Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Financial Markets

Highlights The world remains mired in a manufacturing recession. As such, it is still too early to put on fresh pro-cyclical trades. Focus on the crosses rather than outright U.S. dollar bets. Two new trade ideas: sell EUR/NOK and buy GBP/JPY. Also consider selling the gold/silver ratio. Feature Currency markets tend to trade into and out of various regimes. This means that to be an effective FX manager, you have to be extremely fluid. For example, interest rate differentials might dominate FX moves during a particular period, pivoting your job to a central bank monitor. Other times, flows dominate, perhaps even equity flows, like when a disruptive technology is developed in a specific market. The outperformance of U.S. equities, specifically technology stocks, is a case in point. Balance-of-payments dynamics usually matter mostly at critical turning points, making them not very useful as timing indicators. The exorbitant privilege of the U.S. dollar we discussed a fortnight ago is also a case in point. But more often than not, being able to identify whether the investment climate is about to become more hostile or not could be the key difference between being a successful FX manager or a relic. There has been no shortage of news for investors to digest over the last few days, from the Brexit imbroglio, to the Fed, to the drone attacks in Saudi Arabia and finally to U.S. President Donald Trump’s possible impeachment. But the most perplexing (and perhaps the most important) has been the German manufacturing flash PMI print for the month of September of 41.4, the lowest in over a decade (Chart I-1). If the country with the “cheapest currency” cannot manage to pull itself out of a manufacturing recession, then the message to the periphery is clearly that they have an impending problem. In short, our contention that the euro was close to a bottom might be offside by a few months, based on the latest manufacturing data release (Chart I-2). Chart I-1A Eurozone Manufacturing Recession Chart I-2The Euro Needs Stronger Growth Which FX Regime? Chart I-3A Recession Will Be Dollar Bullish The performance of the dollar since the 10/2 yield curve inverted is instructive. So far, we are tracking both the 2005 and 1998 roadmaps, meaning the window for cautious optimism on risk assets could still pan out (Chart I-3). Specifically, the dollar tends to rally during recessions but the window before the dollar bull market takes hold can be quite long. In both 2006 and 1998, the dollar eventually catapulted higher, but it took longer than 12 months. Having an accurate recession probability-timing model is therefore crucial for strategy. Historically, domestic flows have been a very timely indicator, since repatriation by residents occurs during episodes of severe capital flight. In 2005, domestic individuals were deploying funds outside the U.S., which suggested patience before positioning for dollar strength. This made sense, since the return on capital was higher outside the U.S. with the EM and commodity bull market in full swing. More often than not, FX markets tend to favor regions with the highest return on capital. These tend to be the most difficult to bet against, but potentially the most potent blindside at turning points. If economic data continues to deteriorate due to much larger endogenous factors, a defensive strategy is clearly warranted. One way to tell will be an emerging divergence between our leading indicators and actual underlying data as is occurring so far in September. On the flip side, any specter of positive news could light a fire under sectors, currencies and countries that have borne the brunt of the slowdown. Both are highly risky bets. For now, we prefer to focus on the crosses rather than outright U.S. dollar bets. Sell EUR/NOK Sometimes, the best ideas are the simplest ones. The Norges bank is the most hawkish G-10 central bank, while the European Central Bank restarted QE at its latest meeting. This is a powerful catalyst for a short EUR/NOK trade: The dollar tends to rally during recessions but the window before the dollar bull market takes hold can be quite long.  The slowdown in the euro zone has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, but the deflationary impulse is starting to shift to other parts of the economy. Euro area overall core CPI continues to blast downwards, which has historically been a bad omen for the euro (Chart I-4). We expect euro zone inflation expectations to eventually rise, in part helped by the recovery in oil prices (Chart I-5), but this will also benefit the Norwegian krone. EUR/NOK has historically tracked the performance of relative stock prices between Europe and Norway, but a gaping wedge opened up in 2018 (Chart I-6). This divergence is unsustainable. In short, it is a bet on oil fields in Norway versus European banks. The ECB’s tiering of reserves might prevent euro zone banks from teetering over the edge, but unless the manufacturing recession ends soon and firms start to borrow to invest, banks will continue to have a demand problem. Meanwhile, the flareup in the Middle East means that oil prices will remain bid in the near term. This should favor Norwegian equities over those in the euro zone, and be negative for EUR/NOK (Chart I-7). 10-year German bunds are yielding -0.57% while the yield pickup on Norwegian bonds is a positive carry of 1.8%, despite liquidity concerns. In their latest policy meeting, Central Bank Governor Øystein Olsen stressed that Norway had much more fiscal room to maneuver in the event of a downturn, meaning the supply of Norwegian paper could increase, easing the liquidity premium. Chart I-4Deflation Remains Predominant In The Eurozone Chart I-5A Rise In Oil Prices Will Help Inflation Expectations Chart I-6Stocks And Currencies: An Unsustainable Divergence Chart I-7Higher Oil is Negative ##br##For EUR/NOK Bottom Line: Sell EUR/NOK at 9.937. Buy GBP/JPY Last week’s Special Report made the case for a cyclical recovery in the U.K., even though structural factors remain a headwind. This week, we are re-attempting to buy cable versus the yen: Most importantly, the Bank of England stood pat at its latest policy meeting while the Bank of Japan is likely to introduce more stimulus or stronger guidance. Real interest rate differentials favor a stronger pound. Most importantly, the Bank of England stood pat at its latest policy meeting while the Bank of Japan is likely to introduce more stimulus or stronger guidance (Chart I-8). Chart i-8A Tactical Bounce In GBP/JPY Is Likely Chart I-9The Benefit Of A Weaker Pound Speculators are very short the pound while they have been covering their short bets on the yen, as the investment environment has become more uncertain. The fall in the pound should begin to improve the U.K.’s balance-of-payment dynamics relative to Japan (Chart I-9). Bottom Line: Buy GBP/JPY at 132.6. Concluding Thoughts We continue to track various indicators for the dollar, from interest rate differentials, balance-of-payment dynamics, valuations, portfolio flows and positioning – and none of them are sending a bullish signal at the moment. Global growth remains in a funk, which has been supercharging dollar bulls. However, long-dollar bets remain susceptible should global growth stabilize. Our strategy is to continue focusing on the crosses until categorical evidence emerges that global growth has bottomed.  In our trading portfolio, we continue to favor the NOK, SEK, petrocurrencies and the AUD. So far, these trades have been implemented at the crosses to limit downside risk, should our view on the dollar be offside. We intend to eventually start placing outright dollar bets once evidence emerges that global growth has bottomed and the world has skidded a recession.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been relatively strong: The Markit flash manufacturing PMI rebounded to 51 in September from 50.3. Flash services PMI increased to 50.9. The Chicago Fed national activity index increased to 0.1 from -0.4 in August. The Richmond Fed manufacturing index fell to -9 in September from 1. The Conference Board consumer confidence fell to 125.1 in September from 135.1. On the housing front, home prices grew by 0.4% month-on-month in July. Mortgage applications decreased by 10% for the week ended September 20th, but new home sales increased by 7% month-on-month in August. Initial jobless claims increased to 213,000 for the week ended September 20th. Annualized GDP growth was unchanged at 2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. Trade deficit of goods was little changed at $72.8 billion. Headline and core PCE increased to 2.4% and 1.9% quarter-on-quarter, respectively in Q2. The DXY index appreciated by 0.6% this week. The recent data from the U.S. have been holding up quite well compared with the rest of the world. Net speculative positions on the greenback remain elevated due to U.S. relative strength. While we see dollar resilience in the near term, declining net foreign purchases of U.S. securities, diminishing interest rate differentials and the plunging bond-to-gold ratio all suggest the path of least resistance for the dollar is down. Report Links: Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area continue to deteriorate: The Markit flash manufacturing and services PMIs for the euro area both fell to 45.6 and 52, respectively in September. In France, the Markit flash manufacturing PMI fell to 50.3; services PMI decreased to 51.6. In Germany, the manufacturing PMI collapsed to 41.4; services PMI fell to 52.5. German IFO current assessment increased to 98.5 in September. However, the IFO expectations fell to 90.8. Monetary supply (M3) grew by 5.7% year-on-year in August. German Gfk consumer confidence nudged up to 9.9 in October. The EUR/USD fell by 0.8% this week. The recent data from the euro area has unfortunately showed no signs of global growth bottoming. The manufacturing PMI in Germany is now at its lowest level since the Great Financial Crisis. A major concern faced by investors is that weak activity in manufacturing may have already begun to infiltrate the service sectors. That said, the services PMIs in major economies, though falling, still remain in expansionary territory above 50. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate Of Interest - June 14, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Japense Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: National headline inflation fell from 0.5% year-on-year to 0.3% year-on-year in August. Core inflation was unchanged at 0.6% year-on-year. The Markit flash manufacturing PMI fell to 48.9 in September from 49.3. Services PMI also fell to 52.8 from 53.3. The leading index and coincident index were both little changed at 93.7 and 99.7, respectively, in July.  The USD/JPY has been flat this week. Japanese exports have been weak, weighed by the global trade war and manufacturing slowdown. However, accordingly to the BoJ, domestic demand has remained firm, and capex also continues to increase. Moreover, the consumption tax hike next month will probably have a marginal impact compared with previous tax hikes. In a speech this week, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda emphasized that the central bank will ease without hesitation if the economy loses momentum. Report Links: Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 There is little data from the U.K. this week: Mortgage approvals decreased slightly to 42,576 in August from 43,303 in July. The GBP/USD fell by 1.4% this week. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has now lost his majority in Westminster after large profile defections from the so-called rebels, thus another election is highly likely by year-end. Besides, a further delay of Brexit is almost certain. We have downgraded the probability for a no-deal Brexit. We remain positive on the pound and are buying GBP/JPY this week. Report Links: United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - September 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: The preliminary commonwealth manufacturing PMI fell to 49.4 in September from 50.9 in August. On the other hand, the services PMI rebounded to 52.5 from 49.1, back to above-50 expansionary territory. Consumer confidence increased to 110.1 from 109.3 this week. The AUD/USD fell by 1% this week. Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe commented on Tuesday that the Australian economy is picking up, and is now at a “gentle turning point.” The previous rate cuts have allowed the property markets in big cities like Sydney and Melbourne to regain some strength, but will likely take longer to flow through the whole economy. In terms of monetary policy, Governor Lowe reiterated his commitment to ease monetary conditions when needed, though he did not signal an imminent move for next week. Australia has a large beta to global shifts as a small, open economy. Should the global manufacturing recession come to an end, the positive fundamentals will continue to lift the Australian economy through the rest of the year and into 2020. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Imports increased by NZ$30 million to NZ$5.69 billion in August, while exports fell by NZ$830 million to NZ$4.13 billion. The total trade deficit widened from NZ$700 million to NZ$1.57 billion. The NZD/USD appreciated by 1% initially, then plunged after the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s policy meeting, returning flat this week. As widely expected, the RBNZ kept its official cash rate unchanged at 1% this Wednesday while signaling that there is more scope to ease if necessary amid a global slowdown. The market is currently pricing an 80% probability of a rate cut for the next policy meeting in November, reflecting weak business confidence. We are playing the kiwi weakness through the Australian dollar and Swedish krona, which are 1.9% and 1.95% in the money, respectively. Report Links: USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been resilient: Bloomberg Nanos confidence increased to 57.4 this week from 56.7. Retail sales increased by 0.4% month-on-month in July, lower than the expectations of a 0.6% monthly growth. The USD/CAD has been flat this week. Oil prices have been on a wild ride this year. Since the drone attack a fortnight ago, Saudi Arabia has claimed that it is recovering faster than expected, beating its own targets. Brent crude oil spot prices have fallen by 6% from their September 16th peak, while Western Canada Select (WCS) oil prices have dropped by 12.3%, dampening the loonie’s upside potential. Report Links: Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly negative: The trade balance narrowed to CHF 1.2 billion in August from CHF 2.6 billion in July.  Credit Suisse survey expectations came in at -15.4 in September, up from the last reading of -37.5 in August. The USD/CHF has been flat this week. As a small, open economy, Switzerland belongs to those countries with highest foreign trade-to-GDP share. The trade balance in August has been the lowest since January 2018, with lower exports of main goods including chemical and pharmaceutical products. Among trading  partners, exports to Germany, Italy, and France all declined, reflecting the recent manufacturing slowdown in Europe. That said, we remain positive on the safe-haven Swiss franc during the risk-off period amid trade war uncertainties, Brexit chaos, Middle-East tensions, and more recently, the Trump Impeachment imbroglio. Report Links: What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There is scant data from Norway this week: The unemployment rate increased to 3.8% in July, 0.6 percentage points higher than in April, accordingly to the recent Labour Force Survey. The USD/NOK appreciated by 0.5% this week. The Norges Bank, the one and only hawkish central bank among the G-10, raised its interest rate by 25 basis points to 1.5% last week. Since last September, the Norges Bank has hiked rates four times in total, resulting in a one-percentage-point increase in rates. The central bank stated that “the Norwegian economy has been solid; Employment has risen; Capacity utilization appears to be somewhat above a normal level; Inflation is close to target.” A higher interest rate would also help take the wind out of skyrocketing house prices and household debt levels. In addition, the central bank lowered its projection path for the krone, stating that the factors it outlined, including weaker activity in the petroleum sector, would probably keep weighing on the krone in the years ahead. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: Consumer confidence fell to 90.6 in September. PPI yearly growth fell from 2% in July to 1.4% in August. Trade balance shifted to a deficit of SEK 5.4 billion in August. USD/SEK has been flat this week. We are closely monitoring the Swedish foreign trade as a leading indicator for global growth. The Swedish trade balance has shifted to a deficit for the first time this year. However, compared to last August, the deficit was narrowed by SEK 2.6 billion. Year to date, the Swedish trade surplus amounted to SEK 27 billion. Notably, the trade in goods with non-EU countries resulted in a surplus of SEK 6.6 billion, while the trade with EU resulted in a deficit of SEK 12 billion. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Pension reform in Brazil is pushing through. The upcoming 12-18 months offer a window of opportunity, most notably on the privatization and tax reform front. Ongoing efforts should sustain an improvement in “animal spirits” in the short term and create some potential for structural improvements over the long term. Nevertheless, Brazil’s slow grinding economic recovery remains vulnerable to a negative external or domestic shock that could cause it to “stall speed”. If structural reforms or the business cycle hit stall speed, financial markets will sell off. Weighing the pros and cons, we are upgrading Brazil from underweight to neutral. Feature Pension Reform Will (Eventually) Pass, But What Next? Recent progress on Brazil’s economic reform agenda is market-positive but is clearly at risk of “stall speed”1 if reform momentum is not sustained after the likely passage of social security cuts. Having cleared the Chamber of Deputies, the pension reform bill is now likely to pass the senate. The first round of voting is expected any day now and the government’s senate leader, Fernando Bezerra, expects the bill to pass the second round by mid-October (Diagram I-1). Diagram I-1Brazil: Pension Reform Timeline Chart I-1Pension Bill Will See The Light Of Day The reform is all but certain to be approved by congress, granting the Bolsonaro administration its first major legislative victory. Lower house deputies voted largely in line with party alliances – if this continues in the senate, the bill should rack up the support of at least 56 of the 81 senators – surpassing the 49 votes needed for passage (Chart I-1). We would not be surprised if the bill faced sudden hang-ups in the senate, such as delays or dilutions. The House bill was introduced in February and after some delay passed in August. Rodrigo Maia, President of the Chamber of Deputies, was instrumental in ensuring the bill’s smooth passage. While Senate President Davi Alcolumbre has a similar interest in ensuring its passage, there is no guarantee that it will be smooth. Fragmentation in the senate, for example, is at the highest level ever, unlike the lower house. The bill requires two rounds of voting. Bezerra’s expectation of voting on September 24 and October 15 is already a delay from the initial projection of September 18 and October 2. Bottom Line: Pension reform is highly likely to pass, if not as rapidly as its promoters say, and the Brazilian congress will soon need to turn to the next major item on the economic reform agenda. Tracking Bolsonaro’s Political Capital For The Post-Pension Reform Agenda Does Bolsonaro have enough political capital to pass other structural reforms? Or will he fall victim to stall speed as his policy focus shifts to less market-friendly areas, his relationship with the legislature breaks down, and his popular support continues to slide? With macroeconomic headwinds and a fragile governing coalition, the answer is a qualified yes that Bolsonaro has sufficient political capital to spend on additional reforms. But since it is impossible to know precisely what will occur after the pension reform goes through, we highlight the key signposts that we will use to monitor Bolsonaro’s progress. A fundamental premise is that neither Bolsonaro nor his party are instinctively or ideologically pro-market. He won the 2018 election due to a specific set of circumstances and popular policies. These form the four pillars of his political support: The Collapse Of The Left: The 2016 and 2018 elections wiped out the Worker’s Party, which had ruled Brazil since 2003, and swept Bolsonaro to power on a wave of deep disillusionment. The success of Bolsonaro’s right-wing Social Liberal Party (PSL), a decidedly minor party, over Fernando Haddad’s left-wing PT, one of the country’s biggest parties, highlighted Brazilians’ disenchantment after the worst recession in a century and a sprawling corruption scandal that implicated most of the political elite. Chart I-2The Left Is Still Wounded While Bolsonaro’s “honeymoon period” after election has ended, the PT has not recovered from its loss of legitimacy over the past decade. A poll conducted in