Energy

Highlights Venezuela's economic implosion accelerated with the oil price crash. The petrodollar collapse is suffocating consumption as well as oilfield investment, creating a "death spiral" of falling production. The military has already begun assuming more powers as Maduro becomes increasingly vulnerable, and will likely take over before long. OPEC's cuts may help Maduro delay, but not avoid, deposition. Civil unrest/revolution could cause a disruption in oil production, profoundly impacting oil markets. Feature The wheels on the bus go round and round, Round and round, Round and round ... The story of Venezuela's decline under the revolutionary socialist government of deceased dictator Hugo Chavez is well known. The country went from being one of the richest South American states to one of the poorest and from being reliant on oil exports to being entirely dependent on them (Chart 1). The straw that broke the back of Chavismo was the end of the global commodity bull market in 2014 (Chart 2). Widespread shortages of essential goods, mass protests, opposition political victories, and a slide into overt military dictatorship have ensued.1 Chart 1Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Chart 2Commodity Bull Market Ended Commodity Bull Market Ended Commodity Bull Market Ended The acute social unrest at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 raises the question of whether Venezuela will cause global oil-supply disruptions that boost prices this year.2 One of the reasons we have been bullish oil prices is the fact that the world has little spare production capacity (Chart 3). This means that political turmoil in Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, or other oil-producing countries could take enough supply out of the market to accelerate the global rebalancing process and drawdown of inventories, pushing up prices. Image Image The longer oil prices stay below the budget break-even levels of the politically unstable petro-states (mostly $80/bbl and above), the more likely some of them will be to fail. Venezuela, with a break-even of $350/bbl, has long been one of our prime candidates (Chart 4).3 Venezuela is on the verge of total regime collapse and a massive oil production shutdown. This is not a low-probability outcome. However, the fact that the military is already taking control of the situation, combined with our belief that OPEC and Russia will continue cutting oil production to shore up prices, suggest that the regime may be able to limp along. Therefore a continuation of the gradual decline in oil output is more likely than a sharp cutoff this year. Investors should stay short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds and be aware of the upside risks to global oil prices. A Brief History Of PDVSA State-owned oil company PDVSA is the lifeblood of Venezuela. It once was a well-run company that allowed foreign investment with a reasonable government take, but now it is shut off from direct foreign investment. In 1996-1997, prior to Chavez being elected in late 1998, Venezuela was a rampant cheater on its OPEC quota, producing 3.1-3.3 MMB/d versus a quota of ~2.4 MMB/d in 1996 and ~2.8 in 1997. The oil-price crash that started in late 1997 and bottomed in early 1999 (remember the Economist's "Drowning In Oil" cover story on March 4, 1999 predicting $5 per barrel crude prices?) was a critical event propelling the rise of Chavez (Chart 5). One of the planks in Chavez's platform was that Venezuela had to stop cheating on OPEC quotas because that strategy had helped cause the oil-price decline and subsequent economic misery. Without the oil-price crash, Chavez would not have had such strong public support in the run-up to the 1998 elections, which he won. Chavez did in fact rein in Venezuela's production to 2.8 MMB/d in 1999, which had a positive impact on oil prices and reinforced OPEC. In 2002 and 2003, there were two labor strikes at PDVSA and a two-day coup that displaced Chavez. When Chavez returned to power, he fired 18,000 experienced workers at PDVSA and replaced them with political loyalists. Since then, the total number of employees at PDVSA has swelled from about 46,000 people in 2002, when PDVSA was producing 3.2 MMB/d, to about 140,000 people today, when it is producing slightly below 2 MMB/d. Average oil revenue per employee was over $500,000/person in 2002 at $20 oil, versus about $100,000/person today at $50 oil. Suffice it to say, PDVSA is stuffed to the gills with political patronage, and a strike or a revolution inside PDVSA against President Nicolas Maduro is unlikely. However, if opposition forces manage to seize control of government, the Chavistas in control of PDVSA may attempt to shut down operations to deprive them of oil revenues and blackmail them into a better deal going forward. Chart 5Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Image Venezuela is estimated to have the world's largest proved oil reserves at about 300 billion barrels (Chart 6). In addition, there are 1.2-1.4 trillion barrels estimated to rest in heavy-oil deposits in the Orinoco Petroleum Belt (at the mouth of the Orinoco river) that is difficult to extract and has barely been touched. Chart 7Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster These reserves are somewhat similar to Canada's oil sands. It is estimated that 300-500 billion barrels are technically recoverable. In the early 2000s, there were four international consortiums involved in developing these reserves: Petrozuata (COP-50%), Cerro Negro (XOM), Sincor (TOT, STO) and Hamaca (COP-40%). However, Chavez nationalized the Orinoco projects in 2007, paying the international oil companies (IOCs) a pittance. XOM and COP contested the taking and "sued" Venezuela at the World Bank. XOM sought $14.7 billion and won an arbitrated decision for a $1.6 billion settlement in 2014. Venezuela continues to litigate the case and the amount awarded to investors has apparently been reduced by a recent ruling. Over the past decade, as Venezuelan industry declined due to dramatic anti-free market laws, including aggressive fixed exchange rates absurdly out of keeping with black market rates, the government nationalized more and more private assets in order to get the wealth they needed to maintain profligate spending policies. The underlying point of these policies is to garner support from low-income Venezuelans, the Chavista political base. In addition to the Orinoco nationalization, the government appropriated equipment and drilling rigs from several oilfield service companies that had stopped working on account of not being properly paid. In 2009, Petrosucre (a subsidiary of PDVSA) appropriated the ENSCO 69 jackup rig, although the rig was returned in 2010. In 2010, the Venezuelan government seized 11 high-quality land rigs from Helmerich & Payne, resulting in nearly $200MM of losses for the company. These rigs were "easy" for Venezuela to appropriate because they did not require much private-sector expertise to operate. As payment failures continued, relationships with the country's remaining contractors continued to be strained. In 2013, Schlumberger (SLB), the largest energy service company in the world, threatened to stop working for PDVSA due to lack of payment in hard currency. PDVSA paid them in depreciating Venezuelan bolivares, but tightened controls over conversion into U.S. dollars. Some accounts receivables were partially converted into interest-bearing government notes. Promises for payment were made and broken. SLB has taken over $600MM of write-downs for the collapse of the bolivar (Haliburton, HAL, has taken ~$150MM in losses). With accounts receivable balances now stratospherically high at approximately $1.2 billion for SLB, $636 million for HAL (plus $200 million face amount in other notes), and $225 million for Weatherford International, the service companies have already taken write-offs on what they are owed and have refused to extend Venezuela additional credit. Unlike the "dumb iron" of drilling rigs, the service companies provide highly technical proprietary goods and services, from drill bits and fluids to measuring services. The lack of these proprietary technical services diminishes PDVSA's ability to drill new wells and properly maintain its legacy production infrastructure. Venezuela's production started falling in late 2015 - well before OPEC and Russia coordinated their January 2017 production cuts (Chart 7). Drought contributed to the problem in 2016 by causing electricity shortages and forced rationing of electricity (60-70% of Venezuela's electricity generation is hydro); water levels at key dams are still very low, but the condition has eased a bit in 2017. After watching crude oil production fall from 2.4 MMB/d in 2015 to 2.05 MMB/d in 2016, OPEC gave Venezuela a production quota of 1.97 MMB/d for the first half of 2017, which is about what they were expected to be capable of producing. In essence, Venezuela was exempt from production cuts, like other compromised OPEC producers Libya, Nigeria and Iran. So far, Venezuela has produced 1.99 MMB/d in the first quarter, according to EIA. Venezuela's falling production is not cartel behavior but indicative of broader economic and political instability. Venezuela is losing control of oil output, the pillar of regime stability. Bottom Line: The double-edged sword for energy companies is that if the regime utterly fails, the country's 2MM b/d of production may be disrupted. However, if government policy shifts - whether through the political opposition finally gaining de facto power or through the military imposing reforms - Venezuela could ramp up its production, perhaps by 1MMB/d within five years, and more after that if Orinoco is developed. How Long Can Maduro Last? Chavez's model worked like that of Louis XIV, who famously said, "après nous, le déluge." Chavez benefited from high oil prices throughout his reign and died in 2013 just before the country's descent into depression began (Chart 8). He won his last election in 2012 by a margin of 10.8%, while Maduro, his hand-picked successor, won a special election only half a year later by a 1.5% margin, which was contested for all kinds of fraud (Chart 9). Chart 8A Hyperflationary Depression A Hyperflationary Depression A Hyperflationary Depression Image Thus Maduro has suffered from "inept successor" syndrome from the beginning, compounding the fears of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that the succession would be rocky. Maduro lacked both the political capital and the originality to launch orthodox economic reforms to address the country's mounting inflation and weak productivity, but instead doubled down on Chavez's rapid expansion of money and credit to lift domestic consumption (Chart 10).4 Chart 10Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Chart 11Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not The economic collapse was well under way even before commodities pulled the rug out from under the government.5 Remarkably, the recovery in export revenue since 2010 did not occasion a recovery in foreign exchange reserves - these two decoupled, as Venezuela chewed through its reserves to finance its growing domestic costs (Chart 11). This means Venezuela's ability to recover even in the most optimistic oil scenarios is limited. Another sign that the economic break is irreversible is the fact that, since 2013, private consumption has fallen faster than oil output - a reversal of the populist model that boosted consumption (Chart 12). Chart 12Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Chart 13Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Critically, the external environment turned against Maduro and PSUV as oil prices declined after June 2014. In November 2014 Saudi Arabia launched its market-share war against Iran and U.S. shale producers, expanding production into a looming global supply overbalance. Brent crude prices collapsed to $29/bbl by early 2016 (Chart 13). This pushed Venezuela over the brink.6 First, hyperinflation: Currency in circulation - already expanding excessively - has exploded upward since 2014. The 100 bolivar note has exploded in usage while notes of lower denominations have dropped out of usage. Total deposits in the banking system are growing at a pace of over 200%, narrow money (M1) at 140%, and consumer price index at 150% (see Chart 10 above). Real interest rates have plunged into an abyss, with devastating results for the financial system. The real effective exchange rate illustrates the annihilation of the currency's value. Monetary authorities have repeatedly devalued the official exchange rate of the bolivar against the dollar (Chart 14). However, the currency remains overvalued, which creates a huge gap between the official rate and the black market rate, which currently stands at about 5,400 bolivares to the dollar. Regime allies have access to hard USD, for which they charge high rents, and the rest suffer. Chart 14Official Forex Devaluations Official Forex Devaluations Official Forex Devaluations Chart 15Domestic Demand Collapses Domestic Demand Collapses Domestic Demand Collapses Second, the real economy has gone from depression to worse: Exports peaked in October 2008, nearly recovered in March 2012, and plummeted thereafter. Imports have fallen faster as domestic demand contracted (Chart 15). Venezuela must import almost everything and the currency collapse means staples are either unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. Venezuelan exports to China reached 20% of total exports in 2012 but have declined to about 14% (Chart 16). This means that Venezuela has lost a precious $10 billion per year. The state has also been trading oil output for loans from China, resulting in an ever higher share of shrinking oil output devoted to paying back the loans, leaving less and less exported production to bring in hard currency needed to pay for production, imports, and debt servicing. Both private and government consumption are shrinking, according to official statistics (Chart 17). Again, the consumption slump removes a key regime support. Chart 16Chinese Demand Is Limited Chinese Demand Is Limited Chinese Demand Is Limited Chart 17Public And Private Consumption Shrink Public And Private Consumption Shrink Public And Private Consumption Shrink Third, Venezuela is rapidly becoming insolvent: Venezuela's total public debt is high. It stood at 102% of GDP as of August 2014, and GDP has declined by 25%-plus since then. Total external debt, which becomes costlier to service as the currency depreciates, was about $139 billion, or 71% of GDP, in Q3 2015 (Chart 18). It has risen sharply ever since the fall in export revenues post-2011. The destruction of the currency by definition makes the foreign debt burden grow. Chart 18External Debt Soars... External Debt Soars... External Debt Soars... Chart 19...While Forex Reserves Dwindle ...While Forex Reserves Dwindle ...While Forex Reserves Dwindle The regime's hard currency reserves are rapidly drying up - they have fallen from nearly $30 billion in 2013 to just $10 billion today (Chart 19). Without hard cash, Venezuela will be unable to meet import costs and external debt payments. In Table 1, we assess the country's ability to make these payments at different oil-price and output levels. Assuming the YTD average Venezuelan crude price of $44/bbl, export revenue should hit about $32 billion this year, while imports should hover around $21 billion, leaving $11 billion for debt servicing costs of roughly $10 billion (combining the state's $8 billion with PDVSA's $2 billion). Thus if global oil prices hold up - as we think they will - the regime may be able to squeak by another year. Image In short, the regime could have about $11 billion in revenues left at the end of the year if the Venezuela oil basket hovers around $44/bbl and production remains at about 2 MMB/d. That is a "minimum cash" scenario for the regime this year, though it by no means guarantees regime survival amid the widespread economic distress of the population. Chart 20Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue If production drops to 1.25 MMb/d or lower as a result of the economic crisis - or if Venezuelan oil prices settle at $28/bbl or below - the regime will be unable to meet its import costs and debt payments. It will have to sell off more of its international assets as rapidly as it can (Chart 20), restrict imports further, and eventually default. Moreover, the calculation becomes much more negative for Venezuela if we assume, conservatively, $10 billion in capital outflows, which is far from unreasonable. Outflows could easily wipe out any small remainder of foreign reserves. So far, the government has chosen to deprive the populace of imports rather than default on external debt, wagering that the military and other state security forces can suppress domestic opposition for longer than the regime can survive under an international financial embargo. This strategy is fueling mass protests, riots, and clashes with the National Guard and Bolivarian colectivos (militias). An extension of the OPEC-Russia production cuts in late May, which we expect, will bring much-needed relief for Venezuela's budget. Thus, there is a clear path for regime survival through 2017 on a purely fiscal basis, though it is a highly precarious one - the reality is that the state is bound to default sooner or later. Moreover, the socio-political crisis has already spiraled far enough that a modest boost to oil prices this year will probably be too little, too late to save Maduro and the PSUV in its current form. As we discuss below, the question is only whether the military takes greater control to perpetuate the current regime, or the opposition is gradually allowed to take power and renovate the constitutional order. Bottom Line: Even if oil production holds up, and oil prices average above $44/bbl as we expect, the country's leaders will have to take extreme measures to avoid default. Domestic shortages and military-enforced rationing will compound. As economic contraction persists, social unrest will intensify. Will The Military Throw A Coup? Explosive popular discontent this year shows no sign of abating. It is a continuation of the mass protests and sporadic violence since the economic crisis fully erupted in 2014. However, as recession deepens - and food, fuel, and medicine shortages become even more widespread - unrest will spread to a broader geographic and demographic base. Protests since September 2016 have drawn numbers in the upper hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million on two occasions. Security forces have increasingly cracked down on civilians, raising the death toll and provoking a nasty feedback loop with protesters. Reports suggest that the poorest people - the Chavista base - are increasingly joining the protests, which is a new trend and bodes ill for the ruling party's survival. Already the public has turned against the United Socialist Party, as evinced by the December 2015 legislative election results and a range of public opinion polls, which show Maduro's support in the low-20% range. In the 2015 vote, the opposition defeated the Chavistas for the first time since 1998. The Democratic Unity Roundtable won a majority of the popular vote and a supermajority of the seats in the National Assembly. Since then, however, Maduro has used party-controlled civilian institutions like the Supreme Court and National Electoral Council - backed by the military and state security - to prevent the opposition's exercise of its newfound legislative power. Key signposts to watch will be whether Maduro is pressured into restoring the electoral calendar. The opposition has so far been denied local elections (supposedly rescheduled for later this year) and a popular referendum on recalling Maduro. So it has little reason to expect that the government will hold the October 2018 elections on time. The government is likely to keep delaying these votes because it knows it will lose them. In the meantime, the opposition has few choices other than protests and street tactics to try to pressure the government into allowing elections after all. Further, oil prices are low, so the regime is vulnerable, which means that the opposition has every incentive to step up the pressure now. If it waits, higher prices could give Maduro a new infusion of revenues and the ability to prolong his time in power. The question at this point is: will the military defect from the government? The military is the historical arbiter of power in the country. Maduro - who unlike Chavez does not hail from a military background - has only managed to make it this far by granting his top brass more power. Crucially, in July 2016, Maduro handed army chief Vladimir Padrino Lopez control over the country's critical transportation and distribution networks, including for food supplies. He has also carved out large tracts of land for a vast new mining venture, supposed to focus on gold, which the military will oversee and profit from.7 What this means is that the government and military are becoming more, not less, integrated at the moment. The army has a vested interest in the current regime. It is also internally coherent, as recent political science research shows, in the sense that the upper-most and lower-most ranks are devoted to Chavismo.8 Economic sanctions and human rights allegations from the U.S. and international community reinforce this point, making it so that officials have no future outside of the regime and therefore fight harder for the regime to survive.9 Still, there are fractures within the military that could get worse over time. Divisions within the ranks: An analysis of the Arab Spring shows that militaries that defected from the government (Egypt, Tunisia), or split up and made war on each other (Syria, Libya, Yemen), exhibited certain key divisions within their ranks.10 Looking at these variables, Venezuela's military lacks critical ethno-sectarian divisions, but does suffer from important differences between the military branches, between the army and the other state security forces, and between the ideological and socio-economic factions that are entirely devoted to Chavismo versus the rest. Thus, for example, it is possible that Bolivarian militias committing atrocities against unarmed civilians could eventually force the military to change its position to preserve its reputation.11 Popular opinion: Massive protests have approached 1 million people by some counts (of a population of 31 million) and have combined a range of elements within the society - not only young men or violent rebels/anarchists. Also, public opinion surveys suggest that supporters of Maduro have a more favorable view of the army, and opponents have a less favorable view.12 This implies that Maduro's extreme lack of popular support is a liability that will weigh on the military over time. Military funds shrinking: Because of the economic crisis, Maduro has been forced to slash military spending by a roughly estimated 56% over the past year (Chart 21). The military may eventually decide it needs to fix the economy in order to fix its budget. Image Autonomous military leader: That General Lopez has considerable autonomy is another variable that increases the risk of military defection or fracture. As the country slides out of control Lopez will likely intervene more often. He already did so recently when the Chavista-aligned Supreme Court tried to usurp the National Assembly's legislative function. The attorney general, Luisa Ortega Diaz, broke with party norms by criticizing the court's ruling. Maduro was forced to order the court to reverse it, at least nominally restoring the National Assembly's authority. Lopez supposedly had encouraged Maduro to backtrack in this way, contrary to the advice of two notable Chavistas, Diosdado Cabello and Vice President Tareck El Aissami. Ultimately, military rule for extended periods is common in Venezuelan history. Chavez always deeply integrated the party and military leadership, so the regime could persist through greater military assertion within it, or the military could take over and initiate topical political changes. Finally, if Lopez is ready to stage a coup, he may still wait for oil prices to recover. It makes more sense to let the already discredited ruling party suffer the public consequences of the recession than to seize power when the country is in shambles. Previous coup attempts have occurred not only when oil prices were bottoming but also when they bounded back after bottoming (Chart 22). It would appear that the Venezuelan military is as good at forecasting oil prices as any Wall Street analyst! For oil markets, the military's strong grip over the country suggests that even if Maduro and the PSUV collapse, the party loyalists at PDVSA may not have the option of going on strike. The military will still need the petro dollars to stay in power, and it will have the guns to insist that production keeps up, as long as economic destitution does not force operations to a halt. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that the military will expand its overt control over the country. As long as the leaders avoid fundamental economic reforms, the result of any full-out military coup against Maduro may just mean more of the same, which would be politically and economically unsustainable. Chart 22Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Chart 23Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Investment Implications Any rebound in oil prices as a result of an extension of OPEC's and Russia's production cuts at the OPEC meeting on May 25 will be "too little, too late" in terms of saving Maduro and the PSUV. They may be able to play for time, but their legitimacy has been destroyed - they will only survive as long as the military sustains them. To a great extent, the ruling party has already handed the keys over to the military, and military rule can persist for some time. Hence oil production is more likely to continue its slow decline than experience a sudden shutdown, at least this year. This is because it is likely that military control will tighten, not diminish, when Maduro falls. Incidentally, the military is also more capable than the current weak civilian government of forcing through wrenching policy adjustments that are necessary to begin the process of normalizing economic policy - such as floating the currency and cutting public spending. But any such process would bring even more economic pain and unrest in the short term, and it has not begun yet. Even if the ruling party avoids defaulting on government debts this year - which is possible given our budget calculations - it is on the path to default before long. We remain short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds versus emerging market peers. This trade is down 330 basis points since initiation in June 2015, but Venezuelan bonds have rolled over and the outlook is dim (Chart 23). Within the oil markets, our base case is that global oil producers have benefitted and will benefit from the marginally higher prices derived from Venezuela's slow production deterioration. Should a more sudden and severe production collapse occur, the upward price response would be much more acute. A sustained outage of Venezuelan production would send oil prices quickly towards $80-$100/bbl as a necessary price signal to curb demand growth, creating a meaningful recessionary force around the globe. Oil producers, specifically U.S. shale producers that can react quickly to these price signals, would stand to benefit temporarily from the higher prices, but would again suffer from falling oil prices in the inevitable post-crisis denouement. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 For the military takeover, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Energy Spring," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com; BCA Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "The Other Guys In The Oil Market," dated April 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Venezuelan Chavismo: Life After Death," dated April 2, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, and Monthly Report, "The Reflation Era," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing Political And Financial Landscapes In Argentina, Venezuela And Brazil," dated January 6, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 For Lopez's taking control, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. For the gold mine, please see Edgardo Lander, "The Implosion of Venezuela's Rentier State," Transnational Institute, New Politics Papers 1, September 2016, available at www.tni.org. 8 The junior officers have advanced through special military schools set up by Chavez, while the senior officials have been carefully selected over the years for their loyalty and ideological purity. Please see Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Venezuelan Military Culture," FIU-USSOUTHCOM Military Culture Series, May 2016, available at www.johnpolga.com. 9 Please see David Smilde, "Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy," Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, available at www.foreign.senate.gov. 10 Please see Timothy Hazen, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During The Arab Uprisings," doctoral dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, December 2016, available at ecommons.luc.edu. 11 Civilian deaths caused by the National Guard and Chavez's loyalist militias triggered the aborted 2002 military coup. Please see Steven Barracca, "Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," Third World Quarterly 28: 1 (2007), pp. 137-54. 12 See footnote 8 above.

Highlight Once-ebullient oil markets are overwrought. Fears that an economic slowdown in China will spill over into EM - the engine of global commodity demand growth - along with a very weak 1Q17 U.S. GDP performance, will keep oil markets focused on downside risks to prices. On the supply side, high-frequency inventory data from the U.S. suggests visible OECD stocks remain high, seemingly impervious to OPEC 2.0's best efforts to drain them. Steadily rising U.S. shale output also weighs on prices. Markets appear to be looking right through the choreographed comments on production cuts from leaders of OPEC 2.0, which suggest these cuts will definitely be extended to year-end 2017, and possibly into 2018. We doubt the demand picture is anywhere close to a fundamental downshift, expecting, instead, continued robust demand. We also expect the extension of OPEC 2.0's production cutbacks to year-end 2017 to significantly drain storage, even as shale output continues to grow. If anything, recent market action has presented an opportunity re-establish length, and to position for backwardation toward year-end. Energy: Overweight. The stop-loss on our Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts vs. $65/bbl calls was elected May 4/17, leaving us with a loss of $1.54/bbl (-327.7%). We are reinstating the position as of tonight's close, anticipating Brent will reach $60/bbl by year-end. We also stopped out of our Dec/17 Brent long vs. Dec/18 Brent short on May 4/17, with a $0.50/bbl loss (-263.2%). We will re-establish this position as well basis tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. LME and COMEX stock builds are keeping copper under pressure, offsetting possible renewed labor unrest. This is keeping us neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. We were made long spot gold at $1230.25/oz basis last Thursday's close as a hedge against inflation risk, and a possible equities correction. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA data indicate a favorable start to the grain planting season. We remain bearish. Feature Softer Chinese PMIs spooked commodity markets, coming as they did on the heels of a very visible and much-reported weakening of base metals and iron ore prices emanating from Chinese markets (Chart of the Week).1 Financial markets fear weaker Chinese growth could presage weaker EM growth, which is the engine of commodity growth generally.2 With U.S. GDP coming in weak as well - registering a paltry growth of 0.7% in 1Q17 - markets started re-calibrating oil demand estimates for this year in light of still-high inventory levels. Adding to the market's agita, visible oil inventories in the OECD remain stubbornly high, thwarting OPEC 2.0's best efforts to drain them via their closely followed production cuts. By Wednesday of this week, this potent combination shaved some 9.6% off 1Q17 average prices, taking international benchmarks Brent and WTI below $50/bbl. Dubai prices have largely been spared similar carnage, as Gulf OPEC states continue to reduce supplies of heavier sour crude availabilities (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekChina PMIs Weaken As Monetary##BR##Conditions Tighten Slightly China PMIs Weaken As Monetary Conditions Tighten Slightly China PMIs Weaken As Monetary Conditions Tighten Slightly Chart 2Oil Prices##BR##In Retreat Oil Prices In Retreat Oil Prices In Retreat OPEC 2.0 Responds To Weaker Prices OPEC 2.0 - our moniker for the producer group comprised of OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC, led by Russia - was not oblivious to these concerns. Indeed, earlier this week KSA Oil Minister Khalid al-Falih said the group would "do whatever it takes" to drain stocks and normalize global inventories (Chart 3). The OPEC 2.0 leadership is well aware that failure to do so would again expose these petro-states to the risk of a price collapse, as, absent production discipline, oil inventories once again would fill. This would force prices through producers' cash costs until enough production was knocked off-line to drain the storage overhang.3 Comments by leaders of OPEC 2.0 regarding the extension of its 1.8mm b/d production cuts this year and into next year are consistent with a strategy we laid out earlier, part of which includes the use of forward guidance to convince markets the supply side will tighten in the future.4 The other critical part of the strategy is for OPEC 2.0 to keep the front of the Brent curve at or below $60/bbl, using their own production, spare capacity and storage, and guiding to higher supply in the future, which would keep markets backwardated in 2018 once visible storage returns to five-year average levels. A persistent and deep backwardation - on the order of 10% p.a. - would, based on our modelling, slow the return of rigs to U.S. shale fields. In addition, the combination of a front-end forward curve capped at $60/bbl and persistent backwardation would keep depletion rates elevated, as cash-strapped producers - e.g., non-Gulf OPEC producers with high fiscal breakeven oil prices - are forced to forego maintenance capex. Taken together, this would give OPEC 2.0 a stronger hand in guiding prices - provided the coalition can hold together and maintain production discipline. We continue to expect an extension of the 1.8mm b/d OPEC 2.0 cuts will backwardate markets once inventories normalize later this year, even with strong growth from U.S. shales.5 Indeed, we expect this combination of fundamentals will clear the storage overhang by end-2017, and produce draws of more than 1mm b/d on average from April - December (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA,##BR##Russia: "Whatever It Takes" OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA, Russia: "Whatever It Takes" OPEC 2.0 Leaders KSA, Russia: "Whatever It Takes" Chart 4Steady Demand,##BR##Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Steady Demand, Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Steady Demand, Extended Cuts Will Drain Inventories Wobbly Oil Demand Is Transitory The 1Q17 demand-side scares emanating from China and the U.S. are transitory. Chart 5Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending##BR##Picked Up This Year In China Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending Picked Up This Year In China Fiscal And Infrastructure Spending Picked Up This Year In China Following their return from the mainland, our colleagues on BCA's China Investment Strategy desk note that monetary conditions still are fairly stimulative, and are unlikely to cause the economy to roll over.6 Most of the deterioration in economic growth results from a slowing in the depreciation of China's trade-weighted RMB, following a years-long appreciation from 2012 to 2015, which did dampen growth. In addition, while fiscal stimulus was reduced at the end of 2016, the government "quickly reversed course" as direct spending and investment in infrastructure picked up substantially (Chart 5). Our China Investment Strategy colleagues note China's fiscal spending is pro-cyclical - it increases as the economy improves and tax revenues increase. The government shows no sign of wanting to wind this down: "China's policy setting remains expansionary, a major departure from previous years when the Chinese economy was under the heavy weight of policy tightening while external demand also weakened. Looking forward, there is little chance that the Chinese authorities will commit similar policy mistakes that could lead to a major growth downturn. Barring a major policy mistake of aggressive tightening, Chinese growth should remain buoyant." The impact of Chinese demand on global oil demand is increasing, based on econometric work we've recently completed. From 2000 to end-April 2017, a 1% increase in Chinese oil demand has translated into a 0.64% ncrease in Brent prompt prices. During this period, the impact of non-OECD demand ex China was more than two times that of China's - a 1% increase there could be expected to lead to a 1.3% increase in Brent prices. China's impact on Brent prices in the post-GFC world more than doubled, while the impact of non-OECD demand ex-China increased marginally. Since the Global Financial Crisis, a 1% increase in China's oil consumption has produced a 1.4% increase in Brent prices, while a similar increase in EM ex-China has translated into a 1.8% increase in Brent prices.7 Turning to the U.S., we believe, along with the Fed, the weak patch in GDP in 1Q17 is transitory. Following the report on the quarter's weak 0.7% GDP growth, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics surprised markets with a reading of 4.4% unemployment (U3 measure), and an equally impressive U6 measure of 8.6%, which takes it almost to pre-GFC levels. We expect robust U.S. labor-market conditions will keep demand for refined products in the U.S. robust, which will support oil prices there going forward. Globally, the U.S. EIA expects oil consumption will grow 1.6mm b/d this year - unchanged from last year. This is above our 1.4mm b/d estimate for the year. If the EIA's demand estimate is accurate, we can expect a sharper draw (+200k b/d) in global inventories than the average 860k b/d we currently are projecting, all else equal (Chart 4). This would lead to a sharper and earlier backwardation in prices that we currently expect. We will be re-estimating our balances model next week. Investment Implications We continue to expect the global storage overhang to clear by year-end, given the extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to at least year-end 2017. Wobbly demand is a transitory phenomenon, and we expect a recovery in the balance of the year. Given our expectation, we are re-establishing our long year-end Brent exposure, and are going short a $45/bbl Dec/17 Brent put vs. long a $65/bbl Dec/17 Brent call at tonight's close. We had a -$1.00/bbl stop-loss on this position, which was elected May 4/17 and resulted in a 1.54/bbl loss (-327.7%). We stopped out of our long Brent front-to-back position - long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - in anticipation of backwardation. We also will be looking to re-establishing this position at tonight's closing levels, and for a good entry point to re-establish the same position in WTI. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Iron-ore (62% Fe) prices are down 33.5% after peaking this year at close to $91/MT in March. The LMEX base metals index is down 7.7% from its 2017 peak in February. Regular readers of Commodity & Energy Strategy will recall we've been bearish iron ore and steel for months, and have remained neutral base metals. Please see "China Commodity Focus: Supply Cuts, Environmental Restrictions Will Hit Metals," and "Copper's Price Supports Are Fading," in the January 19, and March 23, 2017, issues of Commodity & Energy Strategy. They are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 In the May 5, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy, our colleague Mathieu Savary notes, "The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing." Please see "The Achilles Heel of Commodity Currencies" in the May 5 FES, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy April 20, 2017, for a further discussion of the logic behind these cuts. 4 This aligns with a strategy we laid out last month, which uses forward guidance to convince markets to anticipate tighter supply further out the curve. By leading markets to anticipate lower crude oil availabilities in the future - while storage is drawing - OPEC 2.0 is setting the stage for forward curves to remain backwardated. Please see "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 "Backwardation" refers to a futures forward-price curve in which contracts for prompt delivery are higher than prices for deferred delivery. This indicates merchants and refiners are willing to pay more for a commodity delivered close in time versus in the future. It is the opposite of a "contango" curve, in which deferred prices exceed prompt prices. 6 Please see "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" in BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report published May 5, 2017. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 These coefficients are all significant at less than 0.01. R2 coefficients of determination for these cointegrating regressions, which include the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) all exceed 0.90, indicating that the USD TWIB and Brent prices share a common long-term trend, and that FX effects remain important in assessing oil prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong

Highlights Chart 1Global Equities At Record Highs Global Equities At Record Highs Global Equities At Record Highs Our Stock Market Timing Model points to a heightened risk of a correction for global equities over the next few months. However, the 12-month cyclical outlook still looks reasonably good thanks to accelerating earnings growth. Monetary policy has also yet to reach restrictive levels in most economies. Beyond the next 12 months, lofty valuations (especially in the U.S.), as well as the prospect of a meaningful economic slowdown late next year, will weigh on returns. Tactically, go short the S&P 500 with a target of 7.5% and stop-loss of 2.5%. This trade will automatically expire in six weeks. Cyclically, go long the December 2017 Brent Oil futures contract. Feature Aging Bull? Global equities have been on a tear lately. The MSCI All-Country Index reached a fresh record high this week (Chart 1). The index is up 14.1% in local-currency terms and 13.3% in U.S. dollar terms since early November. Our philosophy at BCA Research is that the best market calls come from combining informed qualitative analysis with time-tested quantitative indicators. With that in mind, this week's report distills the results of our proprietary Stock Market Timing Model. Our main conclusions are only partly reassuring. While the cyclical 12-month outlook for stocks remains reasonably auspicious, our model suggests that there is an elevated risk of a near-term correction. The model is also forecasting subpar long-term returns for stocks, particularly in the U.S. where valuations have become stretched. What Predicts Stock Returns? As we have documented in past research,1 a number of empirical regularities help predict stock market returns: 1. Stocks Tend To Perform Better When Economic Growth Is Accelerating The state of the business cycle is the most important driver of stock returns over horizons of around 12 months. Our model incorporates a variety of forward-looking cyclical variables that span different parts of the economy. For example, Table 1 shows the S&P 500 has delivered an average annualized real total return of 9.8% since 1948 whenever the gap between the ISM manufacturing new orders and inventories components - based on the prior month's ISM reading - was positive. In contrast, the S&P 500 has fallen by an average of 1.2% whenever the gap was negative. In the same vein, the S&P 500 has produced an average annualized real total return of 9.2% since 2000 whenever initial unemployment claims have declined over the prior three months, while losing 3.6% whenever claims have increased. The gap between new orders and inventories fell to 6.5 in April, down from a March reading of 15.5. The downtrend in initial unemployment claims has also flattened out. The moves in the ISM manufacturing index and unemployment claims, along with other measures such as auto sales, suggest that the economy is going through a soft patch. This softening, in turn, has been reflected in a steep drop in Citi's economic surprise index (Chart 2). Table 1Stocks Tend To Perform Better When Growth Is Accelerating The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Chart 2Some Signs Of Softening U.S. Economic Data... Some Signs Of Softening U.S. Economic Data... Some Signs Of Softening U.S. Economic Data... Still, we would not overstate the extent of the deterioration in the growth picture. Goldman's Current Activity Indicator remains near cyclical highs (Chart 3). The Atlanta Fed's preliminary Q2 growth estimate stands at 4.2%, while the NY Fed's Nowcast stands at 2.3%. If these preliminary estimates prove to be correct, Q1 will end up being just a temporary speedbump along the road to recovery. Consistent with this, a variety of forward-looking indicators suggest that the U.S. economy will grow at an above-trend pace over the remainder of the year (Chart 4). Durable goods orders are rising, business capex intentions have surged, building permits are trending higher, and consumer confidence is strong. Chart 3...But Growth Backdrop Still Solid... ...But Growth Backdrop Still Solid... ...But Growth Backdrop Still Solid... Chart 4...And Forward-Looking Indicators Remain Upbeat ...And Forward-Looking Indicators Remain Upbeat ...And Forward-Looking Indicators Remain Upbeat Globally, the picture remains reasonably upbeat, as highlighted by our Global Leading Indicator (Chart 5). Growth in the euro area is particularly strong. Green shoots are also appearing in beleaguered emerging markets such as Brazil and Russia. The Chinese economy has slowed a notch, but is still in much better shape than it was at this time last year. Above-trend global growth is helping to propel corporate earnings. The Q1 earnings season is off to a strong start. According to Thomson Reuters, EPS for the S&P 500 in the first quarter is expected to increase by 14.8% from year-ago levels. 75% of companies have beat earnings estimates, compared to the long-term average of 64%. 63% of companies have beaten revenue estimates, compared to the historic average of 59%. BCA's global earnings model predicts further upside for profits over the coming months (Chart 6).2 Chart 5Global Economy Is Doing Well Global Economy Is Doing Well Global Economy Is Doing Well Chart 6More Upside For Global Earnings More Upside For Global Earnings More Upside For Global Earnings Bottom Line: Cyclical indicators are somewhat mixed, but generally point to further upside for global stocks. 2. Stocks Tend To Perform Better When Financial Conditions Are Easing Easy money and equity bull markets tend to go hand in hand. Since 1970, the S&P 500 has delivered a real total average annualized return of 12.9% whenever our monetary indicator - which looks at money growth, bank lending, as well as short-term and long-term rates - was above its long-term average in the prior month, but only 0.5% when the indicator was below its long-term average. Similarly, the S&P 500 has risen at a 9.6% annualized pace whenever BCA's Financial Conditions Index (FCI) - which includes such components as credit spreads, the trade-weighted dollar, oil prices, home prices, and the relative performance of bank shares - was above its 250-day moving average, while gaining only 1.4% when the FCI was below its 250-day moving average. Chart 7 shows that our U.S. FCI remains slightly above its moving average, thanks to the decline in credit spreads over the past 12 months, along with higher stock market and house prices. However, the monetary indicator has now dipped below its respective moving average due to rising rates and slower broad money growth. Chart 7Financial Conditions Still Bode Well For Equity Returns, But U.S. Rate Hikes Loom Large Financial Conditions Still Bode Well For Equity Returns, But U.S. Rate Hikes Loom Large Financial Conditions Still Bode Well For Equity Returns, But U.S. Rate Hikes Loom Large Looking out, monetary and financial conditions are likely to be buffeted by various crosswinds. On the one hand, business lending should recover thanks in part to a rebound in manufacturing output (Chart 8). On the other hand, consumer lending standards have been tightening for some time and delinquencies and charge-offs for auto and credit card loans have edged higher, albeit from very low levels (Chart 9). Higher interest rates are also likely to weigh on credit demand. On balance, we expect a modest tightening in U.S. financial conditions over the remainder of the year. Chart 8Business Lending Should Recover Business Lending Should Recover Business Lending Should Recover Chart 9Tightening Consumer Lending Standards Tightening Consumer Lending Standards Tightening Consumer Lending Standards Outside the U.S., financial conditions are likely to stay accommodative. Unlike the Fed, most other central banks will keep rates near rock-bottom levels. In fact, real short-term rates in the euro area and Japan could even decline as stronger GDP growth lifts inflation expectations. Bottom Line: Financial conditions are still somewhat supportive for global equities, but are likely to become less so in the U.S. as the Fed continues to hike rates. 3. Stocks Tend To Perform Better When Sentiment Is Poor But Improving Warren Buffet once famously said that the secret to being a successful investor is to be "fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful." There is no doubt that the level of sentiment can be a powerful contrarian indicator. However, our research indicates that the change in sentiment is also important in predicting equity returns. Trading rules that overweight stocks whenever sentiment over the prior weeks has improved from bearish levels, while underweighting stocks whenever sentiment has deteriorated from bullish levels, can significantly outperform a buy-and-hold strategy (Chart 10). This finding is similar to what one sees for individual stocks. As we discussed in our report on bottom-up stock picking,3 the best stocks tend to be the ones for which the consensus analyst opinion is bearish but improving. In contrast, the worst stocks are typically the ones for which the consensus analyst opinion is bullish but deteriorating. Today, market sentiment is on the bullish side (Chart 11). According to the Marketvane survey, the share of traders that expect stocks to rise over the coming weeks is only slightly below where it was during past stock market peaks. Bullish sentiment is less pronounced in the AAII's survey of individual investors. However, equity allocations among AAII members are about five points above their historic average, which limits the scope for "new money" to come into the market. Meanwhile, complacency is setting in (Chart 12). The VIX hit its lowest level in ten years this week. The Minneapolis Fed's market-based probability of a 20%+ correction in the S&P 500 has also dropped to below 10%, a level last seen during the peak of the previous bull market in 2007. Yale University's One-Year Confidence Index - which measures how likely market participants think that stocks will go up in the succeeding year - is near record levels for individual investors and at an absolute record high for institutional investors. U.S. margin debt, expressed as a share of GDP, has also risen above its 2000 and 2007 peaks. Chart 10Buy Stocks When Sentiment Is Poor But Improving The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Chart 11Equity Sentiment Is More Bullish Than Usual Equity Sentiment Is More Bullish Than Usual Equity Sentiment Is More Bullish Than Usual Chart 12Complacency Reigns Complacency Reigns Complacency Reigns Bottom Line: Current levels of bullish sentiment are a warning sign for equities. Should sentiment measures begin to deteriorate without a correspondingly large drop in stock prices, it will be time to head for the exit doors. 4. Stocks Tend To Perform Better In "Young" Bull Markets Following Pullbacks When is the trend your friend? The answer is over horizons of about two years. Returns tend to be positively serially correlated over this range. This means that if stocks have done well over the past two years, they are likely to continue doing well. Over shorter horizons of less than a year and longer horizons exceeding three years, the trend is not your friend - returns tend to be negatively correlated (Chart 13). Thus, if stocks have fallen over the past few weeks, they are likely to do better over the following few weeks than if they had risen. Likewise, if stocks have done well over, say, the past five years, then this is evidence that the bull market is getting long in the tooth. Obviously, these are not hard and fast rules, but they do give some guidance about what the future may have in store. The fact that the S&P 500 has done well over the past two years is a bullish sign, but the fact that the bull market is now in its eighth year and price gains have accelerated over the past few months (raising the risk of a blow-off top) are both bearish signs. The bull market is less mature outside the U.S., which works in favor of non-U.S. stocks. Relative momentum is also turning more favorable for non-U.S. markets, especially those in the euro area (Chart 14). Chart 13When Is The Trend Your Friend? The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Chart 14Relative Momentum Favors Non-U.S. Stocks Relative Momentum Favors Non-U.S. Stocks Relative Momentum Favors Non-U.S. Stocks Bottom Line: Recent price momentum is sending mixed signals for U.S. stocks, but somewhat more encouraging signals for non-U.S. stocks. 5. Stocks Tend To Perform Better When They Are Cheaply Priced Valuations are not especially useful as a short-term timing tool. However, they are by far the most useful tool for gauging long-term expected returns. This can be seen in the fact that there is a strong negative correlation between the Shiller PE ratio and subsequent real total returns (Chart 15). In the U.S., the Shiller PE ratio currently stands at 29. This is 45% above the post-1960 median and 82% above the median since 1880. If profit margins over the past 10 years had been what they were on average during the 1990s, the Shiller PE ratio would stand at 41 today - within reaching distance of its 2000 peak (Chart 16). U.S. valuations are even more stretched if one looks underneath the indices: The median NYSE stock currently trades at a higher price-to-earnings and price-to-cash flow ratio than at the 2000 peak (Chart 17). Chart 15Valuation Is The Single Best Predictor Of Long-Term Equity Returns The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Chart 16U.S. Valuations Are Stretched... U.S. Valuations Are Stretched... U.S. Valuations Are Stretched... Chart 17...Especially For The Median Stocks ...Especially For The Median Stocks ...Especially For The Median Stocks One could argue that a structurally lower neutral interest rate justifies a higher equilibrium PE ratio. There are plenty of reasons to challenge this argument - a lower neutral rate may foreshadow slow earnings growth, for instance - but even if one accepts its basic premise, it does not imply that stocks will do well in absolute terms. If you assume a lower discount rate in calculating the present value of future cash flows, you must also assume a lower long-term rate of return from owning stocks. You can't one have without the other. Valuations are generally more favorable outside the U.S., even if one adjusts for differences in sector weights across countries (Chart 18). Chart 18Valuations More Favorable Outside The U.S. The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Bottom Line: Valuations are stretched in the U.S. Long-term investors should favor non-U.S. stocks over their U.S. peers. 6. Stocks Tend To Perform Better During Certain Days And Months Of The Year Than Others No discussion of stock market-timing strategies would be complete without a few words on calendar effects (Table 2). Table 2When to Buy Stocks The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model As with all stock market anomalies, there is a risk that any particular calendar pattern will disappear once it has been documented. For example, the "Blue Monday" effect, popularized by Yale Hirsch's 1987 book "Don't Sell Stocks On Monday," vanished soon after the book was published, only to make a comeback of sorts during the past 15 years. The so-called January Effect, which describes the tendency for stocks to do well at the start of the year, largely disappeared from the data at the turn of the century. In its place the "Santa Claus rally" was born, presumably reflecting the desire of traders to front run the January effect. Other calendar effects remain alive and well. The tendency for stocks to underperform during the summer and autumn months (the "Sell In May And Go Away" effect) is still around (Chart 19). The same goes for the so-called "turn-of-the-month effect" - the tendency for stocks to do best in the last few days and first few days of each month. Less well known is the tendency for stocks to do much better on FOMC days.4 Remarkably, the S&P 500 would be more than 50% lower today if one were to exclude all the days since 1990 when scheduled FOMC meetings took place from the return tally (Chart 20). Chart 19Sell In May And Go Away The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Chart 20The Fed Effect The Fed Effect The Fed Effect Bottom Line: High frequency, tactical investors may be able to profit from exploiting calendar effects in the data. Putting It All Together Our Stock Market Timing Model incorporates the factors discussed above. As Chart 21 illustrates, it has an admirable track record of predicting market returns. The current message from the model differs across time horizons. Tactically, over a three-month horizon, it suggests that stocks are overbought and vulnerable to a correction. This is mainly due to the sharp run-up in most global bourses over the past six months, as well as elevated levels of bullish sentiment. The fact that we are also entering the historically weak summer months is also a slight negative in our model. Cyclically, however, the picture still looks fairly reassuring: leading economic indicators and corporate earnings are in an uptrend. Financial conditions also remain accommodative. Thus, the model continues to predict modestly above-average returns for global equities over a 12-month horizon. Looking beyond the next 12 months, however, the picture begins to dim. The U.S. now accounts for over 50% of global equity market capitalization. Valuations for U.S. stocks have reached elevated levels. The U.S. economy is also approaching full employment, which means that growth will fall back to what so far has been a very anemic pace of potential GDP growth. Interest rates may also eventually reach punitive levels as the Fed continues to hike rates. All this suggests that the bullish window for global stocks, and U.S. stocks in particular, may close late next year. Two New Trades We are initiating two new trades reflecting our differing tactical and cyclical views: Tactically, go short the S&P 500 with a target of 7.5% and stop-loss of 2.5%. This trade will automatically expire in six weeks. Cyclically, go long the December 2017 Brent Oil futures contract (Chart 22). Our commodity strategists remain convinced that the supply backdrop for oil is tighter than the market is discounting. Add to that a firm demand picture, and we have a recipe for what is likely to be at least a temporary recovery in oil prices. Chart 21Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Chart 22Go long December 2017 Brent Futures Go long December 2017 Brent Futures Go long December 2017 Brent Futures Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Market Timing: Holy Grail Or Fool's Gold?" dated May 27, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Alpha Sector Strategy Bi-Weekly Report, "Quarterly Review And Outlook," dated April 7, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Introducing ETS: A Top-Down Approach To Bottom-Up Stock Picking," dated December 3, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 David O. Lucca., and Emanuel Moench, "The Pre-FOMC Announcement Drift," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York Staff Reports, August 2013. Appendix Tactical Global Asset Allocation Monthly Update We announced in late March that we are making major upgrades to our Tactical Asset Allocation Model. In the meantime, we will send you a concise update of our recommendations in the first week of every month based on a combination of BCA's proprietary indicators as well as our own seasoned judgement (Appendix Table 1). Appendix Table 1Global Asset Allocation Recommendations (Percent, Relative To Benchmark) The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model Our tactical recommendations are based on a three-month horizon. Thus, at times, they can differ significantly from both our cyclical (12-month) and structural (12-month plus) recommendations. Compared to last month, we are cutting our tactical allocation to global stocks from +7 percentage points to zero (relative to benchmark), reflecting the heightened risk of a near-term pullback. We continue to maintain an underweight position in U.S. stocks within the equity portion of the portfolio. However, given the low-beta nature of U.S. stocks, most of the downgrade in overall equity exposure has occurred among European, Japanese, and EM bourses. We are also increasing our exposure to bonds from -9 to -6 percentage points, and increasing our tactical allocation to cash from +2 to +6 percentage points. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Feature Table 1Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Don't Worry About The Tepid Data Risk assets are likely to continue to grind higher. Two of the catalysts we cited for this in our most recent Quarterly1 have half happened: European political risk is lifting now that Marine Le Pen looks most unlikely to win in the second round of the French presidential election (polls give her less than 40% of the vote); and the Trump administration announced its tax cut plan (which, though details are still sparse, we expect to be passed in some form this year). As a result, the MSCI All Country World Index hit a record high in late April and the S&P 500 is only 1% below its high. But both growth and inflation have surprised somewhat to the downside in the past couple of months. The Citi Economic Surprise Index for the U.S. has fallen sharply, though surprises remain fairly positive elsewhere (Chart 1).Q1 U.S. real GDP growth came in at an annualized rate of only 0.7%. This has pushed bond yields down (with the US Treasury 10-year yield falling back to 2.2%), consequently weakening the dollar. We are not unduly worried about the tepid data. It is mainly due to technical factors. Corporate loan growth in the U.S., for example (Chart 2), mostly reflects just the lagged effect of last year's slowdown on banks' willingness to lend, as well as energy companies repaying credit lines they tapped in early 2016 when short of working capital. The weakness in auto sales (Chart 3) is most likely caused by the end of the car replacement cycle which began in 2010, rather than reflecting any generalized deterioration in consumer behavior. Moreover, there seem to be problems with seasonal adjustment of data caused by the extreme swings in the economy in 2008 and 2009: Q1 has been the weakest quarter for U.S. GDP in six out of the past 10 years, and has on average been 2.3 ppts lower than Q2.2 There were no such distortions prior to 1996. Chart 1U.S. Growth Has Surprised To The Downside U.S. Growth Has Surprised To The Downside U.S. Growth Has Surprised To The Downside Chart 2Weaker Loan Growth Is Mostly Technical... Weaker Loan Growth Is Mostly Technical... Weaker Loan Growth Is Mostly Technical... Chart 3...And The Slowdown In Autos Is Just The End Of A Replacement Cycle ...And The Slowdown In Autos Is Just The End Of A Replacement Cycle ...And The Slowdown In Autos Is Just The End Of A Replacement Cycle A consequence of the wobbly data is that markets have become too complacent about the Fed raising rates, with futures markets now projecting only about 40 bps of hikes over the next 12 months (Chart 4). Our view is that wages will gradually move up this year, pushing core PCE inflation to 2% by year end, which will cause the Fed to raise rates twice before end-2017 and once early in 2018 (though the latter rise could be postponed if the Fed starts to reduce its balance-sheet and forgoes one quarter's hike to judge the impact of this on the market). By contrast, we do not see the ECB hiking before 2019 at the earliest, with ECB President Draghi reiterating that he sees core inflation staying low and remains concerned about the fragile banking systems in peripheral European markets and about Italian politics. We also believe Bank of Japan governor Kuroda when he says he has no plans to change the BoJ's 0% target for the 10-year JGB yield. All this implies that the dollar is likely to appreciate further in the next 12 months as interest rate spreads widen (Chart 5). Chart 4Fed Is Likely To Hike Faster Than This Fed Is Likely To Hike Faster Than This Fed Is Likely To Hike Faster Than This Chart 5Interest Differentials Suggest Further Dollar Strength Interest Differentials Suggest Further Dollar Strength Interest Differentials Suggest Further Dollar Strength The next catalyst for equities to rise further could be earnings. Q1 U.S. earnings are surprising significantly on the upside, with EPS growth of 11.7% year on year and 75% of companies beating analysts' estimates.3 BCA's proprietary model suggests that S&P 500 operating earnings this year could grow by over 20% (Chart 6). If anything, upside surprises to earnings have been even stronger in the euro zone and Japan. With none of the standard indicators signaling any risk of recession over the next 12 months (Chart 7), we remain overweight equities versus bonds. We continue to warn, though, that the Goldilocks scenario of healthy growth and stable inflation may not last for long. A combination of tax cuts, wage growth accelerating as labor participation hits a ceiling, and the Fed falling behind the curve (perhaps when President Trump - given that he recently confessed "I do like a low interest rate policy" - appoints a dovish replacement for Janet Yellen as Fed Chair) could cause inflation to rise unexpectedly next year, forcing the Fed to raise rates sharply, triggering a recession in 2019. Chart 6U.S. Earnings Could Grow 20% This Year U.S. Earnings Could Grow 20% This Year U.S. Earnings Could Grow 20% This Year Chart 7No Sign Of A Recession On The Horizon No Sign Of A Recession On The Horizon No Sign Of A Recession On The Horizon Equities: In a risk-on environment, euro zone equities should continue to outperform, due to their higher beta (averaging 1.3 against global equities over the past 20 years, compared to 0.9 for the U.S.), more cyclical earnings, and modestly cheaper valuations (forward PE is at a 18.9% discount to the U.S.). Japanese equities should also do well as interest rates rise again globally (except in Japan where the BoJ will stick to its 0% yield target on 10-year bonds), which should push down the yen and boost earnings. We remain overweight Japanese equities on a currency-hedged basis. We are underweight EM equities, which are likely to be weighed down over the next 12 months by the stronger dollar, and by a slowdown in China which should cause commodity prices to fall. Fixed Income: We expect the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield to reach 3% by year-end: a pickup in real growth, slightly higher inflation and two more Fed hikes can easily add 70 bps to the yield over the next eight months. Euro zone yields will also rise, though not by as much. This implies a negative return from G7 sovereign bonds for the first time since 1994. We continue to prefer corporate credit, with a preference for U.S. investment-grade debt over high-yield bonds (which have stretched valuations) and over European corporate debt (which will be negatively affected by the tapering of ECB purchases next year). Currencies: As described above, we do not believe that the dollar appreciation which began in 2014 is over, due to divergences in monetary policy. We would look for a further 5-10% appreciation of the dollar over the coming 12 months, though the rise is likely to be bigger against the yen and emerging market currencies than against the euro. Commodity currencies such as the Australian dollar also look vulnerable and overvalued. The British pound will be driven by the vicissitudes of the Brexit negotiations in the short-run but looks undervalued in the long run if, as we expect, the EU eventually agrees a moderately satisfactory trade deal with the U.K. Commodities: We continue to believe that the equilibrium level for oil is $55 a barrel, and that an extension of the OPEC production agreement beyond June and a drawdown in inventories in the second half will bring WTI crude back to that level - with the risk of even $60-65 temporarily if there are any unforeseen supply disruptions. We remain more cautious on industrial commodities, which will be hurt by a mild withdrawal of monetary and fiscal stimulus in China. Following its 6.9% GDP print in Q1, Chinese growth is likely to slow moderately. However, with the Party Congress coming up in the fall, growth will not be allowed to slow excessively - and, indeed, there are signs that central government spending has begun to accelerate recently (Chart 8). We remain positive on gold as a long-term hedge against the tail risk of inflation. As our recent Special Report on Safe Havens demonstrated,4 gold has historically provided good returns during recessions, particularly those associated with high inflation (Chart 9). Chart 8China Is Withdrawing Stimulus - Or Is It? China Is Withdrawing Stimulus - Or Is It? China Is Withdrawing Stimulus - Or Is It? Chart 9Gold Glisters When Inflation Rises Gold Glisters When Inflation Rises Gold Glisters When Inflation Rises Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation, "Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: No Reasons To Turn Cautious," dated 3 April 2017, available at gaa.research.com 2 For detailed analysis of the problems with seasonal adjustment, please see U.S. Investment Strategy, "Spring Snapback?" dated April 24, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 So far about half of U.S. companies have reported. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation, "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?" dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. Recommended Asset Allocation

Highlights Despite Saudi-Iranian tensions, the OPEC 2.0 production-cut deal will survive; Petro-state balance sheets remain under pressure; OPEC 2.0 agreement will backwardate the forward curve, and slow the pace of shale recovery; Aramco IPO will motivate Saudi Arabia to over-deliver on the cuts; In expectation of backwardation, investors should go long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, while also going long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts. Feature Despite cooperating to reduce oil production and drain global oil inventories, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran still compete at every level for dominance of the Gulf region's economic and geopolitical order. We have maintained that KSA's aggressive push to privatize (or de-nationalize) its state oil company - ARAMCO - is an extension of this battle. Now that a state-led Chinese consortium has emerged as a potential cornerstone investor in the $100 billion Saudi Armco initial public offering (IPO) expected next year, we believe a key element of KSA's strategy in the Persian Gulf's "security dilemma" is falling into place.1 The Interests At Stake By aggressively courting Chinese investors for its potential record-breaking Aramco IPO next year, KSA doesn't just secure funding to pursue its goal of becoming the largest publicly traded vertically integrated oil company in the world. It tangibly expands the number of powerful interests in the world with a deep economic stake in its execution of Vision 2030, the grand plan to diversify away from its near-total dependence on oil revenues. China, too, benefits from this arrangement: By expanding its financial and economic commitments to KSA, it pursues its global investment and technology strategy, and gradually its standing as a "Great Power" with a vested interest in protecting those investments. These states jointly benefit from Aramco's expansion of its refining business into the Asian refined-product markets, which will remain the most heavily contested space in the oil market. It also does not hurt China, where crude oil production has been falling since June 2015 (Chart 1), to be financially invested in a petro-super-state like KSA, which has been supplying on average 14% of its imports over the same period (Chart 2). China's product demand will breach 12mm b/d this year, with gasoline demand growing some 300k b/d, according to the IEA. Overall product demand will grow close to 345k b/d, keeping China the premier growth market in the world for refined products. Investing in the refining system meeting this consumption - and Asia's other growing markets - therefore is attractive to Chinese companies on numerous fronts. Chart 1Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chart 2... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady Iran has yet to execute on its apparent strategy to attract FDI to its oil and gas sector, where the resource potential is of the same order of magnitude as KSA's. When combined with the development potential of Iraq, a neighboring petro-state, the potential of OPEC's "Shia Bloc" is enormous. Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and Iraq's oil endowment is second only to KSA's in terms of the vast low-cost, high-quality resource available for development. Yet Iran's success in lining up the investment and technical expertise required to develop its resource endowment as it approaches critical post-sanctions elections next month has been halting at best.2 Aside, that is, from deepening its relationship with Russia, which also is seeking desperately needed FDI in the wake of the oil-price collapse brought about by OPEC's market-share was during 2015 - 16. The KSA-Iran Security Dilemma In Context Before we get into the intricacies of energy geopolitics, a brief recap is in order.3 Chart 3Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Prior to the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran beginning in 2015, KSA and OPEC benefited from an undersupplied oil market that kept oil prices above $100/bbl which allowed these states to increase domestic and military spending massively while experiencing few problems in oil exports or development. This can be seen in the evolution of KSA's fiscal breakeven oil prices, which increased dramatically in the lead-up to the 2014 price collapse (Chart 3), as production grew more slowly than spending. As the Saudi Manifa field came online in early 2014, global production expanded from various quarters, and it became apparent that sanctions against Iran would be lifted, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war. Oil prices fell from $100/bbl before OPEC's November 2014 meeting to below $30/bbl by the beginning of 2016. This strategy turned out to be a complete failure.4 We correctly predicted the failed market-share strategy would force an alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states - led by KSA and Russia, respectively - to cut production in the face of considerable market skepticism in the lead-up to OPEC's November 2016 Vienna meeting and in consultations with the Russian-led non-OPEC petro-states shortly thereafter.5 We remain convinced that this coalition, which we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, will extend its production cuts to the end of this year.6 As a result, OECD commercial inventories will decline by 10% or so, despite rising in Q1.7 Petro-State Balance Sheets Still Under Pressure The oil-price evolution described above buffeted petro-state budgets, particularly KSA's and Russia's. The pressures generated by this evolution hold the key to understanding where oil prices will go next. Finances: While both Saudi Arabia and Russia have managed to weather the decline in oil prices, the pain has been palpable. BCA's Frontier Market Strategy has detailed Saudi fiscal woes in detail.8 Based on their estimates, Saudi authorities will have enough reserves to defend the country's all-important currency peg for the next 18-24 months (Table 1). Without the peg, prices of imports would skyrocket. Table 1Saudi Arabia: Projected Debt Levels And Foreign Reserves OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Given that Saudi Arabia imports almost all of its consumer staples, such a price shock could lead to social unrest. Beyond the next two years, the government will have to rely on debt issuance to fund its deficits and focus its remaining foreign exchange resources on maintaining the peg. The problem is that this strategy will leave the country with just $350 billion in reserves by the end of 2018, lower than local currency broad money (Chart 4). At that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to even greater capital flight than is already underway (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting \ Chart 5KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist While Russia has weathered the storm much better, largely by allowing the ruble to depreciate, its foreign exchange reserves are down to 330 billion, the lowest figure since 2007 (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's shale-focused strategy: The market strategy behind the OPEC 2.0 agreement is complex. The roughly 1.8 mm b/d of coordinated production cuts is supposed to draw down global storage by ~ 300 mm bbls by the end of 2017. This should lead to forward curves backwardating - a process that is clearly under way (Chart 7). According to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, a backwardated forward curve is critical in slowing down the pace of tight oil production in the U.S. given the reliance of shale producers on hedging future production prices to lock in minimum revenue.9 Geopolitics: Countries with an unlimited resource like oil tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 8). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse," and is well documented in political science. Chart 6Russia: Forex ##br##Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 7Backwardation ##br##Under Way Backwardation Under Way Backwardation Under Way Chart 8Unlimited Resources ##br##Undermine Democracy OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets What does it have to do with geopolitics? Basically, it suggests that the main national security risk to energy-producing regimes is not each other but their own populations. In countries where the political leadership generates its wealth from the sale of natural resources, the citizenry becomes a de facto "cost center" requiring social benefits and security expenditures to ensure the unemployed remain peaceful. By contrast, manufacturing nations benefit from an industrious citizenry that is a "profit center" for government coffers. In this paradigm, the main national security risk for energy-producing regimes is not external, but rather derives from their own under-utilized or restless populations. Thus, when the "unlimited resource" is re-priced for lower demand or greater global supply, the real risk becomes domestic unrest. At that moment, expensive geopolitical imperatives take a back seat to domestic stability. This explains the current détente between, on one side, Russia and the OPEC "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq), and on the other, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies. Even with this détente, Saudi Arabia, its allies, and the "Shia Bloc" are finding it difficult to maintain fiscal spending that funds their still-massive social programs with prices trading in the low- to mid-$50/bbl range (Chart 9). Saudi's fiscal breakeven oil price is estimated to be $77.70/bbl this year by the IMF. Iran and Iraq require $60.70/bbl and $54/bbl, respectively, putting them in slightly better shape than their Gulf rival, but still in need of higher prices to sustain the spending required to quell social unrest.10 Given Russia's relatively superior domestic economic situation and political stability (Chart 10), we suspect that Moscow cares a little less about oil market rebalancing than Saudi Arabia. President Vladimir Putin will face reelection in less than a year, but he is unlikely to face a serious challenger. Chart 9Oil Prices Too Low For National Budgets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Chart 10Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Even so, Russia still feels the pain of lower energy prices. Oil and gas revenues constituted 36% of state revenues last year, down from 50% in 2014, when prices were trading above $100/bbl. This pushed Russia's budget deficit out to more than 3% of GDP in 2016. According to The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "even with planned spending cuts (the deficit) will still be more than 1% of GDP by 2019 ... Russia's Reserve Fund could be exhausted by the end of 2017, on the government's original forecast of an oil price of $40/barrel in 2017."11 Oil-Market Rebalancing Critical For KSA's Aramco IPO For Saudi Arabia, however, rebalancing is critical, which explains why it has over-delivered on the promised production cuts, while Russia and the "Shia Bloc" have dragged their feet (Chart 11 and Chart 12). Not only is the currency peg non-negotiable, but Riyadh's clear interest is oil-price stability in the lead-up to its Aramco IPO. It is not enough to attract a mega investor from China; the entire oil-investment community has to be convinced they are not pouring money into an enterprise that could lose value close on the heels of the IPO. Chart 11Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russkies ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russkies ... Chart 12... Or The 'Shia Bloc' ... Or The 'Shia Bloc' ... Or The 'Shia Bloc' To attract foreign capital at reasonable prices for Aramco's massive privatization, KSA must prove it can exert some control over the oil price "floor." As such, the Kingdom's motivation to stick to the OPEC 2.0 agreement is serious. In a joint report done by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy last January, we argued that three factors are critical to this IPO:12 Moving downstream: Saudi Arabia intends to become a major global refiner with up to 10 million b/d of refining capacity (an addition of about 5 mm b/d of capacity). If realized, this volume of refining capacity would rival that of ExxonMobil's 6 mm+ b/d, the largest in the world. Because OPEC does not set quotas for refined-product exports, Saudi Arabia's shift downstream would allow it to capture higher revenues from international sales of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other refined products. This could eventually mean that Saudi Arabia would fly above ongoing crude oil market-share wars. Instead, it could rely on its access to short-haul domestic supplies and state-of-the-art technology - Aramco's principal endowments - to command massive crack spreads, or the difference between the price of input, crude oil, and output, refined product. FDI wars: With estimates of its value hovering ~ $100 billion, the Aramco IPO expected next year will be the largest ever executed. It is likely to divert FDI that Iraq and Iran desperately need to revitalize their production, transportation, and refining infrastructure. This is a crucial long-term goal for Saudi Arabia. At the moment, its oil production dwarfs that of its "Shia Bloc" OPEC rivals. However, Iran and Iraq are projected to close the gap and potentially export even more oil than the Kingdom in future (Chart 13). Bringing China into the region: The U.S. deleveraging from the Middle East continues. President Donald Trump may have ordered cruise missile strikes against Syria, but he is not interested in getting bogged down in another land war in the region. Chart 14 speaks for itself. As such, Saudi Arabia is largely on its own when facing off against Iran, its regional rival. Appeals to Chinese state energy companies are therefore designed to give Beijing a stake in Saudi energy infrastructure. This would force China to start caring more about what happens to Saudi Arabia, as with Iraq, where it is heavily invested, and Iran, where it has long flirted with investing more. Chart 13Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Chart 14U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East When we first penned our report, we were speculating on the China link. Since then, Beijing has created a consortium consisting of state-owned energy giants Sinopec and PetroChina and banks, led by the country's sovereign wealth fund, to compete in the expected $100 billion equity sale.13 Given the financial, economic, and geopolitical importance of the Aramco IPO, we continue to expect that Saudi Arabia will push to extend the OPEC 2.0 production cut when the group meets in Vienna on May 25. Judging by the commitments to the cuts thus far, the deal appears to be an agreement for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to continue to cut and for Russia and the "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq) not to increase production.14 (Both of the latter states still have a lot of "skin in the game," so to speak.) As such, an extension of the deal is in the interests of KSA, Russia, and their respective allies. And, importantly, it will continue to provide a floor to oil prices. Meanwhile, downside and upside risks to supply continue. In terms of supply increase, the usual suspects -Libya and Nigeria - are working to increase production. In terms of supply decrease, we continue to worry about the dissolution of Venezuela as a functioning state and the potential that supply disruptions may occur. Bottom Line: Geopolitical drivers still support the continuation of OPEC 2.0's efforts to restrain production and draw down global oil stockpiles. As such, our positioning recommendations for an expected backwardation - i.e., long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - and our fade of the option-market skew favoring put - the long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts - remain intact. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 A "security dilemma" refers to a situation in which a state's pursuit of "security" through military strength and alliances leads its neighbors to respond in kind, triggering a spiral of distrust and tensions. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com. NB: The $100-billion figure often attached to the estimated size of the IPO, which will seek to float 5% of Aramco, is a placeholder for the moment. There is considerable disagreement over the level at which the market will value Aramco, which some estimates significantly below the value assumed by the $100-billion estimate. We will be examining this in future research. 2 The New York Times provided an excellent summary of post-sanctions development recently in "Even Bold Foreign Investors Tiptoe in Iran," March 31, 2017. 3 For a summary of BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy recommendation performance, please contact your relationship manager. 4 Please see "The Game's Afoot, But Which One," for the consequences of OPEC's market-share war. It was published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Raising The Odds Of A KSA-Russia Oil-Production Cut," dated November 3, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC-Russia Oil Deal On Track To Deliver," dated February 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Frontier Market Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain," dated February 1, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 9 Contango markets - where prices for prompt delivery are less than prices for deferred delivery - favor shale producers when the front of the WTI forward curve is ~ $50/bbl, and - all else equal - incentivizes them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues and maximize the number of rigs they deploy. In backwardated markets, however, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," dated February 16, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2016, Table 5. 11 Please see "Russia Oil Production Outlook to 2020," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2017. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," Reuters, dated April 19, 2017, available at reuters.com. 14 In "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, we noted, "Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015-16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue." This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Despite cooperating to reduce oil production and drain global oil inventories, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran still compete at every level for dominance of the Gulf region's economic and geopolitical order. We have maintained that KSA's aggressive push to privatize (or de-nationalize) its state oil company - ARAMCO - is an extension of this battle. Now that a state-led Chinese consortium has emerged as a potential cornerstone investor in the $100 billion Saudi Armco initial public offering (IPO) expected next year, we believe a key element of KSA's strategy in the Persian Gulf's "security dilemma" is falling into place.1 Energy: Overweight. We are long the Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short the Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts at a net premium of -$0.47/bbl. This new recommendation was down 46.8%, which we initiated last week following our assessment of OPEC 2.0's strategy to reduce global oil inventories. We remain long the Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, which is up 94.7%. Our long GSCI position is down 4.5%; we have a 10% stop on this position. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper registered a 51k metric ton physical surplus in January, according to estimates from the International Copper Study Group. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold retreated going into French elections over the weekend, indicating investors were not as fearful as some pundits. Our long volatility position is down 43.8%. Ags/Softs: Underweight: Reuters reported the Brazilian government will provide up to 500 million reals (~$159mm) to market this year's corn crop. An expected record harvest and weak export volumes prompted the action.2 Feature By aggressively courting Chinese investors for its potential record-breaking Aramco IPO next year, KSA doesn't just secure funding to pursue its goal of becoming the largest publicly traded vertically integrated oil company in the world. It tangibly expands the number of powerful interests in the world with a deep economic stake in its execution of Vision 2030, the grand plan to diversify away from its near-total dependence on oil revenues. China, too, benefits from this arrangement: By expanding its financial and economic commitments to KSA, it pursues its global investment and technology strategy, and gradually its standing as a "Great Power" with a vested interest in protecting those investments. These states jointly benefit from Aramco's expansion of its refining business into the Asian refined-product markets, which will remain the most heavily contested space in the oil market. It also does not hurt China, where crude oil production has been falling since June 2015 (Chart 1), to be financially invested in a petro-super-state like KSA, which has been supplying on average 14% of its imports over the same period (Chart 2). China's product demand will breach 12mm b/d this year, with gasoline demand growing some 300k b/d, according to the IEA. Overall product demand will grow close to 345k b/d, keeping China the premier growth market in the world for refined products. Investing in the refining system meeting this consumption - and Asia's other growing markets - therefore is attractive to Chinese companies on numerous fronts. Chart 1Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chart 2... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady Iran has yet to execute on its apparent strategy to attract FDI to its oil and gas sector, where the resource potential is of the same order of magnitude as KSA's. When combined with the development potential of Iraq, a neighboring petro-state, the potential of OPEC's "Shia Bloc" is enormous. Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and Iraq's oil endowment is second only to KSA's in terms of the vast low-cost, high-quality resource available for development. Yet Iran's success in lining up the investment and technical expertise required to develop its resource endowment as it approaches critical post-sanctions elections next month has been halting at best.3 Aside, that is, from deepening its relationship with Russia, which also is seeking desperately needed FDI in the wake of the oil-price collapse brought about by OPEC's market-share was during 2015 - 16. The KSA-Iran Security Dilemma In Context Chart 3Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Before we get into the intricacies of energy geopolitics, a brief recap is in order.4 Prior to the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran beginning in 2015, KSA and OPEC benefited from an undersupplied oil market that kept oil prices above $100/bbl which allowed these states to increase domestic and military spending massively while experiencing few problems in oil exports or development. This can be seen in the evolution of KSA's fiscal breakeven oil prices, which increased dramatically in the lead-up to the 2014 price collapse (Chart 3), as production grew more slowly than spending. As the Saudi Manifa field came online in early 2014, global production expanded from various quarters, and it became apparent that sanctions against Iran would be lifted, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war. Oil prices fell from $100/bbl before OPEC's November 2014 meeting to below $30/bbl by the beginning of 2016. This strategy turned out to be a complete failure.5 We correctly predicted the failed market-share strategy would force an alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states - led by KSA and Russia, respectively - to cut production in the face of considerable market skepticism in the lead-up to OPEC's November 2016 Vienna meeting and in consultations with the Russian-led non-OPEC petro-states shortly thereafter.6 We remain convinced that this coalition, which we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, will extend its production cuts to the end of this year.7 As a result, OECD commercial inventories will decline by 10% or so, despite rising in Q1.8 Petro-State Balance Sheets Still Under Pressure The oil-price evolution described above buffeted petro-state budgets, particularly KSA's and Russia's. The pressures generated by this evolution hold the key to understanding where oil prices will go next. Finances: While both Saudi Arabia and Russia have managed to weather the decline in oil prices, the pain has been palpable. BCA's Frontier Market Strategy has detailed Saudi fiscal woes in detail.9 Based on their estimates, Saudi authorities will have enough reserves to defend the country's all-important currency peg for the next 18-24 months (Table 1). Without the peg, prices of imports would skyrocket. Table 1Saudi Arabia: Projected Debt Levels And Foreign Reserves OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Given that Saudi Arabia imports almost all of its consumer staples, such a price shock could lead to social unrest. Beyond the next two years, the government will have to rely on debt issuance to fund its deficits and focus its remaining foreign exchange resources on maintaining the peg. The problem is that this strategy will leave the country with just $350 billion in reserves by the end of 2018, lower than local currency broad money (Chart 4). At that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to even greater capital flight than is already underway (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 5KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist While Russia has weathered the storm much better, largely by allowing the ruble to depreciate, its foreign exchange reserves are down to 330 billion, the lowest figure since 2007 (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's shale-focused strategy: The market strategy behind the OPEC 2.0 agreement is complex. The roughly 1.8 mm b/d of coordinated production cuts is supposed to draw down global storage by ~ 300 mm bbls by the end of 2017. This should lead to forward curves backwardating - a process that is clearly under way (Chart 7). According to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, a backwardated forward curve is critical in slowing down the pace of tight oil production in the U.S. given the reliance of shale producers on hedging future production prices to lock in minimum revenue.10 Geopolitics: Countries with an unlimited resource like oil tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 8). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse," and is well documented in political science. Chart 6Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 7Backwardation Under Way Backwardation Under Way Backwardation Under Way What does it have to do with geopolitics? Basically, it suggests that the main national security risk to energy-producing regimes is not each other but their own populations. In countries where the political leadership generates its wealth from the sale of natural resources, the citizenry becomes a de facto "cost center" requiring social benefits and security expenditures to ensure the unemployed remain peaceful. By contrast, manufacturing nations benefit from an industrious citizenry that is a "profit center" for government coffers. In this paradigm, energy-producing states face a primary security risk that is not external, but rather derives from their own under-utilized or restless populations. Thus, when the "unlimited resource" is re-priced for lower demand or greater global supply, the real risk becomes domestic unrest. At that moment, expensive geopolitical imperatives take a back seat to domestic stability. This explains the current détente between, on one side, Russia and the OPEC "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq), and on the other, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies. Even with this détente, Saudi Arabia, its allies, and the "Shia Bloc" are finding it difficult to maintain fiscal spending that funds their still-massive social programs with prices trading in the low- to mid-$50/bbl range (Chart 9). Saudi's fiscal breakeven oil price is estimated to be $77.70/bbl this year by the IMF. Iran and Iraq require $60.70/bbl and $54/bbl, respectively, putting them in slightly better shape than their Gulf rival, but still in need of higher prices to sustain the spending required to quell social unrest.11 Chart 8Unlimited Resources Undermine Democracy OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Chart 9Oil Prices Too Low For National Budgets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Chart 10Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Given Russia's relatively superior domestic economic situation and political stability (Chart 10), we suspect that Moscow cares a little less about oil market rebalancing than Saudi Arabia. President Vladimir Putin will face reelection in less than a year, but he is unlikely to face a serious challenger. Even so, Russia still feels the pain of lower energy prices. Oil and gas revenues constituted 36% of state revenues last year, down from 50% in 2014, when prices were trading above $100/bbl. This pushed Russia's budget deficit out to more than 3% of GDP in 2016. According to The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "even with planned spending cuts (the deficit) will still be more than 1% of GDP by 2019 ... Russia's Reserve Fund could be exhausted by the end of 2017, on the government's original forecast of an oil price of $40/barrel in 2017."12 Oil-Market Rebalancing Critical For KSA's Aramco IPO For Saudi Arabia, however, rebalancing is critical, which explains why it has over-delivered on the promised production cuts, while Russia and the "Shia Bloc" have dragged their feet (Chart 11 and Chart 12). Not only is the currency peg non-negotiable, but Riyadh's clear interest is oil-price stability in the lead-up to its Aramco IPO. It is not enough to attract a mega investor from China; the entire oil-investment community has to be convinced they are not pouring money into an enterprise that could lose value close on the heels of the IPO. Chart 11Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Chart 12... Or The "Shia Bloc" ... Or The "Shia Bloc" ... Or The "Shia Bloc" To attract foreign capital at reasonable prices for Aramco's massive privatization, KSA must prove it can exert some control over the oil price "floor." As such, the Kingdom's motivation to stick to the OPEC 2.0 agreement is serious. In a joint report done by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy last January, we argued that three factors are critical to this IPO:13 Moving downstream: Saudi Arabia intends to become a major global refiner with up to 10 million b/d of refining capacity (an addition of about 5 mm b/d of capacity). If realized, this volume of refining capacity would rival that of ExxonMobil's 6 mm+ b/d, the largest in the world. Because OPEC does not set quotas for refined-product exports, Saudi Arabia's shift downstream would allow it to capture higher revenues from international sales of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other refined products. This could eventually mean that Saudi Arabia would fly above ongoing crude oil market-share wars. Instead, it could rely on its access to short-haul domestic supplies and state-of-the-art technology - Aramco's principal endowments - to command massive crack spreads, or the difference between the price of input, crude oil, and output, refined product. FDI wars: With estimates of its value hovering ~ $100 billion, the Aramco IPO expected next year will be the largest ever executed. It is likely to divert FDI that Iraq and Iran desperately need to revitalize their production, transportation, and refining infrastructure. This is a crucial long-term goal for Saudi Arabia. At the moment, its oil production dwarfs that of its "Shia Bloc" OPEC rivals. However, Iran and Iraq are projected to close the gap and potentially export even more oil than the Kingdom in future (Chart 13). Bringing China into the region: The U.S. deleveraging from the Middle East continues. President Donald Trump may have ordered cruise missile strikes against Syria, but he is not interested in getting bogged down in another land war in the region. Chart 14 speaks for itself. As such, Saudi Arabia is largely on its own when facing off against Iran, its regional rival. Appeals to Chinese state energy companies are therefore designed to give Beijing a stake in Saudi energy infrastructure. This would force China to start caring more about what happens to Saudi Arabia, as with Iraq, where it is heavily invested, and Iran, where it has long flirted with investing more. Chart 13"Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA "Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA "Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA Chart 14U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East When we first penned our report, we were speculating on the China link. Since then, Beijing has created a consortium consisting of state-owned energy giants Sinopec and PetroChina and banks, led by the country's sovereign wealth fund, to compete in the expected $100 billion equity sale.14 Given the financial, economic, and geopolitical importance of the Aramco IPO, we continue to expect that Saudi Arabia will push to extend the OPEC 2.0 production cut when the group meets in Vienna on May 25. Judging by the commitments to the cuts thus far, the deal appears to be an agreement for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to continue to cut and for Russia and the "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq) not to increase production.15 (Both of the latter states still have a lot of "skin in the game," so to speak.) As such, an extension of the deal is in the interests of KSA, Russia, and their respective allies. And, importantly, it will continue to provide a floor to oil prices. Meanwhile, downside and upside risks to supply continue. In terms of supply increase, the usual suspects -Libya and Nigeria - are working to increase production. In terms of supply decrease, we continue to worry about the dissolution of Venezuela as a functioning state and the potential that supply disruptions may occur. Bottom Line: Geopolitical drivers still support the continuation of OPEC 2.0's efforts to restrain production and draw down global oil stockpiles. As such, our positioning recommendations for an expected backwardation - i.e., long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - and our fade of the option-market skew favoring put - the long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts - remain intact. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 A "security dilemma" refers to a situation in which a state's pursuit of "security" through military strength and alliances leads its neighbors to respond in kind, triggering a spiral of distrust and tensions. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com. NB: The $100-billion figure often attached to the estimated size of the IPO, which will seek to float 5% of Aramco, is a placeholder for the moment. There is considerable disagreement over the level at which the market will value Aramco, which some estimates significantly below the value assumed by the $100-billion estimate. We will be examining this in future research. 2 Please see "Brazil readies $159 million in corn subsidies amid record crop," Reuters, April 19, 2017, available at Reuters.com. 3 The New York Times provided an excellent summary of post-sanctions development recently in "Even Bold Foreign Investors Tiptoe in Iran," March 31, 2017. 4 For a summary of BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy recommendation performance, please contact your relationship manager. 5 Please see "The Game's Afoot, But Which One," for the consequences of OPEC's market-share war. It was published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Raising The Odds Of A KSA-Russia Oil-Production Cut," dated November 3, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC-Russia Oil Deal On Track To Deliver," dated February 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Frontier Market Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain," dated February 1, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 10 Contango markets - where prices for prompt delivery are less than prices for deferred delivery - favor shale producers when the front of the WTI forward curve is ~ $50/bbl, and - all else equal - incentivizes them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues and maximize the number of rigs they deploy. In backwardated markets, however, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," dated February 16, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2016, Table 5. 12 Please see "Russia Oil Production Outlook to 2020," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2017. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," Reuters, dated April 19, 2017, availableat reuters.com. 15 In "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, we noted, "Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015-16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue." This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets

Highlights Commercial oil inventories finished the first quarter with a minimal draw. This was largely due to a surge in production and sales by Gulf producers and Russia at the end of 2016 and earlier this year, as well as slightly lower demand. Despite reports floating storage and more opaque inventories - e.g., Caribbean storage - drew significantly, OPEC 2.0 remains well short of its goal to get visible oil stocks down to five-year-average levels by year-end. If drawing storage down to more normal levels remains OPEC 2.0's goal, then the production-cutting deal negotiated by Saudi Arabia and Russia will have to be extended when OPEC meets next month. We expect this to happen. Even so, risk-reversals in options markets indicate investors and hedgers are willing to pay more for downside put protection than upside call exposure. We recommend fading this bias, and buying out-of-the-money calls and selling out-of-the-money puts using Dec/17 options. Energy: Overweight. We closed our long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI position last Thursday with a 583.3% gain. We remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, which is up 242.1%. Our long GSCI position is down 1.3%. We are recommending a long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl call vs. a short Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl put, which we will put on at tonight's close. This is driven by our analysis of the need to extend OPEC 2.0's production-cutting deal into the end of the year to reduce OECD commercial oil inventories. We continue to expect Brent and WTI prices to trade on either side of $60/bbl by year-end. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper traded lower this week, on the back of news Freeport McMoRan is poised to resume exports from its Indonesian facilities. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold traded higher, but remains range-bound. Our long volatility gold options play is up 2.9%. We will leave this trade on as a hedge, going into the French elections. Ags/Softs: Underweight: Despite heavy rains, grains (excluding rice) and beans were well offered this past week. Feature The surge in oil production and sales by Gulf producers and Russia at the end of last year and earlier this year, along with a reported slowing of demand - down ~ 100k b/d from our March estimates - combined to leave estimated supply and demand roughly balanced for 2017Q1 (Chart of the Week). These dynamics left visible OECD inventories above year-end 2016 levels (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekVisible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, ##br##As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Visible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Visible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Chart 2Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average##br## If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Less-visible floating storage, along with oil stockpiles in China and Japan, drew more than 70mm barrels (bbls), according to Morgan Stanley, while Caribbean storage fell by some 10 - 20mm bbls during the last quarter.1 In addition, major trading companies are actively looking for buyers to take unwanted physical storage capacity off their hands. Nonetheless, OPEC 2.0 - the states banded together under the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to remove some 1.8mm b/d of oil production from the market in 2017H1 - remains well short of its goal to get visible inventories down to five-year-average levels. Failure to reduce inventories almost surely requires producers allied in the production-cutting deal to extend their pact into 2017H2. We think they will, given the oft-stated desire of the Saudi and Russian energy ministers, Khalid Al-Falih and Alexander Novak, to see inventories continue to draw. Their desire was re-stated recently at a hastily called news conference in Houston last month.2 This message has remained constant from other OPEC leaders as well. The Logic Of Extending OPEC 2.0's Deal To 2017H2 Reducing the global storage overhang is imperative for the OPEC 2.0 coalition. It is the driving force behind the unlikely alliance KSA and Russia forged at the end of last year. Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015 - 16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector.3 After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue. Entering the second quarter of this year, KSA and its allies continue to over-deliver on their pledges to cut ~ 1.2mm b/d of production. Markets are expecting Russian cuts to increase to ~ 300k b/d, in line with their pledges under the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting Agreement negotiated last year (Chart 3 and Chart 4). Chart 3KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; ##br##Russian Cuts Expected to Increase KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; Russian Cuts Expected to Increase KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; Russian Cuts Expected to Increase Chart 4KSA Allies Continue to Deliver;##br## Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver KSA Allies Continue to Deliver; Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver KSA Allies Continue to Deliver; Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver However, if the OPEC 2.0 production deal to remove ~ 1.8mm b/d of production is not extended beyond its end-June deadline, storage levels will remain uncomfortably high for the KSA - Russia alliance. By our reckoning, allowing the deal to expire without extending it would only reduce visible OECD inventories by a little over 170mm barrels by year-end. This can be inferred from our assessment of balances (Chart of the Week). Not extending OPEC 2.0's deal leaves OECD commercial oil inventories close to 130mm barrels above the targeted 300mm-barrel drawdown required to return OECD inventories to more normal (i.e., five-year average) levels. With U.S. shale production coming on strong, this could be precarious for OPEC 2.0 next year. Extending the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting deal to the end of 2017H2 will reduce visible commercial inventories in the OECD by slightly more than the 300mm barrels being targeted (Chart 5). This should put storage levels back at more normal, five-year average levels, and give OPEC 2.0 some breathing room to craft a strategy to contain U.S. shale production going forward.4 For this reason, extending the 1.8mm b/d production cuts to end-2017 is almost a foregone conclusion for us, particularly as KSA needs to clean up the market, so to speak, ahead of the IPO of Saudi Aramco next year. Among other potential investors with a keen interest in the potential $100 billion floatation is a state-led consortium of Chinese banks and oil companies.5 We Think Upside Risks Dominate Oil Markets The logic of extending the OPEC 2.0 deal is compelling. But the market does not share this view. Oil speculators have significantly reduced their net long position as a percent of total open interest in the dominant crude-oil futures markets, WTI and Brent (Chart 6). This, after the specs were chastened following their huge increase in upside exposure earlier this year. Chart 5Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces ##br##OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Chart 6Specs Are Retreating From Oil Specs Are Retreating From Oil Specs Are Retreating From Oil We can also see a lack of conviction in oil options markets. Option markets provide a useful gauge of fear and greed called "skew," which is nothing more than the difference between implied option volatilities (IOV) for puts and calls.6 When the skew favors puts - shown by a negative number in the risk-reversal shown in Chart 7 - markets are signaling they value downside protection more than upside exposure, and vice versa when call IOVs exceed put IOVs. Chart 7Option Skew Favors Downside Puts ##br##Over Upside Call Exposure Option Skew Favors Downside Puts Over Upside Call Exposure Option Skew Favors Downside Puts Over Upside Call Exposure Given the logic we laid out above, we are recommending investors fade the put skew in the options markets. Specifically, we are getting long out-of-the-money Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls and selling out-of-the-money Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts against them, to express our view. We will be doing so at the close of trading today, and will report our strikes and net premium in next week's publication.7 Bottom Line: We expect the OPEC 2.0 production deal to be extended when OPEC meets on May 25 in Vienna. This will significantly raise the odds OECD commercial oil stocks will be drawn down to more normal levels, giving the OPEC 2.0 petro-states more breathing room to develop a strategy to regain a modicum of control over prices. This is critical for KSA, which still is on track to IPO Saudi Aramco next year. Given our expectation, we are recommending investors buy out-of-the-money Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls and sell out-of-the-money Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts. This allows investors to fade what appears to be a consensus - given put skews and spec positioning - and capitalize on what we believe is an all-but-certain extension of the OPEC 2.0 production deal. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by December, and to average $55/bbl to 2020. As has been mentioned often, our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018, given the large capex cuts for projects that would have been funded between 2015 and 2020 absent the 2014 - 2016 oil-price collapse. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC's Barkindo Sees Progress in Oil Cuts as Stockpiles Drop," and "Oil Traders Drain Hidden Caribbean Hoards as OPEC Cuts Bite," published by Bloomberg.com on April 2 and 3, 2017, respectively. 2 Please see "Saudi Arabia, Russia Offer United Front on Oil Supply Cuts," published by Bloomberg.com on March 7, 2017, and "Saudi energy minister says oil market fundamentals improving," published by reuters.com on the same day. 3 BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy examined this in our feature article published on September 8, 2016, entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 We discuss this at length in "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report April 6 and March 30, 2017, Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," published by Reuters.com on April 19, 2017. We speculated on just such an event in "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and its Geopolitical Strategy January 14, 2016. We noted, "While inviting Western investors and energy firms to take a stake in Aramco would make obvious sense for Saudi Arabia, we would speculate that the real target for the IPO will be Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China has overtaken the U.S. as the main importer of crude from Saudi Arabia ... but it continues to free-ride on Washington's security guarantees and commitments in the region. By giving China a stake in Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure, Riyadh would force Beijing to start caring about what happens in the region." 6 "Implied option volatility" is market jargon for the standard deviation of expected returns. It is used as an input for option-pricing models. The "implied," as it's known colloquially in markets, solves an option-pricing model like Fischer Black's, once the option's premium is discovered via trading. Market participants can determine whether puts (i.e., the right, but not the obligation, to sell) are more highly valued than calls (the right to buy) in relative terms by differencing the implied volatilities of puts and calls that are equidistant from at-the-money options. This is referred to as the options' "skew." We use the IOVs for puts and calls that both change by $0.25/bbl for every $1.00/bbl move in oil futures (i.e., 25-delta puts and calls) to calculate skew. Please see Fischer Black's seminal article, "The Pricing of Commodity Contracts," in the Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, (1976), pp. 167-79. 7 We employed a similar strategy in March 2016 - getting long Dec/16 Brent $50/bbl calls vs. selling $25/bbl puts, which registered a 103.5% gain between March 3 and April 14, following a rally in Brent prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Operating leverage could surprise on the strong side this year, based on the message from our pricing power and wage growth indicators. REITs are experiencing a playable recovery following the Fed-induced sell-off earlier this year, and overweight positions will continue to pay off. Energy services activity is set to steadily accelerate this year, powering an earnings-led share price outperformance phase. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Operating Leverage To The Rescue? Operating Leverage To The Rescue? Feature Volatility has climbed to the highest level since the U.S. election, signaling that the broad market is not yet out of the woods. As stocks recalibrate to a cooling in economic growth momentum and an escalation in geopolitical threats, downside risks should be reasonably contained by mounting signs of a healthier corporate sector. Last week we posited that stronger top line revenue growth is necessary to sustain the profit upcycle, and provide justification for historically rich valuations. Chart 1 shows sales and EPS growth over the long-term. Chart 1Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Obviously, the two move closely together, with earnings enjoying more powerful growth phases when revenue accelerates. Since 1960, regression analysis shows that operating leverage for the S&P 500's is 1.4X. In other words, a 5% increase in sales growth typically leads to 7% EPS growth. When sales are initially recovering from a deep slump operating leverage can be even higher, with earnings often rising two to three times as fast as revenue. Clearly, that is not sustainable, but can give the illusion of powerful and sustained growth for brief periods of time. At the current juncture, there are reasons to expect investors to embrace the durability of the profit expansion. Our corporate pricing power proxy has vaulted higher. Importantly, the breadth of this surge has been impressive, which bodes well for its staying power (Chart 2, second panel). On the flip side, rising labor costs look set to take a breather. Compensation growth has crested, and according to our diffusion index, fewer than half of the 18 industries tracked have higher wages than last year. The wage growth diffusion index provides a reliable leading indication for the trend in labor expenses. In other words, pricing power is rising on a broad basis while wage inflation is decelerating on a broad basis. Consequently, there are decent odds that resilient forward operating margin expectations can be matched (Chart 2, bottom panel). Elsewhere, a revival in animal spirits, the potential for easier fiscal policy and prospects for a hiatus in the U.S. dollar bull market bode well for brisk business activity. While the budding recovery in global trade could sputter if protectionism proliferates, our working assumption is that the U.S. Administrations' bark will be worse than its bite. Thus, a self-reinforcing sales and profit upcycle could be materializing. The objective message from our S&P 500 EPS model concurs (Chart 3), underscoring that high single digit/low double digit profit growth could be broadly perceived as attainable this year. Chart 2Profit Margins Can Expand Profit Margins Can Expand Profit Margins Can Expand Chart 3Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P 500 EPS Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P500 EPS Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P500 EPS True, our model has recently shown tentative signs of cresting, but difficult comparisons will only arise later this year. Indeed, Q3 and Q4 2016 were all-time high EPS numbers, implying that 12% estimated growth rates are a tall order (Chart 3, middle panel). Importantly, dissecting the profit growth sectorial contribution is instructive. Calendar 2017 over 2016 S&P 500 earnings growth is concentrated in four sectors: tech, energy, health care and financials comprise over 87% of the incremental profit growth expected (Chart 3, bottom panel). The upshot is that there is a high degree of concentration risk to fulfilling overall profit growth expectations. Energy profits are wholly dependent on the oil price, and financial sector profit optimism appears to have embedded a healthy increase in both interest rates and capital markets activity. In addition, tech sector earnings are heavily influenced by the U.S. dollar. Consequently, it will be critical for monetary conditions to stay loose, otherwise estimates will be at risk of downward revisions. Adding it up, the corporate sector sales pendulum is finally swinging in a positive direction, which should support the cyclical overshoot in stocks for a while longer, notwithstanding our expectation that the current corrective phase has further to run. This week we are updating our high-conviction overweight views on both the lagging energy services index and REIT sector. Revisiting REITs REITs have staged a mini V-shaped rebound after being punished alongside rising bond yields and worries about aggressive Fed rate hikes earlier this year. As outlined in recent Weekly Reports, the reflation theme is likely to lose steam in the second half of the year as economic momentum cools, providing additional impetus for capital inflows into the more stable income profile of REITs. Even if the economy proves more resilient and Treasury yields move higher, there are few barriers to additional outperformance. Our Technical Indicator, a combination of rates of change and moving average divergences, is extremely oversold. Forward intermediate and cyclical relative returns from current readings have been solid, as occurred in 2004, 2008 and 2014 (Chart 4). REIT valuations are more than one standard deviation below normal, according to our gauge. This suggests that poor operating performance and/or higher discount rates are already expected. There may be a limit as to how high bond yields can climb, given that they are already deep in undervalued territory according to the BCA 10-year Treasury Bond Valuation Index (Chart 4). Regardless, history shows that REITs have typically had a more positive than negative correlation with bond yields. The inverse correlation has only been in place since the financial crisis, when zero interest rate policies pushed massive capital flows into all yield generating assets. Chart 5 shows that prior to 2008, REITs outperformed during periods of both rising and falling Treasury yields. Chart 4Unloved And Undervalued Unloved And Undervalued Unloved And Undervalued Chart 5No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC Similarly, REITs have a solid track record during periods of rising inflation pressures. Since 1975, there have been six periods of rising core PCE inflation: REITs have enjoyed meaningful rallies during five of these phases (Chart 6). Hard assets tend to hold their stock market value well when overall inflation moves higher, with REIT net asset values providing solid support to share price performance. Chart 6Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Looking ahead, REITs should continue to enjoy success in boosting rental rates. Occupancy rates continue to rise (Chart 7). The unemployment rate is low, consumption is decent and businesses are growing increasingly confident. That is a recipe for higher rental demand. Our Rental Rate Composite has crested on a growth rate basis, but the advance in the CPI for homeowner's equivalent rent, a good proxy for REITs, suggests that the path of least resistance remains higher (Chart 7). REIT supply growth has also leveled off, which provides additional confidence that rental inflation will remain solid. Nevertheless, there are some areas of concern. Banks are tightening lending standards on commercial real estate loans. Some sub-categories are experiencing a mild deterioration in credit quality. For instance, Chart 8 shows that delinquency rates in the retail and office spaces have edged higher. Retail and mall REITs are likely under structural pressure owing to online competition from the likes of Amazon. Chart 7Rental Demand##br## Is Solid Rental Demand Is Solid Rental Demand Is Solid Chart 8Watch Delinquencies As ##br##Banks Tighten Credit Standards Watch Delinquencies As Banks Tighten Credit Standards Watch Delinquencies As Banks Tighten Credit Standards Overall vacancy rates are still very low (Chart 8), but if credit becomes too tight, then the relentless advance in commercial property prices may cool. For now, our REIT Demand Indicator is not signaling any imminent stress. In fact, the economy is strong enough to expect occupancy rates to keep climbing, to the benefit of underlying property valuations and rental income (Chart 7, bottom panel). In sum, the budding rebound in REIT relative performance should be embraced as the start of a sustained trend. Total return potential is very attractive on a relative basis. Bottom Line: REITs remain a very attractive high-conviction overweight. Energy Servicers Are Cleaning Up Their Act We put the S&P energy services index on our high-conviction overweight list at the start of the year, because three critical factors that typically lead to a playable rally existed, namely; the global rig count had hit an inflection point, oil supplies were easing and global oil production growth had begun to decelerate. While the pullback in oil prices has undermined relative performance for the time being, there is scope for a full recovery, and more. Oil prices have firmed, underpinned by a revival in the geopolitical risk premium following the U.S. bombing campaign in Syria. There is already a wide gap between share prices and oil prices (Chart 9, top panel), and a narrowing is probable, especially as earnings drivers reaccelerate. There are tentative signs that capital spending cuts are finally reversing. The global rig count has rebounded, and is a good leading indicator for investment (Chart 10). This message is corroborated by our Global Capex Indicator, which has recently surged anew (Chart 10). Chart 9Room For ##br##Margin Improvement... Room For Margin Improvement... Room For Margin Improvement... Chart 10...As Deflation Eases ##br##And Capex Rebounds ...As Deflation Eases And Capex Rebounds ...As Deflation Eases And Capex Rebounds The longer that oil prices can stay in their current trading range, or beyond, the more time E&P balance sheets have to heal and the greater the odds that the cost of capital will be reduced. Against this backdrop, there are high odds that previously mothballed exploration projects will be restored. The V-shaped recovery in the global oil rig count, albeit from a very low base, will eventually absorb excess capacity and allow the industry to escape deflation. A major improvement in day rates is unlikely given the scale of the previous capacity boom, but even a modest pricing power improvement should provide a nice boost given high operating leverage. EBITDA margins have considerable room to improve if pricing power grows anew (Chart 9, bottom panel). Importantly, the shifting composition of global production will allow service companies with domestic exposure to shine. Shale oil producers should recapture lost market share, given that the onus to rebalance markets has been taken on by OPEC. OPEC production is contracting, while non-OPEC output is starting to recover (Chart 11, bottom panel), culminating in a widening in the Brent-WTI oil price spread. Production restraint is helping to rebalance physical oil markets. Total OECD inventory growth is reversing, and anecdotal reports are surfacing that floating storage is rapidly being depleted. Oil supply at Cushing is on the cusp of contracting, which is notable given that this has had a high correlation with relative share price performance for the past decade (oil supply shown inverted, Chart 11). On a global basis, global inventory drawdowns have been correlated with a firming industry relative profitability, and vice versa. OECD oil supply growth is rapidly receding, which augurs well for an extension of budding earnings outperformance (Chart 12, middle panel). Chart 11Receding Inventories ##br##Should Boost Performance... Receding Inventories Should Boost Performance… Receding Inventories Should Boost Performance… Chart 12...EPS And##br## Valuations ...EPS And Valuations ...EPS And Valuations The rise in clean tanker rates reinforces that oil demand is rising quickly enough to expect additional inventory depletion (Chart 12, bottom panel). Typically, tanker rates and energy service relative valuations are positively correlated. Adding it up, a rising global rig count, decelerating inventories and restrained oil production continue to bode well for a playable rally in the high-beta S&P energy services group. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight stance in the S&P energy services index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRE - SLB, HAL, BHI, NOV, FTI, HP, RIG. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights This week, we provide one of our occasional updates on Commodities as an Asset class (CAAC), examining the strategic case for getting long commodity index exposure. Commodity index exposure is more highly correlated with inflation than equities or bond exposure, indicating commodities - and real assets generally - provide a better hedge against inflation than financial assets. A pure investment case for getting long broad commodity index exposure can be made if backwardation is expected in one or more of the components of a given index. Given our expectation for higher inflation, and our positioning for backwardation in the oil market, we recommend getting long the energy-heavy S&P GSCI index as a strategic portfolio position. Energy: Overweight. Deeper-than-expected production cuts from OPEC were reported by Reuters Tuesday, suggesting Cartel members are at 104% of pledged output reductions.1 Our $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl WTI calls spreads in Jul-Aug-Sep settled at an average of $3.06/bbl, and we are taking profits of 76.9%, per the upside $3.00/bbl stop we established for these positions on March 23/17. We also are taking profits on our Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 WTI backwardation trade basis tonight's close, after registering a gain of more than 700% when we marked to market earlier this week. We are keeping our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 Brent backwardation spread open; it is up 426.3% since we recommended it on March 23/17. We are recommending a strategic long position in the energy-heavy S&P GSCI basis today's close. Given this commodity index's overweight to oil and refined products, we believe price appreciation will offset negative roll returns until crude markets go into backwardation later this year. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by year end. Base Metals: Neutral. Workers at Southern Copper's Toquepala and Cuajone mines struck Monday seeking higher wages and improved working conditions, according to Metal Report. Front-line copper on the COMEX has been chopping between ~ $2.50/lb and $2.70/lb since the beginning of the year through multiple strike actions. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold rallied slightly, but our long volatility play still is down 14.7%. Markets do not appear to be overly concerned with Fed actions over the next couple of months. Feature There's a long-standing argument among equities investors as to whether they trade the stock market or a market of stocks. In the case of the former, getting long index exposure makes sense. In the case of the latter, stock pickers sensitive to the idiosyncratic risk of individual equities outperform the broad-exposure devotees. Sometimes, both are right at the same time. Commodities are no different. There are times when broad exposure to commodities is warranted - e.g., in the early stages of a global industrial rebound or when investors expect higher inflation. However, there are periods in which sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk reflecting different fundamental states for each market works best. And, as is the case with equities, there are times when both points of view can co-exist without contradiction. The relative performance of commodities vs. equities post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) leaves much to be desired (Chart 1A and Chart 1B). The re-balancing of commodities generally, led by crude oil, but apparent in key base metals like copper, suggests the overall commodity down-cycle - with the exception of ags - has leveled out. Fundamentals - supply, demand and inventories - will be far more important for commodities going forward, particularly as the Fed pursues its rates-normalization policy and markets are slowly weaned off the excessive monetary accommodation they've seen in the post-GFC period. Chart 1ACommodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, ##br##Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse Commodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse Commodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse Chart 1BCommodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, ##br##Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse Commodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse Commodities Were Competitive Pre-GFC, Post-GFC Underperformance Will Reverse There are two global-macro considerations driving our expectation commodities will outperform the other major asset classes going forward, which we consider below. First, consistent with our House view and recent analysis from our Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) service, we expect higher inflation, which already is being reflected in the forward CPI swaps markets. This could be exacerbated if oil supplies tighten on the back of massive capex cuts following the 2015 - 16 oil-price collapse, and if U.S. fiscal stimulus overheats an economy that already is at or near full capacity and full employment. Second, backwardation in crude oil markets will be a positive development for commodity index products generally, and the energy-heavy S&P GSCI in particular. Together, these fundamentals will provide investors portfolio diversification via non-correlated returns vis-à-vis the other asset classes. Higher Inflation Expectations Support Commodity Index Exposure We have been highlighting the inflationary "tail risks" in commodity markets for a number of months. These include the possibility of 1) higher oil prices after 2018, following the more-than-$1 trillion cuts in oil-and-gas capex in the wake of the 2015 - 16 oil price collapse; and 2) a large injection of fiscal stimulus to the U.S. economy from the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress working with President Trump's White House. The fiscal stimulus could become material next year, revving an economy that is at or near full employment and an output gap at or close to being closed.2 Our colleagues on BCA's GFIS desk note, "underlying U.S. inflation pressures remain strong, particularly given the evidence that conditions in the labor market are getting progressively tighter." While inflationary forces are a bit more subdued in Europe and Japan, our colleagues continue to favor being long CPI swaps in both markets (Chart 2).3 BCA's GFIS expects inflation expectations to rise to a level of ~ 2.5% p.a. on 10-year TIPS breakevens, which are priced off the CPI index. If markets do raise the odds of higher inflation over the medium term, it most likely will continue to show up in the 5-year 5-year (5y5y) CPI Swaps in the U.S. and Europe, which we have found to be cointegrated with 3-year forward WTI futures (Chart 3). The oil market will be especially sensitive to the supply-demand balances after 2018, and will move higher if it senses a supply squeeze from too-little investment in production following the massive cuts to supply-side capex. This will feed into the 5y5y CPI swaps markets, which, in turn, will drive TIPS yields higher. Chart 2Early Days Yet, But ##br##U.S. Inflation Pressures Are Building Early Days Yet, But U.S. Inflation Pressures Are Building Early Days Yet, But U.S. Inflation Pressures Are Building Chart 3Watch 3-Year Forward WTI Futures ##br##For Early Signs Of Higher Inflation Watch 3-Year Forward WTI Futures For Early Signs Of Higher Inflation Watch 3-Year Forward WTI Futures For Early Signs Of Higher Inflation Apart from active commodity positioning, commodity index exposure offers better inflation risk coverage than equities or bonds, as can be seen in Table 1.4 Chart 4 shows the out-performance of the commodity indices, the S&P GSCI in particular, in higher-inflation environments. Table 1Correlations Between Real And Financial Assets CAAC: Time To Get Long Commodity Index Exposure CAAC: Time To Get Long Commodity Index Exposure Our own modeling supports the academic findings. When we estimated the yoy S&P GSCI returns as a function of U.S. CPI yoy changes and the difference between 1st-nearby WTI futures (CL1) and 12th nearby WTI futures (CL12), we found this specification explained just over 84% of the commodity index's annual returns. Our model indicates the S&P GSCI can be expected to increase in value by close to 15bp for every 1% increase in U.S. CPI (Chart 5). This energy-heavy index - crude oil and refined products comprise more than half of the S&P GSCI - performs much better than the more evenly disbursed Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCI) as an inflation hedge. Chart 4Commodities Outperform In##br## Inflationary Markets Commodities Outperform In Inflationary Markets Commodities Outperform In Inflationary Markets Chart 5S&P GSCI Index Exposure ##br##Moves With Inflation S&P GSCI Index Exposure Moves With Inflation S&P GSCI Index Exposure Moves With Inflation Profiting From Backwardation Long-only commodity index products generate returns from three sources: Price appreciation; roll yield - the returns generated by selling and replacing futures contracts approaching their terminal trading date (the expiring contract in the index is sold and replaced by a contract with a deferred delivery); and on the collateral posted to carry positions. An investor with a strong view on prices can express it by getting long or short futures. When an investor wants to express a view on the structure of the market - chiefly the shape of the forward curve and whether it will be backwardated (prompt delivery costs more than deferred delivery), or in contango (prompt delivery costs less than deferred delivery) - they can do so either by trading spreads (buying prompt-delivered contracts vs. selling deferred-delivered contracts, and vice versa) or getting long commodity-index exposure such as the S&P GSCI or Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCI). Typically, long-only commodity-index products largest returns are generated via price appreciation and roll yield, which simply are returns generated by "rolling" the underlying futures contracts in the index as these contracts approach the termination of trading to a deferred month. In a backwardated market, prompt-delivered contracts are sold and replaced with lower-cost contracts. In contango markets the opposite occurs. Indexes with heavy concentrations in futures that are likely to be backwardated for a length of time are preferred to indexes with futures that, on a fundamental basis, are more likely to have a flat or contango term structure. We have been positioning for a backwardation in crude oil later this year for some time. We continue to expect backwardation in crude oil markets, and remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent to express this view. Given the very high concentration of energy exposure in the S&P GSCI index - more than half of the index is crude oil or refined products, according to S&P - this index is best-suited, in our estimation, to benefit from a backwardated oil market.5 Indeed, our modeling, shown in Chart 5, supports our view that backwardation would significantly boost performance in the S&P GSCI index: A 1% increase in the spread between 1st-nearby WTI vs. 12th-nearby WTI contracts likely would translate into gain in the index of slightly more than 1.14%. Bottom Line: We expect higher inflation and backwardation in the oil market later this year. For this reason, we are recommending a long exposure in the energy-heavy S&P GSCI index. Commodities outperform equities and bonds in inflationary markets. In addition, this index's overweight to crude oil and refined products suggests it will outperform when markets backwardate. Given we expect WTI and Brent prices to trade on either side of $60/bbl later this year, we believe price appreciation will offset minor roll-yield losses until markets backwardate. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Exclusive: OPEC futures show oil output cuts exceed pledge in March - sources" published by Reuters.com on April 11, 2017. 2 Please see issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Gold's 'Known Unknowns' And Fat Tails," dated February 23, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy weekly Report "The Song Remains The Same," dated April 11, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Bhardwaj, Geetesh, Gary Gorton and Geert Rouwenhorst (2015), "Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures Ten Years Later*" published by Yale University. This article updates earlier research and notes, "In the original study we found that commodities had historically offered a risk premium similar to equities, and at the same time would provide diversification to a traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds. What set commodities apart from these traditional assets was their positive correlation with inflation. (Emphasis added.) Here we provide 10 years of additional data. Although a decade is sometimes too short to draw firm conclusions, our-of-sample period is rich because it includes a global economic expansion led by the industrialization of China, a housing boom and bust in the United States, the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression, followed by a monetary policy stimulus response which has driven interest rates around the world towards zero. ... Many of the basic conclusions of the original study continue to hold." (p. 22) 5 Please see "WTI Crude Oil Remains On Top As S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces 2017 Weights For The S&P GSCI," at http://ca.spindices.com/indices/commodities/sp-gsci, website for the index. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Summary of Trades Closed In 2016

Highlights WTI and Brent forward curves remain more or less backwardated beginning in 2018. On its face, this indicates hedgers and speculators are trading and positioning as if the OPEC - non-OPEC production deal negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia in late 2016 will succeed in drawing inventories, leaving the market in a physical deficit this year. Over the short-term, this induced supply shock benefits producers generally. Longer term, KSA and Russia will have to continue to manage supplies if they are to exert any influence on oil prices. This is a three-level game, which now involves U.S. shale-oil producers as a permanent feature of the market. It will be difficult to manage. But the stakes are sufficiently high for KSA and Russia that we believe it has to be played. Energy: Overweight. We closed the first quarter on an up note, with our trade recommendations still open and closed in 2017Q1 up 420.75% on average. Base Metals: Neutral. Striking miners at Freeport McMoRan's Cerro Verde facility in Peru are back on the job, as are workers at BHP's Escondido mine in Chile. Export licensing difficulties at Freeport's Grasberg facility in Indonesia are close to being resolved.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long volatility play in gold is down -32.8%, which, from a macro perspective, indicates markets are not fearful of a Fed-related surprise over the next couple of months. Ags/Softs: Underweight. U.S. farmers' corn planting intentions came in 1mm acres less than expected at 90mm; beans came in at 89.5mm acres, or 1.4mm over expectations; and wheat was up 100k acres at 46.1mm. Stocks remain high, and we remain bearish. Feature KSA, Russia and their allies - OPEC 2.0 - are trying to regain control of oil fundamentals produced by one of the most unlikely combinations of events ever seen in the history of the oil market. This week, we review how we arrived at the market conditions we now confront, and consider a possible strategy evolving out of the production-cutting Agreement (the "Agreement" for short) that may allow them to do so. Current markets conditions were spawned by a surge in EM oil demand in the early part of the 21st century, which met an almost perfectly inelastic supply curve. This took prices from $55/bbl in 2005 to more than $140/bbl by the end of 2008H1 (Chart of the Week). Along the way, some 5mm b/d of DM oil demand had to be destroyed by higher prices to make room for the EM growth depicted in Chart 2, which is taken from an analysis by Hamilton (2009).2 Chart of the WeekEM Consumption Surge, Flat Production ##br##Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC Chart 2High Prices Were Required##br## To Balance Markets Pre-GFC The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? These high prices combined with the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) low-interest rate regime into a perfect storm, which allowed the supply side to evolve the shale technology in the U.S. Steadily rising light-tight-oil (LTO) production has profoundly altered the market, forcing OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states to devise a strategy to contain this surge. Whether they can do so is yet to be determined. In this article we consider one strategy that might allow OPEC 2.0 to regain some control over pricing and the rate of growth in shale production, but it is highly dependent on them maintaining production discipline and finding a way to coordinate their production. First, though, a quick review. How Did We Get Here? The GFC dragged all markets lower, leaving oil prices just above $40/bbl by the end of 2008. In the wake of the GFC, central banks led by the Fed pursued massively accommodative monetary policies, which took interest rates to the zero lower bound. OPEC, led by KSA, drastically cut supplies to remove a huge unintended inventory accumulation that developed as demand collapsed (Chart 3). While DM oil demand remained depressed in the wake of the GFC, EM governments, led by China, massively stimulated their economies, which lifted global oil consumption more than 4% by 2010 (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, ##br##Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 Chart 4EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC Growth in global supplies post-GFC, meanwhile, was more measured. OPEC total liquids production from 2009 to 2014 averaged just below 0.05% growth yoy. Part of this meager growth in OPEC production no doubt was explained by lower production from the Cartel resulting from civil war in Libya and nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, which reduced overall output. It also is possible the fall-out from the GFC and the euro-area crisis of 2009 - 2011 kept OPEC producers from committing to higher production as well. Be that as it may, EM demand growth, along with OPEC's lower output, allowed prices to again trade above $100/bbl by 2011 and stay there till mid-2014 (Chart 5). The years-long combination of near-zero interest rates and high oil prices allowed U.S. shale-oil production to advance in leaps and bounds, such that by 2014, yoy light-tight oil (LTO) production from the shales was growing at more than 1mm b/d (Chart 6). Chart 5EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation##br## Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 Chart 6High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale ##br##Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 Now What? OPEC underestimated the magnitude of the shale-oil revolution, as did most observers. However, KSA, the leader of the Cartel, was pre-occupied with geopolitical considerations, chiefly its ongoing proxy wars throughout the Middle East with Iran and its allies. High prices allowed it to build its reserves and fund these proxy wars. This ended when Iran and western powers began negotiating an end to sanctions, which, if successful, would once again allow Iran to access foreign capital and technology to develop its economy.3 As the negotiations to remove sanctions on Iran progressed, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war at the end of 2014, presumably to take back customers lost to shale, particularly in the U.S. We do not believe OPEC's primary aim in declaring a market-share war was to crush U.S. shale output. Indeed, we have consistently maintained the market-share war was more an extension of KSA's and Iran's proxy wars throughout the Middle East, and that KSA was using the pump-at-will strategy to limit revenues that would flow to Iran in the post-sanctions environment. The secondary target of the market-share war was U.S. shale production, but, even then we maintained shale-oil production was needed to keep prices from revisiting $140/bbl-plus levels.4 The market-share war tanked prices, as OPEC increased the quantity of oil it would supply at lower prices. In particular, Saudi Arabia surged production from November 2014, into the collapse of oil prices. Over time, the market-share strategy destroyed high-cost supply worldwide. U.S. shale production fell ~ 15% from a high of ~ 5.3mm b/d in March 2015 in the four largest LTO basins to a low of ~ 4.5mm b/d, by our reckoning, in 2017Q1. At the same time, non-Gulf OPEC production fell dramatically as well, close to 8% in 2016 yoy to an average of 7.7mm b/d. Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia, however, saw production increase 6.5% and 2% yoy, respectively, to close to 25mm b/d and 11.2mm b/d in 2016. In the aftermath of the price collapse, U.S. shale producers retreated to their "core" producing properties - those areas with the lowest-cost, most accessible shale reserves - and dramatically improved their productivity (Chart 7). A collapse in services costs allowed LTO producers to maintain core operations and continue to advance shale-oil technology. At the end of the day, this made the global supply curve more elastic, in that LTO production now allowed higher demand to be met by smaller price increases than had been the case in the lead-up to the GFC. The increased elasticity of supply from U.S. shales, and the increased quantity supply by OPEC is depicted in Chart 8, which picks up from Hamilton's (2009) analysis shown in Chart 2. Chart 7U.S. Shale Productivity Surged ##br##During OPEC's Market-Share War U.S Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC's Market-Share War U.S Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC's Market-Share War Chart 8Global Oil Supply##br## Transformed By 2014H1 The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? OPEC's Market-Share War Failed We contend the KSA - Russia production Agreement negotiated at the end of last year represents an abandonment of OPEC's market-share strategy. If, as recent research suggests, this strategy was an attempt to "squeeze" higher-cost shale production from the market by increasing OPEC crude supplies, it was a failure: The market-share strategy imperiled the finances of OPEC and non-OPEC states heavily dependent on oil revenues to sustain themselves, and left U.S. shale production more resilient than it was prior to the market-share war being declared.5 The surge in shale supplies and in OPEC's quantity supplied to the market during its market-share war, coupled with slower growth following the dramatic increase in EM demand in 2010 - 2012, led to unintended inventory accumulation worldwide, which has kept global storage at record levels. This is the central issue being addressed by the OPEC - non-OPEC production Agreement to remove up to 1.8mm b/d of production from the market. In effect, the KSA - Russia deal is inducing a supply shock to shift the global supply curve back to the left, after it was pushed down and to the right from 2014H2 to 2015H2, as depicted in Chart 9. In and of itself, this should lift and stabilize prices by the end of this year. We expect this induced supply shock will begin to force more visible inventories - e.g., in the U.S. and OECD generally - to draw rapidly. We continue to expect OECD stocks to reach 5-year average levels by year-end 2017, and for prices to reach $60/bbl by year end (Chart 10). We do not believe an extension in OPEC 2.0's production Agreement is needed to achieve this. Chart 9KSA - Russia Deal Is An Induced Supply Shock##br## Intended To Shift The Curve Back To The Left The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Chart 10Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year ##br##Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 It goes without saying, the parties to OPEC 2.0's production-management deal must maintain production discipline for this strategy to be able to evolve to the next level, where they attempt to restore a measure of price inelasticity to the global supply curve. If they are successful, then they will be able to exercise a degree of control over prices using spare capacity, storage and forward guidance to achieve and defend specific targets. If not, the market will do the hard work of destroying high-cost supply with lower prices. The End Game For KSA - Russia For the KSA - Russia Agreement to affect U.S. shale output over the medium to longer term, they have to coordinate production in a way that keeps WTI prices from rising to the point where shale-oil producers are able to step outside their "core" production areas. We believe over the short term, this price is between $55/bbl and $60/bbl. Our colleague Matt Conlan, of the BCA Energy Sector Strategy, has illustrated that the "true" breakeven for shale producers is much closer to $50/bbl, than the $30/bbl figure oft cited in the media.6 However, above $60/bbl, more costly reserves can be developed and still produce acceptable returns for LTO drillers. Therefore, if prices can be kept below $60/bbl, and the induced supply shock engineered by KSA and Russia causes oil inventories to draw as we expect this year, we believe the resulting backwardation in WTI will limit the rate at which rigs return to the field. In our modeling, we find shale rig counts to be sensitive to the shape of the forward curve for WTI. A backwardated curve translates into fewer rigs returning to the field than a flat or contango curve. In one model we estimated, we found a 10% backwardation from mid-2017 to end-2018 resulted in a rig count that was close to 18% below the rig count that could be expected from a relatively flat forward curve. The only way we see for KSA and Russia to affect the shape of the WTI forward curve over the short term - to end 2018 - is to use their own spare capacity and storage to keep the front of the curve below $60/bbl, and to provide forward guidance that they are able to adjust supply markets over the short- to medium-term in a manner that keeps the forward curve backwardated. This will require short-term production coordination among the states comprising OPEC 2.0, so that refinery demand is met out of current production plus inventories, and that unforeseen outages are remedied quickly. This is a short-term fix. It likely can be implemented this year and carried into next year. However, beyond that, it is difficult to see how KSA and Russia, and their respective allies, will coordinate production, storage operations and forward guidance having never attempted such an effort in the past. However, we are reasonably sure members of OPEC 2.0 are discussing how to implement such coordination. Keeping the front of the curve at a price that dissuades shale producers from expanding beyond their "core" production also will limit the amount of investment that can be made in non-Gulf OPEC production, which already is in decline, and other higher-cost conventional production like deep water.7 This, coupled with the $1-trillion-plus cuts to global capex for projects that would have been producing between 2015 - 2020 resulting from the 2015 - 16 price collapse could produce a supply deficit by 2019 that only can be remedied by significantly higher prices that not only encourage new higher-cost production but destroys demand in the meantime while that production is being developed. Bottom Line: We expect the KSA - Russia Agreement to produce a physical deficit this year that draws OECD oil inventories down by ~ 300mm barrels by year end. We also expect to see deeper coordination among the petro-states that are party to this Agreement - OPEC 2.0 - this year and next, which will keep the WTI forward curve backwardated into 2018. While we expect WTI prices to average $55/bbl to 2020 - and to trade between $45 and $65/bbl most of the time - our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018. It is not clear OPEC 2.0 can endure beyond the short term (into 2018). We will be watching the response of U.S. shale producers to increasing demand, and increasing decline-curve losses outside the U.S. shales, the Gulf OPEC producers and Russia, where we expect production declines to accelerate. As we have noted often in the past, the loss of more than $1 trillion of capex will place an enormous burden on U.S. shales, Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia. If any one of these cannot deliver higher volumes when called upon, prices could move sharply above $65/bbl after 2018 going forward. Likewise, we will be watching to see if OPEC 2.0 is capable of setting and meeting production and inventory goals. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Workers to end strike at Peru's top copper mine Cerro Verde," published March 30, 2017, by miningweekly.com. 2 Please see "Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08," by James D. Hamilton, in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009, particularly pp. 228 - 234. 3 Please see "P5+1 and Iran agree on nuclear negotiation framework in Vienna," published February 20, 2014, by cnn.com. The sanctions were lifted in early 2016; see "Iran nuclear deal: Five effects of lifting sanctions," published January 18, 2016, by bbc.com. 4 For an in-depth analysis of OPEC's market-share war, please see the Special Report entitled "End Of An Era For Oil And The Middle East," published jointly by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy groups on April 9, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash," published September 8, 2016, and our "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," published December 8, 2016, in which we discuss the toll lower oil prices were taking on oil-dependent states including KSA and Russia. See also "The Dynamics of the Revenue Maximization - Market Share Trade-Off: Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy in the 2014 - 2015 Price Fall," by Bassam Fattouh, Rahmatallah Poudineh and Anupama Sen, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in October 2015, and "An analysis of OPEC's strategic actions, US shale growth and the 2014 oil price crash," by Alberto Behar and Robert A. Ritz, published by the IMF July 2016. Both papers consider OPEC's market-share war vis-à-vis U.S. shale-oil production, the strategy of squeezing shale producers from the market by increasing supply and lowering prices, and the likelihood for success. 6 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "The Other Guys In The Oil Market" in this week's Energy Sector Strategy, which takes an in-depth look at the stagnant-to-declining production in conventional oil-producing provinces outside the U.S. onshore, Middle East OPEC and Russia, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Summary of Trades Closed In 2016