Europe

Dear Client, I have been visiting clients in Europe this week, so today's report is somewhat shorter than usual. We will be back next week with an exciting Special Report on the macro effects of bitcoin and other virtual currencies. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlights Global growth remains strong and broad-based. U.S. GDP growth will accelerate over the next few quarters thanks to the easing in financial conditions so far this year. The market is pricing in only 20 basis points in cumulative rate hikes between now and the end of next year. This is far too low. Go short the Dec-2018 fed funds futures contract. The euro has strengthened more this year than one would have expected based solely on the change in interest rate differentials. Positioning shifts are the likely culprit. In real terms, the terminal rate in the U.S. based on 5-year, 5-year forward OIS rates is currently only 13 bps higher than in the euro area. We will automatically open a tactical short EUR/USD position if the euro moves above $1.22 any time over the next three weeks. Feature Global Economy Firing On All Cylinders The global economy continues to chug along. All 46 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year, the first time this has happened since 2007. Usually, economists are too optimistic about growth prospects. This has not been the case over the past 12 months. Consensus global growth estimates for 2017 and 2018 have marched higher during this time, led by the euro area, Japan, and a number of emerging economies (Chart 1). U.S. growth projections have been broadly stable, but these too are likely to be revised higher. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM indices improved in August. The same goes for core capital goods orders, consumer confidence, retail sales, and homebuilder sentiment. The employment report was on the weak side, but it was probably distorted by seasonal factors - August payrolls have now fallen short of expectations for seven years in a row, a suspiciously long streak. Hiring intention surveys and perceptions of job availability both remain strong. The net share of households who see jobs as "plentiful" as opposed to "hard to get" rose further in August. It is now well above its pre-recession peak (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher And Higher Higher And Higher Higher And Higher Chart 2A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market A Healthy U.S. Labor Market Fed Rate Expectations Are Too Dovish The Treasury market remains oblivious to these developments, focusing only on the failure of inflation to rise. This could prove to be a fatal mistake. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended (Chart 3). Trying to infer the true level of economic slack from today's inflation rate is like trying to read the speedometer of an automobile when there is a 30-second delay between what the dial says and when you step on the accelerator. Many market participants and a number of Fed officials have argued that interest rates are already close to neutral, implying little need for further rate hikes. We agree that the neutral rate is lower than in the past, but their argument misses a crucial point. Even if the Fed knew what the level of the neutral rate is - which, of course, it doesn't - it would still need to get the timing right. If the Fed waits too long to bring rates up to neutral, the unemployment rate will end up falling below NAIRU. This could force the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it (or the markets) would like. Such an outcome now looks increasingly likely. The easing in U.S. financial conditions since the start of the year should boost real GDP growth over the next few quarters (Chart 4). This could cause the unemployment rate to fall to 3.5% by next summer, leaving it below its 2000 lows and more than a full point below most estimates of NAIRU. If this were to happen, it would prompt the Fed to turn up the hawkish rhetoric. Chart 3Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Central Bank Showdown Central Bank Showdown Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions In The U.S. Bode Well For Growth The market is not giving enough weight to such an outcome. The December-2018 fed funds futures contract is pricing in only 20 basis points in cumulative rate hikes between now and the end of next year. That is much too low. We recommend that clients short this contract and are initiating a new tactical trade to this effect. ECB Will Take It Easy In contrast to the U.S., euro area financial conditions have tightened this year. During his press conference, Mario Draghi expressed confidence in the growth outlook, but acknowledged the risks to the region from a stronger currency. He noted that "the recent volatility in the exchange rate represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring with regard to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for price stability." As we predicted last week, the ECB trimmed its 2018 inflation forecast from 1.3% to 1.2%, and its 2019 forecast from 1.6% to 1.5%. Chart 5 shows the market's estimate of the gap in terminal interest rates between the U.S. and the euro area using 5-year, 5-year forward OIS rates. The gap has narrowed by around 50 bps since the start of the year. However, EUR/USD has strengthened more than one would have expected based solely on the movement in interest rate differentials. Specifically, the market now expects U.S. five-year yields to be 78 basis points higher in 2022 than in the euro area. This is precisely the same gap that prevailed last October. Yet, EUR/USD was $1.10 back then. Today, it is $1.20. Shifts in positioning help explain why the euro has strengthened so much. Traders were heavily short the euro at the start of this year. Today, they are heavily long (Chart 6). Looking out, with few euro shorts left, EUR/USD is likely to trade off the interest rate gap between the two regions. Chart 5U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed U.S. Vs. Euro Area: Interest Rate Gap Has Narrowed Chart 6Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Long Chart 7Fiscal Policy Is More Stimulative In The U.S. Central Bank Showdown Central Bank Showdown In real terms, the terminal rate in the U.S. is currently only 13 bps higher than in the euro area. That seems rather low to us. Trend growth is faster in the U.S., the banking system is in better shape, and fiscal policy is more stimulative (Chart 7). All this suggests that the real neutral rate is substantially higher in the U.S. As such, we will automatically open a tactical short EUR/USD position if the euro moves above $1.22 at any time over the next three weeks, with a stop of $1.24 and a year-end target of $1.15. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Based on long-term moving averages and the advance/decline line, the dollar selloff is still only a severe correction. These factors need to be monitored closely as they stand on the edge. To rebound, the dollar will need U.S. inflation to pick up, which will lift the U.S. OIS curve. Signs are accumulating that U.S. inflation will trough toward the end of 2017. Buying the dollar versus the yen is a much safer bet than shorting the euro. The CAD has more upside, especially on its crosses. Feature The U.S. dollar continues to be tested by investors. As paradoxical as it may sound, it is still too early to sound the death knell for the dollar bull market. However, it is not time either to aggressively bet on a rebound. For that to happen, U.S. inflation must regain its footing in a more convincing fashion. Why Isn't The Bull Market Dead? There are many facets to this question, but let's begin with technical considerations. First, the dollar's advance / decline line has not broken down (Chart I-1). A breakdown in this measure would be one of the key technical signals that the dollar has begun a new cyclical downtrend. In the mid-1990s, the dollar did experience a period of correction. During that time frame, the A/D line was also unable to break down, later highlighting that what was initially perceived as the beginning a new bear market was ultimately a prolonged period of consolidation. Chart I-1Still Not A Cyclical Bear Market Still Not A Cyclical Bear Market Still Not A Cyclical Bear Market Second, the dollar's trend has been best approximated by the four-year moving average of monthly prices. Since the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971, during bear markets, the dollar tends to find its ceiling around this indicator, and during bull markets, it tends to put a floor around this moving average (Chart I-2). Today, the dollar has yet to end a month below this measure. Third, positioning in the dollar is now depressed, as investors have purged their stale USD longs (Chart I-3). When one looks at net long speculative positions in EUR/USD - the most convenient and liquid instrument to bet on the dollar - investors are clearly enamored with the euro, which by definition illustrates their dislike of the greenback. Chart I-2No Trend Break For Now No Trend Break For Now No Trend Break For Now Chart I-3Dollar Downside Is Limited Dollar Downside Is Limited Dollar Downside Is Limited Technical indicators argue that we have experienced a painful correction in the USD, but valuation considerations suggest it will be difficult for these technical indicators to deteriorate enough to begin flagging a cyclical bear market. Our long-term fair value model, which incorporates productivity differentials, highlights that the dollar never hit the nosebleed levels associated with bull market tops in 1985 or in 2001 (Chart I-4). The stability in the trade balance and the current account - both have been stable at around 3% of GDP and 2.5% of GDP, respectively - are at odds with the sharp deterioration in the balance of payments that has occurred when the dollar has been genuinely expensive. Our intermediate-term valuation models point to an even more unequivocal conclusion. Based on this metric, the DXY is at its cheapest level since 2009, a discount that historically has been associated with dollar bottoms, at least temporary ones (Chart I-5). This gives us comfort that the A/D line is unlikely to break down for now, or that the dollar will end September significantly below its crucial four-year moving average. However, if these things happen, the dollar could experience significant downside. Chart I-4The Dollar Never Reached Nosebleed Valuations The Dollar Never Reached Nosebleed Valuations The Dollar Never Reached Nosebleed Valuations Chart I-5Big Discount To IRP Big Discount To IRP Big Discount To IRP Economic forces too do not point to a sharp move in the DXY below 91 - one that could drive the dollar down into the low 80s. After a period of deep underperformance, the U.S.'s economic surprises relative to the G10 have begun to stabilize, as have inflation surprises. More saliently, the incredible strength in the U.S. ISM manufacturing index, especially when compared to other PMIs around the world, points to a rebound in the USD, or at the very least, stabilization (Chart I-6). Finally, the market has now all but priced out additional hikes from the U.S. interest rate curve. There are only 30 basis points of hikes priced in over the next 24 months. Moreover, the probability of the fed funds rate remaining between 1% and 1.25% only falls below 50% in September 2018 (Table I-1). This seems to be a sanguine scenario. Chart I-6Cyclical Support ##br## For USD Cyclical Support For USD Cyclical Support For USD Table I-1Investors See U.S. Rates At Current ##br##Levels Until Late 2018 Conflicting Forces For The Dollar Conflicting Forces For The Dollar Bottom Line: The dollar's technicals are not yet indicative of the end of the cyclical bull market. However, they do need to be monitored closely. Additionally, the dollar is trading at a large discount to interest rate parity relationships, and the Federal Reserve is not expected to execute its next hike until late 2018. While these factors may not point to an imminent rebound in the USD, they do suggest that the down-wave in the dollar is very long in the tooth. Chasing the dollar lower is dangerous. Too Early To Bet The House On A Renewed Upleg Chart I-7The Global Deflation Anchor The Global Deflation Anchor The Global Deflation Anchor This observation on the probability of a Fed move brings us to the vital question of what could lift the U.S. interest rate curve higher, and thus the dollar. This would be the outlook for inflation. As Fed Governor Lael Brainard clearly argued this week, the Fed is not meeting its inflation mandate, warranting a slower pace of rate increases as global deflationary forces remain very potent. The dovish path implied by interest rate markets shows that investors already agree with this assessment. There is no denying that inflation has been globally and structurally pulled down by various forces. While the "Amazon effect" has grabbed headlines, Mark McClellan argues in The Bank Credit Analyst this month that the effect of e-commerce on inflation is no greater than that of Walmart in the 1990s - and probably amounts to a meagre 0.1-0.2% depressive impact on inflation.1 Instead, we peg the capacity buildup in EM and China - which has lifted the global capital stock massively since the turn of the millennia - as the main source of global deflation (Chart I-7). Now that global credit growth is lower than it was before 2008, it has become clearer that the global supply side of the economy has expanded faster than underlying demand, resulting in downward pressure on prices. Nonetheless, while there is a lid on inflation, this does not imply that cyclical determinants of inflation have been fully neutered. They simply have become weaker. Inflation can still ebb and flow in response to the business cycle, but the upside is not as strong as it once was. This limits how high nominal interest rate can go, which is why it is hard to envision a terminal rate much above 3% - a very low reading by post-war standards. Here, we continue to see a turning point coming later this year for inflation, one that would pull core PCE closer to the 2% mark wanted by the Fed in 2018. In the background, our composite capacity utilization indicator is now firmly in "no slack" territory, an environment in which inflation tends to perk up and where interest rate exhibit upside (Chart I-8). This is not enough to warrant fears of inflation, but healthy growth in this context should be a red flag for deflationists. This is exactly the set of circumstances we envision for the next 12 months, even if hurricane Harvey and its potential successors create noise in upcoming data. The U.S. economy has benefited from a strong easing in financial conditions since February 2016. The recent fall in real rates, which has been the key driver of the 60 basis-points fall in Treasury yields since December 2016, is now demonstrably reflationary. Lumber prices are once again at the top of their trading range since 2013, and gold prices have regained vigor. In this optic, the ratio of metal to bond prices - adjusted for their very different volatilities - has been a reliable leading indicator of U.S. growth (Chart I-9). Today, it is pointing to an acceleration of GDP growth relative to potential, the very definition of declining slack. Chart I-8Tight U.S. Capacity Is Inflationary Tight U.S. Capacity Is Inflationary Tight U.S. Capacity Is Inflationary Chart I-9Relfation Will Boost U.S. Growth Above Trend Relfation Will Boost U.S. Growth Above Trend Relfation Will Boost U.S. Growth Above Trend The labor market continues to display signs of resilience as well. True, the last employment report was paltry, but August has been marked by seasonal weaknesses for the past seven years. Moreover, August weaknesses have tended to be minimized in the wake of the notorious revisions typical of the U.S. Department of Labor. However, the strength in the labor market components of the NFIB small businesses survey highlights the potential for more job gains going forward. Where this indicator really shines though, is in its capacity to forecast household total wages and salaries (Chart I-10). Today, this gauge highlights that the income of middle class households will accelerate over the next six months. This matters because if the middle class - a category of U.S. households that gather the vast majority of their income from wages - experiences strong income growth, this will create robust support for consumption. With consumption accounting for 70% of U.S. GDP, a boost to this component would go a long way in lifting aggregate growth. Stronger growth in a tight economy is inflationary, and monetary dynamics confirm this risk. The U.S. velocity of money has picked up meaningfully, and now suggests that inflation will gather steam later this year (Chart I-11). Chart I-10The Labor Market Is Still Strong The Labor Market Is Still Strong The Labor Market Is Still Strong Chart I-11Monetary Dynamics Point To More Inflation Monetary Dynamics Point To More Inflation Monetary Dynamics Point To More Inflation We therefore expect that when this turnaround in inflation emerges, investors will re-assess their expectations for the path of U.S. monetary policy, and the dollar will finally be able to resume its upward trek toward new highs. But until inflation turns the corner, the dollar will continue to struggle to rally durably. Bottom Line: The U.S. economy is still on a firming path. With the amount of slack in the economy vanishing and with the velocity of money accelerating, this will lead to a pick-up in inflation late this year. The end of Q4 is likely to prove the moment when the dollar will finally be able to begin firming up. Investment Implications Shorting the Yen Is Still The Safest Bet Shorting the yen remains the best way to play a dollar rebound for now. The yen has not benefited much from the recent bout of risk aversion prompted by the renewed flare-up of in tensions in the Korean peninsula. It remains weak on its crosses like EUR/JPY, CAD/JPY or even AUD/JPY. USD/JPY seems incapable of staying below 108.5, and may even be forming a consolidation pattern reminiscent of the one experienced in 2013 (Chart I-12). In late 2013, this pattern was resolved by U.S. bond yields moving higher. This time is likely to be similar. The recent weakness in Japanese wages remains a key hurdle that the Bank of Japan does not seem able to shake off. Wage growth hit it slowest pace since 2015 and real wages are worryingly weak (Chart I-13). This is not the picture of an economy with any hint of inflation, even if the labor market is tight. Illustrating this point, contrarily to the euro area, Japanese inflation expectations have not kept pace with the U.S. in recent months (Chart I-14). This argues that the BoJ faces the greatest burden of any central bank. With the BoJ now packed with doves, we expect that interest rates and bond yields in Japan will remain capped for the foreseeable future. As a result, if U.S. bond yields can rise in the face of a strong U.S. economy, JGB yields will not follow higher. This will flatter USD/JPY. Chart I-12Consolidation Pattern In USD/JPY Consolidation Pattern In USD/JPY Consolidation Pattern In USD/JPY Chart I-13Falling Labor Income In Japan Falling Labor Income In Japan Falling Labor Income In Japan Chart I-14Japanese CPI Swaps Are Outliers Japanese CPI Swaps Are Outliers Japanese CPI Swaps Are Outliers A More Complex Picture For The Euro As investors have become more comfortable with the economic and political prospects of the euro area, the euro has become increasingly over-owned, but most importantly, has completely deviated from interest rate parity relationship (Chart I-15). At first glance, this would indicate the euro is greatly vulnerable. This reality, along with very long positioning of speculators in EUR/USD, highlights that it will be difficult for the euro to stay above 1.20 in the coming months. However, for the euro to move below 1.15, U.S. inflation has to pick up. Thus, for the remainder of the year, the EUR/USD is likely to remain range bound between these two numbers. Two factors make the picture less clear for EUR/USD than for USD/JPY. First, the European Central Bank is intent on beginning to taper its asset purchases this year, a move that will be announced in October. At yesterday's press conference, ECB President Mario Draghi was unequivocal about this, despite the slight curtailments to the central bank's inflation forecasts. Moreover, the seeming lack of concern vis-à-vis this year's 6% increase in the trade-weighted euro was perceived by investors as a green light to keep betting on a stronger EUR/USD. Second, as we argued five months ago, exchange rate dynamics are more a function of assets' expected returns than just interest rate differentials.2 As Chart I-16 illustrates, when a portfolio of eurozone stocks, bonds and cash outperforms a similar U.S. one, this leads to a durable rally in EUR/USD. Today, the relative performance of this European portfolio is toward the bottom of its historical distribution, and may even be already turning the corner. If this move has durability, inflows into the euro area could push EUR/USD back into the 1.3 to 1.4 range. Chart I-15Euro Is Expensive ##br##To IRP Euro Is Expensive To IRP Euro Is Expensive To IRP Chart I-16Outperforming Euro Area Assets##br### Could Support EUR/USD Outperforming Euro Area Assets Could Support EUR/USD Outperforming Euro Area Assets Could Support EUR/USD The Loonie Will Keep Flying The Bank of Canada delivered another rate hike this week. The BoC continues to focus on closing the Canadian output gap and the strong economy, ignoring weak wages and inflation. The BoC was rather sanguine regarding the slowdown in real estate activity in Toronto, Canada's largest city, and seemed comfortable with the CAD's recent strength, arguing it was a reflection of Canada's strength and not yet an impediment to it. The CAD interpreted this announcement bullishly. We agree. In a Special Report written last July, we argued that the BoC was among the best-placed central banks to tighten policy among the G10.3 Additionally, the CAD is cheap, trading at a 7% discount to PPP. It is also still below its fair value, implied by interest rate differentials. As such, we continue to overweight the Canadian dollar, being long the loonie against the euro and the Aussie. It also has upside against the USD, but could prove vulnerable to a pick-up in U.S. inflation. Thus, we remain committed to buying the CAD on its crosses. Bottom Line: The euro may be expensive relative to interest rate differentials, but the anticipation around the ECB's tapering continues to represent a support under EUR/USD. As a result, this pair is likely to remain range-bound, roughly between 1.2 and 1.15. USD/JPY has more upside as Japanese inflation expectations and wages are sagging, suggesting the BoJ is nowhere near the ECB in terms of moving away from an ultra-accommodative stance. The CAD will continue to experience upside for the remainder of the year; stay long the loonie on its crosses. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated August 3, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot", dated April 14, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy And Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The dollar had a particularly eventful week. With Fed officials Brainard and Kashkari unleashing their dovish remarks, the greenback suffered as investors pushed down 10-year yields. While Brainard highlighted her concern over the "recent low readings of inflation", Kashkari took it further and said that the hikes may be "doing real harm" to the economy. Adding to the Fed's concerns, Stanley Fischer, a long-serving Fed official and an ardent supporter of policy normalization, announced his resignation on Wednesday. Mario Draghi's hawkish press conference added further downward pressure on the dollar, with the DXY making a new low of 91.41. It is unlikely that the dollar will be able to meaningfully rally until inflation re-emerges, a year-end event. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen - August 11, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 The euro reacted very positively to the ECB monetary policy speech. Draghi highlighted the uncertainty associated with the strong currency, but noted that the ECB doesn't expect it to have a large impact on inflation, which helped the euro hit a high of EUR/USD 1.2018. He nonetheless highlighted that achieving the ECB's price mandate will require "patience" and "persistence" and he expects inflation to hit its target by 2020. Additionally, the ECB lowered its inflation forecasts, while increasing its 2017 growth forecasts. In terms of QE, Draghi clarified that details will be revealed in the next meeting held on October 26, but that interest rates will remain accommodative for an extended period of time. Although President Draghi laid out some concerns about the strong euro, it seems momentum is unlikely to falter unless markets become more positive on the dollar or the pound. We expect this to occur by the end of this year, when inflation picks up again in the U.S. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been negative: Industrial production yearly growth declines substantially from June's 5.5% number, coming in at 4.7%. This data point also underperformed expectations. Housing starts contracted by 2.3% on a YoY basis, also underperforming expectations. Meanwhile, labor cash earnings also contracted by 0.3% on a yearly basis, underperforming expectations. As we highlighted a few weeks ago, multiple indicators are signaling a slowdown in the Japanese economy. The recent batch of negative data seems to confirm this view, which means that the dovish bias of the BoJ will only be further reinforced. Consequently the yen will be the mirror image of U.S. bonds. Given that rate expectations have collapsed to the point that the market is only anticipating 30 basis points in hikes in the U.S. over the next 2 years, risks point upwards for USD/JPY. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen - August 11, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in U.K. has been mixed: Markit manufacturing PMI increased from August to July, coming in at 56.9. This data point also outperformed expectations. Meanwhile, both construction and Markit services PMI underperformed expectations coming in at 51.2 and 53.2, respectively. Finally, nationwide house price year-on-year growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1%. At the beginning of August, we warned of a repricing of rate expectations in the U.K. given that the pass through from the currency was set to dissipate, while the housing market and real disposable income were undergoing a major slowdown. So far, this view has proven correct, with the pound falling against the dollar and the euro. We expect that GBP/USD has further downside on a 12 month basis, as rate expectations in the U.S. have likely found a bottom. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Data out of Australia was not particularly strong: TD Securities Inflation dropped on an annual basis to 2.6% from 2.7%; Gross operating profits contracted at a 4.5% rate, below the expected 4% contraction; Current account balance came in at AUD -9.862 bn, below expectations, following a 59% decrease in the trade balance from the last quarter, and a 4% decrease in the net primary income; Most notably, GDP grew at the expected 1.8% annual rate, albeit faster than the previous growth rate of 1.7%. The RBA decided to leave rates unchanged, but with a slightly hawkish tone. While growth is generally in line with the Bank's forecasts, it was also highlighted that the appreciating exchange rate and low wages remain headwinds for inflation. A brighter housing market was noted as house price increases are slowing down, owing to macroprudential measures. While the Bank sees an improving labor market, we remain skeptical as the underemployment rate has not improved, which is limiting wage growth. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Surprisingly, in spite of the weakness of the U.S. dollar, the kiwi has been falling for the past month. This has been in part due to some weak data coming out of New Zealand: Building permits continued their decline, with a Month-on-Month decline in July of 0.7%. Both the ANZ Activity Outlook and the Business Confidence indicators declines in August relative to July. The New Zealand terms of trade Index underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.5%. Additionally July's number was revised down from 5.1% to 3.9%. The recent weakness in the NZD might be indicative of some weakness permeating from EM, given that the New Zealand economy is highly sensitive to the global economy. If an EM selloff materializes we expect significant downside for the NZD particularly against the yen. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data has been quite strong out of the Canadian economy recently: The current account deficit was better than expected at CAD -16.32 bn, with the merchandise trade balance also improving; Manufacturing PMI came in at 51.7, beating the expected 51.3; GDP growth came in at an astonishing 4.5% annualized rate; Accordingly, the BoC raised the overnight rate to 1%. Markets were expecting hawkish remarks, but not a hike. The CAD rallied more than 1% against USD on the news, and outperformed all other G10 currencies. Current expectations for a December hike are at 68%, and we agree. The CAD will see further strength against all G10 currencies except USD by the end of the year. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Gross Domestic Product yearly growth came in at 0.3%, underperforming expectations and deaccelerating from a month ago. Headline inflation came in line with expectations at 0.5%, it also increase from the previous month reading of 0.3%. Real retails sales underperformed expectations, contracting by 0.7% on a YoY basis. However the SVME PMI outperformed and increased from the July reading, coming in at 61.2. After reaching 1.15 in early August, EUR/CHF has stabilized around to 1.135. Overall the Swiss economy is still too weak for the SNB to change their stance on currency intervention. Core Inflation will have to pick up to at least 1% for the SNB to consider a change in stance and let go of the implied floor in EUR/CHF. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: Retails sales monthly growth came in at 0.4%, recovering from last month negative reading ad outperforming expectations. Manufacturing output growth also outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.5%. Finally registered unemployment came in at 2.7%, declining from last month reading and coming in line with expectations. USD/NOK has continued to go down as rate expectations for the U.S. have decreased and oil prices have increased thanks to the refining shut-downs in Texas due to hurricane Harvey. We expect this trend to reverse once rate expectations in the U.S. start to go up. However, we do expect more downside in EUR/NOK as this cross is much more sensitive to oil prices. Report Links: 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data was largely downbeat: Retail sales are growing at a 3.7% annual rate, in line with expectations; The Swedish trade balance went into a deficit in July of SEK -0.5 bn from a SEK 5.4 bn surplus in June; Consumer confidence decreased to 100.3 from 102.2 and below the expected 103; Manufacturing PMI also disappointed at 54.7, below the expected 60; Swedish IP is growing at a still high 5.3% annual pace, but less than the previous 8.9% rate; While this data was somewhat weak, Swedish inflation is at or above its target across all measures. The Riksbank left its repo rate unchanged at -0.5%. In its press release, the Bank highlighted high growth and inflation but stated that the rate will not be increased until the middle of 2018. It also increased inflation forecasts, with CPI and CPIF predicted at 2.9% and 2.1% by 2019. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Highlights The ECB can talk down the euro, but not by much. The central bank has previously expressed comfort with EUR/USD at 1.15. The cyclical and structural direction of EUR/USD is higher... ...because the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread should ultimately compress to -40 bps from today's -130 bps. Remain neutral in Germany's DAX and underweight Sweden's OMX. Equity markets with a strong base currency and a large exposure to exporters will come under pressure. Overweight German consumer services equities versus German exporters and the DAX. Underweight U.K. consumer services equities versus the FTSE100. Feature When mariners know that a sea-change is coming, their concern is not whether it comes today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The big issue is the sea-change itself - because it brings major implications for navigating the seas. In the same way, when currency markets know that a sea-change in monetary policy is coming, their concern is not whether the policy announcement comes on September 7, October 26 or December 141 - or indeed whether the sea-change will happen suddenly or gradually. At a sea-change, currency markets look much further ahead. Just as for mariners, the big issue is the sea-change itself. EUR/USD is now moving in lockstep with the expected differential between euro area and U.S. policy interest rates not next year, nor the year after next, but rather the differential five years out (Chart I-2). Chart I-1AA Strong Euro Is Good For ##br##German Consumer Services... A Strong Euro Is Good For German Consumer Services... A Strong Euro Is Good For German Consumer Services... Chart I-1B...A Weak Pound Is Bad For##br## U.K. Consumer Services ...A Weak Pound Is Bad For U.K. Consumer Services ...A Weak Pound Is Bad For U.K. Consumer Services Chart I-2EUR/USD Is Moving In Line With The Interest ##br##Rate Differential Expected In 2022 EUR/USD Is Moving In Line With The Interest Rate Differential Expected In 2022 EUR/USD Is Moving In Line With The Interest Rate Differential Expected In 2022 The ECB Can Talk Down The Euro, But Not By Much Chart I-3EUR/USD Might Find Support At 1.15 EUR/USD Might Find Support At 1.15 EUR/USD Might Find Support At 1.15 Therefore, if the ECB really wants to unwind the euro's sharp appreciation this year, the central bank must tell the market that the expectation for a sea-change is completely wrong. In other words, the ECB must indicate that it has no intention to dial back its emergency monetary accommodation. Such a volte-face is unlikely, for two reasons. First, the ECB likes to adjust market expectations incrementally rather than violently. The last policy meeting made the case "for proceeding gradually and prudently when approaching adjustments in the monetary policy stance and communication." Second, not to dial-back its emergency monetary accommodation flies in the face of a euro area economic expansion that is solid, broad, and among the strongest and best-established among major developed economies. "Postponing an adjustment for too long could give rise to a misalignment between the Governing Council's communication and its assessment of the state of the economy, which could (eventually) trigger more pronounced volatility in financial markets." Nevertheless, at the margin, dovish words from Draghi could pare back the euro. How much? Consider that at the last policy meeting EUR/USD stood at 1.15 and the ECB justified this level on the basis of the improved "relative fundamentals in the euro area vis-à-vis the rest of the world." (Chart I-3) Given that these relative fundamentals are still intact, 1.15 might provide a level of support in a technical retracement. Of course, EUR/USD also depends on the Federal Reserve and expectations for its policy rate five years out. EUR/USD would sink if the market became much more hawkish about where it sees the U.S. 'terminal' interest rate. However, for the terminal rate expectation to rise suddenly and sharply in the U.S. relative to the euro area would also fly in the face of the economic data on both sides of the Atlantic. Recently, there has been little difference in either economic growth or inflation rates. The 'Neutral' Real Interest Rates In The Euro Area And U.S. Are The Same More fundamentally, there is little difference in the so-called 'neutral' (or mid-cycle) real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. Through the 19 years of the euro's life, the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread has averaged -40 bps2 (Chart I-4). Over this same period, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -40 bps (Chart I-5). Ergo, the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. Meaning, the neutral real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been exactly the same. Chart I-4Euro-U.S.: Average Interest ##br##Differential = -40bps Euro-U.S.: Average Interest Differential = -40bps Euro-U.S.: Average Interest Differential = -40bps Chart I-5Euro Area-U.S.: ##br##Inflation Differential = -40bps Euro Area-U.S.: Inflation Differential = -40bps Euro Area-U.S.: Inflation Differential = -40bps Bear in mind that the 19 year life of the euro captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. Hence, 1999-2017 is a good representation of what the future holds, at least in relative terms if not in absolute terms. With little difference in the neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there any reason to expect a big difference in the future? Our starting assumption has to be no. Chart I-6If Composition Differences Were Removed, ##br##Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Would Be Near-Identical If Composition Differences Were Removed, Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Would Be Near-Identical If Composition Differences Were Removed, Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Would Be Near-Identical In fact, even the -40 bps annual inflation shortfall in the euro area is due to a compositional difference in the consumer price baskets. The euro area does not include owner occupied housing costs, whereas the U.S. does at a hefty weighting.3 If this compositional difference were removed, inflation would also be near-identical (Chart I-6). Still, each central bank must target inflation as it is defined in its respective jurisdiction, so let's assume the annual inflation differential continues to average -40 bps. In this case, the long bond yield spread should also ultimately compress to -40 bps from today's -130 bps. The biggest risk to this view is if the existential threat to the euro resurfaced. Looking at the political calendar, the German Federal Election on September 24 poses no such threat. Meanwhile, ahead of the Italian general election to be held no later than May 20 2018, even the non-establishment Five Star Movement and Northern League are toning down their anti-euro rhetoric. As my colleague Marko Papic, our Chief Geopolitical Strategist, puts it: "euro area politics are a red herring." On this basis, our central expectation is that the euro area versus U.S. yield spread has the scope to compress much further from its current -130 bps. This means that after a possible near-term retracement, we expect the cyclical and the structural rally in the euro to resume. German Consumers Are Winners, U.K. Consumers Are Losers When European currencies strengthen, the big winners are European consumers because they become richer in terms of the goods and services they can buy in international markets. This is significant because Europe imports its food and energy in large (and inelastic) volumes. Hence, their price decline in local currency terms significantly boosts the real spending power of consumers. And vice-versa (Chart I-7). As if to prove the point, German consumer services equities have rallied strongly this year (Chart I-8). And their outperformance has closely tracked euro strength (Chart of the Week, left panel). Across the English Channel, it is the mirror-image story. The pound has slumped. And the big losers are U.K. consumers, whose real spending power is evaporating as food and energy prices - in pound terms - rise. Again, to prove the point, U.K. consumer services equities have struggled to make any headway this year (Chart I-9). And their underperformance has closely tracked the trade-weighted pound's weakness (Chart of the Week, right panel). Chart I-7German Consumption Accelerating,##br## U.K. Consumption Decelerating German Consumption Accelerating, U.K. Consumption Decelerating German Consumption Accelerating, U.K. Consumption Decelerating Chart I-8German Consumer Services ##br##Have Rallied German Consumer Services Have Rallied German Consumer Services Have Rallied Chart I-9U.K. Consumer Services ##br##Have Struggled U.K. Consumer Services Have Struggled U.K. Consumer Services Have Struggled If the euro has more cyclical and structural upside - as we anticipate - then these equity performance trends have further to run. Chart I-10The Exporter Heavy DAX And##br## OMX Have Struggled The Exporter Heavy DAX and OMX Have Struggled The Exporter Heavy DAX and OMX Have Struggled Remain overweight German consumer services equities versus German exporters and the DAX. And remain underweight U.K. consumer services equities versus the FTSE100. At the same time, equity markets with a strong base currency and a large exposure to exporters will come under pressure. Mostly, this is because the translation of multi-currency international earnings into a strengthening base currency hurts index profits. For the time being, this influences our allocation to Germany's DAX - in which we have been neutral relative to the Eurostoxx600 - and Sweden's OMX - in which we have been underweight (Chart I-10). Next week, we will update our overall European country allocation. Given the large sector skews in European equity indexes, this country allocation is heavily dependent on the stance towards Healthcare and Banks. Hence, we await any incremental communication from the ECB. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 These are the dates of the ECB's three remaining monetary policy meetings in 2017. 2 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. 3 The imputed cost of owner occupied housing (owners' equivalent rent of residences) comprises 25% of the U.S. consumer price basket but 0% of the euro area consumer price basket. Fractal Trading Model Basic materials equities are technically overbought. Initiate a short position relative to the broad market with a profit target / stop loss at 2.5%. In other trades, long Mediaset Espana / short IBEX35 hit its stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Short Basic Materials Vs. Market Short Basic Materials Vs. Market The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Even isolated North Korean attacks are unlikely to lead to a full-scale war; The USD sell-off will start to reverse once Trump makes Gary Cohn his official pick for Fed chairman; Europe is not a risk for investors ... even Italy is only a longer-term risk; France is reforming; stay long French industrials versus German. Feature Last week, in London, we were scheduled to give a talk on Sino-American tensions, East Asian geopolitical risks, and North Korea specifically. We submitted our topic of choice about a month ahead of the event, when tensions between Pyongyang and Washington were at their height. As tensions temporarily subsided following Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un's decision to delay the planned missile launch towards Guam, several colleagues wondered if the topic was still a pertinent one. We stressed in our research that tensions would not dissipate and would continue to be market-relevant, if not critical for S&P 500.1 Unfortunately, we have been proven right. Forecasting geopolitics requires insight, multi-disciplinary methodology, and a treasure trove of empirical knowledge. But sometimes it also just comes down to using Google and looking at a calendar. For example, given the present context of heightened tensions, the annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises - Key Resolve, which occurs normally in the spring, and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, which occurs in August - are obvious dates to monitor. They are provocations that North Korea has to respond to for both foreign and domestic audiences. Pyongyang has chosen to do so by firing an ICBM across Japan and testing a sixth nuclear device, allegedly a miniaturized hydrogen bomb. While both these actions qualitatively expand on previous acts (missile and nuclear tests), neither cross a threshold. We are still in the realm of "territorial threat display." President Trump and Supreme Leader Kim are angling their "swords," but have not dared to cross them yet. Nonetheless, our clients have pointed out that our "arch of diplomacy" approach leaves a lot to imagination. Therefore, the first insight from the road of this week is that we need to put our thinking cap on and imagine a scenario where tensions do blow over into open conflict. How do we imagine such a scenario occurring and why would it not devolve into full out war that forces the U.S. to attack the North Korean mainland? Is North Korea About To Become A Praying Mantis? We can imagine a scenario where North Korea commits an act that takes us beyond the nuanced thresholds set by recent history (Chart 1). For example, we have cited to clients that an attack against international shipping in the Yellow Sea or Sea of Japan by North Korean submarines would be an unprecedented act that the U.S. and Japan would likely retaliate against.2 We could see the U.S. following the script from 1988 Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf - the largest surface engagement by the U.S. Navy since the Second World War - when the U.S. sunk half of Iran's navy in retaliation for the mining of the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts. In the case of North Korea, this would primarily mean taking out its approximately 20 Romeo-class submarines and an unknown number of domestically-produced - Yugoslav-designed - newly built submarines.3 Chart 1North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long Such an increase in tensions is not our baseline case, but we assign much higher probability to it than to an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula (which we still see as highly unlikely). How would the markets react to the sinking of North Korean submarines? How would Pyongyang react? The answer to the former (market's reaction) depends on the answer to the latter (what does Pyongyang do?). Our best guess is that Pyongyang would do nothing. In fact, we may never know that North Korean submarines were sunk. We would suspect that North Korean military strategists would chalk the subs as a loss and quietly move on to more missile tests. Leadership in Pyongyang is massively constrained by its quantifiable military inferiority. This part requires a bit of "order-of-battle" analysis, so bear with us for a few paragraphs. North Korea has around 6 million military personnel, about 25% of the total North Korean population, ready to fight. Which would be great if it were preparing to charge Verdun in WWI. Unfortunately for Pyongyang, it is arrayed against one of the most sophisticated defenses ever constructed by man. To burst through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), its mammoth ground forces would have at their disposal about 2000 T-55s (designed in the 1950s) and an unknown number of T-72s (designed in the 1970s). The former are obsolete, but the latter are solid main battle tanks that could do damage ... that is, in a world where war was not airborne. The problem is that North Korea would lose air superiority within hours of any serious engagement leaving its tanks and ground troops vulnerable to death-from-above. Since North Korean troops would have to enter about 20 miles into South Korea to threaten Seoul with occupation, they would have to exit the range of most of their air defenses. Choosing to turn on the most powerful of their systems - such as the KN-06 with a 150km range - would leave them vulnerable to the U.S. AGM-88 HARM missiles that sniff out active radar antenna or transmitters. To protect its invading forces, North Korea would have at its disposal only about 20-30 Mig-29s. Countering two dozen jets would be South Korea's combined 177 F-15 and F-16s, plus American forces that would vary in size depending how many aircraft carriers were deployed in the vicinity and whether U.S. forces in Japan were deployed to counter the attack. Given that a single American aircraft carrier holds up to 48 fighter jets, North Koreans would likely quickly find themselves fighting a losing battle. Once the North Korean fighter jets were destroyed, the South Korean air force would turn the invasion into a massacre. The reality is that North Korea's ground forces are just for show. Its tanks and fighter jets will never see battle. North Korea really only has two gears: P & N. The first is for "Provocation" and the second is for "Nuclear Armageddon." This is why we highly doubt that we will see our Praying Mantis scenario play out, or lead to full-scale war if it does. North Korea is constrained by its technological inferiority. It does not have the ability to conduct war across a full spectrum of engagement. Neither did Iran in 1988, which is why it never retaliated for the loss of its navy, put all its revolutionary zeal and chest-thumping aside, and sued the U.S. at the International Court of Justice instead.4 The U.S. has a range of limited military engagements, particularly at sea, that could hurt Pyongyang's ability to project what little power it has. Given our constraint-based methodology, which requires one to have some understanding of military affairs, we have a fairly high conviction view that North Korea will continue to toe-the-line of the expected and thus accepted provocations along the lines of the history surveyed in Chart 1. Going beyond that list would threaten to expose the paucity of North Korea's military capabilities. Bottom Line: We are still in for a wild ride with North Korea. As we expected, regional safe haven assets continue to perform well. We will hold on to our safe haven basket of Swiss bonds and gold, up 2.6% since August 16. Nonetheless, we expect North Korea to steer clear of provoking a war. Gary Cohn Will Collapse The USD! (But What If He Already Did?) Several fast-money clients - both in the U.S. and Asia - have a theory for why the greenback continues to suffer: Gary Cohn. The theory goes that Cohn is an ultra-dove whose job as the next Fed Chair will be to stay "behind the curve" and drive down the USD. This would accomplish President Trump's lofty nominal GDP growth goals despite legislative hurdles to his fiscal policy. It would also keep risk assets well bid and help begin rebalancing the U.S. trade deficit. What do we know of Mr. Cohn's views on monetary policy? Not much: He defended the Trump administration goal of a 3% GDP growth target, suggesting that he has a far more optimistic view of U.S. growth than the current Fed projection;5 He believes that monetary policy is "globalized," intoning at a conference in Florida quickly after the election that the Fed policy of raising rates before the rest of the world is ready to do the same would be a mistake;6 In a January 2016 Bloomberg TV interview, he said that both the U.S. and Chinese currencies were overvalued and would both have to devalue.7 People who know and have worked with Gary Cohn (including one colleague at BCA!) speak highly of his pragmatism, work ethic, and focus. Most agree that he would likely be dove-ish, but there is not a single person we have spoken to who thinks that he will be Trump's puppet. As such, his disconnected statements largely say nothing about his potential style of leadership. His most ultra-dovish, USD-slaying comment comes from January 2016, with DXY 6.9% down since then (Chart 2). Mission Accomplished Mr. Cohn? The real reason for the USD slide, aside from a persistently disappointing inflation print, has been a realization by the market that President Trump's bark has no bite. On a slew of measures, President Trump's initial bravado has dissipated into flabby rhetoric. Chart 3 shows the initial surge in optimism regarding growth, tax reform, infrastructure spending, Mexico's comeuppance, and bi-partisanship (measured as support among independents). Each data point has not only fallen back to pre-election levels, but appears to have now been desensitized to any news that would have excited it in the past. For example, NAFTA negotiations are off to a poor start, President Trump continues to bash the trade deal, and yet the peso has rallied since Trump's inauguration! Chart 2Mission Accomplished, Mr. Cohn? Mission Accomplished, Mr. Cohn? Mission Accomplished, Mr. Cohn? Chart 3Trump's Bark Has No Bite? Trump's Bark Has No Bite? Trump's Bark Has No Bite? The Fed itself has lost faith in the president. The number of FOMC members who see upside risks to inflation and GDP growth, not unrelated to fiscal policy, has fallen after a brief surge after the election (Chart 4). Chart 4The Fed Also Doubts Trump Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World What chances are there for the White House and Congress to re-write the fiscal narrative over the final quarter of 2017? As we wrote last week, Hurricane Harvey will ensure that a debt ceiling breach and government shutdown are avoided. However, Congress is likely to spend September making one last attempt at Obamacare repeal and replace, thus largely wasting the month before returning to tax reform in earnest in the new fiscal year. We expect some form of tax legislation to take shape by the end of December. Will it be comprehensive tax reform? Unlikely. It will now almost certainly be merely a tax-cutting exercise, with some revenue offsets attached to it. With the Republicans in Congress now leading the tax reform effort, it is unlikely that the budget deficit hole will be as wide as President Trump would have wanted. The problem is that both Trump's July tax reform proposal and the House GOP August plan come short of revenue-neutrality by around $3-3.5 trillion (over the decade-long period) (Table 1). Given that such a massive increase in the deficit would be unacceptable to fiscal hawks (or Democrats) in the House, we would expect tax rates to be cut by a much more modest degree. Table 1By How Much Will Republican Tax Cuts Widen The Deficit? Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Table 1 gives a detailed survey of the preferences (Tax Cuts) and constraints (Revenue Offsets). It is difficult to see how all the constraints are overcome through the legislative process. This will force Republicans to modify their preferences on the scale of tax cuts. We would expect that a corporate tax cut from 35% to around 27-28% could be possible, along with a minimal middle-class tax cut. Anything beyond that would be overly complicated. Therein lies the paradox for Chair Cohn. The only way that he can be "behind the curve" is if the curve gets "in front of him." But why would it if any coming tax legislation has very little stimulative effect on the economy? Currently, the expected change in the Fed Funds Rate over the next two years stands at a measly 40 bps (Chart 5). That is just barely two rate hikes until September 2019. How can Mr. Cohn get the expectations any lower at this point? Bottom Line: The appointment of Gary Cohn will be a classic "sell the (USD on the) rumor, buy (the USD) on the news." We expect his appointment in late November or early December, if President Trump goes by the lead time from the past two nominations (Chart 6). That may be the time to pare back USD shorts for those investors who have been bearish on the greenback. Chart 5Hard To Drive Expectations##BR##Lower For Rate Hikes Hard To Drive Expectations Lower For Rate Hikes Hard To Drive Expectations Lower For Rate Hikes Chart 6How Long Does It Take To##BR##Confirm The Fed Chair? Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Europe Is Not A Risk Chart 7Europe's Economy Zooming Along Europe's Economy Zooming Along Europe's Economy Zooming Along One clear insight from our five weeks on the road this summer is that Europe is no longer on anyone's radar. We had hardly any questions regarding the upcoming German or Italian elections. And while most investors were somewhat pessimistic regarding French structural reforms, none expressed any interest in betting against them either. The obvious reason is that Europe's economy has genuinely recovered (Chart 7). Consumer and business confidence are holding up while the manufacturing PMI and industrial production remain strong. That said, uniformity of view among clients across several geographies makes us nervous. On the future of the Euro Area, investors have swung wildly from morose to resigned that it is here to stay. Nonetheless, we generally agree with the consensus. Unlike at the beginning of this year, when we boldly claimed that European risks would turn out to be a "trophy red herring," we have no alpha to generate by disagreeing with the market.8 Here is why: German Election: We have a policy of not wasting our client's time by covering major geopolitical events that have no market-relevance. Germany is the world's fourth-largest economy and it will hold an election on September 24. However, we see no investment relevance in the election and therefore no reason to spend time covering it. Polls show that the center-left opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) has arrested its decline and may force another Grand Coalition (Chart 8). The only moderately interesting question is whether Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will be able to get its favored coalition ally, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), into government instead. The FDP has turned towards soft Euroskepticism since 2009. Its parliamentarians voted against several bills dealing with the Euro Area crisis during their 2009-2013 coalition with the CDU. That said, Chancellor Merkel has turned much more forcefully pro-Europe since the dark days of Greek bailouts and bond market rioting. The Chancellor can read the polls: Germans support the common currency at 81%, compared to 66% average between 2009-2013 (Chart 9). We expect the FDP to play along with the Europhile conversion by the CDU. Chart 8Another Grand Coalition? Another Grand Coalition? Another Grand Coalition? Chart 9Merkel Knows Germans Support The Euro Merkel Knows Germans Support The Euro Merkel Knows Germans Support The Euro If there is any significance to the calm ahead of the German election, it is that the country is at "peak normal." Its policymakers have dealt with a massive migration crisis, geopolitical crises to the East, terrorist attacks, and severe political and economic stresses in its sphere of influence, all with a near-complete absence of internal drama. This looks like either "as good as it gets," or the start of a new Golden Age in Europe, with Berlin in the lead. It is probably neither, but given European asset prices, and gearing to the growing global economy, we would remain overweight Euro Area equities going forward. Italian Election: Polls remain too-close-to-call in the upcoming Italian election, with Euroskeptic parties continuing to poll well (Chart 10). However, we are not sure one can truly call these parties Euroskeptic anymore. Despite a high level of Euroskeptic sentiment in the country (Chart 11), its Euroskeptic parties have been scared off by the failures of peers in Austria, the Netherlands, and France. Chart 10Italy: Euroskeptic Parties Poll Well... Italy: Euroskeptic Parties Poll Well... Italy: Euroskeptic Parties Poll Well... Chart 11...Reflecting Broader Euroskepticism ...Reflecting Broader Euroskepticism ...Reflecting Broader Euroskepticism Luigi Di Maio, leader of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing, populist Lega Nord, both reversed positions on the euro this month. Di Maio will be 5SM candidate for prime minister in the upcoming elections - which must be held by May and will likely take place in February or March. He reiterated a position, which 5SM hinted at in the past, that leaving the Euro Area would only be the "last resort" if Brussels refused to relax strict budget rules. Meanwhile, the firebrand, populist, Salvini hid behind Italy's constitution, claiming that a referendum on the euro would be illegal. In the short term, this means that the election in 2018 is no longer a risk. In the long term, it does not change the fact that Italy is ripe for a bout of Euroskeptic crisis at some later stage. Migration Crisis: Bad news for right-wing populists everywhere: the migration crisis is over and in quite a dramatic fashion. This is an empirical fact (Chart 12). Europe's enforcement efforts and collaboration with Libyan authorities (such as they are) have now forced even the humanitarian agencies to abandon the Mediterranean route. One of the largest such agencies - the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) - recently announced that it was packing its mothership, the Phoenix, for Myanmar. The group is the fourth to stop patrols for migrants. Medecins sans Frontieres, Save the Children, and Germany's Sea Eye all cited hostile actions taken by Libyan authorities towards their vessels as the main reason to stop rescuing migrants in Libyan waters. Chart 12The 'Migration Crisis' Is Definitively Over The 'Migration Crisis' Is Definitively Over The 'Migration Crisis' Is Definitively Over To be clear, what is happening in the Mediterranean is a result of European enforcement efforts, not any sudden awakening of Libyan capacity or sovereignty. The European Union and Italy are training and funding the Libyan Coast Guard, which has started to intercept humanitarian vessels, threaten them with force (often right in front of the Italian Navy!), and force them to return migrants to Libya, where they are subjected to extremely cruel internment. Prior to this development, human smugglers would launch barely seaworthy "crafts" towards humanitarian ships waiting literally yards away in Libyan waters to "rescue" the "migrants" to Europe. As such, humanitarian agencies were aiding and abetting human smuggling, by making it a lucrative enterprise with no downside risk for the smugglers. We expect the step-up in enforcement in Libyan waters to severely impair the cost-benefit calculus of attempting a Mediterranean crossing for a would-be migrant. Instead of a welcoming NGO vessel many will find themselves in Libyan Internment camps. Word will spread fast and the migration crisis will abate further. We have now come full circle on the migration crisis, which we predicted back in September 2015 would end precisely in such an illiberal fashion.9 Europe has a vicious streak ... who knew? Structural Reforms In France: In February, we penned a bullish report on France, arguing with high conviction that Marine Le Pen would lose and that structural reforms would follow.10 What is the status of the latter forecast? Despite a decline in President Emmanuel Macron's popularity (Chart 13), he is expending his political capital early in his term. He understands our "J-curve of Structural Reform" (Diagram 1). Policymakers who understand how the reform J-curve works know that they have to spend their political capital while they have it, at the beginning of their term, in order to reap the benefits, if there are any, while they are still in power. Chart 13Macron's Popularity Slips Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Diagram 1The J-Curve Of Structural Reform Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World How do Macron's reforms compare with previous efforts? Generally speaking, Macron's reforms (Table 2) compare favorably with both the 2012 Mariano Rajoy reforms in Spain and the 2003 Hartz reforms in Germany. The Hartz reforms were instrumental in expanding temporary work contracts and restructured generous unemployment benefits. Similarly, the Rajoy reforms in Spain clarified economic grounds for dismissal and created more flexible "entrepreneur contracts." Macron's reforms fit these efforts, especially the proposals to put in place "project contracts" - an open-ended contract lasting for the duration of a project - and to establish a floor and a ceiling for allowances in cases of unfair terminations, and make termination for economic reasons easier. Table 2French Labor Reforms: The Key Bits Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World The two criticisms of the reform efforts we most often hear are that France has not had a crisis to spur reforms and that unions will launch vicious protests. The first criticism is dubious, given that France is itself emerging from the low-growth doldrums of the post-Great Financial Crisis. It is simply false to say that France has had no crisis. The French public is acutely aware that its real per-capita GDP growth has been closer to Greek levels than German ones over the last two decades (Chart 14) and that it has lost competitiveness in the global marketplace (Chart 15). One cannot have a conversation with a French friend, colleague, or client without wanting to order a strong drink!11 Chart 14France's Lost Millennium Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Chart 15France's Lost Competitiveness France's Lost Competitiveness France's Lost Competitiveness Besides, what monumental crisis was it that propelled Germany into reforms in the early 2000s? A vicious recession? A massive bank crisis? It was neither. Germany was simply weighed down for a decade by fiscal transfers to East Germany and sensing that its export-oriented industry was facing a massive challenge from the Asian move up the value chain. It was this acute sense of competitive pressure, of falling behind, that spurred Germany to reform. With France, the acute sense of falling behind Germany (Chart 16) is at the heart of today's effort. Chart 16German Competition Puts A Fire Under France German Competition Puts A Fire Under France German Competition Puts A Fire Under France The second criticism, that the unions will hold protests, misjudges the political capital arrayed behind Macron. Despite his sagging popularity, 85.9% of the seats in the National Assembly are of pro-reform orientation (Diagram 2). The second-largest party in the parliament is Les Republicains, an even more zealously pro-reform group. This is a unique situation in French history and will allow the government to ignore protests on the street. Diagram 2The Balance Of Power In France's National Assembly Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World In fact, two of the largest unions in France - Force Ouvrière and CFDT - have both said they would not protest the labor reforms. This leaves only the more militant CGT to protest, along with the left-wing presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The reason investors will still fret about protests this month is because CGT retains a strong representation in heavy industry and infrastructure sectors like energy and railways. As such, their industrial action could grind the country to a halt. We suspect that a repeat of the 1995 general strike or the 2010 French pension reform unrest - both of which CGT spearheaded - will be the final nail in the coffin of "Old France." Unlike those previous reform efforts, President Macron's effort has been clearly signaled ahead of the election and thus retains considerable democratic legitimacy. As such, any repeat of the 1995 or especially 2010 unrest would delegitimize the unions and give President Macron even more political capital. Bottom Line: We agree with the now conventional view that all is well in Europe. Stability ahead of the German election reminds investors of what a healthy country is supposed to look like. Italian election risks have dissipated. And our French structural reforms call remains on track. This gives us an opportunity to do some house-cleaning regarding our calls. First, we are closing our long French 10-year bond / short Italian 10-year bond trade for a gain of only 1 bps. Second, we are closing our overweight Euro Area equities relative to U.S. equities call for a gain of 7.88%. Given our euro-bullishness, we never recommended that this call be currency hedged. We are now reinstating it with a currency hedge. We are also closing our long German 10-Year CPI Swap for a gain of 45.5 bps. We will stick with our long French industrial equities / short German industrials, which is currently up 9.25%. This is a way we have chosen to articulate our bullish view on the reforms, although clients with greater sophistication in European sectors could come up with a more direct way to articulate the view. Separately, we are also booking profits on our long China volatility trade (CBOE China ETF Volatility Index) for a gain of 16.82%. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 A North Korean submarine sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010, but that was still within the norm of behavior for the two countries that are still effectively at war and have contested maritime borders. 3 Romeo-class submarines are nearly 70 years old. As much as we harken back to Yugoslav engineering with pride at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy, Belgrade was never much of a naval power. Nonetheless, diesel-powered submarines are quite proficient in staying undetected and could present a problem for the U.S. Navy. At least until they had to resurface or get back to base, where nuclear-powered U.S. Virginia-class attack-subs would lie in wait for them. 4 Tehran won the court case in 2003! And the ICJ forced the U.S. to compensate Iran for its lost ships or else face invasion by the United Nations army. (We are just kidding obviously. Iran did win, but it got nothing.) Please see Pieter H.F. Bekker, "The World Court Finds that U.S. Attacks on Iranian Oil Platforms in 1987-1988 Were Not Justifiable as Self-Defense, but the United States Did Not Violate the Applicable Treaty with Iran," American Society of International Law Volume 8, Issue 25, dated November 11, 2003, available at: asil.org. 5 Please see CNBC, "Tax reform is coming in September, Trump economic advisor Gary Cohn says," dated June 29, 2017, available at cnbc.com. 6 Please see Wall Street Journal, "How Donald Trump's New Top Economic Adviser Views the World," dated December 14, 2016, available at wjs.com. 7 Please see Business Insider, "Trump and his top economic adviser have had completely different views on China," dated January 3, 2017, available at businessinsider.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Great Migration - Europe, Refugees, And Investment Implications," dated September 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Thankfully for France, the choice would still be French wine!

Feature Dear Client, In addition to this abbreviated Weekly Report, I am sending you a Special Report written by Mark McClellan, Managing Editor of the monthly Bank Credit Analyst. Mark makes a compelling case that the deflationary effects of the "Amazon economy" are overstated. I trust you will find his report very informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy Chart 1September Is Generally ##br##Not A Good Time Of Year For Stocks Sticking With Bullish ... For Now Sticking With Bullish ... For Now My colleagues and I convened a meeting earlier this week to discuss whether to abandon our long-standing cyclically bullish view towards risk assets. Several of them felt it was time to turn more cautious. I am sympathetic to their concerns: Valuations are stretched, volatility is low, and geopolitical risks (most notably North Korea) are on the rise. Profit growth is likely to decelerate later this year, as the easy comps stemming from the depressed level of earnings in the first half of 2016 vanish. Meanwhile, stocks are entering the volatile early autumn months, a period which has historically seen poor returns (Chart 1). Nevertheless, at times like these, it is useful to fall back on our time-tested indicators. Bear markets have almost always coincided with economic recessions, with the latter usually causing the former (Chart 2). None of our recession-timing signals are flashing red: To cite just a few examples, ISM manufacturing new orders are strong, initial unemployment claims are low, core capital goods orders are accelerating, and the yield curve is not in any immediate risk of inverting (Chart 3). Chart 2Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Chart 3No Warnings Of Recession Here No Warnings Of Recession Here No Warnings Of Recession Here U.S. financial conditions have eased sharply this year, which should support growth over the next few quarters (Chart 4). A recent IMF report highlighted that easier U.S. financial conditions tend to generate positive spillovers onto other countries.1 The fact that all 45 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year - the first time this has happened since 2007 - is a testament to the strong fundamentals underpinning the global economy. Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions Bode Well For Growth Easing Financial Conditions Bode Well For Growth The Fed's Dot Problem In this light, the Fed's projection that the unemployment rate will end this year at 4.3% and only fall to 4.2% by end-2018 no longer looks credible. If U.S. GDP growth remains above trend, as we expect, the unemployment rate could fall below its 2000 low of 3.8% by next summer. That will be enough to prompt investors to price in a few more rate hikes. Considering that the market expects just 22 basis points in hikes through to end-2018, this is not a high bar to clear. A bit more fiscal stimulus would add to the pressure to tighten monetary policy. While any meaningful progress on tax reform will be difficult to achieve, the odds are good that Congress will agree to cut statutory corporate and personal tax rates, with the latter focusing mainly on middle-income earners. Failure to raise the debt ceiling or extend federal spending authority beyond the current budget window could scuttle the benefits from lower tax rates. Fortunately, the risks of such an outcome have receded. If there is a silver lining from Hurricane Harvey, it is that the disaster could at least temporarily overcome the political impasse in Washington. Congress will need to appropriate additional disaster relief funds over the coming weeks. Politicians who are seen as creating roadblocks to such funding will face the electorate's wrath. The odds of an infrastructure bill passing through Congress have also risen. All recoveries eventually run out of steam, but this one can last at least until the second half of 2019, which will make it the longest U.S. expansion on record. As we discussed several weeks ago, the next recession is likely to be triggered by the Fed scrambling to hike rates in response to rising inflation.2 This is not an immediate concern, given that it usually takes a while for an overheated economy to generate inflation - especially since the U.S. currently can satisfy rising domestic demand with higher imports. However, the risks of overheating will increase as unemployment falls further and excess capacity elsewhere in the world is absorbed. Draghi After Jackson Hole Chart 5A Stronger Euro Is Deflationary A Stronger Euro Is Deflationary A Stronger Euro Is Deflationary Textbook economic theory states that a shift in consumption towards imported goods requires a real appreciation of the currency. The dollar, of course, has done exactly the opposite of that, depreciating by 6.6% in trade-weighted terms since the start of the year. The euro, in particular, has gained significant ground against the greenback, rising above $1.20 at one point this week. Mario Draghi's failure to express concerns about the resurgent euro during his Jackson Hole address was construed by many market participants as a green light for further currency strength. We are skeptical of this "saying nothing means you are saying something" interpretation. Draghi wanted to acknowledge (and partly take credit for) the recovery across the euro area, but he is cognizant of the problems posed by a stronger euro. The ECB's June forecast showed inflation rising to only 1.6% in 2019. In the period since those forecasts were compiled, the trade-weighted euro has appreciated by 3.9%, bringing the year-to-date gain to 6.2% (Chart 5). ECB staff calculations, which Draghi has approvingly quoted, show that a 10% appreciation in the euro would reduce inflation by 0.2 percentage points in the first year and 0.6-to-0.8 points in the subsequent two years.3 Better-than-expected growth since the June forecasts will offset some of the deflationary impact from the stronger euro, but probably not by much, given that the Phillips curve is quite flat at high-to-moderate levels of spare capacity. With labor market slack across the euro area still 3.2 percentage points higher today than in 2008 (and 6.7 points higher outside of Germany), it will be a while before stronger growth generates markedly higher inflation. We expect the ECB to reduce its 2018/2019 inflation forecast by 0.1-to-0.2 percentage points next week. It would be awkward for the central bank to play up the prospect of monetary policy normalization while it is simultaneously trimming its inflation projections. This suggests that the ECB's communications could turn more dovish, thereby limiting further upside for the euro. EUR/USD is currently trading near the top of the $1.10-to-$1.20 range that we foresee lasting for the next 10 months. Thus, our expectation is that the euro will weaken over the next few months, ending the year near $1.15, and potentially moving back towards its 2017 lows in the second half of next year, as an overheated U.S. economy forces the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Getting The Policy Mix Right," IMF Global Financial Stability Report, (Chapter 3), (April 2017). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "From Slow Burn Recovery to Retro-Recession?" dated August 18, 2017. 3 Please see European Central Bank, "March 2017 ECB Staff Macroeconomic Projections For The Euro Area." APPENDIX 1 Tactical Global Asset Allocation Monthly Update To complement our analysis, we use a variety of time-tested models to assess the global investment outlook. At present, these models favor global equities over bonds over a three-month horizon (Appendix Table 1). Appendix Table 1BCA's Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations* Sticking With Bullish ... For Now Sticking With Bullish ... For Now Our business cycle equity indicators remain in bullish territory, as reflected in strong global growth and rising corporate earnings. Our monetary and financial indicators are also generally supportive. In contrast, our sentiment readings are sending mixed signals. On the one hand, implied equity volatility remains low and institutional exposure to stocks is quite high. On the other hand, surveys of retail investors show a healthy skepticism towards the bull market, which is a positive contrarian indicator. As has been the case for some time, our valuation measures are signaling that stocks are expensive, but these are typically useful only over horizons beyond one or two years. As we flagged last month, stocks tend to do poorly in August and September, which may hurt returns over the next few weeks. The stronger euro will negatively impact earnings in the euro area. This has caused our models to suggest a slight downgrade to European equities. However, we are inclined to fade this signal, given our expectation that the euro will give up some of its recent gains. Japanese stocks continue to score well on our metrics, buoyed by strengthening corporate profits and attractive valuations. Emerging market equities are fairly valued, although China still appears cheap. The rally in U.S. Treasurys has caused the gap between the 10-year yield and our model's fair value estimate to widen to around 50 basis points, the highest since last September. European and Japanese bonds also look somewhat overvalued, although the latter will continue to receive support from the BoJ's yield curve targeting operations. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 30th, 2017. The model has continued to reduce its allocation to the U.S. driven by worsening liquidity condition, and it's the second consecutive month that the U.S. allocation is the largest underweight. Australia is downgraded to neutral on concern of valuation. Germany and Netherland continued to receive more allocation and Canada's underweight is reduced as well, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 18 bps in August, entirely due to the 43 bps outperformance of Level 2 model where the overweight in Italy and Germany versus the underweight in Japan, Spain and Canada worked very well. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of August 30, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates Table 4Performance Since Going Live GAA Model Updates GAA Model Updates The model is optimistic on global growth and maintains in cyclical tilt. However, the magnitude of overweight in cyclical sectors has reduced on the back of momentum indicators. The biggest change has been utilities which has moved from a 2% underweight to a 1.7% overweight. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Feature Shrugging Off The Political Noise All the political noise of August (White House resignations, Charlottesville, North Korean missile launches, the looming U.S. debt ceiling) could do no more than trigger a minor market wobble: at the worst point, global equities were off only 2% from their all-time high. The reason is that global cyclical growth remains strong, earnings are accelerating, and central banks have no immediate need to turn hawkish. In such an environment, risk assets should continue to outperform over the next 12 months. The political risks will not disappear (and will no doubt produce further hair-raising moments), but they are unlikely to have a decisive impact on markets. BCA's geopolitical strategists think eventually there will be a diplomatic solution to the North Korean situation - albeit only after a significant further rise in tension forces the two sides to the negotiating table.1 It is hard to imagine the debt ceiling not being raised, since Republicans control both houses of Congress and the White House, and they would be blamed for any disruption caused by a failure to raise it. Recent personnel changes in the White House have left - for now - a more pragmatic "Goldman Sachs clique" in charge. We believe there is still a reasonable likelihood of tax cuts, not least since the Republicans are on track to lose a lot of seats in next year's mid-term elections unless they can boost the administration's popularity (Chart 1). Recent growth data has been decent. U.S. Q2 GDP growth was revised up to 3% QoQ annualized, and the regional Fed NowCasts point to 1.9-3.4% growth in Q3. If anything, growth momentum in the euro area (2.4% in Q2) and Japan (4%) is even better. Corporate earnings growth continues to accelerate too, with S&P 500 EPS growth in the second quarter coming in at 10% YoY, compared to a forecast of just 6% before the results season started. BCA's models suggest that, in all regions, earnings growth is likely to continue to accelerate for a couple more quarters (Chart 2). Chart 1Republicans Need A Popularity Boost Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Chart 2Earnings Continue To Accelerate Earnings Continue To Accelerate Earnings Continue To Accelerate The outlook for the dollar remains the key to asset allocation. The market currently assumes that the dollar will weaken further, as U.S. inflation stays low and the Fed, therefore, stays on hold. Futures markets currently price only a 38% probability of a Fed hike in December, and only 25 BP of hikes over the next 12 months. If markets are right, this scenario would be positive for emerging market equities and commodity currencies, and would mean that long-term rates would be likely to stay low, around current levels. But we think that assumption is wrong. Diffusion indexes for core inflation have begun to pick up (Chart 3). The tight labor market should start to push up wages, dollar deprecation is already coming through in the form of rising import prices, and some transitory factors (pre-election drugs price rises, for example) will fall out of the data soon. The Fed is clearly nervous that it has fallen behind the curve, especially since financial conditions have recently eased significantly (Chart 4). A moderate stabilization of inflation by December would be enough to push the Fed to hike again - and to reiterate its plan to raise rates three times next year. Chart 3Inflation To Pick Up? Inflation To Pick Up? Inflation To Pick Up? Chart 4Financial Condition: Easy In The U.S., Tight In Europe Financial Condition: Easy In The U.S., Tight In Europe Financial Condition: Easy In The U.S., Tight In Europe Meanwhile, long-term interest rates in developed economies look too low given growth prospects (Chart 5). As inflation picks up, the Fed talks more hawkishly, and the dollar begins to appreciate again, rates are likely to move up in the U.S. and in the euro zone. Our view, then, is that the Fed will tighten faster than the market expects, long-term rates will rise and the dollar will appreciate. Equities might wobble initially as they price in the tighter monetary policy but, as long as growth continues to be strong, should outperform bonds on a 12-month basis. Our scenario would be positive for euro zone and Japanese equities, but somewhat negative for EM equities. Equities: We prefer DM equities over EM. Emerging equities have been boosted over the past 12 months by the weaker dollar and Chinese reflation. With the dollar likely to appreciate (for the reasons argued above), and a slowdown in Chinese money supply growth pointing to slower growth in that economy (Chart 6), we think EM equities will struggle over coming quarters. Meanwhile, there is little sign that domestic growth momentum is improving in emerging economies (Chart 7). Within DM, our underlying preference is for euro zone and Japanese equities. Our quants model now points to an underweight for the U.S. We haven't implemented this yet because 1) of our view that the USD will strengthen, and 2) we prefer not to make too frequent changes to recommendations. We will review this in our next Quarterly. Chart 5Rates Lag Behind Global Growth Rates Lag Behind Global Growth Rates Lag Behind Global Growth Chart 6Slowing Chinese Money Growth Is A Risk For EM bca.gaa_mu_2017_09_01_c6 bca.gaa_mu_2017_09_01_c6 Chart 7EM Domestic Growth Anemic EM Domestic Growth Anemic EM Domestic Growth Anemic Text below Fixed Income: BCA's model of fair value for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (the model incorporates the Global Manufacturing PMI and USD bullish sentiment) points to 2.6%, almost 50 BP above the current level (Chart 8). We therefore expect G7 government bonds to produce a negative return over the next 12 months, as inflation expectations rise and monetary policy continues to "normalize". We still find some attraction in spread product, especially in the U.S. (Chart 9). While spreads are quite low compared to history, U.S. high-yield spreads remain 119 BP above historic lows, while euro area ones are only 65 BP above. Chart 8U.S. Rate Fair Value Is Around 2.6% U.S. Rate Fair Value Is Around 2.6% U.S. Rate Fair Value Is Around 2.6% Chart 9Credit Spreads Not At Record Lows Monthly Portfolio Update Monthly Portfolio Update Currencies: The euro has likely overshot. Long speculative positions are close to record levels (Chart 10) and the currency has returned to its Purchasing Power Parity level against the USD (Chart 11). An announcement of a "dovish" tapering of asset purchases by ECB President Draghi in September could persuade the market that the ECB will continue to be much more cautious about tightening than the Fed. The yen is also likely to weaken against the US dollar as global rates rise, since the BoJ will not change its yield curve control policy despite the better recent growth numbers, given how far inflation is still from its target. Chart 10There Are A Lot Of Euro Bulls There Are A Lot Of Euro Bulls There Are A Lot Of Euro Bulls Chart 11Euro Is No Longer Undervalued Euro Is No Longer Undervalued Euro Is No Longer Undervalued Commodities: Our forecast that a drawdown in crude inventories will push the WTI price back up is slowing coming about. U.S. crude inventories have fallen by 25.3 million barrels since the start of the year. The after-effects of Hurricane Harvey might affect the data for a while but, as long as global demand holds up, the crude oil price should rise further, with WTI moving over $55 a barrel by year-end. Metals prices have moved largely sideways year to date, and future movements depend mostly on the outlook for Chinese growth, which may begin to slow. In particular, the recent run-up in copper prices (which have risen by 20% since early June) seems unsustainable. The bullish sentiment was mostly due to short-term supply/demand imbalances caused by labor disruptions at some major mines. However, Chinese copper demand, especially for construction, is likely to weaken over coming months.2 Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market," dated 16 August 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Copper's Getting Out Ahead Of Fundamentals, Correction Likely," dated 24 August 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation

Highlights Financial markets have slipped into a 'risk off' phase. The upbeat second quarter earnings season in the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone was overwhelmed by a number of negative events. Equity bear markets are usually associated with recessions. On that score, we do not see any warning signs of an economic downturn. However, geopolitical risks are rising at a time when valuation measures suggest that risk assets are vulnerable. We do not see the debt ceiling or the failure of movement on U.S. tax reform as posing large risks for financial markets. However, trade protectionism and, especially, North Korea are major wildcards. We don't believe the tensions in the Korean peninsula will end the cyclical bull market in global equities. Nonetheless, investors should expect to be tested numerous times over the next year to 18 months. BCA Strategists debated trimming equity exposure to neutral. However, the majority felt that, while there will be near-term volatility, the main equity indexes are likely to be higher on a 6-12 month horizon. Riding out the volatility is a better approach than trying to time the short-term ups and downs. That said, it appears prudent to be well shy of max overweight positions and to hold some safe haven assets within diversified portfolios. On a positive note, we have upgraded our EPS growth forecasts, except in the Eurozone where currency strength will be a significant drag in the near term. The Fed faced a similar low inflation/tight labor market environment in 1999. Policymakers acted pre-emptively and began to tighten before inflation turned up. This time, the FOMC will want to see at least a small increase in inflation just to be sure. Wages may be a lagging indicator for inflation in this cycle. Watch a handful of other indicators we identify that led inflection points in inflation in previous long economic expansions. This year's euro strength is unlikely to delay the next installment of ECB tapering, which we expect in early in 2018. Investors seem to be taking an "I'll believe it when I see it" attitude toward the U.S. inflation outlook, which has led to very lopsided rate expectations. Keep duration short. Feature Chart I-1Trump Popularity Headwind For Tax Reform September 2017 September 2017 A 'risk off' flavor swept over financial markets in August. The upbeat second quarter earnings season in the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone was overwhelmed by a number of negative events, from President Trump's Charlottesville controversy to the never-ending staff changes in the White House to North Korean tensions to the Texas flood and the terror attack in Spain. Trump's popularity rating is steadily declining, even now among Republican voters (Chart I-1). This has raised concerns that none of his business-friendly policies, tax cuts or initiatives to boost growth will be successfully enacted. It is even possible that the debt ceiling will be used as a bargaining chip among the various Republican factions. The political risks are multiplying at a time when the equity and corporate bond markets are pricey. Valuation measures do not help with timing, but they do inform on the potential downside risk if things head south. At the moment, we do not see any single risk as justifying a full retreat into safe havens and a cut in risk asset allocation to neutral or below. Nonetheless, there is certainly a case to be cautious and hold some traditional safe haven assets. Timing The Next Equity Bear Market It is rare to have an equity bear market without a recession in the U.S. There have been plenty of market setbacks that did not quite meet the 20% bear-market threshold, but were nonetheless painful even in the absence of recession (Black Monday, LTCM crisis, U.S. debt ceiling showdown and euro crises). Unfortunately, these corrections are very difficult to predict. At least with recessions, investors have a fighting chance in timing the exit from risk exposure. The slope of the yield curve and the Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) are classic recession indicators, and for good reason (Chart I-2). Over the past 50 years they have both successfully called all seven recessions with just one false positive. We can eliminate the false positive signals by combining the two indicators and follow a rule that both must be in the red to herald a recession.1 Chart I-2The Traditional Recession Indicators Have Worked Well The Traditional Recession Indicators Have Worked Well The Traditional Recession Indicators Have Worked Well It will be almost impossible for the yield curve to invert until the fed funds rate is significantly higher than it is today. Thus, it may be the case that a negative reading on the LEI, together with a flattening (but not yet inverted) yield curve, will be a powerful signal that a recession is on the way. Neither of these two indicators are warning of a recession. Global PMIs are hovering at a level that is consistent with robust growth. The erosion in the Global ZEW and the drop in the diffusion index of the Global LEI are worrying signs, but at the moment are consistent with a growth slowdown at worst (Chart I-3). Financial conditions remain growth-friendly and subdued inflation is allowing central banks to proceed cautiously when tightening (in the case of the Fed and Bank of Canada) or tapering (ECB). As highlighted in last month's Overview, the global economy has entered a synchronized upturn that should persist for the next year. The U.S. will be the first major economy to enter the next recession, but that should not occur until 2019 or 2020, barring any shocks in the near term. That said, risk asset prices have been bid up sharply and are therefore vulnerable to a correction. Below, we discuss five key risks to the equity bull market. (1) Is All Lost For U.S. Tax Cuts? Our recent client meetings highlight that investors are skeptical that any fiscal stimulus or tax cuts will see the light of day in the U.S. Tax cuts and infrastructure spending appear to have been priced out of the equity market, according to the index ratios shown in Chart I-4. We still expect a modest package to eventually be passed, although time is running out for this year. Tax reform is a major component of Trump's and congressional Republicans' agenda. If it fails, Republicans will have to go to their home districts empty-handed to campaign for the November 2018 midterm elections. Chart I-3Some Worrying Signs On Growth Some Worrying Signs On Growth Some Worrying Signs On Growth Chart I-4Fiscal Stimulus Largely Priced Out Fiscal Stimulus Largely Priced Out Fiscal Stimulus Largely Priced Out One implication of Tropical Storm Harvey is that it might force Democrats and Republicans to cooperate on an infrastructure bill for rebuilding. Even a modest spending boost or tax reduction would be equity-market positive given that so little is currently discounted. The dollar should also receive a lift, especially given that the Fed might respond to any fiscally-driven growth impulse with higher interest rates. (2) Who Will Lead The Fed? There is a significant chance that either Yellen will refuse to stay on when her term expires next February or that Trump will appoint someone else anyway. In this case, we would expect the President to do everything he can to ensure that the Fed retains its dovish bias. This means that he is likely to favor a non-economist and a loyal adviser, like Gary Cohn, over any of the more traditional, and hawkish, Republican candidates. Cohn could not arrive at the Fed and change the course of monetary policy on day one. The FOMC votes on rate changes, but in reality decisions are formed by consensus (with one or two dissents). The only way Cohn could implement an abrupt change in policy is if the Administration stacks the Fed Governors with appointees that are prepared to "toe the line" (the Administration does not appoint Regional Fed Presidents). Stacking the Governorships would take time. Nonetheless, it is not clear why President Trump would take a heavy hand in monetary policy when the current FOMC has been very cautious in tightening policy. The bottom line is that we would not see Cohn's appointment to the Fed Chair as signaling a major shift in monetary policy one way or the other. (3) The Debt Ceiling A more immediate threat is the debt ceiling. Recent fights over Obamacare and tax reform have pit fiscally conservative Republicans against the moderates, and it is possible that the debt ceiling is used as a bargaining chip in this battle. While government shutdowns have occurred in the past, the debt ceiling has never been breached. At the end of the day, the debt ceiling will always be raised because no government could stand the popular pressure that would result from social security checks not being mailed out to seniors or a halt to other entitlement programs. Even the Freedom Caucus, the most fiscally conservative grouping in the House, is considerably divided on the issue. This augurs well for a clean bill to raise the debt ceiling as the Republican majority in the House is 22 and the Freedom Caucus has 31 members. Democrats will not stand in the way of passage in the Senate. The worst-case scenario for the market would be a two-week shutdown in the first half of October, just before the debt ceiling is hit. We would not expect a shutdown to have any lasting impact on the economy, although it could provide an excuse for the equity market to correct. That said, the risk of even a shutdown has been diminished by events in Houston. It would be very difficult and damaging politically to shut down the government during a humanitarian emergency. (4) Trade And Protectionism The removal of White House Chief Strategist Stephen Bannon signals a shift in power toward the Goldman clique within the Trump Administration. National Economic Council President Gary Cohn, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross are now firmly in charge of economic policy. The mainstream media has interpreted this shift within the Administration as reducing the risk of trade friction. We do not see it that way. President Trump still sounds hawkish on trade, particularly with respect to China. Our geopolitical experts point out that there are few constraints on the President to imposing trade sanctions on China or other countries. He could use such action to boost his popularity among his base heading into next year's midterm elections. On NAFTA, the Administration took a hard line as negotiations kicked off in August. This could be no more than a negotiating tactic. Our base case is that it will be some time before investors find out if negotiations are going off the rails. That said, the situation is volatile for both NAFTA and China, and we can't rule out a trade-related risk-off phase in financial markets over the next year. (5) North Korea North Korea's missile launch over Japan highlights that the tense situation is a long way from a resolution. The U.S. is unlikely to use military force to resolve the standoff. There are long-standing constraints to war, including the likelihood of a high death toll in Seoul. Moreover, China is unlikely to remain neutral in any conflict. However, the U.S. will attempt to establish a credible threat in order to contain Kim Jong-un. From an investor's perspective, it will be difficult to gauge whether the brinkmanship and military displays are simply posturing or evidence of real preparations for war.2 We don't believe the tensions in the Korean peninsula will end the cyclical bull market in global equities. Nonetheless, investors should expect to be tested numerous times over the next year to 18 months. Adding it all up, there is no shortage of things to keep investors awake at night. We would be de-risking our recommended portfolio were it not for the favorable earnings backdrop in the major advanced economies. Profit Outlook Update Chart I-5EPS Growth Outlook EPS Growth Outlook EPS Growth Outlook Second quarter earnings season came in even stronger than our upbeat models suggested in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. This led to upward revisions to our EPS growth forecast, except in the Eurozone where currency strength will be a significant drag in the near term. The U.S. equity market enjoyed another quarter of margin expansion in Q2 2017 and the good news was broadly based. Earnings per share were higher versus Q2 2016 in all 11 sectors. Results were particularly strong in energy, technology and financials. Looking ahead, an update of our top-down model suggests the EPS growth will peak just under 20% late this year on a 4-quarter moving average basis, before falling to mid-single digits by the end of 2018 (Chart I-5). The peak is predicted to be a little higher than we previously forecast largely due to the feed-through of this year's pullback in the dollar. In Japan, a solid 70% of reporting firms beat estimates. Chart I-6 shows that Japan led all other major stock markets in positive earnings surprises in the second quarter. Manufacturing sectors, such as iron & steel, chemicals and machinery & electronics, were particularly impressive in the quarter, reflecting yen weakness and robust overseas demand. Japanese earnings are highly geared to the rebound in global industrial production. Moreover, Japan's nominal GDP growth accelerated in the second quarter and the latest PPI report suggested that corporate pricing power has improved. Twelve-month forward EPS estimates have risen to fresh all times highs, and have outperformed the U.S. in local currencies so far this year. Corporate governance reform - a key element of Abenomics - can take some credit for the good news on earnings. The share of companies with at least two independent directors rose from 18% in 2013 to 78% in 2016. The number of companies with performance-linked pay increased from 640 to 941, while the number that publish disclosure policies jumped from 679 to 1055. Analysts have been slow to factor in these positive developments. We expect trailing EPS growth to peak at about 25% in the first half of 2018 on a 4-quarter moving total basis, before edging lower by the end of the year. This is one reason why we like the Japanese market over the U.S. in local currency terms. Second quarter results in the Eurozone were solid, although not as impressive as in the U.S. and Japan. The 6% rise in the trade-weighted euro this year has resulted in a drop in the earnings revisions ratio into negative territory. Our previous forecast pointed to a continued rise in the 4-quarter moving average growth rate into the first half of 2018. However, we now expect the growth rate to dip by year end, before picking up somewhat next year. If the euro is flat from today's level, our model suggests that the drag on EPS growth will hover at 3-4 percentage points through the first half of next year as the negative impact feeds through (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Chart I-6Japan Led In Q2 Earning Surprises September 2017 September 2017 Chart I-7Currency Effects On Eurozone EPS Currency Effects On Eurozone EPS Currency Effects On Eurozone EPS Our top-down EPS model highlights that Eurozone earnings are quite sensitive to swings in the currency. In Chart I-7, we present alternative scenarios based on the euro weakening to EUR/USD 1.10 and strengthening to EUR/USD 1.30. For demonstration purposes we make the extreme assumption that the trade-weighted value of the euro rises and falls by the same amount in percentage terms. Profit growth decelerates by the end of 2017 in all three scenarios because of the lagged effect of currency swings. The projections begin to diverge only in 2018. EPS growth surges to around 20% by the end of next year in the euro-bear case, as the tailwind from the weakening currency combines with continuing robust economic growth. Conversely, trailing earnings growth hovers in the 5-8% range in the euro bull scenario, which is substantially less than we expect in the U.S. and Japan over the next year. EPS growth remains in positive territory because the assumed strength in European and global growth dominates the drag from the euro. The strong euro scenario would be negative for Eurozone equity relative performance versus global stocks in local currencies, although Europe might outperform on a common currency basis. The bottom line is that 12-month forward earnings estimates should remain in an uptrend in the three major economies. This means that, absent a negative political shock, the equity bull phase should resume in the coming months. Monetary policy is unlikely to spoil the party for risk assets, although the bond market is a source of risk because investors seem unprepared for even a modest rise in inflation. FOMC Has Seen This Before The Minutes from the July FOMC meeting highlighted that the key debate still centers on the relationship between labor market tightness and inflation, the timing of the next Fed rate hike and how policy should adjust to changing financial conditions. Chart I-8The FOMC Has Been Here Before The FOMC Has Been Here Before The FOMC Has Been Here Before The majority of policymakers are willing for now to believe that this year's soft inflation readings are driven largely by temporary 'one-off' factors. The hawks worry that a further undershoot of unemployment below estimates of full employment could suddenly generate a surge of inflation. They also point to the risk that low bond yields are promoting excess risk taking in financial markets. Moreover, the recent easing in financial conditions is stimulative and should be counterbalanced by additional Fed tightening. The hawks are thus anxious to resume tightening, despite current inflation readings. Others are worried that inflation softness could reflect structural factors, such as restraints on pricing power from global developments and from innovations to business models spurred by advances in technology. In this month's Special Report beginning on page 18, we have a close look at the impact of "Amazonification" in holding down overall inflation. We do not find the evidence regarding e-commerce compelling, but the jury is still out on the impact of other technologies. If robots and new business strategies are indeed weighing on inflation, it would mean that the Phillips curve is very flat or that the full employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed estimates (or both). Either way, the doves would like to see the whites-of-the-eyes of inflation before resuming rate hikes. The last time the Fed was perplexed by a low level of inflation despite a tight labor market was in the late 1990s (Chart I-8). The FOMC cut rates following the LTCM financial crisis in late 1998, and then held the fed funds rate unchanged at 4¾% until June 1999. Core inflation was roughly flat during the on-hold period at 1% to 1½%, even as the unemployment rate steadily declined and various measures pointed to growing labor shortages. The FOMC 's internal debate in the first half of 1999 sounded very familiar. The minutes from meetings at that time noted that some policymakers pointed to the widespread inability of firms to raise prices because of strong competitive pressures in domestic and global markets. Some argued that significant cost saving efforts and new technologies also contributed to the low inflation environment for both consumer prices and wages. One difference from today is that productivity growth was solid at that time. The FOMC decided to hike rates in June 1999 by a quarter point, despite the absence of any clear indication that inflation had turned up. Policymakers described the tightening as "a small preemptive move... (that) would provide a degree of insurance against worsening inflation later". The Fed went on to lift the fed funds rate to 6½% by May 2000. Interestingly, the unemployment rate in June 1999 was 4.3%, exactly the same as the current rate. There are undoubtedly important differences in today's macro backdrop. The Fed is also more fearful of making a policy mistake in the aftermath of the Great Recession and financial crisis. Nonetheless, the point is that the Fed has faced a similar low inflation/tight labor market environment before, but in the end patience ran out and policymakers acted pre-emptively. Inflation Warning Signs During Long-Expansions We have noted in previous research that inflation pressures are slower to emerge in 'slow burn' recoveries, such as the 1980s and 1990s. In Chart I-9, we compare the core PCE inflation rate in the current cycle with the average of the previous two long expansion episodes (the inflection point for inflation in the previous cycles are aligned with June 2017 for comparison purposes). The other panels in the chart highlight that, in the 1980s and 1990s, wage growth was a lagging indicator. Economic commentators often assume that inflation is driven exclusively by "cost push" effects, such that the direction of causation runs from wage pressure to price pressure. However, causation runs in the other direction as well. Households see rising prices and then demand better wages to compensate for the added cost of living. This is not to say that we should totally disregard wage information. But it does mean that we must keep an eye on a wider set of data. Indicators that provided some leading information in the previous two long cycles are shown in Chart I-10. To this list we would also add the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressure index, which is not shown in Chart I-10 because it does not have enough history. At the moment, the headline PPI, ISM Prices Paid and BCA's pipeline inflation pressure index are all warning that inflation pressures are gradually building. However, this message is not confirmed by the St. Louis Fed's index and corporate selling prices. We are also watching the velocity of money, which has been a reasonably good leading indicator for U.S. inflation since 2000 (Chart I-11). Chart I-9In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth ##br##Gave No Early Warning On Inflation In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth Gave No Early Warning On Inflation In The 80s & 90s Wage Growth Gave No Early Warning On Inflation Chart I-10Leading Indicators Of Inflation ##br##In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Leading Indicators Of Inflation In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Leading Indicators Of Inflation In "Slow Burn" Recoveries Chart I-11Money Velocity And Inflation Money Velocity And Inflation Money Velocity And Inflation Our Fed view remains unchanged from last month; the FOMC will announce its balance sheet diet plan in September and the next rate hike will take place in December. Nonetheless, this forecast hangs on the assumption that core inflation edges higher in the coming months. Some indicators are pointing in that direction and recent dollar weakness will help. Wake Me When Inflation Picks Up Investors seem to be taking an "I'll believe it when I see it" attitude toward the U.S. inflation outlook. They also believe that persistent economic headwinds mean that monetary policy will need to stay highly accommodative for a very long time. Only one Fed rate hike is discounted between now and the end of 2018, and implied forward real short-term rates are negative until 2022. While we do not foresee surging inflation, the risks for market expectations appear quite lopsided. We expect one rate hike by year end, followed by at least another 50 basis points of tightening in 2018. The U.S. 10-year yield is also about almost 50 basis points below our short-term fair value estimate (Chart I-12). Moreover, over the medium- and long-term, reduced central bank bond purchases will impart gentle upward pressure on equilibrium bond yields. Twenty-eighteen will be the first time in four years in which the net supply of government bonds available to private investors will rise, taking the U.S., U.K., Eurozone and Japanese markets as a group. This year's euro strength is unlikely to delay the next installment of ECB tapering, which we expect in early in 2018. The currency appreciation will keep a lid on inflation in the near term. However, we see the euro's ascent as reflective of the booming economy, rather than a major headwind that will derail the growth story. Overall financial conditions have tightened this year, but only back to levels that persisted through 2016 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12U.S. 10-year Yield Is Below Fair Value U.S. 10-year Yield Is Below Fair Value U.S. 10-year Yield Is Below Fair Value Chart I-13Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions It will take clear signs that the economy is being negatively affected by currency strength for the ECB to back away from tapering. Indeed, the central bank has little choice because the bond buying program is approaching important technical limits. European corporate and peripheral bond spreads are likely to widen versus bunds as a result. The implication is that global yields have significant upside potential relative to forward rates, especially in the U.S. market. Duration should be kept short. JGBs are the only safe place to hide if global yields shift up because the Bank of Japan is a long way from abandoning its 10-year yield peg. Treasury yields should lead the way higher, which will finally place a bottom under the beleaguered dollar. Nonetheless, we are tactically at neutral on the greenback. Conclusions Chart I-14Gold Loves Geopolitical Crises September 2017 September 2017 In light of rising geopolitical risk, the BCA Strategists recently debated trimming equity exposure to neutral. Some argued that the risk/reward balance has deteriorated; the upside is limited by poor valuation, while there is significant downside potential if the North Korean situation deteriorates alarmingly. However, the majority felt that, while there will be near-term volatility, the main equity indexes are likely to be higher on a 6-12 month horizon. Riding out the volatility is a better approach than trying to time the short-term ups and downs. That said, it appears prudent to be well shy of max overweight positions and to hold some safe haven assets within diversified portfolios. BCA research has demonstrated that U.S. Treasurys, Swiss bonds and JGBs have been the best performers in times of crisis (Chart I-14).3 The same is true for the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, such that the currency exposure should not be hedged in these cases. The dollar is more nuanced. It tends to perform well during financial crises, but not in geopolitical crises or recessions. Gold has tended to perform well in geopolitical events and recessions, although not in financial crises. We continue to prefer Japanese to U.S. stocks in local currency terms, given that EPS growth will likely peak in the U.S. first. Japanese stocks are also better valued. Europe is a tough call because this year's currency strength will weigh on earnings in the next quarter or two. However, the negative impact on earnings will reverse if the euro retraces as we expect. EM stocks have seen the strongest positive earnings revisions this year. We continue to worry about some of the structural headwinds facing emerging markets (high debt levels, poor governance, etc.). However, the cyclical picture remains more upbeat. Chinese H-shares remain our favorite EM market, trading at just 7.5 times 2017 earnings estimates. Our dollar and duration positions have been disappointing so far this year. Much hinges on U.S. inflation. Investors appear to have adopted the idea that structural headwinds to inflation will forever dominate the cyclical pressures. This means that the bond market is totally unprepared for any upside surprises on the inflation landscape. Admittedly, a rise in bond yields may not be imminent, but the risks appear to us to be predominantly to the upside. Lastly, crude oil inventories are shrinking as our commodity strategists predicted. They remain bullish, with a price target of USD60/bbl. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst August 31, 2017 Next Report: September 28, 2017 1 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy, "A Guide To Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," dated August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve? A "culture of profound cost reduction" has gripped the business sector since the GFC according to one school of thought, permanently changing the relationship between labor market slack and wages or inflation. If true, it could mean that central banks are almost powerless to reach their inflation targets. Amazon, Airbnb, Uber, robotics, contract workers, artificial intelligence, horizontal drilling and driverless cars are just a few examples of companies and technologies that are cutting costs and depressing prices and wages. In the first of our series on inflation, we will focus on the rise of e-commerce and the related "Amazonification" of the economy. In theory, positive supply shocks should not have more than a temporary impact on inflation if the price level is indeed a monetary phenomenon in the long term. But a series of positive supply shocks could make it appear for quite a while that low inflation is structural in nature. We are keeping an open mind and reserving judgement on the disinflationary impact of robotics, artificial intelligence and the gig economy until we do more research. But in terms of the impact of e-commerce, it is difficult to find supportive evidence at the macro level. The admittedly inadequate measures of online prices available today do not suggest that e-commerce sales are depressing the overall inflation rate by more than 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points. Moreover, it does not appear that the disinflationary impact of competition in the retail sector has intensified over the years. Today's creative destruction in retail may be no more deflationary than the shift to 'big box' stores in the 1990s. Perhaps lower online prices are forcing traditional retailers to match the e-commerce vendors, allowing for a larger disinflationary effect than we estimate. However, the fact that retail margins are near secular highs outside of department stores argues against this thesis. The sectors potentially affected by e-commerce make up a small part of the CPI index. The deceleration of inflation since the GFC has been in areas unaffected by online sales. High profit margins for the overall corporate sector and depressed productivity growth also argue against the idea that e-commerce represents a large positive macro supply shock. Perhaps the main way that e-commerce is affecting the macro economy and financial markets is not through inflation, but via the reduction in the economy's capital spending requirement. This would reduce the equilibrium level of interest rates, since the Fed has to stimulate other parts of the economy to offset the loss of demand in capital spending in the retail sector. Anecdotal evidence is all around us. The global economy is evolving and it seems that all of the major changes are deflationary. Amazon, Airbnb, Uber, robotics, contract workers, artificial intelligence, horizontal drilling and driverless cars are just a few examples of companies and technologies that are cutting costs and depressing prices and wages. Central banks in the major advanced economies are having difficulty meeting their inflation targets, even in the U.S. where the labor market is tight by historical standards. Based on the depressed level of bond yields, it appears that the majority of investors believe that inflation headwinds will remain formidable for a long time. One school of thought is that low inflation reflects a lack of demand growth in the post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) period. Another school points to the supply side of the economy. A recent report by Prudential Financial highlights "...obvious examples of ... new business models and new organizational structures, whereby higher-cost traditional methods of production, transportation, and distribution are displaced by more nontraditional cost-effective ways of conducting business."1 A "culture of profound cost reduction" has gripped the business sector since the GFC according to this school, permanently changing the relationship between labor market slack and wages or inflation (i.e., the Phillips Curve). Employees are less aggressive in their wage demands in a world where robots are threatening humans in a broadening array of industrial categories. Many feel lucky just to have a job. In a highly sensationalized article called "How The Internet Economy Killed Inflation," Forbes argued that "the internet has reduced many of the traditional barriers to entry that protect companies from competition and created a race to the bottom for prices in a number of categories." Forbes believes that new technologies are placing downward pressure on inflation by depressing wages, increasing productivity and encouraging competition. There are many factors that have the potential to weigh on prices, but analysts are mainly focusing on e-commerce, robotics, artificial intelligence, and the gig economy. In the first of our series on inflation, we will focus on the rise of e-commerce and the related "Amazonification" of the economy. The latter refers to the advent of new business models that cut out layers of middlemen between producers and consumers. Amazonification E-commerce has grown at a compound annual rate of more than 9% over the past 15 years, and now accounts for about 8½% of total U.S. retail sales (Chart II-1). Amazon has been leading the charge, accounting for 43% of all online sales in 2016 (Chart II-2). Amazon's business model not only cuts costs by eliminating middlemen and (until recently) avoiding expensive showrooms, but it also provides a platform for improved price discovery on an extremely broad array of goods. In 2013, Amazon carried 230 million items for sale in the United States, nearly 30 times the number sold by Walmart, one of the largest retailers in the world. Chart II-1E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share Chart II-2Amazon Dominates September 2017 September 2017 With the use of a smartphone, consumers can check the price of an item on Amazon while shopping in a physical store. Studies show that it does not require a large price gap for shoppers to buy online rather than in-store. Amazon appears to be impacting other retailers' ability to pass though cost increases, leading to a rash of retail outlet closings. Sears alone announced the closure of 300 retail outlets this year. The devastation that Amazon inflicted on the book industry is well known. It is no wonder then, that Amazon's purchase of Whole Foods Market, a grocery chain, sent shivers down the spines of CEOs not only in the food industry, but in the broader retail industry as well. What would prevent Amazon from applying its model to furniture and appliances, electronics or drugstores? It seems that no retail space is safe. A Little Theory Before we turn to the evidence, let's review the macro theory related to positive supply shocks. The internet could be lowering prices by moving product markets toward the "perfect competition" model. The internet trims search costs, improves price transparency and reduces barriers to entry. The internet also allows for shorter supply chains, as layers of wholesalers and other intermediaries are removed and e-commerce companies allow more direct contact between consumers and producers. Fewer inventories and a smaller "brick and mortar" infrastructure take additional costs out of the system. Economic theory suggests that the result of this positive supply shock will be greater product market competition, increased productivity and reduced profitability. In the long run, workers should benefit from the productivity boost via real wage gains (even if nominal wage growth is lackluster). Workers may lower their reservation wage if they feel that increased competitive pressures or technology threaten their jobs. The internet is also likely to improve job matching between the unemployed and available vacancies, which should lead to a fall in the full-employment level of unemployment (NAIRU). Nonetheless, the internet should not have a permanent impact on inflation. The lower level of NAIRU and the direct effects of the internet on consumer prices discussed above allow inflation to fall below the central bank's target. The bank responds by lowering interest rates, stimulating demand and thereby driving unemployment down to the new lower level of NAIRU. Over time, inflation will drift back up toward target. In other words, a greater degree of the competition should boost the supply side of the economy and lower NAIRU, but it should not result in a permanently lower rate of inflation if inflation is indeed a monetary phenomenon and central banks strive to meet their targets. Still, one could imagine a series of supply shocks that are spread out over time, with each having a temporary negative impact on prices such that it appears for a while that inflation has been permanently depressed. This could be an accurate description of the current situation in the U.S. and some of the other major countries. We have sympathy for the view that the internet and new business models are increasing competition, cutting costs and thereby limiting price increases in some areas. But is there any hard evidence? Is the competitive effect that large, and is it any more intense than in the past? There are a number of reasons to be skeptical because most of the evidence does not support Forbes' claim that the internet has killed inflation. (1) E-commerce affects only a small part of the Consumer Price Index As mentioned above, online shopping for goods represents 8.5% of total retail sales in the U.S. E-commerce is concentrated in four kinds of businesses (Table II-1): Furniture & Home Furnishings (7% of total retail sales), Electronics & Appliances (20%), Health & Personal Care (15%), and Clothing (10%). Since goods make up 40% of the CPI, then 3.2% (8% times 40%) is a ballpark estimate for the size of goods e-commerce in the CPI. Table II-1E-Commerce Market Share Of Goods Sector (2015) September 2017 September 2017 Table II-2 shows the relative size of e-commerce in the service sector. The analysis is complicated by the fact that the data on services includes B-to-B sales in addition to B-to-C.2 However, e-commerce represents almost 4% of total sales for the service categories tracked by the BLS. Services make up 60% of the CPI, but the size drops to 26% if we exclude shelter (which is probably not affected by online shopping). Thus, e-commerce in the service sector likely affects 1% (3.9% times 26%) of the CPI. Table II-2E-Commerce Market Share Of Service Sector (2015) September 2017 September 2017 Adding goods and services, online shopping affects about 4.2% of the CPI index at most. The bottom line is that the relatively small size of e-commerce at the consumer level limits any estimate of the impact of online sales on the broad inflation rate. (2) Most of the deceleration in inflation since 2007 has been in areas unaffected by e-commerce Table II-3 compares the average contribution to annual average CPI inflation during 2000-2007 with that of 2007-2016. Average annual inflation fell from 2.9% in the seven years before the Great Recession to 1.8% after, for a total decline of just over 1 percentage point. The deceleration is almost fully explained by Energy, Food and Owners' Equivalent Rent. The bottom part of Table II-3 highlights that the sectors with the greatest exposure to e-commerce had a negligible impact on the inflation slowdown. Table II-3Comparison Of Pre- and Post-Lehman Inflation Rates September 2017 September 2017 (3) The cost advantages for online sellers are overstated Bain & Company, a U.S. consultancy, argues that e-commerce will not grow in importance indefinitely and come to dominate consumer spending.3 E-commerce sales are already slowing. Market share is following a classic S-shaped curve that, Bain estimates, will top out at under 30% by 2030. First, not everyone wants to buy everything online. Products that are well known to consumers and purchased on a regular basis are well suited to online shopping. But for many other products, consumers need to see and feel the product in person before making a purchase. Second, the cost savings of online selling versus traditional brick and mortar stores is not as great as many believe. Bain claims that many e-commerce businesses struggle to make a profit. The information technology, distribution centers, shipping, and returns processing required by e-commerce companies can cost as much as running physical stores in some cases. E-tailers often cannot ship directly from manufacturers to consumers; they need large and expensive fulfillment centers and a very generous returns policy. Moreover, online and offline sales models are becoming blurred. Retailers with physical stores are growing their e-commerce operations, while previously pure e-commerce plays are adding stores or negotiating space in other retailers' stores. Even Amazon now has storefronts. The shift toward an "multichannel" selling model underscores that there are benefits to traditional brick-and-mortar stores that will ensure that they will not completely disappear. (4) E-commerce is not the first revolution in the retail sector The retail sector has changed significantly over the decades and it is not clear that the disinflationary effect of the latest revolution, e-commerce, is any more intense than in the past. Economists at Goldman Sachs point out that the growth of Amazon's market share in recent years still lags that of Walmart and other "big box" stores in the 1990s (Chart II-3).4 This fact suggests that "Amazonification" may not be as disinflationary as the previous big-box revolution. (5) Weak productivity growth and high profit margins are inconsistent with a large supply-side benefit from e-commerce As discussed above, economic theory suggests that a positive supply shock that cuts costs and boosts competition should trim profit margins and lift productivity. The problem is that the margins and productivity have moved in the opposite direction that economic theory would suggest (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Amazon Vs. Walmart: ##br##Who's More Deflationary? September 2017 September 2017 Chart II-4Incompatible With A Supply Shock Incompatible With A Supply Shock Incompatible With A Supply Shock By definition, productivity rises when firms can produce the same output with fewer or cheaper inputs. However, it is well documented that productivity growth has been in a downtrend since the 1990s, and has been dismally low since the Great Recession. A Special Report from BCA's Global Investment Strategy5 service makes a convincing case that mismeasurement is not behind the low productivity figures. In fact, in many industries it appears that productivity is over-estimated. If e-commerce is big enough to "move the dial" on overall inflation, it should be big enough to see in the aggregate productivity figures. Chart II-5Retail Margin Squeeze ##br##Only In Department Stores Retail Margin Squeeze Only In Department Stores Retail Margin Squeeze Only In Department Stores One would also expect to see a margin squeeze across industries if e-commerce is indeed generating a lot of deflationary competitive pressure. Despite dismally depressed productivity, however, corporate profit margins are at the high end of the historical range across most of the sectors of the S&P 500. This is the case even in the retailing sector outside of department stores (Chart II-5). These facts argue against the idea that the internet has moved the economy further toward a disinflationary "perfect competition" model. (6) Online price setting is characterized by frictions comparable to traditional retail We would expect to observe a low price dispersion across online vendors since the internet has apparently lowered the cost of monitoring competitors' prices and the cost of searching for the lowest price. We would also expect to see fairly synchronized price adjustments; if one vendor adjusts its price due to changing market conditions, then the rest should quickly follow to avoid suffering a massive loss of market share. However, a recent study of price-setting practices in the U.S. and U.K. found that this is not the case.6 The dataset covered a broad spectrum of consumer goods and sellers over a two-year period, comparing online with offline prices. The researchers found that market pricing "frictions" are surprisingly elevated in the online world. Price dispersion is high in absolute terms and on par with offline pricing. Academics for years have puzzled over high price rigidities and dispersion in retail stores in the context of an apparently stiff competitive environment, and it appears that online pricing is not much better. The study did not cover a long enough period to see if frictions were even worse in the past. Nonetheless, the evidence available suggests that the lower cost of monitoring prices afforded by the internet has not led to significant price convergence across sellers online or offline. Another study compared online and offline prices for multichannel retailers, using the massive database provided by the Billion Prices Project at MIT.7 The database covers prices across 10 countries. The study found that retailers charged the same price online as in-store in 72% of cases. The average discount was 4% for those cases in which there was a markdown online. If the observations with identical prices are included, the average online/offline price difference was just 1%. (7) Some measures of online prices have grown at about the same pace as the CPI index The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics does include online sales when constructing the Consumer Price Index. It even includes peer-to-peer sales by companies such as Airbnb and Uber. However, the BLS admits that its sample lags the popularity of such services by a few years. Moreover, while the BLS is trying to capture the rising proportion of sales done via e-commerce, "outlet bias" means that the CPI does not capture the price effect in cases where consumers are finding cheaper prices online. This is because the BLS weights the growth rate of online and offline prices, not the price levels. While there may be level differences, there is no reason to believe that the inflation rates for similar goods sold online and offline differ significantly. If the inflation rates are close, then the growing share of online sales will not affect overall inflation based on the BLS methodology. The BLS argues that any bias in the CPI due to outlet bias is mitigated to the extent that physical stores offer a higher level of service. Thus, price differences may not be that great after quality-adjustment. All this suggests that the actual consumer price inflation rate could be somewhat lower than the official rate. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that inflation, properly measured, is being depressed by e-commerce to a meaningful extent. Indeed, Chart II-6 highlights that the U.S. component of the Billion Prices Index rose at a faster pace than the overall CPI between 2009 and 2014. The Online Price Index fell in absolute and relative terms from 2014 to mid-2016, but rose sharply toward the end of 2016. Applying our guesstimate of the weight of e-commerce in the CPI (3.2% for goods), online price inflation added to overall annual CPI inflation by about 0.3 percentage points in 2016 (bottom panel of Chart II-6). There is more deflation evident in the BLS' index of prices for Electronic Shopping and Mail Order Houses (Chart II-7). Online prices fell relative to the overall CPI for most of the time since the early 1990s, with the relative price decline accelerating since the GFC. However, our estimate of the contribution to overall annual CPI inflation is only about -0.15 percentage points in June 2017, and has never been more than -0.3 percentage points. This could be an underestimate because it does not include the impact of services, although the service e-commerce share of the CPI is very small. Chart II-6Online Price Index Online Price Index Online Price Index Chart II-7Electronic Shopping Price Index Electronic Shopping Price Index Electronic Shopping Price Index Another way to approach this question is to focus on the parts of the CPI that are most exposed to e-commerce. It is impossible to separate the effect of e-commerce on inflation from other drivers of productivity. Nonetheless, if online shopping is having a significant deflationary impact on overall inflation, we should see large and persistent negative contributions from these parts of the CPI. We combined the components of the CPI that most closely matched the sectors that have high e-commerce exposure according to the BLS' annual Retail Survey (Chart II-8). The sectors in our aggregate e-commerce price proxy include hotels/motels, taxicabs, books & magazines, clothing, computer hardware, drugs, health & beauty aids, electronics & appliances, alcoholic beverages, furniture & home furnishings, sporting goods, air transportation, travel arrangement and reservation services, educational services and other merchandise. The sectors are weighted based on their respective weights in the CPI. Our e-commerce price proxy has generally fallen relative to the overall CPI index since 2000. However, while the average contribution of these sectors to the overall annual CPI inflation rate has fallen in the post GFC period relative to the 2000-2007 period, the average difference is only 0.2 percentage points. The contribution has hovered around the zero mark for the past 2½ years. Surprisingly, price indexes have increased by more than the overall CPI since 2000 in some sectors where one would have expected to see significant relative price deflation, such as taxis, hotels, travel arrangement and even books. One could argue that significant measurement error must be a factor. How could the price of books have gone up faster than the CPI? Sectors displaying the most relative price declines are clothing, computers, electronics, furniture, sporting goods, air travel and other goods. We recalculated our e-commerce proxy using only these deflating sectors, but we boosted their weights such that the overall weight of the proxy in the CPI is kept the same as our full e-commerce proxy discussed above. In other words, this approach implicitly assumes that the excluded sectors (taxis, books, hotels and travel arrangement) actually deflated at the average pace of the sectors that remain in the index. Our adjusted e-commerce proxy suggests that online pricing reduced overall CPI inflation by about 0.1-to-0.2 percentage points in recent years (Chart II-9). This contribution is below the long-term average of the series, but the drag was even greater several times in the past. Chart II-8BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index Chart II-9BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index Admittedly, data limitations mean that all of the above estimates of the impact of e-commerce are ballpark figures. Conclusions We are keeping an open mind and reserving judgement on the disinflationary impact of robotics, artificial intelligence and the gig economy until we do more research. But in terms of the impact of e-commerce, it is difficult to find supportive evidence. The available data are admittedly far from ideal for confirming or disproving the "Amazonification" thesis. Perhaps better measures of e-commerce pricing will emerge in the future. Nonetheless, the measures available today do not suggest that online sales are depressing the overall inflation rate by more than 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points, and it does not appear that the disinflationary impact has intensified by much. One could argue that lower online prices are forcing traditional retailers to match the e-commerce vendors, allowing for a larger disinflationary effect than we estimate. Nonetheless, if this were the case, then we would expect to see significant margin compression in the retail sector. The sectors potentially affected by e-commerce make up a small part of the CPI index. The deceleration of inflation since the GFC has been in areas unaffected by online sales. High corporate profit margins and depressed productivity growth also argue against the idea that e-commerce represents a large positive macro supply shock. Finally, today's creative destruction in retail may be no more deflationary than the shift to 'big box' stores in the 1990s. Perhaps the main way that e-commerce is affecting the macro economy and financial markets is not through inflation, but via the reduction in the economy's capital spending requirement. Rising online activity means that we need fewer shopping malls and big box outlets to support a given level of consumer spending. This would reduce the equilibrium level of interest rates, since the Fed has to stimulate other parts of the economy to offset the loss of demand in capital spending in the retail sector. To the extent that central banks were slow to recognize that equilibrium rates had fallen to extremely low levels, then policy was behind the curve and this might have contributed to the current low inflation environment. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 Robert F. DeLucia, "Economic Perspective: A Nontraditional Analysis Of Inflation," Prudential Capital Group (August 21, 2017). 2 Business to business, and business to consumer. 3 Aaron Cheris, Darrell Rigby and Suzanne Tager, "The Power Of Omnichannel Stores," Bain & Company Insights: Retail Holiday Newsletter 2016-2017 (December 19, 2016). 4 "US Daily: The Internet And Inflation: How Big Is The Amazon Effect?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research (August 2, 2017). 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 6 Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Viacheslav Sheremirov, and Oleksandr Talavera, "Price Setting In Online Markets: Does IT Click?" Journal of the European Economic Association (July 2016). 7 Alberto Cavallo, "Are Online And Offline Prices Similar? Evidence From Large Multi-Channel Retailers," NBER Working Paper No. 22142 (March 2016). III. Indicators And Reference Charts Stocks struggled in August on the back of intensifying geopolitical risks, such that equity returns slipped versus bonds in the month. The earnings backdrop remains constructive for global stocks. In the U.S., 12-month forward EPS estimates continue to climb, in line with upbeat net revisions and earnings surprises. Nonetheless, the risk/reward balance has deteriorated due to escalating risks inside and outside of the U.S. Allocation to risk assets should still exceed benchmark, but should be shy of maximum settings. It is prudent to hold some of the traditional safe haven assets, including gold. Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) remained at 100% in August, sending a bullish message for equities. We introduced the RPI in the July report. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks for the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The U.S. WTP topped out in June and the same occurred in August for the Japan and the Eurozone indexes. While the indicators are still bullish, they highlight that flows into the equity markets in the major countries are beginning to moderate. These indicators would have to clearly turn lower to provide a bearish signal for stocks. The VIX increased last month, but remains depressed by historical standards. This implies that the equity market is vulnerable to bad news. However, investor sentiment is close to neutral and our speculation index has pulled back from previously elevated levels. These suggest that investors are not overly long at the moment. Our monetary indicator is only slightly negative, but the equity technical indicator is close to breaking below the 9-month moving average (a negative technical sign). Bond valuation continues to hover near fair value, according to our long-standing model that is based on a simple regression of the nominal 10-year yield on short-term real interest rates and a moving average of inflation. Another model, presented in the Overview section, estimates fair value based on dollar sentiment, a measure of policy uncertainty and the global PMI. This model suggests that the 10-year yield is almost 50 basis points on the expensive side. We think that Fed rate expectations are far too benign, suggesting that bond yields will rise. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China

Highlights The ECB defines a euro overshoot as EUR/USD in the high 1.20s. Until then, remain cyclically long both EUR/USD and the associated SEK/USD. EUR/USD is a function of expected terminal interest rates in the euro area and U.S. Whether the Fed hikes in December or whether the ECB hikes next year is largely irrelevant. Global investors should be long the euro, but underweight the Euro Stoxx 50. European equity investors should prefer the broader based 300-constituent Euro Stoxx over the 50-constituent Euro Stoxx 50.1 And prefer the FTSE100 over the Euro Stoxx 50. Feature Arguably the biggest macro trade of 2017 has been to own the euro. Year to date, the big winner is EUR/USD, which is up 15%, but even EUR/GBP is up an impressive 9%. An additional merit is that the euro has behaved like a haven currency. When risk assets have sold off sharply, EUR/USD has tended to strengthen.2 The Euro Is Stronger, But It Is Not Strong Although the euro is stronger, the ECB's own indicators for euro area competitiveness3 suggest that the euro is not yet strong. The euro needs to appreciate by at least another 5%4 to cancel the euro area's over-competitiveness versus its top 19 trading partners (Chart of the Week). Translated to EUR/USD this implies a fair value in the 1.25-1.30 range. Chart of the WeekThe Euro Is Stronger, But It Is Not Yet Strong The Euro Is Stronger, But It Is Not Yet Strong The Euro Is Stronger, But It Is Not Yet Strong To be clear, the ECB's competitiveness analysis assumes that the euro started its life in 1999 close to fair value. This assumption seems reasonable. In 1999, the euro area's constituent economies were broadly in internal balance with each other and had much in common. Hard as it is to believe today, in 1999 Germany and Italy scored identically on total debt as a share of GDP (Chart I-2) as well as on exports as a share of GDP (Chart I-3). Chart I-2At The Euro"s Birth, Germany And##br## Italy Had The Same Debt To GDP... At The Euro"s Birth, Germany And Italy Had The Same Debt To GDP... At The Euro"s Birth, Germany And Italy Had The Same Debt To GDP... Chart I-3...And Exports##br## To GDP ...And Exports To GDP ...And Exports To GDP Perhaps more significantly, euro area trade was in external balance, and the bloc's real competitiveness versus its major trading partners was exactly in line with its long-term average. But after its birth, the euro became extremely undervalued in the dot com bubble, then extremely overvalued in the global credit boom, and most recently, extremely undervalued again - as a direct result of the ECB's extreme monetary easing. Seen in this bigger picture, the euro's recent rally is just a recovery from this most recent undervaluation, an argument that the ECB itself made at its last monetary policy meeting: "Regarding exchange rates, the appreciation of the euro to date could be seen as reflecting changes in relative fundamentals in the euro area vis-à-vis the rest of the world." At the same time: "Concerns were expressed about the risk of the exchange rate overshooting in the future." What would constitute such an overshooting? Based on the ECB's own analysis, we can deduce that it would occur if EUR/USD broke into the high 1.20s (Chart I-4). This is the level at which we would consider removing our cyclical overweight. Until then, remain cyclically long both EUR/USD and the associated SEK/USD. Chart I-4The Euro Needs To Rally Another 5% To Cancel The Euro Area"s Over-Competitiveness The Euro Needs To Rally Another 5% To Cancel The Euro Area"s Over-Competitiveness The Euro Needs To Rally Another 5% To Cancel The Euro Area"s Over-Competitiveness Explaining The Stronger Euro The explanation for the euro's impressive rally starts with central banks' strong commitment to 'data-dependency'. Over short periods, economic data can be noisy or "transient" giving central banks an excuse to look through the data. But over periods of 6 months and longer, the noise cancels out. So unless central banks break their commitment to data-dependency - which would mark a big shift in transparency and communication - the markets know that central bank policy must ultimately follow the hard data on GDP growth, inflation, and job creation. This necessarily means that the evolution of relative interest rate expectations and bond yields must also ultimately follow relative economic performance. Which they have done perfectly (Chart I-5). The next part of the explanation is the so-called fixed income portfolio channel (Chart I-6). The key point is that international fixed income investors make their allocations based on both bond valuations and currency valuations. Chart I-5Bond Yield Spreads Follow Relative##br## Economic Performance Bond Yield Spreads Follow Relative Economic Performance Bond Yield Spreads Follow Relative Economic Performance Chart I-6Fixed Income Flows Are The Most Volatile##br## Part Of Currency Demand Fixed Income Flows Are The Most Volatile Part Of Currency Demand Fixed Income Flows Are The Most Volatile Part Of Currency Demand When the expected interest rate in the euro area rises relative to that in the U.S., the euro bond becomes de facto relatively cheaper. As an example, let's say 1% cheaper. In this case, the international fixed income investor will shift into the euro bond until the flow makes EUR/USD symmetrically 1% more expensive. At this point, the fixed income portfolio flow will stop, and an equilibrium will reestablish at the new higher level for EUR/USD. This is because the international investor now has 1% more upside from the cheaper bond, but 1% less upside from the more expensive currency - and the two cancel out. Finally, at major turning points in monetary policy such as now, the expected interest rate that matters is the so-called terminal rate. At such major turning points, the issue for the largest fixed income portfolio flows is not the exact timing of rate hikes. Whether the Fed hikes in December or whether the ECB hikes next year is largely irrelevant. The big issue is: at what level of rates will the respective tightening cycles ultimately end many years from now? Chart I-7 and Chart I-8 illustrate that EUR/USD has recently been tracking the expected policy rate differential not in 2018 or 2019, but in 2022! Chart I-7EUR/USD Is Not Tracking Policy ##br##Rate Differentials In 2019... EUR/USD Is Not Tracking Policy Rate Differentials In 2019... EUR/USD Is Not Tracking Policy Rate Differentials In 2019... Chart I-8...But Rather Policy Rate ##br##Differntials In 2022 ...But Rather Policy Rate Differntials In 2022 ...But Rather Policy Rate Differntials In 2022 Based on the latest PMIs which capture current economic sentiment, and on 6-month credit impulses which lead activity, euro area hard data will continue to perform at least in line with those in other major economies. In which case, relative expectations for the terminal policy interest rate will continue to converge, long-dated bond yield spreads will continue to compress, and the euro has further cyclical upside. Losers And Winners From The Stronger Euro A stronger euro creates both losers and winners. A stronger euro hurts the competitiveness of firms selling euro priced products in international markets. Therefore, firms exporting discretionary goods and services which are price elastic could suffer a drop in sales. Against this, a stronger euro makes everyone in the euro area richer in terms of the goods and services they can buy from outside the euro area. This is particularly significant for non-discretionary items - food and energy - of which Europe is a large importer. Given that the volumes of these purchases tend to be inelastic, their price decline in euro terms significantly boosts the real spending power of euro area consumers. Chart I-9The Stronger Euro Weighs##br## On The Eurostoxx 50 The Stronger Euro Weighs On The Eurostoxx 50 The Stronger Euro Weighs On The Eurostoxx 50 (As an aside, the exact opposite applies in the U.K. The post Brexit vote slump in the pound - and the associated rise in prices - has depressed U.K. consumers' real spending power. And likely explains why the U.K. economy is now slowing.) A stronger euro also reflects a steeper yield curve, and its associated boost to bank profit margins, solvency, and credit creation. The important point is that the stronger euro's aggregate impact on an economy depends on how the losers and winners net out. For example, many people will worry that the stronger euro has made Italy 5% under-competitive versus its major trading partners. However, the drag on Italy's price-sensitive exporters could be less significant than the boost to real consumer spending and bank credit creation - netting out as a positive for Italy. Equity investors should note that most exporters in the Euro Stoxx 50 tend to be multinationals whose sales and costs are currency diversified and/or hedged. So a stronger euro should not hurt operationally. But it does hurt in the translation of multi-currency profits back into euros - the base currency of the Euro Stoxx 50. This drags down (local currency) index performance. Hence, global investors should be cyclically long the euro, but underweight the Euro Stoxx 50. European equity investors should prefer the broader based 300-constituent Euro Stoxx5 over the 50-constituent Euro Stoxx 50 (Chart I-9); and prefer the FTSE100 over the Euro Stoxx 50. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Not to be confused with the Stoxx Europe 600 2 Global equities assets have suffered 11 sharply down days this year - defined as the MSCI World index (in local currency terms) down more than -0.5%. And on 9 of those 11 days, EUR/USD has rallied 3 Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats 4 The ECB calculates three Harmonised Competitiveness Indicators for the euro area versus its top 19 trading partners based on unit labour costs, GDP deflators, and consumer price indices. Updated to August 29 2017, the three indicators suggest that the trade-weighted euro is still undervalued by 5%, 11% and 6% respectively. 5 Not to be confused with the Stoxx Europe 600 Fractal Trading Model* This week we are initiating a short nickel / long silver commodity pair trade with a profit target / stop loss at 8%. In other trades, short MSCI Turkey / long Eurostoxx600 hit its stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Nickel Vs. Silver Nickel Vs. Silver The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Dear Client, The Global Fixed Investment Strategy will not be publishing next week. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on September 12, 2017. Jackson Hole: Last week's Fed conference did not produce any signals on policy shifts from the Fed or ECB. Yet the outlook for either central bank over the next year has not changed. The Fed will deliver more hikes than currently discounted by the market, while the ECB will taper the pace of its asset purchases. A below-benchmark duration stance is warranted on a 6-12 month horizon. IG Sector Performance: Our Investment Grade (IG) corporate sector allocations for the U.S., Euro Area and U.K., taken from our relative value models, have generated outperformance versus the regional benchmarks since the beginning of the year, led by overweights to Banks. The alpha of sector selection should start to outweigh the beta of owning corporates in the next 6-12 months, given the tight overall level of spreads and flat credit curves. Feature Markets Were Too Jacked Up For Jackson Hole Well, so much for that. The highly anticipated Federal Reserve symposium in Jackson Hole last weekend provided little in the way of guidance on the future monetary policy moves in the U.S. or Europe. The speakers at Jackson Hole, including Fed Chair Janet Yellen and ECB President Mario Draghi, instead chose to focus more on factors that they cannot directly control, such as trade protectionism, income inequality and technological change. Chart of the WeekTougher Regulations Or Just Easy Money? Tougher Regulations Or Just Easy Money? Tougher Regulations Or Just Easy Money? The market reaction was interesting. Bond yields and equities were essentially unchanged on the day last Friday, but the U.S. dollar ended softer, especially versus the euro. Perhaps this was simply a function of very short-term positioning in currency markets. The speculation prior to Jackson Hole was that Yellen might talk up another Fed rate hike to offset to stimulative effects of booming financial asset prices, perhaps in the absence of any renewed pickup in U.S. inflation. At the same time, there were expectations that Draghi could use his speech to dial back expectations of a reduction in ECB asset purchases, which have helped fuel the strong rally in the euro. With both central bankers delivering a big "nothing burger" with regards to policy changes, speculators likely covered their positions. The speeches from Yellen and Draghi were not totally without meaningful content, however. They both warned about the potential risks from dialing back some of the post-crisis regulatory changes to the infrastructure of the global financial system. Both of them went as far as stating that the stronger regulatory backdrop has been a major factor behind the current health of the global economy: Yellen: "Our more resilient financial system is better prepared to absorb, rather than amplify, adverse shocks, as has been illustrated during periods of market turbulence in recent years." Draghi: "[...] lax regulation runs the risk of stoking financial imbalances. By contrast, the stronger regulatory regime that we now have has enabled economies to endure a long period of low interest rates without any significant side-effects." This is an interesting way to spin the events of the past decade. Yes, regulatory reforms have forced global banks to hold higher levels of capital. This should, in theory, help mitigate the spillover effects on the real economy from periodic financial market sell-offs that could make banks more risk-averse. Yet central banks have, at the same time, maintained incredibly loose monetary policies that have helped support both global growth and bull markets in risk assets (Chart of the Week). It is, at best, complacency and, at worst, hubris for Yellen or Draghi to say that the financial system can handle market shocks better when their own hyper-easy monetary policies are a big reason why asset markets have avoided protracted sell-offs. "Buy the dip" is an easy investment strategy when central banks are providing a liquidity tailwind while keeping risk-free interest rates at unattractive levels. Yet market valuations are now at the point where the payoff to buying the dips will be much lower than in recent years, presenting a challenge to financial stability for policymakers looking to incrementally become less accommodative. In Charts 2A & 2B, we show the range of asset prices and valuations for key fixed income and equity markets since 1990. The blue dots in each panel represent the latest reading, while the historical ranges are the thick lines. The benchmark 10-year government bond yields for the U.S., Germany, Japan and the U.K. are shown in Chart 2A, both in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms.1 In Chart 2B, the trailing price-earnings multiples for global equity markets and option-adjusted spreads for the major global credit sectors (corporate bonds and Emerging Market debt) are displayed. Chart 2AGlobal Asset Valuations, 1990-2017 A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Chart 2BGlobal Asset Valuations, 1990-2017 A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Within fixed income, nominal government bond yields and credit spreads are trading at the low end of the historical ranges. Equity valuations are not yet at the stretched extremes seen during the late 1990s dot-com bubble, although longer-term measures like the CAPE (cyclically-adjusted price earnings) ratio are much closer to all-time highs. By any measure, most financial assets are not cheap, thanks in large part to the easy monetary backdrop. Right now, the current tranquil market backdrop is increasingly at risk from a shift in monetary policies. The Fed and ECB are still confronted with the problem of tight labor markets alongside tame inflation (Chart 3). While there has been a much more vigorous debate among central bankers on the effectiveness of using a Phillips Curve framework for forecasting inflation, the plain truth is that policymakers do not have any reliable alternative. The best they can do is stick with the unemployment-versus-inflation trade-off and go more slowly on policy adjustments when inflation undershoots levels suggested by strong labor markets. At the moment, there is no immediate need for either the Fed or ECB to tighten monetary policy. Realized inflation rates on both sides of the Atlantic are still below the 2% target. Our Central Bank Monitors for the U.S. and Euro Area are both hovering around the zero line (Chart 4), also indicating that no imminent changes in the policy stance are required. Chart 3Fed & ECB Facing The Same##BR##Phillips Curve Dilemma Fed & ECB Facing The Same Phillips Curve Dilemma Fed & ECB Facing The Same Phillips Curve Dilemma Chart 4Bond & FX Markets Look Fully##BR##Priced For A Stronger Europe Bond & FX Markets Look Fully Priced For A Stronger Europe Bond & FX Markets Look Fully Priced For A Stronger Europe The improvement in the Euro Area Monitor is related to both faster domestic economic growth and a slow-but-steady rise in inflation, trends that are likely to be maintained over at least the next 6-12 months given the strength of European leading economic indicators. However, the decline in the U.S. Monitor is largely a function of the recent surprising dip in U.S. inflation (both prices and wages) over the past few months. We expect that to soon begin to reverse on the back of reaccelerating U.S. growth and a rebound in inflation fueled in part by the lagged impact of the weaker U.S. dollar. The greenback's decline this year versus the euro has been a reflection of a more rapid improvement in European economic growth (3rd panel). Although this looks to have overshot with the EUR/USD exchange rate rising far more rapidly than implied by interest rate differentials between the U.S. and Europe (bottom panel). This either suggests that European bond yields must rise relative to U.S. yields to justify the current level of EUR/USD (a UST-Bund spread close to 100bs based on the relationship over the past three years), or that the currency must pull back to valuations more consistent with interest rate differentials (around 1.10, also based on the post-2014 correlations). The easier path is for the currency to soften up rather than European bond yields rising faster than U.S. Treasuries. The ECB is still far from contemplating an actual interest rate hike, and is only debating the need to continue buying European bonds at the current pace. At the same time, there is now barely one full 25bp Fed rate hike discounted by the market, which makes Treasuries more vulnerable to the rebound in U.S. growth and inflation that we expect. That outcome is not conditional on any easing of U.S. fiscal policy, but any success by the Trump White House in delivering tax cuts would only force the Fed to hike rates to offset the stimulus to an economy already at full employment. In other words, we see more reasons for both U.S. Treasury yields and the U.S. dollar to go up from current levels versus European equivalents. Bottom Line: Last week's Fed conference at Jackson Hole did not produce any signals on policy shifts from the Fed or ECB. Yet the outlook for either central bank over the next year has not changed. The Fed will deliver more hikes than currently discounted by the market, while the ECB will taper the pace of its asset purchases. A below-benchmark duration stance is warranted on a 6-12 month horizon. A Brief Update On The Performance Of Our Corporate Bond Sector Allocation Recommendations Chart 5Performance Of Our IG Sector Allocations A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing We last published an update of our Investment Grade (IG) sector valuation models for the U.S., Euro Area and U.K. back on June 6th.2 This followed up on our report from January 24th of this year where we added our IG sector recommendations to our model bond portfolio.3 That meant putting actual weightings to each sub-sector within the overall IG index for each region, rather than a more nebulous "overweight", "underweight" or "neutral" recommendation. This was in keeping with the spirit of our overall model bond portfolio framework, which is to present a more transparent measure of how our recommended tilts would perform as a hypothetical fully-invested fixed income portfolio. Our IG sector allocations come from our IG relative value model, which is designed to measure the valuation of each sector relative to the overall Barclays Bloomberg corporate bond index for each region. The latest output of the model can be found in the Appendix on page 14. The current valuations have not changed material from that June 6th report, suggesting that the rally in corporate bond markets has been more about beta driving the valuations of all sectors. In other words, the sectors have maintained their value relative to each other and to the overall IG index over the past few months. Having said that, our sector allocations have still been able to deliver some extra return versus the regional benchmarks since we started putting specific weights to our sector tilts back in January. Since then, our sector tilts have added +3bps of "active" excess return (i.e. returns over duration-matched government bonds) versus the IG benchmark in the U.S., +9bps in the Euro Area and an impressive +32bps in the U.K. (Chart 5). Most of that outperformance came between January and our last update, with only the U.K. showing gains since June. The specifics of the returns can be found in Table 1 for the U.S., Table 2 for the Euro Area and Table 3 for the U.K. For all three regions, the biggest source of the outperformance of our allocations has come from the overweight positions in Financials, specifically Banks. As any corporate bond portfolio manager will attest, the large weighting of Financials in IG bond indices makes the Financials versus Non-Financials decision the most important one to make. Our model bond portfolio is no different. Table 1U.S. Investment Grade Performance A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Table 2Euro Area Investment Grade Performance A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Table 3U.K. Investment Grade Performance A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Looking ahead, we expect that sector allocations may soon begin to have a greater impact on the performance of IG corporate bond portfolios, given how flat credit curves have become (Chart 6). The spread between BBB-rated corporates and A-rated corporates is at historically narrow levels in all regions. The flattening of credit curves may be reaching a resistance level in the U.S. and U.K., but not so in the Euro Area where the gap between BBB-rated and A-rated corporates is now a mere 34bps. Chart 6Credit Quality Curves Are Very Flat Credit Quality Curves Are Very Flat Credit Quality Curves Are Very Flat The combination of a solid Euro Area economic upturn and persistent ECB buying of corporates as part of its asset purchase program has driven a reduction of risk premiums throughout the Euro Area credit markets. Given our expectation that the ECB will be forced to begin tapering its asset purchase program in 2018, including the pace of corporate buying, we continue to maintain an underweight allocation to Euro Area IG corporates in our overall model portfolio. We are also seeking to limit our overall recommended spread risk to around index levels using our preferred metric, Duration Times Spread (DTS). At the same time, we are maintaining our recommended overweights to U.S. IG and U.K. IG, sticking with above-benchmark tilts in the Banks, while maintaining a portfolio DTS close to the overall index DTS. In the U.S., we are also keeping an overweight bias on Energy-related sectors, which offer the most attractive valuations despite having a higher DTS than the overall benchmark index. Our underweights in higher DTS U.S. sectors, specifically in the Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Utilities groupings, offset the DTS exposure from our recommended Energy overweight. Bottom Line: Our Investment Grade (IG) corporate sector allocations for the U.S., Euro Area and U.K., taken from our relative value models, have generated outperformance versus the regional benchmarks since the beginning of the year, led by overweights to Banks. The alpha of sector selection should start to outweigh the beta of owning corporates in the next 6-12 months, given the tight overall level of spreads and flat credit curves. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 In the bottom panel of Chart 2A, we deflate nominal 10-year bond yields by a 3-year moving average of realized headline inflation to smooth out the fluctuations in inflation. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Updating Our Investment Grade Corporate Bond Sector Allocations", dated June 6th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Adding Investment Grade Corporate Bond Sectors To Our Model Portfolio Framework", dated January 24th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Appendix Table 1U.S. Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Appendix Chart 1U.S. Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Appendix Table 2Euro Area Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Appendix Chart 2Euro Area Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Appendix Table 3U.K. Corporate Sector Valuation And Recommended Allocation* A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Appendix Chart 3U.K. Corporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing A "Hole" Lot Of Nothing