late August reveals that if the 2022 election were held today, Bolsonaro would secure a sizable lead not only over the PT but also over the combined opposition (Chart I-2). Pension Reform: All of Brazil’s political elites recognize that the bloated pension system must be cut back to improve the country’s fiscal profile and debt sustainability. After the previous government failed to do so, this became a central Bolsonaro campaign promise. Consensus on pension reform has enabled him to form a majority coalition; it is among the most popular items on the government’s agenda not because people love having their pensions cut but because of the widespread perception that it is necessary and will improve Brazil’s overall economic circumstances (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Brazilians See The Value In Pension Reform Ironically, however, passing this reform will also remove this pillar of the administration’s political capital. Bolsonaro will be left with less political capital to spend on other reforms and he will face less unity within his coalition having accomplished its greatest shared goal. Thus if the bill passes yet fails to boost his approval rating, or immediately prompts him to pursue less market-friendly policies or to lose major parties from his coalition, then it is a red flag suggesting that he is a one-trick pony and will not get other major reforms done in his term. Law And Order: Bolsonaro was elected on a ticket of restoring order. The crime rate has fallen since the beginning of the year and voters will be looking for this to be sustained (Chart I-4). The fall in the crime rate and the net approval of the security environment in Brazil are positive for Bolsonaro’s credibility. However, it is not clear that his policies are directly responsible for this improvement, which means the trend could change. If crime goes up, he loses political capital to do other things. Moreover the public may not approve of his approach. As indicated by Chart I-3 above, while the population is divided over the right to possess weapons in the home, there is clear disapproval of the right to possess weapons on the street. Pursuit of an unpopular solution could diminish his support on law and order. Chart I-4A Rise In Crime Would Hurt Bolsonaro Chart I-5Moro Key For Bolsonaro Anti-Corruption Drive Corruption: The third panel of Chart I-4 also reveals that combating corruption is a key area of perceived success by the Bolsonaro administration to date. Bolsonaro won the office partly because he was seen as a clean leader during a time of pervasive corruption. His administration is also fortified by the presence of Minister of Justice Sergio Moro, who played a leading role in prosecuting corrupt figures in the Lava Jato operation. Moro is by far the most popular minister in cabinet today (Chart I-5). A decline in Moro’s popularity would be an indication that Brazilians are not satisfied with the administration’s progress on the anti-corruption front. As such it would flag declining political capital. If Moro departs the administration for any reason, that would also hurt Bolsonaro's credibility on this critical issue. Bolsonaro’s approval rating to date is very low relative to previous presidents and falling (Chart I-6). The only way this can change is if he gets credit for the pension reform and then prioritizes policies that are broadly popular rather than ideological. As mentioned, the change in the wake of pension reform will be critical to observe: polls show that the public gives the federal government and President Bolsonaro personally the most credit for improvements in Brazil (Chart I-7), but it is not clear that he will be greatly rewarded for cutting pensions. Chart I-6Will Pension Reform Passage Save Bolsonaro? Chart I-7All Credit Goes To The Bolsonaro Administration   The legislative effort has succeeded largely due to House Speaker Rodrigo Maia, a clutch player in congress. The economic liberal Maia has set aside personal differences with the leadership to shepherd economic reforms through congress. This has involved a pragmatic approach that sidelines the president’s controversial social policies and focuses on getting pro-market bills passed. Chart I-8A Weak Starting Point For PSL The political news flow from Brazil this year has been preoccupied with the rift between the legislative and executive branches. At first glance, congress looks impossible to navigate. As is typical in Brazil, congress is extremely fractured. Bolsonaro’s PSL holds only 10% of seats that belong to the 25 parties in the lower house, and only 5% of the seats that belong to the 17 parties in the upper house (Chart I-8). This is comparable to the first Cardoso administration – so it is not impossible to grow this legislative base – but it is a weak starting point. On top of that, Bolsonaro has held true to his campaign promise to shun so-called “old politics” – the granting of cabinet positions or “pork” based on congressional patronage. This reinforces his anti-corruption pillar but makes it hard to grease the wheels of legislation. The passage of the pension reform proposal through Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies shows that congress can be navigated, but it highlights Maia’s critical role. This relationship could break down after pension reform, which would reduce the government’s ability to accomplish additional reforms that require legislative approval. Maia’s third two-year term will expire at the end of next year. He technically cannot be elected for a successive term (although this rule has already been broken). This raises the threat that his successor may not be as pro-market or as successful in managing the lower house. In fact, the coming 12 to 18 months create a window of opportunity for the administration and legislature to pass bills before the 2020 local elections and the 2022 general election begin to interfere. Since the pension cuts will be back-loaded – delayed until subsequent years – voters will not immediately feel the pain of the social security changes, which will reduce the chances of a major popular backlash during this window. Provided Maia’s pragmatism continues to prevail, the government can use the pension reform to launch into another major reform initiative. Economy minister Paulo Guedes, another key pro-market player, has highlighted privatization and tax reforms as the next big issues on his agenda. The upcoming 12-18 months offer a window of opportunity for further reforms. Bottom Line: Tensions between the executive and legislative branches of government have not prevented pension reforms from passing because Bolsonaro had a fresh mandate, full political capital, and a broad consensus on the policy itself. Going forward a great deal of political capital will have been spent while consensus will have to be built for the next policy priority. House Speaker Rodrigo Maia is a clutch player, pragmatically enabling the passage of bills through congress, so his cooperation is essential. The upcoming 12-18 months offer a window of opportunity for further reforms, most notably privatization and tax reform. An Executive Way Forward On Privatization The administration’s privatization plan is overly ambitious but there is an executive path forward while the government enters a long slog in the legislature. Guedes has indicated that he wants to sell all of Brazil’s state owned enterprises to the private sector. In value terms, the government hopes to raise 1.3 trillion reals ($323 billion) in the process, about 20% of total public debt. Brazil has 418 SOEs controlled directly or indirectly by the state, both at the state and municipal levels. Of the 134 federal companies, 46 are under direct control, while the remaining 88 are under indirect control – subsidiaries of major SOEs such as Petrobras, Eletrobras, Banco do Brasil, Caixa, and BNDES. With Brazil’s public debt at 86% of GDP, profit from these sales would go toward paying down the debt and hopefully also raising GDP through gains from increased competition and efficiency. The program would also reduce the government’s interest payments – that account for 25% of government spending and 5% of GDP. Salim Mattar – Special Secretary of Privatization, Divestment and Market — argues that the interest saved will allow the government to divert funds to education and health, buoying Brazil’s human capital over the long term. The privatization of inefficient and loss-generating SOEs is positive for both the near-term and long-term outlook, but the government’s plan is completely unrealistic. Even Mattar’s significantly lower projected gains – up to 800 billion reals ($214 billion) – are likely unattainable. Although the government will easily meet its target of raising $20 billion this year,2 these sales represent the low-hanging fruit – they are the asset sales that face no or low resistance from the public and congress. On August 21, the Bolsonaro government released a list of 17 state-owned companies that it intends to privatize (Table I-1). From among the largest SOEs, – Petrobras, Eletrobras, BNDES, Banco do Brasil, and Caixa Economica Federal – only Eletrobras is on the list. The rest of the major SOEs will face greater hurdles as they have been identified as “strategic” and face greater resistance from the public (Chart I-9). In fact, although government officials expressed confidence that Eletrobras will be privatized in 2020, Senate President Davi Alcolumbre indicated that the process faces significant resistance in the senate. As such we would expect the legislature to tackle companies that are not as controversial. Table I-1Government Privatization List What is more, while congressional approval is required for the sale of SOEs, a supreme court ruling earlier this year allows the government to sell subsidiaries of its companies without approval from congress. Thus while major state companies such as Petrobras or Eletrobras are unlikely to be privatized (certainly not wholly), the government will attempt to move forward by selling non-core assets of non-strategic companies, and taking other measures to improve efficiency of operations. Chart I-9These "Strategic" SOEs Face Privatization Resistance Chart I-10Privatization Will Reduce Debt Burden Putting aside the administration’s plan to accelerate the program next year, if we project $20 billion worth of privatizations per year for the remainder of Bolsonaro’s term, the total $80 billion in total sales will bring Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio down to 81% from 85% (Chart I-10). Bottom Line: Although the sale of the largest “strategic” state-owned companies will not happen, the administration’s privatization program can succeed by diverting congressional efforts to non-strategic companies. The administration can also move alone on non-core assets. This is a net positive for overall productivity, competitiveness, and fiscal sustainability although it is not huge in magnitude. Less Optimism On Tax And Tariff Reform In addition to the outsized economic role of the state, Brazil has been suffering from inefficiencies due to the relatively elevated tax burden and overly complicated system (Chart I-11). This has reduced its ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings which assigns it the seventh worst spot in paying taxes (Chart I-12). The nearly six thousand laws governing taxes in Brazil likely hold back the country’s FDI potential and encourages tax evasion. Chart I-11Brazilians Suffer From Outsized Tax Burden … Chart I-12… Contributing To An Unattractive Business Environment Given Brazil’s poor fiscal standing and large debt load, there is no room to reduce taxes. Rather, reform efforts are centered around simplifying the tax code in order to improve the investment environment. A complete overhaul requires the approval of three-fifths of congress. Pension reform shows this is theoretically possible, but the process will be lengthy and unlikely to occur before the second half of next year. There are currently four main proposals being considered. All aim to simplify the tax system by combining all current taxes imposed on consumption into a single tax. The proposal most advanced in the legislative process enjoys the support of Maia and has already been deemed lawful by a lower house committee. It recommends applying the single tax rate uniformly across all states. Bolsonaro’s administration is also designing its own reform proposals, but has yet to release details. As revealed by the firing of special secretary to Brazil’s federal revenue service Marcos Cintra on September 11, the cabinet is in conflict over the reintroduction of a financial transactions tax, such as the CPMF which expired in 2007. Chart I-3 above illustrates that the tax is generally unpopular, causing Bolsonaro to be staunchly against the tax, while Guedes has indicated that it should be part of the reform. The proposal is expected to be put to lawmakers in a congressional committee responsible for drafting the bill by October 8 before being introduced to the lower house. However, given that the financial transactions tax is unpopular and a point of contention in the administration, the timeline will likely be delayed. Moreover the legislative approval process will be lengthy. While Bezerra Coelho does not expect tax reform to be approved until the second half of 2020, this is an optimistic assessment. Given the complexity of overhauling the tax system, we expect a one-year process at minimum and therefore doubt that approval will come in 2020. Instead modifications to the current system may be easier to enact and implement. Guedes has also signaled the need for a reduction in Brazil’s extremely elevated import tariffs which have been erected amid a policy of import substitution (Chart I-13). With most tariffs in the range of 10% and 35%, Guedes has stated that the government plans to reduce tariffs by 10 percentage points during Bolsonaro’s four year term by cutting the rate by one percentage point in the first year, two in the second, three in the third, and four in the fourth. This can be done by executive action and does not require legislation. What about Bolsonaro's trade liberalization push? On the campaign trail, Bolsonaro expressed his intention to step back from Mercosur and instead prioritize bilateral trade with rich countries such as the United States. However, given the importance of the bloc to Brazilian trade, the reality is that Bolsonaro cannot afford to neglect these countries (Chart I-14). The recently agreed EU-Mercosur trade deal, 20 years in the making, could create opportunities for Brazil over the long-run, but it is being held up by European countries as appetite for free trade deals becomes politically problematic across the world. Chart I-13Elevated Tariff Rate Hurts Brazil's Competitiveness Chart I-14Trade Surplus With Mercosur Is Reliable While greater integration with global trade will increase Brazil’s market access – a positive for exports – it also results in increased competition and a threat to existing companies that are unable to compete at an international level over the near term. Thus it is not immediately clear whether trade liberalization will generate net gains for Brazil’s economy in the short term. If Bolsonaro and Guedes do not move immediately, they will have to pause these efforts in the 2021 lead up to the 2022 election. Moreover the Mercosur agreement, as well as Brazil’s general bilateral trade with Argentina, are at risk if opposition leader Alberto Fernandez wins the presidential election on October 27. A return to protectionist policies by Argentina could harm Brazilian exports and threaten progress on the Mercosur trade bloc. There is more reason to be optimistic about privatization than about tax reform or trade liberalization. Bottom Line: There is more reason to be optimistic about privatization efforts than about the passage of a major overhaul to Brazil’s tax system or the integration of Brazil with global markets. Nevertheless, ongoing efforts should sustain an improvement in “animal spirits” in the short term and create some potential for structural improvements over the long term. The Economy: A Stall Speed Risk Chart I-15A Slow Grinding Recovery The Brazilian economy is en route to recovery, albeit a slow one. The level of economic activity is still well below its pre-recession level but is grinding slowly back (Chart I-15). The key economic risk is stall speed. Like an aircraft, if the pace of growth falls below stall speed, gravity forces will overwhelm, and the economy will descend into a recession. In the case of Brazil, gravity forces refer to indebtedness – public debt, household debt servicing costs and corporate foreign currency debt. The path of least resistance for the business cycle is up and bullishness on Brazil is pervasive in the global investment community. Nevertheless, the economy remains very fragile. At the current juncture, while acknowledging that odds for the positive outlook to pan out are reasonably high, we would like to emphasize that gravity forces remain acute in Brazil. While odds for the positive outlook to pan out are high, gravity forces remain reasonably acute. Weakening narrow money growth fore shadows a weaker pace of nominal and real economic activity (Chart I-16). Brazilian households have increasingly relied on credit cards and revolving credit lines to finance their consumption in recent years. These types of credit carry high interest rates. Consequently, at 21% of disposable income, household debt servicing remains very elevated despite a large reduction in bond yields and policy rates (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Is Growth About To Stall? Chart I-17Household Servicing Costs Remain Elevated Private banks have experienced a modest uptick in non-performing loans (NPLs) (Chart I-18). This may incentivize private banks to moderate credit growth. With public banks deleveraging or shrinking their balance sheets, any moderation in private bank lending could stall the pace of growth in the economy. Interestingly, all-time low bond yields and the Selic rate have not yet translated into a meaningful recovery in real estate prices and new construction launches remain anemic (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Private Banks NPLs And Credit Growth Chart I-19Weak Property Market Despite Low Interest Rates   Fiscal policy is straightjacketed by the spending cap rule, which indexes government spending to the rate of inflation of the previous year. Nominal fiscal spending will grow only 4.3% this year and will expand by a mere 3.4% in 2020. Foreign debt obligations (FDO) – the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – stand at $180 billion, equivalent to 78% of Brazil’s annual exports (Chart I-20).  The current account deficit will continue widening if domestic demand and, consequently, imports recover. Foreign funding requirements – FDO plus the current account balance – are substantial, standing at $250 billion (Chart I-21). If portfolio flows to EM are disturbed, Brazil will feel the pain. Chart I-20Foreign Debt Obligation Are Elevated Chart I-21Brazil Has Large Funding Gap... Chart I-22...With Exports Contracting With export growth contracting by double digits on both a value and volume basis (Chart I-22), the demand vesus supply of dollars in Brazil will likely keep the greenback well bid versus the Brazilian real. The nation’s pension bill is a very positive and much-needed step in the structural reform process. However, in its current form, it is insufficient to make public debt dynamics sustainable – i.e., halt the rise in the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Bottom Line: The path of least resistance for the business cycle is up. However, the economy remains very fragile. A negative external or domestic shock could cause the Brazilian economy to stall speed. Barring such negative shocks, the economy will continue its recovery. Have Financial Markets Reached Escape Velocity? Financial markets are vulnerable to the risk of stall speed on both the structural reforms and economic growth fronts. This is especially true now that equity and bond prices have risen substantially. If the pace of structural reforms or the economy fall victim to stall speed, financial markets will tumble. On the contrary, if the reform agenda progresses and economic growth accelerates, financial markets will reach escape velocity and sustain their bull markets. Apart from the outlook for both structural reforms and the business cycle, the largest risks to Brazil’s financial markets are as follows: BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team expects base metals and energy prices to decline further, weighing on EM currencies. The main culprit is weakening Chinese demand. This scenario entails non-negligible odds of Brazilian real depreciation because the latter has historically been positively correlated with commodity prices (Chart I-23). Brazil has become a net exporter of oil, so lower crude prices are negative for the currency. Importantly, the real is not cheap based on the real effective exchange rate (Chart I-24). Chart I-23Commodity Prices Hold The Key Chart I-24Real Valuations Are Not Yet Attractive The gap between local currency and U.S. dollar bond yields has narrowed to a record low. This along with the large overhang of corporate foreign currency debt, as discussed above, is already encouraging debt swap - corporates borrow in reals to repay their foreign currency debt. These capital outflows from residents will continue weighing on the exchange rate. A widening current account deficit has historically foreshadowed lower share prices in U.S. dollar terms (Chart I-25). Finally, local bond yields, and sovereign and corporate spreads have plummeted despite currency depreciation. Such resilience by fixed-income markets to currency depreciation is historically unprecedented. It remains to be seen if yields and credit spreads can remain low if the currency breaks down. Bottom Line: Barring stall speed in structural reforms and economic growth, downside in Brazilian asset prices is limited. However, near-term volatility is likely as the nation’s financial markets are overbought and investor sentiment is very bullish. Besides, equity prices in dollar terms have not broken above important technical resistance levels, as shown in Chart I-26. Hence, we can say the bull market in the Bovespa in dollar terms has not yet reached escape velocity. Chart I-25The Current Account Is A Risk To Share Prices Chart I-26The Bovespa In Dollar Terms Has Not Reached Escape Velocity Investment Recommendations Weighing the pros and cons, we recommend upgrading Brazil from underweight to neutral for dedicated EM equity, credit and domestic bond portfolios. Given the potential risks discussed above, we are looking for a better entry point to upgrade Brazil to overweight. We upgraded Brazil to overweight on October 9, 2018 following the first round of presidential elections but downgraded it on April 4, 2019 when volatility began rising. In retrospect, that was the wrong decision. Volatility could rise but there is a basis for giving the administration the benefit of the doubt as long as it remains committed to pro-market reforms. Chart I-27Real Estate Stocks Offer An Opportunity For long-term absolute return investors the key risk is the exchange rate. Hence, these investors should adopt a positive long-term bias for local currency returns but hedge currency risk periodically. Currently, global financial markets are in a juncture where the dollar will likely move higher and the Brazilian real will depreciate. Hence, investors already invested in Brazil should hedge exchange rate risk. Within the Brazilian equity universe, BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service favors real estate because low nominal and real interest rates are bullish for the property sector. The latter was devastated during the recession and has not yet recovered (Chart I-27). Consequently, for long-term investors, we continue recommending Brazilian real estate plays/assets on dips. Footnotes   1      "Stall speed" is the velocity below which an aircraft will descend, or 'stall', regardless of its angle of attack. If an aircraft's airspeed is greater than the stall speed then the pilot can increase the aircraft's angle of attack to achieve additional lift. 2      So far in 2019 the government has already sold off $12.3 billion worth of assets from Petrobras, $4.9 billion in shares held in various companies, and gained $1.9 billion from leases on airports, railways and ports.
Special Report Investors should pay particular attention to definition and methodology when evaluating value versus growth strategies, both academically and in practice. Value investors should focus on non-U.S. markets, especially the emerging market small-cap universe. Growth investors should focus on large caps, especially the U.S. large-cap universe. Small-cap investors should focus on value. Large- and mid-cap investors should not be making bets between value and growth strategically. Tactical style rotation should be done only when valuation spreads reach extreme levels.  GAA remains neutral on value versus growth, but prefers to use sector positioning (cyclicals versus defensives, financials versus tech and health care) and country positioning (euro area versus U.S.) to implement style tilts. Investing by way of style is as old as investing itself. Value versus growth has been one of the most frequently asked questions among our clients of late, particularly given the sharp style reversal in recent weeks. In this report, we attempt to answer some of the most often-asked questions on value versus growth. We have arranged these questions into five separate sections: First, we look at 93 years of history of the Fama-French value and growth portfolios to see how value, growth, and size have interacted over time, because academics have mostly used the Fama-French framework. Second, we look at how comparable U.S. style indices are, including the S&P, the Russell and the MSCI, since practitioners mostly use these commercial indices as their benchmarks. Third, we investigate if international markets share the same value-growth performance cycles as the U.S., using the MSCI suite of value-growth indices (since MSCI is the only index provider that produces value-growth indices for each market under its global coverage). Fourth, we investigate if pure exposure to value and growth can actually improve the value-growth performance spread by comparing the pure style indices from the S&P and the Russell to their standard counterparts. Finally, we present the GAA approach to style tilts in a section on our investment conclusions. 1. Is It True That Value Outperforms Growth In The Long Run? There has been overwhelming academic evidence supporting the existence of the value premium.1 Academically, the “value premium”, also known as the HML (high minus low) factor premium, or the value outperformance, is defined as the return differential between the cheapest stocks and the most expensive. Even though Fama and French used book-to-price as the sole valuation criterion,2 many researchers have combined book-to-price with other valuation measures such as earnings-to-price, sales-to-price, dividend yield,3 and so on.  There is also academic evidence suggesting that “value outperformance is almost non-existent among large-cap stocks.”4 What is more, in 2014 Fama and French caused a huge stir by publishing “A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model” working paper demonstrating that “HML is a redundant factor” because “the average HML return is captured by the exposure of the HML to other factors” (such as size, profitability, and investment pattern) based on U.S. data from 1963 to 2013.5 Asset owners and allocators should pay special attention when selecting benchmarks for value and growth. For non-quant practitioners, especially the long-only investors, value and growth are two separate investment styles, even though the style classification shares the same principle as the academic “value factor.” Their definitions vary, as evidenced by how S&P Dow Jones, FTSE Russell, and MSCI define their value and growth indexes (see next section on page 7). In general, value stocks are cheap, with lower-than-average earnings growth potential, while growth stocks have higher-than-average earnings growth potential but are very expensive. The indices published by commercial index providers do not have very long histories, however. Fortunately, Fama and French also provide value-growth-size portfolios on their publicly available website.6 Table II-1 shows that for 93 years, from July 1926 to June 2019, U.S. value portfolios in both large-cap and small-cap buckets based on the well-known Fama-French approach have returned more than their growth counterparts, no matter whether the portfolios are equal-weighted or market-cap-weighted. Most strikingly, equal-weighted small-cap value outperformed its growth counterpart by over 10% a year in absolute terms, and has more than doubled the risk-adjusted return compared to its growth counterpart. Table II-1Fama-French Value-Growth-Size Portfolio Performance* Some media reports have claimed that value stocks are “less volatile” because they are on average “larger and better-established companies.”7 This may be true for some specific time periods. For the 93 years covered by Fama and French, however, this common belief is not supported. In fact, value portfolios in both the large- and small-cap universes have consistently had higher volatility than growth portfolios, no matter how the components are weighted. The excess returns, however, have more than offset the higher volatilities in three out of four pairs, with the exception being market cap-weighted large-cap growth, which has a slightly higher risk-adjusted return due to much lower volatility than its value counterpart. From a very long-term perspective, the value outperformance does come from taking higher risk. Further investigation shows that the superior long-run outperformance of value relative to growth came mostly in the first 80 years of Fama and French’s 93-year sample. In more recent years since 2007, however, value has underperformed growth significantly in three out of the four Fama-French value-growth pairs, with the equal-weighted small-cap value-growth pair being the sole exception, as shown in Table II-2. Even though the equal-weighted small-cap value has still outperformed its growth counterpart in the most recent period, the hit ratio drops to 54% compared to 76% in the first 80 years, while the magnitude of average calendar-year outperformance drops to a meager 1.3%, compared to 12.5% in the first 80 years. Table II-2The Fight Between Value And Growth* Statistical analysis is sensitive to the time period chosen. How have value and growth been performing over time? Chart II-1 shows the long-term dynamics among value, growth, and size. The following conclusions are clear: Chart II-1Fama-French Value-Growth-Size Peformance Dynamics* Value investors should favor small caps over large caps, while growth investors should do the opposite, favoring large caps over small caps, albeit with much less potential success (Chart II-1, panel 1). Small-cap investors should favor value stocks over growth stocks (panel 2). Value outperformance in the large-cap space (panel 3) is much weaker than in the small-cap space (panel 2). Fama and French define small and large caps based on the median market cap of all NYSE stocks on CRSP (Center for Research In Security Prices), then use the NYSE median size to split NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (after 1972) into a small-cap group and a large-cap group. The value and growth split is based on book-to-price, with stocks in the lowest 30% classified as growth, and the highest 30% as value. Interestingly, small-cap value and small-cap growth account for only a very small portion of the entire universe, as shown in Charts II-2A and II-2B. Value stocks’ average market cap is about half of that of growth stocks, in both the large- and small-cap universes (panel 3 in Charts II-2A and II-2B). Again, this does not support some media claims that value stocks are larger and better-established companies. However, it does add further support to the claim that all investors should favor small-cap value stocks. Unfortunately, “small-cap value” is a very small universe. As of June 2019, the CRSP total U.S. equity market cap was $26.2 trillion, with small-cap value accounting for only 1.5% (about $383 billion); even large-cap value comprises only a relatively small weight, 13% (US$3.5 trillion). Chart II-2ASmall-Cap Value-Growth Portfolios* Chart II-2BLarge-Cap Value-Growth Portfolios*   The U.S. market is dominated by large-cap growth stocks with a heavy weight of 56% (US$14.7 trillion, as of June 2019). This is encouraging because academic research does show that the value premium among large caps is weak. But the large-cap value weakness mostly started from 2007, after 80 years of strength relative to large-cap growth (Chart II-1, panel 3). The Fama-French approach is widely used in academic research, partly due to its long history from 1926. For non-quant practitioners, especially long-only investors, however, commercial indexes from FTSE Russell, S&P Dow Jones, and MSCI are more often used as performance benchmarks. In this report, we study a series of commercial value-growth indexes in the U.S. and globally to shed light on value-growth dynamics, and how asset allocators can incorporate them into their decision-making processes. 2. Not All U.S. Style Indexes Are Created Equal Three major index providers have style indices. They are FTSE Russell (which launched the industry’s first set of value-growth indexes in 1987), S&P Dow Jones, and MSCI. MSCI is the only provider that has a full suite of value-growth indices for all individual markets under coverage. While all three provide “standard” style indices that include the full component of the parent index, the FTSE Russell and the S&P Dow Jones also provide “pure” style indices. There are two major differences between “standard” and “pure” style indices: 1) the standard indices are market-cap weighted, while the “pure” indices are weighted based on style score. 2) Standard value and standard growth have overlapping components, while pure value and pure growth do not share any common components. We prefer to use sector and country positioning to implement style tilts tactically. Other than book-to-price, the value variable used by the Fama-French approach, the three providers have added different variables in the determination of value and growth, as shown in Table II-3. This also reflects the evolution of the industry’s understanding on value and growth. For example, when MSCI first launched its style index in 1997, it used only book-to-price, but changed its approach in May 2003 to the current “multi-factor two-dimension” framework. Table II-3Value-Growth Index Criteria Because of the differences in index construction methodology, value-growth indices for the U.S. have behaved differently. The S&P 500, the Russell 1000, and the MSCI standard (large and mid-cap) indices are widely followed institutional benchmarks, with back-tested history dating to the 1970s. Chart II-3 shows the relative value/growth performance dynamics from the three index providers, together with that from Fama and French (market value-weighted, to be consistent with the approach from the index providers). One can observe the following: Chart II-3Which Value/Growth? None of the three pairs looks exactly like Fama-French’s market-cap value-weighted value/growth. This raises the question of how historical analysis based on the long history of Fama-French value/growth portfolios can be applied to the commercial indices. In the first cycle from 1975 to February 2000, all three index pairs made a round trip, with flat performance between value and growth. Also, even though the S&P 500 and Russell 1000 were more closely correlated with one another than with the MSCI, the three were quite similar. In the current cycle that began in February 2000, however, Russell value/growth has rebounded much more strongly than the other two. But in the down period that started in 2007, the three indices performed in line with each other, as shown in Table II-4. Table II-4U.S. Style Index Performance* In addition, the difference between S&P and Russell does not just lie between the S&P 500 and the Russell 1000. It actually exists in every market-cap segment, as shown in Chart II-4. Unfortunately, MSCI does not provide history from 1975 for the detailed cap segments. In the current cycle since February 2000, S&P value rebounded the least between 2000 and 2006. Why? Chart II-4Know Your Benchmark Chart II-5Value/Growth: Russell Vs. S&P Further investigation reveals some interesting observations, as shown in Chart II-5. At the aggregate level, the S&P 1500, the Russell 3000 and their respective style indices have performed largely in line with one another in the most recent cycle starting from February 2000 (Chart II-5, panel 4), reflecting the industry trend of index convergence. In different market cap segments, however, the divergence is still prominent, especially in the small-cap space (panel 1). The S&P 600 has consistently outperformed the Russell 2000 in both the value and growth categories. In addition to different style factors, this consistency also reflects different universes, size distribution, and sector exposure, as explained in an earlier GAA Special Report on small caps.8 Managers with Russell 2000 as their performance benchmark could simply beat it by doing a total-return-performance swap between the Russell 2000 and the S&P 600. Bottom Line: Asset owners and allocators should pay special attention when selecting benchmarks for value and growth.  3. How Have Value And Growth Performed Globally? MSCI is the only index provider that also produces value-growth indices for each equity market under its global coverage, using the same methodology. Unfortunately, only the “standard” (i.e., large- and mid-cap) universe has a long history, dating from December 1974. Charts II-6A and II-6B show the value/growth dynamics in major DM and EM markets. The relative performance of MSCI DM value versus growth shares a similar pattern to that of the U.S. in the latest cycle since 2000, but looks very different in the period before 2000 (Chart II-6A). The ratio of EM large- and mid-cap value versus growth did not peak until February 2012, about five years after the peak of its DM peer (Chart II-6B, panel 1). On the other hand, EM small-cap value has resumed its outperformance versus growth since early 2016 after having peaked around the same time as its large-cap counterpart. Chart II-6AIs Value Dead In DM? Chart II-6BIs Value Dead In EM?   The global value/growth dynamics also show that the “value outperforming growth” effect is more prominent in the small-cap space. But why has small value also underperformed small growth in most DM markets? Our explanation is that the EM universe is much less efficient than the DM universe because there are not many quant funds dedicated to the EM small-cap space – in addition to the fact that, in general, EM small caps are much smaller than those in DM markets. This is also in line with our finding that, in general, factor premia are more prominent in the EM universe.9 Bottom Line: Value premium is more prominent in non-U.S. markets, especially the EM small-cap universe. 4. Do Pure Style Indices Improve Performance? Both S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell provide pure-value and pure-growth indices. Unlike the standard value-growth indices, which target about 50% of the parent market cap, the pure-style indices include only stocks with the strongest value and growth characteristics. There is no overlap between the two. In theory, the pure-style indices should outperform the standard-style indices because of their concentrated exposure to style factors. How do they do in reality? Table II-5 shows that in terms of absolute return, this is indeed the case for 14 out of the 18 pairs of indices from S&P and Russell for the period between 1998 and 2019. However, the higher returns from greater exposure to style factors have largely come from much higher volatility in 17 out of the 18 pairs. Pure style has higher volatility than standard style in general, the only exception being the Russell mid-cap value space. As such, on a risk-adjusted basis, pure style is not necessarily better. Table II-5Purer Is Not Necessarily Better Charts II-7A and II-7B show the different performance dynamics for the S&P and Russell families of style indices. For the S&P indices, pure growth has outperformed standard growth for the entire period in all three market-cap segments, but only the S&P 500 pure value outperformed its standard counterpart. Therefore, more concentrated exposure to style characteristics has improved the value-growth spread only in the large-cap space, but it has actually worsened the value-growth spread in the mid- and small-cap universes (Chart II-7A). Chart II-7AS&P Pure Styles* Chart II-7BRussell Pure Styles*   For the Russell indices, it’s clear that there were a lot more tech stocks in its pure-growth indices leading up to the 2000 tech bubble, because pure growth shot up significantly more than the standard growth before the bubble burst, and also crashed more severely following it. Overall, only in the small-cap space did the value-growth spread improve by the more concentrated exposure to style factors. However, this improvement was not because of the outperformance of the pure-style relative to the standard indices. In fact, both pure value and pure growth in the small-cap universe underperformed their standard counterparts, but pure growth performed even worse (Chart II-7B and Table II-5). 5. Investment Conclusions Value and growth can mean very different things and behave very differently. Investors should pay special attention to the definitions and methodologies when evaluating style indices or strategies, both academically and in practice. Depending on an investor’s mandate, the following is recommended: Value investors should focus on non-U.S. markets, especially the emerging market small-cap universe. Growth investors should focus on large caps, especially the U.S. large-cap space. Small-cap investors should focus on value. Large-and mid-cap investors should not make bets between value and growth strategically. Tactical style rotation should be done only when valuation spreads reach extreme levels. Price-to-book is the only common variable used in the determination of value and growth by academics and practitioners. Its track record as a systematic return predictor has been poor, as shown in panel 2 of Charts II-8A and II-8B. Another factor we have a long history for is dividend yield. Its predictive power is even worse than that of price-to-book (panel 3). Chart II-8AValuation Is A Poor Timing Tool In The U.S. Chart II-8BValuation Is A Poor Timing Tool Globally   Many factors have been used in conjunction with price-to-book by both academics and practitioners to time the rotation between value and growth. However, the results have been mixed. Regression models that correctly predicted in the past may not work in the future. For example, a regression model based on valuation spread and earnings-growth spread using data from January 1982 to October 1999 successfully predicted the rebound of value outperformance starting in early 2000,10 but the universal suffering of value funds over the past several years implies that this model may have given many false signals. Chart II-9 demonstrates how difficult it is to use regression models as a timing tool for value and growth rotation. A simple regression is conducted between value and growth return differentials (subsequent 60-month returns) and relative price-to-book. For data from December 1974 to July 2019, the r-squared for the MSCI world is 0.38 and for the U.S. it is 0.09. In hindsight, both models predicted the value outperformance starting in early 2000. However, the gaps between actual value and fitted value started to open, long before 2000. By late 1998, the gaps were already wider than the previous cycle lows, yet they continued to widen as value continued to underperform growth until February 2000. Chart II-9How Good Is The Fit? What should investors currently do, based on these models? The gaps are large, but not as large as in early 2000. At which point should investors start to shift into value given its more than 12 years of underperformance? We have often written that we prefer to use sector and country positioning to implement style tilts.11, 12  This preference has not changed. Value and growth indices have sector tilts that change over time. Currently, the S&P Dow Jones large- and mid-cap value indices have a clear overweight in financials but an underweight in tech and health care compared to their growth counterparts (Table II-6). Table II-6Sector Bets In Value And Growth Indices* Chart II-10Prefer Sector And Country Positioning To Style We have been neutral on value and growth, but would likely change this view if we change our country equity allocation between the U.S. and the euro area, and our equity sector allocation between cyclicals and defensives as well as between financials and information technology (Chart II-10). Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President​​​​​​​ Global Asset Allocation   Footnotes 1     Antti Ilmanen, Ronen Israel, Tobias J. Moskowitz, Ashwin Thapar, Franklin Wang, “Factor Premia and Factor Timing: A Century of Evidence,” AQR Working Paper, July 2, 2019. 2     Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Common risk factors in the return on stocks and bonds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 33 (1993). 3     Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz, “Fact, Fiction, and Value Investing,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 42 No.1, Fall 2015. 4     Ronen Israel and Tobias J. Moskowitz, “The Role of Shorting, Firm Size and Time on Market Anomalies,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 108, Issue 2, May 2013 5      Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model,” Working Paper, University of Chicago, September 2014. 6             Fama-French value-growth-size portfolios. 7     Mark P. Cussen, “Value or growth Stocks: Which are Better?” Investopedia, Jun 25, 2019. 8     Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report titled “Small Cap Outperformance: Fact or Myth?” dated April 7, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 9     Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report titled, “Is Smart Beta A Useful Tool In Global Asset Allocation?” dated July 8, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 10    Clifford S. Asness, Jacques A Friedman, Robert J. Krail and John M Liew, “Style Timing: Value versus Growth,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 2000. 11     Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, “Quarterly - March 2016,” dated March 31, 2016, and available at gaa. bcaresearch.com. 12     Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, “Quarterly - April 2019,” dated April 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights Investors should pay particular attention to definition and methodology when evaluating value versus growth strategies, both academically and in practice. Value investors should focus on non-U.S. markets, especially the emerging market small-cap universe. Growth investors should focus on large caps, especially the U.S. large-cap universe. Small-cap investors should focus on value. Large- and mid-cap investors should not be making bets between value and growth strategically. Tactical style rotation should be done only when valuation spreads reach extreme levels.  GAA remains neutral on value versus growth, but prefers to use sector positioning (cyclicals versus defensives, financials versus tech and health care) and country positioning (euro area versus U.S.) to implement style tilts. Feature Investing by way of style is as old as investing itself. Value versus growth has been one of the most frequently asked questions among our clients of late, particularly given the sharp style reversal in recent weeks. In this report, we attempt to answer some of the most often-asked questions on value versus growth. We have arranged these questions into five separate sections: First, we look at 93 years of history of the Fama-French value and growth portfolios to see how value, growth, and size have interacted over time, because academics have mostly used the Fama-French framework. Second, we look at how comparable U.S. style indices are, including the S&P, the Russell and the MSCI, since practitioners mostly use these commercial indices as their benchmarks. Third, we investigate if international markets share the same value-growth performance cycles as the U.S., using the MSCI suite of value-growth indices (since MSCI is the only index provider that produces value-growth indices for each market under its global coverage). Fourth, we investigate if pure exposure to value and growth can actually improve the value-growth performance spread by comparing the pure style indices from the S&P and the Russell to their standard counterparts. Finally, we present the GAA approach to style tilts in a section on our investment conclusions. 1. Is It True That Value Outperforms Growth In The Long Run? There has been overwhelming academic evidence supporting the existence of the value premium.1 Academically, the “value premium”, also known as the HML (high minus low) factor premium, or the value outperformance, is defined as the return differential between the cheapest stocks and the most expensive. Even though Fama and French used book-to-price as the sole valuation criterion,2 many researchers have combined book-to-price with other valuation measures such as earnings-to-price, sales-to-price, dividend yield,3 and so on.  There is also academic evidence suggesting that “value outperformance is almost non-existent among large-cap stocks.”4 What is more, in 2014 Fama and French caused a huge stir by publishing “A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model” working paper demonstrating that “HML is a redundant factor” because “the average HML return is captured by the exposure of the HML to other factors” (such as size, profitability, and investment pattern) based on U.S. data from 1963 to 2013.5 For non-quant practitioners, especially the long-only investors, value and growth are two separate investment styles, even though the style classification shares the same principle as the academic “value factor.” Their definitions vary, as evidenced by how S&P Dow Jones, FTSE Russell, and MSCI define their value and growth indexes (see next section on page 7). In general, value stocks are cheap, with lower-than-average earnings growth potential, while growth stocks have higher-than-average earnings growth potential but are very expensive. The indices published by commercial index providers do not have very long histories, however. Fortunately, Fama and French also provide value-growth-size portfolios on their publicly available website.6  Table 1 shows that for 93 years, from July 1926 to June 2019, U.S. value portfolios in both large-cap and small-cap buckets based on the well-known Fama-French approach have returned more than their growth counterparts, no matter whether the portfolios are equal-weighted or market-cap-weighted. Most strikingly, equal-weighted small-cap value outperformed its growth counterpart by over 10% a year in absolute terms, and has more than doubled the risk-adjusted return compared to its growth counterpart. Table 1Fama-French Value-Growth-Size Portfolio Performance* Some media reports have claimed that value stocks are “less volatile” because they are on average “larger and better-established companies.”7 This may be true for some specific time periods. For the 93 years covered by Fama and French, however, this common belief is not supported. In fact, value portfolios in both the large- and small-cap universes have consistently had higher volatility than growth portfolios, no matter how the components are weighted. The excess returns, however, have more than offset the higher volatilities in three out of four pairs, with the exception being market cap-weighted large-cap growth, which has a slightly higher risk-adjusted return due to much lower volatility than its value counterpart. From a very long-term perspective, the value outperformance does come from taking higher risk. Further investigation shows that the superior long-run outperformance of value relative to growth came mostly in the first 80 years of Fama and French’s 93-year sample. In more recent years since 2007, however, value has underperformed growth significantly in three out of the four Fama-French value-growth pairs, with the equal-weighted small-cap value-growth pair being the sole exception, as shown in Table 2. Even though the equal-weighted small-cap value has still outperformed its growth counterpart in the most recent period, the hit ratio drops to 54% compared to 76% in the first 80 years, while the magnitude of average calendar-year outperformance drops to a meager 1.3%, compared to 12.5% in the first 80 years. Table 2The Fight Between Value And Growth* Statistical analysis is sensitive to the time period chosen. How have value and growth been performing over time? Chart 1 shows the long-term dynamics among value, growth, and size. The following conclusions are clear: Value investors should favor small caps over large caps, while growth investors should do the opposite, favoring large caps over small caps, albeit with much less potential success (Chart 1, panel 1). Small-cap investors should favor value stocks over growth stocks (panel 2). Value outperformance in the large-cap space (panel 3) is much weaker than in the small-cap space (panel 2). Chart 1Fama-French Value-Growth-Size Peformance Dynamics* Asset owners and allocators should pay special attention when selecting benchmarks for value and growth. Fama and French define small and large caps based on the median market cap of all NYSE stocks on CRSP (Center for Research In Security Prices), then use the NYSE median size to split NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (after 1972) into a small-cap group and a large-cap group. The value and growth split is based on book-to-price, with stocks in the lowest 30% classified as growth, and the highest 30% as value. Interestingly, small-cap value and small-cap growth account for only a very small portion of the entire universe, as shown in Charts 2A and 2B. Chart 2ASmall-Cap Value-Growth Portfolios* Chart 2BLarge-Cap Value-Growth Portfolios* Value stocks’ average market cap is about half of that of growth stocks, in both the large- and small-cap universes (panel 3 in Charts 2A and 2B). Again, this does not support some media claims that value stocks are larger and better-established companies. However, it does add further support to the claim that all investors should favor small-cap value stocks. Unfortunately, “small-cap value” is a very small universe. As of June 2019, the CRSP total U.S. equity market cap was $26.2 trillion, with small-cap value accounting for only 1.5% (about $383 billion); even large-cap value comprises only a relatively small weight, 13% (US$3.5 trillion). The U.S. market is dominated by large-cap growth stocks with a heavy weight of 56% (US$14.7 trillion, as of June 2019). This is encouraging because academic research does show that the value premium among large caps is weak. But the large-cap value weakness mostly started from 2007, after 80 years of strength relative to large-cap growth (Chart 1, panel 3). The Fama-French approach is widely used in academic research, partly due to its long history from 1926. For non-quant practitioners, especially long-only investors, however, commercial indexes from FTSE Russell, S&P Dow Jones, and MSCI are more often used as performance benchmarks. In this report, we study a series of commercial value-growth indexes in the U.S. and globally to shed light on value-growth dynamics, and how asset allocators can incorporate them into their decision-making processes. 2. Not All U.S. Style Indexes Are Created Equal Three major index providers have style indices. They are FTSE Russell (which launched the industry’s first set of value-growth indexes in 1987), S&P Dow Jones, and MSCI. MSCI is the only provider that has a full suite of value-growth indices for all individual markets under coverage. While all three provide “standard” style indices that include the full component of the parent index, the FTSE Russell and the S&P Dow Jones also provide “pure” style indices. There are two major differences between “standard” and “pure” style indices: 1) the standard indices are market-cap weighted, while the “pure” indices are weighted based on style score. 2) Standard value and standard growth have overlapping components, while pure value and pure growth do not share any common components. Other than book-to-price, the value variable used by the Fama-French approach, the three providers have added different variables in the determination of value and growth, as shown in Table 3. This also reflects the evolution of the industry’s understanding on value and growth. For example, when MSCI first launched its style index in 1997, it used only book-to-price, but changed its approach in May 2003 to the current “multi-factor two-dimension” framework. Table 3Value-Growth Index Criteria Because of the differences in index construction methodology, value-growth indices for the U.S. have behaved differently. The S&P 500, the Russell 1000, and the MSCI standard (large and mid-cap) indices are widely followed institutional benchmarks, with back-tested history dating to the 1970s. Chart 3 shows the relative value/growth performance dynamics from the three index providers, together with that from Fama and French (market value-weighted, to be consistent with the approach from the index providers). One can observe the following: Chart 3Which Value/Growth? None of the three pairs looks exactly like Fama-French’s market-cap value-weighted value/growth. This raises the question of how historical analysis based on the long history of Fama-French value/growth portfolios can be applied to the commercial indices. In the first cycle from 1975 to February 2000, all three index pairs made a round trip, with flat performance between value and growth. Also, even though the S&P 500 and Russell 1000 were more closely correlated with one another than with the MSCI, the three were quite similar. In the current cycle that began in February 2000, however, Russell value/growth has rebounded much more strongly than the other two. But in the down period that started in 2007, the three indices performed in line with each other, as shown in Table 4. Table 4U.S. Style Index Performance* In addition, the difference between S&P and Russell does not just lie between the S&P 500 and the Russell 1000. It actually exists in every market-cap segment, as shown in Chart 4. Unfortunately, MSCI does not provide history from 1975 for the detailed cap segments. In the current cycle since February 2000, S&P value rebounded the least between 2000 and 2006. Why? Chart 4Know Your Benchmark Further investigation reveals some interesting observations, as shown in Chart 5. Chart 5Value/Growth: Russell Vs. S&P At the aggregate level, the S&P 1500, the Russell 3000 and their respective style indices have performed largely in line with one another in the most recent cycle starting from February 2000 (Chart 5, panel 4), reflecting the industry trend of index convergence. In different market cap segments, however, the divergence is still prominent, especially in the small-cap space (panel 1). The S&P 600 has consistently outperformed the Russell 2000 in both the value and growth categories. In addition to different style factors, this consistency also reflects different universes, size distribution, and sector exposure, as explained in an earlier GAA Special Report on small caps.8 Managers with Russell 2000 as their performance benchmark could simply beat it by doing a total-return-performance swap between the Russell 2000 and the S&P 600. Bottom Line:  Asset owners and allocators should pay special attention when selecting benchmarks for value and growth.  3. How Have Value And Growth Performed Globally? MSCI is the only index provider that also produces value-growth indices for each equity market under its global coverage, using the same methodology. Unfortunately, only the “standard” (i.e., large- and mid-cap) universe has a long history, dating from December 1974. Charts 6A and 6B show the value/growth dynamics in major DM and EM markets. The relative performance of MSCI DM value versus growth shares a similar pattern to that of the U.S. in the latest cycle since 2000, but looks very different in the period before 2000 (Chart 6A). The ratio of EM large- and mid-cap value versus growth did not peak until February 2012, about five years after the peak of its DM peer (Chart 6B, panel 1). On the other hand, EM small-cap value has resumed its outperformance versus growth since early 2016 after having peaked around the same time as its large-cap counterpart. Chart 6AIs Value Dead In DM? Chart 6BIs Value Dead In EM? The global value/growth dynamics also show that the “value outperforming growth” effect is more prominent in the small-cap space. But why has small value also underperformed small growth in most DM markets? Our explanation is that the EM universe is much less efficient than the DM universe because there are not many quant funds dedicated to the EM small-cap space –  in addition to the fact that, in general, EM small caps are much smaller than those in DM markets. This is also in line with our finding that, in general, factor premia are more prominent in the EM universe.9 Bottom Line: Value premium is more prominent in non-U.S. markets, especially the EM small-cap universe. 4. Do Pure Style Indices Improve Performance? Both S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell provide pure-value and pure-growth indices. Unlike the standard value-growth indices, which target about 50% of the parent market cap, the pure-style indices include only stocks with the strongest value and growth characteristics. There is no overlap between the two. We prefer to use sector and country positioning to implement style tilts tactically. In theory, the pure-style indices should outperform the standard-style indices because of their concentrated exposure to style factors. How do they do in reality? Table 5 shows that in terms of absolute return, this is indeed the case for 14 out of the 18 pairs of indices from S&P and Russell for the period between 1998 and 2019. However, the higher returns from greater exposure to style factors have largely come from much higher volatility in 17 out of the 18 pairs. Pure style has higher volatility than standard style in general, the only exception being the Russell mid-cap value space. As such, on a risk-adjusted basis, pure style is not necessarily better. Table 5Purer Is Not Necessarily Better Charts 7A and 7B show the different performance dynamics for the S&P and Russell families of style indices. For the S&P indices, pure growth has outperformed standard growth for the entire period in all three market-cap segments, but only the S&P 500 pure value outperformed its standard counterpart. Therefore, more concentrated exposure to style characteristics has improved the value-growth spread only in the large-cap space, but it has actually worsened the value-growth spread in the mid- and small-cap universes (Chart 7A). Chart 7AS&P Pure Styles* Chart 7BRussell Pure Styles* For the Russell indices, it’s clear that there were a lot more tech stocks in its pure-growth indices leading up to the 2000 tech bubble, because pure growth shot up significantly more than the standard growth before the bubble burst, and also crashed more severely following it. Overall, only in the small-cap space did the value-growth spread improve by the more concentrated exposure to style factors. However, this improvement was not because of the outperformance of the pure-style relative to the standard indices. In fact, both pure value and pure growth in the small-cap universe underperformed their standard counterparts, but pure growth performed even worse (Chart 7B and Table 5). 5. Investment Conclusions Value and growth can mean very different things and behave very differently. Investors should pay special attention to the definitions and methodologies when evaluating style indices or strategies, both academically and in practice.  Depending on an investor’s mandate, the following is recommended: Value investors should focus on non-U.S. markets, especially the emerging market small-cap universe. Growth investors should focus on large caps, especially the U.S. large-cap space. Small-cap investors should focus on value. Large-and mid-cap investors should not make bets between value and growth strategically. Tactical style rotation should be done only when valuation spreads reach extreme levels. Price-to-book is the only common variable used in the determination of value and growth by academics and practitioners. Its track record as a systematic return predictor has been poor, as shown in panel 2 of Charts 8A and 8B. Another factor we have a long history for is dividend yield. Its predictive power is even worse than that of price-to-book (panel 3). Chart 8AValuation Is A Poor Timing Tool In The U.S. Chart 8BValuation Is A Poor Timing Tool Globally Many factors have been used in conjunction with price-to-book by both academics and practitioners to time the rotation between value and growth. However, the results have been mixed. Regression models that correctly predicted in the past may not work in the future. For example, a regression model based on valuation spread and earnings-growth spread using data from January 1982 to October 1999 successfully predicted the rebound of value outperformance starting in early 2000,10 but the universal suffering of value funds over the past several years implies that this model may have given many false signals. Chart 9 demonstrates how difficult it is to use regression models as a timing tool for value and growth rotation. A simple regression is conducted between value and growth return differentials (subsequent 60-month returns) and relative price-to-book. For data from December 1974 to July 2019, the r-squared for the MSCI world is 0.38 and for the U.S. it is 0.09. In hindsight, both models predicted the value outperformance starting in early 2000. However, the gaps between actual value and fitted value started to open, long before 2000. By late 1998, the gaps were already wider than the previous cycle lows, yet they continued to widen as value continued to underperform growth until February 2000.  Chart 9How Good Is The Fit? What should investors currently do, based on these models? The gaps are large, but not as large as in early 2000. At which point should investors start to shift into value given its more than 12 years of underperformance? We have often written that we prefer to use sector and country positioning to implement style tilts.11, 12 This preference has not changed. Value and growth indices have sector tilts that change over time. Currently, the S&P Dow Jones large- and mid-cap value indices have a clear overweight in financials but an underweight in tech and health care compared to their growth counterparts (Table 6). Table 6Sector Bets In Value And Growth Indices* Chart 10Prefer Sector And Country Positioning To Style Tilts We have been neutral on value and growth, but would likely change this view if we change our country equity allocation between the U.S. and the euro area, and our equity sector allocation between cyclicals and defensives as well as between financials and information technology (Chart 10).     Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Antti Ilmanen, Ronen Israel, Tobias J. Moskowitz, Ashwin Thapar, Franklin Wang, “Factor Premia and Factor Timing: A Century of Evidence,” AQR Working Paper, July 2, 2019. 2Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Common risk factors in the return on stocks and bonds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 33 (1993). 3Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz, “Fact, Fiction, and Value Investing,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 42 No.1, Fall 2015.  4Ronen Israel and Tobias J. Moskowitz, “The Role of Shorting, Firm Size and Time on Market Anomalies,”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 108, Issue 2, May 2013 5Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model,” Working Paper, University of Chicago, September 2014. 6Fama-French value-growth-size portfolios. 7Mark P. Cussen, “Value or growth Stocks: Which are Better?” Investopedia, Jun 25, 2019. 8Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report titled “Small Cap Outperformance: Fact or Myth?” dated April 7, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 9Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report titled, “Is Smart Beta A Useful Tool In Global Asset Allocation?” dated July 8, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 10Clifford S. Asness, Jacques A Friedman, Robert J. Krail and John M Liew, “Style Timing: Value versus Growth,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 2000. 11Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, “Quarterly - March 2016,” dated March 31, 2016, and available at gaa. bcaresearch.com. 12Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, “Quarterly - April 2019,” dated April 1, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.  
Please note that this abbreviated weekly report complements today’s Special Report titled China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon published in collaboration with BCA’s China Investment Strategy service. Feature A major rotation has commenced in recent days in global financial markets: beaten-down value companies have begun outperforming richly-priced U.S. growth stocks. This has cogently coincided with the rise in U.S. bond yields. Further, U.S. small caps have also begun outpacing U.S. large caps. Do these signals mean that EM will start outperforming DM in general and U.S. in particular? We do not think it is likely to occur on a sustainable basis. We agree that certain trends in global financial markets have become over-extended and a mean-reversion is overdue. U.S. bond yields have probably dropped much more than justified by U.S. economic strength. Although U.S. manufacturing, exports and capex have been extremely week/contracting, consumer spending is expanding at a decent clip. We believe fears of a full-blown U.S. recession are presently exaggerated. It is also critical to gauge what is the underlying cause of this financial market rotation. Is it receding fears of U.S. recession or China’s recovery or both? We believe that the rotation is caused by unwinding of recessionary fears in the U.S., not a revival in the Chinese economy or a recovery in global trade and manufacturing. Unwinding U.S. recessionary fears will not be sufficient to produce a strong and lasting rally in EM risk assets and currencies even if it leads to a breakout in DM share prices in absolute terms. EM risk assets and currencies are much more sensitive to China and global growth rather than to the U.S. economy. Watch The Dollar For Clues Chart I-1EM Relative Equity Performance Correlates With U.S. Dollar Whether the sell-off in global safe-haven bonds and outperformance of global cyclical vs. defensive equity sectors is due to a genuine recovery in China or the U.S. will be revealed in the trend of the U.S. dollar (Chart I-1). If the dollar continues grinding higher, it would entail that the recent financial markets rotation is due to amelioration in U.S. growth expectations and that there is little recovery in the Chinese economy as well as global manufacturing and trade. In this scenario, EM risk assets will underperform. On the contrary, if the greenback begins exhibiting persistent and broad weakness, it would signify that the reversal in global safe-haven bond yields and global cyclical stocks is due to a revival in Chinese demand. In such a case, a lasting recovery in global manufacturing and trade are likely. This would be consistent with a durable EM rally and outperformance. Chart I-2Bullish Technicals For U.S. Dollars So far, the greenback has remained well bid (Chart I-2). In addition, industrial commodities prices remain weak and have failed to rebound (Chart I-3). These entail that the recent spike in U.S. bond yields and outperformance of cyclical equity sectors is primarily due to unwinding of pessimism on U.S. growth rather than a reflection of growth amelioration in China. Notably, cyclical data out of China and global trade/manufacturing remain dismal. Chinese overall imports are contracting (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Breakdown Remains In Play Chart I-4Shrinking Chinese Imports Global semiconductor sales and car purchases continue shrinking at a rapid pace (Chart I-5). China’s credit and money growth and impulses appear to be rolling over, having failed to rise as much as in the previous stimulus episodes (Chart I-6). Finally, the pace of EM corporate EPS contraction is accelerating (Chart I-7). Any rally in EM share prices will be unsustainable without a bottom in EM EPS growth. Chart I-5No Improvement In Global Growth Chart I-6Chinese Credit Impulse Is Weak   Chart I-7EM EPS & Share Prices Bottom Line: The U.S. dollar has failed to sell off despite the optimism in global equity markets. This entails that any rebound and outperformance in EM risk assets and currencies will prove to be short-lived.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The contracting manufacturing sector that rekindled recession fears, the harsh reality of the Sino-American trade war weighing on profits, downbeat business confidence and mushrooming capex slowdown signals all warn that investors should tread carefully in the historically difficult equity market months of September and October. It no longer pays to be overweight gold mining equities as sentiment is stretched, the restarting of global QE will likely reverse or at least halt the drubbing in global yields and the U.S. dollar inverse correlation should reassert itself and weigh on global gold miners. EM and China ills, deflating global producer pricing power, export blues and souring financial statement metrics underscore that materials stocks have ample downside. Recent Changes Trim the Global Gold Mining index to neutral, today. Downgrade the S&P Materials sector to underweight, today. Table 1 Feature Equities broke out of their trading range last week, but in order for this short-covering rally to become durable, and for volatility to subside, either global growth needs to turn the corner and alleviate recession fears or the trade war needs to de-escalate materially. On the recession front Central Banks (CBs) are doing their utmost to reflate their respective economies, but the early stages of looser monetary policy have been insufficient to change the global growth trajectory. With regard to the trade war, markets cheered the news that talks between the U.S. and China will resume in September and October. The dates for talks are conveniently chosen to follow the September FOMC meeting and the October 1 70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The latter date implies that Washington is considering delaying the October 1 tariff hike – and it could imply that Washington does not anticipate any violent suppression of Hong Kong protesters by that time. However, the harsh reality is that the two sides are just “kicking the can down the road”. The longer the Sino-American trade war takes to conclude, the more likely it will serve as a catalyst for a repricing of risk significantly lower (top panel, Chart 1). A technical correction may be necessary to force Trump to reduce the trade pressure significantly. Even if the October 1 tariff hike is postponed it will remain a source of uncertainty ahead of the final tariff tranche slated for December 15. The bond market may offer some clues as to the extent that the escalating trade war will eventually get reflected into stocks (bottom panel, Chart 1). The equity transmission mechanism is through the earnings avenue. Simply put, rising trade uncertainty deals a blow to global trade that boosts the U.S. dollar which in turn makes U.S. exports uncompetitive in global markets, deflates the commodity complex and with a lag weighs on SPX earnings. Chart 1Tracking Trade Uncertainty Speaking of the economically hypersensitive manufacturing sector, last week’s ISM release made for grim reading, further fueling recession fears (the New York Fed now pegs the recession probability just shy of 38% by next August). Not only did the overall survey fall below the boom/bust line (middle panel, Chart 2), but also new orders collapsed. In fact, the drubbing in new orders is worrying and it signals that the economy is going to get worse before it gets better (top panel, Chart 2). Tack on the simultaneous rise in inventories, and the sinking new orders-to-inventories ratio (not shown) warns of additional manufacturing ills in the coming months. Importantly, export orders suffered the steepest losses plunging to 43.3. The last three times that this trade-sensitive survey subcomponent was in such a steep freefall were in 1998, 2001 and 2008, when the SPX suffered peak-to-trough losses of 20%, 49% and 57%, respectively. In fact, since the history of the data, ISM manufacturing export orders have never been lower with the exception of the GFC (Chart 3). Such a retrenchment will either mark the bottom for equities or is a harbinger of a steep equity market correction. We side with the latter as the odds of President Trump striking a real trade deal (including tech) with China any time soon are low. Chart 2Like Night Follows Day Similar to the ISM manufacturing/non-manufacturing divergence (bottom panel, Chart 2), business confidence is trailing consumer conference by a wide mark. Historically this flaring chasm has been synonymous with a sizable loss of momentum in the broad equity market (Chart 4). One plausible explanation is that as business animal spirits suffer a setback, CEOs are quick to prune/postpone capex plans and, at the margin, corporations retrench and short-circuit the capex upcycle. Chart 3Export Carnage Chart 4Mind The Gap Circling back to last week’s capex update, national accounts corroborate the financial statement data deceleration, and in some cases contraction, in capital outlays (Chart 5). As a reminder our thesis is that the EPS-to-capex virtuous upcycle is morphing into a vicious down cycle.1 This week, we downgrade a deep cyclical sector by taking profits in a niche subgroup that has served as a reliable portfolio hedge. Crucially, tech investment, that comprises almost 30% of total investment according to national accounts, is decelerating, R&D and other intellectual property investment have also hooked down, non-residential structures are on the verge of contraction, and industrial, transportation and other equipment –that have the largest weight in U.S. capex – are also quickly losing steam (Chart 6). Chart 5Capex Blues Chart 6All Capex Segments… In more detail, Charts 7 & 8 further break down capital outlays in the respective categories and reveal that worrisomely the investment spending slowdown is broad based. Chart 7…Have Rolled Over… Chart 8…Except For One Adding it all up, the contracting manufacturing sector that rekindled recession fears, the harsh reality of the Sino-American trade war weighing on profits, downbeat business confidence and mushrooming capex slowdown signals all warn that investors should tread carefully in the historically difficult equity market months of September and October. As a reminder, this is U.S. Equity Strategy service’s view and it contrasts with BCA’s sanguine equity market house view. This week, we downgrade a deep cyclical sector by taking profits in a niche subgroup that has served as a reliable portfolio hedge. Downgrade Materials To Underweight… Heightened economic and trade policy uncertainty has claimed the S&P materials sector as one of its victims (Chart 9). Given that our Geopolitical Strategy service’s base case remains that there will be no Sino-American trade deal by the U.S. November 2020 election, there is more downside for materials stocks and we are downgrading this niche deep cyclical sector to a below benchmark allocation.2 Beyond the U.S./China trade war inflicted wounds that materials stocks have to nurse, there are four major headwinds that they will also have to contend with in the coming months. Chart 9Trade Uncertainty Sinking Materials First, the emerging markets (EM) in general and China in particular are in a prolonged soft patch that predates the Sino-American trade war. EM stocks and EM currencies are both deflating at an accelerating pace warning that relative share prices will suffer the same fate (Chart 10). Nothing epitomizes the infrastructure spending/capex cycle more than China’s insatiable appetite for commodities and the news on that front remains dire. The Li Keqiang index continues to emit a distress signal and that is negative for materials top line growth (bottom panel, Chart 10). Second, global inflation is in hibernation and select EM producer price inflation growth series are on the verge of contraction or already outright contracting. Chinese raw materials wholesale prices are in the deflation zone and warn that U.S. materials sector profits will underwhelm (Chart 11). Chart 10Bearish EM… Chart 11…And China Backdrops Base metal prices are a real time indicator of the wellness of the S&P materials sector. Currently, base metals are deflating both on the back of a firming U.S. dollar and contracting global manufacturing. Such a commodity price backdrop is dampening prospects for a profit-led materials sector relative share price recovery (top & middle panels, Chart 12). Third, the materials exports outlook is darkening. Apart from the deflating effect the appreciating U.S. dollar has on commodities it also clips basic materials companies’ exports prospects. How? It renders materials related exports uncompetitive in international markets leading to market share losses. Netting it all out, EM and China ills, deflating global producer pricing power, export blues and souring financial statement metrics underscore that materials stocks have ample downside. Chart 12Weak Pricing Power And Declining Exports In addition, the latest ISM export order subcomponent plunged to multi-year lows reflecting trade war pessimism and falling global end-demand. The implication is that the export relief valve is closed for materials equities (bottom panel, Chart 12). Finally, materials sector financial statement metrics are moving in the wrong direction. Net debt-to-EBITDA is rising anew and interest coverage has likely peaked for the cycle at a time when free cash flow generation has ground to a halt (Chart 13). U.S. Equity Strategy’s S&P materials sector profit growth model encapsulates all these moving parts and warns that a severe profit contraction phase looms (Chart 14). Chart 13Financial Statement Red Flags Chart 14Model Says Sell Netting it all out, EM and China ills, deflating global producer pricing power, export blues and souring financial statement metrics underscore that materials stocks have ample downside. Bottom Line: The time is ripe to downgrade the S&P materials sector to underweight. …Via Trimming Gold Miners To Neutral The way we are executing this downgrade in the materials sector to an underweight stance is by trimming the global gold mining index to a benchmark allocation. Our thesis that gold stocks serve as a sound portfolio hedge remains intact and underpinned when: economic and trade policy uncertainty are on the rise (top panel, Chart 15) global CBs start cutting interest rates and in some cases doubling down on negative interest rates currency wars are overheating Nevertheless, what has changed is the price, and we deem that global gold miners that have gone parabolic are in desperate need of a breather. The top panel of Chart 16 shows that gold stocks have rallied 58% since the May 5, 2019 Trump tweet. This outsized four-month relative return is remarkable and likely almost fully reflects a very dovish Fed and melting real U.S. Treasury yields (TIPS yield shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 15). A much needed pause for breath is required before the next leg of the relative rally resumes, and we opt to move to the sidelines. Chart 15Positive Backdrop… Chart 16…But Reflected In Prices Moreover, on the eve of the ECB’s September meeting, were President Mario Draghi to re-commence QE in the form of sovereign and corporate bond purchases as markets participants expect, counterintuitively a selloff in the bond markets would confirm that QE and its signaling is working (bottom panel, Chart 16). Ergo, this would likely exert upward pressure on global interest rates including the U.S., especially given the one-sided positioning in the respective global risk free assets. The implication is that the shiny metal and global gold miners would suffer a setback as real yields would rise further. As a reminder, gold bullion yields nothing and gold mining equities next to nothing, thus when competing safe haven assets at the margin start yielding higher, investors flee gold and gold miners and flock to risk free assets. Sentiment toward gold and global gold miners is stretched. Gold ETF holdings are at multi-year highs (second panel, Chart 17) and gold net speculative positions are at a level that has marked previous reversals. In addition, bullish consensus on gold is near 72%, a percentage last reached in 2012 (third & bottom panels, Chart 17). Similarly, relative share price momentum is also warning that global gold mining equities are currently extended (bottom panel, Chart 18). Chart 17Extreme… Chart 18…Sentiment Finally, while the bond market’s view of 100bps in Fed cuts in the next 12 months should have undermined the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, it has actually defied gravity and slingshot to fresh cycle highs. This is a net negative both for gold and gold mining equities as the underlying commodity is priced in U.S. dollars and enjoys an inverse correlation with the greenback. The implication is that the multi-decade inverse correlation will hold and will likely pull down gold and gold mining equities at least in the short-run (U.S. dollar shown inverted, Chart 19). In sum, the exponential rise in global gold miners is in need of a breather. Sentiment is stretched, the restating of global QE will likely reverse or at least halt the drubbing in global yields and the U.S. dollar inverse correlation should reassert itself and weigh on relative share prices Chart 19Gold Miners/Dollar Correlation Re-establishment Risk Bottom Line: Downgrade the global gold mining index to neutral, but stay tuned.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Capex Blues” dated September 3, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “Big Trouble In Greater China” dated August 29 , 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives   (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights The fundamental backdrop continues to be mixed, but last week’s key data releases were encouraging on balance: While the U.S. manufacturing ISM survey entered contraction territory, and European manufacturing PMIs remained moribund, the services surveys were quite strong, and services contribute much more to developed economies’ total output. The U.S. economy should be able to grow at trend for the next six to twelve months: Consumption is underpinned by a robust labor market, federal government spending will not flag ahead of the 2020 elections, and state and local revenues are well supported. Investment is unlikely to sabotage the other two pillars of the U.S. economy. The view that inflation is deader than New York Mayor de Blasio’s presidential ambitions is widespread and entrenched: Participating on a panel at an inflation-themed conference last week, we were struck by the conviction that inflation is going nowhere over the next few years. The risk-reward of taking the other side of that debate may be quite attractive. Feature Another week, another mixed set of data releases. Last Tuesday, the bears’ most cherished fantasies seemed to be within reach as the ISM Manufacturing Index slid below the boom-bust line in a print that fell well short of consensus expectations. The S&P 500, which had probed around August’s 2,945 resistance level in the final pre-Labor Day session, quickly shed more than a percentage point in response. The U.S. data confirmed the message from the previous day’s European manufacturing PMIs: global manufacturing remains in a deep funk, and a turnaround is not yet at hand. It’s hard to get a recession without tight monetary policy, and it’s hard to get a bear market without a recession, ... Wednesday’s European services PMI releases gave the bulls a lift. Though manufacturing activity truly stinks (Chart 1), it shows no signs of contaminating the services sector, which is still expanding at a solid clip (Chart 2). The U.S. ISM Non-Manufacturing Index surged in August, beating consensus expectations by the same two-point margin by which manufacturing fell short. U.S. equities were already trading higher on the back of an imminent resumption of U.S.-China negotiations when the series was released Thursday morning, and the combination helped the S&P 500 decisively break through the level that had held it in check for a month (Chart 3). Chart 1Global Manufacturing ##br##Is Ailing ... Chart 2... But The Service Sector Is Expected To Expand Chart 3Breakout Taking a step back from the consistently mixed data, recessions don’t occur when monetary conditions are easy. Equity bear markets rarely occur outside of recessions, so our default position is to remain at least equal weight equities in a balanced portfolio. We estimate that the equilibrium fed funds rate is somewhere in the neighborhood of 3 to 3.25%, so the monetary backdrop remains comfortably accommodative with fed funds at 2.25% and seemingly heading to 2% or lower in the coming months. Our estimate of equilibrium is no more than an estimate, however, so we are reprising our analysis of where consumption, investment and government spending are headed over the next six to twelve months. We remain constructive on the basis of that analysis. The GDP Equation GDP is the sum of consumption, investment, government spending and net exports. Rendered as an equation, GDP = C + I + G + (X-M). Net exports are not terribly meaningful for the comparatively closed U.S. economy, and we take a small fixed trade deficit as a given, so we reduce the equation to GDP = C + I + G. Ex-trade, consumption accounts for two-thirds of output, and fixed investment and government spending for one-sixth each. At four times each of the other components’ weight, consumption is the dominant driver of U.S. activity. Investment is considerably more variable, however, making it more likely to wipe out trend growth from the other drivers (Chart 4). As we showed the first time we performed the (C+I+G) analysis, investment would only have to fall to 0.83 standard deviations below its long-run mean to zero out 2% growth in consumption and government spending.1 Chart 4Investment Is The Wild Card In a normal distribution, events 0.83 or more standard deviations below the mean are expected to occur randomly about 20% of the time. It would take a -1.31-sigma consumption event (probability ≈ 10%) to zero out 2% growth in the rest of the economy. An expansion-killing decline in government spending would be a -1.86-sigma event (probability ≈ 3%). Investment is most likely to be the swing factor tilting the economy in the direction of a recession. Consumption Both retail sales and personal consumption expenditures have accelerated since early April (Chart 5). A robust labor market should continue to support consumption spending, as our payroll model projects a pickup in hiring (Chart 6, top panel), thanks to more ambitious NFIB hiring plans (Chart 6, second panel) and falling initial unemployment claims (Chart 6, bottom panel). Job openings are at their highest level in the 19-year history of the series, indicating that demand for new employees is high, and an elevated quits rate indicates that employers are paying up to poach workers from each other to satisfy that demand. We reiterate that more Americans will be working at the end of 2019 than at the end of 2018, and that all of them will be getting paid more, on average. A robust labor market will give household incomes a boost, and solid balance sheets will give them leave to spend it. Households don’t have to spend income gains, however. If they choose instead to save them, or divert them to paying down debt, consumption won’t get much of a near-term boost. The state of household balance sheets is also a driver of consumption’s direction, and they’ve improved at the margin since our last review. The savings rate moved sharply higher in the interim (Chart 7, top panel) and household debt as a share of GDP ticked lower (Chart 7, second panel), while the burden of servicing existing debt remains light (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 5Consumption Is Healthy Chart 6Hiring Is Poised To ##br##Tick Higher, ... Chart 7... And Households Are In A Position To Spend Bottom Line: Consumption remains well supported and will likely continue to be over a six- to twelve-month horizon. Investment Despite hopes that the reduction in corporate income tax rates and immediate expensing of qualified investments would promote capital expenditures, growth in nonresidential fixed investment has been uninspiring. Looking ahead, surveys of corporate investment intentions are decent coincident indicators of capex, and their monthly releases provide some leading insights into quarterly GDP investment. Capital spending plans in the NFIB small business survey have bounced since early April (Chart 8, top panel), but capex plans in the regional Fed surveys have weakened (Chart 8, bottom panel). Although both surveys have turned down, they remain at fairly elevated levels, suggesting that an investment plunge capable of negating trend growth in consumption and government spending is unlikely. Chart 8Neither Here Nor There Residential investment is less than a quarter of nonresidential investment and therefore typically only has a marginal impact on investment. It remains in a slump, with momentum in starts and permits sputtering (Chart 9, top panel); existing home sales running in place (Chart 9, middle panel); and inventories of homes for sale up since April, albeit still at low levels relative to history (Chart 9, bottom panel). Despite a sharp decline in mortgage rates since the end of last year, housing activity has failed to revive. Conversations with various market participants lead us to believe that zoning restrictions, sparse quantities of affordable land, difficulty in assembling construction crews, and a general idling of smaller developers in the wake of the crisis have all contributed to insufficient supplies of the entry-level and first-move-up homes for which there is ample demand. Chart 9Housing Is Weaker Than It Should Be, But It Doesn't Mean The Economy Is In Trouble Bottom Line: Neither nonresidential nor residential investment appears vulnerable enough to spark a decline in investment that could cause the economy to stall out. Government Spending All systems are go from a fiscal perspective. The federal spending taps will surely be open in a hotly contested presidential election year. State income and sales tax revenues have improved since our last review in April (Chart 10, top two panels), and should be well supported by a strong labor market. Solid home price appreciation will nudge the appraisals underpinning property taxes higher (Chart 10, third panel), supporting municipal tax receipts. Government spending will continue to hold up its end. Chart 10State And Local Revenues Will Hold Up Is Inflation Dead? Chart 11Another Upleg Is Coming We participated in a panel discussion last week at an inflation-linked products conference. The panel included Fed researchers and a veteran inflation-products trader turned investment manager. After a wide-ranging discussion that touched on U.S. economic prospects, the message from the yield curve, the impact of trade tensions and the continuing relevance of the Phillips Curve, each panelist was asked if inflation has already peaked for the cycle. The response was a resounding unanimous yes until we got our turn. The other panelists were not laypeople, traders, bottom-up analysts, or anyone else with only a passing interest in macroeconomics. They were experts, and we were struck by the conviction with which they dismissed the possibility that inflation could yet break out in the current cycle. Judging by the shrinking scale of the annual conference (this year’s edition was half the size of the previous two years’), the idea that inflation is dead for the foreseeable future has found a wide following. We do not think that inflation, and bond yields, will go anywhere in the immediate future, but it is far from assured that they will remain moribund for the rest of the expansion (Chart 11). Taking the other side looks attractive to us, given the preponderance of inflation-is-dead opinions. It is not terribly surprising that wide output gaps opened following an especially job-destructive downturn. With economic capacity considerably ahead of aggregate demand across the major economies, inflation had little chance of taking hold at an economy-wide level. The picture is changing, however, with the IMF estimating that the U.S. output gap closed in 2017 and in the advanced economies as a whole sometime last year (Chart 12). Goods inflation is primarily a global phenomenon, and with the IMF estimating that output gaps persist in Australia, Canada, Japan and the U.K., international slack can still mitigate domestic price pressures, though new tariff barriers would bind inflation more closely to domestic conditions. Services inflation, which is much more domestically driven, could begin to perk up now that unemployment is below NAIRU in the Eurozone as well as the U.S. (Chart 13). Finally, while central banks are hardly omnipotent, Milton Friedman’s always-and-everywhere admonition leaves little doubt that the monetary authorities can boost inflation expectations if they really want to. Chart 12Demand Has Caught Up To Capacity Chart 13Mind The Gap Investment Implications The investing backdrop is hardly ideal. Spreads are tight, stocks aren’t cheap, the two largest standalone economies are trying to inflect pain on each other, the U.K. can’t agree on how to get divorced from the EU, and the fate of the longest U.S. expansion on record is in doubt. The risks are well known, however, and save-haven assets have gotten pretty crowded. While the danger that shaky confidence could become self-fulfilling is real, our base case is that the expansion will trundle along, allowing stocks to rise as the worst-case scenarios fail to come to pass. It is at least possible that rumors of inflation’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. We continue to recommend that investors remain at least equal weight equities in balanced portfolios and at least equal weight spread product within bond allocations. We enthusiastically endorse our bond colleagues’ overweight TIPS recommendation. When nearly everyone agrees that a particular outcome cannot happen, it is often worth carving out some space in a portfolio in the event it actually does.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see Table 1 of the April 8, 2019 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “If We Were Wrong,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Global bond yields have closely tracked the trajectory of global growth. While the global economy remains fragile, some positive signs are emerging: Our global leading economic indicator has moved off its lows; global financial conditions have eased significantly; U.S. household spending remains resilient; and China is set to further increase stimulus. Neither a severe escalation of the trade war nor a hard Brexit is likely. A simple comparison between current dividend yields and bond yields implies that global equities would need to fall by an outsized amount over the next decade for bonds to outperform stocks. As global growth stabilizes and then begins to recover over the coming months, bond yields will rebound from depressed levels. Investors should overweight stocks versus bonds for now, and look to upgrade EM and European equities later this year. Feature Global Growth Driving Bond Yields Chart 1Global Bond Yields: How Low Will They Go? Global bond yields rose sharply yesterday on word that U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators will meet in October. The announcement by China’s State Council of additional stimulus measures and better-than-expected data on the health of the U.S. service sector also drove the bond sell-off. The jump in yields follows a period of almost unrelenting declines. After hitting a high of 3.25% last October, the U.S. 10-year yield fell to 1.43% this Tuesday, just shy of its all-time low of 1.34% reached on July 5, 2016. The 30-year Treasury yield broke below 2% for the first time in history on August 15, falling to as low as 1.91% this week. It now stands at 2.07%. In Japan and across much of Europe, bond yields remain firmly in negative territory (Chart 1). The large movements in bond yields can be attributed to both the state of the global economy as well as to changes in how central banks are reacting to economic uncertainty. Just as stronger global growth pushed yields higher between mid-2016 and early-2018, the deceleration in growth since then has pulled yields lower. Chart 2 shows that there has been a close correlation between changes in the U.S. 10-year yield and the ISM manufacturing index. The release on Tuesday of a weaker-than-expected ISM manufacturing print for August was enough to push the 10-year yield down by seven basis points within a matter of minutes. Chart 2The Deceleration In Growth Has Pulled Yields Down The forward-looking new orders component of the ISM manufacturing index sunk to a seven-year low. The export orders component fell to the lowest level since 2009. Export volumes track ISM export orders quite closely (Chart 3). Not surprisingly, the ISM press release noted that trade remains “the most significant issue” for U.S. manufacturers. Chart 3Export Volumes Track The ISM Export Component The only redeeming feature in the report was that the customers’ inventories index dropped a notch from 45.7 in July to 44.9 in August. A reading below 50 for this subindex indicates that manufacturers believe that their customers are holding too few inventories, which is positive for future production. Global Manufacturing PMI Not Looking Much Brighter The Markit global manufacturing PMI remained below 50 for the fourth month in a row in August. While the global PMI did edge up slightly from July’s reading, this was largely due to a modest rebound in the Chinese PMI, which rose from 49.9 to 50.4. The improvement in the China Markit-Caixin PMI stands in contrast to the further deterioration observed in the “official” National Bureau of Statistics PMI. The former is more heavily geared towards private-sector exporting companies, and hence may have been influenced by the front-loading of exports ahead of the planned tariff increase on Chinese exports to the United States. Some Positive Signs Chart 4Global LEI Has Moved Off Its Lows In light of the disappointing manufacturing data, it is too early to call a bottom in the global industrial cycle. Nevertheless, there are some hopeful signs. Our Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has moved off its lows (Chart 4). It usually leads the PMIs by a few months. Sterling will probably be the best performing currency in the G7 over the next five years. Despite ongoing weakness in the manufacturing sector, household spending has held up in most economies. In the U.S., the nonmanufacturing ISM index jumped to 56.4 in August from 53.7 in July. Real personal consumption is still on track to grow by 2.8% in Q3 according to the Atlanta Fed (Chart 5). The euro area services PMIs have also been resilient (Chart 6). In Germany, where the manufacturing PMI stood at 43.5 in August, the services PMI rose to 54.8.  Chart 5Inventories And Net Exports Have Subtracted From U.S. Growth In Q2 And Q3 Chart 6AThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) Chart 6BThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) Global financial conditions have eased significantly, mainly thanks to the steep decline in bond yields. The current level of financial conditions implies that global growth could rebound swiftly (Chart 7). The Chinese government is also likely to step up fiscal/credit stimulus over the coming months in an effort to shore up growth. In a boldly worded statement released on Wednesday, the Chinese State Council promised to further increase bond issuance to finance infrastructure projects, while cutting interest rates and reserve requirements. A stronger Chinese economy should benefit global growth (Chart 8). Chart 7Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Chart 8Stronger Chinese Growth Should Benefit The Global Economy   The Trade War: Moving Towards A Détente? The announcement that the U.S. and China will resume trade negotiations on October 5th is a step in the right direction. As we noted last week, both parties have an incentive to de-escalate the trade conflict. President Trump wants to prop up the stock market and the economy in order to improve his re-election prospects. China also wants to bolster growth.1 Chart 9Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? As difficult as it has been for China to deal with Donald Trump, trying to secure a trade deal with him after he has been re-elected would be even more challenging. This would be especially the case if Trump thought that the Chinese had tried to sabotage his re-election bid. Even if Trump were to lose the election, it is not clear that China would end up with someone more palatable to deal with on trade matters. Does the Chinese government really want to negotiate over labor standards and human rights with President Warren, who betting markets now think has a better chance of becoming the Democratic nominee than Joe Biden (Chart 9)? While Republicans in Congress would be able to restrain a Democratic president on domestic issues, the president would still enjoy free rein over trade policy.   Brexit Uncertainty Adding To Investor Angst Two weeks before the Brexit vote on June 23, 2016, I wrote that “Just like my gut told me last August that Trump would do much better at the polls than almost anyone thought possible, I increasingly feel that come June 24th, the EU may find itself with one less member.”2 Chart 10Brexit Opposition Has Been Growing Soon after the shocking verdict, we argued that a hard Brexit would prove to be politically infeasible, meaning that the U.K. would either end up holding another referendum or be forced to negotiate some sort of customs union with the EU. Our view that a hard Brexit will not happen has not changed. Chart 10 shows that opposition to Brexit has only grown since that fateful day. Boris Johnson does not have enough votes in Westminster to force a hard Brexit. Another election would not change this outcome, given that it would almost certainly produce a hung parliament. In any case, it is not clear that Johnson actually wants a hard Brexit. The Times of London recently reported that the government’s own contingency plans for a hard Brexit, weirdly code-named “Operation Yellowhammer,” predicted a crippling logjam at British ports leading to shortages of fuel, food and medicine.3  Boris Johnson is all hat and no cattle. He will be forced to make a deal with the EU. Buy the pound on any dips. Sterling will probably be the best performing currency in the G7 over the next five years. Central Banks: Cut First, Ask Questions Later Chart 11Inflation Expectations Are Low Across The Globe Despite a few glimmers of good news, central banks are in no mood to take any chances. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said it bluntly last week: “Our job is to get the yield curve uninverted.”4 If history is any guide, global growth will stabilize and begin to recover over the coming months. Inflation expectations are below target in most economies (Chart 11). Central banks know full well that if the current slowdown morphs into a full-blown recession, they will be out of monetary ammunition very quickly. In such a setting, it does not make sense to hold your punches. Much better to generate as much inflation as possible, and as soon as possible, so that real rates can be brought deeper into negative territory if economic circumstances later warrant it. What If The Medicine Works? The risk of easing monetary policy too much is that economies will eventually overheat, producing more inflation than is desirable. It is easy to forget that the aggregate unemployment rate in the G7 is now below its 2007 lows (Chart 12). True, inflation has yet to take off, but this may simply be because inflation is a lagging indicator (Chart 13). Chart 12Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Chart 13Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator For all the talk about how the Phillips curve is dead, the empirical evidence suggests it is very much alive and well (Chart 14). Ironically, this means that lower interest rates today could set the stage for much higher rates in the future if hyperstimulative monetary policies ultimately generate a bout of inflation.  Chart 14The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well Chart 15The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency   Investment Conclusions Like most economic forecasters, central banks tend to extrapolate recent trends too far into the future. Global growth has been weakening since early 2018 so it seems reasonable to assume that this trend will persist into next year. However, as we have documented, global industrial cycles tend to last about three years – 18 months of rising growth followed by 18 months of falling growth.5 If history is any guide, global growth will stabilize and begin to recover over the coming months. Should that occur, we will enter an environment where the lagged effects of easier monetary policy are hitting the economy just when the manufacturing cycle is taking a turn for the better. Stocks are likely to fare well in such a setting, while long-term bond yields will move higher. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will also start to weaken anew (Chart 15). Granted, an intensification of the trade war or some other major adverse shock would upset this rosy forecast. Nevertheless, current market pricing offers a fairly large cushion against downside risks. Thanks to the drop in bond yields, the equity risk premium is quite high globally (Chart 16). Even if one were to assume that nominal dividend payments remain unchanged for the next ten years, the S&P 500 would still need to fall by more than 20% in real terms over the next decade for bonds to outperform stocks (Chart 17). Euro area stocks would need to drop by more than 42%. U.K. stocks would need to plummet by at least 60%! Chart 16AEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Chart 16BEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Chart 17AStocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (I) Chart 17BStocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (II) Investors should remain overweight stocks versus bonds over the next 12 months. We intend to upgrade EM and European equities once we see a bit more evidence that global growth has troughed.   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Psychological Recession?” dated August 30, 2019. 2Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Worry About Brexit, Not Payrolls,” dated June 10, 2016. 3Rosamund Urwin and Caroline Wheeler, “Operation Chaos: Whitehall’s Secret No-Deal Brexit Preparations Leaked,” The Times, August 18, 2019. 4“Fed’s Bullard Sees ‘Robust Debate’ Over Half-Point Cut,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2019. 5Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Cycles,” dated July 26, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report HighlightsEuropean fiscal stimulus will not drive European equity outperformance – Europe needs China to open the stimulus taps.Our mega-theme of European integration continues – the continent is politically stable.The U.S.-China trade war is an opportunity for Europe. Any Sino-American trade deal is unlikely to resolve tech disputes. Go long European tech stocks versus American.The euro has room to grow as a global reserve currency given the dollar’s mounting structural flaws. Look for an opportunity to go long EUR/USD on a strategic basis within the near future.FeatureTalk of European fiscal stimulus is accelerating as investors look for reasons to take advantage of depressed European valuations (Chart 1) and traditional late-cycle outperformance relative to the U.S. (Chart 2). We are skeptical of the thesis. Chart 1European 'Cheapness' An Obvious Inducement  Chart 2Euro Stocks Outperform Late In The Cycle Europe is a price taker, not a price maker, when it comes to global growth. In order for investors to generate alpha from an overweight Europe position, the rest of the world needs to pick up the slack and reverse the current decline in economic fundamentals. That will require policy action on the behalf of the Fed, the Trump administration, and – most relevant to Europe – Chinese fiscal policy.That said, long-term investors should start thinking about increasing exposure to Europe. Not only is the continent well priced relative to the rest of the world, but it may have two more things going for it. First, political risks remain low. Second, Europe stands to gain in any prolonged China-U.S. confrontation. The flipside risk is that it stands to lose enormously in any temporary resolution as well.Europe Is A Derivative – Not A Source – Of Global Growth…Despite accounting for 16% of global GDP, the Euro Area generates an ever-shrinking proportion of the annual incremental change in global GDP (Chart 3). This is not surprising, given that the world has undergone significant transformation due to China’s industrialization and the growth of EM economies. Chart 3Europe’s Contribution To Global Growth Declining China’s imports today drive Euro Area manufacturing PMI broadly and Chinese retail sales drive German manufacturing orders specifically (Chart 4). As such, it is critically important to watch Chinese total social financing (TSF) impulse, which closely leads Europe’s exports to China by six months (Chart 5). Chart 4Europe And Germany Rely On China  Chart 5China's Credit Cycle Drives EU Exports  The problem is that the Chinese credit impulse has only tepidly recovered and implies more downside to European exports ahead. In addition, hopes of a rebound in Chinese retail sales have been dashed (Chart 6). The jump in auto sales in June was the result of heavy discounts offered by manufacturers and dealers to clear inventory before new emission standards came into effect on July 1. Due to the frontloading, car sales are now declining in what is traditionally an off-season for car purchases in China. While the worst may be over, weakness could linger for months. Chart 6China's Retail Sales Flashing Red The bottom line is that without an upturn in global growth, Europe will remain in the doldrums. The good news is that BCA’s Chief Strategist Peter Berezin expects precisely such a development in the second half of 2019.1 The bad news is that Chinese credit stimulus appears to be weighed down by a combination of impaired transmission mechanisms and policymaker unwillingness to launch an old-school credit orgy (Chart 7). This is creating a highly unusual – for this cycle – development where China is not playing its usual counter-cyclical role amidst the global manufacturing cycle (Chart 8). Chart 7China's Credit Stimulus Restrained Thus Far  Chart 8Beijing Goes On Strike As Global Spender Without more Chinese stimulus, European fiscal spending won’t be that meaningful.As such, it is difficult to get excited about European growth. As we discussed in last week’s missive, Europe is moving gingerly towards more fiscal spending. However, it has already done so this year, with fiscal thrust at 0.46% of GDP, the highest figure since 2009 (Chart 9). Did anyone notice? Not really. Chart 9Headwinds Overpower EU's Strong Fiscal Thrust Moreover Euro Area countries have to submit their 2020 budgets in early Q4 to the European Commission. It is unlikely that these proposals will be meaningful, given that there is not yet enough panic to spur massive stimulus.Bottom Line: Yes, Europe will provide more fiscal spending in 2020. But it will remain at the mercy of global growth given its high-beta nature.…But At Least It Is Not Falling Apart!   That said, not all is disappointing on the Old Continent. For one, the aforementioned fiscal thrust at least prevented a deeper slowdown this year – and the drop-off in thrust next year will be less dramatic as budgets turn more accommodative.Meanwhile political risk is falling. Anti-establishment parties are either cleaning up their act, putting on a tie, and becoming part of the establishment, or they are losing power. Our long-held thesis that European integration would persist into the next decade remains well-supplied with empirical evidence.2On the Euroskepticism front, much of the hype today surrounds the collapse of the Five Star Movement (M5S) coalition with the League in Italy. The formerly Euroskeptic M5S has shed its critique of European integration and has decided to partner with the center-left and pro-establishment Democratic Party (PD).This is merely the tip of the iceberg. Several key developments throughout 2019 have signaled to investors that the Euroskeptic moment has passed. For a plethora of data and polling to support this view, please refer to our May report on the European Parliament (EP) election. Here we merely survey the latest developments:European Parliament Election: As expected in our EP election forecast, the May contest was a non-event. Support for the euro and the EU is trending higher (Chart 10 and 11), and 73% of Euroskeptic seats are held by Eastern European or U.K. MEPs (Chart 12), both irrelevant for EU policy.3  Chart 10Even Italy Swings In Favor Of Euro  Chart 11Public Opinion Supports The Union  Chart 12Euroskepticism Overstated Random Elections: We rarely cover politics in Denmark or Finland, but the two Nordic countries have been at the forefront of the anti-establishment, right-wing, evolution in Europe. As such, the elections in Denmark (in June) and Finland (in April) were relevant. The Danish People’s Party (DPP) – one of the original “People’s Parties,” founded in 1995 – was massacred, losing 21 seats in the 179-seat legislature.In Finland, the moderately Euroskeptic Finns similarly saw a disappointing – if not as disastrous – performance.Finally, Austrian election on September 29 will likely see the other Europe’s prominent right-wing, Euroskeptic, party – the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) – decline below 20% for the first time since 2008. Chart 13Macron Recovering In Polls France: Our high conviction view in February that the Yellow Vest protest would ultimately dissipate proved correct. President Emmanuel Macron has also seen a recovery in polling. Although tepid, at least he appears to be diverging from the trajectory of his disastrously unpopular predecessor François Hollande (Chart 13).The good news for Macron is that he continues to lead Marine Le Pen by double digits in the theoretical 2022 second round. While this represents a considerable improvement for Le Pen from her 2017 performance, the fact is that she has had to adjust her policies and rebrand the National Front in order to close the gap with Macron. The party is now called the National Rally and has publicly revised its stance towards both the EU and the euro.4The events in France, Denmark, Finland, and Austria have largely gone unnoticed amidst the China-U.S. trade war, attacks against Federal Reserve independence, and general breakdown in global institutions and paradigms. But they reveal that Euroskepticism in Europe is evolving from a definitive one – in or out – to a much more nuanced position.For students of history, this is not a surprise. European integration has always been a push-pull process. Charles de Gaulle famously caused a total breakdown in integration during the 1965 “Empty Chair Crisis” when France recalled its representative in Brussels and refused to take its seat on the Council.De Gaulle was a Euroskeptic in so far as he believed that European integration was a national, not a supra-national process.5 It could proceed apace, but only if controlled by national capitals. As such, he warred with the Commission all the time. However, de Gaulle did not want to eliminate European integration as he understood its geopolitical and economic imperative. He simply wanted to shape the process to fit French interests.Absolutist Euroskepticism – the idea that all European institutions ought to be replaced by national ones – is an alien idea to the post-World War Two continent, one imported from the nineteenth century. The irony of Brexit, therefore, is that the most vociferous supporters of an absolute end to the EU integrationist project are now abandoning their fellow absolutists on the continent.Geopolitical and structural factors are also pushing European Euroskeptics to evolve from absolutists to modern-era Gaullists. We have identified most of these factors before, but they are worth repeating:Europe has a geopolitical imperative to integrate. In a multipolar world dominated by global powers like the U.S. and China – and with Russia, India, Japan, Iran, and Turkey playing an increasingly independent role – European states are not large enough on their own to defend their economic and geopolitical interests. Chart 14Geopolitical Forces Behind Integration The purpose of integration is to aggregate the geopolitical power of Europe’s individual states amidst rising global multipolarity. Chart 14 is a stylized visualization of what European integration is attempting. It illustrates that the average BCA Geopolitical Power Index (GPI) score of an EMU-5 country is well below that of a BRIC state.6 By aggregating their geopolitical power, European states retain some semblance of relevance in the world.Obviously this is merely a thought experiment as European integration is not aggregation and never will be. Not only is aggregation politically unfeasible, but there is also a lot of double counting in simply adding GPI scores of European states. Nonetheless, the point is that European countries are asymptotically moving from the average to the aggregate score. Chart 15No Basis For Fascism In Great Recession No, the Nazis are not coming. Europe has managed to recover from a generational financial crisis. Pessimists point to the depth of the crisis to explain why Europe is unsustainable, with angst matching the severity of the downturn. However, analogizing to the 1930s is folly. First, Europe’s shared memories of the ravages of populism act as antibodies preventing precisely the same infection from breaking out on the continent.7 Second, the European financial crisis was simply nowhere close to the depth of the Great Depression that rocked Germany as it descended into National Socialism (Chart 15). As for the argument that the European Central Bank fed populism through unorthodox policy easing, the tide of populism would have been much more formidable if Europe had been allowed to sink into deeper recession and deflation.Europeans are just not that desperate. Europe scores much better than the U.S. (or the U.K.) when it comes to the balance between the median income and middle-income share of total population. Chart 16 shows that most Euro Area economies have around 70% of their population in the middle-income bracket. Those that fall short nonetheless hug the line of best fit closely (Italy, Spain, Greece, and the Baltic States). The U.S., on the other hand, has one of the highest median income levels, but with barely 50% of the population considered in the middle-income. Meaning that a lot of the people below the median line are far below it. This is a recipe for actual populist political outcomes (President Trump), as opposed to artificial ones (Italy). Chart 16U.S. At Greater Risk Of Populism Than EU European populism is artificial, U.S. populism is actual.What of the risks in Europe? For example, investors are concerned about mounting Target2 imbalances. Here we agree with our colleague Dhaval Joshi, who has pointed out that growing imbalances in Europe’s monetary system will only further constrain centrifugal forces among the nations.Target2 has seen a steady outflow of Italian cash to German banks as the ECB’s QE saw respective central banks purchase domestic bonds (Chart 17). This means that the Bank of Italy holds assets – BTPs – denominated in Italian euros, while the Bundesbank has a new liability to German banks denominated in German euros. EMU dissolution would be too painful due to this mismatch. Target2 is therefore not a threat to the EMU, but rather a Gordian Knot that can only be unraveled with immense pain and violence.That said, there may be an upcoming headline risk in Europe: the end of Chancellor Merkel’s reign. In our view, Merkel’s role in stabilizing Europe is greatly overstated. Her dithering and lack of conviction caused several crises to descend into chaos amidst the sovereign debt imbroglio. As such, an infusion of new blood will be positive for Europe. The populist threat is also overstated, with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) performing relatively tepidly in the polls. In fact, the liberal, Europhile, Greens are starting to gain votes (Chart 18). As such, an early election in Germany would create volatility and uncertainty but would not undermine our secular thesis on Europe. Chart 17Gordian Knot Supports Integration  Chart 18Germany Not Falling To Populism Bottom Line: There is an ever-strengthening case for the sustainability of the Euro Area and European integration well into the next decade.From Geopolitical Gambit To A Geopolitical Safe-Haven?At this point, we have built a strong case for why Europe will remain a high-beta play on global growth that is unlikely to collapse. As such, investors should plow into Europe when the rest of the world is doing well with confidence that the continent will not descend into chaos.The U.S.- China trade war offers an intriguing opportunity for Europe.This is largely underwhelming as an investment thesis. Could there be something more exciting to the story given a slew of well-known headwinds to European growth from demographics, low productivity, and regulatory malaise?The trade war between the U.S. and China does offer an intriguing opportunity for Europe.There appears to be an interesting development where European equities outperform those of the U.S. during periods of trade war turbulence (Chart 19). The outperformance is not major, but it is highly counterintuitive. Chart 19Europe Outperforms Amid Trade War Shocks As is understood, Europe is a high-beta play on global growth. Presumably, investors should abandon high-growth derivative plays when trade war accelerates. It is one of the reasons that EM equities and EM FX suffer whenever trade war accelerates.So why is Europe different? Because European exporters generally compete with their American counterparts (and Japanese and South Korean) for Chinese market share. And if China retaliates against U.S. companies, European companies stand to benefit, potentially massively.Take Boeing and Airbus. Boeing expects China to demand 7,700 new airplanes over the next two decades, an order valued at $1.2 trillion. It would be disastrous to the U.S. airline industry if the entirety of that order went to Airbus and its subsidiaries.8 According to the latest news reports, China has slowed down its airplane procurement to a crawl as it awaits the outcome of the dispute with the U.S.9 It is predictably using the procurement decision as leverage in the negotiations. Chart 20Europe To Lose If China Strikes U.S. Deal Yet this “substitution effect” thesis is a double-edged sword for Europe. A resolution of the trade war between the U.S. and China would likely include a massive purchase of U.S. agricultural, commodity, and manufacturing goods: the so-called “Beef and Boeings” deal. China bears often point out that such a massive purchase will negatively impact China’s current account, which is barely in surplus thanks to China’s trade surplus with the U.S. (Chart 20). This is false. Chinese policymakers are not suicidal. The last thing China needs is a balance of payments crisis due to a trade deal with the U.S.China would simply rob Peter to pay Paul, pulling its orders of soy from Brazil and Airbus from Europe in order to make a deal with the U.S. As such, it is highly likely that European capital goods exporters would suffer in any trade war resolution between China and the U.S.That said, a substantive trade deal that resolves all U.S.-China tensions is extremely unlikely. The U.S. and China are not just commercial rivals, they are also geopolitical rivals. As such, the tech conflict between the U.S. and China will continue well beyond any resolution of the trade war. This could create an opportunity for Europe’s traditionally beleaguered tech stocks to finally outperform their American counterparts (Chart 21). Chart 21Go Long EU Tech Versus U.S. Tech Bottom Line: A deterioration of the U.S.-China trade relationship would be a boon for European exporters. Short of a total breakdown of U.S.-China trade, however, European tech stocks may finally begin outperforming their U.S. counterparts thanks to the open distrust between U.S. and China.In addition, U.S. technology firms are likely going to face a slew of regulatory challenges over the next decade. While not necessarily negative, these challenges will nonetheless create new headwinds for the sector.10 We are therefore initiating a structural theme of being long European tech relative to U.S.Investment ImplicationsAre there any broader themes to be extracted from the combined geopolitical forecasts presented in this report? Europe will not collapse, and it may benefit from the souring of U.S.-China geopolitical and economic relations.Long euro is an obvious theme. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi has recently pointed out, the chasm between monetary policies of the Fed and the ECB has become a major geopolitical risk. This is because it has depressed the euro versus the dollar by at least 10 percent – based on the ECB’s own competitiveness indicators. The exchange rate distortion stemming from polarized monetary policies is the culprit for the euro area’s huge trade surplus with the United States (Chart 22).In the short term, EUR/USD may have reached its practical (and geopolitically acceptable) lows. Yes, the ECB is readying another round of monetary stimulus on September 12, but the fiscal policy counterpart is likely to be tepid and thus fail to (yet again) take advantage of historically depressed borrowing costs on the continent. The September 12 ECB meeting may therefore be a “sell the rumor, buy the news” event for EUR/USD. Chart 22Monetary Policy Accounts For Bilateral Surplus  Chart 23U.S. Rivals Buying Gold, Ditching Dollar On the more cyclical and secular horizon, we see an opportunity for the euro to reestablish some of its lost reserve currency status due to the geopolitical conflict between China and the U.S. Washington’s willingness to use trade and financial sanctions for geopolitical benefit has given pause to central bank authorities around the world in using dollars as a reserve currency. Purchases of gold for FX reserve have surged, particularly among America’s geopolitical rivals (Chart 23), as our colleague Chester Ntonifor has recently pointed out.As we argued in a report entitled “Is King Dollar Facing Regicide?” the euro has some catch-up potential. In 1990, the combined currencies of the countries that today comprise the Euro Area accounted for 35% of total composition of global currency reserves. Today, the figure is merely 20% (Chart 24). Chart 24Euro Has Plenty Of Room To Grow As Reserve Currency Could Europe supply the world with enough euros to replace USD as a reserve currency? This is highly unlikely. However, at the margin, an expansion of European liquidity is possible, particularly if Germany finally learns to love fiscal expansion and if European policymakers capitulate on the issuance of Eurobonds. However, such a lack of euro liquidity is not negative for the euro. The world could soon experience a situation where the demand for non-USD liquid assets dramatically increases due to the politicization of America’s reserve currency status while the supply of USD-alternatives remains relatively low. This should be positive for the only true alternative to the USD as a global reserve currency: the euro.As such, we will be looking to initiate a strategic long EUR/USD position, potentially sometime this fall as the ECB and FOMC meetings take place and the risk of a no-deal Brexit is averted. We do not expect the massive monetary policy divergence between Europe and the U.S. to continue, while the Euro Area’s political stability, and the broader geopolitical demand for a non-USD reserve currency, create more long-term tailwinds for the euro.Marko PapicConsulting Editor, BCA Research              Chief Strategist, Clocktower GroupHousekeepingOur high-conviction view that no-deal Brexit odds were overrated has been confirmed by the recent events in the U.K. parliament. We are going long GBP-USD with a tight stop-loss of 3%. Since we expect further volatility – with an election likely and the Conservative Party performing well in the polls and monopolizing the Brexit vote in a first-past-the-post system – we will sell at the $1.30 mark.Footnotes1 Please see Global Investment Strategy, “Trade War: The Storm Before The Calm,” dated August 9, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy, “Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration,” dated November 3, 2011, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.3 The reason we extracted the U.K. Euroskeptics from the calculation is because with Brexit nigh, the U.K. members of European Parliament are no longer policy relevant. As for Central European Euroskeptics, we extracted them because they are irrelevant for EU policy as they hail from member states that – in truth – nobody seriously thinks would ever leave the EU.4 Ahead of the May EP election, National Rally electoral platform focused on “local, ecological, and socially responsible production." The party advocates combining environmentalism with protectionism, creating an ecological custom barrier at the EU’s doorstep which would defend the European market from products manufactured or produced with less environmentally friendly processes. On the matters of EU membership, the party now advocates a more traditionally Euroskeptic line, a purely Gaullist form of Euroskepticism that seeks to curb – or, at best, abolish – the EU Commission and replace its legislative prerogative by giving the Council of the EU all legislative powers. 5  Please see Julian Jackson, De Gaulle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2018).6 We chose to use EMU-5 in the chart because it focuses on the top-five economies in the Euro Area: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. If we focused on the overall average EMU score, even one we weighed by population, the results would be even more stark in terms of loss of importance.7 And, worryingly, the U.S. lacks precisely the same shared memory of how wild pendulum swings of polarization can descend into extreme nationalism or left-wing extremism.8 Airbus would not have the capacity to fulfill that entire order today. However, demand creates its own supply, giving Airbus a reason to surge capex and reap the profits.9 Please see Reuters, “Exclusive: Boeing CEO eyes major aircraft order under any U.S.-China trade deal.”10 Please see Geopolitical Strategy, “Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG?,” dated August 1, 2018 and “Surviving A Breakup: The Investor’s Guide To Monopoly-Busting In America,” dated March 20, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The lingering global manufacturing recession and the substantial drop in U.S. bond yields have been behind the decoupling between both EM stocks and the S&P 500, and cyclical and defensive equities. Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to indicate either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. We review some of our long-standing themes and associated recommendations. Feature Global financial markets have become bifurcated. On one hand, numerous segments of global financial markets leveraged to global growth, including EM stocks, have already sold off (Chart I-1). On the other hand, share prices of growth companies, defensive stocks and global credit markets have remained resilient. Chart I-2 shows that a similar divergence has taken place within EM asset classes: EM share prices have plummeted while EM corporate credit excess returns have not dropped much. Chart I-1Bifurcated Equity Markets Chart I-2Bifurcated Markets In EM   How to explain this market bifurcation? Financial markets sensitive to global trade and manufacturing cycles have been mirroring worsening conditions in global trade and manufacturing. Some of the affected segments include: Global cyclical equity sectors. Emerging Asia manufacturing-related currencies (KRW, TWD and SGD) versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). EM and DM commodity currencies (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Total Return (Including Carry): KRW, TWD And SGD Vs. USD Chart I-4EM And DM Commodity Currencies   Industrial and energy commodities prices. U.S. high-beta stocks as well as U.S. small caps (Chart I-5). Chart I-5U.S. High-Beta Stocks DM bond yields.  Crucially, the current global trade and manufacturing downturns have taken place despite robust U.S. consumer spending. In fact, our theme for the past several years has been that a global business cycle downturn would occur despite ongoing strength in American household spending. The rationale has been that China and the rest of EM combined are large enough on their own to bring down global trade and manufacturing, irrespective of strength in U.S. consumer spending. At the current juncture, one wonders whether such a market bifurcation is justified. It is not irrational. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Corporate bonds have also done well, given the background of a falling risk-free rate. Will the current market bifurcation continue? Or will these segments in global financial markets recouple and in which direction? What To Watch China rather than the U.S. has been the epicenter of this slowdown, as we have argued repeatedly in the past. Hence, a major rally in global cyclical equities and EM risk assets all hinge on a recovery in the Chinese business cycle. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Even though Caixin’s PMI for China was slightly up in August, many other economic indicators remain downbeat: The latest hard economic data out of Asia suggest that global trade/manufacturing continues to contract. Korea’s total exports in August contracted by 12.5% from a year ago, and its shipments to China plunged by 20% (Chart I-6). The import sub-component of China’s manufacturing PMI is not showing signs of amelioration (Chart I-7). The mainland’s import recovery is very critical to a revival in global trade and manufacturing. Chart I-6Korean Exports: No Recovery Chart I-7Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chart I-8German Manufacturing Confidence German manufacturing IFO business expectations and current conditions both suggest that it is still early to bet on a global trade recovery (Chart I-8). Newly released August data points reveal that U.S., Taiwanese, and Swedish manufacturing new export orders continue to tumble. To gauge whether bifurcated markets will recouple and whether it will occur to the downside or the upside, investors should watch the relative performance of China-exposed markets, global cyclicals and high-beta plays – the ones that have already sold off substantially. The notion is as follows: These markets’ relative performance will likely bottom before their absolute performance recovers. If so, their relative performance will likely foretell the outlook for their absolute performance. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. In other words, they could sell off even if a global recession is avoided. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. To assess the outlook for global cyclicals and China-related plays, we are monitoring the following financial market indicators: The Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio is the average of high-beta commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP and ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to the average of JPY and CHF total returns (including carry). This ratio is dollar-agnostic. This ratio is making a new cyclical low (Chart I-9). Hence, it presently warrants a negative view on global growth, China’s industrial sector and commodities. Global cyclical equity sectors seem to be on the edge of breaking down versus defensives (Chart I-10). This ratio does not signal ameliorating global growth conditions. Chart I-9The Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio Chart I-10Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Chart I-11U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 Finally, U.S. high-beta stocks continue to underperform the S&P 500 (Chart I-11). This is consistent with overall U.S. growth deceleration. Bottom Line: Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to foreshadow either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. Continue trading EM stocks and currencies on the short side, and underweighting EM risk assets versus DM. Our Investment Themes And Positions Some of our open positions often run for years because they reflect our long-standing themes. Our core theme has for some time been that a global trade/manufacturing recession will be generated by a growth relapse in China. To capitalize on this theme, we have been recommending a short EM stocks / long 30-year U.S. Treasurys strategy since April 2017. This recommendation has produced a 25% gain since its initiation (Chart I-12). Continue betting on lower local interest rates in emerging economies where the central bank can cut rates despite currency depreciation. To implement this theme, we have been recommending receiving swap rates in Korea and Chile for the past several years. Our reluctance to recommend an outright buy on local bonds stems from our bearish view on both currencies – the Korean won and Chilean peso. In fact, we have been shorting both the KRW and the CLP against the U.S. dollar. Chart I-13 shows that swap rates in Korea and Chile have dropped substantially since our recommendations to receive rates in these countries. More rate cuts are forthcoming in these economies, and we are maintaining these positions. Chart I-12EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds Chart I-13Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile   We have been bearish on EM banks in general and Chinese banks in particular. We have expressed these themes in a number of ways: Short EM and Chinese / long U.S. bank stocks. Short EM banks / long EM consumer staples (Chart I-14). Within Chinese banks, we have been short Chinese medium and small banks / long large ones. All these strategies remain valid. In credit markets, we have been favoring U.S. corporate credit versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Ability to service debt is better among U.S. debtors than EM/Chinese borrowers. We have been playing this theme in the following ways: Underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit / overweight U.S. investment-grade corporates (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Chart I-15Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates   Underweight Asian high-yield corporate credit / overweight emerging Asian investment-grade corporates. As a bet on a deteriorating political and business climate in Hong Kong, in our Special Report on Hong Kong SAR from June 27, we reiterated the following positions: Short Hong Kong property stocks / long Singapore equities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing The Mexican economy is heading into a full-blown recession. Most segments of the economy are in contraction, and leading indicators point to further downside. Both manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs are well below 50 (Chart II-1). Monetary policy remains too restrictive: Nominal and real interest rates are both very high and plunging narrow money (M1) growth is signaling  further downside in economic activity (Chart II-2). Chart II-1The Economy Is Deteriorating Chart II-2Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth   An inverted yield curve signifies that the central bank is behind the curve and foreshadows growth contraction (Chart II-3). Fiscal policy has tightened as the government has remained committed to achieving a primary fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP in 2019 (Chart II-4, top panel). Consequently, nominal government expenditures have been curbed (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The government’s fiscal stimulus has not been large and has been implemented too late. Chart II-3A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve Chart II-4Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot   Finally, business confidence is extremely low due to uncertainty over President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) policies towards the private sector. The president is attempting to revive business confidence, but it will take time. Chart II-5Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Our major theme for Mexico has been that both monetary and fiscal policies are very tight. Consequently, we have been recommending overweight positions in Mexican domestic bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. (Chart II-5). Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Meanwhile, we have been favoring the Mexican peso relative to other EM currencies due to the fact that AMLO is not as negative for the country as was initially perceived by markets. With inflation falling and the Federal Reserve cutting rates, Banxico will ease further. Yet, it will likely cut rates slower than warranted by the economy. The longer the central bank takes to ease, the lower domestic bond yields will drop. Concerning sovereign credit, investors should remain overweight Mexico within an EM credit portfolio. Mexico’s fiscal position is healthier, and macroeconomic policies will be more prudent relative to what the market is currently pricing. We continue to believe concerns about Pemex’s financing and its impact on government debt are overblown, as we discussed in detail in our previous Special Report. In July, the government released an action plan for Pemex financing. We view this plan as marginally positive. To supplement this plan, the government can use the $14.5 billion federal budget stabilization fund to fill in financing shortfalls in the coming years. Importantly, the starting point of Mexican public debt is quite low, which will allow the government to finance Pemex in the years to come by borrowing more from markets. Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Lastly, our overweight recommendation in Mexican stocks has not played out. However, we are maintaining it for the following reasons: Chart II-6 illustrates that when Mexican domestic bond yields decline relative to EM ones (shown inverted on Chart II-6), Mexican share prices usually outperform their EM counterparts in common currency terms. Consistent with our view that Mexican local currency bonds will outperform their EM peers, we expect Mexican stocks to outpace the EM equity benchmark. The Mexican bourse’s relative performance against EM often swings with the relative performance of EM consumer staples versus the EM equity benchmark. This is due to the large share of consumer staples stocks in Mexico (34.5%) compared to that in the EM benchmark (7%). Consumer staples stocks are beginning to outpace the EM equity index, raising the odds of Mexican equity outperformance versus its EM peers (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Chart II-7Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse   We do not expect a major rally in this nation’s stock market given the negative growth outlook. Our bet is that Mexican share prices - having already deflated considerably - will drop less in dollar terms than the overall EM equity index. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Mexican sovereign credit, domestic bonds and equities relative to their respective EM benchmarks. The main risk to the Mexican peso stems from persisting selloff in EM currencies. Traders’ net long positions in the MXN are elevated posing non-trivial risk (Chart II-8). We have been long MXN versus ZAR but are taking profit today. This trade has generated a 9.7% gain since March 29, 2018. A plunging oil-gold ratio warrants a caution on this cross rate in the near term (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Investors Are Long MXN Chart II-9Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade   Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations