Financial Markets
Feature Recommended Allocation In late November, BCA Research published its 2020 Outlook titled Heading Into The End Game, an annual discussion between BCA’s managing editors and the firm’s longstanding clients Mr. and Ms X.1 We recommend GAA clients read that document for a full analysis of the macro and investment environment we expect in 2020. In this Monthly Portfolio Outlook, we focus on portfolio construction: how we would recommend positioning a global multi-asset portfolio for the 12-month investment horizon in light of that analysis. First, a brief summary of the BCA macro outlook. We believe the global manufacturing cycle is starting to bottom out, partly because of its usual periodicity of 18 months from peak to trough, and also because of easier financial conditions, and some moderate fiscal and credit stimulus from China (Chart 1). Central banks will remain dovish next year despite accelerating growth. The Fed, in particular, worries that inflation expectations have become unanchored (Chart 2) and, moreover, will be reluctant to raise rates ahead of the US presidential election. This environment implies a moderate rise in long-term interest rates, with the US 10-year Treasury yield rising to 2.2-2.5%. Chart 1Reasons To Expect A Rebound Chart 2Unanchored Inflation Expectations Worry The Fed For an asset allocator, this combination of an improving manufacturing cycle and easy monetary policy looks like a very positive environment for risk assets (Chart 3). We, therefore, remain overweight equities and underweight fixed income. We have discussed over the past few months the timing to turn more risk-on and pro-cyclical in our recommendations.2 Since we are increasingly confident about the probability of the manufacturing cycle turning up, this is the time to make that change. Consequently, the shifts we are recommending in our global portfolio, shown in the Recommended Allocation table and discussed in detail below, add to its beta (Chart 4). Chart 3A Positive Environment For Risk Assets Chart 4Raising The Beta Of Our Portfolio Chart 5Some Signs Of Risk-On Still Missing Nonetheless, we still have some concerns. China’s stimulus (particularly credit growth) remains half-hearted compared to previous cyclical rebounds in 2012 and 2016. We expect a “phase one” ceasefire in the trade war. But even that is not certain, and it would not anyway solve the long-term structural disputes. To turn fully risk-on, we would want to see signs of a clear rebound in commodity prices and a depreciation of the US dollar, which have not yet happened (Chart 5). The 2020 Outlook proposed some milestones to monitor whether our scenario is playing out and whether we should turn more or less risk-on. We summarize these milestones in Table 1. Given these uncertainties, to hedge our pro-cyclical positioning we continue to recommend an overweight in cash, and we are instituting an overweight position in gold. Table 1Milestones For 2020 Chart 6Recessions Are Caused By Inflation Or Debt How will this cycle end? All recessions in modern history have been caused either by a sharp rise in inflation, or by a debt-fueled asset bubble (Chart 6). The Fed will likely fall behind the curve at some point as, after further tightening in the labor market, inflation starts to pick up. How the Fed reacts to that will determine what triggers the recession. If – as is most likely – it lets inflation run, that could blow up an asset bubble (and it was the bursting of such bubbles which caused the 2000 and 2007 recessions); if it decides to tighten monetary policy to kill inflation, the recession would look more like those of the 1970s and 1980s. But it is hard to see either happening over the next 12-18 months. Equities: As part of our shift to a more pro-risk, pro-cyclical stance, we are cutting US equities to underweight, and raising the euro zone to overweight, and Emerging Markets and the UK to neutral. US equities have outperformed fairly consistently since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 7) – except during the two periods of accelerating global growth, in 2012-13 (when Europe did better) and 2016-17 (when EM particularly outperformed). The US today is expensive, particularly in terms of price/sales, which looks more expensive than the P/E ratio because the profit margin is at a record high level (Chart 8). The upside for US stocks in 2020 is likely to be limited. In 2019 so far, US equities have risen by 29% despite earnings growth close to zero. Multiples expanded because the Fed turned dovish, but investors should not assume further multiple expansion in 2020. Our rough model for US EPS growth points to around 8% next year (sales in line with nominal GDP growth of 4%, margins expanding by a couple of points, plus 2% in share buybacks). Add a dividend yield of 2%, and US stocks might give a total return of 10% or so. Chart 7US Doesn't Always Outperform Chart 8US Equities Are Expensive To play the cyclical rebound, we prefer euro zone stocks over those in EM or Japan. Euro zone stocks have a higher weighting in sectors we like such as Financials and Industrials (Table 2). European banks, in particular, look attractively valued (Chart 9) and offer a dividend yield of 6%, something investors should find appealing in this low-yield world. EM is more closely linked to China and commodities prices, which are not yet sending strong positive signals. We worry about the excess of debt in EM (Chart 10), which remains a structural headwind: the IMF and World Bank put total external EM debt at $6.8 trillion (Chart 11). Table 2Equity Sector Composition Chart 9Euro Zone Banks Are Especially Cheap Chart 10EM Debt Remains A Headwind Japan is another likely beneficiary of a cyclical recovery. But, before we turn positive, we want to see (1) signs of a stabilization of consumption after the recent tax rise (retail sales fell by 7% year-on-year in October), and (2) clarification of a worrying new investment law (which will require any investor which intends to “influence management” to get prior government approval before buying as little as a 1% stake in many sectors). For an asset allocator this combination of an improving manufacturing cycle and easy monetary policy looks very positive for risk assets. We raise the UK to neutral. The market has been a serial underperformer over the past few years, but this has been due to the weak pound and derating, rather than poor earnings growth (Chart 12). It now looks very cheap and, with the risk of a no-deal Brexit off the table, sterling should rebound further. The UK is notably overweight the sectors we like (Table 2). However, political risk makes us limit our recommendation to neutral. Although the Conservatives look likely to win a majority in this month’s general election, which will allow them to push through the negotiated Brexit deal, subsequent arguments over the future trade relationship with the EU will be divisive. Chart 116.8 Trillion In EM External Debt Chart 12The UK Has Been Derated Since 2016 Fixed Income: We remain underweight government bonds. Stronger economic growth is likely to push up long-term rates (Chart 13). Nonetheless, the rise in yields should be limited. The Fed looks to be on hold for the next 12 months, but the futures market is not far away from that view: it has priced in only a 60% probability of one rate cut over that time. The gap between market expectations and what the Fed actually does is what our bond strategists call the “golden rule of bond investing”. US inflation is also likely to soften over the next few months due to the lagged effect of this year’s weaker growth and appreciating dollar. We do not expect the 10-year US Treasury to rise above 2.5% – the current FOMC estimate of the long-run equilibrium level of short-term rates (Chart 14). Chart 13Growth Will Push Up Rates... Chart 14...But Only As Far As 2.5% Within the fixed-income universe, we remain positive on corporate credit. But US investment-grade bond spreads are no longer attractive and so we downgrade them to neutral (Chart 15). Investors looking for high-quality bond exposure should prefer Agency MBS, which trade on an attractive spread relative to Aa- and A-rated corporate bonds. European IG should do better since spreads are not so close to historical lows, risk-free rates should rise less than in the US, and because the ECB is increasing its purchases of corporate bonds. Chart 15US IG Spreads Are Close To Historical Lows Chart 16US Caa Bonds Have Some Catching Up To Do We continue to like high-yield bonds, both in the US and Europe. But we would suggest moving down the credit curve and increasing the weight in Caa-rated bonds. These have underperformed this year (Chart 16), mainly because of technical factors such as their overweight in the energy sector and relatively smaller decline in duration.3 With a stronger economy and rising oil prices, they should catch up to their higher-rated HY peers in 2020. To play the cyclical rebound, we prefer euro zone stocks over those in EM or Japan. Currencies: Since the US dollar is a counter-cyclical currency (Chart 17), we would expect it to weaken against more cyclical currencies such as the euro, and commodity currencies such as the Australian dollar and Canadian dollar. But it should appreciate relative to the yen and Swiss franc, which are the most defensive major currencies. We expect EM currencies to continue to depreciate. Most emerging markets are experiencing disinflation (Chart 18), which will push central banks to cut rates and inject liquidity into the banking system. This will tend to weaken their currencies. Overall, we are neutral on the US dollar. Chart 17The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency Chart 18Disinflation Will Push EM Currencies Down Further Commodities: Industrials metals prices are closely linked to Chinese stimulus (Chart 19). A moderate recovery in Chinese growth should be a positive, and so we raise our recommendation to neutral. But with question-marks still lingering over the strength of the rebound in the Chinese economy, we would not be more positive than that. Oil prices should see moderate upside over the next 12 months, with supply tight and demand growth recovering in line with the global economy. Our energy strategists forecast Brent crude to average $67 a barrel in 2020 (compared to a little over $60 today). Chart 19Metals Prices Depend On China Chart 20Gold: Short-Term Negatives, But Remains A Good Hedge Gold looks a little overbought in the short term, and less monetary stimulus and a rise in rates next year would be negative factors (Chart 20). Nonetheless, we see it as a good hedge against our positive economic view going awry, and against geopolitical risks. If central banks do decide to let economies run hot next year and ignore rising inflation, gold could do particularly well. We, therefore, raise our recommendation to overweight on a 12-month horizon. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see "Outlook 2020," dated November 22 2019, available at bcaresearch.com 2 Please see, for example, last month’s GAA Monthly Portfolio Update, “Looking For The Turning-Point,” dated November 1, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed explanation, please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Signs Or Buying Opportunity,” dated 26 November 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights BCA still sees green shoots: Our latest view meeting reinforced BCA strategists’ optimistic global outlook, and we are methodically adding international and cyclical exposures to reflect it. Relatively modest M&A activity is not a sign of a top, … : Last Monday was the busiest Merger Monday of the year, but relative merger volumes are not anywhere near the peaks that coincided with the end of the last two expansions. … and neither is small-cap equity underperformance: There is no empirical basis for concluding that small-cap underperformance heralds economic weakness, stock market weakness or heightened risk aversion. Feature Onward. At our latest editorial view meeting, held last week, we completed the step we first began discussing in the spring, upgrading Eurozone equities to overweight in global equity portfolios. BCA continues to recommend investors remain underweight sovereign bonds in balanced and dedicated fixed income portfolios, and we expect that a top in the dollar versus the more cyclical major currencies is coming soon. We downgraded US equities to underweight to make room for the Eurozone overweight, along with new overweights in British and Japanese equities. The move reflects the BCA consensus that global growth has bottomed and is poised to accelerate. Against an improved growth backdrop, the dollar should cede leadership to more cyclically sensitive currencies, providing non-US equities with a relative tailwind.1 The narrowing of the growth differential between the US and the rest of the world should give international equities an additional boost. A revived growth outlook, and a cooling of trade tensions signaled by a signed Phase 1 China-US agreement, would ease some of the safe-haven demand for sovereign bonds, and help interest rates unwind some of the downward pull that dragged them lower across the first eight months of the year. The US equity downgrade is only a relative call, however; US Investment Strategy remains constructive on the absolute return outlook for US stocks. Other economies with a greater reliance on trade will benefit more from a global upswing than the US, which suffered less from the global slowdown than its peers. The S&P 500 has much more exposure to the rest of the world than the US economy, though, and its earnings would get a boost from accelerating global growth and a weaker dollar. At the same time that the fundamental picture is poised to improve, the wall of worry continues to renew itself, and this week we discuss concerns about M&A activity and small-cap stocks’ underperformance, which have come to the fore as Sino-American tensions have relaxed their grip on the collective investor psyche. Mergers And Animal Spirits Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) generated some attention-getting headlines last month. Just last Monday, nearly $60 billion of deals were struck: Charles Schwab purchased TD Ameritrade for $26 billion, LVMH bought jewelry icon Tiffany for $18 billion, Novartis paid nearly $10 billion for drugmaker Medicines Company, and Ebay sold StubHub for $4 billion. Earlier last month, Xerox launched a hostile bid for HP ($32 billion), and KKR reportedly discussed an acquisition of Walgreens that could top $70 billion. A Walgreens transaction is a long shot, as it would potentially be the largest leveraged buyout of all time, but it has set tongues wagging in investment banking and private equity circles and fingers wagging among observers with an inclination to be scolds. M&A overtures cannot be viewed as a pure proxy for animal spirits, but M&A activity has aligned closely with the business cycle over the past two full cycles. The value of completed transactions as a share of equity values and GDP has troughed soon after the recession ends and peaked just before the recession begins, both here and abroad (Chart 1). In early 2016, proportional M&A volumes approached the levels that marked a top in 2000 and 2007, but the signal turned out to be a head fake, at least in terms of the US business cycle. Today’s volumes do not appear to be a concern, especially when compared to equity market value, which has consistently outpaced M&A activity since the 2016 peaks. Chart 1Peaks In M&A Activity Coincide With Business Cycle Peaks, ... It makes intuitive sense that peaks and troughs, or surges and slowdowns, in M&A might provide some insight into corporate confidence. Insight into confidence might in turn offer a preview of capex and hiring activity. Chart 2... But M&A Isn't Predictive Otherwise The empirical record does not support the intuition, however, as non-residential fixed investment growth has not shown much of a relationship with M&A volume as a share of GDP (Chart 2, top panel). Since the crisis, M&A volume has oscillated around the steady climb in hiring intentions (Chart 2, middle panel) and job openings (Chart 2, bottom panel) without exhibiting a clear relationship. What Is Small-Cap Performance Saying? The S&P 500 has made thirteen new all-time highs, or about one every other day, since the last week of October. The S&P SmallCap 600, on the other hand, just narrowly topped its year-to-date high, and remains more than 9% from its all-time high, set at the end of August 2018. Small-caps are more volatile than large-caps and many investors treat relative small-cap performance as a proxy for overall risk aversion. When small-caps are outperforming, investors are presumed to be more willing to embrace risk; when they’re underperforming, investors are supposedly more prone to shun it, with implications for all equities. Small-cap indices are simply too jumpy to predict large-cap equity moves. The empirical record does not support the view that relative small-cap underperformance leads broader market downturns. Because small-cap market cycles tend to be more compressed than large-cap market cycles, there are many more of them. There have been seven complete S&P 500 market cycles since 1970 (Table 1), versus fifteen complete market cycles for the equal-weighted all-cap Value Line Index2 (Table 2). Simple logic holds that all fifteen small-cap events can’t be portents of seven large-cap events, and the S&P 500 has been largely indifferent to small-cap outperformance and underperformance over time (Chart 3). Table 1The S&P 500 Is On Its Eighth Bull Market Since 1970 … Table 2… While The Value Line Index Is On Its Sixteenth Chart 3Independent Events We do not believe that small-cap relative performance is a reliable indicator of investor risk tolerance/aversion, or a proxy for animal spirits. We have found that relative performance is best explained by more prosaic elements like sector composition, valuation and earnings discrepancies, domestic/global performance shifts and cyclical/defensive performance shifts. These elements have sent mixed signals as group so far this year, but sector composition is likely to support small-caps going forward if our constructive economic view pans out. Relative small-cap performance doesn't tell us anything about the S&P 500's future direction. Compositional Factors: The S&P SmallCap 600 Index is not just a mini-me version of the S&P 500 because the benchmarks’ sector composition often varies considerably. The SmallCap 600 currently has much heavier weightings than the S&P 500 in Industrials, Financials, Consumer Discretionaries and Real Estate, and much lighter weightings in Technology, Communication Services and Consumer Staples stocks (Table 3). The small-cap index has a greater share of early cyclicals than the S&P 500, and an equivalently smaller share of defensives, but that hasn’t mattered this year, as small-caps have underperformed large-caps in every sector but Health Care (Table 4). Small-cap underperformance in Energy, Communication Services, Staples, and Financials has been especially stark. Table 3Not Quite Apples To Apples Table 4Year-To-Date Sector Performance Valuation/Earnings Discrepancies: Disparities in index valuation may bear on small- and large-cap performance without revealing anything about underlying business or economic trends, or without providing much insight into investors’ broader appetites for risk. Relative valuation does not appear to have been much of a factor for small- and mid-cap stocks’ relative performance this year, as standardized relative multiples have stayed close to the mean (Chart 4). Both of the SMID indexes have experienced relative de-rating this year, but their underperformance is better explained by lagging earnings growth. According to Refinitiv/I/B/E/S, MidCap 400 and SmallCap 600 earnings are expected to decline by 7% and 19%, respectively, versus the S&P 500’s modest 1% contraction. Chart 4Relative Valuations Are In Line Domestic/Global Discrepancies: Smaller companies are less likely to derive significant portions of earnings and revenues from overseas, and multinationals tend to be mega-caps. The formerly decent correlation between small-cap relative performance and domestic-versus-global industry group performance has unraveled since the 2016 presidential election (Chart 5, bottom panel). It’s possible that investors bid too eagerly for small-caps on expected policy changes after the election and in early 2018, following the cut in the top marginal corporate income tax rate that stood to disproportionately benefit small-caps with effective tax rates equivalent to the top marginal rate.3 It is much easier to buy a small-cap index ETF than it is to assemble portfolios of domestically- and globally-exposed industry groups, which may explain why small-caps decoupled from domestic-versus-global industry groups in two pronounced spikes. A continued small-cap slide would be consistent with BCA’s sanguine global view. Small-caps' relative performance has decoupled from global-facing stocks' relative performance. Could tariffs be hurting them more than expected? Chart 5Small Caps May Not Be Immune To Global Pressures After All Cyclical/Defensive Discrepancies: Differences in exposure to cyclical and defensive sectors offer another perspective on differences in sector composition. The SmallCap 600 Index has just 60% of the S&P 500’s exposure to defensive sectors. Absolute small-cap performance has moved with cyclical-to-defensive performance this year (Chart 6, top panel), but the relative breakdown in small-cap performance that began when defensives took the lead failed to reverse when cyclicals recently revived (Chart 6, bottom panel). We expect cyclicals to outperform defensives in line with our constructive view on global growth, which should translate to a boost for relative small-cap performance. Chart 6Cyclicals Investment Implications The conventional wisdom that small-cap underperformance signals a broader equity downturn does not hold up to examination. Small- and mid-cap earnings have contracted considerably more than S&P 500 earnings, and SMID stocks have de-rated versus large-caps since the fourth quarter of last year, but it is not clear why either of those trends will continue this year. We suspect that SMID underperformance largely reflects a downward revision in expectations that ran a little too high in the wake of the tax cut and the assumption that small-caps would emerge relatively unscathed from new tariff barriers. Large-caps are more globally-oriented, but it’s possible that overweights in Industrials and Discretionaries render small-caps more vulnerable to increased tariff-related input costs. M&A volumes as a share of market cap or GDP have served as a much more reliable proxy for overheated animal spirits. Peaks and troughs in M&A have aligned closely with peaks and troughs in the last two completed business cycles. M&A headlines have revved up in the last month, but the volume of completed deals is not yet at worrisome levels. Our main takeaway from last week’s internal view meeting is that 2019’s worldwide easing of monetary conditions will manifest itself in a pickup in global activity in the first half of 2020. Our bond strategists expect that the Fed’s primary concern is getting inflation expectations up to a level consistent with its inflation target, and that it will strive to maintain policy settings that are perceived as accommodative until it gets the inflation expectations response it seeks. Unless signs of financial instability compel it to tighten policy to contain bubble-like excesses, they expect the Fed to remain on hold for nearly all of 2020. We concur, and therefore expect the monetary backdrop to remain conducive for risk asset outperformance at least into 2021. Investors should maintain risk-friendly positioning against that backdrop. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 All of BCA’s global recommendations are made from a common-currency perspective. 2 A complete market cycle encompasses a completed bull market (at least 20% closing trough to closing peak gain) and a completed bear market (at least 20% closing peak to closing trough decline). We use the Value Line Index as a small-cap proxy here because it has a 50-year history, unlike the Russell 2000 or SmallCap 600. 3 Multinationals’ effective tax rates are often reduced by their ability to shift income among tax jurisdictions.
Highlights Investors should remain overweight global stocks relative to bonds over the next 12 months and begin shifting equity exposure towards non-US markets. Bond yields will rise next year as global growth picks up, while the dollar will sell off. The extent to which bond yields increase over the long term depends on whether inflation eventually stages a comeback. Today’s high debt levels could turn out to be deflationary if they curtail spending by overstretched households, firms, and governments. However, high debt levels could also prompt central banks to engineer higher inflation in order to reduce the real burden of debt obligations. Which of these two effects will win out depends on whether central banks are able to gain traction over the economy. This ultimately boils down to whether the neutral rate of interest is positive or negative in nominal terms. While there is little that policymakers can do to alter certain drivers of the neutral rate such as the trend rate of economic growth, they do have control over other drivers such as the stance of fiscal policy. Ironically, a structural shift towards easier fiscal policy could lead to a decline in government debt-to-GDP ratios if higher inflation, together with central bankers' reluctance to raise nominal rates, pushes real rates down far enough. This suggests that the endgame for today’s high debt levels is likely to be overheated economies and rising inflation. Stay Bullish On Stocks But Shift Towards Non-US Equities We returned to a cyclically bullish stance on global equities following the stock market selloff late last year, having temporarily moved to the sidelines in June 2018. We have remained overweight global equities throughout 2019. Two weeks ago, we increased our pro-cyclical bias by upgrading non-US stocks within our recommended equity allocation at the expense of their US peers. Our decision to upgrade non-US equities stems from the conviction that global growth has turned the corner. Manufacturing has been at the heart of the global slowdown. As we have often pointed out, manufacturing cycles tend to last about three years – 18 months of weaker growth followed by 18 months of stronger growth (Chart 1). The current slowdown began in the first half of 2018, and right on cue, the recent data has begun to improve. The global manufacturing PMI has moved off its lows, with significant gains seen in the new orders-to-inventories component. Global growth expectations in the ZEW survey have rebounded. US durable goods orders surprised on the upside in October. The regional Fed manufacturing surveys have also brightened, suggesting upside for the ISM next week (Chart 2). Chart 1A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle Chart 2Some Manufacturing Green Shoots Unlike in 2016, China has not allowed a major reacceleration in credit growth this year. Instead, fiscal policy has been loosened significantly. The official general government deficit has increased from around 3% of GDP in mid-2018 to 6.5% of GDP at present. The augmented budget deficit – which includes spending through local government financing vehicles and other off-balance sheet expenditures – is on track to reach nearly 13% of GDP in 2019. This is a bigger deficit than during the depths of the Great Recession (Chart 3). As a result of all this fiscal easing, the combined Chinese credit/fiscal impulse has continued to move up. It leads global growth by about nine months (Chart 4). Chart 3China Has Been Stimulating, Fiscally Chart 4Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth The dollar tends to weaken when global growth strengthens (Chart 5). The combination of stronger global growth and a softer dollar will disproportionately benefit cyclical equity sectors. Financials will also gain thanks to steeper yield curves (Chart 6). The sector weights of non-US stock markets tend to be more tilted towards deep cyclicals and financials. As a consequence, non-US stocks typically outperform when global growth picks up (Chart 7). Chart 5The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 6Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials In addition, valuations favor stocks outside the US. Non-US equities currently trade at 13.8-times forward earnings, compared to 18.1-times for the US. The valuation gap is even greater if one looks at price-to-book, price-to-sales, and other measures (Chart 8). Chart 7Non-US Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Chart 8US Stocks Are Relatively More Expensive Trade War Remains A Key Risk The US-China trade war remains a key risk to our bullish equity view. President Trump continues to send conflicting signals about the status of the talks. He complained last week that Beijing is not “stepping up” in finalizing a phase 1 agreement, adding that China wants a deal “much more than I do.” This Wednesday he struck a more optimistic tone, saying that negotiators were in the “final throes” of deal. However, he made this statement on the same day that he decided to sign the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act into law, a decision that was bound to antagonize China. According to our BCA geopolitical team, Trump had little choice but to sign the bill. The Senate approved it unanimously, while the House voted for it 417-1. Failure to sign it would have resulted in an embarrassing veto by the Senate. The key point is that the new law does not force Trump to take any immediate actions against China. This suggests that the trade talks will continue. In fact, from China's point of view, Congress’ desire to pass a Hong Kong bill may provide a timely reminder that getting a deal done with Trump now may be preferable to waiting until after the election and potentially facing someone like Elizabeth Warren who is likely to make human rights a key element of any deal to roll back tariffs. Waiting For Inflation If global growth accelerates next year, history suggests that bond yields will rise (Chart 9). Looking further out, the extent to which bond yields will continue to increase depends on whether inflation ultimately stages a comeback. Right now, most of our forward-looking inflationary indicators remain well contained (Chart 10). However, this could change if falling unemployment eventually triggers a price-wage spiral. Chart 9Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Chart 10An Inflation Breakout Is Not Imminent Many investors are skeptical that such a price-wage spiral could ever emerge. They argue that automation, globalization, weak trade unions, and demographic changes make an inflationary outburst rather implausible. We have addressed these arguments in the past1 and will not delve into them in this report. Instead, we will focus on one argument that also gets a fair bit of attention, which is that high debt levels will prove to be deflationary. Are High Debt Levels Inflationary Or Deflationary? Total debt levels in developed economies are no lower today than they were during the Great Recession. While private debt has fallen, public debt has risen by roughly the same magnitude, leaving the overall debt-to-GDP ratio unchanged (Chart 11). Meanwhile, debt levels in emerging markets have risen substantially. A common rebuttal to any suggestion that inflation might rise over the medium-to-longer term is that high debt levels around the world will cause households, firms, and governments to pare back spending. While this may be true, it could also be argued that high debt levels could prompt central banks to engineer higher inflation in order to reduce the real burden of debt obligations. So which effect will win out? Given the choice, it is likely that most policymakers would opt for higher inflation. This is partly because high unemployment and fiscal austerity are politically toxic. It is also because falling prices make it very difficult to reduce real debt burdens. The experience of the Great Depression bears this out: Private debt declined by 25% in absolute terms between 1929 and 1933. However, due to the collapse in nominal GDP, the ratio of debt-to-GDP actually increased more in the first half of the 1930s than during the Roaring Twenties (Chart 12). Chart 11Global Debt Levels Remain High Chart 12The Experience Of The Great Depression Shows Deleveraging Is Impossible Without Growth Means, Motive And Opportunity Chart 13A Kinked Relationship: It Takes Time For Inflation To Break Out There is a big difference between wanting to engineer higher inflation and being able to do so. The distinction between success and failure ultimately boils down to a seemingly technical question: Is the neutral rate of interest – the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation – positive or negative in nominal terms? When the neutral rate is above zero, central banks can gain traction over the economy. Even if the neutral rate is only slightly positive, a zero rate would be enough to keep monetary policy in expansionary territory. When monetary policy is accommodative, the unemployment rate will tend to drop. Eventually the “kink” in the Phillips curve will be reached, resulting in higher inflation (Chart 13). In contrast, when the neutral rate is firmly below zero, monetary policy loses traction over the economy. Since there is a limit to how deeply negative policy rates can go before people decide to hold cash, the central bank could find itself out of ammunition. This could set off a vicious circle where high unemployment causes inflation to drift lower, leading to an increase in real rates. Rising real rates will then further curb spending, causing inflation to fall even more. Drivers Of The Neutral Rate Two of the more important determinants of the neutral rate of interest are the growth rate of the economy and the national savings rate. If either the savings rate rises or economic growth slows, the stock of fixed capital will tend to pile up in relation to GDP, leading to a higher capital-to-output ratio.2 As Chart 14 shows, this has already happened in Europe and Japan. An increase in the capital-to-GDP ratio will drag down the rate of return on capital. A lower interest rate will be necessary to ensure that the capital stock is fully utilized. Chart 14Capital Stock-To-Output Ratios Have Risen Realistically, there is not much that policymakers can do to raise trend GDP growth. While looser immigration policy would allow for a faster expansion of labor force growth, this is politically contentious. Increasing productivity growth is also easier said than done. Fiscal Policy And The Neutral Rate In contrast, policymakers already have a ready-made mechanism for lowering the savings rate: fiscal policy. The fiscal balance is a component of national savings. If the government runs a larger budget deficit in order to finance tax cuts or higher transfer payments to households, national savings will decline and aggregate demand will rise. Is the endgame for today’s high debt levels deflation or inflation? The answer is inflation. Since one can think of the neutral rate as the interest rate that brings aggregate demand in line with the economy’s supply-side potential, anything that raises demand will also lift the neutral rate. Once the neutral rate has risen above the zero bound, monetary policy will gain traction again. This implies that central banks should never run out of ammunition in countries whose governments can issue debt in their own currencies. While higher inflation stemming from fiscal stimulus will erode the real value of private sector debt obligations, won’t the impact on total debt be offset by the increase in public debt? Not necessarily. True, larger budget deficits will raise the stock of government debt. However, nominal GDP will also rise on account of higher inflation. Standard debt sustainability equations state that the government debt-to-GDP ratio could actually fall if higher inflation pushes real policy rates down far enough. As discussed in Box 1, such an outcome is quite likely when inflation accelerates in response to an overheated economy, but the central bank nevertheless refrains from raising nominal rates. The Final Verdict We are finally ready to answer the question posed in the title of this report: Is the endgame for today’s high debt levels deflation or inflation? The answer is inflation. People with a 30-year fixed rate mortgage will always favor inflation over deflation. And there are more voters who owe mortgage debt than own mortgage debt. Chart 15Germany's Competitive Advantage Over The Rest Of The Euro Area Is Deteriorating Politics is moving in a more populist direction. Whether it is left-wing populism of the Elizabeth Warren/Jeremy Corbyn variety or right-wing populism of the Donald Trump/Matteo Salvini variety, the result is usually bigger budget deficits and higher inflation. Even in those countries where populism has been slow to take hold, there may be pragmatic reasons for loosening fiscal policy. For example, Germany’s trade surplus with the rest of the euro area has fallen in half since 2007, largely because German unit labor costs have increased more than elsewhere (Chart 15). As Germany loses its ability to ship excess production to the rest of the world, it may end up having to rely more on easier fiscal policy to bolster demand. Of course, the path to higher inflation is paved with interest rates that stay lower for much longer than the economy needs to reach full employment. This means we are entering a period where first the US economy, and then many other economies, will start to overheat, and yet central banks will still refrain from tightening monetary policy until inflation rises well above their comfort zones. Such an environment will be positive for stocks for as long as it lasts, even if it eventually produces a mighty hangover. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 When Does A Large Budget Deficit Lead To A Lower Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio? Footnotes 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could It Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018. 2 This point can be seen through the lens of the widely used Solow growth model. In steady state, the desired level of investment in the model is given by the formula: I=(a/r)(n+g+d)Y where a denotes the output elasticity of capital, r is the real rate of interest, n is labor force growth, g is productivity growth, d is the depreciation rate, and Y is GDP. Savings is assumed to be a constant fraction of income, S=sY. Equating savings with investment yields: r=(a/s)(n+g+d). A decrease in the growth rate of the economy (n+g) shifts the investment schedule downward, leading to a lower equilibrium rate of interest. This initially makes investing in fixed capital more attractive than buying bonds. Over time, however, the marginal return on capital will fall as the capital stock expands in relation to GDP. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The seemingly interminable discussions around the “phase one” deal touted by US and Chinese trade negotiators notwithstanding, base metals prices are primed for a rally. The bottoming in base metals prices indicates industrial activity, particularly in EM economies, will turn higher, which will lift aggregate demand. The signaling from base metals markets is consistent with our proprietary industrial activity models, including our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast, which continue to show industrial activity has bottomed and is turning up. Year-on-year growth in supply and demand of aluminum and copper – the largest components of the LMEX index – is diverging: Consumption is outpacing production, which is forcing inventories to draw hard. Any increase in demand will rally prices. Given our view, we are going long the LMEX index at tonight’s close. We recommend this as a tactical position at present and are including a 10% stop-loss; however, we could move this to a strategic position. Feature Despite the seemingly interminable back-and-forth between US and Chinese negotiators working on “phase one” of the Sino-US trade deal, base metals prices are signaling a revival of global economic growth, particularly in EM economies, in 2020. This is consistent with the growth indications being picked up in our proprietary models and reflected in global PMIs. The proximate cause of this revival in economic activity is the global monetary accommodation systemically important central banks have been pursuing for the better part of 2019, and the likely implementation of the long-awaited “phase one” Sino-US trade deal. Fiscal policy space remains available for systematically important economies – e.g., China, Germany and the US – and we expect such stimulus to be deployed next year. Fundamentally, global base metals inventories continue to draw hard, as the rates of growth in consumption and production diverge. Any recovery in organic growth – particularly in EM demand – would spark a rally. Base Metals In The Role Of Leading Economic Indicators We use metals prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge economic growth prospects. Base metals prices often are used as indicators of global economic activity, particularly EM nominal and real GDP growth (Chart of the Week). Indeed, US Federal Reserve Board economists recently noted base metals prices are “often viewed by policymakers and practitioners as early indicators of swings in economic activity and global risk sentiment.”1 These metals prices are more sensitive to changes in global growth than other commodities (e.g., oil, which has its own idiosyncratic factors driving the evolution of prices). For this reason, we use these prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge economic growth prospects. Our research indicates base metals prices are more closely linked to EM activity than DM activity, which makes them especially useful to our analysis of commodity markets generally, particularly oil. This is true also of our proprietary models by construction – EM demand drives commodity demand. Together, the base metals prices and our models contain complementary information that is useful in gauging growth prospects, particularly for EM economies (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekBase Metals Often Function As Gauges of GDP Growth Chart 2Base Metals Prices, BCA's GIA Model Both Are Sensitive to EM Growth Prospects We’ve found base metals prices to be timely indicators of turning points in EM GDP cycles, similar to the Fed’s findings (Table 1). In particular, the LMEX, IMF Base Metals index, and high-grade copper prices lead nominal and real EM GDP by anywhere from one to three months. However, for the entire sample correlation, which goes from 1995 to present, our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index and Global Commodity Factor (GCF) have the highest correlation with nominal and real EM GDP. Table 1Correlation Between EM GDP And Indicators Of Global Activity Our proprietary indicators – GIA index, GCF, EM Import Volume Model (EMIV Model) – have been signaling a revival in commodity demand for several months (Chart 3). The model we’ve developed to track freight, similar to our EMIV Model, also is signaling a recovery in global trade (Chart 4).3 Chart 3BCA's Proprietary Models Also Closely Aligned with EM Growth Chart 4EM Import Volumes Closely Follow Freight Base Metals Stocks Drawing Hard Supply in the biggest components of the LMEX – copper and aluminum – is contracting, while demand is holding up or slightly growing. This is causing global stocks to draw hard, as incremental demand is met from inventory. Any stimulus coming out of China, which accounts for more than half of global base metals demand would propel prices in these markets higher. Global refined aluminum inventories have been drawing sharply as growth rates in production and consumption diverge (Chart 5). Global ali inventories now stand at 1.76mm MT, down 24% y/y. On average, global consumption has exceeded production by 7.2k MT this year. A similar set of fundamentals is forcing copper inventories to draw hard, as well, where consumption has exceeded production by 22.6k MT this year (Chart 6). Global copper inventories are down ~ 20% y/y, and continue to fall. Chart 5Ali Consumption Outpaces Production, Forcing Stocks To Draw Hard Chart 6Copper Stocks Draw Hard On Similar Fundamental Pressure The only thing preventing a sustained rally in these markets is organic demand growth, which the global accommodation by systematically important central banks is directed toward reviving. PBOC policymakers in China have drawn attention to their capacity for additional monetary stimulus, even though they have held off on goosing money and credit supply this year. A prolonged weakening of GDP growth in China likely would push policymakers to move to a more accommodative stance on monetary policy. Net, weak demand growth is offsetting upside price pressure as production contracts in key base metals markets. That said, EM demand ex-China for base metals likely will increase, if our economic activity gauges and prices are correct in the signals they are generating. Any stimulus coming out of China, which accounts for more than half of global base metals demand would propel prices in these markets higher. Expect Higher Base Metals Demand In 2020 Both our GIA index and base metals prices are good predictors of EM economic activity – overall EM and EM ex-China – which inclines us to expect growth to revive there as well. We are expecting base metals consumption to move higher next year, given the uptick we are seeing in base metals markets and from our economic activity gauges, particularly our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast, which is a weighted combination of the individual models we use as a contemporaneous indicator (Chart 7).4 Chart 7Base Metals Demand Set To Recover in 2020 Chart 8Global Financial Easing Will Lift Base Metals Part of this will be led by improving Chinese demand, which accounts for more than 50% of base metals demand globally (Chart 8). We expect global financial conditions to remain supportive, and for total social financing in China to provide additional tailwinds to metal prices. This will keep aluminum demand in China stable-to-higher (Chart 9) along with copper demand (Chart 10). Both our GIA index and base metals prices are good predictors of EM economic activity – overall EM and EM ex-China – which inclines us to expect growth to revive there as well.5 Chart 9Chinese Aluminum Consumption... Chart 10...And Copper Demand Will Recover Given our view, we are going long the LMEX Index at tonight’s close. Bottom Line: Base metals prices and price indexes are telling a similar story to the gauges we’ve constructed to follow EM growth prospects, hence commodity demand prospects. Fundamentally, these markets continue to tighten, as supply growth remains significantly behind demand growth and stocks continue to draw hard. The y/y changes in the metals price indexes likely have bottomed and will be moving higher. Our GIA and GCF indicators concur. Taking the information contained in our proprietary indexes and base metals prices together drives our expectation for stronger base metals demand next year, which, given the state of supply growth and inventories, points to higher prices. Given our view, we are going long the LMEX Index at tonight’s close. We recommend this as a tactical position and will await confirmation of a robust recovery in demand before moving it to a strategic position. For that reason, we are including a 10% stop-loss; however, we could move this to a strategic position. Chart 11Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Also Works Against Base Metals Demand The same forces that are hindering a strong recovery in oil demand – chiefly the elevated level of global economic uncertainty, which keeps the USD well bid – also are at play in the base metals markets. USD strength keep the cost of base metals high in local-currency terms, which retards demand, and encourages increased supply at the margin, as the local-currency cost of production is suppressed (Chart 11). It will be difficult to go all-in on a commodity price rally until this uncertainty is resolved, or at least reduced. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Brent prices closed at one-month high on Tuesday, surpassing $64/bbl. We expect this trend to continue as demand – mainly from EM – picks up in the coming months, as signaled by our proprietary indicators. Next week will be critical for the 2020 oil market balance. OPEC’s Joint Technical Committee will meet on December 3, OPEC on December 5, and OPEC and non-OPEC countries – i.e. OPEC 2.0 – on December 6. The current market consensus seems to be that OPEC 2.0 will agree to maintain the current production curtailments for three additional months, which would take their deal to keep 1.2mm b/d off the market to the end of June. Non-complying countries – mainly Iraq – can be expected to encounter pressure to further reduce production in line with their quotas. In our global oil market balances, we assume OPEC 2.0 will extend the current quota until year-end 2020. Nonetheless, this could be announced gradually throughout the year. Base Metals: Neutral. Base metals moved higher on Tuesday following positive developments in the US-China trade talks. Top negotiators from both countries spoke by phone earlier this week and Trump signal its administration was in the “final throes of a very important deal.”6 We expect a ceasefire to be signed this year, which will revive sentiment at the margin. Moreover, copper and aluminum prices will be supported by rising EM GDP next year (see this week’s front section for details). Copper prices are up 2% since last Thursday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices held above our $1,450/oz stop-loss despite the risk-on sentiment fueled by encouraging discussions between the US’s and China’s top negotiators. For next year, we believe the Fed will remain accommodative and will not risk de-railing the recovery pre-emptively, even as inflation moves above target. This will support gold prices. The Fed will only tighten more aggressively once inflation breakeven rates are well anchored in the 2.3% to 2.5% range identified by our US Bond strategists. Appearing before the New York Association of Business Economics this week, Fed Governor Lael Brainard argued for a flexible average inflation target that would allow for a sustained period of inflation running above 2% to offset the last decade of inflation averaging far below the current 2% target.7 This is part of the undergoing review of how the Fed conducts monetary policy, led by Vice Chair Richard Clarida. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The slow corn harvest forced the USDA to delay the end of its weekly crop progress report. 84% of corn harvest was complete, below the five-year average of 96%. This season’s corn harvesting has been the slowest since 2009. Wheat rallied on Monday amid fund buying, with its most active contract for March delivery up almost 3%. The rally continued from last week when European wheat prices climbed over unfavorable weather conditions, particularly in France, where the condition of the grain was revised down to a four-year low. The soybean market has faced pressure over doubts a Sino-US trade deal will be concluded. China has turned to Brazil to lock in supplies. The January 2020 futures contract on the CME sank to its lowest level since September. Footnotes 1 In a recent study, The Fed researchers used the IMF’s Base Metals index as a leading indicator of GDP growth. The IMF’s index is highly correlated with the London Metal Exchange Index (LMEX) we use from time to time to assess base metals markets. However, the LMEX, unlike the IMF’s index, does not include iron ore, which can, at times, cause these indexes to diverge. Please see Caldara, Dario, Michele Cavallo, and Matteo Iacoviello (2016), Oil Price Elasticities and Oil Price Fluctuations, International Finance Discussion Papers 1173, published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2 We find two-way Granger-causality between EM GDP and the IMF’s base-metals price index, the LMEX index, and our Global Industrial Activity Index (GIA), Global Commodity Factor (GCF), and shipping rates proxy, which we discuss below. Close to 75% of the LMEX Index is accounted for by aluminum and copper. Aluminum account for 14% of the IMF index, while copper makes up 30% of the index. 3 The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity. These statistics are highly correlated with trade-related activity, which, since most of this involve trade in manufactured goods, is important to global industrial activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different real commodity prices. The EMIV model tracks EM import volumes which are reported with a two-month lag by the CPB in the Netherlands, which we update to current time using FX rates for trade-sensitive currencies, commodity prices and interest rates variables. We are also following shipping indexes, which are highly correlated with global trade volumes. 4 Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast is a coincident indicator of commodity demand, comprised of our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models. 5 EM GDP ex-China is more correlated with base metals prices and our GIA index, while US GDP and IP is only slightly impacted by them. 6 Please see U.S.-China trade deal close, Trump says; negotiations continue published November 26, 2019 by reuters.com. 7 Please see Fed's Brainard calls for 'flexible' average inflation target published November 26, 2019 by reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Global High-Yield: The widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Feature There’s Nothing To “Caa” Here The clouds of pessimism on global growth, and financial markets, continue to slowly dissipate. The global manufacturing PMI has clearly bottomed, our rising global leading economic indicator is signaling more upside for the first half of 2020, equity markets worldwide are grinding higher, volatility is subdued, while corporate credit spreads in the US and Europe remain generally tight. Yet within the corporate bond market, a peculiar dynamic has emerged. We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the overall Bloomberg Barclays US high-yield (HY) index now sits at 376bps. While this spread is relatively narrow from a longer-term perspective, investors may have become more discerning about credit risk. Lower-rated HY has dramatically underperformed higher-rated HY debt of late, with the US Caa-rated OAS now sitting at 985bps compared to Ba-rated spreads of 196bps (Chart of the Week). The divergence across credit tiers is unprecedented, in that Caa spreads are widening while Ba spreads are narrowing – typically, spreads move in tandem directionally, both in bull and bear markets for US junk bonds. The widening of US Caa-rated junk bond spreads has started to raise concerns that this is a “canary in the coal mine” signaling future financial stress among US corporate borrowers. Yet the same dynamic is occurring in euro area HY, with Caa-rated and Ba-rated spreads tracking the US on an almost tick-for-tick basis. In a report published yesterday, our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy investigated the history of Caa spread widenings dating back to 1996.1 They noted that Caa spread widening has typically been a good predictor of one-year-ahead negative excess returns for the overall US junk bond index. However, there has never been a period like today where Caa spreads have widened while overall HY spreads have remained stable. Chart of the WeekSome Odd Divergences In Global Credit We do not see a reason to extrapolate the weakness in lower-rated US junk bonds into a broader macro issue for the corporate bond market, and the US economy, for two main reasons: Chart 2Lower Energy Prices Hurt Lower Rated US HY 1) The widening is focused on Energy related debt The widening of US Caa-rated spreads in 2019 has occurred alongside a parallel increase in the spreads of Energy-related companies in the US junk bond universe (Chart 2). A similar trend played out during the 2014/15 HY bear phase, which was triggered by the collapse of world oil prices that ravaged the US shale oil industry which dominated the lower-rated tiers of the junk bond market. In 2019, oil prices have declined, although not as dramatically, and HY Energy spreads have widened but to nowhere near the levels seen five years ago. More importantly, non-Energy junk spreads remain very subdued and stable, unlike the case in 2014/15 (bottom panel). When looking at the 2019 year-to-date excess returns for the Bloomberg Barclays US HY index, it is clear that the overall negative returns for the Caa-rated bucket have been driven by the lagging performance of Energy names (Chart 3). The rest of the market has generally been delivering solid excess returns. Chart 3Contribution To 2019 YTD US HY Excess Returns* 2) The widening has not been confirmed by signals from other reliable credit cycle indicators We believe that, from a top-down macro perspective, corporate credit performance in the US is influenced by three main factors: the state of US corporate health, the stance of the Fed’s monetary policy and the trend in lending standards for US banks. We have dubbed this our “Credit Checklist”, and we present a version of that checklist for US high-yield in Chart 4. Chart 4Conditions Not In Place For A Broad US HY Selloff Our “bottom-up” US HY Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) aggregates, for a sample set of US HY issuers, published financial ratios that are typically used to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers – measures like interest coverage, operating margins and leverage. The US HY CHM is currently at a “neutral” reading (2nd panel), unlike past periods where Caa-rated spreads widened sharply: during the early 2000s telecom bust, the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices. The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual. Turning to measures of the stance of US monetary policy, we look at both the slope of the US Treasury curve (2-year vs 10-year) and the gap between the real fed funds rate and the New York Fed’s estimate of the neutral “r-star” rate. Prior to the early 2000s and 2008 blowout in Caa spreads, the Fed had pushed the real funds rate into restrictive territory above r-star, and the Treasury curve subsequently inverted. That was not the case during the 2014/15 Caa widening, as the Fed was only beginning to transition away from its QE/zero-rate era at that time. Currently, the real funds rate is right at r-star, and the Treasury curve is very flat but not inverted, indicating a broadly neutral monetary policy stance. Finally, we look at data from the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey to evaluate lending standards for US banks. On that front, the latest reading on standards for commercial and industrial loans showed a very modest tightening in the third quarter of 2019, but the overall level remains broadly neutral – unlike the sharp tightening of conditions seen in the early 2000s and 2008 (and the modest tightening in 2014/15). The readings for the three components of our US HY Credit Checklist are all at neutral levels, suggesting that there is no fundamental underpinning at the moment for a sustained increase in US HY spreads. Yet another reason why the latest widening of Caa-rated spreads looks unusual, rather than a sign of future stress in US credit markets. We even see a similar dynamic at work in the euro area. In Chart 5, we present a Credit Checklist for euro area HY, using the same indicators that go into our US HY Credit Checklist. The readings here are even more positive for corporate credit performance than in the US. Our euro area bottom-up HY CHM is showing no deterioration of euro area corporate health, the real ECB policy rate is well below the estimate of r-star, the German yield curve is not inverted and the ECB’s survey of euro area bank lending standards showed a modest easing in the third quarter. Just like in the US, the fundamental backdrop does not argue for a sustained period of euro area HY spread widening, making the latest move higher in euro area Caa spreads as unusual as the move in US Caa. We cannot even blame lower oil prices for the spread widening, as Energy represents only a tiny fraction of the euro area HY market, compared to the large weighting of Energy borrowers in the US junk bond universe. Chart 5Conditions Not In Place For A Broad European HY Selloff We suspect that the correlation between US and euro area HY spreads, by credit tier, has more to do with the increased correlation of trading within global credit markets. Or perhaps it is a sign of investors staying cautious and staying up in quality, even within the riskier HY market. Whatever the reason, we see little fundamental reason to expect the widening of Caa-rated spreads to leak into the broader high-yield market. In fact, if oil prices begin to move higher again, as our commodity strategists are expecting for 2020, that might create a tactical buying opportunity in Caa-rated junk bonds in both the US and euro area. In the meantime, we see no reason to change our recommended overweight stance on US and euro area HY corporate bonds, even with the widening of lower-rated spreads. Bottom Line: The recent widening of US Caa-rated high-yield spreads is narrowly focused in Energy-related companies. The conditions for a spillover into the broader junk bond market (tight monetary policy, tightening lending standards & deteriorating corporate health) are not currently in place. Stay overweight high-yield in both the US and euro area, where Caa-rated spreads have also widened. Australia: The RBA May Not Be Done Yet The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. We have maintained a recommended overweight investment stance on Australian government bonds since December 19, 2017. Since then, the yield on Bloomberg Barclays Australian Treasury index has declined by -140bps, sharply outperforming bonds in the other developed markets and ending Australia’s long-time status as a “high-yielding” developed economy bond market (Chart 6). The rally in Australian government bonds has been driven by the dovish policy response from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to weak economic growth and tepid inflation – a backdrop that is showing little sign of reversing quickly. The central bank has already cut interest rates by 75bps this year, taking the Cash Rate down to a record low of 0.75%. At the November 5th monetary policy meeting, the RBA held off on additional easing but still delivered what was perceived by the market to be a dovish surprise, emphasizing persistently below-target inflation and potential downside risks stemming from the housing market. The door was kept wide open for further rate cuts, if necessary. RBA Governor Philip Lowe has even discussed the possibility that the RBA may have to cut rates to the zero bound and start buying assets via quantitative easing to try and restore inflation back to the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% target band. Chart 6Australian Bonds Have Outperformed Sharply The RBA’s dovishness is justified, given sluggish economic growth and tepid inflation. Real GDP growth slowed sharply in the first half of 2019 to a meager 1.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). Consumer sentiment and business confidence remain depressed, having both declined since the start of the year. The former is being hit by weak house prices and sub-par income growth, while the latter is suffering under the weight of weaker demand from Australia’s most important trade partner, China. In addition, persistent drought conditions in much of the country have pushed up food prices and brought down incomes related to the farming sector. Chart 7Sluggish Australian Domestic Demand Chart 8From Boom To Bust In Australian Housing A bellwether for the Australian economy, the housing market, has not fared much better (Chart 8). Building approvals for new dwelling units have fallen almost 20% since September of last year, while house prices in the major cities have been contracting since the fourth quarter of 2017. Responding to easy financial conditions in Australia and the rest of the world, the standard variable mortgage rate has now fallen to a 60-year low. It remains to be seen how quickly the housing market will turn around and when that, in turn, will lift dwelling investment, but the RBA cuts in 2019 should give a bit of a lift to Australian housing in 2020. As in other developed markets, trade uncertainty and fears of a recession have made Australian firms more hesitant to invest. Real private business investment is now falling in year-over-year terms, even with the boost to the terms of trade (and corporate profits) from the increase in prices for Australia’s most important commodities seen in 2019 (Chart 9). That impact may be starting to fade, however. The price for iron ore – a major Australian commodity export – has already fallen 28% from the 2019 peak. In addition, Chinese iron ore imports from Australia are contracting in year-over-terms, even with Chinese growth starting to show signs of stabilization in response to stimulus measures implemented earlier this year. Those is an ominous signal for Australian growth, given the massive swing in net exports seen this year. Chart 9Terms Of Trade Turning Negative For Australian Capex Chart 10An Unsustainable Lift From Net Exports Driven by the persistent depreciation of the Australian dollar, and supportive terms of trade, the Australian trade balance has reached its highest value as a percent of nominal GDP (3.7%) since 1959, when quarterly data began (Chart 10). The surge has come almost entirely from the export side, occurring alongside the boost to commodity prices that was concentrated in iron ore, and looks both unsustainable and unrepeatable on a rate-of-change basis. Slowing Australian economic momentum has also impacted the labor market. Employment growth is slowing and the unemployment rate has ticked up to 5.3% from a cyclical low of 5% in February 2019 (Chart 11). The so-called “underemployment rate”, is a much higher 8.5%, indicating that there is still ample slack in the Australian labor market as workers are working fewer hours than they wish (and are hence, “underemployed”). The underemployment rate is negatively correlated to wage growth, suggesting that the modest upturn in the latter seen since the end of 2016 is likely to cool off (bottom panel). Chart 11Some Softening In The Australian Labor Market Chart 12Australian Inflation Remains Subdued The RBA has already warned that wage growth expectations may have become anchored at a lower level given the anemic growth over the past several years. That mirrors the trend seen in overall price inflation. Headline CPI inflation was only 1.6% in the third quarter of 2019, as was the “trimmed mean” CPI inflation rate that is favored by the RBA. Both are below the bottom end of the RBA’s target range of 2-3%, as are survey-based expectations of short-term inflation (Chart 12). The previously mentioned drought conditions have put some upward pressure on overall inflation via grocery food prices, but that is expected to be transitory. With depressed house prices and ongoing issues with spare capacity in the labor market, longer-term market-based inflation expectations, captured by the 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap rate, have dipped below the 2% level. The combination of weakening growth and soggy inflation poses a problem for the RBA, as it tries to use monetary policy tools to reverse those trends at a time when Australian banks have seen an unprecedented level of scrutiny of their lending practices. Australian banks have been under the harsh political spotlight after the government’s Royal Commission on misconduct in the financial industry released its findings back in February of this year. Many banks were exposed for serious violations, including money laundering and “improperly” selling financial products to households. Several top bank executives lost their jobs as a result, with the overall industry duly chastised and humbled. Australian banks remain well capitalized, following the path of most developed market banks in response to the Basel III reforms, while non-performing loans remain modest. Yet the risk moving forward is that Australian banks become more prudent in their lending practices after the public “flogging” they received this year, which may impair the transmission mechanism from low RBA policy rates to increased loan growth - and, eventually, faster economic activity. Already, private credit growth has slowed sharply, with the sharpest declines coming for housing and business lending (Chart 13). Investment implications for Australian bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. Despite signs that the global economy is starting to bottom out after the 2019 downturn, the momentum in Australian economic growth and inflation remains tepid. This suggests that Australian sovereign debt is likely to continue outperforming global peers on a relative basis over the next 6-12 months. Our RBA Monitor continues to signal that more interest rate cuts from the RBA are needed. Yet the Australian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve now discounts only 19bps of rate cuts over the next year (Chart 14). This mirrors the trend seen in other developed interest rate markets, as investors have shifted to pricing out the dovish policy expectations as global growth starts to improve. Chart 13Weakening Loan Demand, But No Credit Crunch Chart 14Stay Overweight Australian Government Bonds In the case of Australia, however, the underlying economy and inflation trends still point to a possibility that the RBA will have to ease again sometime in the next few months – a move that is unlikely to be matched in the other major developed markets. This likely means that Australian government bonds can continue to outperform in 2020. We advise staying strategically overweight Australian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios. Bottom Line: A sluggish economy and soggy inflation, with little evidence of an imminent turnaround, imply that the Reserve Bank of Australia may not be done with its rate cutting cycle. Maintain an overweight stance on Australian sovereign debt relative to global benchmarks. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Incoming data are consistent with our view that global growth is at an inflection point, and will improve during the next few months. As this plays out and recessionary fears fade into the background, we expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to settle near 2.5%, 57 bps above its current level. High-Yield: Caa-rated debt has underperformed the duration-matched Treasury index so far this year, despite strong performance for junk bonds overall. We document that weak Caa returns often precede negative returns for the overall junk index. High-Yield: We show several ways in which this year’s Caa underperformance is unique compared to prior episodes. All in all, we conclude that we should not take too strong a signal from the recent Caa spread widening. Remain overweight high-yield in US bond portfolios. The Way Back To 2.5% Chart 1Target 2.5% Worries about a looming US recession peaked in late August when the 2/10 Treasury curve inverted and the 10-year yield hit 1.47%. Since then, some better economic data and the prospect of a “phase 1” US/China trade deal have lifted yields and un-inverted the curve. But the bond market is not yet sending the all-clear. Once recession fears completely fade into the background, we would expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to settle near 2.5%. This is the FOMC’s median estimate of the longer-run fed funds rate, and also where the 5-year/5-year forward yield peaked during the last two global growth upturns (Chart 1). We expect that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield will reach 2.5% in the first half of 2020, but global growth needs to rebound for that to happen. At present, we detect some positive signals from our preferred global growth indicators. The Global Manufacturing PMI troughed at 49.3 in July and came in at 49.8 in October (Chart 1, bottom panel). Then last week, Flash PMI data showed further gains in November for the US, Eurozone and Japan (Chart 2). Only the UK saw its manufacturing PMI drop in November, and it accounts for a mere 2% of the global index. There is no Flash PMI estimate for China. We detect some positive signals from our preferred global growth indicators. More signs of economic optimism are found in regional manufacturing PMIs, which continue to diverge positively from the national number (Chart 3). November data have already been released for New York, Philadelphia, Kansas City and Dallas. All four surveys point to a stronger national print. Chart 2A Bottom In Global PMIs Chart 3Regional PMIs Hooking Up Other data released last week include the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Indicator, which held flat at just above zero in year-over-year terms (Chart 4). The Leading Index is at a key inflection point. A rebound from here would be consistent with the 2015/16 episode (our base case expectation), while a dip into negative territory would sound some alarm bells. Chart 4Keep A Close Eye On Jobless Claims October existing home sales and housing starts came out last week (Chart 4, panels 2 & 3). Both series continue to rebound sharply from the depressed levels seen earlier in the year. This should not be too surprising, given this year’s large drop in mortgage rates. It will be more interesting to see what happens to the housing data as bond yields move higher and the stimulus from low rates fades. We have previously argued that the housing market will provide important clues about where bond yields will peak for the cycle. It will be critical to monitor the housing data as bond yields move higher in 2020.1 One note of caution comes from initial jobless claims, which printed at 227k in each of the past two weeks, slightly above recent levels (Chart 4, bottom panel). Claims remain roughly flat on a 6-month basis, consistent with continued economic recovery. However, a sustained increase would send an important warning sign about the labor market. We will be watching claims closely during the next few weeks. Bottom Line: Incoming data are consistent with our view that global growth is at an inflection point, and will improve during the next few months. As this plays out and recessionary fears fade into the background, we expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to settle near 2.5%, 57 bps above its current level. The Puzzling Underperformance Of Caa-Rated Junk Bonds Chart 5The Puzzling Case Of Caa-Rated Junk Bonds Overall high-yield returns have been solid in 2019, but oddly, the lowest-rated junk bonds have not participated in the rally. So far this year, Ba and B-rated junk bonds have bested duration-matched Treasuries by 786 bps and 717 bps, respectively. But Caa-rated bonds have underperformed the duration-matched Treasury index by 87 bps (Chart 5). We usually think of the Caa-rated credit tier as being “higher beta” than the Ba and B tiers. That is, it should perform best in “risk on” environments, and worst in “risk off” environments. With that in mind, this year’s Caa underperformance is puzzling, and raises two important questions that we attempt to answer in this report. Is Caa underperformance a warning sign for the overall junk sector? Can we identify the reasons for this year’s Caa underperformance? And if so, do they suggest a buying opportunity? A Caa-nary In The Coal Mine? To assess whether this year’s Caa underperformance might be a warning sign for overall junk bond excess returns, we ran a few tests using historical data. First, we looked at calendar year excess returns going back to 1996 (Table 1). We then tested the performance of a couple trading rules to see whether Caa performance is a bellwether for the overall index. For the first test, we identified calendar years when junk index excess returns were positive but Caa was the worst performing credit tier. Four years fit this criteria: 1999, 2005, 2014 and 2019. Of the three years other than 2019, two (1999 and 2014) were followed by negative junk index excess returns the next year. Table 1Junk Excess Returns By Calendar Year We also posited that one difference between the Caa and Ba/B credit tiers might be that Caa-rated firms tend to be smaller. We therefore identified calendar years when junk index excess returns were positive but when small cap equities underperformed large cap equities. We identified eight such years. Of the seven years other than 2019, five were followed by negative junk index excess returns the next year. Both rules appear to give a good warning sign for the overall junk index. What if we combine them? We identify three years when junk index excess returns were positive, but Caa was the worst performing credit tier and small cap equities lagged large caps: 1999, 2014 and 2019. Both 1999 and 2014 were followed by negative junk index excess returns the next year. So far the evidence of Caa underperformance being a warning sign for the overall index is quite compelling. But let’s look more closely at the periods flagged by our trading rules. It is only this year that we have seen a large divergence in terms of direction between Caa spreads and overall junk index spreads. Recall that we identified 2019, 2014, 2005 and 1999 as the four years when overall junk index excess returns were positive, but when the Caa credit tier was the worst performer. If we look at the direction of junk spreads in those periods, we see that the direction of Caa spreads tracked the overall index very closely throughout 2014, 2005 and 1999. It is only this year that we have seen a large divergence in terms of direction between Caa spreads and overall junk index spreads (Chart 6). This divergence is odd, and it suggests that this year is unique compared to the other periods identified in our analysis (more on this below). Chart 62019 Is Unique Another reason to doubt the potential relevance of our calendar year analysis is that the decision to use calendar years is arbitrary, and it severely limits our sample size. We therefore run the same analysis using rolling 12-month periods. The results are presented in Table 2. Table 2Predictive Power Of Caa Returns: Rolling 12-Month Periods From December 1996 To October 2019 First, note the baseline result that there are 178 12-month periods of positive junk index excess returns in our sample. Of those 178 periods, 31% were followed by negative excess returns during the subsequent 12 months. If we apply our “Caa Return” filter and look only at 12-month periods when junk index excess returns were positive but Caa was the worst performing credit tier, our 178 examples fall to just 22. Of those 22 episodes, half were followed by negative junk index excess returns during the subsequent 12 months. Our “Small Cap/Large Cap Equity” filter provides a similar 51% hit rate with a larger sample size of 78. In this analysis we also test a “Caa Spread” filter where we scan for 12-month periods when junk index excess returns were positive, but when Caa spreads widened despite tightening in the overall index spread. We identify only 16 such periods, 56% of which were followed by negative index excess returns. We also looked at what happens when we combine two or more of our filters. Using our “Caa Return” and “Small Cap / Large Cap Equity” filters together, we identify only 18 episodes, 61% of which were followed by negative junk index excess returns during the next 12 months. If we take all three of our filters together, we find only 5 episodes, 4 of which preceded a period of negative junk excess returns. Please recall that the most recent 12-month period meets the criteria of all three of our filters. As was the case with our Table 1 results, an important caveat to this analysis is that of the 5 episodes identified by all three of our filters, the direction of Caa spreads never diverged from the direction of the overall index spread. In fact, we could find no historical period other than this year when Caa spreads diverged in direction from the overall index spread for so long. We conclude that Caa underperformance can provide advance notice of negative junk index excess returns, but also that the current period is so unique that it requires further analysis. Can We Explain The Divergence Between Caa Spreads And The Overall Index? As mentioned above, the current period of sharply widening Caa spreads alongside a rangebound overall index spread is unique historically. This not only raises questions about the relevance of the historical analysis we just presented, but also cries out for an explanation. Fortunately, several things appear to explain the odd behavior of Caa spreads. First, changes in index duration. Junk index duration fell dramatically in 2019, but the decline was much larger for Ba and B rated credits than for the Caa tier. If we control for changes in index duration by looking at 12-month breakeven spreads instead of the average index option-adjusted spread, we see that the spread divergence looks much less dramatic (Chart 7). Controlling for changes in index duration by looking at 12-month breakeven spreads instead of the average index OAS, we see that the spread divergence looks much less dramatic. Second, it’s possible that credit quality has deteriorated more for the lowest-rated credits than for the rest of the junk index. That would explain the spread divergence. However, this appears to not be the case. Our bottom-up sample of high-yield firms shows that debt-to-assets and interest coverage look similar compared to history for both the median high-yield firm and the worst 10% of firms (Chart 8). Chart 7A Duration Story Chart 8Credit Quality Is Not The Culprit Finally, we consider the sector composition of the different credit tiers. We look at year-to-date sector contributions to each credit tier’s excess returns and find that the difference between Caa and the rest of the index is concentrated in the Energy and Communications sectors (Chart 9). Caa-rated Communications firms underperformed the Ba and B credit tiers because of two Caa-rated firms – Frontier Communications Corp and Intelsat – that ran into problems. As for Energy, we note that the Caa tier has much more exposure to the Oil Field Services sub-sector than the other credit tiers. This sub-sector captures many of the shale players, who have struggled with falling oil prices. Notice that this year’s decline in the WTI oil price tracks Caa spread widening very closely (Chart 10). Chart 9Contribution To Year-To-Date Excess Returns* (%) Chart 10Blame Energy The Appendix at the end of this report provides a sector decomposition of the different junk credit tiers. Specifically, it presents three tables. One showing the sector weights in each credit tier. A second showing year-to-date excess returns for each sector by credit tier. A third showing the contribution from each sector to each credit tier’s year-to-date excess returns. Investment Conclusions Overall, we are hesitant to make too much of the recent Caa underperformance. Yes, we find compelling evidence that Caa underperformance can be a bellwether for negative high-yield excess returns. However, the behavior of Caa spreads in 2019 doesn’t resemble the prior periods in our analysis very closely. Specifically, the Caa spread doesn’t tend to diverge from the overall index spread in terms of direction, as it has this year. We are also able to identify two compelling reasons for this year’s divergence between Caa spreads and the overall index. The first is the change in relative index duration, and the second is stress in the shale oil sector due to a falling oil price. Spreads should adjust to changes in duration over time, and the stress in the shale sector should ease if oil prices rise as our commodity strategists expect.2 Given the uniqueness of the current period, and our base case outlook for a rebound in global growth, we are inclined to view Caa bonds (and junk bonds more generally) as an attractive buying opportunity in the current environment. But we will keep an eye on the performance of Caa bonds during the next few months. If global growth recovers and the oil price rises, but Caa continues to lag the overall index, then it may compel us to change our view. Appendix Table 3Sector Weights Within High-Yield Corporate Bond Credit Tiers* (%) Table 4Sector Year-To-Date Excess Return* By High-Yield Credit Tier (%) Table 5Sector Contribution To Year-To-Date Excess Return* For Each High-Yield Credit Tier (%) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Position For Modest Curve Steepening”, dated October 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Our commodity strategists forecast an average price of $63/bbl for WTI crude oil in 2020. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade”, dated November 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Dear Client, In addition to this short weekly report, you will also receive our 2020 outlook, published by the Bank Credit Analyst. Next week, I will be on the road visiting clients in South Africa. I hope to report my discussions and findings the following week. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor Highlights According to a simple attractiveness framework, the most desirable currencies are the Norwegian krone, the Swedish krona, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the New Zealand dollar and the British pound. Take profits soon on our long GBP/JPY position. Feature In this report, we use a simple framework for ranking G10 currencies. First, we consider the macroeconomic environment using as proxies a country’s basic balance and external vulnerability. Next, we look at valuation metrics, surveying a variety of both short-term and longer-term models. Finally, we consider positioning, to gauge if our view is mainstream or out of consensus. Below are our results. Basic Balance Chart I-1Basic Balance We consider the basic balance to be one of the most important concepts in determining the attractiveness of a currency. In a nutshell, it captures the ebb and flow of demand for a country’s domestic assets. Persistent basic balance surpluses are usually associated with an appreciating currency and vice versa. The euro area sports the best basic balance surplus in the G10 universe, followed by Norway and then Australia (Chart I-1). In simple terms, this means there is constant strong underlying demand for these currencies - either for domestic goods and services, or for investment into portfolio assets. The UK and the US rank the worst in terms of basic balances, driven by Brexit uncertainty and the ebbing of tax reform benefits in the US. We will explore balance of payments dynamics within all of the G10 countries in detail next week. External Debt A currency is sometimes only as vulnerable as its external liabilities. In an absolute sense, external debt as a share of GDP is highest in the UK, euro area, and Switzerland (Chart I-2). However, what matters most times for vulnerability are net external assets rather than gross liabilities. On this measure, Japan, Switzerland, and Norway are the most attractive countries, while the US and Australia rank the worst (Chart I-3). Chart I-2External Vulnerability Chart I-3US Is Least Attractive Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Chart I-4PPP Model Various models have shown PPP to be a very poor tool for managing currencies, but an excellent one at extremes. However, there is a roadblock that comes from measurement issues, since consumer price baskets tend to differ in composition from one country to the next. In order to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison across countries, two adjustments are necessary. First, categorizing the consumer price index (CPI) into five major groups. In most cases, this breakdown captures 90% of the national CPI basket. This includes food, restaurants and hotels (1), shelter (2), health care (3), culture and recreation (4), and energy and transportation (5). The second adjustment is to run two regressions with the exchange rate as the dependent variable. The first regression (call it REG1) uses the relative price ratios of the five groups as independent variables. This allows us to observe the most influential price ratios that help explain variations in the exchange rate. The second regression (call it REG2) uses a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If, for example, shelter is 33% in the US CPI basket, but 19% in the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, as opposed to using the national CPI weights. The US dollar is overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and Norwegian krone. The results show the US dollar as overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and Norwegian krone. Commodity currencies are closer to fair value, and within the safe-haven complex, the Japanese yen is more attractive than the Swiss franc. The euro is less undervalued than implied by the overvaluation in the DXY index (Chart I-4). Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM) Back in 2016, we developed a set of currency indicators to help global portfolio managers increase their Sharpe ratio in managing currency exposure. The idea was quite simple: For every developed world country, there were three key variables that influenced the near-term path of its exchange rate versus the US dollar. Our intermediate-term timing models are not sending any strong signals at the moment. Interest Rate Differentials: Under the lens of interest rate parity, if one country is expected to have lower interest rates versus another, the incumbent’s currency will fall today so as to gradually appreciate in the future and nullify the interest rate advantage. Chart I-5Intermediate-Term Model Inflation Differentials: Assuming no transactional costs, the price of sandals cannot be relatively high and rising in Mumbai versus Auckland. Either the Indian rupee needs to fall, the kiwi rise, or a combination of the two has to occur to equalize prices across borders. Risk Factor: Exchange rates are not government bonds in that few treasury departments and central banks can guarantee a par value on them. Ergo, the ebb and flow of risk aversion will have an impact on the Norwegian krone as well as the yen. For the most part, our models have worked like a charm. On a risk-adjusted return basis, a dynamic hedging strategy based on our ITTMs has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001. These results give us confidence to continue running these models as a sanity check for our ever-shifting currency biases. That said, our intermediate-term timing models are not sending any strong signals at the moment. The Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and New Zealand dollar are the most attractive currencies, while the British pound and Swiss franc are the least attractive (Chart I-5). Long-Term Fair Value Model Chart I-6Long-Term Model Our long-term FX models are also part of a set of technical tools we use to help us navigate FX markets. Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion. These models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and emerging market FX markets. The models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their main purpose is to provide information on the longevity of a currency cycle, depending on where we are in the economic cycle. Our long-term FX models are not sending any strong signals right now, with the US dollar at fair value. The cheapest currencies are the yen, the Norwegian krone, and Swedish krona (Chart I-6). The priciest currencies are the South African rand and the Saudi riyal. Real Interest Rates One defining feature of the currency landscape is that pretty much across the G10 countries, we have negative real rates (Chart I-7). Within the G10 universe, the US and New Zealand dollars are the highest-yielding currencies, while the British pound and Swedish krona are the least attractive. Chart I-7Real Rates Speculative Positioning Being long Treasurys and the dollar has been a consensus trade for many years now (Chart I-8). According to CFTC data, this has been expressed mostly through the aussie and kiwi, although our bias is that the Swedish krona and Norwegian krone have been the real victims. Chart I-8Positioning That said, flow data highlights just how precarious being long US dollars is right now. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive, but the momentum of these flows is clearly rolling over. This is being more than offset by official net outflows. As interest rate differentials have started moving against the US, so has foreign investor appetite for Treasury bonds. Concluding Thoughts Should the nascent pickup in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, it will go a long way in further eroding the US’ yield advantage. More specifically, the currencies that have borne the brunt of the manufacturing slowdown should also experience the quickest reversals. For example, yields in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan have risen by much more than those in the US since the bottom. The most attractive currencies are the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the British pound and New Zealand dollar. This is the message being sent by an aggregate of our ranking model. The most attractive currencies are the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the British pound and New Zealand dollar (Chart I-9). Take profits soon on our long GBP/JPY position. Chart I-9Favor Norway, Japan and Sweden Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: Retail sales grew by 0.3% year-on-year in October. Industrial production contracted by 0.8% month-on-month in October. On the housing market front, building permits and housing starts both increased by 5% and 3.8% month-on-month in October. However, MBA mortgage applications contracted by 2.2% for the week ended November 15th. The NY Empire State Manufacturing index fell to 2.9 from 4 in November. The Philly Fed manufacturing index, on the other hand, soared to 10.4 from 5.6 in November. The DXY index depreciated by 0.3% this week. The FOMC minutes released this Wednesday showed that the Fed now sees little need to further reduce rates. Last week, we did a reassessment of global growth and the USD, and entered a limit sell for the DXY index at 100. Report Links: Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4UR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The seasonally-adjusted trade balance fell to €18.3 billion in September. The current account surplus slightly narrowed by €0.3 billion to €28.2 billion. Headline and core inflation were both unchanged at 1.1% and 0.7% year-on-year respectively in October. Consumer confidence improved from -7.6 in October to -7.2 in November. EUR/USD increased by 0.5% this week. The improvement in soft data confirms that the economy is in a bottoming process in the euro area. The fact that the largest economy, Germany, skirted a recession last week also boosted investor confidence. We continue to remain overweight the euro. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Exports decreased by 9.2% year-on-year in October. Imports slumped by 14.8% year-on-year. The total trade balance shifted to a surplus of ¥17.3 billion. The industry activity index increased by 1.5% month-on-month in September. USD/JPY fell by 0.2% this week. While global growth is set to improve given a possible trade détente and easy monetary policy worldwide, uncertainties continue to loom. The US Senate unanimously passed legislation on the "Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act," adding more difficulties to finalize the Phase I trade deal. Global trade uncertainty is positive for safe-haven demand. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The Rightmove house price index increased by 0.3% year-on-year in November. Public sector net borrowing increased by £3 billion to £10.5 billion in October. The British pound continues to appreciate by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. With Brexit being less of a threat, the pound is poised to rise through next year. We are long GBP/JPY in our portfolio and it is in the money at 6.1%. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been soft: The Westpac leading index fell by 0.1% month-on-month in October, following a slight decline the previous month. AUD/USD has been more or less flat this week. In the monetary policy minutes released this week, the RBA expressed their expectations for stronger growth at 2.75% in 2020 and around 3% in 2021, supported by accommodative monetary policy, infrastructure spending, stabilizing house prices, and strong steel-intensive activities in China. The minutes also presented an argument against lower interest rates: while lower interest rates can support the economy through the usual transmission channels, they could be negative for savers and confidence. That said, the RBA is "prepared to ease monetary policy further if needed." Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: Both output and input components of the producer price index have increased in Q3: the output component grew by 1% quarter-on-quarter and input component by 0.9% quarter-on-quarter. NZD/USD increased by 0.7% this week. Both growth and inflation in New Zealand are showing signs that the economy is in a bottoming process. We are positive on the kiwi against the US dollar while we remain short against the Australian dollar and Swedish Krona. Report Links: Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Manufacturing shipments fell by 0.2% month-on-month in September. Both headline and core inflation were unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in October. ADP employment showed a loss of 22.6K jobs in October. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. While a possible trade détente between US and China and rising oil prices could put a floor under the loonie, the pipeline constraints in Canada have dampened the correlation between the oil prices and the loonie. This will limit the upside potential for the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: The trade surplus narrowed to CHF 3.5 billion in October from CHF 4.1 billion the previous month, due primarily to growth in imports, which grew by 1.9 billion month-on-month. Exports also increased by 1.3 billion month-on-month. Import demand remains firm for chemical products. Industrial production grew by 8% year-on-year in Q3. USD/CHF increased by 0.2% this week. The trade balance still remains at a high level in Switzerland, which is bullish for the franc. Moreover, global uncertainties could underpin the safe-haven franc. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been positive: The trade balance shifted to a surplus of NOK 5.9 billion in October, after a deficit of NOK 1.4 billion in September. However, this is compared to a surplus of NOK 32.6 billion in the same month last year. On a year-on-year basis, exports slumped by 27%, caused by a decrease in exports of mineral fuels and chemical products. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week, supported by the oil price recovery. On Wednesday, the EIA posted an increase of crude oil inventories by 1.4 million barrels from the previous week, lower than expectations. WTI crude oil prices thus surged by 4% on the news. Going forward, we remain overweight energy prices and the Norwegian krone. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Capacity utilization increased to 0.5% in Q3, up from 0.1% in the previous quarter. The Swedish krona increased by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The Swedish krona has depreciated by 23% against the USD since its 2018 peak. A global growth revival is likely to give a boost to the krona from a valuation perspective. Report Links: Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given my many concerns about the outlook. Our portfolio has done well in the past year thanks to the surge in bond prices and the outperformance of defensive equities. However, I am deeply troubled by the amount of monetary stimulus required to support risk assets, and by how expensive bonds and equities are. Moreover, the global economy remains engulfed in deflationary risks, and policymakers are running out of ammunition. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I am also pleased to once again be here to discuss the major risks and opportunities in the global marketplace. A year ago, I held a more positive market view than my father. Directly after our meeting, the deep market correction gave me second thoughts, but ultimately, the rebound in stock prices vindicated my view. Clearly, your assertion that markets would be turbulent proved correct. Since I joined the family firm in early 2017, I have been pushing my father to keep a higher equity exposure than he was normally comfortable with. We agreed to still favor stocks last year, albeit, with a bias toward defensive sectors, and this strategy paid off. But after the past year’s powerful rally in both bonds and stocks, we are again left wondering how to position our portfolio. Ultimately, I do not believe a recession is imminent. Yes, stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. Since I expect economic growth to pick up, I am inclined to tilt the portfolio further into equities and move away from our preference for defensive sectors. As usual, I am very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our core theme for 2019 was that we would face classic late-cycle turbulence. Despite this volatility, a run-up in asset prices was likely. Soon after we met, the stock market plunged, hitting a low on December 26, 2018. We anticipated the Federal Reserve to be much more hawkish than what actually transpired. Wage growth and even core inflation have remained firm in the US, but the weakness in global inflation expectations drove central banks’ reaction functions more powerfully than we anticipated. Moreover, the rapid escalation of the Sino-US trade war added a layer of uncertainty that exacerbated the economic slowdown that had started in mid-2018, forcing global central banks to ease policy as an indemnity against recession. Looking ahead, central bankers are highly unlikely to tighten monetary policy as long as inflation expectations remain below their normal range consistent with a 2% inflation target. We agree that the odds of a US recession in the coming year are still low because financial conditions are set to remain accommodative, Chinese authorities are setting policy to shore up growth, and a trade truce is likely. Global economic activity will rebound in early 2020. Instead, the most probable timeframe for a broad based recession is late 2021/early 2022. As a result, we remain positive on risk assets, especially foreign stocks. We are also underweighting bonds as they offer extremely poor absolute and relative value. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your or my daughter’s optimism. My list of concerns is long, I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: This exercise is always interesting and often humbling, too. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: Tensions between policy and markets would be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the US unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it would take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Ultimately, the Fed would deliver more hikes in 2019 than discounted in the markets. This would push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar would peak in mid-2019. China would also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which would boost global growth. However, until both of these things happened, emerging markets would remain under pressure. We favored developed market equities over their EM peers. We also preferred defensive equity sectors such as healthcare and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the US would outperform Europe and Japan over the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. Stabilization in global growth would ignite a blow off rally in global equities. If the Fed was raising rates in response to falling unemployment, it would be unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints began to bite fully in early 2020 and inflation began to rise well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks would begin to buckle. This would mean that a window would exist in 2019 for stocks to outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from then (late 2018) current levels without a corresponding deterioration in the economic outlook. Corporate credit would underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in credit spreads was unlikely as long as the economy remained in expansion mode, but spreads could still widen modestly. US shale companies had been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices would be unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, we expected production cuts in Saudi Arabia would push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio was likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. As already noted, our forecast for more Fed rate hikes was wrong. This meant that we were offside in our duration call. Ultimately, 10-year Treasuries have generated returns of 10.8% so far this year, and German bunds and Japanese government bonds returns of 5.8% and 1.0% in EUR and JPY terms, or 2.5% and 2.0% in USD terms, respectively (Table 1). Nonetheless, our expectation of a run-up in risk asset prices was spot on. Equities outperformed bonds, with global stocks climbing 22.2% in USD terms. We missed the initial outperformance of corporate bonds relative to Treasuries, as investment grade credit rose by 13.9%. However, our bond team took a more constructive stance on corporates as the year progressed. Table 1Market Performance Chart 12019 Was A Good Year For Stocks In terms of regional allocation recommendations, we were correct to overweight US equities which beat non-US stocks by 13.4%, partly thanks to the dollar’s appreciation. We were also right to underweight EM equities, with Asia and Latin America generating dollar returns of only 12.6% and 6.9%. Overall, it was a good year for financial markets (Chart 1). Our growth forecasts were mixed. We predicted global growth would slow in the first half of 2019 but improve thereafter. Instead, the slowdown extended and intensified into the second half of the year as the Sino-US trade war escalated more than expected, and Chinese policymakers were more reluctant to reflate than anticipated. The IMF also revised down its growth forecasts. In the October 2019 World Economic Outlook report, growth in advanced economies for the year was cut to 1.7% from 2.1% compared to 2018 forecasts, led by a downward revision to 1.5% from 2% in Europe (Table 2). They also pared down 2019 EM growth estimates to 3.9% from 4.7%. Consequently, inflation was softer than originally predicted. These trends in economic activity meant that our dollar call was partially right. The currency did not peak in the middle of the year as we foresaw, but has been flat since the spring and today trades where it was in April. Meanwhile, the weaker-than-expected growth put our oil call offside, with Brent averaging $62/bbl this year, not $82/bbl. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts The Cycle’s End Game Mr. X: You mentioned that you remain positive on risk assets and stocks for 2020. You will not be surprised that I am extremely skeptical of this view. The Fed could only raise rates to 2.5% before all hell broke loose, and it has now cut them back to 1.75%. The European Central Bank has lowered its deposit rate to -0.5% and is resuming its asset purchase program, while the Bank of Japan is clearly out of ammunition. Yet global growth remains weak. Despite this lack of economic traction, US stocks are at a record high and are unequivocally expensive. This situation seems untenable. If global growth weakens further, there is little more policymakers can do. I think the risk of a recession is a lot more elevated than you believe, especially as we cannot count on a lasting trade détente. Meanwhile, the US presidential election makes me uncomfortable, and I cannot see how business leaders will want to deploy capital to expand capacity given the risk that the regulatory and tax environment could become hostile to the corporate sector. If I’m wrong about growth – and I hope I am – then inflationary pressures will build and central banks will have to tighten policy suddenly. As bond yields rise, stocks will be sold and yet bonds will not offer any protection since they yield so little. Also, I have not even talked about negative interest rates. $12.1 trillion of debt yields less than zero percent. This is obviously preventing creative destruction from purging the system of rot. It is also promoting capital misallocation and undue risk-taking by financial institutions who cannot meet fiduciary liabilities. Ms. X: Based on this tirade, you can easily imagine what life at the office has been like in recent months. I do share some of my father’s concerns. Negative rates cannot be a good thing, especially from a long-term perspective. If growth weakens further, I’m also concerned that central banks have few options left. However, I do not see these risks as imminent. There are nascent signs that the global economy will stabilize soon; both President Trump and President Xi have strong incentives to reach a trade truce; and central banks are nowhere near removing the proverbial punch bowl. While US stocks are expensive, other risk assets offer value if global growth rebounds. The wall of worry is high, but stocks can and will climb that wall. BCA: Your debate is similar to our own internal discussions. It is undeniable that the investing landscape looks shaky at the moment, especially with the S&P 500 currently trading at 18-times forward earnings. However, the situation you are describing is a direct consequence of one BCA’s long running macro themes: The end of the debt supercycle. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular. The private debt load in advanced economies has declined by 20% of GDP since 2009 (Chart 2A). Despite the burgeoning US federal government deficit, public debt accumulation has not been strong enough to cause total debt loads to increase. Instead, aggregate indebtedness has been stuck slightly above 260% of GDP for the past 10 years. Depressed, and in some cases, negative interest rates reflect weak demand for credit. Chart 2AThe Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... Chart 2B...But Not In EM The end of the debt supercycle has both a negative and positive impact. Without increasing leverage, domestic demand cannot grow faster than trend GDP. Thus, it takes much more time for inflationary pressures to build. Concurrently, in the absence of inflationary pressure, more time passes before monetary policy reaches a restrictive level causing recession. The upshot is that the business cycle can last much longer. Moreover, a world less geared to credit accumulation reduces the fragility of the financial system, at the margin. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular (Chart 2B), where the demand for credit is still very sensitive to changes in monetary settings. EM countries are the major source of volatility in the global business cycle. Chinese policymakers’ management of the tradeoff between growth and leverage will determine whether the global economy can avoid deflation. If they decide to tackle debt excesses head on, EM credit growth will contract and EM final demand will suffer. In this scenario, negative rates will persist in low-growth advanced economies, and the Fed will be incapable of raising rates because global deflationary forces will be too strong. Chart 3The World Is In The Midst Of A Deflationary Episode The second half of 2018 and the whole of 2019 gave us a taste of these forces. When China tightened credit conditions, the EM economies slowed first. Trade and manufacturing hubs like Europe, Australia and Japan quickly followed. A deflationary wave spread around the world, as evidenced by a drop in global producer prices (Chart 3). The US is a comparatively closed economy, but it could not avoid this gravitational pull. The ISM manufacturing survey ultimately started to contract in August 2018, converging to weakness in the rest of the world. The trade war’s hit to business confidence added insult to the injury of an already weak economic environment. Looking ahead, our optimism reflects an expectation that Chinese policymakers will adopt a more pro-growth policy stance because they too are spooked by the downtrend in their economy. While the Politburo Standing Committee has not abandoned its structural reform agenda, it realizes that aggressive deleveraging is dangerous. The Chinese economy is growing at its weakest pace in nearly 30 years and deflation is once again taking hold. In response to date, policymakers have lowered China’s reserve requirement ratio by 400 basis points, cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP, increased the issuance of local government bonds to finance public infrastructure projects, and boosted capex at state-owned enterprises. EM economies will respond to these stimulative measures. The Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has stabilized (Chart 4). Meanwhile, the Fed has pushed the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Holston-Laubach-Williams estimate of the neutral rate, and coordinated global policy easing points to a rebound in the global manufacturing sector (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, the global inventory purge that magnified the industrial sector’s pain is getting exhausted and the auto sector is looking up. Finally, we agree with Ms. X that both President Trump and President Xi have their own incentives to deescalate trade policy uncertainty. We are entering the end game of this business cycle and bull market. Global borrowing rates will rise, but only to a limited extent. Rightly or wrongly, major central banks are terrified by the prospect of the Japanification of their economies. Practically speaking, this means that they want inflation expectations to move back up to normal levels (Chart 5). However, after undershooting their 2% targets for 11 years, achieving this objective will require central banks to let realized inflation overshoot these targets first. Thus, central banks are unlikely to tighten policy until late next year at the earliest, which will limit how far yields can climb in 2020. Chart 4…But Do Not Bet Against Reflation Chart 5Depressed Inflation Expectations Equities and other risk assets should perform well if global growth re-accelerates but interest rates don’t rise much at first. Some benefit of this fertile backdrop is already priced in, but many pockets of value levered to stronger global growth still exist. We are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. While the general environment favors remaining invested in risk assets in 2020, this is likely the last window of opportunity to do so. Today’s accommodative monetary policy will revive inflationary pressures in 2021, and central banks will ultimately be forced to lift rates much more aggressively. China will continue to resist excessive leverage. Neither the business cycle nor the equity bull market will withstand these final assaults. Mr. X: Your benign outlook reminds me of when we met in December 2007. Do you remember? You told me that the housing slowdown and the credit market seizure were large risks, but central banks would put a floor under global growth. How did that turn out? I agree that in advanced economies, overall debt loads have been stable. But this belies major disparities. For example, US corporate debt has never represented a larger share of GDP than it does today. This must be a major vulnerability. While household balance sheets look healthy, I do not think consumption will save the day if companies are cutting capex and employment while they clean up their balance sheets. Countries like Canada and Australia are drowning in private sector debt. How can you ignore these vulnerabilities? BCA: A comparison with 2008 actually reveals why advanced economies, particularly the US, are not the powder keg that they once were. US corporate debt is elevated when compared to GDP, but profits also represent a much larger share of GDP than they did 10 or 20 years ago, and interest rates are close to historic lows. As a result, interest coverage ratios are still adequate (Chart 6). In 2007, household debt loads were large, but interest payments also accounted for 18.1% of disposable income, the highest proportion since 1972. Additionally, US firms’ debt-to-asset ratio is in line with the post-1970 average of 22.1%. Finally, US businesses have not used rising leverage to fund capital spending, as demonstrated by the elevated age of the capital stock. Thus, the US corporate sector continues to generate positive net savings. Ahead of recessions, US businesses typically generate negative net savings. The composition of the creditors is another important difference. In 2007, an extremely large share of the spurious borrowings resided on banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, the banking system was woefully undercapitalized with a leverage ratio of 17x. Weak banks had to absorb 2.2 trillion of losses after 2008. Consequently, the money creation mechanism broke down, and money multipliers collapsed (Chart 7). Today, US banks boast relatively stronger balance sheets, and they are still judicious about extending credit despite being less exposed to the corporate sector than they were to the mortgage market in 2008. Instead, most corporate debt is held by less levered entities such as ETFs, pension plans, and insurance companies. The leveraged losses that proved so debilitating in 2008 are less likely to be a source of systemic risk in this cycle. Chart 6US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt Chart 72008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money Countries like Australia and Canada have much more worrisome private sector debt dynamics, as their servicing costs are elevated (Chart 8). However, these economies are unlikely to collapse when global rates are low, as long as the global economy can avoid a recession, which would reduce export revenue in these trade-sensitive countries. You expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. The bottom line is that both the US corporate sector and at-risk countries like Canada should avoid a day of reckoning until interest rates rise meaningfully. As we have already mentioned, central banks are very clear that they will allow inflation to overshoot before tightening policy anew. We monitor US inflation breakeven rates to gauge the likely timing of that outcome. At 1.6%, they remain well below the 2.3% to 2.5% range, which is historically consistent with central banks durably achieving their inflation target (Chart 9). Until inflation expectations are re-anchored back up in that range, we will not worry about an imminent tightening in monetary conditions. Chart 8Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Chart 9The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten Chart 10Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator It is true that inflationary pressures are building in the US. Historical evidence points to a kink in the Phillips curve, the link between wage growth and the unemployment rate. Since the labor market is tight, we are already seeing average hourly earnings growth accelerate. Moreover, the output gap is mostly closed. However, keep in mind that inflation is also a lagging economic indicator (Chart 10). Consequently, the recent global economic slowdown is likely to keep US inflation at bay for most of 2020. The sharp fall in US capacity utilization along with the decline in imported goods and core producer price inflation corroborate this picture. Mr. X: So you believe that as long as rates stay low, the day of reckoning will be delayed. But ultimately, that it is unavoidable. BCA: Correct. No matter what, we are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. The current period of easy policy will allow cyclical spending to rise as a share of output, and debt to build up again over the coming 18 months. Because slack is clearly limited, this latest wave of policy easing will generate inflationary pressures. Ultimately, the Fed will be forced to play catch up and tighten more aggressively than expected in 2021. Paradoxically, the longer the onset of recession is delayed, the deeper it is likely to be… Mr. X: Because imbalances and vulnerabilities will only grow larger! BCA: Absolutely! Mr. X: That is something we can agree on. Ms. X: The way you complete one another’s sentences is a testament to how many years you have been talking to each other. For me, the most concerning issue is political risk. While I am more positive on the outlook for trade policy than my father, I do worry about the impact of US election risk on capital spending. Chart 11If The 2012 Election Is Any Guide, Trump Can Still Win A Second Term BCA: On the trade war, we would like to address your father’s concerns. All politicians, even unconventional ones like President Trump, seek re-election. Yet, President Trump’s overall approval rating is low (Chart 11). If the election were held today, his odds of winning would be minimal. However, US presidential elections do ultimately favor the incumbent. If the re-election of President Obama in 2012 is any guide, President Trump has enough time to boost his approval rating over the coming 12 months to secure a second term through the Electoral College. In order to achieve this outcome, he must reverse the large slowdown in wage growth currently plaguing the swing states he won by only a small margin in 2016 (Chart 12). Workers in states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are suffering disproportionately from the uncertainty created by the trade tensions. President Trump will have to pause the tariffs – and even cut tariff rates – to support the economy and reassure voters. Chart 12Trump's Fear Is Coming True China is willing to accept a trade truce. The Chinese economy is weak and producer prices are once again deflating. President Xi doesn’t want to preside over another massive surge in leverage or a 1930’s Irving Fisher-style deflationary spiral. Reviving private sector investment sentiment via a reduction in trade policy uncertainty would help stabilize spending and avoid a disorderly economic slump. Moreover, President Xi may not trust the current White House, but the prospect of a Democratic administration that will be tough on both environmental standards and human rights would offer little solace. This brings us to the US election. The recent Bank of America Merrill Lynch positioning survey shows that the investment community shares your concerns. This risk is hard to quantify. The Democratic nomination is wide open. Former Vice President Joe Biden leads the opinion polls, and is a known quantity. Meanwhile, the rising progressive wing of the party, embodied in Senator Elizabeth Warren, is hostile to business and likely to cause concerns in boardrooms across the US, especially in the tech, energy, financial services and healthcare sectors. This could dampen animal spirits. Biden’s and Warren’s odds of beating President Trump are overstated by current polls, especially if the President softens his stance on trade to allow for a growth pick-up. Moreover, to be competitive nationally, Senator Warren will have to abandon some of her more progressive plans and pivot toward the center. The recent upbeat equity market performance of sectors like managed healthcare suggests that markets are discounting this shift. Thus, we doubt the election is currently really weighing on business intentions. The recent pick up in capital spending intentions in various Fed Manufacturing surveys fades this risk. Chart 13A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished What is clear though is that if the economy were to weaken further, Senator Warren’s chances would improve and CEOs would genuinely begin to worry about re-regulation, potentially unleashing a vicious cycle. Thus, the end game is an unstable equilibrium. On a structural basis, whether one looks at the rise of populism or the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US, trade tensions will remain a pesky feature of the global economy. In effect, the trade truce will not be a permanent deal. The global economy has therefore lost the tailwind of deepening global integration achieved through trade (Chart 13). This will limit global potential GDP growth. Ms. X: Thank you. I think the time is right to explore your economic outlook in more detail. The Economic Outlook Chart 14China: Modest Reflation Is Underway Mr. X: From your arguments, it seems that the outlook for China and Emerging Markets is critical, so let’s start there. My impression is that President Xi is not abandoning his structural reform agenda. Avoiding the middle-income trap will require decreasing China’s dependence on credit as a growth driver. Can economic activity really stabilize under those circumstances? BCA: You are correct: Senior Chinese administrators are reluctant to allow another major phase of debt accumulation to take hold. However, as we already highlighted, policymakers are taking steps to end the most severe economic slowdown since the first half of the 1990s. China is currently implementing a middling stimulus program. The positive impact of the lower bank reserve requirement ratio, the tax cuts and increased public infrastructure spending is being mitigated by strong regulatory constraints on the shadow banking system and small financial institutions, by efforts to limit real estate speculation, and by the cash crunch facing real estate developers. These crosscurrents make it unlikely that the credit impulse will rise as sharply as it did following the reflationary campaigns of 2009, 2012 or 2016. Nonetheless, the Chinese economy is indeed exhibiting some mildly positive signals. Our monetary indicator and state-owned enterprise capital spending point to a rebound in overall Chinese economic activity (Chart 14). Moreover, household spending is trying to bottom. If China stabilizes, then the EM slowdown will end soon. Without a deepening drag from the Chinese economy, EM countries should be able to take advantage of the easing in global financial and liquidity conditions. But the end of the Chinese drag on EM growth does not mean a massive tailwind will be forthcoming. Additionally, deflationary forces remain stronger in the emerging world than in the US. As a result, EM real rates will remain stubbornly above the level that real economic activity warrants, posing a headwind for capital and durable goods spending. Generally speaking, EM and China are moving from a headwind for the world to a mild tailwind. Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone. Ms. X: I’m somewhat more positive than you on global growth next year. The policy easing around the world looks very promising for economic activity. How do you factor the impact of improving global liquidity conditions into your outlook for 2020? BCA: It is undeniable that global liquidity conditions have eased massively. As we already highlighted, the majority of global central banks cutting rates is a very positive dynamic for global growth. Trends in measures of liquidity ratify this message. Foreign exchange reserves are again growing and our BCA US Financial Liquidity index has rallied sharply over the past 12 months. Historically, this indicator forecasts the trend in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator, commodity prices and EM export prices by 18 months (Chart 15). Moreover, money aggregates are growing faster than credit across the major advanced economies. Such developments typically foretell an acceleration in global economic activity (Chart 16). Chart 15Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Chart 16Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing The duration of the current slowdown also warrants optimism. We have often highlighted that since the early 1990s, the global manufacturing sector evolves over 36-month symmetric cycles (Chart 17). The current soft patch has lasted more than 18 months. In the context of easing liquidity and depleted inventories, pent-up demand can easily translate into actual spending. The recent surge in the new orders-to-inventories ratio confirms that global manufacturing activity should soon pick up (Chart 18). The auto sector’s weakness, which was exacerbated by previous inventory buildups, changing emission standards, and rising borrowing costs, is also ebbing. Chart 17The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth Chart 18The New Order-To-Inventory Ratio Points To A Global Rebound Various growth indicators are sniffing out this positive inflection point. The recent trough in the global ZEW survey is revealing (Chart 19). It materialized quickly after Sino-US trade tensions began to ease. Enough positive global economic momentum exists such that a minor decline in policy uncertainty could unleash a large improvement in growth expectations. The rebound in Taiwanese equities and European luxury stocks confirms that the global economy should soon bottom. There are two things we cannot emphasis enough. First, this is the end game of the business cycle, after which a recession will ensue. Second, investors should not expect the kind of strong synchronized growth rebound witnessed in 2017. Without a Chinese and EM boom, a crucial source of demand will be wanting. Mr. X: What about US growth? The yield curve inverted this summer and deteriorating consumer and business confidence raised the specter of an imminent recession. Moreover, the fiscal stimulus that helped the economy in the first half of 2019 is now over. In fact, with a $1 trillion federal deficit despite an unemployment rate of only 3.6%, we have run out of fiscal room to support activity if and when a recession materializes. BCA: The recent yield curve inversion most likely overstated the risk of an economic contraction. First, in the mid-1990s, if the term premium had been as low as it is today, the curve would have also inverted without any recession materializing from 1995 to 2000. Second, this summer, the curve inverted up to the 5-year tenor and steepened for longer maturities. Prior to recessions, the curve inverts across all maturities. Recessions are not born out of thin air. They are caused by imbalances and tight monetary policy. The large debt buildup and other investment imbalances that have preceded prior US recessions are not yet apparent. Prior to the 1991, 2001 and 2008 recessions, the private sector debt load had increased by 20.6%, 14.6% and 25.6% of GDP in the previous five years, not the current 1.4% run rate. The Fed’s policy is now clearly accommodative. Not only is the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Fed’s favored estimate of the neutral rate of interest, but also real estate, the most interest-rate sensitive economic sector, is rebounding. In 2018, real estate activity collapsed in response to mortgage rates rising to 4.9%. Today, the NAHB Homebuilding index has retraced 79% of its losses; mortgage demand has improved; and housing starts and building permits have recovered (Chart 20). When policy is tight, real estate activity never recovers this quickly, even as yields fall. Chart 19Positive Signals For Global Growth Chart 20The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative Chart 21Robust Household Financial Health A counterargument is that real estate price appreciation is weak. However, tight monetary policy is not the cause. Two forces are dampening house prices. First, the Jobs and Tax Act of 2017 lowered allowable mortgage interest and state and local tax deductions. High-end properties in high-tax states such as California, New York and Massachusetts have suffered from this adjustment. Second, the US housing market has an overhang of large, pricey homes relative to strong demand for smaller, starter homes. Median home prices outpacing average ones show this divergence. We also to need to gauge if consumer spending is likely to follow the manufacturing sector lower. If it does, a recession will be unavoidable. On this front, we are hopeful because: The outlook for household income is positive. As you noted, the unemployment rate is still extraordinarily low, and more Americans will be working by the end of 2020 than today. Additionally, the rising employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers is tightly linked to stronger wages (Chart 21). Also, the recent pick up in productivity growth points to higher real wage growth. The household savings rate is elevated and has limited upside. Households already have a large cushion insulating them from unforeseen shocks. At 8.1% of disposable income, the savings rate is in the 65th percentile of its post-1980 distribution. It is especially lofty if we take into account robust American households’ net worth (Chart 21, bottom panel). Consumer credit demand is rising, according to the Fed’s Senior Loan officer survey. Since household liquid assets are quickly expanding and the household formation rate is robust, consumption of durable goods should pick up, especially in light of the large decrease in borrowing costs. This is particularly true since the household debt-to-assets ratio is at its lowest level since 1985 and debt-servicing costs only represent 9.7% of disposable income, the lowest share for nearly 40 years. The corporate sector outlook should brighten soon. The modest rise in productivity protects margins from higher wages, an effect that will linger given that capacity expansion is consistent with further productivity gains (Chart 22). Crucially, the combined fiscal and monetary easing in China should bolster capital-spending intentions around the world, including the US (Chart 23). Rising productivity will only consolidate these trends. Chart 22Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Chart 23Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending The most positive development for the US corporate sector is our outlook for non-US growth. If the global manufacturing sector mends itself, so will the US. Ample liquidity is a positive for the world economy, as well as for US manufacturing conditions (Chart 24). On the fiscal front, we appreciate your worries, but they are not a story for 2020. The US fiscal thrust will not be as positive as it was in 2018 or 2019, but it is set to remain a small tailwind, not a drag. Furthermore, given that 2020 is an election year it is unlikely that politicians will tighten purse strings over the coming 12 months. Fiscal risks are undoubtedly greater in the long run. However, a sudden fiscal consolidation is a remote probability because fiscal austerity has gone out of style. Instead, the federal debt burden will be a major source of long-term inflation because there is no other easy way to address this gigantic pile of liabilities. The path of least resistance will be more spending and financial repression. In other words, real rates will stay too low and excess government spending will push prices higher, conveniently eroding the real value of that high federal debt burden. This was a big story in the 20th century and it will remain so in the 21st (Chart 25), especially since an aging population and the peak in globalization will weigh on global savings. Chart 24The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course Chart 25Inflation Is About Political Decisions Ms. X: Your point about demographics makes me think of Europe and Japan. Brexit has not been resolved; populism remains a concern in Italy; and the European banking system is still fragile. Japan suffers from an even worse demographic profile and the recent VAT increase was ill-timed, economically. Given these headwinds, can these regions participate in the global recovery you foresee? BCA: The short answer is yes, albeit to varying degrees. The outlook for Europe is more promising than Japan. A No-Deal Brexit is now a very low probability event, even after next month’s UK election. The conservatives’ support for Prime Minister Johnson’s Brexit plan will ensure as much. A large source of uncertainty is being lifted, which will allow European businesses to resume investment planning. The situation in the European periphery is also improving. Non-performing loans in Spain and Italy are falling (Chart 26), which is allowing for a normalization of credit origination. The narrowing Italian and peripheral spreads to German bunds will be helped by easing financial conditions in the European economies that need it most. Higher Italian bond prices improve banks’ solvency and cut borrowing costs for the private sector. Finally, populism is alive and well in Europe, rejecting fiscal austerity, but not embracing euro-skepticism. More generous fiscal spending would be a positive for Europe. European liquidity conditions are also generous. Deposit growth has strengthened and financial conditions have benefited from lower German yields and a cheap euro, which trades 15% below fair-value estimates. Our model for European banks’ return on tangible equity is rising, which is a clear indication that easy financial and liquidity conditions should deliver stronger incremental economic activity (Chart 27). Chart 26Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Chart 27European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 The fiscal outlook is murkier. European fiscal thrust was a positive 0.4% of GDP in 2019, but it will decline to 0.1% in 2020. However, fiscal policy affects economic activity with a lag. The impact of this year’s easing has yet to be fully felt. Since European rates are so low and the economy is not operating at full capacity, the fiscal multiplier is greater than one. Therefore, Europe can still reap a substantial fiscal dividend next year. Finally, Europe remains a very pro-cyclical economy. A large share of euro area GDP is connected to manufacturing and exports. As a result, Europe will be one of the prime beneficiaries of a pickup in global growth. Already, the sharp rebound in the German and euro area ZEW survey expectation components point to a brighter outlook for the region. Japan is also a very pro-cyclical economy, which will reap a dividend from a bottom in global manufacturing activity. However, the Land of the Rising Sun is still subject to idiosyncratic constraints. Japanese financial conditions have not improved as much as those in Europe. The yen has appreciated 2.6% in trade-weighted terms this year, while Japanese yields have not melted as much as European ones (because Italian and peripheral yields fell so much in 2019). Japan will also have to reckon with the impact of the October VAT increase. Ahead of the tax hike, retail sales spiked by 9.1% on a year-on-year basis, or 7.1% compared to the previous month, a script similar to 2014. 2015 was a payback year where consumption was depressed. This scenario will play out again, even if the Abe government has implemented some fiscal offsets. Ultimately, the Japanese economy will lag Europe’s in the first half of the year but should catch up in the second half. The impact of the tax hike will dissipate. Most importantly, rebounding global growth will hurt the yen, at least on a trade-weighted basis, providing a lift to export prospects and easing Japanese financial conditions relative to the rest of the world, which will produce a growth dividend later in 2020. Ms. X: To summarize, you expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. EM activity will also pick up but will not generate fireworks. The US will be okay but Europe will probably deliver the largest positive growth surprise as external and domestic conditions align positively. Japan will also stabilize on the back of stronger global growth, but domestic headwinds mean that a true reacceleration won’t happen until the latter part of the year. This recovery constitutes the business cycle’s end game as inflation will become a concern in 2021, forcing the Fed to tighten then. BCA: Yes, this is correct. Ms. X: Thank you! Bond Market Prospects Chart 28Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Ms. X: I do not like US Treasuries at current yields. They do not protect me against an inflation surprise and will do nothing for me in an economic recovery. However, my bearishness is tempered by the large stock of bonds with negative yields in Europe and Japan. As long as this strange situation persists, I doubt US yields will experience much upside. US paper is too attractive to foreign asset managers right now. BCA: We share your view and are recommending an underweight to global government bonds. Global yields offer little value and are vulnerable to a rebound in economic activity or a trade détente. Our Global Bond Valuation index is flashing a clear sell signal (Chart 28). As yields rise, global yield curves are bound to steepen. We also agree that the upside for Treasury yields is limited, but we disagree with the limiting factor. Foreign investors are not the major buyers of Treasuries. Indeed, the data shows that European and Japanese investors have not been aggressive purchasers of US government securities. The US yield curve is flat and US short rates tower above European and Japanese ones, hedging currency exposure when buying Treasuries is expensive. In euro or yen terms, a hedged Treasury yields -67 basis points and -60 basis points, less than 10-year bunds or JGBs, respectively. Meanwhile, EM central banks are diversifying their FX reserves away from the US dollar into gold. Instead, our view is governed by the concept we dub the “Golden Rule of Treasury Investing.” According to this principle, the outperformance of Treasuries relative to cash is a direct function of the Fed’s ability to surprise the market. If the Fed cuts rates more than the OIS curve anticipated 12 months prior, Treasuries outperform. The opposite happens if the Fed delivers a hawkish surprise (Chart 29). Chart 29The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone, because the OIS curve is now only pricing in 28 basis points of rate cuts over the next year. It is not just the US OIS curve that has priced out a large amount of rate cuts; this phenomenon has materialized around the world over the past five weeks. Chart 30The Term Premium Is Too Low Any upside risk to that 2.25% to 2.5% forecast for 2020 will come from the inflation expectations and term premium components of yields. Central banks, including the Fed, have telegraphed an intention to allow inflation expectations to rise, initially, in response to stronger global growth. Moreover, declining risk aversion should also allow the exceptionally depressed term premium to normalize (Chart 30). Only in late 2020 or early 2021 will Treasury yields durably move above this 2.25-2.5% zone. Punching above these levels will require core PCE inflation to have been above target long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations back up to their 2.3% to 2.5% target zone. Only then will the Fed give the all-clear signal to the bond market to lift yields higher. Mr. X: You still have not directly addressed the question of negative yields in Europe and Japan. This story will not end well. Do you worry about these bond markets over the next year? BCA: Our answer is an emphatic yes. But we assume you will not let us leave it at that. Mr. X: You know me too well. BCA: Over the course of the past 50 years, we have learned a thing or two about you. In all seriousness, let’s start with our simple but effective valuation ranking. It compares the current level of real yields for each country to their historical averages and standard deviations. You can see that the most unattractive bond markets right now are all in Europe (Chart 31). Chart 31European Bonds Are Too Dear Chart 32Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition The lower bound of interest rates is another reason to avoid these markets. This floor seems to lie around -1% in nominal terms. Because of these constraints, in recent months, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch and German 10-year bonds have failed to rally as much as their higher-yielding US, Canadian or Australian counterparts when global yields are declining. However, they also underperform when yields are rising (Chart 32). They have become a lose-lose proposition. The only pockets of value left in DM bond markets are Greece, Portugal or Italy. Despite their apparent risks, we still like them. Support for the euro in Greece and Italy is 70% and 65%, respectively. Even populist governments in these nations are reluctant to attack euro membership anymore. Moreover, the ECB remains committed to the survival of the euro area in its current form. Christine Lagarde will not change that. For 2020 or 2021, the risk of euro breakup is practically zero. The same may not be true on a 5- to 10-year investment horizon, but for the coming year, these bonds offer an attractive risk-adjusted carry. Ms. X: Unsurprisingly, my father does not like corporate bonds because of highly levered corporate balance sheets. I think this is a long-term problem, but not a risk for 2020, so I’m looking to stay overweight spread product relative to Treasuries. Where do you stand on this market? BCA: On this issue, we sit somewhere between you both. Our Corporate Health Monitor continues to deteriorate (Chart 33). The high debt load of the US business sector coupled with the decline of the return on capital worries us. Furthermore, the covenant-lite trend in recent issuance suggests that corporate borrowers, not lenders, are getting the good deals. Essentially, too much cash is still chasing too little available yield pick-up. In this environment, capital is sure to be misallocated, and money ultimately lost. We find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. On a short-term basis, the spreads will not widen much. An easy Fed, recovering global growth, and the gigantic pile of negative-yielding bonds around the world will make sure of that. We advocate a neutral stance on investment grade corporates because IG bonds have high modified duration such that breakeven spread compensation versus Treasuries is near the bottom of its historical distribution across the IG credit spectrum (Chart 34). This means that credit will generate poor returns if government bond yields rise. Chart 33Dangerous Long-Term Picture For US Corporates Chart 34No Value Left In IG Chart 35EMs Still Experiencing Deflation Thankfully, they are ways around this problem: emphasizing exposure to high-yield (HY) bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) instead. HY breakeven spreads remain much more attractive than in the IG space, and option-adjusted spreads will benefit if our growth and inflation forecasts materialize. Investors reluctant to commit capital to these products should look into high quality agency MBS. After the recent wave of mortgage refinancing, these securities’ duration has collapsed to 3.0 compared to 7.9 for IG corporates. These securities therefore offer much better protection in a rising-yield environment. Ms. X: Before we move on to equities, where do you stand on EM bonds? BCA: We need to differentiate between EM local-currency bonds and EM USD-denominated bonds. We do like some EM local currency bonds. Inflation in EM countries is low and dropping. Money and credit growth is slowing, which implies that the disinflationary trend will remain in place through 2020 (Chart 35). Weaker nominal growth means that central banks in EM will continue to cut rates, providing a nice tailwind for local-currency bond prices. This comes with a caveat. Lower policy rates will boost bond prices but hurt EM currencies, especially because most EM currencies are not cheap and are already over-owned. Next year, it will be preferable to garner exposure to those countries interest rate moves via the swap market rather than the cash bond market. Chart 36The Mexican Peso Is Cheap There are some exceptions, like Mexico. The MXN is already very cheap because of fears surrounding the economic policies of President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador (AMLO) (Chart 36). However, we doubt he will turn out to be as dangerous as feared. Hence, MXN Mexican bonds are attractive to foreign investors in unhedged terms. We are currently avoiding EM USD-denominated debt, corporate and sovereign. Since emerging markets sport $5.1 trillion of dollar-denominated debt, falling EM exchange rates will increase the cost of servicing this debt, which makes it riskier. Mr. X: I think we will continue to underweight corporate and EM bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. I must admit that I find your recommendation to overweight MBS intriguing. We will need to ponder this idea further. Ms. X: And please wish me luck trying to convince my father to buy some high-yield bonds. Equity Market Outlook Mr. X: US stocks are too expensive for my taste, with the S&P 500 trading at a forward P/E ratio of 18. I’m well aware of the argument that equities may be expensive but that they are actually cheap compared to bonds, which implies that I should favor stocks over bonds. However, you know that I emphasize capital preservation. With stocks this rich already, equities offer no margin of safety. If I own stocks, I am therefore exposed to any unexpected shocks. Because I do not share your optimism on the economy, I am more worried about downside risk. Moreover, even if the economy performs better than I fear, I suspect stocks will respond poorly to higher yields. Chart 37The S&P Is Very Expensive Ms. X: I agree with my father that stocks are expensive. Nonetheless, as Keynes famously quipped, “Markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” In today’s context, to me this means that stocks can ignore their overvaluation so long as liquidity is plentiful, rates are low, and a recession is avoided. BCA: On this question, we agree with Ms. X. We all agree that US equities are expensive. As you mentioned, their price-to-earnings ratio is 18. Only at the apex of the tech bubble and in early 2018 was the S&P 500 more expensive. Worryingly, the price-to-sales ratio is at 2.3, an even larger historical outlier than the P/E (Chart 37). Chart 38Low Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Ms. X is correct that we cannot look at stock valuations in isolation. Investing is about opportunity cost and the macroeconomic context. On this front, even US equities have their merit. Despite the S&P 500’s expensive multiples, our Composite Valuation Indicator is no more elevated than it was in 2013. Meanwhile, our Monetary Indicator has rarely been as supportive of stock prices as it is today, and our Speculation Indicator is in line with its January 2016 reading (Chart 38). Moreover, BCA’s Composite Sentiment indicator is still below its long-term historical average and margin debt has declined by $47.5 billion to the lowest share of US market capitalization since June 2005. These are hardly signs of irrational exuberance. Ultimately, bear markets and recessions travel together. A durable 20% drop in stock prices requires a significant and long-lasting decline in earnings. These developments happen during recessions (Chart 39). Our call is for a recession in the next 24 months or so. We must also remember that while equities perform poorly six months ahead of a recession, the end of a bull market, its last 12 to 18 months, tend to be very rewarding (Table 3). We are within this window. Chart 39Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Table 3The End Game Can Be Rewarding Based on our forecast for interest rates, we do not share the concerns that rising bond yields will topple stocks right away. Stock prices are an inverse function of risk-free rates, but a positive function of growth expectations. Higher yields will initially reflect stronger growth, not restrict it. But remember: the upside for yields is limited because central banks do not want to choke off the recovery. They will maintain accommodative policy. In other words, we expect real rates to lag behind growth expectations. Because long-term growth expectations, whether from sell-side analysts or extracted out of market prices using the Gordon Growth Model, are low, we are willing to make this bet (Chart 40). Equities will suffer if the global bond yield rises above 2.5%. This is more a story for 2021, and not our central scenario for 2020. It is nonetheless a reminder that we are entering the end game of the business cycle, so we are also entering the end-game of the bull market. Mr. X: I think you are playing with fire. Stocks are so expensive that if you are wrong on either the growth call or the yield call, they will suffer. I would rather miss the last melt-up in stocks than unnecessarily expose my portfolio to a meltdown. Additionally, you have not addressed the fact that S&P 500 margins have begun to soften but are still extremely elevated. Shouldn’t this dampen your optimism? BCA: Aggregate S&P 500 margins have some downside. Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion index and Corporate Pricing Power indicator all remain weak (Chart 41). The deceleration in the crude PPI excluding food and energy and the past strength in the dollar confirm this insight, especially as the corporate wage bill climbs in a tight labor market. The biggest mitigating factor is that productivity is also on the mend, which curbs the negative impact of higher worker pay. Chart 40Growth Expectations Are Muted Chart 41US Margins Under Pressure This danger must be put into perspective though. Margin expansion has been dominated by the tech sector (Chart 42). Excluding this industry, S&P 500 margins are roughly in line with their previous peak, and are not declining. The aggregate softness in margins is a reflection of the sharper decline in tech margins. Declining margins do not spell the imminent end of the bull market either. Table 4 shows that on average, the S&P 500 rises by 9.5% following the peak in margins. Equities can rise after margins crest because this is often an environment where wages are climbing, which boosts consumption. Consequently, top-line growth can accelerate and earnings can rise even if they represent a lower proportion of sales. This is the environment we foresee over 2020. Chart 42Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Table 4Margin Peaks Do Not Spell S&P Doom Chart 43Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Ms. X: You have talked about the tech sector being a drag on overall margins. How would you position a US stock portfolio? BCA: First, around the world, we prefer cyclical sectors to defensive ones. Cyclical stocks are depressed relative to defensive firms’ shares. Rebounding global growth and rising bond yields will favor cyclical sectors. Globally, the performance of cyclical equities relative to defensive ones correlates with Taiwanese equities, which are currently rallying smartly (Chart 43). This suggests that at the margin, the most cyclical asset markets are beginning to express optimism about global growth. Within the S&P 500, our favorite pair trade to express this bias is to overweight energy stocks at the expense of utilities. Utilities are bond proxies which will substantially underperform energy stocks when the rate of change of Treasury yields moves up (Chart 44). Moreover, based on our valuation indicators, energy stocks have never traded at such a deep discount to utilities, nor have they ever been as oversold. Chart 44Favor Energy Over Utilities Second, we are currently neutral on tech stocks but have put them on a downgrade alert. Tech equities are expensive, trading at a forward P/E ratio 21% above the other cyclicals. Moreover, since software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown, it will likely lag investment in machinery and structures when industrial demand rebounds. Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Tech multiples will also suffer when bond yields rise. As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate We implement this view by way of an underweight in tech and an overweight to industrials. Industrials have suffered disproportionately from the trade war. Any near term truce is unlikely to contain a grand bargain on intellectual property rights transfer that galvanizes tech exports, but it will remove some of the uncertainty weighing on industrials. Moreover, industrials are a much cheaper play on a global growth rebound. The global manufacturing slowdown has caused industrial equities to trade at their greatest discount to the tech sector since the financial crisis. Finally, the wage bill for the industrial sector is melting relative to tech, and our margin proxy is surging (Chart 45). This has created a very positive backdrop for this pair trade. We also like financials. They will be a key beneficiary of rising yields and a steepening yield curve. Additionally, household credit demand has picked up and overall credit growth should accelerate as central banks will maintain very accommodative monetary conditions. The yield impulse already points toward higher bank credit growth and companies are issuing an increasingly large stock of bonds (Chart 46). Chart 45Operating Metrics Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Chart 46Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Ms. X: When combining valuation analysis with your fundamental sectoral slant, I am guessing that you must favor European, Japanese and EM stocks over the S&P 500? BCA: We do favor European and Japanese equities. Based on valuation alone, all the regions you mentioned offer higher expected long-term real rates of return than the US (Chart 47). Moreover, the dollar is expensive relative to advanced economies’ currencies. Hence, these markets are cheaper vehicles than the S&P 500 to bet on a global economic recovery. But valuation alone is not enough. US stocks are trading at unprecedented levels relative to global equities because of the FAANG craze (Chart 48). Looking at sector representation, our positive view on non-tech cyclicals also flatters exposure to Europe and Japan (Table 5). Chart 47Non US Equities Offer Better Value Chart 48FAANG-Driven US Outperformance Table 5Equity Market Sector Composition Chart 49European Banks Are Cheap Europe is particularly attractive because of its large skew towards industrials and financials, which represent 32.3% of the market versus 22.3% in the US. Moreover, European financials are also a tantalizing bet because they trade at a 50% discount to US financials, according to their price-to-book ratio. Additionally, their return on tangible equity will benefit from higher German yields, easing financial conditions, declining non-performing loans in the periphery and rebounding global growth. Our RoE model for European banks already points to a resurgence in their stock prices (Chart 49). Of the major markets we track, Japan offers the highest prospective long-term real returns. Its strong cyclical slant and low share of tech stocks means it is another market investors should overweight to bet on a global recovery. The biggest problem for Japanese equities is the yen. When global yields climb higher, a weak JPY will clip some of the Nikkei’s gains for foreign investors. Finally, we are reluctant to overweight EM stocks just yet. In this space, median P/E ratios are much higher than on a market capitalization-weighted basis (Chart 50). State-owned companies explain this bifurcation, Chinese banks in particular. Since we expect Chinese banks to remain a conduit for policy, credit origination may flatter economic growth more than shareholders’ interests. Moreover, we have a negative outlook on EM currencies, and hedging this exposure is expensive. Finally, if China’s economic activity improves only modestly in 2020, the 2012 experience suggests that EM stocks can still underperform the global equity universe as global growth improves and yields rise (Chart 51). In other words, we find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. Chart 50EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet Chart 51EM Stocks Can Underperform When Global Growth Improves Mr. X: Thank you. I am still not sure what share of our portfolio will be dedicated to stocks. However, I think that whatever this proportion will be, buying global equities makes more sense than US ones. Your valuation argument alone is swaying me, considering my more conservative instincts. Ms. X: I’m glad we will not have to argue on this point, but I know we will nonetheless battle on the stock/bond/gold split. Should we move on to your currency and commodity forecasts? BCA: It would be our pleasure. Currencies And Commodities Mr. X: You have often argued that the dollar is a countercyclical currency. Based on our discussion so far, you must expect the dollar to decline until we get closer to the next recession. I am not fully convinced. Specifically, I remember that in the back half of 2016 global growth was rebounding, but the dollar soared. Therefore, the growth/dollar relationship can be more complex than you argue. Meanwhile, with negative interest rates in Europe, Japan and Switzerland, why would I even consider divesting out of my positive yielding dollar assets? Chart 52The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency BCA: You raise interesting questions, and you are correct that we expect the dollar to depreciate if our constructive view on global growth pans out for 2020. The inverse relationship between global industrial production (excluding the US) and the trade-weighted dollar is unambiguous (Chart 52). As you also mentioned, the reality is a little bit more nuanced. To understand why, it is important to remember how currencies function. We can think of an exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism that solves for the gap in growth between any two countries. This is at the root of the dollar’s counter-cyclicality. When global growth is picking up, returns tend to be higher in cyclical markets, which are highly concentrated outside of the US. Flows then gravitate from the US to other markets and the dollar declines. After a while, the dollar becomes cheap enough that these flows reverse. In the second half of 2016, three factors drove the dollar rebound. First, US manufacturing was improving at a faster pace than that of the rest of the world. Second, the Fed resumed its interest rate hikes, so interest rate differentials suddenly flattered the dollar anew. Finally, the election of President Trump, who campaigned on large scale fiscal stimulus, elicited memories of the Reagan dollar bull market of the first half of the 1980s. These factors eventually faded as global growth rebounded. Today, the Fed’s policies are hurting the dollar. Aside from recent interest rate cuts, the Fed has been injecting liquidity into the banking system through repurchase agreements and renewed asset (T-Bills) purchases. Moreover, the rate cuts are also easing global funding conditions and promoting a re-steepening of the yield curve. This will incentivize banks to lend and boost the US money supply. As growth re-accelerates and demand for imports (machinery, commodities, and consumer goods) rises, the current account deficit will widen further. This process will increase the international supply of dollars. Historically, these dynamics usually hurt the dollar. What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. Like you, we are deeply uncomfortable with negative interest rates. Thankfully, the nascent pickup in global economic activity is lifting global bond yields. So far, foreign bond markets have led this move. More specifically, countries that have suffered most from the global manufacturing slowdown are now seeing their bond yields rise the quickest (Chart 53). For example, yields in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen by a lot more than those in the US since global yields troughed in September. Should the initial signals of stabilization in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, the US yield advantage will evaporate. In a nutshell, interest rates might be negative in Europe and Switzerland, but the positive carry offered by US assets is rapidly fading. Chart 53AAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Chart 53BAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Chart 54Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries For international investors, the currency risk inherent in owning US bonds is just too large at the current juncture. Remember, the trade-weighted dollar stands 25% above its long-term equilibrium and the US twin deficits are expanding. Markets priced in cheap currencies with some potential upside, such as Australia, Canada, Norway or even the European periphery, might be better bets. Flows highlight just how precarious the situation is for the US dollar. Since last August, overall flows into the US Treasury market have been negative. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive at an annualized US$180 billion, but they are clearly rolling over. Moreover, official net outflows are running at $350 billion, easily cancelling out the private sector’s inflows (Chart 54). Essentially, foreigners’ appetite for US fixed-income assets is waning exactly as interest rate differentials have started moving against the dollar. Ms. X: I share my father’s concerns, but how would you implement your negative dollar view. Which currencies should I be loading up on as we enter the business cycle’s end game? BCA: The more export-dependent economies (and currencies) should benefit the most from a rebound in global growth. Within the G-10, we particularly like the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone and the British pound. Bond yields for these currencies are rising the fastest vis-à-vis the US. As a result, the currencies themselves should soon follow (previously mentioned Chart 53). We also expect commodity currencies to benefit, but only upon clearer signs that the resource-thirsty Chinese economy is improving. Until then, they are likely to lag the pro-cyclical European currencies, which are less directly dependent on Chinese stimulus. The euro could become the greatest beneficiary from a weaker dollar because a large headwind for European economic activity is disappearing for now. For the past ten years, European real interest rates have been too low for the most productive, competitive exporter – Germany – but too high for others such as Spain and Italy. Consequently, the euro has been caught in a tug-of-war between a rising neutral rate of interest for Germany and a very low one for the peripheral economies. Via its rate cuts, asset purchase programs, and aggressive TLTRO packages, the ECB may have now finally eased policy to the point where nearly all Eurozone countries enjoy an accommodative monetary environment. 10-year government bond yields in France, Spain, Portugal and even Italy now all sit close to the neutral rate of interest for the entire eurozone (Chart 55). Chart 55The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough Finally, the euro is likely to benefit from inflows into European equity markets. The euro’s drop since 2018 has eased financial conditions and made euro area businesses more competitive. This is an important tailwind for European corporate profits and thus stocks. Moreover, European equities, especially those in the periphery, remain unloved, as illustrated by their cheap valuations compared to other advanced economies. Additionally, analysts’ earnings expectations for eurozone equities are perking up relative to US stocks. If the sell-side is right, powerful inflows into the region will lift the euro in 2020. Mr. X: Thank you. I find it difficult to share your enthusiasm for the euro, a currency backed by such a flimsy edifice. While I would agree that it could rebound next year, I find currencies highly unpredictable on such a time horizon. I prefer to think about them on a long-term basis, and while the euro is cheap, its weak institutional underpinning is too concerning. Let’s move on to commodities. Following our meeting last year, we took your advice on oil and gold. Overall, these calls helped our portfolio. Going forward, these markets are extremely perplexing. There is so much risk in oil markets, such as the tensions in the Middle East and the uncertainty stemming from the trade war between the US and China. How would you recommend playing the oil market in 2020? Chart 56Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil BCA: Your assessment of these markets is spot on. Yet, price risk is skewed to the upside because fiscal and monetary stimulus will revive commodity demand. The oil-producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia will continue to restrain production, and will probably extend its 1.2mm b/d production cut due to expire at the end of March to year-end 2020. In the US, market-imposed capital discipline will keep reducing the growth of US shale-oil supply. Additionally, US shale-oil supply growth is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Ms. X: What about the demand side of the oil markets? The fall in the growth rate of demand this year caught most participants off guard. What do you make of that? BCA: Demand data shows a lot of lingering weakness, much of which was caused by tight financial conditions last year in the US and China. But now, most global central banks are pursuing highly accommodative monetary policy and many governments are also easing fiscal policy. As a result, this demand weakness will fade next year. We think next year growth will clock in at 1.4mm b/d. Not as robust as 2017, but still respectable. This should stop the downward pressure on oil prices that has prevailed since May (Chart 56). Mr. X: You’re describing a fairly strong market for next year. What are the downside risks to your view? BCA: Global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. Uncertainty is one of the key factors driving demand for USD, which is one of the most popular safe havens in the world (Chart 57). A strong dollar creates a headwind for commodity demand. It raises the local-currency costs of consumers in the EM economies that drive oil demand, and lowers production costs outside of the US, encouraging supply growth at the margin. Chart 57Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Has Kept The USD Well Bid Chart 58Gold: A Valuable Portfolio Hedge Ms. X: So, pulling it all together, what is your call for 2020? BCA: The weaker 2019 demand data and the upward revisions to global oil inventories pushed our 2020 Brent Oil forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We still expect WTI to trade at a $4/bbl discount to Brent. As we mentioned earlier, the risk to our forecast is to the upside: a resolution of the US-China trade war, and lower global economic policy uncertainty could trigger a sharp rally in crude prices. Mr. X: Thank you for your insight on oil. I would like to hear your thoughts on gold. You can tell that I see little absolute value in stocks or bonds at the moment, so I have an outsized preference for the yellow metal this year. Also, how could the US dollar and gold both rally at the same time in 2019? BCA: Let’s start with your dollar/gold question. It is very rare to see gold and the dollar rally together. Normally a strong dollar hurts gold. As you know, we’ve been recommending an allocation to gold since 2017, mostly as a portfolio hedge. We like that gold strongly outperforms other safe havens in equity bear markets and can participate in the upside (even if to a limited extent) in bull markets. We think the safe-haven properties of gold and the US dollar really have come to the fore over the past couple of years (Chart 58). Economic policy uncertainty, and divisive politics globally have raised the level of uncertainty to record levels. In such an environment, the dollar and gold both provide a safe haven and a portfolio hedge. Hence, their joint popularity this past year. We should also remember that gold is a good inflation hedge, and is particularly negatively correlated with real interest rates. A Fed that is willing to let the economy overheat is a Fed that will limit how high real rates climb. Moreover, global liquidity is plentiful. Finally, EM central banks have been slowly divesting from Treasuries and diversifying into gold lately, buying most of the new supply in the process. This backdrop, along with our forecast of a weaker dollar, should support gold again in 2020. That being said, because gold is tactically overbought and could face temporary headwinds if global uncertainty recedes, we prefer silver, which is not as stretched. Furthermore, silver’s higher industrial use means that it should also benefit from a global manufacturing recovery. Geopolitics Chart 59Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Mr. X: Let’s return to geopolitical and policy risks, both of which abound. Global economic policy uncertainty is the highest it has been since academics began measuring it. The world is fraught with populism, authoritarianism, war, immigration, technological disruption, inequality, and corruption. With so much chaos, and so little consensus, is there anything solid for an investor to grasp about the political backdrop next year? BCA: Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to short circuit this long bull market, given that the Federal Reserve, the usual culprit, has paused its rate tightening campaign. On a secular basis, geopolitical risk is rising because the United States’ national power is declining relative to that of other world powers (Chart 59). China’s rise, in particular, is stirring conflict with the US and its allies in the western Pacific. Beijing’s technological and military advance is generating fear across the American political establishment. Russia and China continue to deepen their relationship in the face of an increasingly unpredictable United States. These strategic tensions will persist despite any tariff ceasefire with China. Chart 60Globalization Has Peaked Competition among the great powers makes for a world of contested authority. As the rules of the road have become less certain, the tailwind behind international trade and investment has weakened (Chart 60). Deglobalization is a headwind for the earnings of large cap global companies in the long run. Emerging markets, which are exposed to trade, face persistent unrest. Mr. X: Given the above, how can an investor take an optimistic view of the global economy and markets next year? BCA: We have a framework for analyzing politics: constraints over preferences. We cannot predict what the chief politicians will prefer at any given time, but we can try to identify and measure the constraints that will restrict their freedom of movement. With global growth slowing, world leaders have become more sensitive to their constraints. The Fed has reversed rate hikes; China is easing policy; President Trump has refrained from attacking Iran; and President Trump and President Xi are negotiating a ceasefire. The UK has avoided a “no deal” Brexit – not once but twice. In short, the risk of recession (or conflict) has been sufficient to alter the policy trajectory. As a result, there is a prospect for global geopolitical risks to abate somewhat in 2020. Both the American and Chinese administrations need to see growth stabilize despite their ongoing strategic conflict. Both the British and European governments need to avoid a disorderly Brexit despite their lack of clarity beyond that. Geopolitical risk is declining, albeit from an extremely elevated level. Mr. X: The US and China have already come close to a deal only to get cold feet and back away from it. The British Prime Minister is committed to leaving the EU with or without a deal. Surely you cannot believe that the Middle East, Russia, other emerging markets, or North Korea will be any bastion of stability. BCA: The US-China trade war is still the single greatest threat to the equity bull market. Brexit is not resolved and a new deadline for a trade deal looms at the end of 2020. Investors must remain vigilant and hedge their portfolios, particularly with gold. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore this year’s reaffirmation of the Fed put, the China put, and Trump’s “Art of the Deal.” The base case for next year should be constructive, albeit with vigilant attention to the major risks: President Trump, China and Iran. The other issues you mention have varying degrees of market relevance. Russia is focusing on pacifying domestic discontent. North Korea is on a diplomatic track with the United States. Emerging market unrest is particularly relevant where it can have a bearing on global stability: Iraq, Iran and Hong Kong in particular. Ms. X: If I may interject: It seems to me that the worst of the trade war has passed, that the risk of a no-deal Brexit is negligible, and that Iran is unlikely to outdo its attack against Saudi Arabia in September. Doesn’t this imply that geopolitical risk is overrated and that investors should rush to capture the risk premium in equities? BCA: What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. After all, any fall in global risks will be amply made up for by the impending rise in US domestic political risk. Indeed, US politics are the chief source of global political risk in 2020. First, if President Trump becomes a “lame duck” then he could take actions that are hugely disruptive to global markets in a desperate attempt to win reelection as a “war president.” Chart 61European Political Risk Is Now Low Second, if President Trump is reelected, then his disruptive populism will have a new mandate and his “America First” foreign and trade policy will be unshackled. Third, if the opposition Democrats succeed in unseating an incumbent president, they will likely take the Senate too, removing the main hurdle to a dramatic policy change. That would mark the third 180-degree reversal in national policy in 12 years. Moreover, investors may find the country merely exchanged right-wing populism for left-wing populism, which has a more negative impact on corporate earnings prospects. Polarization and institutional erosion will continue. The election results may be razor thin; swing states may have to recount votes; and the outcome could hinge on rare or unprecedented developments in the Electoral College, the Supreme Court or cyberspace. A crisis of legitimacy could easily afflict the next administration. In short, there are few scenarios in which US political risk does not rise over the next 12-24 months. Rising American risk stands in stark contrast to Europe (Chart 61), where the will to integrate has overcome several challenges since the sovereign debt crisis. Substantial majority of voters support the euro and the European Union. Germany is on the brink of a major political succession but it is not turning its back on the European project. France is successfully pursuing structural reforms. Italy remains the weakest link, but even the populist Northern League accepts the euro. This leaves two remaining global risks: China and Iran. Chinese political risk is generally understated. President Xi Jinping, lacking President Trump’s electoral constraint, could overestimate his leverage. He could overreach in the trade talks, in his battle to prevent excessive debt growth, or in his handling of Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, or Iran. The result could be a breakdown in the trade talks or a separate strategic crisis with the United States. Another cold war-style escalation in tensions could easily kill the green shoots in global growth. As for Iran, the regime is under crippling American sanctions and faces unrest both at home and within its regional sphere of influence. There is a non-negligible risk that it will lash out and cause an extended oil supply shock. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground but I remain deeply concerned that staying invested in risk assets today is akin to picking-up pennies in front of a steamroller. I accept your opinion that a recession is unlikely in 2020, but valuations of both stocks and bonds are uncomfortably stretched for my taste. As a result, I believe stocks could suffer whether growth is good or bad next year. Finally, since so many things need to go right for the global economy to continue to defy gravity, a recession may hit faster than you envision. To me, there is simply not enough margin of safety in stocks to compensate me for the risk! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks are high because we are entering the end game of the cycle. But I also see pockets of value, some of which you have mentioned today. Moreover, I am sympathetic to your view that global growth will recover next year. Corporate earnings should therefore expand. Hence, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful, especially because policy is quite accommodative. While stocks may not perform as well as they did in 2019, I expect them to outperform bonds handily. I’m therefore willing to continue holding risk assets, even if I need to be more judicious in my sector and regional allocation. BCA: Your family debate mirrors our own internal discussions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term return prospects. Because so many assets have become more expensive this year, long-term returns are likely to be uninspiring compared to recent history. Table 6 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.4% over the next ten years, or 2.4% after adjusting for inflation. That is a noticeable deterioration from our inflation-adjusted estimate of 2.8% from last year, and also still well below the 6.5% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2019. Table 6Asset Market Return Projections Our outlook for next year hinges on global growth rebounding and policy uncertainty receding. Monetary policy is less of a threat to equities than it was last year because central banks have already eased considerably and have been very open about their willingness to let inflation run above target for a while before retightening the monetary screws. We propose the following list of easy-to-track milestones to monitor whether or not our central scenario for the global economy and asset markets is playing out, and how close we are to the end of the cycle: Chinese money and credit numbers. Chinese credit growth must stabilize for the economy to do so. If credit origination continues to decelerate, this will indicate that Beijing has decided to tolerate the slowdown and prioritize its reform and deleveraging agenda. In this case, the Chinese debt supercycle is over sooner and the global economy will pay the price. Our China Investment Strategy Activity Index. Global policy is accommodative and liquidity conditions have improved significantly. However, if the Chinese economy continues to deteriorate, global growth will not rebound. The China Activity Index must stabilize and even improve somewhat for our global growth view to come to fruition. Progress in the “phase one” deal. China and the US must agree to a trade détente. As long as uncertainty around immediate tariffs remain high and retaliation risks stay alive, global capital spending intentions and thus the global manufacturing sector will be hamstrung. Surveys of global growth. The Global manufacturing PMI and the global growth expectation component of the ZEW survey must both recover. If these variables cannot gain any traction, the global economy is sicker than we estimate and risk assets will suffer. Commodity prices and the dollar. In the first quarter, industrial commodity prices must rebound and the dollar must start to depreciate. These two developments will not only reflect an improvement in global growth. They will also alleviate deflationary pressures around the world, revive profits and sponsor a business spending recovery. Moreover, a weaker dollar will also ease global financial conditions by decreasing the global cost of capital. 10-year inflation breakeven rate. If US breakevens move above the 2.3% to 2.5% zone, the Fed will become more proactive about raising rates. This would provoke a quicker end to the business cycle. President Trump’s approval rating. If President Trump’s approval rating stabilizes below 42%, he could give up on the economy and instead bet on a “rally around the flag” as his best strategy for re-election. This would result in a much more hawkish and confrontational White House that would become an even greater source of uncertainty for the economy, and thus risk asset prices. Ms. X: Thank you for this comprehensive list of variables to monitor. As always, you have left us with much to think about. We look forward to these discussions every year. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: It will be our pleasure. The key points are as follow: Global equities are entering the end game of their nearly 11-year bull market. Stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. As a result, if global growth can recover and the US can avoid a recession in 2020, earnings will not weaken significantly and stocks will again outperform bonds. Low rates reflect the end of the debt supercycle in the advanced economies. However, the debt supercycle is still alive in EM in general, and in China, in particular. The global economic slowdown that begun more than 18 months ago started when China tried to limit debt growth. If Beijing continues to push for more deleveraging, global growth will continue to suffer as the EM debt supercycle will end. Nonetheless, we expect China to try to mitigate domestic deflationary pressures in 2020. As a result, a small wave of Chinese reflation, coupled with the substantial easing in global monetary and liquidity conditions should promote a worldwide re-acceleration in economic activity. Policy uncertainty will recede next year. Domestic constraints are forcing China and the US toward a trade détente. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is now marginal, and President Trump is still the favorite in 2020. A decline in policy risk will foster a global economic rebound. That being said, some pockets of risk remain, such as in the Middle East. Global central banks are highly unlikely to remove the punch bowl anytime soon. Not only will it take some time before global deflationary forces recede, monetary authorities in the G10 want to avoid the Japanification of their economies. As a result, they are already announcing that they will allow inflation to overshoot their 2% target for a period of time. This will ultimately raise the need for higher rates in 2021, which will push the global economy into recession in late 2021, or early 2022. These dynamics are key to our categorization of 2020 as the end game. US growth will re-accelerate. The US consumer remains in good shape thanks to healthy balance sheets and robust employment and wage growth prospects. Meanwhile, corporate profits and capex should benefit from a decline in global uncertainty and a pick-up in global economic activity. China will continue to stimulate its economy but will not do so as aggressively as it did over the past 10 years. Consequently, EM growth will also bottom but is unlikely to boom. Europe and Japan will re-accelerate in 2020. Bond yields will grind higher in 2020. However, Treasury yields are unlikely to break above the 2.25% to 2.5% range until much later in the year. Inflationary pressures won’t resurface quickly, so the Fed is unlikely to signal its intention to raise interest rates until late 2020 or later. European bonds are particularly unattractive. Corporate bonds are a mixed offering. Investment grade credit is unattractive owing to low option-adjusted spreads and high duration, especially when corporate health is deteriorating. Agency mortgage-backed securities and high-yield bonds offer better risk-adjusted value. Global stocks will enjoy their last-gasp rally in 2020. As global growth recovers, favor the more cyclical sectors and regions which also happen to offer the best value. US stocks are the least attractive bourse; they are very expensive and loaded with defensive and tech-related exposure, two groups that could suffer from higher bond yields. We are neutral on EM equities. Investors should pare exposure to equities after inflation breakevens have moved back into their 2.3% to 2.5% normal range and the Fed funds rate has moved closer to neutral. We anticipate this to be a risk in 2021. The dollar is likely to decline because it is a countercyclical currency. Balance of payment dynamics and valuation considerations are also becoming headwinds. The pro-cyclical European currencies and the euro should be the main beneficiary of any dollar depreciation. Oil and gold will have upside next year. Crude will benefit from both supply-side discipline and a recovery in oil demand on the back of the improving growth outlook. Gold will strengthen as global central banks limit the upside to real rates by allowing inflation to run a bit hot. A weaker dollar will flatter both commodities. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.4% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.5% a year between 1982 and 2019. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 22, 2019