Financial Markets

Next Thursday May 26, we will hold the BCA Debate – High Inflation: Here To Stay,Or Soon In The Rear-View Mirror? – a Webcast in which I will debate my colleague, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist, Bob Ryan on the outlook for inflation, and take the side that inflationary fears will soon recede. I do hope you can join us. As such, the debate will replace the weekly report, though we will renew the fractal trading watchlist on our website. Dhaval Joshi Executive Summary The second quarter’s synchronised sell-off in stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals and gold is an extremely rare star alignment. The last time that the ‘everything sell-off’ star alignment happened was in early 1981 when the Paul Volcker Fed ‘broke the back’ of inflation and turned stagflation into an outright recession. In 2022, the Jay Powell Fed risks doing the same. If history repeats itself, then the template of 1981-82 could provide a useful guide for 2022-23. In which case, bond prices are now entering a bottoming process.  Stocks would bottom next. While the near term outlook is cloudy, we expect stock prices to be higher on a 12-month horizon, especially long-duration stocks that are most sensitive to bond yields. But just as in 1981-82, the biggest casualty will be industrial metals, which are likely to suffer at least double-digit losses over the coming year. Fractal trading watchlist: FTSE 100 versus Stoxx Europe 600, Czech Republic versus Poland, Food and Beverages, US REITS versus Utilities, CNY/USD. 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 Bottom Line: The 1981-82 template for 2022-23 suggests that bonds will bottom first, followed by stocks. But steer clear of gold and industrial metals. Feature Investors have had a torrid time in the second quarter, with no place to hide.1  Stocks are down -10 percent. Bonds are down -6 percent. Inflation protected bonds are down -6 percent. Industrial metals are down -13 percent. Gold is down -6 percent. To add insult to injury, even cash is down in real terms, because the interest rate is well below the inflation rate! (Chart I-1) Chart I-1The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession The 'Everything Sell-Off' In 2022 Last Happened In 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Such a star alignment of asset returns, in which stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold all sell off together, is unprecedented. In the eighty calendar quarters since the inflation protected bond market data became available in the early 2000s there has never been a quarter with an ‘everything sell-off’. Everything Has Sold Off, But Does That Make Sense? The rarity of an ‘everything sell-off’ is because there are virtually no economic or financial scenarios in which all five asset-classes should fall together (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare Chart I-3An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare An 'Everything Sell-Off' Is Extremely Rare A scenario dominated by rising inflation is bad for bonds, but good for inflation protected bonds, especially relative to conventional bonds. Yet inflation protected bonds have not outperformed either in absolute or relative terms. A scenario of rising inflation should also support the value of stocks, industrial metals and certainly gold, given that all three are, to varying degrees, ‘inflation hedges.’ Yet the prices of stocks, industrial metals, and gold have all plummeted. The rarity of an ‘everything sell-off’ is because there are virtually no economic or financial scenarios in which all asset classes should fall together. Conversely, a scenario dominated by slowing growth is bad for industrial metal prices, but good for conventional bond prices – as bond yields decline on diminished expectations for rate hikes. Yet conventional bonds have sold off. What about a scenario dominated by both rising inflation and slowing growth – which is to say, stagflation? In this case, we would expect inflation protected bonds to perform especially well. Meanwhile, with the economy still growing, the prices of industrial metals should not be collapsing, as they have been recently.  In a final scenario of an imminent recession we would expect stocks, industrial metals and even gold to sell off, but conventional bonds to perform especially well. The upshot is there are virtually no economic scenarios in which stocks, bonds, inflation protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold plummet together, as they have recently. So, what’s going on? To answer, we need to take a trip back to the 1980s. 1981 Was The Last Time We Had An ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Inflation protected bonds did not exist before the late 1990s. But considering the other four asset-classes – stocks, bonds, industrial metals, and gold – to find the last time that they all fell together we must travel back to 1981, the time of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and the Paul Volcker Fed. And suddenly, we discover spooky similarities with the current Zeitgeist. Just like today, the world’s central banks were obsessed with ‘breaking the back’ of inflation, which, like a monster in a horror movie, kept appearing to die before coming back with second and third winds (Chart I-4). Chart I-4In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation In 1981, Just As In 2022, Central Banks Would 'Do Whatever It Takes' To Kill Inflation Just like today, the central banks were desperate to repair their badly damaged credibility in managing the economy. As the biography “Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence” puts it: “He restored credibility to the Federal Reserve at a time it had been greatly diminished.” And just like today, central bankers hoped that they could pilot the economy to a ‘soft landing’, though whether they genuinely believed that is another story. Asked at a press conference if higher interest rates would cause a recession, Volcker replied coyly “Well, you get varying opinions about that.” 2022 has spooky similarities with 1981. In fact, in its single-minded aim ‘to do whatever it takes’ to kill inflation, the Volcker Fed hiked the interest rate to near 20 percent, thereby triggering what was then the deepest economic recession since the Depression of the 1930s (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). With hindsight, it was a price worth paying because the economy then began a quarter century of low inflation, steady growth, and mild recessions – a halcyon period for which the Volcker Fed’s aggressive tightening in the early 1980s have been lauded. Chart I-5In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... In 1981, The Fed Hiked Rates To Near 20 Percent... Chart I-6...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession ...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession ...And Thereby Morphed Stagflation Into Recession Granted, the problems of 2022 are a much scaled down version of those in 1981, yet there are spooky similarities – a point which will not have gone unnoticed by the current crop of central bankers. It is no secret that Jay Powell is a big fan of Paul Volcker.   The Echoes Of 1981-82 In 2022-23 The answer to why everything sold off in early 1981 is that central banks took their economies from stagflation to outright recession, and the risk is that the same happens again in 2022-23 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession The Echoes Of 1981-82: Aggressive Rate Hikes In 2022-23 Will Morph Stagflation Into Recession In the transition from stagflation fears to recession fears, everything sells off because first the stagflation casualties get hammered, and then the recession plays get hammered. This leaves investors with no place to hide, as no mainstream asset is left unscathed. Just as in 1981, a transition from stagflation fears to recession fears likely explains the recent ‘everything sell-off’ because the sell-off in April was most painful for the stagflation casualties – bonds. Whereas, the sell-off in May has been most painful for the recession casualties – industrial metals and stocks.  In a stagflation that morphs to recession, everything sells off. What happens next? The template of 1981-82 could provide a useful guide. Bond prices bottomed first, in the late summer of 1981, as it became clear that the economy was entering a downturn which would exorcise inflation. Of the three other asset classes – all recession casualties – stocks continued to remain under pressure for the next few months but were higher 12 months later. Gold fell another 30 percent, though rebounded sharply in 1982. But the greatest pain was in the industrial metals, which fell another 30 percent and did not recover their highs for several years (Chart I-8). Chart I-82022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 Could Be An Echo Of 1981-82 2022-23 could be an echo of 1981-82, with bond prices now entering a bottoming process.  Stocks would bottom next, with one difference being a quicker recovery than in 1981-82 because of their higher sensitivity to bond yields. While the near term outlook is cloudy, we expect stock prices to be higher on a 12 month horizon, especially long-duration stocks that are most sensitive to bond yields. But just as in 1981-82, the biggest casualty of a stagflation that morphs into a recession will be the overvalued industrial metals, which are likely to suffer at least double-digit losses over the coming year. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week’s new additions are Czech Republic versus Poland, and Food and Beverages versus the market, which appear overbought. And US REITS versus Utilities, and CNY/USD, which appear oversold. Finally, our new trade recommendation is to underweight the FTSE 100 versus the Stoxx Europe 600. The resource heavy FTSE 100 is especially vulnerable to our anticipated sell-off in commodities, and its recent outperformance is at a point of fragility that has marked previous turning points (Chart I-9). Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. Chart I-9FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion FTSE 100 Outperformance Is Near Exhaustion Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions Chart I-10Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart I-11Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Chart I-12US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 Chart I-13CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 6US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 7A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 8Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 9CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 10Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 11Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 12Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Chart 13BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 14The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 16Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 17Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 18Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 19The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 20The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 21A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 22FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Chart 24The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 25The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 26Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart 27Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Food And Beverage Outperformance Near Exhaustion CHART 1 Chart 28US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities CHART 12 Chart 29CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level CNY/USD At A Support Level   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The returns are based on the S&P 500, the 10-year T-bond, the 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS), the LMEX index, and gold.   Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (May 17 at 9:00 AM EDT, 14:00 PM BST, 15:00 PM CEST and May 18 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

Executive Summary Global inflation will peak sometime in the next few months, a process that has likely already begun in the US. This will give policymakers some breathing room to turn less hawkish, a more credible stance given softening global growth momentum and increased financial market volatility. Our Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing suggests that overall government bond returns should turn positive over the next year, but with widening divergences across countries for our base case scenarios. Projected government bond return expectations over the next 12 months look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK – where far too many rate hikes are priced in – compared to the US, where the Fed is more likely to follow through on most, but not all, discounted rate increases. Japan has the lowest expected returns, and the defensive properties of “low-beta” JGBs will be less necessary with global yield momentum set to peak in the latter half of 2022. Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Bottom Line: The return expectations over the next year stemming from our Global Golden Rule suggest the following country allocation recommendations in global government bond portfolios: maintain overweights in Australia, Germany and the UK, stay underweight the US and neutral Canada, but downgrade Japan to underweight. Feature Chart 1A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market Global bond markets may finally be showing signs of settling down after a painful period of rising yields and high volatility. Government bond yields across the developed economies have fallen substantially over the past week as equity and credit markets have sold off, in a typical risk-off response to increased concerns over global growth momentum. For example, benchmark 10-year government yields have fallen by -32bps both the US and UK, -25bps in Germany and -22bps in Canada since the cyclical intraday high was reached on May 9. These moves are modest in the context of the cyclical bond bear market, with the Bloomberg Global Treasury index still down -12.1% year-to-date and -14.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 1). That painful selloff has been driven by expectations of intense monetary tightening in response to surging global inflation. However, last week’s release of US Consumer Price Index data for April confirmed that US goods inflation has peaked, a trend that we expect to follow suit in other countries (Chart 2). That will leave inflation momentum, and eventual interest rate hikes, to be driven more by domestic services inflation that will prove to be less correlated across countries over the next 6-12 months (Chart 3). Chart 2Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . ​​​​​​ Chart 3. . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation . . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation . . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation ​​​​​​ With that in mind, we revisit our framework for linking government bond returns to monetary policy outcomes versus expectations, the Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing. A Brief Overview Of The Global Golden Rule In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields and Treasury returns. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyRevisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. This gave us a framework to help project expected global bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (a.k.a. our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables labeled “+25bps” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. Showing these scenarios allows us to pick the one that most closely correlates to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 4Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' US Treasuries have delivered a painful loss of -7.8% versus cash over 12 months. Bearish outcomes of such magnitude were last seen during 1994 and 1999 when the Fed was aggressively lifting the funds rate. The Fed delivered a smaller hawkish surprise over the past year than those 1990s episodes, with a trailing 12-month policy rate surprise of -72bps. Thus, the Golden Rule underestimated losses realized by US Treasuries, as US bond yields moved to price in far more Fed tightening than what was expected one year ago. The US OIS curve now discounts +229bps of rate hikes over the next 12 months, taking the fed funds rate to 3.3% (Chart 4). That is a more aggressive profile than was laid out in the March 2022 Fed “dots”, where the median FOMC member projection called for the funds rate to climb to 2.8% in 2023. That means there is less scope for Fed rate hikes to surprise versus market expectations that are already very hawkish, at a time when US growth and inflation momentum is rolling over. Our base case calls for the Fed to deliver +200bps of rate increases over the next year, +50bps at the next two policy meetings followed by +25bps at the subsequent four meetings. That outcome produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -13bps, generating a total return of +3.73% (Tables 1 & 2). Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 5Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian government bonds have sold off hard over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -7.5% (Chart 5). That loss reflects the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) hawkish turn, but is a less severe outcome compared to other developed economy government bond markets that saw a major repricing of rate hike expectations like the US and Australia. Losses in the Canadian government bond market were consistent with the +34bps of hawkish surprises delivered by the BoC, which tightened by +75bps on a 12-month basis versus the +41bps expected by markets in May 2021. Rate expectations are highly aggressive on a forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts 210bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months. However, high household debt in Canada, fueled by a relentlessly expanding housing bubble, will limit the ability of the BoC to match the Fed’s rate hikes over the next 6-12 months. Higher debt levels also imply a lower nominal neutral rate of interest, as the BoC has less room to hike before debt servicing costs become overly burdensome for overleveraged Canadian consumers. Our base case is that the BoC will deliver +150bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -17bps, delivering a projected total return of 4.52% (Tables 3 & 4). Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 6Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -9.6% over the past year (Chart 6). This is the biggest sell-off among all the countries covered in our Global Golden Rule framework. The magnitude of those realized losses far exceeded what would have been predicted by the Golden Rule a year ago, with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivering only a modest hawkish surprise. An unexpectedly high Australian headline inflation print of 5.1% in Q1 of this year led the RBA to deliver a surprise +25bps rate hike in April. This created a mild hawkish policy rate surprise of -17bps over the past 12 months, as only +8bps of tightening had been discounted in the Australian OIS curve in May 2021. The Australian OIS curve is now discounting 292bps of rate hikes over the next year, taking the cash rate to just over 3% - a level last seen in 2013 when the neutral rate in Australia was much higher by the RBA’s own reckoning. The RBA appears confident in the Australian economy, forecasting the unemployment rate to reach a 50-year low around 3.5% in 2023. However, we believe the RBA will be more measured in its pace of rate increases over the next year than markets expect, as global traded goods inflation cools and Australian wages are still not overheating. According to the Golden Rule projections, our base case of +150bps of tightening will produce a decline in Australian government bond index yield of -92bps, delivering a projected total return of 9.29% (Tables 5 & 6). Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 7The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect UK government bonds have gotten hit hard over the past year, delivering a negative excess return over cash of -7.9% - one of the worst performances seen over the past quarter century (Chart 7). The size of that loss was in line with the Global Golden Rule forecasts, given the magnitude of the rate shock seen in the UK. The Bank of England (BoE) hiked rates by 90bps over the past 12 months, which was a hawkish surprise of -79bps compared to what was discounted one year earlier. The UK OIS curve is now priced for another +139bps of rate hikes over the next year. This would take the BoE’s Bank Rate to 2.4%, a level that would push the UK unemployment rate up by two percentage points and lower UK inflation to below 2% within the next 2-3 years, according to the BoE’s own forecasting models. As we discussed in our report last week, where we upgraded our stance on UK Gilts to overweight, the neutral level of UK policy rates is between 1.5-2%, at best, with UK potential growth barely above 1%. Thus, markets are already pricing in a very restrictive monetary policy stance from the BoE that is unlikely to be fully delivered before UK growth and inflation decline sharply. Our base case calls for the BoE to deliver only another +75bps of hikes over the next year, which will produce a fall in the UK government bond index yield of -21bps and a total return of 4.12% (Tables 7 & 8). Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 8German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German government bonds suffered major losses over the past year, underperforming cash by -8.5% over the past year. We saw no policy surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) over that time relative to market expectations (Chart 8). The dramatic sell-off instead reflected surging expectations of future tightening as the euro area faces an energy-driven inflation spike. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero. However, markets now expect a very aggressive move by the ECB, discounting a full +156bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This would push the ECB’s main refinancing rate to levels last seen in the disastrous tightening cycle during the 2011 European debt crisis. As argued by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the euro area is heading into a growth slowdown and energy inflation looks set to peak. Even if the hawks are able to sway the ECB Governing Council to begin hiking rates this summer, the slowing trajectory of growth and inflation make it highly unlikely that the ECB will deliver the full amount of tightening currently discounted. Our base case is that the ECB will deliver only +50bps of tightening over the next 12 months, enough to push the deposit rate out of negative territory to 0%. As shown in Tables 9 & 10, this is consistent with the Germany government bond index yield falling -55bps, delivering an index return of 5.07% over a 12-month horizon. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 9The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -1.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 9). The policy rate surprise was flat as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept the policy rate unchanged at -0.1%. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The BoJ has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while instituting yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016 to anchor yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. However, rates traders are making some attempt to challenge the BoJ’s ultra-dovish posture. The Japan OIS curve now discounts +9bps of tightening, approximately enough to push the policy rate to zero, over the next 12 months. With the yen weakening rapidly and the cost of imported energy elevated, consumer price inflation in Tokyo (excluding fresh food) hit the BoJ’s 2% target in April. However, as evidenced in the minutes of the March BoJ meeting, policymakers see a sustainable inflation overshoot as unlikely. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Tables 11 & 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged for the next twelve months and delivering a slight dovish surprise. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a -6bps fall in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of 0.87%. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections For all the countries discussed above, our base case calls for the respective central banks to deliver less tightening than markets are discounting over the next year. This suggests that government bonds should be expected to deliver positive returns versus cash, even as we expect multiple rate increases from all central banks except the BoJ. While this could argue for an above-benchmark duration stance at the overall global level, we prefer to translate the Global Golden Rule results via country allocations – as we have greater conviction on relative central bank moves in the current high inflation environment – while keeping overall global duration exposure at neutral. The return outcomes for our base case scenarios for the six countries in our Global Golden Rule framework are presented in Table 13. We show the expected returns both in local currency and hedged into US dollars, the latter allowing a comparison in common currency terms. In our base case scenarios, we expect Australian and German government bonds to deliver the strongest performance over the next year, followed by the UK, Canada, the US and Japan. Table 13Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Chart 10Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Our UK upgrade to overweight last week was a change to our strategic call on Gilts. Based on the results from our Global Golden Rule update, increased exposure to UK Gilts should be “funded” in a global bond portfolio by reducing exposure to Japan, with JGBs expected to deliver the weakest returns. Cutting JGB exposure also fits with the signal from our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 10). JGBs are typically a good “defensive” overweight country allocation in an environment of rising global bond yields. Persistently low Japanese inflation prevents the BoJ from credibly signaling rate hikes when other central banks like the Fed are lifting rates in response to stronger growth or overshooting inflation as is currently the case. The relative performance of Japan versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury benchmark index (in USD-hedged terms) is highly correlated to the year-over-year momentum of the overall level of global bond yields. With our Duration Indicator signaling a peak in yield momentum, we expect JGBs, which continue to exhibit a very low “beta” to changes in global bond yields, to underperform. Thus, this week we are downgrading our strategic allocation to Japan from overweight (4 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). We view this as an offsetting recommendation to our UK upgrade from last week, while leaving our other country allocations unchanged. The result is that our country recommendations now line up with the expected returns from our Global Golden Rule, as can be seen in Table 13. That includes leaving the recommended US Treasury exposure at underweight, as we expect the Fed to deliver the smallest dovish surprise out of the central banks discussed in this report. We are adding both of the view changes made over the past two weeks, upgrading the UK and downgrading Japan, to our model bond portfolio as seen on pages 20-21. Bottom Line: Our Global Golden Rule suggests that developed market government bonds are expected to deliver positive returns over the next year as softening inflation momentum leads central banks to not fully deliver discounted rate hikes. Return expectations look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK, especially compared to the US and Japan.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Deborah Acri Research Associate deborah.acri@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2     Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Tactical Overlay Trades

Executive Summary Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Southeast Asia is suffering from fading macro and geopolitical tailwinds but there are still investment opportunities on a relative basis. The peace dividend, globalization dividend, and demographic dividend are all eroding and will continue to erode, though there are relative winners and losers. The Philippines and Thailand are most secure; the Philippines and Indonesia are least dependent on trade; and the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest potential GDP growth. Geopolitical risk premiums have risen for Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and will rise for the Middle East. This leaves ASEAN states as relatively attractive emerging markets. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG PHILIPPINES / EM EQUITIES 2022-05-12   LONG ASEAN / ACW EQUITIES 2022-05-12   Bottom Line: ASEAN’s geopolitical outlook is less ugly than many other emerging markets. Cyclically, go long ASEAN versus global equities and long Philippine equities versus EM. Feature Chart 1Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States The Philippines elected its second “strongman” leader in a row on May 9, provoking the usual round of editorials about the death of liberalism. Investors know well by now that such political narratives do as much to occlude economic reality as to clarify it. Still, there is a fundamental need to understand the changing global political order since it will ultimately impact the investment landscape. If the global order stabilizes – e.g. US-Russia and US-China relations normalize – then trade and investment may recover from recent shocks. A new era of “Re-Globalization” could ensue. Asia Pacific would be a prime beneficiary as it is full of trading economies (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategySecond Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours By contrast, if Great Power Rivalry escalates further, then trade and investment will suffer, the current paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will continue, and East Asia’s frozen conflicts from 1945-52 will thaw and heat up. Asian states will have to shift focus from trade to security and their economies will suffer relative to previous expectations. How will Southeast Asia fare in this context? Will it fall victim to great power conflict, like Eastern Europe? Or will it keep a balance between the great powers and extract maximum benefits? Three Dividends Three dividends have underpinned Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity in recent decades: 1.  Peace Dividend – A relative lack of war and inter-state conflict. 2.  Globalization Dividend – Advantageous maritime geography and access to major economies. 3.  Demographic Dividend – Young demographics and strong potential GDP growth. All three of these dividends are eroding, so the macro and geopolitical investment case for ASEAN has weakened relative to twenty years ago. Nevertheless in a world where Russia, China, and the Gulf Arab markets face a higher and persistent geopolitical risk premium, ASEAN still offers attractive investment opportunities, particularly if the most geopolitically insecure countries are avoided. Peace Dividend Favors The Philippines And Thailand Since the end of the US and Chinese wars with Vietnam, military conflicts in Southeast Asia have been low intensity. Lack of inter-state conflict encouraged economic prosperity and security complacency. The five major Southeast Asian nations saw military spending decline since the 1990s and only Vietnam spends more than 2% of GDP (Chart 2). Chart 2Peace Brought Prosperity Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Unfortunately that is about to change. China has large import dependencies, an insufficient tradition of sea power, and feels hemmed in by its geography and the US alliance system. Beijing’s solution is to build and modernize its navy and prepare for potential conflict with the US, particularly over Taiwan. The result is rising tension across East Asia, including in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The ASEAN states fear China will walk over them, China fears they will league with the US against China, and the US tries to get them to do exactly that. Hence ASEAN’s defense spending has not kept up with its geopolitical importance and will have to rise going forward. Consider the following: Vietnam risks conflict with China. Vietnam has the most capable and experienced naval force within ASEAN due to its sporadic conflicts with China. Its equipment is supplied mainly by Russia, pitting it squarely against China’s Soviet or Soviet-inspired equipment. But Russia-China ties are tightening, especially after Russia’s divorce with Europe. While Vietnam will not reject Russia, it is increasingly partnering with the United States. The pandemic added to the Vietnamese public’s distrust of China, which is ancient but has ramped up in recent years due to clashes in the South China Sea. While Vietnam officially maintains that it will never host the US military, it is tacitly bonding with the US as a hedge against China. Yet Vietnam does not have a mutual defense treaty with the US, so it is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression over time. Indonesia distances itself from China. Rising security tensions are also forcing Indonesia to change its strategy toward China. Indonesia lacks experience in naval warfare and is not a claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is reluctant to take sides due to its traditionally non-aligned diplomatic status, its military culture of prioritizing internal stability (which is hard to maintain across thousands of islands), and China’s investment in its economy. However, China is encroaching on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and Indonesia has signaled its displeasure through diplomatic snubs and high-profile infrastructure contracts. Indonesia is trying to bulk up its naval and air capabilities, including via arms purchases from the West. Malaysia distances itself from China. Malaysia and the Philippines have the weakest naval forces and both face pressure from China’s navy and coast guard due to maritime-territorial disputes. But while the Philippines gets help from the US and its allies and partners, Malaysia has no such allies. Traditionally it was non-aligned. Instead it utilizes economic statecraft, as it has often done against more powerful countries. It recently paused Chinese economic projects in the country to conduct reviews and chose Ericsson over Huawei to build the 5G network. Ongoing maritime and energy disputes will motivate defense spending. The Philippines preserves alliance with United States. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte tried but failed to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Beijing continued to swarm the Philippines’ economic zone with ships and threaten its control of neighboring rocks and reefs. Ultimately Duterte renewed his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in July 2021. The newly elected President “Bong Bong” Marcos is even less likely to try to pivot away from the US. Instead the Philippines will work with the US to try to deter China. Thailand preserves alliance with United States. Thailand is the most insulated from the South China Sea disputes and often acts as mediator between China and other ASEAN states. However, Thailand is also a formal US defense ally and assisted with logistics during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. While US military aid was suspended after the 2014 military coup, non-military aid from the US continued. The State Department certified Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, relations were normalized, and the annual Cobra Gold exercise resumed in 2020. The US’s hasty normalization shows Thailand’s importance to its regional strategy. On their own, the ASEAN states cannot counter China – they are simply outgunned (Chart 3). Hence their grand strategy of balancing Chinese trade relations with American security relations. Chart 3Outgunned By China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Chart 4Opinion Shifts Against China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines In recent decades, with the US divided and distracted, they sought to entice China through commercial deals, in hopes that it would reduce its encroachments on the high seas. This strategy failed, as China’s expansion of economic and military influence in the region is driven by China’s own imperatives. Beijing’s lack of transparency about Covid-19 also sowed distrust. As a result, public opinion became more critical of China and defensive of national sovereignty (Chart 4). Southeast Asia will continue trading with China but changing public opinion, the US-China clash, and tensions in the South China Sea will inject greater geopolitical risk into this once peaceful and prosperous region. Military weakness will also lead the ASEAN states to welcome the US, EU, Japan, and Australia into the region as economic and security hedges against China. This trend risks inflaming regional tensions in the short run – and China may not be deterred over the long run, since its encroachments in the region are driven by its own needs and insecurities. Decades of under-investment in defense will result in ASEAN rearmament, which will weigh on fiscal balances and potentially economic competitiveness. Investors should not take the past three decades of peace for granted. Bottom Line: Vietnam (like Taiwan) is in a geopolitical predicament where it could provoke China’s wrath and yet lacks an American security guarantee. The Philippines and Thailand benefit from American security guarantees. Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from distance from China. All of these states will attempt to balance US and China relations – but in the future that means devoting more resources to national security, which will weigh on fiscal budgets and take away funds from human capital development. Waning Globalization Dividend Favors Indonesia And The Philippines All the ASEAN states rely heavily on both the US and China for export markets. This reliance grew as trade recovered in the wake of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Now global trade is slowing down cyclically, while US-China power struggle will weigh on the structural globalization process, penalizing the most trade-dependent ASEAN states relative to their less trade-dependent neighbors. So far US-China economic divorce is redistributing US-China trade in a way that is positive for Southeast Asia. China is rerouting exports through Vietnam, for example, while the US is shifting supply chains to other Asian states (Chart 6). The US will accelerate down this path because it cannot afford substantively to reengage with China’s economy for fear of strengthening the Russo-Chinese bloc. Chart 5Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance ​​​​​ Chart 6ASEAN’s Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China’s ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's Hence the US will become more reliant on Southeast Asian exporters. Whatever the US stops buying from China will have to be sourced from other countries, so countries that export a similar basket of goods will benefit from the switch. Comparing the types of goods that China and ASEAN export to the US, Thailand is the closest substitute for China, whereas Malaysia is the farthest (Chart 7). That is not to say that Malaysia will suffer from US-China divorce. It is already ahead of China in exporting high-tech goods to the US, which is the very reason its export profile is so different. In 2020, 58% of Malaysia’s exports to the US are high-tech versus 35% for China’s. At the same time, Southeast Asian exports to China may not grow as fast as expected – cyclically China’s economy may accelerate on the back of current stimulus efforts, but structurally China is pursuing self-sufficiency and import substitution via a range of industrial policies (“Made in China 2025,” “dual circulation,” etc). These policies aim to make Chinese industrials competitive with European, US, Japanese, and Korean industrials. But they will also make China more competitive with medium-tech and fledging high-tech exports from Southeast Asia. Thus while China will keep importing low value products and commodities, such as unrefined ores, from Southeast Asia, imports of high-tech products will be limited due to China’s preference for indigenous producers. US export controls will also interfere with ASEAN’s ability to export high-tech goods to China. (In order to retain their US trade, in the face of Chinese import substitution, ASEAN states will have to comply with US export controls at least partially.) Even the low-to-medium tech goods that China currently imports from Southeast Asia may not grow as fast in the coming years as they have in the past. The ten provinces in China with the lowest GDP per capita exported a total of $129 billion to the world in 2020, whereas China’s imports from the top five ASEAN states amounted to $154 billion USD in 2020 (Chart 8). If Beijing insists on creating a domestic market for its poor provinces’ exports, then Southeast Asian exports to China will suffer. China might do this not only for strategic sufficiency but also to avoid US and western sanctions, which could be imposed for labor, environmental, human rights, or strategic reasons. Chart 7The US Sees Thailand And Vietnam As Substitutes For China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 8China Threatens ASEAN With Import Substitution Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 9Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China China, unlike the US during the 1990s and 2000s, cannot afford to open up its doors and become a ravenous consumer and importer of all Asia’s goods. This would be a way to buy influence in the region, as the US has done in Latin America. But China still has significant domestic development left to do. This development must be done for the sake of jobs and income – otherwise the Communist Party will face sociopolitical upheaval. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most vulnerable to China’s dual circulation strategy because of their sizeable exports to China, which stand at 12%, 15% and 7.6% of GDP respectively (Chart 9). Even though the Southeast Asian states have formed into a common market, and have joined major new trade blocs such as the CPTPP and RCEP, they will not see unfettered liberalization within these agreements – and they will not be drawn exclusively into China’s orbit. Instead they will face a China that wishes to expand export market share while substituting away from imports. The US and India, which are not part of these new trade blocs, will still increase their trade with ASEAN, as they will seek to substitute ASEAN for China, and ASEAN will be forced to substitute them for China. Thus globalization will weaken into regionalization and will not provide as positive of a force for Southeast Asia as it did over the 1980s-2000s. Going forward, the new paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will weigh on trade-dependent countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand relative to their neighbors. Within this cohort, Malaysia and the Philippines will benefit from selling high-tech goods to the US, while Thailand and Vietnam will benefit from selling low- and mid-tech goods. China will remain a huge and critical market for ASEAN states but its autarkic policies will drive them to pursue other markets. Those with large and growing domestic markets, like Indonesia and the Philippines, will weather hypo-globalization better than their neighbors. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are all extremely dependent on foreign trade and hence vulnerable if international trade linkages weaken. Bottom Line: Global trade is likely to slow on a cyclical basis. Structurally, Hypo-Globalization is the new paradigm and will remove a tailwind that super-charged Southeast Asian development over the past several decades. Indonesia and the Philippines stand to suffer least and benefit most. Potential Growth Dividend Favors The Philippines And Vietnam Countries that can generate endogenous growth will perform the best under hypo-globalization. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have the largest populations within ASEAN. But we must also take into account population growth, which contributes directly to potential GDP growth. A domestic market grows through population growth and/or income growth. For example, China benefitted from its growing population but now must switch to income generation as its population growth is stagnating. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the highest population growth, while Thailand has the lowest. Thai population growth is even weak compared to China. The total fertility rate reinforces this trend – it is highest in Philippines but lowest in Thailand (Chart 10). A population that is too young or too old needs significant support that diverts resources away from the most productive age group. Philippines and Indonesia have the lowest median age, while Thailand has the highest. The youth of Indonesia and Philippines will come of age in the next decade, augmenting labor force and potential GDP growth. By contrast, Vietnam and especially Thailand, like China, will be weighed down by a shrinking labor force in the coming decade (Chart 11). Chart 10Fertility Rates Robust In ASEAN Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 11Falling Support Ratio Weighs On Thailand, Vietnam Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Hence Indonesia and Philippines will prosper while Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam, lack the ability to diversify away from trade through domestic market growth. Malaysia sits in the middle: it is trade dependent and has the smallest population, but it has a young and growing population, and its labor force is still growing. Yet falling population growth is not a disaster if productivity and income growth are high. Productivity trends often contrast with population trends: Indonesia had the weakest productivity growth despite having a large, young, and growing population, while Vietnam had the strongest growth, despite a population slowdown. In fact Vietnam has the strongest productivity growth in Southeast Asia, at a 5-year, pre-pandemic average of 6.3%, followed by the Philippines (Chart 12A). By comparison China’s productivity growth averaged between 3%-6.6%, depending on the data source. Chart 12AProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 12BProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 13Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Productivity growth adds to labor force growth to form potential GDP. In 2019, Philippines had the highest potential GDP growth at 6.9%, followed by the Vietnam at 6.8%, Indonesia at 5.6%, Malaysia at 3.9% and Thailand at 2.3%. In comparison China’s potential GDP growth was 3.6%-5.9%, again depending on data. Thailand is undoubtedly the weakest from both a population and productivity standpoint, while the Philippines has strength in both (Chart 12B). Countries invest in their economies to increase productivity. In 2019, Vietnam recorded the highest growth in grossed fixed capital formation at around 10.6%, followed by Indonesia at 6.9%, Philippines at 6.3%, and Thailand at 2.2%. Gross fixed capital formation has rebounded from the contractions countries suffered during the pandemic lockdowns in 2020 (Chart 13). Bottom Line: The Philippines has strong potential GDP growth, but Indonesia is not far behind as it invests in its economy. Vietnam has the highest investment and productivity growth, but its demographic dividend is waning. Malaysia is slightly better than Thailand because it has a growing population, but it has stopped investing and it is as trade dependent as Thailand. Thailand is weak on all accounts: it is trade dependent, has a shrinking population, and has a low potential GDP growth. Investment Takeaways Bringing it all together, ASEAN is witnessing the erosion of key dividends (peace, globalization, and demographics). Yet it offers attractive investment opportunities on a relative basis, given the permanent step up in geopolitical risk premiums for other major emerging markets like Russia, eastern Europe, China, and (soon) the Gulf Arab states (Charts 14A & 14B). Indeed the long under-performance of ASEAN stocks as a bloc, relative to global stocks, has recently reversed. As investors recognize China’s historic confluence of internal and external risks, they increasingly turn to ASEAN despite its flaws. Chart 14AASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China The US and China will use rewards and punishments to try to win over ASEAN states as strategic and economic partners. Those that have a US security guarantee, or are most distant from potential conflict, will see a lower geopolitical risk premium. Chart 14BASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ​​​​​​ Chart 15Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines The Philippines is the most attractive Southeast Asian market based on our criteria: it has an American security guarantee, domestic-oriented growth, and high productivity. Populism in the Philippines has come with productivity improvements and yet has not overthrown the US alliance. Philippine equities can outperform their emerging market peers (Chart 15). Indonesia is the second most attractive – it does not have direct territorial disputes with China, maintains defense ties with the West, is not excessively trade reliant, and keeps up decent productivity growth. It is vulnerable to nationalism and populism but its democracy is effective overall and the regime has maintained general political stability after near-dissolution in 1998. Thailand is geopolitically secure but lacking in potential growth. Vietnam has high potential growth but is geopolitically insecure over the long run. Investors should only pursue tactical investments in these markets. We maintain our long-term favorable view of Malaysia, although it is trade dependent and productivity has weakened. In future reports we will examine ASEAN markets in greater depth and with closer consideration of their domestic political risks.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary India’s annual consumer price inflation will rise a notch from current levels but is unlikely to surpass 8% in a sustained manner. Demand-driven price pressures are absent in the Indian economy. So are wage pressures. That leaves commodity prices as the sole source of inflation. Global industrial commodity prices dictate India’s producer price inflation, but not consumer price inflation. The latter is determined by domestic factors. Higher import costs on fertilizer and edible oils will push up India’s food inflation a bit, but food inflation is mainly affected by the ‘Minimum Support Price’ that the government pays to farmers for food procurement. The central bank is making a policy mistake by raising interest rates to suppress commodity price-driven inflation when domestic demand is quite weak. The Indian profit outlook has deteriorated meaningfully due to falling margins. Higher interest rates will add to the headwinds. This bourse is also very expensive relative to its EM peers. India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply Bottom Line: Absolute return investors should avoid this bourse. Asset allocators should stay underweight India in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Bond investors should stay neutral India in EM and Emerging Asian domestic bond portfolios. Feature In much of the developed world, inflation has risen to 40-year highs. Inflation has surged in many developing countries as well. India has been one major exception in the latter group − where both headline and core consumer inflation have remained rangebound so far (Chart 1). The question is, if and for how long will India be able to buck the tide of higher global inflation? On a related note, what would be the likely effects of higher inflation on Indian markets? We believe headline and core CPI in India will rise from the current levels of around 6.5%; but will not go past 8% on a sustainable basis. This is much below the double digit levels the country often witnessed in the 1990s and 2000s. The main reason behind our optimism is that demand-driven price pressures are absent in the current cycle. The sole source of inflation is higher global commodity prices, which could be peaking on a rate of change basis. The commodity-led nature of inflation in India also makes monetary policy a less effective tool to control it in this cycle. In fact, considerable monetary tightening will be a policy error as it could nip the already weak domestic demand in the bud. We turned bearish on Indian stocks in March this year, and believe they have more downside in absolute terms. Their recent relative outperformance will also fizzle out sooner rather than later, as this was partially due to investors forsaking the Chinese market. This caused a sharp fall in the latter boosting other bourses’ relative performances (Chart 2). Chart 1India Has So far Been An Exception To The Global Trend Of Surging Inflation India Has So far Been An Exception To The Global Trend Of Surging Inflation India Has So far Been An Exception To The Global Trend Of Surging Inflation Chart 2Indian Stocks Will Weaken More And Underperform EM Indian Stocks Will Weaken More And Underperform EM Indian Stocks Will Weaken More And Underperform EM   Investors would therefore do well to stay underweight Indian stocks in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios for now. Local currency bond investors should stay neutral India in the respective EM and Emerging Asian bond portfolios. Why Has Inflation Stayed Downbeat? Just like in other economies, labor productivity trends set the tone of India’s structural inflation backdrop. Up until the early 2000s, India’s average productivity gains used to be rather low: of the order of 3% annually. Thereafter, a surge in capital spending on infrastructure and other productive capacity propelled India’s average annual productivity growth rate to twice as high. This has helped improve India’s structural inflation backdrop considerably. That said, over a cyclical horizon, it is the ebbs and flows of broad money supply (M3) that determines India’s consumer inflation trajectory (Chart 3). Chart 3India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply Chart 4Money Supply Will Stay Tame As Its Sources Are Rather Muted Money Supply Will Stay Tame As Its Sources Are Rather Muted Money Supply Will Stay Tame As Its Sources Are Rather Muted Broad money supply in India has decelerated over the past year and a half. This is in sharp contrast to most developed economies and many emerging economies in Latin America and EMEA; and it is the main reason why inflation prints have diverged between those countries and India. In the foreseeable future, there is little indication that India’s broad money supply will accelerate by any meaningful measure. This is because the major sources of money creation – bank credit origination and the central bank and commercial banks’ purchases of non-bank securities − have all remained rather muted in the recent past. Bank credit has grown only at a 7% nominal annualized rate over the past three years. In real terms (deflated by headline CPI), they have barely risen. Commercial banks’ purchases of government bonds are growing at only 5%. The central bank’s monetization of government debt, the other source of money creation, has also decelerated since early 2020 (Chart 4). The decelerating broad money supply means the odds of a demand-driven surge in consumer price inflation is also quite low. What About Commodity-Led Inflation? Elevated commodity prices have pushed up India’s consumer price inflation by a notch. Yet, given that much of the rally in global industrial commodities is probably already behind us, it’s effect on future inflation in India will likely be limited: Global industrial commodity prices drive India’s producer price inflation1 (PPI). But the correlation with India’s consumer price inflation is only tenuous (Chart 5). Moreover, given that India’s PPI tracks global commodity prices with a few months lag, this is also set to decelerate in the coming months.  Consistently, the pass-through effect from high global crude prices to local gasoline and diesel prices in India has also rolled over on a rate of change basis (Chart 6, top panel). Chart 5Global Commodity Prices Dictate India's Producer Prices, But Not Consumer Prices Global Commodity Prices Dictate India's Producer Prices, But Not Consumer Prices Global Commodity Prices Dictate India's Producer Prices, But Not Consumer Prices Chart 6Domestic Fuel Price Inflation Is Much Lower Than Crude Price Would Suggest Domestic Fuel Price Inflation Is Much Lower Than Crude Price Would Suggest Domestic Fuel Price Inflation Is Much Lower Than Crude Price Would Suggest   Notably, Indian authorities did not reduce local gasoline and diesel prices back in 2020-21 when global crude prices had slumped. Hence, the incremental rise in local fuel prices in the past several months has not been as steep as they might have been (Chart 6, bottom panel). As a result, energy-related inflation prints in India are not as high as crude oil prices would suggest. In fact, CPI for Fuel & Light and Transport & Communication2 have both decelerated from 12%+ YoY rate to 8% and are slowing further. That means the pass-through from higher fuel prices to the rest of the economy going forward will also be receding. Fertilizer (mostly potash) and edible oil3 are the two other major commodities that India imports. The import bill of these two items has almost doubled in dollar as well as in rupee terms in the past year due to surging prices globally. Together, they now account for 5% of India’s total imports. Higher import costs of these items will lead to slightly higher food prices in future. That said, India’s food inflation moves more with the “Minimum Support Price” (MSP). This is the price that the government pays to farmers for procuring various food grains every year (Chart 7, top panel). Since the government is by far the single largest purchaser, the price it pays sets the floor in the market. In recent years, authorities did not hike procurement prices by much. Unless authorities announce a much higher MSP for the current year, both food and headline CPI will likely stay under control. Finally, India is largely self-reliant when it comes to food. The buffer stock of the country’s food grains, currently at 74 million tons, far exceeds the estimated requirements (Chart 8). Short of any logistics debacle therefore, it’s hard to imagine that food prices could soar sustainably. Chart 7The Government's Support Prices Have A strong Bearing On Food Inflation And Rural Wages The Government's Support Prices Have A strong Bearing On Food Inflation And Rural Wages The Government's Support Prices Have A strong Bearing On Food Inflation And Rural Wages Chart 8India's Buffer Stock Of Food Grains Is Quite Robust India's Buffer Stock Of Food Grains Is Quite Robust India's Buffer Stock Of Food Grains Is Quite Robust   All that said, food inflation is the main risk on India’s inflation horizon. The reason for that is rising food prices often unmoor household inflation expectations, and eventually lead to higher realized inflation. Chart 9 shows that higher food prices in India do leak into non-food prices, albeit to a limited extent. As such, marginally higher food prices owing to higher import costs of fertilizer and edible oils will see India’s core inflation also rise a bit.   Chart 9Higher Food Inflation Leaks Into Core Inflation, But Only So Much Higher Food Inflation Leaks Into Core Inflation, But Only So Much Higher Food Inflation Leaks Into Core Inflation, But Only So Much How High Can Core CPI Rise? As discussed, India’s core inflation will likely remain mostly under control. A crucial reason for that is wage pressures are absent in India. This is in stark contrast to the US, where high wage pressures are threatening to morph into a wage-inflation spiral. In rural India, both farm and non-farm nominal wages have been growing at an average sub-5% rate since 2016, which is below CPI inflation. One reason rural wages have stayed low is that authorities have not raised the MSP much in recent years. A lower MSP not only reins in food prices, but it also keeps a tab on wages (Chart 7, bottom panel). As such, unless the government decides to raise the MSP meaningfully this year, it will be difficult for rural wages to rise materially. On the urban side, the RBI survey on expectations for industrial salary and remunerations also depicts a similarly subdued outlook (Chart 10). Going forward, as tens of millions of young people continue to join the workforce every year, the broader wage picture in India is unlikely to change much. Subdued wage pressures will help keep a tab on the general inflationary pressures in the economy. On its own, India’s core CPI (i.e., CPI ex-food and ex-fuel) is largely a function of domestic money and credit trends. Global crude oil prices also matter to some extent. However, as discussed above, few of these variables are accelerating sharply. That means odds are low that core CPI will rise much more from the current levels. Indeed, our in-house model for core CPI, based on the variables just mentioned, points to a rather benign outlook (Chart 11). Chart 10Wage Pressures Are Absent, Entailing Core Inflation Will Stay Under Control Wage Pressures Are Absent, Entailing Core Inflation Will Stay Under Control Wage Pressures Are Absent, Entailing Core Inflation Will Stay Under Control Chart 11India's Inflation Outlook Is Sanguine India's Inflation Outlook Is Sanguine India's Inflation Outlook Is Sanguine   Does Inflation Hurt Indian Stocks? The primary drivers of Indian stocks are economic growth and corporate profits. Stock prices do not usually get hurt as long as CPI stays in low and mid-single digits. However, once CPI breaches the 8% mark sustainably, stocks typically sell off (Chart 12). Chart 12Indian Stocks Face Major Headwinds When CPI Breaches The 8% Mark Indian Stocks Face Major Headwinds When CPI Breaches The 8% Mark Indian Stocks Face Major Headwinds When CPI Breaches The 8% Mark Chart 13Indian Stocks Have A Positive Correlation With PPI, As Both Benefit From Global Growth Indian Stocks Have A Positive Correlation With PPI, As Both Benefit From Global Growth Indian Stocks Have A Positive Correlation With PPI, As Both Benefit From Global Growth The reason is that when inflation is sustainably high, meaningful monetary tightening ensues. Higher interest rates make it costlier to borrow for either consumption or investment purposes, and therefore depresses demand in the economy. That leads to a squeeze in profit margins, which in turn weighs on equity multiples and thus equity prices.  Interestingly, unlike CPI, which has no stable correlation with Indian stock prices, PPI has a robust positive correlation with stocks. The link is via corporate earnings. Indian PPI tracks the ebbs and flows in global commodity prices, and therefore global growth. Strong global growth boosts all corporate earnings, including that of India. Accelerating PPI is therefore a harbinger of higher Indian earnings and stock prices. Going forward, however, a decelerating PPI is pointing to lower stock prices in India (Chart 13). Is RBI Making A Policy Mistake? India’s central bank seems to be committing a policy mistake by raising interest rates to suppress commodity price-driven inflation when domestic demand is already very weak. This is negative for the economy and share prices. Chart 14Household Consumption Is Quite Weak; Domestic Production Is Far Below Trend Household Consumption Is Quite Weak; Domestic Production Is Far Below Trend Household Consumption Is Quite Weak; Domestic Production Is Far Below Trend The Reserve Bank of India surprised the market last week by raising policy rates by 40 basis points to 4.4%. They also raised commercial banks’ cash reserve ratio by 50 basis points to 4.5% in order to tighten banking sector liquidity. Monetary tightening, as a policy tool, works by stifling domestic demand. It makes borrowing for the purpose of investments and consumption more costly. It is, however, rather ineffective in resolving inflation caused by higher food and fuel prices – as is the case in India presently. Notably, high commodity inflation itself forces consumers to spend a lower amount on other core items – leading to weaker demand for the latter. Further monetary tightening would exacerbate that weakness. As explained before, Indian consumer prices are driven mostly by domestic factors, such as money supply and productivity (Chart 3, above), rather than global commodity prices. This distinction is important given that the central bank’s mandate is to manage CPI, not PPI. As such, monetary policy should ideally be based on mostly domestic dynamics. India’s domestic demand is extremely soft compared to the US where inflation has skyrocketed. Given the massive negative output gap that opened up in the Indian economy during the pandemic-related lockdowns, it will take a while before this economy sees genuine, sustained overheating. In view of this softness, any meaningful hike in interest rates (say another 100 basis points) could have a material negative impact on the recovery, and by extension, on stock prices:  Household consumption is quite weak − as is evident in local car and 2-wheeler sales (Chart 14, top panel). One reason for that is the subdued wage growth mentioned above. Pandemic-era fiscal stimulus, at less than 2% of GDP, has not been nearly enough to compensate for lost household income during the lockdowns. Consistent with lackluster household demand, manufacturing and other industrial productions are also languishing at far below the pre-pandemic trend (Chart 14, bottom panel). Robust capex is what spearheaded India’s post-pandemic recovery. But, now with decelerating corporate profits, capital investments have begun to slow. Higher costs of borrowing will further discourage capex plans. If so, lower investments will do more than shave off GDP growth in the coming quarters. If continued, this could be a major risk for India’s sustainable growth story, and its ill-effects may linger. Chart 15Higher Interest Rates Are A Headwind For Stock Prices Higher Interest Rates Are A Headwind For Stock Prices Higher Interest Rates Are A Headwind For Stock Prices All in all, given the nature of inflation in India in the current cycle, it will be a mistake to raise policy rates by any meaningful measure. Both consumption and investments will be hurt. Stock prices, which clearly benefit from lower interest rates, will be facing higher rates, and will therefore sell off (Chart 15). As such, it will be difficult for the RBI to continue to tighten monetary policy without causing a significant bear market in Indian stocks.   Investment Conclusions Equities: The Indian profit outlook has deteriorated meaningfully as a result of falling margins and an impending growth slowdown. This bourse is also very expensive relative to its EM peers. Higher interest rates will add to the headwinds. Absolute return investors should avoid this market. Asset allocators should stay underweight in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Currency And Bonds: The Indian rupee could depreciate marginally along with a likely sell-off in Indian stocks. Given that higher interest rates will likely be detrimental to a growth recovery, it will discourage capital inflows, and will therefore be negative for the rupee. As the rupee could be weaker, and bond yields could rise marginally with tighter banking sector liquidity, investors should stay neutral on India in EM and Emerging Asian bond portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Also called ‘wholesale prices.’ 2     CPI for Fuel & Light has a 6.8% weight in the CPI basket. Transportation & Communication has 8.6% weight. 3    Edible oil has a weight of 3.6% in India’s CPI basket.​​​​​​​

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off We tactically downgraded global equities in late February but see the current level of stock prices as offering enough upside to warrant an overweight. Global equities are now trading at 15.6-times forward earnings, and only 12.6-times outside the US. More importantly, the forces that pushed down stock prices are starting to abate: The war in Ukraine no longer seems likely to devolve into a broader conflict; the number of new Covid cases in China has fallen by half; and global inflation has peaked. The next 18 months of falling inflation and receding recession fears could see stocks recover much of their losses. The “Last Hurrah” for equities is coming. We continue to think that over a 5-year horizon, bond yields will rise from current levels, value stocks will outperform growth stocks, and crypto prices will fall. However, countertrend rallies are likely. To express this view, we recommend taking partial profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade recommendation (up 9.3% from an initial entry yield of 1.45% on June 30, 2021). We are also halving our long global value/growth position (up 20.1% since inception on December 10, 2020) and our short Bitcoin position (up 98% based on our exponential shorting technique). Bottom Line: Global equities are heading towards a “last Hurrah” starting in the second half of this year. Tactically upgrade stocks to overweight.   Feature Dear Client, We published a Special Alert early this afternoon tactically upgrading global equities to overweight. As promised, the enclosed report elaborates on our view change. Best regards, Peter Berezin Restore Tactical Overweight On Global Equities Chart 1Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off We tactically downgraded global equities from overweight to neutral on February 28th. The war in Ukraine, the Covid outbreak in China, and most importantly, the rise in bond yields have kept us on the sidelines ever since. At this point, however, the outlook for stocks has brightened, and thus we are restoring our tactical (3-month) overweight to stocks so that it is consistent with our bullish 12-month cyclical view. First, valuations have discounted much of the bad news. After the recent sell-off, global equities are trading at 15.6-times forward earnings (Chart 1). Outside the US, they trade at only 12.6-times forward earnings. Second, the forces that pushed down stock prices are starting to abate. The war in Ukraine is approaching a stalemate, with Russian troops unable to take much of the country, let alone seriously threaten regional neighbours. A European embargo on Russian oil is likely but will be watered down significantly before it is implemented. European officials have shied away from banning Russian natural gas, an action that would have much more severe economic implications. While still very high in absolute terms, December-2022 European natural gas futures are down 36% from their peak on March 7 (Chart 2). The 7-day average of new Covid cases in China has fallen by more than half since late April (Chart 3). Considering that a significant fraction of China’s elderly population is unvaccinated, the authorities will continue to play whack-a-mole with the virus for the next few months (Chart 4). Fortunately, Chinese domestic production of Pfizer’s Paxlovid anti-Covid drug is starting to ramp up, which should allow for some easing in lockdown measures later this year. Chart 2European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil Chart 3Covid Cases Are Falling In China… It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight The 20th Chinese National Party Congress is slated for this fall. In the lead-up to the Congress, it is likely that the government will move to diffuse social tensions over its handling of the pandemic by showering the economy with stimulus funds. Of note, the credit impulse has already turned higher, which bodes well for both Chinese growth and growth abroad (Chart 5). Chart 4… But Low Vaccination Rates Among The Elderly Remain A Risk It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Chart 5A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World   Inflation Is Peaking On the inflation front, the data flow has gone from unambiguously bad to neutral (and perhaps even slightly positive). In the US, core goods inflation fell by 0.4% month-over-month in April, the first outright decline in core goods prices since February 2021. The Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index has crested and is now 6.4% below its January peak (Chart 6). Global shipping rates have moved up a bit recently on the back of Chinese port shutdowns but remain well below their highs earlier this year (Chart 7). Chart 6Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Chart 7Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs It Is The Composition Of Spending That Is Distorted Despite the often-heard claim that US consumer spending is well above trend, the reality is that spending is more or less in line with its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 8). It is the composition of spending that is out of line: Goods spending is well above trend while services spending is well below. One might think that only the overall level of spending should matter for inflation, and that the composition of spending is irrelevant. However, this ignores the reality that services prices are generally stickier than goods prices. Companies that sold fitness equipment during the pandemic had no qualms about raising prices. In contrast, gyms barely cut prices, figuring that lower membership fees would do little to drive new business through the door (Chart 9). Chart 8Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Chart 9Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices This asymmetry matters, and it suggests that goods inflation should continue to fall over the coming months as the composition of spending shifts back to services. A Lull In Wage Growth Wages are the most important determinant of services inflation. While it is too early to be certain, the latest data suggest that wage growth has peaked. The 3-month annualized growth rate in average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers slowed from 7.2% in the second half of 2021 to 3.8% in April (Chart 10). Assuming productivity growth of around 1.5%, this is consistent with inflation of only slightly more than 2%. Nominal wage growth is a function of both labor market slack and expected inflation. Slack should increase modestly during the rest of the year as labor participation recovers. Chart 11 shows that the labor force participation rate is still about 0.9 percentage points below where one would expect it to be, even adjusting for an aging population and increased early retirements. Chart 10Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Chart 11Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Employment has been particularly depressed among lower-wage workers (Chart 12). This should change as more low-wage workers exhaust their savings and are forced to seek employment. According to the Fed, the lowest-paid 20% of workers are the only group to have seen their bank deposits dwindle since mid-2021 (Chart 13). Chart 12More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work Chart 13The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling Inflation expectations should come down as goods inflation recedes and oil prices come off their highs (Chart 14). Bob Ryan, BCA’s Chief Commodity Strategist, sees the price of Brent averaging $86/bbl in the second half of this year, down 16% from current levels.  Central Banks Will Dial Back The Hawkishness With inflation set to fall over the remainder of the year, and financial markets showing increasing signs of stress, the Fed and other central banks will adopt a softer tone. It is worth noting that the median terminal dot for the Fed funds rate actually declined from 2.5% to 2.4% in the March Summary of Economic Projections (Chart 15). Given that markets expect US interest rates to rise to 3.25% in 2023, the Fed may not want investors to further rachet up rate expectations. Chart 14US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop Chart 15Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral   The Bank of England has already veered in a more dovish direction. Its latest forecast, released on May 5, showed real GDP contracting slightly in 2023. Based on market interest rate expectations, the BoE sees headline inflation falling to 1.5% by end-2024, below its target of 2%. Even assuming that interest rates remain at 1%, the BoE believes that inflation will only be slightly above 2% at the end of 2024, implying little need for incremental policy tightening. Not surprisingly, the pound has sold off. We have been tactically short GBP/USD but are using this opportunity to turn tactically neutral. Given favorable valuations, we like the pound over the long run. Chart 16Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend The euro area provides a good example of the dangers of focusing too much on short-term inflation dynamics. Supply-side disruptions stemming from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have weighed on European growth this year. Yet, those very same factors have also pushed up inflation. Harmonized inflation across the euro area reached 7.5% in April, the highest since the launch of the common currency. The ECB is eager to put some distance between policy rates and the zero bound. However, there is little need for significant tightening. Unlike in the US, spending in the euro area is well below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 16). If anything, more inflation would be welcome since that would give the ECB scope to bring real rates further into negative territory if economic conditions warrant it. To its credit, the Bank of Japan has stuck with its yield curve control system, even as bond yields have risen elsewhere in the world. Japan’s currency has weakened but given that inflation expectations are too low, and virtually all of its debt is denominated in yen, that is hardly a bad thing. Too Late? Has the surge in bond yields already done enough damage to the global economy to make a recession inevitable? We do not think so. As noted above, much of the recent harm has been caused by various dislocations, namely the war in Ukraine and the ongoing effects of the pandemic. As these dislocations dissipate, inflation will fall and global growth will recover. Despite the hoopla over how the US economy contracted in the first quarter, real private final sales to domestic purchasers (a measure of GDP growth that strips out the effects of changes in government spending, inventories, and net exports) rose by 3.7% at an annualized rate. As Table 1 shows, this measure of economic activity has the highest predictive power for GDP growth one-quarter ahead. Table 1A Good Sign: Real Final Sales To Private Domestic Purchasers Rose By 3.7% In Q1 It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Meanwhile, and completely overlooked at this point, S&P 500 earnings have come in 7.3% above expectations so far in Q1, with nearly 80% of S&P 500 companies surprising on the upside. Earnings are up 10.4% year-over-year in Q1. Sales are up 13.6%. Looking out to Q4 of 2022, S&P companies are expected to earn $60.93 in EPS, up 4.3% from what analysts expected at the start of the year. It is also worth noting that homebuilder stocks have basically been flat over the past 30 days, even as the S&P 500 has dropped by nearly 10% over this period. Housing is the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. With the homeowner vacancy rate at record low levels, even today’s mortgage rates may not be enough to push the economy into recession (Chart 17). Economic vulnerabilities are greater outside the US. Nevertheless, there is enough pent-up demand on both the consumer and capital spending side to sustain growth. The Last Hurrah How long will the “Goldilocks” period of falling inflation and supply-side driven growth last? Our guess is about 18 months, starting this summer and lasting until the end of 2023. Unfortunately, as is often the case, the benign environment that will emerge in the second half of this year will sow the seeds of its own demise. Real wages are currently falling across the major economies (Chart 18). That has dampened consumer confidence and spending. However, as inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. This will stoke demand, leading to a reacceleration in inflation, most likely in late 2023 or early 2024. Chart 17Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Chart 18Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries   In the end, central banks will discover that the neutral rate of interest is higher than they thought. That is good news for stocks in the short-to-medium run because it means that forthcoming rate hikes will not induce a recession. Down the road, however, a higher neutral rate means that investors will eventually need to value stocks using a higher discount rate. It also means that the disinflation we envision over the next 18 months will not last. All this puts us in the rather lonely “transitory transitory” camp: We think much of today’s high inflation will prove to be transitory, but the transitory nature of that inflation will itself be transitory. Be that as it may, the next 18 months of falling inflation and receding recession fears could see stocks recover much of their losses. For most investors, that is too long a period to sit on the sidelines. The “Last Hurrah” for equities is coming. Taking Partial Profits On Our Short Treasury, Long Value/Growth, And Short Bitcoin Trades We continue to think that over a 5-year horizon, bond yields will rise from current levels, value stocks will outperform growth stocks, and crypto prices will fall. However, with the “Last Hurrah” approaching, countertrend rallies are likely. To express this view, we recommend taking half profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade recommendation (up 9.3% from an initial entry yield of 1.45% on June 30, 2021). We are also halving our long global value/growth position (up 20.1% since inception on December 10, 2020), and our short Bitcoin position (up 98% based on our exponential shorting technique). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight

Executive Summary The Fed offered more explicit near-term forward rate guidance at its meeting last week. This guidance will reduce yield volatility at the front-end of the curve during the next few months. We expect the Fed to deliver two more 50 basis point rate hikes (in June and July) before settling into a pattern of hiking by 25 bps at each meeting. Our anticipated Fed hike path is shallower than what is priced in the market, but it also lasts longer. Investors should position for this outcome by buying the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract. Economic and financial market indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield will fall back during the next six months, alongside falling inflation. Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Bottom Line: Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for now, though we expect to get an opportunity to reduce portfolio duration later this year once inflation and bond yields are lower. Feature Last week was a chaotic one for the US bond market. Treasury yields rose and the Fed delivered its first 50 basis point rate increase since 2000. Yet, there is a broad consensus that the Fed’s message was dovish relative to expectations. In this week’s report we try to make sense of these confusing market signals. We do this by focusing on two important occurrences: (1) The Fed’s “dovish” 50 basis point rate hike and (2) The 10-year Treasury yield breaking above 3% for the first time since 2018. The Fed Takes Back Control Chart 1An Uncertain Rates Market An Uncertain Rates Market An Uncertain Rates Market Fed Chair Jay Powell had a clear agenda for last week’s FOMC press conference. Simply, he wanted to provide more concrete forward rate guidance to a market that had become increasingly volatile (Chart 1). The problem is that while the Fed had been explicit about its intention to lift rates, it hadn’t provided any firm guidance about its anticipated pace of tightening. This led to wild speculation in rates markets. Will the Fed lift rates at every meeting or every other meeting? Will it move in traditional 25 basis point increments or perhaps 50 basis point increments? Maybe even 75 basis point increments? This sort of speculation is unacceptable to Chair Powell who said in his opening remarks that the Fed “will strive to avoid adding uncertainty to what is already an extraordinarily challenging and uncertain time.”1 New Explicit Forward Guidance From Chair Powell’s post-meeting press conference, we can discern the following about the Fed’s near-term rate hike intentions. The Fed will not lift rates by 75 basis points at any single meeting. Two more 50 basis point rate hikes are likely at the June and July FOMC meetings. After July, the Fed will likely continue to lift rates at each FOMC meeting. Inflation’s trend will dictate whether these rate increases are delivered in 50 bps or 25 bps increments. The Fed will continue to lift rates at every meeting until it is confident that it has “done enough to get us on a path to restore price stability.” It’s also worth noting that, in addition to delivering a 50 basis point rate hike and providing firmer forward rate guidance, the Fed announced that it will begin shrinking its balance sheet on June 1. The Fed will follow the plan that was presented in the minutes from the March FOMC meeting and that we discussed in a recent report.2 Turning to markets, we see that the overnight index swap curve (OIS) is priced for an additional 201 bps of rate increases between now and the end of 2022 (Chart 2). This is consistent with three more 50 basis point rate hikes and two more 25 basis point rate hikes at this year’s five remaining FOMC meetings. If delivered, those hikes would bring the fed funds rate up to a range of 2.75% to 3.00%. Chart 2Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Looking out until the end of 2023, we see the OIS curve priced for 262 bps of rate increases. That is, the market is priced for roughly 200 bps of tightening between now and the end of 2022, but only another 62 bps of rate increases in 2023. In fact, Chart 2 shows that the OIS curve has the funds rate peaking at 3.49% near the middle of 2023 and then edging slowly back down. Related Report  US Investment StrategyWage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Based on our view that inflation will decline between now and the end of the year, we see the Fed delivering only 175 bps of additional tightening this year (50 bps rate hikes in June and July, followed by three more 25 bps hikes). This is slightly lower than what is priced in the curve. However, given the strong state of private sector balance sheets, we can also easily envision 25 basis point rate increases continuing at every meeting in 2023. That scenario would push the fed funds rate above 4% by the end of 2023, significantly higher than what is priced in the market. We recommend that investors position for this “slower, but longer” tightening cycle by buying the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract (see “Yield Curve Trades” table on page 12). Charts 3A-3D focus more specifically on what’s priced in for the next few FOMC meetings. The charts show where the fed funds rate is expected to land after each meeting, as implied by the fed funds futures curve. Additionally, we use an ‘x’ to denote where we expect the fed funds rate to be at the end of each meeting. You can see that we expect the fed funds rate to be about 25 bps lower than the market by the end of September. Our expectation of a slower near-term hike pace stems from our view that inflation has already peaked.3 With that in mind, it’s notable that monthly core PCE inflation printed below levels consistent with the Fed’s 2022 forecasts in both February and March (Chart 4). In addition, last week’s employment report showed a significant deceleration in average hourly earnings (Chart 5). Average hourly earnings are an imperfect wage measure because they don’t adjust for the changing industry composition of the workforce. However, an adjusted measure that gives each industry group equal weighting is also starting to slow (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 3AMay 2022 FOMC Meeting May 2022 FOMC Meeting May 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3BJune 2022 FOMC Meeting June 2022 FOMC Meeting June 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3CJuly 2022 FOMC Meeting July 2022 FOMC Meeting July 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3DSeptember 2022 FOMC Meeting September 2022 FOMC Meeting September 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 4Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Chart 5Peak Wage Growth Peak Wage Growth Peak Wage Growth Bottom Line: The Fed’s more explicit rate guidance will reduce yield volatility at the front-end of the curve. Two more 50 basis point rate hikes are likely in June and July, but we expect falling inflation will prompt the Fed to switch to 25 basis point hikes after that. We also expect the tightening cycle to last longer than what is currently priced in the curve. Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark and should position for our expected “slower, but longer” tightening cycle by owning the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract. A Quick Note On The Neutral Rate And Financial Conditions Chart 6Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Chart 2 shows that the market expects the Fed to lift the funds rate until it is slightly above the range of the Fed’s long-run neutral rate estimates (2% - 3%). At that point, restrictive monetary policy will presumably weigh on economic growth enough for the Fed to back away from tightening. While forecasters need some estimate of the neutral rate to predict where bond yields will land at the end of the cycle, it’s important to understand that Fed policymakers are not guided by these same concerns. In fact, Chair Powell said the following last week when asked whether the Fed intended to lift rates above estimates of neutral: … there’s not a bright line drawn on the road that tells us when we get [to neutral]. So we’re going to be looking at financial conditions, right. Our policy affects financial conditions and financial conditions affect the economy. So we’re going to be looking at the effect of our policy moves on financial conditions. Are they tightening appropriately? And then we’re going to be looking at the effects on the economy. And we’re going to be making a judgment about whether we’ve done enough to get us on a path to restore price stability. In other words, actual Fed policy will not be guided by neutral rate estimates. Instead, the Fed will continue lifting rates at a regular pace until it sees enough evidence of tightening financial conditions and slowing inflation. For this reason, it will be critical to monitor broad indexes of financial conditions as the Fed tightens policy. At present, the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index remains deep in “accommodative” territory, but it is rising quickly (Chart 6). Based on history, we might expect the pace of tightening to slow once the index breaks into “restrictive” territory. Conversely, if financial conditions don’t tighten very much, then it will encourage the Fed to hike more aggressively.  The Return Of 3% Treasury Yields Chart 7Back Above 3% Back Above 3% Back Above 3% The 10-year Treasury yield broke above 3% after the FOMC meeting on Wednesday and it has so far held firm above that key psychological level. The last time the 10-year yield reached these heights was near the end of the last tightening cycle in 2018 (Chart 7). One big difference between today and 2018 being that today’s 3% 10-year yield consists of a much higher inflation component and a much lower real yield (Chart 7, bottom panel). At 2.88%, the cost of inflation compensation embedded in the 10-year yield is too high, and it will fall as inflation rolls over and the Fed tightens. There is a question, however, about whether this drop in 10-year inflation expectations will translate into a lower nominal bond yield or simply be offset by a rising 10-year real yield. The answer will depend on how quickly inflation comes down off its highs. Chart 85y5y Is Above Neutral 5y5y Is Above Neutral 5y5y Is Above Neutral If inflation falls quickly during the next few months, then the market will start to price-in a less aggressive Fed. This will hold down the 10-year real yield. However, if inflation remains sticky near its current level, then the market will judge that the Fed still has a lot of work to do. This will pressure 10-year real yields higher even if long-dated inflation expectations recede. It’s often simpler to ignore the breakdown between real yields and inflation expectations and focus purely on the nominal bond yield itself. This exercise strongly suggests that long-maturity nominal bond yields will fall back somewhat during the next six months. First, we observe that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has risen to 3.19%, above the upper-end of survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate (Chart 8). Long-maturity forward yields have rarely moved much above the range of neutral rate estimates during the past decade. Second, high-frequency indicators that historically correlate with bond yields have not justified the recent move higher in the 10-year yield. The ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index and gold and the relative performance of cyclical versus defensive equity sectors have both stalled out, even as yields have shot up (Chart 9). Finally, the change in bond yields correlates strongly with the level of economic data surprises. Positive data surprises tend to coincide with a rising Treasury yield, and vice-versa. Economic data surprises have been positive during the past few months, justifying the move higher in yields (Chart 10). However, that trend is poised to reverse in the coming months. Economic momentum is bound to slow now that the Fed is tightening and the labor market is close to full employment. Further, the Economic Surprise Index exhibits a strong mean-reverting pattern. Extremely high values tend to be followed by lower values, and vice-versa. A simple auto-regressive model of the Surprise Index suggests that it is on track to turn negative within the next month. Chart 9Bonds Go Their Own Way Bonds Go Their Own Way Bonds Go Their Own Way Chart 10Economic Data Surprises Economic Data Surprises Economic Data Surprises Bottom Line: Our indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield will fall back somewhat during the next six months. That said, on a longer-run horizon we continue to expect that interest rates will rise further than the market anticipates. Investors should maintain neutral portfolio duration for now, but stand ready to re-initiate below-benchmark positions later this year once inflation and bond yields are lower. A Quick Note On The Yield Curve And Credit Spreads Yield Curve Positioning Not only have bond yields increased since the Fed meeting last Wednesday, but the Treasury curve has also steepened significantly. The turnaround in the yield curve has been startling. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope was inverted one month ago, but it is now back up to 40 bps (Chart 11). But despite the big moves in the 2/10 slope, the yield curve remains quite flat beyond the 5-year maturity point. In fact, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread – the 5-year yield minus the yield on a duration-matched 2/10 barbell – remains far too high compared to the 2/10 slope (Chart 11, bottom 2 panels). Therefore, our recommended yield curve positioning remains unchanged. Investors should buy the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Credit Spreads A steeper yield curve has positive implications for corporate bond spreads. All else equal, a steeper yield curve suggests that we are further away from the end of the economic recovery, meaning that corporate bonds have a longer window for outperformance. That said, at 40 bps, the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope is still relatively flat, and while corporate bond spreads have widened during the past few months, the high-yield index option-adjusted spread is still close to its 2019 level and the 12-month breakeven spread for the investment grade index is still below its median since 1995 (Chart 12). Chart 11Favor The 5-Year Favor The 5-Year Favor The 5-Year Chart 12Corporate Bond Valuation Corporate Bond Valuation Corporate Bond Valuation We remain cautious on corporate credit for the time being. Specifically, we recommend an underweight allocation (2 out of 5) to investment grade corporates and a neutral allocation (3 out of 5) to high-yield. However, if the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope were to steepen to above 50 bps and/or if corporate bond spreads were to widen further, then we may see an opportunity this year to tactically increase exposure. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220504.p… 2    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Peak Inflation,” dated April 19, 2022. 3    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Peak Inflation,” dated April 19, 2022.   Recommended Portfolio Specification On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Executive Summary EM Credit Spreads Correlate With The EM Business Cycle EM Credit Spreads Correlate With The EM Business Cycle EM Credit Spreads Correlate With The EM Business Cycle A buying opportunity in EM local bonds and sovereign credit (EM USD bonds) will open up once US Treasury yields roll over and the US dollar begins its descent. US 10-year Treasury yields will likely peak at around 3.3-3.4%. The US dollar will roll over soon after that. Although we are getting closer to a buying opportunity in EM local currency bonds, it is not imminent. EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads fluctuate with their exchange rates and the EM/global business cycle. The near-term outlook for EM currencies and EM/global growth remains unfavorable.   Bottom Line: For now, continue shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, HUF, PHP and IDR. Maintain a defensive tilt within an EM local bond portfolio. Our only outright long has been Brazilian 10-year domestic bonds but we recommend that investors hedge currency risk over the near term. Continue underweighting EM credit relative to US credit, quality adjusted. Feature Bond yields are surging around the world. How advanced are the bond selloffs in the US and in EM? Our short answer is that while the global bond selloff is fairly advanced, volatility will remain high in the near term and yields might rise further. A buying opportunity in EM local bonds and sovereign credit (EM USD bonds) will emerge when US bond yields roll over and the US dollar begins its descent. For now, investors should continue shorting EM currencies versus the US dollar and stay defensive in their EM domestic bond and credit portfolios. US Inflation And Bond Yields Since the top in US bond prices in 2020, US 10-year Treasurys have experienced their second largest drawdown of the past 42 years (Chart 1). The bond rout has pushed net bullish sentiment on US Treasurys to extremely low levels (Chart 2, top panel). From a contrarian perspective, depressed sentiment is positive for the outlook for bonds. Chart 1US 10-Year Treasurys Are Experiencing Their Second Worst Drawdown In 45 years US 10-Year Treasurys Are Experiencing Their Second Worst Drawdown In 45 years US 10-Year Treasurys Are Experiencing Their Second Worst Drawdown In 45 years Chart 2Traders Are Very Bearish On Bonds Traders Are Very Bearish On Bonds Traders Are Very Bearish On Bonds However, the term premium on 10-year bonds is still too low (Chart 2, bottom panel). Extremely high inflation uncertainty warrants a higher risk premium on US bonds. Given that the term premium is a gauge of the risk premium embedded in bonds, it will likely rise further due to inflation and policy uncertainty. Moreover, the tight labor market and surging wages imply that the fundamental outlook for US bonds is also unfavorable. Chart 3 displays that the US labor market has not been this tight since the late 1960s when inflation rose sharply, got embedded in consumer and business expectations and stayed structurally elevated util the early 1980s. The bottom panel of Chart 3 shows the US employment cost index and the Atlanta wage tracker. Both are high and accelerating. Chart 3The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating Critically, US unit labor costs (ULC) – which have a significant impact on core inflation’s medium-term trends – are accelerating (Chart 4). Productivity growth will not be able to keep up with the pace of wage increases, which implies that unit labor costs will continue to rise at a rapid rate. As a result, any decline in core and headline CPI will be technical and limited in nature. US headline and core inflation rates will drop from the current extremely high levels as transitory forces – which exacerbated price pressures over the past 12 months – ebb. Trimmed-mean core PCE and median core CPI measures suggest that underlying US core consumer price inflation is probably in the 3.5% to 4% range (Chart 5). These two measures strip out outliers like used auto prices. Chart 4Unit Labor Costs Drive Core CPI Unit Labor Costs Drive Core CPI Unit Labor Costs Drive Core CPI Chart 5US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4% US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4% US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4%   Thus, core PCE and CPI will drop in H2 this year but will stay above 3.5-4%. That is well above the Fed’s 2-2.25% target range for core inflation. Hence, the Fed will maintain its hawkish stance and continue to tighten monetary policy for now. That is why we have been arguing that the Fed and US stocks are on a collision course. The Fed will adopt a dovish tilt only after financial conditions tighten dramatically, i.e., when the S&P500 is down more than 20% from its January high. Bottom Line: Even though headline and core inflation measures will decline later this year, genuine price pressures will remain intense. US government bond yields might be approaching a turning point. Odds are that US 10-year yields will roll over when they reach 3.3-3.4% (Chart 6). EM Domestic Bonds The current drawdown in the total return of EM domestic bonds is the largest on record in local currency terms, but not in US dollar terms (Chart 7, top and middle panels). The basis is that in the current cycle, EM currencies have depreciated less than they did during previous bond selloffs in 2014-15 and 2020. Chart 6The Next Technical Resistance For 10-Year Treasurys Yields Is Around 3.4% The Next Technical Resistance For 10-Year Treasurys Yields Is Around 3.4% The Next Technical Resistance For 10-Year Treasurys Yields Is Around 3.4% Chart 7EM Local Currency GBI Bond Index: Total Return And Yields EM Local Currency GBI Bond Index: Total Return And Yields EM Local Currency GBI Bond Index: Total Return And Yields   However, historical comparisons do not take into account changes to the composition of the JP Morgan GBI-EM index. Specifically, China was included in 2020 and it now makes up 10% of the index. Chinese onshore government bond yields have been falling and are now very low (comparable with the yields on US Treasurys). Plus, the Chinese yuan is a low beta currency in the EM universe. In brief, Chinese onshore bonds have been supporting the GBI-EM index’s performance over the past 12 months. However, even after considering this favorable compositional change to the GBI-EM index, the recent drawdowns in both local currency and US dollar terms have been significant (Chart 7, middle panel). From a valuation point of view, EM bonds are beginning to offer value (Chart 7, bottom panel). However, risks to ex-China EM local currency bond yields remain to the upside over the near term. First, as long as EM exchange rates depreciate versus the US dollar, EM ex-China central banks will hike their policy rates because weak currencies will aggravate domestic inflationary pressures. Odds are that the greenback’s rally will continue in the near term. Net bullish sentiment on the US dollar is not yet at a peak level (Chart 8). Plus, investors’ net long positions in high-beta EM currencies was elevated as of April 29 (Chart 9). Chart 8Bullish Sentiment On US Dollar Is Not Extreme Bullish Sentiment On US Dollar Is Not Extreme Bullish Sentiment On US Dollar Is Not Extreme Chart 9EM Currencies Have Near-Term Downside EM Currencies Have Near-Term Downside EM Currencies Have Near-Term Downside     Critically, the Chinese yuan’s depreciation versus the US dollar will continue to exert downward pressure on commodity prices and other EM currencies. Besides, EM ex-China currencies have failed to break above the falling trendline (Chart 10). This is a sign that the rebound has been exhausted and a new downleg is in the offing. Second, the pass-through effect of high food and energy prices into core inflation is higher among EM economies than DM ones. Given that food prices are surging and oil prices are elevated, mainstream EM central banks will continue hiking interest rates. Finally, EM local bond yields will not drop until US TIPS yields roll over (Chart 11). TIPS yields are still low, and their path of least resistance would be up. Chart 10Stay Short EM Currencies for Now Stay Short EM Currencies for Now Stay Short EM Currencies for Now Chart 11EM Local Yields Correlate With US TIPS Yields EM Local Yields Correlate With US TIPS Yields EM Local Yields Correlate With US TIPS Yields   Bottom Line: A buying opportunity in EM domestic bonds will likely occur when US Treasury yields and the US dollar roll over. These are not imminent. EM local currency bond investors should stay defensive for now. EM Credit Spreads EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads fluctuate with their exchange rates and the EM/global business cycle, as was discussed in A Primer on EM USD Bonds and illustrated in Chart 12 and 13. Chart 12EM Credit Spreads Correlate With EM Currencies EM Credit Spreads Correlate With EM Currencies EM Credit Spreads Correlate With EM Currencies Chart 13EM Credit Spreads Correlate With The EM Business Cycle EM Credit Spreads Correlate With The EM Business Cycle EM Credit Spreads Correlate With The EM Business Cycle     As we discussed above, the outlook for EM currencies remains unfavorable. Risks to EM/global business cycle are also to the downside. China’s growth remains weak. The favorable impact of fiscal and monetary stimulus is being offset by the harsh lockdowns. Copper prices seem to be breaking down in line with China’s economic weakness (Chart 14). This is negative for many EM economies that export raw materials. Domestic demand in many emerging economies is subdued (Chart 15). Monetary tightening and negative fiscal thrust will cause domestic demand in the majority of EM economies to slow further. Chart 14Copper Prices Have Broken Down Copper Prices Have Broken Down Copper Prices Have Broken Down Chart 15EM Domestic Demand Has Been Very Weak EM Domestic Demand Has Been Very Weak EM Domestic Demand Has Been Very Weak   Finally, global trade volumes will shrink as DM consumption of goods ex-autos declines. Bottom Line: A combination of weakening growth and depreciating currencies will cause EM sovereign and credit spreads to widen further. Investment Recommendations Chart 16EM Credit Spreads Will Widen Further EM Credit Spreads Will Widen Further EM Credit Spreads Will Widen Further US Treasury yields will likely peak at around 3.3-3.4%. The US dollar will roll over soon after. For now, continue shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, HUF, PHP and IDR. Be patient before buying EM local currency bonds. Our current positions are as follows: receiving 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia, betting on yield curve inversion in Mexico and Colombia (receiving 10-year/paying 1-year and 6-month swap rates, respectively) and paying Polish/receiving Czech 10-year rates. Our only outright long has been Brazilian 10-year bonds but we recommend that investors hedge currency risk in the near term. EM sovereign and credit spreads will widen further (Chart 16). Continue underweighting EM credit relative to US credit, quality adjusted. Our country allocation for EM domestic bond and sovereign credit portfolios is presented in the tables below. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

In lieu of next week’s report, I will be presenting a webcast titled ‘The 5 Big Mispricings In The Markets Right Now, And How To Profit From Them’. I do hope you can join. Executive Summary Just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes are setting in train a global recession. Demand is already cool, so aggressive rate hikes will take it to outright cold. The risk is elevated because central banks are desperate to repair their damaged credibility on fighting inflation, and it may be their last chance. Inflationary fears and hawkishness from central banks are weighing on bonds and stocks, and it may take some weeks, or months, for inflation fears to recede. But we could be approaching a turning point. By the summer, core inflation should be receding. Furthermore, the fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility that have signalled inflection points. Fractal trading watchlist: 30-year T-bond, NASDAQ, FTSE 100 versus Euro Stoxx 50, Netherlands versus Switzerland, and Petcare (PAWZ). US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Bottom Line: Tactically cautious, but long-term investors who do not need to time the market bottom should overweight bonds and overweight long-duration defensive equities versus short-duration cyclical equities – for example, overweight US versus non-US equities. Feature The First World War, the historian AJP Taylor famously argued, was “imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables.” Taylor proposed that the railways and their timetables were so central to troop mobilisation – and specifically, the German Schlieffen Plan – that a plan once set in motion could not be stopped. “Once started the wagons and carriages must roll remorselessly and inevitably to their predestined goal.” Otherwise, the whole process would unravel, and an opportunity to demonstrate military credibility would be lost that might never come again. Today, could a global recession be imposed upon us by central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes? Just as it was difficult to unwind the troop mobilisation that led to the Great War, it will be difficult to back down from the aggressive rate hikes that the central banks have timetabled, at least in the near term. Otherwise, an opportunity to demonstrate inflation fighting credibility would be lost that might never come again.  Just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes may set in train  another global recession. Unfortunately, central banks do not have precision weapons. Quite the contrary, monetary tightening is a blunt instrument which works by cooling overall demand. But demand is already cool, as evidenced by the contraction of the US economy in the first quarter. In their zeal to repair their damaged credibility on fighting inflation, the danger is that central banks take the economy from cool to outright cold. Granted, the US economy was dragged down by a drop in inventories and net exports. But even US domestic demand – which strips out inventories and net exports – is barely on its pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-1). Meanwhile, the euro area economy is still 5 percent below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart I-2). To reiterate, by hiking rates aggressively into economies that are at best lukewarm, central banks are risking an outright recession. Chart I-1US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not US Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Chart I-2Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Euro Area Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not Our Three-Point Checklist For A Recession Has Three Ticks My colleague Peter Berezin has created a three-point checklist for a recession: The build-up of an imbalance makes the economy vulnerable to downturn. A catalyst exposes this imbalance. Amplifiers exacerbate the downturn. Is there a major imbalance? You bet there is. The post-pandemic 26 percent overspend on durable goods in the US constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. Other advanced economies also experienced unprecedented binges on durable goods. The catalyst that is exposing this major imbalance is the realisation that durable goods are, well, durable. So, if you overspent on durables in 2020/21, then the risk is that you symmetrically underspend in 2022/23 (Chart I-3). The post-pandemic 26 percent overspend on durable goods in the US constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. Meanwhile, a future underspend on goods cannot be countered by an overspend on services because the consumption of services is constrained by time, opportunity, and biology. There is a limit to how often you can eat out, go to the movies, or go to the doctor (Chart I-4). Indeed, for certain services, an underspend will persist, because we have made some permanent post-pandemic changes to our lifestyles: for example, hybrid office/home working and more online shopping and online medical care. Chart I-3An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend... An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend... An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend... Chart I-4...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend ...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend ...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend Finally, the amplifier that will exacerbate the downturn is monetary tightening. If central banks follow their railway timetables for aggressive rate hikes, a goods downturn will magnify into an outright recession. So, in Peter’s three-point checklist, we now have tick, tick, and tick. Inflation Is Hot, But Demand Is Not If economic demand is at best lukewarm, then what caused the post-pandemic inflation that central banks are now fighting? The simple answer is massive fiscal stimulus combined with the equally massive shift in spending to durable goods. Locked at home and flush with government supplied cash, we couldn’t spend it on services, so we spent it on goods. This created a massive shock in the distribution of demand, out of services whose supply could easily adjust downwards, and into goods whose supply could not easily adjust upwards. For example, airlines could cut back their flights, but auto manufacturers couldn’t make more cars. So, airfares didn’t collapse but used car prices went vertical! The causality from stimulus payments to durable goods spending to core inflation is irrefutable. The causality from stimulus payments to durable goods spending to core inflation is irrefutable. The biggest surges in US durable goods spending all coincided with the government’s stimulus checks (Chart I-5). And the three separate surges in month-on-month core inflation all occurred after surges in durable goods demand (Chart I-6). As further proof, core inflation is highest in those economies where the stimulus checks and furlough schemes were the most generous – like the US and the UK. Chart I-5Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending Stimulus Checks Caused The Surges in Durable Goods Spending Chart I-6The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation The Surges In Durable Goods Spending Caused The Surges In Core Inflation What Does All This Mean For Investment Strategy? Our high conviction view is that the pandemic’s inflationary impulse combined with the Ukraine war will turn out to be demand-destructive, and thereby ultimately morph into a deflationary impulse. Yet central banks are all pumped up to demonstrate their inflation fighting credibility. Given that this credibility is badly damaged, it may be their last opportunity to repair it before it is shattered forever. To repeat, just as the railway timetables set in train the First World War, central bank timetables for aggressive rate hikes may set in train another global recession. That said, a recession is not inevitable. The interest rate that matters most for the economy and the markets is not the policy rate that central banks want to hike aggressively, it is the long-duration bond yield. A lower bond yield can underpin both the economy and the financial markets, just as it did during the pandemic in 2020. But to the extent that the bond market is following the real economic data, we are in a dangerous phase. Because, as is typical at an inflection point, the real data will be noisy and ambiguous. Meaning it may take some weeks, or months, for inflation fears to be trumped by growth fears. On March 10th, in Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? we predicted:  “On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally” That prediction proved to be spot on! Recession, or no recession, we are still in a difficult period for markets because inflationary fears and hawkishness from central banks are weighing on bonds and stocks, while buoying the US dollar. As such, tactical caution is still warranted. Fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility. But we could be approaching a turning point. By the summer, core inflation should be receding. Furthermore, the fractal structures of the sell-offs in both the 30-year T-bond and the tech-heavy NASDAQ index are approaching points of extreme fragility that have reliably signalled previous inflection points (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart I-8The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The advice for long-term investors who do not need to time the market bottom is: Bonds will ultimately rally. Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond. Equities will be conflicted between slowing growth which will weigh on cyclical profits, and falling bond yields which will buoy long-duration valuations.  Therefore, overweight long-duration defensive sectors and markets versus short-duration cyclical sectors and markets. For example, overweight US versus non-US equities. Fractal Trading Watchlist As just discussed, the sell-offs in the 30-year T-bond and the NASDAQ are approaching points of fractal fragility that have signalled previous turning points. Hence, we are adding both investments to our watchlist. Also added to our watchlist is the outperformance of the FTSE100 versus Euro Stoxx 50, and the underperformance of Netherlands versus Switzerland, both of which are approaching potential reversals. Our final addition is Petcare (PAWZ). After a stellar 2020, Petcare gave back most of its gains in 2021. But this underperformance is now approaching a point of fragility which might provide a new entry point. There are no new trades this week, but the full watchlist of investments at, or approaching, turning points is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 6US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 7A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 8Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 9CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 10Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 11Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 12Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Greece's Brief Outperformance To End Chart 13BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 14The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 16Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 17US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point US Homebuilders' Underperformance Has Reached A Potential Turning Point Chart 18Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 19The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 20The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 21A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 22FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Close To Exhaustion Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession Central Bank ‘Railway Timetables’ Are Dragging Us Into Recession 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval   President Kennedy’s performance in 1962 would be ideal for the Biden administration in this year’s midterm elections – but today the Russian conflict is less likely to help the Democrats.   A threat to the homeland could lift President Biden’s job approval. But most likely inflation and foreign crises will weigh on his approval. A contrarian stock rally would not help Biden’s approval but Biden’s attempts to boost his rating could deliver negative surprises for stocks.    US “peak polarization” and Democratic Party policies are negative for the stock market and investor risk appetite over the next zero-to-six months.   Our quantitative election models suggest Republicans will win the Senate, though uncertainty will rise as a result of the controversy over the Supreme Court and abortion. Democratic odds of keeping the White House in 2024 are 54.6% but eroding. CLOSE Recommendation (Cyclical) CLOSING Level CLOSING Date RETURN Long Municipal Bonds Vs. Duration Matched Treasuries 93.53 2-MAY-22 -1.50%   Bottom Line: Overall Biden policies plus global events are neutral or bullish for US Treasuries while neutral or bearish for US stocks over a tactical time horizon (zero-to-six months). Feature President Biden is doubling down on his support for Ukraine and thus adopting the John F. Kennedy foreign policy playbook of confronting Russia ahead of the US’s midterm elections. Related Report  US Political StrategyWar Not Helping Biden So Far Biden’s position today is weaker than Kennedy’s in 1962, so his reaction to Russian aggression will create more market hurdles than it removes. Bad news will come before good news, compounding bearish investor sentiment in the near term. Policy uncertainty should decline after the midterm election on November 8, which is positive for equities in 2023.   Democrats Scramble Amid Recession Fear The US economy contracted unexpectedly in the first quarter at an annualized 1.4% rate. The underlying data contained some silver lining – personal consumption grew at 2.7%. But the contraction is bad news for the economy and the ruling Democratic Party. Public approval of Biden’s handling of the economy has fallen to -16.2%. The global economy continues to sputter. Risks to growth are high in Europe and China as well (Chart 1). The US policy response will take shape on the monetary and fiscal level but also on the foreign policy level. First, global risks will not dissuade the Federal Reserve from normalizing interest rates. Chairman Jerome Powell signaled on April 21 that he is willing to hike interest rates 50 basis points at a time to combat core PCE inflation at 5.2%. The market currently expects core inflation to peak at 5.2% while the Fed funds rate will hit 3.3% in 2023 before falling in 2024. The implication is that monetary policy will tighten quickly, even as the economy stutters, which is negative for the US equity market and investor sentiment. However, Fed hawkishness is largely priced. US long-duration treasuries are at or near fair value at 3%, according to our US Bond Strategy. Our US Investment Strategy believes that with the S&P500 already down by 13% so far this year, stocks can begin to grind upward, barring other negative surprises. Chart 1US Slows Amid Global Growth Risks US Slows Amid Global Growth Risks US Slows Amid Global Growth Risks   Second, the White House will scramble to try to limit the damage to the Democratic Party in the midterms – with the unintentional result that negative surprises could arise from fiscal policy and especially foreign policy. On the fiscal front, congressional Democrats will redesign their budget reconciliation bill to try to gain a legislative victory. They will need to make it as close to deficit-neutral as possible to avoid fanning inflation. The odds of passage are higher than consensus expectations (26% on PredictIt). But the stock market does not want more government spending or higher taxes in a stagflationary environment. Fiscal policy is still a significant source of uncertainty in 2022, if not in 2023. On the foreign policy front, the greatest trouble looms. Russian aggression has prompted the US and its NATO allies to double down on their support for Ukraine, providing additional arms and aid. Biden’s Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the US wants to see Ukraine “a democratic country able to protect its sovereign territory … [and] Russia weakened to the point where it can't do things like invade Ukraine.”1 Finland and Sweden are increasingly likely to join NATO, which will antagonize Russia. Russia’s response is not yet known but it has issued aggressive warnings. By cutting off natural gas to Poland and Bulgaria, Moscow is warning that it may cut off natural gas to all Europe. Meanwhile Germany is embracing an oil embargo. A larger energy shock is increasingly likely. Chart 2More Bad News Before Good News More Bad News Before Good News More Bad News Before Good News ​​​​​ Bottom Line: Monetary policy hawkishness is largely priced whereas additional fiscal uncertainty and America’s reactive foreign policy are not fully priced. This news is neutral or bullish for US Treasuries while neutral or bearish for US stocks over a tactical time horizon (zero-to-six months) (Chart 2). Biden Can Hurt Stocks, Stocks Cannot Help Biden Before addressing how Biden will try to boost his job approval, we should ask whether approval ratings have any direct impact on financial markets. The answer is largely no – or fleeting at best. During the Trump administration it was easy to get the impression that the president’s approval rating had a substantive impact on the stock market, or at least benefited stocks relative to bonds. After the first year, a correlation developed between presidential approval and the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 3A, top panel). The passage of tax cuts juiced corporate profits but also suggested that President Trump could get things done, boosting his approval rating. Oddly, however, the relationship continued even after Republicans lost Congress in 2018. Spurious or not, the correlation persisted until Covid-19 erupted. At that point Trump’s approval tanked while the stock market roared on the back of gargantuan monetary and fiscal stimulus. President Biden’s administration started off the same way, with presidential approval falling (the usual honeymoon ended) while stocks rallied relative to bonds (Chart 3A, bottom panel). But Biden’s passage of the American Rescue Plan Act and the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act in 2021 did not boost his approval rating. Going forward, Biden’s approval rating will probably stabilize at a low level in an inflationary or stagflationary context. Stocks may continue to underperform bonds over a tactical time frame but will not underperform bonds over the cyclical time frame as long as the US avoids a recession. Thus there is not likely to be close correlation between Biden’s approval and the stock-to-bond ratio. From the sector and style perspective, there is also no clear relationship with presidential approval. There may be some basis for seeing Trump’s tax cuts as positive for cyclicals relative to defensives. His term coincided with the second half of a business cycle when growth expanded. But ultimately cyclicals vacillated and went sideways. Moreover growth stocks outperformed value stocks, in accordance with President Obama’s term in office. Yet there was no correlation between Trump’s approval and growth stocks relative to value  (Chart 3B, top two panels). In Biden’s case, presidential job approval has no clear correlation with cyclicals relative to defensives. There may be some relationship with value relative to growth stocks but it is far from convincing. Most likely the underlying macroeconomic dynamics that favored value stocks (i.e. recovery, inflation) coincided with Biden’s honeymoon period and then outlasted it. However, if Biden passes a reconciliation bill with tax hikes, the implication should be positive both for value versus growth stocks and for his approval rating (Chart 3B, bottom two panels). Chart 3AStocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Chart 3BStocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval Stocks Not Linked To Presidential Approval From the above data we can draw a few conclusions. On one hand, the stock-to-bond ratio and cyclicals-versus-defensives could rally again on the back of a resilient global economy and yet Biden’s approval rating could fail to recover. The distribution of wealth means that inflation and rising mortgage rates hit low-to-middle income groups who comprise the bulk of voters. Cyclical assets will rise if the global economy improves relative to the US economy, whereas presidential approval may not. Inflation could subside incrementally with limited benefit to the president. On the other hand, if stocks and cyclical sectors continue to underperform, it will probably be due to even worse economic outcomes that will simultaneously prevent Biden’s approval from recovering. If the economy slows further and inflation remains persistent, disapproval will rise. The problem for investors is that the latter is the likeliest scenario based on the energy supply risks in Europe and China’s difficulties stabilizing growth. The US economy cannot entirely avoid the knock-on effects of slower global growth over the next six months. Bottom Line: There is no stable relationship between presidential approval and the stock market, whether regarding bonds, sectors, or styles. There are occasional correlations that reflect coincidences of macro, market, and political cycles or major policy changes. In today’s context a rebound in cyclical assets may not help the president while a further downturn would hurt him. But the president’s attempts to boost his approval rating could hurt stocks. Inflation And Foreign Wars Tend To Hurt Presidents What can Biden do to boost his approval rating and his party’s odds in the midterm election? Not much. Foreign policy is his best option, though he is limited to a defensive or reactive foreign policy and even then the underlying economy will drive voters the most. Looking at presidential approval over time, upswings occur during periods of economic prosperity and peaks occur amid foreign belligerence that threatens the homeland. Presidential approval has slumped since the subprime mortgage crisis and today it is even lower than under President Obama (Chart 4A). Chart 4APresidential Approval Follows Peace And Prosperity, Not War And Poverty Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Similarly presidential disapproval rises during recessionary and inflationary periods as well as wars and scandals (Chart 4B). The Obama/Trump era saw a rise in disapproval that could resume due to inflation. Foreign wars that do not present a threat to the homeland can increase disapproval. Chart 4BPresidential Approval Follows Peace And Prosperity, Not War And Poverty Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War The takeaway is that a homeland threat from abroad could temporarily lift the president’s approval but it will not last for long unless the underlying economic malaise is cured. The problem for Biden is that the most immediate foreign policy challenges emanate from oil producers whose reactions exacerbate the inflation problem (Russia, Iran). Biden may or may not keep relations steady with China, where disputes could drive up import prices. Bottom Line: A reactive foreign policy could provoke a threat to the homeland that boosts the president’s job approval. But more likely the weakening economy, high inflation, and foreign crises that add to inflation will hurt the president. Biden And The Kennedy Playbook President Kennedy’s experience in 1962 presents the best case for Democrats but the underlying economic and political context are different and damaging for Biden. Comparing today’s situation to comparable midterm election years, the negative outlook for Biden and the Democrats becomes clear. Comparable midterm elections feature high international tensions, high inflation, or low presidential approval on a net basis. Today the “Misery Index” (unemployment plus inflation) is comparable to the minimum levels in midterm years in the 1970s – and higher than the maximum levels in other midterm years (Table 1). The House and Senate losses during periods of high misery and low presidential approval are substantial. Table 1Misery And Midterms Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War The 1962 midterm election is a notable exception. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy’s handling of it minimized the Democratic Party’s losses that year, with only four seats lost in the House, plus a gain of three seats in the Senate. Compare this to the typical midterm election, with an average of 27 lost seats in the House (31 for Democrats) and four seats lost in the Senate (five for Democrats) (Table 2). Table 2Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis Midterm, 1962 Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Kennedy’s net approval averaged 55% that year, whereas Biden’s today stands at -11%. A threat to the homeland could boost Biden’s approval but today’s likeliest conflicts would worsen inflation if they occurred. The Misery Index stands at 11% this year compared to 6% in 1962. Most importantly, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Russians recognized that America would always care about Cuba’s status more than Russia because it posed a proximate strategic threat. Americans had more at stake and could take greater risks to prevent Cuba from hosting nuclear arms. Today, while the US is not trying to supply Ukraine or Finland with nuclear weapons, NATO membership would expand the US nuclear umbrella. Americans do not seem prepared to recognize that Russia will always care more about Ukraine’s and Finland’s status than Americans will. Russians have more at stake and can take greater risks. Thus while Biden’s foreign policy could easily provoke a crisis with Russia, Biden may not get the better end of the crisis like Kennedy did. Meanwhile financial markets will suffer from the spike in tensions. Bottom Line: Biden’s doubling down on support for Ukraine and NATO enlargement suggest that he does not have an interest in reducing tensions with Russia ahead of the midterm election. Yet Biden is unlikely to get the better of any reactive foreign policy that escalates tensions – at least not in time for the midterms. This dynamic is negative for US and global stocks and risk assets. Election Quant Model Updates The Philadelphia Federal Reserve released a second update to its state-level coincident indicators in April, enabling us to update our quant models for the Senate election in 2022 and presidential election in 2024. The model still predicts that Democrats will lose two Senate seats, producing a Republican majority of 52-48 (Chart 5). Arizona and Georgia are the two states in which Democrats won Senate seats in 2022 but are expected to flip to the Republican side. Arizona and Pennsylvania remain toss-up states (odds of Democratic victory range from 45%-55%) but are inching downward toward likely Republican victories. Chart 5GOP Tipped To Take The Senate (Quant Election Model, April 2022) Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Democrats shed probability in all states once again. Odds fell the most in Arizona (-1.08 percentage point since the last update in early April) followed by North Carolina (-1.03ppt) and Pennsylvania (-0.98ppt). In seven states the Democratic odds of victory fell by more than 0.5ppts, including Arizona and Nevada (Chart 6). Overall the probability for Democrats retaining control of the Senate now stands at 48.2% (down 0.2ppt). These odds are higher than consensus even though they agree with the consensus on expecting Republican victory. Online betting markets like PredictIt are pricing in Republican control at around 79%, up 3ppt from our last update. This is overstated and the new controversy over the Supreme Court and abortion will fire up Democratic voters, making the Senate race closer to what our model suggests. Chart 6Democrats Falter Across Senate Races: AZ, PA, NC Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Looking ahead to 2024, our presidential election model still predicts 308 Electoral College votes for the Democratic Party, a number that has not changed since the 2020 election (Chart 7). Democrats have a 54.6% chance overall of retaining the White House. Chart 7Biden Still Tipped For 2024 (Quant Election Model, April 2022) Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War The trend is negative for the incumbent party. North Carolina slipped out of the toss-up category and into Republican category – i.e. Democrats now have only a 44% chance of winning it. Democrats’ odds of winning Florida moved lower – it is now in toss-up territory at 54%, which comes closer to our subjective judgment that Republicans are favored there. The toss-up states have remained well anchored in the range of 40%-60% since 2020 and will play a pivotal role in future predictions. Generally the trend is for falling odds that Democrats will win these states (PA, FL, NC, AZ, and GA). Both Pennsylvania and Florida account for a combined 49 electoral votes and Florida is probably more Republican-leaning than the model says. If the three critical Rust Belt states (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan) slip into toss-up territory then the model will be flagging serious trouble for Democrats. But a lot can happen between now and 2024. In the latest update Democrats are shedding probability of winning in all states, although to a lesser degree than the past two updates. Economic data, while still negative for the incumbent party, may be deteriorating less rapidly. Biden’s approval rating improved marginally since our last update and we expect it to stabilize, albeit at a low level. Michigan recorded the largest decline in Democratic odds of victory (-1.07ppt) followed by Minnesota (-0.79ppt) and New Hampshire (-0.78ppt). Democrats shed more than 0.5ppts from their odds of victory in twelve states, nine of which they won in 2022 (Chart 8). Chart 8Democrats Shedding Odds Of Winning States In 2024 Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Bottom Line: Republicans are favored to take the Senate (as well as the House) in 2022. Democrats are slightly favored to retain the White House in 2024, though the model is optimistic by granting Florida to the Democrats and the election odds look to be razor-thin yet again. Investment Takeaways As we go to press, the unusual leak of a draft opinion of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito has roiled US politics. The draft argues that the landmark court case of Roe Versus Wade should be overturned. This incident reflects our “Peak Polarization” theme – that polarization will remain very disruptive in the short term yet subside over the long term. It also suggests an activist effort to escalate the culture wars ahead of the midterm election, which we have argued would be the case and implies that more unrest will follow from this event. Whether the Supreme Court overturns the landmark Roe versus Wade ruling of 1973, the battle for women voters will help sustain election-year policy uncertainty, as women’s approval for Democrats will start to recover  (Chart 9). Investor sentiment will remain bearish in the very near term. A series of hurdles need to be cleared before we close our tactical long DXY trade and defensive sector tilt. We are closing our long municipal bond relative to Treasury trade for a loss of 1.5% (Chart 10). Chart 9Women Are Key Constituencies In The Midterm Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Chart 10Municipal Trade Fizzled Out Despite Strong Local Government Finance Municipal Trade Fizzled Out Despite Strong Local Government Finance Municipal Trade Fizzled Out Despite Strong Local Government Finance The overall analysis of US politics is neutral or bullish for US Treasuries while neutral or bearish for US stocks over a tactical time horizon (zero-to-six months). If recession is avoided at the critical juncture this year, then 2023 will see a rising stock market as the economy expands and political risks fall.   Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Peter Weber, “Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin says U.S. believes Ukraine can win, wants to 'see Russia weakened,'” The Week, April 25, 2022, theweek.com.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Table A3US Political Capital Index Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Chart A1Presidential Election Model Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Chart A2Senate Election Model Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Biden's Cold War And Culture War Biden's Cold War And Culture War