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Special Report Highlights US politics are the chief source of global geopolitical risk over the coming year – and likely beyond. President Trump’s reelection remains our base case – the sitting president rarely loses if the economy is expanding. Yet the risk of a Democratic victory is high – Trump’s low approval rating, impending impeachment trial, and various policy troubles threaten his reelection bid. Trump’s tactics and the Democrats’ turn to the progressive left pose threats to BCA Research’s cyclically bullish house equity view. Feature If a time-traveler had accosted you in the fall of 2014 and told you that Donald Trump, the host of the reality TV show The Apprentice, would be the next American president, would you have believed him? What if the time-traveler had gone on to say that President Trump’s unconventional behavior would get him into hot water and that in 2020 he would become the first president in US history to be impeached and removed from office? Granting the premise, the second proposition is easier to imagine. And yet Trump is highly unlikely to be removed from office. He is in fact favored to be reelected. Just as his victory in 2016 proved more likely than the consensus held at the time, so his reelection in 2020 is more likely than the consensus holds today. The reason comes down to political constraints. First, the bar for removal in the Senate is very high. Second, it is easier for a sitting president to get reelected than it is for the opposition to convince voters to start over with something entirely different. Especially if the economy is in decent shape. In what follows we present our quantitative 2020 election model and our qualitative, constraints-based analysis of the election and likely market responses. Trump's fate is only one factor. But US politics is the chief source of market-relevant global political risk over the next 12-24 months. Not A Lame Duck (Yet) After a harrowing year in which global manufacturing slumped due to China’s tight credit policy and Trump’s trade war, the probability of a US recession is now – tentatively – subsiding (Chart 1). This is good news for Trump, whose presidency is hanging by a thread. Chart 1Recession Averted? Or Trump's Death Knell? Chart 2Bookies Expect A Democrat Victory Betting markets like PredictIt.org suggest that Democrats are slightly more likely than Republicans to win the White House next November (Chart 2). The narrow spread is appropriate given that the balance of evidence is fairly even. However, if there is to be a tilt, it should go the opposite way, i.e. toward Republicans as the incumbent party. The history of US elections since 1860 shows a strong tendency for the incumbent party to hold the White House when the sitting president is running at the head of the ticket. This is especially true when there has not been a recession during the president’s four-year term. It is even true when the ruling party has lost seats in preceding congressional elections, as occurred in 2018 and as is often the case (Chart 3). Other than recession, the biggest exception to the sitting president’s victory – especially in modern times – is when a major scandal has occurred, as with Gerald Ford in 1976. This is clearly relevant to today. In these rare cases the incumbent president’s and incumbent party’s historic reelection rates are both 50/50. The implication of Chart 3 is that Trump’s odds, from a historical point of view, are slightly above 50%. Of course, history does not afford an example of a first-term president being impeached, acquitted, and running for election again.1 Yet this is the most likely outcome today, as there is not an overwhelming popular demand to remove Trump from office. Despite the revelations and public hearings in the impeachment inquiry so far, support for removal stands at 47%, while opposition to removal stands at 45% (Chart 4). In other words, there is no majority in favor of removal, but only a narrow plurality. Removal – nullifying an election result – requires more. Chart 3History Says Trump More Likely To Win Than Not Chart 4No Consensus On Removal From Office The spread is conspicuously close to the 46%-to-48% popular vote spread for Trump and Hillary Clinton, respectively, in 2016. The impeachment is not a tsunami of public opposition to the administration. It is a bare-knuckle power struggle: Trump tried to have his top rival investigated and tarred with corruption allegations, the Democrats are retaliating by trying to remove Trump prior to the election. Support for removal will fluctuate, but it will take more than 47% of the population to generate a 67-vote supermajority against Trump in a Republican-held Senate. Republican senators would be taking a grave risk in voting against their base when they have the option of deferring to voters in just 11 months’ time. Both Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton were in their second terms when Congress began moving articles of impeachment: the public had no other recourse in the event that they committed “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Trump is in his first term and is due for the public’s verdict shortly. Nixon resigned when it became clear that grassroots Republicans had lost faith in him and the Senate would not acquit. Trump’s political base has not yet lost faith – his approval among Republicans is still 90%, higher than the average of Republican presidents and at the high end of his term in office (Chart 5). When it comes to the final vote, some Republican senators may defect, but it would take 20 to remove Trump from office. This will require a Nixon-like hemorrhage of support. Remarkably Trump’s general approval rating has not been affected by the impeachment inquiry (Chart 6). His approval rating is still comparable to President Barack Obama’s rating at this stage in his first term (as well as Ronald Reagan’s). While Trump is highly unlikely to break above 50%, he is emphatically not a lame duck … at least not yet. Presidential approval tends to rise as the opposition nomination is settled and the election approaches. If Trump’s approval revives to the 46% of the popular vote he won in 2016, then he remains competitive in the swing states where the election will be fought and won. Chart 5Trump’s Political Base Geared Up For Battle Chart 6A Precarious Approval Rating What about the Republicans’ heavy losses in the midterm elections and special elections since 2016? Haven’t national voting trends already condemned Trump and the Republicans to a loss in 2020? Not necessarily. Democrats lost elections more dramatically in 2009-11 than Republicans lost in 2017-19 – both in voter support and turnout (Table 1) – and yet President Obama secured the victory in 2012. Presidential elections are a different beast. Table 1Democrats Suffered More Post-2008 Than Republicans Post-2016 … Yet Obama Won Reelection Chart 7GOP Governorships At Low End Of Rising Trend The same goes for Republican losses in recent gubernatorial races. In Kentucky the incumbent governor was a Republican and lost; in Louisiana the incumbent governor was a Democrat and won. The catch is that the number of Republican governors was extremely elevated prior to 2018. Recent losses have merely brought the Republicans back to the bottom of their upward channel as a share of the nation’s 50 governors (Chart 7). Thus while the interim elections are a warning sign to Trump and the GOP, they are not a death knell – as long as the economy rebounds and President Trump’s approval rises as the election approaches. Bottom Line: Trump is not a lame duck yet. His administration is embattled and the impeachment process could permanently damage his standing. But so far his general approval rating and the specific impeachment polling suggest that he will stay in office and remain competitive in the 2020 race. If the election were today he would almost surely lose, but a lot can change in 12 months. If the economy avoids recession, then investors should take reelection as their base case. Cyclical Constraints Will Prevail A recession is the surest way to render a president a lame duck. It does not have to be a technical recession. The contraction in the manufacturing sector – and corresponding cutbacks in lending in the manufacturing-heavy and electorally vital Midwest – are extremely threatening to a president who promised to revive manufacturing and trade (Chart 8). Incumbency, economic growth, failed impeachment, and partial policy victory are enough to win the key swing states. Having declared that “trade wars are good and easy to win,” President Trump will not be able to hide from a deeper slowdown in the industrial heartland. State-level wage growth is positive, but swing states, particularly Trump swing states, are seeing a sharp drop-off from the highs prior to the trade war (Chart 9). The solution is the trade ceasefire being pursued with China. Trump is now in the position of the Federal Reserve Chairman: he can no longer afford to hike (tariff) rates, and the equity market may force him to cut, as long as he can reasonably hope to improve the economy. If the economy is lost, the trade war is back on. Chart 8An Urgent Need For A Trade Ceasefire Chart 9Trump Swing States Took A Hit From The Trade War Chart 10Buttigieg And Warren More Favorable Than Others Are incumbency, economic growth, failed impeachment, and partial policy victories enough to get Trump over the line in the key swing states?2 Subjectively, we think so. The Democrats have to win all of the states they won in 2016 plus Michigan and Florida (or two other states in place of Florida, such as Wisconsin and Pennsylvania). President Trump can afford to lose Michigan and one other state (but not Florida). This assessment has little to do with the Democratic presidential nominee – as yet unknown – and everything to do with whether the incumbent president or party has been fundamentally discredited. Democratic candidates like Senator Elizabeth Warren and Mayor Pete Buttigieg are generally more competitive than consensus holds. Warren, for instance, is one of the few candidates in recent elections who has a net positive favorability rating (Chart 10). But her favorability is not enough to overturn a sitting president – that will most likely require a shock that renders the status quo intolerable. The cyclical constraints on Trump and his opponents are thus clear. What of the structural constraints? Trump’s 2016 victory is often attributed to long-running structural trends in the US such as deindustrialization, immigration, and racial attitudes. The Democrats’ “blue wall” in the Rust Belt crumbled because Trump courted the working-class voter there and/or stoked racial anxieties. The implication, however, is that Trump still has an advantage in these swing states. Older voters and especially white voters have drifted toward Republicans for several years – the trend was interrupted only by the Great Recession, which saw a surge in Democratic support that has now subsided (Chart 11). Chart 11Old And White People Drifting To GOP Over Time ... Excepting The Great Recession While the white share of the swing states is falling over time, that trend is not sufficient to prevent Trump from winning the Electoral College in the year 2020. Instead the rapidly changing racial and ethnic composition of society should be seen as motivating the attitudes that Trump exploits. Trump’s electoral strategy of maximizing white turnout and support for the Republican Party, which we dubbed “White Hype” in 2016, is still the only way for him to achieve a popular vote victory in 2020, and hence the clearest pathway for him to achieve an Electoral College victory (Chart 12). Needless to say, tensions and controversies over race and immigration will swell in the coming year. Chart 12Electoral College Scenarios Show Trump Win Still Possible Chart 13Swing State Turnout Follows Unemployment By the same token, demographic change means that the Democrats can theoretically win by performing no better than they did in 2016 in terms of voter turnout and support rates (see the “Status Quo” scenario in Chart 12). This is a low hurdle for Democrats – suggesting once again that the election will be extremely close, that Trump can win only through the Electoral College (not the popular vote), and that the election outcome will ultimately swing on the cyclical factors outlined above, particularly the state of the economy. A final word about voter turnout. The greatest electoral risk to President Trump is an increase in voter turnout among traditionally low turnout groups that heavily favor the Democratic Party, such as young people and minorities. Given the surge in turnout for the 2018 midterm elections, and the extremely controversial and heated environment surrounding Trump’s presidency, there is considerable reason to suspect that 2020 will be a high-turnout election. Other things being equal, this would likely penalize Trump’s reelection prospects. However, it is important to recognize that voter turnout in swing states is fairly well correlated with the unemployment rate (Chart 13). Depending on the state, surges in turnout occurred in 1992, in the wake of recession; 2004, in the wake of recession, terrorism and war; and 2008, in the wake of the great financial crisis. The exception is Pennsylvania, where a surge in white voter turnout helped Trump pull off a surprise win in the state. Turnout is the hardest political variable to predict, so it is not clear whether Trump’s scandals and impeachment will do the trick. But an increase in the unemployment rate would virtually destroy Trump’s bid, being negatively correlated with presidential approval and positively correlated with voter turnout. Bottom Line: Trump’s executive powers give him the potential to achieve some additional policy victories that could boost his approval rating – namely a trade ceasefire with China that simultaneously improves the economic outlook. Meanwhile structural factors such as demographics do not forbid Trump from winning the Electoral College – on the contrary, aging and the decline in the white share of the population mean that Trump’s electoral strategy could succeed again in 2020, but will be much harder to pull off after 2020. Introducing … BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy 2020 US Presidential Election Model The BCA Geopolitical Strategy Presidential Election Model is a state-by-state model that uses political and economic variables to predict the Electoral College vote. What differentiates our model from that of others is that it attempts to predict the probability of the incumbent party winning the Electoral College votes in each of the 50 states. The model would have predicted the past five elections correctly on an out-of-sample basis, even the controversial win of George W. Bush over Al Gore in 2000. Why do we predict the electoral vote rather than the popular vote? First, the winner of the presidential election is determined by the Electoral College, not the popular vote. Second, in recent history, two candidates who lost the popular vote (George W. Bush in 2000 and Donald Trump in 2016) won the election. It is possible that we will see a similar result in 2020, given President Trump’s low national popularity yet distinctive policy pitch for the Midwestern states (e.g. economic patriotism, hardline on immigration). With only minor exceptions, electoral votes are allocated based on a winner-take-all process, as opposed to proportionately to the popular vote. Hence the best way to forecast the presidential election winner is to predict the probability of winning each state, i.e. receiving all the electoral votes assigned to each state.3 Due to the data availability of our input variables, our sample size includes nine elections (1984 to 2016) across 50 states, making for a total of 450 observations. We designed the model to be as succinct as possible. It includes four explanatory variables: A weighted average of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia State Leading Index, from the beginning of the previous presidential term until September of the election year. The state leading indexes predict the 6-month growth rate of the state coincident indexes, which include nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city average).4 Chart 14Voters Make Up Their Minds Ahead Of Time We use a weighted average of all the monthly forecasts in the presidential term preceding an election, where later months are weighted more heavily than earlier months. Our sample includes 6-month growth rates up to and including September of the election year, which means it includes a rough forecast of the direction of the state’s economy in Q1 of the new president’s term. Since we weigh recent months more heavily, our model assigns more importance to forward-looking factors. It is sufficient to end our calculations of the average state leading indexes in September of the election year. First, the October data comes out in early November, just days before the election, which would be an insufficient lead-time for our final forecast. Second, most voters make their decision at least one month in advance of the election and last-minute changes in economic forecasts will likely not influence their decision (Chart 14). The incumbent party’s margin of victory in the previous presidential election in each state. This is measured as the incumbent party vote share minus the non-incumbent party vote share. Simply put, if the incumbent party failed to secure a solid win in a given state in the previous election, the probability of securing a solid win in the current election is much smaller. Average national approval level of the incumbent president in July of the election year. We tested the correlation between presidential approval in every month leading up to the election versus the election outcome and found that July approval levels have the second-highest correlation with the popular vote and Electoral College vote (Chart 15). Average October approval levels have slightly higher correlation with election outcomes, but not sufficiently so to sacrifice three months of lead-time. A “time for change” variable. This is a categorical variable indicating whether the incumbent party has been in the White House for one or more terms. Academic literature shows that a party that has occupied the White House for two terms or more is much less likely to win an election than a party that is running for a second term.5 Chart 15Voters Mostly Decided By July The output of our model is the probability of an incumbent win in each state. There are two ways of aggregating these probabilities to produce a national-level outcome: Allocate the number of Electoral College votes won by the incumbent proportionally to their probability of victory in each state, and then sum them up across all states. This method would smooth out potential errors in our forecast. The Republican Party is expected to win with 279 Electoral College votes in 2020. Assume a probability threshold of 50%: any state with an incumbent win that is at least 50% likely is fully assigned to the incumbent. While this method could significantly sway our forecast towards one of the parties because of small changes in probability, it is closer to the political reality. Even the smallest majority in a given state will (usually) result in the winning candidate getting all of the state’s Electoral College votes. We therefore adopt this method in our aggregation.6 Our model performs well in back tests: it correctly predicted every election in in-sample tests and every election from 2000 to 2016 in out-of-sample tests (Chart 16). Chart 16BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Election Model: Back Tests Accurate Chart 17 shows our initial 2020 prediction. Overall, the Republican Party is expected to win 279 Electoral College votes, a 25-vote decrease from its 2016 result. Chart 17Trump Narrowly Slated To Win 2020 With 279 Electoral College Votes As of the latest available data, our model predicts that the Republicans will lose Michigan and Wisconsin (critical victories in 2016). Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire become borderline or “toss-up” states: the probability of a Republican win in these states is 48.77%, 50.17%, and 46.90%, respectively. Even the smallest change in our inputs can shift these states to either party. The two inputs that can affect our forecast are the state leading index and President Trump’s approval level, since the other two inputs – the time for change variable and last election’s margin of victory – are fixed. Table 2 shows the predicted Electoral College votes for the Republican Party for various scenarios of these two variables. According to the model, President Trump is currently at the lowest level of approval and weakest state-by-state economy that he can afford. If one of these factors stabilizes below today’s level, Trump will lose his reelection bid. Table 2Small Decline In State Economies Could Ruin Trump’s 2020 Bid In the worst-case scenario for Trump – if his approval and the state leading indexes drop to the lowest levels they have touched in Trump’s presidency – the Republican Party will only manage to secure 230 Electoral College votes. The opposite, optimistic scenario would see them winning with 329 votes. An interesting takeaway from our model is that it captures the increase in American political polarization that has been widely observed by scholars. The 2020 forecast shows that many states will be won or lost by the incumbent party with extreme certainty (0% or 100%). Results of in-sample predictions show that this trend has been increasing since 1992 (Chart 18, top panel), which is also in line with our own measure of polarization (Chart 18, bottom panel). Since the results are based on in-sample estimations, the coefficients remain constant, so the differences in the results can be attributed to the underlying data. The impression of ever-intensifying polarization in the US is correct. What does this mean for Trump? He cannot be written off simply because he has a relatively low approval rating. Structural political factors that propelled him to the White House are still in place. His approval and the economy must deteriorate to change this base case. The chief risk to our model is the accuracy and interpretation of presidential approval polling. While polling data always has a margin of error, it is possible that approval polling is underestimating Trump’s support, particularly on the state level, as was witnessed in 2016 (Chart 19). Chart 18Rising Polarization – It’s Empirical Chart 19State-Level Polling Still A Risk We have a high degree of confidence in professional pollsters, who have also made improvements since 2016.   But asking Americans whether they “approve” of the unorthodox Trump may be a different proposition than in the past, disguising voting intentions to some degree. By choosing the level of Trump’s approval in our model (see Appendix), we are guarding against overstating his support and not allowing much room for any dampening effects or self-censorship, which is thus a risk to our model. Bottom Line: Quantitative modeling, entirely independent of our qualitative assessment, suggests that Trump is favored to win the 2020 election. However, he is skating on very thin ice with regard to key cyclical variables such as state-level economic performance and popular approval rating. If his approval level suffers from a slowing economy, or scandal and impeachment, then he will lose the critical toss-up states and the White House. Investment Conclusions In this report we have outlined a case where President Trump, despite his extreme unorthodoxy in general, and acute vulnerability at this moment in time, is still the most likely winner of the 2020 election. Elections are a Bayesian process in which investors should establish a clear prior, or starting place, and update their probabilities according to reliable data streams. This report establishes our prior and our key data streams. So what? Does it matter if Trump is reelected? Is it relevant to investors? From a bird’s eye view, Trump has made a few decisions that clearly distinguish his term in office from that of previous presidents. First, by replacing Janet Yellen with Jerome Powell at the Federal Reserve, Trump arguably accelerated the normalization of monetary policy, which contributed to a rise in bond yields, an increase in market volatility, a strong dollar, and a global slowdown. Second, by embracing sweeping Republican tax reform, Trump initiated pro-cyclical fiscal stimulus that widened the US’s monetary and economic divergence from the rest of the world, while exacerbating the US’s long-term fiscal woes. Third, by adopting protectionist trade policy to confront China’s mercantilism, Trump rattled global sentiment and contributed to a manufacturing recession. As long as our view remains correct, investors will have a base case that is cyclically bullish. Of these three macro developments, the only one that the election could substantially change is trade policy – and yet the Democrats are also taking a more hawkish approach to China. On the fiscal front, the Democrats will raise taxes, but they will not impose austerity – instead they propose large expansions of entitlements that the populace increasingly demands. Populist social spending combined with geopolitical struggle with China ensures that the deficit/GDP ratio will go up regardless of the party in power. From a market point of view, the historical record suggests that presidential elections – specifically elections that lead to gridlock between the White House and Congress, since we do not expect the Democrats to lose the House of Representatives – usually see a rising US stock market beforehand and a higher degree of volatility afterwards (Chart 20). Relative to developed market equities, US stocks typically underperform, and only resume their rise in the second half of the following year (i.e. 2021). Comparing Trump to other first-term presidents, it is clear that his “pluto-populism” (populism plus tax cuts for the rich) has exerted a reflationary effect on the equity market (Chart 21). As long as the data show that he has a fair chance of reelection, investors will have a base case that is cyclically bullish, despite the volatility to come from the Democrats’ taxation and regulation proposals. Chart 20Equity Outcomes Surrounding US Presidential Votes Chart 21Trump A Reason To Be Bullish What is most striking about Trump’s presidency is the low real total return on US Treasuries. This is despite his aggressive foreign and trade policy, which has motivated safe-haven flows into Treasuries this year (Chart 22). The bottom line is that the output gap is closed, the labor market is tight, and fiscal policy is expansive, putting upward pressure on yields. Given that Trump needs to cultivate a China ceasefire and economic improvement for reelection, this trend should continue until the next recession looms. Chart 22Trump Marks End Of Bull Market In Bonds The risk, however, is that Trump’s precarious China negotiations fall through, or that his scandals cause a permanent downshift in his approval rating, rendering him a lame duck. Not only would this free him of the election constraint that currently forces him to pursue pro-market policies, but it would also make a Democratic victory more likely. The Democratic nomination, meanwhile, could easily produce a progressive populist in the figure of Elizabeth Warren, who is still a frontrunner in the Democratic nomination. A bear market could develop quite easily if a normal equity market correction, which improves the odds of a Democratic victory becomes entangled in expectations that Warren is set to win the nomination. If the opposition can summon enough votes to unseat an incumbent president, chances are that the circumstances will include a “blue wave” that also sees the Democrats take the Senate. This would institute another sweeping change to American policy, this time in a direction that is unfriendly to corporate profits. As the probability of such a scenario rises, the equity market will have to discount it. Expectations of a Trump victory will spur the market upward – but investors should be wary. If this very long bull market has continued all the way to November 3, 2020, and President Trump is confirmed in office, the positive stock market reaction will likely provide an excellent time for booking profits and reducing risk. In a second term, Trump will be unshackled from his electoral constraints – very much unlike a first-term Democrat. This would free him to pursue his trade wars with fewer inhibitions – against China but also likely against Europe. A continuation of the trade war has important impacts across the full slate of global assets, as outlined in Chart 23, which depicts the movement of assets on days in which US equities reacted negatively to trade war developments. Chart 23A Trump Second Term Means Trade War With Fewer Constraints With 11 months to go, we are a world away from the election. The party nomination process, or third-party candidates, could overturn all expectations. But if there is one certainty, it is that polarization and political risk will rise in the coming 12-24 months. The losing side of the population will have deep heartburn. A crisis of legitimacy could easily haunt the next administration. There could be hanging chads, vote recounts, faithless electors, or contested results. The outcome of the election could turn upon unprecedented developments in the Electoral College, Supreme Court, or even in cyberspace. If the Democrats win, redistribution will amplify partisanship. If Trump wins, inequality will rise. There is no easy way forward for the United States.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1: The Approval Question: Level Or Change? Chart 24Trump’s Historically Low Approval Rating The chief risk to our model is the interpretation of the presidential approval rating and its impact on the election. President Trump’s approval rating is notoriously low compared to the average president (Chart 24). While many authors use approval rating (or popularity) in their models, some argue that it is not the approval level, but the change in approval leading up to the election that matters.7 Consider the following: if President Trump’s approval increases from today’s level of 43% by 5%, he would be at the same level of approval as the average president if their approval were to drop by 5%. A model based on approval level would place these two presidents equally, while a model based on the change in approval would favor Trump. So which one is correct? We compare the incumbent’s popular vote in post-WWII elections with four different “variations” of incumbent president approval: the average level in July of the election year (as in our model); the deviation of the average October level from the election-year average, the change during the last two years of the term; and the range throughout the entire term. Directionally, the results are as expected. Level and change in approval are positively correlated with the popular vote, while a less stable approval (higher range) is negatively correlated (Chart 25A). We also find that approval level has the best fit with the election outcome, followed by the change in approval in the two years leading up to the election. However, if we restrict the sample size to the range of elections used in our model, 1984 to 2016, we find that the change in approval has a much better fit than the level (Chart 25B). In other words, in modern elections the presidential candidate’s momentum matters more in the final outcome. Chart 25AHigh, Rising, And Stable Approval Ratings … Chart 25B… Help Presidents Win Elections We tested each variation of approval as an input in our model instead of the July approval level. Table 3 summarizes the results. Trump wins in all four versions. Table 3All Measures Of Approval Favor Trump In 2020 Our current model penalizes Trump the most, while the model based on approval range favors him. This makes sense, given that President Trump’s approval is relatively low but very stable (Chart 26). Chart 26Trump Approval Very Low … And Very Stable We will continue to use approval level in our model to generate updated predictions, given that this measure has the best long-term historical fit with the election outcome. However, given that President Trump is performing relatively well on these other measures of approval, there is upside risk to his 2020 performance. Appendix 2: A Word About The Probit Model Table 4 presents the regression coefficients of our model. Since this is a probit model, the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as they would in an ordinary regression. The coefficients in a probit regression model measure the change in the Z-score associated to each independent variable for a one-unit change in that variable. Table 4BCA 2020 US Presidential Election Model Statistics The sign of the coefficient corresponds to the direction of change in probability. So increases in the state leading index, presidential approval, or the incumbent’s margin of victory in the last election increase the probability of the incumbent winning a state. Of course, the latter variable is fixed and will not change until the election. At the same time, having occupied the White House for two terms or more decreases the probability of an incumbent win. But this is not the case in the current election. Footnotes 1 Andrew Johnson, the first to be impeached, did not run in 1868; Ulysses Grant bowed out after two terms in 1876, amid the “Great Barbecue” scandal; Warren Harding died before the election of 1924, amid the infamous “Teapot Dome” scandal; Harry Truman stepped down amid scandal after two terms in 1952; Richard Nixon resigned before the election of 1976; Bill Clinton was impeached and hit the two-term limit before the election of 2000. For these examples, and the electoral impact of great scandals in general, please see Allan J. Lichtman, Predicting The Next Presidency: The Keys To The White House 2016 (Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). 2 Trump’s policy record contains one major legislative victory, the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, along with a number of works in progress. The Republicans’ failed attempt to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) exacted an opportunity cost: it deprived Trump and the GOP Congress of time needed to legislate a southern border wall, while mobilizing the opposition for all subsequent elections. As for other policies, the renegotiation of NAFTA is only a partial success as the USMCA has not been ratified. The promised infrastructure package will become a campaign pledge for the second term. We expect some kind of North Korea deal. 3 To this end, we use a probit model, where the dependent variable is stated as 1 = incumbent party won all Electoral College votes in this state, or 0 = incumbent party did not win any Electoral College votes in this state. This model allows us to measure the probability that a state with certain characteristics will fall into one of these two categories. 4 “The leading index for each state predicts the six-month growth rate of the state’s coincident index. In addition to the coincident index, the models include other variables that lead the economy: state-level housing permits (1 to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill.” See the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, www.philadelphiafed.org. 5 Alan I. Abramowitz, “Forecasting the 2008 Presidential Election with the Time-for-Change Model,” Political Science and Politics, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 691-695. 6 We also assume that the Democrats always win the District of Columbia. 7 Please see Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Charles Tien, “Forecasting presidential elections: When to change the model,” International Journal of Forecasting, Volume 24, Issue 2, April–June 2008, Pages 227-236, and Mark Zandi, Dan White, Bernard Yaros, “2020 Presidential Election Model,” Moody’s Analytics, September 2019.
Highlights Lingering weakness evident in fundamental supply-demand data will fade next year, and with it the downward pressure on oil prices. Price risk is skewed to the upside: Continued monetary accommodation from systematically important central banks and fiscal stimulus will revive oil demand; OPEC 2.0 production restraint and market-imposed discipline in the US will slow the growth of oil supply. Shale-oil supply growth also is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Elevated geopolitical tensions cannot be ignored, particularly as economic and political discontent boils over in Iraq and Iran, where leaders could feel compelled to lash out. To the downside, global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. It continues to keep the USD well bid. This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving demand growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Weaker 2019 data showing up in demand and upward revisions to inventories pushed our 4Q19 Brent forecast down to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent. Feature In the multi-level game that drives the political economy of oil, domestic and international factors shaping supply-demand fundamentals are always shifting. As multiple constituencies vie for advantage, market participants will be forced to grapple with the consequences of policies now under consideration. The bullet points above provide a restricted aperture through which to view some of the issues currently in play.1 Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. Demand-side impacts of policy shifts and policy signaling remain the most prominent feature of fundamental adjustments markets will continue to grapple with, as fall-out from the Sino-US trade war; political discontent in DM and EM electorates; and ad hoc economic policy raise global economic policy uncertainty. Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. This is most visible in our global Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs), particularly in EM economies, although DM demand also looks like it could pick up (Chart of the Week). For the real economy, it is useful to remember Milton Friedman’s “long and variable lags” regarding the effects of monetary policy and how they affect oil markets.2 Chart of the WeekGlobal LEIs Point To Demand Recovery Chart 2BCA's EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Points Toward Upturn in Oil Demand EM growth is hugely important to global oil-demand growth in our analysis. Our proprietary EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast continues to indicate EM economies are responding to easier global financial conditions (Chart 2).3 Global growth expectations for oil demand are diverging sharply in the lead-up to OPEC 2.0’s December 5 meeting in Vienna. At the low end, the US EIA expects 2019 growth of 760k b/d this year, a sharply lower estimate than the agency’s co-eval institutions; OPEC is closing in on the 1mm b/d growth threshold at 0.98mm b/d, followed by the IEA at 1mm b/d. We lowered our estimate of oil-demand growth this year to 1.1mm b/d, in line with weaker consumption data being reported by these big agencies. Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. We are maintaining our expectation for growth of 1.4mm b/d next year, which is close to the EIA’s estimate (Chart 3). The IEA’s estimate for 2020 stays at 1.2mm b/d, while OPEC’s is just under 1.1mm b/d. On the supply side, we expect lower US shale-oil output growth next year. Lower prices, backwardated WTI futures curves – which results in lower forward prices for producers hedging their output – and recalcitrant investors who are unwilling to commit capital to all but the most profitable shale-oil producers will take their toll (Chart 4). As a result, we expect US shale output to reach ~ 9.35mm b/d on average next year in the Big Five basins (Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara and Anadarko). This leads to an 800k b/d increase in our US lower 48 output over this year’s levels, which is down from our earlier estimate of a 900k b/d increase. Chart 3Stronger Oil Demand, Tighter Supply Will Lift Oil Prices in 2020 Chart 4Lower Prices, Backwardated WTI Curve Lead to Lower Rig Count, Shale-Oil Output Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth, as the electorate grows increasingly restive with the practice. Industry officials in Texas and North Dakota – home to the Permian and Bakken plays – already have been sounding the alarm on this issue.4 According to Rystad Energy, flaring reached another record high in the Permian at 752 million cubic feet per day in 3Q19 amid growing oil production. Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest. We also are penciling in an extension of OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm-barrel-per-day output cut to year-end 2020. Over-compliance likely persists, particularly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Stronger non-OPEC output from Norway and Brazil offsets this somewhat (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest.  As our colleague Roukaya Ibrahim notes, “The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services … . This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace.”5 There is an underlying tension within the society between Iraqi forces loyal to Iran’s Shia theocracy and Iraqis seeking full autonomy for their country. “The widening rift between the rival Iraqi Shia blocs implies that any détente will be temporary,” according to BCA’s geopolitical strategists. We have consistently maintained markets are too complacent regarding these geopolitical risks, which also encompass US-Iran hostilities in the Persian Gulf. We are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. That said, our balances still reflect the lingering demand weakness discussed above, and continue to work through higher inventories. In line with revisions by the EIA to historical inventory levels and lower demand growth, we are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl (Chart 5). We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent (Chart 6). Chart 5Storage Revisions Help Weaken Price Forecasts Chart 6BCA 2020 Oil Price Forecasts Fall Slightly To $67/bbl For Brent, $63/bbl For WTI Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Persists While accommodative monetary policy and stimulative fiscal policy will foster a revival in commodity demand, global economic uncertainty remains elevated.6 This risks keeping the broad trade-weighted USD index for goods (TWIBG) well bid (Chart 7). This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Chart 7Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid, Retards Demand We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand.  However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest. As the multi-level game dominating the evolution of the political economy of the oil market becomes more complex and uncertain – particularly in re the Sino-US trade war and domestic politics in systemically important economies – monetary and fiscal policy have an additional headwind to battle in the attempt to revive aggregate commodity demand. Bottom Line: We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand. However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest, with oil prices rising ~ 10% next year. That said, if the phase-one Sino-US trade deal leads to a phase-two and –three – i.e., a durable resolution to the trade imbroglio and political discontent roiling markets, the recovery could be more significant.7     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Trade-related news continues to drive short-term price movements. On Tuesday, Brent prices fell 2.5% on rising pessimism about the US-China “phase one” deal. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 countries will meet in early December to assess whether the group should extend – and possibly deepen – output cuts. Russia signaled it is unlikely to support deeper cuts, but appears to be open to extending the current quotas until year-end 2020. Our updated global oil market balances assume OPEC 2.0 will agree to extend the current production curbs. Separately, anti-government protests in Basra, Iraq, are impacting the oil sector. On Monday, protesters reportedly blocked roads leading to the major oil fields and to commodity export terminals. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices seem detached from their current fundamentals, moving up and down with expectations related to the US-China trade war and ongoing protests in Chile – the world’s largest copper producer. Negative sentiment has weighed on copper most of this year. Speculative short positioning reached a high of 137k contracts in August, pushing our Copper Composite Indicator into “oversold” territory. Going forward, the metal’s fundamentals will support higher prices; quarter-to-date copper prices increased 3.5%. Global visible copper inventories resumed their downward trend in 2H19 – reaching a 10-year low. We expect global growth to pick up in the coming months – led by emerging economies. Risks are skewed to the upside. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices recovered to $1475/oz after trading close to our $1450/oz stop-loss last week. Slightly weaker real rates in the US and ratcheted-up trade tensions supported the yellow metal’s price this week. Over the short term, prices could be pushed lower as markets await positive developments re a Sino - US trade agreement. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Corn futures traded lower earlier in the week, but rebounded slightly Tuesday after the USDA Crop Progress reported the harvest rate for it was 76%, which was below analysts’ expectations of 77% and well below the five-year average of 92%. Wheat performed better, marking a 0.9% weekly increase in March futures on the back of a lower percentage of the crop being rated good or excellent by the USDA.  Finally, soybeans were flat throughout the week but fell almost 0.8% on Wednesday, amid reports that a phase-one trade deal between US and China may not be completed by the end of 2019.     Footnotes 1       Understanding and balancing these interests is difficult, as is forecasting outcomes. Please see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988). 2      Friedman’s classic paper, “The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” appeared in the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Oct., 1961). Our own research suggests these lags range from six to 18 months in commodity markets. 3      Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast uses our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models to characterize the current state of commodity demand. The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity, which is highly correlated with trade-related activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different commodity prices traded globally. Lastly, the EMIV model is driven by EM import volumes, which are highly correlated with income; as income rises, oil demand – and commodity demand in general – rises. Please our report entitled Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand, which was published October 31, 2019, for additional discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  Concerns over associated natural-gas flaring into the atmosphere are rising in the shale-oil community, as political discontent with the practice grows.  Please see Gas Flaring “Running Rampant” In The Permian, published by oilprice.com, and New Initiative will Map and Measure Methane Emissions Across the Permian Basin, a press release issued by the Environmental Defense Fund outlining their initiative to install methane emissions-monitoring gear around the Permian to begin logging the massive amount of flaring in that basin.   According to the Oil & Gas Journal, “… collective volumes of flared and vented gas from (the Permian and Bakken) basins up to about 1.15 bcfd. For comparative purposes, that represents 12 billion cu m/year of wasted gas, which exceeds the yearly gas demand of nations such as Israel, Colombia, and Romania.”  Please see Permian gas flaring, venting reaches record high published by the OGJ June 4, 2019.  Please see Permian gas flaring reaches yet another high, published by Rystad Energy on its website November 5, 2019. 4      S&P Global Platts posted an interesting podcast on its website featuring an interview with Lynn Helms, director of the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources. He said flaring in the Bakken – where production is hitting record highs – will force state regulators to throttle back on the rate of shale-production growth beginning in 2Q20, when growth could slow substantially if gas-capture technologies are not deployed.  Growth could remain subdued for 2020-21, he said.  Please see North Dakota’s record oil growth to be upended by flaring rules, posted November 18, 2019. 5      Please see Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated, published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy November 8, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      We measure uncertainty using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. This is a GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related to economic policy uncertainty, which are found in newspapers and articles online from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP are scoured for reports reflecting economic uncertainty. Please see our October 17 and October 31, 2019, reports Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth and Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand for the original research on this topic. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      This is not our base case. Our geopolitical strategists expect a temporary ceasefire in the trade war, but doubt that a “grand compromise” leading to a new period of US-China economic engagement will emerge from the negotiations. Strategic tensions will keep rising on a secular basis between the two countries. Please see BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy weekly report entitled How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Analysis on the Chinese property market is available below. In the Philippines, domestic demand is set to accelerate at the hands of the government’s fiscal boost. The current account deficit will widen and the peso and local bonds will likely sell-off. This warrants an underweight stance in this interest rate-sensitive bourse. A new trade: Pay 2-year swap rates. The outlook for China’s property market and construction activity is downbeat. Financial market plays leveraged to mainland construction activity remain at risk. The Philippines: The Cycle Is Turning The relative performance of Philippine equities against the EM benchmark is moving inversely to the direction of relative (Philippines minus EM) local bond yields (Chart I-1). When local Philippine bond yields drop versus those of other EMs, this bourse outperforms, and vice versa. Likewise, Philippine share prices in absolute terms exhibit a negative relationship with local bond yields (Chart I-2). The rationale behind this high sensitivity in share prices to local interest rates is the large presence of banks and property stocks in the Philippines' bourse. Banks account for 20% and real estate stocks another 21% of the local stock exchange. These sectors benefit in a falling interest rate environment and suffer during periods of rising rates. Chart I-1Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Chart I-2Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Our underweight position in Philippine equities has not played out because the economy has slowed much more than we had expected, which has also coincided with collapsing US Treasury bond yields. Consequently, Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Chart I-3Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Chart I-4Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit The growth rate of the Philippines has decelerated markedly due to sharp slowdowns in both government spending and bank loan growth (Chart I-3). In fact, the combined bank loan and fiscal spending impulse has plunged, leading to a major slowdown in domestic demand, which in turn has stabilized the current account (Chart I-4). The latter effect has supported the currency and allowed the central bank to cut rates. A budget deadlock on a number of items delayed the approval of the 2019 budget, causing government spending to plunge in the first half of 2019. In short, it was unintended fiscal tightening that has wrong-footed our view on the direction of the macro cycle, and consequently Philippine financial markets. Government spending has been instrumental in driving fixed capital formation since President Rodrigo Duterte came to power in May 2016. Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse: Chart I-5Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Government expenditure will rise substantially – infrastructure spending in particular – lifting imports. The 2019 budget was approved back in April, and the House of Representatives has given the green light to extend the shelf-life of the current 2019 budget. Moreover, the fiscal 2020 budget, now approved by Duterte, entails 12% nominal growth in government expenditures in general and 14% growth in capital/infrastructure spending in particular. Duterte will oversee 100 flagship infrastructure projects estimated to cost 4.3 trillion Philippine pesos, or 24% of GDP. More than half of these projects are either ongoing or will commence construction in the next six to eight months. The larger infrastructure expenditure will encourage bank lending. Overall, domestic demand will revive considerably, causing the current account deficit to widen. Importantly, the expected fiscal boost will come on top of already strong consumer spending. The marginal propensity to spend among households and companies is already improving, confirming domestic growth acceleration (Chart I-5, top panel). In particular, both vehicle and machinery sales are recovering (Chart I-5, middle panel). Narrow and broad money impulses have bottomed (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Stronger imports amid still-depressed exports due to sluggish global demand will lead to a widening of the current account deficit. We expect the peso to resume its depreciation. Renewed currency weakness and a domestic demand revival will put a floor under inflation. The central bank is headed by Governor Benjamin Diokno, the former Budget Secretary and an associate of populist President Duterte. The odds are that the central bank will not hike interest rates in the face of a rising current account deficit and modestly rising inflation. This will reinforce currency depreciation. Finally, domestic bond yields are set to rise. A widening fiscal deficit has historically coincided with higher domestic bond yields (Chart I-6). Odds are it will not be different this time. Besides, Philippine banks have been relentlessly purchasing government bonds because credit demand from companies has been sluggish (Chart I-7). As private credit demand begins to recover and banks accelerate their loan origination, they will become net sellers – or will at least ease their pace of government bond purchases – pushing yields higher. Chart I-6Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Chart I-7Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Bottom Line: Unintended fiscal tightening has slowed domestic demand, narrowed the current account deficit, supported the currency and induced a drop in local bond yields. This has allowed the Philippines’ interest rate-sensitive bourse to outperform the overall EM equity index. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse. This cycle is about to reverse due to strong fiscal expansion: Domestic demand and imports will grow briskly, and the current account deficit will widen considerably. Widening twin deficits will lead to material currency depreciation and higher domestic bond yields. Investment Recommendations Continue shorting the Philippine peso versus the US dollar. 2-year swap rates are 48 basis points below the policy rate (Chart I-8). The market will price out rate cuts as the business cycle recovers and the currency depreciates. We recommend a new trade: pay 2-year swap rates. Dedicated EM fixed-income investors should underweight the Philippines in their EM domestic currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Chart I-8The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts Chart I-9Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap     Does an upcoming growth revival warrant an overweight stance in Philippine stocks within an EM equity portfolio? As shown in Charts I-1 and I-2, this equity market is more sensitive to interest rates than growth. The growth deceleration did not prevent this stock market from outperforming its EM peers. Hence, higher local bond yields amid renewed currency depreciation will likely lead to a period of underperformance. Finally, Philippine stocks are not cheap in absolute terms or relative to the EM benchmark (Chart I-9). Hence, they will not respond well to rising interest rates. Chart I-10Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Within this bourse, underweight/short property stocks. These stocks are the most vulnerable to rising bond yields (Chart I-10). The key risks to our strategy are lower global bond yields and continuous flows of foreign capital into EM assets in general, and local bonds in particular.   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   China: Making Sense Of The Property Market Real estate activity in general, and property construction volumes in particular, are critical to our thesis of an ongoing growth slowdown in China. The basis is that construction volumes on the mainland have a considerable impact on industrial activity both within and outside China. On the structural front, housing demand is facing major headwinds: Genuine pent-up demand for housing has diminished. Most Chinese households already own at least one property. Based on a recent survey conducted by The Economic Daily,1 nearly 97% of households surveyed own at least one residential property. Last year’s China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics of China, showed about 68% of new homes sold in China’s urban areas in the first quarter of 2018 were purchased for the purpose of investment. In addition, the living area per capita in China’s urban areas has risen to 40 square meters as of the end of last year – larger than in South Korea and Japan. Other structural impediments include low affordability, slowing rural-to-urban migration, demographic changes and the promotion of the housing rental market. The government has been repeatedly stressing that China will not use the property market as a short-term economic growth-booster this time. The authorities will also continue to prevent speculative housing demand. Between late 2015 and 2017, the People's Bank of China undertook outright monetization of excess housing inventories via the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program. So far, even though the Chinese economy has already slowed considerably, the government has not injected much stimulus into the property market. On the contrary, the government has drastically reduced the number of slum-reconstruction units as well as its PSL injection this year. This year, the government has also started a new long-term project of renovating residential buildings built in 2000 or earlier. The projects involved include adding parking lots, elevators, fiber cable installments, electricity/gas line improvements, and so on. This renovation program will likely delay property purchases from those owners who were considering purchasing new properties instead of living in the older residential buildings. Chart II-1Property Sales In China: A Sustainable Recovery? From a cyclical perspective (6-12 months), falling home prices and relatively tight financing for property developers will likely prevent a recovery in construction activity: First, Chart II-1 shows there has recently been a pickup in residential property sales. Our research reveals that this has been the result of aggressive promotion strategies – price reductions – implemented by many real estate developers. Among the promotions being offered by many developers are “buy one property, get the second one at half price,” “buy a house and get a car for free,” or “buy a house and get free furniture and decorations.” Local governments have been “discouraging” outright property price declines. Yet, it seems they have allowed implicit price reductions to take place. In cases where outright price cuts cannot be avoided, the authorities try to limit them. Earlier this month, the government of Maanshan, a third-tier city in the Anhui province, released a rule instructing property developers not to lower prices by more than 10%. The outlook for China’s property market and construction activity is downbeat. As a result, official statistics on new housing prices do not truly reflect price pressures in the marketplace. Official statistics show new housing prices are rising at 9% since last year. Nevertheless, many 1st- and 2nd- tier cities are showing price declines in their secondhand residential property markets (Chart II-2).  Chart II-2China: Secondary Market Property Prices Are Weak Chart II-3Chinese Property Developers: Massive Pre-Sold Homes, But Lack Of Funding To Complete Construction   All in all, it seems that falling home prices have begun to spread from 1st tier cities to some 2nd- and 3rd-tier cities. The number of cities reporting declines in residential home prices is on the rise.   Second, in theory, falling property prices should discourage new starts and new construction. Falling prices signal that supply is exceeding demand, with producers typically responding by curtailing output. This holds true for any industry. However, the intricacies of property developers in China may be different. Chart II-4Building Construction Data Is A Broader Measure Than Commodity Buildings Specifically, property developers have been pre-selling aggressively since 2017 while slowing their completion process due to lack of financing (Chart II-3). Such financial constraints arose due to their rapid expansion in the past 10 years. Having already incurred enormous amounts of leverage, they have resorted to pre-sales as another source of funding. Property developers are currently under pressure to deliver those units that were pre sold about two years ago. Will they be able to secure new funding and ramp up construction? Or will they default or delay delivery of houses? It may well be different for each developer. The ones with strong balance sheets and access to financing will build and deliver. The weakest ones will default, while the average ones will likely delay delivery. Hence, it is difficult to gauge construction trends in the next six months in the residential property market. Even so, it is unlikely to be very strong given the industry is highly fragmented, and many small and medium and even some large developers are financially weak. Finally, there is a large gap between the two construction activity datasets – both published by the National Bureau of Statistics. These datasets are referred to as “commodity buildings” and “building construction” (Chart II-4). “Commodity buildings” – i.e., those developed by real estate developers (the equivalent of homebuilders in the US), are only a subset of “building construction.” The “building construction” dataset is more comprehensive. It includes not only “commodity buildings” but also buildings built by non-real estate developers. For example, companies, universities, and various organizations that can construct both residential and non-residential buildings for their own use. Both datasets include residential and non-residential buildings. From a cyclical perspective (6-12 months), falling home prices and relatively tight financing for property developers will likely prevent a recovery in construction activity. Chart II-5 illustrates that “building construction” floor area started, under construction and completed are all shrinking. They are much weaker than floor area started, under construction and completed of “commodity buildings.” Chart II-5Building Construction Is In Recession Chart II-6Falling Construction-Related Commodities Prices Reflect The Weakness In China Construction Activity The take-away from these datasets is as follows: Construction activity in China goes beyond property developers and “commodity buildings” statistics do not always paint the complete picture. Companies and organizations have dramatically curtailed their construction activity. Combined with tight financing conditions for real estate developers, this heralds a downbeat outlook for construction activity. Bottom Line: While short-term fluctuations in construction activity are impossible to gauge in China, the cyclical outlook remains negative. The current round of stimulus has avoided the property market, and real estate bubble excesses have not yet been wrung out. This is why we remain negative on China’s construction outlook and continue to recommend underweighting property developers relative to both the A-share and investable equity indexes. Falling steel, iron ore and industrial commodities prices confirm that construction activity in China remains weak (Chart II-6).   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    The Economic Daily, administratively managed by the Ministry of Communication, is one of the most influential and authoritative newspapers in China. It is an official outlet for the government to publicize its economic policies. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Stock markets are set to produce low single digit returns in 2020. Favour stocks over bonds and cash, especially where bond yields are zero or negative – specifically, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Underweight zero and negative yielding high-quality bonds versus higher yielding bonds – for example, underweight Swiss bonds versus US T-bonds. Favour lower yielding currencies because the central bank loses the ability to depress its own currency. For 2020, our preferred expression of this is long SEK/USD. The biggest risk in 2020 is if the global bond yield were to rise towards 2.5 percent exposing the fragility of risk-asset prices to higher bond yields. The $400 trillion global risk-asset edifice dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy by five to one. Fractal trade: Short Ireland (ISEQ 20) versus Europe (Stoxx Europe 600). Feature For all the talk of economic growth driving stock markets, the big story through 2018-19 has been bond yields driving stock markets. This is true in Europe as well as more broadly – and it is very easy to demonstrate by decomposing the stock market price into its two components: the underlying profits (earnings per share) and the valuation multiple paid for those profits (Chart of the Week). Chart of the Week2018 And 2019 Were All About Valuations. What About 2020? 2018 And 2019 Were All About Valuations Contrast 2018-19 with 2017. In 2017, the stock market’s stellar return came almost entirely from growth – profits surged while the multiple drifted sideways. But in 2018 and 2019, the story was all about valuation multiples – profits drifted sideways while the multiple plunged in 2018, and then symmetrically surged in 2019 (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Decomposing Stock Market Performance... Chart I-3...Into Valuation And Profits The cause of the stock market multiple contraction and re-expansion was the dramatic swing in bond yields. This is hardly surprising given that the prospective return on bonds drives the prospective return on competing long-duration assets, like equities and real-estate. Higher bond yields require a higher prospective return on equities, meaning a lower valuation multiple, while lower bond yields require a higher valuation multiple. In driving the swing in bond yields, the principal player was the Federal Reserve. Again, this is hardly surprising given that the ECB and BoJ are stuck on the side lines with monetary policy already locked at ‘maximum accommodative’, while the Fed can still move the lever in both directions. The cause of the stock market multiple contraction and re-expansion was the dramatic swing in bond yields. Through 2018-2019, the 10-year T-bond yield took a round trip from around 2 percent to 3.3 percent and then down again to around 2 percent where it stands today. This explains the mirror-image round trip in the stock market’s multiple: from 16 down to 13 and then back up again to 16 where it stands today (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Round Trip In The T-Bond Yield Explains The Round Trip In The Stock Market's Valuation Admittedly, the Fed’s dramatic pivot was influenced by the trade war, and the perceived threat to global growth. But two other considerations loomed large: the persistent undershoot of inflation versus its 2 percent target; and the fragility of risk-asset valuations – and thereby financial conditions – to higher bond yields. Bear in mind that the value of global risk-assets at over $400 trillion now dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy by a factor of five to one. So the main danger is not that economic imbalances and fragilities will drag down the financial markets; the main danger is that financial market imbalances and fragilities will drag down the economy – as we painfully felt in 2000, 2007, and 2011. The Valuation And Growth Outlook In 2020 The two key investment questions for 2020 are: What will happen to bond yields, and what will happen to stock market profits? Starting with bond yields, most of the major central banks are, to repeat, out of play. Leaving the Fed as the principal player. But at the last press conference, Jay Powell, made it crystal clear that the Fed is also out of play for the time being, at least when it comes to raising rates. “We've just touched 2 percent core inflation, and then we've fallen back. So, I think we would need to see a really significant move up in inflation that's persistent before we even consider raising rates to address inflation concerns.” Reinforcing this, Powell also hinted at introducing a potential ‘tolerance band’ around the 2 percent inflation target – perhaps 1.5-2.5 percent – before the central bank would need to react. “We're also, as part of our review, looking at potential innovations… changes to the framework that would be more supportive of achieving inflation on a symmetric 2 percent basis over time… these changes to monetary policy frameworks don't happen really quickly (but)… I think we'll wrap it up around the middle of next year. I've some confidence in that.” What about profits – could 2020 be a repeat of the 2017 stellar growth story? No, there are two reasons why it will be very difficult to repeat the 2017 story on profits. The two reasons come from the two components of profits: sales and profit margins. Unlike in 2017, global sales will not start 2020 at the very depressed levels from which they can play a very strong catch-up. The first reason is that, unlike in 2017, global sales will not start 2020 at the very depressed levels from which they can play a very strong catch-up (Chart I-5). Significantly, the recession in global sales through 2015-16 was comparable to that suffered in 2008-09. The 2015-16 recession just hasn’t been well documented because it was essentially an emerging markets recession rather than the developed market recession of 2008-09. Chart I-5Global Sales Are Not Depressed The second reason is that today’s profit margins are still close to their structural and cyclical peak; whereas at the start of 2017, they were at a cyclical low (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Profit Margins Are Elevated Hence, the two components of profits – sales and profit margins – will start 2020 at elevated levels. The upshot is that profits can grow in 2020, but the growth will be pedestrian at best. Let’s summarise some of the key investment messages for 2020. High quality bond yields that are near the lower bound of -1 percent cannot go much lower, but those yields in the region of 2 percent cannot go significantly higher. It follows that fixed-income investors should underweight zero and negative yielding bonds versus higher yielding bonds – for example, underweight Swiss bonds versus US T-bonds. In a negative growth shock, T-bonds can still offer substantial capital gains but Swiss bonds cannot. For currencies, it is the opposite message. Favour lower yielding currencies because the central bank loses the ability to depress its own currency. For 2020, our preferred expression of this is long SEK/USD. Stock markets are set to produce low single digit returns. This is uninspiring, but in a world of low prospective returns from all major asset-classes, favour stocks over bonds and cash. This is especially true in those regions and countries where bond yields are zero or negative – specifically, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Today’s profit margins are still close to their structural and cyclical peak The biggest risk to this view is if the global bond yield were to rise towards 2.5 percent exposing the fragility of the risk-asset edifice to higher bond yields. To repeat, the value of global risk-assets, at over $400 trillion, dwarfs the $80 trillion global economy. So the biggest risk comes from the valuation of global financial markets, it does not come from the global economy. More About Price To Sales Having completed our 20 paragraphs on 2020, we would like to follow up on the analysis in last week’s report: Are European Stocks Attractive? To recap, we found that price to sales is the stock market valuation metric that has the best predictive power for prospective returns – because unlike other metrics such as assets, profits, and cash flow, sales are quantifiable, unambiguous, and undistorted by profit margins. In last week’s report our prospective return forecasts were based on price to sales data sourced from Thomson Reuters. To which, several clients asked if the analysis would be the same using the price to sales data sourced from MSCI (Chart I-7). The answer is broadly yes. Chart I-8-Chart I-10 illustrate that: Chart I-7Despite The US, Germany, And Japan Trading On Different Valuations... Chart I-8...The Prospective Return From The US Is Low Single Digit... Chart I-9...The Prospective Return From Germany Is Low Single Digit... Chart I-10...The Prospective Return From Japan Is Low Single Digit... First, despite vastly different stock market valuations in Germany, Japan, and the US, the implied prospective 10-year annualised returns are almost identical. Second, the implied prospective returns from the MSCI calculated price to sales are slightly lower than from the Thomson Reuters data, because current MSCI valuations are closer to the dot com bubble peak. Third, this just reinforces the point that stock market valuations are very fragile to higher bond yields, as already discussed in our preceding 20 paragraphs on 2020. Fractal Trading System* This week we note that the strong outperformance of the Irish stock market is vulnerable to a correction based on its broken 65-day fractal structure. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short Ireland (ISEQ 20) versus Europe (Stoxx Europe 600). Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent. In other trades, we are pleased to report that long gold versus nickel achieved its 11 percent profit target and is now closed. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
Highlights Duration: The bond market’s bearish trend remains intact, but suffered a hiccup last week as some economic data disappointed. Our sense is that the worst of the global growth slowdown is over, but a rebound in our preferred global growth indicators – Global Manufacturing PMI, US ISM Manufacturing PMI and CRB Raw Industrials index – is necessary to push bond yields higher. We expect that such a rebound will transpire in the coming months. The Credit Cycle & Inflation: Low inflation expectations will keep monetary policy accommodative for the next 6-12 months. This justifies a positive outlook for spread product excess returns. Eventually, inflation will return and force the Fed to adopt a more restrictive stance. This will lead to the end of the credit cycle. We will get more defensive on spread product when long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%. Municipal Bonds: The main issues facing municipal bonds are long-run in nature, mostly related to underfunded state & local government pensions. These concerns are propping up yield ratios at the long-end of the muni curve, but aren’t likely to cause a wave of ratings downgrades until revenue growth slows during the next downturn. For the time being, investors can grab an attractive after-tax yield premium in long-maturity munis. Hiccups Judging by the bond market, recession fears appear to have peaked in late August. Since then, the Treasury index has lost 2.1% versus a position in cash and the 2/10 yield curve is 23 bps steeper (Chart 1). Curve steepening has also occurred via the real yield curve, while the breakeven inflation curve is moderately flatter, consistent with our expectations.1 However, this bearish bond market trend suffered a set-back last week. The 10-year yield fell 10 bps, back down to 1.84%, and the 2-year yield fell 7 bps to 1.61%. The move was driven by an increase in skepticism about the US and China’s “phase 1” trade deal and some mixed economic data. Both industrial production growth and capacity utilization remain well above their 2016 lows, consistent with stronger PMIs.  October’s Industrial Production report was the worst of last week’s data releases. Production declined 0.8% on the month and capacity utilization fell from 77.5% to 76.7% (Chart 2). The data were significantly influenced by the General Motors strike, but the index still fell 0.5% with motor vehicles and parts stripped out. In our prior discussions of the divergence between “hard” and “soft” economic data, we pointed to relatively strong industrial production as a reason to expect a snapback in depressed manufacturing PMIs.2 This month’s weak print challenges that view, though both industrial production growth and capacity utilization remain well above their 2016 lows, consistent with stronger PMIs. The New York Fed’s Manufacturing PMI also came in roughly flat last week, and continues to point to a rebound in the national index (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 1Bumps On The Road ##br##To Higher Yields Chart 2Disappointing Data, But Well ##br##Above 2016 Lows October’s retail sales were also released last week, and we continue to observe a wide divergence between strong consumer spending growth and falling consumer confidence (Chart 3). As with the divergence between industrial production and the manufacturing PMI, we suspect that negative sentiment about the US/China trade war has unduly depressed consumer and business sentiment. Sentiment should rebound if trade tensions ease in the coming months, as we expect. Finally, we note that the CRB Raw Industrials index remains downbeat (Chart 4). We should continue to view the recent increase in bond yields as tenuous until it is confirmed by a rebound in this global growth bellwether. Chart 3Retail Sales Still Strong Chart 4Waiting On The CRB Index To Rebound Bottom Line: The bond market’s bearish trend remains intact, but suffered a hiccup last week as some economic data disappointed. Our sense is that the worst of the global growth slowdown is over, but a rebound in our preferred global growth indicators – Global Manufacturing PMI, US ISM Manufacturing PMI and CRB Raw Industrials index – is necessary to push bond yields higher. We expect that such a rebound will transpire in the coming months.   Inflation Will End The Cycle … But Not Anytime Soon As global growth improves during the next few months and recession fears fade into the background, discussion will once again turn toward questions about how much longer the credit cycle can run, and what will ultimately bring it to an end. On the first question, we find the slope of the yield curve to be an excellent indicator of the age of the cycle. Specifically, we like to split each cycle into three phases based on the slope of the 3-year/10-year yield curve: 3 Phase 1 starts at the end of the last recession and ends when the 3/10 slope flattens to below 50 bps. Phase 2 encompasses the period when the slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps. Phase 3 begins when the 3/10 slope inverts and ends at the start of the next recession. We expect Phase 2 to persist for some time given that inflation expectations remain downbeat. Table 1 shows that corporate bond excess returns are highest in Phase 1, when the yield curve is steep and spreads are tightening quickly. Excess returns tend to remain positive in Phase 2, but are much lower. Excess returns don’t usually turn negative until after the yield curve inverts and we enter Phase 3. Table 1Corporate Bond Performance During The Three Phases Of The Yield Curve Cycle Though some segments of the yield curve inverted in August, we do not think that the cycle has transitioned into Phase 3. The inversion was quite brief, and the measure we employ in our analysis – the monthly average of daily closing values of the 3-year/10-year slope – never broke below zero. The 3-year/10-year slope is currently +23 bps. We expect the current Phase 2 environment to persist for some time, and consequently, corporate bonds will deliver small positive excess returns relative to Treasuries. The reason why we expect Phase 2 to persist for some time is that inflation expectations remain downbeat (Chart 5). Both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are well below the 2.3%-2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s target. This means that the Fed has every incentive to maintain an accommodative monetary policy until inflation expectations are re-anchored. An accommodative policy stance will prevent the yield curve from inverting for any sustained period of time. Chart 5The Re-Anchoring Process Will Take Time The upshot is that a re-anchoring of TIPS breakeven inflation rates will be an important signal for us to get more defensive on corporate credit. When the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%, the Fed will have less incentive to maintain an accommodative stance. The pace of tightening will likely quicken, leading to a sustained curve inversion and a transition into Phase 3 of the cycle. How Long Until Inflation Expectations Are Re-Anchored? Given our framework for thinking about the age of the cycle, the big question for our corporate credit call is: How long until inflation expectations are re-anchored? We have previously demonstrated that inflation expectations adapt to changes in the actual inflation data, and that this adaptive process occurs very slowly.4 Note that our Adaptive Expectations Model puts fair value for the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate at 1.9%. This is above the current rate of 1.63%, but still well below our 2.3%-2.5% target range (Chart 5, bottom panel). The gradual nature of the adaptive process means that actual core inflation will probably have to overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for a period of time before long-dated expectations are firmly re-anchored. With that in mind, we are still a long way away from inflation posing a problem for the credit cycle. Core CPI and core PCE inflation are running at year-over-year rates of 2.3% and 1.7%, respectively, both slightly below levels consistent with the Fed’s target (Chart 6).5 Trimmed mean measures are slightly higher and less volatile. They currently suggest that core inflation will remain in a slow and steady uptrend going forward. Any durable increase in core inflation will likely occur via the Core Services (ex. shelter and medical care) component.  Looking at the main components of core inflation, we see some reason to expect consumer price acceleration to cool in the coming months. Recent inflation gains have come mostly via the Core Goods component (Chart 7). This component tracks non-oil import prices with a long lag, and import prices have already rolled over. Meanwhile, shelter is the largest component of core inflation and we expect it will remain well supported in the coming months. The National Multifamily Housing Council’s Apartment Market Tightness Index has been in “net tightening” territory for two consecutive quarters (Chart 7, bottom panel). An above-50% reading from this index tends to coincide with rising shelter inflation. Chart 6Expect Core Inflation To Rise Slowly Chart 7A Closer Look At The Core CPI Components Ultimately, any durable increase in core inflation will likely occur via the Core Services (ex. shelter and medical care) component. This component has been relatively stable during the past few months (Chart 7, panel 3). Another interesting dynamic to monitor when assessing how long it will take for inflation to return is the labor share of national income. Chart 8 shows that the wage acceleration seen during the past few years has come mostly at the expense of corporate profit margins, and has not yet been significantly passed through to higher consumer prices. This is typical late-cycle behavior, and at some point firms will need to start raising prices in order to protect margins. Chart 8Where Will The Labor Share Peak? If we use the past few cycles as a guide, we see that the labor share of income peaked at above 70%. If this is an accurate road-map for the current cycle, then it means that firms can stomach quite a bit more margin compression, and it could be a long time before inflation pressures emerge. However, some recent research suggests that the labor share of income might peak at a lower level this cycle than in the past.6  This research documents that many industries are increasingly dominated by a small number of “superstar firms”. These firms have greater pricing power and might be able to sustain higher profit margins indefinitely. This would mean that inflationary pressures could re-emerge at a lower labor share of national income than in previous cycles. Bottom Line: Low inflation expectations will keep monetary policy accommodative for the next 6-12 months. This justifies a positive outlook for spread product excess returns. Eventually, inflation will return and force the Fed to adopt a more restrictive stance. This will lead to the end of the credit cycle. We will get more defensive on spread product when long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates move above 2.3%. Strong Revenue Growth Supports Munis We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to municipal bonds due to attractive yield ratios, particularly for long maturities, and steady state & local government revenue growth. Chart 9 shows that Aaa Municipal / Treasury yield ratios were quite low earlier this year, but have increased significantly during the past few months. Yield ratios are above average pre-crisis levels for maturities of 10-years and greater. Against that back-drop of attractive valuations, credit quality trends are also supportive. Municipal bond ratings upgrades are outpacing downgrades (Chart 10), and history suggests that will continue until state & local government revenue growth slows. On that front, the three main sources of state & local government revenue are all growing at strong rates, a trend that should continue as long as the economic recovery is maintained. Municipal bond ratings upgrades are outpacing downgrades, and history suggests that will continue until state & local government revenue growth slows.  Of course, many state & local governments face long-run credit constraints, mostly related to underfunded pension obligations. This is almost certainly the reason why yield ratios for long-maturity bonds are so attractive. Crucially, these long-run issues will not be exposed until revenue growth slows during the next economic downturn, and investors have an opportunity to capture the attractive yield premium in the meantime. Chart 9Great Value At The Long End Chart 10Revenue Growth Will Remain Strong State governments have also made progress shoring up their balance sheets during the past few years. The National Association of State Budget Officers calculates that the overall state & local government total balance has returned back to 2006 levels, while rainy day funds have been built up considerably (Chart 11). Chart 11States Are Growing Rainy Day Funds Bottom Line: The main issues facing municipal bonds are long-run in nature, mostly related to underfunded state & local government pensions. These concerns are propping up yield ratios at the long-end of the muni curve, but aren’t likely to cause a wave of ratings downgrades until revenue growth slows during the next downturn. For the time being, investors can grab an attractive after-tax yield premium in long-maturity munis.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Position For Modest Curve Steepening”, dated October 29, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Crisis Of Confidence”, dated October 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our analysis of the phases of the cycle based on the slope of the yield curve please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For US Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 The Fed targets 2% PCE inflation, which is historically consistent with CPI inflation between 2.4% and 2.5%. 6 https://economics.mit.edu/files/12979 Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Dear Client, Instead of our regular weekly report next Monday, this Friday November 22, you will receive our flagship publication “The Bank Credit Analyst” with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on December 2  with our high-conviction calls for 2020. Kind regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy Weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and pricey valuations are all warning that REITs are headed south. Global capex blues and the ongoing manufacturing recession, the resilient US dollar and weak operating metrics all confirm that an underweight stance is still warranted in the S&P communications equipment index. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 made fresh all-time highs again last week, as investors focused on hopes of a US/China trade deal and continued to ignore negative data/news at their own peril. Domestically, unemployment insurance claims jumped to the highest level since June, and none of the major market and industry groups showed a gain in output on a month-over-month basis in October according to the latest Fed industrial production release. Internationally, Korean exports remain in the doldrums, Chinese data releases were weak across the board, and the mighty US dollar is making multi-decade highs versus a slew of EM currencies. Chart 1Disquieting Gap All of this begs the question is global growth going to recover and aid the equity market grow into its lofty valuation? Our indicators suggest that a definitive earnings trough is now pushed out to Q2/2020. Thus, equity market caution is still warranted.   Given all the recent equity market euphoria, we feel more and more like “the lone calf standing on the desolate, dangerous, wolf-patrolled prairie of contrary opinion” as – arguably the greatest trader of all time – Jesse Livermore mused roughly a century ago. Share buybacks have been a key pillar underpinning stocks since the GFC averaging roughly $500bn/annum since 2010. But, last year equity retirement jumped to nearly $1tn/annum. That is clearly unsustainable, warning that there is a disconnect between the S&P 500 and already steeply decelerating share buybacks. Our equity retirement estimate for next year is a return to the 10-year average, signaling that the market may hit a significant air pocket (top panel, Chart 1). Another perplexing recent phenomenon has been the lack of buying on margin that typically confirms SPX breakouts. While this episode may be similar to the 2015/16 episode, if margin debt does not recover soon it will exert downward pull on the broad market (bottom panel, Chart 1). Turning over to earnings, revenues, margins and the forward multiple is instructive. Turning over to earnings, revenues, margins and the forward multiple is instructive. Chart 2 highlights the S&P 500 earnings growth surprise factor. In more detail, this IBES/Refinitiv data show how accurate the sell side analysts’ 12-month forward EPS forecasts have been over time: a reading above zero implies the analyst community was too timid, while a fall below zero signals analysts were too optimistic. Chart 2Unhinged From The EPS Accuracy Signal Equity market momentum moves with the ebb and flow of this factor and given the still downbeat message both from our SPX profit model (please refer to our recent webcast slides) and our simple liquidity indicator (please see Chart 4 from last week’s publication), we doubt 10% profit growth is even plausible for 2020. On the margin front, all four key profit margin drivers are on the brink of turning from tailwinds to headwinds as we recently highlighted in our “Peak Margins?” Special Report. Revenue growth is also at risk of a standstill. Domestic producer prices are deflating, and the ISM prices paid index has been clobbered. German, Japanese, Korean and Chinese wholesale prices are contracting and the OECD’s composite PPI measure is also sinking, suggesting that final demand is anemic at best. Under such a dire global pricing backdrop, it will be challenging for SPX sales to sustain their positive momentum, especially if the greenback remains well bid (Chart 3). Chart 3Top Line Growth Troubles Forward multiples have slingshot higher despite a near 40bps increase in the 10-year yield since Labor Day. When the discount rate rises the multiple should come in and vice versa. Thus, we would lean against the recent spike in the S&P 500 forward P/E (10-year yield shown inverted, Chart 4). This week we are updating our negative views on a niche high-yielding sector and a tech subgroup. Finally, while sifting through market internals, we recently stumbled upon the GICS2 S&P consumer services index. Digging deeper into services was revealing. This relative share price ratio has gapped down of late. One of the reasons is that the services component of the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) data is decelerating (PCE services shown advanced, middle panel, Chart 5). The ISM non-manufacturing survey is also an excellent leading indicator of the S&P consumer services index, and warns that things will likely get worse before they get better (bottom panel, Chart 5).       Chart 4Lofty Valuations Chart 5Market Internals Signal: Sit This One Out This week we are updating our negative views on a niche high-yielding sector and a tech subgroup. Getting Real With Real Estate We would refrain from chasing high yielding real estate stocks higher, and would rather avoid them altogether at the current juncture. Similar to utilities, REITs have come to the forefront lately as they have populated the top return sector ranks. However, real estate stocks, which have split out of the financials sector, are a niche GICS1 sector with a mere 3% market capitalization weight in the SPX, and have not driven the S&P 500 to all-time highs. Instead, tech stocks have, owing to their 23% market capitalization weight, as we have shown in recent research.1 Importantly, several key factors continue to signal that investors should shed public market real estate exposure. Namely, weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and still pricey valuations (primarily rock bottom cap rates) are all firing warning shots. The commercial real estate (CRE) sector is a bubble candidate that exemplifies this cycle’s excesses. As we have highlighted in the past, CRE prices sit at roughly two standard deviations above both the historical time trend and the previous cycle’s peak (not shown).2 Worryingly, CRE demand is waning. Not only our proprietary real estate demand indicator has sunk recently, but also the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey revealed that demand for CRE loans remains feeble (third & bottom panels, Chart 6). Simultaneously, fewer bankers are willing to extend CRE credit according to the same quarterly Fed survey (Chart 7). This tightening backdrop is weighing on CRE credit growth and CRE prices (second panel, Chart 6). In fact, absent credit growth providing the necessary fuel to sustain the CRE price inflation frenzy, there are rising odds that investors pull the plug on REITs (top panel, Chart 7). Chart 6Demand Ails Chart 7Time To... Already, occupancy rates have crested and there are increasing anecdotes of credit quality deterioration. As a result, CRE rents are also failing to keep up with inflation which eats into relative cash flow growth prospects (Chart 8). The supply side build up tilts this delicate balance further into deficit. Non-residential construction shows no signs of abating, with multi-family housing starts still running at an historically high rate of roughly 400K/annum (Chart 9). Such relentless overbuilding sows the seeds of the eventual felling in CRE prices and rents, which should also dent the S&P real estate sector. Chart 8...Lighten Up On Real Estate Chart 9Supply Build Up Is Deflationary Meanwhile, interest rate related headwinds will also weigh on this high-yielding sector in coming quarters, especially if the selloff in the bond market gains steam as BCA’s fixed income strategists continue to expect. While in the 2000s REITs were positively correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield, since 2010 this relationship has flipped and is now a tight inverse correlation (Chart 10). Chart 10Rising Yields = Sell REITs Finally, our proprietary Valuation Indicator (VI) has enjoyed an impressive run since the 2017 trough and despite the recent relative selloff remains in overvalued territory. Our Technical Indicator (TI) hit a wall of late near one standard deviation above the historical mean and has only partially unwound the overbought reading since the early 2018 bottom. If our thesis pans out, we expect heightened selling pressure to weigh further on our VI and TI (Chart 11). Chart 11Still Too Pricey Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight rating in the S&P real estate sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5RLST – AMT, PLD, CCI, SPG, EQIX, WELL, PSA, EQR, AVB, SBAC, O, DLR, WY, VTR, ESS, BXP, CBRE, ARE, PEAK, MAA, UDR, EXR, DRE, HST, REG, VNO, IRM, FRT, KIM, AIV, SLG, MAC . Lost Signal The communications equipment rally stalled early in the summer and has since morphed into a bear market. We are sticking with our underweight recommendation, especially given a darkening profit outlook for this niche tech sub-group. Bellwether CSCO’s latest guidance was weak and confirmed that this capex-laden tech sub-index is in for a rough ride. Worryingly, CSCO’s key enterprise segment has no pulse. Historically, this data series has been positively correlated with telecom carrier capital outlays and the current message is grim (second panel, Chart 12). Tack on the ongoing manufacturing recession with CEOs canceling/postponing capital spending plans and the outlook dims further for the revenue prospects of communications equipment vendors (third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Chart 12Heed The CSCO Warning Adding insult to injury, the US/China trade war is further complicating the picture. The ongoing tariffs have exacerbated the global growth slowdown and global capex plans have come under intense scrutiny. The IFO’s World Economic Outlook capex intentions survey has plunged, warning that global exports of telecom gear have ample downside (Chart 13). Chart 13Global Capex Blues Chart 14US Dollar The Deflator The greenback’s resilience is also sapping business purchasing power, especially in the emerging markets, denting final-demand. Therefore, the US dollar’s appreciation robs communications equipment manufacturers’ pricing power, makes their goods more expensive in the global market place, and as a consequence forces market share losses on them (Chart 14). The greenback’s resilience is also sapping business purchasing power, especially in the emerging markets, denting final-demand. The implication of weakening pricing power is that profits will likely underwhelm. Currently, the sell-side is penciling in roughly 10% EPS growth for the S&P communications equipment index over and above the SPX in the next twelve months. This is a tall order and we would lean against such extreme analyst optimism (bottom panel, Chart 15). Operating metrics are quickly losing steam, another harbinger of profit ails for this tech sub-group. In more detail, our productivity proxy has taken a steep turn for the worse and industry executives have also put investment projects on hold (middle panel, Chart 15). Moreover, the communication equipment new orders-to-inventories ratio is contracting and industry resource utilization is probing multi-year lows, according to the Fed’s latest industrial production release. Under such a backdrop, relative top line growth is on track to level off and likely flirt with the contraction zone (Chart 16). Chart 15Operating Metric... Chart 16...Dysphoria Netting it all out, global capex blues, the resilient US dollar and weak operating metrics all confirm that an underweight stance is still warranted in the S&P communications equipment index.    Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P communications equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Deciphering Sector Returns” dated August 30, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “10 Most FAQs From The Road” dated April 8, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)
