Europe

Highlights The U.K. election was about austerity, not Brexit; The median voter in the U.K. and the U.S. has moved to the left; Nationalism will not satisfy the popular revolt in these countries; The pound is not likely to fall much below GBP/USD 1.2. Feature The political consequences of the extraordinary U.K. general election are still not clear. The coalition-building process will take time as the horse-trading between parties proceeds over the weekend. Our high-conviction view, however, is that the investment implications were in fact already self-evident and do not require foresight into the eventual make-up of the U.K. government. How can that be? Last year, in anticipation of unorthodox electoral results, we introduced the "Median Voter Theory."1 This theory in political science posits that policymakers are not price-makers but price takers in the political marketplace. The price maker is the median voter. Policymakers, of all stripes and colors, will attempt to approximate the policy demands of the median voter in order to win over as many voters as they can in the marketplace. Further, we argued that the median voter in the two most laissez-faire economies, the U.S. and the U.K., had moved to the left of the economic spectrum.2 The U.K. election confirms this argument. It also confirms our suspicion that the plebian revolts in these two bastions of free-market capitalism will not be extinguished merely by rallying the public around the flag and promoting nationalist themes of de-globalization.3 As such, the two trends we believe will emerge from this election, regardless of the ultimate political outcome, are: The Brexit process will continue, albeit toward a "softer" variety and with a somewhat higher probability of eventual reversal; Fiscal austerity is dead in Britain and investors should expect its economic policy - under whatever leadership ultimately gains power - to swing firmly to the left on fiscal, trade, and regulatory policy. Because of this mix of policy outcomes, we expect the GBP to suffer little in the post-election environment, though heading back towards its January lows versus the USD later this year. The market will have to price in much looser fiscal policy out of the U.K. over the course of the next government, with expectations that the BoE will continue to stand pat. This Election Was About Austerity And Globalization, Not Brexit It is absolutely crucial for investors to understand that the Labour Party did not, in any way whatsoever, focus its campaign on the results of the Brexit referendum. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's strategy was not only to accept Brexit as a done deal, but ostensibly even to accept the "hard Brexit" of keeping the U.K. out of the Common Market, which PM Theresa May announced in a major policy speech on January 17. The three policy positions of the Labour Party on Brexit during the campaign were: Gain "tariff-free access" to the EU single market, while accepting that Common Market membership was off the table; Keep the option of negotiating a customs union - which would prohibit the U.K. from negotiating its own trade deals - on the table; Refuse the mantra that "no deal" is better than a "bad deal." Overall, these points are not too far from Tory strategy, although they are devoid of nationalist rhetoric. More importantly, the key difference between the Labour and Tory approach to Brexit was that Labour was not trying to entice blue-collar voters, battered by the winds of globalization, with promises of free-trade agreements with India and China. If last year's Brexit voters did not want a free-trade tie-up with Europe, why on earth would they support a Tory vision of free trade deals with China and India?! Jeremy Corbyn's Labour has, in other words, a much better handle on what the Brexit referendum was all about. As we concluded in our net assessment ahead of the referendum in March of last year, the vote would ultimately be about globalization and its impact on the economic wellbeing of the median voter in the U.K. (Chart 1), not the angst over the EU's technocratic elites and bureaucratic overreach.4 Yes, the latter also mattered, but not to the blue-collar voters who crossed the aisle to support the Tory/UKIP vision on Brexit. For them, Brexit was a vote against elites that have profited from globalization. Election polls gave investors a hint that blue-collar Brexit voters would shift back to Labour. Tories began to see a drop in support almost immediately after they called the election on April 18 - i.e. before May's various mistakes (Chart 2). All the subsequent gaffes by May reinforced the trend, but the trend started on the first day of campaigning. This suggested that traditional Labour voters were turning back to their bread-and-butter economic demands immediately as the campaign began. Chart 1Brits Exposed To Harsher Change Brits Exposed To Harsher Change Brits Exposed To Harsher Change Chart 2Labour Rally Began When Election Called Labour Rally Began When Election Called Labour Rally Began When Election Called Corbyn, who has been underestimated by the media for over a year, was quick to press the gas pedal on left-wing economic issues, steering clear of Brexit. In fact, if one was unfamiliar with British politics, and only focused on the Labour campaign rhetoric, one would hardly know that a referendum on EU membership had even taken place. Corbyn's campaign was straight out of the Labour playbook of the 1980s. He gambled that the median voter had swung to the left. In particular, the Labour campaign pounced on three policy issues that isolated Tory tone-deafness on the unpopularity of austerity: "Dementia tax" - May's quip that the elderly would be means-tested by including the value of their homes in assessing government support for social care ultimately proved to be profoundly self-harming. At the moment when she made the gaffe, Tories were up 11% on Labour in the polls. "Triple Lock" - May hesitated and waffled over the triple lock pension system - which was introduced by the Conservative and Liberal Democratic coalition from 2010-15. It guaranteed that government pension payouts would rise annually at the highest rate of inflation, 2.5% per year, or wage growth. She did so even as inflationary pressures built up as a result of Brexit, which similarly fell flat with voters. This is unsurprising, given that it was the Euroskeptic Tories and UKIP plan to exit the EU that caused inflationary pressures in the economy in the first place. That they then asked low-income elderly to shoulder the costs of Brexit also illustrates a profound misunderstanding of what the Brexit referendum was about. Police funding - May thought that the Manchester and London Bridge terrorist attacks would swing the vote towards the center-right, security-conscious party. She went so far as to announce that human rights concerns would not stand in the way of Britain's fight against terrorism, doubling down on nationalist rhetoric.5 Corbyn stuck to the strategy of tying everything to austerity: he condemned the attacks but criticized the Tories for significant cuts to police forces under May's watch as Home Secretary, claiming that these imperiled law enforcement's ability to keep U.K. citizens safe. Following Brexit, May did try to shift policy to the left. For example, her October 2016 speech - her first major address as the U.K. Prime Minister - blamed "globalized elites" for the pain incurred by Britain's low and medium income households. However, Tories could not help to subsequently promise corporate tax cuts and budget-saving measures. And her gaffes during the election convinced voters - many of whom may have voted for Brexit - that Tories were stereotypical Tories; i.e., not concerned for the plight of the common man. All that said, the Conservative Party will still win around 57 seats more than the Labour Party. In any previous election, that would be considered a decent, if not commanding, result. What we want to stress to clients is that the Conservative Party in fact only won 22 more seats than the combined result of the most left-wing Labour Party in half a century and an extremely left-leaning Scottish National Party. When seen from that perspective, and when we consider the Tories' 22% lead in polls at the onset of the electoral campaign, the result on June 8 is an unmitigated disaster for the party and a wake-up call: the economic preferences of the U.K.'s median voter are as left wing as they have been since the mid-1920s. Bottom Line: The U.K. election was not contested solely on Brexit. As such, investors should not overthink the implications of the election on the Brexit process and hence the implications for the pound and U.K. assets. Labour gained around 29 more seats despite firmly accepting the Brexit referendum. This is not to say that the Labour Party, were it to cobble together a governing coalition with the SNP and others, would not be quick to reverse the Brexit process and call a second referendum if the economic costs of Brexit were to rise over the course of its mandate. That is a possible scenario. But the bigger picture is that Labour's opposition to austerity politics is what made all the difference in this election. Likely Government Formation Scenarios At the time of publication of this Client Note, May's comments and the distribution of seats favor a Tory minority government (or perhaps a formal coalition) supported by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. As we discussed in our just-published Weekly Report, the Northern Irish have not exercised real power in Westminster in a century, literally.6 The party won ten seats, which makes for a majority with the Tories, and thus could provide just enough support to accomplish the single goal of a Tory-led Brexit. Tories and the DUP have already been in an informal coalition due to the Tories' attempts to increase their earlier majority of only 17 seats. Nonetheless, such a coalition will be controversial and will lead to uncertainties about parliament's ability to pass a final Brexit deal in 2019. Currently, such an arrangement would see a Tory government depend on the slimmest of majorities, around two seats over the 326 needed for a nominal majority. However, because the Irish nationalist Sinn Fein MPs (who gained seven seats this time around) normally do not sit in the parliament, and because the speaker and deputy speakers do not vote, Tory's would have some buffer. (And yet the extraordinary circumstances suggest that one should not rule out Sinn Fein taking up their seats!) How much political capital would a May-led government have? Extremely little. First of all, not only did the Tories squander an extraordinary lead in the polls, but their ultimate share of the total population's vote is merely 2.4% above Labour's haul (Chart 3). In fact, the only thing that saved the Tories from opposition is the U.K.'s first-past-the-post electoral system, which allowed them to win more seats merely by being the only right-of-center option for British voters. Chart 3 In addition, it is now clear that May failed to get all of the UKIP voters to swing to the center-right, establishment party. The UKIP vote declined by over 11% in the election, but the Tory net gain in percentage terms from the last election is only half that figure. This supports our view from above that many blue-collar voters, who voted for Brexit, swung back to the Labour party the minute the election was announced, reflecting deep distrust of the Tory Party on bread-and-butter, non-Brexit issues. A slim government majority made possible by a Euroskeptic Northern Irish Party will ensure that the Brexit process continues. Would Euroskeptic Tories have a bigger say in such a government, forcing May to swing further to the nationalist right and leading to acrimony with Europe? Normally we would say "yes." However, it was May's turn to the nationalist right at the expense of nurturing left-leaning economic policies that cost her a majority. As such, we doubt that she, or her potential replacement in the wake of the disastrous result, would double-down on more Euroskepticism. That would be a profound error following a clear signal from the electorate that nationalist rhetoric and Brexit chest-beating is insufficient to bolster the Conservative Party in the post-Brexit environment. As May herself said, Brexit means Brexit. The median voter appears to agree and now wants the government to move on by turning the U.K. away from austere economic policies. We suspect the Tories understand this now. As for a potential Labour coalition with the SNP and Liberal Democratic Party, the numbers do not add up at the moment. Nonetheless, if we combine all the left-of-center parties in the U.K., their share of total vote is 52%. As such, we expect the Tories, assuming they govern, to tilt to the left on the economic front. Bottom Line: Tories are likely to produce a government in some kind of coalition with Northern Irish DUP. We highly doubt that they will double down on Euroskepticism after that strategy proved so disastrous in the election. The U.K. voters have moved on from Brexit and are not interested in re-litigating the reasons for it. They are, however, interested in seeing a definitive end to austerity. Investment Implications Another reason this election is not a game changer on anything other than domestic economic policy is that the Scottish National Party sustained serious losses of 21 seats. Former banner-bearing member Alex Salmond even lost his seat. Voters are simply not interested in the constitutional struggles within the U.K. or the EU at this point. The key takeaway for investors is that fiscal policy is the driving issue in British politics. Brexit was not only a vote about sovereignty and immigration, it was also a demand from the lower and middle classes for an end to second-class status. That is why May highlighted the need for government to moderate the forces of globalization and capitalism and make the economy "work for everyone" in her October 2016 speech at the Conservative Party conference and in her rhetoric since then. She lost sight of her own message and squandered her massive lead. The Tories had started to ease fiscal policy ahead of the election. In his first Autumn Statement, Chancellor Philip Hammond abandoned his predecessor George Osborne's promise to eliminate the budget deficit by 2019, pushing the timeline beyond 2022 (Chart 4). The latest budget projections by the Office for Budget Responsibility show that the current government is projecting more spending than its predecessor (Chart 5). Chart 4 Chart 5 Thus monetary and fiscal conditions are both accommodative in the short and medium term. Given that we do not expect the European Union to exact crippling measures on the Brits for leaving, as we have outlined in previous reports, the result is a relatively benign environment for the U.K., at least until the business cycle turns, the effects of Brexit begin to bite, and/or global growth slows down. The combination of fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy, however, should weigh on the pound regardless of the election outcome. We do not expect the GBP to retest its January 16, 2016 lows against the USD in the near term, but the large amount of uncertainty injected into the British political sphere will nonetheless result in a few more days of cable weakness that can be exploited by short-term traders. The competing crosswinds confusing investors in the immediacy of the election are as follow: Jeremy Corbyn's Labour is as left-wing as any major center-left party has become in the West. Yet it just won over 40% of the vote in the U.K.; Brexit remains the likely outcome of U.K.-EU negotiations, but the chances of a "super hard Brexit" or some sort of a "Brexit cliff" have been reduced as voters have repudiated May's hard right turn; The pound has already fallen on every gaffe and misstep by the Tories, suggesting that the current disappointing result, although not fully priced, was partly anticipated by the FX markets. In the long term, however, a reversal of austerity and a relatively dovish monetary policy from the BoE should be negative for the pound. While less austerity is a big plus for the economy, the inflationary momentum experienced in recent months should increase further and dampen the fiscal dividend as higher prices hurt real spending (Chart 6). This puts the BoE in a bind, in which it will be hard to move away from its super-accommodative stance even if inflation is becoming dangerous. Thanks to these dynamics, the leftward tilt for one of the previously most laissez-faire economies in the world could see the GBP ultimately retest its January 16 lows over the medium term as the recent surge in FDI could peter off, increasing the cost of financing the U.K.'s large current-account deficit. Moreover, BCA's House View calls for a higher dollar by year's end, another negative for cable. Yet a fall much below GBP/USD 1.2 is unlikely, given that uncertainty over Brexit negotiations with the EU were overstated to begin with and likely to be resolved towards a "softer Brexit" outcome over the life of the next government. Additionally, the pound is now cheap, and another pullback would result in a more than 1-sigma undervaluation relative to long-term fundamentals (Chart 7). Chart 6The BOE's Dilemma The BOE's Dilemma The BOE's Dilemma Chart 7The Pound Enjoys A Valuation Cushion The Pound Enjoys A Valuation Cushion The Pound Enjoys A Valuation Cushion Is there a message for the rest of the world from the U.K. election? Absolutely. It signals that the voters who did not benefit from globalization are singularly focused on economic issues and that distracting them with nationalism will only go so far. This is a message that the Trump administration in the U.S. will either heed over the next three years or ignore and suffer a left-wing backlash in the 2020 election that will unsettle the markets in a fundamental way.7 The bastions of laissez-faire economics - the U.K. and the U.S. - are swinging to the left. We continue to believe that investors are unprepared for the consequences of this reality. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Throwing The Baby (Globalization) Out With The Bath Water (Deflation)," dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 The failure of May's tough rhetoric on terrorism to help her in the polls suggests, along with other evidence, that Europeans are becoming desensitized to terror attacks. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Bull Market For Terror," dated August 5, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk?" dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The U.K. election was about austerity, not Brexit; The median voter in the U.K. and the U.S. has moved to the left; Nationalism will not satisfy the popular revolt in these countries; The pound is not likely to fall much below GBP/USD 1.2. Feature The political consequences of the extraordinary U.K. general election are still not clear. The coalition-building process will take time as the horse-trading between parties proceeds over the weekend. Our high-conviction view, however, is that the investment implications were in fact already self-evident and do not require foresight into the eventual make-up of the U.K. government. How can that be? Last year, in anticipation of unorthodox electoral results, we introduced the "Median Voter Theory."1 This theory in political science posits that policymakers are not price-makers but price takers in the political marketplace. The price maker is the median voter. Policymakers, of all stripes and colors, will attempt to approximate the policy demands of the median voter in order to win over as many voters as they can in the marketplace. Further, we argued that the median voter in the two most laissez-faire economies, the U.S. and the U.K., had moved to the left of the economic spectrum.2 The U.K. election confirms this argument. It also confirms our suspicion that the plebian revolts in these two bastions of free-market capitalism will not be extinguished merely by rallying the public around the flag and promoting nationalist themes of de-globalization.3 As such, the two trends we believe will emerge from this election, regardless of the ultimate political outcome, are: The Brexit process will continue, albeit toward a "softer" variety and with a somewhat higher probability of eventual reversal; Fiscal austerity is dead in Britain and investors should expect its economic policy - under whatever leadership ultimately gains power - to swing firmly to the left on fiscal, trade, and regulatory policy. Because of this mix of policy outcomes, we expect the GBP to suffer little in the post-election environment, though heading back towards its January lows versus the USD later this year. The market will have to price in much looser fiscal policy out of the U.K. over the course of the next government, with expectations that the BoE will continue to stand pat. This Election Was About Austerity And Globalization, Not Brexit It is absolutely crucial for investors to understand that the Labour Party did not, in any way whatsoever, focus its campaign on the results of the Brexit referendum. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's strategy was not only to accept Brexit as a done deal, but ostensibly even to accept the "hard Brexit" of keeping the U.K. out of the Common Market, which PM Theresa May announced in a major policy speech on January 17. The three policy positions of the Labour Party on Brexit during the campaign were: Gain "tariff-free access" to the EU single market, while accepting that Common Market membership was off the table; Keep the option of negotiating a customs union - which would prohibit the U.K. from negotiating its own trade deals - on the table; Refuse the mantra that "no deal" is better than a "bad deal." Overall, these points are not too far from Tory strategy, although they are devoid of nationalist rhetoric. More importantly, the key difference between the Labour and Tory approach to Brexit was that Labour was not trying to entice blue-collar voters, battered by the winds of globalization, with promises of free-trade agreements with India and China. If last year's Brexit voters did not want a free-trade tie-up with Europe, why on earth would they support a Tory vision of free trade deals with China and India?! Jeremy Corbyn's Labour has, in other words, a much better handle on what the Brexit referendum was all about. As we concluded in our net assessment ahead of the referendum in March of last year, the vote would ultimately be about globalization and its impact on the economic wellbeing of the median voter in the U.K. (Chart 1), not the angst over the EU's technocratic elites and bureaucratic overreach.4 Yes, the latter also mattered, but not to the blue-collar voters who crossed the aisle to support the Tory/UKIP vision on Brexit. For them, Brexit was a vote against elites that have profited from globalization. Election polls gave investors a hint that blue-collar Brexit voters would shift back to Labour. Tories began to see a drop in support almost immediately after they called the election on April 18 - i.e. before May's various mistakes (Chart 2). All the subsequent gaffes by May reinforced the trend, but the trend started on the first day of campaigning. This suggested that traditional Labour voters were turning back to their bread-and-butter economic demands immediately as the campaign began. Chart 1Brits Exposed To Harsher Change Brits Exposed To Harsher Change Brits Exposed To Harsher Change Chart 2Labour Rally Began When Election Called Labour Rally Began When Election Called Labour Rally Began When Election Called Corbyn, who has been underestimated by the media for over a year, was quick to press the gas pedal on left-wing economic issues, steering clear of Brexit. In fact, if one was unfamiliar with British politics, and only focused on the Labour campaign rhetoric, one would hardly know that a referendum on EU membership had even taken place. Corbyn's campaign was straight out of the Labour playbook of the 1980s. He gambled that the median voter had swung to the left. In particular, the Labour campaign pounced on three policy issues that isolated Tory tone-deafness on the unpopularity of austerity: "Dementia tax" - May's quip that the elderly would be means-tested by including the value of their homes in assessing government support for social care ultimately proved to be profoundly self-harming. At the moment when she made the gaffe, Tories were up 11% on Labour in the polls. "Triple Lock" - May hesitated and waffled over the triple lock pension system - which was introduced by the Conservative and Liberal Democratic coalition from 2010-15. It guaranteed that government pension payouts would rise annually at the highest rate of inflation, 2.5% per year, or wage growth. She did so even as inflationary pressures built up as a result of Brexit, which similarly fell flat with voters. This is unsurprising, given that it was the Euroskeptic Tories and UKIP plan to exit the EU that caused inflationary pressures in the economy in the first place. That they then asked low-income elderly to shoulder the costs of Brexit also illustrates a profound misunderstanding of what the Brexit referendum was about. Police funding - May thought that the Manchester and London Bridge terrorist attacks would swing the vote towards the center-right, security-conscious party. She went so far as to announce that human rights concerns would not stand in the way of Britain's fight against terrorism, doubling down on nationalist rhetoric.5 Corbyn stuck to the strategy of tying everything to austerity: he condemned the attacks but criticized the Tories for significant cuts to police forces under May's watch as Home Secretary, claiming that these imperiled law enforcement's ability to keep U.K. citizens safe. Following Brexit, May did try to shift policy to the left. For example, her October 2016 speech - her first major address as the U.K. Prime Minister - blamed "globalized elites" for the pain incurred by Britain's low and medium income households. However, Tories could not help to subsequently promise corporate tax cuts and budget-saving measures. And her gaffes during the election convinced voters - many of whom may have voted for Brexit - that Tories were stereotypical Tories; i.e., not concerned for the plight of the common man. All that said, the Conservative Party will still win around 57 seats more than the Labour Party. In any previous election, that would be considered a decent, if not commanding, result. What we want to stress to clients is that the Conservative Party in fact only won 22 more seats than the combined result of the most left-wing Labour Party in half a century and an extremely left-leaning Scottish National Party. When seen from that perspective, and when we consider the Tories' 22% lead in polls at the onset of the electoral campaign, the result on June 8 is an unmitigated disaster for the party and a wake-up call: the economic preferences of the U.K.'s median voter are as left wing as they have been since the mid-1920s. Bottom Line: The U.K. election was not contested solely on Brexit. As such, investors should not overthink the implications of the election on the Brexit process and hence the implications for the pound and U.K. assets. Labour gained around 29 more seats despite firmly accepting the Brexit referendum. This is not to say that the Labour Party, were it to cobble together a governing coalition with the SNP and others, would not be quick to reverse the Brexit process and call a second referendum if the economic costs of Brexit were to rise over the course of its mandate. That is a possible scenario. But the bigger picture is that Labour's opposition to austerity politics is what made all the difference in this election. Likely Government Formation Scenarios At the time of publication of this Client Note, May's comments and the distribution of seats favor a Tory minority government (or perhaps a formal coalition) supported by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. As we discussed in our just-published Weekly Report, the Northern Irish have not exercised real power in Westminster in a century, literally.6 The party won ten seats, which makes for a majority with the Tories, and thus could provide just enough support to accomplish the single goal of a Tory-led Brexit. Tories and the DUP have already been in an informal coalition due to the Tories' attempts to increase their earlier majority of only 17 seats. Nonetheless, such a coalition will be controversial and will lead to uncertainties about parliament's ability to pass a final Brexit deal in 2019. Currently, such an arrangement would see a Tory government depend on the slimmest of majorities, around two seats over the 326 needed for a nominal majority. However, because the Irish nationalist Sinn Fein MPs (who gained seven seats this time around) normally do not sit in the parliament, and because the speaker and deputy speakers do not vote, Tory's would have some buffer. (And yet the extraordinary circumstances suggest that one should not rule out Sinn Fein taking up their seats!) How much political capital would a May-led government have? Extremely little. First of all, not only did the Tories squander an extraordinary lead in the polls, but their ultimate share of the total population's vote is merely 2.4% above Labour's haul (Chart 3). In fact, the only thing that saved the Tories from opposition is the U.K.'s first-past-the-post electoral system, which allowed them to win more seats merely by being the only right-of-center option for British voters. Chart 3 In addition, it is now clear that May failed to get all of the UKIP voters to swing to the center-right, establishment party. The UKIP vote declined by over 11% in the election, but the Tory net gain in percentage terms from the last election is only half that figure. This supports our view from above that many blue-collar voters, who voted for Brexit, swung back to the Labour party the minute the election was announced, reflecting deep distrust of the Tory Party on bread-and-butter, non-Brexit issues. A slim government majority made possible by a Euroskeptic Northern Irish Party will ensure that the Brexit process continues. Would Euroskeptic Tories have a bigger say in such a government, forcing May to swing further to the nationalist right and leading to acrimony with Europe? Normally we would say "yes." However, it was May's turn to the nationalist right at the expense of nurturing left-leaning economic policies that cost her a majority. As such, we doubt that she, or her potential replacement in the wake of the disastrous result, would double-down on more Euroskepticism. That would be a profound error following a clear signal from the electorate that nationalist rhetoric and Brexit chest-beating is insufficient to bolster the Conservative Party in the post-Brexit environment. As May herself said, Brexit means Brexit. The median voter appears to agree and now wants the government to move on by turning the U.K. away from austere economic policies. We suspect the Tories understand this now. As for a potential Labour coalition with the SNP and Liberal Democratic Party, the numbers do not add up at the moment. Nonetheless, if we combine all the left-of-center parties in the U.K., their share of total vote is 52%. As such, we expect the Tories, assuming they govern, to tilt to the left on the economic front. Bottom Line: Tories are likely to produce a government in some kind of coalition with Northern Irish DUP. We highly doubt that they will double down on Euroskepticism after that strategy proved so disastrous in the election. The U.K. voters have moved on from Brexit and are not interested in re-litigating the reasons for it. They are, however, interested in seeing a definitive end to austerity. Investment Implications Another reason this election is not a game changer on anything other than domestic economic policy is that the Scottish National Party sustained serious losses of 21 seats. Former banner-bearing member Alex Salmond even lost his seat. Voters are simply not interested in the constitutional struggles within the U.K. or the EU at this point. The key takeaway for investors is that fiscal policy is the driving issue in British politics. Brexit was not only a vote about sovereignty and immigration, it was also a demand from the lower and middle classes for an end to second-class status. That is why May highlighted the need for government to moderate the forces of globalization and capitalism and make the economy "work for everyone" in her October 2016 speech at the Conservative Party conference and in her rhetoric since then. She lost sight of her own message and squandered her massive lead. The Tories had started to ease fiscal policy ahead of the election. In his first Autumn Statement, Chancellor Philip Hammond abandoned his predecessor George Osborne's promise to eliminate the budget deficit by 2019, pushing the timeline beyond 2022 (Chart 4). The latest budget projections by the Office for Budget Responsibility show that the current government is projecting more spending than its predecessor (Chart 5). Chart 4 Chart 5 Thus monetary and fiscal conditions are both accommodative in the short and medium term. Given that we do not expect the European Union to exact crippling measures on the Brits for leaving, as we have outlined in previous reports, the result is a relatively benign environment for the U.K., at least until the business cycle turns, the effects of Brexit begin to bite, and/or global growth slows down. The combination of fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy, however, should weigh on the pound regardless of the election outcome. We do not expect the GBP to retest its January 16, 2016 lows against the USD in the near term, but the large amount of uncertainty injected into the British political sphere will nonetheless result in a few more days of cable weakness that can be exploited by short-term traders. The competing crosswinds confusing investors in the immediacy of the election are as follow: Jeremy Corbyn's Labour is as left-wing as any major center-left party has become in the West. Yet it just won over 40% of the vote in the U.K.; Brexit remains the likely outcome of U.K.-EU negotiations, but the chances of a "super hard Brexit" or some sort of a "Brexit cliff" have been reduced as voters have repudiated May's hard right turn; The pound has already fallen on every gaffe and misstep by the Tories, suggesting that the current disappointing result, although not fully priced, was partly anticipated by the FX markets. In the long term, however, a reversal of austerity and a relatively dovish monetary policy from the BoE should be negative for the pound. While less austerity is a big plus for the economy, the inflationary momentum experienced in recent months should increase further and dampen the fiscal dividend as higher prices hurt real spending (Chart 6). This puts the BoE in a bind, in which it will be hard to move away from its super-accommodative stance even if inflation is becoming dangerous. Thanks to these dynamics, the leftward tilt for one of the previously most laissez-faire economies in the world could see the GBP ultimately retest its January 16 lows over the medium term as the recent surge in FDI could peter off, increasing the cost of financing the U.K.'s large current-account deficit. Moreover, BCA's House View calls for a higher dollar by year's end, another negative for cable. Yet a fall much below GBP/USD 1.2 is unlikely, given that uncertainty over Brexit negotiations with the EU were overstated to begin with and likely to be resolved towards a "softer Brexit" outcome over the life of the next government. Additionally, the pound is now cheap, and another pullback would result in a more than 1-sigma undervaluation relative to long-term fundamentals (Chart 7). Chart 6The BOE's Dilemma The BOE's Dilemma The BOE's Dilemma Chart 7The Pound Enjoys A Valuation Cushion The Pound Enjoys A Valuation Cushion The Pound Enjoys A Valuation Cushion Is there a message for the rest of the world from the U.K. election? Absolutely. It signals that the voters who did not benefit from globalization are singularly focused on economic issues and that distracting them with nationalism will only go so far. This is a message that the Trump administration in the U.S. will either heed over the next three years or ignore and suffer a left-wing backlash in the 2020 election that will unsettle the markets in a fundamental way.7 The bastions of laissez-faire economics - the U.K. and the U.S. - are swinging to the left. We continue to believe that investors are unprepared for the consequences of this reality. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Throwing The Baby (Globalization) Out With The Bath Water (Deflation)," dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 The failure of May's tough rhetoric on terrorism to help her in the polls suggests, along with other evidence, that Europeans are becoming desensitized to terror attacks. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Bull Market For Terror," dated August 5, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk?" dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Client, Along with this brief Weekly Report, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Chief Strategist of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the U.S. is vulnerable to serious socio-political instability by the 2020 election, as a result of the widening gulf between elites and the rest. Trump, thus far, seems unlikely to bridge this gap. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlight U.S. growth will accelerate over the remainder of the year, thanks to easier financial conditions. This will force the Federal Reserve to raise rates more than the market is currently discounting. In contrast, the BoJ and the ECB will remain on hold. The net result would be a stronger dollar. Solid Chinese growth will support commodity prices. Stay overweight global equities over a cyclical horizon of 12 months. Feature U.S. Growth Will Surprise On The Upside I have been meeting clients in Asia over the past week. The ongoing decline in Treasury yields - the 10-year yield hit a 7-month low of 2.14% this week - was a frequent topic of conversation. Investors are becoming increasingly convinced that the U.S. economy is running out of steam. The OIS curve is pricing in only 48 basis points of rate hikes over the next 12 months. Since a June rate increase is now largely seen as a done deal, the market is essentially saying the Fed will abandon its tightening cycle later this year. We think that's too early. The U.S. economy may not be on fire, but it is hardly floundering. The Blue Chip consensus estimate for Q2 growth stands at 3.1%. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is pointing to growth of 3.4%. There is little reason to think that growth will slow substantially later this year. Financial conditions have eased significantly over the past few months thanks to a weaker dollar, falling bond yields, narrower credit spreads, and higher equity prices (Chart 1). Our research has shown that GDP growth tends to react to changes in financial conditions with a lag of around 6-to-9 months (Chart 2). This means demand growth is likely to strengthen, not weaken, over the remainder of the year. Chart 1Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Financial Conditions Have Been Easing... Chart 2...Which Bodes Well For Growth ...Which Bodes Well For Growth ...Which Bodes Well For Growth Running Out Of Slack If demand growth does accelerate, does the U.S. economy have the supply capacity to fully accommodate it? We do not think so. The headline unemployment rate fell to a 16-year low of 4.3% in May. It is now half a percentage point below the Fed's estimate of full employment. The broader U-6 rate, which includes marginally-attached workers and those working part-time purely for economic reasons, dropped to 8.4%, essentially completing the roundtrip to where it was before the recession (Chart 3). Chart 3A Tight Labor Market A Tight Labor Market A Tight Labor Market Chart 4Wage Growth Is In An Uptrend Wage Growth Is In An Uptrend Wage Growth Is In An Uptrend Chart 5Wage Gains Are Broad Based Wage Gains Are Broad Based Wage Gains Are Broad Based Contrary to popular perception, wages are rising. Looking across the various official wage indices that are published on a regular basis, the underlying trend in wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% (Chart 4). The acceleration in wage growth has been broad-based, occurring across most industries, regions, and worker characteristics (Chart 5). Wage Growth: No Mystery Here Granted, wage growth is still about a percentage point lower than it was before the recession, but that can be explained by slower productivity growth and lower long-term inflation expectations (Chart 6). Real unit labor costs, which take both factors into account, are rising at a faster pace than in 2007 and close to the pace in 2000 (Chart 7). Chart 6A Secular Downtrend In Productivity Growth ##br##And Inflation Expectations A Secular Downtrend In Productivity Growth And Inflation Expectations A Secular Downtrend In Productivity Growth And Inflation Expectations Chart 7Rising Real Unit Labor Costs: ##br##A Case Of Deja-Vu Rising Real Unit Labor Costs: A Case Of Deja-Vu Rising Real Unit Labor Costs: A Case Of Deja-Vu Looking out, wage growth is likely to accelerate further. The evidence strongly suggests that the Phillips curve has a "kink" at an unemployment rate of around 5% (Chart 8). In plain English, this means that a drop in the unemployment rate from 10% to 8% tends to have little effect on inflation, while a drop from 6% to 4% does. Chart 8 The Cost Of Waiting One might argue that the Fed can afford to take a "wait and see" approach to raising rates. There is some merit to this view, but it can be taken too far. If the Fed is to have any hope of achieving a soft landing for the economy, it needs to stabilize the unemployment rate at a level close to NAIRU. This may be possible if the unemployment rate is near 4%, but it would be difficult to pull off if the rate slips much below that level. Trying to stabilize the unemployment rate when it has already fallen well below its full employment level means accepting a permanently overheated economy. A standard "expectations-augmented" Phillips curve says that this is not possible to accomplish without accepting persistently rising inflation. If the Fed did find itself in a situation where the economy were overheating, it would have no choice but to jack up rates in order push the unemployment rate to a higher level. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that once the unemployment rate starts rising, it keeps rising. Indeed, there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 9). Chart 9Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle The inescapable fact is that modern economies contain numerous feedback loops. When unemployment is falling, this generates a virtuous cycle where rising employment boosts income and confidence, leading to more spending and even lower unemployment. The exact opposite happens when unemployment starts rising. History suggests that trying to raise the unemployment rate by just a little bit is like trying to get a little bit pregnant. It's simply impossible to pull off. The implication is that the Fed will not only raise rates in line with the dots, but could actually expedite the pace of rate hikes if aggregate demand accelerates later this year, as we expect. Remember, it wasn't that long ago that a typical tightening cycle entailed eight rate hikes per year. In this context, the market's expectation of less than two hikes over the next 12 months seems implausibly low. No Tightening In Japan Or Europe Chart 10Inflation Is Way Below The BoJ's Target Inflation Is Way Below The BoJ's Target Inflation Is Way Below The BoJ's Target Could other major central banks follow in the Fed's footsteps and tighten monetary policy more aggressively than what the market is currently discounting? We doubt it. Japanese inflation is nowhere close to the BOJ's 2% target (Chart 10). And even if Japanese growth surprises significantly to the upside, the first step the authorities will take is to tighten fiscal policy by raising the sales tax. Monetary tightening remains some ways off. Likewise, while the ECB might remove a few of its emergency measures, it is nowhere close to embarking on a full-fledged tightening cycle. The ECB's own research department recently put out a paper documenting that the combined unemployment and underemployment rate currently stands at 18% of the labor force across the euro area (Chart 11). This is 3.5 points above where it was in 2008. If one excludes Germany from the picture, the level of unemployment and underemployment is seven points higher than it was in 2008. This is not the stuff of which tightening cycles are made. Meanwhile, on the other side of the English Channel, the BoE must contend with the fact that growth remains underwhelming, partly due to ongoing angst about Brexit negotiations (Chart 12). Chart 11 Chart 12U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers U.K. Is Lagging Its Peers EM Outlook Chart 13Positive Signs For The Chinese Housing Market... Positive Signs For The Chinese Housing Market... Positive Signs For The Chinese Housing Market... The outlook for EM currencies is a tougher call. On the one hand, a more hawkish Fed and broad-based dollar strength have usually been bad news for emerging markets, given that 80% of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. On the other hand, stronger global growth should support commodity prices, even if the dollar is strengthening. Our energy strategists remain particularly convinced that oil prices will rise over the remainder of this year due to robust demand growth for crude and continued OPEC discipline. Strong Chinese growth should also boost metals demand, while limiting the need for further RMB weakness. Chart 13 shows that property developers have been snapping up new land at an accelerating pace. The percentage of households who intend to buy a new home has also surged to record high levels. This bodes well for construction, and by extension, commodity demand. The strong pace of growth in excavator sales - a leading indicator for capex - confirms this trend. Meanwhile, real-time measures of Chinese industrial activity such as rail freight traffic and electricity generation remain buoyant (Chart 14). This is helping to lift producer prices, which, in turn, is fueling a rebound in industrial company profits (Chart 15). And for all the talk about the government's crackdown on credit growth, the reality is that medium-to-long term lending to nonfinancial companies has actually picked up (Chart 16). Chart 14... And Positive Signs For Chinese Capex ... And Positive Signs For Chinese Capex ... And Positive Signs For Chinese Capex Chart 15Higher Producer Prices Boosting Profits Higher Producer Prices Boosting Profits Higher Producer Prices Boosting Profits Chart 16A Positive In China's Credit Picture A Positive In China's Credit Picture A Positive In China's Credit Picture Stick With Stocks... For Now In terms of global asset allocation, we continue to recommend a cyclical (12-month) overweight in equities relative to bonds. We have a slight preference for DM over EM stocks, although given some of the positive factors supporting EM economies noted above, we do not regard this as a high-conviction view. Within the DM universe, we favour higher-beta equity markets such Japan and the euro area over the U.S. (currency hedged). In the government bond space, we would underweight U.S. Treasurys, given the likelihood that the Fed will deliver more rate hikes over the coming months than the market is currently discounting. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights 'Super Thursday' June 8 brings three potentially high-impact events for financial markets: a U.K. General Election; a ECB monetary policy meeting; and former FBI Director James Comey's testimony to the U.S. Senate intelligence committee. Each of these events has the potential to move markets - especially currencies - abruptly in either direction. Medium-term investors should use Super Thursday and its aftermath as follows: If the pound sells off, use it to buy pound/dollar. If the euro sells off, use it to buy both euro/pound and euro/dollar. Use any associated underperformance of FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 to buy this relative equity position. Feature Traders will be salivating at the prospect of three potentially high-impact events for financial markets in the space of a day: a U.K. General Election; a ECB monetary policy meeting; and former FBI Director James Comey's testimony to the U.S. Senate intelligence committee about possible collusion between the campaign of President Donald Trump and Russian officials. This report will focus on the first two of these 'Super Thursday' events. Chart of the WeekRelative Interest Expectations Must Follow Relative Economic Performance Relative Interest Expectations Must Follow Relative Economic Performance Relative Interest Expectations Must Follow Relative Economic Performance 300-340 Conservative Seats = Short-Term Pain For The Pound Chart I-2The Pound Is Where It Was When##br## The Election Was Called The Pound Is Where It Was When The Election Was Called The Pound Is Where It Was When The Election Was Called The U.K. General Election result has the potential to move the pound abruptly in either direction. Therefore, it also has the potential to drive FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 relative performance which is just an inverse currency play. But treat the U.K. election result as a trading opportunity rather than as a game changer for any investment position. Theresa May admits that she called the snap election to strengthen her narrow parliamentary majority ahead of Brexit negotiations. When she called the election, the Conservatives were riding high in the polls, and markets expected May easily to achieve her aim. Reasoning that a much strengthened majority would reduce the influence of the hard Brexiters in her party, the pound rallied (Chart I-2). But as the polls have tightened, it has given back this gain. If the number of Conservative seats does not meaningfully move up from the current 330, or worse, if the result increases uncertainty, the pound is vulnerable to a further snap sell-off. A parliamentary majority requires 326 MPs, but around 320 is enough for an effective majority because Sinn Fein MPs,1 the speaker and deputy speakers do not vote. 315 might just scrape a Conservative minority government supported by its Northern Ireland Unionist allies. Hence, if the Conservatives win 300-340 seats, a knee-jerk sell-off in the pound is likely. Chart I-3The Brexit Vote Depressed The Pound Because##br## It Depressed U.K. Interest Rate Expectations The Brexit Vote Depressed The Pound Because It Depressed U.K. Interest Rate Expectations The Brexit Vote Depressed The Pound Because It Depressed U.K. Interest Rate Expectations If the Conservatives win well above 340 seats, the pound should knee-jerk rally - as May's effective majority would strengthen enough to marginalize the hard Brexiters. If the Conservatives win well below 300 seats, the pound might also settle higher - as this is the territory of a Labour minority government supported by the Scottish National Party and Liberal Democrats, and thereby a softer Brexit. But any major moves in the pound after the election will prove to be transient, because the over-arching driver of currencies is the interplay of interest rate expectations. Chart I-3 illustrates that last year's Brexit vote depressed the pound because the shock outcome precipitated a base rate cut and depressed expectations for Bank of England interest rate policy. In contrast to the Brexit vote, the General Election result per se will not have a lasting impact on the pound because it is unlikely to change the interest rate setting calculus for the BoE relative to other central banks. The BoE has been one of the most inert central banks when it comes to changing interest rates in either direction. Last year's emergency rate cut, forced by the shock vote for Brexit, has been the BoE's only policy rate move in 8 years! We expect the BoE to continue with its policy rate inertia because U.K. real consumption is highly correlated (inversely) to inflation. When inflation is too high, real consumption is undermined, making it difficult to hike rates; when inflation is too low, real consumption tends to grow strongly, making it difficult to cut rates (Chart I-4). This mirror image performance of inflation and real consumption has tied the hands of the BoE for 8 years, and will continue to do so. Chart I-4Why The Bank Of England's Hands Are Tied Why The Bank Of England's Hands Are Tied Why The Bank Of England's Hands Are Tied With the BoE's hands tied, relative interest rate expectations - and therefore the medium-term direction of the pound - will depend on the other central bank in the respective cross rate. Which brings us neatly to the ECB. The ECB Must Follow The Hard Data Years of extreme and experimental central bank intervention have left markets hyper-sensitive to the slightest change of nuance in central bank communication. We have now come to a ridiculous state of affairs where reducing two instances of the sentence "the balance of risks remain tilted to the downside" in the March 9 ECB press conference introductory statement to just one instance in the April 27 statement is regarded as de facto monetary tightening! The slightest change of nuance in central bank communication can powerfully drive markets over a timeframe of a few weeks or months. As Peter Praet, the ECB Chief Economist, warns: "After a prolonged period of exceptional monetary policy accommodation, financial markets are particularly sensitive to any perceived change in the future course of monetary policy. (Therefore) any substantial change in communication needs to be motivated by some more evidence in the hard data." On this basis, we expect the ECB to acknowledge the hard data showing euro area growth is solid and broad, and downside risks are diminishing; but that the required upward adjustment in inflation remains sluggish. For euro/dollar, a mixed message such as this might create a near-term setback of around 2%, given that it has rallied strongly in the past 65 days and is now technically overbought (see page 8). We would regard a 2% setback for the euro as a medium-term buying opportunity. As Peter Praet points out, central banks' data-dependency means that policy must follow the hard data over a timeframe of six months or longer. The Chart of the Week, Chart I-5 and Chart I-6 should make this crystal clear. Relative interest rate expectations and bond yield spreads ultimately follow relative economic performance. Chart I-5Bond Yield Spreads Must Follow The Hard Data On Economic Growth Differentials... Bond Yield Spreads Must Follow The Hard Data On Economic Growth Differentials... Bond Yield Spreads Must Follow The Hard Data On Economic Growth Differentials... Chart I-6...And Inflation Differentials ...And Inflation Differentials ...And Inflation Differentials If, as we expect, euro area growth2 continues to perform in line with or better than the U.S. and U.K. - and inflation differentials continue to narrow - then relative interest rate expectations will also continue to converge. Even the ECB admits that its main growth worry comes not from the euro area economy itself but rather from "the considerable uncertainty surrounding the new U.S. Administration's policies." In this regard, observe that the post-Trump spike in U.S. interest rate expectations has barely unwound (Chart I-7). We think it should unwind more. And who knows, perhaps James Comey will be the immediate catalyst. Chart I-7The Trump Spike In U.S. Interest Rate Expectations Hasn't Unwound The Trump Spike In U.S. Interest Rate Expectations Hasn't Unwound The Trump Spike In U.S. Interest Rate Expectations Hasn't Unwound What To Do After Super Thursday Chart I-8Pound/Euro (Inversely) Drives ##br##FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 Pound/Euro (Inversely) Drives FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 Pound/Euro (Inversely) Drives FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 In summary, policy rate expectations - in relative terms - will structurally continue to: Get less dovish in the euro area. Remain broadly unchanged in the U.K. Get more dovish in the U.S. Hence, our structural preference for currencies is euro first, pound second, dollar third. Which brings us finally to what medium-term investors should do after Super Thursday. If the pound sells off, use it to buy pound/dollar. If the euro sells off, use it to buy both euro/pound and euro/dollar. And use any associated underperformance of FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 to buy this relative equity position (Chart I-8). Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Sinn Fein MPs are not eligible to vote because they refuse to pledge allegiance to the Queen. 2 Growth must be adjusted for different demographics. Our preference is to use real GDP per head based on working age (15-64) population. Fractal Trading Model* Euro/dollar is technically overbought, so traders can play a countertrend move. Target a 2% retracement. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 Short Euro/Dollar Short Euro/Dollar The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Merkel is not revolutionizing but reaffirming Germany's Europhile policy; An earlier date for the Italian election would bring market jitters forward from Q1 2018; Yet a new German-style electoral law would decrease the risks of a populist win; The Tories will retain their majority in U.K. elections. Fiscal policy will ease regardless of the outcome; Close long Chinese equities versus Hong Kong/Taiwan; remain overweight Euro Area equities. Feature Possible early elections in Italy and a narrowing lead for Theresa May in the June 8 U.K. election has unsettled investors over the past week. The former threatens to rekindle the flames of the Euro Area conflagration and has weighed on Euro Area equities (Chart 1). The latter threatens Prime Minister May's mandate and political capital, suggesting that the U.K.-EU Brexit negotiations could be acrimonious later this year. This report deals with both issues. Yes, Italy is a major risk to the Euro Area, and despite general awareness of the election, it is not clear to us that investors realize the depth of the risk. As such, Euro Area equities may outperform developed market peers right until the election. As for the U.K. election, we think its impact on global risk assets is non-existent and its impact on U.K. assets is likely to be fleeting. The bigger threat to global markets remains China. In a March report, we suggested that Chinese policymakers may be testing the waters for broad-based financial and industrial sector reform akin to their late 1990s efforts.1 These reforms could be deflationary in cyclical terms and thus a risk for global growth. We argued that the timeline for these efforts would have to wait for the conclusion of the nineteenth National Party Congress this fall and thus Beijing's policy represented a potential problem for 2018.2 Chart 1Italy Weighs On European Risk Assets Italy Weighs On European Risk Assets Italy Weighs On European Risk Assets Chart 2China: Monetary Tightening Takes A Toll China: Monetary Tightening Takes A Toll China: Monetary Tightening Takes A Toll Then again, President Xi Jinping may flout the rule of thumb in Chinese politics that aggressive policy actions should wait until after the five-year party congresses. Monetary tightening - which could be the first salvo of broader financial-sector reform - has already had negative effects on the real economy (Chart 2). The economic surprise index has corrected, as have China's PMI and LEI. Further Chinese tightening would invariably hurt Chinese demand for imports (Chart 3), which would have negative knock-on effects for EM economies, whose growth momentum appears to have already rolled over (Chart 4). Investors should carefully monitor China over the summer. Any signaling from policymakers that they are willing to move away from the "Socialist Put" and towards genuine deleveraging (not to mention their promised free-market reforms) would have negative global implications. Our colleague Mathieu Savary, of BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, has pointed out that Europe's economic outperformance relative to the U.S. is highly leveraged to Chinese liquidity (Chart 5).3 As such, decisions made by policymakers in Beijing will likely be more important for European asset performance than who sits in Rome's Palazzo Chigi. Chart 3Tighter Credit Impulse##br## Will Drag Down Imports Tighter Credit Impulse Will Drag Down Imports Tighter Credit Impulse Will Drag Down Imports Chart 4A Chinese Import ##br##Drag Will Hurt EM A Chinese Import Drag Will Hurt EM A Chinese Import Drag Will Hurt EM Chart 5Euro/U.S. Growth Differentials ##br##And Chinese Liquidity Euro/U.S. Growth Differentials And Chinese Liquidity Euro/U.S. Growth Differentials And Chinese Liquidity We are closing our long Chinese equities / short Taiwanese and Hong Kong equities trade for a gain of 3.45%. While policymakers are already backpedaling a bit, financial tightening inherently raises risks in an excessively leveraged economy. Europe Über Alles? Many clients are asking about German Chancellor Angela Merkel's recent comments on European unity. On the heels of the G7 summit, during which Merkel locked horns with U.S. President Donald Trump, Merkel delivered the most Europhile speech of her career: The era in which we could fully rely on others is over ... That's what I experienced over the past several days ... We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands ... But we have to know that we Europeans must fight for our own future and destiny. To many in the media and financial industry the speech seemed like a massive departure from Merkel's cautious and reticent approach to European policymaking. We could not disagree more. European integration imperatives are intrinsically geopolitical, as we have argued since 2011.4 Members of the Euro Area are integrating not because of liberal idealism or misguided dogmatism on monetary union. Rather, they are engaged in a cold, calculated, and deeply realist political project to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. This net assessment has guided our analysis of various Euro Area crises. We supported our top-down theoretical view with bottom-up data showing that European voters were not revolting against integration. Integration may be elite-driven, but it has broad popular support. Support for the common currency has never dipped below 50% (Chart 6), despite a once-in-a-generation economic crisis, and most European states are pessimistic about their separate futures outside the EU (Chart 7). Chart 6Voters Approve Of The Euro Voters Approve Of The Euro Voters Approve Of The Euro Chart 7EU Exits: Not On Horizon EU Exits: Not On Horizon EU Exits: Not On Horizon German policymakers have operated within these geopolitical confines since the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis began in the waning days of 2009. At every turn of the crisis, whenever one or another German policymaker issued a "red line" regarding what "Berlin cannot accept," the correct view was to bet against that policymaker, i.e. against any Euroskeptic outcome. Since 2010, we have seen: Numerous direct bailouts of member states; A dove appointed to lead the ECB, with Berlin's blessing; Direct ECB purchases of government bonds; Deeper fiscal and banking integration of the Euro Area, albeit at a slow pace; Expansion - not contraction - of Euro Area membership; The reversal of fiscal austerity. We were able to forecast these turns because our constraint-based methodology gave us a high-conviction view that German policymakers would ultimately be forced down the integrationist, Europhile road. The German population did not revolt against these constraints. Germans are not Euroskeptic. We have no idea why many investors think they are: there is no evidence of it in data or history. German history is replete with failed efforts to unify (and lead) the European continent by hook or by crook. The country is cursed with just enough economic prowess to be threatening to its peers and yet not enough to dominate them by force. As such, it is a German national security imperative to ensure that it does not see the rest of Europe coalesce into an economic or military alliance against it. The EU and its institutions, which allow Germany to be prosperous without the threat of an enemy coalition, are therefore worth preserving, even at a steep cost. True, the costs of bailing out Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain tested German enthusiasm for European integration. However, German support for the common currency never dipped below 60% amidst the sovereign debt crisis and has since rebounded to a record high of 81% (Chart 8). Only 20% of Germans are confident of a future outside the EU (Chart 9). Chart 8Rise Of The Europhile Germany Rise Of The Europhile Germany Rise Of The Europhile Germany Chart 9Germany: No Life After EU Death Germany: No Life After EU Death Germany: No Life After EU Death As such, Merkel's statement following the G7 summit is only surprising because it is explicit. Indeed, the reason Merkel made this statement now is not because she suddenly had a grand geopolitical realization, nor because Trump suddenly disabused her of a naïve belief in the benevolence of the United States. Merkel has understood Europe's imperatives for at least a decade. The real reason for her statement is domestic politics. Martin Schulz, Merkel's opponent in general elections to be held on September 24, has tapped into the rising Europhile sentiment among Germans. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) sprang back to life this year following Schulz's appointment as SPD chancellor-candidate. Despite a recent relapse for the SPD in the polls, Merkel wants to ensure that she is not vulnerable on her left flank to the more Europhile Social Democrats. In the face of this renewed threat from the SPD, the venue of Merkel's speech was highly symbolic: a summit of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), held in a beer hall no less! Bavaria is the most conservative and Euroskeptic part of Germany. Over the past two years, the CSU has flirted with abandoning its post-war electoral alliance with the CDU due to Berlin's various Europhile turns. This development threatened to undermine Merkel and her base of power from within. Merkel's speech, to the most Euroskeptic part of Germany, was designed to prepare her conservative base for a further deepening of European integration. It was not a policy shift but rather a statement that brought her rhetoric more in line with her policy actions. It was also a reminder to her core allies that they must continue on the current policy path unless they would rather have Schulz's SPD force them into even deeper European integration, and faster. What does this mean going forward? We think that the dirty word of European politics - "Eurobonds" - will come into play again. As if on cue, the European Commission has published a report that proposes bundling the debt of Euro Area sovereigns.5 The proposal is not exactly calling for Eurobonds, but rather for securitizing existing bonds into new instruments. As usual, a German finance ministry spokesperson opposed the plan. However, the path of least resistance will be towards more integration that may include such securitization. In fact, Eurobonds already exist. Europe's fiscal backstop mechanisms - formerly the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and now the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) - have both issued bonds to finance sovereign bailout efforts. So has the European Investment Bank (EIB). Their bonds trade largely in line with French sovereign debt, with a 37 basis point premium over German 10-year Bunds (Chart 10). Chart 10 Most importantly, the European Commission - the executive arm of the EU - already has authority to issue bonds and even tap member states for funds in case it needs to fill a gap. As the European Commission cites in its pitch-book to bond investors (yes, you read that correctly), "should the funds available from the EU budget be insufficient, the Commission may directly draw on the Member States, without any extra decision making being required."6 Currently, EU treaties forbid bond issuance that would directly finance the budget of a member state. However, Article 143 lays down the possibility of granting mutual assistance to an EU country facing a balance-of-payments crisis, which the EU Commission handles via its €50 billion balance-of-payments assistance program. In the future, the Commission could issue bonds to finance joint, EU-wide projects for areas like defense or infrastructure. It does not appear that such a decision would require a change to EU treaties. Over the long term, the integration imperative will remain strong in Europe. Ironically, Donald Trump is probably the best thing that has happened to European unity, at least since President Vladimir Putin. However, we think media commentators may be overstating President Trump's impact. The U.S. was already growing aloof toward Europe under President Obama, who overtly tilted his foreign policy towards Asia, and President Bush, whose administration clashed with "old Europe" and merely flirted with "new Europe." With the prospect of the U.S. withdrawing its security blanket, Europeans are being forced to integrate. Otherwise they would have to deal with the full range of global crises - from debt to terrorism to migration to war - as separate, and weak, individual states. And the U.S. is unlikely to return to its post-World War II level of concern regarding European affairs anytime soon. We doubt that even a recession would greatly impede the integrationist impulse on the continent. The Great Financial Crisis was a once-in-a-generation economic crisis and yet it has deepened, not decreased, support for integration. That said, risks remain. While the median voter in Europe appears to support the elite-driven integrationist effort, the median voter in Italy is on the fence. Bottom Line: Merkel's Europhile speech in Bavaria was meant to reinforce the ongoing integrationist path to her domestic audience in an election year. We suspect that Germany under Merkel, along with France under recently elected President Emmanuel Macron, will continue down the same path. At some point in the not-so-distant future, this may include the issuance of Eurobonds for specific projects. Our long-held geopolitical view supports overweighting Euro Area risk assets, given economic momentum and valuations. However, near-term political risks in Italy are substantial and pose the main risk to our strategic view. Italy's Divine Comedy - Coming Soon To A Theater Near You? Early Italian elections - in September 2017, instead of February-May 2018 - have become a real possibility. Matteo Renzi, leader of the ruling Democratic Party (PD) and former prime minister, recently signaled that he would be willing to compromise on a new electoral law, and that it could pass as early as July, given a tentative agreement with the Forza Italia party of former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. This would satisfy the condition of President Sergio Mattarella that a new electoral law be passed before elections can proceed. What does this development mean for markets? Italian political elites share the same integrationist goals of their European peers. There is no logic in Italian independence from the EU. Rome's ability to patrol its coastline for smugglers bringing in migrants would not improve with independence, nor would its ability to negotiate a low price for Russian natural gas. Italy is, as much as any European country, in terminal decline as a geopolitical power. Membership in the EU is therefore a natural, and realist, response to its weakness. In addition, exiting the monetary union would be fraught with risks that would overwhelm any benefits that Italian exports may gain from devaluation. It is highly unlikely that Germany, France, Spain, and the Netherlands would allow Italy - the Euro Area's third largest economy - to set a precedent of using massive currency devaluation while maintaining access to the Common Market. Rome would in fact break its Maastricht Treaty obligations. These stipulate that every member state, save for Denmark and the U.K., must become a member of the EMU. It would likely be evicted from both the EU and the Common Market. Furthermore, as we discussed in our September net assessment of Italy, the country's 19th nineteenth century unification has never made much sense.7 We would go so far as to argue that Euro Area amalgamation makes more sense than the unification of Italy. Northern Italy remains as much part of "core Europe" as London, the Rhineland, or the Netherlands, whereas the south - the Mezzogiorno - might as well be in the Balkans. We do not see how Rome would afford the Mezzogiorno on its own without access to both the EU's markets and ECB-induced low financing costs. All that said, the median Italian voter is not buying the Euro Area at the moment. Unlike their European peers, Italians seem to be flirting with overt Euroskepticism. When it comes to support for the common currency, Italians are clear outliers, with support levels around 50% (Chart 11). Similarly, a plurality of Italians appears to be confident in the country's future outside the EU (Chart 12). Chart 11Italy A Clear Outlier On The Euro Italy A Clear Outlier On The Euro Italy A Clear Outlier On The Euro Chart 12Italians Willing To Go Solo? Italians Willing To Go Solo? Italians Willing To Go Solo? Of course, only about a third of Italians identify themselves as only "Italians," largely in line with the Euro Area average and nowhere near the trend in Britain, where the share of the public that feels exclusively British has generally ranged from half to two-thirds (Chart 13). Nevertheless, the Euroskeptic trend in Italy is real and jeopardizes European integration. Our high-conviction view that European politics would be a "red herring" in 2017 was originally based on data that showed that voters in the Netherlands, France, and Germany increasingly supported European integration. This allowed us to dismiss polls that suggested that Euroskeptic politicians - such as Geert Wilders or Marine Le Pen - would do well in this year's elections. Even if they did perform well, the median voter's stance on European integration would force such policymakers to modify their Euroskepticism. This process has already happened in Spain (Podemos), Finland (The Finns, formerly known as the True Finns), and Greece (SYRIZA). In Italy, however, the median voter's Euroskepticism has not abated. As such, parties such as the Five Star Movement (M5S) and Lega Norde (LN) have no political incentive to modify their Euroskepticism. In fact, LN has done the opposite, evolving from a liberal and pro-EU regional sovereignty movement into a far-right, anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic, and nationalist Italian party -- a full brand overhaul. The timing of the upcoming election is difficult to forecast. Nonetheless, Renzi's compromise on changing electoral rules has now increased the probability that the election be held in Q4 2017, instead of Q1 2018. Renzi reportedly favors the same date as the German election, September 24. To accomplish this timetable, the new electoral law would have to be rushed through Italy's bicameral Parliament. The Chamber of Deputies - the lower house - is expected to vote on the compromise law in the first week of June, with the Senate passing the law by July 7. Given that the top four parties all seem to agree with adopting a German-style electoral system - proportional representation, with parties required to gain at least 5% of the vote to gain any seats - this ambitious timeline is possible. However, there are still some minor outstanding issues, which could drag out the process until the fall. In addition, local elections scheduled for June 11 (with a second-round run-off on June 25) could change the calculus of the ruling PD. If Renzi's party underperforms, he may back away from early elections, although the message would be that a strong populist performance in early 2018 is more likely. Polls have not budged much for the past 18 months, although Renzi's PD lost support around the time of its failed December 2016 constitutional referendum (Chart 14). The market may find solace in the fact that the revised electoral law would grant no "majority-bonus" to the winner, virtually ensuring that the Euroskeptic M5S cannot govern on its own. Chart 13Majority Of Italians Are Also Europeans Majority Of Italians Are Also Europeans Majority Of Italians Are Also Europeans Chart 14Ruling Party And Populist M5S Neck-In-Neck Ruling Party And Populist M5S Neck-In-Neck Ruling Party And Populist M5S Neck-In-Neck The risk to the market, however, is that M5S outperforms and then creates a limited coalition with right-wing Euroskeptics. Such a coalition could have the singular goal of calling a "non-binding, consultative" referendum on Italy's Euro Area membership. The official M5S line is that it would call such a referendum "if fiscal policies of the Euro Area did not change." Either way, the Italian constitution forbids referendums on international treaties, but a consultative referendum would give impetus to Euroskeptic parties to start negotiating a Euro Area exit for the country. There are two reasons why such an outcome is possible, if not our base scenario. First, a German-style 5% threshold will eliminate the votes cast for a number of minor parties from the overall calculation. These currently combine to make up about 18% of the total vote. This means that the parties that meet the 5% minimum will gain a larger share of seats in the parliament than they gained of the overall popular vote (82% of the vote will hold 100% of the seats), as is the case in Germany. There is a chance that both the PD and M5S get a considerable seat boost in the final tally that puts them close an overall majority. Second, much will hinge on whether the right wing - and Euroskeptic - Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) enter parliament. They are currently polling at about 5% of the vote. If they gain seats, it would significantly increase the percentage of total seats held by Euroskeptic parties. There is no evidence at the moment that M5S, which is on the left of the policy spectrum, would contemplate such an electoral alliance with LN and FdI. The party remains opposed to any coalitions and we suspect that it would not break its pledge to pursue the highly risky strategy of calling a referendum on the Euro Area. The M5S stands for a lot of different things: anti-corruption, anti-establishment, youth empowerment, etc. Euroskepticism is one of its pillars, not a singular objective. In fact, party leader Beppe Grillo recently attempted to abandon the Euroskeptic alliance with UKIP at the European Parliament to join the ultra-liberal, and Europhile, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Various factions vying for control of the movement oscillate between overt Euroskepticism, aloofness toward Europe, and open support for European integration. In addition, Italian voters may adjust ahead of the election by switching their support away from the various minor parties currently polling below 5% and toward the four major parties. This will likely benefit the ruling PD more than any other party. Out of the four parties highly unlikely to cross the 5% threshold - Campo Progressista (CP), Movimento Democratica e Progressista (MDP), Alternativa Popolare (MP), and Sinistra Italiana (SI) - three are centrist or aligned with the PD. One (Sinistra Italiana) would likely see its voters split between the PD and M5S (Chart 15). Such vote migration would clearly benefit the center-left PD, which Renzi is likely counting on in accepting the German-style proportional electoral system.8 Chart 15Most Minor Party Votes ##br##Would Help Ruling Democrats Most Minor Party Votes Would Help Ruling Democrats Most Minor Party Votes Would Help Ruling Democrats Bottom Line: Investors trying to make sense of the Italian election will find relief in the new electoral law. A purely German-style system - given the current level of factionalism in Italian politics - is unlikely to produce a populist government in Italy. In fact, the center-left PD could see a boost in support as voters switch away from minor parties. The tentative compromise on the electoral law has both increased risks by making an earlier election more likely and decreased risks by reducing the probability of an anti-market result. That said, there is still a possibility that M5S crosses the ideological aisle to form an alliance with right-wing Euroskeptics to try to take Italy out of the Euro Area. We doubt that they will do so. Nonetheless, it will be appropriate to hedge such a risk in currency markets closer to the date of the election, once the date is known. We therefore closed our long EUR/USD recommendation last week for a gain of 3.48%. Whatever the outcome of the election, Italian political risks will remain the main threat to European integration (and assets) going forward. We therefore expect the ECB to keep one eye on Italy, forcing it to be less hawkish than it otherwise would be. We will explore Italian politics and economy further in an upcoming report with our colleagues at BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy. U.K.: The Election Is About G The latest polling averages show that Prime Minister Theresa May's Conservative Party maintains a 5% lead over Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party, despite Labour's remarkable rally since early elections were called on April 18 (Chart 16). One projection of actual parliamentary seats that takes into account the crucial factor of voter turnout suggest that the Tories could add from 15 to 34 seats to their 2015 take of 330 seats - and this roughly matches our back-of-the-envelope calculation that the Tories could pick up 11 seats on account of the Brexit referendum (Table 1).9 Chart 16Labour Revives On Snap Election Labour Revives On Snap Election Labour Revives On Snap Election Table 1Referendum Results Offer Some Simple Gains For Tories Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk? Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk? There have been only two other cases in recent memory in which Britain's incumbent party led by double digits two months ahead of an election: 1983 and 2001. In the first case, Margaret Thatcher followed up the hugely successful Falklands campaign by expanding her popular support in the final two weeks to win a huge 144-seat majority. In the second case, Tony Blair lost some of his lead but still won the election handily.10 There has not been a case in recent memory where a double-digit lead dropped into single digits as quickly as it did this past month. Moreover, looking at the latest individual polls, it is too soon to say that Labour's rally has ended. Indeed, YouGov's model even shows the Conservatives losing their majority.11 Snap elections are always a gamble, as we have stressed throughout this campaign.12 There is no question that Labour has the momentum and May is feeling the heat. Yet the Tories have a fairly solid foundation of support at the moment. First, they are still polling above 40% support, almost 10% higher than before the referendum, reflecting the rally-around-the-flag effect after voters' surprising decision to leave the EU. They even poll above 40% among working-class voters, the original base of Labour, and the country's aging demographic profile also heavily favors them. (Youth turnout would have to surprise upward to upset the Tories.) Second, the Tory strategy of gobbling up supporters of the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) has succeeded (Chart 17). UKIP has no raison d'être after achieving its foundational goal of Brexit. The Conservative Party's decision to hold a referendum on the EU was, in fact, driven by this rivalry from the right flank. UKIP posed the chief threat to the Tories through its ability to dilute their vote share in Britain's first-past-the-post electoral system. Now, almost all conservative voters will vote for the Conservative Party, while Labour must still compete with the Liberal Democrats, Greens, Scottish National Party, and Welsh Plaid Cymru in various constituencies (Chart 18). Chart 17Tories Keep Devouring UKIP Tories Keep Devouring UKIP Tories Keep Devouring UKIP Chart 18Labour Has Rivals, Tories Do Not Labour Has Rivals, Tories Do Not Labour Has Rivals, Tories Do Not Third, while May's popularity is merely converging with her party's still-buoyant level, Corbyn is less popular than both May and his own party (Chart 19). Corbyn still has a net negative favorability and is seen as less "decisive" and less "in touch" with voters than May. Fourth, voters still see Brexit as the most important issue of the election (Chart 20) and May as the best candidate to manage the tricky exit negotiations ahead. Because Brexit is the driver, the benefit of the doubt goes to the Tories. The 2015 elections, the EU referendum, the polls since the referendum, and the parliamentary votes (driven by popular pressure) enshrining the referendum result all suggest a great deal of public momentum on this key issue. The only truly historic development that could have broken this momentum, given that the economy is holding up, is the Tory decision to seek a "hard Brexit," i.e. exit from the EU's Common Market. Yet opinion polls show that Brexit still has the support of a majority of likely voters; moreover, 55% of voters would rather have "no exit deal" than "a bad exit deal."13 If voters still see this as the defining issue, then the Tories still have a key advantage. On the other hand, perceptions of Jeremy Corbyn and Labour have improved rapidly and May's simultaneous popularity slump is especially important in this election. She is a "takeover prime minister" (having initially gained the office when Cameron resigned rather than leading her party into an election as the presumed prime minister) and thus highly vulnerable. This election is largely about her need for a "personal mandate."14 Her political missteps (both real and perceived) are very much at issue in this particular election. Chart 19May Lifts Tories, Corbyn Drags Labour May Lifts Tories, Corbyn Drags Labour May Lifts Tories, Corbyn Drags Labour Chart 20 If polls continue to narrow, the election could produce a "hung parliament," in which no single party holds the 326 seats necessary for a majority in the House of Commons. What should investors expect in that scenario? First, May would have the chance to rule a minority government or form a coalition. A minority government would be weak, vulnerable to collapse under pressure, and would have a harder time controlling the Brexit negotiations. As for a coalition, there is very little chance that the other major parties would cooperate with her - the Liberal Democrats would not reprise their role as coalition partner from 2010-15. But there is a slim chance that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland could unite with the Tories to obtain a majority. The DUP has not exercised real power in a century, literally, and several of its members do not normally even take their seats in Westminster. However, the party is Euroskeptic and could provide just enough support to accomplish the single goal of a Tory-led Brexit. Suffice it to say that this outcome is not impossible - the Tories have been courting the DUP for months and the existence of a historic "common cause" changes the usual parliamentary dynamic. Still, this arrangement would be highly unusual, causing a massive uproar, and would lead to all kinds of uncertainties about parliament's ability to pass a final Brexit deal in 2019. Second, assuming May fails, the Labour Party would have to rule in the minority or form a coalition (if informal) with the Scottish National Party, LibDems, Plaid Cymru, Greens, and others. Here are the most likely outcomes of such an arrangement, in broad brush strokes: Brexit will in all likelihood proceed, given that all parties have professed respect for the referendum outcome. Since the new government would likely not seek to curtail immigration as strictly, it could seek to retain membership in the Common Market. However, a la carte membership in the Common Market remains the greatest difficulty with the EU member states, and therefore it is possible that even Labour would have to accept the logic of exiting the Common Market. In fact, we could see Labour's insistence on access to the Common Market producing more acrimony with the EU than the Tory clean-break strategy. Nevertheless, the odds of a "Brexit cliff" in which the U.K. exits without a trade deal would fall from their already low level, given Labour's unwillingness to let that happen. Despite moving ahead with Brexit, a Labour-led government would increase the relatively low probability of an eventual reversal of the decision, given that it would be more inclined to accept or encourage such an outcome in the face of a bad exit deal, a recession, or other challenges that cause public opinion to shift. The Scottish National Party would probably sideline its demands for a second Scottish independence referendum - especially given that polls supporting a second referendum have floundered for the time being - though not permanently.15 Fiscal spending would increase as a result of Labour's and the SNP's campaign promises and greater focus on domestic social issues. Even if May avoids squandering her party's majority (our baseline case), there are several important takeaways from her drop in the polls: Chart 21Dementia Tax' Gaffe Added To Tory Woes Dementia Tax' Gaffe Added To Tory Woes Dementia Tax' Gaffe Added To Tory Woes The median voter wants government support: The Labour Party's rally began as soon as elections were called, with left-leaning voters switching away from the LibDems once they saw a chance to challenge the ruling party. But the Tories took a hit from May's unprecedented (and publicly awkward) reversal on a party manifesto pledge only days after publishing it (Chart 21). The pledge, now infamous as the "dementia tax," was an attempt at fiscal tightening by which the government would include the value of an elderly person's home in the assessment of their financial means when it came to government support for social care. By contrast, Labour has rallied on the back of a party manifesto that promises fiscal expansion in various categories, including £7.7 billion additional funds for health care, social care, and nursing. More broadly, National Health Service funding, rent caps, and a higher "living wage" are the top four campaign pledges that gain above 60% popular support. As we elucidated last year, the two economies that most enthusiastically embraced a laissez-faire model - the U.S. and the U.K. - are now experiencing the most effective swing to the left.16 The U.K. campaign confirms that, with the Tories minimizing cuts and Labour offering greater spending. Brexit means Brexit: 69% of the public claims that government should follow the referendum outcome, and 52% favor Theresa May's proposed Brexit strategy. The opposition parties are not openly opposing the referendum outcome, as mentioned. Moreover, Labour's pledge to prevent the U.K. leaving the bloc without a trade deal is one of the least popular campaign pledges (only 31% approve), while the Liberal Democrats' pledge to hold a second nationwide referendum on the outcome of the exit talks is also unpopular (34% approve) (Chart 22). Labour is recovering support by focusing on its bread-and-butter, left-wing, social platform. Terrorism is not driving voters: The tragic terrorist attacks at parliament, Manchester, and London Bridge have hardly given May and the Tories any additional support despite being the party viewed as stronger on security. Amid a bull market in terrorism, British voters, like European peers, are becoming somewhat inured to periodic attacks against "soft" targets.17 Health is a bigger concern than immigration: A large majority of Britons think immigration has been too high in recent years, but only about 25% think it is a major issue facing the country, compared with 43% who cite health care as a major issue (see Chart 20 above). These are not completely independent issues because many people believe that immigrants are putting pressure on scarce health care resources. Immigration is closely tied to Brexit and will remain a burning issue if the government does not convince voters that it is more vigilant. But the Labour Party's greater support on health care (as well as education and other social issues) is a growing liability to the Tories as Brexit becomes more settled. If Brexit was a revolt against the elites, it is not necessarily the only manifestation of that revolt. The elitist Tories should be careful that they do not rest on their laurels having been on the right side of that particular issue. The key takeaway is that, aside from Brexit, fiscal policy is the driving issue in British politics. Brexit was not only a vote about sovereignty and immigration, it was also a demand from the lower and middle classes for an end to second-class status. That is why May highlighted the need for government to moderate the forces of globalization and capitalism and make the economy "work for everyone" in her October 2016 speech at the Conservative Party conference and in her rhetoric since then.18 Chart 22 That is also why the ruling party has already eased fiscal policy. In his first Autumn Statement, Chancellor Philip Hammond abandoned his predecessor George Osborne's promise to eliminate the budget deficit by 2019, pushing the timeline to beyond 2022 (Chart 23). The latest budget projections by the Office for Budget Responsibility show that the current government is projecting more spending than its predecessor (Chart 24). Chart 23 Chart 24 The Tories are also claiming that they will reboot the country's industrial strategy to improve productivity, which will become all the more imperative if they even partially follow through on their pledge to cut immigration numbers from the current annual ~250,000 to under 100,000, which will necessarily reduce labor force growth and thus also potential GDP growth.19 The National Productivity Investment Fund will need a projected £23 billion just to get on its feet. Given that Labour is proposing even more ambitious spending increases (£49 billion additional spending through 2022), the direction of U.K. politics - away from austerity - is clear regardless of the election outcome. Finally, our colleagues at BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy expect the Bank of England to maintain loose monetary policy for the foreseeable future, being unable to turn more hawkish against inflation in the context of continued risks and uncertainties related to Brexit.20 Thus monetary and fiscal conditions are both accommodative for the short and medium term. Given that we do not expect the European Union to exact crippling measures on the Brits for leaving, as we have outlined in previous reports,21 the result is a relatively benign environment for the U.K., at least until the business cycle turns, the effects of Brexit begin to bite, and/or global growth slows down. The combination of fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy, however, could weigh on the pound regardless of the election outcome. As such, we closed our short USD/GBP last week for a gain of 3.34%. Bottom Line: We do not expect a hung parliament; most signs suggest that the Tories will retain at least a weak majority. However, a hung parliament that produces a Labour-SNP alliance would not likely reverse Brexit (though it would make a reversal more conceivable). Such an alliance could eventually result in an exit deal that is both less politically logical than the Tory deal (because London would pay to stay in the Common Market yet have less say in how it is managed) and more favorable to the British economy in the long run (because retaining the benefits of Common Market access). But this is not a foregone conclusion. We maintain our view that Brexit itself has largely ceased to have concrete market-relevant impacts other than a decline in Britain's long-term potential GDP growth. There are two reasons for this. First, May has ruled out membership in the Common Market and thus has removed a potential source of acrimony with Brussels over any "special treatment." Second, the EU does not want to precipitate a crisis in the U.K. that could reverberate back onto the continental economy. Investment Implications We remain strategically overweight European equities relative to their U.S. peers, a trade that has returned 7.39% thus far. We would remind clients that we closed our long GBP/USD and long EUR/USD tactical trades last week for 3.34% and 3.48% gains, respectively. We are also booking a 3.45% profit on our "One China Policy" strategic trade (long Chinese equities as against their Taiwanese and Hong Kong peers). We still think policymakers will do everything they can to keep China's economic growth stable ahead of the party congress this fall, but, as we discussed in our May 24 missive,22 the decision to tighten financial regulation is risky and threatens to cause unintended consequences. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “China Down, India Up?” dated March 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Political Risks Are Understated In 2018,” dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “ECB: All About China?” dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Europe’s Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration,” dated November 3, 2011; and “Europe: The Euro And (Geo)politics,” dated February 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see European Commission, “Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and monetary union,” May 31, 2017, available at ec.europa.eu. 6 Please see European Commission, “EU Investor Presentation,” April 7, 2017, available at ec.europa.eu. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Europe’s Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno,” dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 The only minor party that is Euroskeptic, FdI, is just close enough to the 5% threshold that its voters are unlikely to abandon it. They will not likely give the Euroskeptic Lega Norde and M5S much of a boost. 9 Please see Lord Ashcroft Polls, “2017 Seat Estimates: Overall,” May 2017, available at lordashcroftpolls.com. 10 In the 1997 election, Tony Blair and Labour led by double digits, but they were in the opposition. Their lead in the polls shrank slightly before Blair won a 178-seat majority, even larger than Thatcher’s 144 seats in 1983 and Clement Attlee’s 147 seats in 1945. 11 Please see YouGov, “2017 UK General Election Model,” accessed June 6, 2017, available at yougov.co.uk. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!” dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see Anthony Wells, “Attitudes to Brexit: Everything We Know So Far,” March 29, 2017, available at yougov.co.uk. 14 Please see footnote 12 above. 15 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Will Scotland Scotch Brexit?” dated March 30, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?” dated April 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “A Bull Market For Terror,” dated August 5, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Brexit Update: Does Brexit Really Mean Brexit?” dated July 15, 2016, and “Brexit Update: Red Dawn Over Britain” in Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, “King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Redistribution,” dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, “With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU,” dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Adventures In Fence-Sitting,” dated May 16, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see “Brexit: A Brave New World” in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “The ‘What Can You Do For Me’ World?” dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets,” dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Overall Investment Grade (IG) Corporates: An update of our regional sector relative value models shows that it has become increasingly difficult to find industries where debt looks cheap. Maintain overweight allocations to U.S. & U.K. IG, and stay underweight Euro Area IG, but keep overall spread risk close to neutral levels. U.S. IG: Within U.S. Investment Grade corporate debt allocations, upgrade Energy names (Oil Field Services, Integrated) and Cable & Satellite to overweight, while downgrading Consumer Cyclical sectors (Retailers) and Other Industrials to Underweight. Euro IG: Stay underweight and keep spread risk (i.e. DTS) close to index levels. Reduce exposure to Cable & Satellite, Electric Utilities and Natural Gas Utilities. U.K. IG: Stay overweight U.K. IG but keep overall spread risk near index levels. Feature Chart of the WeekCandidates For Additional Spread Convergence Candidates For Additional Spread Convergence Candidates For Additional Spread Convergence Back on January 24th, we published a Special Report that introduced specific Investment Grade (IG) corporate bond sector allocations for the U.S., Euro Area and U.K. to our model portfolio framework.1 The recommended weightings were based on the output from our sector relative value models for each region. We had presented those models on a semi-regular basis in the past, but without any specific numerical allocation among the sectors. By attaching actual weightings to each sector, within a "fully invested" model portfolio, we are now able to more accurately measure the aggregate success of our recommendations. In this follow-up report, we discuss the performance of our sector tilts since January, refresh our relative value models and present changes to our allocations. The broad conclusion is that, while our calls have done well over the past few months and our IG portfolios have outperformed the broad IG bond indices, it remains difficult to find compellingly cheap sectors (particularly in non-financial industries) given the overall tight level of corporate bond spreads. This is especially true in the Euro Area, where we see the poorest risk/reward tradeoff for IG exposure relative to the U.S. and U.K. We are more comfortable recommending an overweight stance on U.S. and U.K. IG corporates versus Euro Area equivalents, in line with our overall allocation in our main model portfolio. Given the tight overall level of spreads in all three regions, however, we are focusing our recommendations on sectors that have cheaper valuations but with riskiness closer to the overall IG indices - like Energy in the U.S. and Wireless in both the Euro Area and U.K. (Chart 1). Good Performance From Our Sector Tilts The performance of our sector recommendations has been reasonably solid since January (Chart 2). Our U.S. sector tilts added +5bps of excess return versus duration-matched U.S. Treasuries, coming mostly from our overweights in Energy and Financials. Within the Euro Area, we were able to generate +9bps of excess return versus government debt, also mainly from above-benchmark allocations to Energy and Financial names. In the U.K., our call to overweight Bank debt provided essentially all of our +23bps of outperformance versus Gilts. These strong excess returns came on top of a very strong performance for corporate debt since January 24th. Excess returns for IG in the U.S., Euro Area and U.K. were 0.9%, 1.3% and 1.3%, respectively. The detailed breakdown of the returns by sector are shown in Appendix Tables at the back of this report. To determine the success rate of our sector tilts, we can define "winners" as sectors where we had an active view (i.e. not neutral) and where the relative performance of the sector versus the overall IG corporate index was in the direction of that active view. For example, our decision to go underweight Diversified Manufacturing in the Euro Area was a good one, as that sector had an excess return of 0.7%, well below that of the overall Euro Area IG index (a 1.3% excess return). We can define "losers" in the same way, where the relative sector performance went against our active allocation. In Chart 3, we show the "winners" and "losers" for our U.S., Euro Area and U.K. sector allocations since late January. Our success rate was quite good, as we had far more winners than losers in all three regions. Chart 2 Chart 3 The Big Picture For Corporate Credit: Favorable Business Cycle, But Valuations Are Not Cheap We have been maintaining an overall overweight allocation to IG corporates since late January. This was based on a view that global economic activity was accelerating, which would support faster profit growth. This would provide cyclical relief for stressed corporate balance sheets in the U.S. Euro Area & U.K. corporates would also benefit from a better profit backdrop, with the added bonus of central bank asset purchases helping to improve the supply/demand balance for IG debt. Yet spreads have already tightened substantially throughout the IG universe. This reflects declining macro volatility and the ongoing investor stretch for yield after the rise in global government bond yields earlier this year faded significantly. The result is that there is now far less dispersion among corporate sectors, by industry or by credit quality, then we've seen in recent years (Charts 4, 5 & 6). Coming at a time of high corporate leverage, and with central bank liquidity growth starting to roll over as we discussed in last week's Weekly Report, we are recommending an "up in quality" bias to sector allocations and credit exposure, while favoring U.S. and U.K. corporates over Euro Area equivalents.2 Chart 4Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve##BR##In The U.S. Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve In The U.S. Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve In The U.S. Chart 5Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve##BR##In The Euro Area Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve In The Euro Area Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve In The Euro Area Chart 6Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve##BR##In The U.K. Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve In The U.K. Tight Spreads, Flat Credit Curve In The U.K. Bottom Line: An update of our regional sector relative value models shows that it has become increasingly difficult to find industries where debt looks cheap. Maintain overweight allocations to U.S. & U.K. IG, and stay underweight Euro Area IG, while keep overall spread risk close to neutral levels. U.S. Investment Grade: Stay Overweight, But Be Selective In Tables 1A and 1B, we present the results of our U.S. IG sector valuation model as of May 31st.3 We are maintaining an overweight recommendation on U.S. IG in our overall model portfolio, as we continue to see the backdrop for U.S. economic growth being much friendlier for corporate debt versus Treasuries. Credit spreads are very tight, however, so we are maintaining some degree of caution in our sector recommendations. Chart Chart Specifically, we are aiming to favor industries with option-adjusted spread (OAS) at or above that of the overall U.S. IG index, but with a positive valuation from our U.S. IG relative value model. We also wish to keep the aggregate level of spread risk, using our preferred "duration times spread" (DTS) metric, in line with that of the overall U.S. IG index. As can be seen in the scatter diagram in Chart 7, which plots the model valuations versus the DTS score for each sector, there are precious few non-financial sectors that offer attractive spreads that are not riskier than the overall index. Chart 7 Our model has shown some improvement in value within the sub-sectors of the Energy space, which is a consequence of the softness in oil prices over the past few months. With our commodity strategists calling for a recovery in oil prices back up towards to $55-60 range by year-end, we see this an opportunity to raise our allocations to Energy by upgrading the Independent and Integrated sub-sectors to overweight from neutral. At the same time, we are reducing the size of our prior overweights in Refining and Midstream to keep the overall Energy sector allocation to no more than two times that of the U.S. IG Energy index - a pure risk management move on our part. We are also upgrading some of our prior underweights in the Communications sectors to neutral (Media & Entertainment, Wirelines & Wireless) and to overweight (Cable & Satellite), given relatively attractive valuations in those areas. By the same token, we are cutting Other Industrials to underweight from neutral with valuations now looking unattractive. All of our U.S. sector changes result in an upgrade of our weighting to the broad Industrials grouping by 5 percentage points to 58.6%. We are reducing our large overweight to U.S. Banks by an equivalent amount to "fund" this new allocation within our 100% invested model IG portfolio. The net result of all these changes is that our U.S. IG portfolio has an overall DTS score of around 9, in line with that of the U.S. IG benchmark index. Thus, we are not making any changes to our aggregate recommended spread risk, in line with our top-down views on the overall level of credit spreads and curves, as described earlier. Bottom Line: Within U.S. Investment Grade corporate debt allocations, upgrade Energy names (Oil Field Services, Integrated) and Cable & Satellite to overweight, while downgrading Consumer Cyclical sectors (Retailers) and Other Industrials to Underweight. Euro Area Investment Grade: Not Much Value Left, Remain Underweight In Tables 2A and 2B, we show the output from our Euro Area IG sector valuation model. The scatter diagram showing the model residuals versus the individual sector DTS scores is shown in Chart 8. Chart Chart Chart 8 Finding value has become a problem in Europe, with only a few sectors (most notably, Metals & Mining, Oil Field Services, Life Insurance and P&C Insurance) showing a double-digit spread residual from our model. All those sectors also offer wider spreads than the overall Euro Area IG index, but the Insurers stand out as being much riskier from a DTS perspective. That is a function of the wide spread for the overall Insurance sector, which is nearly double that of the overall Euro Area IG index. We see no reason to change our existing allocations to those sectors in our model portfolio, keeping Metals & Mining and Oil Field Services at overweight and the Insurers at neutral (a prudent tradeoff between wide spreads and high risk). It would likely take a meaningful rise in European interest rates before any serious compression in Insurance spreads could unfold, given the struggles that industry faces from low yields on its fixed income investment assets. A rise in European bond yields could unfold later this year if the European Central Bank (ECB) signals that a tapering of its asset purchase program will begin next year. We see that scenario as increasingly likely, given the overall strength of the Euro Area recovery. The ECB will only shift its stance gradually, due to the lack of immediate inflation concerns. Any signal that that fewer bond purchases are in the offing, however, will pose a major risk for European corporates given the large ECB buying of that debt over the past year. We see very few necessary changes to our Euro Area allocations at the moment, as our overall portfolio DTS is in line with the IG benchmark index (around 6). We do recommend cutting Cable & Satellite and Utilities (Electric & Natural Gas) to underweight. Bottom Line: With corporate spreads at tight levels, and with few sectors showing compelling value, we are comfortable in remaining underweight Euro Area corporates, while keeping spread risk (i.e. DTS) close to index levels. Reduce Cable & Satellite, Electric Utilities and Natural Gas Utilities to underweight. U.K. Investment Grade: Stay Overweight, Focusing On Financials In Tables 3A and 3B, we present our update U.K. IG sector model, with the scatterplot of model residuals versus DTS scores shown in Chart 9. Not much has changed in terms of which sectors appear cheap in our model versus the late January levels. Financials, in general, have the cheapest spreads on an absolute basis, especially the Insurers. Although the cheap valuation on the Insurance debt mirrors the same problem highlighted above for the Euro Area insurers - interest rates that are too low to generate acceptable investment returns on the insurers' portfolios. Chart Chart Chart 9 We are maintaining our overall modest overweight allocation to U.K. IG, while keeping overall spread risk close to index levels. While the political and security risks within the U.K. are significant at the moment, there is no threat of the Bank of England moving to a less accommodative monetary policy anytime soon. A backdrop of churning economic growth, an undervalued British Pound and a central bank maintaining hyper-easy monetary policy is still a decent one for U.K. corporate debt. In terms of sector allocation changes based on our U.K. IG sector valuation model, we recommend upgrading Health Care and REITs to overweight, downgrading Other Industrials to neutral and cutting Tobacco to underweight. Bottom Line: Stay overweight U.K. IG but keep overall spread risk near index levels. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Adding Investment Grade Corporate Bond Sectors To Our Model Portfolio Framework", dated January 24 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Distant Early Warning", dated May 30 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Our valuation framework assesses the attractiveness of each IG sector within a cross-sectional analysis. The OAS for each sector is regressed against common risk factors (interest rate duration, credit quality) with the residual spread determining the valuation of each sector. Appendix Image Image Image

Highlights The global economy remains awash in massive amounts of oversupply, reflecting extraordinary levels of capex in emerging markets. This will weigh on global inflation. Thanks to a tighter labor market, the U.S. is likely to suffer less from this force than the euro area or commodity producers. In this context, the tightening in Chinese and U.S. policy could represent a severe blow to the recent improvement in global trade. Continue to hold some yen and some dollars but stay short commodity and European currencies. Feature The U.S. is in its eighth year of recovery, yet core PCE is clocking in at a paltry 1.5% despite the headline unemployment rate standing 0.3% below its long-term equilibrium and despite incredibly low interest rates. The phenomenon is not unique to the U.S., euro area core CPI remains a meager 1% and even Germany, despite experiencing an unemployment at 26 year lows, is incapable of generating core inflation beyond 1.6%. Let us not even broach the topic of Japan... So what lies behind this low inflation environment? Not Enough Capex Or Too Much Capex? Capex in advanced economies has averaged 21% of GDP since 2008, compared to an average of 24% of GDP between 1980 and 2007, suggesting that the supply side of the economy is not expanding as fast as before (Chart I-1). Historically, countries plagued by low investment rates have tended to experience higher inflation. Simply put, these low investment rates mean these economies do not enjoy high labor productivity growth rates, causing severe bottlenecks. When these capacity constraints are hit, inflation emerges. This time around, the low investment rate in advanced economies is not yielding this development. Why? One reason is that demand has been hampered by the rise in savings preferences that emerged following the financial crisis (Chart I-2). But another phenomenon is also at play. Global capex has remained very elevated. Chart I-1Low Investment In DM ##br##Should Create Bottlenecks Low Investment In DM Should Create Bottlenecks Low Investment In DM Should Create Bottlenecks Chart I-2Post 2008: ##br##Marked Preference For Savings Post 2008: Marked Preference For Savings Post 2008: Marked Preference For Savings As Chart I-3 illustrates, global capex has averaged 25.2% of world GDP since 2010, well above the international average from 1980 to 2009. This is simply a reflection of the massive amount of capacity expansion that continues to materialize in the EM space, where investment has equaled more than 30% of GDP for eight years in a row. This matters because since the 1990s, the world has experienced a massive outward shift in the aggregate supply curve, resulting in an extended period of falling inflation and then, low inflation, independent of the state of growth or of long-term inflation expectations (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Global Capex Is High Global Capex Is High Global Capex Is High Chart I-437 Years Of Inflation History At A Glance 37 Years Of Inflation History At A Glance 37 Years Of Inflation History At A Glance In the 1990s, this expansion of global production capacity reflected the addition of billions of potential workers to the international capitalist system, but this phenomenon slowed massively in the 2000s and is now over (Chart I-5). Instead, the driver of the expansion of the global supply curve has since become the rampant investment taking place in developing economies, which has resulted in a massive increase in the capital-to-GDP ratio for the entire planet (Chart I-6). Chart I-5 Chart I-62000s To Present: Capital Drives##br## The Supply Expansion 2000s To Present: Capital Drives The Supply Expansion 2000s To Present: Capital Drives The Supply Expansion In the first decade of the millennium, this massive increase in the level of global capacity was still manageable. Global real GDP growth expressed in purchasing-power parity terms averaged 7% from 2000 to 2008 and was able to absorb some of the productive capacity being added to the world economy. As a result, core inflation average 2% in the OECD while short-term and long-term interest rates averaged 2.9% and 4.1%, respectively. However, since 2009, global GDP growth expressed in purchasing-power parity terms has only averaged 4.6%, despite a continued robust pace of investment globally, suggesting that now, supply growth is outstripping demand growth by a greater margin than in the previous cycle. This means that to achieve an average core inflation rate of 1.8% in the OECD, short-term and long-term interest rates have needed to average 0.7% and 2.4%, respectively. Going forward, the problem is that global excess capacity has not been expunged. With credit growth still limited in the G10 and in a downtrend in China (Chart I-7), deflationary tendencies are likely to remain a prevalent feature of the global economy for the rest of the business cycle. Thus, central banks the world over will find it very difficult to tighten monetary policy by much without re-invigorating downward spirals in inflation. While this problem applies to the Fed - a case cogently described by Lael Brainard this week - this is even truer for many other economies. The global trend in inflation is a function of this global expansion in supply, but domestic dynamics can still affect the dispersion of national inflation rates around this depressed global level. As Chart I-8 shows, countries with an unemployment rate substantially below equilibrium - a negative unemployment gap - do experience higher levels of inflation. Today, this puts the U.S. on a path toward higher inflation relative to the euro area. This suggests that there remains a valid case to expect a tightening of monetary conditions in the U.S. vis-à-vis the euro area. Chart I-7Low Credit Growth Harms Demand Growth Low Credit Growth Harms Demand Growth Low Credit Growth Harms Demand Growth Chart I-8 In this vein, Japan is an interesting case. Japan does have one of the most negative unemployment gaps among major economies, yet it experiences one of the lowest inflation rates. Japan is such an outlier that if it were excluded from the chart above, the explanatory power of the employment gap on inflation would double. This is because Japan has to grapple with another, even more pernicious problem: chronically depressed inflation expectations. Hence, the BoJ has to commit to an "irresponsibly easy" monetary policy and keep the economy growing above its potential for an extended period of time to genuinely shock inflation expectations upwards if it ever wants to remotely approach its 2% inflation target. Thus, we should remain negative the yen on a cyclical basis, only buying the JPY when asset markets are at risk. Bottom Line: The global economy remains awash in excessive supply. In the 1980s and 1990s, much of the supply expansion reflected an increase in the global labor force; since the turn of the millennium, the global supply expansion has been a function of high investment rates in developing economies. Without credit growth, the global economy will be hostage to deflationary pressures, at least for the rest of this cycle. Despite this picture, among major economies, the U.S. needs the smallest amount of monetary accommodation, supporting a bullish dollar stance. Policy Mistake In The Making? In this context of global overcapacity, low growth and underlying deflationary pressures, deflationary policy mistakes are easy to come by, and the world economy may be facing two such shocks. In and of itself, the U.S. economy may be able to handle higher rates. Even if inflation is likely to remain low by historical standards, a rebound toward 2% could happen later this year. At the very least, our diffusion index of industrial sector activity suggests that the recent inflation deceleration in the U.S. may be over (Chart I-9). However, it remains to be seen if EM economies, which is where the true excess capacity still lies, can actually handle higher global real rates. The rollover in our global leading indicator diffusion index is perplexing and points to a deceleration in global growth, a potential warning sign about the frailty of the global economy (Chart I-10). Additionally, it is true that 1% CPI inflation in China does not necessitate much of a strong policy response by the PBoC. But the vast swathe of cumulative capital investment in China implies that this country could suffer from the greatest amount of excess capacity (Chart I-11). China required a massive amount of stimulus in 2015 and early 2016 to generate a small rebound in growth. Thus, the current tightening in Chinese monetary conditions, as small as it may be, could be enough to prompt another wave of weakness in that country. The recent softness in PMIs - with the Caixin gauge falling below 50 - could be a symptom of this problem. Chart I-9U.S. CPI Deceleration Is Ending... U.S. CPI Deceleration Is Ending... U.S. CPI Deceleration Is Ending... Chart I-10...But Global Growth Is Deteriorating ...But Global Growth Is Deteriorating ...But Global Growth Is Deteriorating Chart I-11China Is Oversupplied China Is Oversupplied China Is Oversupplied Making the situation even more precarious is that China stands at the apex of the overcapacity problem, which makes it prone to develop virtuous and vicious cycles. Chinese corporate debt stands at 180% of GDP, heavily concentrated in state-owned enterprises and heavy industries. This means that swings in producer prices can have a deep impact on real rates. Based on a 10 percentage points swing in PPI, Chinese real rates were able to collapse from 10% to -1% in the matter of 12 months last year. The problem is that for this PPI rebound to happen, Chinese monetary conditions had to ease greatly (Chart I-12). Now that Chinese monetary conditions are tightening and now that commodity prices are weakening anew, PPI could once again fall toward 0%, lifting real rates to 4.4% in the process (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Chinese MCI: From Friend To Foe Chinese MCI: From Friend To Foe Chinese MCI: From Friend To Foe Chart I-13Real Rates Are Likely To Go Up Real Rates Are Likely To Go Up Real Rates Are Likely To Go Up This means that the already emerging contraction in manufacturing and the recent deceleration in new capex projects could gather further momentum (Chart I-14). As credit flows dry up because of the increasing price of credit in a weakening and over-supplied economy, so will Chinese imports, which are so sensitive to the investment cycle and credit impulse (Chart I-15). This is a problem because the recent bright patch in the global economy was based on this rebound in Chinese demand. In the wake of the Chinese growth acceleration last year, global exports and export prices rebounded sharply (Chart I-16). However, now that China is facing a renewed slowdown, this improvement is likely to dissipate. Chart I-14Problems With Chinese Growth Problems With Chinese Growth Problems With Chinese Growth Chart I-15Slowing Chinese Credit Will Hurt Chinese Imports... bca.fes_wr_2017_06_02_s1_c15 bca.fes_wr_2017_06_02_s1_c15 Chart I-16...Which Will Weigh On Global Trade ...Which Will Weigh On Global Trade ...Which Will Weigh On Global Trade This is obviously negative for the commodity currency complex. Not only does this mean that the negative terms of trade shock that is affecting many commodity producers could deepen - for example iron ore futures continue to fall and are now down 39% since mid-march - but also, monetary policy could be eased relative to the U.S. Actually, our monetary stance gauge, based on real short rates and the slope of the yield curve, already highlights potential weaknesses for AUD/USD (Chart I-17). This development is also a problem for Europe. As we have highlighted before, European growth is three times more levered to EM dynamics than the U.S. economy is. Also, employment in the manufacturing sector in the euro area is still five percentage points above that of the U.S., underscoring the euro area's greater exposure to global manufacturing and global trade. This means that if Chinese troubles deepen, the closing of the European unemployment gap might slow, at least relative to the U.S. where the unemployment rate is already below equilibrium. Therefore, the high-time to bet on a tightening of European policy relative to the U.S. could be passing. Already, before the European economy has even been hit by a negative shock from EM, the euro looks vulnerable. Investors are very long the euro, but also EUR/USD has dissociated enough from interest rate fundamentals that it is now expensive on a short-term basis. The relative monetary stance gauge between the euro area and the U.S. is pointing toward trouble ahead (Chart I-18). This trend may be magnified if, as we expect, global goods prices weaken anew. Another problem for the euro is that now that the world has embraced president Macron with a firm handshake, political risk may be once again rearing its ugly head in Europe. The Italicum electoral reform in Italy is progressing and there may be a new prime minister sitting in the Palazzo Chigi in Rome this fall. The problem is that the Italian public remains much more euroskeptic than France and the euro is supported by barely more than 50% of the population (Chart I-19, top panel). With euroskeptic and pro-euro parties standing neck-and-neck in the polls, the risk of a referendum on the euro in the area's third largest economy is becoming increasingly real (Chart I-19, bottom panel). Chart I-17Relative Monetary Conditions ##br##Point To A Lower AUD Relative Monetary Conditions Point To A Lower AUD Relative Monetary Conditions Point To A Lower AUD Chart I-18Euro At ##br##Risk Euro At Risk Euro At Risk Chart I-19Italy Is Not ##br##France Italy Is Not France Italy Is Not France The yen could benefit if the combined impact of higher U.S. rates and tighter Chinese policy proves to be a mistake. Our composite indicator of global asset market volatility - based on implied volatility in bonds, global stocks, global commodities, and various exchange rates - is near record lows (Chart I-20). Hence, global risk assets - commodity and EM plays in particular - could suffer some damage in the face of a deeper than anticipated global growth slowdown led by China. The recent improvement in Japanese industrial production, which mirrors the improvement in EM trade, may be short-lived. This would depress Japanese inflation expectations and boost Japanese real rates, helping the yen in the process (Chart I-21). Shorting GBP/JPY may be one of the best ways to take advantages of these dynamics (Chart I-22). Chart I-20Global Cross-Asset ##br##Volatility Is Too Low Global Cross-Asset Volatility Is Too Low Global Cross-Asset Volatility Is Too Low Chart I-21If China And EM Slow, Japanese ##br##CPI Expectations Will Plunge If China And EM Slow, Japanese CPI Expectations Will Plunge If China And EM Slow, Japanese CPI Expectations Will Plunge Chart I-22New Downleg In ##br##GBP/JPY? New Downleg In GBP/JPY? New Downleg In GBP/JPY? Bottom Line: An oversupplied global economy could find it difficult to withstand the combined tightening emanating from China and the U.S. The improvement in global trade and global good prices is likely to dissipate in the coming month. The euro and commodity currencies could suffer from this development and the yen could benefit. Concluding Thoughts Global policy makers will ultimately not stand pat in the face of this problem. This may in fact deepen their well-entrenched dovish biases. As a result, while the scenario above sounds dire, it is likely to be transitory. The Chinese authorities will not let growth crater; European and Japanese policymakers will fight deflation; and even the Fed may be forced to leave policy easier than it would like. We will explore this topic in more detail in future publications. A Few Words On The RMB Chart I-23China Has Regained Control ##br##Of Its Capital Account China Has Regained Control Of Its Capital Account China Has Regained Control Of Its Capital Account This week, the RMB has been well bid as the PBoC announced that the currency will increasingly be used as a countercyclical tool. The market has interpreted this move as an attack on speculators betting on a falling RMB. The conditions had become very propitious for this kind of announcement to lift the CNY. On the back of a weaker dollar the trade-weighted RMB had in fact weakened for most of 2017 (Chart I-23, top panel), implying that the RMB has continued to help the Chinese economy. Additionally, capital flight out of China has slowed in response to the enforcement of capital controls, something made clear by the collapse in import over-invoicing (Chart I-23, bottom panel). Going forward, it is not clear whether this announcement is necessarily bullish or bearish. It all depends on the Chinese economy and its deflationary pressures. If we are correct that Chinese deflationary pressures are set to increase in the coming quarters, this could imply that Chinese authorities put downward pressure on the CNY later this year. That being said, we remain reluctant to short the yuan to play Chinese deflationary forces. The capital account is well controlled and the PBoC will continue to aggressively manage the exchange rate. This implies that currencies like the AUD or BRL, which exhibit strong correlations with Chinese imports, could remain the main vehicles to play a Chinese slowdown in the forex space. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The greenback displayed further weakness as FOMC member Brainard shared her opinions questioning the future path of U.S. policy. We consider these remarks as temporary hurdles for the dollar, as fundamentals are still in favor of a stronger dollar, which is something the Fed recognizes. This week, some minor deflationary worries resurfaced as the ISM Prices Paid declined to 60.5 from the previous 68.5. While this is true, the labor market continues to tighten as the ADP survey come in very strong. Additionally, ISM Manufacturing PMI also paints a brighter picture for manufacturing, coming in at 54.9. We believe the Fed will hike this month, and will continue to highlight its tightening path going forward, which will provide a fillip for the dollar. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Europe delivered a more negative outlook this week with softer data: Services sentiment, economic sentiment indicator, industrial confidence and business climate all came in less than expected; German CPI disappointed with CPI increasing at a 1.5% rate, less than the expected 2% rate, and the harmonized index also underperformed at 1.4%; European CPI also disappointed at 1.4%, while core CPI also slowed; However, Italian unemployment improved to 11.1% from 11.5%. President Draghi also reiterated his dovish stance in a speech on Monday. While the euro is up this week, elevated short-term valuations warrant a lower euro in coming months. Furthermore, following Draghi's reiteration, rate differentials may continue to move in favor of the dollar. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Upbeat data from Japan has lifted the yen this week: Job/applicants ratio is at 1.48, a level last seen in 1974; Retail trade increased at a 3.2% annual pace, much more than the expected 2.3% rate; Industrial production increased at a 5.7% pace; Housing starts increased at 1 .9%. While data surprises to the upside in Japan, low inflation still remains entrenched in the economy. We believe the BoJ will remain dovish until inflation emerges, which will keep JPY's upside limited. That being said, risk-averse behavior can provide a temporary tailwind for the yen in the upcoming months. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 The U.K.'s consumer sector remains mixed, showing a ray of sunshine after batches of poor numbers: Gfk Consumer Confidence came in at -5, better than the expected -8; Consumer credit came in at GBP 1.525 bn,; M4 Money Supply also increased at 8.2% yoy. Mortgage approvals, however, clicked in below estimates, while net lending to individuals was GBP 4.3 billion, less than expected and previously reported. Nevertheless, cable has been relatively strong this week, lifted by the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 There was some negative data out of Australia this week: Building permits are still contracting, now at a 17.2% pace, less than the 19.9% pace last month; Private sector credit is expanding at a slower pace of 4.9%; AiG Performance of Manufacturing Index decreased to 54.8 from 59.2; AUD has been considerably softened recently, as commodity prices weakened. While the Chinese NBS manufacturing PMI marginally beat expectations, the Caixin Manufacturing PMI actually weakened from 50.3 to 49.6, and is now in contraction territory. As China continues to face structural issues, which are now front and center thanks to their most recent debt rating downgrade, AUD could suffer even more. In the G10 space, it is likely it will be one of the worst performing currencies this year. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The NZD has seen a broad-based appreciation across the G10 space in the past 2 weeks due to stronger than expected trade balance and visitor arrivals. Dairy prices annual growth rate also remain robust at 56% this week. Further buoying the NZD was the release of the RNBZ Financial Stability Report, which was upbeat and states that financial risks have subsided in the past 6 months. The RBNZ also highlighted the slowdown in house price growth due to macroprudential measures. Most recently, NZD has been weak against European currencies, as upbeat data and a higher euro drove up these currencies. EUR/NZD is likely to trend downwards as growth differentials could further bifurcate central bank policies, and weigh on this cross. NZD/USD, itself, is unlikely to see much upside if the dollar bull market resumes and EM cracks deepen. However, AUD/NZD should weaken some more. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The CAD has seen downside recently as oil's gains receded after markets seemed disappointed by the OPEC deal. Data further corroborated this negative view, as both industrial and raw material prices increased by less than expected at 0.6% and 1.6% respectively. Additionally, the first quarter current account also faltered into a further deficit of CAD 14.05 bn. However, GDP growth was strong and could improve further. Investors are currently highly bearish on the CAD, with net speculative positions at the lowest level in 10 years, suggesting the bad news is well priced in. Going forward, the BoC continues to argue that the output gap is closing quicker than expected which will warrant higher rates, and help the CAD. While the CAD may not appreciate much against the USD, it will be one nonetheless one of the best performing currencies in the G10 space. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF continues to drift lower as lofty short-term valuations are hurting the euro. As the ECB is likely to remain accommodative, as per Draghi's recent remarks, the recent weakness may only be the beginning of a new trend. Recent data shows that there might be a slight deceleration in the Swiss economy as the KOF leading indicator has slowed down to 101.6. However, with Italian political risks growing faster than anticipated, the CHF could find additional support. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 As oil prices falter after the OPEC deal, the NOK displayed substantial downside against the USD, the EUR, and the CAD. Despite our Commodity and Energy team seeing additional upside for oil prices, the NOK will continue to be pulled down by low rates as the Norges Bank battles against deflationary prices, falling wages, and a weak labor market. Real rate differentials will prompt upside in USD/NOK, as well as CAD/NOK, as both the U.S. and Canada have adopted a hawkish and neutral bias, respectively. Regarding data, retail sales picked up from a meager 0.1% growth rate to a still unimpressive rate of 0.2%. At 5.1%, Norway's credit Indicator also grew less than expected and continues to slowdown. Report Links: Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data this week showed that last quarter, the economy did not perform as well as anticipated, with GDP increasing by 2.2%, lower than the expected 2.9%. However, more recent data shows a pickup in activity, with retail sales increasing at a 4.5% rate. USD/SEK has been weak recently due to the dollar's weakness, which we think is at its tail end. EUR/SEK's recent appreciation is likely to alleviate the Riksbank's deflationary worries. However, downside is possible as the euro may retract some of its gains. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Through the 18 years of the euro, growth in 'core' Germany and France and 'periphery' Spain has equalled that in the U.S., U.K. and Canada. But Italy has severely underperformed since 2008. Italy's economic underperformance is due to the uncured malaise in its banks. Fixing Italian banks will fix Italy and reduce euro breakup risk. Euro area equities and periphery bonds do offer long-term relative value on the premise that euro breakup risk does ultimately fade. But for those who can time their entry, await the outcome of the Italian election. Feature The euro recently had its 18th birthday.1 Through the formative, testing and often tempestuous first 18 years of its life, how have the euro area's main economies performed - and how do these performances compare with the developed world's other major economies? The answers might come as a surprise (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekItaly Has Severely Underperformed Since 2008. Why? Italy Has Severely Underperformed Since 2008. Why? Italy Has Severely Underperformed Since 2008. Why? To allow for the different demographics, we must look at growth in real GDP per head.2 On this metric, the gold medal goes to Japan, with 34% growth. During the euro's lifetime, Japan's real GDP has grown by 18%, but its working age population has shrunk by 12%, resulting in the developed world's best real growth per head.3 The silver medal winner is probably not surprising: Germany, with 28% growth. But the bronze medal winner might surprise you. It is a euro 'periphery' country: Spain, with 26% growth - a medal shared with the U.K. Then come Canada, 24%; the U.S., 22%; and France, 19%. So through the 18 years of the euro, Germany, France and Spain have performed more or less in line with the U.S., U.K. and Canada. Making it very difficult to argue that being in the single currency has penalized the growth of either 'core' Germany and France or 'periphery' Spain. Italy Isn't Partying... But Don't Blame The Euro Unfortunately, there's a problem - Italy. Through the 18 years of the euro, Italy's real GDP per head has grown by just 5%, substantially below any other G10 or G20 economy. If the euro is to blame for the significant underperformance of its third largest economy with 60 million people, then the single currency's long-term viability has to be in serious doubt. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that the euro per se is not to blame for Italy's painful underperformance. First, observe that through 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head kept up with many of its G10 peers. Even without a substantial tailwind from a credit-fuelled housing boom - which other economies had - Italian real growth per head performed in line with France, the U.S. and Canada (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line With France, The U.S. And Canada Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line With France, The U.S. And Canada Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line With France, The U.S. And Canada Second, in the post-crisis years, there was little to distinguish the economic performance of Italy from Spain until 2013 (Chart I-3). Only after 2013 has a huge gap opened up. While Italy has struggled to grow, Spain has taken off, expanding by more than 12%. This recent strong recovery in Spain makes it hard to attribute Italy's underperformance to membership of the single currency (per se). Chart I-3Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish Italy and Spain Until 2013 Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish Italy and Spain Until 2013 Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish Italy and Spain Until 2013 Fix Italian Banks To Fix Italy We believe that Italy's economic underperformance is down to the as yet uncured malaise in its banks. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Crucially, the acute financial crises in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland forced their policymakers to recapitalize the banks, and thereby allowed the bank credit flow channel to function again. For example, Spain's turning point came in 2013, when bank equity capital as a multiple of non-performing loans (NPLs) started to recover (Chart I-4), allowing Spanish banks to operate more normally. Chart I-4Spanish Banks' Solvency Recovered In 2013 Spanish Banks' Solvency Recovered In 2013 Spanish Banks' Solvency Recovered In 2013 But Spanish banks' health did not recover because NPLs declined; indeed, if anything, NPLs continued to increase (Chart I-5). Spanish banks' health improved because of a large injection of bailout equity capital (Chart I-6). By contrast, Italian banks have not yet received the injection of equity capital that is desperately needed to fix Italy's bank credit flow channel. Chart I-5NPLs Continued To Rise Everywhere NPLs Continued To Rise Everywhere NPLs Continued To Rise Everywhere Chart I-6French And Spanish Banks Have Raised Equity. Italian Banks Have Not. French And Spanish Banks Have Raised Equity. Italian Banks Have Not. French And Spanish Banks Have Raised Equity. Italian Banks Have Not. To lift Italian banks' equity capital to NPL multiple to the lowest level that Spanish banks reached before recovery would require €80-100 billion of fresh bank equity capital. Which equates to 5-6% of Italian GDP. The good news is that this is an affordable price if it kick starts long-term growth. The bad news is that Italy's avoidance of outright financial crisis (thus far) has now tied its hands. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the state bailout escape route that Spain and Ireland used. Granted, in a crisis, the BRRD would allow Italian government state intervention to aid a troubled bank. But the overarching aim would be to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. "Other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." Without a crisis, the process to recapitalise Italian banks and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Our concern is that such a protracted nursing to health will keep Italy's bank credit channel dysfunctional, thereby leaving economic growth in a 60 million people economy sub-par for an extended period. Only when the Italian banks are adequately recapitalized, will the danger of a financial or political tail-event - and a euro breakup - be fully exorcised. Unfortunately, the danger may first have to rise before policymakers allow the necessary action. But ultimately they will. Some Investment Thoughts If euro breakup risk does ultimately fade, then euro area equities will receive a tailwind relative to other markets. This is because relative to these other markets, euro area equity prices are discounted to generate a 1.5% excess annual return through the next 10 years - as a risk premium for euro breakup.4 So if this risk premium suddenly and fully vanished, relative prices would have to rise by 15%. Likewise, euro area periphery bond yields can compress further - as the yield premium effectively equals the perceived annual probability of euro breakup multiplied by the expected currency redenomination loss after the breakup. So euro area equities and periphery bonds do offer long-term relative value on the premise that the policy steps needed to boost Italian growth are affordable and relatively minor - and that euro breakup risk does ultimately fade. However, for those who can time their entry, await the outcome of the Italian election due to take place within the next year. Breakup risk may flare up again before it does ultimately fade. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The euro was born on January 1st 1999. 2 Zeal GDP divided by working age (15-64) population 3 1.18/(1-0.12)=1.34 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Markets Suspended In Disbelief" published on April 13 2007 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-7 Short CAC40 / Long EUROSTOXX600 Short CAC40 / Long EUROSTOXX600 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Markets have gone too far in pricing out the Republican's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections. A bill that at least cuts taxes should be forming by year end. The risk is that continued political turbulence, now including the possibility of impeachment, distracts Congress and delays or completely derails tax reform plans. Fortunately for the major global equity markets, corporate profits are providing solid support. We expect U.S. EPS growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at just under 20%. The projected profit acceleration is even more impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. Corporations are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end that will favor the latter two bourses in local currency terms. EPS growth will fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017, but what is more important for equity indexes is the direction of 12-month forward EPS expectations, which remain in an uptrend. The positive earnings backdrop means that stocks will outperform bonds for the remainder of the year even if Congress fails to pass any market-friendly legislation. The FOMC is "looking through" the recent soft economic data and slower inflation, and remains on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year. The impact of the Fed's balance sheet runoff on the Treasury market will be limited by several factors, but a shrinking balance sheet and Fed rate hikes will force bond yields to rise faster than is currently discounted. Policy divergence will push the dollar higher. The traditional relationship between the euro/USD and short-term yield differentials should re-establish following the French election. The euro could reach parity before the next move is done. "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chinese growth has slowed but the authorities are easing policy, which will stabilize growth and support base metals. That said, we remain more upbeat on oil prices than base metals. Feature Investors have soured on the prospects for U.S. tax reform in recent weeks, but the latest travails in Washington inflicted only fleeting damage on U.S. and global bourses. The S&P 500 appears to have broken above the 2400 technical barrier as we go to press. Market expectations for a more tepid Fed rate hike cycle, lower Treasury yields and related dollar softness undoubtedly provided some support. But, more importantly, corporate profits are positively surprising in the major economies and this is not just an energy story. The good news on company earnings should continue to drive stock prices higher this year in absolute terms and relative to bond prices. It is a tougher call on the dollar and the direction of bond yields. We remain short duration and long the dollar, but much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and fiscal policy. A Death Knell For U.S. Tax Reform? Chart I-1 highlights that the market now sees almost a zero chance that the Republicans will ever be able to deliver any meaningful tax cuts or infrastructure spending. Many believe that mushrooming political scandals encumbering President Trump will distract the GOP and delay or derail tax reform. Indeed, impeachment proceedings would be a major distraction, although this outcome would not necessarily lead to an equity bear market. The historical record shows that the economy is much more important than politics for financial markets. BCA's geopolitical strategists looked at three presidential impeachments, covering the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974) and the President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999).1 Watergate was the only episode that coincided with a bear market, but it is difficult to pin the market downturn on Nixon's impeachment since the U.S. economy entered one of the worst post-war recessions in 1973 that was driven by tight Fed policy and an oil shock. Impeachment would require that Trump loses support among the Republican base, which so far has not happened. The President still commands the support of 84% of Republican voters (Chart I-2). Investors should monitor this support level as an indicator of the President's political capital and the risk of impeachment. Chart I-1Fading Hopes For Tax Reform Fading Hopes For Tax Reform Fading Hopes For Tax Reform Chart I-2 We believe that markets have gone too far in pricing out Trump's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the President and congressional Republicans see eye to eye. The odds are good that an agreement to cut taxes will be formed by year end. Congressional leaders want tax reform to be revenue neutral, but finding sufficient areas to cut spending will be extremely difficult. They may simply require that tax cuts are paid for in a 10-year window. This makes it possible to lower taxes upfront and promise non-specific spending cuts and revenue raising measures down the road. Or, Congress may pass tax reform that is not revenue neutral through the reconciliation process, which would require that tax cuts sunset at some point in the future. Tax cuts would give stocks a temporary boost either way but, as we discuss below, it may be better for corporate profits in the medium term if Congress fails to deliver any fiscal stimulus. Profits, Beats And Misses While economists fret over the soft U.S. economic data so far this year, profit growth is quietly accelerating in the background (Chart I-3). On a 4-quarter moving total basis, S&P 500 earnings-per-share were up by more than 13% in the first quarter (84% reporting). We expect growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at about 18%, before moderating in 2018. Profit growth is accelerating outside of the energy sector. The projected acceleration in EPS growth is equally impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. The favorable profit picture in the major economies reflects two key factors. First, profits are rebounding from a poor showing in 2015/16, when EPS was dragged down by the collapse in oil prices and a global manufacturing recession. Oil prices have since rebounded and global industrial production is recovering as expected (Chart I-4). Our short-term forecasting models for real GDP, based on a mixture of hard data and surveys, continue to flag a pickup in economic growth in the major economies (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Top-Down Profit Projection Top-Down Profit Projection Top-Down Profit Projection Chart I-4EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production Chart I-5GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate The U.S. model's forecast paints an overly rosy picture, but it does support our view that Q1 softness in the hard data reflected temporary factors that will give way to a robust rebound in the second and third quarters. The Eurozone economy is really humming at the moment, as highlighted by our model and recent readings from the IFO and purchasing managers' surveys. Indeed, these indicators are consistent with real GDP growth of nearly 3%! Our GDP models are also constructive for Japan and the U.K., although not nearly as robust as in the U.S. and Eurozone. Chart I-6Profit Margins On The Rise Profit Margins On The Rise Profit Margins On The Rise Second, the corporate sectors in the major economies are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. This is the case even in the U.S., where labor market slack has largely been absorbed. Indeed, margins rose in Q1 2017 for the third quarter in a row (Chart I-6). Our indicators suggest that the corporate sector has gained some pricing power at a time when wage gains are taking a breather.2 The hiatus of wage pressure may not last long, and we expect the "mean reversion" in profit margins to resume next year. But for now, our short-term EPS growth model remains upbeat for the next 3-6 months (not shown). Profit margins are also on the rise in Japan and the Eurozone. Margins in the latter appear to have the most upside potential of the three major markets, given the fact that current levels are still depressed by historical standards, and that there remains plenty of slack in the European labor market. We are not incorporating any margin expansion in Japan because they are already very high. Nonetheless, we do not expect any "mean reversion" in margins over the next year either, because the business sector is going to great lengths to avoid any increase in the wage bill despite an extremely tight labor market. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end: The U.S. is further ahead in the global profit mini recovery and year-ago EPS comparisons will become more difficult by the end of the year. The drag on corporate profits in 2017 from previous dollar strength will be larger than the currency drag in the Eurozone according to our models, assuming no change in trade-weighted exchange rates in the forecast period (Chart I-7). The pass-through of past yen movements will be a net boost to EPS growth for Japanese companies this year.3 Currency shifts would favor the Japanese and the Eurozone markets versus the U.S. even more if the dollar experiences another upleg. We expect the dollar to appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms. A 10% broad-based dollar appreciation would trim EPS growth by 2½ percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2018 due to lags (Chart I-8). Eurozone and Japanese EPS growth would receive a lift of 2 and ½ percentage points, respectively, as their currencies depreciate versus the dollar. Chart I-7Currency Impact On EPS Growth Currency Impact On EPS Growth Currency Impact On EPS Growth Chart I-8A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits Finally, the fact that profits in Japan and the Eurozone are more leveraged to overall economic growth than in the U.S. gives the former two markets the edge as global industrial production continues to recover this year and into 2018. Japanese and Eurozone equity market indexes also have a higher beta with respect to the global equity index. The implication is that we remain overweight these two markets relative to the U.S. on a currency hedged basis. Lofty Expectations Even though the message from our EPS models is upbeat, our forecasts still fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017. Is this a risk for the equity market, especially in the U.S. where valuations are stretched? Investors are well aware that bottom-up estimates are perennially optimistic. Table I-1 compares the beginning-of-year EPS growth estimate with the actual end-of-year outcome for 2007-2016. Not surprisingly, bottom-up analysts massively missed the mark in the recession. But even outside of 2008, analysts significantly over-estimated earnings in seven out of nine years. Despite this, the S&P 500 rose sharply in most cases. One exception was 2015, when the S&P 500 fell by 0.7%. Plunging oil and material prices contributed to an EPS growth "miss" of seven percentage points. Chart I-9 highlights that the level of the 12-month forward EPS estimate fell that year, unlike in the other years since the Great Recession. Valuations are more demanding today than in the past, but the message is that attaining bottom-up EPS year-end estimates is less important for the broad market than the trend in 12-month forward estimates (which remains up at the moment). Chart I- Chart I-9S&P 500 Follows ##br##12-month Forward EPS S&P 500 Follows 12-month Forward EPS S&P 500 Follows 12-month Forward EPS The bottom line is that the backdrop is constructive for equities even if the Republicans are unable to push through any fiscal stimulus. In fact, it may be better for the stock market in the medium term if the GOP fails to pass any meaningful legislation. The U.S. economy does not need any demand stimulus at the moment (although measures to boost the supply side of the economy would help lift profits over the long term). The current long-in-the-tooth U.S. expansion is likely to stretch further in the absence of stimulus, extending the moderate growth/low inflation/low interest rate backdrop that has been positive for risk assets in recent years. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time The minutes from the May FOMC meeting reiterated that policymakers plan to begin scaling back on reinvesting the proceeds of its maturing securities of Treasurys and MBS by the end of the year. The Fed is leaning toward a gradual tapering of reinvestment in order to avoid shocking the bond market. Still, investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the balance sheet runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. Chart I-10 Chart I-10 presents a forecast for the flow of Treasurys available to the private sector, taking into consideration the supply that is absorbed by foreign official institutions and by the Fed. The bottom panel shows a similar calculation for the aggregate supply of government bonds from the U.S., Japan, the Eurozone and the U.K. While the supply of Treasurys has been positive since 2012, the net flow has been negative for these four economies as a whole because of aggressive quantitative easing programs. This year will see the largest contraction in the supply of government bonds available to the private sector, at US$800 billion. The flow will become less negative in 2018 even if the Fed were to keep its balance sheet unchanged (mostly due to assumed ECB tapering). If the Fed goes ahead with its balance sheet reduction plan, the net supply of government bonds from the major economies will move slightly into positive territory for the first time since 2014. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" for the path of future short rates. Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables and the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. Just for exposition purposes, let us take an extreme example and assume that the Fed simply terminates all re-investment as of January 2018 (i.e. the runoff is not tapered). In this case, the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a contraction of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart I-11). Applying the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.09, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. Chart I-11Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: The balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).4 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Fed Outlook: Mostly About Inflation The May FOMC minutes confirmed that the FOMC is "looking through" the soft economic data in the first quarter, chalking it up to temporary factors such as shifts in inventories. They are also inclined to believe that the moderation in core CPI inflation in recent months is temporary. The message is that policymakers remain on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year, in line with the 'dot plot' forecast. The market is pricing almost a 100% chance of a June rate hike. However, less than two full rate hikes are expected over the next year, which is far too benign in our view. Investors have been quick to conclude that recent economic data have convinced Fed officials to shift from a "gradual" pace of rate hikes to a "glacial" pace. Treasurys rallied on this shift in Fed expectations and a decline in long-term inflation expectations. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has dropped to about 1.8%, the lowest level since before the U.S. election. This appears to us that the bond market over-reacted to the drop in core CPI inflation from 2.2% in February to 1.9% in April. The evolution of actual inflation will be critical to the outlook for the Fed and Treasury yields in the coming months. Our U.S. fixed-income strategists have simulated a traditional Phillips Curve model of inflation (Chart I-12).5 The model projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.1% by December, even assuming no change in the unemployment rate or the trade-weighted dollar. Inflation ends the year not far below the 2% target even in an alternative scenario in which we assume that the dollar appreciates and that the full-employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed currently assumes. Chart I-12U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% Thus, the trend in inflation should reinforce the FOMC's bias to keep tightening policy, forcing the bond market to reassess the pace of rate hikes discounted in the curve. That said, if we are wrong and inflation does not trend higher in the next 3-4 months, then it is the FOMC that will be forced to reassess and our short duration recommendation will probably not pan out on a six month horizon. Longer-term, last month's Special Report highlighted that we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, builds on that theme with a look at the impact of technological progress on equilibrium bond yields. With respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. Stay overweight corporate bonds within fixed income portfolios for now. While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten policy for an extended period, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. The euro has appreciated versus the dollar even as two-year real interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar since the end of March. This divergence probably reflects euro short-covering following the market-friendly French election outcome. Next up are the two rounds of French legislative elections in June. Polls support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus. In the meantime, we do not see any risk factors emanating from the Eurozone that could upset the global equity applecart in the near term. Moreover, the traditional relationship between the euro/USD exchange rate and 2-year real yield differentials should now re-establish. The implication is that the euro could reach parity before the next move is done. Dr. Copper? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 25% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 5% since February (Chart I-13). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 7-10%, nickel has dropped by 18% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Chart I-13What Are Commodities Telling Us? What Are Commodities Telling Us? What Are Commodities Telling Us? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in previous reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart I-14). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over. Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: The authorities wish to slow credit growth, but there is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably this year (Chart I-15). Finally, the PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility and recently made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months. Chart I-14China Is The Main Story ##br##For Base Metals Demand China Is The Main Story For Base Metals Demand China Is The Main Story For Base Metals Demand Chart I-15Direct Fiscal Spending And ##br##Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Direct Fiscal Spending And Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Direct Fiscal Spending And Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. Fading fears about a China meltdown may give commodities a lift later this year. Our commodity strategists are particularly positive on crude oil, as extended production cuts from OPEC and Russia outweigh the impact of surging shale production, allowing bloated inventories to moderate. In contrast, the backdrop is fairly benign for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Investment Conclusions: Accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a healthy tailwind and suggests that stocks could perform well under a couple of different scenarios in the second half of 2017. If the rebound in U.S. economic growth from the poor first quarter is unimpressive and it appears that Congress will be sidetracked by political turmoil in the White House, then the S&P 500 should benefit from the 'goldilocks' combination of healthy profit growth, low bond yields, an accommodative Fed and a soft dollar. If, instead, U.S. growth rebounds strongly and Congress makes progress on the broad outline of a tax reform bill over the summer months, then stocks should benefit from the prospect of stronger growth in 2018. Rising bond yields and a firmer dollar would provide some offset for stocks, but would not derail the equity bull market as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. Our model suggests that U.S. inflation will remain below-target for the next several months, but could be near 2% by year end. This scenario would set the stage for a more aggressive Fed in 2018, a surge in the dollar and possibly a bear market in risk assets next year. We are therefore comfortable in predicting that the stock-to-bond total return ratio will continue to rise for at least the remainder of this year. The tough part relates to bond yields and the dollar, since the above two scenarios have very different implications for these two asset classes. Our base case is closer to the second scenario, such that we remain below benchmark in duration and long the dollar. That said, much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and U.S. politics. Both are particularly difficult to forecast. A failure for core PCE inflation to pick up in the next 3-4 months and/or continuing political scandals in Washington would force us to reconsider our asset allocation. Of course, there are other risks to consider, including growing mercantilism in the U.S., Sino-American tensions and North Korea. At the top of the list are China and Italy. (1) China China remains our geopolitical strategists' top pick as the catalyst most likely to scuttle our upbeat view on global risk assets in 2017.6 Our base case assumption is that policymakers will not enact wide-scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans and bankruptcies and defaults, ahead of the Fall Party Congress. The regulatory crackdown so far seems merely to keep the financial sector in check for a while. The government has already stepped back somewhat in the face of the liquidity squeeze, and fiscal policy has been loosened (as mentioned above). All of the key Communist Party statements have emphasized that stability remains a priority. Nonetheless, it may be difficult for the authorities to manage the deleveraging process given nose-bleed levels of private-sector leverage. Politicians could misjudge the fragility of the financial system and investors might front-run the reform process, sending asset prices down well in advance of policy implementation. (2) Italy We have flagged the next Italian election as a key risk for markets because of polls showing that voters have become disillusioned with the euro. It appeared that an election would not take place until 2018, and we have downplayed European elections as a risk factor for 2017. However, the 5-Star Movement has now backed a proportional electoral system, which raises the chances of an autumn election in Italy. This would obviously spark turbulence in financial markets in the months leading up to the event. Turning to emerging markets, the pickup in global growth and a modest bounce in commodity prices would support this asset class. However, our view that the dollar is headed higher on the back of Fed rate hikes keeps us from getting too excited about EM stocks, bonds or currencies. Our other recommendations include the following: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Overweight small caps stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2017 Next Report: June 29, 2017 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Overview," April 017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Currency shifts affect earnings with a lag, which in captured by our models. 4 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers," dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets ," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com II. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? This month's Special Report was written by Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist for BCA's Global Investment Strategy Service. The report is a companion piece to last month's Special Report, which argued that some of the structural factors that have depressed global interest rates are at an inflection point. These factors include demographic trends and the integration of China's massive labor supply into the global economy. Peter's report focuses on technology's impact on bond yields. He presents the non-consensus view that slow productivity growth likely depresses interest rates at the outset, but will lead to higher rates later on. Not only could sluggish productivity growth lead to higher inflation, it could also deplete national savings. Both factors would be bond bearish, reinforcing the other factors discussed in last month's Special Report. I trust that you will find the report as insightful and educational as I did. Mark McClellan Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. Chart II-1 If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation The Great Recession Hit Capital Stock Accumulation However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software ##br##Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains The Shift Towards Software Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Chart II-4 Chart II-5 Chart II-6 Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-8 Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The ##br##1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The 1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated The ##br##Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of the Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics China's Very High Rate Of National Savings Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-14 Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce ##br##Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings Aging Will Reduce Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains U.S.: Real Wages Have Been Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-17 Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-20 Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked The Low-Hanging Fruits Of Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed ##br##Thanks To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth Output Gap Has Narrowed Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The breakout in the S&P 500 above 2400 in May has further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are elevated relative to past equity cycles. The price/sales ratio is in a steep rise too. However, our U.S. Composite valuation metric, which takes into consideration 11 different measures of value, is still a little below the one sigma level that marks significant overvaluation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, these measures will not look as favorable when rates finally rise. Technically, the U.S. equity market has upward momentum. Our Equity Monetary Indicator has remained around the zero line, meaning that it is not particularly bullish or bearish at the moment. Our Speculation Index is high, pointing to froth in the market. The high level of our Composite Sentiment Index and low level of the VIX speaks to the level of investor complacency. The U.S. net revisions ratio jumped higher this month, and it is bullish that the earnings surprise index advanced again. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little "dry powder" left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The widening gap between the U.S. WTP and that of Japan and Europe highlights that recent flows have favored the U.S. market relative to the other two. Looking forward, this means that there is more "dry powder" available to buy the Japanese and European markets. A rise in the WTPs for these two markets in the coming months would signal that a rotation into Europe and Japan is taking place. It is disconcerting that our Europe WTP suffered a pull-back over the past month. Nonetheless, we believe that accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a strong tailwind and suggests that stocks remain in a window in which they will outperform bonds. U.S. bond valuation is hovering close to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. We also believe that the combination of Fed balance sheet shrinkage and rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Technically, our composite indicator has touched the zero line, clearing the way for the next leg of the bond bear market. The dollar is very expensive on a PPP basis, although it is less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year, crossing the 200-day moving average. That said, according to our dollar technical indicator, overbought conditions have been totally worked off, suggesting that the currency is clear to move higher if Fed rate expectations shift up as we expect. Moreover, we believe that policy divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and BoJ on the other will push the dollar higher. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights Geopolitical risks remain overstated in 2017, but China and Italy could scuttle the party; June elections in France and the U.K. are not market-movers; But early Italian election is a risk that could prompt the ECB to stay easy, close long EUR/USD for a gain; U.S. budget reconciliation process may be arcane, but is vital to understand upcoming tax reform process; Investors should expect details of tax reform by Q4 2017, but legislation may only pass in Q1 2018. Feature We turned the traditional adage of "sell in May and go away" on its head last month in a report titled "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!"1 So far so good (Chart 1). The fundamental reasons behind the breakout is the narrowing of the global equity risk premium on the back of easy monetary policy and a recovering global economy (Chart 2) two trends that our colleagues at the Global Alpha Sector Strategy highlighted last September.2 Since then, geopolitical risks cited as likely to end the party have been largely overstated.3 We continue to worry about Chinese financial sector reforms, U.S. politics, Sino-American tensions, signs of growing U.S. mercantilism, prospects of early Italian elections, and especially the developments in North Korea. But these remain risks for 2018, rather than 2017.4 Chart 1Blow-Off Phase Has Resumed Blow-Off Phase Has Resumed Blow-Off Phase Has Resumed Chart 2Global ERP Has Room To Fall Global ERP Has Room To Fall Global ERP Has Room To Fall There are still some "loose ends" to tie up from the first quarter, including the upcoming French legislative and U.K. general elections. On the former, there is nothing to say other than that investors should indeed prepare for a "French Revolution," by which we mean a supply-side revolution.5 Current seat projections based on the latest polling have pro-market, centrist, Europhile parties controlling between 85-92% of the National Assembly following the two-round elections in mid-June (Diagram 1).6 Diagram 1French National Assembly Seat Projection Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Yes. In France. Skeptical commentary will surely rain on the centrist parade by pointing out that anti-establishment presidential candidates won nearly 50% of the vote in the first round of the presidential election (true), that Marine Le Pen will be back even stronger in 2020 (false), or that the electoral system is designed to suppress the populist vote (yes, so what?). We are not as perceptive nor profound as the witty op-ed writers. Our far simpler conclusion is that the French National Assembly will elucidate the revealed preference of the French electorate, given the electoral rules that are quite familiar to all French voters. And that preference appears to be for pro-market, and quite possibly painful, structural reforms. We remain long French industrials relative to German ones, but our clients may find alternative ways to play the upcoming free-market revolution in France. On the British front, Tory PM Theresa May is facing her first genuine crisis. The impact of the Manchester terrorist attack on the election is difficult to forecast. However, May's "dementia tax" gaffe has clearly given Labour new life in the polls (Chart 3). What most commentators saw as a clear shoo-in for the Conservative Party has now become a competitive, if not exactly tight, race. Chart 3Labour Gains... Labour Gains... Labour Gains... Chart 4...But Tories Keep Devouring UKIP ...But Tories Keep Devouring UKIP ...But Tories Keep Devouring UKIP We would note that despite Labour's rise in the polls, May's strategy of suppressing the UKIP vote by campaigning from the nationalist right is paying off. As Chart 4 illustrates, UKIP voters appear to be switching to the Tories en masse: UKIP has gone from support of 20% in April 2016 to under 5% today. Given Britain's first-past-the-post electoral system, May's strategy of swallowing the UKIP whole is a savvy move. It will eliminate the probability that UKIP siphons votes away from the Tories in competitive constituencies. Our own, highly conservative, estimate gives the Tories a minimum of 11 gained seats (Table 1). This is based on constituencies that voted for Brexit but where Labour and the Liberal Democrats won by less than 5% in the last election. Table 1Minimal Scenario Gives Tories 11 New Seats For Their Majority Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep We do not think that the election will have much impact on the Brexit process. Political risks peaked in January when May announced that she planned to take the U.K. out of the EU Common Market. We pointed out at the time that this decision made it highly unlikely that the U.K. and EU negotiations would take an acrimonious turn.7 The market agreed with us, with the pound bottoming in mid-January. We continue to believe that the Brexit process will have no investment relevance for global assets. As for U.K. equities and the pound, a larger-than-expected seat grab by the Tories (375+) at the upcoming election would likely strengthen the pound further, which in turn could weigh on the FTSE 100 (with the FTSE 250 being less affected). A disappointing result, one where the Conservative Party fails to reach 350 seats, could create temporary headwinds for the pound. The one risk that remains on our horizon is faster-than-expected deleveraging in China. As we mentioned in our report last week, China's financial crackdown raises near-term risks (Chart 5).8 We do not think that policymakers are looking to enact wide scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans, bankruptcies, and defaults ahead of the Fall Party Congress. However, Chinese investors and businesses may already be looking ahead to 2018. Chart 5Policymakers Are Inducing Financial Risk... Policymakers Are Inducing Financial Risk... Policymakers Are Inducing Financial Risk... Chart 6...At A Time When Vulnerability Is Growing ...At A Time When Vulnerability Is Growing ...At A Time When Vulnerability Is Growing China's reserves-to-M2 ratio - an IMF-proposed measure that captures Chinese reserves of liquid assets against those that its residents could potentially liquefy as part of wide scale capital flight - has continued to decline (Chart 6). Measures of quarterly net portfolio flows and capital flight show that the Q4 2016 outflows accelerated sharply after a slowdown in outflows in the previous two quarters (Chart 7), although we have no information for Q1 2017. More recently, there has been a stunning surge in Bitcoin prices. The crypto-currency is up 65% since the start of May, which cannot be attributed to Euro Area fears given the victory of Europhile Emmanuel Macron in the French election. Could it be related to policy uncertainty in China? We think yes (Chart 8). China remains our pick for the risk that is most likely to scuttle our sanguine view on global risk assets in 2017. Chart 7Chinese Outflows Restarted In Q4 2016 Chinese Outflows Restarted In Q4 2016 Chinese Outflows Restarted In Q4 2016 Chart 8Chinese Uncertainty Is Bitcoin's Gain Chinese Uncertainty Is Bitcoin's Gain Chinese Uncertainty Is Bitcoin's Gain The final risk to investors that we have been tracking this year is inaction by U.S. Congress on the tax reform front. We have received many client questions regarding when investors should expect to see tax reform legislation and when (and how) it is expected to pass. We turn to this question in the rest of this report. Market Relevance Of The Budget Reconciliation Process The U.S. legislative process is complicated, arcane, and highly mutable. We have tried to spare our clients as much of the headache of U.S. congressional procedure as possible.9 However, the budget reconciliation process underpins current efforts to reform both the 2010 Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and enact tax reform. To understand how, when, and whether the GOP-controlled Congress will pass these pieces of legislation, it is necessary for investors to learn the basics of the reconciliation process in particular, and the budget process more broadly. Budget reconciliation - or simply, reconciliation - simplifies the process of passing a budget and was introduced by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.10 To understand why reconciliation matters, we first have to explain how the U.S. Congress sets the budget. The U.S. Budget Process The U.S. budget process (Diagram 2) begins with the U.S. president submitting the White House budget request to Congress. This is a largely ceremonial act as Congress has the power over the appropriations process. Diagram 2U.S. Budget Process: A Tentative Timeline Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Congress takes into account the president's request as it formulates a budget resolution, which both houses of Congress pass but which is not presented to the president and does not actually constitute law. The resolution sets out the guidelines for the budget process, which is supposed to ultimately produce an appropriations bill. It is this bill, also referred to as a budget bill, which appropriates funding for the various federal government departments, agencies, and programs. Under a revised timetable in effect since 1987, the annual budget resolution is supposed to be adopted by both chambers of Congress by April 15, giving legislators sufficient time to then pass a budget bill by the start of the fiscal year on October 1. However, there is no obligation to do so. In fact, Congress failed to pass a budget resolution for most of President Obama's two terms in office due to a high degree of polarization between the Democrats and Republicans. As such, the government was funded via "continuing resolutions," which merely extended pre-existing appropriations at the same levels as the previous fiscal year. Reconciliation Process Where does the reconciliation process fit? It was originally introduced to simplify the process of changing the law on the books in order to bring revenue and spending levels into line with the budget resolution. The crucial feature of the process, and the reason we are focusing so much on it, is that it limits the debate in the Senate to 20 hours, thus automatically preventing any Senator from filibustering the ultimate legislation that emerges from the reconciliation process. No filibuster, no need to reach 60 Senate votes to invoke cloture, an act that ends the debate in the chamber. In the current context, where the Republican Party controls 52 seats, this means that the Republicans can use the reconciliation process to pass legislation that would otherwise be "filibustered" in the Senate. The reconciliation procedure is a very powerful legislative tool by which Congress can pass controversial legislation, as long as such legislation has an impact on government revenues or spending levels. Tax legislation, obviously, would impact government revenues. George W. Bush used the reconciliation procedure to lower taxes in 2001 and 2003. His father, George H. W. Bush used reconciliation to raise taxes in 1990 (and thus roll back some of the Ronald Reagan 1986 tax reform). The 1996 welfare reform - the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 - was also passed via the reconciliation process. Obamacare was not passed via the reconciliation procedure. The main portion of the bill - including almost all of its key provisions - was passed at the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009 when the Democrats held 58 seats in the Senate following the momentous 2008 election.11 It was the subsequent amendments to the original bill that required the reconciliation process due to the death of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy, particularly several crucial funding provisions. The one unifying feature of all reconciliation bills is that they must have an impact on the budget, essentially by changing the revenue or spending levels of the federal government. If the bill introduces extraneous provisions that deviate from the budgetary requirement, then these can be struck out by invoking the so-called "Byrd rule." Waiving the Byrd rule requires an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Senate, which is 60 votes. As such, it essentially requires the 60-seat majority needed to also invoke cloture, making the entire reconciliation process redundant. Bottom Line: The budget reconciliation process allows U.S. Congress to pass legislation without the a 60-seat Senate majority. However, procedural rules require the provisions of a reconciliation bill to deal exclusively with legislation that impact government revenue or spending levels. Timing Since the introduction of the procedure in 1974, there have been 24 reconciliation bills, three of which were vetoed by the president. The reconciliation process begins with the passing of the budget resolution, which sets out the "reconciliation instructions." However, since the procedure was introduced, it has rarely progressed along the intended timeline. The very first reconciliation act in 1980 was introduced in a budget resolution that passed well after the April 15 deadline, in mid-June. And the ultimate appropriations bill, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, was only signed into law in early December 1980, so essentially two months after the start of FY1981 on October 1. Investors should therefore understand that the U.S. budget process has no real firm deadlines. The schedule is highly malleable. A reconciliation bill also does not have to be passed with the actual budget. Despite being initiated by the budget resolution, reconciliation runs parallel to the budget process. For example, Congress has already set appropriations for FY2017, but the reconciliation bill on Obamacare - set by the FY2017 budget resolution - is still in negotiations. Diagram 3 illustrates that half of all reconciliation bills were passed after the start of the fiscal year for which they were introduced in a budget resolution. And five reconciliation bills were passed in the calendar year of the fiscal year for which they were supposed to reconcile the budget, basically mid way through the fiscal year. Diagram 3Timing Of Reconciliation Procedures Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep This is important in the current context because investors are waiting for tax reform legislation which is supposed to be passed via the budget reconciliation process for FY2018. However, the GOP-controlled Congress has not even finished the budget process for FY2017. In fact, the budget resolution for FY2017 only passed the House on January 13, 2017. As we learned above, U.S. budget process guidelines call for the budget resolution to have been passed by April 15, 2016. As such, the Obamacare repeal and replace bill, if it were to ultimately pass the Senate, would certainly be the most delayed reconciliation bill ever. In fact, we could see the current Congress passing the FY2017 reconciliation bill in the waning days of FY2017! Congressional rules only allow one budget resolution to be active at any one time. In fact, as soon as a new budget resolution is passed, the old reconciliation instructions are made void. As such, investors have to wait for the Republicans to decide what they plan to do with the Obamacare reconciliation bill before they begin contemplating tax reform. Bottom Line: Republicans in Congress decided to issue reconciliation instructions as part of the FY2017 budget resolution, which passed in January. As such, investors have to wait until that process ends - with either Obamacare repeal or failure of the bill - before Congress can produce a FY2018 budget resolution with reconciliation instructions for tax reform. We suspect that the FY2018 budget resolution will be passed sometime between the end of the August Congressional recess, on September 5, and December. But that is just a guess (Diagram 4). It could happen earlier, in July, if Obamacare is dealt with over the next month. Diagram 4Tentative U.S. Political Timeline Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep Reconciliation Rules And Tax Reform Changing America's complex tax laws is precisely the sort of legislative action that reconciliation was designed to facilitate. That said, investors are still not sure whether the Trump administration and Congress will be able to agree on comprehensive tax reform that includes lowering top rates for corporations, or whether they will merely agree to cut household taxes on households. Some clarity will emerge once the Republican-controlled Congress passes the FY2018 budget resolution, which will contain reconciliation instructions for either comprehensive tax reform (most likely) or merely household tax reform (unlikely). At that point, the length of the reconciliation process will depend on how much agreement there is surrounding tax reform. Diagram 3 shows that tax cuts - such as those in 2001 and 2003 - take relatively little time to pass. Tax reform, on the other hand, could take a while longer given multiple competing interests. If comprehensive, we would expect tax reform to be passed by the end of Q1 2018. Would that mean that tax cuts would only be effective from January 1, 2018? Or, even less bullish, from the start of FY2019? No. The GOP would have the option of making tax cuts retroactive and thus can avoid a huge market disappointment if tax cuts come later in the next year. It is even legally possible for tax laws passed in 2018 to take effect on January 1, 2017 - though it is admittedly more of a stretch than doing it this year.12 Can reconciliation be used to pass budget-busting tax reform, as we have argued investors should expect? You bet! From 1980 to the 1990s the reconciliation procedure was primarily used - and in fact designed - to reduce the deficit through reductions in mandatory spending, revenue increases, or both. It has since become a tool to expand deficits. This was most famously done by the Bush era reconciliation bills in 2001 and 2003, which introduced large tax cuts. The aforementioned Byrd rule forces any provision of a bill that increases the deficit beyond the years covered by the reconciliation bill to "sunset." In the case of the 2001 and 2003 bills, this meant that Bush-era tax cuts expired in 2011 (estate tax) and 2013 (which investors will remember as the "fiscal cliff"). The sunset period does not have to be ten years, it could conceivably be a lot longer, in effect making tax reform permanent, as far as most investors' time horizons are concerned. Following the Democratic Party sweep in the 2006 midterm elections, the Democrat-controlled Senate changed reconciliation rules to prohibit any deficit-increasing measures, regardless of the sunset clause loophole. However, the Republicans changed the rules back in 2015, after they re-took the Senate in the 2014 midterm election. This is crucial for two reasons: first, it means that the current procedural rules on the books allow deficits to be blown out via the reconciliation procedure and second, it establishes that the current cohort of Republicans in Congress is fiscally profligate, despite media punditry to the contrary. Bottom Line: The reconciliation process was designed to facilitate precisely the type of legislation that Republicans will try to pass via tax reform. According to the current procedural rules, such legislation can increase the budget deficit, as long as it sunsets at the conclusion of the budgetary period set out by the legislation (normally 10-years, but it could be longer). We suspect that tax reform will take until Q1 2018 to pass, but Republicans will be able to make its effects retroactive to January 1, 2017. The Big Picture - What Does It All Mean For Fiscal Policy? We expect the Republican-held Congress to attempt to pass comprehensive tax reform over the next four quarters. If the GOP fail to agree on "revenue offsets" for corporate tax cuts, we could see the Republican Congress electing to pass simple tax cuts for households, as the Bush-era tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 did. To facilitate such legislation politically, the Republicans will rely on "dynamic scoring," the macroeconomic modeling tool based on the work of economist Arthur Laffer (of the "Laffer curve" fame). The idea is that the headline government revenue lost through tax cuts fails to take into account the growth-generating consequences ("macroeconomic feedback") of the cuts, factors that actually add to revenues. In other words, "tax cuts pay for themselves." It is true that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) will balk at dynamic scoring. But we doubt that "egghead, socialist economists" will stand in the way of tax reforms. As we discussed above, the CBO's score will ultimately only force the Republicans to "sunset" tax reform legislation, not scuttle it. The market disagrees with us. After a wave of euphoria following the presidential election, the market has largely priced out meaningful fiscal stimulus. This can be seen in the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies, as well as in the sharp decline in inflation expectations (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Has Voted: No Fiscal Stimulus Market Has Voted: No Fiscal Stimulus Market Has Voted: No Fiscal Stimulus We think the market is making a serious mistake by taking the Republican mantra of "revenue neutral" - meaning that any tax cuts would need to be offset by other revenue-raising measures - tax reform seriously. This is easier said than done. The three main ways that House Republicans have offered to pay for corporate and personal tax cuts - introducing a border adjustment tax, eliminating the deductibility of business interest payments, and jettisoning the deduction for state and local income taxes for individuals - will all face resistance from vested interests. We suspect that the GOP will produce some revenue offsets, but not enough to have a revenue-neutral tax reform. The path of least resistance, therefore, will be to bust the budget and then force the measures to expire over the life of the budget-setting window. White House budget director Mick Mulvaney has already floated the idea of extending the 10-year budget scoring window to 20 years. This would allow tax reform measures, even if they are characterized by the CBO as profligate, to expire in two decades. That's practically a lifetime away, as far as any investor is concerned. What is the investment significance of a stimulative tax reform package? Our colleague Peter Berezin has recently pointed out that it is ironic that fiscal stimulus is coming to America only when the economy has reached full employment. This means that much of the increase in aggregate demand arising from a more expansionary fiscal stance will be reflected in higher inflation rather than faster growth. This does not represent a major threat to risk assets now, but could later next year, as the Fed responds to greater fiscal thrust with tighter monetary policy.13 We encourage our clients to read BCA Special Report "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," penned by Martin Barnes in March, which details the likely path that assets and the economy will take over the next two years.14 In the short term, the market will continue to fret that tax reform is doomed and that Republicans are committed to austerity. However, budget-busting tax reform could begin to be priced in by the market well before the reconciliation bill is ultimately passed. We suspect that the outlines of tax reform will emerge this summer. The market may realize that stimulus is coming as soon as the FY2018 budget resolution, containing tax reform instructions, is passed in Q3 or Q4 2017. Such a realization later this year could augur a violent snap-back in the USD. Currently, the two-year real interest rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. have widened by 58 basis points in favor of the latter since the end of March, even though EUR/USD has actually rallied over this period (Chart 10). We have been long EUR/USD since March 22,15 in expectations that investors would be busy covering their euro hedges that they put on in the lead up to the French elections, the outcome of which we have had a high conviction on since November.16 However, now that net long speculative positions in the euro have risen to a three-year high - having been deeply short just a few weeks ago - the speculative demand for euros will ultimately subside (Chart 11). Chart 10Widening Real Rate ##br##Differentials Support The Dollar Widening Real Rate Differentials Support The Dollar Widening Real Rate Differentials Support The Dollar Chart 11Speculators Are Long The Euro##br## For The First Time In Three Years Speculators Are Long The Euro For The First Time In Three Years Speculators Are Long The Euro For The First Time In Three Years We are therefore closing our USD short versus both the euro and the pound, for gains of 3.48% and 3.34% respectively. As we expected, the ECB is going to look to guide investors towards a "dovish" tapering of its QE program. Speaking before the European Parliament's committee on economic affairs, ECB President Mario Draghi confirmed that "very accommodative financing conditions" reliant on "a fairly substantial amount of monetary accommodation" would continue. The ECB will have to make a decision whether to extend its sovereign bond purchase program into the next year or start winding it down as planned. Given news flow out of Italy that an election may be planned as early as September, the ECB may be forced to stand pat until after the end of the year. Given our view that tax reform in the U.S. would ultimately happen, and that it would eventually be marginally stimulative, any resurfacing of political risks in Europe - which we are expecting - should be negative for the EUR/USD. What should investors do about European equities? We are cautious. As we have been pointing out to our clients since September of last year, Italy is the political risk in Europe.17 However, we think that most investors are willing to bet that European equities can survive Italian political turbulence. This could be a mistake in the short term, as we think that Euroskeptic (albeit evolving) Five Star Movement could win a plurality in the next election. In the long term, Italy will become ECB's proverbial boulder, that Draghi must push up a hill like Sisyphus, only to see it roll down to the bottom with each bout of Italian political instability. As such, Italy's instability will force ECB to set its monetary policy for the weakest link in the Euro Area (Italy), rather than the aggregate. This should be positive for Euro Area risk assets, but negative for the euro, all other things being equal. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Strike While The Iron Is Hot," dated September 2, 2016, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 The dates for the two rounds of the legislative elections are June 11 and 18. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 We draw on several overviews of the budget reconciliation process in this report. Please see David Reich and Richard Kogan, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Introduction To Budget 'Reconciliation'," dated November 9, 2016, available at cbpp.org; Megan S. Lynch, Congressional Research Service, "The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing Of Legislative Action," dated February 23, 2016, available at fas.org; and Megan S. Lynch, Congressional Research Service, "Budget Reconciliation Measures Enacted Into Law: 1980-2010," dated January 4, 2017, available at fas.org. 11 To reach the required 60 seat filibuster-proof majority the Democrats relied on some luck and cunning. Democrat Al Franken unseated Republican Incumbent Norm Coleman in a recount in Minnesota and Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, switched his party affiliation to Democrat. 12 Congress, after the sweeping 1986 tax reforms, corrected certain oversights in that law by passing subsequent measures in 1987. These were made to be retroactive back to the previous calendar year, i.e. January 1, 1986, and the courts upheld the legislation. Hence, there is precedent for Republicans to pass tax reform in 2018 that takes effect January 1, 2017, though admittedly the circumstances would matter. Courts have even upheld retroactive tax legislation back to two calendar tax years. Please see Erika K. Lunder, Robert Meltz, and Kenneth R. Thomas, "Constitutionality of Retroactive Tax Legislation," Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2012, available at fas.org. 13 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Fiscal Policy In The Spotlight," dated May 26, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated March 7, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe," dated March 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar