulting in more frequent supply disruptions, especially in its steel industry. In addition to plant-specific environmental measures, in late 2016, China rolled out rules to evaluate the "green" efforts of local governments. For the first time since 1949, when the People's Republic of China was established, the central government indicated it would put more weight on environmental protection than on economic development, as measured by GDP, in evaluating local government officials' performance. This likely will reduce the local governments' incentive to support unqualified or unprofitable steel/aluminum production. Bottom Line: China's stricter environmental policies will cause more supply disruptions and increase production costs for the Chinese metal sector, especially the steel industry. Our Views On Iron Ore And Steel In 2017 We are strategically neutral on steel prices and bearish on iron ore prices. Supply-side reforms and stricter environmental policies in China likely will result in zero growth or even a small contraction in Chinese steel production, which may well support steel prices while reducing iron ore demand. This will be good news for global steel producers ex-China, and bad news for global iron ore producers. China is determined to cull all "shoddy steel" production by the end of June, which will make considerable volumes of scrap steel available to be used in good-quality steel production. Chinese steel producers are currently willing to replace iron ore with scrap steel in their steel production, given scrap steel prices are cheap versus iron ore and steel product prices (Chart 2). In addition, using scrap as an input to produce crude steel will save steel producers money on coking coal, the price of which has surged over the past year. Chinese steel demand growth may remain robust in 2017H1. Last year's stimulus still has not run out of steam, and this year's fiscal and monetary policy will stay accommodative.1 Raw-material costs in the form of iron ore, coking coal and oil soared versus levels seen last year, which means the production costs of steel now are much higher than last year. This will support steel prices (Chart 3). Chart 2More Scrap Steel Will Replace##br## Iron Ore In Steel Production More Scrap Steel Will Replace Iron Ore In Steel Production More Scrap Steel Will Replace Iron Ore In Steel Production Chart 3Cost Push Will Support ##br##Steel Prices Cost Push Will Support Steel Prices Cost Push Will Support Steel Prices Steel product inventories at the major cities in China are still low; producers' inventory holdings have declined to levels last seen in 2014, which also will be supportive of steel prices (Chart 4). China's iron ore inventories are high, while domestic iron ore production is recovering (Chart 5, panels 1 and 2). With slowing domestic steel production, Chinese iron ore import growth likely will be subdued this year (Chart 5, panel 3). Global iron ore supplies are increasing. The "Big Three" producers - Vale, Rio Tinto, and BHP - all plan to boost production in response to profitable iron ore prices this year. Indeed, this month, Vale started its first iron-ore shipments from the giant new S11D mine. Chart 4Low Inventory Supports Steel Prices As Well Low Inventory Supports Steel Prices As Well Low Inventory Supports Steel Prices As Well Chart 5Limited Chinese Iron Ore Import Growth In 2017 Limited Chinese Iron Ore Import Growth In 2017 Limited Chinese Iron Ore Import Growth In 2017 Bottom Line: The outlook for steel prices this year is brighter relative to iron ore in 2017, although, the backwardation in the Dalian Commodity Exchange's iron-ore futures suggests markets may be pricing in tighter iron-ore supply in the near term. We will explore this in future research. Downgrading Our Nickel And Aluminum Views We are downgrading nickel from bullish to neutral, both tactically and strategically. Chart 6Downgrading Nickel And Aluminum View Downgrading Nickel And Aluminum View Downgrading Nickel And Aluminum View In November, we expected the global nickel supply deficit to widen on rising stainless steel demand and falling nickel ore supply. One major reason we were bullish nickel was that there was no sign Indonesia's export ban - imposed in January 2014 - would be removed. With elevated global nickel output, surging Chinese nickel pig iron (NPI) imports, and rebounding Indonesian nickel ore exports, Chinese NPI production will recover in 2017, which will reduce the country's need for refined nickel imports (Chart 6). Our long Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract was stopped out for a 5.1% loss this week. We are no longer bullish nickel versus zinc. We also are downgrading our tactically bullish stance on aluminum to neutral, after the Indonesian government unexpectedly allowed exports of nickel ore and bauxite under certain conditions earlier this month. We are removing our buy limit order to go long Mar/17 aluminum contracts if it falls to $1,640/MT from our shopping list. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "China Commodity Focus: How China's Monetary And Fiscal Policy Will Affect Metal Markets," dated January 12, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Grains/Softs Global Grain Stocks Set To Rise Overall: Despite some positive developments in the U.S. - where corn supplies are falling faster than demand - we remain underweight grains. This is largely because of the continued growth of production relative to consumption globally, which looks like it will lift global stocks by the end of the 2016-17 crop year in September. While we do expect a slight decrease in output this year, it is difficult to upgrade our view at this point (Table 1). Table 1World Grains Estimates - January 2017 China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals Wheat: Worldwide, output growth in Argentina, Russia and the EU added 1.3mm tons of production to global supplies. In the U.S., ending stocks are projected to reach levels not seen since the late 1980s, according to the USDA. Global consumption, meanwhile, is projected to increase a mere 100k tons, according to the USDA, which will lift ending stocks 1.2mm tons by the end of the crop year to a record 253.3mm tons. Corn: U.S. production is expected to fall, which, along with higher usage in the ethanol market, will contribute to lower stocks. However, on a global basis, production is set to outstrip consumption resulting in higher ending stocks at the end of the crop year. Soybeans: Same story here: Production growth outstripping consumption, leaving ending stocks higher by close to 7% yoy, based on the USDA's estimates. Rice: In relative terms, the rice market has the most bullish fundamentals - global production and consumption are roughly balanced, leaving expected ending stocks slightly above last year's level. We continue to favor rice over the other grains (save wheat) for this reason. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals

Highlights Deflation has decisively ended, and the economy is making a gradual transition towards inflation. The upshot is that growth is reviving rapidly in nominal terms. It is unrealistic to expect exports to be a main growth driver for the Chinese economy in the post-crisis world - even without protectionist pressures from President-elect Trump. The "Trump" wildcard serves as a wake-up call for Chinese policymakers to further focus on supporting domestic demand. There is a strengthening case for cyclical improvement in manufacturing investment. This further limits downside risk and sets the stage for potential positive surprises in the coming months. Feature Investors will be paying close attention to President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration speech this coming Friday, which may allow for a clearer understanding of his world view and economic policies, as well as their global implications. The inauguration will overshadow China's key economic statistics to be released later this week, and which we expect to show that the Chinese economy has picked up sequentially. As political uncertainty will stay elevated and deserves close monitoring going forward, it is equally important to keep in mind the economic big picture. In the next two months, China's economic data will once again be heavily distorted by the Chinese New Year holiday, making it more difficult to detect genuine growth trends. In last week's report, we laid out our view on China's growth and policy outlook for 2017.1 This week, we offer a reality check and our take on some key cyclical issues. Watch For Inflation Surprises The biggest change in China's macro condition in the past year, in our view, has been the sharp turnaround in producer prices. Rising PPI has lifted corporate pricing power, reduced real interest rates and eased financial stress in some heavy industries, the weakest link in the corporate sector - all of which are important reasons behind China's growth improvement of late. Looking forward, we expect inflation will remain well behaved. Improving producer prices is to a large extent attributable to RMB depreciation, which has already begun to crest. The trade-weighted RMB's depreciation has halted, and it is unrealistic to expect it to continue to depreciate at an ever-accelerating pace (Chart 1). This should cap the upside of PPI inflation. The headline consumer price index (CPI), the broader inflation measure, was fairly stable throughout last year's roller coaster ride in PPI (Chart 2). Moreover, the fluctuation in headline CPI was mainly attributable to food prices, which have been noisy due to seasonal factors and unexpected supply-demand disruptions, but have been largely trendless in recent years. There is no case for a food-induced inflation outbreak. Chart 1PPI Inflation Is Peaking PPI Inflation Is Peaking PPI Inflation Is Peaking Chart 2No Case For Food Inflation No Case For Food Inflation No Case For Food Inflation More fundamentally, although the Chinese economy has strengthened, it is still operating below potential. Historically, runaway inflation has always occurred when the economy overheated, which is far from the current situation (Chart 3). Without a strong growth rebound, it is difficult to expect genuine inflationary pressures. In short, the current environment is best characterized as "easing deflation" rather than "rising inflation," and our base case remains that inflationary pressures will stay at bay. Nonetheless, it is important to note that strong deflationary pressures have prevailed since the global financial crisis, which has led to major adjustments in the world economy. In China's case, for example, capital spending has slowed sharply. Meanwhile, cutting excess capacity has been an explicit policy priority, which, together with strengthening demand may lead to a quick rise in prices. Last year's sharp rebound in steel, thermal coal and some other raw materials prices provided clear evidence of this. Indeed, several factors warn against being overly complacent about the inflation outlook. For producers, the improvement in pricing power appears rather broad based, as both industrial firms and the service sector have been reporting rising levels in their respective output prices. In other words, rising prices are not just contained in resource sectors associated with global commodities prices and Chinese capacity cuts. For consumers, inflation expectations have begun to rise (Chart 4). Consumers' inflation expectations may be just a response to changes in prices rather than a leading indicator for future price moves. However, there has been a significant pickup in confidence on future income growth, which is likely a reflection of a tighter labor market and rising wages. If this trend holds, it would make it a lot easier for producers to pass through rising input costs to end users. Chart 3Inflation Vs Economic Overheating Inflation Vs Economic Overheating Inflation Vs Economic Overheating Chart 4Inflation Expectations Are On The Rise Inflation Expectations Are On The Rise Inflation Expectations Are On The Rise Overall, it is premature to worry about an inflation outbreak, and we do not consider inflation as a major policy constraint for the People's Bank of China. However, it appears that deflation has decisively ended, and the economy is making a gradual transition towards inflation. The upshot is that growth is reviving rapidly in nominal terms, supercharged by both improvement in real activity and a rising GDP deflator. Nominal GDP may reclaim a double-digit annual pace in the coming quarters. Exports: Why Has The Historical Correlation Broken Down? China's latest export numbers continued to disappoint, falling by 6.1% in dollar terms from a year ago. Part of the decline is due to falling prices measured in dollar terms; exports in volume terms are considerably stronger. Nonetheless, the export sector has been a chronic underperformer in the Chinese economy in recent years. Historically, China's export sector performance was highly predictable based on some key domestic and global variables - this correlation has clearly broken down since 2015 (Chart 5). If the historical correlation still held, export growth should have rebounded sharply. Many have viewed the divergence as a sign that Chinese exporters have lost competitiveness, which does not seem credible, as Chinese exports have continued to gain global market share. In our view, the chronic disappointment of the Chinese export sector's performance is due to several factors. First, the global financial crisis was a watershed event that marked structural breaks in economic correlations. Since then, consumers in the developed world have been focusing on deleveraging and fixing their balance sheets, and therefore the growth recovery has not led to a corresponding increase in demand - and imports for - consumer goods. Second, protectionist pressures have been on the rise since the global financial crisis, as all countries have tried to protect domestic producers in the face of weak final demand. Anti-dumping measures initiated by World Trade Organization member countries have increased notably in recent years, a growing share of which have been targeted at Chinese exporters (Chart 6). The high profile anti-dumping measures adopted by the Obama administration against Chinese tire and steel products have caused significant damage to Chinese producers and exporters.2 Chart 5Exports Have Disappointed Exports Have Disappointed Exports Have Disappointed Chart 6Protectionism Is Already On The Rise Protectionism Is Already On The Rise Protectionism Is Already On The Rise Finally, Chinese export numbers have been distorted by disguised capital flows driven by speculation on the RMB exchange rate. The sharp swings in Chinese exports to Hong Kong since the global financial crisis can be viewed as proxy for shifting expectations on the yuan (Chart 7). Immediately after the global financial crisis, the RMB was widely expected to rise against the dollar, leading to a massive surge in Chinese sales to Hong Kong as exporters overstated export revenues to bring more foreign currencies onshore. The tide completely reversed in early 2014 when the RMB began to drop against the greenback. Exporters may have been underreporting overseas sales so they could park part of their foreign revenues offshore in anticipation of a weaker RMB, weighing on overall export sector performance. Whatever the reason, the important point here is that it is unrealistic to expect exports to be a main growth driver for the Chinese economy in the post-crisis world - even without protectionist pressures from President-elect Trump. In recent years the Chinese authorities systematically overestimated the vigor of global demand, and export sector performance almost always lagged the government's annual targets, which contributed to chronic growth disappointments. In this regard, the "Trump" wildcard serves as a wake-up call for Chinese policymakers to further focus on supporting domestic demand. Has Investment Bottomed? With exports chronically disappointing, domestic capital spending holds the key for economic growth. Policy driven investment on infrastructure construction has held up strongly since 2013, while private sector investment mainly in the mining and manufacturing sectors has downshifted sharply. Looking forward, infrastructure spending will likely remain buoyant, supported by both public budgetary sources and public-private-partnerships (PPPs).3 What's changing is that capital spending in the manufacturing sector may have bottomed from a cyclical point of view. Inventory destocking in the manufacturing sector has become very advanced. Improving new orders and rising producer prices should lead to a restocking cycle. There has been a notable improvement in corporate sector profitability and confidence of late, which has historically led capital spending in the manufacturing sector (Chart 8). Consistently, the latest credit numbers show a significant pickup in medium- and long-term loans by the corporate sector, which are typically used to finance investment spending rather than replenish working capital. Chart 7Hong Kong Trade And The RMB Hong Kong Trade And The RMB Hong Kong Trade And The RMB Chart 8Manufacturing Capex Has Bottomed Manufacturing Capex Has Bottomed Manufacturing Capex Has Bottomed The long-term outlook for Chinese private capital spending hinges critically on structural reforms on many fronts. As far as the corporate sector is concerned, it is widely recognized that China's overall tax burden is not high by global standards, but is primarily shouldered by the corporate sector rather than households, and a rebalancing is long overdue. The government under incumbent Premier Li Keqiang has been focusing on reducing administrative red tape and mandatary employee benefits provided by employers as ways to cut corporate sector costs. If the Chinese authorities can implement reforms despite the populist resistance to shifting some of the tax burden from the corporate sector to households, it could further boost corporate profitability and revive animal spirits among Chinese entrepreneurs, leading to another round of investment boom. Any tax reform measures in this direction should be viewed as a major positive development. For now, we see a strengthening case for cyclical improvement in manufacturing investment, after decelerating for over six years. The current sub-par "new normal" growth trajectory rules out a sharp revival in capex, but the marginal change in "second derivatives" is still important as it diminishes a chronic growth headwind. This further limits downside risk and sets the stage for potential positive surprises in the coming months. Stay tuned. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1, 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China-U.S. Trade Relations: The Big Picture," dated November 17, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Trump's protectionism supercharges our theme of Sino-American tensions. China is at a stark disadvantage to the U.S. in a trade war. China cannot give concessions easily; it may batten down the hatches. Remain short RMB; but go long "One China," i.e. mainland stocks versus Taiwan/Hong Kong. Feature "Life's short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes." - Horace, Odes "Of course, you know, this means war." - Bugs Bunny, Looney Tunes President-elect Trump has said he will not designate China a "currency manipulator" on the first day of his presidency, contrary to what he promised during the campaign. Is this a sign that Trump is "normalizing" after the wild threats of his campaign? What are the real risks of a U.S.-China "trade war"? How should investors prepare? Trade War Is More Likely Than You Think BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has long cautioned investors that geopolitical tensions in East Asia were severely underestimated by the market.1 In 2013, we argued that a Sino-American military conflict was more likely than most of our clients dared to think.2 And over the past several years, in one-on-one conversations and in presentations at numerous conferences, we have stressed that tensions in East Asia could imperil the largest trade relationship. Why so alarmist? We have always based our analysis on three key pillars: Multipolarity: With the U.S. in a relative decline, containing China's rise has become a national security issue. The U.S. "Grand Strategy" operates under the imperative that no regional power is allowed to become a regional hegemon, as that would be a stepping stone to global competition. "Pivot" To Asia: The U.S. geopolitical deleveraging from the Middle East was from the start designed to free up more U.S. resources for Asia. While the Obama Administration pursued the pivot cautiously, it was putting the infrastructure in place for a confrontation with China. Regional dynamics: China is surrounded by neighbors that are cautious about Beijing's intentions for geographic, historical, and strategic reasons. They have therefore sought to balance their increasing economic addiction to China with deeper military and political links to the U.S. Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Trump's victory has made markets considerably less oblivious to the risks we have stressed to clients for the past five years. The idea that a trade war might erupt is now widely discussed. And Trump's repeated statements about Taiwan, North Korea, and the South China Sea have awoken some investors to the reality that a trade conflict could spill over into strategic areas, and vice versa. Nevertheless, judging by the ebullient market reaction relative to previous U.S. presidential transitions, most investors think that cool heads will inevitably prevail. They may be right, but from where we sit it is premature - and imprudent - to bet on it. Make no mistake, China, not NAFTA, will suffer the brunt of Trump's efforts to fulfill his protectionist campaign promises (Chart 1). We see 70% odds that a "crisis event" will affect U.S.-China trade patterns in a significant way over the next four years. How Did We Get Here? The Global Financial Crisis caused a sharp break in Sino-American relations: It interrupted the economic symbiosis between China and American households refused to keep re-leveraging, forcing China to become more internally driven economy (Chart 2). With final demand in the U.S. declining, China decided to re-leverage with credit, injecting its existing overproduction and overcapacity with steroids. But this only accelerated China's capture of global export market share, while supercharging the deflationary global effects (Chart 3). On top of its credit policies, China has struggled to internationalize the RMB. So now, it is not only still washing the world with its industrial overcapacity but also inadvertently - or not so innocently - reducing the prices of its goods with the weakening of its currency (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died Chart 3China's Historic Export Grab China's Historic Export Grab China's Historic Export Grab Chart 4China Still Exporting Deflation China Still Exporting Deflation China Still Exporting Deflation U.S.-China trade disputes have a long history. China's WTO entrance was agreed only with the stipulation that China be treated as a "non-market economy" for 15 years. Punitive trade bills almost passed through Congress in 2005 and 2010-11, for instance, but were held back at the last minute.3 Since 2009, in particular, protectionist policies have emerged. President Obama began his term with an unprecedented use of the authority under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act to punish China for "market distorting" exports of car tires, and with protectionist "Buy America" provisions in his economic stimulus package. After that, a sequence of tit-for-tat punitive measures took place affecting a range of goods on both sides, attempted Chinese investments in the U.S., and American companies operating in China. China's meteoric rise, surging trade surpluses with the U.S., and the rapid loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs was the main cause of tension (Chart 5). Americans benefited from China's rise, namely from cheaper goods and lower interest rates, but it caused significant economic dislocations.4 Meanwhile Chinese protectionism discouraged American elites that had endorsed China's rise on the hopes of gradually unfolding market access. Amid the heightened political risks of the global recession and its aftermath, China intensified intellectual property theft, non-tariff barriers, indigenous innovation policies, and cyber-attacks.5 The saving grace, for markets, was that the aforementioned tensions always remained within bounds. The WTO was a mutually recognized adjudicator. Also, the rival American and Chinese commercial authorities played a slow, step-by-step, predictable game, with the punitive measures being mostly proportional. When pressures flared in the U.S., the executive branch stayed Congress's hand; meanwhile China's government could steamroll any internal opposition to its trade policies. No more. Hillary Clinton might have helped contain trade tensions, but the outlook has darkened irrespective of Trump. Notably, American multinational corporations have increasingly decried Chinese protectionism and lobbied for the U.S. government to help persuade China to give them greater market access and a better legal-regulatory climate (Chart 6). As the Obama administration exited the stage in December 2016, the U.S., Japan and others refused to accept China's "market economy" status despite the fifteen-year deadline coming due. This means the U.S. and its allies explicitly wanted to reserve the power to impose anti-dumping duties more easily on China, which is what "Non-Market Economy" status entails (Chart 7).6 China considers this delay an outright violation of U.S. commitments under WTO. Chart 5A Tale Of Two Manufacturers A Tale Of Two Manufacturers A Tale Of Two Manufacturers Chart 6American Business Under Pressure In China Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Chart 7China's Non-Market Status A Liability Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Further, Clinton had promised to create a special prosecutor for trade disputes and to triple the number of enforcement officers. More broadly, she wanted to continue Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy that had roiled U.S.-China strategic relations. Bottom Line: U.S.-China trade relations had already turned sour as a result of the divergence of interests following the Global Financial Crisis. China has emerged as a trade juggernaut and the U.S. corporate and political establishments have become far more anxious about it recently. Now Trump has supercharged the situation. Will Trump "Normalize" In Office? With Trump, the U.S. is likely to undergo a "regime change" in terms of how trade policy is conducted - the only question is how long-lasting it will be. U.S. presidents have very few constraints on trade and foreign policy (Table 1). Ignore Trump's statements and look at his team: Incoming Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.7 This group, especially Navarro, is stridently hawkish on China and appears ready to bring the full weight of the United States' economic and strategic advantages to the table in order to negotiate a new framework of relations. Table 1Trump Is Not Constrained On Trade Policy Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin The model is the renegotiation of trade relations with an ascendant Japan in the 1980s. And China looks ripe for a crackdown by this yardstick. The penetration of Chinese exports meet or exceed Japan's position at its peak in the 1980s (Chart 8). Meanwhile the RMB has not appreciated nearly as much as the yen had done by this time (Chart 9). Ultimately the two resolved their differences because Japan acceded to major U.S. demands, strengthening its currency after the 1985 Plaza Accord and accelerating financial liberalization. It helped that the two were staunch allies without genuine security tensions (unlike the U.S. and China today). Chart 8China Has Gotten Away ##br##With More Than Japan Did China Has Gotten Away With More Than Japan Did China Has Gotten Away With More Than Japan Did Chart 9Reagan Forced Faster ##br##Appreciation On Japanese Yen Reagan Forced Faster Appreciation On Japanese Yen Reagan Forced Faster Appreciation On Japanese Yen From the Trump administration's point of view, the standard trade remedies have failed given that U.S. trade deficits have deteriorated all along. True, China has made considerable structural adjustments in recent years (Chart 10). But relative to the U.S., China has not really changed its ways. In fact, the current account surplus, which has collapsed from 10% to around 2% since 2008, is now roughly equal to the trade surplus with the United States (Chart 11). Chart 10China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way Chart 11China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable Therefore we do not put much stock in Trump's claim that he will not call China a currency manipulator on day one - this does not signal a "normalization" or softening of Trump's protectionist line. There was always a technical issue with this pledge that made the timing awkward.8 The manipulator charge will remain a Sword of Damocles hanging over China this year and next, but it is also only one tool in Trump's toolkit - and not the most intimidating one either (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin At a minimum, Trump could easily do what Obama did in February 2009 on tires - simply approve recommendations from his own Treasury Department for tariffs on specific goods. At a more aggressive level, he has the example of Richard Nixon before him. Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods in 1971. We would not put it beyond Trump to take arbitrary actions within the four-year term if international economic conflicts heat up dramatically. (We will be especially leery in the lead-up to the 2018 or 2020 elections if Trump's touted deal-making is not going his way.) Congress is not likely to prove a major constraint, at least not at first. Trump's election is a strong signal that the U.S. populace wants more protectionist policies. Congressional Republicans are limited, given the laws empowering the president on trade, and they will face the reality that his electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. Democrats, in these and other competitive states, have to perform verbal gymnastics to oppose Trump's positions on trade that substantially echo their own. And as mentioned, U.S. multinationals are not likely to "domesticate" Trump - rather, they will lobby for relative moderation or tactfulness within his general framework. Bottom Line: Trump is relatively unconstrained on trade policy. We expect his administration to begin with a "shot across the bow" in the first 100 days - a mostly but not entirely symbolic punitive measure against China - and then to seek high-level negotiations toward a framework for the administration's relations with China over the next four years. We expect the initial shot to rattle markets, then for a calming period to ensue, which will give a false sense of security. But given the lack of constraints on Trump, we are not optimistic. What Are China's Options? In a trade war with the U.S., China is outgunned on every front. Its economy is far more vulnerable to a disruption of exports to the U.S. than vice versa (Chart 12). It does not have ready alternatives to the U.S., given that U.S. imports of Chinese goods are roughly equal to Japanese, South Korean, German, Vietnamese and British imports combined. And China is most competitive in goods that the U.S. can easily source elsewhere (Chart 13). Chart 12The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War Chart 13The U.S. Can Find Substitutes For China Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Yes, China can disrupt the supply chain for the iPhone, but no, the Trump administration is not going to confuse Apple's interests with what it views as the "National Interest." Certainly China will favor non-American companies - Airbus over Boeing, etc - but the U.S. growth model is not reliant on exports, so it is not clear that the Trump administration will heed Boeing's cries about long-term competitiveness. The states most exposed to Chinese retaliation - Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Louisiana, and South Carolina - will not harm his electoral base. His Midwestern Rust Belt states could suffer, according to some research, but voters there may approve of his protectionist measures and Trump's other economic policies may blunt the short-term impact of Chinese retaliation.9 Looking at major Chinese export categories to the U.S., like textiles, electrical machinery, and equipment, suggests that 30 million Chinese jobs could be affected - perhaps ten times as many as the comparable U.S. jobs at risk from Chinese retaliation (far more than proportional given population). There is one factor that stands in China's favor. The history of trade wars says something different than the raw balance of trade. Like all wars, trade wars seek political ends, and a government's internal unity and resilience can be critical to its ability to bear out the worst.10 Politically, it is not clear that the U.S. has a better stomach for a full trade war than China: The U.S. remains divided - Polarization will worsen under Trump given his low approval ratings, low favorability, narrow popular victory margin, and controversial policy inclinations. Though China-bashing and economic patriotism can win some support, and we do not expect Congress or the corporate lobby to prevent Trump from launching a trade crusade if he wishes, nevertheless we see a fair chance that Trump would lose credibility and be forced to moderate his stance once negative trade consequences began to be felt at home. China is relatively unified - Xi has set himself up to be the "core" of power in the Communist Party in anticipation of worsening domestic conditions.11 It is worth remembering that the original use of the "core leader" moniker emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown when the Western world imposed sanctions on a newly liberalized China and it was forced to retreat into its shell from 1989-1992 (Chart 14). China's leadership wants to make the country less dependent on the U.S., and more autarkic, but is having difficulty imposing austere changes on itself. Trump may hasten the reforms while giving Chinese leaders a convenient "foreign devil" to distract the populace from the pain of restructuring. Chart 14China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 The above should not suggest that China wants a trade war, however. Trump is threatening to kick the export leg out from under its growth model at a time when the other leg - investment - stands at risk from domestic credit excesses.12 But the recent case study of Russia and economic sanctions is instructive. President Vladimir Putin used sanctions to blame all of the economic ills that befell Russia on the West, even though the Kremlin was often at fault. That policy largely worked. Bottom Line: China stands to suffer the most economically in a trade war with the United States. Chinese policymakers may therefore choose to ride out the economic costs of a trade war while blaming the U.S. for the pain. But closing its economy today would derail global growth and cause a dramatic spike in geopolitical risk, unlike in 1989. Strategic Spillover Trump's approach is likely to increase geopolitical risk because he wants to use the strategic disagreements plaguing Sino-American relations as leverage to get concessions on trade. The three hot spots are: Taiwan - Tensions with Taiwan spiked when Trump revealed that his administration considers the "One China" policy to be up for negotiation. China has engaged in serious saber-rattling in response, both around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. By linking trade disputes with Taiwan, Trump likely made it harder for Xi to compromise on the former without looking weak on the latter. Trump's negotiating style may work in business, but will not work with China on Taiwan, which is a matter of sovereignty and a clear red line. North Korea - Trump has said North Korea will not manage to test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which it is preparing to do. He is threatening to hold China to account for not curbing the North's violations of UN resolutions on nuclear proliferation and missile development. This would likely mean an expansion of the practice adopted under Obama of sanctioning Chinese entities for dealing with North Korean partners. This situation would likely shake up markets that have normally been able to ignore North Korea. South China Sea - Trump has repeatedly signaled that China has militarized the South China Sea, and his incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that China be deprived of access, a policy that would trigger a shooting war if operationalized. Persistent tensions here are unlikely to go away anytime soon and could spark a diplomatic crisis or naval conflict (if not with the U.S. then with regional players like Vietnam). Thus Trump's administration is likely to make serious demands on China regarding its strategic situation and national security even while demanding an overhaul of trade policies that will force difficult economic reforms on China. Bottom Line: China's political strengths at home make it unlikely to compromise on Trump's major strategic demands. Contrary to adding leverage in trade negotiations - where the U.S. already has the upper hand - using these issues as negotiating tools is likely to cause China to fear for its security and thus become more defiant. Risks To The View The risk to this view would be that the U.S. and China manage to negotiate a new framework and actually improve relations, with the U.S. giving more respect to China's legitimate rights and regional initiatives in exchange for Chinese concessions. But is China capable of conceding significantly on Trump's major demands? RMB appreciation? No. Many commentators have pointed out that Trump's view of the RMB is outdated - the PBoC is now propping it up, not suppressing it. The driver of RMB weakness is China's excessive monetary and credit expansion, weakening productivity growth, domestic investors' desires to move capital out, corporate deleveraging, the need for stimulus, tightening Fed policy, and rising geopolitical risks. While it is possible that the PBoC will defend the RMB to the hilt, the near-term path of least resistance is down, and that sets China on a collision course with the Trump administration. Market access and dumping? Yes. Trump complains that China taxes U.S. imports unfairly and dumps goods into the American market, killing jobs. To appease the U.S., China could take concrete steps to remove non-tariff barriers and open wider investment avenues for U.S. businesses - it has recently suggested it might do so.13 Less likely, it could accelerate overcapacity cuts and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises. These moves would fit with its avowed reform goals and strengthen Chinese self-sufficiency in the long run, and Xi's administration likely has the power to do them. China could also improve intellectual property protections and declare a ceasefire on cyber-attacks on companies. All of this is possible, but clearly extremely difficult to achieve. Strategic concerns? Maybe. It is conceivable but unlikely that China could de-escalate matters in the South China Sea and agree to a "freedom of navigation" guarantee for the United States, which is not a party to the territorial disputes. A significant compromise on North Korea would be even less likely, since China is unwilling to move beyond the usual, ineffective management and impose real hardship on the regime for its violations of UN resolutions and improving nuclear and missile capabilities. One impetus for China to concede on these points is that it is fearful of creating instability in a politically sensitive year in which it will oversee a major five-year leadership rotation at its National Party Congress. Trump may deliberately threaten to disrupt the transition in order to extract concessions. Bottom Line: We operate on a constraint-based methodology: Trump has very few constraints on trade policy, China has major constraints on making these concessions, so there is no basis for assuming that the two countries will skip conflict and go directly to a new level of cooperation. Investment Recommendations We remain short the RMB. The currency has fallen by 5.62% since we initiated this trade. The trade itself has suffered a bit since the end of last year as a result of the PBoC's efforts to fight speculation. But monetary expansion sans productivity improvements continues apace in China, and we expect USD strength to persist, so we think there is room for the RMB to fall further. In the near term, however, the USD could experience further pullback as investors start pricing the negatives of the Trump administration. Therefore we are closing our long USD/EUR trade for a 4.55% gain. We remain somewhat positive on China relative to EM - because of the relative unity and centralization of its government and financial resources at its disposal - but we would not recommend investing in Chinese assets in the absolute due to the heightened internal and external risks outlined above. Hence we propose going long the "One China" policy, i.e. long Chinese mainland stocks versus Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chart 15). This enables us to play the fact that mainland valuations are depressed while the global trend of de-globalization and the conflicts within Greater China and with the U.S. are likely to increase uncertainties about Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two are particularly vulnerable to tighter regulations or sanctions from Beijing. Yan Wang, Senior Vice-President at BCA's China Investment Strategy, argues that while there is no case for a clear directional move in Chinese stocks - especially given the ongoing tightening of policies on the property sector - nevertheless they should be favored relative to global equities, given that growth is improving, fiscal policy will remain accommodative, and valuations are depressed (Chart 16).14 Meanwhile our negative outlook on China in absolute terms supports a globally negative outlook on cyclical equities relative to defensives. Cyclicals move with EM in general and China in particular. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President in charge of U.S. Equity Strategy, notes that EM performance does not warrant the sharp rise in U.S. cyclicals versus defensives, nor that in globally oriented versus domestically oriented stocks (Chart 17).15 This creates the opportunity for a tactical short. Chart 15Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chart 16China Trades With Cyclicals China Trades With Cyclicals China Trades With Cyclicals Chart 17Go Long The 'One China Policy' Go Long The 'One China Policy' Go Long The 'One China Policy' Finally, we caution investors about investing in companies with major exposure to China (Table 2). We would recommend that clients short a "China, Inc" Index of the top 20 S&P 500 stocks exposed to trade with China relative to the rest of S&P 500. The "China, Inc" stocks have been outperforming the market for a while (Chart 18). We fear that China may retaliate against some of these firms as the trade war with the U.S. heats up. Table 2'China, Inc.' May Suffer From Trade War Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Chart 18Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kurri, Research Analyst 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Imad Moosa, The U.S.-China Trade Dispute: Facts, Figures And Myths (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012). 4 For prominent research on this topic, please see David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning From Labor-Market Adjustment To Large Changes In Trade," Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016), pp. 205-40, available at www.annualreviews.org; Autor et al., "Foreign Competition And Domestic Innovation: Evidence From U.S. Patents," NBER Working Paper No. 22879, December 2016, available at www.nber.org. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Scholars have shown that countries granting China market economy status have subsequently initiated fewer antidumping cases against it. Please see Francisco Urdinez and Gilmar Masiero, "China And The WTO: Will The Market Economy Status Make Any Difference After 2016?" The Chinese Economy 48:2 (2015), pp. 155-172. Technically speaking, the difference in duty rates can be substantial between market and non-market economies; please see the U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S.-China Trade: Eliminating Nonmarket Economy Methodology Would Lower Antidumping Duties For Some Chinese Companies," GAO-06-231, January 2006, available at www.gao.gov. 7 Ross has criticized China more heavily since joining Trump; Navarro is the author of Death By China: Confronting The Dragon, A Global Call To Action (Pearson, 2011); together they criticized China in a paper for Trump's campaign, "Scoring The Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts," dated September 29, 2016, available at assets.donaldjtrump.com. Lighthizer worked on Ronald Reagan's Treasury Department's team that engaged in the tough trade negotiations with Japan in the mid-1980s. 8 The existing statutory procedure, now enshrined in Title VII of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, involves the Treasury Department making semi-annual assessments and potentially initiating bilateral or multilateral negotiations. According to the more or less standard time frame since 1988, any charges of currency manipulation would occur in the April report at earliest, and more likely in the October report or thereafter. For Trump to have designated China a manipulator on day one, he would either have had to issue a simple statement of intent or an executive directive that bypassed the formal foreign exchange review process. 9 Please see Andy Kiersz, "Here's Every State's Biggest International Trading Partner," Business Insider, October 20, 2016, available at www.businessinsider.com. See also Marcus Noland et al, "Assessing Trade Agendas In The US Presidential Campaign," Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6, dated September 2016, available at piie.com. 10 Serbia "defeated" the much larger Austria-Habsburg in their "Pig War" in the early 1900s, while Ireland won most of its key demands from England despite losing the "Economic War" of the 1930s. Russia's attempts over the past decade to bully Ukraine into submission have not succeeded in achieving Russia's political aims. In each of these cases, a far greater economic disparity existed than currently exists between the U.S. and China, and yet even then the weaker country's popular support, and the willingness of neighbors to exploit the new trade opportunities that opened up, enabled the weaker country to win the political clash of wills. 11 Please see "China: Xi Is A "Core" Leader... So What?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "China unveils new plan to further open economy to foreign investment," Reuters, January 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 14 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 High-Conviction Calls," dated January 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights In any country, excess national savings, i.e., current account surpluses, lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but have no implications on domestic loan creation. Savings are not necessary for the banking system to originate loans. Quite the opposite, new loans boost purchasing power and spending and, thereby, create new income and additional savings. Unlimited loan/money creation will ultimately lead to currency depreciation and/or inflation. The RMB is at major risk because Chinese banks continue creating enormous amount of credit/money "out of thin air." Feature This week we publish the third report in our trilogy series on money, credit, savings and investment, where we address several misconceptions that dominate mainstream macroeconomic thought as well as the investment industry. Our previous Special Reports were: Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses, and China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB.1 This third report focuses on: (1) Elaborating on the link - or lack thereof - between the investment-savings identity and domestic credit creation in any country; (2) Demonstrating how new loans lead to new income and ultimately new savings creation, and not, vice versa; (3) Discussing the macro limits to money/credit creation among banks. Macroeconomics has many areas that are not well understood or developed. We do not pretend to have all the answers related to savings and loan origination and their links to other factors. Even though all points of this report are applicable to any economy, the practical relevance and goal of our analysis is to demonstrate that China's credit excesses are not the natural outcome of its unique macro features such as a high savings rate. In fact, the leverage expansion that has been underway since early 2009 (Chart I-1) is nothing more than a credit bubble driven by banks willingness to create credit exponentially and policymakers' tolerance of it. Chart I-1Chinese Companies Are Extremely Leveraged Favor Indian Banks Versus Chinese Ones Favor Indian Banks Versus Chinese Ones That said, this does not mean that the Chinese credit bubble is about to burst. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has been negative on China's credit cycle and growth since 2010, yet has never used the word "crisis". China may well experience one at some point, but it is impossible to time it. A more distinct possibility is that the country's growth could stagnate/slump further, and financial markets leveraged to its growth sell off materially - particularly in the wake of last year's rally. The investment implications are that there is more downside to Chinese financial markets and China-related plays globally. National Savings And Domestic Credit Creation One of the prevailing notions that justifies China's large credit excesses, as elaborated by some of my colleagues at BCA and others in the investment industry as well as academia is as follows: A current account surplus implies that national savings exceed investment. If a country generates a lot of national savings, as China does, it must either absorb those savings through domestic investment or, where possible, export the savings to the rest of the world by running a large current account surplus. As a reminder to readers, the investment-savings identity is as follows: Investment = Savings is an identity for a closed economy; and Savings (S) - Investment (I) = Current Account Balance (CA) holds true for an open economy. While on the surface this proposition might appear very intuitive, a deeper examination reveals there is no link at all between the national savings-investment identity (S - I = CA) and domestic credit creation in any country: S - I = CA is an identity of the real economy. It means an economy produces more goods and services than it consumes, and that the difference between production and consumption (excess supply) is being exported. Hence, "excess savings" here are "real excess savings" in the form of goods and services that were produced but not consumed in the economy, but rather sold abroad. These "real excess savings," or the CA surplus, have nothing to do with aggregate deposits in the country's banking system, or money/credit origination by its banks. As we elaborated in the first report of our three-part series, banks do create loans and deposits "out of thin air". Banks do not intermediate deposits into loans. They create deposits when they originate loans. For a more detailed discussion on this, readers should refer to our report titled, Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses.2 Consequently, banks can create as much in the way of loans as they like (subject to the regulatory capital constraints), regardless of the country's current account balance. Chart I-2 and Chart I-3 depict that, historically, in various countries there has been no correlation between the national and household savings rates and bank credit origination. Chart I-2China: Credit And Savings ##br##Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated China: Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated Chart I-3The U.S., Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Credit And Savings Are Not Correlated NPL Ratios In Perspective: India & China NPL Ratios In Perspective: India & China When a country runs a current account surplus, it does not mean it brings in "excess savings" and invests those funds domestically. A current account surplus (or an excess of national savings over investment) only means that the country's net foreign assets will rise - i.e., the nation's "excess savings" have to be exported in the form of capital outflows (more on this below). On the whole, the S - I = CA identity is derived from the national accounts and balance of payments, and it has no relationship to how loans and deposits are created within the domestic banking system. Empirical evidence supports neither positive nor negative correlation between the current account balance and loan origination. For example, Germany has had massive current account surpluses, but its non-financial debt-to-GDP ratio has been stable (Chart I-4). On the contrary, the U.S. and Turkey have been running large current account deficits, while their domestic credit and leverage has boomed (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-4Germany: National Savings And Debt India: Public Bank Loan Growth Has Slumped India: Public Bank Loan Growth Has Slumped Chart I-5U.S.: National Savings And Debt India's Capital Spending Is Sluggish India's Capital Spending Is Sluggish Chart I-6Turkey: National Savings And Debt Indian Consumer Health Is Strong Indian Consumer Health Is Strong As the popular argument goes, more national savings lead to more deposits within the domestic banking system and ultimately more domestic loans stem from the application of the intermediation of loanable funds (ILF) model of banking. The ILF model states that banks intermediate deposits (savings) into loans. Yet, as we argued in the first report of this series, the ILF model is simply wrong. Commercial banks create both loans and deposits, simultaneously, "out of thin air". Consequently, any macro thesis that uses or relies on the ILF model is misguided. Bottom Line: National savings is a real economy concept, and has no relevance to loan creation and leverage in the country in question. Below we show that current account (CA) surpluses ("excess savings") lead to an accumulation of net foreign assets, but have no implication for domestic leverage. CA Surplus = Accumulation Of Net Foreign Assets CA surpluses are consistent with a nation expanding its net foreign assets, while CA deficits are congruent with a reduction in a country's net foreign assets. They do not suggest anything about domestic credit origination and leverage. Chart I-7U.S. Net International Investment Position India's Employment Is Turning The Corner India's Employment Is Turning The Corner The mechanism of converting CA surpluses into net foreign assets (external assets minus external liabilities) is somewhat different between fully floating and managed exchange rate regimes, so we consider both cases: A fully flexible exchange rate (the central bank does not interfere in the currency market): Let's assume Country A had a current account surplus over a given period. Exporters can keep the proceeds abroad and buy foreign assets, or bring them back and sell these dollars to other domestic players who want to buy foreign assets. Alternatively, exporters can sell these dollars to foreigners who sold assets in Country A and want to repatriate capital out of Country A. In this case, the nation's net foreign assets still rise because foreigners' claims on its assets shrink. Provided the central bank does not intervene in the currency market and the balance of payments, by definition, equals zero, the current account surplus is offset by a deficit on capital/financial accounts. In brief, the sole result of an excess of national savings relative to domestic investment is net capital/financial outflows and an ensuing increase in a country’s net foreign assets. This does not lead to any change in the banking system’s local currency loans.3 Chart I-7 demonstrates that the U.S.'s net foreign assets have dropped from - US$ 0.4 trillion in 1995 to - US$ 6 trillion currently, because the U.S. has been running current account deficits - i.e., on a net basis, foreigners have accumulated enormous amounts of claims on America. In spite of these persistent CA deficits and a low national savings rate, the U.S. bank loan-to-GDP ratio has risen substantially over the same period, proving the lack of relationship between national savings and loan origination. In the case of a managed or fixed exchange rate system (i.e., when the central bank intervenes in the currency market, by buying/selling foreign exchange), the dynamics are somewhat different, yet the end result is the same. If Country B has a current account surplus and its central bank is involved in managing the exchange rate, the central bank could buy foreign currency and thereby accumulate net foreign assets. Hence, the dynamics are the same, but the nation's central bank, rather than other economic agents, amasses more net foreign assets. If foreign exchange interventions are not completely sterilized, the central bank’s accumulation of foreign assets will be accompanied by issuance of high-power money (banks' reserves at the central bank) and new money (bank deposit) creation, but not a loan creation.4 Some observers might argue that the increase of bank reserves at the central bank would lead commercial banks to originate more loans. However, in the first and second reports of our trilogy series, we documented that commercial banks in the majority of countries, including all advanced economies and China, do not require central bank liquidity to originate loans. On the contrary, banks originate loans first and then, if needed, ask the central bank for liquidity. Chart I-8The PBoC Has Begun ##br##Targeting Rates In Recent Years India: PMIs Are Positive India: PMIs Are Positive In the case of China, there is evidence that from early 2014 until very recently, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) was targeting short-term interest rates (Chart I-8). When any central bank targets the price of money (interest rates), it cannot steer/manage the quantity of money - i.e., it has to provide/withdraw as much liquidity as commercial banks desire at a given interest rate level. Therefore, since early 2014, the PBoC has met commercial banks' demand for liquidity by keeping interest rates at its preferred target. In such a case, commercial banks - not the PBoC - decide on the amount of loan origination at a given interest rate level. Even in this case, the CA balance has no bearing on loan origination by commercial banks. Central banks nowadays steer loan growth and economic growth primarily via interest rates. Unless the current account dynamics lead the monetary authorities to alter interest rates, balance of payments dynamics will not have direct impact on credit growth. Bottom Line: A CA surplus raises a nation's net foreign assets, while a CA deficit reduces its net foreign assets. CA balances do not affect or determine commercial banks' capacity for domestic credit creation. Savings Are Not A Constraint On Loan Origination Mainstream economic literature typically relies on treating deposits as savings - i.e., refraining from spending by households or enterprises. Then, it uses the Intermediation of Loanable Funds (ILF) model to argue those savings flow to the banking system to become deposits. In turn, banks intermediate these savings (deposits) into loans. We have to again emphasize that the ILF model is simply wrong - in reality, this is not how the banking system works in any country in the world. This was the focal point of the first report of our trilogy. In particular, Fabian Lindner states that "...saving does not finance investment. No saving and abstention of consumption is needed for any lending to take place since lending and borrowing money are pure financial transactions that only affect gross financial assets and liabilities."5 Similarly, Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof utter: "In the ILF model, bank loans represent the intermediation of real savings, or loanable funds, between non-bank savers and non-bank borrowers. But in the real world, the key function of banks is the provision of financing, or the creation of new monetary purchasing power through loans, for a single agent that is both borrower and depositor". 6 They also provide a further distinction between savings and financing: "...if the loan is for physical investment purposes, this new lending and money is what triggers investment and therefore, by the national accounts identity of saving and investment (for closed economies), saving. Saving is therefore a consequence, not a cause, of such lending. Saving does not finance investment, financing does." 6 Let's consider an example: Company A - which intends to build a production facility - requests a loan from Bank Z. After approving the loan request, Bank Z opens an account for Company A and grants a loan of $100 million by crediting Company A's bank account and in turn creating purchasing power for the company. Hence, Bank Z originated a loan and deposit of $100 million "out of thin air". As Company A uses this amount to pay for construction of production facility, it pays the builder, architects, engineers and various suppliers. These entities, in turn, pay their own suppliers as well as their employees, while the profits (dividends) are remitted to shareholders. All entities, and ultimately their employees and shareholders involved in the project, derived income from the original loan. Thus, their income was contingent on the loan that was originated by Bank Z and spent by Company A. Without it, these households, other companies and their shareholders would not have earned that income. In turn, these households and companies would spend/consume part of their income and save the other part. A few observations: Loan creation by Bank Z generated household income and enterprise profits that otherwise would not have occurred. This extra income would produce extra saving. In other words, without the loan origination by Bank Z, these extra savings would not have arisen. The fact that all companies and their employees involved in this project decided to save a part of their income does not mean they deposited new funds at their banks. Their "savings" already existed in the banking system. In fact, these deposits were created by Bank Z when the latter originated the loan. Ultimately, with banks willing to originate new loans, spending can exceed current income. Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements corroborates this point: "Crucially, the provision of financing does not require someone to abstain from consuming. It is purely a financial transaction and hence distinct from saving... The equality of saving and investment is an accounting identity that always holds ex post and reveals nothing about financing patterns. In ex post terms, being simply the outcome of expenditures, saving does not represent a constraint on how much agents are able to spend ex ante. If we step back from comparative statics and consider the underlying dynamics, it is only once expenditures take place that income and investment, and hence saving, are generated".7 Bottom Line: Savings are not necessary for the banking system to originate loans and finance investment and consumption. Quite the opposite, new loans boost spending and create new income and additional savings (even though they may not impact the savings rate). Applying this to China, this means that the absolute amount of household savings is high because before 2008 booming exports, and since 2008 mushrooming loan growth, produced robust income growth. In sum, households decide on their savings rate, yet the credit boom since 2008 has tremendously boosted their income and has thereby expanded the absolute amount of their savings. Limits On Country Loan Origination Does this mean any country (specifically, its commercial banks) can originate unlimited amounts of loans/money, and thereby print their way to prosperity? To date, no country we are aware of has accomplished this. Indeed, if this were the case, there would be no poor countries. In the first report of our trilogy, we elaborated on the constraints banks face in originating loans, such as tighter monetary policy, lack of credit demand, government regulations and capital requirements, bank shareholders appetite to lend and liquidity constraints for banks. Chart I-9China: Signs Of Budding Inflation India's Share In Global Trade India's Share In Global Trade Herein we elaborate on limits at a macro level for banks to originate loans and finance investment and consumption. The supply side of an economy and its capacity to produce goods and services that are in demand is ultimately a macro constraint on credit/money issuance. China's ability to sustain such rapid money creation has been due to its strong supply side - i.e., its productive capacity. This makes China different from other emerging markets such as Turkey. China has low inflation and a CA surplus, while Turkey has had high inflation and a large CA deficit. Ultimately, a country's growth trajectory depends on its potential growth, which is the sum of labor force growth and productivity growth. China's "economic miracle" of the past 30 years has been due to its productivity, not credit/money creation. Money/credit origination greases the wheels of the supply side "machine" but does not replace it. Indeed, China's productivity boom over the past three-plus decades has been due to reforms that have allowed for the emergence and development of private enterprises, and attracting foreign technology/know-how. It has not been due to government control over the economy and credit creation. By and large, China is facing two potential growth trajectories, as depicted in Chart I-12 and Chart I-13 and explained in Box 1 on pages 13-15. A credit-driven economic downtrend entails deflation, while the path towards socialism warrants inflation. Barring a deflationary credit-driven growth slump, inflation in China will pick up sooner than later. The reason is that growing state control of the economy and resource allocation means poor capital allocation and much slower productivity - and in turn potential GDP growth. The latter, along with double-digit credit, creates fertile ground for an inflation outbreak (Chart I-9). If banks create too much money/credit, the price of money will go down- i.e., the currency will ultimately depreciate both versus foreign currencies as well as relative to goods/services and real assets like property. Chinese banks have created too much money (RMBs), and it is not surprising property prices have gone exponential and that the RMB is under downward pressure. In fact, Chinese households may be sensing there are too many RMBs floating around, and want to get rid of them by converting them into foreign currencies and buying real assets (real estate). On the whole, the exchange rate is a key to China's macro dynamics. If unrelenting credit creation persists, the yuan will continue to fall because Chinese households and companies will be reluctant to hold local currency. In such a case, credit origination will have to be curtailed to stabilize the exchange rate. Bottom Line: Unlimited credit/money creation will ultimately produce a major currency depreciation and/or inflation. These, in turn, will short-circuit the credit boom. Conclusions When investors and commentators justify exponential moves in credit or asset prices by the unique features of a particular economy - implying this time is really different - critical consideration is warranted. For example, Japan's 1980s bubble was justified by exclusive particularities of the Japanese economy; Hong Kong's real estate bubble of the 1990s was justified by limited land on the island; and the U.S. tech bubble of the late 1990s was explained by a "new era of productivity brought on by technology." Needless to say, in retrospect we know that these were bubbles, and they all deflated. Explaining away China's exponential surge in domestic leverage as a bi-product of its high savings rate makes us wary. The report explains why high national savings rates do not warrant high credit creation. China is facing two potential growth roadmaps, as depicted in Chart I-11 and Chart I-12 and elaborated in Box 1 (see page 13-15). Regardless of which way China's economy evolves, the medium-term outlook for mainland growth is downbeat. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team expects double-digit RMB depreciation in the next 12 months. We continue to recommend short positions in the RMB via 12-month NDFs. This is the rationale behind our negative stance on Asian currencies. We believe EM equities, credit markets and currencies will underperform their DM counterparts, regardless of the trajectory of share prices in the U.S./DM. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com BOX 1 Two Growth Path Forward For China1 1. Short-Term Pain / Long-Term Gain If the authorities were to allow market forces to prevail, the state should withdraw meaningfully from the credit allocation process. In that case, credit markets will bring discipline to both debtors and creditors - in effect, an emerging perception of potential losses rather than government-led bailouts will make creditors less willing to lend, and debtors less willing to borrow and expand. The result will be a considerable dampening in credit origination. In this scenario, it is very likely that credit growth slows from 12% currently to the level of potential nominal GDP growth of 7-8% or lower (Chart I-10), leading to a classic credit-driven economic downtrend (Chart I-11). In that case, cyclical growth will undershoot. Chart I-10China: Credit Is Outpacing ##br##GDP Growth By Wide Margin India Has Been Losing Export Market Share India Has Been Losing Export Market Share Chart I-11Capitalist-Style Credit-Driven Downtrend India's Education Improvement Has Stalled India's Education Improvement Has Stalled However, potential GDP growth (the red line in Chart I-11) - which has been falling in recent years - will stabilize and probably improve. The reason being that by allowing market forces to prevail in credit allocation and corporate restructuring/reorganization, China will ultimately improve its capital allocation and productivity. In brief, potential GDP growth - which equals productivity growth plus labor force growth - will stop falling and, in fact, could improve as productivity growth ameliorates. 2. No Short-Term Pain But Long-Term Stagnation It is essential to differentiate cyclical growth drivers from structural ones. If the government does not allow credit growth to slow, cyclical growth will hold up. However, in this scenario, structural growth will tumble and China will embark on a path of economic stagnation. That said, the growth deceleration would be gradual, as depicted in Chart I-12. Chart I-12Toward Socialism = Secular Stagnation And Inflation Upgrade Indian Bourse Within EM Universe Upgrade Indian Bourse Within EM Universe A rising role of state and government officials in capital allocation and business decision-making guarantees suboptimal capital allocation, resulting in poor efficiency and declining productivity growth. Since China's labor force growth is projected to be flat-to-negative, the sole source of potential GDP growth going forward will be productivity growth. Besides, it is much easier to achieve high productivity growth in manufacturing than in the service sector. Finally, high productivity growth is possible when the productivity level was low. From the current levels, it is hard to grow productivity more than 5-6% annually. Chart I-13Socialist Put Will Depress ##br##Productivity Growth Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth Socialist Put Will Depress Productivity Growth If we assume China's productivity is now about 6% (which is already very high) (Chart I-13), and if the country embarks down this path, odds are that productivity growth might drop by 100 basis points in each of the following years. In five years or so, productivity growth would be only around 1%. Given that labor force growth will be zero, if not contracting, in five years' time, potential GDP will drop to 1% or so, as shown in Chart I-12 on page 14. Hence, this path is the ultimate recipe for economic stagnation in China. The only thing the authorities can do in this scenario is to boost growth from time to time via credit and fiscal stimulus. This will produce mini-recovery cycles around a falling primary growth trend. The latest acceleration in China's growth is probably the first mini-cycle. How can investors invest in this scenario? The mini-cycles depicted in Chart I-12 look nice, because we drew them ourselves. In reality, they will not be symmetric or smooth. Besides, financial market swings for China-related plays will differ from the economy's growth mini-cycles because markets can be driven by factors other than growth like politics, geopolitics, credit events, and other global variables such as the U.S. dollar and bond yields. In short, this analysis explains why we have been and remain bearish on China-related financial markets despite the stimulus that has been injected about a year ago. Investing around economic mini-cycles is difficult because it assumes near-perfect timing. Without that, investors cannot make money. 1 Originally published in January 11, 2017 EMS Weekly Report. 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, the links are available on page 18. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, the link is available on page 18. 3 This example assumes that neither the central bank nor local commercial banks are buying foreign currency. In the case when a commercial bank buys foreign currency, that transaction creates new money/deposit in the banking system although it does not create a new loan. The opposite is also true: when a commercial bank sells foreign currency, existing money/deposits are destroyed. 4 This example assumes that the local commercial banks are not buying foreign currency and only the central bank buys foreign currency from non-banks. 5 Lindner, F. (2015), "Does Saving Increase the Supply of Credit? A Critique of the Loanable Funds Theory", World Economic Review 4: 1-26, 2015 6 Jakad, Z. and Kumhof, M. (2015), "Banks Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and why this Matters", Bank of England, Working Paper 529, May 2015 7 Borio, C. and Disyatat, P. (2015), "Capital Flows and the Current Account: Taking Financing (more) Seriously", BIS Working Papers, No. 525, October 2015 Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear Client, I am visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and India this week, and as such there will be no regular Weekly Report. Instead, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the Middle East has reached a stable equilibrium, as much as is possible, and will not drive the news or markets in 2017. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy Highlights The Middle East is not a major geopolitical risk in 2017. Saudi-Iranian and Russo-Turkish tensions will de-escalate, for now. The OPEC production cut will go through; oil prices will average $55/bbl in 2017. Geopolitical risk continues to rotate to the Asia Pacific region. Trump, Iranian elections, and Iraqi instability pose risks to the view. Feature The Middle East has dominated the news flow for the past five years, for good reason. The carnage in Syria and Iraq is tragic and reprehensible. However, the investment relevance of the various regional conflicts is dubious. For all the attention paid to the rise of the Islamic State, we would remind clients that the group's conquest of Iraq's second-largest city Mosul in June 2014 did not cause a spike in oil prices but rather marked the end of the bull market (Chart 1)! From an investment perspective, the only dynamic worth watching in the Middle East is the "Great Game" between regional actors, which have been looking to fill the vacuum left by America's dramatic geopolitical deleveraging (Chart 2). The U.S. strategy is permanent and driven by global interests, namely the rise of China and the need to shift resources towards East Asia. Given the incoming Trump administration's laser focus on China, we expect that the U.S. will remain aloof from the Middle East. Chart 1Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Chart 2While The U.S. Military Deleverages... While The U.S. Military Deleverages... While The U.S. Military Deleverages... Does the recent détente between Russia and Turkey in Syria, and between Iran and Saudi Arabia over OPEC production cuts, signal that the Middle East has finally found geopolitical equilibrium? We tentatively think the answer is yes. This will reduce the importance of the region as the primary source of geopolitical risk premia, which BCA's geopolitical strategists have expected to shift to Asia for some time.1 Saudi-Iranian Tensions Are On Ice Chart 3...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up Since the U.S. decision to deleverage from the region in 2011, Saudi Arabia has leveraged up, becoming one of the world's largest arms purchasers and involving itself overtly and covertly in several regional conflicts in the process (Chart 3). Saudi insecurity deepened following President Barack Obama's decision to leave no troops in Iraq. The last U.S. soldier of the main occupation force left Iraq on December 18, 2011. The very next day, on December 19, Iraq's Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a close ally of Iran, issued an order for the arrest of the Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi. The move by al-Maliki set off what essentially became a civil war in the country, with the Sunni minority eventually turning to ever-more radicalized militant groups for protection. From the Saudi perspective, Iraq is a vital piece of real estate as it is a natural buffer between itself and its Shia rival Iran. While the Fifth Fleet of the U.S. Navy, based in Bahrain, continues to guard against any Iranian incursion via the Persian Gulf, there is very little space between the Saudi oil fields and Iran if Iraq falls into Iran's orbit. The subsequent five years saw Iran and Saudi Arabia fight several proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These included direct military action by Iran in Iraq and Syria against Saudi-backed militants and by Saudi Arabia in Yemen against Iranian-backed militants. It also included oil politics, with Saudi Arabia announcing in November 2014 that it was ending years of its price-setting strategy. These strategies ultimately proved to be unsustainable and BCA's Geopolitical Strategy called the peak in Saudi-Iranian tensions in February 2016.2 Why? First, because oil prices collapsed! Geopolitical adventurism is a luxury afforded to those with the means to pursue adventures. The combination of low oil prices, domestic social outlays, and an expensive war in Yemen forced Saudi Arabia to burn through $220 billion of its foreign reserves between July 2014 and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of its central-bank holdings!3 There is a relationship between high oil prices and aggressive foreign policy in oil-producing states (Chart 4). Political science research shows that the relationship is not spurious. As Chart 5 illustrates, petrol states led by revolutionary leaders are much more likely to engage in militarized international disputes.4 This relationship is particularly pronounced when oil sells at above $70 per barrel. At that price, oil producing states become more prone to disputes than non-oil states, regardless of leadership qualities. Chart 4 Chart 5 Second, Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen proved to be a disaster. The kingdom intervened in March 2015 to reinstate the democratically elected President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had been removed from power by Iranian-linked Houthi rebels. The real reason for the intervention was for the Saudis to gauge their war-making capabilities, test their recently purchased military equipment, and put a check on Iranian influence in the region. A quick, successful war in Yemen would have been a template for future interventions in Iraq and Syria on behalf of Sunni allies, and would have cemented Saudi Arabia's position as a regional power in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy warned, however, defeating the experienced Houthis would not be easy and Saudi Arabia would ultimately hesitate to commit to a land war.5 The intervention has resulted in disaster for Saudi Arabia on several levels: Houthis remain in control of the capital Sana'a and largely the same territory that encompassed the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen); The Saudis, desperate for a ground-force presence, have turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda's and ISIS's control of almost a third of the country in the south and coastal regions; Saudi forces have taken considerable losses, including some high-tech and high-priced items; The conflict has exposed severe military deficiencies, from the low level of strategic and tactical planning of senior staff, to the poor communication of units at the middle level, to the pervasive low morale and training of the rank-and-file. The biggest loss for Saudi Arabia has been that of leadership. What began as a pan-Sunni intervention led by Riyadh, with considerable involvement by the UAE and Egypt, has seen the Saudis lose almost all their allies. The UAE removed its troops in mid-2016 (in somewhat of a diplomatic spat with Riyadh) and Egypt has subsequently held military exercises with Russia, a Saudi rival in the region, and decided in December to provide military advisors to the Syrian Arab Army. All the talk about a "Sunni NATO" is over. Saudi Arabia's experience in Yemen, combined with the decline in its currency reserves, forced it to come to terms with reality, and eventually agree to an oil production cut with Russia and Iran. Thus it took Saudi Arabia exactly five years, from the U.S. withdrawal in Iraq in 2011, to realize the limits of its regional power. Bob Ryan, Senior Vice President of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, correctly forecast the OPEC cut and expects the deal to be successfully implemented in 2017.6 One reason Bob is confident is that both Saudi Arabia and Russia are looking to privatize their energy sector significantly by 2018. Russia has sold 19.5% of Rosneft and the Saudis want to conduct an IPO of 5% of their state-owned oil company Aramco. It makes no sense to do this IPO in an environment of low oil prices. Furthermore, sovereign debt issuance to cover budget deficits will become cheaper when oil prices are higher. Geopolitics are aligning with Bob's view as well. Saudi Arabia's attempt to counter Iranian influence in the region has failed both militarily and via oil politics. Riyadh is focusing inwards, on its "Vision 2030" reforms, which will entail considerable domestic upheaval as a result of its comprehensive effort to remove the ultra-conservative religious establishment from power.7 This is now coming to light, with Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently announcing harsh punitive measures for any cleric who incites or resorts to violence against the reform agenda. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia's bid for regional hegemony is over, at least for now. The country is focusing inwards, on long-term political and social reforms and economic diversification. Its efforts to bring Iran to heel with low oil prices and with direct military confrontation in Yemen have failed. The oil production-cut deal between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia should hold as a result of the de-escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions and the socio-economic priorities of all three states. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service is overweight energy relative to other commodities as a result.8 Is The Russia-Turkey Détente Sustainable? Turkey and Russia have concluded a political and military détente in Syria with surprising speed. This has made one of our major geopolitical risks for 2017 - a Turkish-Russian confrontation over Syria - already obsolete. Much as with Saudi Arabia, Turkey has had a bite of regional hegemony, did not like the bitter taste, and has decided to make a deal with its rivals instead. For Turkey, the real concern over the past five years has been American inaction in Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spent a lot of political capital opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He had hoped that a successful revolution would create a new client state for Turkey, yielding Turkey overland access to Persian Gulf energy sources. Erdogan was therefore beyond dismayed when President Barack Obama failed to intervene in Syria in 2013 following Assad's use of chemical weapons. The chronology of what happened next is important: Russia intervened two years later, in September 2015, to stem the progress of anti-Assad rebels and save the regime from collapse. Two months later, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 was shot down by Turkish F-16s in the Turkey-Syria border area. Turkey and Russia broke relations for a while, but tensions did not escalate. Ankara faced a coup attempt in mid-July 2016, which the ruling party linked to the U.S.-based Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen. The Obama administration refused to extradite Gülen without concrete evidence of his involvement. By late July, Turkish officials were calling Russia a "friendly neighbor" and a "strategic partner." In early August, Erdogan met Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, after issuing a letter with an apology to the family of the shot-down pilot. Then, on August 24, Turkey invaded Syria. The military intervention, dubbed "Operation Euphrates Shield," was officially launched to fight the Islamic State, a common pretext these past three years. Erdogan officially stated that he also aimed to fight Assad's regime, but this appeared to put Ankara and Moscow back on collision course, and statements from the Turkish side have since been "corrected." The real reason for the intervention was not to fight ISIS or Assad, but rather to curb the gains made by the various Kurdish militias on the ground in Iraq and Syria. In particular, Ankara intervened to prevent the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) - the armed wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, which is affiliated with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party - from linking up with its now vast territory held in the north of Syria (Map 1). Chart The territory, which our map shows has expanded considerably as the YPG has claimed mostly Islamic State-held areas, is split between Rojava, the main territory east of the Euphrates river, and the Afrin enclave near the Mediterranean Sea. For Turkey, the proximity of such a vast Kurdish-held territory so close to its own Kurdish southeastern region presents a national-security nightmare. The operation's strategic goal was to capture Al-Bab, the stronghold of the Islamic State in northern Syria and a strategic point between the two YPG-held swaths of territory. However, it has taught the Turks that they have no experience fighting a prolonged battle, especially against local insurgents and militants who know the region. Since the first attack on Al-Bab's western part, the Turkish army has suffered three defeats and retreated to initial positions. With Turkey stuck in Al-Bab, the Russian air force has now begun to bomb Islamic State positions to help their tentative new ally. This level of operational coordination is notable and important. It suggests that Turkey, a NATO member state, is now reliant on Russian air strikes for ground support rather than on American sorties flying out of NATO's air base in Incirlik, Turkey. Turkey even claims that U.S. presence in Incirlik is obsolete if it receives no help from the U.S. Air Force around Al-Bab. How sustainable is the Turkey-Russia détente? We suspect it will be quite sustainable, at least in the short term. Ankara has moved away from demands for Assad to step down, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmus, recently stating that Turkey would not "impose any decision" on the Syrian people regarding future leadership. The assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey also failed to derail Russo-Turkish cooperation. Beyond the short term, however, the question remains what Turkey intends to do about Kurdish gains, which are considerable in both Syria and Iraq. The town of Manbij, for instance, is strategically located west of the Euphrates and was supposed to be ceded to Turkey by the Kurds. The situation could grow even more complicated for Turkey as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq may proclaim independence after the Islamic State stronghold of Mosul is liberated in early 2017.9 The YPG in Syria could then ask to join their fellow Kurds in Iraq in forming a unitary state. Although unlikely, this scenario is probably on Turkey's mind, as it would mean that the Kurds inside Turkey may intensify their anti-government insurgency. Note, however, that this scenario does not bother Russia. As far as Moscow is concerned, it has succeeded in keeping Assad in power, its Syrian naval base in Tartus is secure, and it has proven its ability to project power outside of its immediate sphere of influence (Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, and the Caucasus), thus advertising its "Great Power" status. Bottom Line: For the time being, the Russian-Turkish détente will hold. The real risk is not a Turkish-Russian confrontation, but rather a wider Turkish engagement in both Syria and Iraq against the Kurds sometime in the future. We suspect that the Turkish military experience in Syria may make the Turks think twice about engaging in a large-scale war against the Kurds across three states. But given the erratic policymaking out of Ankara in recent years, it is difficult to say this with any confidence. The geopolitical risk of Turkish imperial overreach will continue to weigh on Turkish assets in 2017. Risks To The Sanguine View There are many reasons why investors should stay up at night in 2017, but the Middle East is not one of them. The process of U.S. deleveraging from the region has been painful and costly (from a human perspective especially), but it has ultimately forced regional powers to figure out how to carve out the leftover space between them. There are a few questions left to answer, starting with the Kurdish question. But, for the most part, we do not expect to see the major players - Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, or Israel - come to blows with each other. There are three major risks to this sanguine view. The U.S. Is Back! The current semi-stable equilibrium will definitely be thrown off track if the Trump administration decides to sink its teeth fully into the Middle East. We expect President-elect Donald Trump to authorize greater military action against the Islamic State, including more intense air strikes. However, this is not a qualitative reversal of Obama's deleveraging policy. A real reversal would be if Trump decided to follow the advice of Iran hawks in his government - of whom there are several - and increase tensions with Tehran. This is unlikely, given Trump's focus on China and his willingness to improve ties with Russia, a nominal ally of Iran. In fact, there has been almost no talk of Iran from either President-elect Trump or any of his advisors since the election. Furthermore, while U.S. oil imports from OPEC are no longer declining, they are still massively down since their peak in the mid-2000s (Chart 6). It is unlikely that Trump will commit resources to a region of diminishing importance to U.S. interests. Change Of Guard In Tehran. While the risk of Washington saber-rattling with Iran is overstated, what happens if the moderate President Hassan Rouhani is defeated in the upcoming May election? Hardliners are arguing that the nuclear deal with the West has done nothing for the economy, the main pillar of Rouhani's 2013 platform. This is not true. Headline inflation ticked up in late 2016, but remains well off the 40% levels in 2013, while GDP growth has been in the black throughout Rouhani's term, and net exports have bottomed (Chart 7). However, the flow of FDI into the country has been tepid, probably due to ongoing uncertainty with the government transition in the U.S. Both European and Asian businesses are waiting to see if the incoming Trump administration wants to revive sanctions. Meanwhile, skirmishes between U.S. and Iranian vessels - purportedly controlled by the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - have increased in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the hardliners in Tehran are hoping that they can bait the hardliners in D.C. into a pre-election confrontation that sinks Rouhani. Iraqi Instability. Although the Iraqi government is set to take over Mosul from the Islamic State some time in Q1 2017, the fact remains that the country is bitterly divided between Sunnis and Shia amidst sluggish oil revenues. While the production cut deal will raise revenues marginally, revenues will still be well below their highs (Chart 8). Defeating the Islamic State militarily is one thing, but the real challenge is for Baghdad to reintegrate the Sunni population, which largely lives in territory devoid of oil production. A renewal of civil strife and terrorism targeting Iraqi civilians, which could happen as the Islamic State militants blend back into the wider population, may be a risk in 2017. Chart 6U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low Chart 7Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Chart 8Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs A word on Israel may also be in order. Israel has not played a major geopolitical role in the region for the past five years and we suspect it will not in the next five. It is secure from its neighbours, who cannot match it in terms of military capability, and remains preoccupied with domestic politics and internal security. Meanwhile, the days when the region unified against Israel are over. Sectarian and ethnic conflicts have gutted Israel's traditional enemies. And former foes, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are now close allies. The one geopolitical threat that remains is Iran. However, that threat remains dormant as long as Israel maintains nuclear supremacy over Iran and as long as the U.S. remains a security guarantor for Israel. We do not see either changing any time soon. Investment Implications The main investment implication of our thesis that the Middle East has found a new equilibrium is that the region will not dominate the news flow in 2017. Short of a major Turkish blunder in Syria and Iraq, we see the current status quo largely frozen in place. Saudi Arabia appears to have conceded, for now at least, its inferior place in the geopolitical pecking order. Investors have plenty of things to worry about in 2017, such as general de-globalization, a potential Sino-American trade war, geopolitical tensions in East Asia, and elections in four of the five largest euro-area economies. Our geopolitical team's long-standing thesis that geopolitical risk is rotating out of the Middle East and into East Asia is therefore fully playing out.10 Chart 9KSA-Russia Production ##br##Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories KSA-Russia Production Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories KSA-Russia Production Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories In the near term, the geopolitical equilibrium should allow Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia to maintain their six-month agreement to cut production by up to 1.8 million b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 million b/d from OPEC, 300,000 b/d from Russia, and another 300,000 b/d from other non-OPEC producers. The goal of this agreement is to reduce global oil inventories to more normal levels, which our commodity strategists believe will happen by the end of 2017 (Chart 9). Bob Ryan, of the Commodity & Energy Strategy, forecasts U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl in 2017. The incoming Trump administration will focus its Middle East policy on cooperating with regional actors against the Islamic State. Investors should expect to see more American "muscle" dedicated to the fight, perhaps at the risk of causing civilian casualties (which the Obama White House was careful to avoid). The downside of this strategy is that as the Islamic State loses its territory and ceases to be a caliphate, it will revert to being a more conventional terrorist organization. Its foreign fighters may return home to Europe, Russia, and elsewhere, while home-grown militants will seek to sow further Sunni-Shia discord, especially in Iraq. Unfortunately, this trend will keep our thesis of "A Bull Market For Terror" intact, which lends support to U.S. defense stocks.11 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Middle East: Saudi-Iran Tensions Have Peaked," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 According to the estimates of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Cullen S. Hendrix, "Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behavior," Peterson Institute for International Economics, dated July 2014, available at iie.com. According to Hendrix, revolutionary leaders are "leaders who come to power by force and attempt to transform preexisting political and economic relationships, both domestically and abroad." The definition is broad and includes leaders who used force in order to gain prominence. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Does Yemen Matter?" dated March 26, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Emerging Market Equity Sector Strategy, "MENA: Rise Early, Work Hard, Strike Oil," dated October 4, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see P. Ronzheimer, C. Weinmann, and K. Mössbauer, "Kurden Brauchen Mehr Deutsche Abwehrraketen," Bild, dated October 28, 2016, available at http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/mossul/kurden-brauchen-dringend-milan-systeme-48495330.bild.html. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Bull Market For Terror," dated August 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights China's monetary and fiscal policy in 2017 will likely remain accommodative, in order to achieve the goal of an average 6.5% GDP growth over the next five years. China's policies related to its property market will be much more restrictive than the previous two years. Chinese metal demand will grow at a slower pace than last year, as reflationary policies are throttled back. Feature Base metals and bulk markets had a fantastic year in 2016, a complete reversal of their miserable performance in 2015 (Chart 1, panels 1 and 2). Last year, the LMEX base metal index, steel prices and iron ore prices were up 30%, 75%, and 91%, respectively (using average prices in January and December). In comparison, during the same period of 2015, the LMEX index, steel and iron ore were down 22%, 30%, and 41%, respectively. Massive supply reductions, and recovering demand caused by China's reflationary fiscal and monetary policies, were the driving forces behind these sharp rallies in bulks and base metals prices last year. Both the official manufacturing PMI and Keqiang index, which are broadly used as key measures of Chinese economic conditions, reached a three-year high in late 2016 (Chart 1, panels 3 and 4). Clearly, metal prices had already discounted a positive outlook vis-a-vis Chinese economic growth, which was boosted by a series of reflationary policy initiatives in the past two years. The question now is: will reflationary monetary and fiscal policies continue into 2017? If so, on how large a scale will it be? What factors could limit or even prevent reflationary policies in China? A look back China's reflationary policies actually started in late 2014, when the property market and overall economy showed signs of weakness. The country accelerated its reflationary policies throughout 2015 and maintained a moderate reflationary stance in 2016, in order to spur domestic economic growth. Monetary policy: China cut its central-bank directed policy rate five times in 2015 from 5.6% to 4.35%, the lowest level since the data started in 1980 (Chart 2, panel 1). The People's Bank of China (PBoC), the country's central bank, also lowered the reserve requirement ratio at banks - the amount of reserves banks must keep on hand - four times in 2015 and once in 2016 from 18% to 15%, the lowest level since May 2010 (Chart 2, panel 2). Chart 1China Reflationary Policy Drove ##br##Metal Price Rallies In 2016 China Reflationary Policy Drove Metal Price Rallies In 2016 China Reflationary Policy Drove Metal Price Rallies In 2016 Chart 2Both Monetary and Fiscal Policies ##br##Were Reflationary Last Year Both Monetary and Fiscal Policies Were Reflationary Last Year Both Monetary and Fiscal Policies Were Reflationary Last Year Fiscal policy: China halved its 10% sales tax on passenger cars with engines up to 1.6 liters in October 2015, which boosted auto sales and production significantly last year (Chart 2, panel 3). The country also maintained its high-growth infrastructure investment last year (Chart 2, panel 4). Real estate-related policy: China loosened its housing-related policies extensively since September 2014, by among other things, reducing down-payment requirements for first-time home buyers, and reducing down payments needed to finance second homes. The goal of the policies was to reduce elevated housing inventories. Indeed, those policies, along with the combination of falling mortgage rates, revived the Chinese property market in 2016, and sparked a massive rally in steel-making commodities - metallurgical coal and iron ore - and in base metals. For the first 11 months of last year, the average selling prices of 70 cities and the total floor-space-sold area rose 13.6% and 24.3% yoy, respectively, which considerably improved from the 2015 same period's 6% and 7.4% yoy growth. The floor-space-started area had an even more significant improvement - a growth of 7.6% for the first 11 months of last year versus a deep contraction of 14.7% yoy for the same period of 2015 (Chart 3). What now? This year, we continue to expect accommodative monetary and fiscal policy in China. "Stability" was the key word during the three-day Central Economic Work Conference (December 14-16, 2016), an annual meeting that set out economic targets and policy priorities for next year. "Stability" means the country's leaders will try to implement policies designed to keep the country's GDP growth around 6.5% this year, the average GDP growth target for the five years between 2016 and 2020, under China's five-year plan. China's economic growth is on a downtrend, coming in at 6.9% in 2015, and a predicted 6.7% in 2016 (for the first three quarters of 2016, China's GDP growth was all 6.7%) (Chart 4, panel 1). Chart 3Property Market Policy: ##br##Greatly Loosened In 2015 And 2016 Property Market Policy: Greatly Loosened In 2015 And 2016 Property Market Policy: Greatly Loosened In 2015 And 2016 Chart 4We Expect Chinese Monetary And Fiscal Policies ##br##To Stay Accommodative This Year We Expect Chinese Monetary and Fiscal Policies To Stay Accommodative This Year We Expect Chinese Monetary and Fiscal Policies To Stay Accommodative This Year The market's expectation for China's 2017 GDP growth currently is 6.5%. Even though President Xi has stated he is open to growth in China falling below 6.5%, too far below this level - for example, below 6% - could cause widespread disappointment in the country and trigger the "instability" leaders are trying to avoid. Hence, monetary accommodation likely will persist in 2017. As both headline inflation and core inflation in China still are not elevated, we do not expect any rate hikes or increases in the reserve requirement ratio to be announced by the PBoC this year (Chart 4, panel 2). In addition, the RMB depreciated considerably last year, which helps the country's exports and, to some extent, stimulates domestic economic growth (Chart 4, panel 3). In mid-December last year, Chinese policymakers raised the tax on small-engine autos slightly - from 5% last year to 7.5% this year - but this is still below its normal 10% level. This also indicates the country wants to maintain a moderate, but not too expansionary, level of fiscal stimulus In 2017. In 2016, most of Chinese automobile production growth came from small-engine passenger cars, which clearly benefited from this policy (Chart 4, panel 4). This year, we still expect positive growth in Chinese vehicle production but at a much slower rate than last year. Curbing Property Market Exuberance Regarding the Chinese property market, our take-away from the Central Economic Work Conference was that "curbing the speculative home purchases, containing asset bubbles and financial risks" will be among the country's top 2017 priorities. In comparison, back in 2016, reducing housing inventories was the focus. Indeed, with property sales recovering, inventory has fallen from its 2015 peak. Inventories still are elevated, but most of the overhang is in third- and fourth-tier cities, with some of it in even smaller cities (Chart 4, panel 5). A continuation of stricter housing policies deployed since last September to cool the over-heated domestic property market is expected. For example, Beijing raised the down payment for first-time homebuyers from 30% to 35%. Down payments for second homes rose from 30% to a minimum of 50%. For a second home larger than 140 square meters, the down payment is now 70%. So far, more than 20 cities have declared similarly strict policies to control speculative buying in property markets. Currently, a record high 20% of people surveyed plan to buy a new house in the next three months, which indicates further cooling measures are needed for the property market (Chart 5, panel 1). In the meantime, new mortgage loans as a share of home sales in value also reached a record high of 49%, and real estate-related loans as a share of total new bank loans now stand at a 6-year high, signaling financial risk in these markets is rising (Chart 5, panels 2 and 3). All of these factors signal that the Chinese authorities will maintain their restrictive property market policies in 2017. This will be negative for the country's bulk and base metals demand, as the property market accounts for some 35% of demand for these commodities. In conclusion, China's monetary and fiscal policies are likely to stay accommodative in 2017, while the country's housing market is facing restrictive policies. Shifting Economic Drivers For Bulk and Base Metal Demand We would like to remind our clients that China's economic structure is shifting: Services (also known as the "tertiary sector") account for a rising share of GDP, and are not big users of bulks or metals, while manufacturing (i.e., the "secondary sector) demand for these commodities is slowing. Services now account for 51.4% of GDP, while manufacturing now accounts for 39.8% (Chart 6). The GDP weight of services is up from 42% ten years ago, while the GDP weight of manufacturing is down 8 percentage points over the same period. Chart 5Property Market Policy Will Remain ##br##Restrictive in 2017 Property Market Policy Will Remain Restrictive in 2017 Property Market Policy Will Remain Restrictive in 2017 Chart 6China's Economic Structure Shift Is ##br##Negative To Metals Demand China's Economic Structure Shift Is Negative To Metals Demand China's Economic Structure Shift Is Negative To Metals Demand This shift is negative for metal demand growth, as the related manufacturing activity growth slows faster than the overall GDP growth. Overall, we believe Chinese bulk and base metal demand growth in 2017 will slow as a result of less expansionary policies than prevailed last year, and a more restrictive domestic housing market. Next week The Chinese Central Economic Work Conference also emphasized that 2017 will be a year to deepen supply-side structural reforms, which we will discuss in our next week's pub. We also will address the impact of Chinese environmental policy on Chinese metal output. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com ENERGY Chart 7Evidence Of Production Cuts Will Lift Oil Prices Evidence Of Production Cuts Will Lift Oil Prices Evidence Of Production Cuts Will Lift Oil Prices Oil Production Expected To Fall Reports of production cuts and reduced volumes being made available to U.S. and Asian refiners have been trickling out since the start of the year, lending underlying support to prices globally (Chart 7). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is reducing exports of heavy-sour crudes favored by U.S. Gulf refiners, and boosting light-sweet sales, which will compete with North Sea volumes and U.S. shale production. This should tighten the spread between the light-sweet benchmarks Brent and WTI vs. Dubai (medium/heavy-sour). Reduced volumes being shipped by KSA to Asian refiners - particularly to Chinese refiners - will support Brent prices. We continue to expect the production cuts negotiated under the leadership of KSA and Russia to become apparent next month, and for inventories to draw in response. Continued high output by Iraq likely will be reduced in the near future. U.S. shale-oil output most likely will increase in 2H17 by ~ 200k to 300k b/d on average, given higher prices supporting drilling economics. Our expectation for global demand growth remains ~ 1.4mm b/d this year, roughly in line with 2016 growth. Given these underlying fundamentals, we expect inventories will begin showing sharp draws, causing backwardation in crude-oil markets to re-emerge in 2H17. As such, we are re-establishing our Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 WTI front-to-back spread - i.e., buying Dec/17 WTI and selling Dec/18 WTI against it. This spread was in contango going to press, making it particularly compelling. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 China Commodity Focus: How China's Monetary And Fiscal Policy Will Affect Metal Markets China Commodity Focus: How China's Monetary And Fiscal Policy Will Affect Metal Markets

Highlights Barring major external disruption, Chinese GDP growth will likely continue to accelerate into the first half of 2017. The overall policy stance will stay accommodative to safeguard against potentially negative shocks from abroad. Trade tensions between the world's two largest economies will inevitably increase, the degree of which matters greatly for how the Chinese economy as well as the global economy perform in the medium to long term. The dollar trend will continue to dictate the USD/RMB cross rate in the near term. The PBoC will continue to intervene heavily to prevent excessive currency weakness. Shorting the CNH/USD is not much different from a direct bet on the dollar index. Aggressive directional bet on Chinese shares is not warranted in the near term. Strategically favor Chinese equities over their global peers. Feature China has rung into 2017 with strengthening growth momentum that has been building in recent months, but the New Year clearly brings new challenges. China is on the receiving end of two major external uncertainties - namely, the anti-globalization backlash from the U.S. under President-elect Donald Trump and the outlook for the U.S. dollar, both of which are completely beyond its control. 2017 will also be a highly charged year in Chinese politics, as the ruling Communist Party prepares for a generational leadership reshuffle. This means the Chinese leadership will be more sensitive to perceived "provocations" from abroad, making political risk between the U.S. and China even less predictable. The Chinese authorities will remain highly vigilant about economic and financial stability. Meanwhile, the government will continue to mobilize the public sector and fiscal resources to support the economy, as external uncertainties mount. Domestic Demand Should Remain Buoyant Most of the recent data releases coming out of China have surprised to the upside, and the regained strength appears rather broad-based (Chart 1). Some indicators that are highly sensitive to industrial activity such as transportation freight, electricity generation and construction machine sales have rebounded sharply, partly due to last year's low base. Meanwhile, the consumer sector has remained buoyant, with strong expansion in durable goods sales such as cars and air conditioners. Looking forward, we expect the economy to continue to improve, at least in the next two quarters. Leading indicators are still strengthening. The latest PMI figures, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, have continued to climb, and remain above the boom-bust threshold. The labor market is on the mend. The employment component of the PMIs has been rising in recent months, indicating increased hiring as the economy picks up (Chart 2). This could lead to a self-feeding virtuous cycle where an improving labor market leads to rising income growth and strengthening aggregate demand, which further boosts overall business activity and the labor market. Chart 1Broad-Based Recovery Broad-Based Recovery Broad-Based Recovery Chart 2Labor Market On The Mend Labor Market On The Mend Labor Market On The Mend The corporate sector is recovering. Inventories are exceptionally low, setting the stage for inventory restocking, which could further boost production (Chart 3). Profit growth among both private and state-owned enterprises has continued to accelerate. Rising profits are easing financial stress, particularly for debt-laden, asset-heavy sectors. This is also reflected in banks' asset quality; banks' non-performing loan accumulation has slowed sharply of late (Chart 4). In addition, recovery in the corporate sector should also bode well for investment, which is still subdued. The housing crackdown since early October has once again set the stage for negative surprises. Home sales have already begun to slow, and the government appears determined to check housing demand. A key difference between now and previous rounds of housing crackdowns is that developers have been quite cautious throughout the current cycle1: confidence has been downbeat, and housing starts have remained quite weak. Consequently, housing inventories have been quickly depleted nationwide. The demand crackdown has dashed hopes for a housing-led growth recovery, but low inventories and sluggish housing construction has also reduced the risk of another housing-led investment bust, which has typically followed previous housing tightening campaigns. Chart 3Inventory Restocking Will ##br##Further Boost Production Inventory Restocking Will Further Boost Production Inventory Restocking Will Further Boost Production Chart 4Corporate Sector Recovery ##br## Also Helps Banks Corporate Sector Recovery Also Helps Banks Corporate Sector Recovery Also Helps Banks Our model shows that Chinese GDP growth likely accelerated notably in the final quarter of the year, and the momentum will probably carry forward into the first half of 2017, assuming no major external disruption (Chart 5). The inauguration of Donald Trump next week marks the biggest uncertainty for China's growth outlook in recent history due to his well-publicized anti-globalization stance, especially his proposed harsh anti-China trade policies. Chart 5Growth Should Continue To Improve Growth Should Continue To Improve Growth Should Continue To Improve The Trump Wildcard Speculation on President-elect Trump's forthcoming China policies run amok, ranging from pragmatic deal-making, simmering frictions and tit-for-tat retaliation, to the inevitability of a full-fledged trade war and even to a geo-strategic alliance with Russia against China. It is impossible to tell at the moment where reality will eventually end up, but what is clear is that trade tensions between the world's two largest economies will inevitably increase, the degree of which matters greatly for how the Chinese economy as well as the global economy perform in the medium to long term. Low-profile trade tensions and punitive barriers will prove damaging to specific sectors and industries, but should not have a major macro impact. Chinese products that are likely to be subject to American punitive tariffs are some heavy industries such as metals. The usual suspects that may fall victim to Chinese retaliation are American transportation equipment and agricultural products - two main American export items to China. At the macro level, however, China's export sector performance should improve on a cyclical basis, especially if "Trumponomics" successfully lifts U.S. economic growth this year (Chart 6). As one of the major beneficiaries of globalization, China stands to suffer if the broad globalization trend reverses. The saving grace is that exports as a share of the Chinese economy have already almost halved to below 20%, a level comparable to the early 2000s before China joined the World Trade Organization (Chart 7). In other words, China's "globalization dividends" have already diminished to some extent. Moreover, Chinese exports depend more on the U.S. market than the other way around. Therefore, it is in China's best interests to avoid an escalation of trade frictions with the U.S., simply because it has more to lose.2 Nonetheless, it goes without saying that no country gains in a trade war, and the world risks a deep economic recession if the two largest economies engage in an all-out trade battle. Geo-strategic containment of some kind further darkens the outlook for both China and the world. A "cold war" between China and the U.S. would mark a drastic break from the global environment of the past four decades that allowed China to focus solely on economic development. One can only hope that a "clash of the titans" will not drag the world into a self-destructive downward spiral. Chart 6Trumponomics Should Also ##br##Help Chinese Exports Trumponomics Should Also Help Chinese Exports Trumponomics Should Also Help Chinese Exports Chart 7Globalization Dividends ##br## Have Already Diminished Globalization Dividends Have Already Diminished Globalization Dividends Have Already Diminished In short, it is too early to evaluate the impact of America's new trade policy on China's growth outlook. We suspect the near-term impact should be limited, as it is unlikely that trade tensions will immediately erupt once Trump takes office. Nonetheless, the situation needs to be monitored closely going forward. Policy: Fiscal Takes The Helm We expect the Chinese authorities will further downplay the significance of the annual GDP growth target as a binding policy constraint. Growth recovery and improvement in labor market conditions reduce the need for further pump-priming, but the overall policy stance will stay accommodative to safeguard against potentially negative shocks from abroad. On the monetary policy front, the case for further interest rate cuts has diminished (Chart 8). The People's Bank of China (PBoC) recently reiterated that its monetary stance will stay decisively "neutral." In our view, this means the PBoC will continue to fine-tune interbank liquidity, but any symbolic policy move in either direction can be ruled out, unless the economic situation takes a sudden turn. In contrast, fiscal policy will be more stimulative. The annual budget deficit will likely be further increased in the March session of the People's Congress. Moreover, some high-profile investment plans have been released in recent weeks, meaning policy-led investment spending will remain elevated going forward. The country aims to invest RMB 2 trillion, or US$290 billion, in tourism between 2016 and 2020. This would translate into annual growth of more than 14% in direct investment in the industry. China's National Energy Administration (NEA) plans to invest RMB 2.5 trillion (US$360 billion) to develop the nation's energy sector over the next five years, with a focus on renewable resources. Installed renewable power capacity including wind, hydro, solar and nuclear is expected to contribute to about half of new electricity generation in five years, which will boost growth and reduce pollution. The government continues to promote private-public partnerships (PPPs) to build infrastructure. The published PPP proposals so far amount to a whopping RMB 12.5 trillion, with a heavy concentration on the transportation network and urban development (Chart 9). Chart 8Expect No Change In Policy Interest Rate Expect No Change In Policy Interest Rate Expect No Change In Policy Interest Rate Chart 9Fiscal Takes The Helm China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard It is worth noting that recent growth improvement has been accompanied by a notable slowdown in fiscal spending, leaving room for reacceleration going forward (Chart 10). In short, fiscal spending and policy-led investment will remain the key tools for the Chinese government to stabilize the economy. Chart 10Fiscal Spending Is Set To Reaccelerate Fiscal Spending Is Set To Reaccelerate Fiscal Spending Is Set To Reaccelerate Chart 11Weak RMB Or Strong Dollar? Weak RMB Or Strong Dollar? Weak RMB Or Strong Dollar? The RMB: Which Way Will The Wind Blow? Since the New Year, offshore RMB (CNH) liquidity has tightened dramatically, which has led to a massive surge in the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) of the RMB and a sharp rebound in the CNH/USD cross rate. This is widely viewed as a successful short squeeze engineered by the PBoC to punish speculators. It is certainly true that the authorities "allowed" offshore RMB liquidity to dry up, but the sharp spike in the HIBOR rate also closely resembles a classic emerging market currency crisis: speculative attacks on the exchange rate forces the monetary authorities to dramatically jack up interest rates to maintain exchange rate stability - a textbook example of the "Impossible Trinity" thesis at work. In China's case, however, the offshore HIBOR rate bears no relevance on the funding cost of the Chinese corporate sector. As such, the PBoC couldn't care less about periodic tightening in CNH liquidity, as it has no consequence on the domestic economy. This bodes poorly for the internationalization of the RMB, but is a low-cost tool for the PBoC to maintain control over the exchange rate. Two observations can be made from this episode: It is unlikely that the PBoC will completely give up control over the RMB exchange rate, especially in this politically charged year. Sharp depreciation in the RMB/USD may be viewed as a sign of systemic financial risk and economic weakness, a taboo ahead of the Party Congress later this year. Since the New Year, the Chinese authorities have further tightened capital account controls to restrict capital outflows - a reflection of the PBoC's determination to maintain exchange rate stability. There is now an almost universal consensus that the U.S. dollar will strengthen further this year, and that the RMB will decline. It is of course foolish to blindly bet against consensus, but it also means shorting the CNH/USD has already become a very crowded trade. The sharp rebound of the CNH/USD a few days ago is a classic example of a market stampede where investors rush to a narrow exit when conditions change. All this has made the risk-return profile of shorting the RMB against the dollar unfavorable, as the PBoC, with its formidable resources, could unexpectedly hit back at any time. Indeed, the performance of the CNH/USD cross rate has closely tracked the broad U.S. dollar index over the past two years, a situation unlikely to change going forward (Chart 11). The bottom line is that the dollar trend will continue to dictate the USD/RMB cross rate in the near term. The PBoC will continue to intervene heavily to prevent excessive currency weakness. For investors, shorting the CNH/USD is not much different from a direct bet on the dollar index. What To Do With Chinese Stocks? Chart 12Chinese Shares Valuation Perspective Chinese Shares Valuation Perspective Chinese Shares Valuation Perspective Chinese stocks will likely range-bound in the near term. The downside is limited by accommodative policy, stable/improving growth and depressed valuation, especially for H shares (Chart 12). The upside is capped by the ongoing macro concerns and brewing tension with the incoming U.S. administration. Chinese shares may also be vulnerable if the more frothy global bourses correct. Therefore, aggressive directional bet is not warranted in the near term. From a big picture point of view, however, we remain convinced that market concerns on China's macro conditions are overdone, and Chinese equities have been unduly punished. Investors with longer-term horizons should hold H shares. Strategically we favor Chinese equities over their global peers. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Housing Tightening: Now And 2010," dated October 13, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China-U.S. Trade Relations: The Big Picture," dated November 17, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations