Equities

With Treasury yields backing up from extremely depressed levels, many clients are asking if an overweight allocation to the REIT space remains appropriate. While a sharp spike in yields would clearly be problematic in the short run, we have shown that REITs have often outperformed during periods of strong economic growth and Fed tightening cycles. The key is for REITs to generate above-market cash flow. At the moment, our composite REIT rental rate inflation is running comfortably above overall inflation, led by the CPI for homeowner's equivalent rent (top panel). New supply has been coming on stream for years, but so far has been absorbed with little adverse pricing power impact. Vacancy rates are still historically low. Consequently, operating performance should stay robust. Importantly, relative valuations are not overly demanding, and technical conditions are not overbought, and there have been no negative momentum divergences. We continue to recommend an overweight stance. BLBG: S5REITS

The latest data releases confirm that the Chinese economy regained its footing. In the near term, growth figures should continue to surprise to the upside. Earnings preannouncements by Chinese listed firms show a significant acceleration in earnings in the second quarter from a year ago, while the market continues to expect sharp earnings contractions for Chinese companies.

U.S. companies have historically traded at a premium to their European counterparts because of better underlying 'financials'. To address this issue, we developed the "Fundamental Approach" to determine the relative value of European equities in comparison to the U.S. Our analysis involved regressing the difference in the valuation metrics between the two markets on differences in financial variables, including RoE, operating margins, trailing EPS, forward EPS, sales-per-share, interest coverage, two measures of leverage and cash flow growth. While not as successful as the mechanical approach, the regressions confirmed the conclusion of the mechanical approach. The historical "batting average" of the fundamental valuation indicators are also good. Taken as a whole, our analysis suggests that Eurozone stocks are on the cheap side of fair value versus the U.S. at the moment, but not by enough to justify overweighing the Eurozone based on value alone. One also needs the expectation that European earnings growth will be better than in the U.S. over the next 1-2 years. Indeed, we are more bullish on Eurozone EPS growth than for the U.S. due to ongoing margin pressure in the latter market. For additional details please see Monday's Special Report.

European stocks have lagged the U.S. by a wide margin in the post-Lehman era. The relative EMU/U.S. total return index is close to its lowest level since the late 1970s in local currency terms. It is tempting to take a contrary position, especially since European stocks appear cheap relative to the U.S. on the surface. Nonetheless, European stocks have traditionally traded at a discount, in part because of persistently lower profitability. A Special Report - first published in the Bank Credit Analyst last month - takes a top-down approach to determine whether Eurozone stocks are cheap versus the U.S. after adjusting for persistent differences in underlying profit fundamentals. The report focused on the non-financial sector, and re-weighted the Eurozone equity index using U.S. weights in order to avoid the problem that differing sector weights could bias measures of relative value for the overall market. The report employed both a mechanical approach and a fundamental approach. Seven valuation measures were used, Price/Sales, Price/Forward Earnings, Price/Cash Flow, Price/Book, EV/EBITDA, Price/Trailing Earnings and Shiller P/E. The mechanical approach adjusted the valuation measures by subtracting the 5-year moving average from both markets. We then divided the Valuation Gap (VG) between the U.S. and Eurozone markets by the 5-year moving standard deviation of the VG. In this way, we adjusted for the persistent, but time-varying, gap between the two markets. The result is an indicator that moves roughly between +/- 2 standard deviations. Valuation is not a timing tool, but our analysis of the historical "batting average" shows that all of these valuation metrics except the trailing P/E provide value added as an investment tool. Historically, there was a high probability of a significant excess return to positioning in a contrary fashion between the two markets when relative valuation reached 1 and, especially, 2 standard deviations away from the mean. Currently, all of the mechanical valuation indicators suggest that Eurozone stocks are on the cheap side of fair value relative to the U.S., except for the trailing P/E. However, only two are more than 1 standard deviation away from the mean. We then approached valuation from a fundamental perspective (see next Insight).

Special Report

Highlights Just ahead of the attempted coup d'état in Turkey, the international press was largely complementary of the political situation in the country. For example, a Bloomberg headline read "Once Spurned, Turkey Stocks Find Love As Political Risk Ebbs" mere hours before the coup!1 Feature Politics Stay The Same: Not Good BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has challenged the sanguine narrative on Turkey since 2013.2 The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) - once a reformist beacon in emerging markets - has become a political vehicle for President Recep Erdogan's political power grab - Erdogan has been planning to turn Turkey into a presidential republic, giving himself more powers - since 2013. Protests erupted that year against the government, in large part due to growing suspicion among secular, and mainly urban, middle classes that Erdogan and his Islamist AKP were evolving the country towards soft authoritarianism. Since the protests in 2013, the country's politics have been off track: A vast corruption scandal ensnaring the ruling AKP, including Erdogan's family, erupted in late 2013, prompting then-Prime Minister Erdogan to blame the moderate Islamist Gülen movement and its allies in the judiciary; Erdogan won a closer-than-expected presidential election in 2014, becoming the first democratically-elected president in modern Turkish history, and immediately set out to award himself greater powers through constitutional reform; AKP then failed to win a majority in the June 2015 general election; The election was immediately followed by a manufactured anti-insurgency campaign against ethnic Kurds designed to reduce support for moderate pro-Kurdish parties and allow the AKP to win a majority in the next election; In November 2015, the AKP finally won a majority; Many reformist members of the AKP have since been sidelined, including Erdogan's predecessor as President Abdullah Gül, and his successor as Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Despite the political turbulence, markets have largely looked through the risks (Chart 1). And, this is not even including the geopolitical risks engulfing Turkey's neighbors, including the souring relations with Russia, Israel, and the EU, due to Ankara's role in the migration crisis. Investors have largely given Turkey the benefit of the doubt, despite Erdogan's penchant for heterodox monetary policy and lack of focus on structural reforms. The AKP - which swept into power in the early 2000s on an agenda of promoting democracy, moderate Islamist cultural values, and economic reforms - has essentially become completely focused on the single goal of enhancing Erdogan's power. The failed coup is a silver lining for Erdogan as it will allow him to accomplish what electoral politics could not (he has in fact referred to the coup as a "gift of God"). Thousands of military, law enforcement, and judicial professionals have been arrested since the uprising. It is very likely that Erdogan will use the event as a pretext to undermine whatever checks and balances still exist in the country. In addition, it would appear that relations between Turkey and the West are also set to sour. First, Erdogan has demanded that the U.S. extradite moderate cleric Fethullah Gülen, who Erdogan sees as a chief rival, despite the fact that Gülen has not lived in Turkey since 1999. Second, the government has arrested the Turkish commander in charge of the Incirlik Air Base, which hosts U.S. forces, grounding U.S. air operations against the Islamic State. Third, the EU could pull the plug on its deal with Turkey which would see Ankara limit the migrant flows into the bloc, which Turkey had agreed to in exchange for visa-free travel, progress in negotiations for EU membership, and EUR 3 billion. The deal was signed in March, well past the point at which the migrant flows to Europe peaked (Chart 2), which suggests that the deal may not be as relevant to stopping the flow of migrants as most pundits claim. The EU's post-coup statement emphasized support for democracy in Turkey, but also stopped short of backing Erdogan personally. Chart 1Investors Should Stay##br##Underweight Turkish Assets Chart 2Migrant Flows: No Longer##br##A Bargaining Chip For Turkey Bottom Line: Investors who hoped that the November election would resolve political intrigue in Turkey and focus Ankara on structural reforms will be disappointed. The coup gives Erdogan the excuse to use extra-judicial methods to grab as much power as he can and to concentrate on rooting out enemies in the judiciary and the armed forces. Economic And Financial Headwinds While President Erdogan will consolidate power and finalize the formation of an authoritarian regime, the economic and financial challenges facing the government will intensify. A negative confidence shock is the last thing Turkey needs: The country runs a current account deficit of US$ 27 billion, or 4% of GDP (Chart 3). Any country running a current account deficit relies on foreign funding in order to grow. If foreign funding diminishes, the country will have to reduce domestic demand. This will be achieved via a weaker currency, higher interest rates, or a combination of the two. A weaker currency will depress imports by making them more expensive for residents, while higher interest rates will curtail domestic demand. Given recent political developments, it is reasonable to assume that foreign investors will reduce their appetite for Turkish assets. This will weigh on the currency and potentially force interest rates higher. Furthermore, tourism makes up 22% of total exports and 4% of GDP. Tourism revenues will be hit more in the following months (Chart 4), aggravating their current nose-dive. Chart 3Turkey Is Heavily Reliant##br##On Foreign Funding Chart 4Plunging Tourist Arrivals Will##br##Weigh On The Currency's Value The central bank only has US$12 billion of net foreign exchange reserves - equivalent to 0.6 months of imports - to defend the exchange rate. The gross value of foreign exchange reserves (US$ 103 billion) published by the central bank includes commercial banks foreign currency deposits at the central bank (Chart 5). These foreign currency resources do not belong to the central bank. The authorities might use them to defend the lira, but that could undermine investor confidence and reduce their willingness to hold Turkish assets. Finally, the funding of Turkey's current account deficit is not of high quality. Net FDI has amounted to US$ 9 billion over the past 12 months, with net portfolio investment at US$ -5 billion, and net errors and omission at US$ 2 billion. Overall, odds are that the foreign flows will diminish in the wake of political uncertainty and the lira will depreciate. As this occurs, local market-driven interest rates - bond yields and money-market rates - will rise. This will force banks to hike their lending rates and credit growth, which has been running at an annual pace of 10%, will decelerate further (Chart 6). This will weigh on the economy and thus odds of recession are not trivial. Chart 5Turkey Is Low On Hard Currency Reserves Chart 6Credit Growth To Slow Further Chart 7The Credit-Led Growth Boom Is Over As growth deteriorates following a 10-year credit boom (Chart 7), bank non-performing loans (NPL) and provisions will have to rise, and bank balance sheets will weaken noticeably. With bank stocks accounting for 38% of the MSCI Turkey equity index, poor banking health will weigh on the stock market. Bottom Line: Asset allocators should stay underweight Turkish stocks and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. We also recommend maintaining short positions in both the Turkish lira versus the U.S. dollar and Turkish bank stocks. Marko Papic, Managing Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Managing Editor arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Bloomberg, "Once Spurned Turkey Stocks Find Love As Political Risk Ebbs," dated July 13, 2016, available at bloomberg.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Political Recapitalization Rally - Turkey: Canary In The EM Coal Mine?," dated June 13, 2013, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Emerging Markets: No Curtain To Hide Behind," dated September 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Forecast is diverging from strategy for equities. Intermediate-term positives allow for a blowoff to the upside. But we do not expect the rally to have staying power over a 6-12 month horizon.

Special Report

Eurozone equities have delivered one of the worst stretches of underperformance in more than 25 years. Are European equities a 'buy' versus the U.S., or are they "cheap for a reason"?

The perception that central banks have turned even more dovish has pushed down global bond yields, while also giving stocks a lift. Looking out, bond yields are likely to edge higher as investors begin to focus more on the outcome of easing measures: Higher inflation. As long as yields rise gingerly and in the context of firming economic growth, global equities will remain reasonably well supported. Equity investors should favor the euro area, Japan, and China.

While we are neutral on the broad consumer discretionary index, we remain constructive on the S&P homebuilding sub-group. U.S. bond yields are probing multi-decade lows mostly as a consequence of global deflationary forces and unorthodox monetary policy abroad. This is a welcome assist to the U.S. housing market, as these exogenous factors have pushed down the U.S. 30-year mortgage rate, providing an incentive for consumers to reenter the housing market (bottom panel). A simple homebuilding demand/supply indicator, comprising new home sales expectations versus new home inventories, is steadily climbing. Historically, this gauge has led new home sales prices, and the current message is to expect the latter to reaccelerate. Homebuilder profits have considerable leverage to selling prices, underscoring that a round of positive earnings revisions lies ahead. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the S&P homebuilding index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM.

Given that the seemingly unthinkable can actually happen, we reassess how financial markets price uncertainty, and whether the current pricing is correct.