Equities

Special Report

Dear Client, I had the pleasure of participating in the Affin Hwang Capital conference in Kuala Lumpur on November 8th. In addition to sharing my views on today's macro environment, I discussed BCA's recent successes in developing quant-based solutions for bottom-up stock picking and market timing. I have transcribed my remarks on the latter topic below. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature The Arithmetic Of Active Management Every active investor wants to outperform the market. Unfortunately, just like everyone cannot be above-average in height, beauty, or intelligence, not every investor can outperform their benchmark. I think very few people in the audience would dispute this assertion. What could be more surprising to some of you is the following claim, which is that active investors as a group will always underperform the market. I say this not because I have any ill will towards active investors. I'm an active investor myself. I say this simply because it is a mathematical tautology. As Bill Sharpe has emphasized, the market return is simply the weighted average of the returns that passive and active investors earn before fees.1 The passive return must, by definition, equal the market return. This necessarily implies that the average active return must also equal the market return. Since active investors incur higher costs than passive investors, the former group will always underperform the latter group on average. That's the bad news. The good news is that not all active investors are the same. Some are better than others, and while it is not easy, it is possible to isolate certain strategies that active managers employ that help them outperform the market. Before I discuss these strategies, let me make a generic point, which is that most so-called active investors are not particularly active. In fact, according to one academic paper, the fraction of truly active investors - those whose returns deviate significantly from the market benchmark - shrank from 60% in 1980 to less than 20% in 2009 (Chart 1). In contrast to active investors whose portfolio returns broadly mimic the market's, genuinely active investors typically outperform their benchmarks (Chart 2).2 Chart 1How Active Are Active Investors? Chart 2Active Stock Pickers Outperform What are successful active investors doing to beat their benchmark? Well, first of all, let me tell you what they are not doing: They are not taking on more risk. Don't Bet On Beta Chart 3 shows that there is no clear relationship between a stock's beta and its expected return.3 To those familiar with the CAPM model, this may be surprising. The CAPM model predicts that higher-beta stocks will earn superior returns because they are riskier. High-beta stocks outperform the market when the market is going up, but underperform the market when it is going down. Since the market tends to go up more often than it goes down, the expected return to high-beta stocks should exceed the expected return to low-beta stocks. Chart 3Don't Bet On Beta As I will discuss, the reason this theoretical prediction is refuted by the empirical evidence is because the market is rife with inefficiencies. What is more, these inefficiencies reflect pervasive institutional and behavioral biases that are engrained within the market's very own DNA. Active managers who understand these biases can exploit them to outperform their benchmarks. Let me start with the former: institutional biases. The investment industry often encourages a "heads I win, tails you lose" mentality: If a fund manager takes on a lot of risk and gets lucky, he or she will be well remunerated; if the manager is unlucky, he or she may have to look for a new job, but the primary losers will be the clients of the fund. Such an incentive structure encourages managers to take on excessive risk by purchasing, among other things, high-beta stocks. This bids up the price of these stocks to the point where they no longer offer enough additional return to compensate for their higher risk. Size And Value If buying high-beta stocks simply adds more risk without generating more reward, what types of stocks do outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis? Much of the early academic literature focused on two factors: size and value. Historically, it has been the case that small caps and value stocks have outperformed large caps and growth stocks. Some academics have offered risk-based explanations for the size and value effects. Personally, I find these explanations unconvincing, especially in the case of value stocks. The main problem with risk-based arguments is that they fail to convincingly identify the nature of the risk that investors who purchase value stocks are being compensated for. It is certainly not market risk - value stocks tend to be low beta (Chart 4). Revealingly, companies that do face greater existential risks - those that have high levels of debt relative to equity, for example - tend to underperform the market.4 This is exactly the opposite of what risk-based arguments would predict. Chart 4Value Tends To Outperform Growth When The Stock Market Is Falling The presence of market inefficiencies provides a more compelling explanation for why small caps and value stocks outperform. Consider two companies, identical in every way except that one has a lower market capitalization than the other. Since the only difference between the two companies is the price of their shares, the "cheaper" company will generate higher returns for shareholders over the long haul. The cheaper, smaller capitalization company will also initially trade at a lower price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratio. In other words, it will look more like a small cap value stock. Thus, it is not necessary to invoke complex, risk-based explanations for why small caps and value stock outperform. It is exactly what one would expect if markets are not perfectly efficient. Ignore The Analysts? Of course, some stocks are cheap for a reason. How can we distinguish between hidden gems and fool's gold? Wall Street is populated with thousands of analysts paid to make that determination. But are they any good? For the most part, the answer is no. Chart 5 shows analysts' published earnings forecasts versus realized earnings growth. Analysts have had some success at predicting earnings growth over a one-to-two year horizon, but are almost useless over a five-year horizon.5 In fact, large cap companies favoured by analysts tend to underperform companies that analysts pan. Chart 5A Mug's Game There are two exceptions to this rule. The first applies to small caps. Since many smaller companies are not widely followed, analysts that do follow them often add significant value. Unlike their large cap brethren, small cap stocks with buy recommendations tend to outperform stocks with sell recommendations. Second, changes in analyst recommendations do predict returns. Stocks that have recently been upgraded tend to outperform those that have recently been downgraded.6 Insiders And Short Interest How about insiders? Here, the data suggests that insiders know what they are doing. The shares of companies with a lot of insider buying tend to rise more than those that have experienced insider selling. Short interest also predicts returns. Heavily-shorted companies tend to underperform companies that have attracted few short sellers. Combining data on insider activity and short interest can help supercharge returns. Chart 6 shows the highest returns are earned when insiders are buying and short interest is decreasing.7 The worst-performing stocks end up belonging to companies where insiders are heavy sellers and short interest has risen over the prior 12 months. Chart 6Prefer Stocks Where Insiders Are Buying And Short Interest Is Falling Mo' Money What about technical analysis? The academic literature on this topic is a mixed bag, with some studies deeming it useless and others suggesting it can be useful in certain situations. For most technical indicators, the noise-to-signal ratio is very high. Nevertheless, some technical indicators are worth following. Momentum is one of them (Chart 7). Over short-term horizons of about one month, mean reversion prevails - stocks that did well over the prior month tend to do poorly during the subsequent month. In contrast, over medium-term horizons of about 12 months, return continuation is the name of the game - stocks that have done well over the last 12 months tend to do well during the subsequent month. Interestingly, at very long time horizons of three-to-five years, mean reversion takes over again: Stocks that have done well over the last five years tend to do poorly over the subsequent month. The implication is that the best stocks are those that have underperformed the market over the past one month and over the past three years, but have outperformed the market over the past 12 months. Chart 7The Three Phases Of Momentum Putting aside the short-term reversal effect which, in practice, is hard to exploit due to trading costs, what are the drivers of the medium-term return continuation effect and the longer-term return reversal effect? I think three factors explain the medium-term return continuation effect. The first is institutional inertia. A large money manager cannot instantly jump in and out of a position. It may take many months to build a position to its desired size and just as much time to liquidate it. Persistent buying and selling generates momentum in equity returns. The second factor is imperfect information. A lot of the return continuation effect occurs around the time of earnings reports. If a company reports better-than-expected earnings, its stock goes up. As others hear about and process the good news, the stock usually continues to advance over the subsequent days. The third factor is behavioral biases. People tend to be quite eager to lock in gains but are usually reluctant to realize losses. When a company reports good news, investors are too quick to sell. This premature selling prevents the stock price from rising to its fair value instantaneously. During the time it takes the stock to reach fair value, the share price displays upward momentum. Conversely, when the company reports bad news, investors avoid taking losses, hoping instead that some miracle will bail them out. The lack of willing sellers prevents the stock from falling to its fair value immediately. In the time it takes investors to come to terms with the fact that a miracle is not forthcoming, the share price displays downward momentum. What about the longer-term return-reversal effect? Ironically, it is probably a function of the medium-term return continuation effect. Upward momentum attracts interest from trend-following investors. People who sold too early or never got in from the beginning kick themselves and look for the slightest dip to buy. All this buying interest eventually pushes the stock price above its fair value, setting the stage for a prolonged period of subpar returns. Anomalies Abound Let me briefly mention a few other factors that predict equity returns. Share turnover is one of them. Investors often presume that high turnover is intrinsically a good thing. Terms such as "healthy volume" abound. The truth is that companies with low rates of share turnover actually outperform the market, all things equal.8 Part of this outperformance reflects a liquidity premium. Part of it may also simply reflect the fact that undervalued companies often hide in the shadows of the market, away from the spotlight. There are also balance sheet and earnings quality factors that are worth highlighting. I already mentioned that companies with high debt-to-equity ratios tend to underperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis. It is also true that companies with high accruals - firms that fail to convert most of their earnings into cash flow - underperform the market. More surprisingly, companies whose assets have been growing very quickly also tend to underperform the market. Such asset growth often ends up reflecting empire building rather than prudent corporate management. Relatedly, a significant dispersion in analyst earnings estimates is often a red flag.9 Companies with something good to say usually say it. Companies that do not have much good to say often clam up, leading to greater uncertainty about their earnings prospects. When analysts have little visibility on what earnings a company is poised to deliver, be careful. Picking Stocks With ETS I have discussed a variety of factors that help predict the performance of individual stocks. There are dozens of others that I could have mentioned but did not. Clearly, successful bottom-up investing requires that one sort through a lot of information. What one would like is a system that distills all this information into a single score that ranks stocks from best to worst. The ideal system should dynamically adjust factor weightings to account for the fact that there is momentum in factor returns. For example, if value stocks have recently been doing well, they are likely to continue to do well. At BCA Research, we have constructed our Equity Trading Strategy (ETS) to do just that.10 Chart 8 shows the backtested returns of the ETS model. As you can see, they are quite impressive. Chart 8ETS Model Back Tested Performance To Date I have been personally trading a variant of the ETS model for the past 18 years and once wrote a blog chronicling the journey.11 I have added a line in the chart that shows my own personal performance on a pre-tax basis inclusive of brokerage commissions and other trading costs. I typically hold about 30 to 50 stocks. Except in very rare cases, I don't let any single stock exceed five percent of my portfolio. I normally hold a cash cushion of about 10%-to-15%, although occasionally, as in late 2008/early 2009, I have bought stocks on margin. I have lost a lot of money shorting stocks, so I rarely do it. I am not sure how lucky I have been over the years or how scalable my results are - I generally invest only in small cap companies that most money managers would not touch. But it does give you a sense of what is possible with this system. Market Timing With MacroQuant Of course, stock selection is only one half of a successful investment formula. The other half is market-timing - knowing when to scale back or increase exposure to the stock market. That's where our soon-to-be-released MacroQuant model comes in. The model uses over 100 variables on the economy, financial and monetary conditions, sentiment, and valuations to predict the direction of the stock market. Chart 9 shows the back-tested performance of the model. Chart 9MacroQuant* Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted What is MacroQuant saying today? The signal from the model moved into bearish territory in the lead up to October's correction and continues to flag downside risks to stocks. This is mainly because the leading economic data has softened outside the United States, and more recently, in the U.S. itself. Financial conditions have also tightened on the back of rising bond yields, wider credit spreads, and a stronger dollar. Sentiment enters our model in both level and directional terms. We have found that the best configuration for stocks is when sentiment is bearish but improving while the worst configuration is when sentiment is bullish but deteriorating. Going into October, sentiment began to slip from very bullish levels, which was a warning sign for stocks. Valuations have improved over the past month, but still remain somewhat stretched by historic standards. We do not believe that we are at the beginning of a bear market in stocks. However, our model does suggest that the correction may have further to run. With that, let me conclude my formal remarks, and open it up to questions. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 William F. Sharpe, "The Arithmetic of Active Management," The Financial Analysts Journal 47:1 (January/February 1991): 7-9. 2 Antti Petajisto, "Active Share And Mutual Fund Performance," Financial Analysts Journal 69:4 (July/August 2013): 73-93. 3 Andrea Frazzini And Lasse Heje Pedersen, "Betting Against Beta," Journal Of Financial Economics 111:1 (January 2014): 1-25. 4 John Y. Campbell, Jens Hilscher, and Jan Szilagy, "In Search Of Distress Risk," The Journal of Finance 63:6, (December 2008): 2899-2939. 5 Louis K. C. Chan, Jason Karceski, And Josef Lakonishok, "The Level And Persistence Of Growth Rates," The Journal Of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2003): 643-684. 6 Ireneus Stanislawek, "Are Stock Recomemndations Useful?"1741 Asset Management Ltd Research Note Series, (IV 2012). 7 Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, And H. Nejat Seyhun, "Do Short Sellers Trade On Private Information Or False Information?"Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.53, 3 (2018): 997-1023. 8 Vinay T. Datar, Naik Y. Narayan, and Robert Radcliffe, "Liquidity And Stock Returns: An Alternative Test," Journal of Financial Markets 1:2, (1998): pp. 203-219; and Charles M.C. Lee and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, "Price Momentum And Trading Volume," The Journal of Finance 55:5, (October 2000): 2017-2069. 9 David Veenman and Patrick Verwijmeren, "Earnings Expectations And The Dispersion Anomaly," (January 2015). 10 Please see Global Investment Strategy and Equity Trading Strategy Special Report, "Introducing ETS: A Top-Down Approach To Bottom-Up Stock Picking," dated December 3, 2015. 11 My now-defunct blog, stockcoach.blogspot.com, discussed my real-time trading progress between 2004 and 2007. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Overweight The S&P consumer finance index, much like their larger financials peers in the S&P banks index, have mostly not participated in the rise in Treasury yields, a relationship that has heretofore been relatively tight (top panel). This is despite credit card interest rate spreads that are pushing close to their post-GFC highs; such moves in the spread have typically heralded bullish sell-side sentiment changes and the current message is no different as earnings estimates have soared (second panel). While rate-driven revenues are climbing, the cost picture remains stable. The credit card delinquency rate has ticked up modestly but remains at severely depressed levels, driven by historically low unemployment (bottom panel). We continue to expect a sector rotation with financials and industrials leading the next phase of the market advance, a result of the bond market selloff gaining steam into year-end and beyond.1 Accordingly, we reiterate our overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CFINX - AXP, DFS, SYF, COF. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "The "FIT" Market," dated October 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Frenzied software M&A activity, the ongoing capex upcycle, firming industry operating metrics and pristine balance sheets suggest that software stocks are a must have for equity portfolios. Rising interest rates along with the Fed's quantitative tightening, the return of volatility, higher gasoline prices, stretched technicals and a lack of a valuation cushion all suggest that it pays to remain bearish consumer discretionary stocks. Recent Changes We lifted the S&P Industrial Conglomerates index to overweight in a Sector Insight on Wednesday last week.1 Table 1 Feature Chart 1Stocks Are... The S&P 500 found its footing last week, but the volatility comeback assures more violent oscillations before equities resume their upward trajectory. Crash-prone October lived up to its reputation but it is now over, and once the midterm election uncertainty passes this week, investors will refocus their attention on the U.S./China trade war and U.S. economic growth. Trump's moderating approach on the former was welcome news last week, and any further de-escalation signs in the trade tussle will breathe a huge sigh of relief for equities. On the investment front, the 10% SPX drawdown triggered our "buy the dip" strategy on Friday October 26 (please see the "Time To Bargain Hunt" Sector Insight), when we put to work longer-term oriented capital. Our "buy the dip" view remains intact, as we still do not foresee a recession in the coming 9-12 months. On the volatility front, the CBOE SKEW index, a measure of tail risk,2 is sending a positive message as investors are no longer buying tail risk protection as they did in August. Interestingly, as the nominal level of the SPX has been increasing over the decades so has the price of tail risk protection (Chart 1). We view the recent collapse in the CBOE SKEW index as a positive indication that the worst may be behind the equity market. With regard to global flows to U.S. shores, the Treasury International Capital (TIC) System data revealed that global portfolio managers were not chasing U.S. equities this summer as they had been at the beginning of the year. The likely current trough in net foreign portfolio flows into U.S. equities should, at the margin, underpin U.S. stocks (Chart 2). Chart 2... Likely Out Of The Woods... On the U.S. economic front, the latest GDP release revealed that housing is indeed softening. This is the first time since the GFC that residential investment's contribution to real GDP growth turned negative for three consecutive quarters. Tack on decelerating house prices and collapsing lumber prices (Chart 3) and residential real estate confirms the yellow flag from our recently introduced Economic Impulse Indicator.3 Chart 3...But Housing Poses A Risk While house prices are decelerating, corporate pricing power remains upbeat. True, investors focused on anecdotes about input cost inflation this earnings season and all but ignored evidence that companies across different sectors have been able, and will continue, to raise selling prices by more than the rise in wage and commodity costs. Thus, corporate profit margin squeeze fears are overblown; they are likely a risk for the back half of 2019, especially if volume growth suffers a setback. This week we are updating our corporate pricing power gauge. While our overall proxy has ticked down, it is still clocking higher than wage inflation. In fact, our pricing power diffusion index shows excellent breadth (second panel, Chart 4). This firming corporate inflation backdrop suggests that businesses have been successful in passing on rising input costs down the supply chain or to the consumer, and thus suggests that investors are mistakenly fretting about a looming profit margin squeeze. Chart 4No Margin Pressures Yet While labor cost inflation is trending higher, wage growth remains contained near 3% despite a multi-decade low in the unemployment rate. According to our wage growth diffusion index, just over half of the 44 industries we track have to contend with rising wages, a visible fall from earlier in the year (middle panel, Chart 4). In addition, the Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker remains tame and the switcher/stayer index recently nosedived to multi-year lows. The switcher/stayer index provides a reliable leading indication for the trend in overall labor expenses (fourth panel, Chart 4). Put differently, corporate pricing power is rising on a broadening basis while leading indicators of wage inflation suggest an easing in wage pressures in the coming months. As a result, there are rising odds that expanding forward operating margin expectations are likely, extending the two year margin expansion phase (bottom panel, Chart 4). Digging deeper into our corporate pricing power update is revealing. Table 2 summarizes the results. As a reminder, we calculate industry group pricing power from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. Table 2 also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation. Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power 73% of the industries we cover are lifting selling prices, while another ten industries are experiencing only mild price deflation (less than a 0.6% decline). If we include those ten industries then 90% of sectors are maintaining or raising selling prices. One third of the industries are lifting prices at a faster clip than overall inflation. This is lower than our early-July report. Outright deflating sectors increased by four to sixteen since our last update but only six are deflating at 1% or more. On a slightly negative note, fourteen industries are experiencing a downtrend in selling price inflation, twice as many since our most recent report (Table 2). Deep cyclicals/commodity-related industries continue to dominate the top ranks, occupying the top 7 slots (top panel, Chart 5). Despite the ongoing global export softness, intensifying trade tussle with China and 5% year-to-date appreciation in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, the commodity complex's ability to increase prices is impressive especially given that the base effects from the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession have filtered out. On the flip side, tech industries dominate the bottom ranks of Table 2. Chart 5Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand In sum, accelerating business sector selling prices will continue to underpin top line growth into 2019. As long as wage inflation rises gradually and does not gallop higher and the corporate sector sustains its pricing power, then profit margins and earnings will remain upbeat. This week we update a high-conviction overweight tech subgroup and reiterate our below benchmark allocation to an early cyclical sector. Software Is In High Demand Despite recent tech stock ills, software stocks continue to defy gravity and remain in a multi-year uptrend, still above the dotcom bubble relative performance highs (top panel, Chart 6). We reiterate our high-conviction overweight status and within tech we continue to prefer the S&P software and S&P tech hardware, storage & peripherals indexes to the early-cyclical tech S&P semis and S&P semi equipment subgroups. Chart 6Software Fever It did not take long for the large CA acquisition to get surpassed by RHT. Inter-industry M&A activity is reaching fever pitch and this frenzy is bidding up premia to stratospheric levels (fourth panel, Chart 6). The push to the cloud, SaaS and even AI has boosted the appeal of software stocks and brought them to the forefront of potential takeout candidates. These are secular trends and will likely continue to gain steam irrespective of the different stages in the business cycle. As a result, software stocks should remain core tech holdings in equity portfolios. Chart 7Capex Gains... Beyond the positive M&A angle that we have been exploring for quite some time in our research, software stocks are particularly levered on capital spending. Chart 7 shows that relative capital outlays and the share price ratio are joined at the hip. Software upgrades offer the simplest, quickest and most effective capital deployment especially when productivity gains ground to a halt. Importantly, leading indicators of overall capex remain upbeat and should continue to underpin software profits (Chart 8). Chart 8...Say Stick With Software Moreover, industry operating metrics are on fire. Top line growth is accelerating and running at a higher clip than the broad market. The recovery in the software price deflator (middle panel, Chart 9), a proxy for industry pricing power, corroborates this bright demand backdrop. Impressively, labor additions have been muted, implying that margins can expand further and possibly challenge cyclical highs (bottom panel, Chart 9). Chart 9Operating Metrics Are Firing On All Cylinders With regard to financial statements, software stocks have pristine balance sheets with more cash on hand than debt, which sustains the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio in negative territory. Interest coverage is great at 10x and free cash flow generation is expanding smartly (Chart 10). Chart 10Pristine Balance Sheets Nevertheless, all of these positives have pushed several valuation metrics to a premium to the broad market and leave little space for any mishaps. On a forward P/E, trailing P/S, and even EV/EBITDA basis, software equities are pricey, but we think for good reason (bottom panel, Chart 10). This rerating phase will likely continue until there is evidence of an end either to the M&A frenzy, or capex upcycle or business cycle. In sum, feverish software M&A activity, the ongoing capex upcycle, firming industry operating metrics and pristine balance sheets, suggest that software stocks are a must have for equity portfolios. Bottom Line: The S&P software index remains a high-conviction overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, INTU, RHT, ADSK, CA, SNPS, CTXS, ANSS, CDNS, FTNT and SYMC. Consumer Discretionary Stocks Are Still A Sell While we remain constructive on financials that benefit from higher rates, we continue to recommend investors avoid the consumer discretionary sector - the other early cyclical - that suffers when interest rates rise. Chart 11 depicts this inverse correlation consumer discretionary equities have with interest rates, especially the fed funds rate. Most discretionary equites are levered off of floating rates and thus any increase in the fed funds rates gets reflected immediately in banks' prime lending rate. Also, most consumer debt is floating rate debt and thus tighter monetary conditions, at the margin, dampen consumer debt uptake and, as a knock-on effect, weigh on discretionary consumer outlays. Chart 11Rising Fed Funds Rates... Last week we highlighted that, now that the Fed has been raising rates and allowing bonds to roll off its balance sheet, volatility is making a comeback. Unsurprisingly, the consumer discretionary share price ratio is inversely correlated with the VIX index, signaling that more pain lies ahead for this early cyclical index (VIX shown inverted, Chart 12). Chart 12...The Volatility Comeback... Money aggregates also corroborate that the time to buy consumer discretionary equities is when the money supply is galloping higher and shed exposure when both M1 and M2 are decelerating as we have shown in previous research. Importantly, the velocity of M2 money stock is inversely correlated with relative share prices and the current message is negative for consumer discretionary stocks as GDP is finally growing faster than M2 money growth (velocity of M2 money stock shown inverted, Chart 13). Chart 13...And Money Velocity Point To More Losses In Consumer Discretionary Not only are higher interest rates anchoring consumer discretionary stocks but rising energy prices are also dealing a blow to this sector. Chart 14 shows our Consumer Drag Indicator (CDI, comprising mortgage rates and energy prices). Historically, our CDI has been an excellent leading indicator of relative share price momentum. Currently, the message is clear: the sinking CDI signals that a bear market in consumer discretionary stocks has likely commenced. Chart 14Heed The Message From The Consumer Drag Indicator Sentiment and technical indicators also point to more downside ahead for this interest-rate sensitive index. Our sector advance/decline line is waning and EPS breadth has plunged (Chart 15). Worrisomely, sell-side analysts are penciling in an extremely optimistic 5-year outlook with EPS growth north of 30%/annum or twice as high as the overall market. Clearly this is not realistic as it assumes a near quadrupling of EPS in the coming 5 years. Chart 15Bad Breadth... In the near-term, analysts are more cautious (bottom panel, Chart 15). Relative EPS estimates have already given way as AMZN commands very little EPS weight, despite its massive market cap weight (30% of the S&P consumer discretionary sector), and suggests that relative share prices will converge lower (top panel, Chart 16). As a result, the 12-month forward P/E ratio is trading at a 27% premium to the broad market and significantly above the historical mean. Technicals are almost as extended as relative valuations and cyclical momentum has likely peaked, warning that a downdraft in relative share prices looms (Chart 16). Chart 16...With Poor Technicals And No Valuation Cushion Adding it up, a rising interest rate backdrop along with the Fed's quantitative tightening, the return of volatility, higher gasoline prices, stretched technicals and a lack of a valuation cushion, all suggest that it pays to remain bearish consumer discretionary stocks. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance is lower for the S&P consumer discretionary index, stay underweight. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Sector Insight, "A Rout For Conglomerates Opens A Buying Opportunity," dated October 31, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 "The crash of October 1987 sensitized investors to the potential for stock market crashes and forever changed their view of S&P 500® returns. Investors now realize that S&P 500 tail risk - the risk of outlier returns two or more standard deviations below the mean - is significantly greater than under a lognormal distribution. The Cboe SKEW Index ("SKEW") is an index derived from the price of S&P 500 tail risk. Similar to VIX®, the price of S&P 500 tail risk is calculated from the prices of S&P 500 out-of-the-money options. SKEW typically ranges from 100 to 150. A SKEW value of 100 means that the perceived distribution of S&P 500 log-returns is normal, and the probability of outlier returns is therefore negligible. As SKEW rises above 100, the left tail of the S&P 500 distribution acquires more weight, and the probabilities of outlier returns become more significant. One can estimate these probabilities from the value of SKEW. Since an increase in perceived tail risk increases the relative demand for low strike puts, increases in SKEW also correspond to an overall steepening of the curve of implied volatilities, familiar to option traders as the "skew"." Source: CBOE, http://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/volatility-indicators/skew 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Icarus Moment?" dated October 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Highlights Did October's equity rout ... : Before bouncing back in its final two sessions, October was the S&P 500's 12th-worst month of the postwar era. ... represent a watershed for financial markets?: Shaken investors have begun asking if the equity bull market is finally over, and if Treasury yields are in the process of making their cyclical highs. Not according to the macro backdrop, which still supports risk assets, ... : There is no recession in sight. An earnings contraction sufficient to induce an equity bear market, or a meaningful pickup in defaults, isn't imminent. ... or our rates checklist, which still supports a bearish take: Inflation may be taking its time, but nothing on our rates checklist calls for increasing duration in a bond portfolio. Feature U.S. equity investors were relieved to close the books on October, which was a notably bad month for the S&P 500. Its 7% loss was good for 33rd-worst in the postwar record books, and just missed being a -2 standard-deviation event. Had the month ended before its robust bounce in the final two sessions, it would have been the 12th-worst, two-and-a-half standard deviations below the mean (Chart 1). At its lowest point, a half-hour before the October 29th close, the index was down a whopping 10.5% for the month. Chart 1Standing Out From The Crowd The price action understandably unnerved investors. Monthly declines of this magnitude are almost always associated with bear markets; just seven of the thirty-two larger declines occurred outside of bear markets, two of them by the skin of their teeth. Decomposing the equity returns into changes in earnings estimates and changes in forward multiples shows that sharp multiple contraction is a feature of nearly every bad month (Table 1). Table 1Worst Postwar Monthly Declines It is estimate growth - a robust 0.8% - that makes October something of an outlier among the S&P 500's worst months, and we expect growing forward earnings will keep the S&P out of a bear market for another year, especially now that its multiple is more than 15% off its peak. Earnings growth should also keep spread product out of trouble for the time being. Although we recommend no more than an equal weight in corporate bonds, modest spread widening has boosted their total return prospects. Too Legit To Quit We expect that earnings will keep growing because they rarely contract in a meaningful way outside of recessions. With monetary accommodation likely reinforcing certain fiscal stimulus over the coming year, it is hard to see how the next U.S. recession will occur before 2020. As our U.S. bond strategists pointed out last week, the ongoing market implications of last month's equity decline depend on what precipitated it.1 Was it a simple correction sparked by a valuation reset, or has the market begun to sniff out an economic slowdown? With forward four-quarter earnings growing by an annualized 9.5% in October, it appears that the selloff was nothing more than a valuation reset. As our bond strategists point out, the picture was much different when the S&P 500 corrected in the summer of 2015 and the winter of 2015-16. Those corrections unfolded against the backdrop of a global manufacturing recession (Chart 2). The U.S. economy is not bulletproof, and slowing global growth and tighter financial conditions will eventually bring it to heel, but we think the next recession is still too far down the line for markets to begin selling off in advance of it. Chart 2The Fundamentals Are Much Improved From 2015-16 Checking In With Our Rates Checklist If macro conditions really did change for the worse last month, our bearish rates view may no longer apply, and we would have to rethink our underweight Treasury and below-benchmark-duration calls. We introduced our rates checklist in September to identify and track the key series that could trigger a view change. We review it now to see if perceptions of the Fed, inflation measures, labor-market developments, or financial-market excesses suggest that rates may be at a turning point (Table 2). Table 2Rates View Checklist Market Perceptions Of The Fed We continue to scratch our head over markets' refusal to take the FOMC's terminal-rate projections seriously. The overnight index swap (OIS) curves are calling for a measly two hikes over the next 12 months ... and the next 18 months ... and the next 24 as well (Chart 3). That would leave the terminal fed funds rate for this tightening cycle at a mere 2.75%. The median projection among FOMC voters is 3 1/8%, and we're looking for anywhere from 3.5 to 4%. We will have to start backing off once the gap between our expectations and the market's expectations begins to close, but it's only widened since we established the checklist. Chart 3Stubbornly Staying Behind The Curve We get to our 3.5-4% estimate on the premise that measured inflation will pick up enough to force the Fed to keep hiking beyond its own expectations in a bid to keep inflation from getting out of hand. Client meetings suggest that investors find our inflation call hard to swallow. Some eye-rolling when we mention the Phillips Curve is understandable, but our view is ultimately based on capacity constraints. Tepid investment in the years following the crisis have left the economy's productive potential ill-suited to meet the surge in aggregate demand provoked by tax cuts and fiscal stimulus. An inverted curve would indicate that the bond market has begun to anticipate that rate hikes will soon stifle the economy's momentum. For all the hand-wringing in the media about flattening over the 2-year/10-year segment of the curve, our preferred 3-month/10-year measure remains nowhere near inverting (Chart 4). The yield curve tends to invert way ahead of a recession, so we would look for other indicators to corroborate its message before we changed our big-picture take. We also note that a bear flattening would support below-benchmark-duration positioning. Chart 4The Fed Hasn't Gone Too Far Yet Bottom Line: The bond market remains well behind the Fed, and the Fed may well wind up behind the economy. A broad repricing of the Treasury curve awaits. Inflation Measures Inflation's slow creep has gotten a little slower since we initially rolled out the checklist. Headline PCE and CPI have hooked downward, though their uptrends remain intact (Chart 5). Looking forward, continued tightening of the output gap should boost inflation (Chart 6), though long-term expectations have stalled for now (Chart 7). Inflation is the only section of the checklist that has backslid since September, but not by nearly enough to justify checking any of the boxes. Chart 5Two Steps Forward, One Step Back Chart 6An Economy Running Hot ... Chart 7... Will Eventually Produce Inflation Labor Market Indicators The first item on our list of labor-market indicators is the unemployment gap, the difference between the unemployment rate and NAIRU. NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating-Inflation Rate of Unemployment), is the estimate of the lowest sustainable unemployment rate. The actual rate fell below NAIRU in early 2017, and the gap has been getting steadily more negative ever since (Chart 8, top panel). A negative gap is associated with higher compensation, but the wage response has been muted so far (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8Supply And Demand Friday's October employment report pointed to further downward pressure on the unemployment gap. The three-month moving average of net payroll additions came in at 218,000, keeping job growth for the last seven years at around 200,000/month (Chart 9). If the trend were to continue for another twelve months, and population growth and the labor force participation rate (Chart 10, middle panel) were to remain constant, the Atlanta Fed Jobs Calculator2 projects that the unemployment rate will fall to 3%. Chart 9A Steady, Job-Rich Recovery Chart 10As 'Hidden' Unemployment Shrinks ... We understand investors' impatience with the Phillips Curve. We admit to being surprised that compensation growth hasn't shown more life to this point (Chart 11). Just because wage gains have been sluggish out of the gate, however, doesn't mean they won't speed up in the future. Ancillary indicators like the broader definition of unemployment that includes discouraged and involuntary part-time workers (Chart 10, top panel), and the ratio of workers voluntarily leaving their jobs (Chart 10, bottom panel), reinforce the unemployment rate's signal that the labor market is on its way to becoming as tight as a drum. Chart 11... Wages Should Rise Broader Indications Of Instability The final three items on our checklist are meant to flag factors that could bump the Fed off its gradual rate-hiking pace. Overheating would encourage the Fed to move more quickly, but there is nothing in the main cyclical elements of the economy that stirs concern (Chart 12). The Fed might move faster if its third mandate - preserving financial stability - dictated it, but the Fed has been quiet about financial-sector imbalances since Governor Brainard expressed concern about corporate lending two months ago. Finally, the Fed is not oblivious to economic strain in the rest of the world, but conditions in even the most vulnerable emerging markets are far from triggering some sort of "EM put." Chart 12No Sign Of Overheating Yet Investment Implications We remain constructive on the economy and markets in the absence of a near-term catalyst to cut off the expansion, the credit cycle and/or the equity bull market. Like our bond strategists, we simply think the U.S. economy is too healthy to merit revising our bearish view on rates. The implication for investors with a balanced mandate is to continue to underweight Treasuries. Within fixed-income portfolios, investors should continue to maintain below-benchmark duration. No investment stance is forever, and we are counting on our checklist to help keep us alert to an approaching inflection point in rates, but the coast is clear for now. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?," published October 30, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/calculator.aspx?panel=1

Highlights Investors are worrying too much about the things that caused the global financial crisis, and not enough about those that could cause the next downturn. Despite the recent patch of soft data, the U.S. housing market is in good shape. Go long homebuilders relative to the S&P 500. Imbalances in the corporate debt market have increased, but are not severe enough to generate systemic economic distress. U.S. rates will need to rise quite a bit more than the market anticipates before the economy slows by enough to force the Fed to back off. The combination of a stronger dollar and inadequate Chinese stimulus will continue to pressure emerging markets. Even Brazil's pro-capitalist new president may not be able to reverse the country's bleak fiscal dynamics. Our MacroQuant model, which predicted the correction, points to further near-term downside risk for global equities. The cyclical (12-to-18 month) outlook looks much better, however. Feature The Market's Maginot Line One of the most reliable ways to make money as an investor is to figure out the market's collective biases and trade against them. Behavioral economists have long noted that people tend to assign too much weight to recent experience in taking decisions. As a result, in finance, as in military strategy, there is a constant temptation to fight the last war. The last war policymakers waged was against the scourge of deflation that followed the housing bust and financial crisis. For much of the past decade, investors have held a magnifying glass over anything that could possibly resemble the conditions that led up to the Global Financial Crisis. While such behavior is understandable, it is misplaced. History suggests that both lenders and borrowers tend to act prudently for years, if not decades, following major financial crises. Mistakes are still made, but they are different mistakes. People overcompensate. They obsess about the past rather than focusing on the future. U.S. Housing Is Okay There is no denying that the U.S. housing market has softened this year (Chart 1). Housing starts, building permits, and home sales have all fallen. Residential investment has subtracted from GDP growth over three consecutive quarters. Chart 1Housing Has Been A Drag On The U.S. Economy This Year There is little mystery as to why the housing market has been on the back foot. The Trump tax bill capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while reducing the amount of mortgage debt on which homeowners can deduct interest payments from $1 million to $750,000. This had a negative effect on housing activity, especially in high-tax Democrat-leaning states with elevated real estate prices. More importantly, mortgage rates have risen by over 100 basis points since last August. Chart 2 shows that home sales and construction almost always decline after mortgage rates rise. In this respect, the weakness in housing activity is reminiscent of the period following the taper tantrum, when housing activity also slowed sharply. Chart 2No Mystery Why U.S. Housing Has Been Weak... We do not expect mortgage rates to fall from current levels. But they are not going to rise at the same pace as they have over the past year. Thus, while the headwinds from higher financing costs will not disappear, they will abate to some extent. Fundamentally, the housing market is on solid ground (Chart 3). Mortgage rates are still well below their historic average. Home prices have risen considerably, but do not appear excessively stretched compared to rents or incomes. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate is near its historic lows. Residential investment stands at only 3.9% of GDP, compared with a peak of 6.7% of GDP in the second half of 2005. The average age of the residential capital stock has risen by nearly five years since 2006, the largest increase since the Great Depression. With household formation rebounding briskly from its post-recession lows, homebuilders are still arguably not churning out enough new homes. Chart 3A...But Fundamentals Are Still In Good Shape (I) Chart 3B...But Fundamentals Are Still In Good Shape (II) Mortgage lenders have learned from past mistakes (Chart 4). While lending standards have eased modestly over the past 4 years, underwriting standards have remained high. The average FICO score for new borrowers is more than 40 points above pre-recession levels. The Urban Institute Housing Credit Availability index, which measures the percentage of home purchase loans that are likely to default over the next 90 days, is at reassuringly low levels. This is particularly the case for private-label mortgages, whose default risk has hovered at just over 2% during the past few years, down from a peak of 22% in 2006. Moreover, banks today hold much more high-quality capital than in the past, which gives them additional space to absorb losses (Chart 5). Chart 4Lending Standards Have Been Tight, But Are Starting To Loosen Chart 5U.S. Banks Are Well Capitalized With all this in mind, we are initiating a new strategic trade to go long U.S. homebuilders relative to the S&P 500.1 Corporate Debt: How Big Are The Risks? Unlike household debt, U.S. corporate debt has risen over the past decade and now stands at a record high level as a share of GDP. The quality of the lending has also been less than pristine, as evidenced by the proliferation of "covenant lite" loans. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole - defined as the volume of profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid - is still above its historic average (Chart 6). However, this number is skewed by a few mega-cap tech companies that hold a lot of cash and have little debt. Chart 6Interest Coverage Looks Relatively High My colleague Mark McClellan, who writes our monthly Bank Credit Analyst publication, has shown that the interest coverage ratio for companies comprising the Bloomberg Barclays index would drop close to the lows of the Great Recession if interest rates were to rise by a mere 100 basis points across the corporate curve. The damage would be far worse if profits also fell by 25% in this scenario.2 While the corporate debt market has become increasingly frothy, it does not pose an imminent danger to the economy. There are several reasons for this. First, while U.S. corporate debt is high in relation to the past, it is still quite low in comparison with many other economies (Chart 7). The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP, for example, is 30 percentage points higher in the euro area. This suggests that U.S. businesses still have the "carrying capacity" to take on additional debt. Chart 7U.S. Corporate Debt Is Not That High By Global Standards Second, the average maturity of U.S. corporate debt has risen over the past decade, with an increasing share of companies opting for fixed over floating-rate borrowings. This implies that it will take a while for the effect of higher rates to make their way through the system. Third, and perhaps most importantly, corporate bonds are generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate-sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart 8). The share of leveraged loans held by banks has declined from about 25% a decade ago to less than 10% today. Chart 8Banks Have Reduced Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Tellingly, we already had a dress rehearsal for what a corporate debt scare might look like. Credit spreads spiked in 2015. Default rates rose, but the knock-on effects to the financial system were minimal (Chart 9). This suggests that corporate America could withstand quite a bit of monetary tightening without buckling under the pressure. Chart 9The 2015 Debt Scare Did Not Topple The Economy Government Debt: No Worries... Yet If the risks posed by both the housing market and corporate debt market are contained, what about the risks posed by soaring government debt? The long-term fiscal outlook is certainly bleak, but the near-term risks are low.3 President Trump's tweets aside, the U.S. has an independent central bank which has been able to keep inflation expectations well anchored. The U.S. private sector is also running a financial surplus at the moment, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 10). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its fiscal deficit. Chart 10The U.S. Private Sector Is A Net Saver The private sector's financial balance will deteriorate over the next two years as household savings decline and corporate investment rises. This will put upward pressure on Treasury yields. However, if rising yields are reflective of stronger aggregate demand, this is unlikely to derail the economy. When Things Break Recessions are usually caused when the Fed raises rates by enough to undermine spending on interest rate-sensitive purchases such as housing, or when higher rates prick an asset bubble just waiting to burst. Given the lack of clear imbalances either in the real economy or financial markets, the Fed may have to raise rates significantly more than the market is currently anticipating. In fact, far from having to press the pause button midway through next year, our baseline expectation is that the Fed will expedite the pace of rate hikes in late 2019 as inflation finally starts to accelerate. Aggressive Fed rate hikes combined with an incrementally less expansionary fiscal policy will sow the seeds of a recession in late 2020 or 2021. Before the next U.S. downturn arrives, the dollar will have strengthened further. A resurgent greenback will cast a long shadow over emerging markets and commodity producers. As we discussed last week, China is unlikely to save the day by launching a massive stimulus program of the sort that it orchestrated in both 2009 and 2015.4 True, not all emerging markets are equal. Emerging Asia is more resilient now than it was two decades ago. Thailand, for example, was patient zero for the Asian crisis in 1997. Today, it sports a current account surplus of over 10% of GDP and low levels of external debt. This resilience will not prevent Asian economies from experiencing slower growth on the back of weaker Chinese demand, but it will prevent a full-blown balance of payments crisis from spiraling out of control. In contrast to Emerging Asia, Latin America looks more vulnerable (Table 1). BCA's chief emerging market strategist, Arthur Budaghyan, wisely upgraded Brazilian assets on a tactical basis on October 9th ahead of the presidential elections. Nevertheless, Arthur still worries that Brazil's daunting fiscal challenges - the budget deficit currently stands at 7.8% of GDP and the IMF expects government debt to rise to nearly 100% of GDP over the next five years (Chart 11) - are so grave that even South America's answer to Donald Trump may not be able to save the Brazilian economy. Table 1Vulnerability Heat Map For Key EM Markets Chart 11Brazil Is Fiscally Challenged A Correction, Not A Bear Market The current market environment bears some similarities to the late 1990s. The Fed is tightening monetary policy in order to keep the domestic economy from overheating. The U.S. economy is responding to higher rates to some extent, but the main effects are being felt overseas. The Asian Crisis did not end the bull market in U.S. stocks, but it did generate a few nasty selloffs, the most notable being the 22% peak-to-trough decline in the S&P 500 between July 20 and October 8, 1998. We witnessed such a selloff this October. The bad news is that our MacroQuant model is pointing to additional equity weakness over the coming weeks (Chart 12). The model tends to downgrade stocks whenever growth is slipping, financial conditions are tightening, and sentiment is deteriorating from bullish levels. All three of these things are currently occurring. Chart 12MacroQuant* Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted The good news is that none of our recession indicators are flashing red. Since recessions and bear markets typically overlap (Chart 13), the odds are high that the current stock market correction will be just that, a correction. Chart 13Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 The corresponding ETFs are long ITB/short SPY. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis," dated October 25, 2018. 3 It is actually not even clear that a loss of confidence in America's fiscal management would cause a recession. The Fed largely determines borrowing costs at the short-to-medium end of the yield curve, which is where the government finances most of its debt. If people lose confidence in the dollar, they will either need to run down their cash balances by purchasing more goods and services or try to move their wealth abroad. The former will directly increase aggregate demand, while the latter will indirectly increase it through a weaker currency. To be clear, we are not suggesting that such an outcome would be beneficial to the economy; it would, among other things, greatly slow potential GDP growth by discouraging investment. But the near-term effect would likely be economic overheating and rising inflation rather than a recession. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Stimulus: Not So Stimulating," dated October 26, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Investors looking for equity upside, along with fixed-income-like downside protection, coupled with a hedge against rising rates, should consider convertible bonds. As we near the end of the business cycle, the attractions of convertibles are becoming clearer: investors will benefit from more upside capture in case of a last run-up in stocks, but at the same time suffer less downside in a recession. Moreover, in periods of rising rates, convertible bonds perform well compared to other traditional fixed-income securities. However, multi-asset portfolio managers should note that the risk-return profile of convertible bonds is more like equities than bonds, and so convertibles have no place in a conservative fixed-income portfolio. Investors have a number of options to choose from when customizing equity-versus-fixed-income exposure in their convertible allocations. Feature Introduction An ideal financial instrument would have large equity exposure in an equity bull market, and increased fixed-income exposure in a bear market. Financial engineering can create synthetic positions using derivatives to replicate just this sort of hybrid exposure - or an investor can just buy convertible bonds. In this current, late, phase of the business cycle - with increased volatility, rising interest rates, and a pickup in inflation - where can investors find shelter, but without sacrificing returns in the event of a last blow-out run-up in stocks? In this report, we discuss how convertible bonds - despite their somewhat complex structure1 - could be the answer. Issuers prefer convertibles to traditional corporate bonds because of: 1) a lower coupon rate and fewer covenants, 2) the opportunity to sell equity at a premium to the current price, 3) a faster process for raising capital, compared to a secondary equity issue, and 4) easier access to capital markets for non-investment grade firms. On the demand side, the composition of convertible investors has evolved over time. Prior to the 2007-9 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), proprietary trading desks and leveraged hedge funds were the most important players, since convertible arbitrage2 was very profitable. But the liquidity freeze in 2008 and 2009 forced these short-term investors out of the market and brought back long-term buy-and-hold investors. Currently 65% of U.S. convertible bonds are held by long-only investors. This change in market structure has had important implications for arbitrage opportunities (Chart 1). Chart 1Fewer Short-Term Investors In the first half of 2018, issuance of global convertible securities topped $57 billion, the largest amount for a six-month period since 2008. The U.S. led the way, with issuance of $34 billion (Chart 2), followed by Asia ex-Japan at $12 billion, and Europe, $10 billion. The U.S. total includes $13.4 billion in convertible bond issuance by tech companies, the highest amount in the post-GFC period (Chart 2, panel 2). Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that full-year global issuance could be the highest in 12 years. The macro-backdrop for convertibles remains favorable: Chart 2Issuance Similar To Pre-Crisis Levels The hybrid equity/fixed-income exposure offers protection against rising rates because of its shorter duration; The new U.S. tax code limits interest deductibility, which strengthens the relative appeal of issuing a convertible security instead of a traditional bond; The return of volatility means investors benefit from holding a security with an embedded option; The flexibility of the asset class gives investors room to customize their exposure in terms of coupon rate, premium, and maturity. In this report, we start with the market structure and mechanics of convertible bonds. Next, we look at the four types of convertible bonds, which provide different risk-return profiles. In the following section, we analyze historical returns and performance in different market environments. Finally, we discuss the key asset allocation decisions involved in investing in convertible bonds. Our main findings are: Investors can customize their risk-return profile by choosing between high-volatility equity exposure (equity-sensitive convertibles), or more stable fixed-income exposure (credit-sensitive convertibles); Convertible bonds historically have generated an annualized return of 9.5% compared to 9.8% from equities, but with 2% lower volatility; Convertible bonds have a risk-return profile more like that of equities and junk bonds than that of investment-grade credit; In periods of rising rates and inflation, convertible bonds have outperformed their traditional fixed-income counterparts; In comparison to equities, convertibles capture more upside in bull markets than downside in bear markets; Investing in convertible bonds requires active management because of their varying degree of equity- and fixed-income sensitivity that changes over time. The Convertibles Market Convertible securities can be broken into three key groups: 1) convertible bonds (cash-pay3 and zero-coupon), 2) convertible preferred shares, and 3) mandatory convertibles. Cash-pay convertible bonds make up almost 80% of the outstanding market (Chart 3), while zero-coupon convertible bonds are almost non-existent. Mandatories and convertible preferred equities make up 15% and 7% respectively. Chart 3Convertibles Bonds Are 80% Of Convertibles Market... Before we delve deeper into the convertible bond markets, here are few key characteristics (Chart 4) of the other two groups: Chart 4...And Have The Best Risk-Adjusted Returns Convertible Preferred Equities are issued with a specific dividend rate that is generally higher than the dividend on common shares. They include an embedded option to convert to a specified number of common shares. Additionally, preferred dividends usually accumulate in arrears should the firm be unable to make a payment. The conversion rate increases with any increase in the common-share dividend. After the call protection expires, the company has the option of redeeming the issue at the stated par value. Mandatory Convertibles. These bonds automatically convert to common shares at a specified time. However, they do not offer downside protection since conversion can be into shares worth less than the original issue price. Rating agencies view these securities more as equities than bonds, giving firms an incentive to issue them from a balance-sheet perspective. Table 1 shows us that cash-pay (coupon paying convertible bonds) generated the highest return with the lowest volatility, thereby providing investors with the best risk-adjusted returns. Mandatory convertibles have a large excess kurtosis - driven by the forced conversion into equities at inopportune times. In bull and bear markets, it is clear convertible bonds did not enjoy the full upside provided by preferred shares and mandatories, but had 50% less downside in bear markets. Also, in periods of rising rates convertible bonds produced positive returns, but lagged both preferred shares and mandatory convertibles. Table 1Convertible Bonds' Risk-Return Profile A niche market exists for contingent convertibles (CoCos) - or, as they are sometimes called, anti-convertibles. Banks in the euro area issue CoCos to meet capital requirements and provide a cushion should they find themselves in a serious predicament. These typically pay a higher coupon than the bank's straight bonds to compensate for the possibility of a complete wipeout. In short, if all goes well you receive your fixed coupons and principal back at maturity. But, if things turn sour, the bonds convert to equity and the investor potentially loses everything. Mechanics Of Convertible Bonds Convertible bonds are a hybrid security issued as a senior unsecured bond with a fixed maturity (normally five years) with optionality to convert to a fixed number of shares. In exchange for the equity kicker, these bonds typically yield less and carry a lower coupon rate (Chart 5) than the issuer's comparable non-convertible debt. We describe the basics of convertible bonds in the Appendix. Chart 5The Cost Of An Embedded Option An investor considering an allocation to convertibles has four groups to choose from depending on his or her risk-return tolerance. The trade-off is between high volatility equity exposure versus more stable credit exposure. If the underlying stock does well, the convertible increases in value even without the investor exercising the option to convert into shares. If the stock does not appreciate, the investor retains the bond and collects regular coupons and par value at maturity. The interaction of market price with investment value and conversion price creates convertible bonds with different risk-return profiles: Credit Sensitive: A large decrease in the stock price has pushed the convertibles to trade close to their investment value (bond floor). These are out-of-the money convertibles, with a delta ranging from 10% to 40%, and also with large premium over investment value. The main factors affecting the pricing of such instruments are the level of interest rates and credit spreads. An investor has a small probability of generating large unexpected gains from underlying stock appreciation. Balanced: The stock price is close to the conversion price, making these at-the-money convertibles. They have a moderate premium to conversion value, and deltas in the range of 40-80%. Rising stock prices make the embedded call option more valuable, pushing the convertible price closer to the stock price. Long-term buy-and-hold investors looking to maintain a core allocation to convertibles should invest in balanced convertibles. Equity Sensitive: Convertibles that are deep in-the-money, trading near parity, with high deltas of over 80%, and generating returns that closely track equities. They still retain some downside protection due to seniority and par value at maturity even if they have most of the common share's upside potential. Distressed: As a company threatens to default or goes bankrupt, the value of the straight bond component declines to trade significantly below par. These bonds tend to have high degree of price volatility and low probability of return of capital. Risk & Return Convertible bond returns are driven by: 1) the bond component that is a function of rates, credit spreads, and curve effects; 2) the equity component, supported by the delta to the underlying stock price; and 3) the option component, that is a function of the underlying stock price and time to maturity. Convertibles combine characteristics of stocks and bonds (Chart 6), so they represent either lower-volatility equity exposure or enhanced fixed-income exposure. Over the past 24 years (Table 2), U.S. convertible bonds generated returns similar to U.S. equities, but with a lower volatility. However, relative to traditional corporate bonds, convertibles outperformed massively, but with much higher volatility. Looking at risk-adjusted returns, we see that convertible bonds have more similarity to equities and high-yield credit than to investment-grade credit (Chart 7). However, defaults in the convertible bond space have been close to 1%, which is significantly lower than the 4% in the high-yield credit market (Chart 8). This is because convertible bonds include a smaller proportion of issuers with high operating leverage, such as energy producers, and have a high representation of mature healthcare and technology companies. Chart 6Convertibles Vs. Traditional Table 2Better Than Equities, But More Volatile Than Traditional Bonds Chart 7Close To Equities & Junk Chart 8Lower Defaults Than Junk Bonds Short-term performance of the convertible bond market is driven by the composition of issuers, but long-term performance is driven by the performance of the different variables described above. In 1Q 2018, convertible bonds outperformed equities, largely due to technology and consumer staples convertibles. Technology convertibles saw a 11% gain, while the S&P technology sector was up only 3.5%. This was because technology convertible issuers were concentrated in the mid-cap growth segment, whereas the large-cap equity names are more heavily weighted in semiconductors. BCA has for two or three years been warning about the return of inflation and rising interest rates. Convertible bonds outperform traditional fixed income in periods of rising interest rates because: 1) rising rates are often coupled with periods of positive equity momentum, which benefits convertibles; 2) convertibles have lower duration than straight bonds. Since 1994, there have been 10 instances when the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield rose by more than 100 bps: convertible bonds outperformed in every instance. Additionally, convertible bonds enjoy a yield advantage: the average income return (coupon rate) on a convertible is greater than the dividend yield on the underlying stock. When investors allocate to convertible bonds from either their equity or fixed-income portfolio, the key consideration is upside versus downside exposure. When the underlying stock price rises, convertibles will capture a portion of the capital appreciation but, on the downside, convertibles continue to provide a consistent income flow and principal repayment at maturity. History tells us that convertibles capture more upside in bull markets than downside in bear markets. If the share price falls sharply below the conversion price, the convertible will react less and less to fluctuations in the underlying stock price. In short, convertible bonds provide more downside protection than stocks as market value will not drop below the investment value (bond floor). Convertibles also have a mechanism to offset rising equity volatility and rising rates. The embedded equity option in a convertible bond rises in value when volatility rises, providing a meaningful offset in contrast to equities that may suffer a drawdown. Over the long-run, convexity enables this asset to make the most of favorable stock market conditions, whilst suffering less in difficult conditions. As mentioned earlier, the risk-return profile of convertible bonds tends to have a closer relation with equities than with fixed income. Within fixed income, high-yield credit, which tends to have a return profile closely aligned with equities, has a strong correlation with convertible bonds. The greatest diversification potential is when convertible bonds are added to a portfolio of government bonds. However, investors should realize the risk-return profiles for convertibles and government bonds are very different, and an allocation to the former is only a possibility for an investor with a higher risk tolerance. What To Choose From? Equity Sensitive Versus Credit Sensitive Investors need to choose the right type of convertible bond depending on their risk tolerance. Equity-sensitive convertibles made up over 60% of the market prior to the GFC, but this proportion fell to around 20% during the recession (Chart 9). As stock prices tumble, the market price of convertibles get closer to the investment value (bond floor), and convertibles start behaving more like pure credit-sensitive bonds. Looking at total returns (Chart 10 & Table 3), it is clear that aggressive investors with a higher risk tolerance should invest exclusively in equity-sensitive convertibles. But investors looking to maintain a core long-term allocation to convertibles should focus on the balanced group. Despite being a small piece of the market, distressed convertibles are attractive return enhancers immediately after a recession. Investors looking for income return should prefer credit-sensitive or distressed convertibles over equity-sensitive ones. Equity-sensitive convertibles have the highest delta, making them the most vulnerable to underperformance in a downturn. Balanced convertibles have the highest vega, which means they are most impacted by increasing volatility - driven by both equity and rate volatility. In times of rising interest rates, equity-sensitive convertibles provide their best protection given their short duration. Credit- and rate-sensitive convertibles have almost double the duration, making them more vulnerable to rising rates. Chart 9Equity Vs. Fixed Income Exposure Chart 10Massive Outperformance By Equity Sensitive Table 3Equity Sensitive For The Aggressive, Credit Sensitive For The Conservative, Balanced For Everyone Small Cap Versus Large Cap Issues Investors can choose between convertible issues from companies of different size. Since the middle of the financial crisis, large-cap issues have grown to over 50% of the market (Chart 11), up from below 30%. The increase in market share was taken from small-cap issues, with mid-cap issues stable at 20% of the market. In terms of total returns (Chart 12 & Table 4), small cap outperformed both mid and, particularly, large caps. Part of this outperformance was due to the higher yield offered by small-cap issuers compared to their larger counterparts. In terms of equity sensitivity, small-cap issues currently have significantly lower delta than large caps. However, in times of rising volatility, small-cap issues lose more, driven by their higher vega. In terms of interest-rate sensitivity, all three sizes are roughly equally exposed given similar durations. Chart 11Bigger Is Not Always Better Chart 12Small Cap Outperforms Table 4Small Cap Provides The Best Value Investment Grade Versus The Rest A credit investor has one particularly important call: investment-grade versus high-yield. The situation is trickier for convertibles as over 60% of the bonds are unrated (Chart 13), thereby giving managers amply opportunity for alpha generation. Historical performance (Chart 14 & Table 5) shows that non-rated convertible bonds have a close relationship with non-investment-grade issues. Moreover, the relative performance of non-investment-grade and non-rated issues with investment grade issues follows a similar path. From an income-return perspective, both non-rated and non-investment-grade issues have lost their yield advantage since 2016. Investors are not receiving adequate yield for the additional risk they are taking with riskier issues. The return of volatility will have a smaller impact on investment-grade issues compared to the rest of the market because the former have a lower effective duration. Additionally, implied volatility is lower for investment-grade issues. Chart 13Over 60% Has No Credit Rating Chart 14Similar Return, But Different Risk Table 5No Rating = Source Of Alpha The Asset Allocation Decision The key question here is: are investors looking at convertible bonds (Chart 15) as part of an equity or a fixed-income allocation? Investors considering convertibles as part of their equity allocation are looking for a more defensive exposure and yield pick-up, and so should focus on balanced convertibles and not equity-sensitive ones. On the other hand, considering convertibles as part of fixed-income allocation will deliver equity exposure, and so investors should focus on credit-sensitive or balanced convertibles. Chart 15Somewhere Between Equities & Junk Another major factor is the investment horizon of the convertible allocation. A core strategic allocation to convertibles will require a hybrid exposure, providing lower-volatility equity exposure over multiple full market cycles. Such investors are looking for long-term equity upside, but are concerned about shorter-term downside equity volatility and should consider balanced convertibles. On the other hand, investors using convertibles as part of a tactical allocation, to make a short-term bet in order to diversify away from traditional fixed-income or equity exposure, should consider either equity-sensitive or credit-sensitive convertibles. The bottom-line is that convertible investing requires active management because these securities have varying degrees of equity and fixed-income sensitivity that change over time. In periods of rising equity markets, an investor with passive exposure to convertibles would automatically have a large holding in equity-sensitive convertibles with a high delta, thereby increasing his or her exposure to equity downside risk. For example, in February 2009, when markets troughed after the GFC, more than two-thirds of convertibles were trading as credit-sensitive instruments. An investor following a passive index in this situation would have had minimal exposure to equity-sensitive convertibles, and would thereby have had limited participation in the equity upside. Finally, the convertible universe is constantly evolving. The typical convertible bond is issued with a five-year life by a company in the early to mid stage of its corporate life cycle, seeking capital to grow. As time passes, the issuer matures to a point where it no longer needs convertibles in its capital structure. Nearly two-thirds of the current issuers of convertible were not in the market 10 years ago, while two-thirds of the S&P 500 members remain unchanged over this time. Aditya Kurian, Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com 1 Despite the complexities, the first convertible bond was issued as long ago as 1874 by Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg Railroad to finance a project. The bond was never converted since the underlying shares failed to rise enough and the company refinanced the bond in 1904. 2 For an explanation of convertible arbitrage, please see A Note On Convertible Arbitrage at the end of this report. 3 Convertible bonds that make regular coupon payments. A Note On Convertible Arbitrage A market-neutral hedge fund strategy where the manager goes long the convertible bond and short the underlying stock. The short position in the underlying stock creates a delta-neutral position, but maintaining this position requires dynamic hedging which is expensive. There is a possibility of large mispricing because of the over-the-counter nature of the market and uncertainty regarding call or redemption features of convertibles. Often, the embedded equity option is a source of cheap volatility compared to the underlying stock's listed options. A quick measure for convertible valuations is comparing the volatility of options in the market to the volatility priced in the embedded option in the convertible. If market volatility rises, but the price of convertible stays the same, the security could be cheap and attractive. Looking at historical performance (Table 6), convertible arbitrage generated almost 3% less than equities, but with less than half the volatility. However, all of the outperformance was during recessions or equity bear markets. Additionally, convertible arbitrage funds have large negative skew and kurtosis relative to both equities and the hedge-fund composite. We recommend investors allocate to convertible arbitrage hedge funds in preparation for a downturn. Table 6Convertible Arbitrage Versus Traditionals Appendix: The Basics Of Convertible Bonds Investment Value (Bond Floor): The fixed-income component of the convertible bond, or in other words, the value of the bond without the conversion feature (equity kicker). This remains stable over a wide range of stock prices but, when creditworthiness deteriorates, consequent stock price movements will have an impact on the investment value (IV). Holding creditworthiness constant, the IV provides the bond floor, below which the convertible should not trade. The IV fluctuates in tandem with the price of a straight corporate bond of similar quality. A convertible that is trading close to its IV will be more affected by changes in rates than one that is well above it. Investment Premium: The market price minus IV expressed as a percentage of IV. Premium over IV indicates the level of downside risk. A higher premium means the bond price is more sensitive to the price of underlying stock, which means less downside protection because the bond market price would have to decline significantly before reaching the IV. Higher premium is a result of rising underlying stock value, whereas a smaller premium is when the convertible is more interest-rate sensitive and behaves like a pure bond. Conversion Value (CV): The equity portion of the convertible bond. Conversion ratio is set at the time of issuance and it is the number of shares a bondholder will receive upon conversion. Conversion price is the price at which the number of converted shares is equal to the par value of the bond. At issuance, the underlying stock price is usually below conversion price. Conversion Premium: The market price minus CV expressed as a percentage of CV. As market price rises above CV, fixed-income attributes are lost and equity features take over, consequently decreasing conversion premium. Declining stock prices mean convertible market price approaches fixed-income value (bond floor) and conversion premium increases. Appendix Chart 1Preferred Shares & Mandatory Convertibles Have Higher Income Returns Appendix Chart 2Convertible Bonds' Delta & Vega Reduces In A Recession Appendix Chart 3Conversion Premium Far From Recessionary Levels Appendix Chart 4Average Duration Less Than 2.5 Appendix Chart 5U.S. Is 60% Of Global Appendix Chart 6U.S. Is Clearly The Best Performer Appendix Chart 7U.S. Also Provides The Best Income Return Appendix Chart 8But, U.S. Is The Most Equity Sensitive Appendix Chart 9U.S. Has A Higher Implied Volatility Appendix Chart 10Distressed Is The Best Solution Immediately After A Recession Appendix Chart 11Balanced Has The Lowest Coupon Appendix Chart 12Balanced Has Moderate Delta, But Highest Vega Appendix Chart 13Equity Sensitive Are The Best Rate Hedge Appendix Chart 14Premiums Are Stable Appendix Chart 15Mid-Cap Provides Low Income Return Appendix Chart 16Massive Delta & Vega Divergence Appendix Chart 17Large Cap Premium Has Risen The Most Appendix Chart 18Implied Volatility Is Similar Across The Board Appendix Chart 19ALl Coupon Rates Have Fallen Appendix Chart 20Investment Grade Has The Highest Delta Appendix Chart 21Underweight Duration = Investment Grade Convertibles Appendix Chart 22Premiums Stable