Europe

Watch Inflation Expectations How much longer can this go on? Global equities were up 6% in January alone (the 15th consecutive month of positive returns), and investors are increasingly asking how much further this bull market has to run. There are no signs we can see that suggest it will end imminently. Our watch-list of key recession indicators (decline in global PMIs, inverted yield curve, rise in credit spreads - Chart 1) is sending no warning signals. U.S. GDP growth was a little weaker than expected in Q4, at 2.6% QoQ annualized, but this was mainly due to inventories and strong imports: final private demand, a better guide to future growth, was strong at 4.3%. Fed NowCasts for Q1 growth point to 3.1-4.2%. The euro zone grew even faster than the U.S. last year, and even Japan probably saw 1.8% GDP growth. Corporate earnings expectations have accelerated sharply over just the past few weeks - particularly in the U.S. as a result of the tax cuts (Chart 2) - with analysts now expecting 16% EPS growth for the S&P 500 this year. BCA U.S. Equity Strategy service's earnings models suggest that this forecast may still be too cautious (Chart 3). Recommended Allocation Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Chart 1No Recession Signals Flashing No Recession Signals Flashing No Recession Signals Flashing Chart 2A Dramatic Rise In Earnings Forecasts... A Dramatic Rise In Earnings Forecasts... A Dramatic Rise In Earnings Forecasts... Chart 3...But Forecasts May Still Be Too Cautious ...But Forecasts May Still Be Too Cautious ...But Forecasts May Still Be Too Cautious While it is true that equity valuations are stretched, particularly in the U.S. (with BCA's Composite Valuation Index having just tipped into the "Extremely Overvalued" zone - Chart 4), valuations are not usually a good timing tool. Investor euphoria seems not yet to have reached the extremes that usually characterize a bull-market peak. The message we hear consistently from wealth managers is that their clients who missed last year's rally are now looking to get into risk assets. The American Association of Individual Investors' latest weekly survey shows 45% bulls to 24% bears - not especially optimistic by past standards (Chart 5). Flows into equity funds have started to accelerate, but have been weaker than bond flows over the past year (Chart 6). Chart 4U.S. Equities Now 'Extremely Overvalued' U.S. Equities Now 'Extremely Overvalued' U.S. Equities Now 'Extremely Overvalued' Chart 5Investors Are Not Particularly Bullish Investors Are Not Particularly Bullish Investors Are Not Particularly Bullish Chart 6Flows Into Equities Starting To Accelerate Flows Into Equities Starting To Accelerate Flows Into Equities Starting To Accelerate Chart 7Key: Inflation Expectations Getting to 2.5% Key: Inflation Expectations Getting to 2.5% Key: Inflation Expectations Getting to 2.5% We think the key to timing the top lies in inflation expectations. With the U.S. economy at full capacity and unemployment at 4.1%, well below the NAIRU of 4.6%, the Fed believes that a pick-up in inflation is just a matter of time - an analysis we agree with. The market has started to come round to this view too, with implied inflation rising by about 40 BPs over the past two months (Chart 7). The market has now priced in a 65% probability of the Fed's projected three rate hikes this year, and even a 27% probability of four. Inflation expectations hitting 2.5% (which would be compatible with the Fed's 2% PCE inflation target - CPI inflation is typically 50 BPs higher) could be the tipping-point. This is because it would remove the Fed put - with inflation expectations elevated, the Fed would no longer be able to back off from tightening in the event of a global risk-off event such as a stock-market correction or a slowdown in China. Such a rise in inflation expectations would also push the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield above 3%, which would increase the attraction of fixed income, and represent a threat to highly indebted borrowers, especially in emerging markets. This is how bull markets typically end: with the Fed having to raise rates to choke off inflation, and either making a policy mistake or tightening monetary policy enough to slow growth. But all this is probably quite a few months away. We expect to turn more defensive perhaps late this year, ahead of a recession that we have for some time now penciled in for the second half of 2019. Given how advanced the cycle is, conservative investors primarily concerned with capital preservation might look to dial down risk or hedge exposure now. But investors focused on quarterly performance should ride the bull market until some of the warning signals mentioned above begin to flash. For now, therefore, we continue to recommend an overweight in equities relative to bonds on the 12-month investment horizon, and mostly pro-risk and pro-cyclical tilts. Equities: We continue to prefer developed over emerging equities. EM will be hurt by the slowdown likely in China (where money supply and credit growth have fallen in response to the authorities' tighter policies - Chart 8), rising U.S. interest rates, sluggish productivity growth, and valuations that are no longer particularly cheap (Chart 9). Within DM, we are overweight euro zone and Japanese equities, which should benefit from their higher beta, more cyclical earnings, still accommodative monetary policy, and cheaper valuations than the U.S. Our sector bets are tilted to late-cycle value sectors such as financials, industrials and energy. Chart 8Tighter Monetary Conditions in China bca.gaa_mu_2018_02_01_c8 bca.gaa_mu_2018_02_01_c8 Chart 9EM No Longer Cheap EM No Longer Cheap EM No Longer Cheap Fixed Income: Rising inflation expectations should push the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield up to 3% this year, with German Bunds rising by a similar amount. We recommend an underweight on duration, and a preference for inflation-linked over nominal bonds, in these markets. In the U.K. and Australia, however, central banks are unlikely to tighten as quickly as futures markets have priced in and so we prefer their government bonds. While the expansion continues, spread product should continue to outperform in the fixed-income bucket. The default-adjusted spread on U.S. high-yield bonds remains over 200 BP and, though we see little further spread contraction, carry alone makes this attractive. Currencies: BCA was correct last year to predict a widening of interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and the euro zone, but wrong to conclude that this would lead to a stronger dollar (Chart 10). The drivers of currencies can undergo regime shifts, and it seems now that valuation (both the euro and yen are cheap compared to their purchasing power parity, 1.32 and 99 to the U.S. dollar respectively), current account surpluses (3.3% for the euro zone and 3.7% for Japan), and other factors have become more important. Tactically, the euro, in particular, looks very overbought. Speculative investors are very long euros, the ECB is likely to remain dovish relative to the Fed, and the strong euro could put some downward pressure on growth in the short-term. However, if the dollar were to rebound by 5% or so we would be likely to end our dollar bull call. Chart 10Rate Differentials No Longer Moving Currencies Rate Differentials No Longer Moving Currencies Rate Differentials No Longer Moving Currencies Chart 11Oil Supply To Increase In 2019 Oil Supply To Increase In 2019 Oil Supply To Increase In 2019 Commodities: Oil prices have risen on the back of strong global demand, OPEC discipline, and a lag in the response of U.S. shale oil producers. We forecast an average of $67 a barrel for Brent crude this year, with spikes to as high as $80 in the event of disruptions in producer countries such as Venezuela. However, with one-year forward crude prices around $62, shale producers (whose marginal costs average about $52 a barrel) are likely to pick up production soon. OPEC, too, should be happy with crude around $50-60. Our energy team forecasts a pick-up in supply next year (Chart 11), which should bring the crude price down to an average of $55 in 2019. Industrial commodities are a product of Chinese demand, global growth, and the U.S. dollar. These drivers look likely to be mixed over the coming months and so we remain neutral. Gold has risen, in the face of rising interest rates, because of the weak dollar - it remains an excellent hedge against inflation, recession, and geopolitical risks and so should be a modest part of any balanced portfolio. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation

Highlights The German 10-year bund yield rising to 1%, or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3% would be a trigger to downgrade equities and upgrade bonds... ...especially as the blue sky expectations for global growth in H1 2018 will turn out to be overly-optimistic. On a 6-9 month horizon, upgrade Airlines to overweight. Downgrade Banks to underweight. Upgrade Germany (DAX) to neutral. Downgrade Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) to underweight. Feature Where has the equity market cycle gone? Since 2012, the stock market's 6-month returns have generated an unprecedented consistency, with only a brief breakdown - at the end of 2015 - into negative territory (Chart of the Wesk and Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekSince 2012, The Equity Market ##br##Cycle Has Disappeared Since 2012, The Equity Market Cycle Has Disappeared Since 2012, The Equity Market Cycle Has Disappeared Chart I-2Much Less Cyclicality In Equities ##br##Than In Commodities Much Less Cyclicality In Equities Than In Commodities Much Less Cyclicality In Equities Than In Commodities The disappearance of the equity market cycle brings to mind the concept of the "Great Moderation", a term coined in 2002 to describe the big drop in business cycle volatility during the 1990s. In 2004, Ben Bernanke suggested that "improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not the only factor, probably were an important source of the Great Moderation." Today's Great Moderation 2.0 refers to the equity market cycle - or rather, its disappearance. And in finding a reason for the Great Moderation 2.0, Bernanke's attribution to monetary policy might be right on the money. Stick With TINA, Or Flirt With TIA? For many years, ultra-accommodative monetary policy has provided a consistent and substantial uplift to world stock market valuations. Since 2012, our preferred measure of equity market valuation - world stock market capitalisation to GDP - has almost doubled. This inexorable and relatively trouble-free rise has even spawned its own acronym: TINA - There Is No Alternative (to owning equities.) However, the uplift to stock market valuations has happened in a less obvious way than you might realise. Based on the excellent predictive power of stock market capitalisation to GDP, the prospective 10-year annualised return from world equities has collapsed from 9% in 2012 to 1.5% now (Chart I-3). Over the same period, the global 10-year bond yield has compressed from 3% to 1.5%. Hence, the collapse in prospective equity returns is not due to the decline in bond yields per se. It has happened mostly because the excess return offered by equities over bonds - the so-called 'equity risk premium' has compressed from 6% to zero (Chart I-4). Chart I-3World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies##br## A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return Chart I-4Prospective Equity Returns ##br##Have Become 'Bond Like' Prospective Equity Returns, Have Become "Bond Like" Prospective Equity Returns, Have Become "Bond Like" Ultra-accommodative monetary policy has caused the disappearance of the equity risk premium. The simple reason is that at low bond yields, the risk of owning bonds becomes similar to the risk of owning equities. Chart I-5Below A 2% Yield, 10-Year Bonds Have ##br##More Negative Skew Than Equities Beware The Great Moderation 2.0 Beware The Great Moderation 2.0 When bond yields approach their lower bound, bond prices have little upside but they have a lot of downside. This ratio of an investment's potential losses relative to its potential gains is the risk that most frightens investors,1 and is known as negative skew. At yields below 2%, bond returns become as negatively skewed as equity returns, or even more negatively skewed than equities (Chart I-5). As the risk of bonds increases to become 'equity-like', the prospective return from equities must compress to become 'bond-like'. Which is to say, equity valuations become substantially richer. All well and good - so long as the global 10-year bond yield stays low. Above a 2% yield, the negative skew on bond returns disappears, and equities once again require an excess prospective return over bonds. More colloquially, investors would dump TINA and start flirting with TIA (There Is an Alternative). In essence, a big threat to the Great Moderation 2.0 comes the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1%, or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%. Any moves towards these thresholds would be a trigger to downgrade equities and upgrade bonds - especially as we now explain why the blue sky expectations for global growth in H1 2018 will turn out to be overly-optimistic. The Equity Sector Cycle Is Alive And Well For the stock market in aggregate, the cycle has been moribund. But for equity sector relative performance, the cycle is very much alive and well. In The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles 2 we showed and explained the existence of mini-cycles in economic and financial variables. To summarise, a lag between the demand for credit and its supply necessarily creates mini-cycles in both the price of credit (the bond yield) and the quantity of credit (the global credit impulse). Thereby it also creates mini-cycles in GDP growth. The useful point is that these cycles are very regular with half-cycles averaging 6-8 months. Which makes their turning points and phases predictable. Given that the global credit impulse cycle has been in a mini-upswing phase since last May, it is highly likely to turn into a mini-downswing phase through the first half of 2018. The latest data point, showing a tick down, seems to corroborate such a turning point. From an equity sector perspective, Banks versus Healthcare has closely tracked the phases of the credit impulse mini-cycle (Chart I-6). In all five of the last five mini-downswings, Banks have underperformed Healthcare, and we would expect no difference in the next mini-downswing. Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, downgrade Banks to underweight. Unsurprisingly, exactly the same pattern applies to Basic Materials (and Energy) versus Healthcare (Chart I-7). Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, stay underweight Basic Materials and Energy versus Healthcare. Also unsurprisingly, the performance of European Airlines is a mirror-image of the oil price cycle, given that aviation fuel comprises the sector's main variable cost (Chart I-8). As an aside, this also somewhat insulates the European Airlines against a strengthening euro, given that this variable cost is priced in dollars. Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, upgrade European Airlines to overweight. Chart I-6Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The ##br##Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Chart I-7Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The##br## Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Chart I-8European Airlines Relative Performance Is A##br## Mirror-Image of The Oil Price Cycle European Airlines Relative Performance Is A Mirror-Image of The Oil Price Cycle European Airlines Relative Performance Is A Mirror-Image of The Oil Price Cycle Country Allocation Just Drops Out Of Sector Allocation Our core philosophy of investment reductionism teaches us that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) skews swamp any effect that comes from the domestic economy. For example, the defining skew for Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX is their large overweighting to banks. So unsurprisingly, MIB and IBEX relative performance reduces to: will banks outperform the market? (Chart I-9 and Chart I-10). Chart I-9Italy = Long Banks Italy = Long Banks Italy = Long Banks Chart I-10Spain = Long Banks Spain = Long Banks Spain = Long Banks Therefore, the key consideration for European equity country allocation is always: how to allocate to the vital few equity sectors that feature most often in the skews: Banks, Healthcare, Energy and Materials. To reiterate, our 6-9 month recommendation is to underweight Banks, Materials And Energy versus Healthcare, and to overweight Airlines versus the market. Then to arrive at a country allocation, combine the cyclical view on the vital few sectors with the country sector skews shown in Box I-1. Even if you disagree with our sector views, the sector-based approach is the right way to pick European equity markets. If you agree with our sector views, the result is the following updated European equity market allocation: Box I-1: The Vital Few Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks. France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials. Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks. Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks. Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy. And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound. Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy. Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials. Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials. Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy. The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands. Underweight: Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. In terms of change, it means upgrading Germany (DAX) to neutral and downgrading Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) to underweight. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities", January 28, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles", January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* There is a lot of optimism already priced into the South African rand, making it vulnerable to a countertrend reversal. Therefore, this week's recommended trade is to go long USD/ZAR with a profit-target of 6% and a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short S&P500/long Eurostoxx50 hit its stop-loss, while short Japanese energy and short palladium moved comfortably into profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 USD/ZAR USD/ZAR The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Duration Checklist: Our Duration Checklists continue to point to a bearish backdrop for global bond yields. A continued below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance is warranted. There is not enough of a difference between the U.S. & European portions of the Checklist to suggest a big imminent move in the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread is in the cards. UST-Bund Spread: A big cyclical turn in the Treasury-Bund spread is coming, but not before the ECB begins to seriously signal an end to its asset purchases and the Fed delivers a few more rate hikes. There will be better levels to move to a long Treasury/short Bund position by the summer. Feature Chart of the WeekUST-Bund Gap Still##BR##Reflects Policy Differences UST-Bund Gap Still Reflects Policy Differences UST-Bund Gap Still Reflects Policy Differences With the 10-year yield on both U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds hitting new cyclical highs on an intraday basis yesterday (2.72% and 0.70%, respectively), it is clear that the backdrop for global government bond markets is still bearish. The yield differential between the two markets remains quite wide, however, with the cyclical European economic performance rapidly catching up to that in the U.S. This is raising the odds that European Central Bank (ECB) will have to soon begin signaling a move to a less accommodative policy stance that will raise European bond yields further away from historically low levels. The continued strength of the Euro versus the U.S. dollar is a sign that investors are already expecting a big compression in U.S. bond yields versus European equivalents (Chart of the Week). Should investors position now for an eventual tightening of the Treasury-Bund spread? Or is it possible that the spread widens even further, thus providing a better entry point to profit from a spread tightening move? In this Weekly Report, we investigate the drivers of the Treasury-Bund spread to provide some clues as to its future direction. Our conclusion is that, from a medium-term strategic perspective, a narrowing of the Treasury-Bund spread is highly probable, but there is still potential for widening in the next few months. Checking In On Our Duration Checklist: Still Bearish, But With No Big Signal For U.S.-German Spreads In early 2017, we introduced a list of indicators to monitor in order to determine if our strategic below-benchmark duration stance on U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds should be maintained.1 This list, which we dubbed our "Duration Checklist", contained elements focused on economic growth, inflation, central bank policy biases, investor risk appetite and bond market technicals. The vast majority of indicators in the Checklist have accurately pointed to a cyclical backdrop for rising yields throughout the past year, despite the surprising drop in global inflation witnessed in 2017 (Table 1). Table 1The Message From Our Duration Checklist Is Still Bearish For Both USTs & Bunds Some Thoughts On The Treasury-Bund Spread Some Thoughts On The Treasury-Bund Spread With bond yields hitting fresh cyclical highs this week, it is a good time to provide another update of our Duration Checklist to see how conditions have changed since our last update in September. Specifically, we are looking for any differences in the individual U.S. and European components of the Checklist that can inform our view on the UST-Bund spread. Global growth momentum is accelerating to the upside. The global leading economic indicator (LEI) continues to climb steadily higher, even with global growth already in a solid uptrend (Chart 2). The global ZEW index, measuring investor sentiment towards growth in the major developed economies, has started to accelerate. The Citigroup Global Data Surprise index is at the highest level since 2004 (!), while our global credit impulse indicator has picked up sharply - both of which should keep global bond yields under upward pressure. We are giving a "check" to all these elements of our Duration Checklist, indicating that a defensive stance on overall duration exposure should be maintained. The only indicator in the "global" section of our Duration Checklist that is not pointing to higher bond yields is our global LEI diffusion index, which has fallen to just below the 50 line. This suggests a potential narrowing of the breadth of the current global upturn, which warrants an "x" in the Checklist. Domestic economic growth in both the U.S. and Euro Area remains solid. Manufacturing PMIs in both the U.S. (the ISM index) and Europe remain high and are rising, as is consumer and business confidence on both sides of the Atlantic (Charts 3 & 4). Corporate profit growth is solid both in the U.S. and Europe, with our models suggesting that earnings should expand at a double-digit pace again in 2018. All these indicators earn a "check" in our Duration Checklist. Chart 2Majority Of Global Growth Indicators##BR##Still Pointing To Higher Yields Majority Of Global Growth Indicators Still Pointing To Higher Yields Majority Of Global Growth Indicators Still Pointing To Higher Yields Chart 3U.S. Growth##BR##Remains Solid U.S. Growth Remains Solid U.S. Growth Remains Solid Chart 4A Booming European##BR##Economy Is Bearish For Bunds A Booming European Economy Is Bearish For Bunds A Booming European Economy Is Bearish For Bunds Inflation signals are mixed both in the U.S. and Europe. This remains the portion of our Checklist that has the greatest number of conflicting signals. While the rapid rise in oil prices over the past several months is putting upward pressure on headline U.S. inflation (Chart 5), the equally fast increase in the EUR/USD exchange rate is helping offset much of that increase in the Euro Area (Chart 6). Unemployment is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment NAIRU rate in the U.S., yet both Average Hourly Earnings growth and the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker are decelerating. Unemployment in the Euro Area is now back to the OECD'S NAIRU level for the first time since the Great Recession, but wage inflation has only risen modestly. Chart 5U.S. Inflation Still Subdued,##BR##Despite Higher Oil & Low Unemployment U.S. Inflation Still Subdued, Despite Higher Oil & Low Unemployment U.S. Inflation Still Subdued, Despite Higher Oil & Low Unemployment Chart 6A Puzzling Lack Of##BR##Euro Area Core Inflation A Puzzling Lack Of Euro Area Core Inflation A Puzzling Lack Of Euro Area Core Inflation For the U.S. inflation side of our Checklist, we are giving a "ü" to the accelerating oil price (in U.S. dollar terms) and the unemployment gap, but an "x" to decelerating wage inflation. In the Euro Area, we give a "check" to the unemployment gap and a weak "check" to wage inflation which is in a mild uptrend. The stable momentum in the Euro-denominated Brent oil price earns an "x" in the Checklist, however. Both the Fed and ECB Are Looking To Tighten Monetary Policy. The Fed remains in a tightening cycle and with U.S. growth strong, core inflation bottoming out and the labor market still tight, there is no reason why the Fed should not deliver on its projected three rate hikes in 2018. The ECB just reduced the size of its monthly asset purchases in response to the robust Euro Area economic growth and modest pickup in inflation. The latest comments from various ECB officials suggests that, if core inflation rebounds after the recent unusual dip, then additional moves to less accommodative monetary policy (tapering first, rate hikes later) should be expected. So for both the U.S. and Europe, we place a "check" in this portion of the Duration Checklist. Investors risk appetite remains strong. The surge in global stock markets seen so far in 2018 has definitely played a role in the backup in global bond yields, as investors have been allocating out of fixed income into equities. Within our Duration Checklist framework, a bearish signal for bonds occurs if the percentage deviation of equity indices from their 200-day moving average is positive but is not yet at 10% - a stretched level that has typically preceded significant equity corrections. The S&P 500 index is now 14% above its 200-day average, and thus earns an "x" in that element of the Duration Checklist. The other parts of the U.S. side of the Checklist - tight corporate bond spreads and a low level of the VIX volatility index - both warrant a "check" as an indication of intense investor risk appetite that lessens the appeal of government bonds (Chart 7). In the Euro Area, the Stoxx 600 index is only 4% above its 200-day moving average, but with tight credit spreads and a low level of the VStoxx volatility index (Chart 8). All these elements earn a "check" in our Duration Checklist. Chart 7High Risk Appetite In the U.S.,##BR##But Risk Assets Look Stretched High Risk Appetite In the U.S., But Risk Assets Look Stretched High Risk Appetite In the U.S., But Risk Assets Look Stretched Chart 8Still A Pro-Risk Bias##BR##Among Euro Area Investors Still A Pro-Risk Bias Among Euro Area Investors Still A Pro-Risk Bias Among Euro Area Investors Bond market momentum is not overly stretched, although short positioning is an issue. In the U.S., the 10-year Treasury yield is only 35bps above its 200-day moving average, well below the 90-100bps levels seen at previous yield peaks (Chart 9). Price momentum for the 10-year is right on the zero line, suggesting no stretched extreme that would precede a reversal. Both of those indicators earn a "check" in the Checklist. Positioning is a problem in the U.S., however, with the CFTC data on Treasury futures showing a net short position on the 10-year contract among speculators. From the point of view of our Duration Checklist, a big net short is a bullish signal for bonds from a contrarian perspective. Thus, positioning warrants an "x" in the U.S. side of the Checklist. In Europe, the 10-year Bund yield is now 22bps above its 200-day moving average. This is below the previous peaks around the 50bps level. Price momentum is also hovering just above the zero line and is no impediment to a move higher in yields (Chart 10). Both of these pieces of the Duration Checklist score a "check". Note that due to a lack of available data, we do not include a positioning component on the European side of the Checklist. Chart 9USTs Not Oversold,##BR##But Positioning Getting Stretched USTs Not Oversold, But Positioning Getting Stretched USTs Not Oversold, But Positioning Getting Stretched Chart 10Bunds Not Yet At##BR##Oversold Extremes Bunds Not Yet At Oversold Extremes Bunds Not Yet At Oversold Extremes The net conclusion from our Duration Checklist is that the majority of indicators continue to point to upward pressure on U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Thus, a below-benchmark duration stance is still warranted for both markets. There are only a few potentially bullish signals in the Checklist. The overshoot in U.S. equity markets and the large net short position in Treasury futures are both sending a more positive signal for Treasuries, while the more stable momentum in the Euro denominated oil price is also a positive for Bunds. None of those is enough to prompt a change in our recommended below-benchmark duration stance. At the same time, there is not enough of a difference between the U.S. and European sides of the Checklist to provide a signal for the future direction of the Treasury-Bund spread. For that, we must dig a bit deeper into the drivers of that spread, which we cover in the next section. Bottom Line: Our Duration Checklists continue to point to a bearish backdrop for global bond yields. A continued below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance is warranted. There is not enough of a difference between the U.S. & European portions of the Checklist to suggest a big imminent move in the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread is in the cards. How To Play The Treasury-Bund Spread - Tactically Wider, Structurally Narrower The Treasury-Bund spread, like most cross-country bond yield spreads, is driven mostly by economic growth and inflation differentials. In the past, the U.S. and European economic cycles have rarely been in sync, which creates gaps in growth, inflation and monetary policy between the two regions. This usually leads to the Fed and ECB (and the Bundesbank before it) rarely having interest rates at similar levels, or moving at a similar pace, thus creating large cyclical swings in the Treasury-Bund spread. At the moment, however, the 200bp gap between 10-year Treasuries and German Bunds mostly reflects the 4.6 percentage point gap between the unemployment rates in the U.S. and Europe. The spread has been far less correlated to the difference in inflation rates between the two economies. Reported headline inflation in the U.S. is only 30bps above the same measure in Europe, with core inflation only 60bps higher in the U.S. (Chart 11). The latter may be more critical for the future direction of the Treasury-Bund spread, however. The dip in Euro Area core inflation back below the 1% level at the end of 2017 was a surprise given the strength of European growth last year, with real GDP reaching a well-above potential pace of 2.8%. Core inflation must rise from the current 0.9% level for the ECB to consider any move to a tighter monetary policy stance, as this would give the central bank confidence that its 2% inflation target would be reached in the medium-term. The markets seem to be pricing in a recovery of Euro Area core inflation in the coming months. Our Euro Area months-to-hike indicator, which measures the number of months until the first full 25bp rate hike is priced into the EUR Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve, is now down to 17 months. As the interest rate markets have pulled forward the date of the next ECB rate hike to June 2019, the currency markets have followed suit with the euro rallying to a 3-year high last week (Chart 12). Chart 11Big Gaps Between Yields & Unemployment,##BR##Small Gaps In Inflation Big Gaps Between Yields & Unemployment, Small Gaps In Inflation Big Gaps Between Yields & Unemployment, Small Gaps In Inflation Chart 12Markets Are Acting Like##BR##Core Inflation Will Rebound In Europe Markets Are Acting Like Core Inflation Will Rebound In Europe Markets Are Acting Like Core Inflation Will Rebound In Europe A rebound in Euro Area core inflation is the first step towards seeing a convergence of the Treasury-Bund spread. The key is how the ECB responds to that move. Looking across the full spectrum of maturities, the moves in the yield gap between U.S. Treasuries and German government bonds have historically occurred alongside changes in relative inflation expectations (Chart 13). This makes sense, as to the extent that inflation expectations were climbing at a faster rate in the U.S. than in Europe, the market would price in a higher future Fed funds rate relative to European policy rates and, thus, widen the Treasury-Bund spread (and vice versa). That correlation between relative inflation expectations and the Treasury-Bund spread has broken down in recent years. The specific timing of that breakdown can be traced back to the August 2014 speech given by Mario Draghi at the Fed's Jackson Hole conference, marked by the vertical line in Chart 13. In that speech, Draghi introduced the idea that the ECB could begin buying government bonds to fight deflation pressures in Europe. That sent a powerful signal to the markets not to expect any movement in European policy rates for some time - the typical response seen in recent years to an announcement by a central bank that it was ramping up asset purchases. If Euro Area core inflation begins to rise in the coming months, the ECB's "forward guidance" can start to work in reverse. The ECB will be forced to signal further reductions in its asset purchases, likely all the way to zero in a full taper scenario. Markets will then begin to price in both higher inflation expectations and ECB rate hikes, resulting in a normalization of the Treasury-Bund spread through higher Bund yields. Until that inflation upturn happens in Europe, however, it will be difficult to get much of a tightening of the Treasury-Bund spread. In Chart 14, we present the spread versus the difference between policy rates in the U.S. and Europe (top panel), the ratio of the U.S. and Euro Area unemployment rates (middle panel), and the gap between U.S. and European headline inflation (bottom panel). At the moment, the Treasury-Bund spread is being held at an elevated level by the relative unemployment rates, with the spread looking wide versus the inflation differential. The much lower U.S. unemployment rate, which is driving the Fed to continue slowly hiking interest rates while the ECB keeps policy rates near zero, is preventing any meaningful decline in the Treasury-Bund spread. Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Has Divorced##BR##From Inflation During ECB QE UST-Bund Spread Has Divorced From Inflation During ECB QE UST-Bund Spread Has Divorced From Inflation During ECB QE Chart 14UST-Bund Spread Reflects Policy##BR##& Unemployment Differentials UST-Bund Spread Reflects Policy & Unemployment Differentials UST-Bund Spread Reflects Policy & Unemployment Differentials We have combined these three variables into a simple econometric model to explain the Treasury-Bund spread (Chart 15). We also added the size of the balance sheets of the Fed and ECB as separate variables, to account for the impact of bond purchases from each central bank. This model shows that a) the predicted value of the spread continues to steadily rise and b) the current spread is below one standard deviation away from that predicted value - a level equal to 237bps on the spread. That implies that there is still room for Treasury yields to climb higher versus Bunds before the spread becomes "too wide". Additional spread widening will be much harder to come by in the near-term, however. The gap between data surprise indices between the U.S. and Euro Area - which correlates well to the momentum in the Treasury-Bund spread - is relatively stretched, at a time when U.S. bond managers are already very underweight duration exposure (Chart 16). Yet with the forward curves already pricing in some mild tightening over the next year (top panel), betting on Treasury-Bund spread widening is a positive carry trade. One final point in favor of a wider Treasury-Bund spread is that the spread momentum is not yet close to the extremes seen in previous cycles (Chart 17). The big cyclical peaks in the spread typically occur when spreads are 50bps above the 200-day moving average, which is well above current levels. Chart 15Our New Model Suggests##BR##UST-Bund Spread Not Overstretched Our New Model Suggests UST-Bund Spread Not Overstretched Our New Model Suggests UST-Bund Spread Not Overstretched Chart 16Relative Data Surprises & UST##BR##Positioning May Limit Additional Spread Widening Relative Data Surprises & UST Positioning May Limit Additional Spread Widening Relative Data Surprises & UST Positioning May Limit Additional Spread Widening Chart 17UST-Bund Spread Momentum##BR##Not Yet At Stretched Extremes UST-Bund Spread Momentum Not Yet At Stretched Extremes UST-Bund Spread Momentum Not Yet At Stretched Extremes Our conclusion after looking at all these indicators is that the major cyclical peak in the Treasury-Bund spread is not yet on the immediate horizon, but is likely to unfold later this year - after one final move higher in Treasury yields versus Bunds. Bottom Line: A big cyclical turn in the Treasury-Bund spread is coming, but not before the ECB begins to seriously signal an end to its asset purchases and the Fed delivers a few more rate hikes. There will be better levels to move to a long Treasury/short Bund position by the summer. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Some Thoughts On The Treasury-Bund Spread Some Thoughts On The Treasury-Bund Spread Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights EUR/USD is in a blow off phase. Treasury secretary Mnuchin's comments added fuel to a fire already lit by worries of twin deficits and the inherent responsivity of the dollar to momentum. It is dangerous to short EUR/USD when momentum is so strong; while we expect EUR/USD to correct over the next three months, it is safer to short the euro against the yen. The rebound in Australia's national income will peter off, this will hurt inflows into the country. The RBA will not surprise markets to the upside in 2018. Most of the drivers of AUD/USD point south. Stay short the AUD against the CAD and NZD, shorting AUD/JPY is attractive. Feature By somewhat abandoning the "strong dollar policy" in Davos, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin sent the dollar in yet another tailspin this week.1 The weakness was further compounded by the seeming lack of concern vis-à-vis the euro's strength expressed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi during the European Central Bank's press conference in Frankfurt yesterday. Mnuchin's comments rightfully worried investors, as they echoed President Trump's own rhetoric from a year ago that a strong dollar was negative for the U.S. economy, at least in terms of trade competitiveness. However, it is important to remember that words are only words, and for these utterances to have any durable impact, they need to be backed by policy instruments. The 1985 Plaza Accord was able to drive down the dollar not just because finance ministers said that the greenback was too strong, but also because the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in half between July 1984 and October 1986. This drove 2-year yield differentials between the U.S. and Japan, the U.K., and Germany down by 454 bps, 630 bps and 407 bps, respectively. Compounding this punch, the USD was trading at prodigiously expensive levels in early 1985. Today, the Fed is not cutting interest rates, it is raising them. In fact, BCA expects at least three rate hikes this year. The current weakness in the dollar is also easing U.S. financial conditions further, which is giving more ammunition for the Fed to tighten policy. Meanwhile, President Draghi reiterated that the ECB was very unlikely to increase rates in 2018; thus rate differentials between the U.S. and the euro area are widening, not narrowing. There is also the nagging question of the twin deficit in the U.S. The Trump stimulus package is expected to increase the fiscal deficit, and also feed through to a higher current account deficit. We have sympathy for this view. While such a twin deficit was associated with a weakening USD at the beginning of the millennium, in the first half of the 1980s it was not. Thus a twin deficit is no guarantee of a weaker dollar. The behavior of the Fed is likely to once again dominate. In the early days of the millennium, the Greenspan Fed was easing policy aggressively. In the early 1980s, while the Fed was cutting rates, it was cutting rates at a slower pace than had been anticipated because it realized that President Ronald Reagan's tax cuts and increased military spending were inflationary. Volcker wanted to make sure inflation expectations would stay well anchored, and not spike up. It thus seems that once again, the behavior of U.S. inflation is paramount. If U.S. inflation picks up as we expect (Chart I-1), the dollar is likely to appreciate as the Fed will hike. If U.S. inflation stays moribund, the twin deficit will likely tank the dollar. What to do practically? We have posited that the expected terminal rate spread between the euro area and the U.S. has been the interest rate spread driving EUR/USD rate over the past 12 months. Yet, even by this metric, the move in the euro to 1.25 is out of bound, as the euro has completely diverged from the recent trends in terminal rate differentials (Chart I-2). This suggests the euro is vulnerable at current levels. Chart I-1U.S. Inflation Will Pick Up U.S. Inflation Will Pick Up U.S. Inflation Will Pick Up Chart I-2Mind The Gap! Mind The Gap! Mind The Gap! It is also important to remark that the dollar's weakness is generalized. Moreover, the dollar is oversold and likely to experience a rebound (Chart I-3). However, timing this rebound is a made harder by the nature of the greenback. As we highlighted in a Special Report in December, the U.S. dollar is one of the two currencies exhibiting the strongest response to momentum factors.2 This is because the dollar is a very important macro variable, which is both responsive to global growth but also a key input to global growth. As global growth strengthens, this tends to weigh on the USD, but the USD's weakness tends to also boost global growth, as it eases global financial conditions. This creates a strong feedback loop that favors momentum trades in the USD. Chart I-3The Time To Bet On A Rebound Is High The Time To Bet On A Rebound Is High The Time To Bet On A Rebound Is High The greenback is currently entangled in such dynamics. Global growth improved after China massively stimulated its economy in 2015 and early 2016, which hurt the dollar. The weakness in the dollar is now helping global growth, which further hurts the dollar. It is thus a mugs game trying to time a reversal in the USD. As a result, even if we think EUR/USD is likely to experience a sharp correction in the coming weeks, we prefer shorting EUR/JPY. EUR/JPY is expensive, and positioning is just as extreme. However, by shorting the euro against the yen, we are not as exposed to the dollar cycle, and if global growth were to weaken in response to increasing tightening in Chinese policy, the yen would benefit in this environment. As such, the risk-reward ratio for this trade is higher. Bottom Line: Mnuchin comments on the USD were only an excuse for the dollar to sell off. The true culprit for the dollar's weakness is the greenback's own extreme sensitivity to momentum. As a result, timing a dollar reversal is nearly impossible. Only once the dollar begins to turn around can we begin betting on a tactical USD rally, even if it dooms us to miss the early parts of the move. Shorting EUR/JPY continues to offer a more attractive risk-reward tradeoff than shorting EUR/USD. Feature: Hard Times Ahead For The AUD The Australian dollar has rallied by a stunning 18.3% since its February 2016 trough. Improvement in global trade, surging Chinese stimulus, the resurgence in commodity prices, the rally in EM stocks, and the fall in the U.S. dollar have all aligned to transform the AUD into a high flyer. Not only have these factors encouraged risk-taking, creating an environment that is helping high-beta Australian assets perform well, they also have had a direct positive outcome on the Australian balance of payments, thus creating real improvements in the AUD's fundamentals as well. With AUD/USD now back above the key 0.80 threshold, it is important for investors to ask themselves: Can the AUD continue on its upward trajectory or is it time to bet against it? While the short-term outlook remains clouded by the USD's downward momentum, the AUD is likely to weaken on a cyclical basis. Playing AUD weakness against the NZD, CAD, and JPY seems like safer bets at the current juncture. Australian Economic Developments Australia's real GDP growth has slowed from 2.8% in Q3 2016 to 2.2% in Q3 2017, and currently stands below the lows recorded in 2015. However, this hides some very significant improvements, as nominal GDP growth has surged - from 1.4% in Q3 2015 to 6.5% in Q3 2017 (Chart I-4). Consumption has not been the crucial source of variations in Australia's economic activity. Instead, the source of change has emanated from net exports, which have moved from slicing off nearly 2% to GDP growth in late 2015 to adding more than 3% in the most recent quarter. The fluctuations in Australian growth have in large part reflected the dynamics in commodities prices. Australia has undergone massive fluctuations in its terms-of-trade as iron ore, copper and coal prices experienced a bust, followed by a subsequent boom that has pushed base metals prices up by 76% since their nadir. These movements in commodity prices not only explain past gross domestic product performance, they also explain the swings in both national income and corporate profits (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Australian Growth Decomposition Australian Growth Decomposition Australian Growth Decomposition Chart I-5The Positive Shock: Commodities The Positive Shock: Commodities The Positive Shock: Commodities In response to the improvement in national income and profits since the winter of 2016, the basic balance of Australia has surged from a deficit of 3% of GDP to a surplus of 3% (Chart I-6). While higher commodities prices contributed to higher exports, lifting the current account, portfolio flows moved up by more than 4% of GDP. This was simply because the surge in Australian corporate profits also made investing in Australia much more attractive for investors around the world. This combination caused a lot of investors to buy Australian dollars in the process, generating a severe upward bias in favor of the AUD. But how these trends are likely to evolve remains uncertain. To begin with, the rate of change of the Reserve Bank of Australia's commodity index has already rolled over, plunging from a high of 47% six months ago to -1% today. The historical lead times of this variable on GDP, GNI and profits suggests that each of these three variables are set to decelerate meaningfully in the coming quarters. This could weigh on inflows into Australia. China too plays a key role. Exports to China were subtracting 0.5% from Australia's growth as of the end of 2016 and are now adding 1.5%. Swings in Chinese activity could amplify the impact of the rollover in commodities price inflation. In fact, the slowing Li Keqiang index already paints this exact picture (Chart I-7). The growth rate of railway freight, one of the index's components, has already collapsed from 20% in August 2017 to 1%, and iron ore stockpiles in Chinese ports are hitting record highs. The tightening of the monetary and fiscal screws in China are therefore likely to exert a negative impact on Australia's national income, and thus on inflows that have been so important in supporting the AUD. Chart I-6From Income Shock To ##br##Balance Of Payment Shock From Income Shock To Balance Of Payment Shock From Income Shock To Balance Of Payment Shock Chart I-7China's Boost Is Dissipating ##br##The Boost To Trade Is Dissipating China's Boost Is Dissipating The Boost To Trade Is Dissipating China's Boost Is Dissipating The Boost To Trade Is Dissipating But what about real economic activity? Here again, the picture does not shine particularly bright. Fiscal policy has been a drag on GDP since 2011, and 2018 will be no exception, as the fiscal thrust will be -0.3% of potential GDP (Chart I-8). A potential rollover in aggregate profits could limit corporate capex in 2018. Mining projects in Australia are expected to continue to decline as a share of GDP in 2018, thus mining capex will remain a drag on growth (Chart I-9). Moreover, imports of capital goods have been a leading indicator of Australian capex, and they too have rolled over after a recent surge, suggesting that non-mining capex growth will also experience limited upside. The Australian consumer is also unlikely to come and save the day. To begin with, the savings rate has additional upside. As net worth has increased, Australian households have curtailed their savings rate to 3% of disposable income (Chart I-10). Moreover, debt levels have increased significantly, rising to an eye-opening 200% of income. The problem is that Australian housing is now much overvalued (Chart I-11). While this does not guarantee a fall in house prices, it is highly unlikely that net worth will continue to increase at its heady pace. Thus, with high debt loads and a limited wealth effect, the probability is high that the savings rate will increase. Chart I-8Fiscal Policy: Still Contractionary ##br## Fiscal Policy Is Still A Drag Fiscal Policy: Still Contractionary Fiscal Policy Is Still A Drag Fiscal Policy: Still Contractionary Fiscal Policy Is Still A Drag Chart I-9Mining Capex##br## Still Falling Grim Outlook For Mining Sector Mining Capex Still Falling Grim Outlook For Mining Sector Mining Capex Still Falling Chart I-10Households Savings ##br##Rate Should Rise Households Savings Rate Should Rise Households Savings Rate Should Rise Put together, the Australian economy is unlikely to accelerate this year. As Chart I-12 illustrates, business confidence has been weakening throughout the year, new orders are at high levels but are rolling over, and real consumer spending has not been able to gain any traction - despite job growth reaching a 3.8% annual pace. Job growth is unlikely to accelerate from such high levels, limiting the potential for household income growth to undo the damage of a rising savings rate. Chart I-11House Price Gains Will Slow House Price Gains Will Slow House Price Gains Will Slow Chart I-12No Boost To Real GDP Growth No Boost To Real GDP Growth No Boost To Real GDP Growth Bottom Line: The Australian dollar has benefitted from a major nominal improvement in the economy. As terms of trade rebounded, so did nominal GDP, national income and profits. This caused a surge in inflows into the country. However, the best of the positive terms-of-trade shock is ebbing, and the slowdown in Chinese industrial activity also points to weakening national income growth. In terms of real activity, the Australian fiscal drag continues unabated, capex will not accelerate, and households are likely to increase their savings rate, which will weigh on consumption. While Australia is not on the verge of recession, it will not experience much of a boom either. But How Fast Can The RBA Hike Anyway? Chart I-13The RBA Is Limited By Economic Slack The RBA Is Limited By Economic Slack The RBA Is Limited By Economic Slack The RBA is also still facing a tough environment. On one hand, job creation was very robust in Australia last year, and core CPI has accelerated. However, wage growth remains depressed at 2%. Even more disturbing is the fact that Australian wages have decoupled from a reliable driver: exports to China (Chart I-13). This underscores the extremely large degree of slack present in the Australian labor market. As the middle panel of Chart I-13 displays, the underemployment rate remains near twenty five-year highs and is congruent with the current level of wage growth. Moreover, Australia's output gap is still -2% of GDP and is not expected to close until after 2020. Thus, the underemployment rate will continue to act as an anchor on policy (Chart I-13, bottom panel). The strength in the AUD since 2016 will play into these dynamics. The lack of traction on wages is likely to be compounded by the tightening in monetary conditions resulting from an expensive AUD. As such, we would expect core CPI to weaken again in the coming quarters, which will comfort the RBA that its dovish stance remains appropriate. Finally, the high indebtedness of Australian households along with the fact that house price appreciation has slowed also suggests that household balance sheets are not capable of withstanding much of an increase in interest rates right now. The RBA is unlikely to toy with such a deflationary risk while the output gap is still negative and labor utilization is so low. The market is currently pricing in 40 basis points of hikes in 2018. A hike in 2018 is possible, as the global economy has healed from its deflationary nadir of 2016, but the economic backdrop of Australia will not let the RBA test the waters more than once this year. We thus anticipate that the RBA will continue to lag the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve - two central banks we expect to raise rates three times in 2018. The RBA will also most likely lag behind the RBNZ. Bottom Line: The Australian economy is replete with excess capacity, which is limiting the ability of the RBA to push up its policy rate. Moreover, the elevated indebtedness of Australian households suggests the RBA is loath to generate a deflationary shock while the output gap is already negative. The RBA will therefore lag the Fed, the BoC and the RBNZ. Implications For The AUD AUD/USD is currently trading at a 15% premium to its purchasing power parity equilibrium versus the U.S. dollar, making it one of the rare currencies expensive against the still-pricey greenback (Chart I-14, top panel). Moreover, Australia's real effective exchange rate also trades above its long-term average (Chart I-14, bottom panel). While the AUD is not wildly expensive, its current premium to fair value does suggest it would not be immune to adverse cyclical dynamics. What do the cyclical drivers currently say about the AUD? As we have highlighted, Australian national income and profit growth are likely to decelerate sharply in 2018, which is likely to undo some of the improvement that has materialized in the basic balance and thus remove one of the key supports that has underpinned the AUD. In this optic, the fact that the AUD has been able to strengthen despite a significant deceleration in Australian exports of iron ore to China raises a yellow flag against the AUD's strength (Chart I-15). Chart I-14No Valuation Cushion In AUD No Valuation Cushion In AUD No Valuation Cushion In AUD Chart I-15AUD Disconnect AUD Disconnect AUD Disconnect However, when investors expect strong growth from EM economies, the AUD does well. Thus, if the outlook for EM growth remains healthy, current weaknesses in commodities shipments can be safely ignored. Under this framework, the recent sharp upgrade by global investors of long-term earnings growth of EM equities sheds light on the AUD's strength, despite slowing iron ore exports (Chart I-16). Yet, this growth expectation is now the highest on record. This suggests the expectation hurdles in EM are very elevated. Even if EM growth does not crater, any disappointment could leave the AUD in a vulnerable position. The rollover in the annual performance of EM/JPY carry trades point to a growing risk of such disappointments.3 Financial markets are also sending interesting signals. Australian equities are underperforming global indices in local currency terms, suggesting the growth outlook for Australia is weakening relative to the rest of the world. These developments are true even when financial stocks are removed from the equation. Moreover, AUD/USD has historically traded in line with the relative performance between Australian and U.S. equities. Not only is the AUD currently quite above the level implied by the relative stock performance, but also the underperformance of Aussie stocks is deepening. This is another poor omen for AUD/USD (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Investors Love EM, ##br##This Helps The Aussie Bottom-Up Analysts Are Record Bullish On EM EPS Investors Love EM, This Helps The Aussie Bottom-Up Analysts Are Record Bullish On EM EPS Investors Love EM, This Helps The Aussie Chart I-17Listen To Equities Listen To Equities Listen To Equities If stocks are sending a message regarding the path of the Australian economy vis-à-vis the U.S., and thus about the outlook for AUD/USD, so are various key drivers of policy. First, AUD/USD normally broadly tracks the gap in the five-year moving average of nominal GDP growth between Australia and the U.S. This growth differential is moving in the opposite direction of AUD/USD, and based on the IMF's forecast, it is only expected to widen. AUD/USD has also been responsive to the relative utilization of labor, as measured by the spreads between the U.S.'s U-6 unemployment rate and Australia's labor underemployment measure (Chart I-18). Currently, this spread is not ratifying the rally in AUD/USD - and is pointing toward a much more hawkish Fed than RBA. This too paints a somber picture for the Aussie. This picture is echoed by the trend in Australia's employment-to-population ratio for prime age workers relative to the U.S. Again, Australia's large labor market excess supply points to a weaker AUD (Chart I-19, top panel). What's more, Australia's employment-to-population ratio is set to fall further vis-à-vis the U.S. This relative labor utilization measure has tracked the share of investment as a percent of Chinese GDP. This is because the investment-heavy period of development that China has undergone over the past 30 years has been very commodities intensive, forcing full labor utilization in Australia. However, based on the IMF's forecast, the role of investment in the Chinese economy is set to decline further (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Chart I-18Labor Market Slack Points To Weak AUD Labor Market Slack Points To Weak AUD Labor Market Slack Points To Weak AUD Chart I-19Labor Market And China Labor Market And China Labor Market And China Additionally, Xi Jinping's reforms are about decreasing pollution and leverage while increasing the role of consumption and services in the economy. This points to a risk of an even greater fall in the share of capex in China's economy. This would deepen the decline in labor utilization in Australia relative to the U.S., and thus increase downside risk for the AUD. Another risk emanates from U.S. financial markets themselves. The AUD tends to perform well when volatility in financial markets is on the decline, or at very low levels. This describes the current state of financial markets. On the other hand, a higher VIX is associated with a declining AUD. The VIX's current low level is not enough to flash an imminent sell signal, but the risk of a spike in risk aversion increases significantly if the spot VIX is low and the VIX futures curve is "too flat." Since there is a strong inverse relationship between the VIX futures curve slope and the spot VIX, the curve is "too flat" when its steepness is below the degree implied by the line of best fit linking the slope to spot VIX. As Chart I-20 shows, when the slope of the VIX is below this implied fair value, the subsequent 12 months of returns in the AUD/USD have been negative 84% of the time. The current reading in this relationship suggests that the AUD could depreciate by a large amount over the coming year. Chart I-20Flat VIX Term Structure = Lower AUD In 12 Months From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt Bottom Line: Australia's national income growth is set to decline, and the RBA is unlikely to increase rates more than is currently priced into the curve. Moreover, the Australian dollar is trading on the expensive side. These factors point to vulnerability for the AUD. Moreover, key variables are suggesting this vulnerability could materialize into actual weakness: investors are pricing in too much growth in the EM space, Australian equities point to growth underperformance, labor market utilization measures suggest relative policy will hurt the AUD, China's long-term policy tilt is becoming increasingly AUD-negative, and any spike in asset volatility would hurt the Aussie. Strategy Considerations The arguments highlighted above all point to a weakening AUD. However, the picture is never that clear-cut. In fact, there is one major risk to our view: commodities prices and the USD itself. As Chart I-21 illustrates, commodities prices have a stronger inverse relationship with the USD than they have a positive link to Chinese economic conditions. Thus, if the greenback were to weaken further, the AUD could delay its moment of reckoning even further. This suggests that playing AUD weakness on its crosses, while potentially less rewarding, is a safer strategy. Our long-term valuation models continue to highlight the positive risk/reward tradeoff to shorting AUD/NZD: Not only is the New Zealand economy less exposed to shifting away from investment in the Chinese economy, AUD/NZD is trading at valuation levels that are historically followed by periods of pronounced weakness (Chart I-22). Moreover, the Kiwi economy is displaying a much higher level of resource utilization than Australia, suggesting there is more scope for the RBNZ to increase rates than there is for the RBA. Chart I-21Risk To The View: The Weak USD Risk To The View: The Weak USD Risk To The View: The Weak USD Chart I-22Improve Your Reward To Risk: Short AUD/NZD Improve Your Reward To Risk: Short AUD/NZD Improve Your Reward To Risk: Short AUD/NZD The same can be said about AUD/CAD. AUD/CAD also trades at a significant premium to its fair value. As we argued two weeks ago, like New Zealand, labor and capacity utilization in Canada are both very tight, thus we foresee three BoC rate hikes this year, which is at least two more than we anticipate in Australia. Additionally, our commodity strategists continue to like energy more than they like metals. Thus, terms-of-trade dynamics will play in favor of the CAD. That being said, this trade is much more correlated with the movements in AUD/USD than the AUD/NZD bet is. Shorting AUD/JPY is also an attractive trade right now. AUD/JPY is trading at a 30% premium to purchasing power parity, and the risk represented by a potential removal of over-exuberance currently evident in the pricing of growth in EM markets would likely be amplified in this cross. Additionally, as we highlighted two weeks ago, the risk of a tactical rally in the JPY is growing significantly. Bottom Line: The outlook is negative for AUD/USD, but if the USD's bear market can gather force from current levels, this would dampen the attractiveness of shorting the Aussie. While potentially less profitable but also considerably less risky, shorting AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD remain attractive expressions of our negative AUD bias. We also like going short AUD/JPY as it plays both on our positive tactical view on the JPY and on the risks of a slowdown in EM earnings growth expectations. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Even if he somewhat retracted his comments later during the day. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets," dated December 8, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades," dated December 1, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed: The Chicago Fed National Activity Index underperformed expectations of 0.44, coming in at 0.27; The Richmond Fed Manufacturing Index came in at 14, well below the expected 19; Manufacturing PMI came in at 55.5, above the consensus of 55; Existing Home Sales contracted by 3.6% on a monthly pace; New Home Sales contracted by 9.3% on a monthly pace; Continuing jobless claims underperformed at 1.937 million, while initial jobless claims outperformed expectations at 233,000. The greenback has experienced notable downside this week owing to a slew of disappointing data and significant technical breakdowns. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin's comments concerning a weaker dollar being beneficial for growth only added fuel to the fire. We have a neutral view on the greenback against the euro as emerging inflation in the U.S. later in the year should help alleviate some of the gains in the euro. Report Links: A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 European data this week was stellar: German Current Situations and Economic Sentiment ZEW Surveys came in at 95.2 and 20.14, outperforming the expected 89.8 and 17.8; Overall euro area Economic Sentiment ZEW Survey came in at 31.8, outperforming the expected 29.7; European consumer confidence also beat expectations of 0.6, coming in at 1.3; German IFO Business Climate and Current Assessment outperformed expectations, while the Expectations survey underperformed; German Gfk Consumer Confidence came in at 11, also surpassing expectations of 10.8. Mario Draghi affirmed his positive outlook on European growth and inflation. However, we believe that the most recent move to 1.25 is unsustainable as the euro continues to decouple from relative terminal rates. We believe that signs of weakening global growth should translate into a weaker euro in the short term. Report Links: The Unstoppable Euro - January 19, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Even if they decelerated relative to the previous month, imports yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 14.9%. Moreover, the Nikkei Manufacturing PMI also outperformed expectations, coming in at 54.4. The All Industry Activity Index month-on-month growth also outperformed, coming in at 1%. However, exports yearly growth, surprised to the downside, coming in at 9.3%. The Bank of Japan left the reference rate unchanged at -0.1%. In their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices, the BoJ stated that it expects inflation to reach the 2% target by 2019. Moreover, the committee highlighted that the output gap will move further into positive territory in 2018 and 2019. Overall, we expect for the yen to appreciate in coming months, particularly against the Euro, given that financial conditions have tightened much more in Europe than in Japan. Report Links: Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - December 8, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel yearly growth both underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.4% and 1.3% respectively. Both of these measures also declined relatively to last month. Moreover, the claimant count change surprised negatively, coming in at 8.6 thousand. However, average earnings excluding bonus yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.4%. This number also increased from 2.3% last month. GBP/USD has surged by almost 4% this week, partly due to the fall in the dollar. However the pound has also rallied against the euro, with EUR/GBP falling by almost 2%. Overall, the ability for the BoE to raise rates relative to other central banks will be limited, as the strengthening currency should create a drag on inflation and the economy displays underlying weaknesses. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 The Australian dollar has benefitted from last year's stellar growth period, now above the crucial 0.80 level. Slowing Chinese industrial activity and a domestic fiscal drag will handicap Australian growth this year. We believe the AUD is expensive amongst various metrics and the RBA is unlikely to hike any time soon given the negative output gap. Additionally, substantial labor market slack remains as the concentration of employment has been in part-time growth. We believe markets are overpricing hikes at 40 bps, and the AUD will suffer once this becomes priced in. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data In New Zealand has been mixed: The ANZ Activity Outlook was unchanged from last month, coming in at 15.6%. However, headline inflation surprised to the downside, coming in at 1.6%. It also declined significantly from last month's 1.9% value. Intraday, the kiwi fell by almost 1.5% following the weak inflation number. However even amid this drop NZD/USD has rallied by almost 1% this week, as the dollar has weakened to its lowest level in 3 years. Overall, we are positive on this cross relatively to the AUD, given that Australia is more sensitive to a slowdown in China than New Zealand. However, the New Zealand dollar will likely have downside against the yen. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada was mixed: Wholesale sales monthly growth missed expectations of 1%, coming in at 0.7%; Headline retail sales missed expectations of 0.7%, coming in only at 0.2% on a monthly basis; Core retail sales (ex. Autos) outperformed the expected 0.8% greatly, coming in at 1.6% month-on-month; We remain bullish on CAD as strong employment and higher wages will augur well for inflation this year. Higher oil prices will continue to power the Canadian economy and help close the output gap in line with expectations. The Bank will therefore continue to tighten policy. Report Links: Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has fallen this week by almost 0.5% even as the euro has rallied. Nevertheless, as long as the SNB continues with its ultra-dovish monetary stance, upside for the franc is limited, as the Swiss National Bank will continue to intervene in the currency markets. Indeed, on Monday SNB president Thomas Jordan once again reiterated that he believed that the franc was "Highly Valued". As of now, while inflation is slowly picking up, wage growth and house price growth are too anemic for the SNB to have a significant change in their monetary stance. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has depreciated by 2.2% this week, as it has been struck by a double whammy of higher oil prices and a very weak dollar. Meanwhile, on Wednesday, the Norges Bank decided to keep its key interest rate unchanged at 0.25%. The bank decided that monetary policy should stay accommodative for the foreseeable future, as inflation is likely to stay under target. Furthermore they stated that inflation, the economy, and the currency were evolving according to their December 2017 expectations. Overall, we expect the krone to appreciate relative to the Canadian dollar, as the BoC is fully priced this year, while the Norwegian interest rates could still have some upside amid rising oil prices. Report Links: Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Data out of Sweden was mixed: Consumer confidence decreased to 107.2 from 107.7, under expectations of 107.4; The unemployment rate increased to 6% from 5.8%, but beat expectations of 6.1%; Producer prices increased in December at a 1.6% monthly pace, and a 2.3% yearly pace. The SEK has appreciated noticeably given the recent hawkish comments by Riksbank officials about the policy path. While the consensus does seem to be changing in the Bank, we remain cautious given Ingves' dovish leanings. SEK could weaken against EUR for the rest of the year given Europe's stellar growth momentum. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Dear Client, In addition to this abbreviated Weekly Report, I am sending you a Special Report co-authored by Mark McClellan, Managing Editor of the monthly Bank Credit Analyst, and Brian Piccioni of Technology Sector Strategy. Mark and Brian argue that the deflationary impact of robot automation will not prevent inflation from rising as the labor market tightens. I hope you will find their report interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlights Our cyclically overweight stance on global equities/underweight stance on bonds is working. Stick with it. U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin's comments about the dollar are unlikely to have any lasting effects. EUR/USD has decoupled from terminal rate expectations since the start of this year. Tactical trade recommendation: Go short EUR/USD while simultaneously going long 30-year U.S. Treasurys/short 30-year German bunds. Feature Global Equities Enter A Blow-Off Phase Valuations do not matter on the way up, but they sure do matter on the way down. Once the market reaches that Wile E. Coyote moment - the one where the poor sap runs off the cliff, pauses in mid-air, looks down, and sees the ground below - all hell will break loose. On every valuation measure, U.S. stocks, and increasingly global stocks, have become very expensive (Chart 1). Chart 1AU.S. Stocks Are Expensive... U.S. Stocks Are Expensive... U.S. Stocks Are Expensive... Chart 1B...While Global Stocks Are Getting There ...While Global Stocks Are Getting There ...While Global Stocks Are Getting There That moment, however, is unlikely to arrive until the global economy and earnings growth begin to stall out. As we have argued in past reports, this probably will not happen until late next year. Historically, it has not paid to get defensive until six months before the start of a recession (Table 1). This suggests that stocks could continue to rally right through 2018. Beep beep. Table 1Too Soon To Get Out The Indefatigable Euro The Indefatigable Euro Granted, the timing of our recession call could turn out to be wrong, which is why we are watching a wide number of leading variables for signs that a slowdown is around the corner (Chart 2). In the U.S., these include credit spreads, the slope of the yield curve, financial conditions, business and consumer confidence, ISM new orders minus inventories, building permits, core capital goods orders, and initial unemployment claims. We have consolidated these variables and dozens of others into our MacroQuant model. The model is still pointing to a reasonably rosy cyclical outlook for stocks (Chart 3). Chart 2Leading Cyclical Data Still Strong Leading Cyclical Data Still Strong Leading Cyclical Data Still Strong Chart 3Cyclical Outlook For Stocks Is Still Rosy The Indefatigable Euro The Indefatigable Euro The Dollar Takes A Pounding While our cyclical bullish view on stocks and bearish view on bonds has paid off this year, our expectation that the dollar would recoup some of last year's losses has not worked out. Time will tell if December 2016 marked the beginning of a secular dollar bear market. The dollar tends to suffer when global growth accelerates. This happened last year. The dollar also tends to weaken when the composition of growth shifts away from the United States. That also happened in 2017. The remainder of this year could be different. We expect global growth to remain solidly above-trend in 2018, but ease from the torrid pace of 2017. This is already being foreshadowed by the decline in our Global LEI diffusion index to below 50%, a slowdown in Korean and Taiwanese exports, a deceleration in the Chinese Li Keqiang Index, and the loss of momentum in EM carry trades (Chart 4). Meanwhile, the composition of global growth should shift back in favor of the U.S. The fact that the U.S. Economic Surprise index has recovered in recent months relative to other economies suggests that this reversal of fortunes is already underway (Chart 5). The end result for asset markets could be slightly reminiscent of the late 1990s, a period when both equities and the dollar rallied. Chart 4Global Growth Will Remain Above-Trend ##br##But Ease From Blistering Pace Global Growth Will Remain Above-Trend But Ease From Blistering Pace Global Growth Will Remain Above-Trend But Ease From Blistering Pace Chart 5Composition Of Global Growth Will Shift ##br##Back In Favor Of The U.S. Composition Of Global Growth Will Shift Back In Favor Of The U.S. Composition Of Global Growth Will Shift Back In Favor Of The U.S. Talk Is Cheap Chart 6Trade-Weighted Dollar No Longer Pricey Trade-Weighted Dollar No Longer Pricey Trade-Weighted Dollar No Longer Pricey We do not put much weight on the remarks concerning the dollar made by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin at Davos this week. While Mnuchin did say that "obviously a weaker dollar is good for us as it relates to trade and opportunities," he added that "longer term, the strength of the dollar is a reflection of the strength of the U.S. economy and the fact that it is and it continues to be the primary currency in terms of the reserve currency." More importantly, history suggests that verbal interventions in currency markets are only effective beyond the near term when backed by a supporting change in monetary policy. Many people remember the success that then-Treasury Secretary James Baker had in driving down the dollar following the Plaza Accord in 1985, but what is often forgotten is that the Federal Reserve steadily cut rates from 11.8% in July 1984 to 5.8% in October 1986. As a result, the 2-year interest rate differential fell by 454 bps against Japan, 630 bps against the U.K., and 407 bps against Germany over this period. It is also worth noting that the Fed's real broad trade-weighted dollar index is now 27% below its 1985 peak and 3% below its long-term average (Chart 6). This makes any effort to talk down the dollar all the more difficult. ECB Sending Mixed Messages About The Euro Chart 7Market Has Brought Forward ECB Rate Hikes Market Has Brought Forward ECB Rate Hikes Market Has Brought Forward ECB Rate Hikes ECB officials continue to send mixed messages about the resurgent euro. Earlier this month, ECB Vice President Vitor Constâncio and Bank of France Governor François Villeroy both expressed concern about the euro's strength, as did Ewald Nowotny, the fairly hawkish President of Austria's central bank. In contrast, Mario Draghi refused to wade into the debate during yesterday's press conference. The lack of angst in his tone sent the euro higher. Draghi's reluctance to say anything concrete about the euro was partly motivated by the desire to avoid the sort of "beggar thy neighbor" criticism that greeted Mnuchin's remarks. Like other central banks, the ECB gives a lot of weight to financial conditions in setting monetary policy. A stronger currency has tightened euro area financial conditions. This is something that must concern the ECB, at least behind closed doors. Ultimately, any effort by the ECB to knock down the euro will only work if it convinces the market to soften its expectations about the future pace of rate hikes. The likelihood of such an outcome is certainly higher now than it was in 2016. Our "months to hike" measure for the ECB has plummeted from over 60 months in mid-2016 to 19 today (Chart 7). Given that the ECB has made it clear that it intends to delay raising rates for some time after asset purchases end later this year, it is hard to see the central bank hiking rates before the summer of 2019. That is not far from where market pricing now stands. In contrast, if euro area growth were to surprise meaningfully on the downside or if core inflation in the peripheral economies continues to fall - it is already close to zero in Italy - the ECB could be forced to bide its time longer than the market currently expects. A Safer Way To Short EUR/USD Chart 8EUR/USD And Rate Decoupling ##br##Will Not Last Long EUR/USD And Rate Decoupling Will Not Last Long EUR/USD And Rate Decoupling Will Not Last Long Still, the euro has a lot going for it. Unlike the U.S., the euro area is running a current account surplus. This means the region does not need to attract foreign capital for there to be excess demand for euros. All it needs to do is keep net capital outflows roughly below 3% of GDP. The ability of the euro area to retain and attract fresh capital has become easier as political risk has ebbed and the ECB's pledge to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro has solidified. The euro's share of global central bank reserves currently stands at 20%, well below the 60% share enjoyed by the U.S. dollar. If capital continues to gravitate towards the region, the euro could strengthen further. All this makes shorting the euro a risky bet. With that in mind, investors should consider hedging short EUR/USD positions by wagering that the terminal rate spread between the euro area and the U.S. will narrow. Chart 8 shows that the spread in expected policy rates ten years out has decoupled from EUR/USD since the start of the year. The same is true for the 30-year spread between Treasurys and bunds - another good proxy for the terminal rate spread. While spreads have widened in favor of the dollar, the greenback has nonetheless plunged. Such decoupling rarely lasts long, which makes this a highly attractive trade. With that in mind, we are going short EUR/USD as a tactical trade while hedging the risk of a stronger euro by going long 30-year Treasurys/short 30-year bunds (a bet on further spread compression). Given that the first leg of the trade is more volatile than the second, we are scaling up the latter by a factor of 1.5. We will aim to close the trade for a gain of 5% (EUR/USD of about 1.18), assuming no change in the current spread of 160 bps. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights U.S. equities 'melted up' in January as tax cuts made the robust growth/low inflation sweet spot even sweeter. Ominously, recent market action is beginning to resemble a classic late cycle blow-off phase. The fundamentals supporting the market will persist through most of the year, before an economic downturn in the U.S. takes hold in 2019. The repatriation of overseas corporate cash will also flatter EPS growth this year via buyback and M&A activity. The S&P 500 could return 14% or more this year. Unfortunately, the consensus now shares our upbeat view for 2018. Valuation is stretched and many indicators suggest that investors have become downright giddy. This month we compare valuation across the major asset classes. U.S. equities are the most overvalued, followed by gold, raw industrials and EM assets. Oil is still close to fair value. Long-term investors should already be scaling back on risk assets. Investors with a 6-12 month horizon should stay overweight equities versus bonds for now, but a risk management approach means that they should not try to squeeze out the last few percentage points of return. In terms of the sequencing of the exit from risk, the most consistent lead/lag relationship relative to previous tops in the equity market is provided by U.S. corporate bonds. For this reason, we are likely to take profits on corporates before equities. EM assets are already at underweight. We still see a window for the U.S. dollar to appreciate, although by only about 5%. A lot of good news is discounted in the euro, peripheral core inflation is slowing and ECB policymakers are getting nervous. Monetary policy remains the main risk to a pro-cyclical investment stance, although not because of the coming change in the makeup of the FOMC. The economy and inflation should justify four Fed rate hikes in 2018 no matter the makeup. The bond bear phase will continue. Feature Chart I-1Investors Are Giddy Investors Are Giddy Investors Are Giddy U.S. equities 'melted up' in January as tax cuts made the robust growth/low inflation sweet spot even sweeter. Ominously, though, recent market action is beginning to resemble the classic late cycle blow-off phase. Such blow-offs can be highly profitable, but also make it more difficult to properly time the market top. Our base case is that the fundamentals supporting the market will persist through most of the year, before an economic downturn in the U.S. takes hold in 2019. Unfortunately, the consensus now shares our upbeat view for 2018 and many indicators suggest that investors have become downright giddy (Chart I-1). These indicators include investor sentiment, our speculation index, and the bull-to-bear ratio. Net S&P earnings revisions and the U.S. economic surprise index are also extremely elevated, while equity and bond implied volatility are near all-time lows. From a contrarian perspective, these observations suggest that a lot of good news is discounted and that the market is vulnerable to even slight disappointments. It is also a bad sign that our Revealed Preference Indicator moved off of its bullish equity signal in January (see Section III for more details). Meanwhile, central banks are beginning to take away the punchbowl as global economic slack dissipates. This is all late-cycle stuff. Equity valuation does not help investors time the peak in markets, but it does tell us something about downside risk and medium-term expected returns. The Shiller P/E ratio has surged above 30 (Chart I-2). Chart I-3 highlights that, historically, average total returns were negligible over the subsequent 10-year period when the Shiller P/E was in the 30-40 range. Granted, the Shiller P/E will likely fall mechanically later this year as the collapse of earnings in 2008 begins to drop out of the 10-year EPS calculation. Nonetheless, even the BCA Composite Valuation indicator, which includes some metrics that account for extremely low bond yields, surpassed +1 standard deviations in January (our threshold for overvaluation; Chart I-2, bottom panel). An overvaluation signal means that investors should be biased to take profits early. Chart I-2BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma BCA Valuation Indicator Surpasses One Sigma Chart I-3Expected Returns Given Starting Point Shiller P/E February 2018 February 2018 As we highlighted in our 2018 Outlook Report, long-term investors should already be scaling back on risk assets. We recommend that investors with a 6-12 month horizon should stay overweight equities versus bonds for now, but we need to be vigilant in terms of scouring for signals to take profits. A risk management approach means that investors should not try to get the last few percentage points of return before the peak. U.S. Earnings And Repatriation Before we turn to the timing and sequence of our exit from risk assets, we will first update our thoughts on the earnings cycle. Fourth quarter U.S. earnings season is still in its early innings, but the banking sector has set an upbeat tone. S&P 500 profits are slated to register a 12% growth rate for both Q4/2017 and calendar 2017. Current year EPS growth estimates have been aggressively ratcheted higher (from 12% growth to 16%) in a mere three weeks on the back of Congress' cut to the corporate tax rate.1 U.S. margins fell slightly in the fourth quarter, but remain at a high level on the back of decent corporate pricing power. A pick-up in productivity growth into year-end helped as well. Our short-term profit model remains extremely upbeat (Chart I-4). The positive profit outlook for the first half of the year is broadly based across sectors as well, according to the recently updated EPS forecast models from BCA's U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service.2 The repatriation of overseas corporate cash will also flatter EPS growth this year via buyback and M&A activity. Studies of the 2004 repatriation legislation show that most of the funds "brought home" were paid out to shareholders, mostly in the form of buybacks. A NBER report estimated that for every dollar repatriated, 92 cents was subsequently paid out to shareholders in one form or another. The surge in buybacks occurred in 2005, according to the U.S. Flow of Funds accounts and a proxy using EPS growth less total dollar earnings growth for the S&P 500 (Chart I-5). The contribution to EPS growth from buybacks rose to more than 3 percentage points at the peak in 2005. Chart I-4Profit Growth Still Accelerating Profit Growth Still Accelerating Profit Growth Still Accelerating Chart I-5U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS U.S. Buybacks To Lift EPS We expect that most of the repatriated funds will again flow through to shareholders, rather than be used to pay down debt or spent on capital goods. Cash has not been a constraint to capital spending in recent years outside of perhaps the small business sector, which has much less to gain from the tax holiday. A revival in animal spirits and capital spending is underway, but this has more to do with the overall tax package and global growth than the ability of U.S. companies to repatriate overseas earnings. Estimates of how much the repatriation could boost EPS vary widely. Most of it will occur in the Tech and Health Care sectors. Buybacks appear to have lifted EPS growth by roughly one percentage point over the past year. We would not be surprised to see this accelerate by 1-2 percentage points, although the timing could be delayed by a year if the 2004 tax holiday provides the correct timeline. This is certainly positive for the equity market, but much of the impact could already be discounted in prices. Organic earnings growth, and the economic and policy outlook will be the main drivers of equity market returns over the next year. We expect some profit margin contraction later this year, but our 5% EPS growth forecast is beginning to look too conservative. This is especially the case because it does not include the corporate tax cuts. The amount by which the tax cuts will boost earnings on an after-tax basis is difficult to estimate, but we are using 5% as a conservative estimate. Adding 2% for buybacks and 2% for dividends, the S&P 500 could provide an attractive 14% total return this year (assuming no multiple expansion). Timing The Exit Chart I-6Timing The Exit (I) Timing The Exit (I) Timing The Exit (I) That said, we noted in last month's Report and in BCA's 2018 Outlook that this will be a transition year. We expect a recession in the U.S. sometime in 2019 as the Fed lifts rates into restrictive territory. Equities and other risk assets will sniff out the recession about six months in advance, which means that investors should be preparing to take profits sometime during the next 12 months. Last month we discussed some of the indicators we will watch to help us time the exit. The 2/10 Treasury yield curve has been a reliable recession indicator in the past. However, the lead time on the peak in stocks was quite extended at times (Chart I-6). A shift in the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate above 2.4% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We expect the Fed to tighten four times in 2018. We are likely to take some money off the table if core inflation is rising, even if it is still below 2%, at the time that the TIPS breakeven reaches 2.4%. We will also be watching seven indicators that we have found to be useful in heralding market tops, which are summarized in our Scorecard Indicator (Chart I-7). At the moment, four out of the seven indicators are positive (Chart I-8): State of the Business Cycle: As early signals that the economy is softening, watch for the ISM new orders minus inventories indicator to slip below zero, or the 3-month growth rate of unemployment claims to rise above zero. Monetary and Financial Conditions: Using interest rates to judge the stance of monetary policy has been complicated by central banks' use of their balance sheet as a policy tool. Thus, it is better to use two of our proprietary indicators: the BCA Monetary Indicator (MI) and the Financial Conditions Indictor. The S&P 500 index has historically rallied strongly when the MI is above its long-term average. Similarly, equities tend to perform well when the FCI is above its 250-day moving average. The MI is sending a negative signal because interest rates have increased and credit growth has slowed. However, the broader FCI remains well in 'bullish' territory. Price Momentum: We simply use the S&P 500 relative to its 200-day moving average to measure momentum. Currently, the index is well above that level, providing a bullish signal for the Scorecard. Sentiment: Our research shows that stock returns have tended to be highest following periods when sentiment is bearish but improving. In contrast, returns have tended to be lowest following periods when sentiment is bullish but deteriorating. The Scorecard includes the BCA Speculation Indicator to capture sentiment, but virtually all measures of sentiment are very high. The next major move has to be down by definition. Thus, sentiment is assigned a negative value in the Scorecard. Value: As discussed above, value is poor based on the Shiller P/E and the BCA Composite Valuation indicator. Valuation may not help with timing, but we include it in our Scorecard because an overvalued signal means investors should err on the side of getting out early. Chart I-7Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Equity ScoreCard: Watch For A Dip Below 3 Chart I-8Timing The Exit (II) Timing The Exit (II) Timing The Exit (II) We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Table I-1Exit Checklist February 2018 February 2018 To our Checklist we add the U.S. Leading Economic index, which has a good track record of calling recessions. However, we will use the LEI excluding the equity market, since we are using it as an indicator for the stock market. It is bullish at the moment. Our Global LEI is also flashing green. Table I-1 provides a summary checklist for trimming equity exposure. At the moment, 2 out of 9 indicators are bearish. Cross Asset Valuation Comparison Clients have asked our view on the appropriate order in which to scale out of risk assets. One way to approach the question is to compare valuation across asset classes. Presumably, the ones that are most overvalued are at greatest risk, and thus profits should be taken the earliest. It is difficult to compare valuation across asset classes. Should one use fitted values from models or simple deviations from moving averages? Over what time period? Since there is no widely accepted approach, we include multiple measures. More than one time period was used in some cases to capture regime changes. Table I-2 provides out 'best guestimate' for nine asset classes. The approaches range from sophisticated methods developed over many years (i.e. our equity valuation indicators), to regression analysis on the fundamentals (oil), to simple deviations from a time trend (real raw industrial commodity prices and gold). Table I-2Valuation Levels For Major Asset Classes February 2018 February 2018 We averaged the valuation readings in cases where there are multiple estimates for a single asset class. The results are shown in Chart I-9. Chart I-9Valuation Levels For Major Asset Classes February 2018 February 2018 U.S. equities stand out as the most expensive by far, at 1.8 standard deviations above fair value. Gold, raw industrials and EM equities are next at one standard deviation overvalued. EM sovereign bond spreads come next at 0.7, followed closely by U.S. Treasurys (real yield levels) and investment-grade corporate (IG) bonds (expressed as a spread). High-yield (HY) is only about 0.3 sigma expensive, based on default-adjusted spreads over the Treasury curve. That said, both IG and HY are quite expensive in absolute terms based on the fact that government bonds are expensive. Oil is sitting very close to fair value, despite the rapid price run up over the past couple of months. This makes oil exposure doubly attractive at the moment because the fundamentals point to higher prices at a time when the underlying asset is not expensive. Sequencing Around Past S&P 500 Peaks Historical analysis around equity market peaks provides an alternative approach to the sequencing question. Table I-3 presents the number of days that various asset classes peaked before or after the past major five tops in the S&P 500. A negative number indicates that the asset class peaked before U.S. equities, and a positive number means that it peaked after. Table I-3Asset Class Leads & Lags Vs. Peak In S&P 500 February 2018 February 2018 Unfortunately, there is no consistent pattern observed for EM equities, raw industrials, U.S. cyclical stocks, Tech stocks, or small-cap versus large-cap relative returns. Sometimes they peaked before the S&P 500, and sometime after. The EM sovereign bond excess return index peaked about 130 days in advance of the 1998 and 2007 U.S. equity market tops, although we only have three episodes to analyse due to data limitations. Oil is a mixed bag. A peak in the price of gold led the equity market in four out of five episodes, but the lead time is long and variable. The most consistent lead/lag relationship is given by the U.S. corporate bond market. Both investment- and speculative-grade excess returns relative to government bonds peaked in advance of U.S. stocks in four of the five episodes. High-yield excess returns provided the most lead time, peaking on average 154 days in advance. Excess returns to high-yield were a better signal than total returns. This leading relationship is one reason why we plan to trim exposure to corporate bonds within our bond portfolio in advance of scaling back on equities. But the 'return of vol' that we expect to occur later this year will take a toll on carry trades more generally. We are already underweight EM equities and bonds. This EM recommendation has not gone in our favor, but it would make little sense to upgrade them now given our positive views on volatility and the dollar. An unwinding of carry trades will also hit the high-yielding currencies outside of the EM space, such as the Kiwi and Aussie dollar. Base metal prices will be hit particularly hard if the 2019 U.S. recession spills over to the EM economies as we expect. We may downgrade base metals from neutral to underweight around the time that we downgrade equities, but much depends on the evolution of the Chinese economy in the coming months. Oil is a different story. OPEC 2.0 is likely to cut back on supply in the face of an economic downturn, helping to keep prices elevated. We therefore may not trim energy exposure this year. As for equity sectors, our recommended portfolio is still overweight cyclicals for now. Our synchronized global capex boom, rising bond yield, and firm oil price themes keep us overweight the Industrials, Energy and Financial sectors. Utilities and Homebuilders are underweight. Tech is part of the cyclical sector, but poor valuation keeps us underweight. That said, our sector specialists are already beginning a gradual shift away from cyclicals toward defensives for risk management purposes. This transition will continue in the coming months as we de-risk. We are also shifting small caps to neutral on earnings disappointments and elevated debt levels. The Dollar Pain Trade Market shifts since our last publication have largely gone in our favor; stocks have surged, corporate bonds spreads have tightened, oil prices have spiked, bonds have sold off and cyclical stocks have outperformed defensives. One area that has gone against us is the U.S. dollar. Relative interest rate expectations have moved in favor of the dollar as we expected at both the short- and long-ends of the curve. Nonetheless, the dollar has not tracked its historical relationship versus both the yen and euro. The Greenback did not even get a short-term boost from the passage of the tax plan and holiday on overseas earnings. Perhaps this is because the lion's share of "overseas" earnings are already held in U.S. dollars. Reportedly, a large fraction is even held in U.S. banks on U.S. territory. Currency conversion is thus not a major bullish factor for the U.S. dollar. The recent bout of dollar weakness began around the time of the release of the ECB Minutes in January which were interpreted as hawkish because they appeared to be preparing markets for changes in monetary policy. The European debt crisis and economic recession were the reasons for the ECB's asset purchases and negative interest rate policy. Neither of these conditions are in place now. The ECB is meeting as we go to press, and we expect some small adjustments in the Statement that remove references to the need for "crisis" level accommodations. Subsequent steps will be to prepare markets for a complete end to QE, perhaps in September, and then for rates hikes likely in 2019. The key point is that European monetary policy has moved beyond 'peak stimulus' and the normalization process will continue. Perhaps this is partly to blame for euro strength although, as mentioned above, interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar. Does this mean that the dollar has peaked and has entered a cyclical bear phase that will persist over the next 6-12 months? The answer is 'no', although we are less bullish than in the past. We believe there is still a window for the dollar to appreciate against the euro and in broader trade-weighted terms by about 5%. First, a lot of euro-bullish news has been discounted (Chart I-10). Positive economic surprises heavily outstripped that in the U.S. last year, but that phase is now over. The euro appears expensive based on interest rate differentials, and euro sentiment is close to a bullish extreme. This all suggests that market positioning has become a negative factor for the currency. Chart I-10Euro: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted EURO: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted EURO: A Lot Of Bullish News Is Discounted Second, the chorus of complaints against the euro's strength is growing among European central bankers, including Ewald Nowotny, the rather hawkish Austrian central banker. Policymakers' concerns may partly reflect the fact that peripheral inflation excluding food and energy has already weakened to 0.6% from a high of 1.3% in April last year (Chart I-10, fourth panel). Third, U.S. consumer price and wage inflation have yet to pick up meaningfully. The dollar should receive a lift if core U.S. inflation clearly moves toward the Fed's 2% target, as we expect. The FOMC would suddenly appear to have fallen behind the curve and U.S. rate expectations would ratchet higher. Chart I-10, bottom panel, highlights that the euro will weaken if U.S. core inflation rises versus that in the Eurozone. The implication is that the Euro's appreciation has progressed too far and is due for a pullback. As for the yen, the currency surged in January when the Bank of Japan (BoJ) announced a reduction in long-dated JGB purchases. This simply acknowledged what has already occurred. It was always going to be impossible to target both the quantity of bond purchases and the level of 10-year yield simultaneously. Keeping yields near the target required less purchases than they thought. The market interpreted the BoJ's move as a possible prelude to lifting the 10-year yield target. It is perhaps not surprising that the market took the news this way. The economy is performing extremely well; our model that incorporates high-frequency economic data suggests that real GDP growth will move above 3% in the coming quarters. The Japanese economy is benefiting from the end of a fiscal drag and from a rebound in EM growth. Nonetheless, following January's BoJ policy meeting, Kuroda poured cold water on speculation that the BoJ may soon end or adjust the YCC. Recent speeches by BoJ officials reinforce the view that the MPC wants to see an overshoot of actual inflation that will lower real interest rates and thereby reinforce the strong economic activity that is driving higher inflation. Only then will officials be convinced that their job is done. Given that inflation excluding food and energy only stands at 0.3%, the BoJ is still a long way from the overshoot it desires. On the positive side, Japan's large current account surplus and yen undervaluation provide underlying support for the currency. Balancing the offsetting positive and negative forces, our foreign exchange strategists have shifted to neutral on the yen. The Euro remains underweight while the dollar is overweight. Similar to our dollar view, we still see a window for U.S. Treasurys to underperform the global hedged fixed-income benchmark as world bond yields shift higher this year. European government bonds will also sell off, but should outperform Treasurys. JGBs will provide the best refuge for bondholders during the global bond bear phase, since the BoJ will prevent a rise in yields inside of the 10-year maturity. Our global bond strategists upgraded U.K. gilts to overweight in January. Momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. FOMC Transition Monetary policy remains the main risk to a pro-cyclical investment stance, although not because of the coming change in the makeup of the FOMC. An abrupt shift in policy is unlikely. There was some support at the December 2017 FOMC meeting to study the use of nominal GDP or price level targeting as a policy framework, but this has been an ongoing debate that will likely continue for years to come. The Fed will remain committed to its current monetary policy framework once Powell takes over. Table I-4 provides a summary of who will be on the FOMC next year, including their policy bias. Chart I-11 compares the recent FOMC makeup with the coming Powell FOMC (voting members only). The hawk/dove ratio will not change much under Powell, unless Trump stacks the vacant spots with hawks. Table I-4Composition Of The FOMC February 2018 February 2018 Chart I-11Composition Of Voting FOMC Members 2017 Vs. 2018 February 2018 February 2018 In any event, history shows that the FOMC strives to avoid major shifts in policy around changeovers in the Fed Chair. In previous transitions, the previous path for rates was maintained by an average of 13 months. Moreover, Powell has shown that he is not one to rock the boat during his time on the FOMC. It will be the evolution of the economy and inflation, not the composition of the FOMC, that will have the biggest impact on markets at the end of the day. Recent speeches reveal that policymakers across the hawk/dove spectrum are moving modesty toward the hawkish side because growth has accelerated at a time when unemployment is already considered to be below full-employment by many policymakers. The melt-up in equity indexes in January did little to calm worries about financial excesses either. The Fed is struggling to understand the strength of the structural factors that could be holding down inflation. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 21, focusses on the impact of robot automation. While advances on this front are impressive, we conclude that it is difficult to find evidence that robots are more deflationary than previous technological breakthroughs. Thus, increased robot usage should not prevent inflation from rising as the labor market continues to tighten. The macro backdrop will likely justify the FOMC hiking at least as fast as the dots currently forecast. The risks are skewed to the upside. The median Fed dot calls for an unemployment rate of 3.9% by end-2018, only marginally lower than today's rate of 4.1%. This is inconsistent with real GDP growth well in excess of its supply-side potential. The unemployment rate is more likely to reach a 49-year low of 3.5% by the end of this year. As highlighted in last month's Report, a key risk to the bull market in risk assets is the end of the 'low vol/low rate' world. The selloff in the bond market in January may mark the start of this process. Conclusions We covered a lot of ground in this month's Overview of the markets, so we will keep the conclusions brief and focused on the risks. Our key point is that the fundamentals remain positive for risk assets, but that a lot of good news is discounted and it appears that we have entered a classic blow-off phase. This will be a transition year to a recession in the U.S. in 2019. Given that valuation for most risk assets is quite stretched, and given that the monetary taps are starting to close, investors must plan for the exit and keep an eye on our timing checklist. The main risk to our pro-cyclical portfolio is a rise in U.S. inflation and the Fed's response, which we believe will end the sweet spot for risk assets. Apart from this, our geopolitical strategists point to several other items that could upset the applecart this year:3 1. Trade China has cooperated with the U.S. in trying to tame North Korea. Nonetheless, President Trump is committed to an "America First" trade policy and he may need to show some muscle against China ahead of the midterm elections in November in order to rally his base. It is politically embarrassing to the Administration that China racked up its largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in Trump's first year in office. A key question is whether the President goes after China via a series of administrative rulings - such as the recently announced tariffs on solar panels and white goods - or whether he applies an across-the-board tariff and/or fine. The latter would have larger negative macroeconomic implications. 2. Iran On January 12, President Trump threatened not to waive sanctions against Iran the next time they come due (May 12), unless some new demands are met. Pressure from the U.S. President comes at a delicate time for Iran. Domestic unrest has been ongoing since December 28. Although protests have largely fizzled out, they have reopened the rift between the clerical regime, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Iranian hardliners, who control part of the armed forces, could lash out in the Persian Gulf, either by threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz or by boarding foreign vessels in international waters. The domestic political calculus in both Iran and the U.S. make further Tehran-Washington tensions likely. For the time being, however, we expect only a minor geopolitical risk premium to seep into the energy markets, supporting our bullish House View on oil prices. 3. China Last month's Special Report highlighted that significant structural reforms are on the way in China, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. The reforms should be growth-positive in the long term, but could be a net negative for growth in the near term depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. The risk is that the authorities make a policy mistake by staying too tight, as occurred in 2015. We are monitoring a number of indicators that should warn if a policy mistake is unfolding. On this front, January brought some worrying economic data. The latest figures for both nominal imports and money growth slowed. Given that M2 and M3 are components of BCA's Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and that nominal imports directly impact China's contribution to global growth, this raises the question of whether December's economic data suggest that China is slowing at a more aggressive pace than we expect. For now, our answer is no. First, China's trade numbers are highly volatile; nominal import growth remains elevated after smoothing the data. Second, China's export growth remains buoyant, consistent with a solid December PMI reading. The bottom line is that we are sticking with our view that China will experience a benign deceleration in terms of its impact on DM risk assets, but we will continue to monitor the situation closely. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 25, 2018 Next Report: February 22, 2018 1 According to Thomson Reuters/IBES. 2 Please see U.S. Equity Sector Strategy Special Report "White Paper: Introducing Our U.S. Equity Sector Earnings Models," dated January 16, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 For more information, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Also see "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018. II. The Impact Of Robots On Inflation Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. Technological advance in the past has not prevented improving living standards or led to ever rising joblessness over the decades, but pessimists argue that recent advances are different. The issue is important for financial markets. If structural factors such as automation are holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. We see no compelling evidence that the displacement effect of emerging technologies is any stronger than in the past. Robot usage has had a modest positive impact on overall productivity. Despite this contribution, overall productivity growth has been dismal over the past decade. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale as some claim, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Periods of strong growth in automation have historically been associated with robust, not lackluster, wage gains, contrary to the consensus view. The Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. This and other evidence suggest that it is difficult to make the case that robots will make it tougher for central banks to reach their inflation goals than did previous technological breakthroughs. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. Recent breakthroughs in technology are awe-inspiring and unsettling. These advances are viewed with great trepidation by many because of the potential to replace humans in the production process. Hype over robots is particularly shrill. Media reports warn of a "Robot Apocalypse" that is already laying waste to jobs and depressing wages on a broad scale. In the first in our series of Special Reports focusing on the structural factors that might be preventing central banks from reaching their inflation targets, we demonstrated that the impact of Amazon is overstated in the press. We estimated that E-commerce is depressing inflation in the U.S. by a mere 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. This Special Report tackles the impact of automation. We are optimistic that robot technology and artificial intelligence will significantly boost future productivity, and thus reduce costs. But, is there any evidence at the macro level that robot usage has been more deflationary than technological breakthroughs in the past and is, thus, a major driver of the low inflation rates we observe today across the major countries? The question matters, especially for the outlook for central bank policy and the bond market. If structural factors are indeed holding back inflation by more than in previous decades, then the Fed will have to proceed very slowly in raising rates. However, if low inflation simply reflects long lags between wages and the tightening labor market, then inflation may suddenly lurch to life as it has at the end of past cycles. The bond market is not priced for that scenario. Are Robots Different? A Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service suggested that the "robot revolution" could be as transformative as previous General Purpose Technologies (GPT), including the steam engine, electricity and the microchip.1 GPTs are technologies that radically alter the economy's production process and make a major contribution to living standards over time. The term "robot" can have different meanings. The most basic definition is "a device that automatically performs complicated and often repetitive tasks," and this encompasses a broad range of machines: From the Jacquard Loom, which was invented over 200 years ago, on to Numerically Controlled (NC) mills and lathes, pick and place machines used in the manufacture of electronics, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), and even homicidal robots from the future such as the Terminator. Our Technology Sector report made the case that there is nothing particularly sinister about robots. They are just another chapter in a long history of automation. Nor is the displacement of workers unprecedented. The industrial revolution was about replacing human craft labor with capital (machines), which did high-volume work with better quality and productivity. This freed humans for work which had not yet been automated, along with designing, producing and maintaining the machinery. Agriculture offers a good example. This sector involved over 50% of the U.S. labor force until the late 1800s. Steam and then internal combustion-powered tractors, which can be viewed as "robotic horses," contributed to a massive rise in output-per-man hour. The number of hours worked to produce a bushel of wheat fell by almost 98% from the mid-1800s to 1955. This put a lot of farm hands out of work, but these laborers were absorbed over time in other growing areas of the economy. It is the same story for all other historical technological breakthroughs. Change is stressful for those directly affected, but rising productivity ultimately lifts average living standards. Robots will be no different. As we discuss below, however, the increasing use of robots and AI may have a deeper and longer-lasting impact on inequality. Strong Tailwinds Chart II-1Robots Are Getting Cheaper Robots Are Getting Cheaper Robots Are Getting Cheaper Factory robots have improved immensely due to cheaper and more capable control and vision systems. As these systems evolve, the abilities of robots to move around their environment while avoiding obstacles will improve, as will their ability to perform increasingly complex tasks. Most importantly, robots are already able to do more than just routine tasks, thus enabling them to replace or aid humans in higher-skilled processes. Robot prices are also falling fast, especially after quality-adjusting the data (Chart II-1). Units are becoming easier to install, program and operate. These trends will help to reduce the barriers-to-entry for the large, untapped, market of small and medium sized enterprises. Robots also offer the ability to do low-volume "customized" production and still keep unit costs low. In the future, self-learning robots will be able to optimize their own performance by analyzing the production of other robots around the world. Robot usage is growing quickly according to data collected by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) that covers 23 countries. Industrial robot sales worldwide increased to almost 300,000 units in 2016, up 16% from the year before (Chart II-2). The stock of industrial robots globally has grown at an annual average pace of 10% since 2010, reaching slightly more than 1.8 million units in 2016.2 Robot usage is far from evenly distributed across industries. The automotive industry is the major consumer of industrial robots, holding 45% of the total stock in 2016 (Chart II-3). The computer & electronics industry is a distant second at 17%. Metals, chemicals and electrical/electronic appliances comprise the bulk of the remaining stock. Chart II-2Global Robot Usage Global Robot Usage Global Robot Usage Chart II-3Global Robot Usage By Industry (2016) February 2018 February 2018 As far as countries go, Japan has traditionally been the largest market for robots in the world. However, sales have been in a long-term downtrend and the stock of robots has recently been surpassed by China, which has ramped up robot purchases in recent years (Chart II-4). Robot density, which is the stock of robots per 10 thousand employed in manufacturing, makes it easier to compare robot usage across countries (Chart II-5, panel 2). By this measure, China is not a heavy user of robots compared to other countries. South Korea stands at the top, well above the second-place finishers (Germany and Japan). Large automobile sectors in these three countries explain their high relative robot densities. Chart II-4Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Stock Of Robots By Country (I) Chart II-5Stock Of Robots By Country (II) (2016) February 2018 February 2018 While the growth rate of robot usage is impressive, it is from a very low base (outside of the automotive industry). The average number of robots per 10,000 employees is only 74 for the 23 countries in the IFR database. Robot use is tiny compared to total man hours worked. Chart II-6U.S. Investment In Robots U.S. Investment in Robots U.S. Investment in Robots In the U.S., spending on robots is only about 5% of total business spending on equipment and software (Chart II-6). To put this into perspective, U.S. spending on information, communication and technology (ICT) equipment represented 35-40% of total capital equipment spending during the tech boom in the 1990s and early 2000s.3 The bottom line is that there is a lot of hype in the press, but robots are not yet widely used across countries or industries. It will be many years before business spending on robots approaches the scale of the 1990s/2000s IT boom. A Deflationary Impact? As noted above, we view robotics as another chapter in a long history of technological advancements. Pessimists suggest that the latest advances are different because they are inherently more threatening to the overall job market and wage share of total income. If the pessimists are right, what are the theoretical channels though which this would have a greater disinflationary effect relative to previous GPT technologies? Faster Productivity Gains: Enhanced productivity drives down unit labor costs, which may be passed along to other industries (as cheaper inputs) and to the end consumer. More Human Displacement: The jobs created in other areas may be insufficient to replace the jobs displaced by robots, leading to lower aggregate income and spending. The loss of income for labor will simply go to the owners of capital, but the point is that the labor share of income might decline. Deflationary pressures could build as aggregate demand falls short of supply. Even in industries that are slow to automate, just the threat of being replaced by robots may curtail wage demands. Inequality: Some have argued that rising inequality is partly because the spoils of new technologies over the past 20 years have largely gone to the owners of capital. This shift may have undermined aggregate demand because upper income households tend to have a high saving rate, thereby depressing overall aggregate demand and inflationary pressures. The human displacement effect, described above, would exacerbate the inequality effect by transferring income from labor to the owners of capital. 1. Productivity It is difficult to see the benefits of robots on productivity at the economy-wide level. Productivity growth has been abysmal across the major developed countries since the Great Recession, but the productivity slowdown was evident long before Lehman collapsed (Chart II-7). The productivity slowdown continued even as automation using robots accelerated after 2010. Chart II-7Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Productivity Collapsed Despite Automation Some analysts argue that lackluster productivity is simply a statistical mirage because of the difficulties in measuring output in today's economy. We will not get into the details of the mismeasurement debate here. We encourage interested clients to read a Special Report by the BCA Global Investment Strategy service entitled "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians." 4 Our colleague Peter Berezin makes the case that the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, radio, indoor plumbing and air conditioning. He argues that the real reason that productivity growth has slowed is that educational attainment has decelerated and businesses have plucked many of the low-hanging fruit made possible by the IT revolution. Cyclical factors stemming from the Great Recession and financial crisis are also to blame, as capital spending has been slow to recover in most of the advanced economies. Some other factors that help to explain the decline in aggregate productivity are provided in Appendix II-1. Nonetheless, the poor aggregate productivity performance does not mean that there are no benefits to using robots. The benefits are evident at the industrial level, where measurement issues are presumably less vexing for statisticians (i.e., it is easier to measure the output of the auto industry, for example, than for the economy as a whole). Chart II-8 plots the level of robot density in 2016 with average annual productivity growth since 2004 for 10 U.S. manufacturing industries (robot density is presented in deciles). A loose positive relationship is apparent. Chart II-8U.S.: Productivity Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 Academic studies estimate that robots have contributed importantly to economy-wide productivity growth. The Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) estimated that labor productivity growth rises by 0.07 to 0.08 percentage points for every 1% rise in the rate of robot density.5 This implies that robots accounted for roughly 10% of the productivity growth experienced since the early 1990s in the major economies. Another study of 14 industries across 17 countries by the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) found that robots boosted annual productivity growth by 0.36 percentage points over the 1993-2007 period.6 This is impressive because, if this estimate holds true for the U.S., robots' contribution to the 2½% average annual U.S. total productivity growth over the period was 14%. To put the importance of robotics into historical context, its contribution to productivity so far is roughly on par with that of the steam engine (Chart II-9). It falls well short of the 0.6 percentage point annual productivity contribution from the IT revolution. The implication is that, while the overall productivity performance has been dismal since 2007, it would have been even worse in the absence of robots. What does this mean for inflation? According to the "cost push" model of the inflation process, an increase in productivity of 0.36% that is not accompanied by associated wage gains would reduce unit labor costs (ULC) by the same amount. This should trim inflation if the cost savings are passed on to the end consumer, although by less than 0.36% because robots can only depress variable costs, not fixed costs. There indeed appears to be a slight negative relationship between robot density and unit labor costs at the industrial level in the U.S., although the relationship is loose at best (Chart II-10). Chart II-9GPT Contribution To Productivity February 2018 February 2018 Chart II-10U.S.: Unit Labor Costs Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 In theory, divergences in productivity across industries should only generate shifts in relative prices, and "cost push" inflation dynamics should only operate in the short term. Most economists believe that inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon in the long run, which means that central banks should be able to offset positive productivity shocks by lowering interest rates enough that aggregate demand keeps up with supply. Indeed, the Fed was successful in meeting the 2% inflation target on average from 2000 to 2007, when the impact of the IT revolution on productivity (and costs) was stronger than that of robot automation today. Also, note that inflation is currently low across the major advanced economies, irrespective of the level of robot intensity (Chart II-11). From this perspective, it is hard to see that robots should take much of the credit for today's low inflation backdrop. Chart II-11Inflation Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 2. Human Displacement A key question is whether robots and humans are perfect substitutes. If new technologies introduced in the past were perfect substitutes, then it would have led to massive underemployment and all of the income in the economy would eventually have migrated to the owners of capital. The fact that average real household incomes have risen over time, and that there has been no secular upward trend in unemployment rates over the centuries, means that new technologies were at least partly complementary with labor (i.e., the jobs lost as a direct result of productivity gains were more than replaced in other areas of the economy over time). Rather than replacing workers, in many cases tech made humans more productive in their jobs. Rising productivity lifted income and thereby led to the creation of new jobs in other areas. The capital that workers bring to the production process - the skills, know-how and special talents - became more valuable as interaction with technology increased. Like today, there were concerns in the 1950s and 1960s that computerization would displace many types of jobs and lead to widespread idleness and falling household income. With hindsight, there was little to worry about. Some argue that this time is different. Futurists frequently assert that the pace of innovation is not just accelerating, it is accelerating 'exponentially'. Robots can now, or will soon be able to, replace humans in tasks that require cognitive skills. This means that they will be far less complementary to humans than in the past. The displacement effect could thus be much larger, especially given the impressive advances in artificial intelligence. However, Box II-1 discusses why the threat to workers posed by AI is also heavily overblown in the media. The CEP multi-country study cited above did not find a large displacement effect; robot usage did not affect the overall number of hours worked in the 23 countries studied (although it found distributional effects - see below). In other words, rather than suppressing overall labor input, robot usage has led to more output, higher productivity, more jobs and stronger wage and income growth. A report by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)7 takes a broader look at automation, using productivity growth and capital spending as proxies. Automation is what occurs as the implementation of new technologies is incorporated along with new capital equipment or software to replace human labor in the workplace. If automation is increasing 'exponentially' and displacing workers on a broad scale, one would expect to see accelerating productivity growth, robust capital spending, and more violent shifts in occupational shares. Exactly the opposite has occurred. Indeed, the report demonstrates that occupational employment shifts were far slower in the 2000-2015 period than in any decade in the 1900s (Chart II-12). Box II-1 The Threat From AI Is Overblown Media coverage of AI/Deep Learning has established a consensus view that we believe is well off the mark. A recent Special Report from BCA's Technology Sector Strategy service dispels the myths surrounding AI.8 We believe the consensus, in conjunction with warnings from a variety of sources, is leading to predictions, policy discussions, and even career choices based on a flawed premise. It is worth noting that the most vocal proponents of AI as a threat to jobs and even humanity are not AI experts. At the root of this consensus is the false view that emerging AI technology is anything like true intelligence. Modern AI is not remotely comparable in function to a biological brain. Scientists have a limited understanding of how brains work, and it is unlikely that a poorly understood system can be modeled on a computer. The misconception of intelligence is amplified by headlines claiming an AI "taught itself" a particular task. No AI has ever "taught itself" anything: All AI results have come about after careful programming by often PhD-level experts, who then supplied the system with vast amounts of high quality data to train it. Often these systems have been iterated a number of times and we only hear of successes, not the failures. The need for careful preparation of the AI system and the requirement for high quality data limits the applicability of AI to specific classes of problems where the application justifies the investment in development and where sufficient high-quality data exists. There may be numerous such applications but doubtless many more where AI would not be suitable. Similarly, an AI system is highly adapted to a single problem, or type of problem, and becomes less useful when its application set is expanded. In other words, unlike a human whose abilities improve as they learn more things, an AI's performance on a particular task declines as it does more things. There is a popular misconception that increased computing power will somehow lead to ever improving AI. It is the algorithm which determines the outcome, not the computer performance: Increased computing power leads to faster results, not different results. Advanced computers might lead to more advanced algorithms, but it is pointless to speculate where that may lead: A spreadsheet from 2001 may work faster today but it still gives the same answer. In any event, it is worth noting that a tool ceases to be a tool when it starts having an opinion: there is little reason to develop a machine capable of cognition even if that were possible. Chart II-12U.S. Job Rotation Has Slowed February 2018 February 2018 The EPI report also notes that these indicators of automation increased rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period that saw solid wage growth for American workers. These indicators weakened in the two periods of stagnant wage growth: from 1973 to 1995 and from 2002 to the present. Thus, there is no historical correlation between increases in automation and wage stagnation. Rather than automation, the report argues that it was China's entry into the global trading system that was largely responsible for the hollowing out of the U.S. manufacturing sector. We have also made this argument in previous research. The fact that the major advanced economies are all at, or close to, full employment supports the view that automation has not been an overwhelming headwind for job creation. Chart II-13 demonstrates that there has been no relationship between the change in robot density and the loss of manufacturing jobs since 1993. Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. Interestingly, despite a worsening labor shortage, robot density among Japanese firms is falling. Moreover, the Japanese data show that the industries that have a high robot usage tend to be more, not less, generous with wages than the robot laggard industries. Please see Appendix II-2 for more details. Chart II-13Global Manufacturing Jobs Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 The bottom line is that it does not appear that labor displacement related to automation has been responsible in any meaningful way for the lackluster average real income growth in the advanced economies since 2007. 3. Inequality That said, there is evidence suggesting that robots are having important distributional effects. The CEP study found that robot use has reduced hours for low-skilled and (to a lesser extent) middle-skilled workers relative to the highly skilled. This finding makes sense conceptually. Technological change can exacerbate inequality by either increasing the relative demand for skilled over unskilled workers (so-called "skill-biased" technological change), or by inducing companies to substitute machinery and other forms of physical capital for workers (so-called "capital-biased" technological change). The former affects the distribution of labor income, while the latter affects the share of income in GDP that labor receives. A Special Report appearing in this publication in 2014 focused on the relationship between technology and inequality.9 The report highlighted that much of the recent technological change has been skill-biased, which heavily favors workers with the talent and education to perform cognitively-demanding tasks, even as it reduces demand for workers with only rudimentary skills. Moreover, technological innovations and globalization increasingly allow the most talented individuals to market their skills to a much larger audience, thus bidding up their wages. The evidence suggests that faster productivity growth leads to higher average real wages and improved living standards, at least over reasonably long horizons. Nonetheless, technological change can, and in the future almost certainly will, increase income inequality. The poor will gain, but not as much as the rich. The fact that higher-income households tend to maintain a higher savings rate than low-income households means that the shift in the distribution of income toward the higher-income households will continue to modestly weigh on aggregate demand. Can the distribution effect be large enough to have a meaningful depressing impact on inflation? We believe that it has played some role in the lackluster recovery since the Great Recession, with the result that an extended period of underemployment has delivered a persistent deflationary impulse in the major developed economies. However, as discussed above, stimulative monetary policy has managed to overcome the impact of inequality and other headwinds on aggregate demand, and has returned the major countries roughly to full employment. Indeed, this year will be the first since 2007 that the G20 economies as a group will be operating slightly above a full employment level. Inflation should respond to excess demand conditions, irrespective of any ongoing demand headwind stemming from inequality. Conclusions Technological change has led to rising living standards over the decades. It did not lead to widespread joblessness and did not prevent central banks from meeting their inflation targets over time. The pessimists argue that this time is different because robots/AI have a much larger displacement effect. Perhaps it will be 20 years before we will know the answer. But our main point is that we have found no evidence that recent advances in robotics and AI, while very impressive, will be any different in their macro impact. There is little evidence that the modern economy is less capable in replacing the jobs lost to automation, although the nature of new technologies may be affecting the distribution of income more than in the past. Real incomes for the middle- and lower-income classes have been stagnant for some time, but this is partly due to productivity growth that is too low, not too high. Moreover, it is not at all clear that positive productivity shocks are disinflationary beyond the near term. The link between robot usage and unit labor costs over the past couple of decades is loose at best at the industry level, and is non-existent when looking across the major countries. The Fed was able to roughly meet its 2% inflation target in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, despite IT's impressive contribution to productivity growth during that period. For investors, this means that we cannot rely on automation to keep inflation depressed irrespective of how tight labor markets become. The global output gap will shift into positive territory this year for the first time since the Great Recession. Any resulting rise in inflation will come as a shock since the bond market has discounted continued low inflation for as far as the eye can see. We expect bond yields and implied volatility to rise this year, which may undermine risk assets in the second half. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Brian Piccioni Vice President Technology Sector Strategy Appendix II-1 Why Is Productivity So Low? A recent study by the OECD10 reveals that, while frontier firms are charging ahead, there is a widening gap between these firms and the laggards. The study analyzed firm-level data on labor productivity and total factor productivity for 24 countries. "Frontier" firms are defined to be those with productivity in the top 5%. These firms are 3-4 times as productive as the remaining 95%. The authors argue that the underlying cause of this yawning gap is that the diffusion rate of new technologies from the frontier firms to the laggards has slowed within industries. This could be due to rising barriers to entry, which has reduced contestability in markets. Curtailing the creative-destruction process means that there is less pressure to innovate. Barriers to entry may have increased because "...the importance of tacit knowledge as a source of competitive advantage for frontier firms may have risen if increasingly complex technologies were to increase the amount and sophistication of complementary investments required for technological adoption." 11 The bottom line is that aggregate productivity is low because the robust productivity gains for the tech-savvy frontier companies are offset by the long tail of firms that have been slow to adopt the latest technology. Indeed, business spending has been especially weak in this expansion. Chart II-14 highlights that the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth has mirrored that of the capital stock. Chart II-14U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity U.S. Capex Shortfall Partly To Blame For Poor Productivity Appendix II-2 Japan - The Leading Edge Japan is an interesting case study because it is on the leading edge of the problems associated with an aging population. The popular press is full of stories of how robots are taking over. If the stories are to be believed, robots are the answer to the country's shrinking workforce. Robots now serve as helpers for the elderly, priests for weddings and funerals, concierges for hotels and even sexual partners (don't ask). Prime Minister Abe's government has launched a 5-year push to deepen the use of intelligent machines in manufacturing, supply chains, construction and health care. Indeed, Japan was the leader in robotics use for decades. Nonetheless, despite all the hype, Japan's stock of industrial robots has actually been eroding since the late 1990s (Chart II-4). Numerous surveys show that firms plan to use robots more in the future because of the difficulty in hiring humans. And there is huge potential: 90% of Japanese firms are small- and medium-sized (SME) and most are not currently using robots. Yet, there has been no wave of robot purchases as of 2016. One problem is the cost; most sophisticated robots are simply too expensive for SMEs to consider. This suggests that one cannot blame robots for Japan's lack of wage growth. The labor shortage has become so acute that there are examples of companies that have turned down sales due to insufficient manpower. Possible reasons why these companies do not offer higher wages to entice workers are beyond the scope of this report. But the fact that the stock of robots has been in decline since the late 1990s does not support the view that Japanese firms are using automation on a broad scale to avoid handing out pay hikes. Indeed, Chart II-15 highlights that wage deflation has been the greatest in industries that use almost no robots. Highly automated industries, such as Transportation Equipment and Electronics, have been among the most generous. This supports the view that the productivity afforded by increased robot usage encourages firms to pay their workers more. Looking ahead, it seems implausible that robots can replace all the retiring Japanese workers in the years to come. The workforce will shrink at an annual average pace of 0.33% between 2020 and 2030, according to the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. Productivity growth would have to rise by the same amount to fully offset the dwindling number of workers. But that would require a surge in robot density of 4.1, assuming that each rise in robot density of one adds 0.08% to the level of productivity (Chart II-16). The level of robot sales would have to jump by a whopping 2½ times in the first year and continue to rise at the same pace each year thereafter to make this happen. Of course, the productivity afforded by new robots may accelerate in the coming years, but the point is that robot usage would likely have to rise astronomically to offset the impact of the shrinking population. Chart II-15Japan: Earnings Vs. Robot Density February 2018 February 2018 Chart II-16Japan: Where Is The Flood Of Robots? Japan: Where Is The Flood OF Robots? Japan: Where Is The Flood OF Robots? The implication is that, as long as the Japanese economy continues to grow above roughly 1%, the labor market will continue to tighten and wage rates will eventually begin to rise. 1 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "The Coming Robotics Revolution," dated May 16, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that this includes only robots used in manufacturing industry, and thus excludes robots used in the service sector and households. However, robot usage in services is quite limited and those used in households do not add to GDP. 3 Note that ICT investment and capital stock data includes robots. 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Centre for Economic and Business Research (January 2017): "The Impact of Automation." A Report for Redwood. In this report, robot density is defined to be the number of robots per million hours worked. 6 Graetz, G., and Michaels, G. (2015): "Robots At Work." CEP Discussion Paper No 1335. 7 Mishel, L., and Bivens, J. (2017): "The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On," Economic Policy Institute. 8 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report "Bad Information - Why Misreporting Deep Learning Advances Is A Problem," dated January 9, 2018, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Rage Against The Machines: Is Technology Exacerbating Inequality?" dated June 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10 OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 05 (2016): "The Best Versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence Across Firms and the Role of Public Policy." 11 Please refer to page 27. III. Indicators And Reference Charts As we highlight in the Overview section, the earnings backdrop for the U.S. equity market remains very upbeat, as highlighted by the rise in the net earnings revisions and net earnings surprises indexes. Bottom-up analysts will likely continue to boost after-tax earnings estimates for the year as they adjust to the U.S. tax cut news. Our main concern is that a lot of good news is now discounted. Our Technical Indicator remains bullish, but our composite valuation indicator surpassed one sigma in January, which is our threshold of overvaluation. From these levels of overvaluation, the medium-term outlook for equity total returns is negligible. Our speculation index is at all-time highs and implied volatility is low, underscoring that investors are extremely bullish. From a contrary perspective, this is a warning sign for the equity market. Our Monetary Indicator has also moved further into 'bearish' territory for equities, although overall financial conditions remain positive for growth. It is also disconcerting that our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) shifted to a 'sell' signal for stocks, following five straight months on a 'buy' signal. This occurred because investors may be buying based on speculation rather than on a firm belief in the staying power of the underlying fundamentals. For now, though, our Willingness-to-Pay indicator for the U.S. rose sharply in January, highlighting that investor equity inflows are very strong and are favoring U.S. equities relative to Japan and the Eurozone. This is perhaps not surprising given the U.S. tax cuts just passed by Congress. The RPI indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Our U.S. bond technical indicator shows that Treasurys are close to oversold territory, suggesting that we may be in store for a consolidation period following January's surge in yields. Treasurys are slightly cheap on our valuation metric, although not by enough to justify closing short duration positions. The U.S. dollar is oversold and due for a bounce. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights One of the biggest mistakes in finance is to equate risk with volatility. The correct measure of risk is the negative skew in payoff distributions. If 10-year bond yields should rise another 40 bps, equities would become riskier than bonds and elevated equity valuations would become much harder to sustain. This would be the point at which to scale back equity exposure. The corollary for bonds is that 10-year yields cannot sustainably rise more than 40bps before experiencing a tradeable reversal. Feature It is the crucial question that all investors should ask at all times. What is the relative risk of the two major asset classes - bonds and equities - and are their relative return prospects commensurate with the relative risk? Chart of the WeekBelow A 2% Yield, 10-Year Bonds Are Riskier Than Equities Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? But first, there is an even more fundamental question: what do we mean by risk? Conventional wisdom says that the risk of an investment is captured by its volatility. Indeed, through instruments such as the VIX futures and currency volatility options, volatility has become a multi-trillion dollar asset-class in its own right. Therefore, volatility must measure the risk of an investment, right? Wrong. The Biggest Mistake In Finance As a measure of risk, volatility is clearly wrong. Volatility regards price gains in exactly the same way as it regards price losses. But investors don't mind gains, they only mind losses! Consider an investment whose price moves alternately sideways and sharply higher. The maths would say that the returns have high volatility, implying that the investment is very risky. In truth though, the investment is highly desirable and 'risk-free' - because its price never declines. At our recent New York conference, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman warned that one of the biggest mistakes in finance is to equate risk with volatility. After decades of empirical and theoretical studies - which culminated in the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics - Kahneman proved that investors are not concerned about the symmetrical fluctuations in investment returns. Instead, they are concerned about the asymmetry - or skew - in payoff distributions. Kahneman explained the underlying psychology. "People are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, so highly unlikely events are overweighted." If the payoff distribution is symmetric, the overweighting of unlikely events in the loss tail and the gain tail exactly cancels out. But if the distribution is asymmetric, the longer tail determines the perceived attractiveness of the payoff. Where the longer tail is on the gain side, the distribution is said to have positive skew (Figure I-1). The classic example is a lottery. When people play the lottery, their loss is limited to the ticket price, but their gain could be tens of millions. People perceive the positive skew as attractive because they overweight the minuscule probability of becoming a millionaire. As a result, they overpay for the lottery ticket versus its expected value. Where the longer tail is on the loss side, the distribution is said to have negative skew (Figure I-2). This is like a lottery in reverse. The gain size is relatively limited, but the loss could be very large. People perceive the negative skew as unattractive because they overweight the probability of a large loss. As a result, they demand overpayment to take it on. Figure I-1People Like Positive Skew Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Figure I-2People Dislike Negative Skew Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? For investments with negative skew, this overpayment takes the form of an excess return demanded from the market - a 'risk premium' - versus investments with less negative skew. Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? We are now in a position to tackle the question in the title. To determine whether bonds are riskier than equities or vice-versa, we must compare the skews of their return profiles.1 The important point is that for a bond, the skew of its return profile changes with its yield. At yields above 2.5%, 10-year bond returns show no skew. Worst losses broadly equal best gains. However, when yields drop below 2%, returns start to exhibit negative skew (Chart I-2). And at yields below 1%, the negative skew becomes extreme. Chart I-2Bond Risk Increases At ##br##Low Bond Yields Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Chart I-3Equity Risk Does Not Increase At##br## Low Bond Yields Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities? The reason is obvious. Central banks accept that there is a 'lower bound' for policy interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. The limit also marks the lower bound for bond yields. Close to this lower bound for yields, bond mathematics necessarily creates a negatively skewed return profile. Simply put, prices have little upside, but they have a lot of downside! Chart I-4A 40Bps Rise In Yields Would Make Global ##br##Bonds Riskier Than Equities A 40Bps Rise In Yields Would Make Global Bonds Riskier Than Equities A 40Bps Rise In Yields Would Make Global Bonds Riskier Than Equities Turning to equities, the empirical evidence shows that equity returns always exhibit negative skew. Worst losses are typically around 1.5 times the size of best gains (Chart I-3). But the negative skew of equity returns is largely independent of the bond yield. The upshot is that there is a crossover bond yield below which the negative skew on 10-year bonds exceeds that on equities. This crossover bond yield is around 2%. In negative skew terms, we can say that at a 10-year bond yield below 2%, 10-year bonds are riskier than equities. And at a yield above 2%, equities are riskier than 10-year bonds (Chart of the Week). So in negative skew terms, 10-year bonds are riskier investments than equities in Europe and in Japan. But equities are riskier investments than 10-year bonds in the United States. Still, given that developed financial markets tend to move en masse, the relationship that is most significant is the aggregate one. At a global level, 10-year bond yields are 40bps below the crossover yield at which equities become riskier than bonds (Chart I-4). QE Distorted The Relative Valuation Of Equities Versus Bonds Which segues us neatly to today's ECB monetary policy meeting. Many people, worried about the end of QE, point out that the $10 trillion of bonds that the 'big four'2 central banks have bought is not far short of the size of the euro area economy. However, in the context of a global fixed income market of $220 trillion,3 $10 trillion of buying is small change. For the $220 trillion global bond and bank loan complex, the much more significant driver of yields has been the expected path of policy interest rates. As ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet put it, serial QE has been nothing more than "a signalling channel which reinforces the credibility of forward guidance on (ultra-low) policy rates." Chart I-5A Promise To Keep The Policy Rate Ultra-Low ##br##Pulls Down Bond Yields A Promise To Keep The Policy Rate Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields A Promise To Keep The Policy Rate Ultra-Low Pulls Down Bond Yields Central bankers know that QE depressed bond yields by signalling an extended period of ultra-low interest rates (Chart I-5). They also know that if the prospective return on bonds drops, so must the prospective return on competing investments such as equities. Thereby, the absolute valuations of bonds and equities both rise. However, one largely overlooked impact of QE - even by central bankers - has been the effect on the relative valuation of equities versus bonds. To repeat, when 10-year bond yields drop below 2%, their return distribution becomes more negatively skewed than that for equities. But if bonds become riskier investments, the 'risk premium' (excess return) on equities must disappear. Meaning equity valuations and prices get a second boost, compressing the prospective 10-year equity return to become 'bond-like'. Is this the case? Unlike for 10-year bonds, we do not know the 10-year prospective return from equities with certainty. However, we can get a good estimate from today's starting valuation. But which valuation metric to use? We are cautious of using profit based metrics as these will be flattered by the advanced position in the business cycle as well as the structural uptrend in profit margins. Instead, at an aggregate level, world equity market capitalisation to world GDP has been an excellent predictor of the prospective 10-year return on world equities. Today, this valuation metric is at the same level as in 2000 and 2007, and implies a prospective return of less than 2% a year (Chart I-6). Chart I-6World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return Nevertheless, while the global 10-year bond yield stays below 2%, this is a sustainable valuation for equities. Effectively, equities and bonds are offering broadly similar negative skews, and therefore should offer broadly similar prospective returns. However, if 10-year bond yields should rise another 40 bps, equities would become riskier than bonds and elevated equity valuations would become much harder to sustain. Though not there yet, this would be the point when we would scale back equity exposure. The corollary for bonds is that 10-year yields cannot sustainably rise more than 40bps before experiencing a tradeable reversal. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 One simple way to quantify this skew is to find an extended period of time in which the price ended where it started, and then to calculate the period's worst 3-month loss as a multiple of the best 3-month gain. We define skew = -ln(worst 3-month loss / best 3-month gain) using log returns for 3-month loss and 3-month gain. 2 The Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England. 3 Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF) https://www.iif.com/publication/global-debt-monitor/global-debt-monitor-june-2017. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to position for an underperformance of the Japanese energy sector (led by JXTG Holdings And Inpex) versus the overall Japanese market. This is a longer trade than normal with a maximum duration of 26 weeks. Set a profit-target at 8% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-7 Short Japan Oil & Gas Short Japan Oil & Gas The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Global Duration Strategy: Global bond yields continue to move higher, driven by rising inflation expectations and falling investor risk aversion. With global interest rates still not at levels that will restrict growth or draw capital away from booming equity markets, the path of least resistance for yields remains upward. Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, with a bearish curve steepening bias in the U.S. and core Europe. U.K. Gilts: The momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. Stay overweight Gilts. Feature Revisiting Our Duration Strategy After The Rise In Yields Global government bond markets have started 2018 in a grumpy mood. The price return on the overall Barclays Global Treasury index is already down -0.6% so far in January, and yields are up for almost every country and maturity bucket within the developed market universe. Only longer-dated Peripheral European debt (Italy, Spain, Portugal, even Greece) has seen lower yields month-to-date, as the powerful growth upturn in the Euro Area has resulted in sovereign credit upgrades and narrowing spreads to core European bonds. The global sell-off has been led by the U.S., with the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yield climbing all the way to 2.66% last week, already surpassing the 2016 high seen last March. Rising inflation expectations are the biggest culprit, with the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate climbing to 2.07%, the highest level since 2014. Chart of the WeekNo Good News For Bonds Right Now No Good News For Bonds Right Now No Good News For Bonds Right Now The relentless surge in global stock markets - driven by faster worldwide economic growth and an absence of volatility - is also helping fuel the bearishness in government bond markets. The economic growth momentum is showing no signs of abating. The IMF just raised its global growth forecast for both 2018 and 2019 to 3.9% in both years - the fastest pace since 2011 - largely because of the impact of the U.S. tax cuts but also because of much faster expected growth in Europe.1 The IMF noted that "the cyclical rebound could prove stronger in the near term as the pickup in activity and easier financial conditions reinforce each other." We could not agree more. With robust growth pushing a majority of economies to operate beyond full employment, and with financial conditions remaining highly accommodative, global bond markets are now pricing in both higher inflation expectations and less accommodative monetary policy (Chart of the Week). While we only expect actual rate increases in the U.S. and Canada in 2018, the pressures on global central banks to respond to the coordinated growth upturn with hawkish talk will keep government bond markets on the defensive - especially if global inflation rates are moving up at the same time. Diminishing demand for government bonds from recently reliable sources may also act to push up yields in the months ahead. A reduced pace of asset purchases from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), combined with the Fed reducing the reinvestments of its maturing Treasury holdings, means that the private sector must now absorb a greater share of bond issuance, on the margin. In the U.S. in particular, the biggest swing factor for the Treasury market could end up being the retail investor. Households have been notably risk-averse in the years since the Great Financial Crisis, keeping relatively high allocations to fixed income and relatively low allocations to equities after suffering such steep losses in the 2008 crash. Those attitudes are changing, however, with the U.S. equity market continuing to hit new all-time highs amid increased media coverage of the rally (as well as the bullish Tweets from the White House taking credit for it). The latest University of Michigan U.S. consumer confidence survey showed that the expected probability of another year of rising stock prices is now at the highest level (66%) in the fifteen years that question was asked. U.S. investment advisors are also very optimistic, with the Investors' Intelligence bull/bear ratio back to the highest level since 1987! (Chart 2) Yet actual equity returns over the past three years have lagged those seen during periods of elevated investor sentiment, like in 1987, 2005 and 2014 (Chart 2). What is missing now is a big surge of retail investor money into equities that can fuel the next leg of the equity rally, particularly through mutual funds and ETFs. Chart 2The Bond-Bearish Equity Party##BR##Is Just Getting Started The Bond-Bearish Equity Party Is Just Getting Started The Bond-Bearish Equity Party Is Just Getting Started This is starting to happen. The rolling 12-month total of net flows into U.S. equity mutual funds and ETFs is about to accelerate into positive territory for the first time since 2012, according to data from the Investment Company Institute (3rd panel). This could soon pose a problem for U.S. bond markets as, since 2008, there has been a reliable negative correlation between U.S. retail flows into equity funds and flows into fixed income funds, especially at major turning points (bottom panel). For example, after that 2012 bottom in net equity flows, the rolling total of net flows into bond funds collapsed from over $400bn to zero in a span of 18 months, with the vast majority of the outflow from bonds going into equities. An exodus of U.S. retail investors from fixed income would be a major problem for bond markets, especially at a time when net Treasury issuance is expected to increase due to wider fiscal deficits and the Fed will be buying fewer bonds as it begins to unwind its massive balance sheet. Other buyers like commercial banks and global reserve fund managers can pick up some of the slack if the retail bid fades from U.S. Treasuries. However, in an environment of strong global growth, rising inflation and more hawkish central banks, it may require higher yields to entice those buyers to ramp up their allocations. In the near-term, the next wave of global bond-bearish news will have to come from upside surprises in inflation, not growth. The Citi Global Economic Data Surprise index - which has historically correlated with swings in global bond yields - is now at elevated levels which should raise the odds of data disappointments as growth expectations get revised up (Chart 3). The Citi Global Inflation Data Surprise index, however, remains just below zero after last year's plunge, but is showing signs of stabilizing (bottom panel). U.S. inflation is already starting to bottom out, but Euro Area core inflation has been underwhelming of late. It will likely take a rise in the latter to trigger the next move higher in global yields, as the market will begin to more aggressively price in less accommodative monetary policy from the ECB. For now, U.S. Treasuries are driving the path of yields, with the "leadership" of the bond bear market expected to switch to Europe later on in 2018. In terms of our recommend duration strategy and country allocations, we are sticking with our current positions which are finally beginning to move in favor of our forecasts (Chart 4): Chart 3The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields##BR##Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises The Next Leg Higher In Global Yields Must Be Driven By Inflation Surprises Chart 4Our Recommended##BR##Country & Curve Allocations Our Recommended Country & Curve Allocations Our Recommended Country & Curve Allocations Underweights to countries where we expect central banks to hike rates (U.S., Canada) or more openly discuss a tapering of asset purchases (Germany, France). Overweights to countries where we expect no change in policy rates (U.K., Australia) or only modest changes to asset purchase programs (Japan). Positioning for steeper yield curves in countries where growth is strong, economies are at or beyond full employment, but where inflation expectations remain far enough below central bank targets to prevent policymakers from turning more hawkish faster than expected (U.S., Germany, Japan). Bottom Line: Global bond yields continue to move higher, driven by rising inflation expectations and falling investor risk aversion. With global interest rates still not at levels that will restrict growth or draw capital away from booming equity markets, the path of least resistance for yields remains upward. Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance, with a bearish curve steepening bias in the U.S. and core Europe. U.K. Gilts: The BoE's Hands Are Tied In our final report of 2017, we updated our recommended allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio based on the key views stemming from the 2018 BCA Outlook.2 We upgraded our country allocation to U.K. Gilts to overweight, primarily as a "defensive" position within a portfolio positioned for an expected rise in global bond yields. That may sound surprising given the current elevated level of inflation and low unemployment rate in the U.K. Yet our view is based on the notion that the Bank of England (BoE) will have a very difficult time trying to raise interest rates at all in 2018 when other major global central banks are likely to take a more hawkish turn. The main reason that the BoE will be unable to do much on the interest rate front is that the U.K. economy is likely to slow in the coming quarters. The OECD leading economic indicator is decelerating steadily, and is pointing to a real GDP growth rate below 2% in 2018 (Chart 5). The updated IMF forecast for the U.K. calls for growth to only reach 1.5% in both 2018 and 2019. The biggest factors that will weigh on growth will be a sluggish consumer and softer capex. Household consumption growth has already been slowing since early 2017, driven by diminishing consumer confidence (Chart 6, top panel). High realized inflation which has sapped the purchasing power of U.K. workers who have not seen matching increases in wages, is weighing on confidence (3rd panel). Consumers were able to maintain a decent pace of spending during a period of stagnant real income growth by drawing down on savings, but that looks to be tapped out now with the saving rate down to a 19-year low of 5.5% (bottom panel). Chart 5U.K. Growth Set To Slow U.K. Growth Set To Slow U.K. Growth Set To Slow Chart 6The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out The U.K. Consumer Looks Tapped Out Making matters worse, U.K. consumers are not seeing much of a wealth effect from the housing market. The December 2017 readings of the year-over-year growth rate of U.K. house prices from the Halifax and Nationwide house prices came in at 1.1% and 2.5% respectively (Chart 7, top panel). In addition, the net balance of national house price expectations from the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) survey has steadily declined since mid-2016 and now sits just above zero (i.e. equal number of respondents expecting higher prices and falling prices). The same indicator for London was a staggering -54% in November 2017. U.K. homeowners have had to take a lot of hits over the past couple of years. A 2016 hike in the stamp duty for second homes and buy-to-let properties prompted a plunge in more "speculative" property transactions. The squeeze on real household incomes that has damaged consumer spending has also made homes less affordable, even with very low mortgage rates. Most importantly, the 2016 Brexit vote and subsequent uncertainty over the U.K.'s future relationship with Europe has placed an enormous cloud over housing demand - both from potential reduced immigration to the U.K. and businesses and jobs potentially relocating to European Union countries. The Brexit uncertainty is also weighing on U.K. business investment spending. U.K. capital expenditure growth slowed to 4.3% year-over-year in nominal terms in Q3 2017, and is even lower in real terms (Chart 8, top panel). Capex is generally import-intensive, and the rise in import costs due to the depreciation of the Pound after the 2016 Brexit vote raised the cost of investment. Chart 7No Growth In##BR##U.K. Housing No Growth In U.K. Housing No Growth In U.K. Housing Chart 8Brexit Gloom Trumps Export##BR##Boom For U.K. Companies Brexit Gloom Trumps Export Boom For U.K. Companies Brexit Gloom Trumps Export Boom For U.K. Companies This explains why U.K. capital spending has lagged even with manufacturing indicators in decent shape, such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) survey which shows the highest readings on total industrial orders and export orders since 1988 and 1995, respectively (2nd panel). Yet non-financial credit growth stalled out in the latter half of 2017, while the CBI survey of business optimism has turned into negative territory. Brexit uncertainties are clearly trumping strong export demand, thus U.K. capital investment is likely to remain sluggish in 2018 even with robust global growth. With U.K. economic growth likely to slow in 2018, the lingering problem of high inflation should start to fade. Already, both headline and core CPI inflation have stabilized, with the latter actually drifting a touch lower in the latter half of 2017 (Chart 9). The small gap between the two can be explained by the rise in global oil prices seen over the past year. The impact of oil on U.K. inflation expectations is relatively modest compared to other countries with much lower realized inflation rates, as we discussed in last week's Weekly Report.3 What is far more relevant is the path of British pound. The 16% plunge in the trade-weighted sterling index after the 2016 Brexit vote was a major reason why U.K. realized inflation blew through the BoE's 2% target last year. The currency has since stabilized at a depressed level and traded in a relatively narrow range in 2017. The trade-weighted index is now 3% above year-ago-levels, which should help U.K. inflation rates drift lower in the next 6-12 months - especially if U.K. growth underwhelms at the same time. Already, the more stable currency has allowed the inflation rates of import prices and producer prices to fall sharply last year (bottom panel), which should soon start to feed through into overall inflation rates. Lower realized inflation would be a welcome boost for the spending power of U.K. households and businesses, but will likely be dwarfed by the impact of oil prices in the near term. More importantly, the slowing momentum of economic growth, now fueled more by Brexit uncertainty than high inflation, will limit the BoE's ability to continue normalizing the very low level of U.K. interest rates. Our 12-month U.K. discounter shows that markets are pricing in 25bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 10). The forward path of interest rates shown in the U.K. Overnight Index Swaps curve suggests that the hike could come by October. That is unlikely to happen given the slump in leading economic indicators, and peaking in currency-fueled inflation, currently underway. Chart 9Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Currency-Fueled U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Out Chart 10Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts A stand-pat BoE, combined with more stable and potentially falling U.K. inflation, will limit the ability for U.K. Gilt yields to rise by as much as we are expecting in the U.S., and even core Europe, over the next 6-12 months. Gilts have become a relative safe haven within a global bond bear market in the developed markets, with a yield beta of around 0.5 to U.S. Treasuries and German government bonds. This has already allowed Gilts to outperform the Barclays Global Treasury index (in currency-hedged terms) since the most recent cyclical low in global bond yields last September (bottom panel). We continue to expect Gilts to outperform in 2018. Stay overweight. Bottom Line: The momentum in the U.K. economy is slowing, as a weaker consumer, slower housing activity, and softer capital spending are offsetting a pickup in exports. With the inflationary impulse from the 2016 plunge in the Pound now fading, and with Brexit uncertainty weighing on business confidence, the Bank of England will struggle to raise rates in 2018. Stay overweight Gilts. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst Ray@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/01/11/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2018 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Our Model Bond Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves", dated December 19th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Importance Of Oil", dated January 16th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations A Melt-Up In Equities AND Bond Yields? A Melt-Up In Equities AND Bond Yields? Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Trade #1: Go Short The December 2018 Fed Funds Futures Contract. The trade has gained 64 bps since we initiated it. We are lifting the stop to 60 bps and targeting a profit of 75 bps. Trade #2: Go Long Global Industrial Stocks Versus Utilities. The trade is up 13.1%. We are targeting a profit of 15%, and are tightening the stop further to 12%. Trade #3: Go Short 20-Year JGBs Relative To Their 5-Year Counterparts. The trade is up 0.7%. We see this as a multi-year trade with significant upside potential. The unwinding of heavy short positions could cause the yen to strengthen temporarily. The euro is vulnerable to negative growth surprises. A retracement of some of its recent gains is likely. Feature Looking Back, Thinking Forward I had the pleasure of speaking at BCA's Annual Investment Conference held in New York on September 27th of last year where I offered three "tantalizing" trade ideas. Chart 1 reviews their performance. They were the following: Trade #1: Go Short The December 2018 Fed Funds Futures Contract We argued last summer that U.S. growth was likely to accelerate, taking rate expectations higher. That has indeed happened. Aggregate hours worked rose by 2.5% in Q4 over the previous quarter. Assuming that productivity increased by 1.5% in Q4 - equal to the pace recorded in Q3 - real GDP probably increased by nearly 4%. A variety of leading indicators point to continued above-trend growth in the months ahead (Chart 2). Chart 1Three Tantalizing Trades: ##br##An Update Three Tantalizing Trades: An Update Three Tantalizing Trades: An Update Chart 2Leading Indicators Pointing ##br##To Above-Trend U.S. Growth Leading Indicators Pointing To Above-Trend U.S. Growth Leading Indicators Pointing To Above-Trend U.S. Growth We think the Fed will raise rates four times this year, one more hike than projected by the dots and roughly 35 bps more in tightening than implied by current market expectations. The median Fed dot calls for an unemployment rate of 3.9% by end-2018, only marginally lower than today's rate of 4.1%. We have been saying for a while that above-trend growth will take the unemployment rate down to a 49-year low of 3.5% by the end of this year. If the unemployment rate falls this much, the Fed will probably turn more hawkish. Stronger inflation numbers should also give the Fed confidence to keep raising rates once per quarter. Core inflation surprised on the upside in December. We expect this trend to continue in the coming months, as the ISM manufacturing index, the New York Fed's Inflation Gauge, and our own proprietary pipeline inflation index are already foreshadowing (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Inflation ##br##Should Accelerate U.S. Inflation Should Accelerate U.S. Inflation Should Accelerate Chart 4A Pick-Up In Wage Growth ##br##Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation A Pick-Up In Wage Growth Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation A Pick-Up In Wage Growth Would Put Upward Pressure On Service Inflation As we noted two weeks ago,1 service sector inflation should get a lift from faster wage growth this year (Chart 4). Goods inflation should also rise on the back of higher oil prices and the lagged effects of a weaker dollar (Chart 5). In addition, health care inflation is likely to pick up from its current depressed level, especially if the Congressional Budget Office is correct that insurance premiums will rise due to the elimination of the individual mandate (Chart 6). Housing inflation will moderate, but this is unlikely to stymie the Fed's tightening plans since excessively low interest rates could lead to even more overbuilding in the increasingly vulnerable commercial real estate sector. Chart 5Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar ##br##Are A Tailwind For Inflation Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar Are A Tailwind For Inflation Higher Oil Prices And A Weaker Dollar Are A Tailwind For Inflation Chart 6Health Care Inflation ##br##Should Move Higher Health Care Inflation Should Move Higher Health Care Inflation Should Move Higher Granted, four rate hikes equal four opportunities to defer raising rates. It is easy to imagine scenarios where the Fed stands pat, but hard to conjure scenarios where the Fed has to raise rates five times or more this year. Thus, the risk to our four-hike view is to the downside. As such, we will be looking to take profits of 75 bps on the trade, and are putting in a stop of 60 bps. Trade #2: Go Long Global Industrial Stocks Versus Utilities Capital spending tends to accelerate in the late innings of business-cycle expansions. We are in such a phase now, as evidenced by capital goods orders, capex intention surveys, and our global capex model (Chart 7). Increased capital spending will benefit industrial companies. Conversely, rising bond yields will hurt rate-sensitive utilities. Valuations in the industrial sector have gotten stretched, but are not at extreme levels (Chart 8). Based on enterprise value-to-EBITDA, industrials are still only slightly more expensive than utilities compared to their post-1990 average. Chart 7Capex Is Shifting Into ##br##Higher Gear Capex Is Shifting Into Higher Gear Capex Is Shifting Into Higher Gear Chart 8Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, ##br## But Not Yet Extreme Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, But Not Yet Extreme Industrial Stocks: Valuations Are Stretched, But Not Yet Extreme While we do think global growth will slow this year from the heady pace of 2017, it should remain firmly above-trend. A bigger-than-expected slowdown - especially if it is concentrated in China - would undoubtedly hurt industrials. A stronger dollar could also be a headwind. Thus, we are keeping this trade on a short leash, with a target of 15% and a stop of 12%. Trade #3: Go Short 20-Year JGBs Relative To Their 5-Year Counterparts The Japanese economy is on fire. Growth almost reached 2% in 2017 and leading indicators suggest a solid start to 2018 (Chart 9). The unemployment rate has fallen to 2.7%, a full point below 2007 levels. The ratio of job openings-to-applicants has surpassed its bubble peak. The Tankan Employment Conditions Index is pointing to an exceptionally tight labor market. Wages excluding overtime pay are rising at the fastest pace in twenty years (Chart 10). Chart 9Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Japanese Growth Momentum Is Positive Chart 10Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Signs Of A Tight Labor Market Inflation is low but is starting to edge up. The most recent release surprised on the upside. Inflation expectations moved higher on the news, benefiting our long Japanese 10-year CPI swap trade recommendation (Chart 11). A simple scatterplot between the unemployment rate and core inflation suggests the Phillips curve remains intact in Japan -- amazingly, it even looks like Japan (Chart 12)! Chart 11Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Inflation Expectations Have Edged Higher Chart 12The Phillips Curve In Japan Looks Like Japan Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On Three Tantalizing Trades - Four Months On Still, with core inflation excluding food and energy running at only 0.3%, there is a long way to go before inflation reaches the BoJ's target -- and even longer if the BoJ honours its promise to generate a meaningful overshoot to compensate for the below-target inflation of prior years. This suggests the BoJ will not meaningfully water down its Yield Curve Control regime anytime soon. As such, five-year yields are likely to stay put while yields with maturities in excess of ten years should move higher. Our "tantalizing trade" being short 20-year JGBs versus their 5-year counterparts still has a long way to run. Too Risky To Short The Yen The exceptionally strong correlation between USD/JPY and U.S. Treasury yields has broken down this year (Chart 13). Had the relationship held, the yen would have actually weakened against the dollar. Still, we are reluctant to get too bearish on the yen (Chart 14). The yen real effective exchange rate is close to multi-decade lows. Positioning on the currency is heavily short. The current account surplus has mushroomed from close to zero in 2014 to 4% of GDP at present. And even if the BoJ keeps the Yield Curve Control regime in place, investors may still anticipate its demise, leading to a temporary bout of yen strength. Chart 13Strong Correlation Is Broken Strong Correlation Is Broken Strong Correlation Is Broken Chart 14Too Risky To Short The Yen Too Risky To Short The Yen Too Risky To Short The Yen What's Propping Up The Euro? The euro has been on a tear since last week, egged on by the ECB minutes, which hinted at a faster pace of monetary normalization. Growing confidence that Angela Merkel will be able to form a grand coalition also helped the common currency, along with hopes that the new government will loosen the fiscal purse strings. The euro is often thought of as the "anti-dollar." And sure enough, the euro's strength has been reflected in a broad-based decline in the dollar index in recent days. BCA's Global Investment Strategy service went long the dollar on October 31, 2014. We "doubled up" on this call in the fall of 2016, controversially arguing that "Trump will win and the dollar will rally." Obviously, in retrospect, I should have rung the register and declared victory on our long dollar view when I had the chance. EUR/USD fell to 1.04 on December 2016, within striking distance of our parity target. Bullish dollar sentiment had reached unsustainably lofty levels. That was the time to sell the greenback. But hubris got the best of me. While our other currency trade recommendations have delivered net gains of 11% since the start of 2017, the long DXY trade has stuck out like a sore thumb. Hindsight is 20/20. The key question is what to do today. EUR/USD is still trading below the level it was at when we went long the DXY. Relative to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate of 1.32, the euro is 7% undervalued. That said, PPP exchange rates may not be a reliable benchmark in this case. Given current market expectations, EUR/USD would need to strengthen to 1.41 over the next ten years just to cover the carry cost of being short the dollar. Even assuming lower inflation in the euro area, that would still leave the euro trading above its long-term fair value. It is possible, of course, that rate differentials will narrow further, but the scope for this is more limited than it might appear. The market currently expects policy rates ten years out to be 95 basis points higher in the U.S., down from a spread of nearly 180 basis points in late December (Chart 15). Given that euro area inflation expectations are 40-to-50 bps lower than in the U.S., this implies a real spread of about 50 bps - broadly in line with our estimate of the real neutral rate gap between the two regions. Ultimately, the fate of the euro in 2018 will rest on the same question that drove the currency in 2017: Will euro area growth surprise on the upside, prompting investors to price in a faster pace of monetary normalization? The bar for success is certainly higher at present. Chart 16 shows that euro area consensus growth estimates have risen significantly since the start of last year. The expected lift-off date for policy rates has also shifted in by more than a year to mid-2019. Considering that Jens Weidmann stated earlier this week that he thinks current market pricing is broadly consistent with when the ECB expects to hike rates, there is little scope for the lift-off date to move forward. Chart 15Little Scope For Rate Differentials ##br## To Narrow Further Little Scope For Rate Differentials To Narrow Further Little Scope For Rate Differentials To Narrow Further Chart 16Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up ##br##Since The Start Of 2017 Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up Since The Start Of 2017 Euro Area Growth Estimates Have Been Revised Up Since The Start Of 2017 Meanwhile, financial conditions have tightened significantly in the euro area relative to the U.S., the euro area credit impulse has turned negative, and the U.S. economic surprise index has jumped above that of the euro area (Chart 17). Euro area inflation has also dipped. Especially worrying is that core inflation in Italy has fallen back to a near record-low of 0.4% (Chart 18). How is Italy supposed to navigate its way out of its debt trap if nominal growth stays this weak? On top of all that, long speculative euro positions have soared to record-high levels (Chart 19). Given the choice of betting whether EUR/USD will first hit 1.30 or 1.15, we would go with the latter. If our bet turns out to be correct, we will use that opportunity to shift to neutral on the dollar. Chart 17The Euro Is Vulnerable ##br##To Negative Growth Surprises The Euro Is Vulnerable To Negative Growth Surprises The Euro Is Vulnerable To Negative Growth Surprises Chart 18Euro Area Core Inflation ##br##Has Dipped Euro Area Core Inflation Has Dipped Euro Area Core Inflation Has Dipped Chart 19Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short ##br##To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The euro is in a cyclical bull market. It is supported by attractive valuations, improving balance of payments dynamics, declining political risk, potential shifts in reserves preferences, and a re-rating of the European terminal rate. This positive cyclical backdrop hides a more treacherous short-term outlook. EUR/USD is vulnerable because ECB members are increasingly worried, the European periphery is displaying early strains, European inflation will slow versus the U.S., global industrial activity may experience a mini down cycle, and sentiment measures are massively stretched. Short EUR/JPY for now, and use any move in EUR/USD to 1.15 or lower to buy this pair. Feature The euro has undergone a major paradigm shift over the course of the past 16 months. In December 2016, the euro was trading near parity, and expectations were uniform that it would fall well below that threshold. The narrative was simple: Europe was turning Japanese, with inflation forever moribund; also, Europe was succumbing to the siren call of nationalism and populism, which meant the euro was bound to break up within the next five years. Meanwhile, the U.S. was on the rebound. Core consumer price inflation was above 2.2%, and U.S. President Donald Trump was set to massively stimulate the American economy, giving a free hand for the Federal Reserve to hike to its heart's content. Today, the picture could not be more different. Investors expect the European Central Bank's first hike to materialize in the summer of 2019, European growth is stellar, and European inflation is not low enough to warrant emergency-level policy rates. As a result, not only is EUR/USD trading above 1.20, but consensus forecasts increasingly see the euro trading into the 1.25 to 1.30 zone by year end. Is EUR/USD at 1.22 a buying or a selling opportunity? Short-term risks are currently elevated for the euro, but a move toward 1.15 would represent a buying opportunity, as the cyclical bear market in the euro is over. The Long-Term Bull Case A crucial long-term positive factor for the euro is that it is cheap. EUR/USD currently trades at a 10% discount to its purchasing-power-parity equilibrium, even after a nearly 17% rally since its December 2016 low. Encapsulating this concept, the real effective exchange rate for the euro remains well below equilibrium (Chart I-1). Additionally, our fundamental long-term fair value model pegs the euro as being almost 1-sigma undervalued. The euro area's balance of payment is also very favorable. It is well known among the investment community that the euro area sports a surplus of 3.5% of GDP, but significant changes are also materializing in the capital account. Portfolios outflows out of the euro area have begun to decrease, as equity inflows are rising and bond outflows are becoming smaller. Moreover, the euro area basic balance is moving into positive territory, which historically has been a precursor to sustainable euro rallies (Chart I-2). The supply of euro for international markets is therefore decreasing. Additionally, the euro area's net international investment position (NIIP), which was as low as -17% of GDP in 2014, will likely move into positive territory toward the end of the year. The NIIP has historically been a strong driver of long-term exchange rate moves.1 Chart I-1The Euro Is Still Cheap The Euro Is Still Cheap The Euro Is Still Cheap Chart I-2The European Balance Of Payments Has Improved The European Balance Of Payments Has Improved The European Balance Of Payments Has Improved Politics too have been moving in the right direction. Euro skepticism is not taking hold in the euro area: Last year's French election was a vivid demonstration that "more Europe" is not electoral poison. Even the Italian elections this coming March may not land much of a blow to the European project: The Five Star Movement is rapidly softening its anti-euro rhetoric, and support for centrist parties is strengthening (Chart I-3). Moreover, a German move toward a grand coalition means Angela Merkel's CDU is very likely to be governing along with a pro-euro SPD, whose campaign theme was "MEGA": Make Europe Great Again. Already, Germany is lending a listening ear to some of Macron's integrationist proposals, and fiscal stimulus could well be in the pipeline. Long-term reserves diversification is also in the euro's favor. A headline last week suggested that China would unload some of its vast holdings of Treasurys. This leak was soon condemned as "Fake News" by China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange. However, while the news clearly lacked substance, the reality remains that despite the euro area and the U.S. being similarly sized economies, the euro only represents 20% of allocated global reserves, compared to 65% for the greenback. The greater depth and liquidity of U.S. bond markets contributes to this discrepancy, but the ECB's bond buying, by creating a scarcity of euro denominated securities, has exacerbated the disparity. This latter handicap for the euro will end sometime next fall, and if Europe's integrates further, European bond markets will increasingly become alternatives to U.S. ones. A rebalancing of reserves would principally help the euro by hurting the U.S. dollar: It will become more tenuous for the U.S. to achieve a positive international income balance while sporting a NIIP of -40% of GDP if official international demand for dollars falls (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Italian Centrists Are Gaining Ground Italian Centrists Are Gaining Ground Italian Centrists Are Gaining Ground Chart I-4The USD Needs Its Reserve Status The USD Needs Its Reserve Status The USD Needs Its Reserve Status Finally, the terminal rates differential between the U.S. and the euro area remains well above its long-term average of 110 basis points. Thus, there is scope for a normalization of European terminal rates relative to the U.S. on a long-term basis (Chart I-5). However, an average is only a number. What forces could cause the terminal rate spread between the euro area and the U.S. to normalize over the coming years? European policy is currently very loose when compared to the U.S., which will enable the ECB to play catchup over the coming years. To make this judgment, we look at broad money supply in excess of money demand. Because money demand is an unobserved variable, we have to estimate it. Economic theory argues it should be a positive function of economic activity, wealth and uncertainty. Therefore, to get a sense of what money demand may be, we regress the real broad money aggregates of various countries on uncertainty indices and real wealth.2 The difference between real broad money supply numbers and these estimates represent excess money supply. If a country's excess money is being generated today, it ends up stimulating future economic activity and inflation. This increase in expected nominal growth should contribute to lifting expected interest rates at the long end of the yield curve - i.e. expected terminal rates. As Chart I-6 shows, the stock of excess money supply in the U.S. has stopped growing since 2015. However, it is currently exploding in the euro area as European commercial banks are regaining their health and lending again. The money supply dynamics in Europe signal that the easy policy of the ECB is finally bearing fruit. And as the bottom panel of Chart I-6 illustrates, when European excess money supply increases relative to the U.S., as is currently the case, EUR/USD experiences cyclical rallies.3 This counterinituitive result exists because previous ECB easing is bearing fruits, European asset returns are rising, and economic activity is increasing. As a result, the European terminal rate now has more scope to rise vis-à-vis the U.S. The steepening of the German yield curve relative to the Treasury curve only confirms this message (Chart I-7). Chart I-5The U.S. Terminal Rate Has Room To Fall##br## Against That Of Europe The U.S. Terminal Rate Has Room To Fall Against That Of Europe The U.S. Terminal Rate Has Room To Fall Against That Of Europe Chart I-6European Excess##br## Money Is Surging European Excess Money Is Surging European Excess Money Is Surging Chart I-7Listen To Yield ##br##Curves Listen To Yield Curves Listen To Yield Curves The five forces described above imply that the euro's move from 1.03 to 1.21 was the first salvo in what is likely to be a long cyclical bull market that could end up driving the euro above 1.40 over many years. However, these factors provide little insight regarding the euro's path over the next three to six months. Bottom Line: The euro is likely to have embarked on a cyclical bull market at the beginning of 2017. Five factors support this judgment: The euro is cheap, the European balance-of-payment backdrop is favorable, political winds in the euro area remain favorable to further European integration, global foreign exchange reserves are very underweight the euro, and the spread between U.S. and euro area expected terminal rates remains well above its long-term average, and has scope to narrow. Murkier Short-Term Outlook While the long-term outlook is very favorable for the euro, the shorter-term outlook is much more clouded. First, the chorus of complaints against the euro's strength is growing among European central bankers. In recent days, not only have Vitor Constâncio and Francois Villeroy voiced concerns over the euro's recent strength, but so has Ewald Nowotny, the rather hawkish Austrian central banker. Additionally, Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann stated that the market should not anticipate a rate hike before the summer of 2019, suggesting he would not want to see a more aggressive rate pricing than what is currently at play (Chart I-8). Second, the less competitive and more fragile European periphery is already showing early signs that the sharp appreciation in the euro is causing some pain. Peripheral equities have begun to underperform the stocks of core euro area nations, and are also sharply underperforming U.S. equities. This phenomenon tends to be associated with a weakening euro. Moreover, peripheral inflation excluding food and energy has already weakened to 1.3% from a high of 2% in February last year, the consequence of a tightening in financial conditions (Chart I-9). Chart I-8ECB Doesn't Want This To Change ECB Doesn't Want This To Change ECB Doesn't Want This To Change Chart I-9Peripheral Core Inflation In Free Fall Peripheral Core Inflation In Free Fall Peripheral Core Inflation In Free Fall Third, the economic environment points to underperformance of aggregate European inflation relative to the U.S. A fall in the gap between euro area and U.S. inflation tends to be associated with short-term gyrations in EUR/USD (Chart I-10). This is because a fall in relative inflation against the euro area causes investors to temporarily tweak the perceived path of future policy differentials. Over the course of 2018, U.S. inflation is set to increase. A simple model based on U.S. capacity utilization and the velocity of money shows that U.S. core CPI could hit 2.1% (Chart I-11). While this model has done a good job picking the turning points in U.S. core inflation, it has consistently overestimated inflation since 2013. Correcting for this bias, the model still forecasts a significant pick-up in inflation to 1.8% (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-10Higher European Inflation Equals Higher Euro Higher European Inflation Equals Higher Euro Higher European Inflation Equals Higher Euro Chart I-11A U.S. Inflation Pick Up Is Coming A U.S. Inflation Pick Up Is Coming A U.S. Inflation Pick Up Is Coming The same cannot be said for euro area inflation. Not only is the European periphery already feeling the pain caused by the euro's strength, but also we have entered the window of time where the previous tightening in euro area financial conditions vis-à-vis the U.S. puts a brake on euro area relative inflation.4 Moreover, the diffusion index of the components of the euro area core CPI index has been below 50% for four months in a row now. Historically, this has been associated with a fall in core CPI. Fourth, over the past year or so, EUR/USD has traded in line with risk assets. The euro area has benefited from EM growth improvement, which has lifted all corners of the global economy levered to the global industrial cycle. As a result, as investors become increasingly bullish on industrial metals, EM assets or momentum plays, so they have of the euro.5 However, clouds are slowly forming over the global economy, at the very least pointing to a mini-cycle downturn. For one, Chinese producer prices have rolled over, and Chinese import growth has significantly underperformed expectations in recent months, slowing to a 5% pace from a 20% pace as recently as September 2017. Essentially, industrial activity has slowed in response to a tightening in Chinese monetary conditions. This slowdown is already beginning to impact various corners of the globe: Korean and Taiwanese export growth continues to decelerate; BCA's Global LEIs Diffusion Index is well below the 50% mark, which normally precedes slowdowns in the global LEI itself; Our boom/bust and global growth indicators have slowed further - two precursors to global industrial production decelerations. Our global economic and financial A/D line, which tallies 100 pro-cyclical variables, has also rolled over sharply, another early warning sign for the global economy (Chart I-12). Finally, as we highlighted in December, EM/JPY carry trades, a canary for the global economy, have lost momentum - a signal that has normally preceded a slowdown in global industrial activity.6 All these signals only confirm the "Yellow Flags" we highlighted last October.7 In an environment where complacency is rampant and assets levered to growth are priced for perfection, this is worrisome. The euro's recent elevated correlation to such risk assets, along with the fact that the gap between European and U.S. core inflation is itself led by Chinese PPI, suggests that the euro is tactically vulnerable. Fifth, from a technical perspective speculators have never been this long the euro, which represents a significant danger as the euro is trading at a sharp premium to its short-term interest rate driver (Chart I-13). Moreover, risk-reversals for EUR/USD point to heightened susceptibility of a selloff if the bad omen on global growth and European inflation come to fruition (Chart I-14). Chart I-12Rising Risks For Global Growth Rising Risks For Global Growth Rising Risks For Global Growth Chart I-13The Euro Is Vulnerable The Euro Is Vulnerable The Euro Is Vulnerable Chart I-14Risk Reversals Point To Euro Downside Risk Reversals Point To Euro Downside Risk Reversals Point To Euro Downside This short-term picture suggests that the probability of a move in EUR/USD toward 1.15 is growing over the course of the next three to six months. Bottom Line: While the cyclical picture for the euro is bright, the short-term snapshot is much more dangerous. Not only are an increasing number of ECB officials weighing in on the impact of the euro's recent rally, but the European periphery is showing growing signs that the euro rally has indeed taken a bite. Additionally, European inflation is set to underperform U.S. inflation, and the global economic cycle could enter a short burst of disappointment. Finally, investors are not positioned for such developments, increasing the likelihood of a downward move in the euro. What To Do? Caught between a cyclically propitious backdrop and a tactically dangerous environment, EUR/USD presents a riddle for FX investors right now. The odds of a euro correction over the next three to six months are substantially greater than 50%. But as we highlighted last week, instead of taking a direct bet on EUR/USD, we recommend investors short EUR/JPY. Shorting EUR/JPY is an even cleaner way to take advantage of the cloudy weather building over the global economy.8 Moreover, in recent years, EUR/JPY has fallen when the 52-week rate-of-change of momentum trades began to weaken (Chart I-15). This highly mean-reverting indicator is currently in the 96th percentile of its distribution for the past 25 years, suggesting an imminent rollover. Additionally, EUR/JPY tends to perform well when the LIBOR-OIS spread widens. Today, the three-month FRA-OIS spread has been widening, even as the end-of-year dollar funding shortage has passed (Chart I-16). These kinds of dynamics point to a potential drying out in global liquidity, a phenomenon which historically hurts risk assets, especially when they are as frothy as they are now. This should once again hurt EUR/JPY. Chart I-15EUR/JPY And Momentum Stocks EUR/JPY And Momentum Stocks EUR/JPY And Momentum Stocks Chart I-16Funding Stresses Point To A Fall In EUR/JPY Funding Stresses Point To A Fall In EUR/JPY Funding Stresses Point To A Fall In EUR/JPY Thus, shorting EUR/JPY is our highest conviction trade for the next six months or so. If, as we foresee, EUR/USD weakens during the first half of 2018, we will look to buy this pair. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets" dated February 26, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 We do not include real GDP in the models because since wealth is affected by GDP, they are two co-integrated variables, which creates strong multi-collinearity in the regressions. Of the two variables, real wealth was the stronger explanatory variable. 3 While the focus of this report is on the euro, the relationship between relative excess money supply and currency performances works across many exchange rates. We will develop this theme over the coming weeks. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets" dated February 26, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Euro: Risk On Or Risk Off" dated November 17, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter" dated January 5, 2018 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Best Of Possible Worlds?" dated October 6, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!" dated January 12, 2018 available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Data out of the U.S. was strong this week: Industrial production increased by 0.9% on a monthly pace; Capacity utilization increased to 77.9% from 77.2%; Continuing jobless claims increased to 1.952 million from 1.876 million, beating expectations of 1.9 million; Initial jobless claims however decreased to 220K from 261K, beating expectations of 250K. We continue to expect the Fed to hike more than is priced by the market. A tightening labor market will eventually feed inflationary pressures, causing upward pressure on the dollar. Report Links: A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 European data was decent: German CPI came in unchanged and at expectations, at 1.6%; European headline and core CPI also remained unchanged and at consensus, coming in at 1.4% and 1.1% respectively. However, the euro seems to be losing momentum his week. Comments by ECB board members such as Ewald Nowotny, Vitor Constâncio, and Francois Villeroy, all pointed to issues with the euro's sharp rise, and how they "don't reflect changes in fundamentals". Additionally, relapsing inflation data in the peripheries shows that the strength in the euro is beginning to cause strains and may even negatively affect the ECB's mandate. Report Links: The Unstoppable Euro - January 19, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Domestic corporate goods year on year inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 3.1%. It also decreased substantially from November. Moreover, the Eco Watchers Survey for current conditions underperformed expectations, coming in at 53.9. It also decreased from the November reading. However, machinery orders yearly growth outperformed expectations substantially, coming in at 4.1%. USD/JPY is relatively flat from last week. Overall we expect upside to the yen to be limited against the U.S. dollar, given that bond yields are set to go up in the U.S. That being said, the yen has upside against the euro, as financial conditions have eased significantly in Japan relatively to the euro area. This should cause rate expectations in Japan to improve relative to those of Europe's, pushing EUR/JPY lower. Report Links: Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - December 8, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: The DCLG House Price Index yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 5.1%. However, core consumer price inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. It also decreased from the 2.7% reading of November. Moreover, headline inflation came in line with expectations at 3%. This also marks the first decrease in inflation in the U.K. since July 2017. Lifted by the USD's weakness, cable has now reached the pre-Brexit low 1.38 hit in February 2016. However, GBP has been experiencing a downtrend versus the euro since last September Overall, we continue to be skeptical of the ability of the BoE to raise interest rates meaningfully. Thus, we would fade any further rally from GBP/USD. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was strong this week: Home loans grew at a 2.1% annual pace in November, higher than the expected -0.2%; Employment grew by 34.7K, beating expectations of 9K. The part-time component increased by 19.5K, while the full-time component grew by 15.1K; The participation rate increased to 65.7% from 65.5%; Unemployment rate increased to 5.5% from 5.4%. Foreign exchange traders lifted the AUD further this week. While the headline employment data remains stellar, the heavy concentration part-time job creation means that overall labor utilization measures is staying low. This will cap wage and inflationary pressures, especially as the AUD is once again expensive, further exacerbating deflationary pressures. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been negative: The month-on-month growth of food prices declined from -0.4% to -0.8%. Moreover, Electronic Card retail sales yearly growth slowed from 4.3% to 3.3%. Finally the ANZ Commodity Price Index year on year growth declined from -0.9% to -2.2%. The New Zealand Dollar has surges by almost 3% year to data against the U.S. dollar. This has been largely due to the depreciation of the greenback itself, as global growth continues to beat forecast. On a short term basis we are positive on the NZD relative to the AUD, as Chinese tightening should weigh more on Australia than New Zealand. However, the new populist government in New Zealand worsens the outlook of the kiwi on a long term basis. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Movements in the petrocurrency were muted following the 'dovish hike' by the Bank of Canada. Numerous factors were highlighted to justify the rate hike to 1.25%, such as: strong employment growth; higher wages; robust consumption; and exceptional GDP growth in 2017. While the Bank's Business Outlook Survey suggests the labor market is tightening due to labor shortages, the BoC underplayed this factor, pointing to much more muted overall labor utilization metrics. The BoC also noted the expected decline in the contribution of housing and consumption to growth this year due to higher mortgage and borrowing rates. While the economy is firing on all fronts, the spread between the West Canada Select and West Texas Intermediate oil prices continues to widen due to a lack of pipeline capacity to ship the oil out of Canada. According to the Bank, these bottlenecks should be temporary, which means that the CAD could catch up to oil later. Report Links: Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 On Tuesday, Thomas Jordan, the president of the SNB once again reiterated that the franc is still "highly valued", and thus interest rates need to stay low so as to prevent the franc from appreciating. Moreover, he emphasized that while expansionary monetary policy was necessary, it was important to not wait too long to normalize rates. Overall, we believe that the SNB will want to see sustained inflation at relatively high levels to justify an exit from their radical monetary policy. In the meantime the Swiss Central bank will stay accommodative, and thus, EUR/CHF is likely to have limited downside. If the mini down cycle takes hold of the global economy, this would temporarily weigh on EUR/CHF. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The krone continued to appreciate this week, and is now UP 3.3% year-to-date. The krone has been helped mostly by the surge in oil prices and by the fall in the dollar. Overall, we are bullish on this cross against the CAD, as there are 60 basis points of hiked priced in the Canadian curve, even after this week's hike. In the meantime, there are only 21 basis points in the Norwegian curve. We believe this spread is too high, and thus, that the krone should appreciate against the Canadian dollar. Moreover, further downside in EUR/NOK is limited, given that near 70 dollars, there is not much room for oil prices to go up. Thus, we are closing our EUR/NOK trade with a 3.40% gain but keep our long NOK/SEK call in place. Report Links: Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 In a recent speech in Uppsala, Sweden, Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson reminded the audience of his view from the December meeting that it would have reasonable to hike rates in "early 2018". He pointed to Sweden's robust economic performance, highlighting population growth, migration into cities, and higher real wages. Inflation has also been on target since mid-2017. This assessment is in line with our view of the economy, however Governor Ingves consistently supported a strong dovish tone which undermined our view. Now that the ECB has begun tapering, the consensus within the Riksbank seems to also be shifting. Falling house prices need to be monitored closely, especially when one keeps in mind Governor Ingves dovish inclinations. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades