Energy
BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy service recently presented that their 2021-25 forecast for Brent oil prices is $65-$70/bbl. The need for fiscal and monetary stimulus over the next five years will fade slowly. Policy challenges to restoring…
BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy service increased its estimate of oil-demand destruction this year. However, their price expectation for 2021 Brent remains at $65/bbl, in response to continued supply management by OPEC 2.0. Oil markets…
Copper has withstood the COVID-19 shock much better than Brent despite the strong cyclicality of both natural resources. The long-term outlook is likely to favor copper: a move away from carbon-intensive energy production will permanently hurt the appetite…
Highlights Does it still make sense to use historical yield betas for fixed income country allocation? Yes, favoring countries with higher government bond yield betas when global yields are falling, and vice versa, is still an appropriate way to manage fixed income risk – although betas do vary between global bond bull and bear markets. Can inflation breakevens and real yields continue moving in opposite directions? Yes, but that negative correlation will become less intense, especially in the US, with rising inflation expectations eventually becoming the more dominant influence on nominal bond yields. Will inflation breakevens continue to have a strong positive correlation with oil prices? Yes, but only for as long as non-energy inflation remains low and stable, which has made energy prices the only source of inflation variability in most developed countries. Feature Sleepy bond markets got a bit of a jolt over the past couple of weeks, with longer-maturity government bond yields moving higher across the developed markets, led by the US where the 30-year Treasury yield is now back to levels last seen in June. The move higher in US Treasury yields may be a sign that investors are taking the US election polling numbers – which now signal not only a Joe Biden victory on November 3, but also a swing of the US Senate to Democratic Party control – seriously. A so-called “Blue Sweep”, resulting in the full implementation of the Biden policy platform including a massive fiscal stimulus, is potentially bond bearish, and not only for US Treasuries, given the close correlation of US yields to other bond markets. There is a strong correlation between the level of bond yields, and the yield beta, for the major developed market countries. This brief burst of global bond market volatility, stemming from developments in the US, is a reminder that investors should always be aware of the importance of cross-market correlations when making trading and portfolio construction decisions. With that in mind, this week we ask some important questions about the critical correlations across global government bond markets that support our current investment recommendations – and under what conditions they could possibly change. Does It Still Make Sense To Use Historical Yield Betas For Fixed Income Country Allocation? Chart 1Developed Bond Yields Relative To The 'Global' Bond Yield
Developed Bond Yields Relative To The 'Global' Bond Yield
Developed Bond Yields Relative To The 'Global' Bond Yield
One of the key elements underlying our bond country allocation recommendations is the concept of “yield beta”. Simply put, this is a measure of the sensitivity of changes in individual country bond yields to changes in the overall level of global bond yields. The way we measure yield betas is by using a regression (over a three-year rolling window) of monthly changes for an individual country’s 10-year bond yield on the monthly change of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index yield for the 7-10 year maturity bucket (as the proxy for the “global” 10-year yield). The regression coefficient on the individual country yield change is the yield beta. There is a strong correlation between the level of bond yields, and the yield beta, for the major developed market countries. Currently, the list of “high-yielders” – with 10-year government bond yields above the benchmark index yield – includes the US, Italy, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Chart 1). The low-yielders, with 10-year yields below the benchmark index yield, are Germany, France, Spain, the UK and Japan. When we look at the yield betas for that same list of countries, we can also break up the list into high-beta and low-beta bond markets. When we rank the ten countries by their rolling three-year yield betas, the five highest betas belong to the same five countries with the highest yields, and vice versa (Chart 2). This is an intuitive correlation, as countries with higher yield betas are, by definition, more volatile and should require higher yields from investors to compensate for that additional volatility. Chart 2The Higher-Yielding Countries Also Have Higher Yield Betas
The Higher-Yielding Countries Also Have Higher Yield Betas
The Higher-Yielding Countries Also Have Higher Yield Betas
The yield betas are not stable over time for all countries, however. The US has consistently remained the highest beta market, and Japan the lowest beta market, over the past twenty years. Other countries have seen their yield betas evolve over time. For example, France, Spain and, more recently, the UK have seen their yield betas decline in recent years, while Italy has gone from being low-beta to one of the higher-beta markets. In our view, the evolution of yield betas relates to the “activism” of policymakers in each country. Higher-beta, higher-yield countries also have central banks that move interest rates higher and lower with more frequency compared to the low-beta, low-yield countries. In our view, the evolution of yield betas relates to the “activism” of policymakers in each country. That high-beta group includes bond markets linked to the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand – all central banks that are not shy about aggressively cutting or hiking interest rates. The low-beta markets have central banks that move rates very infrequently, like the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan. Table 1Yield Betas For The Major Developed Markets
Some Important Questions Regarding Bond Yield Correlations
Some Important Questions Regarding Bond Yield Correlations
One other interesting point on yield betas is that they do vary depending on the overall direction of global bond yields. As a way to show this, we estimated “upside” and “downside” yield betas for the same ten countries shown earlier. Those betas were calculated by sorting the monthly yield changes for all countries by months when the benchmark global bond index yield was rising or falling. Thus, upside yield beta comes from a regression of monthly yield changes for individual countries on changes in overall global bond yields, but only using data for months when global yields increased. The opposite is true for downside beta, where only data from months when the global benchmark index yield declined are used. The individual yield betas – for the overall sample and the upside and downside groupings – are presented in Table 1. One conclusion that comes from breaking up the data this way is that countries that were in the low-beta group when looking at the full set of data have relatively high yield betas during periods of rising global yields, like France and the UK (Chart 3). In addition, when looking at downside betas, US Treasuries have the highest beta, by far, when global yields are falling – with yields for euro area countries having relatively lower betas (Chart 4). Chart 3Yield Betas During Periods Of Rising Global Yields
Yield Betas During Periods Of Rising Global Yields
Yield Betas During Periods Of Rising Global Yields
Chart 4Yield Betas During Periods Of Falling Global Yields
Yield Betas During Periods Of Falling Global Yields
Yield Betas During Periods Of Falling Global Yields
Our conclusion from this analysis is that yield betas do have a useful role in making country allocation decisions for global fixed income investors. Specifically, adjusting allocations based on a view on the overall direction of global bond yields should help better manage portfolio risk and, potentially, improve returns. Chart 5Italy Has Become High-Beta As Spreads Have Narrowed
Italy Has Become High-Beta As Spreads Have Narrowed
Italy Has Become High-Beta As Spreads Have Narrowed
A final point on Italy – the reason Italy has had such a high yield beta over the past few years is because Italian government bond yields have been driven more by the reduction of Italian sovereign credit risk – including the redenomination risk from a potential Italian exit from the euro (Chart 5). As Italian credit spreads have melted away from the levels reached during the 2011/12 European Debt Crisis, yields have fallen faster than others during periods of falling global yields, and vice versa. Looking ahead, with the ECB continuing to be an aggressive buyer of Italian bonds in its various asset purchase programs, and with the COVID-19 pandemic forcing the European Union into a deeper level of economic co-operation – which now includes grants to Italy – the sovereign risk premium on Italian government debt should continue to narrow. That means Italy will continue to trade as a high-beta market when global yields are falling, and a low-beta market when yields are rising, making Italy an ideal overweight candidate in global bond portfolios. Bottom Line: Favoring countries with higher government bond yield betas when global yields are falling, and vice versa, is still an appropriate way to manage fixed income risk – although betas do vary between global bond bull and bear markets. Can Inflation Breakevens And Real Yields Continue Moving In Opposite Directions? The behavior of real bond yields over the past few months garnered a lot of attention in 2020, particularly the sharp fall in US TIPS yields into deeply negative territory. This has occurred at the same time as a widening of inflation breakevens, which exhibited a deeply negative correlation with real yields. The result: narrow trading ranges for nominal government bond yields in most developed countries, with moves in real yields and inflation breakevens largely offsetting each other. Adjusting allocations based on a view on the overall direction of global bond yields should help better manage portfolio risk and, potentially, improve returns. Looking at the history of real yields and inflation breakevens, periods of a negative correlation between the two are not unusual. In Chart 6, we show the range of historic correlations between 10-year inflation-linked bond yields, and 10-year inflation breakevens, for the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Canada and Japan since 2010. The dark bars represent the range of rolling correlations over a three-year period, while the red diamonds are a more recent correlation over the past thirteen weeks. All countries shown have seen periods of negative correlation, with only Australia and France having the most recent correlation be far lower than the historic experience. Chart 6Negative Real Yield/Breakevens Correlations Are Not Unprecedented
Some Important Questions Regarding Bond Yield Correlations
Some Important Questions Regarding Bond Yield Correlations
So if a negative real yield/inflation breakeven correlation is not that unusual, then what is the cause of it? We see two drivers: the amount of spare capacity in an economy and the central bank policy response to it. We can see this by looking at the data from the countries with the two largest inflation-linked bond markets, the US and UK. In the US, real TIPS yields and inflation breakevens have generally been positively correlated only during Fed tightening cycles, specifically after the Fed has raised the fed funds rate above the rate of realized core inflation (Chart 7). This was the case in the tightening cycles of the mid-2000s and 2016-18. During those episodes, the Fed pushed the real funds rate steadily higher, which also had the effect of pushing real TIPS bond yields higher, even as inflation expectations were stable-to-rising. Looking at the history of real yields and inflation breakevens, periods of a negative correlation between the two are not unusual. The opposite held true during Fed easing cycles since the advent of the TIPS market in the late 1990s, when the Fed always lowered the funds rate below realized inflation. The result was a period of a falling real funds rate, leading to lower real TIPS yields and eventually triggering an increase in inflation breakevens. In other words, the correlation between breakevens and real yields became negative. In the UK, the negative correlation between real index-linked Gilt yields and inflation breakevens has been consistently negative since the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 8). The Bank of England has barely moved policy rates since that crisis, while keeping nominal policy rates below 1% - a level that was consistently below core UK inflation. Thus, the Bank of England has maintained negative real policy rates for the past twelve years, with real Gilt yields declining steadily and inflation breakevens rising – a negative correlation - over that period. Chart 7Fed Policy Influences The US Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation
Fed Policy Influences The US Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation
Fed Policy Influences The US Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation
Chart 8A Persistently Negative Correlation Of UK Real Yields & Breakevens
A Persistently Negative Correlation Of UK Real Yields & Breakevens
A Persistently Negative Correlation Of UK Real Yields & Breakevens
For both the US (Chart 9) and UK (Chart 10), the rolling 3-year correlation between real yields and breakevens has itself been correlated to the unemployment gap, or the difference between the unemployment rate and the full-employment NAIRU rate, over the past two decades. This suggests that the ebbs and flows of labor market slack, and how the Fed and Bank of England have responded to them by easing or tightening monetary policy, also play a role in determining the real yield/breakevens correlation. Chart 9Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The US
Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The US
Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The US
Chart 10Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The UK
Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The UK
Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The UK
In the case of the US, a more extended UK-like period of negative real policy rates and real bond yields is likely if the Fed is to be taken at their word that they will keep rates low to engineer a US inflation overshoot. We suspect that the correlation will not be perfectly negative, as has occurred at times this year, with inflation expectations rising alongside stable-to-falling real TIPS yields as the US economy recovers from the COVID-19 shock – especially if there is a major boost from fiscal stimulus after next month’s elections. Bottom Line: We continue to see a case for inflation breakevens and real yields to stay negatively correlated in the developed economies over at least the next few years, as the labor market slack created by the 2020 COVID-19 global recession is slowly absorbed. That negative correlation will become less intense, especially in the US, with rising inflation expectations eventually becoming the more dominant influence on nominal bond yields. Will Inflation Breakevens Continue To Have A Strong Positive Correlation With Oil Prices? While the negative correlation between real inflation-linked bond yields and real yields has gotten attention this year, the positive correlation between breakevens and oil prices has become familiar to investors over the past several years. That correlation has been persistently high and positive across all developed economies since the 2008 financial crisis. Prior to that, oil prices and inflation breakevens moved together less frequently and, at times, were even uncorrelated (Chart 11). In both the US and euro area, the lack of non-energy inflation is the main reason why breakevens and oil are so correlated. In our view, the reason why breakevens and oil became strongly correlated is relatively straightforward. Since the 2008 crisis and ensuing Great Recession, swings in oil prices have been the main driver of changes in realized inflation, with ex-energy inflation rates staying very low and stable. We can see that in the US, where ex-energy CPI inflation has been broadly stable around 2% for the past decade, even as headline CPI inflation has seen more variability and has even approached 0% after the collapse in oil prices in 2014/15 and 2020 (Chart 12). Chart 11A Persistent Strong Correlation Of Global Breakevens To Oil
Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The UK
Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The UK
Chart 12Strong Oil/Breakevens Correlation While US Ex-Energy Inflation Is Low
Strong Oil/Breakevens Correlation While US Ex-Energy Inflation Is Low
Strong Oil/Breakevens Correlation While US Ex-Energy Inflation Is Low
Chart 13Energy Has Become The Only Source Of Euro Area Inflation
Energy Has Become The Only Source Of Euro Area Inflation
Energy Has Become The Only Source Of Euro Area Inflation
The same dynamics, only more intense, exist in the euro area. Ex-energy inflation has struggled to stay above 1% over the past decade, leaving changes in energy prices as an even greater determinant of realized headline inflation than in the US (Chart 13). In both the US and euro area, the lack of non-energy inflation is the main reason why breakevens and oil are so correlated. Until there is evidence of a more broad-based move higher in inflation rates outside of oil - which will almost certainly require an extended period of above-trend global growth and accommodative global fiscal and monetary policies - trading inflation breakevens off oil will still be a successful strategy. Bottom Line: Global inflation breakevens will maintain a strong positive correlation to oil prices, but only for as long as non-energy inflation remains low and stable, which has made energy prices the only source of inflation variability in most developed countries Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Dear Client, We are sending you our Quarterly Strategy Outlook today, where we outline our thoughts on the macro landscape and the direction of financial markets for the rest of the year and beyond. We will also be hosting a webcast on Thursday, October 1st at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) where we will discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Macroeconomic outlook: Global growth faces near-term challenges from a resurgence in the pandemic and the failure of the US Congress to pass a stimulus deal. However, growth should revive next year as a vaccine becomes available and fiscal policy turns stimulative again. Global asset allocation: Favor equities over bonds on a 12-month horizon, while maintaining somewhat larger than normal cash positions in the short run that can be deployed if stocks resume their correction. Equities: Prepare to pivot from the “Pandemic trade” to the “Reopening trade.” Vaccine optimism should pave the way for cyclicals to outperform defensives, international stocks to outperform their US peers, and for value to outperform growth. Fixed income: Bond yields will rise modestly, suggesting that investors should maintain below average duration exposure. Favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Spread product will outperform safe government bonds. Currencies: The US dollar will weaken over the next 12 months. The collapse in interest rate differentials, stronger global growth, and a widening US trade deficit are all bearish for the greenback. Commodities: Rising demand and constrained supply will support oil prices, while Chinese stimulus will buoy industrial metals. Investors should buy gold and other real assets as a hedge against long-term inflation risk. I. Macroeconomic Outlook Policy And The Pandemic Will Continue To Drive Markets Going into the fourth quarter of 2020, we are tactically neutral on global equities but remain overweight stocks and other risk assets on a 12-month horizon. As has been the case for much of the year, both the virus and the policy response to the pandemic will continue to be key drivers of market returns. Coronavirus: Still Spreading Fast, But Less Deadly On the virus front, the global number of daily new cases continues to trend higher, with the 7-day average reaching a record high of nearly 300,000 this week (Chart 1). Chart 1Globally, The Number Of Daily New Cases Continues To Trend Higher
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
The number of daily new cases in the EU has risen above its April peak. Spain and France have been particularly hard hit. Canada is also seeing a pronounced rise in new cases. In the US, the number of new cases peaked in July. However, the 7-day average has been creeping up since early September, raising the risk of a third wave. On the positive side, mortality rates in most countries remain well below their spring levels. There is no clear consensus as to why the virus has become less lethal. Better medical treatments, including the use of low-cost steroids, have certainly helped. A shift in the incidence of cases towards younger, healthier people has also lowered the overall mortality rate. In addition, there is some evidence that the virus may be evolving to be more contagious but less deadly.1 It would not be surprising if that were the case. After all, a virus that kills its host will also kill itself. Lastly, pervasive mask wearing may be mitigating the severity of the disease by reducing the initial viral load that infected individuals receive.2 A smaller initial dose gives the immune system more time to launch an effective counterattack. It has even been speculated that the widespread use of masks may be acting as a form of “variolation.” Prior to the invention of vaccines, variolation was used to engender natural immunity. Perhaps most famously, upon taking command of the Continental Army in 1775, George Washington had all his troops exposed to small amounts of smallpox.3 The gamble worked. The US ended up winning the Revolutionary War, making Washington the first president of the new republic. Waiting For A Vaccine Despite the decline in mortality rates, there is still much that remains unknown about Covid-19, including the extent to which the disease will lead to long-term damage to the vascular and nervous systems. Thus, while governments are unlikely to impose the same sort of severe lockdown measures that they implemented in March, rising case counts will delay reopening plans, and in many cases, lead to the reintroduction of stricter social distancing rules. Chart 2Some States Have Started To Relax Lockdown Measures
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
This has already happened in a number of countries. The UK reinstated more stringent regulations over social gatherings last week, including ordering pubs and restaurants to close by 10pm. Spain has introduced tougher mobility restrictions in Madrid and surrounding municipalities. France ordered gyms and restaurants to close for two weeks. Canada has also tightened regulations, with the government of Quebec raising the alert level to maximum “red alert” in several regions of the province. In the US, the share of the population living in states that were in the process of relaxing lockdown measures has risen above 50% for the first time since July (Chart 2). A third wave would almost certainly forestall the recent reopening trend. Ultimately, a safe and effective vaccine will be necessary to defeat the virus. Fortunately, about half of experts polled by the Good Judgment Project expect a vaccine to become available by the first quarter of 2021. Only 2% expect there to be no vaccine available by April 2022, down from over 50% in May (Chart 3). Chart 3When Will A Vaccine Become Available?
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Premature Fiscal Tightening And The Risk of Second-Round Effects Even if a vaccine becomes available early next year, there is a danger that the global economy will have suffered enough damage over the intervening months to forestall a rapid recovery. Whenever an economy suffers an adverse shock, a feedback loop can develop where rising joblessness leads to less spending, leading to even more joblessness. Fiscal stimulus can short-circuit this vicious circle by providing households with adequate income to maintain spending. Fiscal policy in the major economies turned expansionary within weeks of the onset of the pandemic (Chart 4). In the US, real personal income growth actually accelerated in the spring because transfers from the government more than offset the loss in wage and salary compensation (Chart 5). Chart 4Fiscal Policy Has Been Very Stimulative This Year
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Chart 5Personal Income Accelerated Earlier This Year
Personal Income Accelerated Earlier This Year
Personal Income Accelerated Earlier This Year
Chart 6Drastic Drop In Weekly Unemployment Insurance Payments
Drastic Drop In Weekly Unemployment Insurance Payments
Drastic Drop In Weekly Unemployment Insurance Payments
Starting in August, US fiscal policy turned less accommodative. Chart 6 shows that regular weekly unemployment payments have fallen from around $25 billion to $8 billion since the end of July. At an annualized rate, this amounts to over 4% of GDP in fiscal tightening. While President Trump signed an executive order redirecting some of the money that had been earmarked for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be given to unemployed workers, the available funding will run out within the next month or so. On top of that, the funds in the small business Paycheck Protection Program have been used up, while many state and local governments face a severe cash crunch. US households saved a lot going into the autumn, so a sudden stop in spending is unlikely. Nevertheless, fissures in the economy are widening. Core retail sales contracted in August for the first time since April. Consumer expectations of future income growth remain weak (Chart 7). Permanent job losses are rising faster than they did during the Great Recession (Chart 8). Both corporate bankruptcy and mortgage delinquency rates are moving up, while bank lending standards have tightened significantly (Chart 9). Chart 7Consumer Expectations Of Future Income Growth Remain Weak
Consumer Expectations Of Future Income Growth Remain Weak
Consumer Expectations Of Future Income Growth Remain Weak
Chart 8Permanent Job Losses Are Rising Faster Than They Did During The Great Recession
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Chart 9Corporate Bankruptcy And Mortgage Delinquency Rates Are Moving Up … While Bank Lending Standards Have Tightened Significantly
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fiscal Stimulus Will Return We ultimately expect US fiscal policy to turn accommodative again. There is no appetite for fiscal austerity. Both political parties are moving in a more populist direction, which usually signals larger budget deficits. Even among Republicans, more registered voters support extending emergency federal unemployment insurance payments than oppose it (Chart 10). Chart 10There Is Much Public Support For Fiscal Stimulus
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
As long as interest rates stay low, there will be little market pressure to trim budget deficits. US real rates remain in negative territory. Despite a rising debt stock, the Congressional Budget Office expects net interest payments to decline towards 1% of GDP over the span of the next couple of years, thus reaching the lowest level in six decades (Chart 11). Outside the US, there has been little movement towards tightening fiscal policy. The UK government unveiled last week a fresh round of economic and fiscal measures to help ease the burden on both employees, by subsidizing part-time work for example, and firms, by extending government-guaranteed loan programs. At the beginning of the month, the Macron government announced a 100 billion euro stimulus plan in France. Meanwhile, European leaders are moving forward on a euro area-wide 750 billion euro stimulus package that was announced this summer. In Japan, the new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has indicated that he will pursue a third budget to fight the economic downturn, adding that “there is no limit to the amount of bonds the government can issue to support an economy battered by the coronavirus pandemic.” The Japanese government now earns more interest than it pays because two-thirds of all Japanese debt bears negative yields (Chart 12). At least for now, a big debt burden is actually good for the Japanese government’s finances! Chart 11Low Interest Payments Amid Skyrocketing Debt In The US
Low Interest Payments Amid Skyrocketing Debt In The US
Low Interest Payments Amid Skyrocketing Debt In The US
Chart 12Japan: Ballooning Debt And Declining Interest Payments
Japan: Ballooning Debt And Declining Interest Payments
Japan: Ballooning Debt And Declining Interest Payments
China also continues to stimulate its economy. Jing Sima, BCA’s chief China strategist, expects the broad-measure fiscal deficit to reach a record 8% of GDP this year and remain elevated into next year. The annual change in total social financing – a broad measure of Chinese credit formation – is expected to hit 35% of GDP, just shy of its GFC peak (Chart 13). Not surprisingly, the Chinese economy is responding well to all this stimulus. Sales of floor space rose 40% year-over-year in August, driven by a close to 60% jump in Tier-1 cities. Excavator sales, a leading indicator for construction spending, are up 51% over last year’s levels, while industrial profits have jumped 19%. A resurgent Chinese economy has historically been closely associated with rising global trade (Chart 14). Chart 13China Continues To Stimulate Its Economy
China Continues To Stimulate Its Economy
China Continues To Stimulate Its Economy
Chart 14Chinese Economic Rebound Has Historically Been Closely Associated With Rising Global Trade
Chinese Economic Rebound Has Historically Been Closely Associated With Rising Global Trade
Chinese Economic Rebound Has Historically Been Closely Associated With Rising Global Trade
Biden Or Trump: How Will Financial Markets React? Betting markets expect former Vice President Joe Biden to become president and for the Democrats to gain control of the Senate (Chart 15). A “blue wave” would produce more fiscal spending in the next few years. Recall that House Democrats passed a $3.5 trillion stimulus bill in May that was quickly rejected by Senate Republicans. More recently, Democratic leaders have suggested they would approve a stimulus deal in the range of $2-to-$2.5 trillion. Chart 15Betting Markets Putting Their Money On The Democrats
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
In addition to more pandemic-related stimulus, Joe Biden has also proposed a variety of longer-term spending initiatives. These include $2 trillion in infrastructure spending spread over four years, a $700 billion “Made in America” plan that would increase federal procurement of domestically produced goods and services, and new spending proposals worth about 1.7% of GDP per annum centered on health care, housing, education, and child and elder care. As president, Joe Biden would likely take a less confrontational stance towards relations with China. While rolling back tariffs would not be an immediate priority for a Biden administration, it could happen later in 2021. Less welcome for investors would be an increase in taxes. Joe Biden has proposed raising taxes by $4 trillion over ten years (about 1.5% of cumulative GDP). Slightly less than half of that consists of higher personal taxes on both regular income (for taxpayers earning more than $400,000 per year) and capital gains (for tax filers with over $1 million in income). The other half consists of increased business taxes, mainly in the form of a hike in the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28% and the introduction of a minimum 15% tax on the global book income of US-based companies. Netting it out, a blue sweep in November would probably be neutral-to-slightly negative for equities. What about government bonds? Our guess is that Treasury yields would rise modestly in response to a blue wave, particularly at the longer end of the yield curve. Additional fiscal support would boost aggregate demand, implying that it would take less time for the economy to reach full employment. That said, interest rate expectations are unlikely to rise as sharply as they did in late 2016 following Donald Trump‘s victory. Back then, the Fed was primed to raise rates – it hiked rates nine times starting in December 2015, ultimately bringing the fed funds rate to 2.5% by end-2018. This time around, the Fed is firmly on hold, with the vast majority of FOMC members expecting policy rates to stay at rock-bottom levels until at least 2023. The Fed’s New Tune In two important respects, the Fed’s new Monetary Policy Framework (MPF) represents a sharp break with the past. Chart 16The Mechanics Of Price-Level Targeting
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
First, the MPF abandons the Fed’s historic reliance on a Taylor Rule-style framework, which prescribes lifting rates whenever the unemployment rate declines towards its equilibrium level. Second, the MPF eschews the “let bygones be bygones” approach of past monetary policymaking. Going forward, the Fed will try to maintain an average level of inflation of 2% over the course of the business cycle. This means that if inflation falls below 2%, the Fed will try to engineer a temporary inflation overshoot in order to bring the price level back up to its 2%-per-year upward trend (Chart 16). Some aspects of the Fed’s new strategy are both timely and laudable. A Taylor rule approach makes sense when there is a clear relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate, as governed by the so-called Phillips curve. However, if inflation fails to rise in response to declining economic slack – as has been the case in recent years – central banks may find themselves at a loss in determining where the neutral rate of interest lies. In this case, it might be preferable to keep interest rates at very low levels until the economy begins to overheat. Such a strategy would avoid the risk of raising rates prematurely, only to discover that they are too high for what the economy can handle. Targeting an average rate of inflation also has significant merit. When investors purchase long-term bonds, they run the risk that the real value of those bonds will deviate significantly from initial expectations when the bonds mature. If inflation surprises on the upside, the bonds will end up being worth less to the lender as measured by the quantity of goods and services that they can be exchanged for. If inflation surprises on the downside, borrowers could find themselves facing a larger real debt burden than they had anticipated. An inflation targeting system that corrects for past inflation surprises could give both borrowers and lenders greater certainty about the future price level. This, in turn, could reduce the inflation risk premium embedded in long-term bond yields, leading to a more efficient allocation of economic resources. In addition, an average inflation targeting system could make the zero lower bound constraint less vexing by keeping long-term inflation expectations from slipping below the central bank’s target. This would give the central bank more traction over monetary policy. A Bias Towards Higher Inflation Despite the advantages of the Fed’s new approach, it faces a number of hurdles, some practical and some political. On the practical side, it may turn out that the Phillips curve, rather than being flat, is kinked at a fairly low level of unemployment. Theoretically, that would not be too surprising. If I have 100 apples for sale and you want to buy 60, I have no incentive to raise prices. Even if you wanted to buy 80 apples, I would have no incentive to raise prices. However, if you wanted to buy 105 apples, then I would have an incentive to raise my selling price. The point is that inflation could remain stubbornly dormant as slack slowly disappears, only to rocket higher once full employment has been reached. Since changes in monetary policy only affect the economy with a lag, the central bank could find itself woefully behind the curve, scrambling to contain rising inflation. This is precisely what happened during the 1960s (Chart 17). Chart 17Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s
Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s
Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s
Chart 18Something Has Always Happened To Preempt Overheating
Something Has Always Happened To Preempt Overheating
Something Has Always Happened To Preempt Overheating
Over the past three decades, something always happened that kept the US economy from overheating (Chart 18). The unemployment rate reached a 50-year low in 2019. Inflation may have moved higher this year had it not been for the fact that the global economy was clotheslined by the pandemic. In 2007, the economy was heating up only to be sandbagged by the housing bust. In 2000, the bursting of the dotcom bubble helped reverse incipient inflationary pressures. But just because the economy did not have a chance to overheat at any time over the past 30 years does not mean it cannot happen in the future. The Political Economy Of Higher Inflation On the political side, average inflation targeting assumes that central banks will be just as willing to tolerate inflation undershoots as overshoots. This could be a faulty assumption. Generating an inflation overshoot requires that interest rates be kept low enough to enable unemployment to fall below its full employment level. That is likely to be politically popular. Generating an inflation undershoot, in contrast, requires restrictive monetary policy and rising unemployment. More joblessness would not sit well with workers. High interest rates could also damage the stock market and depress home prices, while forcing debt-saddled governments to shift more spending from social programs to bondholders. None of that will be politically popular. If central banks are quick to allow inflation overshoots but slow to engineer inflation undershoots, the result could be structurally higher inflation. Markets are not pricing in such an outcome (Chart 19). Chart 19Markets Are Not Pricing In Structurally Higher Inflation
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
II. Financial Markets Global Asset Allocation: Despite Near-Term Dangers, Overweight Equities On A 12-Month Horizon An acceleration in the number of COVID-19 cases and the rising probability that the US Congress will fail to pass a stimulus bill before the November election could push equities and other risk assets lower in the near term. Investors should maintain somewhat larger than normal cash positions in the short run that can be deployed if stocks resume their correction. Chart 20The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices
The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices
The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices
Provided that progress continues to be made towards developing a vaccine and US fiscal policy eventually turns stimulative again, stocks will regain their footing, rising about 15% from current levels over a 12-month horizon. Negative real bond yields will continue to support stocks (Chart 20). The 30-year TIPS yield has fallen by over 90 basis points in 2020. Even if one assumes that it will take the rest of the decade for S&P 500 earnings to return to their pre-pandemic trend, the deep drop in the risk-free component of the discount rate has still raised the present value of future S&P 500 cash flows by nearly 20% since the start of the year (Chart 21). Chart 21The Present Value Of Earnings: A Scenario Analysis
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Thanks to these exceptionally low real bond yields, equity risk premia remain elevated (Chart 22). The TINA mantra reverberates throughout the investment world: There Is No Alternative to stocks. To get a sense of just how powerful TINA is, consider the fact that the dividend yield on the S&P 500 currently stands at 1.67%. That may not sound like much, but it is still a full percentage point higher than the paltry 0.67% yield on the 10-year Treasury note (Chart 23). Chart 22Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated
Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated
Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated
Chart 23S&P 500 Dividend Yield Is Above The Treasury Yield
S&P 500 Dividend Yield Is Above The Treasury Yield
S&P 500 Dividend Yield Is Above The Treasury Yield
Imagine having to decide whether to place your money either in an S&P 500 index fund or a 10-year Treasury note. Dividends-per-share paid by S&P 500 companies have almost always increased over time. However, even if we make the pessimistic assumption that dividends-per-share remain unchanged for the next ten years, the value of the S&P 500 would still have to fall by 10% over the next decade to equal the return on the 10-year note. Assuming that inflation averages around 1.9% over this period, the real value of the S&P 500 would need to drop by 25%. The picture is even more dramatic outside the US. In the euro area, the index would have to fall by over 30% in real terms for investors to make more money in bonds than stocks. In the UK, it would need to fall by over 50% (Chart 24). Chart 24 (I)Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds
Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds
Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds
Chart 24 (II)Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds
Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds
Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds
A Weaker US Dollar Favors International Stocks Outside the US, price-earnings ratios are lower, while equity risk premia are higher. Cheap valuations are usually not enough to justify a high-conviction investment call, however. One also needs a catalyst. Three potential catalysts could help propel international stocks higher over the next 12 months, while also giving value stocks and economically-sensitive equity sectors a boost: A weaker US dollar; the end of the pandemic; and a recovery in bank shares. Let’s start with the dollar. The US dollar faces a number of headwinds over the coming months. First, interest rate differentials have moved sharply against the greenback (Chart 25). Second, as a countercyclical currency, the dollar is likely to weaken as the global economy improves (Chart 26). Third, the current account deficit is rising again. It jumped over 50% from $112 billion in Q1 to $170 billion in Q2. According to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model, the trade balance is set to widened further in Q3. This deterioration in the dollar’s fundamentals is occurring against a backdrop where the currency remains 11% overvalued based on purchasing power parity exchange rates (Chart 27). Chart 25Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved Sharply Against The Greenback
Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved Sharply Against The Greenback
Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved Sharply Against The Greenback
A weaker dollar is usually good for commodity prices and cyclical stocks (Chart 28). In general, commodity producers and cyclical stocks are overrepresented outside the US. Chart 26The Dollar Is Likely To Weaken As The Global Economy Improves
The Dollar Is Likely To Weaken As The Global Economy Improves
The Dollar Is Likely To Weaken As The Global Economy Improves
Chart 27USD Remains Overvalued
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Chart 28A Weaker Dollar Is Usually Good For Commodity Prices And Cyclical Stocks
A Weaker Dollar Is Usually Good For Commodity Prices And Cyclical Stocks
A Weaker Dollar Is Usually Good For Commodity Prices And Cyclical Stocks
BCA’s chief energy strategist Bob Ryan expects Brent to average $65/bbl in 2021, $21/bbl above what the market is anticipating. Ongoing Chinese stimulus should also buoy metal prices. A falling greenback helps overseas borrowers – many of whom are in emerging markets – whose loans are denominated in dollars but whose revenues are denominated in the local currency. It is thus no surprise that non-US stocks tend to outperform their US peers when global growth is strengthening and the dollar is weakening (Chart 29). Chart 29Non-US Equities Tend To Outperform Their US Peers When Global Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening
Non-US Equities Tend To Outperform Their US Peers When Global Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening
Non-US Equities Tend To Outperform Their US Peers When Global Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening
The outperformance of non-US stocks in soft dollar environments is particularly pronounced when returns are measured in common-currency terms. From the perspective of US-based investors, a weaker dollar raises the dollar value of overseas sales and profits, justifying higher valuations for international stocks. From the perspective of overseas investors, a weaker dollar reduces the local currency value of US sales and profits, implying a lower valuation for US stocks. This helps explain why European stocks tend to outperform their US counterparts when the euro is rising, even though a stronger euro hurts the European economy. It’s Value’s Turn To Shine Value stocks have often outperformed growth stocks when the US dollar has been weakening and global growth strengthening. Recall that value stocks did poorly during the late 1990s, a period of dollar strength and economic turbulence throughout the EM world. In contrast, value stocks did well between 2001 and 2007, a period during which the dollar was generally on the back foot. The relationship between value stocks, the dollar, and global growth broke down this summer. Growth stocks continued to pull ahead, even though global growth turned a corner and the dollar began to weaken. There are two reasons why this happened. First, investors were too slow to price in the windfall that growth stocks in the tech and health care sectors would end up receiving from the pandemic. Second, rather than rising in response to better economic growth data, real rates fell during the summer months. A falling discount rate benefits growth stocks more than value stocks because the former generate more of their earnings farther into the future. The tentative outperformance of value stocks in September suggests that the tables may have turned for the value/growth trade. Retail sales at physical stores are rebounding, while online sales growth is coming down from highly elevated levels (Chart 30). Bank of America estimates that US e-commerce penetration doubled in just a few short months earlier this year. Some “reversion to the trend” is likely, even if that trend does favor online stores over the long haul. Chart 30Are Brick-And Mortar Retailers Coming Back To Life?
Are Brick-And Mortar Retailers Coming Back To Life?
Are Brick-And Mortar Retailers Coming Back To Life?
Chart 31The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge
The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge
The Pandemic Has Caused Global Server And PC Shipments To Surge
Meanwhile, PC shipments soared during the pandemic as companies and workers rushed out to buy computer gear to allow them to work from home (Chart 31). To the extent that this caused some spending to be brought forward, it could create an air pocket in tech demand over the next few quarters. A third wave of the virus in the US and ongoing second waves elsewhere could give growth stocks a boost once more, but the benefits are likely to be short-lived. If a vaccine becomes available early next year, investors will pivot from the “pandemic trade” to the “reopening trade.” The “reopening trade” will support companies such as banks, hotels, and transports that were crushed by lockdown measures and which are overrepresented in value indices. From a valuation perspective, value stocks are cheaper now compared to growth stocks than at any point in history – even cheaper than at the height of the dotcom bubble (Chart 32). Chart 32Value Stocks Are Extremely Cheap Relative To Growth Stocks
Value Stocks Are Extremely Cheap Relative To Growth Stocks
Value Stocks Are Extremely Cheap Relative To Growth Stocks
The lofty valuations that growth stocks enjoy can be justified if the mega-cap tech companies that dominate the growth indices continue to increase earnings for many years to come. However, it is far from clear that this will happen. Close to three-quarters of US households already have an Amazon Prime account. Slightly over half have a Netflix account. Nearly 70% have a Facebook account. Google commands 92% of the internet search market. Together, sites owned by Google and Facebook generate about 60% of all online advertising revenue. While all of these companies dominate their markets, this could change. At one point during the dotcom bubble, Palm’s market capitalization was over six times greater than Apple’s. The Blackberry superseded the PalmPilot; the iPhone, in turn, superseded the Blackberry. History suggests that many of today’s technological leaders will end up as laggards. Investors looking to find the next tech leader can focus on smaller, fast growing companies. Unfortunately, picking winners in this space is easier said than done. History suggests that investors tend to overpay for growth, especially among small caps. Based on data compiled by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, small cap growth stocks have lagged small cap value stocks by an average of 6.4% per year on a market-cap weighted basis, and by 10.4% on an equal-weighted basis, since 1970 (Table 1). Table 1Small Caps Vis-A-Vis Large Caps: Comparison of Total Returns
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Bank On Banks Financial stocks are heavily overrepresented in value indices (Table 2). Banks have made significant provisions against bad loans this year. If global growth recovers in 2021 once a vaccine becomes available, some of these provisions will end up being released, boosting profits in the process. Table 2Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Chart 33Modestly Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Bank Shares
Modestly Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Bank Shares
Modestly Higher Bond Yields Will Benefit Bank Shares
A stabilization in bond yields should also help bank shares. Chart 33 shows that a fall in bank stocks vis-à-vis the overall market has closely matched the decline in bond yields. While we do not think that central banks will tighten monetary policy in the next few years, nominal bond yields should still drift modestly higher as output gaps narrow. What about the outlook for bank earnings? A massive new credit boom is not in the cards in any major economy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that global bank EPS was able to return to its long-term trend in 2019, until being slammed again this year by the pandemic (Chart 34). Global bank book value-per-share was 30% higher in 2019 compared to GFC highs (even though price-per-share was 30% lower). Chart 34Global Bank EPS Was Able To Return To Its Pre-GFC Peak In 2019 Until The Pandemic Hit
Global Bank EPS Was Able To Return To Its Pre-GFC Peak In 2019 Until The Pandemic Hit
Global Bank EPS Was Able To Return To Its Pre-GFC Peak In 2019 Until The Pandemic Hit
Chart 35European Bank Earnings Estimates Have Lagged Credit Growth
European Bank Earnings Estimates Have Lagged Credit Growth
European Bank Earnings Estimates Have Lagged Credit Growth
Admittedly, the global numbers disguise a lot of regional variation. While US banks were able to bring EPS back to its prior peak, and Canadian banks were able to easily surpass it, European bank EPS was still 70% below its pre-GFC highs in 2019. The launch of the common currency in 1999 set off a massive credit boom across much of Europe, leaving European banks dangerously overleveraged. The GFC and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis led to a spike in bad loans, necessitating numerous rounds of dilutive capital raises. At this point, however, European bank balance sheets are in much better shape. If EPS simply returns to its 2019 levels, European banks will trade at a generous earnings yield of close to 20%. That may not be such a hurdle to cross. Chart 35 shows that European bank earnings estimates have fallen far short of what would be expected from current credit growth. If, on top of all this, European banks are able to muster some sustained earnings growth thanks to somewhat steeper yield curves and further cost-cutting and consolidation, investors who buy banks today will be rewarded with outsized returns over the long haul. Fixed Income: What Is Least Ugly? As noted above, a rebound in global growth should push up both equity prices and bond yields. As such, we would underweight fixed income within a global asset allocation framework. Within the fixed income bracket, investors should favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. They should underweight government bonds in favor of a modest overweight to spread product. Spreads are quite low but could sink further if economic activity revives faster than anticipated. The upper quality tranche of high-yield corporates, which are benefiting from central bank purchases, have an especially attractive risk-reward profile. EM debt should also fare well in a weaker dollar, stronger growth environment (Chart 36). Chart 36BB-Rated And EM Debt Offer Reasonable Risk-Reward Profiles
BB-Rated And EM Debt Offer Reasonable Risk-Reward Profiles
BB-Rated And EM Debt Offer Reasonable Risk-Reward Profiles
Given that some investors have no choice but to own developed economy government bonds, which countries or regions should they buy from within this category? Chart 37 shows the 3-year trailing yield betas for several major developed bond markets. In general, the highest-yielding currencies (US and Canada) also have the highest betas, implying that their yields rise the most when global bond yields are rising and vice versa. Chart 37High-Yielding Bond Markets Are The Most Cyclical
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
In economies such as Europe and Japan where the neutral rate of interest is stuck deep below the zero bound, better economic news is unlikely to lift policy rate expectations by very much. After all, the optimal policy rate would still be above its neutral level even if better economic data brought the neutral rate from say, -4% to -3%. In contrast, when the neutral rate is close to zero or even positive, better economic data can lift medium-to-long-term interest rate expectations more meaningfully. As such, we would underweight US Treasurys and Canadian bonds, while overweighting Japanese government bonds (JGBs) over a 12-month horizon. On a currency-hedged basis, which is what most bond investors focus on, 10-year JGBs yield only 20 basis points less than US Treasurys (Table 3). This lower yield is more than offset by the risk that Treasury yields will rise more than yields on JGBs. Table 3Bond Markets Across The Developed World
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
The End Game What will end the bull market in stocks? As is often the case, the answer is tighter monetary policy. The good news is tight money is not an imminent risk. The Fed will not hike rates at least until 2023, and it will take even longer than that for interest rates to rise elsewhere in the world. The bad news is that the day of reckoning will eventually arrive and when it does, bond yields will soar and stocks will tumble. Investors who want to hedge against this risk should consider owning more real assets. As was the case during the 1970s, farmland will do well from rising inflation. Suburban real estate will also benefit from more people working from home and, if recent trends persist, rising crime in urban areas. Gold should also do well. The yellow metal has come down from its August highs, but should benefit from a weaker dollar over the coming months, and ultimately, from a more stagflationary environment later this decade. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 “More infectious coronavirus mutation may be 'a good thing', says disease expert,” Reuters, August 17, 2020. 2 Nina Bai, ”One More Reason to Wear a Mask: You’ll Get Less Sick From COVID-19,” University of California San Francisco, July 31, 2020. 3 Dave Roos, “How Crude Smallpox Inoculations Helped George Washington Win the War,” History.com, May 18, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Fourth Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: A Post-Pandemic Regime Shift
Highlights Global GDP growth estimates from the OECD point to a stronger recovery in oil demand than markets are pricing in at present (Chart of the Week). Our forecast for Brent remains at $46/bbl for 2H20 and $65/bbl on average for 2021. Global trade data – particularly EM import volumes, which are highly correlated with income (GDP) – remain supportive, as does monetary policy, particularly out of the US, EU and China. Doubt surrounds the US Congress’s determination to extend the fiscal support that underpins many households’ and firms’ budgets, but we expect a deal. Aggregate demand uncertainty remains high. COVID-19 infections are increasing globally. However, death rates appear to be trending lower, which likely will keep lockdowns localized. On the supply side, the leaders of OPEC 2.0 – Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – continue to insist on full adherence to agreed production levels among member states. This carries an implicit threat the leadership may be willing to flood the market with oil to remind the laggards of the consequences of cheating, which would hit non-Gulf OPEC members particularly hard. Longer term, sharp reductions in capex point to higher prices in the mid-2020s. Feature Stronger-than-expected growth estimates, most recently the OECD’s, suggest the decline in aggregate demand to the end of this year will not be as gruesome as earlier feared. Realized oil demand continues its V-shaped recovery, in line with rising GDP in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Stronger-than-expected growth estimates, most recently the OECD’s, suggest the decline in aggregate demand to the end of this year will not be as gruesome as earlier feared, and that growth could be stronger in 2021 than earlier anticipated, as seen in the Chart of the Week.1 The OECD is expecting global GDP growth to contract 4.5% this year vs. its June estimate of a 6% decline. The World Bank’s forecast of a 5.2% contraction in global GDP this year drives our oil-demand estimate, so the OECD’s estimate is more bullish for oil demand. Incoming data for EM import volumes suggest income is on track to recover by year-end or early 2021 in developing and emerging markets (Chart 2). EM import growth is driven by income growth; EM demand is the most important driver of global oil-demand growth. Chart of the WeekOECD Raises Global Growth Estimates
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Chart 2EM Import Volumes Remain On Recovery Path
EM Import Volumes Remain On Recovery Path
EM Import Volumes Remain On Recovery Path
Growth estimates continue to be overshadowed by fears of another round of widespread lockdowns arising from a second wave of COVID-19 infections and deaths. For next year, the OECD expects global growth to expand at a 5% rate vs. the World Bank’s 4.2% rate. We are awaiting the Bank’s updated income (GDP) estimates before revising our oil demand estimates. We already show EM oil demand, proxied by non-OECD consumption, recovering to pre-COVID-19 levels by the middle of next year, while DM demand flattens at a lower level (Chart 3). A confirmation of better-than-expected growth – particularly from EM economies – would move our expectation of a full recovery in EM oil-demand into 1H21 and could push DM demand up slightly. Chart 3EM Oil Demand Will Surpass Pre-COVID-19 Levels In Mid-2021
EM Oil Demand Will Surpass Pre-COVID-19 Levels In Mid-2021
EM Oil Demand Will Surpass Pre-COVID-19 Levels In Mid-2021
Chart 4COVID-19 Infections Rising, But Death Rates Are Falling
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
These growth estimates continue to be overshadowed by fears of another round of widespread lockdowns arising from a second wave of COVID-19 infections and deaths. This perforce makes any bullish demand recovery suspect. For the present, while COVID-19 infections are rising, death rates appear to be trending lower recently (Chart 4). If, as appears to be the case, a vaccine for the virus is approved later this year or in early 2021, markets likely would re-orient to discounting the time at which it is available globally to estimate a demand-recovery vector. Our estimate of the global oil-demand loss for this year is slightly larger than last month – -8.15mm b/s vs. -8.1mm b/d in August (Table 1). The US EIA and IEA also increased their estimates of 2020 global demand loss slightly this month as well, to -8.3mm b/d and -8.4mm b/d, respectively. OPEC once again is an outlier – albeit a very important source of information – in expecting a loss of -9.5mm b/d of demand this year. For 2021, we expect demand to grow 7.3mm b/d, vs. 6.5mm b/d from the EIA. OPEC expects oil-demand growth of 6.6mm b/d next year vs. last month’s forecast of 7mm b/d. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances)
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds Our expectation for OPEC 2.0 production is driven by our belief the group is targeting higher prices next year, and will adjust output to reach that goal. OPEC 2.0 continues to manage member-states’ output effectively. Compliance with the production cuts agreed by OPEC 2.0 remained strong in August – at 102%, based on OPEC’s calculations. The group’s production cut will be reduced to 5.8mm b/d starting in January 2021 from 7.7mm b/d currently (Chart 5). At its September 17 meeting, the coalition’s Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) reiterated the importance of all countries complying with the agreed cuts, and recommended the so-called “compensation period” for underperforming countries failing to meet their production cuts be extended to the end of December 2020. This is meant to keep production below demand in 4Q20. For 2021, we continue to expect the group will accommodate higher demand growth by gradually increasing production beyond the currently planned January increase in quotas. This will limit the rise in prices, and will keep them below $70/bbl (Chart 6). Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds ...
OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds ...
OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Holds ...
Chart 6... And Continues To Support Prices
... And Continues To Support Prices
... And Continues To Support Prices
Our expectation for OPEC 2.0 production is driven by our belief the group is targeting higher prices next year, and will adjust output to reach that goal. KSA and Russia are making it abundantly clear in their public remarks they intend to keep the pressure up on the rest of OPEC 2.0 to move prices higher – their budgets have been hammered by the COVID-19 pandemic, after just starting to recover from the 2014-16 market-share war launched by OPEC when the pandemic hit earlier this year.2 Even in the current relatively low-price environment, KSA imposed a value-added tax (VAT) and is paring back social spending, while Russia is signaling it will increase in taxes on oil producers and metals companies and others to raise revenues.3 In the US, we believe most of the previously shut-in wells have been brought back on line. In our modeling, we marginally reduced OPEC 2.0’s production increase in this month’s forecast due to the slight downward revisions in demand. We now expect the group to increase its production to ~ 45mm b/d by December 2021, vs our previous expectation of ~ 46mm b/d. In our lower-demand scenario, which is driven by OPEC’s 2020 and 2021 demand estimates, we estimate prices would peak at ~ $50/bbl next year when keeping OPEC 2.0’s production unchanged vs. our base case. However, without the strong upward demand pressure, we believe OPEC 2.0 will keep its 5.8mm b/d production cuts in place for most of 2021 and that KSA, and to a lesser extent Russia, will push for strict production discipline at that level. This is sufficient to move prices close to $60/bbl on average in our lower-demand scenario in 2021 (Chart 7). Securing additional production cuts – to push average prices to $65/bbl as in our base case – from other OPEC 2.0 member states, including Russia, would be a difficult task. Chart 7Lower-Demand Price Scenarios
Lower-Demand Price Scenarios
Lower-Demand Price Scenarios
Chart 8Falling US Rig Counts …
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
In the US, we believe most of the previously shut-in wells have been brought back on line. Going forward, legacy production declines rates will push onshore production down as new production from new completed wells remains below the level required to keep production flat (Chart 8). We expect production will bottom in June 2021 at ~ 8.1mm b/d before slowly moving up in 2H21 (Chart 9). The small uptick in production will come mainly from the completion of drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells in the US shales, which expand and contract with the level of drilling activity, and function as a ready source of incremental lower-cost supply (Chart 10). DUCs will provide a cheap source of new production. We expect producers will begin developing this source of supply during the first half of next year, as the only expense left to bring oil to market from them are completion costs. Chart 9… And Falling US Production
... And Falling US Production
... And Falling US Production
Chart 10Expect DUCs To Be Developed In 2021
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Oil’s Capex Dilemma The IEA estimated oil and gas investment will fall by close to $244 billion y/y in 2020 which will reduce supply by ~ 2mm b/d by 2025. The combination of OPEC 2.0’s low-cost production and high spare capacity; parsimonious capital markets and the growing appeal of ESG-driven investment decisions; and concerns over peak oil demand will continue to limit funding to all but the most profitable producers, which will continue to limit E+P ex-OPEC 2.0.4 Consequently, new oil production in non-OPEC countries risks falling below the level needed to cover legacy wells’ decline rates, which we estimate at ~ 8% for non-OPEC ex-US shale production. This will be mostly apparent in The Other Guys – our moniker for all producers excluding Gulf OPEC, US shales, Canada, and Russia – which account for ~ 40% of global oil supply. In our view, the decline rates of The Other Guys currently are being overlooked, while the prospect of so-called “peak oil demand” is receiving a disproportionate amount of attention, and could be discouraging needed investment in new E+P. Keeping production flat in The Other Guys and US onshore production will require ~ 7mm b/d of new oil production between 2022 and 2025 (Chart 11). In the US, most of the added upstream capex will be dedicated to replacing legacy production declines. The IEA estimated oil and gas investment will fall by close to $244 billion y/y in 2020 which will reduce supply by ~ 2mm b/d by 2025. The sluggish rebound in capex could remove another 2-4mm b/d. According to IHS Markit, for supply to meet the expected demand over the next 5 years, close to $4.5 trillion in capex and opex is needed. The capital-constrained Other Guys’ supply growth, and a similar paucity of funding in the US and Canada will barely suffice to offset the decline rates in non-OPEC producing countries. This implies OPEC 2.0’s role will increase over the coming years as its spare capacity – which allows the group to move production to market more rapidly than shale producers – and ability to grow its productive capacity at low costs will disincentivize investments in major oil projects outside of these regions. Chart 11"The Other Guys" Production Remains In Decline
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Fear And Loathing Attend Oil-Price Recovery
Investment Implications We expect the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline, parsimonious capital markets, and increasing decline rates will tighten the supply side of the market. In the near term, the recent upgrade in global GDP growth estimate from the OECD points to a stronger-than-expected recovery in oil demand, owing largely to massive fiscal and monetary support around the world. We expect the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline, parsimonious capital markets, and increasing decline rates will tighten the supply side of the market. As a result, we expect markets to continue to tighten (Chart 12), and for inventories to continue to draw this year and next (Chart 13). Chart 12Markets Will Continue To Tighten ...
Markets Will Continue To Tighten ...
Markets Will Continue To Tighten ...
Chart 13... And Storage Will Continue To Draw
... And Storage Will Continue To Draw
... And Storage Will Continue To Draw
We will continue to monitor growth estimates, but for the present, we are keeping our forecast for Brent at $46/bbl for 2H20 and $65/bbl on average for 2021. WTI will trade $2 - $4/bbl below Brent over this time. Longer term, producers outside the core OPEC 2.0 states are being starved for capital. The combination of continued production discipline and a paucity of capital available for producers outside this coalition are pointing toward a lower rate of supply growth going forward. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight The recent announcement by Eastern Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar that the LNA would lift its blockade on oil output for a month does not meaningfully impact our previous Libyan oil production forecast. We continue to forecast a gradual recovery in the country’s production to 600k b/d and 900k b/d by December 2020 and 2021 (Chart 14). The news signals production could resume at a slightly higher pace than in our forecasts. However, we still believe risks to an export recovery are elevated, as the underlying conflicts in the country remain unresolved. Thus, we are keeping our projections largely unchanged (see Table 1). Base Metals: Neutral World copper markets ended 1H20 with an apparent refined copper deficit of 278k MT, after adjustments for changes in Chinese bonded stocks. according to the International Copper Study Group. World ex-China refined copper usage declined ~ 9%, led by declines of 12% in Japan, 10% in the EU and ~ 8% in Asia (Ex-China). A 31% increase in net refined copper imports lifted Chinese apparent usage 9% offsetting, which offset declines in the rest of the world (Chart 15). China accounts for ~ 50% of refined copper consumption and ~ 40% of refined copper production. Precious Metals: Neutral The sell-off in silver took prices below our trailing stop of $26/oz, leaving us with a gain of 40.5% since inception July 2, 2020. Our views for silver and gold remain positive, as the Fed continues to signal it will look through any pick-up in inflation, which we believe will keep real rates in the US low for the foreseeable future, and lead to a weaker USD. Ags/Softs: Underweight Soybean and corn futures paired back their gains, falling roughly 3.5% since last week. The USDA crop progress report for the week ending September 21, 2020, indicated that the deterioration in the condition of soybean and corn crops has stalled. The sharp rise in the US dollar Index has been another headwind. Given these factors and the precarious level of current prices, we recommend staying underweight agricultural products at this juncture. Chart 14LIBYA CRUDE PRODUCTION SET TO REBOUND
LIBYA CRUDE PRODUCTION SET TO REBOUND
LIBYA CRUDE PRODUCTION SET TO REBOUND
Chart 15Strong Chinese Copper Imports
Strong Chinese Copper Imports
Strong Chinese Copper Imports
Footnotes 1 Please see OECD Interim Economic Assessment, “Coronavirus: Living with uncertainty,” published September 16, 2020. 2 Following the JMMC meeting, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al-Saud said OPEC 2.0 could hold an extraordinary meeting to address weaker demand, and warned traders against shorting the market. Please see Saudi energy minister warns oil price gamblers ‘make my day’ published by aljazeera.com September 17, 2020. 3 Please see KSA VAT rate to increase to 15% from 1 July 2020 published by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited July 1, 2020. See also Russian lawmakers give initial nod to hefty tax hike for mining, oil published by reuters.com September 22, 2020. 4 We opened our examination of the longer-term consequences of the contraction of supply growth last week in Oil's Next Bull Market, Courtesy Of COVID-19. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy service concludes that OPEC 2.0 will be the oil market’s driving force over the coming years, as long as it can maintain its discipline. COVID-19 caused immense demand destruction that resulted in a massive…
Highlights If it can maintain production discipline over the next 2-3 years, OPEC 2.0 will be the oil market’s most important determinant of price levels for years. The massive increase in OPEC 2.0 spare capacity resulting from COVID-19-induced demand destruction, along with its low-cost production, global storage and distribution will allow it to bring crude to market quicker than US shale-oil producers, and to manage an orderly drawdown in global inventories, which remains its raison d'être. As spare capacity is drawn down over the next couple of years, Brent and WTI forward curves will backwardate in in 1H21, as spare capacity and the slope of the forward curve are inversely related (lower spare capacity leads to higher backwardation). This will keep spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge (Chart of the Week). Parsimonious capital markets will continue to deny funding to all but the most profitable producers, which will continue to limit E+P ex-OPEC 2.0. ESG-focused investments will increasingly favor energy producers outside the oil and gas sector. As demand growth resumes, this will sow the seeds for higher oil prices in the mid-2020s. We will be updating our oil balances and 2H20 and 2021 forecasts – $46/bbl and $65/bbl for Brent in 2H20 and 2021 – next week. Feature While the hit to oil producers’ revenues from the demand destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has been severe – particularly for those states comprising OPEC 2.0, which are so heavily dependent on oil exports – it set the stage for the producer coalition to take control of global oil-price dynamics for the next couple of years. If the OPEC 2.0 coalition can maintain its production discipline, its member states could extend this control for years into the future, just as they are attempting to diversify their economies from this dependence on hydrocarbons. Once OPEC 2.0 member states manage to diversify a large part of their economies, the next optimal strategy will be to monetize their reserves and market share. Until then, it is our contention it is in these states' interest to have higher prices via gaining control of supply. The producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia today sits on some 7mm b/d of spare capacity that is a direct result of the global collapse in demand. This gives it a powerful lever to restrain the recovery of production growth in the US shales and elsewhere. Spare Capacity Turns The Tables On Shale Oil The enormous spare capacity now held by OPEC 2.0 – the majority of which is in KSA – allows the coalition to turn the tables on the US shales and producers ex-US Since its inception in late 2016, OPEC 2.0 has accommodated higher US shale production by reducing its output and then expanding it at a slower rate, as US production soared to meet domestic demand and, increasingly, global oil demand (Chart 2). OPEC 2.0 has been in operation since January 2017. Over that period, the coalition reduced its output growth ~ 0.37% for every 1% increase in crude and liquids output ex-OPEC 2.0. Within that adjustment, OPEC 2.0’s output falls by 0.16% for every 1% increase in US output, most of which was accounted for by the unprecedented growth of shale production.1 The enormous spare capacity now held by OPEC 2.0 – the majority of which is in KSA – allows the coalition to turn the tables on the US shales and producers ex-US (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekFalling OPEC 2.0 Spare Capacity Will Backwardate Brent Forward Curves
Falling OPEC 2.0 Spare Capacity Will Backwardate Brent Forward Curves
Falling OPEC 2.0 Spare Capacity Will Backwardate Brent Forward Curves
Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Accommodated US Shales
OPEC 2.0 Accommodated US Shales
OPEC 2.0 Accommodated US Shales
Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Would Benefit From Maintaining Spare Capacity At High Levels
OPEC 2.0 Would Benefit From Maintaining Spare Capacity At High Levels
OPEC 2.0 Would Benefit From Maintaining Spare Capacity At High Levels
Along with its low-cost production, global storage and distribution, this spare capacity allows OPEC 2.0 member states to bring crude to market quicker than US shale-oil producers as the need for additional supply becomes apparent. This was demonstrated earlier this year by KSA when it engaged in a brief market-share war with Russia following the breakdown of negotiations to extend OPEC 2.0’s production cuts.2 The spare capacity also allows the coalition to manage an orderly drawdown in global inventories, which remains its raison d'être, by making crude available out of production on short notice. As a result, Brent and WTI forward curves will backwardate in 1H21, keeping spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge. By keeping forward curves backwardated, the amount of revenue – i.e., price x quantity – hedged is limited by lower forward prices vs. spot prices. This limits the volume of oil a producer can bring to market in the future. Extending OPEC 2.0’s Low-Cost Spare Capacity In the near term, we expect OPEC 2.0’s production to come back faster and stronger than that of the US shales. The advantage OPEC 2.0 realizes from holding spare capacity – KSA in particular – can be extended at low cost going forward.3 And, if OPEC 2.0 communicates its intent to maintain spare capacity at higher levels than have prevailed recently, as was indicated last week by Aramco’s CEO, who announced KSA intends to raise capacity 1mm b/d to 13mm b/d, this could, at the margin, disincentivize investment in production ex-OPEC 2.0 in the future.4 Developing spare capacity for low-cost producers like Aramco is akin to building a portfolio of deep-in-the-money options to increase output quickly at minimal expense. These options can be exercised – i.e., output can be increased in short order at low cost – before competitors can mobilize to meet the market need. What makes this strategy credible is KSA’s capacity to surge production and put oil on the water in VLCCs at astonishing speed, as noted above vis-à-vis the breakdown in negotiations earlier this year in Vienna to extend production cuts. In the near term, we expect OPEC 2.0’s production to come back faster and stronger than that of the US shales (Chart 4). This will allow them to begin rebuilding revenues sooner as demand recovers (Chart 5). Any demand increase in excess of OPEC 2.0’s flowing supply – which could be restrained to force refiners to draw storage (Chart 6) – can be met with spare capacity and storage held or controlled by coalition members. Chart 4OPEC 2.0 Supply Recovers Faster Than US Shales
OPEC 2.0 Supply Recovers Faster Than US Shales
OPEC 2.0 Supply Recovers Faster Than US Shales
Chart 5Rate Of Demand Growth Will Exceed Supply Growth
Rate Of Demand Growth Will Exceed Supply Growth
Rate Of Demand Growth Will Exceed Supply Growth
Chart 6Forcing Inventories Lower
Forcing Inventories Lower
Forcing Inventories Lower
Capital-Market Parsimony Will Tighten Supply Equity investors have abandoned the oil and gas sector, as can be seen in the collapse in the percentage of the overall market accounted for by energy stocks (Chart 7). Chart 7Energy Share Of Overall Market Collapses
Energy Share Of Overall Market Collapses
Energy Share Of Overall Market Collapses
This no doubt is fueled by underperformance vs. technology stocks and other alternatives available to investors, and to a migration toward Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) investing (Chart 8). Indeed, as our colleagues in BCA’s Global Asset Allocation Strategy noted, “ESG-related equities have outperformed global benchmarks over the past two years, as well as during the recent equity selloff.” In addition, “green energy” investments account for half of the $300 billion G20 governments have allocated to clean energy policies and renewable energy programs as part of the COVID-19 fiscal stimulus deployed worldwide.5 Chart 8ESG Investment Surge
Oil's Next Bull Market, Courtesy Of COVID-19
Oil's Next Bull Market, Courtesy Of COVID-19
We believe this combination of a long-standing aversion to oil and gas equities and OPEC 2.0’s clear advantage in terms of its spare capacity, low-cost production and global storage and distribution networks will result in under-funding of new E+P, and will lead to a tighter market by the mid-2020s. This is particularly true for oil, which, is not confronting the competitive threat faced by natural gas vis-à-vis renewable energy. We will continue to develop these themes, and subject this thesis to fiery critique, borrowing from Kant’s methodology.6 Risks To Our View There are two major risks to the thesis developed here: OPEC 2.0 breaks down, as it came close to doing earlier this year (discussed above). A breakdown of the coalition would lead to lower E&P investment via very low oil prices that almost surely would occur if this were to happen. This would be a far more volatile path to higher prices, which also would discourage investment. A battery-technology breakthrough that makes electric vehicles viable – i.e., unsubsidized – competitors to internal-combustion engine technology powering the vast majority of transportation. We expect Brent and WTI forward curves to backwardate in 1H21, keeping spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0’s massive spare capacity resulting from COVID-19-induced demand destruction, its low-cost production and global storage and distribution network allow it to take control of crude-oil pricing dynamics over the next couple of years. These endowments also allow it to orchestrate an orderly drawdown in global inventories, which remains its raison d'être. As a result, we expect Brent and WTI forward curves to backwardate in 1H21, keeping spot prices realized by OPEC 2.0 states above the deferred prices at which shale producers hedge. Parsimonious capital markets and a preference for ESG-focused investment will increasingly favor energy producers outside the oil and gas sector. As demand growth resumes, this will sow the seeds for higher oil prices in the mid-2020s. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight JKM and TTF natural gas prices are up 49% and 27% over the past four weeks. The price spreads for December 2020 futures contracts between the US and Europe and Asia reached $1.6/MMBtu and $1.9/MMBtu this week. This will support the ongoing recovery in US LNG exports – which was briefly halted last month by Hurricane Laura – during the coming winter season (Chart 9). Separately, Libyan oil exports could be set to rebound following statements by General Haftar – the leader of Libyan National Army (LNA) – that he was committed to lifting the current blockade on the country’s exports, according to the US Embassy in Libya. Base Metals: Neutral China’s expansionary monetary and fiscal stimulus continued in August. The country’s total social financing (TSF) climbed past market expectations of CNY 2.59 trillion to CNY 3.58 trillion (Chart 10). This will provide further support to base metals prices – chiefly copper – over the coming months. The increase in TSF reflects the strong local government bond issuance and reinforces our view that the recovery in copper prices will be policy-driven – i.e. dictated by Chinese policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of total social financing funds in its economy with domestic supply adjusting to demand. Precious Metals: Neutral Palladium prices are up 7% since the beginning of September, supported by rebounding car sales and production in China. In August, vehicle sales grew by 12% y/y. We expect fiscal and credit stimulus in the country will allow car sales to continue growing y/y in the coming months. Ags/Softs: Underweight Soybean prices remain strongly bid, looking to re-test 2018 highs. The latest weekly USDA crop progress report indicated continued deterioration in the number of soybean crops in good or excellent condition. Investor sentiment is fueled by China maintaining its promise to import record amounts of U.S. agricultural goods this year, as part of the Phase 1 trade deal. Last week, the U.S. Agriculture Department reported that Chinese buyers booked deals to buy 664,000 tonnes of soybeans, the largest daily total since July 22. Chart 9LNG
LNG
LNG
Chart 10COPPER PRICES
COPPER PRICES
COPPER PRICES
Footnotes 1 These estimates were generated by an ARDL model used to determine the sensitivity of OPEC 2.0 total liquids output to non-OPEC 2.0 production and consumption. 2 For a recap of this market-share war, please see KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War, which we published March 19, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Briefly, KSA put millions of barrels on the water in a matter of months after Russia launched its market-share war at the end of OPEC’s March 2020 meeting in Vienna. This demonstrated an ability to mobilize supply and deliver it that greatly surpassed the eight-month time frame we estimate is required for shale production to reach the market after prices signal the need for additional crude. 3 Please see The $200 billion annual value of OPEC’s spare capacity to the global economy published by The King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC) July 17, 2018, for a discussion of the global impact of KSA’s spare capacity. 4 Please see Aramco CEO: Saudi Arabia to raise oil production capacity to 13 million barrels per day published by Oil & Gas World Magazine September 9, 2020. 5 Please see ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream, published by BCA’s Global Asset Allocation Strategy August 25, 2020. It is available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see O’Shea, James R. (2012), “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, An Introduction and Interpretation,” Acumen Publishing Limited, Durham, UK. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Highlights Oil-price volatility will remain subdued as markets correctly downgrade measurable risks on the supply side and upgrade financial conditions supporting demand (Chart of the Week). OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity – ~ 7mm b/d – presents the producer coalition with an opportunity to gain control of the evolution of global supply, and to restrain price volatility as global storage levels fall. Scaling production and delivery of a COVID-19 vaccine will be challenging, given limited global production and distribution capacity.1 This will slow down – but not derail – a recovery in demand. Lingering policy uncertainty will restrain a speedy return to pre-COVID-19 demand levels. Looming large are US election uncertainty and mounting geopolitical tensions. Our forecast attaches a significantly higher probability to Brent crude oil prices trading above $65/bbl next year, vs. the 15% probability the market is discounting in options for December 2021 delivery. Feature As OPEC 2.0 gains control of the evolution of the supply side, global fiscal and monetary policy accommodation will keep global financial conditions supportive of demand. Oil-price volatility will remain subdued, as market participants correctly price in continued OPEC 2.0 production discipline and cohesion within the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. In addition, the coalition’s substantial spare capacity – ~ 7mm b/d, most of which is in KSA – will, as we have argued elsewhere, present OPEC 2.0 with an opportunity to influence production moreso than in pre-COVID-19 markets: It will be able to respond to higher prices quicker than US shale oil producers, as was demonstrated in 2018 when KSA took its production from less than 10mm b/d to 11.1mm b/d between June and November (Chart 2). This means OPEC 2.0 can move quickly to capture economic rents, which will slow the recovery of the shales – already limited by parsimonious capital markets – and increase OPEC 2.0’s global market share (Chart 3).2 Chart of the WeekVol Falls As Known Unknowns Are Resolved
Vol Falls As Known Unknowns Are Resolved
Vol Falls As Known Unknowns Are Resolved
Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Quick Response Spare Capacity Advantage
OPEC 2.0 Quick Response Spare Capacity Advantage
OPEC 2.0 Quick Response Spare Capacity Advantage
Chart 3Ensures Production Restraint
Ensures Production Restraint
Ensures Production Restraint
As OPEC 2.0 gains control of the evolution of the supply side, global fiscal and monetary policy accommodation will keep global financial conditions supportive of demand (Chart 4). We expect the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, which will now focus on reviving the labor market and on achieving a 2% average PCE index core inflation rate, to weaken the USD, which also will be supportive of oil demand.3 Demand also will be supported by expectations – and the realization – of a COVID-19 vaccine, which is expected later this year or early next year. Limited production and logistical constraints will make it difficult to scale delivery of a vaccine globally until infrastructure is built out. This will restrain – but not derail – the recovery in demand we expect (Chart 5). Lingering policy uncertainty – particularly around the upcoming US elections and mounting geopolitical tensions – remain obstacles for the recovery. Chart 4Global Financial Conditions Will Support Demand
Global Financial Conditions Will Support Demand
Global Financial Conditions Will Support Demand
Chart 5Demand Expected To Recover Smartly
Demand Expected To Recover Smartly
Demand Expected To Recover Smartly
Well-managed supply, coupled with steadily improving demand already apparent in the data, will allow storage to draw over the next year without raising oil-price volatility, which typically occurs when spare capacity is low (Chart 6).4 Chart 6Falling Storage Will Not Spike Vol This Time
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Oil Vol Will Stay Lower Volatility bursts typically are presaged by increases in implied volatility as hedgers and speculators react to new information coming into the market. As the Chart of the Week indicates, a surge in volatility caused by either a supply or demand shock typically is followed by a more tranquil period after markets adjust to the shock. These volatility bursts typically are presaged by increases in implied volatility as hedgers and speculators react to new information coming into the market.5 Following the resolution of the elevated risk conditions prompting the increased option trading, historical volatility, which is calculated using the annualized returns of the underlying assets, typically increases then tails off, as can be seen in the experience of 2019-20 – i.e., pre- and intra-COVID-19 markets (Chart 7). Chart 7Implied Vol Typically Leads Realized Vol
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Ahead of meetings of OPEC and its Ministerial Monitoring Subcommittee, internet searches move upward along with implied volatilities. Increases in oil-price volatility also are accompanied by heightened interest in news specific to oil markets or OPEC. Market participants usually expect OPEC countries will adjust output as needed following swift changes in underlying global demand – e.g., the COVID-19 demand shock – and non-OPEC supply. Ahead of meetings of OPEC and its Ministerial Monitoring Subcommittee, internet searches move upward along with implied volatilities in expectation of supply adjustments from OPEC (Chart 8). The relationship actually has strengthened since 2014, following OPEC’s market-share war and the ensuing OPEC 2.0 agreement to drain the accumulated global oil inventories. Since its formation, OPEC 2.0 has played a crucial role in balancing oil markets. This makes every meeting highly relevant for markets. Moreover, when oil prices move abruptly, internet searches for “OPEC” or “OPEC MEETING” generally move higher as investors seek guidance from the producer coalition to assess where prices will go next. High levels of speculation can affect oil price volatility. Hence, the higher the interest in oil prices from retail and institutional investors, the larger the increase in implied volatility ahead of these meetings.6 Chart 8Implied Vol Follows Google Search Activity
Implied Vol Follows Google Search Activity
Implied Vol Follows Google Search Activity
Implied Volatility And Efficient Markets Implied volatility, like prices discovered in competitive trading markets, impounds all information available to market participants buying and selling options. As it is an estimate of the standard deviations of returns for the underlying asset against which options are traded, it can be used to estimate the probability market participants assign to the realization of a particular price outcome (Chart 9). As an be seen in Chart 9, the market is pricing more in line with the US EIA’s expectation Brent prices will average $50/bbl next year, as opposed to our estimate of $65/bbl. Based on the settlement values for prices and volatilities on Monday, the December 2021 Brent futures contract has a 15% probability of expiring above $65/bbl (Chart 10). Chart 9Markets Pricing To EIA Assumptions
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Chart 10BCA Price Forecasts
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Investment Implications Our forecast attaches a higher probability to Brent crude oil prices trading above $65/bbl next year, vs. the 15% probability the market currently is discounting in options for December 2021 delivery. Our econometric modeling gives us a higher expected value for Brent prices next year than what markets currently are pricing in, based on our assessment of the distributions derived from option implied volatilities. This means the cost of gaining exposure to the upside in the Brent market next year is low, relative to our expected value, as vol drives option prices. We remain long 2H21 Brent vs. short 2H22 Brent given our expectation. We also will be looking for opportunities to get long call options or option spreads in 2H21. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity of ~ 7mm b/d (OPEC + Russia and its allies spare capacity), will allow it to gain control of global supply growth, and to manage price volatility as global storage levels fall. Our forecast attaches a higher probability to Brent crude oil prices trading above $65/bbl next year, vs. the 15% probability the market currently is discounting in options for December 2021 delivery. We remain long Brent exposure next year and look for opportunities to buy calls and call spreads. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent prices remain in the $40/bbl to $46/bbl range in which it had been trading since mid-June. The Fed’s shift to an average inflation targeting regime makes inflation expectations an increasingly important variable to its monetary policy decisions. This implies commodities – oil in particular – will have a larger effect on interest rates due to their crucial influence on market-based inflation expectations (Chart 11). Base Metals: Neutral The LMEX and copper prices rose 5% and 6%, respectively, in August, supported by rising global manufacturing PMIs. At first glance, China’s manufacturing PMI disappointed last month as it fell to 51 from 51.1 in July. However, the underlying recovery in its industrial sector remains in place according to our China Investment strategists. The New Orders and Export Orders components of the index increased, indicating the demand-side of the economy is picking up. Metals’ prices also continued being supported by further declines in the US dollar index. The USD index ended the month of August below the upward trend line that has supported its lows since 2011.7 Precious Metals: Neutral Gold and silver prices are up 2% and 5%, respectively, since Jerome Powell’s Jackson Hole speech. According to our US and Global Bond strategists “The official shift to an average inflation targeting regime represents a massive structural break relative to how the Fed conducted monetary policy in the past.”8 Consequently, precious metals will benefit from a lower dollar and a prolonged period of depressed interest rates. The Fed’s decision also increased gold’s attractiveness as an inflation hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight Soybean prices have rallied to their highest level since June 2018 (Chart 12). Crops were affected by droughty weather in the Midwest during August. The Crop Progress report listed 66% of soybeans in good or excellent condition, compared with 73% of soybeans in those categories at the beginning of the month. Strong demand from China has been supportive of prices. According to the data, for the 2019/20 marketing year, US soybean exports to China are higher than last year, but still account for only half of pre-trade war exports in volume terms. Outstanding sales to China booked for the 2020/21 marketing year are the highest since 2012/13. This is a clear indication of continued commitment to the phase one trade deal. Finally, the weak USD has been yet another tailwind for soybean prices. Chart 11Rising Oil Prices Will Revive Inflation Expectations
Rising Oil Prices Will Revive Inflation Expectations
Rising Oil Prices Will Revive Inflation Expectations
Chart 12Soybeans Prices Rising
Soybeans Prices Rising
Soybeans Prices Rising
Footnotes 1 Please see The latest in the global race for a COVID-19 vaccine published by the American Enterprise Institute August 25, 2020, which notes that 29 of the 167 vaccines under development are in human trials. Six of these candidates are in Phase III trials. 2 This outsized spare capacity also gives KSA a potent tool in enforcing production discipline within the OPEC 2.0 coalition, which was demonstrated earlier this year in the brief market-share war initiated by Russia following the breakdown in negotiations to extend the coalition’s production cuts. Please see KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War, which we published March 19, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 For an excellent discussion of the Fed’s policy change, which was announced by Chair Jerome Powell last week, please see A New Dawn For US Monetary Policy, a Special Report published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy and US Bond Strategy on September 1, 2020. It is available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 For our latest view on oil fundamentals, please see The Oil Markets' Knife Edge, which we published last week. 5 Implied volatility is the estimated standard deviation of returns that solves an option pricing model. This empirical fact was explored in depth in Ogawa, Yoshiki, (1989), “Market Expectations Evident In Crude Oil Futures Options Volatility Measures Since The Opening Of The Option Trading In November 1986,” IFAC Energy Systems. Management and Economics, Tokyo, Japan, pp. 337-341. See also Feedback Loop: Spec Positioning & Oil Price Volatility, which we published May 10, 2018; and Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009), “Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty,” published by the US EIA. 6 Please see Campos, I., Cortazar, G., and Reyes, T. (2017), "Modeling and predicting oil VIX: Internet search volume versus traditional variables," Energy Economics, Elsevier, 66(C): 194-204. 7 Please see BCA Research Daily Insights A Worrying Month of August For The Dollar published August 31, 2020. 8 Please see A New Dawn For US Monetary Policy, a Special Report published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy and US Bond Strategy on September 1, 2020. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Lower Vol As OPEC 2.0 Gains Control
Highlights President Trump is making a comeback in our quantitative election model. An upgrade from our 35% odds of a Trump win is on the horizon, pending a fiscal relief bill. The Fed’s pursuit of “maximum employment,” the necessities of the pandemic response, fiscal largesse, a US shift toward protectionism, and the strategic need to counter China will pervade either candidate’s presidency. A Democratic “clean sweep” would add insult to injury for value stocks, but these stocks don’t have much more downside relative to growth stocks. Trump’s tariffs, or Biden’s taxes, will hit the outperformance of Big Tech, as will the recovery of inflation expectations. Feature More than at any time in recent US history, voters believe that the 2020 election is definitive in charting two distinct courses for the country (Chart 1). No doubt 2020 is an epic election with far-reaching implications. However, from an investment point of view, a Trump and a Biden administration have more in common than consensus holds. Chart 1An Epic Choice About The US’s Future
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
The US political parties have finalized their policy platforms, giving investors greater clarity about what policies the parties will try to implement over the next four years.1 While the presidential pick is critical for American foreign and trade policy, the Senate is just as important as the president for US equity sectors. The only dramatic changes would come if the Democrats achieved a clean sweep of government – yet this result is likely as things stand today (Chart 2). Investors should prepare. It would prolong the suffering of value stocks relative to growth stocks by hitting the US health care and energy sectors hard. Chart 2“Blue Wave” Still The Likeliest Scenario
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
The State Of Play A “Blue Wave” is still the likeliest outcome – and that’s where the stark policy differences emerge. The race is tightening. Our quantitative election model looks at state leading indicators, margins of victory in 2016, the range of the president’s approval rating, and a “time for change” variable that gives the incumbent party an advantage if it has not been in the White House for eight years. The model now shows Florida as a toss-up state with a 50% chance of flipping back into the Republican fold (Chart 3). Chart 3Florida Now 50/50 In Our Election Quant Model – 45% Chance Of Trump Win
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
As long as the economy continues recovering between now and November 3, Florida should flip and Trump should go from 230 Electoral College votes to 259. One other state – plus one of the stray electoral votes from either Nebraska or Maine, which Trump is like to get – would deliver him the Oval Office again. The model says that Trump has a 45% chance of victory, up from 42% last month. Subjectively, we are more pessimistic than the model. Pandemic, recession, and social unrest have taken a toll on voters and unemployment is nearly three times as high as when Trump’s approval rating peaked in March. Consumer confidence is weak, albeit making an effort to trough. Voters take their cue from the jobs market more than the stock market, although the stock rally is certainly helpful for the incumbent. We await the completion of a new fiscal relief bill in Congress before upgrading Trump to closer to our model’s odds and the market consensus of 45%. Another Social Lockdown? COVID-19 subsiding in the US a boon for Trump in final two months of campaign. The first concern for the next president is COVID-19. On the surface Trump and Biden are diametrically opposed. President Trump is obviously disinclined to impose a new round of lockdowns and the Republican platform calls for normalizing the economy in 2021. By contrast, the Democrats claim they will contain the virus even at a high economic cost. Biden says he will be willing to shut down the entire US economy again if scientists deem it necessary.2 There is apparently political will for new draconian lockdowns – but it is not likely to be sustained after the election unless the next wave of the virus is overwhelming (Chart 4). Biden will need to be cognizant of the economy if he is to succeed. Chart 4Biden Has Some Support For Another Lockdown
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
However, it is doubtful that Trump would refuse to lock down the economy in his second term if his advisers told him it was necessary. After all, it is Trump, not Biden, who implemented the lockdowns this year. Arguably he reopened the economy too soon with the election in mind. But if that is true, then it isn’t an issue for his second term, since he can’t run for president a third time. This is a theme we often come back to: reelection removes a critical impediment to Trump’s policies in a second term as opposed to his first. Bottom Line: The coronavirus outbreak and the country’s top experts will decide if new lockdowns are warranted, regardless of president, but the bar for a complete shutdown is high. COVID-19 is subsiding in both the US and in countries like Sweden that never imposed draconian lockdowns (Chart 5). Still, given that the equity market has recovered to pre-COVID highs, investors would be wise to hedge against a bad outcome this winter. Chart 5Pandemic Subsiding In US And ‘Laissez-Faire’ Sweden
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Maximum Employment The monetary policy backdrop will be ultra-dovish regardless of the presidency. The Fed is now pursuing average inflation targeting and “maximum employment,” according to Fed Chairman Jay Powell, speaking virtually on August 27 at the Kansas City Fed’s annual Jackson Hole summit. This means that if Trump wins, he will not have to fight running battles with Powell over rate hikes. The monetary backdrop for either president will be more reminiscent of that faced by President Obama from 2009-12 – extremely accommodative. It is possible that Trump’s “growth at all costs” attitude could lead to speculative bubbles that the Fed would need to prick. Already the NASDAQ 100 is off the charts. Elements of froth reminiscent of the dotcom bubble era are mushrooming (Chart 6). Nobody has any idea yet how the Fed will square its maximum employment mission with the need to prevent financial instability, but it will err on the side of low rates. Chart 6Frothy NDX
Frothy NDX
Frothy NDX
Chart 7The Mother Of All V-Shapes
The Mother Of All V-Shapes
The Mother Of All V-Shapes
Biden will be more likely to tamp down financial excesses through executive orders – or to deter excesses through taxes if he controls the Senate. But there is no reason the executive branch would be more vigilant than the Fed itself. Higher inflation will push real rates down and weaken the dollar almost regardless of who wins the presidency. Trump’s trade wars – and any major conflict with China – would tend to prop up the greenback relative to Biden’s less hawkish, more multilateral, approach. But either way the combination of debt monetization, twin deficits, and global economic recovery spells downside for the dollar. This in turn spells upside for the S&P500 and inflation-friendly (or deflation-unfriendly) equity sectors in the longer run (Chart 7). Fiscal Largesse The next president will struggle with a massive fiscal hangover resembling late 1940s. The Fed’s new strategy ensures that fiscal policy will prove the driving factor in the US macro outlook. Regardless of who wins the election, the budget deficit will fall from its extreme heights amid the COVID-19 crisis over the next four years (Chart 8). If government spending falls faster than private activity recovers, overall demand will shrink and the economy will be foisted back into recession. Chart 8Budget Deficit Will Decrease As Economy Normalizes
Budget Deficit Will Decrease As Economy Normalizes
Budget Deficit Will Decrease As Economy Normalizes
The deep 1948-49 recession occurred because of the government’s climbing down from wartime levels of spending (Chart 9). Premature fiscal tightening would jeopardize the 2021 recovery. Yet neither candidate is a fiscal hawk. Trump is a big spender; Biden is a Democrat. The House Democrats will control the purse strings. Republican senators, the only hawkish actors left, are not all that hawkish in practice. They agreed with Trump and the Democrats in passing bipartisan spending blowouts from 2017-20. They will likely conclude another such deal just before the election. Chart 9Sharp Deficit Correction Would Jeopardize Recovery
Sharp Deficit Correction Would Jeopardize Recovery
Sharp Deficit Correction Would Jeopardize Recovery
So Trump would maintain high levels of spending without raising taxes; Biden would spend even more, albeit with higher taxes. Table 1Biden Would Raise $4 Trillion In Revenue Over Ten Years
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
On paper, Biden would add a net ~$2 trillion to the US budget deficit over ten years, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. But these are loose costings. Nobody knows anything until actual legislation is produced. The risk to spending levels lies to the upside until the employment-to-population ratio improves (Chart 10). Trump’s net effect on the deficit is even harder to estimate because the Republican Party platform is so vague. What we know is that Trump couldn’t care less about deficits. Back of the envelope, if Congress permanently cut the employee side of the payroll tax for workers who earn less than $8,000 per month, as Trump has suggested, the deficit would increase by roughly $4.8 trillion over ten years.3 Table 2Biden Would Spend $6 Trillion In Programs Over Ten Years
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Chart 10Massive Labor Slack Will Encourage Government Spending
Massive Labor Slack Will Encourage Government Spending
Massive Labor Slack Will Encourage Government Spending
House Democrats will hardly agree to any major new tax cuts – and certainly not gigantic ones that would “raid Social Security.” This accusation will be popular and Trump will want to avoid it during the campaign as well – his 2020 platform does not explicitly mention the payroll tax. Many of Trump’s other proposals would focus on extending the Tax Cut and Jobs Act. For example, it is possible that Trump could extend the full expensing of companies’ depreciation costs for capital purchases, set to expire in 2022 and 2026, to the tune of $419 billion over ten years.4 Thus the overall contribution of government spending to GDP growth will be higher than in the recent past. This trend was established prior to COVID (Chart 11). The rise of populism supports this prediction, as Trump has always insisted he will never cut mandatory (entitlement) spending – a major change to Republican orthodoxy now enshrined in its policy platform. Chart 11Government Role To Increase In America
Government Role To Increase In America
Government Role To Increase In America
Chart 12No Cuts To Defense Likely Either
No Cuts To Defense Likely Either
No Cuts To Defense Likely Either
Meanwhile Biden is not only rejecting spending cuts but also coopting the profligate spending agenda of the left wing of his party. Practically speaking, social spending cannot be cut by Trump – and yet Biden cannot cut defense spending much either, since competition with Russia and China is growing (Chart 12). The common thread in both party platforms is fiscal largesse at a time of monetary dovishness, i.e. reflation. Other Common Denominators Market is overrating Biden’s China friendliness. Both Trump and Biden promise to build infrastructure, energize domestic manufacturing, and lower pharmaceutical prices. The two candidates are competing vociferously over who will bring more American manufacturing jobs home. President Trump won the Republican nomination in 2016 partly because he stole the Democrats’ thunder on “fair trade” over “free trade.” Biden’s agenda is effusive on these Trump (and Bernie Sanders) themes – his party sees an existential risk in the Rust Belt if it cannot steal that thunder back. The manufacturing agenda centers on China-bashing. China runs the largest trade surplus with the US, it has a negative image in the public eye, and it has alarmed the military-industrial complex by rising to the status of a peer strategic competitor over the technologies of tomorrow. Where Trump once spoke of a “border adjustment tax,” or a Reciprocal Trade Act, Biden speaks openly of a carbon border tax: “the Biden Administration will impose carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations.”5 China’s coal-guzzling economy would obviously be the prime target. It is true that Biden will seek to engage China and reset the relationship. He will probably maintain Trump’s tariff levels or even slap a token new tariff, but he will then settle down for a two-track policy of dialogue with China and coalition-building with the democracies. The result may be a reprieve from strategic tensions for a year or so. Investors are exaggerating Biden’s positive impact on China relations, judging by the correlation of China-exposed US equities with the Democrats’ odds of winning. The truth is that Biden will maintain the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia,” which was about countering China. The secular power struggle will persist and China-exposed stocks, especially tech, will be the victims (Chart 13). Chart 13Market Over-Optimistic About Biden Vis-à-Vis China
Market Over-Optimistic About Biden Vis-à-Vis China
Market Over-Optimistic About Biden Vis-à-Vis China
Senate election will likely tip with White House – but checks and balances are best for equities. Control of the Senate will determine whether the big differences between the two candidates materialize. Biden can’t raise taxes without the Senate; Trump can’t wage trade wars of choice as Congress is supreme over commerce and could take his magic tariff wand away from him. Trump can use executive orders to pare back immigration, but he cannot force the House Democrats to approve a southern border wall. In fact, he dropped “the Wall” from his agenda this time around. (It didn’t help that former Trump adviser Steve Bannon has been arrested for allegedly scamming people out of their money to pay for a wall.) Biden will be far looser on immigration than Trump and the reviving economy will attract foreign workers. But the Obama administration showed that during times of high unemployment, even Democrats have a limit to the influx they will allow (Chart 14). Meanwhile Biden can use executive orders to impose aspects of his version of the Green New Deal, but he cannot pass carbon pricing laws or other sweeping climate policy if Republican Senators are there to stop him. For this reason, a divided government is likely to produce three cheers from the markets. The single most market-positive scenario is Biden plus a Republican Senate, which suggests a moderation of the trade war and yet no new taxes. Second best would be Trump with a Democratic Congress that would clip his wings on tariffs, but enable him to veto any anti-market laws. The stock market’s performance to date is more reminiscent of a “gridlock” election outcome, in which the two parties split the executive and legislative branches of government in some way, as opposed to a unified single-party government (Chart 15). Chart 14Immigration Faces Limits Even Under Democrats
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Chart 15Stock Market Expects Gridlock?
Stock Market Expects Gridlock?
Stock Market Expects Gridlock?
Investors should not be complacent, however, because the political polling so far suggests that the Senate race is on a knife’s edge. The balance of power will tilt whichever way the heavily nationalized, heavily polarized White House race tilts (Chart 16). A “blue sweep” is still a fairly high probability. Indeed a Biden win will most likely produce a Democratic sweep while a Trump win will produce the status quo. Chart 16Tight Senate Races Will Turn On White House Race
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Biden’s Agenda After A Blue Sweep Democrats would remove the filibuster – another big difference in outcomes. Biden is more likely to benefit from Democratic control of Congress if he wins. He is also more likely to rely on his top advisers and the party apparatus. Hence the Democratic platform matters more than the Republican platform in this cycle. Investors should set as their base case that a new president will largely succeed in passing his top one or two priorities. Less conviction is warranted after the initial rush of policymaking, as political capital will fall and the economic context will change. But in the honeymoon period, a president can get a lot done, especially if his party controls Congress. Investors would have been wrong to bet against George W. Bush’s Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act (2001), Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act (2009), or Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act (2017). Yet they could never have known that COVID-19 would strike in Trump’s fourth year and overturn the very best macroeconomic forecasts. Critically, if Democrats take the Senate, our base case is that they will remove the filibuster, i.e. the use of debate to block legislation. Biden has suggested that he would look at doing so. President Obama recently linked it to racist Jim Crow laws of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, making it hard for party members to defend keeping the filibuster. Senate minority leader Charles Schumer (D, NY) has signaled a willingness to change the Senate rules if he becomes majority leader. Removing the filibuster would change the game of US lawmaking, enabling the Senate to pass laws with a simple majority of 51 votes – i.e. 50 plus a Democratic vice president. This is entirely within reach. While a handful of moderate Democratic senators may oppose such a dramatic move at first, the Democratic Party leadership will corral its members once it faces the reality of the 60-vote requirement blocking its agenda. The party will remember the last time it took power after a national crisis, in 2009, and the frustrations that the filibuster caused despite having at that time a much stronger Senate majority than it can possibly have in 2021. Populism is rife in the US and it is all about shattering norms. Moreover, the filibuster has already been eroding over the past two administrations (vide judicial appointments). Revoking it would enable Democrats to pass a lot more ambitious legislation, and many more laws, than in previous administrations. This is important because Biden’s agenda is more left-wing than some investors realize given his history as a traditional Democrat. In order to solidify the increasingly powerful progressive faction of his party, symbolized by Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, Biden created task forces to merge his agenda with that of Sanders. Sanders and his fellow progressive Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts have much more influence in the party than their 35% share of the Democratic primary vote implies. The youth wing of the party shares their enthusiasm for Big Government. Here are the key structural changes that matter to investors: Offering public health insurance – A public health option will benefit from government subsidies and thus outcompete private options, reducing their pricing power. The lowest income earners will be enrolled in the program automatically, rapidly boosting its size (Chart 17). Enabling Medicare to negotiate drug prices – Medicare’s drug spending is equivalent to almost 45% of Big Pharma’s total sales. Enabling this government program to bargain with companies over prices will push down prices substantially. However, the sector’s performance is not really tied to election dynamics because President Trump is also pledging to cap drug prices – it is an effect of populism (Chart 18). Doubling the federal minimum wage – The wage will rise from $7.25 to $15 per hour, hitting low margin franchises and small businesses alike. Chart 17Health Care Gives Back Gains After Biden Nomination
Health Care Gives Back Gains After Biden Nomination
Health Care Gives Back Gains After Biden Nomination
Chart 18Big Pharma Faces Onslaught From Both Parties
Big Pharma Faces Onslaught From Both Parties
Big Pharma Faces Onslaught From Both Parties
Eliminating carbon emissions from power generation by 2035 – Countries are already rapidly shifting from coal to natural gas, but the Biden agenda would attempt to move rapidly away from fossil fuels completely (Chart 19). If legislation passes it will revolutionize the energy sector. Prohibiting “right to work” laws – This is only one example of a sweeping pro-labor agenda that would involve an extensive regulatory push and possibly new laws. New laws would prevent states from passing “right to work” laws that give workers more freedoms to eschew labor unions. The removal of the filibuster makes this possible. Moreover Biden will be aggressive in using executive orders to implement a pro-labor agenda, going further than Bill Clinton or Barack Obama attempted to do in recognition of the party’s shift to the left of the political spectrum. Chart 19Blue Sweep Would Bring Climate Policy Onslaught
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Trump Versus Biden: Tariffs Versus Taxes
Subsidizing college tuition and low-income housing. US housing subsidies currently make up 25% of domestic private investment in housing and Biden’s government would roll out a significant expansion of these programs. Granting Washington, DC statehood – This is unlikely to happen as two-thirds of Americans are against it. But without the filibuster, Democrats could conceivably railroad it through. Trump’s Agenda Trump’s signature is tariffs – and globally exposed stocks know it. If Trump wins, his domestic legislative agenda will be stymied, other than laws directly aimed at fighting the pandemic and reviving the economy. As mentioned, Trump is unlikely to pass a law building a wall on the southern border. It is conceivable that Trump could pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill with House Democrats, but that is not a priority on the platform and Trump would have to pivot toward compromise. That would depend on Democrats winning the Senate or forcing him to negotiate with the House. Hence a Trump second term will mostly focus on foreign and trade policy. The Republican platform is aggressive on economic decoupling from China, which is ranked third behind tax cuts and pandemic stockpiles.6 Trump, vindicated on protectionism, would likely go after other trade surplus nations. The Chinese could offer some concessions, producing a Phase Two deal early in his second term to avoid sweeping tariffs and encourage him to wage trade war against Europe (Chart 20). Chart 20Trump = Global Trade War
Trump = Global Trade War
Trump = Global Trade War
Trump’s foreign policy would consist of reducing US commitments abroad. Withdrawing from Afghanistan and other scattered conflicts is hardly a game changer. Shifting some forces back from Germany and especially South Korea is far more consequential. It will create power vacuums. But the US is not likely to abandon the allies wholesale. Chart 21Defense Stocks Will Get Wind In Sails
Defense Stocks Will Get Wind In Sails
Defense Stocks Will Get Wind In Sails
Trump has moderated his positions on NATO and other defense priorities over his first term. It is possible he could revert back to his original preferences in a second term, however, so global power vacuums and geopolitical multipolarity will remain a major source of risk for global investors. He will probably also succeed in maintaining large defense spending, despite a Democratic House, given the reality of great power struggle with China and Russia. Geopolitical multipolarity means that defense stocks will continue to enjoy a tailwind from demand both at home and abroad (Chart 21). Investment Takeaways Energy sector struggles most under Democrats. Biden and Trump are both offering reflationary agendas. Where the two agendas diverge most notably, the impacts are largely market-negative – Trump via tariffs, Biden via taxes. The current signals from the market suggest that growth stocks benefit more from a Democratic clean sweep than value stocks (bottom panel, Chart 22). However, the general collapse in value stocks versus growth suggests that there is not much more downside even if the Democrats win (top panel, Chart 22), especially if the 10-year yield rises, as we have been writing in recent research: a selloff in the bond market is the last QE5 puzzle-piece to fall into place. Fed policy, fiscal largess, and the dollar’s decline will support a global cyclical recovery and downtrodden value stocks regardless of the president. The difference is that Biden would slow their relative recovery by piling regulatory burdens on energy as well as health care, which in the US context are a value play. As a reminder, and contrary to popular belief, health care stocks are the largest constituent of the S&P value index with a market cap weight of 21%.7 Trump’s populist “growth at any cost” and deregulatory agenda would persist in a second term and clearly favor value. Yet, if his trade wars get out of hand, they would also weigh on the recovery of these stocks. The difference is that tech stocks are not priced for a Phase Two trade war. If Trump wins it will be a rude awakening. Not to mention that Trump and populist Republicans will seek to target the tech sector for what is increasingly flagrant favoritism in political and cultural debates. Democrats are much more clearly aligned with tech. While they have ambitions of reining in the tech giants as part of the progressive drive against corporate power writ large, Joe Biden will struggle to take on Big O&G, Big Pharma, Big Insurance, and Big Tech at the same time in a single four-year term. The logical conclusion is that he will spare Silicon Valley, which maintained a powerful alliance with the Obama administration. He cannot afford to betray his progressive base when it comes to climate policy, so the Obama alliance with domestic O&G producers will suffer. Tech will face regulatory risks but they will not be existential. Chart 22Not Much Downside Left For Value Stocks
Not Much Downside Left For Value Stocks
Not Much Downside Left For Value Stocks
The fact that the final version of the Democratic Party platform did not contain a section on removing federal subsidies for fossil fuels is merely rhetorical.8 The one clear market reaction from this election cycle is the energy sector’s abhorrence of Democratic policies (Chart 23). The difference is that energy is priced for it whereas tech is priced for perfection. Chart 23Energy Sector Loses From Blue Sweep
Energy Sector Loses From Blue Sweep
Energy Sector Loses From Blue Sweep
Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In this report we work from the latest policy platforms available. See “Trump Campaign Announces President Trump’s 2nd Term Agenda: Fighting For You!” Trump Campaign, donaldjtrump.com ; and the draft “2020 Democratic Party Platform” Democratic National Committee, demconvention.com. 2 Bill Barrow, “Biden Says he’d shut down economy if scientists recommended,” Associated Press, August 23, 2020, abcnews.go.com. 3 See Seth Hanlon and Christian E. Weller, “Trump’s Plan To Defund Social Security,” Center for American Progress, August 12, 2020, americanprogress.org; “The 2020 Annual Report Of The Board Of Trustrees Of The Federal Old-Age And Survivors Insurance And Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds,” Social Security Administration, April 22, 2020, ssa.gov. 4 Erica York, “Details And Analysis Of The CREATE JOBS Act,” Tax Foundation, July 30, 2020, taxfoundation.org. 5 See “The Biden Plan For A Clean Energy Revolution And Environmental Justice,” Biden Campaign, joebiden.com. 6 A Democratic Congress could take back the constitutional power over commerce that it delegated to the president back in the 1960s-70s, limiting Trump’s ability to wage trade war. If Republicans hold the Senate, they still might restrain Trump’s protectionism, as they did with his threatened Mexico tariffs in early 2019, but they would not do so until he has already taken a major disruptive action. 7 See “S&P 500 Value,” S&P Dow Jones Indices, spglobal.com. 8 Andrew Prokop, “The Democratic Platform, Explained,” Vox, August 18, 2020, vox.com.