Energy

  Nearly two-thirds of the S&P 500 companies reported their Q3 earnings, and the earnings season is drawing to a close. 83% of companies have beaten the street expectations with an average earnings surprise standing at 11% (40% earnings growth vs. 29% expected on October 1, 2021). Sales beats are only marginally worse: 77% of the companies have exceeded expectations with an average sales surprise of 3%. Quarter-on-quarter earnings growth is 0.25% exceeding expected 6% contraction. Compared to Q3-2019, eps CAGR is 12%. Chart 1 Approaching The Finish Line Approaching The Finish Line Financials, Energy, and Health Care have delivered the largest earnings surprises. Financials have done well on the back of the robust M&A activity, while the unfolding energy crisis has lifted the overall S&P 500 Energy complex. Pent-up demand for the elective medical procedures has translated into strong Health Care earnings.   Industrials and Materials were amongst the worst: China-related headwinds continue to weigh on both of these sectors. However, some analysts expect China to ease in Q1-2022, providing a tailwind for these sectors.  Most companies commented that supply chain bottlenecks and soaring shipping costs are the major headwinds. However, as we see, most have navigated a challenging economic environment swimmingly. Strong pricing power and operating leverage have preserved margins and earnings so far. Looking ahead, companies’ ability to raise prices further is waning (Chart 1), while costs continue marching up. These factors are the ubiquitous reasons for a negative guidance – 52.6% of companies are guiding lower for Q4-2021 (compare that to 32.7% previous quarter). Bottom Line: Companies are exceeding analysts’ expectations both in terms of sales and earnings growth.     Chart

Highlights Short-term inflation risk will escalate further if politics causes new supply disruptions. Long-term inflation risk is significant as well. There is a distinct risk of a geopolitical crisis in the Middle East that would push up energy prices: the US’s unfinished business with Iran. The primary disinflationary risk is China’s property sector distress. However, Beijing will strive to maintain stability prior to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. South Asian geopolitical risks are rising. The Indo-Pakistani ceasefire is likely to break down, while Afghani terrorism will rebound. Book gains on our emerging market currency short targeting “strongman” regimes. Feature Chart 1 Investors are underrating the risk of a global oil shock. This was our geopolitical takeaway from the BCA Conference this year. Investors are focused on the risk of inflation and stagflation, always with reference to the 1970s. The sharp increase in energy prices due to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are universally cited as aggravating factors of stagflation at that time. But these events are also given as critical differences between the situation in the 1970s and today. Unfortunately, there could be similarities. From a strictly geopolitical perspective, the risk of a conflict in the Middle East is significant both in the near term and over the coming year or so. The risk stems from the US’s unfinished business with Iran. More broadly, any supply disruption would have an outsized impact as global energy inventories decline. OPEC’s spare capacity at present can cover a 5 million barrel shock (Chart 1). In this week’s report we also provide tactical updates on China, Russia, and India. Geopolitics And The 1970s Inflation Chart 2Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Fundamentally the stagflation of the 1970s occurred because global policymakers engendered a spiral of higher wages and higher prices. The wage-price spiral was exacerbated by a falling dollar, after President Nixon abandoned the gold standard, and a commodity price surge (Chart 2). Monetary policy clearly played a role. It was too easy for too long, with broad money supply consistently rising relative to nominal GDP (Chart 3). Central banks including the Federal Reserve were focused exclusively on employment. Policymakers saw the primary risk to the institution’s credibility as recession and unemployment, not inflation. Fear of the Great Depression lurked under the surface. Fiscal policy also played a role. The size of the US budget deficit at this time is often exaggerated but there is no question that they were growing and contributed to the bout of inflation and spike in bond yields (Chart 4). The reason was not only President Johnson’s large social spending program, known as the “Great Society.” It was also Johnson’s war – the Vietnam war. Chart 3Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s On top of this heady mix of inflationary variables came geopolitics. The Yom Kippur war in 1973 prompted Arab states to impose an embargo on Israel’s supporters in the West. The Arab embargo cut off 8% of global oil demand at the time. Oil prices skyrocketed, precipitating a deep recession (Chart 5). Chart 4Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending The embargo came to a halt in spring of 1974 after Israeli forces withdrew to the east of the Suez Canal. The oil shock exacerbated the underlying inflationary wave that continued throughout the decade. The Iranian revolution triggered another oil shock in 1979, bringing the rise in general prices to their peak in the early 1980s, at which point policymakers intervened decisively. Chart 5Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution There is an analogy with today’s global policy mix. Fear of the Great Recession and deflation rules within policymaking circles, albeit less so among the general public. The Fed and the European Central Bank have adjusted their strategies to pursue an average inflation target and “maximum employment.” Chart 6Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? ​​​​​​ The Biden administration is reviving big government with a framework agreement of around $1.2 trillion in new deficit spending on infrastructure, green energy, and social programs likely to pass Congress before year’s end. In short, the macro and policy backdrop are changing in a way that is reminiscent of the 1970s despite various structural differences between the two periods. It is too early to declare that a wage-price spiral has developed but core inflation is rising and investors are right to be concerned about the direction and potential for inflation surprises down the road (Chart 6). These trends would not be nearly as concerning if they were not occurring in the context of a shift in public opinion in favor of government versus markets, labor versus capital, onshoring versus offshoring, and protectionism versus free trade. Investors should note that the last policy sea change (in the opposite direction) lasted roughly 30-40 years. The global savings glut – shown here as the combined current account balances of the world’s major economies – has begun to decline, implying that a major deflationary force might be subsiding. Asian exporters apparently have substantial pricing power, as witnessed by rising export prices, although they have yet to break above the secular downtrend of the post-2008 period (Chart 7). Chart 7Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary A commodity price surge is also underway, of course, though it is so far manageable. The US and EU economies are less energy-intensive than in the 1970s and there is considerable buffer between today’s high prices and an economic recession (Chart 8). Chart 8Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? The problem is that there is a diminishing margin of safety. Furthermore, a crisis in the Middle East is not far-fetched, as there is a concrete and distinct reason for worrying about one: the US’s unresolved collision course with Iran. A crisis in the Persian Gulf would greatly exacerbate today’s energy shortages. Iran: The Risk Of An Oil Shock Iran now says it will rejoin diplomatic talks over its nuclear program in late November. This development was expected, and is important, but it masks the urgent and dangerous trajectory of events that could blow up any day now. It is emphatically not an “all clear” sign for geopolitical risk in the Persian Gulf. The US is hinting, merely hinting, that it is willing to use military force to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The Iranians doubt US appetite for war and have every reason to think that nuclear status will guarantee them regime survival. Thus the Iranians are incentivized to use diplomacy as a screen while pursuing nuclear weaponization – unless the US and Israel make a convincing display of military strength to force Iran back to genuine diplomacy. A convincing display is hard to do. A secret war is taking place, of sabotage and cyber-attacks. On October 26 a cyber-attack disrupted Iranian gas stations. But even attacks on nuclear scientists and facilities have not dissuaded the Iranians from making progress on their nuclear program yet. Iran does not want to be attacked but it knows that a ground invasion is virtually impossible and air strikes alone have a poor record of winning wars. The Iranians have achieved 60% highly enriched uranium and are expected to achieve nuclear breakout capacity – the ability to make a nuclear device – sometime between now and December (Table 1). The IAEA no longer has any visibility in Iran. The regime’s verified production of uranium metal can only be used for the construction of a warhead. Recent technical progress may be irreversible, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.1 If that is true then the upcoming round of diplomatic negotiations is already doomed. Table 1Iran’s Compliance With Nuclear Deal And Time Until Breakout (Oct 2021) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) American policymakers seem overconfident in the face of this clear nuclear proliferation risk. This is strange given that North Korea successfully manipulated them over the past three decades and now has an arsenal of 40-50 nuclear weapons. The consensus goes as follows: Regime instability: Americans emphasize that the Iranian regime is unstable, lacks genuine support, and faces a large and restive youth population. This is all true. Indeed Iran is one of the most likely candidates for major regime instability in the wake of the COVID-19 shock. Chart 9AIran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ... Iran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ... Iran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ... ​​​​​​ Chart 9B... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising ... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising ... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising However, popular protest has not had any effect on the regime over the past 12 years. Today the economy is improving and illicit oil revenues are rising (Chart 9). A new nationalist government is in charge that has far greater support than the discredited reformist faction that failed on both the economic and foreign policy fronts (Chart 10). The sophisticated idea that achieving nuclear breakout will somehow weaken the regime is wishful thinking.  If it provokes US and/or Israeli air strikes, it will most likely see the people rally around the flag and convince the next generation to adopt the revolutionary cause.2 If it does not provoke a war, then the regime’s strategic wisdom will be confirmed. American military and economic superiority: Americans tend to think that Iran will back down in the face of the US’s and Israel’s overwhelming military and economic superiority. It is true that a massive show of force – combined with the sale of specialized weaponry to Israel to enable a successful strike against extremely hardened nuclear facilities – could force Iran to pause its nuclear quest and go back to negotiations. Yet the US’s awesome display of military power in both Iraq and Afghanistan ended in ignominy and have not deterred Iran, just next door, after 20 years. Nor have American economic sanctions, including “maximum pressure” sanctions since 2019. The US is starkly divided, very few people view Iran as a major threat, and there is an aversion to wars in the Middle East (Chart 11). The Iranians could be forgiven for doubting that the US has the appetite to enforce its demands. Chart 10 ​​​​​​ Chart 11 ​​​​​​ In short the US is attempting to turn its strategic focus to China and Asia Pacific, which creates a power vacuum in the Middle East that Iran may attempt to fill. Meanwhile global supply and demand balances for energy are tight, with shortages popping up around the world, giving Iran greater leverage. From an investment point of view, a crisis is likely in the near term regardless of what happens afterwards. A crisis is necessary to force the US and Iran to return to a durable nuclear deal like in 2015. Otherwise Iran will reach nuclear breakout and an even bigger crisis will erupt, potentially forcing the US and Israel (or Israel alone) to take military action. Diplomatic efforts will need to have some quick and substantial victories in the coming months to convince us that the countries have moved off their collision course. A conflict with Iran will not necessarily go to the extreme of Iran shutting down the Strait of Hormuz and cutting off 21% of the world’s oil and 26% of liquefied natural gas (Chart 12). If that happens a global recession is unavoidable. It would more likely involve lesser conflicts, at least initially, such as “Tanker War 2.0” in the Persian Gulf.3 Or it could involve a flare-up of the ongoing proxy war by missile and drone strikes, such as with the Abqaiq attack in 2019 that knocked 5.7 million barrels per day offline overnight. The impact on oil markets will depend on the nature and magnitude of the event. Chart 12 What are the odds of a military conflict? In past reports we have demonstrated that there is a 40% chance of conflict with Iran. The country’s nuclear program is at a critical juncture. The longer the world goes without a diplomatic track to defuse tensions, the more investors should brace for negative surprises. Bottom Line: There is a clear and present danger of a geopolitical oil shock. The implication is that oil and LNG prices could spike in the coming zero-to-12 months. The implication would be a dramatic “up then down” movement in global energy prices. Inflation expectations should benefit from simmering tensions but a full-blown war would cause an extreme price spike and global recession. China: The Return Of The Authoritative Person Another reason that today’s inflation risk could last longer than expected is that China’s government is likely to backpedal from overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy. If this is true then China will secure its economic recovery, the global recovery will continue, commodity prices will stay elevated, and the inflation expectations and bond yields will recover. If it is not true then investors will start talking about disinflation and deflation again soon. We are not bullish on Chinese assets – far from it. We see China entering a property-induced debt-deflation crisis over the long run. But over the 2021-22 period we have argued that China would pull back from the brink of overtightening. Our GeoRisk Indicator for China highlights how policy risk remains elevated (see Appendix). So far our assessment appears largely accurate. The government has quietly intervened to prevent the troubled developer Evergrande from suffering a Lehman-style collapse. The long-delayed imposition of a nationwide property tax is once again being diluted into a few regional trial balloons. Alibaba founder Jack Ma, whom the government disappeared last year, has reappeared in public view, which implies that Beijing recognizes that its crackdown on Big Tech could cause long-term damage to innovation. At this critical juncture, a mysterious “authoritative” commentator has returned to the scene after five years of silence. Widely believed to be Vice Premier Liu He, a Politburo member and Xi Jinping confidante on economic affairs, the authoritative person argues in a recent editorial that China will stick with its current economic policies.4 However, the message was not entirely hawkish. Table 2 highlights the key arguments – China is not oblivious to the risk of a policy mistake. Table 2Messages From China’s ‘Authoritative Person’ On Economic Policy (2021) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) Readers will recall that a similar “authoritative Person” first appeared in the People’s Daily in May 2016. At that time, the Chinese government had just relented in the face of economic instability and stimulated the economy. It saw a 3.5% of GDP increase in fiscal spending and a 10.0% of GDP increase in the credit impulse from the trough in 2015 to the peak in 2016. The authoritative person was explaining that the intention to reform would persist despite the relapse into debt-fueled growth. So one must wonder today whether the authoritative person is emerging because Beijing is sticking to its guns (consensus view) or rather because it is gradually being forced to relax policy by the manifest risk of financial instability. To be fair, a recent announcement on government special purpose bonds does not indicate major fiscal easing. If local governments accelerate their issuance of new special purpose bonds to meet their quota for the year then they are still not dramatically increasing the fiscal support for the economy. But this announcement could protect against downside growth risks. The first quarter of 2022 will be the true test of whether China will remain hawkish. Going forward there are two significant dangers as we see it. The first is that policymakers prove ideological rather than pragmatic. An autocratic government could get so wrapped up in its populist campaign to restrain high housing costs that it refuses to slacken policies enough and causes a crash. The second danger is that inflation stays higher for longer, preventing authorities from easing policy even when they know they need to do so to stabilize growth. The second danger is the bigger of the two risks. As for the first risk, ideology will take a backseat to necessity. Xi Jinping needs to secure key promotions for his faction in the top positions of the Communist Party at the twentieth national party congress in 2022. He cannot be sure to succeed if the economy is in free fall. A self-induced crash would be a very peculiar way of trying to solidify one’s stature as leader for life at the critical hour. Similarly China cannot maintain a long-term great power competition with the United States if it deliberately triggers property deflation and financial turmoil. It can and will continue modernizing and upgrading its military, e.g. developing hypersonic missiles, even if it faces financial turmoil. But it will have a much greater chance of neutralizing US regional allies and creating a regional buffer space if its economic growth is stable. Ultimately China cannot prevent financial instability, economic distress, and political risk from rising in the coming years. There will be a reckoning for its vast imbalances, as with all countries. It could be that this reckoning will upset the Xi administration’s best-laid plans for 2022. But before that happens we expect policy to ease. A policy mistake today would mean that very negative economic outcomes will arrive precisely in time to affect sociopolitical stability ahead of the party congress next fall. We will keep betting against that. Bottom Line: China’s “authoritative” media commentator shows that policymakers are not as hawkish as the consensus holds. The main takeaway is that policymakers will adjust the intensity of their reform efforts to maintain stability. This is standard Chinese policymaking and it is more important than usual ahead of the political rotation in 2022. Otherwise global inflation risk will quickly give way to deflation risk as defaults among China’s property developers spread and morph into broader financial and economic instability. Indo-Pakistani Ceasefire: A Breakdown Is Nigh India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along the line of control in February 2021. While the agreement has held up so far, a breakdown is probably around the corner. It was never likely to last for long. Over the short run, the ceasefire made sense for both countries: COVID-19 Risks: The first wave of the pandemic had abated but COVID-19-related risks loomed large. India had administered less than 15 million vaccine doses back then and Pakistan only 100,000. Dangerous Transitions Were Underway: With America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in the works, Pakistan was fully focused on its western border. India was pre-occupied with its eastern front, where skirmishes with Chinese troops forced it to redirect some of its military focus. As we now head towards the end of 2021, these constraints are no longer binding. COVID-19 Risks Under Control: The vaccination campaign in India and Pakistan has gathered pace. More than 50% of India’s population and 30% of Pakistan’s have been given at least one dose. Pakistan’s Ducks Are Lined-up In Afghanistan: America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been completed. Afghanistan is under Taliban’s control and Pakistan has a better hold over the affairs of its western neighbor. One constraint remains: India and China remain embroiled in border disputes. Conciliatory talks between their military commanders broke down a fortnight ago. Winter makes it nearly impossible to undertake significant operations in the Himalayas but a failure of coordination today could set up a conflict either immediately or in the spring. While India may see greater value in maintaining the ceasefire than Pakistan, India has elections due in key northern states in 2022. India’s northern states harbor even less favorable views of Pakistan than the rest of India. Hence any small event could trigger a disproportionate response from India. Bottom Line: While it is impossible to predict the timing, a breakdown in the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire may materialize in 2022 or sooner. Depending on the exact nature of any conflict, a geopolitically induced selloff in Indian equities could create a much-needed consolidation of this year’s rally and ultimately a buying opportunity. Russia, Global Terrorism, And Great Power Relations Part of Putin’s strategy of rebuilding the Russian empire involves ensuring that Russia has a seat at the table for every major negotiation in Eurasia. Now that the US has withdrawn forces from Afghanistan, Russia is pursuing a greater role there. Most recently Russia hosted delegations from China, Pakistan, India, and the Taliban. India too is planning to host a national security advisor-level conference next month to discuss the Afghanistan situation. Do these conferences matter for global investors? Not directly. But regional developments can give insight into the strategies of the great powers in a world that is witnessing a secular rise in geopolitical risk. Chart 13 China, Russia, and India have skin in the game when it comes to Afghanistan’s future. This is because all three powers have much to lose if Afghanistan becomes a large-scale incubator for terrorists who can infiltrate Russia through Central Asia, China through Xinjiang, or India through Pakistan. Hence all three regional powers will be constrained to stay involved in the affairs of Afghanistan. Terrorism-related risks in South Asia have been capped over the last decade due to the American war (Chart 13). The US withdrawal will lead to the activation of latent terrorist activity. This poses risks specifically for India, which has a history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. And yet, while China and Russia saw the Afghan vacuum coming and have been engaging with Taliban from the get-go, India only recently began engaging with Taliban. The evolution of Afghanistan under the Taliban will also influence the risk of terrorism for the rest of the world. In the wake of the global pandemic and recession, social misery and regime failures in areas with large youth populations will continue to combine with modern communications technology to create a revival of terrorist threats (Chart 14). Chart 14 American officials recently warned of the potential for transnational attacks based in Afghanistan to strike the homeland within six months. That risk may be exaggerated today but it is real over the long run, especially as US intelligence turns its strategic focus toward states and away from non-state actors. India, Europe, and other targets are probably even more vulnerable than the United States. If Russia and China succeed in shaping the new Afghanistan’s leadership then the focus of militant proxies will be directed elsewhere. Beyond terrorism, if Russia and China coordinate closely over Afghanistan then India may be left in the cold. This would reinforce recent trends in which a tightening Russo-Chinese partnership hastens India’s shift away from neutrality and toward favoring the US and the West in strategic matters. If these trends continue to the point of alliance formation, then they increase the risk that any conflicts between two powers will implicate others. Bottom Line: Afghanistan is now a regional barometer of multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism, the exclusivity of Russo-Chinese cooperation, and India’s strategic isolation or alignment with the West. Investment Takeaways It is too soon to play down inflation risks. We share the BCA House View that they will subside next year as pandemic effects wane. But we also see clear near-term risks to this view. In the short run (zero to 12 months), a distinct risk of a Middle Eastern geopolitical crisis looms. A gradual escalation of tensions is inflationary whereas a sharp spike in conflict would push energy prices into punitive territory and kill global demand. Over the next 12 months, China’s economic and financial instability will also elicit policy easing or fiscal stimulus as necessary to preserve stability, as highlighted by the regime’s mouthpiece. Obviously stimulus will not be utilized if the economic recovery is stable, given elevated producer prices. In a future report we will show that Russia is willing and able to manipulate natural gas prices to increase its bargaining leverage over Europe. This dynamic, combined with the risk of cold winter weather exacerbating shortages, suggests that the worst is not yet over. Geopolitical conflict with Russia will resume over the long run. Stay long gold as a hedge against both inflation and geopolitical crises involving Iran, Taiwan/China, and Russia. Maintain “value” plays as a cheap hedge against inflation. Book a profit of 2.5% on our short trade for currencies of emerging market “strongmen,” Turkey, Brazil, and the Philippines. Our view is still negative on these economies. Stay long cyber-security stocks. Over the long run, inflation risk must be monitored. We expect significant inflation risk to persist as a result of a generational change in global policy in favor of government and labor over business and capital. But the US is maintaining easy immigration policy and boosting productivity-enhancing investments. Meanwhile China’s secular slowdown is disinflationary. The dollar may remain resilient in the face of persistently high geopolitical risk. The jury is still out.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, "Iran’s Recent, Irreversible Nuclear Advances," Institute for Science and International Security, September 22, 2021, isis-online.org. 2     Ray Takeyh, "The Bomb Will Backfire On Iran," Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 3     See Aaron Stein and Afshon Ostovar, "Tanker War 2.0: Iranian Strategy In The Gulf," Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 10, 2021, fpri.org. 4     "Ten Questions About China’s Economy," Xinhua, October 24, 2021, news.cn.     Section II: Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan-Province of China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan-Province of China: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) will open this weekend in Glasgow, Scotland, amid a global crisis induced in no small measure by policies and regulations that led to energy-market failures. Price-distorting regulations and ad hoc fixes – e.g., retail price caps, "windfall profits" taxes – will compound the current crisis. Mad rushes to cover energy and space-heating demand in spot coal and gas markets when renewable-energy output falters will be repeated, given utility-scale battery storage will continue to be insufficient to replace hydrocarbons in the transition to a low-carbon economy.  On the back of higher coal, gas and oil demand, CO2 emissions will return to trend growth or higher this year (Chart of the Week). Base metals capex will have to increase at the mining and refining levels to meet renewables and EV demand.  This includes the need to diversify metals' production and refining concentration risks more broadly.1 We remain strategically long the COMT ETF and the S&P GSCI index, as these fundamental imbalances are addressed.  We also are initiating a resting buy order on the XME ETF if this basic materials ETF trades down to $40/share. Feature Going into the COP26 meetings starting this weekend, delegates no doubt will be preoccupied with the global energy crisis engulfing markets as the Northern Hemisphere winter approaches. In no small measure, the crisis is a product of poor policy design and regulatory measures meant to accelerate the transition to low-carbon economies globally. This is most apparent in China, the UK and the EU. China and the UK use retail price-caps to control the cost of energy to households. In China, the price caps recently brought state-owned electricity providers to the brink of bankruptcy, because suppliers were not able to pass through higher wholesale prices for coal and natural gas to retail consumers. In the UK, retail price caps actually did result in bankruptcies of smaller electricity providers. In the EU, price caps and "windfall profits" taxes are being imposed on retail energy providers in different states in the wake of the energy crisis.2 Chart 1 China's Impressive Renewables Push China has been making significant progress in introducing renewable energy to their energy supply mix, particularly wind and solar (Chart 2), accounting for 81.5% of Asia-Pacific's wind generation last year, and 55.5% of the region's solar generation. Chart 2 China generates just 11% of its energy from renewables. This has been insufficient to meet demand over the past year, owing to a combination of reduced coal supplies; colder-than-normal temperatures last winter, and hotter-than-normal temps during the summer brought on by a La Niña event. While energy demand was expanding over the course of the year due to strong economic growth in 1H21 and weather-related demand over the course of the year (for heating and cooling), provincial officials were vigorously enforcing the state-mandated "dual-control policy," which in some instances led to overly aggressive shutdowns of coal mines that left local markets short of the fuel needed to supply ~ 63% of the country's electricity.3 Chinese authorities have said that they would “go all out” to boost coal production in a bid to tackle widespread power cuts. Some 20 provinces in China have experienced electricity rationing and blackouts over the past month due to power-production shortfalls driven by a lack of coal. The power rationing was imposed due to a shortage of coal supply, which led to the surge in coal prices. The high coal prices, in turn, forced coal-power companies to cut back their production to avoid losses that threatened to bankrupt them.4 To be able to ensure coal and electricity supplies this winter, state authorities released new rules to enforce a policy scheme that includes increasing coal production capacity and revising the electricity pricing mechanism. China's state-owned Global Times news service reported more than 150 coal mines have been approved to re-open.5 The regional governments can prioritize their energy intensity targets over energy consumption. Coal-fired power prices, which are largely state-controlled, will be allowed to fluctuate by up to 20% from baseline levels. However, raising household tariffs is seen as a difficult task politically, given that China's per-capita income remains low.6 UK, EU Market-Distortions The UK electricity production and supply market consists of three segments – producing, distributing, and selling electricity. Entities can operate in any or all of these areas. As in many things, the UK punches way above its weight in renewables, accounting for 15% of wind generation and 7.5% of solar produced in Europe, as seen in Chart 2. Wind can supply ~ 25% of UK power, depending on weather conditions. For all renewables, the UK accounts for 14% of Europe's total generation capacity. Twice a year, the national energy regulator, The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) sets a cap on the price at which electricity sellers or retailers can supply power to the final consumer. While the maximum price retailers can sell electricity to consumers is capped, the price they can buy it from the electricity producer is not. This price depends on market factors, including fuel costs. When wind power dropped sharply this past summer, electric suppliers were forced to scramble for natgas as a generation fuel, and, at the margin, coal. In the UK, natural gas powers more than 35% of the electricity mix, and accounts for 15% of Europe's natgas-fired generation. Coal generation in the UK accounts for 1% of Europe's coal fueled electricity generation. China's push to secure additional coal and natgas places it in direct competition for limited supplies with European buyers. High demand, stiff competition, reduced supply, and low inventories all contribute to higher gas prices globally (Chart 3). Easing pandemic related restrictions globally has released pent-up energy demand, which is expected to move higher over the next few months, as the Northern Hemisphere possibly sees another colder-than-normal winter, and economic growth boosts manufacturing demand. Chart 3 Capping selling prices during periods of very high fuel costs squeezes retailers’ profit margins. In the last six weeks, seven UK retailers have gone under, affecting ~ 1.5 million consumers. Such a system favors the incumbents: retailers that can produce their own electricity and hedge their exposure to price volatility have access to lower costs of capital and higher economies of scale. When retailers are no longer able to operate due to bankruptcy, their customers are distributed to the remaining suppliers. The British government would prefer to offer financial support to persuade larger companies to take on stranded consumers than save retailers who are being forced to go out of business.7 However, as wholesale gas prices rise, industry operators – even the more established ones – may not be keen to borrow from the government to take on additional consumers. The EU also finds itself facing stiff competition from Asia for natgas imports. According to Qatar’s energy minister, suppliers prefer Asian buyers since they purchase natgas on fixed long-term contracts to ensure energy security, unlike European buyers which purchase much of their  fuel on the spot market.8 The EU's natgas imports are projected to remain uncertain as Russian exports have fallen below pre-pandemic levels and supply via the NordStream2 pipeline is delayed. With one of the lowest working inventories within the EU (Chart 4), the UK, which imports ~ 65% of its natural gas, is unable to protect itself from supply volatility. These high prices coincided with low wind speeds earlier this year, curtailing wind power, which as of 2020, is the UK’s second highest electricity source. Chart 4 Unfocused Policy Hinders Energy Transition It is impossible to gainsay the merit of the decarbonization of the global economy. Disrupting weather patterns, spewing particulates and chemicals into the atmosphere, dumping plastics into the oceans and waterways, and ravaging forests worldwide do not contribute to any species fitness for survival. However, policymakers appear to be completely ignoring existing constraints any serious decarbonization effort would require. Encouraging the winddown of fossil fuels decades before sufficient renewable-energy and carbon-capture technologies are developed and deployed to replace the lost energy indirectly forces a harsh calculation: Do sovereign governments want to restrict income growth and quality-of-life improvements to the energy available from renewables (including EVs) at any point in time? Who actually makes that choice and enforces the rules and regulations that go with it? We have written about the enormous increase in base metals supply that will be required over the coming decades to develop and deploy renewables, most recently in La Niña And The Energy Transition last month. Base metals – like oil and gas markets – are extremely tight, and are operating in years-long physical deficit conditions, as can be seen in the bellwether copper and Brent markets (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 5Base Metals Markets Are Tight … Base Metals Markets Are Tight... Base Metals Markets Are Tight... Chart 6As Is Oil... As Is Oil... As Is Oil... Any policy contemplating a global buildout of renewable-energy generation and its supporting grids, along with EVs and their supporting infrastructure, should start with the recognition laws, regulations and rules need to encourage responsible, safe and sound incentives for developing the supply side of base metals markets. An argument also could be made for fossil-fuels, which arguably should receive technology subsidies and favorable tax treatment – not unlike those granted to renewables and EVs – to invest in carbon-capture tech development. Rules and regulations favoring long-term contracts so that producers are able to address stranded-asset concerns and secure funding for these projects also should be developed. Investment Implications Absent a more thought-out and focused effort to write laws, develop rules and regulations on at least the level of trading blocs, the evolution to a low-carbon energy future will be halting and volatile. This in an of itself is detrimental to funding such an enormous undertaking. Until something like it comes along, we remain long commodity-index exposure – the S&P GSCI index and the COMT ETF – and long the PICK ETF. At tonight's close we are opening a resting order to buy the XME ETF if if trades to or below $40/share.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Crude oil markets unexpectedly moved lower mid-week on the back of yet another drop in Cushing, OK, inventory levels reported by the US EIA. Cushing crude-oil stocks stood at 27.3mm barrels vs. 31.2mm barrels for the week ended 22 October 2021. Two years ago, Cushing inventories were at 46mm barrels. Markets had been rallying on falling Cushing storage levels over the past couple of weeks. The EIA's estimate of refined-product demand – known as "Product Supplied" – remains below comparable 2019 levels at this time of year, although not by much (19.8mm b/d vs. 21.6mm b/d). We expect global oil and liquids demand to rebound above 100mm b/d in the current quarter. Stronger demand in 2022 and 2023 prompted us to raise our Brent forecasts to $80/bbl and $81/bbl, respectively (Chart 7). Base Metals: Bullish Copper continues to trade lower as markets price in a higher likelihood of softer demand for the bellwether metal as the global power-supply crunch weighs on manufacturing activity, particularly in China. Copper inventories are still at precariously low levels, with the red metal in global inventories hitting lows not seen since 2008 (Chart 8). This will keep copper's forward curve backwardated over time, as inventories are drawn to fill the gap between supply and demand globally. Low inventory levels are expected to persist as power rationing in China, which was responsible for more than 41% of global refined copper output in 2020, persists. Precious Metals: Bullish Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell's remarks stating supply disruptions are expected to keep US inflation elevated next year are supportive to base metals. Higher inflation will increase demand for the yellow metal, as investors look for a hedge against USD debasement. However, the Fed's asset-purchase taper, which we expect to be announced in November, and the interest rate hikes we expect as a result of it beginning in end-2022, will push bond yields higher and raise the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding gold. That said, we believe the Fed will remain behind the inflation curve and will work to keep real rates weak, which will tend to support gold prices. Chart 7 Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly Chart 8 Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y       Footnotes 1     Please see our report entitled La Niña And The Energy Transition, published on September 30, 2021, for discussion. 2     Please see Spain to Cap Windfall Energy Profits as Rally Hits Inflation published by bloomberglaw.com on September 14, 2021. 3    Please see carbonbrief.org's China Briefing for 23 and 30 September and 14 October 2021 for additional discussion, and fn 1 above. 4    Please see ‘All out’ to beat power shortages; 2050 ‘net-zero’ for airlines; ‘Critical decade” for global warming, published by China Brief on 7 October, 2021. 5    Please see Chinese officials move to increase coal output amid shortage published by globaltimes.cn 13 October 2021. 6    Data from the World Bank showed China's GDP per capita reached $10,500 in 2020, below the global average of $10,926. Some experts expect any reform to be gradual. 7     Please see Kwarteng insists UK will avoid power shortages as gas crisis worsens, published by the Financial Times on September 20, 2021. 8    Please see Qatar calls for embrace of gas producers for energy transition, published by the Financial Times on October 24, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations

In lieu of next week’s report, I will be presenting the quarterly Counterpoint webcast titled ‘Where Is The Groupthink Wrong? (Part 2)’. I do hope you can join. Highlights If a continued surge in the oil price – or other commodity or goods prices – started driving up the 30-year T-bond yield, the markets and the economy would feel the pain. We reiterate that the pain point at which the Fed would be forced to volte-face is only around 30 bps away on the 30-year T-bond, equal to a yield of around 2.4-2.5 percent. That would be a great buying opportunity for bonds. Given the proximity of this pain point, it is too late to short bonds, or for equity investors to rotate into value and cyclical equity sectors. That tactical opportunity has almost played out. On a 6-month and longer horizon, equity investors should prefer long-duration defensive sectors such as healthcare. Chinese long-duration bond yields are on a structural downtrend. Fractal analysis: The Korean won is oversold. Feature Many people have noticed the suspicious proximity of oil price surges to subsequent economic downturns – most recently, the 1999-2000 trebling of crude and the subsequent 2000-01 downturn, and the 2007-2008 trebling of crude and the subsequent 2008-09 global recession. Begging the question, should we be concerned about the trebling of the crude oil price since March 2020? Of course, we know that the root cause of both the 2000-01 downturn and the 2008-09 recession was not the oil price surge that preceded them. As their names make crystal clear, the 2001-01 downturn was the dot com bust and the 2008-09 recession was the global financial crisis. And yet, and yet… while the oil price surge was not the culprit, it was certainly the accessory to both murders, by driving up the bond yield and tipping an already fragile market and economy over the brink. Today, could oil become the accessory to another murder? (Chart I-1) Chart I-1AOil Was The Accessory To The Murder In 2008... Oil Was The Accessory To The Murder In 2008... Oil Was The Accessory To The Murder In 2008... Chart I-1B...Could It Become The Accessory To Another Murder? ...Could It Become The Accessory To Another Murder? ...Could It Become The Accessory To Another Murder?   Oil Is The Accessory To Many Murders Turn the clock back to the 1970s, and it might seem more straightforward that the recession of 1974 was the direct result of the oil shock that preceded it. Yet even in this case, we can argue that oil was the accessory, rather than the true culprit of that murder. It is correct that the specific timing, magnitude, and nature of OPEC supply cutbacks were closely related to geopolitical events – especially the US support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. Yet as neat and popular as this explanation is, it ignores a bigger economic story: the collapse in August 1971 of the Bretton Woods ‘pseudo gold standard’, which severed the fixed link between the US dollar and quantities of commodities. To maintain the real value of oil, the OPEC countries were raising the price of crude oil well before October 1973. Meaning that while geopolitical events may have influenced the precise timing and magnitude of price hikes, OPEC countries were just ‘staying even’ with the collapsing real value of the US dollar, in which oil was priced. Seen in this light, the true culprit of the recession was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and the oil price surge through 1973-74 was just the accessory to the murder (Chart I-2). Chart I-2In 1973-74, OPEC Was Just 'Staying Even' With A Collapsing Real Value Of The Dollar In 1973-74, OPEC Was Just 'Staying Even' With A Collapsing Real Value Of The Dollar In 1973-74, OPEC Was Just 'Staying Even' With A Collapsing Real Value Of The Dollar A quarter of a century later in 1999, the oil price again trebled within a short time span – and by the turn of the millennium, the ensuing inflationary fears had pushed up the 10-year T-bond yield from 4.5 percent to almost 7 percent (Chart I-3). With stocks already looking expensive versus bonds, it was this increase in the bond yield – rather than a decline in the equity earnings yield – that inflated the equity bubble to its bursting point in early 2000 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3In 1999, As Oil Surged, So Did The Bond Yield... In 1999, As Oil Surged, So Did The Bond Yield... In 1999, As Oil Surged, So Did The Bond Yield... Chart I-4...Making Expensive Equities Even More Expensive ...Making Expensive Equities Even More Expensive ...Making Expensive Equities Even More Expensive To repeat, for the broader equity market, the last stage of the bubble was not so much that stocks became more expensive in absolute terms (the earnings yield was just moving sideways). Rather, stock valuations worsened markedly relative to sharply higher bond yields. Seen in this light, the oil price surge through 1999 was once again the accessory to the murder. Eight years later in 2007-08, the oil price once again trebled with Brent crude reaching an all-time high of $146 per barrel in July 2008. Again, the inflationary fears forced the 10-year T-bond yield to increase, from 3.25 percent to 4.25 percent during the early summer of 2008 (Chart I-5) – even though the Federal Reserve was slashing the Fed funds rate in the face of an escalating financial crisis (Chart I-6). Chart I-5In 2008, As Oil Surged, So Did The Bond Yield... In 2008, As Oil Surged, So Did The Bond Yield... In 2008, As Oil Surged, So Did The Bond Yield... Chart I-6...Even Though The Fed Was Slashing Rates In The Face Of A Financial Crisis ...Even Though The Fed Was Slashing Rates In The Face Of A Financial Crisis ...Even Though The Fed Was Slashing Rates In The Face Of A Financial Crisis Suffice to say, driving up bond yields in the summer of 2008 – in the face of the Fed’s aggressive rate cuts and a global financial system teetering on the brink – was not the smartest thing that the bond market could do. On the other hand, neither could it override its Pavlovian fears of the oil price trebling. Seen in this light, the oil price surge through 2007-08 was once again the accessory to the murder. Inflationary Fears May Once Again Lead To Murder Fast forward to today, and the danger of the recent trebling of the oil price comes not from the oil price per se. Instead, just as in 2000 and 2008, the danger comes from its potential to drive up bond yields, which can tip more systemically important economic and financial fragilities over the brink. One such fragility is the extreme sensitivity of highly-valued growth stocks to the 30-year T-bond yield, as explained in The Fed’s ‘Pain Point’ Is Only 30 Basis Points Away. On this note, one encouragement is that while shorter duration yields have risen sharply through October, the much more important 30-year T-bond yield has just gone sideways. A much bigger systemic fragility lies in the $300 trillion global real estate market, as explained in The Real Risk Is Real Estate (Part 2). Specifically, the global real estate market has undergone an unprecedented ten-year boom in which prices have doubled in every corner of the world. Over the same period, rents have risen by just 30 percent, which has depressed the global rental yield to an all-time low of 2.5 percent. Structurally depressed rental yields are justified by structurally depressed 30-year bond yields. Therefore, any sustained rise in 30-year bond yields risks undermining the foundations of the $300 trillion global real estate market (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Structurally Depressed Rental Yields Are Justified By Structurally Depressed 30-Year Bond Yields Structurally Depressed Rental Yields Are Justified By Structurally Depressed 30-Year Bond Yields Structurally Depressed Rental Yields Are Justified By Structurally Depressed 30-Year Bond Yields Nowhere is this truer than in China, where prime real estate yields in the major cities are at a paltry 1 percent. In this context, the recent woes of real estate developer Evergrande are just the ‘canary in the coalmine’ warning of an extremely fragile Chinese real estate sector. This will put downward pressure on China’s long-duration bond yields. As my colleague, BCA China strategist, Jing Sima, points out, “Chinese long-duration bond yields are on a structural downtrend…yields are likely to move structurally to a lower bound.” But it is not just in China. Real estate is at record high valuations everywhere and contingent on no major rise in long-duration bond yields. In the US, there is a tight relationship between the (inverted) 30-year bond yield and mortgage applications for home purchase (Chart I-8), and a tight relationship between mortgage applications for home purchase and building permits (Chart I-9). Thereby, higher bond yields threaten not only real estate prices. They also threaten the act of building itself, an important swing factor in economic activity. Chart I-8The Bond Yield Drives Mortgage Applications... The Bond Yield Drives Mortgage Applications... The Bond Yield Drives Mortgage Applications... Chart I-9...And Mortgage Applications Drive Building Permits ...And Mortgage Applications Drive Building Permits ...And Mortgage Applications Drive Building Permits To repeat, focus on the 30-year T-bond yield – as this is the most significant driver for both growth stock valuations, and for real estate valuations and activity. To repeat also, the 30-year T-bond yield has been generally well-behaved over the past few months. But if a continued surge in the oil price – or other commodity or goods prices – started driving up the 30-year T-bond yield, the markets and the economy would feel pain. And at some point, this pain would force the Fed to volte-face. We reiterate that this pain point is only around 30 bps away, equal to a yield on 30-year T-bond of around 2.4-2.5 percent – a level that would be a great buying opportunity for bonds. Given the proximity of this pain point, it is too late to short bonds or for equity investors to rotate into value and cyclical equity sectors. That tactical opportunity has almost played out. On a 6-month and longer horizon, equity investors should prefer long-duration defensive sectors such as healthcare. The Korean Won Is Oversold Finally, in this week’s fractal analysis, we note that the Korean won is oversold – specifically versus the Chinese yuan on the 130-day fractal structure of that cross (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Korean Won Is Oversold The Korean Won Is Oversold The Korean Won Is Oversold Given that previous instances of such fragility have reliably indicated trend changes, this week’s recommended trade is long KRW/CNY, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 2 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

With 119 S&P 500 companies having reported Q3-2021 earnings, it’s time to take a pulse of the interim results. So far, the blended earnings growth rate is 34.8% while actual reported growth rate is 49.9%. The blended sales growth rate is 14.4%, while the actual reported rate is 16.6%. Analysts expected Q3-2021 earnings to be 6% below the Q2-2021 level. As of now, this quarter’s earnings are only 3% lower. Most of the companies that have reported are beating analysts’ forecasts are surprising to the upside. Currently, 83% of companies reported EPS above expectations, with five out of eleven sectors delivering an impressive 100% beat score. In terms of the magnitude of the beats, the overall number currently stands at 14% with Financials and Technology leading the pack. However, these results are bound to change as more companies report: less than 5% of the market cap has reported within the Energy, Materials, Real Estate, and Utilities sectors. The big theme for the current earnings season is input cost inflation. Many industrial giants, including Honeywell (HON), are complaining about supply-chain cost increases, and their potential adverse effect on margins. As a result, many companies are reducing guidance for the fourth quarter. So far, there are 59 positive pre-announcements, and 45 negative. On the bright side, the majority of companies are reporting that demand for their products remains strong, potentially offsetting some of the cost increases. This is especially the case with consumer demand: a few consumer staples companies, such as P&G, commented that their recent price hikes have not dampened demand for their products and have fortified their bottom line against rising costs. Bottom Line: The earnings season is gaining speed, and so far, it appears that Q3-2021 growth expectations are set at a low bar, that is easy to clear for most companies. Chart

Who Likes A Flattening Yield Curve? Who Likes A Flattening Yield Curve? In a recent daily report, we analyzed relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under different US 10-year Treasury yield (UST10Y) regimes. Today we expand our analysis and map relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under the distinct US Treasury yield curve regimes, defined as a three-months change between 10-year and 2-year yields. To analyze sector and style performance by regime, we calculate contemporaneous three-months relative returns of sectors and styles. To summarize the results, we calculate median relative return of each sector/style in each regime. We subtract total period median to remove the sector and style biases in the long-term performance. In a flattening yield curve environment, Defensives, Quality, and Growth tend to outperform, as it indicates scarcity of growth. Accordingly, Real Estate, Technology, Utilities, and Communications Services also outperform. Yield curve steepening is usually associated with growth acceleration. This regime gives boost to more economically sensitive and capex intensive sectors and styles: Value, Small caps, and Cyclicals. Bottom Line: The shape of the US Treasury yield curve will be an important variable to monitor going forward, as it has a substantial effect on relative sector and style performance. ​​​​​​​

Highlights In our latest balances and forecast estimates, we are lifting our expectation for 4Q21 Brent prices to $81/bbl, and our forecasts for 2022 and 2023 to $80.00/bbl and $81.00/bbl, up $5/bbl and $1/bbl, respectively. Our revised balances reflect deeper physical deficits in the EIA's latest historical data, and higher short-term demand consistent with IEA's expected increase of 500k b/d. This largely is a knock-on effect of tight coal markets in Asia and globally tight natural gas markets. Over-compliance with production-cutting goals likely will force higher oil output from GCC producers to offset declining output from OPEC 2.0 states outside the Gulf. We expect output in the Lower 48 states of the US, which consists mostly of shale-oil production, to average 9.5mm b/d in 2022 and 10mm b/d in 2023, versus 2021 production levels of 9.0mm b/d. The odds of oil prices exceeding $100/bbl by the end of 1Q22 are 12.05%, based on price distributions embedded in market-cleared crude-oil options prices (Chart of the Week).1 At the margin, downside risk is increasing going into winter, due to slower economic growth brought on by tight coal and gas markets globally. Feature The short-term evolution of energy markets globally remains highly uncertain, mostly because it depends so much on the evolution of the Northern Hemisphere winter; policy actions to address tight coal and natural gas markets in Asia and Europe, and OPEC 2.0's reading of short- and medium-term demand. We are lifting our 4Q21 Brent price forecast to $81/bbl from $70.50/bbl, to reflect a marginal increase of 500k b/d in oil demand resulting from the knock-on effects of tighter coal and gas markets in Asia and Europe.2 For all of 2021, we are raising our expected global oil demand to 97.5mm b/d from 97.3mm b/d. Chart of the WeekProbability Of $100/bbl Remains Low Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside For 2022 and 2023, we expect slightly higher oil demand – 102mmb/d and 103.3mm b/d, respectively, most of which will come from DM economies at the margin (Chart 2). This lifts our Brent forecasts for next year to $80.00/bbl, and to $81/bbl in 2023 (Chart 3). We expect WTI to trade $2-$3/bbl below Brent. Chart 2Short-Term DM Demand Increases At The Margin Short-Term DM Demand Increases At The Margin Short-Term DM Demand Increases At The Margin Chart 3Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly The uncertainty around our price forecast remains elevated, given the knock-on effects of additional slowing of economic growth in Asia due to lower hydro power output because of drought, and tighter coal and gas markets, as inventories continue to be restocked ahead of the Northern Hemisphere winter.3 Tighter coal and natural gas markets in China and Europe already have led to shutdowns in industrial output particularly in China's and Europe's base metals markets. Countering this bearish impulse is our expectation the roll-out of mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccines will pick up momentum, as joint ventures with the developers of these technologies increase global distribution over the next couple of years.4 Oil Supply Side Remains Well Managed OPEC 2.0 – led by Saudi Arabia and Russia – has consistently managed the level of its production to keep it just below the level of demand for its crude. Producers outside this coalition – the price-taking cohort, in our phraseology – has been managing its output to maintain profitability, which means investor interests are paramount. Both have been responsive to actual demand. Neither is calibrating output to match expected demand. From the EIA’s most recent historical estimates of realized supply and demand, it appears production from both OPEC 2.0 and the price-taking cohort was underestimated in 2H21, or the data-gathering-and-reporting agencies undercounted barrels (Chart 4). This can be seen in the larger physical deficits – i.e., demand in excess of supply – relative to last month's historical estimates, and in the sharply lower OECD inventories (Chart 5). In this month’s modeling, we tweaked OPEC 2.0 supply estimates to reflect the recent high compliance rate of the OPEC 2.0 coalition. According to Reuters, low oil investment in suppliers – chiefly Nigeria, Angola and Kazakhstan – was the primary reason the coalition has been unable to bring all of its agreed-to additional monthly supply increase of 400k b/d to the market.5 This undersupply is expected to continue until the end of 2021 in our models. Chart 4Higher 2H21 Physical Deficits Reported Higher 2H21 Physical Deficits Reported Higher 2H21 Physical Deficits Reported Chart 5OECD Inventories Remain Key OPEC 2.0 Metric OECD Inventories Remain Key OPEC 2.0 Metric OECD Inventories Remain Key OPEC 2.0 Metric We also modified our forecasts for Iranian production to reflect our Geopolitical Strategy colleagues’ belief that a deal between the US and Iran is likely.6 We project Iranian oil supply will reach 2.9 mmb/d by end of Q1 2022, and 3.7 mmb/d by the end of 2022.  OPEC's most recent monthly supply-demand estimates caution higher electricity prices due to the coal and natgas shortages in Asia and Europe could lead to lower demand over the winter months. This already is apparent in China and Europe, where heavy electricity users – steel mills and zinc smelters, e.g., – are being forced to shut down production as electricity is rationed. Should this persist – and result in lower oil demand – OPEC 2.0 output could contract. However, with inventories drawing sharply in the OECD, we expect the producer coalition will err on the side of higher output if Brent prices surge to $90/bbl or more this winter. OPEC 2.0 member states do not gain any long-term advantage from higher oil prices when demand globally is contracting and EM economies – the growth engine of global oil markets – are still trying to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. The price-taking cohort – exemplified by the US shale-oil producers – cannot ramp production quickly enough to fill a physical supply deficit over the course of the winter. We estimate it takes ~ 8 months to assemble rigs and crews, drill pads in the shales, and hook gathering lines up to main lines to move oil to refining centers. Given the level of prices and the shape of the forward curve, we expect US production in the Lower 48 states, which is mostly accounted for by shale-oil production, to average 9.5mm b/d in 2022 and 9.9mm b/d in 2023 (Chart 6). While production in the Permian basin continues to rise, it will not grow quickly enough to address a tightening in global oil markets in the short run (Chart 7). Chart 6Higher US Shale Output Expected Higher US Shale Output Expected Higher US Shale Output Expected Chart 7US Shales Cannot Cover Deficit Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside Investment Implications The evolution of global energy markets remains highly uncertain. Markets likely will not be able to form solid expectations until after the New Year begins, owing to weather uncertainty. There are reports already that winter has started early in northern China, but this does not necessarily presage colder-than-normal weather globally for the entire winter.7 We expect markets to remain balanced and for OPEC 2.0 in particular to manage its output in line with actual demand (Table 1). Our intellectual framework for assessing OPEC 2.0's production strategy is grounded in the view the coalition does not want to see oil prices much higher than current levels, given the fragility of the global economic recovery, particularly in EM economies. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside We remain long commodity index exposure going into winter, in the expectation colder-than-normal weather will keep energy prices well bid, and oil and natural gas forward curves backwardated. We continue to monitor weather expectations   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The EIA expects US households using natural gas will pay just under $750 to heat their homes on average this winter, a 30% increase over last year's level. This is the result of higher prices vs last year, and higher consumption estimates by the EIA, given its weather expectation. This past week, the US Climate Prediction Center raised the odds of a second La Niña to 87%, from it earlier 70-80% expectation. This raises the likelihood of a colder-than-normal winter in the Northern Hemisphere. US natural gas inventories are expected to end the April-October injection season at 3.6 TCF, in the EIA's latest estimate, which will put stocks ~ 5% below the 2016-2020 five-year average. US LNG exports are expected to average 10.7 BCF/d over the Oct21-Mar22 period, which would be a record. Higher prices in Asia and Europe due to stronger demand are pulling US natgas prices higher via exports (Chart 8). Base Metals: Bullish Spot copper traded in excess of $1,100/MT over 3-month forward LME futures this week, as traders globally scramble for product ahead of possible power rationing at copper-refining facilities in China this winter.8 Prices abruptly fell more than 7% from there, following a press report the Chinese government would directly intervene in coal markets to lower prices. Coal and natural gas shortages going into the winter are forcing smelters to shut production in China and Europe. Separately, China reportedly ordered 70% (35/50) of its magnesium smelters to close until year-end, to conserve fuel. Magnesium is critical to producing aluminum sheet and billets. The knock-on effects from lower aluminum supplies could be especially harsh for automobile manufacturers, which have been increasing their use of aluminum. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold was unable to hold last week’s gains as US Treasury yields and the dollar rallied towards the end of the week. The expected normalization of the US Fed’s monetary policy will be bullish for the USD and will push treasury yields higher, which will act as headwinds to gold. We continue to expect a weaker dollar, in line with the view of our colleagues at BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy (Chart 9). Chart 8 Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside Short-Term Oil-Price Risk Moves To The Downside Chart 9Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD     Footnotes 1     Please see Appendix II beginning on p. 22 in Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009), "Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty," Short-Term Energy Outlook Supplement, US EIA. 2     The 500k b/d estimate is consistent with the IEA's October 2021 Oil Market Report. We are loading most of the 500k b/d increase in demand on OECD consumption, given its dual-fired oil and gas generation capacity. Please see Inflation Surges, Slows, Then Grinds Higher and La Niña And The Energy Transition, for additional discussion. 3    The US Climate Prediction Center raised the odds of a La Niña winter in the Northern Hemisphere persisting from Dec21 – Feb22 to 87% this week. While this increases the odds of a colder-than-normal winter in the hemisphere it is not absolutely certain. That said, prudence will push governments and firms to fill inventories and increase coal and gas production ahead of winter. 4    Please see Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude, published on September 16, 2021 for discussion of the global mRNA vaccine rollout. 5    Please see As OPEC reopens the taps, African giants losing race to pump more, published by Reuters on September 27, 2021; Please also refer to OPEC+ struggles to pump more oil to meet rising demand, published by Reuters on September 21, 2021. 6    Please see Third Quarter Outlook 2021: The Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran, published by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy on June 25, 2021. 7     Please see Early start to China's winter heating season bullish for gas, coal demand published by S&P Global Platts on October 19, 2021. 8    Please see LME 0-3 Copper Backwardation Surged to above $1,000/mt on Oct 19 published by metal.com on October 20, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations

Dear Client, There will be no weekly report next week. Instead, we will host our quarterly webcast on Tuesday, October 26 for the US and EMEA regions and Wednesday, October 27 for the Asia Pacific region. We will resume our regular publishing schedule on Monday, November 1. In the meantime, we look forward to seeing many of you at our BCA Research Investment Conference this week. Best regards, Mathieu Savary   Highlights This year’s decline in EUR/USD has rendered this pair sufficiently inexpensive and oversold to account for the near-term risks we highlighted in March. Nonetheless, some risks remain—among them, the continued credit slowdown in China, diverging monetary policy trends, and the energy crisis hurting Europe. However, long-term fundamentals continue to support the euro’s 12- to 18-month outlook. Moreover, Chinese credit growth may soon stabilize and markets already largely factor in the policy divergence between the Fed and the ECB. As a result, we buy the euro today with a preliminary target at 1.25 and a stop loss at 1.1175. The Bank of England will lift rates this December, but the market already prices in a hawkish BoE. GBP/USD has upside, even if the euro should outpace the pound in the coming months. Look to upgrade UK small-cap stocks. Italian equities do not appear particularly appealing on a cyclical horizon, neither in absolute nor relative terms. Investors should favor Spanish stocks over Italian ones for the next 12-to-18 months. Feature EUR/USD recently flirted with 1.15. Did this move create a buying opportunity? Last March, we warned that the euro would correct to the 1.12 to 1.15 zone because short-term models flagged it as expensive, speculators carried a substantial net-long exposure, and Chinese credit growth was set to slow meaningfully. These forces have now mostly played out; thus, the euro’s near-term outlook is becoming more positive. Despite this more constructive view, EUR/USD still carries ample downside risks, especially if Chinese authorities remain reluctant to reflate their economy. Moreover, the energy crisis facing Europe clouds the euro. We are nonetheless buyers of EUR/USD, with a target at 1.25. Investors should set a wide stop in at 1.1175. Cheap And Oversold The internal dynamics of the euro indicate that the bulk of the sell-off is behind us. First, the euro is now cheap on a tactical basis. Back in March, our short-term fair value model for EUR/USD flagged at 7% overvaluation based on real rate differentials, on the slope of the German yield curve relative to that of the US, and on the copper-to-lumber prices ratio. Today, this same measure shows a 5% undervaluation. BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy Intermediate Term Timing Model (ITTM) flags an even clearer buy signal.  The ITTM framework combines interest rate parity models, with risk aversion and considerations for the currency’s trend. Currently, this model is at -8% or nearly minus one standard error. Historically, such a depressed reading points to generous returns in the subsequent 12 months (Chart 1). Second, the euro is oversold. BCA’s Intermediate Term Technical Indicator has hit 7, which is consistent with past rebounds in EUR/USD (Chart 2). While some of these rallies have been extremely short-lived, the technical indicator’s message is stronger when it is matched by a buy signal from the ITTM. Chart 1Strong Buy Signal From Short-Term Valuations Strong Buy Signal From Short-Term Valuations Strong Buy Signal From Short-Term Valuations Chart 2EUR/USD is Oversold EUR/USD is Oversold EUR/USD is Oversold Chart 3Stale Euro Longs Have Been Purged Stale Euro Longs Have Been Purged Stale Euro Longs Have Been Purged Third, speculators do not carry a large net long position in the euro anymore. This variable suggests that the worst of the selling pressure is behind us, but it has yet to send a strong buy signal on its own (Chart 3). Bottom Line: The euro is sufficiently inexpensive that our Intermediate-term timing model flags a strong buy signal. Moreover, our technical indicators paint an oversold picture consistent with a reversal. Nonetheless, speculators may not be long EUR/USD anymore, but they are not aggressively selling it either. Thus, macro dynamics remain important to the future trend of this currency. Macro Fog Remains The macro environment is not yet conducive to a euro rally, especially when Chinese credit growth remains weak. However, considering the euro’s valuation and technical picture, small changes in the macro environment could be enough to catalyze a jump in EUR/USD. A key problem for the euro is that the dollar remains well bid. The yen and the dollar are the two momentum currencies within the G-10 (Chart 4). This property of the dollar is a large handicap for the euro, because it remains the most liquid vehicle to bet on the USD. Thus, as long as the dollar’s momentum is strong, the euro will find it difficult to rally. Relative economic growth is another headwind for EUR/USD. European activity is weakening versus that of the US. Since 2019, the relative manufacturing PMIs between the Euro Area and the US track EUR/USD, and they currently confirm the euro’s weakness (Chart 5). Moreover, European economic surprises are significantly weaker than US ones, which adds to the euro’s malaise (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 4The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency Time For The Euro To Shine? Time For The Euro To Shine? Chart 5Deteriorating European Growth Hurts EUR/USD Deteriorating European Growth Hurts EUR/USD Deteriorating European Growth Hurts EUR/USD The near-term outlook does not signal a resolution of this issue until the first half of 2022. The declines in the expectation and current situation components of both the ZEW and Sentix surveys herald an additional deceleration in manufacturing activity (Chart 6). The Eurozone’s growth problems reflect China’s slowing credit flows. Europe economic activity is still extremely sensitive to the evolution of the global industrial cycle (Chart 7, top panel), much more so than the US GDP is. China’s business cycle is an essential determinant of the robustness of the global manufacturing sector. Consequently, when measures of China’s marginal propensity to consume decelerate, such as the gap between M1 and M2 growth, European PMIs and industrial production underperform those of the US (Chart 7, second and bottom panels). Chart 6A Bit More Time Before Europe's Slowdown Ends A Bit More Time Before Europe's Slowdown Ends A Bit More Time Before Europe's Slowdown Ends Chart 7China's Travails Hurt Europe China's Travails Hurt Europe China's Travails Hurt Europe     The fourth quarter of 2021 is likely to represent the tail end of the Chinese headwind on EUR/USD. The Chinese credit impulse remains weak, but signs of a floor are beginning to appear. For example, the decline in Chinese commercial banks excess reserve growth warned us of the coming decline in the credit impulse. Today, excess reserves have begun to stabilize, which points to an upcoming imporvement in credit flows (Chart 8). Additionally, the Evergrande problems continue to weigh on Europe in the near-term because of the deceleration in Chinese construction activity;  however, the crisis will also intensify the pressure on Beijing to revive credit growth in order to avoid a systemic collapse. Chart 8Will China's Credit Impulse Bottom Soon? Will China's Credit Impulse Bottom Soon? Will China's Credit Impulse Bottom Soon? Monetary policy differentials also remain euro bearish. The US Federal Reserve will announce the start of its tapering program on November 3. The FOMC is set to hike rates by the end of 2022. Meanwhile, the ECB is unphased by the increase in European inflation, which remains mostly a reflection of energy prices and base effects. Thus, Europe will lag behind the US when it comes to monetary policy tightening. Nonetheless, investors already understand this dichotomy very well. The US OIS curve anticipates four hikes in 2023. Meanwhile, the EONIA curve shows a first 25-bps hike only by September 2023. Thus, the euro will suffer more from policy differentials if the Fed generates hawkish surprises relative to this pricing. The energy crisis shaking Europe is the last major headwind currently affecting the euro. Historically, EUR/USD and the ratio of European to US natural gas prices track each other (Chart 9). This relationship reflects relative growth dynamics. A stronger Eurozone economy relative to the US pushes up the value of the euro and European natural gas, which is a commodity with heavy industrial usage.  However, since this summer, the spike in European natural gas prices has coincided with a decline in the euro. This divergence highlights the negative effect on European activity of the current energy shock, which raises fears of stagflation. The cross-Atlantic bond market dynamics confirm the notion that the energy shock increases the perceived stagflation risk in the Eurozone. German yields have risen relative to US ones because of a pick-up in inflation expectations, not real rates (Chart 10). The lack of traction for relative real rates is appropriate because market participants believe that the ECB wants to ignore the spike in energy prices. An environment of rising relative inflation expectations but stable relative real rates is very negative for any currency, including the euro. However, European inflation expectations should decrease relative to those of the US once European natural gas prices normalize, which we expect to take place in the coming months (Chart 10, bottom panel). This process will be very positive for the euro. Chart 9The European Energy Crisis Harms The Euro The European Energy Crisis Harms The Euro The European Energy Crisis Harms The Euro Chart 10Pricing In European Stagflation? Pricing In European Stagflation? Pricing In European Stagflation? Bottom Line: While euro pricing and technicals suggest EUR/USD will bottom soon, the economic environment is murkier. The dollar is a momentum currency, and its current strength feeds the euro’s weakness. China’s credit flows continue to decelerate, which hurts the euro; however, credit flows may stabilize in early 2022. The Fed is a tailwind for the dollar, but markets already price in this reality. Finally, the energy crisis hurts European growth and thus EUR/USD; nonetheless, the spike in natural gas prices will soon give way to a period of decline, which will lessen the pain for the euro. What To Do? When we balance the positives and negative for the euro, we are becoming more comfortable with buying EUR/USD outright, even if it is still a risky bet. To begin with, the big fundamental forces point to a firmer euro on an 18- to 24-month basis: BCA’s Foreign Exchange strategists see greater cyclical downside for the USD and believe the current rebound is a pronounced countertrend move within a multi-year dollar bear market. The euro will naturally benefit over the coming years from a weak greenback. EUR/USD is still inexpensive on long-term valuation metrics. Based on BCA’s purchasing power parity model, this pair trades 17% below its fair value. Moreover, the PPP estimate keeps rising in favor of the euro, a result of the Eurozone’s lower inflation compared to the US (Chart 11). The relative balance of payments favors the euro. The European economy generates a current account surplus of 3% of GDP compared to a current account deficit of 3.1% for the US. The US current account deficit is unlikely to narrow, even if the federal government’s budget hole declines because the private sector’s savings rate is falling even faster. Moreover, US real two-year rates remain well below those of its trading partners. Investors underweight Eurozone assets aggressively. For the past ten years, capital has consistently flowed out of the Euro Area relative to the US (Chart 12). European growth should converge toward the US next year, especially if Chinese credit activity stabilizes. Therefore, 2022 should witness a period of inflows into the Eurozone. Chart 11EUR/USD Significant Long-Term Discount EUR/USD Significant Long-Term Discount EUR/USD Significant Long-Term Discount Chart 12Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets We argued that the valuation and technical backdrop shows the Euro is becoming increasingly supportive and our timing model is clearly arguing against selling EUR/USD. However, the biggest technical risk is the momentum sensitivity of the dollar, which means that the euro’s weakness could last somewhat longer. Nevertheless, BCA’s Dollar Capitulation Index now warns of a pullback in the USD, especially as speculators are very long DXY futures (Chart 13). The biggest downside risk remains China’s credit trend. If it takes more time than we anticipate for Beijing to put an end to the credit impulse slowdown, the euro will experience greater downside pressure. Moreover, the longer it takes Beijing to reflate, the greater the chance of an uncontrolled selloff in the CNY, which would drag down the euro (Chart 14). Chart 13Is The Dollar Technically Vulnerable? Is The Dollar Technically Vulnerable? Is The Dollar Technically Vulnerable? Chart 14China Remains The Euro's Main Risk China Remains The Euro's Main Risk China Remains The Euro's Main Risk Despite this level of near-term uncertainty, we recommend investors buy the euro, with a target at 1.25, and a stop loss at 1.1175. Bottom Line: Conditions are falling in place for the countertrend decline in the euro to end soon. As a result, the euro should converge back toward the upward path driven by fundamentals. The greatest near-term risk remains the path of Chinese credit trends. We recommend investors buy the euro with a preliminary target at EUR1.25 and a stop loss at 1.1175.   Country Focus: A Well Discounted BoE Hike The Bank of England will begin to increase interest rates at its December meeting. The BoE’s communication has been clear that it does not see a need to wait between the end of its tapering program in December and the beginning of its hiking campaign. Recent comments by senior MPC members, including new Chief Economist Huw Pill, also suggest a rate hike is looming. Chart 15The BoE's Inflation Problem The BoE's Inflation Problem The BoE's Inflation Problem We see little reason to doubt the willingness of the MPC to start lifting the Bank Rate. UK Core CPI stands at 3.1% or 110 basis points above the BoE’s inflation target. Moreover, both market-based and survey-based long-term inflation expectations are well above 3.5%, which increases the risk of a dangerous dis-anchoring of UK inflation (Chart 15). UK economic activity remains inflationary. Wages are strong, climbing 7.2% in August. This number probably exaggerates the underlying wage growth due to compositional effects, but job creation remains robust and the unemployment rate fell to 5.2%. The BoE was concerned that the end of the furlough scheme last month would cause a jump in unemployment, but their fears have dwindled, because job vacancies stand at a record high and capex intentions are solid (Chart 16). The housing market continues to be a tailwind to growth. House prices are up 10% annually, which lifts household net worth considerably (Chart 17). The pace of transactions in the real estate market will slow this spring because the stamp duty holiday will end; however, low mortgage rates and expectations of further housing gains may fuel greater appreciation. This creates long-term financial stability risks for the UK because household leverage will rise. This worries the BoE. Chart 16The UK's Labor Market Strength Will Continue The UK's Labor Market Strength Will Continue The UK's Labor Market Strength Will Continue Chart 17Rising Household Net Worth Rising Household Net Worth Rising Household Net Worth Market participants already expect a hawkish BoE. A rate hike is priced in for December and the SONIA curve embeds almost two more increases in 2022. The 4.3% underperformance of the UK government bond index over the global benchmark in seven weeks also underscores the rapid adjustment in investors’ perceptions of the UK policy path. BCA’s Global Fixed-Income strategists have underweighted UK government bonds for two months, and they maintain a negative view over the coming quarters.  Nonetheless, the risk of a short-lived countertrend rebound in UK bonds’ relative performance is significant. However, it would be a temporary position squaring, while hedge funds and CTAs take profits. BCA’s Foreign Exchange strategists expect GBP/USD to rebound. Cable is oversold and trades at a 12% discount to BCA’s PPP fair-value estimate. GBP/USD is also hurt by fears that the BoE hikes will damage the UK economy. From a contrarian perspective, this creates a positive entry point to buy cable, especially because the pound should benefit from the anticipated dollar weakness and the euro’s upcoming rally. However, BCA’s FX strategists also foresee some decline in the pound versus the euro, because GBP is a low beta play on EUR/USD. Hence, the trade-weighted pound could remain flat to slightly down in the coming months. We stay neutral on UK small-cap stocks relative to large-cap equities, but we are putting them on an upgrade alert. Small-cap stocks benefit from the strength in the domestic economy; however, they are also extremely expensive compared to large-cap ones (Chart 18). The arbiter of performance will be profits. The forward EPS of small-caps have lagged behind those of large-caps by 9% since the COVID recession, after underperforming since 2016 (Chart 19). Small-caps’ relative profits are currently trying to stabilize, but the durability of this trend will be tested if the trade-weighted pound remains flat in the coming months. Thus, the EPS of small-cap shares must regain more ground before moving more aggressively in this market. Chart 18UK Small Cap Are Pricey UK Small Cap Are Pricey UK Small Cap Are Pricey Chart 19Follow The Profits Follow The Profits Follow The Profits Bottom Line: On the back of a strong UK economy and significant inflationary forces, the BoE will start elevating interest rates this December. The market already prices in this outcome. Nonetheless, UK bonds should continue to underperform the global benchmark, and cable has upside, even if the near-term outlook favors the EUR over the GBP. We are putting UK small-cap stocks on a buy alert. They are expensive, but a turnaround in profits would solve this problem. Market Focus: A Quick Take On Italian Equities The Italian equity market remains Europe’s problem child. The Italian MSCI index has underperformed the rest of the Euro Area by 40% since 2010. This underperformance holds even after adjusting for sectoral differences, although it becomes less dramatic (Chart 20, top panel). Despite this underperformance, Italian equities have managed to outperform their Spanish counterparts by 27% since 2010, but this outperformance dissipates once sectoral difference are accounted for (Chart 20, bottom panel). The RoE of Italian non-financial listed equities is equivalent to the rest of the Eurozone, but it only reflects elevated financial leverage, as is the case in Spain (Chart 21). Italy’s RoA is poor, because Italy’s excess capital stocks hurts its return on capital. As a result, Italian equities continue to face a structural handicap. Chart 20A Problem Child A Problem Child A Problem Child Chart 21Italy's Return On Asset Is Poor Italy's Return On Asset Is Poor Italy's Return On Asset Is Poor The good run in Italian equities in absolute terms faces headwinds. Italian stocks are very sensitive to the global business cycle; however, they often respond with a delay and in an exaggerated fashion to decelerations in the global PMI (Chart 22, top panel). Moreover, since 2010, widening European high-yield corporate bond spreads have preceded falling Italian stock prices. Thus, the recent slide in the global PMI and the widening in European high-yield OAS create a period of vulnerability for Italian equities. Finally, Italian share prices have overshot the path implied by US yields (Chart 22, bottom panel). Nonetheless, Italian stocks may be sniffing out further increases in global yields. The cleanest way to play these vulnerabilities in the Italian is via a short bet against Spain. A steeper global yield curve will help both markets due to their heavy exposure to financials. However, we still favor Spanish financials, which benefit from higher RoEs than their Italian counterparts (Chart 23) and lower NPLs. As a result, the forward EPS of Spanish financials should begin to outperform those of Italian financials. Chart 22Some Risks To Italian Stocks Some Risks To Italian Stocks Some Risks To Italian Stocks Chart 23Spanish Banks Are Better Placed To Benefit From Rising Global Yields Spanish Banks Are Better Placed To Benefit From Rising Global Yields Spanish Banks Are Better Placed To Benefit From Rising Global Yields   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Time For The Euro To Shine? Time For The Euro To Shine? Cyclical Recommendations Time For The Euro To Shine? Time For The Euro To Shine? Structural Recommendations Time For The Euro To Shine? Time For The Euro To Shine? Closed Trades Time For The Euro To Shine? Time For The Euro To Shine? Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Highlights A perfect storm has engulfed global energy markets. Strong economic growth, adverse weather conditions, and politically-induced supply disruptions have caused energy prices to surge. Fortunately, the global economy has become less vulnerable to energy shocks. Not only has the energy intensity of the global economy declined over the past few decades, but central banks are now less inclined to respond to higher energy prices by raising interest rates. Stock returns have been positively correlated with oil prices over the past decade. This suggests that equities can withstand the current level of oil prices. Markets are betting that energy prices will come down. Yet, given the diminished feedback loop between higher energy prices and slower economic growth, energy prices can stay elevated for longer than the market is discounting. We remain long the December 2022 Brent Crude futures contract as well as the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real. Value stocks are a cheap and effective hedge against higher-than-expected inflation. A Perfect Storm For Energy Markets Global energy prices have soared (Chart 1). The price of crude, having fallen into negative territory in April 2020, currently trades at over $80 per barrel. Natural gas prices have jumped more than three-fold in the UK and across much of continental Europe since March. In the US, the price of natural gas has doubled. Chart 1Natural Gas Prices Have Dipped, But Are Still Up Massively On The Year Natural Gas Prices Have Dipped, But Are Still Up Massively On The Year Natural Gas Prices Have Dipped, But Are Still Up Massively On The Year Chart 2Global Industrial Production Is Back Above Pre-Pandemic Levels Global Industrial Production Is Back Above Pre-Pandemic Levels Global Industrial Production Is Back Above Pre-Pandemic Levels   A perfect storm has driven up energy prices. The reopening of the global economy has supported energy demand. A surge in spending on goods has depleted inventories, forcing producers to ramp up output. Global industrial production is 8% higher than in January 2020 (Chart 2). Merchandise trade has recovered more quickly than expected (Chart 3). Chinese exports are up 28% from the start of the pandemic (Chart 4). Electricity consumption in China is running 7.5% above trend (Chart 5).   Chart 3World Trade Has Recovered Faster Than Expected The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 4China's Export Sector Is Booming China's Export Sector Is Booming China's Export Sector Is Booming Chart 5Strong Manufacturing Activity Has Pushed Up Electricity Demand In China Strong Manufacturing Activity Has Pushed Up Electricity Demand In China Strong Manufacturing Activity Has Pushed Up Electricity Demand In China   Weather has amplified the tightness in energy markets. A cold snap across the Northern Hemisphere this spring depleted natural gas supplies (Chart 6). Compounding the problem, a lack of wind reduced energy production by European wind farms, leading to a shift toward natural gas and coal for power generation. A hot summer in Northern Asia raised electricity demand. Flooding in China and Indonesia curbed coal output, while a drought in Brazil reduced hydroelectric generation. Chart 6Natgas Storage Remains Tight The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Political Factors Policy developments have contributed to the dislocations in energy markets. China has been trying to wean itself off coal, which still accounted for 63% of electricity generation in 2020 (Chart 7). For a while, Australian coal imports made up for the lack of domestic coal production, but those disappeared last year following a diplomatic row between the two nations (Chart 8). To fill the energy gap, China has stepped up purchases of natural gas from Russia. Chart 7China Has Been Trying To Shift Away From Coal The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 8A Lack Of Aussie Coal Imports Has Depleted Chinese Coal Inventories A Lack Of Aussie Coal Imports Has Depleted Chinese Coal Inventories A Lack Of Aussie Coal Imports Has Depleted Chinese Coal Inventories Never one to miss an opportunity, Russia has taken advantage of the natural gas shortage by pushing Germany to approve the newly completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The US$11 billion pipeline carries gas directly to Germany. Built under the Baltic  Sea, it bypasses Ukraine and thus deprives the NATO-allied government in Kyiv of as much as $2 billion a year in transit fees. The pipeline was backed by outgoing chancellor Angela Merkel and has the strong support of the German public (Chart 9). However, opposition from the US has kept the project in limbo. Texas Senator Ted Cruz has blocked approval for President Biden’s nominees to various departmental posts in an effort to halt the pipeline. Chart 9Germans Say "Ja" To Nord Stream 2 The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Cruz has justified his actions on foreign policy grounds. However, economics has probably also played a role: The US is Europe’s top supplier of liquefied natural gas. Texas exported 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas last year. It’s Not Just ESG Years of subpar investment in the energy sector have exacerbated the crisis. Globally, oil and gas capex is down 60% since 2014 (Chart 10). Proven global oil reserves increased by only 6% between 2010 and 2020, having risen by 26% over the preceding decade. Gas reserves followed a similar trajectory, increasing by only 5% between 2010 and 2020 compared to 30% over the prior ten years (Chart 11). It would be easy to blame ESG for this predicament, but the truth is that energy had been a lousy sector for investors until recently. The shares of global energy companies have risen just 25% since March 2009, compared to 315% for the MSCI All-Country World Index (Chart 12). Chart 10Energy Producers Have Not Been Investing Much In New Capacity The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 11Oil And Gas Reserves Have Barely Grown Over The Past Decade The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences   The Global Economy Is Less Dependent On Energy Could the jump in energy prices torpedo growth? It is possible, but the bar for an energy-induced recession is much higher than in the past. The energy intensity of the global economy has fallen steadily over time, especially in advanced economies. Today, the US generates three-times as much output for every joule of energy consumed than it did in 1970 (Chart 13). Chart 12Low Returns On Capital Have Reduced Investment In The Energy Sector Low Returns On Capital Have Reduced Investment In The Energy Sector Low Returns On Capital Have Reduced Investment In The Energy Sector Chart 13The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time   In the US, household spending on energy has declined from a peak of 8.3% of disposable income in 1980 to 3.5% in August 2021, the latest month of data. Chart 14When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production,The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production,The USA Is Now #1 While the recent run-up in energy prices will push up that number towards 4% in October, US consumers are well positioned to absorb the blow. Last week’s “disappointing” September jobs report saw private-sector employment rise by 317,000. Combined with an increase in the average length of the workweek, aggregate hours worked rose by 0.8% on the month – equivalent to 1,036,000 new private-sector jobs. Improved conditions for energy producers will also help insulate the US economy. The US now produces over 11 million barrels of oil per day, more than Saudi Arabia (Chart 14). Higher energy costs will exact more of a toll on European growth. However, as Mathieu Savary, BCA’s Chief European Strategist, recently argued, the region is likely to weather the storm given current strong growth momentum. Central Banks No Longer Fret Over Higher Oil Prices Helping matters is the fact that central banks are no longer responding to rising energy prices like they once did. Up until the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed would often lift rates whenever oil prices jumped (Chart 15). Since then, the Fed has looked through oil price fluctuations, a sensible strategy considering that core inflation is no longer highly correlated with oil prices (Chart 16). Chart 15Rising Oil Prices No Longer Scare The Fed Rising Oil Prices No Longer Scare The Fed Rising Oil Prices No Longer Scare The Fed Chart 16Oil Spikes No Longer Feed Into Core Inflation Like They Used To Core Inflation No Longer Driven By Oil Prices Oil Spikes No Longer Feed Into Core Inflation Like They Used To Core Inflation No Longer Driven By Oil Prices Oil Spikes No Longer Feed Into Core Inflation Like They Used To     The ECB has also changed tack. Jean-Claude Trichet disastrously hiked rates when oil prices reached $140/bbl in 2008, just as the global economy was heading off a cliff. Having failed to learn from his mistake the first time around, he then pushed the ECB to raise rates two times in 2011, helping to set off the euro area debt crisis. Mario Draghi and Christine Lagarde have followed a different course. In her speeches, Lagarde has pushed back on any talk that the ECB will expedite policy normalization. “The lady isn’t tapering,” she said on September 9th, echoing Margaret Thatcher’s famous proclamation. Energy Prices Should Come Off The Boil, But Geopolitics And The Weather Are Wild Cards Chart 17US Rig Count Has Risen From Low Levels US Rig Count Has Risen From Low Levels US Rig Count Has Risen From Low Levels Looking out, a number of factors should help restore balance to the energy market. The US rig count, while still far below its 2014 highs, has doubled since last year (Chart 17). It usually takes 6-to-9 months for a newly deployed rig to start producing output. China has instructed 170 coal mines to expand capacity. It has also allowed utilities to charge higher prices, helping to stave off bankruptcies across the sector. In addition, it is releasing some Australian coal from storage, potentially a first step towards restarting imports. Still, there are many wild cards at play that could cause energy prices to rise further. In addition to uncertainty over Chinese energy policy and the ongoing dispute over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the situation in Iran remains volatile. Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, believes that Iran could secure enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear device by the end of the year. In his opinion, “a crisis over Iran is imminent.” Any disruption of Middle Eastern energy flows will add to global supply bottlenecks and price pressures. Furthermore, there is continued uncertainty about OPEC’s strategy. So far, OPEC and its partners have been reluctant to boost production. The general feeling among market participants is that OPEC would increase output if oil prices rose towards $100/bbl for fear that excessively high prices would expedite the adoption of electric vehicles. At this point, however, that electric horse has left the barn. OPEC may simply decide that it is better to wrangle out as much revenue from its reserves while they still have value. Weather also remains a wild card. The US Climate Prediction Center estimates that there is a 70%-to-80% chance that La Niña will return this winter. La Niña typically results in colder temperatures across much of Western and Northern Europe, which would lead to higher electricity demand. Investment Implications Markets are betting that energy prices will come down. The futures curves are in backwardation (Chart 18). Investors expect oil, gas, and coal prices to decline over the coming months (Chart 19). Chart 18Energy Futures Are In Backwardation Energy Futures Are In Backwardation Energy Futures Are In Backwardation Chart 19Investors Expect Commodity Prices To Fall The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences     One does not need to bet on higher energy prices these days to make money from being long energy futures; one only needs to bet that prices will not fall as much as currently discounted. Given the diminished feedback loop between higher energy prices and slower economic growth, the view of BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy service, led by Bob Ryan, is that energy prices can stay elevated for longer than the market is discounting. Chart 20Stock Prices Are Now Positively Correlated With Oil Stock Prices Are Now Positively Correlated With Oil Stock Prices Are Now Positively Correlated With Oil We remain long the December 2022 Brent Crude futures contract as well as the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real. Stock returns have been positively correlated with oil prices over the past decade (Chart 20). This suggests that equities can withstand the current level of oil prices. Some stocks will do better than others, however. Energy and banks are overrepresented in value indices (Table 1). Energy stocks will do well if oil prices remain buoyant (Chart 21). For their part, banks should also outperform the market if bond yields continue to drift higher (Chart 22). Table 1Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Chart 21Higher Oil Prices Are A Tailwind For Energy Stocks Higher Oil Prices Are A Tailwind For Energy Stocks Higher Oil Prices Are A Tailwind For Energy Stocks Chart 22Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Bank Stocks Tend To Outperform When Yields Rise Chart 23Inflation Expectations Are Highly Correlated With Oil Prices Inflation Expectations Are Highly Correlated With Oil Prices Inflation Expectations Are Highly Correlated With Oil Prices     In fixed-income portfolios, we continue to prefer TIPS over nominal bonds. Chart 23 shows that the 5y/5y forward TIPS breakeven inflation is highly correlated with oil prices. Thus, overweighting TIPS remains an effective hedge against an oil spike.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com       Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Special Trade Recommendations The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences The Global Energy Crisis: Causes And Consequences