Highlights A few indicators suggest that global growth will soon bottom. The bottoming process could prove volatile, but the duration of the slowdown suggests a V-shaped rather than U-shaped recovery. The dollar should weaken as higher-beta cyclical currencies rebound from deeply oversold levels. Sell the DXY index at 100. Aggressive short USD bets can be played via the NOK and SEK. The euro is also a natural beneficiary. Our favorite dollar-neutral bets include long AUD/CAD, SEK/NZD, GBP/JPY and short CAD/NOK. Feature The biggest question facing global investors is whether growth will pick up next year, and if so, what the durability of such a rebound will be. Any additional growth hiccups will cause the dollar to soar, and this week’s disappointing credit and industrial production numbers from China are a sober reminder that we are not out of the woods yet. Nevertheless, we believe a pickup in demand, especially emanating from outside the US, is forthcoming. This will favor more pro-cyclical currencies. Cyclical sectors of the equity market are already sniffing a growth rebound, and the dollar is off its peak for the year (Chart I-1). Historically, these have been good reflation indicators, especially when they are sending the same message. This is also a reminder to focus on where economic data will be six to 12 months from now rather than trade on yesterday’s news. Chart I-1The Dollar Tends To Weaken When Cyclicals Are Outperforming Policy shifts affect the economy with a lag, with a bottoming process that can be volatile and/or protracted. However, the duration of the current slowdown suggests we might be entering a V-shaped rather than U- or W-shaped recovery. Investors can track a few indicators to help calibrate the probability of the different scenarios playing out. The Message From Economic Variables There are a swath of economic variables one can follow to track the health of an economy, but we tend to focus on purchasing managers’ indices. This is because they are timely and have a good track record of confirming cyclical shifts in the economy. The problem is that for the most part, they tend to be coincident rather than leading indicators. Gauging the magnitude and duration of the cycle is also important to avoid false starts. The message is that the European manufacturing recession will be over by the first quarter of 2020.  In the US, financial conditions lead the ISM manufacturing index with a tight correlation (Chart I-2). Over the past 18 months, US bond yields have fallen. The historical precedent is that manufacturing activity should be reviving about now. The current reading is consistent with a rather explosive rise in the ISM manufacturing index, towards 60. Chart I-2The Drop In Bond Yields Is Consistent With An ISM Near 60 In Europe, the Sentix sentiment index, which surveys the balance of investors’ emotions between greed and fear, tends to be coincident. However, the ratio of the expectations component to the current situation, a second derivative measure of exuberance or capitulation, tends to lead changes in the PMI indices by six months (Chart I-3, top panel). Again, the message is that the European manufacturing recession will be over by the first quarter of 2020. Applying the same formula to the ZEW survey gives a similar message for Germany (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Even within the Japanese economy, which was heavily hit by the October consumption tax hike, some green shoots can still be uncovered. The expectations component of the Economy Watchers Survey, a comprehensive read across much of the smaller entrepreneurs that drive the local economy, is improving. This has nudged the difference between the expectations component and the current situation to the highest in 5 years. The message is corroborated by the economic surprise index (Chart I-4). Chart I-3A V-Shaped Recovery In European Manufacturing? Chart I-4Japan Green ##br##Shoots   Chinese credit growth was uninspiring in October, but the Caixin manufacturing PMI is now firmly above the 50 boom/bust level. More and more financial intermediation is being done through the bond market, and the drop in Chinese bond yields has eased financial conditions tremendously. This should encourage lending, which should lead to stronger economic activity, boosting demand for imports (Chart I-5). Rising Chinese imports will boost global growth. Chart I-5Chinese Imports Could Soon Rebound Bottom Line: For the most part, PMIs across many countries remain weak, but a few indicators are starting to point to an improvement next year. Given PMIs tend to be coincident, the most potent gains will be made by being early in the cycle. What Are Financial Markets Telling Us? The nascent upturn in our growth indicators is also coinciding with a positive signal from financial variables. Usually, when financial and economic data are in sync, the move in markets tends to be durable and powerful. Below are a few examples.  Usually, when financial and economic data are in sync, the move in markets tends to be durable and powerful.  Global cyclical stocks have started to outperform defensives, and the traditional negative correlation with the dollar appears to be holding (previously referenced Chart I-1). Correspondingly, flows into more cyclical ETF markets are accelerating. These are a small portion of overall FX flows, but the information coefficient is directionally quite good. The message is that in six months, EUR/USD will hit 1.16, GBP/USD will be at 1.4, AUD/USD at 0.75 and the USD/SEK at 8.5. Paradoxically, these are also closer to our own internal targets (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Inflows Into Cyclical ETFs The copper-to-gold, oil-to-gold, and CRB Raw Industrials-to-gold1 ratios often capture the transmission mechanism between easing liquidity conditions and higher growth. It is encouraging that these also tend to move in lockstep with US bond yields, another global growth barometer. The power of the signal is established when all three indicators peak or bottom at the same time, as is the case now (Chart I-7). The next confirmation will come with a clear breakout in these ratios. Chart I-7Global Growth Barometers Flashing Amber Correspondingly, in China, scrap steel prices have begun to rise faster than imported iron ore prices, suggesting an improving margin for steel producers. This is probably an indication that steel destocking has reached a nadir (Chart I-8). A renewed restocking cycle should benefit iron ore and other commodity imports and prices. In sympathy, the LMEX index appears to be making a tentative trough.  AUD/JPY breached the important technical level of 72 cents this year but has since recovered. The cross has failed to sustainably break below this level both during the euro area debt crisis in 2011-2012 and the China slowdown in 2015-2016. Again, it appears reflation is winning the tug-of-war. Given speculators are neutral the cross, it suggests that any move either way will be powerful and significant (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Bullish Bottom-Up Signals From Metals Chart I-9Breakdown Avoided For Now An improving liquidity environment will be especially favorable for carry trades. High-beta currencies such as the RUB/USD, ZAR/USD and BRL/USD have not yet broken down. These currencies are usually good at sniffing out a change in the investment landscape. The message so far is that the drop in US bond yields may have been sufficient to backstop any cascading selloff (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Carry Trades May Be Back In Style Soon Finally, bond yields across major markets are off their lows. Our strategy is to be selective as US dollar tailwinds shift to headwinds, by initially expressing tactical USD shorts via the more potent Norwegian krone and Swedish krona. We have discussed at length our rationale for picking these currency pairs,2 but the bottom line is that they are deeply oversold and have probably been the primary vehicles used to express US dollar long positions. Bottom Line: It is too early to tell if the dollar will retest its highs before ultimately cresting, because part of the move has been driven by risk aversion/political uncertainty. Our bias is that some sort of trade détente is sufficient to rejuvenate economic activity given part of the slowdown, especially vis-à-vis capex, has been driven by uncertainty. Meanwhile, lots of monetary ammunition has already been fired over the past year.  Notes On Australia And New Zealand This week, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand surprised markets by keeping rates on hold, a volte-face to its dovish surprise this summer. In retrospect, this makes sense. First, the RBNZ may be watching the same indicators as us, and as such is seeing an imminent turnaround in the global economy. Keeping some ammunition will allow for more room to ease down the road. Second, the weakness in the currency has probably done the heavy lifting in boosting exports and supporting domestic income. Finally, Australia and China are New Zealand’s biggest trading partners, and the trade war along with rising pork prices have allowed for a terms-of-trade boost for New Zealand’s agricultural exports (Chart I-11). Slowing migration will go a long way in eroding a meaningful supply of employment and domestic demand in New Zealand. We are positive on the kiwi but believe it will underperform its antipodean neighbor. First, the AUD/NZD is cheap on a real effective exchange rate basis (Chart I-12). Meanwhile, a more pronounced downturn in Aussie house prices has allowed some cleansing of sorts, bringing them further along the adjustment path relative to New Zealand. We are willing to overlook this week’s disappointment in Australia’s job numbers, given the unfortunate wildfires that are destroying businesses and homes. Fiscal stimulus will be forthcoming, and reconstruction efforts will go a long way to boosting domestic demand Chart I-11A Terms Of Trade Boost Chart I-12AUD/NZD Is Cheap Meanwhile, the RBNZ began a new mandate on April 1st that now includes full employment in addition to inflation targeting. But given the RBNZ has been unable to fulfill its price stability mandate over the past several years, it is hard to argue it will find a dual mandate any easier. Slowing migration will erode a meaningful supply of employment and domestic demand in New Zealand (Chart I-13). The final catalyst for the AUD/NZD cross will be a terms-of-trade shock (Chart I-14). Iron ore prices may face further downside, given supply from Brazil is back online, but China’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix. Given eliminating pollution is a strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind Chart I-13Loss Of A Meaningful Tailwind For Employment Chart I-14Terms Of Trade Favors ##br##Aussie Bottom Line: Remain long AUD/NZD as a strategic position and SEK/NZD as a tactical position. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The CRB Raw Industrials-to-gold ratio is not shown here because of the steep correction in iron ore prices, after a resolution to a supply disruption. That said, iron ore prices are up 28% this year, versus 14% for gold. 2 Please see page 24 for a summary of our recent reports. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been positive: The Michigan consumer sentiment index edged up to 95.7 from 95.5 in November. The NFIB business optimism index slightly increased to 102.4 from 101.8 in October. Headline inflation recorded modest growth to 1.8% year-on-year in October while core inflation fell to 2.3%. Headline and core producer prices both slowed to 1.1% and 1.6% year-on-year respectively in October. The housing market remains healthy, with mortgage applications up 9.6% for the week. The DXY index appreciated by 0.2% this week. During his testimony this week, Fed Chair Powell suggested the growth outlook for the US remained favorable, based on labor market trends. That said, Europe and EM probably have more scope to outperform amid a global growth recovery, which will be a headwind for the US dollar.  Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been improving: The ZEW economic sentiment index rebounded to -1 from -23.5 in November. Industrial production contracted by 1.7% year-on-year in September, however it is better than the contraction of 2.8% in the previous month and the expectations of a 2.3% drop. The preliminary GDP report showed that growth increased to 1.2% year-on-year in Q3, up from 1.1% in the previous quarter. Impressively, Germany steered clear of a recession. The euro fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. We expect the euro to recover along with the gradual improvement in the data. Moreover, the increased issuance of euro-denominated debt suggests some inflows into European corporate bond markets. This will benefit the euro. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: The trade surplus plunged to JPY 1 billion in September. The current account surplus narrowed to JPY 1.6 trillion from JPY 2.2 trillion. Machinery orders contracted by 2.9% month-on-month in September. On a yearly basis however, they grew by 5.1% year-on-year. Preliminary machine tool orders kept falling by 37.4% year-on-year in October. Preliminary annualized GDP growth slowed to 0.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q3. USD/JPY fell by 0.6% this week. Forward-looking data are showing more optimism on the domestic economy. This might prove that the damage from the tax hike is only a one-off effect. Continue to hold the yen, as both portfolio insurance, and a bet against more aggressive monetary stimulus from the BoJ. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been mostly negative: The total trade deficit (including EU) widened to £3.4 billion in September. Preliminary GDP growth slowed to 1% year-on-year in Q3, from 1.3% in the previous quarter. Industrial production contracted by 1.4% year-on-year in September. Average earnings kept growing by 3.6% year-on-year in September. Moreover, the ILO unemployment rate fell further to 3.8%. Headline inflation fell to 1.5% year-on-year in October, while core inflation remained at 1.7%. GBP/USD increased by 0.4% this week. Despite the recent small rally, the pound is still undervalued on a PPP basis. With a lower probability of a hard-Brexit, our bias remains that the pound has more upside and will converge towards its long-term fair value. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: NAB business conditions and confidence both increased to 3 and 2 in October. Moreover, Westpac consumer confidence increased by 4.5% in November. The wage price index grew by 2.2% year-on-year in Q3. The labor market data was however disappointing, the unemployment rate slightly increased to 5.3% in October. There was a loss of 19K jobs in October, with 10K full-time and 9K part-time. AUD/USD fell by 1.3% this week, weighed down by the recent slide in iron ore prices and employment data. Given speculators are already very short the cross, this could be capitulation. We discuss Australia in this week’s front section. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mostly negative: Inflation expectations fell slightly to 1.8% in Q4. The REINZ house price index grew by 1.1% month-on-month in October, down from 1.4% in the previous month. Migration into New Zealand continues to slow, with only 3440 newcomers in September. The New Zealand dollar rose by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The main driver is that the RBNZ unexpectedly kept its interest rate unchanged at 1% this Wednesday. We are positive on the kiwi, but remain underweight against both the Australian dollar and the Swedish krona on valuation grounds. Report Links: USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly negative: Housing starts fell by 20K to 202K in October. Building permits fell by 6.5% month-on-month in September. The unemployment rate was unchanged at 5.5% in October. There was a loss of 1.8K jobs in October. However, average hourly wages yearly growth accelerated to 4.4%. New house prices contracted by 0.1% year-on-year in September. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week, given broad US dollar strength. CAD has handsomely outperformed its G10 commodity counterparts and some measure of rotation is due. We are short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been negative: Producer and import prices contracted by 2.4% year-on-year in October. The Swiss franc has appreciated by 0.6%, and the latest PPI numbers suggest deflation is becoming more and more rampant. Our bias remains that the SNB is likely to soon weaponize its currency like other central banks. We have a limit buy on EUR/CHF at 1.06. Stay tuned. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Producer prices fell by 13.8% year-on-year in October. This can largely be explained by the petroleum sector. Headline inflation increased to 1.8% year-on-year from 1.5% in October. Core inflation was unchanged at 2.2% year-on-year. The mainland GDP growth was unchanged at 0.7% in Q3. The Norwegian krone fell by 0.8% this week. The weakness in the krone remains much more than is warranted by underlying economic conditions. Should the DXY hit 100, we will be aggressive buyers of the krone. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Headline inflation increased to 1.6% year-on-year from 1.5% in October. The unemployment rate fell to 6% from a downward-revised 6.6% in October. The Swedish krona depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. Statistics Sweden has revised down the unemployment rate for the period from July 2018 to September 2019, due to a flaw in data quality. This has dampened the credibility of the employment data in Sweden and its effect on the exchange rate. That said, we maintain a pro-cyclical stance and remain bullish on the Swedish krona.  Report Links: Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Dear Client, I will be visiting clients in Paris, Amsterdam, and London next week. In lieu of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report from Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Matt argues that US politics and the 2020 election represent the greatest source of geopolitical risk over the coming year, and possibly beyond. Best regards, Peter Berezin Highlights Having underperformed for more than ten years, non-US stocks are set to gain the upper hand over their US peers. A reacceleration in global growth, a weaker US dollar, and favorable valuations should all support non-US stocks next year. Meanwhile, one of the greater drivers of US equity outperformance – the stellar returns of tech stocks – is likely to dissipate. Investors should remain overweight global equities relative to bonds, but start increasing allocations to non-US stocks at the expense of US stocks. US Stocks: From Leaders To Laggards? US equities have handily outperformed their global peers since 2008. About half of that outperformance was due to faster sales-per-share growth in the US, a third was due to faster growth in US margins, and the rest was due to relative P/E expansion in favor of the US (Chart 1). Looking ahead, non-US stocks are set to gain the upper hand over their US peers thanks to an improving global growth backdrop, a weaker US dollar, and an increasingly irresistible valuation tailwind. Chart 1Faster Sales Growth, Rising Margins, And Relative PE Expansion Helped Drive US Outperformance Over The Past Decade Improving Global Growth Outlook Global growth should benefit next year from the dovish pivot by most central banks. The share of central banks cutting/raising rates leads global growth by about 6-to-9 months (Chart 2). Chart 2Lower Rates Should Help Spur Growth Chart 3The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy The global manufacturing downturn is also coming to end as inventories continue to be run down. The auto sector, which has been at the forefront of the manufacturing slowdown, is finally showing signs of life. US banks stopped tightening lending standards for auto loans in the third quarter. They are also reporting stronger demand for vehicle financing (Chart 3). In Europe, the new orders-to-inventory ratio of the Markit Europe Automobile PMI has moved back to parity for the first time since the autumn of 2018. In China, vehicle production and sales are rebounding on a rate-of-change basis (Chart 4). Both automobile ownership and vehicle sales in China are still a fraction of what they are in most other economies (Chart 5). Chart 4Chinese Auto Sector Is Bottoming Out Chart 5China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright The trade war is a clear and present danger to our bullish outlook on global growth. The good news is that President Trump has a strong incentive to make a deal. A resurgence in the trade war would hurt the economy, which is Trump’s best selling point (Chart 6). As a self-described master negotiator, Trump has to produce a “tremendous” deal for the American people. Had he negotiated an agreement a year or two ago, he would currently be on the hook for showing that it resulted in a smaller trade deficit with China. But with the presidential election only a year away, he can semi-credibly claim that the trade balance will improve only after he is re-elected. Assuming a “Phase 1” agreement is concluded, global business sentiment should improve. Chart 6Trump Gets Reasonably High Marks On His Handling Of The Economy, But Not Much Else A détente in the trade war is unlikely to cause China to restart its deleveraging campaign. Credit growth is currently only a few points above trend nominal GDP growth, implying that the ratio of credit-to-GDP is barely increasing (Chart 7). The combined Chinese credit and fiscal impulse is still rising; it reliably leads global growth by about nine months (Chart 8). Chart 7China: The Deleveraging Campaign Has Been Put On The Backburner Chart 8Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth Faster Global Growth Should Disproportionately Benefit Non-US stocks The sector composition of international stocks is more skewed towards cyclicals than defensives compared to US stocks (Table 1). As a result, non-US stocks generally outperform their US peers when global growth accelerates (Chart 9). Table 1Cyclicals Are More Heavily Weighted Outside The US Stock Market We would include financials in our definition of cyclical sectors. As global growth improves, long-term bond yields will increase at the margin (Chart 10). Since central banks are in no hurry to raise rates, yield curves will steepen. This will boost bank net interest margins, flattering profits and share prices (Chart 11). Chart 9Non-US Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Chart 10Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields   The US Dollar Should Weaken Compared to most other economies, the United States has a large service sector and a small manufacturing base. This makes the US a “low beta” play on global growth. As a result, capital tends to flow from the US to the rest of the world when global growth picks up, putting downward pressure on the US dollar in the process (Chart 12). Chart 11Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials Chart 12The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency   Interest-rate differentials have been moving against the dollar for most of this year (Chart 13). This makes the greenback more vulnerable to a correction. Chart 13The Dollar Has Been Diverging From Rate Differentials This Year Chart 14Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Bullish sentiment towards the dollar also remains somewhat stretched. Net long speculative positions are near the top of their historic range (Chart 14). Our tactical MacroQuant model, which has an excellent track record of predicting short-to-medium term moves in the dollar, has dropped its bullish bias towards the currency (Chart 15).   Chart 15MacroQuant Has Soured On The US Dollar A weaker dollar will help boost commodity prices, which is usually good news for cyclical stocks (Chart 16). A softer dollar will also raise the USD value of overseas shares, thus making international stocks more attractive in common-currency terms. Valuations Favor Non-US Stocks There is an old investment adage which says that valuations are useless as a short-term timing tool. That is only partially true. While valuations by themselves offer little guidance as to where the stock market is going in the short run, combined with a catalyst, valuations can make a big difference. When stocks are cheap, a bullish catalyst can cause prices to surge; whereas when stocks are expensive, a bearish catalyst can cause them to plunge. Looking ahead, non-US stocks are set to gain the upper hand over their US peers thanks to an improving global growth backdrop, a weaker US dollar, and an increasingly irresistible valuation tailwind. Non-US stocks are currently trading at 13.8-times forward earnings. This represents a significant discount to US stocks, which trade at a forward PE ratio of 17.7. The valuation discount is even greater if one looks at other measures such as the cyclically-adjusted PE, price-to-book, price-to-sales, and the dividend yield (Chart 17). Chart 16A Weaker Dollar Tends To Support Commodity Prices Chart 17US Stocks Are More Expensive...   Differences in sector weights account for about a quarter of the valuation gap between the US and the rest of the world (Chart 18). The rest of the gap is due to cheaper valuations within sectors. Financials, utilities, and consumer discretionary stocks, in particular, are quite a bit more expensive in the US than elsewhere (Chart 19). Chart 18…Even When Adjusting For Sector Weights Chart 19AEquity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (I) Chart 19BEquity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (II)   The valuation gap between the US and the rest of the world is even starker if we compare earnings yields with bond yields. Since bond yields are lower outside the US, the implied equity risk premium is markedly higher for non-US stocks (Chart 20). An examination of the relative performance of US vs non-US companies over the past 50 years reveals two major tops, and one potential top. Some commentators have argued that the loftier valuations enjoyed by US stocks are warranted due to their superior growth prospects. While there may be some truth to that, it is worth noting that the IMF projects GDP growth (based on MSCI country weights) will be faster outside the US over the next five years (Chart 21). Chart 20Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High Chart 21Growth Prospects Brighter Outside The US   One should also keep in mind that relatively fast US earnings growth is a fairly recent phenomenon. Between 1970 and 2008, European EPS actually grew slightly faster than US EPS (Chart 22). Earnings in emerging markets also increased more rapidly than in the US during the two decades leading up to the Global Financial Crisis. Chart 22US Earnings Have Not Always Outperformed The Role Of US Tech The large weight of the tech sector in the US stock market explains much of the superior performance of US stocks over the past decade. As Chart 23 illustrates, EPS in the I.T. sector has grown a lot more quickly than in other sectors. Chart 23US Earnings: Who Has Been Doing The Heaving Lifting? Chart 24S&P 500: Much Of The Increase In Margins Has Occurred In The I.T. Sector Looking out, there are four reasons why US tech stocks may be due for a breather. First, tech valuations have gotten stretched relative to the broader market. Second, tech margins have risen to unprecedented high levels. We estimate that about half of the increase in S&P 500 profit margins since 2007 has been due to I.T. (Chart 24). Even that understates the role of tech in the expansion of profit margins because Standard & Poor’s no longer classifies some large-cap behemoths such as Google and Facebook as I.T. companies. Third, tech companies may face increased regulatory scrutiny in the years ahead stemming from alleged privacy violations, perceived monopolistic behavior, and worries about the censorship of online speech. This could weigh on sales and earnings growth. Fourth, the growth in private equity funds is likely to limit the number of tech companies that go public at a very early stage. Stock market investors were very lucky that companies such as Microsoft, Cisco, Nvidia, Qualcomm, Oracle, Amazon, and Netflix issued shares to the public at a young stage in their development (Table 2). All seven had market caps below $1 billion when they went public. Such hidden gems are becoming less common: The number of publicly listed companies in the US has fallen by more than half over the past two decades (Chart 25). The median age of tech companies at the time of IPO has risen from around 7 in the 1990s to 12 years today (Chart 26). Table 2Big Gains From Once Small Companies Chart 25The Number Of Publicly Listed Companies Fell   Chart 26Tech Companies Entering The Public Arena Are Now More Mature Had Uber gone public as a small, upstart company not long after it was founded in 2009, it probably would have also made public shareholders a lot of money. Instead, it ended up going public this year with a market cap of $75 billion, only to see it shrink to as low as $40 billion in the ensuing six months. We won’t even mention what would have happened if WeWork had gone public. Investment Conclusions An examination of the relative performance of US vs non-US companies over the past 50 years reveals two major tops, and one potential top: The first during the “Nifty 50” era of the late 1960s, the second during the 1990s dotcom boom, and the third during the recent FAANG craze (Chart 27). It is too early to say whether FAANG stocks have peaked, but it is worth noting that the group has underperformed the S&P 500 since May (Chart 28). Chart 27Putting The Recent FAANG Craze Into Context Chart 28FAANG Stocks And The Market Chart 29Has The Underperformance Of Value Run Its Course?   Regardless of whether the secular outperformance of US equities is ending, the cyclical backdrop that we foresee over the next 12-to-18 months – characterized by faster global growth, a weakening dollar, and higher commodity prices – is likely to favor non-US stocks. As such, investors should remain overweight global equities relative to bonds, but start increasing allocations to non-US stocks at the expense of US stocks. Consistent with this, we are initiating a new recommendation to go long the MSCI ACWI ex USA index versus the MSCI USA index in dollar terms. Looking across the various stock markets outside the US, we are particularly fond of Europe. Net profit margins among companies in the STOXX Europe 600 index are about three percentage points below the S&P 500. This gives European companies greater scope to boost earnings. European banks are especially attractive, sporting a forward PE of 8.3, a price-to-book ratio of 0.6, and a dividend yield of 6.1%. Lastly, on the question of style investing, we would note that the relative performance of the MSCI value and growth indices closely tracks the performance of global financials versus I.T. (Chart 29). Given our preference for the former over the latter, we suspect that value will outperform growth next year.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Investors’ perception of “fallen angels” – bonds downgraded from investment grade to high yield – is mostly negative, especially since many believe we are near the end of the economic and credit cycle. In this report, we show that fallen angels can provide investors with an opportunity to invest in relatively high-quality bonds at attractive valuations – bonds which on average outperform other corporate bonds. We find that a good entry-point into fallen angels is usually a week after the bonds are downgraded, after which selling pressures begin to fade. However, investors need to be aware that fallen angels are accompanied by some, less obvious, risks, particularly longer duration and sector skewness. Introduction Chart 1Baa-Rated Bonds Are Now 50% Of The IG Universe Elevated levels of US corporate debt, as well as declining credit quality in the investment-grade space, have raised investor worries that a large portion of bonds will be downgraded in the next recession and default cycle. The lowest tranche of investment-grade debt, Baa-rated, now constitutes over 50% of the investment-grade index (Chart 1). However, investors tend to dismiss the opportunities that this tranche of debt can provide when downgraded from investment grade to high yield – known as “fallen angels”. The change in the ownership structure of corporate bonds has contributed to the performance of fallen angels. Increasing demand for corporate-bond funds – both mutual funds and ETFs – has displaced direct ownership of corporate bonds by households and financial institutions over the past few years (Chart 2, panels 1 & 2). Chart 2Corporate Bond Ownership Active fund managers, constrained by their rules to hold only bonds with a certain (usually non-speculative grade) rating, are often forced to sell their holdings ahead of a potential downgrade. In addition, passive funds exacerbate the selling pressure, since they are forced to sell a bond in the event of a downgrade. Insurance companies and pensions funds, the biggest holders of corporate bonds, have increased their allocation to corporate bonds in the search for income in an environment of low yields. Estimates suggest that life insurance companies’ holdings of Baa-rated bonds comprise 34% of their total portfolios.1 However, high-yield bonds represented less than 5% as of the end of 2016.2 There is no regulation prohibiting them from owning sub-investment-grade bonds, but they face higher capital costs when they do. This could also fuel fire sales during the next downgrade cycle. Fallen angels therefore often enter the high-yield index at a much cheaper valuation than bonds that were originally issued as high yield. In fact, during the past two downgrade cycles, in 2007-2008 and 2015-2016, the average spread of fallen angels over an adjusted high-yield index (weighted so that it has the same credit rating as fallen angels) widened by 560 and 130 basis points, respectively (Chart 3). While this seems negative at a first glance, it also leaves more room for spread compression, once market conditions improve, for investors who correctly time their entry into this market. As the bottom panel of Chart 3 shows, investors almost always receive a higher yield for holding fallen angels compared to a similarly rated high-yield basket. Chart 3Fallen Angels Have Mostly Traded At A Discount... Chart 4...Despite Their Better Performance In this Special Report, we explain what fallen angels are, analyze their historical risk-return characteristics, and compare them to other major asset classes, particularly high-yield corporate bonds in general. We show that, once downgraded, fallen angels – due to oversold pressures – tend to outperform other asset classes as well as similarly-credit-rated high-yield bonds (Chart 4). We also assess their performance during periods of financial-market stress. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with owning fallen angels, and highlight the vehicles investors can use to access this asset class. What Are Fallen Angels? Fallen angels refer to bonds that have been downgraded from investment grade to junk (or speculative grade). Whereas different commercial indices can have slightly different classifications for the term (discussed below in the Historical Risk And Return section), the generic definition includes bonds previously classified as investment grade but later downgraded to high yield. These transitions can occur from and to any credit rating within both universes. However, the majority of downgrades occur between the lowest tranche of investment-grade bonds, rated Baa, and the highest tranche of high-yield bonds rated Ba (Chart 5). Generally, fallen angels have provided inves­tors with an opportunity to buy higher qual­ity, cheaper, and better performing corpo­rate bonds than those originally issued as high yield. Generally, fallen angels have provided investors with an opportunity to buy higher quality, cheaper, and better performing corporate bonds than those originally issued as high yield. So how do fallen angels differ? Higher quality: Over 73% of bonds within the fallen angels ETF fall into the Ba bucket – the highest tranche in the speculative space — versus 45% within the broader high-yield ETF (Chart 6). Chart 5The Downgrade Transition Chart 6Fallen Angels Have Better Credit Quality Than High Yield Cheaper: In anticipation of a downgrade, selling pressure from fund managers intensifies, causing prices of “potential” fallen angels to drop prior to their downgrade date. However, our US Bond Strategists report academic findings that show forced fire sales of fallen angels are usually short-lived.3 They conclude that, once Baa-rated securities are downgraded, there is no mechanism to force downward pressure on the price to continue. Chart 7Selling Pressures Intensify Even After The Bonds Are Downgraded Academic research corroborates this view: fallen angels exhibit ‘V-shaped’ price action,4 where their prices start falling ahead of a potential downgrade. This is the result of the reaction of active fund managers as discussed earlier. This trend persists for a short while even after the bonds are downgraded, as passive funds – index mutual funds and ETFs – offload the bonds. Selling pressures come to a halt shortly after the downgrade date (on average around seven trading days). This represents an entry-point for investors to add fallen angels to their portfolios. These conclusions are also supported by the price trajectory of a sample5 of fallen angels we tested (Chart 7). Note, however, that the trajectory shown in our results suggests that the attractiveness of fallen angels disappears quite quickly, since prices plateau about three to four months after the downgrade. Chart 8Fallen Angels Peform Better Than Similar High- Yield Bonds Better performance: The fallen angels index has outperformed a similarly credit-rated duration-matched high-yield basket in eight out of the 15 years since the index’s inception. In particular, fallen angels have tended to outperform in years when the Federal Reserve was on hold or cutting interest rates, due to their longer average duration of 5.5 years versus 2.9 years for high-yield bonds – as discussed below in the Risks section (Chart 8). Generally, fallen angels are concentrated in sectors that were subject to a recent shock. This was the case in the Telecommunications sector in 2001, the Financials sector in 2007-2008, and the Energy sector in 2014-2015. How Many Fallen Angels Will There Be In The Next Downturn? Over the past three decades, US Baa-rated debt – the lowest tranche in investment grade – has doubled from only 20% of total corporate debt to 40%. This coincided with an increase in nonfinancial corporate debt from 55% of GDP in the mid-1990s to nearly 75% by the end of 2018. Low interest rates over the past 10 years incentivized firms to take advantage of cheaper financing for capital expenditure, equity buybacks, M&A, and more (Chart 9). To a degree, this corporate behavior was rational since businesses understood that their optimal capital structure in a world of low interest rates required them to take on more debt. Simply put, firms found that targeting a Baa rating was more desirable. While rising leverage and weaker corporate health are concerns, we do not see these as imminent risks until the next recession and downgrade cycle hit – which we do not see happening in the next 12 months. For now, there is no worrying trend in downgrades. In fact, there are more “rising stars” – corporate bonds previously classified as high yield that have been upgraded to investment grade – than fallen angels (Chart 10). Nevertheless, it is important for investors to gauge the extent of potential downgrades during the next recession. Chart 9Debt Issuance: A Smart Corporate Decision Chart 10Rising Stars Versus Fallen Angels Several research papers use historical probabilities and downgrade rates to estimate a range for potential fallen angels. Given that investment-grade bonds currently amount to $5.3 trillion, and that the average peak in the one-year rate of investment-grade bond downgrades over the past four decades was 7.1%, that would imply the amount of new fallen angels in the next recession to be $376 billion. That is three times bigger than the current value of fallen angels, and represents nearly 30% of the entire junk-bond universe.6  Historical Risk And Return Chart 11Fallen Angels Provide Alpha To assess the performance of fallen angels versus other high-yield bonds, we adjust the indices to which we compare the fallen angels index in two ways. First, we remove the fallen angels from the overall high-yield index. However, that on its own would fail to consider the different credit qualities of the two indices – shown in Chart 6. It would also make it difficult to account for differences in duration. We therefore create a high-yield duration-matched basket with similar credit ratings to the fallen angels index in order to account for this. Fallen angels significantly outperformed both indices (Chart 11). In doing so, we were also able to distinguish between the extra performance due to duration– the gap between the jade and indigo lines – and the alpha created by fallen angels – the gap between the dark green and the jade lines. For the purpose of this report, we use the Bloomberg Barclays US High Yield Fallen Angel 3% Capped Bond Index, which is designed to track USD-denominated fallen angels. The index, based on the market value of the underlying bonds, includes securities that have a current high-yield rating, while having been assigned an investment-grade index rating at some point since issuance. The index relies on the average of three credit-rating agencies, Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P, to qualify bonds for inclusion. It is worth noting that there are other indices that track fallen angels, with different methodologies. For example, the FTSE Time-Weighted US Fallen Angel Index implements a time-weighted metric, assigning a larger weight to recently downgraded securities. It also adds a maximum inclusion period of 60 months. Since the index’s inception, fallen angels have outperformed other fixed-income assets on both an absolute and risk-adjusted return basis (Table 1). In absolute terms, fallen angels had the highest return of all the assets we compared them with. However, that came with an annualized volatility of 1.5 percentage points higher than the similarly rated high-yield basket – albeit not when compared to its duration-matched counterpart. Another explanation is that the extra volatility is a function of the swift fall and recovery in prices, as well as on going turbulence in the impacted sectors. Table 1Historical Risk-Return Characteristics Financial Market Stress Having established that fallen angels on average outperform other types of bonds, we now address the question: how do they perform during recessions and other periods of financial market stress? Given the index’s relatively short history, the only recession we are able to cover is the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. Nevertheless, we also look at other market crises dating back to 2005. During the GFC, fallen angels fell, similarly to their high-yield peers. However, coming out of the recession, fallen angels’ performance diverged from similarly rated high-yield bonds as well as from Treasurys and investment-grade bonds. Fallen angels have outperformed other similarly rated high-yield bonds after every market stress period over the past 14 years, except the Q4 2018 equity selloff caused by trade tensions (Chart 12). Fallen angels – even when credit and dura­tion are accounted for – have outperformed following periods of broad credit distress. They also seem to outperform during peri­ods of sector-specific distress. Fallen angels – even when credit and duration are accounted for – have outperformed following periods of broad credit distress. They also seem to outperform following periods of sector-specific distress. Chart 12Fallen Angels Outperform In Periods Of Credit- And Sector-Specific Distress Chart 13The Energy Sector: A Perfect Example This was evident in 2015-2017, when Brent crude oil fell from $120 to nearly $40, causing spreads of energy-rated junk bonds to widen dramatically. There was also a rise in corporate downgrades, particularly within the Energy sector. However, as the oil market stabilized and the Energy sector recovered, Energy corporate spreads quickly tightened and fallen angels outperformed a similarly credit-rated high-yield index. In the second half of 2016, the Energy sector comprised 28% of the fallen angels ETF, compared to 13% and 10% of the high-yield and investment grade ETFs respectively (Chart 13).7 Risks The arguments above should make fallen angels of interest to any investor. However, there are also risks, in particular the following: Sector skew: We have shown that fallen angels can be concentrated in sectors going through distress – the oil market in 2014-2015 being a perfect example. It is important to be aware of the sector skew of fallen angels compared to the high-yield and investment-grade bond universes. As of October 2019, the fallen angels universe was skewed towards the Energy, Technology, and the Industrials sectors compared to both high-yield and investment-grade bonds. It was notably underweight Consumer Non-cyclicals (Chart 14). Fallen angels also have a skew towards Banks – 12% as opposed to 2% in the high-yield universe. This might represent an opportunity rather than a risk. It could allow investors to exploit sectoral differences in the credit market. Longer Duration: Fallen angels also present greater duration risk. Given that they were once investment grade, they have a longer maturity of 9.8 years on average, versus 7.1 years for the credit-weighted high-yield basket. That would partially explain why fallen angels’ duration did not decline as much this year when long-term bond yields fell over 100 bps. We expect higher long-term interest rates over the next 12 months, which might hurt the performance of fallen angels (Chart 15). Chart 14Sector Skew: Risk And Opportunity Chart 15Fallen Angels: Characteristics Idiosyncratic Risks: The most obvious risk would be that the firm is incapable of fixing its balance sheet, and ultimately becomes subject to further downgrades. Catching Fallen Angels Investors now have access to vehicles that track fallen angels, though these ETFs are still new and rather small. ANGL and FALN were launched in 2012 and 2016 and track the BofA Merrill Lynch and Bloomberg Barclays fallen angles indices respectively (Table 2). Table 2ETFs Tracking Fallen Angels Chart 16Catching Fallen Angels Chart 16 shows the tracking error and tracking difference between the fallen angels index and the FALN ETF. The tracking error for FALN has been higher than the ETF tracking the overall high-yield index (HYG), but the tracking difference has been less volatile. Conclusion        Fallen angels allow investors to buy certain high-yield bonds at an attractive valuation for a period of time. Fallen angels have historically provided a pick-up in risk-adjusted performance over overall high-yield bonds, even when adjusting for quality differences. They have also outperformed investment-grade bonds on a risk-adjusted basis, as well as other asset classes. Investors need to time their entry-point into fallen angels. The ideal timing is usually about a week after the bond is downgraded. The sector weighting of the fallen-angels index tends to be related to a recent market or sector shock. Sector skew and long duration remain the principal risks that investors should be wary of.   Amr Hanafy Research Associate AmrH@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Please see Financial Times "Search for yield draws US life insurers to risky places", available at https://www.ft.com/ 2   Please see National Association Of Insurance Commissioners, Capital Markets Special Report Index, “U.S. Insurers’ High-Yield Bond Exposure On The Rise”, December 21st 2017. 3   Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report titled “The Risk From US Corporate Debt Part 2: Fund Flows, BBBs, And Leveraged Loans", available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4   Please see Prof. Andrew Clare, Prof. Stephen Thomas, Dr Nick Motson “Fallen Angels: The investment opportunity”, dated September 2016, Cass Business School. 5   We looked at the 12-month price trajectory (six months before and after the downgrade date) of 60 corporate bonds in the FALN ETF. 6   Please see Moody’s Investors Service, Fallen angels: High-yield market buffers potential transitions amid wider risks, May 13, 2019. 7   We used the iShares Fallen Angels USD Bond ETF (FALN) as a proxy for fallen angels, the iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (HYG) as a proxy for high-yield bonds, and the iShares iBoxx $ Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF (LQD) as a proxy for investment-grade bonds.
Highlights The attractiveness of European stocks is relative to European bonds rather than relative to non-European stocks. Despite vastly different stock market valuations in Germany, Japan, and the US, the implied prospective 10-year annualised returns are almost identical – at around 5 percent per annum. Overweight the DAX versus German long-dated bunds. Equities would lose their attractiveness if the global 10-year bond yield were to rise through 2.5 percent, because the required excess return from equities would viciously normalise. Tactically overweight EM versus DM. Fractal trade: short GBP/NOK, as the recent rally in the pound appears technically extended. Feature Chart of the WeekOverweight Europe Vs. World = Overweight Consumer Staples Vs. Technology   Stock markets recently broke to new highs, begging the perennial question: how attractive are equities at current valuations? To answer, we need to assess the prospective return that is now ‘baked in the equity valuation cake’. But which valuation metric gives the most credible assessment of prospective returns? Equity valuations based on assets are problematic – because nowadays, assets comprise intellectual capital or intangibles or ‘virtual’ assets, which are extremely difficult to value. Equity valuations based on earnings are problematic. Equity valuations based on earnings (profits) are also problematic – because they take no account of structurally high profit margins (Chart I-2). The problem is that earnings will face a headwind when profit margins normalise, depressing prospective returns. Some people suggest adjusting the earnings to derive a cyclically adjusted price to earnings multiple (CAPE), but by definition this does not correct for the structural rise in profit margins. Chart I-2Structurally High Profit Margins Flatter Earnings Hence, the most credible assessment comes from price to sales – because sales are quantifiable, unambiguous, and undistorted by profit margins. Significantly, while price to earnings missed the high valuation of world equities in 1990 (Japanese bubble) and 2007 (credit bubble), price to sales did not (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3Price To Earnings Missed The Japanese Bubble And The Credit Bubble... Chart I-4...But Price To Sales ##br##Didn't Are Stocks Attractive? Based on the credible assessment from price to sales, today’s prospective 10-year annualised return from world equities is around 5 percent (Chart I-5). This is not that different to the 4 percent prospective return at the peak of the credit bubble in 2007.1 Which raises an obvious question. Back in 2007, a secular growth boom provided the excuse for the rich absolute valuation, but today, if anything, investors fear a ‘secular stagnation’. What can excuse today’s rich absolute valuation? Chart I-5The Prospective Return From World Equities Is 5 Percent The answer is ultra-low bond yields. In 2007, the global 10-year bond yield stood at 5 percent; today, it stands well below 2 percent (Chart I-6). A lower prospective return on bonds means a lower prospective return on competing long-duration assets, like equities. Chart I-6The Global 10-Year Bond Yield Has Plunged To Below 2 Percent Moreover, as bond yields approach their lower bound, the riskiness of bonds rises because they take on an unattractive ‘lose-lose’ characteristic. As holders of Swiss government bonds discovered this year, prices do not rise much in a rally, but they do plunge in a sell-off. This higher riskiness of bonds justifies an abnormally low (or zero) ‘risk premium’ on competing long-duration assets, like equities. The 5 percent prospective return makes equities look attractive relative to bonds.  The upshot is that the 5 percent prospective return from equities is low in absolute terms. But in a world of ultra-low numbers – for both bond yields and equity risk premiums – the 5 percent prospective return makes equities look attractive relative to bonds. At the peak of the credit bubble in 2007, equities were offering a lower prospective return than the 5 percent available from bonds. But today’s equity risk premium over bonds is generous. The caveat is that this would change if the global 10-year bond yield were to rise through 2.5 percent because the required risk premium on equities would viciously normalise. Are European Stocks Attractive? Turning to the relative attractiveness of major stock markets, it is tempting to think that the markets trading on the best head-to-head valuation comparisons are the most attractive. For example, Germany and Japan, both trading on a price to sales multiple of 0.9, appear compelling buys compared to the US, trading on a multiple of 2.1 (Chart I-7). But such a knee-jerk conclusion is wrong, for two reasons. Chart I-7Germany And Japan Trade On Much Lower Multiples Than The US First, stock markets have very different sector compositions. Two sectors with vastly different structural growth prospects – say, technology and banks – must necessarily trade on vastly different valuations. So the sector with the lower valuation is not necessarily the better-valued sector. By extension, the stock market with the lower valuation because of its ‘sector fingerprint’ is not necessarily the better-valued stock market. Second, major stock markets are dominated by multinational companies with mixed currency sales and profits, while the stock price is quoted in the domestic currency. Hence, if the market expects the mixed currency profits to depreciate in domestic currency terms, the stock will trade at a discount. Put another way, if the domestic currency is cheap the stock market will appear cheap. The best way to see this is to look at the two valuations of dual-listed multinationals like the UK/US cruise operator Carnival. In London, the stock trades on a price to forward earnings at 9.7; in New York it trades at 10.3. But it would be absurd to suggest that Carnival is cheaper in London than in New York! The discrepancy is simply because the market expects the pound to appreciate versus the dollar.  A head-to-head comparison of stock market valuations is misleading. Allowing for the distortions from sector skews and currency adjustments, the best way to assess an equity region’s attractiveness is to quantify the prospective return implied by its valuation versus its own history. The method is to regress historic starting price to sales with the (historic) prospective 10-year returns that followed. Then apply this relationship to the current price to sales to predict the (current) prospective 10-year return. The results are amazing. Despite the vastly different price to sales multiple of 0.9 in Germany and Japan, and 2.1 in the US, the implied prospective 10-year annualised returns are almost identical – at around 5 percent from each of the three stock markets (Chart I-8-Chart I-10). Chart I-8Expect Near-Identical Returns From The US... Chart I-9…Germany… Chart I-10...And Japan Still, there is one significant difference: the 10-year bond yield is much lower in Germany and Japan than in the US, equating to a much more attractive equity risk premium of over 5 percent in Germany and Japan. So to answer this week’s title, yes, European stocks are attractive. But the attractiveness is not relative to non-European stocks, the attractiveness of European stocks is relative to European bonds. Bottom Line: maintain a structural overweight to the DAX versus German long-dated bunds. Europe’s ‘Sector Fingerprint’ Is No Longer Pro-Cyclical Over the short term, stock market relative performance is just the result of global sector relative performance combined with the unique sector fingerprint of each stock market. It follows that regional and country equity allocation must always start with a sector view combined with an awareness of the sector fingerprint of the major bourses (Table 1-1). Table I-1EM, DM, And Europe Have Unique ‘Sector Fingerprints’ In this regard, there is an important change. Market action plus index composition changes are making the European index less cyclical. Specifically, the European index is no longer over-weighted to Financials relative to the world index. Instead, the European sector fingerprint is now: ‘Overweight Consumer Staples, Underweight Technology’ (Chart of the Week). With the overweight skew being to defensive staples and the underweight skew to partly-cyclical tech, the cyclicality of the European index has become ambiguous. By contrast, emerging market (EM) equities remain ultra-cyclical with a sector fingerprint that is: ‘Overweight Banks, Underweight Healthcare’ (Chart I-11). Suffice to say, this is ultra-cyclical because the 10 percent overweight is to an unambiguously cyclical sector, while the symmetrical 10 percent underweight is to an unambiguously defensive sector. Chart I-11Overweight EM Vs. DM = Overweight Banks Vs. Healthcare The upshot is that a pro-cyclical sector tilt no longer implies an overweight to European equities versus other regions, but it does strongly imply an overweight to EM equities. This is our recommended stance, albeit only on a tactical horizon until our leading indicators show that the current growth rebound can be sustained well into 2020. Stay tuned. Fractal Trading System* The broken 65-day fractal structure of GBP/NOK suggests that its recent rally is susceptible to a countertrend sell-off, albeit UK election campaign developments are likely to be the near-term sentiment drivers. Go short GBP/NOK, setting a profit target at 2.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short Italian 10-year BTP achieved its 3 percent profit target and is now closed, while long gold / short nickel is very close to its 11 percent profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Total (capital plus income) nominal annualised returns Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations