Financials

Highlights We are reviewing our recommendations. We are also introducing recommendation tables to monitor these positions. Overall, our main recommendations have generated alpha and have a positive batting average. Feature The end of the month of August offers an opportunity to review the positions recommended in this publication. We introduce three tables corresponding to three investment horizons—tactical, cyclical, and structural—which summarize our main views. Each table is subdivided by asset class, namely equities, fixed income, and currencies. The tables can be found on page 12 and 13 and will be available at the end of future strategy reports. Tactical Recommendations Short Equity Leaders / Long Laggards This position is down 1.4% since inception. The idea behind this bet was that the easy money in the market had been made, and investors needed to become more discerning, although the big-picture economic backdrop continued to favor a pro-cyclical, pro-risk bias in a portfolio. To achieve this goal, we opted to buy cyclicals sectors that had lagged the broad market and to sell the ones that had already overtaken their pre-COVID highs, in the hope of creating a portfolio hedge. Practically, this meant buying sectors such as Industrials, Banks and Energy, while selling sectors such as Capital goods, Autos and Consumer services (Chart 1). This position has not worked out well as yields fell. Chart 1Leaders vs Laggards The Road So Far The Road So Far UK Mid-Cap And Small-Cap To Outperform This position is up 3.4% since inception. We initially favored the more domestically-oriented mid- and small-cap indices in the UK as a bet on the re-opening trade, following the lead taken by the UK in the global vaccination campaign. A faster re-opening would not only boost the ability of smaller domestic firms to generate cash flows, it would also elevate the pound, which would hurt the profit translation of the multinational dominating the UK large-cap indices. By mid-May, we opted to move small cap back to neutral, as the positive story was well discounted and we expected the GBP to correct, which would help large-cap stocks. Favor European Banks Relative To US Ones This position is up 4.1% since inception. It is mainly a value trade. The European economy has lagged behind that of the US, and European yields remain well below US ones. As a result, European financials have greatly underperformed their US counterparts. However, this performance differential has left European banks trading at an enormous discount relative to their US peers. Hence, as continental European economies were catching up to the US on the vaccination front, we expected European banks to regain some ground. This trade has further to go, as valuation differentials remain excessive, especially since European banks are not as risky as they once were. Underweight / Short Norway As Hedge To Swedish Stocks This position is down 1% since inception. We have a cyclical overweight on the Swedish equity market (see page 9), which is extremely sensitive to the global industrial cycle. Thus, we were concerned by the potential near-term impact of the Chinese credit slowdown on this position. Selling Norway remains an appropriate hedge, because this market massively overweight materials stocks, which are even more exposed to the Chinese credit cycle than industrials are. Positive European Small-Cap Stocks This position is up 0.2% since inception. This was a bet on the economic re-opening taking place in the wake of the accelerating pace of vaccination in Europe. However, the weakness in the Euro since May has caused the large-cap European stocks to perform almost as well as their more-domestically focused counterparts. Neutral Stance On Cyclicals Relative To Defensives Chart 2The Cause Of Our Cautious Tactical Stance The Cause Of Our Cautious Tactical Stance The Cause Of Our Cautious Tactical Stance This trade is up 2.3% since inception. While we like cyclical plays on an eighteen to twenty-four months basis, we became concerned this spring about a tactical pullback. Globally, cyclical stocks had become extremely expensive and overbought relative to defensive sectors (Chart 2). Moreover, the rapid deceleration of the Chinese credit impulse pointed toward a period of negative economic surprises and was historically consistent with a period of underperformance of cyclical names. Now that China is stepping off the brake pedal, this trade is becoming long in the tooth. Neutral Stance On Europe Relative To The Rest of The World This trade is down 0.3% since its inception. This position is a corollary to the neutral view on cyclicals, as European equities possess a high beta. This bet did not pan out; European equities did underperform US stocks, but weaknesses in China and EM undid this benefit. Favoring Industrials Over Materials This trade is up 0.6% since inception. Industrial equities are less exposed to the Chinese credit slowdown than materials, but are more direct beneficiaries of the large infrastructure spending packages being rolled out across advanced economies. Industrials are also a direct bet on a capex recovery, which we expect to intensify over the next two years as companies address supply side issues. The tactical element of this trade may soon dissipate as China’s policy tightening ends, which would warrant booking profits. However, the industrials versus materials theme remains attractive as a cyclical bets on capex. Financials Over Other Cyclicals This trade is down 1.6% since inception. This was another trade aiming to keep some cyclical exposure on the book (long financials), while diminishing the exposure to the Chinese credit slowdown. The fall in yields and the weakness in the euro prevented this trade from working out. We now close this position. Long / Short Basket Based On Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator This trade is flat since inception. This market-neutral trade uses the methodology developed in our May 31st Special Report in which we introduced our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator (CMVI). We bought the most undervalued sectors and sold the most overvalued. We will look to rebalance this portfolio in the coming months. Short Euro Area Energy Stocks / Long UK Energy Stocks Chart 3UK Energy Stocks As A Bargain UK Energy Stocks As A Bargain UK Energy Stocks As A Bargain This trade is up 7.5% since inception. This market neutral trade was fully based on the results from our CMVI (Chart 3). We are taking profits today. Short Consumer Discretionary / Long Telecommunication In Europe This trade is up 10.6% since inception. It is our favored way to express our tactical worries toward cyclical equities and the resulting preference for defensive stocks. Moreover, this trade is attractive from a valuation perspective, as the CMVI gap between discretionary and telecommunication equities is at a record high despite the higher RoE offered by telecom equities (Chart 4). Short Tech / Long Healthcare In Europe This trade is up 9.3% since inception. It is a low-octane version of the short discretionary / long telecommunications position. While it is a short cyclicals / long defensive trade, it does not have the long value / short growth overlay as its higher-octane cousin. However, it is also supported by attractive valuation differentials (Chart 5). Chart 4An Extreme Version Of Short Cyclicals / Long Defensives... An Extreme Version Of Short Cyclicals / Long Defensives... An Extreme Version Of Short Cyclicals / Long Defensives... Chart 5...and A Lower Octane Expression ...and A Lower Octane Expression ...and A Lower Octane Expression Favor Spain Over France This trade is down 2% since inception. Based on sectoral composition, the Spanish market is more defensive than that of France, which was an appealing characteristic considering our tactical worries for cyclical bets. Moreover, Spanish equities were more attractively priced. However, the Spanish economy has proven less resilient to the Delta variant than that of France. As a result, Spanish financials, which represent a large share of the national benchmark, have suffered. Underweight French Consumer Discretionary Equities Relative To Global Peers This trade is up 0.6% since inception. French discretionary stocks, led by beauty and luxury names, remain attractive structural plays. However, they have become expensive and risk temporarily underperforming their foreign competitors. Buy Swiss Equities / Sell Eurozone Defensive This trade is up 0.5% since inception. Due to their sectoral bias toward consumer staples and healthcare, Swiss equities are extremely defensive. However, they often outperform their Euro Area counterparts when Swiss yields rise relative to those of Germany. We do expect such widening to take place over the coming months. The ECB will continue to expand its balance sheet, which will force the SNB to become increasingly active about putting a floor under EUR/CHF. Historically, these processes boost Swiss stocks relative to Eurozone defensives. Buy European Momentum Stocks / Sell European Growth Stocks Chart 6The Recovery In Momentum Stocks Can Run Further The Recovery In Momentum Stocks Can Run Further The Recovery In Momentum Stocks Can Run Further This trade is up 1.7% since inception. In Europe, momentum stocks are exceptionally oversold relative to growth stocks (Chart 6). As yields stabilize, momentum stocks are well placed to outperform growth equities. Moreover, this trade is a careful attempt to begin to move away from our defensive tactical stance as China backs away from policy tightening. More Value Left In European IG This trade is up 0.9% so far. European IG bonds have low spreads, but their breakeven spreads may narrow further as policy remains extremely accommodative and European growth continues to recover, even in the face of the Delta variant. In this context, we see the modest yield pick-up offered by these products as attractive, especially compared to the meagre yields generated by European safe-haven securities. Despite the modest success of the overall recommendation, the country implication did not work out as well. Overweight Italian And Spanish Bonds In Balance Portfolios This trade is up 0.2% since inception. Italian and Spanish government bonds are expensive in absolute terms, but compare well relative to French, Dutch, or German bonds. In a backdrop in which the ECB continues to purchase these instruments, where the NGEU funds create an embryo of fiscal risk-sharing within the EU and where growth is recovering, risk premia in the European periphery have room to decline further. Buy European Steepeners And US Flatteners As A Box Trade Chart 7Buy European Steepeners and US Flatteners Buy European Steepeners and US Flatteners Buy European Steepeners and US Flatteners This trade is up 63 bps since inception. The ECB will lag behind the Fed, but market pricing already reflects this future. Meanwhile, the terminal policy rate proxy embedded in the EONIA and US OIS curves overstates how high the neutral rate is in the US compared to that of Europe (Chart 7). Thus, as the Fed begins to remove accommodation in the US, the US yield curve should flatten compared to that of Europe. Favor The GBP Over The EUR This trade is up 0.6% since inception. The pound is cheaper than the euro, and the domestic UK economy is well supported by the more advanced re-opening process. This combination will continue to hurt EUR/GBP. Sell EUR/NOK This trade is down 2.6% since inception. The NOK is cheaper than the EUR, and the Norges Bank will lead DM central banks in raising interest rates. Moreover, higher oil prices create a positive term of trade shock in favor of Norway. However, this trade has not worked out so far. Among G-10 currencies, the NOK (along with the SEK) is the most sensitive to the USD’s fluctuations. The rebound in the Greenback since March has therefore hurt this position significantly. Cyclical Recommendations Overweight Stocks Vs Bonds This position is up 7% since inception. European equities follow the global business cycle; while we warned a slowdown would take shape, growth is slated to remain above trend for the foreseeable future. Consequently, while we may adjust tactical positioning to take advantage of these gyrations in growth relative to expectations, our core cyclical view remains to overweight stocks within European balanced portfolios. Overweight Bank Equities Chart 8Euro Area Banks Are Not As Risky Anymore Euro Area Banks Are Not As Risky Anymore Euro Area Banks Are Not As Risky Anymore This position is up 2.4% since inception. We have espoused the near-term decline in yields, but our big picture cyclical view remains that yields have more upside globally. An environment in which yields increase is one in which bank profit margins expand, which will in turn boost the relative return of cheap financial equities. Even though the long-term growth rate of bank cash flows warrants a discount, these firms’ valuations also reflect the perception that they carry elevated risks. However, if European NPLs have greatly improved, capital buffers have expanded significantly (Chart 8), and the ECB is unwilling to precipitate a crisis as it did ten years ago. In this context, the risk premia embedded in European bank valuations have room to decrease, which will boost the relative performance of these equities. Bullish German Equities (Absolute) This position is up 3.9% since inception. German stocks are a direct bet on the global economy, as a result of their heavy weighting in industrials and consumer discretionary stocks. Moreover, the German economy continues to fare well, boosted by a cheap euro and a low policy rate. Finally, we expect German fiscal policy to remain accommodative after the upcoming federal election weakens the power of the CDU. This combination will allow German stocks to generate further upside over the coming years. Favor Swedish Equites Over Eurozone And US Benchmarks Since inception, this position is up 0.9% on its European leg and is up 0.3% on its US leg. Sweden is a particularly appealing market despite its demanding valuations. The Swedish benchmark overweighs industrials and financials, two of our favorite sectors for the coming eighteen months. Moreover, the Swedish corporate sector’s operating metrics are robust, with wide profit margins, elevated RoEs, and comparatively healthy levels of leverage. Finally, the SEK is one of our favored currencies on a twenty-four-month basis, because it has a strong beta to the USD, which BCA expects to depreciate on a cyclical time frame. Buying Sweden versus the Eurozone has worked out, but selling the US market has not, because yields experienced a countertrend decline. Once global yields begin to rise anew and Chinese credit growth begins to recover, Swedish equities should also beat their US peers. Long Swedish Industrials / Short Eurozone And US Industrials Chart 9Favor Swedish Industrials Favor Swedish Industrials Favor Swedish Industrials This position is up 3% on its European leg and 8.5% on its US one. This market neutral position narrows in on the very reason to favor Swedish equities: industrials. As is the case for the overall market, Swedish industrials offer stronger operating metrics than their counterparts in both the Eurozone and the US (Chart 9). Additionally, the early positioning of Sweden in global supply chains adds some operating leverage to these firms, which gives them an advantage in an environment of continued inventory rebuilding, infrastructure spending, and capex plans around the world. Underweight German Bunds Within European Fixed-Income Portfolios German bund yields have declined 15bps since inception. German Bunds suffer from their extremely demanding valuations versus other European fixed-income securities. As long as global and European growth remains above trend, German yields should underperform other European fixed-income assets, even if the ECB stands pat for the foreseeable future (which would force greater spread compression across European markets). Weakness In EUR/USD Creates Long-Term Buying Opportunities Earlier this spring, we expected the dollar to experience a counter-trend bounce as a result of skewed positioning and the potential for a decline in global growth surprises. However, BCA’s cyclical view calls for a weaker USD because of the US balance of payments deficit, the greater tolerance of the Fed for higher inflation, and the overvaluation of the Greenback. Based on these diverging forces, we continue to recommend investors use the current episode of weakness in EUR/USD as an opportunity to garner more exposure to the euro. Short EUR/SEK This position is down 0.6% since inception. The SEK is even more sensitive to the dollar’s gyration than the euro. Moreover, beyond some near-term disappointment in global economic activity, we expect global growth to remain generally robust over the coming eighteen months. This combination will allow the SEK to appreciate versus the EUR, especially when Sweden’s domestic economic activity and asset markets are stronger than that of the Eurozone. Structural Recommendations A Structural Underweight On European Financial Chart 10Too Much Capital Too Much Capital Too Much Capital This long-term position is at odds with our near-term optimism about the sector. However, Europe has an excessively large capital stock, which, relative to GDP, dwarves that of the US or China (Chart 10). This phenomenon hurts rate of returns across the region and will remain a long-term structural handicap for the financial industry. Hence, investors with long investment horizons should use the expected rebound in European financials over the next year or two to diminish further their exposure to that sector. Norwegian Equities Remain Challenged As Long-Term Holdings Norwegian stocks overweight the financials, materials, and energy sectors. While materials face a bright future as electricity becomes an even more important component of the global energy mix, financials and energy face deep structural headwinds. Moreover, the krone faces its own structural challenges (see below). This combination augurs poorly for the long-term rates of return of Norwegian stocks. Overweight French Industrials Relative To German Ones This position is a bet on the continuation of the reform efforts of the French economy. BCA expects Emmanuel Macron to win a second mandate next year, which should result in additional reforms to the French economy. As a result, the French unit labor costs should remain contained relative to those of Germany. This process will help the profit margins of French industrial firms relative to that of their competitors across the Rhine. Overweight French Tech Equities Relative To European Ones French tech stocks will benefit from the greater R&D subsidies and budgets promoted by the French government. The Euro Will Underperform Pro-Cyclical European Currencies The Swedish krona and the British pound are particularly attractive versus the euro on a long-term basis. They benefit not only from their cheaper valuations, but also from the fact that the Riksbank and the Bank of England will tighten policy considerably ahead of the ECB. Additionally, the SEK and the GBP are now both more pro-cyclical than the euro. The Norwegian Krone Faces Structural Challenges The NOK is cheap and may even benefit in the coming month from its historical pro-cyclicality. However, Norway suffers from declining productivity relative to that of its trading partners, which creates a strong long-term handicap for its currency. As a result, long-term investors should withdraw from the NOK.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Tactical Recommendations The Road So Far The Road So Far Cyclical Recommendations The Road So Far The Road So Far Structural Recommendations The Road So Far The Road So Far ​​​​​​​ Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance  

Highlights Earnings season was impressive, with 87% of companies beating analyst earnings expectations. Analysts’ targets were too low because a whopping 38% of companies provided negative forward guidance for the Q2-2021 results. The markets expect 12-17% earnings growth over the next 12 months. Growth is past its peak and is returning to trend. Earnings growth will pick up the baton from multiple expansion and will propel US equity markets further. Yet, returns will be lower than in the past due to high valuation “speed limit.” US equity market is expensive, and earnings growth with a 10% handle will not deliver a significant re-rating, while growth rates above 20% are unlikely. We still like the consumer theme: Earnings results were strong, and more growth is expected ahead, especially in the consumer services space. Overweight Health Care: Pent up demand for elective procedures will propel earnings growth higher. Overweight Industrials to benefit from the US manufacturing Renaissance long term, and from a rebound in earnings growth in response to the inventory restocking cycle and infrastructure spending short term. Stay underweight Materials: China slowing will take a toll on the earnings growth of industrial metals miners and on the Materials sector as a whole. Overweight Growth vs Value for now. Watch for a persistent rise in rates and steeping of the yield curve – once that happens, rotate into Value and Small Caps, which thrive in such a macroeconomic environment. Feature The Q2-2021 earnings season is coming to an end, and it is time to take stock of the companies’ results and validate our equity views on styles, sectors, and investment themes into the balance of the year. Review Of The Q2-2021 Earnings Season The S&P 500 Key Earnings Results Stats S&P 500 quarterly earnings grew 93% YoY, and sales increased by 23.5% YoY compared to the same quarter a year ago (Table 1). Q2-2021 earnings stand 29% above the Q2-2019 level, which translates into 14% annualized growth. CAGR for sales for the same period is 4.6%. 87% of the companies have beaten both sales and earnings expectations. Earnings surprise is 16%, while sales surprise is 4.6%. As our colleagues from US Investment Strategy (USIS) have observed, beats are unprecedented: Their magnitude is more than two standard deviations above the historical average (Chart 1). Table 1S&P 500 Q2-2021 Earnings And Sales Results Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Chart 1Earnings Surprises Are Unprecedented Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Decoding The S&P 500 Earnings Season Results While we are impressed with the earnings results delivered by the US companies, our reaction to these superb growth numbers and beats is tepid, like the market’s reaction. The average reaction to an EPS beat this earnings season was about 0.9%. Misses were penalized harshly with stocks falling 1.1%. S&P 500 is up only 2% since the beginning of the reporting season. There are a few reasons for this lukewarm reception: Analyst targets were too low: Ubiquitous beats of earnings and sales expectations indicate that the analyst targets were too low despite upgrades throughout the earnings season (downgrades are more typical). The bar was set too low because a whopping 38% of the companies provided negative forward guidance for the Q2-2021 results. Growth was lumpy: Much of the robust growth can be explained by what we can call two sides of the same coin, one being a low base for the comparisons – after all, in the summer of 2020, the economy was close to a standstill – and the other is a pent-up demand for goods and services. In other words, all the growth postponed in 2020 was delivered at once over this past couple of quarters. With that, a 14% annualized growth rate for the S&P 500 earnings since 2019, which smooths results over time, is strong but not exceptional. Corporate guidance was cautious: Many companies have warned investors that their high growth rates are unsustainable (31% of companies guided lower for Q3-2021). Since the markets are forward-looking, reported earnings growth is seen in the rearview mirror and is priced in, and it is future growth that matters. Earnings growth has returned to trend: Earnings have fully recovered from the pandemic dip. The street bottom-up EPS growth projections (according to Refinitiv) for the rest of 2021, 2022, and 2023 are based on that assumption (Chart 2). The corollary to the point above is that earnings growth has peaked (Chart 3, RHS): Earnings will grow forward along the trend line at about 6-8% annually, which is the historical average. Chart 2Earnings Growth Is Returning To Trend Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings What To Expect Over The Next Four Quarters? According to the data compiled by Refinitiv, analysts expect Q3-2021 earnings to be 5% (QoQ) below their Q2-2021 level, staying flat for the next couple of quarters and exceeding the current level only in Q2-2022 (Chart 3, LHS). Aggregating quarterly growth rates into next 12 months growth rate, analysts expect 12.6% YoY growth over the next 12 months. Chart 3Growth Has Peaked And Quarterly Earnings Are Expected To Be Almost Flat Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings We believe that these growth expectations are too low, as they are based on the expectation that over the next four quarters EPS will stay practically flat. Therefore, most of the 12.6% YoY growth can be attributed to a base effect. It is likely that YoY growth will be higher: Some sector earnings are still at a pre-pandemic level, while others should grow simply because the economy is expanding. IBES expects EPS NTM to grow at 17% over the next 12 months, which is slightly more realistic in our opinion (Chart 4). The difference with Refinitiv is in the calculation methodology. Our working assumption is that next year’s growth will be within the 12-17% YoY range. From Multiple Expansion To Earnings Growth! Return decomposition demonstrates that in 2020, the S&P 500 return was 26%, with 43% contributed by the multiple expansion, and 19% detracted by the earnings contraction: Over the past year, returns have been borrowed from the future, but this year is payback time. The source of the equity returns is shifting from multiple expansion to earnings growth. This means that 12%-17% expected EPS growth (and possibly more if we get a positive earnings surprise) in the upcoming four quarters will propel the markets higher (Chart 5). Chart 4IBES Expect Next 12 Months Growth To Be 17% IBES Expect Next 12 Months Growth To Be 17% IBES Expect Next 12 Months Growth To Be 17% Chart 5Earnings Growth Replaces Multiple Expansion As A Driver Of Returns Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Will the S&P 500 Grow Into Its Big Valuations Shoes? Not So Fast At present, the S&P 500 is trading at 21.3x forward earnings (PE NTM), which is steep compared to a historical average of 18x. PE NTM multiples will compress if earnings growth exceeds index price appreciation. While we do expect multiple expansion to pass the baton to earnings growth over the next 12 months, we are curious to know by how much earnings would have to grow for PE to come down to 18x. To get an answer, we created a scenario analysis matrix, varying price and earnings growth simultaneously. The most likely scenario is for the earnings to grow at 3-5% each quarter over the next 12 months (13-16% annualized) and, assuming that the S&P 500 price does not move, it will trade at 20.5-21x forward earnings multiples. For PE to come down to 18x, earnings would have to grow by more than 10% every quarter, or 30% over the next 12 months, which is way above the growth rates expected by the market. Therefore, we are unlikely to see significant multiple compression without a market correction (Table 2). US equities are expensive, no excuses. Table 2Earnings Have To Grow in Double-Digits For PE NTM To Come Down To 18x Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Zooming In On The US Equity Market Segments Table 3Style Indices Q2-21 Sales And Earnings Growth Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Value Outgrew Growth: Earnings of Value grew 31% faster than earnings of Growth (Table 3). However, looking under the hood, annualized EPS growth of Growth was 16% p.a. since 2019, while EPS of Value contracted by 2% p.a. This means that for many Value companies, the earnings surge is a function of the base effect; earnings have not yet reached their pre-pandemic levels (Chart 6) and have room to run further. Chart 6Small Delivered Spectacular 2019-2021 Growth Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Small Crushes Earnings: Small Caps' quarterly results have been nothing short of astonishing: EPS in Q2-21 is 10 times higher than during the same quarter a year ago. This growth surge can’t be attributed just to the base effect, as earnings are double what they were two years ago. The S&P 600 has an annualized earnings growth rate over the past two years of 42%, and sales growth of 6.2%. Sectors Sector results are characterized by a powerful rebound of the cyclical sectors: Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Materials, and Financials have delivered triple-digit earnings growth, and double-digit sales growth (Table 4). Table 4S&P 500 Sectors' Q2-21 Sales And Earnings Growth Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings However, looking at 2019-2021 CAGR, we observe that the Industrials sector earnings are still 10% below the 2019 level, and the Consumer Discretionary sector has only grown 2% annualized, much slower than the market. The case is the same for Energy. Financials and Materials growth was very strong: The former benefited from the M&A and IPO boom, while the latter has grown thanks to stimulative Chinese policy, which has been tightened lately (Chart 7). Chart 7Cyclical Sectors Did Not Grow Much Since 2019 Despite Recent Profit Rebound Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Profitability Is Unlikely to Return To A Previous Peak Many companies have tightened their belts during the pandemic to preserve capital in the face of uncertainty. Margins have compressed, but less than expected in such a dire situation. Currently, the majority of sectors has margins close to their historical averages (Chart 8). While most sectors, with exception of Financials and Technology, are below peak margins, it is unlikely that they will be able to return to their former highs. Sales will soar thanks to stimulative fiscal and monetary policies, strong demand by consumers, and inflation. Yet the bottom line may be impeded by the increases in labor and input costs and tighter fiscal policy, which have not yet been priced in by the market. Market Expectations For The Next 12 Months According to IBES, earnings growth will be propelled by the cyclicals, such as Industrials, Consumer Discretionary and Energy (though less so as it is a small sector). These expectations are well aligned with our investment thesis (Chart 9). Chart 8Most Sectors' Margins Are Back To Normal, But Peak Margins Are Elusive Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Chart 9Cyclical Sectors Are Expected To Grow The Most Over The Next 12 Months Decoding Earnings Decoding Earnings Investment Themes Consumers Are Flush With Cash One of our key investment themes is that the US consumer still has plenty of money to spend: Excess savings in the US currently stand at $2.5 trillion, and disposable incomes have been padded by the pandemic helicopter cash drops. While spending on goods had exceeded its historical trend and has recently turned, spending on services is still below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 10). During Q2-2021, Consumer Services earnings grew by 154%, exceeding analyst targets by 27%, though the level of earnings is only 5% above the Q2-2019 level (Chart 11). This suggests that the theme has worked, but also that it has the potential to run further only if not derailed by the fear of COVID-19 variants. However, the approach to investing in this sector needs to be granular, with overweights allocated to service industries such as hotels, restaurants, and leisure (S&P leisure products, S&P hotels, S&P restaurants). Chart 10Real Spending On Services Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Real Spending On Services Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Real Spending On Services Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Chart 11The Consumer Discretionary Sector Growth Will Stay Robust The Consumer Discretionary Sector Growth Will Stay Robust The Consumer Discretionary Sector Growth Will Stay Robust We recommend staying away from Internet Retail (downgrade is pending) and the other sectors that have outsized exposure to consumer goods. Amazon earnings were a case in point: The company disappointed analysts with weaker revenue growth as well as provided a more cautious outlook as it finds it difficult to surpass its stellar pandemic numbers. Brick and mortar retail is likely to fare better, as going out to shop now falls into the “experiences” basket. China Slowdown: Underweight The Materials Sector Chinese growth is slowing, which has an adverse effect on demand for industrial metals (Chart 12). As a result, we have underweighted the Materials sector, along with the Metals and Mining industry. This call was on the money: While Materials more than doubled earnings over the past year, its earnings surprise at 6.40% is the smallest of all the sectors. The Materials sector has underperformed S&P 500 by 8% since the beginning of June. Chart 12Materials Sector Earnings Growth Is Slowing Materials Sector Earnings Growth Is Slowing Materials Sector Earnings Growth Is Slowing Post-COVID-19 Normalization: Overweight The Health Care Sector We upgraded this sector to an overweight three weeks ago. We intended to add a defensive sector in our portfolio to make it more robust in the face of an imminent market pullback, likely volatility on the back of elevated valuations and the upcoming debt ceiling kerfuffle. This quarter, Health Care posted mixed results despite being among the key beneficiaries of the pandemic. There are several factors at play. One is that some US vaccine manufacturers pledged to produce vaccines at no profit (J&J). Another reason is that the pandemic forced hospitals to halt their non-emergency operations that serve as an important end-demand market for the S&P Health Care sector. Weak Q2-2021 earnings suggest untapped demand for medical services and elective procedures. Just now, hospitals started reopening, and we expect a spike in the number of hospital visits, with positive spillover effects for medical equipment manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies. We are sticking to our overweight unless Delta and Lambda take over the hospital beds. US Manufacturing Renaissance The Industrials delivered triple-digit growth, but the sector’s earnings are still below pre-pandemic levels. There was an earnings growth dichotomy at play. Manufacturing companies that derive a high percentage of earnings from abroad have been affected by a slowdown of Chinese demand and by inflationary pressures. CAT’s recent 20% drawdown in relative terms encapsulates these headwinds. Domestic and services-oriented stocks like railroads reported exceptionally strong demand. Looking ahead, we are constructive on the sector. There is still significant pent-up demand for industrial goods and services, inventories are historically low (Chart 13) and need to be replenished, Federal infrastructure spending is a near certainty, and onshoring of US manufacturing is a new structural theme. Analysts concur: Expected EPS growth for the sector over the next 12 months is 46%. Chart 13Inventories Are At All Time Low Inventories Are At All Time Low Inventories Are At All Time Low Chart 14Value-Growth Earnings Growth Differential Is Closing Value-Growth Earnings Growth Differential Is Closing Value-Growth Earnings Growth Differential Is Closing Rate Stabilization: Overweight Technology and Growth vs Value Technology is one of our core overweights in the portfolio and the sector fared well last quarter. One of the drivers behind the strong quarter is an accelerating shift to remote work as companies re-evaluate the need for offices, especially given the possibility of new virus variants. A similar upbeat message came from the semiconductor industry: A shortage of chips that touches all corners of manufacturing from cars to computers, translates into strong earnings growth, which is likely to continue far into the future. As our BCA colleague, Arthur Budaghyan observed, semiconductor chip manufacturing is becoming a strategic asset, especially in a standoff between China and the US, and the country that controls the production of semis controls the production of most tech goods. We have been overweight Growth vs Value in our portfolios since the beginning of June. Since then, Growth has outperformed Value by about 6%. While Value was growing faster than Growth in Q2-21, the earnings growth expectation between Growth and Value is closing. After a strong run, Growth is expensive again, trading at 28x forward earnings compared to 16x for Value. We expect the yield curve to steepen and yields to rise this fall once workers return to work and the unemployment rate falls further. In other words, we are edging closer to downgrading Growth to neutral; we are just waiting to get more visibility on the Delta variant scare. Upgrade Small vs Large When Rates Rise Again Back in June, we wrote a deep-dive report on Small / Large cap allocation and concluded that an equal-weighted allocation was warranted. This call has not worked so far as Small has underperformed Large by about 5%. Our reasons for not overweighting Small vs Large were manifold: Slowing growth, flattening yield curve, mean reversion of high-yield spreads and, most importantly, a significant downgrade of earnings expectations (Chart 15). Chart 15Small Cap Downgrades Likely Ran Their Course Small Cap Downgrades Likely Ran Their Course Small Cap Downgrades Likely Ran Their Course However, we are warming up to Small: Reported earnings and sales growth was impressive. Furthermore, we expect the yield curve to steepen (helping banks in the S&P 600) as people go back to work in September, and rates to go up to as high as 1.8% by the end of the year. When the timing is right, we will swap overweight in the Growth stocks to an overweight in Small. Investment Implications The earnings season was impressive, but growth is returning to trend and is past its peak. The markets expect 12-17% earnings growth over the next 12 months. Earnings growth will pick up the baton from multiple expansion and will propel US equity markets further. Yet returns will be lower than in the past due to a high valuation “speed limit.” The US equity market is expensive, and earnings growth with a 10% handle will not deliver a significant re-rating, while growth rates above 20% are unlikely. We still like the consumer theme: Earnings results were strong, and more growth is expected ahead, especially in the consumer services space. Overweight Health Care: Pent-up demand for elective procedures will propel earnings growth higher. Overweight Industrials which will benefit from the US manufacturing Renaissance over the long term, and from a rebound in earnings growth in response to the inventory restocking cycle and infrastructure spending over the short term. Stay underweight Materials: China slowing will take a toll on the earnings growth of industrial metals miners and on the Materials sector as a whole. Overweight Growth vs Value for now. Watch for a persistent rise in rates and steeping of the yield curve – once that happens, rotate into Value and Small Caps, which thrive in such a macroeconomic environment. Bottom Line The earnings season produced peak growth, and the next phase of the cycle is earnings growth returning to trend. This normalization will be a tailwind for the equity markets and will replace multiple expansion as a driver of equity returns. We are sticking to our overweights in Industrials, Health Care and Consumer Discretionary, and our underweight in Materials. We are reconsidering our overweight in Growth and neutral positioning in Small Caps. Once rates turn up decisively, a rotation into Small and Value is warranted.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   Recommended Allocation

Foreword Today we are publishing a charts-only report focused on the S&P 500 and its sectors. Many of the charts are self-explanatory; to some we have added a short commentary.  As with the styles Chart Pack, published a month ago, the sector charts cover macro, valuations, fundamentals, technicals, and the uses of cash.  Our goal is to equip you with all the data you need to underpin sector allocation decisions.  We also include performance, valuations, and earnings growth expectations tables for all the styles, sectors, industry groups, and industries (GICS 1, 2 and 3). We hope you will find this publication useful. We plan to update it monthly, alternating sector and style coverage. Overarching Investment Themes Macro Economic surprise index is flagging while Q2-21 earnings surprises are unprecedented.  Much of the good economic news has been priced in and the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index is hovering around zero (Chart 1A).  Most of the economic indicators have turned, confirming that the surge in growth has run its course and the macroeconomic environment is normalizing. Covid-19 fears are resurfacing:  The spread of the Delta variant is unlikely to trigger another lockdown, but consumers may curtail their activities out of fear of infection, adversely affecting demand for goods and services.  However, for now, we are sanguine about this risk. Investors expect inflation to roll over: Investors’ inflation fears are dissipating, attested by the falling 5Y/5Y inflation breakevens (Chart 1B).  Indeed, it appears that the debate on the persistence of inflation has been won by the “inflation is transitory” camp.  Yet, we won’t be surprised if inflation surprises on the upside (no pun intended).  Chart 1AGood Economic News Has Been Priced In Good Economic News Has Been Priced In Good Economic News Has Been Priced In Chart 1BMost Investors Are Now Convinced That Inflation Will Be Transitory Most Investors Are Now Convinced That Inflation Will Be Transitory Most Investors Are Now Convinced That Inflation Will Be Transitory Labor shortages are starting to dissipate: On the labor front, companies are still struggling to fill job openings.  However, there are signs that the labor market is healing, with more and more workers interested in returning to the labor force  (Chart 2). Inventories will be replenished, spurring investment: Post-pandemic economic recovery is still plagued by the mismatch between supply and demand. Supply-chain disruptions and shortages fail to meet pent-up demand of consumers eager to spend “helicopter drop cash” and accumulated savings.  As a result, inventories have been drawn down, chipping away 1.1% from GDP growth. In fact, they are at all-time lows: Non-farm inventories to final sales have dropped lower than they were during the GFC (Chart 3).  Low inventories will have to be replenished, resulting in further gains in investment and providing a boost to industrial activity going forward. Chart 2More Workers Are Interested In Returning To The Labor Force US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Demand for services will continue to exceed demand for goods: Last, but not least, consumers have money to spend but are shifting away from goods and toward services and experiences.  Consumer expenditure on goods is above trend and has recently turned down, while spending on services is still below pre-pandemic levels, and rebound is still running its course (Chart 4). Chart 3Inventories Are At All Time Low Inventories Are At All Time Low Inventories Are At All Time Low Chart 4Real Spending On Services Is At PrePandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Real Spending On Services Is At PrePandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Real Spending On Services Is At PrePandemic Levels: Room For Further Rebound Valuations And Profitability The US stock market remains expensive: The S&P 500 is trading more than two standard deviations above the long-term average.  However, there are pockets of reasonably priced, albeit unloved, stocks within the S&P 500: Telecom (11x forward earnings), Health Care (17x), Energy (14x), and Financials (14x).  Earnings continue to crush expectations: While equities are expensive, they are redeemed by the strong showing of earnings and sales growth reported for Q2-2021.  The scale of earnings beats relative to analyst expectations is spectacular: Running at nearly 20%, or more than two standard deviations above the historical average (Chart 5). Chart 5Earnings Surprises Are Unprecedented US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Earnings growth is normalizing: Earnings have increased 90% over the lackluster Q2, 2020.  Compared to Q2-2019 as a baseline quarter, earnings are up 22%, pointing to normalization going forward.  Earnings growth will become a tailwind for the outperformance of equities into the balance of the year and will help the S&P 500 to grow into its big valuation “shoes”. Margins are expanding despite inflation:  Many sectors are able to grow earnings and recover margins despite increases in costs of raw materials and labor, thanks to their strong pricing power, i.e., ability to pass on higher input costs to their customers (Chart 6A).  Sectors with the highest pricing power are: Communications Services, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Energy and Materials.  They are the best inflation hedges. Chart 6ACompanies' Profitability Is Improving To Pre-Pandemic Levels Companies' Profitability Is Improving To Pre-Pandemic Levels Companies' Profitability Is Improving To Pre-Pandemic Levels Uses Of Cash Cash to be disbursed to shareholders: Share buybacks and other shareholder-friendly activities are on the rise again and are expected to gain steam this year and next.  This is supported both by strong earnings growth, healthy balance sheets, and regulatory headwinds to any potential M&A activity due to the anti-trust stance of the current administration Capex is about to make a comeback: Capex is still lagging across most sectors.  A pickup in capex will signal that the post-pandemic recovery is firmly on track, and companies are comfortable investing in future growth.  However, there are early signs that that is about to change.  Philly Fed survey shows that over 40% of respondents are planning to increase their capex expenditure  (Chart 6B). Chart 6BCapex Increases Are On The Way Capex Increases Are On The Way Capex Increases Are On The Way Investment Implications Overweight sectors and industry groups exposed to consumer services spending (airlines, hotels, leisure) and be selective about consumer goods and retailing industry groups: Real PCE for goods has turned down toward the trend line.  Exceptions are areas of the market with well-publicized shortages such as Autos and Parts. Overweight Industrials – US manufacturing has limited capacity, onshoring is a new trend, inventories need to be replenished, and capex intentions are on the rise. Overweight Health Care – growth slowdown favors this defensive sector, which also benefits from a backlog of demand for medical procedures and services. Reflation trade is out of the picture, now that inflation fears have abated and the Delta variant preoccupies investors.  For that, we still favor Growth over Value.  Yet, we watch this allocation closely, to time rotation once Covid-19 fears dissipate, rates pick up and inflation surprises on the upside. With valuations high, and forward returns expectations lackluster, we favor sectors likely to delivery healthy cash yield: Financials, Health Care, Energy, and Technology.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   S&P 500 Chart 7Macroeconomic Backdrop And Earnings Surprise Macroeconomic Backdrop And Earnings Surprise Macroeconomic Backdrop And Earnings Surprise Chart 8Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 9Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 10Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart 11Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 12Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 13Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 14Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart 15Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 16Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 17Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 18Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart 19Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 20Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 21Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 22Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Energy Chart 23Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 24Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 25Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 26Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Financials Chart 27Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 28Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 29Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 30Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart 31Health Care: Sector vs Industry Groups Health Care: Sector vs Industry Groups Health Care: Sector vs Industry Groups Chart 32Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 33Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 34Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart 35Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 36Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 37Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 38Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart 39Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 40Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 41Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 42Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Materials Chart 43Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 44Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 45Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 46Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart 47Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 48Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 49Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 50Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart 51Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 52Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 53Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 54Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash  Table 1Performance US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Table 2Valuations And Forward Earnings Growth US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Recommended Allocation   Footnotes  

Highlights Globalization is recovering to its pre-pandemic trajectory. But it will fail to live up to potential, as the “hyper-globalization” trends of the 1990s are long gone. China was the biggest winner of hyper-globalization. It now faces unprecedented risks in the context of hypo-globalization. Global investors woke up to China’s domestic political risks this year, which include arbitrary regulatory crackdowns on tech and private business. While Chinese officials will ease policy to soothe markets, the cyclical and structural outlook is still negative for this economy. Growth and stimulus have peaked. Political risk will stay high through the national party congress in fall 2022. US-China relations have not stabilized. India, the clearest EM alternative for global investors, is high-priced relative to China and faces troubles of its own. It is too soon to call a bottom for EM relative to DM. Feature Global investors woke up to China’s domestic political risk over the past week, as Beijing extended its regulatory crackdown to private education companies. Our GeoRisk Indicator shows Chinese political risk reaching late 2017 levels while the broad Chinese stock market continued this year’s slide against emerging market peers (Chart 1). Chart 1China: Domestic Political Risk Takes Investors By Surprise Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) A technical bounce in Chinese tech stocks will very likely occur but we would not recommend playing it. The first of our three key views for 2021 is the confluence of internal and external headwinds for China. True, today’s regulatory blitz will pass over like previous ones and the fast money will snap up Chinese tech firms on the cheap. The Communist Party is making a show of force, not destroying its crown jewels in the tech sector. However, the negative factors weighing on China are both cyclical and structural. Until Chinese President Xi Jinping adjusts his strategy and US-China relations stabilize, investors do not have a solid foundation for putting more capital at risk in China. Globalization is in retreat and this is negative for China, the big winner of the past 40 years. Hypo-Globalization Globalization in the truest sense has expanded over millenia. It will only reverse amid civilizational disasters. But the post-Cold War era of “hyper-globalization” is long gone.1 The 2010s saw the emergence of de-globalization. In the wake of COVID-19, global trade is recovering to its post-2008 trend but it is nowhere near recovering the post-1990 trend (Chart 2). Trade exposure has even fallen within the major free trade blocs, like the EU and USMCA (Chart 3). Chart 2Hypo-Globalization Hypo-Globalization Hypo-Globalization Chart 3Trade Intensity Slows Even Within Trade Blocs Trade Intensity Slows Even Within Trade Blocs Trade Intensity Slows Even Within Trade Blocs Of course, with vaccines and stimulus, global trade will recover in the coming decade. We coined the term “hypo-globalization” to capture this predicament, in which globalization is set to rebound but not to its previous trajectory.2 We now inhabit a world that is under-globalized and under-globalizing, i.e. not as open and free as it could be. A major factor is the US-China economic divorce, which is proceeding apace. China’s latest state actions – in diplomacy, finance, and business – underscore its ongoing disengagement from the US-led global architecture. The US, for its part, is now on its third presidency with protectionist leanings. American and European fiscal stimulus are increasingly protectionist in nature, including rising climate protectionism. Bottom Line: The stimulus-fueled recovery from the global pandemic is not leading to re-globalization so much as hypo-globalization. A cyclical reboot of cross-border trade and investment is occurring but will fall short of global potential due to a darkening geopolitical backdrop. Still No Stabilization In US-China Relations Chart 4Do Nations Prefer Growth? Or Security? Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) A giant window of opportunity is closing for China and Russia – they will look back fondly on the days when the US was bogged down in the Middle East. The US current withdrawal from “forever wars” incentivizes Beijing and Moscow to act aggressively now, whether at home or abroad. Investors tend to overrate the Chinese people’s desire for economic prosperity relative to their fear of insecurity and domination by foreign powers. China today is more desirous of strong national defense than faster economic growth (Chart 4). The rise of Chinese nationalism is pronounced since the Great Recession. President Xi Jinping confirmed this trend in his speech for the Communist Party’s first centenary on July 1, 2021. Xi was notably more concerned with foreign threats than his predecessors in 2001 and 2011 (Chart 5).3 China has arrived as a Great Power on the global stage and will resist being foisted into a subsidiary role by western nations. Chart 5Xi Jinping’s Centenary Speech Signaled Nationalist Turn Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Meanwhile US-China relations have not stabilized. The latest negotiations did not produce agreed upon terms for managing tensions in the relationship. A bilateral summit between Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping has not been agreed to or scheduled, though it could still come together by the end of October. Foreign Minister Wang Yi produced a set of three major demands: that the US not subvert “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” obstruct China’s development, or infringe on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Table 1). The US’s opposition to China’s state-backed economic model, export controls on advanced technology, and attempts to negotiate a trade deal with the province of Taiwan all violate these demands.4 Table 1China’s Three Demands From The United States (July 2021) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) The removal of US support for China’s economic, development – recently confirmed by the Biden administration – will take a substantial toll on sentiment within China and among global investors. US President Joe Biden and four executive departments have explicitly warned investors not to invest in Hong Kong or in companies with ties to China’s military-industrial complex and human rights abuses. The US now formally accuses China of genocide in the Xinjiang region.5 Bottom Line: There is no stabilization in US-China relations yet. This will keep the risk premium in Chinese currency and equities elevated. The Sino-American divorce is a major driver of hypo-globalization. China’s Regulatory Crackdown President Xi Jinping’s strategy is consistent. He does not want last year’s stimulus splurge to create destabilizing asset bubbles and he wants to continue converting American antagonism into domestic power consolidation, particularly over the private economy. Now China’s sweeping “anti-trust” regulatory crackdown on tech, education, and other sectors is driving a major rethink among investors, ranging from Ark-founder Cathie Wood to perma-bulls like Stephen Roach. The driver of the latest regulatory crackdown is the administration’s reassertion of central party control. The Chinese economy’s potential growth is slowing, putting pressure on the legitimacy of single-party rule. The Communist Party is responding by trying to improve quality of life while promoting nationalism and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” i.e. strong central government control and guidance over a market economy. Beijing is also using state power and industrial policy to attempt a great leap forward in science and technology in a bid to secure a place in the sun. Fintech, social media, and other innovative platforms have the potential to create networks of information, wealth, and power beyond the party’s control. Their rise can generate social upheaval at home and increase vulnerability to capital markets abroad. They may even divert resources from core technologies that would do more to increase China’s military-industrial capabilities. Beijing’s goal is to guide economic development, break up the concentration of power outside of the party, prevent systemic risks, and increase popular support in an era of falling income growth. Sociopolitical Risks: Social media has demonstrably exacerbated factionalism and social unrest in the United States, while silencing a sitting president. This extent of corporate power is intolerable for China. Economic And Financial Risks: Innovative fintech companies like Ant Group, via platforms like Alipay, were threatening to disrupt one of the Communist Party’s most important levers of power: the banking and financial system. The People’s Bank of China and other regulators insisted that Ant be treated more like a bank if it were to dabble in lending and wealth management. Hence the PBoC imposed capital adequacy and credit reporting requirements.6 Data Security Risks: Didi Chuxing, the ride-sharing company partly owned by Uber, whose business model it copied and elaborated on, defied authorities by attempting to conduct its initial public offering in the United States in June. The Communist Party cracked down on the company after the IPO to show who was in charge. Even more, Beijing wanted to protect its national data and prevent the US from gaining insights into its future technologies such as electric and autonomous vehicles. Foreign Policy Risks: Beijing is also preempting the American financial authorities, who will likely take action to kick Chinese companies that do not conform to common accounting and transparency standards off US stock exchanges. Better to inflict the first blow (and drive Chinese companies to Hong Kong and Shanghai for IPOs) than to allow free-wheeling capitalism to continue, giving Americans both data and leverage. Thus Beijing is continuing the “self-sufficiency” drive, divorcing itself from the US economy and capital markets, while curbing high-flying tech entrepreneurs and companies. The party’s muscle-flexing will culminate in Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power over the Politburo and Central Committee at the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022, where he is expected to take the title of “Chairman” that only Mao Zedong has held before him. The implication is that the regulatory crackdown can easily last for another six-to-12 more months. True, investors will become desensitized to the tech crackdown. But health care and medical technology are said to be in the Chinese government’s sights. So are various mergers and acquisitions. Both regulatory and political risk premia in different sectors can persist. The current administration has waged several sweeping regulatory campaigns against monopolies, corruption, pollution, overcapacity, leverage, and non-governmental organizations. The time between the initial launch of one of these campaigns and their peak intensity ranges from two to five years (Chart 6). Often, but not always, central policy campaigns have an express, three-year plan associated with them. Chart 6ABeijing Cracked Down On Monopolies, Corruption, Pollution... Beijing Cracked Down On Monopolies, Corruption, Pollution... Beijing Cracked Down On Monopolies, Corruption, Pollution... Chart 6B...NGOs, Overcapacity, And Leverage ...NGOs, Overcapacity, And Leverage ...NGOs, Overcapacity, And Leverage Chart 7China Tech: Buyer Beware China Tech: Buyer Beware China Tech: Buyer Beware The first and second year mark the peak impact. The negative profile of Chinese tech stocks relative to their global peers suggests that the current crackdown is stretched, although there is little sign of bottom formation yet (Chart 7). The crackdown began with Alibaba founder Jack Ma, and Alibaba stocks have yet to arrest their fall either in absolute terms or relative to the Hang Seng tech index. Bottom Line: A technical bounce is highly likely for Chinese stocks, especially tech, but we would not recommend playing it because of the negative structural factors. For instance, we fully expect the US to delist Chinese companies that do not meet accounting standards. The Chinese Government’s Pain Threshold? The government is not all-powerful – it faces financial and economic constraints, even if political checks and balances are missing. Beijing does not have an interest in destroying its most innovative companies and sectors. Its goal is to maintain the regime’s survival and power. China’s crackdown on private companies goes against its strategic interest of promoting innovation and therefore it cannot continue indefinitely. The hurried meeting of the China Securities Regulatory Commission with top bankers on July 28 suggests policymakers are already feeling the heat.7 In the case of Ant Group, the company ultimately paid a roughly $3 billion fine (which is 18% of its annual revenues) and was forced to restructure. Ant learned that if it wants to behave more like a bank athen it will be regulated more like a bank. Yet investors will still have to wrestle with the long-term implications of China’s arbitrary use of state power to crack down on various companies and IPOs. This is negative for entrepreneurship and innovation, regardless of the government’s intentions. Chart 8China's Pain Threshold = Property Sector China's Pain Threshold = Property Sector China's Pain Threshold = Property Sector Ultimately the property sector is the critical bellwether: it is a prime target of the government’s measures against speculative asset bubbles. It is also an area where authorities hope to ease the cost of living for Chinese households, whose birth rates and fertility rates are collapsing. While there is no risk of China’s entire economy crumbling because of a crackdown on ride-hailing apps or tutoring services, there is a risk of the economy crumbling if over-zealous regulators crush animal spirits in the $52 trillion property sector, as estimated by Goldman Sachs in 2019. Property is the primary store of wealth for Chinese households and businesses and falling property prices could well lead to an unsustainable rise in debt burdens, a nationwide debt-deflation spiral, and a Japanese-style liquidity trap. Judging by residential floor space started, China is rapidly approaching its overall economic pain threshold, meaning that property sector restrictions should ease, while monetary and credit policy should get easier as necessary to preserve the economic recovery (Chart 8). The economy should improve just in time for the party congress in late 2022. Bottom Line: China will be forced to maintain relatively easy monetary and fiscal policy and avoid pricking the property bubble, which should lend some support to the global recovery and emerging markets economies over the cyclical (12-month) time frame. China’s Regulation And Demographic Pressures Is the Chinese government not acting in the public interest by tamping down financial excesses, discouraging anti-competitive corporate practices, and combating social ills? Yes, there is truth to this. But arbitrary administrative controls will not increase the birth rate, corporate productivity, or potential GDP growth. First, it is true that Chinese households cite high prices for education, housing, and medicine as reasons not to have children (Chart 9). However, price caps do not attack the root causes of these problems. The lack of financial security and investment options has long fueled high house prices. The rabid desire to get ahead in life and the exam-oriented education system have long fueled high education prices. Monetary and fiscal authorities are forced to maintain an accommodative environment to maintain minimum levels of economic growth amid high indebtedness – and yet easy money policies fuel asset price inflation. In Japan, fertility rates began falling with economic development, the entrance of women in the work force, and the rise of consumer society. The fertility rate kept falling even when the country slipped into deflation. It perked up when prices started rising again! But it relapsed after the Great Recession and Fukushima nuclear crisis (Chart 10, top panel). Chart 9China: Concerns About Having Children Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) China’s fertility rate bottomed in the 1990s and has gradually recovered despite the historic surge in property prices (Chart 10, second panel), though it is still well below the replacement rate needed to reverse China’s demographic decline in the absence of immigration. A lower cost of living and a higher quality of life will be positive for fertility but will require deeper reforms.8 Chart 10Fertility Fell In Japan Despite Falling Prices Fertility Fell In Japan Despite Falling Prices Fertility Fell In Japan Despite Falling Prices At the same time, arbitrary regulatory crackdowns that punish entrepreneurs are not likely to boost productivity. Anti-trust actions could increase competition, which would be positive for productivity, but China’s anti-trust actions are not conducted according to rule of law, or due process, so they increase uncertainty rather than providing a more stable investment environment. China’s tech crackdown is also aimed at limiting vulnerability to foreign (American) authorities. Yet disengagement with the global economy will reduce competition, innovation, and productivity in China. Bottom Line: China’s demographic decline will require larger structural changes. It will not be reversed by an arbitrary game of whack-a-mole against the prices of housing, education, and health. India And South Asia Chart 11China Will Ease Policy... Or India Will Break Out China Will Ease Policy... Or India Will Break Out China Will Ease Policy... Or India Will Break Out Global investors have turned to Indian equities over the course of the year and they are now reaching a major technical top relative to Chinese stocks (Chart 11). Assuming that China pulls back on its policy tightening, this relationship should revert to mean. India faces tactical geopolitical and macroeconomic headwinds that will hit her sails and slow her down. In other words, there is no great option for emerging markets at the moment. Over the long run, India benefits if China falters. Following the peak of the second COVID-19 wave in May 2021, some high frequency indicators have showed an improvement in India’s economy. However, activity levels appear weaker than of other emerging markets (Chart 12). Given the stringency levels of India’s first lockdown last spring, year-on-year growth will look faster than it really is. As the base effect wanes, underlying weak demand will become evident. Moreover India is still vulnerable to COVID-19. Only 25% of the population has received one or more vaccine shots which is lower than the global level of 28%. The result will be a larger than expected budget deficit. India refrained from administering a large dose of government spending in 2020 (Chart 13). With key state elections due from early 2022 onwards, the government could opt for larger stimulus. This could assume the form of excise duty cuts on petroleum products or an increase in revenue expenditure. These kinds of measures will not enhance India’s productivity but will add to its fiscal deficit. Chart 12Weak Post-COVID Rebound In India – And Losing Steam Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Chart 13India Likely To Expand Fiscal Spending Soon Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Such an unexpected increase in India’s fiscal deficit could be viewed adversely by markets. India’s fiscal discipline tends to be poorer than that of peers (see Chart 13 above). Meanwhile India’s north views Pakistan unfavorably and key state elections are due in this region. Consequently, Indian policy makers may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response to any terrorist strikes from Pakistan or territorial incursions by China over August 2021. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan poses risks for India as it has revived the Taliban’s influence. India has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. And its diplomatic footprint in Afghanistan has been diminishing. Earlier in July, India decided temporarily to close its consulate in Kandahar and evacuated about 50 diplomats and security personnel. As August marks the last month of formal US presence in Afghanistan, negative surprises emanating from Afghanistan should be expected. Bottom Line: Pare exposure to Indian assets on a tactical basis. Our Emerging Markets Strategy takes a more optimistic view but geopolitical changes could act as a negative catalyst in the short term. We urge clients to stay short Indian banks. Investment Takeaways US stimulus contrasts with China’s turmoil. The US Biden administration and congressional negotiators of both parties have tentatively agreed on a $1 trillion infrastructure deal over eight years. Even if this bipartisan deal falls through, Democrats alone can and will pass another $1.3-$2.5 trillion in net deficit spending by the end of the year. Stay short the renminbi. Prefer a balance of investments in the dollar and the euro, given the cross-currents of global recovery yet mounting risks to the reflation trade. A technical bounce in Chinese stocks and tech stocks is nigh. China’s policymakers are starting to respond to immediate financial pressures. However, growth has peaked and structural factors are still negative. The geopolitical outlook is still gloomy and China’s domestic political clock is a headwind for at least 12 more months. Prefer developed market equities over emerging markets (Chart 14). Emerging markets failed to outperform in the first half of the year, contrary to our expectation that the global reflation trade would lift them. China/EM will benefit when Beijing eases policy and growth rebounds. Chart 14Emerging Markets: Not Out Of The Woods Yet Emerging Markets: Not Out Of The Woods Yet Emerging Markets: Not Out Of The Woods Yet Stay short Indian banks and strongman EM currencies, including the Turkish lira, the Brazilian real, and the Philippine peso. The biggest driver of EM underperformance this year is the divergence between the US and China. But until China’s policy corrects, the rest of EM faces downside risks.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New York: Norton, 2011). 2 See my "Nationalism And Globalization After COVID-19," Investments & Wealth Monitor (Jan/Feb 2021), pp13-21, investmentsandwealth.org. 3 Our study of Xi’s speech is not limited to this quantitative, word-count analysis. A fuller comparison of his speech with that of his predecessors on the same occasion reveals that Xi was fundamentally more favorable toward Marx, less favorable toward Deng Xiaoping and the pro-market Third Plenum, utterly silent on notions of political reform or liberal reform, more harsh in his rhetoric toward the outside world, and hawkish about the mission of reunifying with Taiwan. 4 The Chinese side also insisted that the US stop revoking visas, punishing companies and institutes, treating the press as foreign agents, and detaining executives. It warned that cooperation – which the US seeks on the environment, Iran, North Korea, and other areas – cannot be achieved while the US imposes punitive measures. 5 See US Department of State, "Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory," July 13, 2021, and "Risks and Considerations for Businesses Operating in Hong Kong," July 16, 2021, state.gov. 6 Top business executives are also subject to these displays of state power. For example, Alibaba founder Jack Ma caricatured China’s traditional banks as “pawn shops” and criticized regulators for stifling innovation. He is now lying low and has taken to painting! 7 See Emily Tan and Evelyn Cheng, "China will still allow IPOs in the United States, securities regulator tells brokerages," CNBC, July 28, 2021, cnbc.com. Officials are sensitive to the market blowback but the fact remains that IPOs in the US have been discouraged and arbitrary regulatory crackdowns are possible at any time. 8 Increasing social spending also requires local governments to raise more revenue but the central government had been cracking down on the major source of revenues for local government: land sales and local government financing vehicles. With the threat of punishment for local excesses and lack of revenue source, local governments have no choice but to cut social services, pushing affluent residents towards private services, while leaving the less fortunate with fewer services. As with financial regulations, the central government may backpedal from too tough regulation of local governments, but more economic and financial pain will be required to make it happen. The Geopolitics Of The Olympics The 2020 Summer Olympics are currently underway in Tokyo, even though it is 2021. The arenas are mostly empty given the global pandemic and economic slowdown. Every four years the Summer Olympics create a golden opportunity for the host nation to showcase its achievements, infrastructure, culture, and beauty. But the Olympics also have a long history of geopolitical significance: terrorist acts, war protests, social demonstrations, and boycotts. In 1906 an Irish athlete climbed a flag pole to wave the Irish flag in protest of his selection to the British team instead of the Irish one. In 1968 two African American athletes raised their fists as an act of protest against racial discrimination in the US after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. In 1972, the Palestinian terrorist group Black September massacred eleven Israeli Olympians in Munich, Germany. In 1980 the US led the western bloc to boycott the Moscow Olympics while the Soviet Union and its allies retaliated by boycotting the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. In 2008, Russia used the Olympics as a convenient distraction from its invasion of Georgia, a major step in its geopolitical resurgence. So far, thankfully, the Tokyo Olympics have gone without incident. However, looking forward, geopolitics is already looming over the upcoming 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) How the world has changed. The 2008 Summer Olympics marked China’s global coming-of-age celebration. The breathtaking opening ceremony featured 15,000 performers and cost $100 million. The $350 million Bird’s Nest Stadium showcased to the world China’s long history, economic prowess, and various other triumphs. All of this took place while the western democratic capitalist economies grappled with what would become the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. In 2008, global elites spoke of China as a “responsible stakeholder” that was conducting a “peaceful rise” in international affairs. The world welcomed its roughly $600 billion stimulus. Now elites speak of China as primarily a threat and a competitor, a “revisionist” state challenging the liberal world order. China is blamed for a lack of transparency (if not virological malfeasance) in handling the COVID-19 pandemic. It is blamed for breaking governance promises and violating human rights in Hong Kong, for alleged genocide in Xinjiang, and for a list of other wrongdoings, including tough “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, cyber-crime and cyber-sabotage, and revanchist maritime-territorial claims. Even aside from these accusations it is clear that China is suffering greater financial volatility as a result of its conflicting economic goals. Talk of a diplomatic or even full boycott of Beijing’s winter games is already brewing. Sponsors are also second-guessing their involvement. More than half of Canadians support boycotting the winter games. Germany is another bellwether to watch. In 2014, Germany’s president (not chancellor) boycotted the Sochi Olympics; in 2021, the EU and China are witnessing a major deterioration of relations. Parliamentarians in the UK, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway have asked their governments to outline their official stance on the winter games. In the age of “woke capitalism,” a sponsorship boycott of the games is a possibility. This is especially true given the recent Chinese backlash against European multinational corporations for violating China’s own rules of political correctness. A boycott which includes any members of the US, Norway, Canada, Sweden, Germany, or the Netherlands would be substantial as these are the top performers in the Winter Olympics. Even if there is no boycott, there is bound to be some political protests and social demonstrations, and China will not be able to censor anything said by Western broadcasters televising the events. Athletes usually suffer backlash at home if they make critical statements about their country, but they run very little risk of a backlash for criticizing China. If anything, protests against China’s handling of human rights will be tacitly encouraged. Beijing, for its part, will likely overreact, as these days it not only controls the message at home but also attempts more actively to export censorship. This is precisely what the western governments are now trying to counteract, for their own political purposes. The bottom line is that the 2008 Beijing Olympics reflected China’s strengths in stark contrast with the failures of democratic capitalism, while the 2022 Olympics are likely to highlight the opposite: China’s weaknesses, even as the liberal democracies attempt a revival of their global leadership.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Section II: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Underweight (Upgrade Alert) We are currently underweight US banks, but the macro environment is changing and today we put this sub-sector on an upgrade alert looking to push it to a neutral allocation. The news on the buyback and dividend fronts is encouraging as banks will be allowed to resume their shareholder friendly activities that were halted last year due to the Fed’s Stress Test. Already, financials stocks are at the front of the pack with a roughly 3% total yield that is likely to increase further. Tack on the current search for yield environment, and the allure of financials equities becomes even more tempting.  Bottom Line: We are putting banks on our upgrade alert watchlist. Please see an upcoming Strategy Report where we delve deeper into the buyback and dividend topics. Buyback Revival? Buyback Revival?

Highlights Three distinct forces are likely to make South Asia’s geopolitical risks increasingly relevant to global investors. First, India’s tensions with China stem from China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness and India’s shift away from traditional neutrality toward aligning with the US and its allies. This creates a security dilemma in South Asia, just as in East Asia. Second, India’s economy is sputtering in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, adding fuel to nationalism and populism in advance of a series of important elections. India will stimulate the economy but it could also become more reactive on the international scene. Third, the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan and negotiating a deal with Iran in an effort to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East and South Asia. This will create a scramble for influence across both regions and a power vacuum in Afghanistan that is highly likely to yield negative surprises for India and its neighbors. Traditionally geopolitical risks in South Asia have a limited impact on markets. India’s growth slowdown and forthcoming fiscal stimulus are more relevant for investors. However, a sharp rise in geopolitical risk would undermine India’s structural advantages as the West diversifies away from China. Stay short Indian banks. Feature Geopolitical risks in South Asia are slowly but surely rising. India-Pakistan and China-India are well-known “conflict-dyads” or pairings. Historically, these two sets have been fighting each other over their fuzzy Himalayan border with limited global financial market consequences. But now fundamental changes are afoot that are altering the geopolitical setting in the region. Specifically, the coming together of three distinct forces could trigger a significant geopolitical event in South Asia. The three forces are as follow: Force #1: Sino-Indian Tensions Get Real About a year ago, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in Ladakh, a disputed territory in the Kashmir region. Following these clashes China reduced its military presence in the Pangong Tso area but its presence in some neighboring areas remains meaningful. Besides the troop build-up along India’s eastern border, China is building more air combat infrastructure in its India-facing western theatre. China’s major air bases have historically been concentrated in China’s eastern region, away from the Indian border (Map 1). Consequently, India has historically enjoyed an advantage in airpower. But China appears to be working to mitigate this disadvantage. Map 1Most Of China’s Major Aviation Units Are Located Away From India South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown Owing to China’s increased military focus along the Sino-India border, India’s threat perception of China has undergone a fundamental change in recent years. Notably, India has diverted some of its key army units away from its western Indo-Pak border towards its eastern border with China. India could now have nearly 200,000 troops deployed along its border with China, which would mark a 40% increase from last year.1 Turning attention to the Indo-Pak border, India’s problems with Pakistan appear under control for now. This is owing to the ceasefire agreement that was renewed by the two countries in February 2021. However, this peace cannot possibly be expected to last. This is mainly because core problems between the two countries (like Pakistan’s support of militant proxies and India’s control over Kashmir) remain unaddressed. History too suggests that bouts of peace between the two warring neighbors rarely last long. These bouts usually end abruptly when a terrorist attack takes place in India. With both political turbulence and economic distress in Pakistan rising, the fragile ceasefire between India and Pakistan could be upended over the next six months. In fact, two events over the last week point to the fragility of the ceasefire: Two drones carrying explosives entered an Indian air force station located in Jammu and Kashmir (i.e. a northern territory that India recently reorganized, to Pakistan’s chagrin). Even as no casualties were reported, this attack marks a turning point for terrorist activity in India as this was the first-time terrorists used drones to enter an Indian military base. Hours later, another drone attack struck an Indian base at the Ratnuchak-Kaluchak army station, the site of a major terrorist attack in 2002. Chart 1China, Pakistan And India Cumulatively Added 41 Nuclear Warheads Over 2020 South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown Given that the ceasefire was agreed recently, any further increase in terrorist activity in India over the next six months would suggest that a more substantial breakdown in relations is nigh. Distinct from these recent tensions, China’s troop deployment along India’s eastern arm and Pakistan’s presence along India’s western arm creates a strategic “pincer” that increasingly threatens India. India is naturally concerned. China and Pakistan are allies who have been working closely on projects including the strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a collection of infrastructure projects in Pakistan that includes the development of a port in Gwadar where a future presence of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is envisaged. Gwadar has the potential of providing China land-based access to the Indian Ocean. Trust in the South Asian region is clearly running low. Distinct from troop build-ups and drone-attacks, China, Pakistan, and India cumulatively added more than 40 nuclear warheads over the last year (Chart 1). China is reputed to be engaged in an even larger increase in its nuclear arsenal than the data show.2 From a structural perspective, too, geopolitical risks in the South Asian peninsula are bound to keep rising. When it comes to the conflicting Indo-Pak dyad, India’s geopolitical power has been rising relative to that of Pakistan in the 2000s. However, the geopolitical muscle of the Sino-Pak alliance is much greater than that of India on a standalone basis (Chart 2). Chart 2India Has Aligned With The QUAD To Counter The Sino-Pak Alliance South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown China’s active involvement in South Asia is responsible for driving India’s increasing desire to abandon its historical foreign policy stance of non-alignment. India’s membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the QUAD, whose other members include the US, Japan, and Australia) bears testimony to India’s active effort to develop closer relations with the US and its allies (Chart 2). India’s alignment with the US is deepening China’s and Pakistan’s distrust of India. Conventional and nuclear military deterrence should prevent full-scale war. But the regional balance is increasingly fluid which means geopolitical risks will slowly but surely rise in South Asia over the coming year and years. Force #2: A Growth Slowdown Alongside India’s Loaded Election Calendar The pandemic has hit the economies of South Asia particularly hard. South Asia historically maintained higher real GDP growth rates relative to Emerging Markets (EMs). But in 2021, this region’s growth rate is set to be lower than that of EM peers (Chart 3). History is replete with examples of a rise in economic distress triggering geopolitical events. South Asia is characterized by unusually low per capita incomes (Chart 4) and the latest slowdown could exacerbate the risk of both social unrest and geopolitical incidents materialising. Chart 3South Asian Economies Have Been Hit Hard By The Pandemic South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown Chart 4South Asia Is Characterized By Very Low Per Capita Incomes South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown To complicate matters a busy state elections calendar is coming up in India. Elections will be due in seven Indian states in 2022. These states account for about 25% of India’s population. State elections due in 2022 will amount to a high-stakes political battle. During state elections in 2021, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the incumbent in only one of the five states. In 2022, the BJP is the incumbent party in most of the states that are due for elections, which means it has the advantage but also has a lot to lose, especially in a post-pandemic environment. Elections kick off in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh next February. Last time this state faced elections Prime Minister Narendra Modi was willing to go to great lengths to boost his popularity ahead of time. Specifically, he upset the nation with a large-scale and unprecedented de-monetization program. Given the busy state election calendar in 2022, we expect the BJP-led central government to focus on policy actions that can improve its support among Indian voters. Two policies in particular are likely to come through: Fiscal Stimulus Measures To Provide Economic Relief: India has refrained from administering a large post-pandemic stimulus thus far. As per budget estimates, the Indian central government’s total expenditure in FY22 is set to increase only by 1% on a year-on-year basis. But the expenditure-side restraint shown by India’s central government could change. With elections and a pandemic (which has now claimed over 400,000 lives in India), the central government could consider a meaningful increase in spending closer to February 2022. Map 2Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown India’s Finance Minister already announced a fiscal stimulus package of $85 billion (amounting to 2.8% of GDP) earlier this week. Whilst this stimulus entails limited fresh spending (amounting to about 0.6% of India’s GDP), we would not be surprised if the government follows it up with more spending closer to February 2022. Assertive Foreign Policy To Ward-Off Unfriendly Neighbors: India’s northern states are known to harbor unfavorable views of Pakistan (Map 2). The roots of this phenomenon can be traced to geography and the bloody civil strife of 1947 that was triggered by the partition of British-ruled India into the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan. Given the north’s unfavorable views of Pakistan and given looming elections, Indian policy makers may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response, to any terrorist strikes from Pakistan or territorial incursions by China. This kind of response was observed most recently ahead of the Indian General Elections in April-May 2019. An Indian military convoy was attacked by a suicide-bomber in early February 2019 and a Pakistan-based terrorist group claimed responsibility. A fortnight later the Indian air force launched unexpected airstrikes across the Line of Control which were then followed by the Pakistan air force conducting air strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. While the next round of Pakistani and Indian general elections is not due until 2023 and 2024, respectively, it is worth noting that of the seven state elections due in India in 2022, four are in the north (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, and Himachal Pradesh). Force #3: Power Vacuum In Afghanistan The final reason to be wary of the South Asian geopolitical dynamic is the change in US policy: both the Iran nuclear deal expected in August and the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan in September. The US public has now elected three presidents on the demand that foreign wars be reduced. In the wake of Trump and populism the political establishment is now responding. Therefore Biden will ultimately implement both the Iran deal and the Afghan withdrawal regardless of delays or hang-ups. But then he will have to do damage control. In the case of Iran, a last-minute flare-up of conflict in the region is likely this summer, as the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran underscore their red lines before the US and Iran settle down to a deal. Indeed it is already happening, with recent US attacks against Iran-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. A major incident would push up oil prices, which is negative for India. But the endgame, an Iranian economic opening, is positive for India, since it imports oil and has had close relations with Iran historically. In the case of Afghanistan, the US exit will activate latent terrorist forces. It will also create a scramble for influence over this landlocked country that could lead to negative surprises across the region. The first principle of the peace agreement between the US and Afghanistan states that the latter will make all efforts to ensure that Afghan soil is not used to further terrorist activity. However, the enforceability of such a guarantee is next to impossible. Notably, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will revive the Taliban’s influence in the region. This poses major risks for India, which has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. The Taliban played a critical role in the release of terrorists into Pakistan following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999. Furthermore, the Haqqani network, which has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, has attacked Indian assets in the past. Any attack on India deriving from the power vacuum in Afghanistan would upset the precarious regional balance. Whilst there are no immediate triggers for Afghani groups to launch a terrorist attack in India, the US withdrawal will trigger a tectonic shift in the region. Negative surprises emanating from Afghanistan should be expected. Investment Conclusions Chart 5Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives We reiterate the need to pare exposure to Indian assets on a tactical basis. India’s growth engine is likely to misfire over the second half of the Indian financial year. Macroeconomic headwinds pose the chief risk for investors, but major geopolitical changes could act as a negative catalyst in the current context. So we urge clients to stay short Indian Banks (Chart 5). Financials account for the lion’s share of India’s benchmark index (26% weight). India could opt for an unexpected expansion in its fiscal deficit soon. Whilst we continue to watch fiscal dynamics closely, we expect the fiscal expansion to materialize closer to February 2022 when India’s most populous state (i.e. Uttar Pradesh) will undergo elections. Over the long run, India’s sense of insecurity will escalate in the context of a more assertive China, stronger Sino-Pakistani ties, and a power vacuum in Afghanistan. For that reason, New Delhi will continue to shed its neutrality and improve relations with the US-led coalition of democratic countries, with an aim to balance China. This process will feed China’s insecurity of being surrounded and contained by a hegemonic American system. This security dilemma is a source of South Asian geopolitical risk that will become more globally relevant over time. China’s conflict with the US and western world should create incentives for India to attract trade and investment. However, its ability to do so will be contingent upon domestic political factors and regional geopolitical factors.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, ‘India Shifts 50,000 Troops to China Border in Historic Move’, Bloomberg, June 28, 2021, bloomberg.com. 2 Joby Warrick, “China is building more than 100 missile silos in its western desert, analysts say,” Washington Post, June 30, 2021, washingtonpost.com.

Underweight Last month, we made a final defensive tweak to our portfolio and downgraded financials from overweight to neutral by trimming banks to below benchmark allocation. One of the reasons we focused on financials specifically, was our view that the yield curve has likely peaked for this stage of the business cycle. The taper news from last week served as a catalyst bringing our view to life with the 30/5-year US Treasury yield curve flattening violently (bottom panel). The knock-on effect was felt by banks, which are down more than 10% from their peak in mid-May in relative terms (top panel). As we highlighted in previous research, any whiff of QT/taper is bearish news for yields considering the implications of an imminent liquidity withdrawal. Slightly hawkish Fed comments from last week have not been digested by the market yet, and bank stocks still have room to the downside. Once the news is fully priced in, banks will represent a good buying opportunity given our cyclical (9 to 12 months) and structural sanguine equity market views. We will be closely monitoring this call. Bottom Line: We remain underweight the S&P banks index. The position is currently up 11% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – JPM, BAC, C, WFC, USB, PNC, TFC, FRC, FITB, SIVB, KEY, MTB, RF, CFG, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT. Chart 1 An Uppercut For Banks An Uppercut For Banks    

Dear Client, Next week, instead of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report from BCA Research’s MacroQuant tactical global asset allocation team. Titled “MacroQuant: A Quantitative Solution For Forecasting Macro-Driven Financial Trends,” this white paper will discuss the purpose, coverage, and methodology of the MacroQuant model. I hope you will find the report insightful. We will be back the following week with the GIS Quarterly Strategy Outlook, where we will explore the major trends that are set to drive financial markets for the rest of 2021 and beyond. We will also be holding a webcast on Thursday, July 8 at 10:00 AM EDT (3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 10:00 PM HKT) to discuss the outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Highlights Although the Fed delivered a hawkish surprise on Wednesday, monetary policy is likely to remain highly accommodative for the foreseeable future. We continue to see high US inflation as a long-term risk rather than a short-term problem. Outside of a few industries, wage inflation remains well contained. In those industries suffering from labor shortages, the expiration of emergency unemployment benefits, increased immigration, and the opening up of schools should replenish labor supply. Bottlenecks in the global supply chain are starting to ease. Many key input prices have already rolled over, suggesting that producer price inflation has peaked and is heading down. A slowdown in Chinese credit growth could weigh on metals prices during the summer months, which would further temper inflationary pressures. We are downgrading our view on US TIPS from overweight to neutral. Owning bank shares is a cheaper inflation hedge. Look Who’s Talking The Fed jolted markets on Wednesday after the FOMC signaled it may raise rates twice in 2023. Back in March, the Fed projected no hikes until 2024 (Chart 1). Chart 1Fed Forecasts Converge Toward Market Expectations Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Seven of 18 committee members expected lift-off as early as 2022, up from four in March. Only five participants expected the Fed to start raising rates in 2024 or later, down from 11 previously. The Fed acknowledged recent upward inflation surprises by lifting its forecast of core PCE inflation to 3.4% for 2021 compared with the March projection of 2.4%. These forecast revisions bring the Fed closer to market expectations, although the latter are proving to be a moving target. Going into the FOMC meeting, the OIS curve was pricing in 85 bps of rate tightening by the end of 2023. At present, the market is pricing in about 105 bps of tightening. At his press conference, Chair Powell acknowledged that FOMC members had discussed scaling back asset purchases. “You can think of this meeting as the ‘talking about talking about’ meeting,” he said. A rate hike in 2023 would imply the start of tapering early next year. The key question for investors is whether this week’s FOMC meeting marks the first of many hawkish surprises from the Fed. We do not think it does. As Chair Powell himself noted, the dot-plot is “not a great forecaster of future rate moves,” before adding that “Lift-off is well into the future.” Ultimately, a major monetary tightening cycle would require that inflation remain stubbornly high. As we discuss below, while there are good reasons to think that the US economy will eventually overheat, the current bout of inflation is indeed likely to be “transitory.” This implies that bond yields are unlikely to rise into restrictive territory anytime soon, which should provide continued support to stocks. Inflation: A Long-Term Risk Rather Than A Short-Term Problem Chart 2Globalization Plateaued More Than A Decade Ago Globalization Plateaued More Than A Decade Ago Globalization Plateaued More Than A Decade Ago There are plenty of reasons to worry that US inflation will eventually move persistently higher. As we discussed in a recent report, many of the structural factors that have suppressed inflation over the past 40 years are reversing direction: Globalization is in retreat: The ratio of global trade-to-manufacturing output has been flat for over a decade (Chart 2). Looking out, the ratio could even decline as more companies shift production back home in order to gain greater control over unruly global supply chains. Baby boomers are leaving the labor force en masse. As a group, baby boomers control more than half of US wealth (Chart 3). They will continue to run down their wealth once they retire. However, since they will no longer be working, they will no longer contribute to national output. Continued spending against a backdrop of diminished production could be inflationary. Chart 3Baby Boomers Have Accumulated A Lot Of Wealth Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Despite a pandemic-induced bounce, underlying productivity growth remains disappointing (Chart 4). Slow productivity growth could cause aggregate supply to fall short of aggregate demand. Social stability is in peril, as exemplified by the recent dramatic increase in the US homicide rate. In the past, social instability and higher inflation have gone hand in hand (Chart 5). Chart 4Trend Productivity Growth Has Been Disappointing Trend Productivity Growth Has Been Disappointing Trend Productivity Growth Has Been Disappointing Chart 5Historically, Social Unrest And Higher Inflation Move In Lock-Step Historically, Social Unrest And Higher Inflation Move In Lock-Step Historically, Social Unrest And Higher Inflation Move In Lock-Step Perhaps most importantly, policymakers are aiming to run the economy hot. A tight labor market will lift wage growth (Chart 6). Not only could higher wage growth push up inflation through the usual “cost-push” channel, but by boosting labor’s share of income, a tight labor market could spur aggregate demand. Despite these structural inflationary forces, history suggests that it will take a while – perhaps another two-to-four years – for the US economy to overheat to the point that persistently higher inflation becomes a serious risk. Consider the case of the 1960s. While the labor market reached its full employment level in 1962, it was not until 1966 – when the unemployment rate was a full two percentage points below NAIRU – that inflation finally took off (Chart 7). Chart 6A Tight Labor Market Eventually Bolsters Wages A Tight Labor Market Eventually Bolsters Wages A Tight Labor Market Eventually Bolsters Wages Chart 7Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s In May, 4.4% fewer Americans were employed than in January 2020 (Chart 8). The employment-to-population ratio for prime-aged workers stood at 77.1%, 3.4 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level (Chart 9). Chart 8US Employment Still More Than 4% Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Chart 9Prime-Age Employment-To-Population Ratio Remains Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Prime-Age Employment-To-Population Ratio Remains Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Prime-Age Employment-To-Population Ratio Remains Below Pre-Pandemic Levels A Labor Market Puzzle Admittedly, if one were to ask most companies if they were finding it easy to hire suitable workers, one would hear a resounding “no.” According to the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), 48% of firms reported difficulty in filling vacant positions in May, the highest share in the 46-year history of the survey (Chart 10). Chart 10US Labor Market Shortages (I) US Labor Market Shortages (I) US Labor Market Shortages (I) Chart 11US Labor Market Shortages (II) US Labor Market Shortages (II) US Labor Market Shortages (II)   Nationwide, the job openings rate reached a record high of 6% in April, up from 4.5% in January 2020. The share of workers quitting their jobs voluntarily – a measure of worker confidence – also hit a record of 2.7% (Chart 11). How can we reconcile the apparent tightness in the labor market with the fact that employment is still well below where it was at the outset of the pandemic? Four explanations stand out. First, unemployment benefits remain extremely generous. For most low-wage workers, benefits exceed the pay they received while employed. It is not surprising that labor shortages have been most pronounced in sectors such as leisure and hospitality where average wages are relatively low (Chart 12). The good news for struggling firms is that the disincentive to working will largely evaporate by September when enhanced unemployment benefits expire. Chart 12Labor Scarcity Prevalent In Low-Wage Sectors Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Chart 13School Closures Have Curbed Labor Supply Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Second, lingering fears of the virus and ongoing school closures continue to depress labor force participation. Chart 13 shows that participation rates have recovered less for mothers with young children than for other demographic groups. This problem will also fade away by the fall when schools reopen. Third, the number of foreign workers coming to the US fell dramatically during the pandemic. State Department data show that visas dropped by 88% in the nine months between April and December of last year compared to the same period in 2019 (Chart 14). President Biden revoked President Trump’s visa ban in February, which should pave the way for renewed migration to the US. Chart 14US Migrant Worker Supply Is Depressed Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Chart 15The Pandemic Accelerated Early Retirement The Pandemic Accelerated Early Retirement The Pandemic Accelerated Early Retirement   Fourth, about 1.5 million more workers retired during the pandemic than one would have expected based on the pre-pandemic trend (Chart 15). Most of these workers were near retirement age anyway. Thus, there will likely be a decline in new retirements over the next couple of years before the baby boomer exodus described earlier in this report resumes in earnest. Other Input Prices Set To Ease Just as labor shortages in a number of industries will ease later this year, some of the bottlenecks gripping the global supply chain should also diminish. The prices of various key inputs – ranging from lumber, steel, soybeans, corn, to DRAM prices – have rolled over (Chart 16). This suggests that producer price inflation for manufactured goods, which hit a multi-decade high of 13.5% in May – has peaked and is heading lower. Chart 16Input Prices Have Rolled Over Input Prices Have Rolled Over Input Prices Have Rolled Over The jump in prices largely reflected one-off pandemic effects. For example, rental car companies, desperate to raise cash at the start of the pandemic, liquidated part of their fleets. Now that the US economy is reopening, they have found themselves short of vehicles. With fewer rental vehicles hitting the used car market, households flush with cash, and new vehicle production constrained by the global semiconductor shortage, both new and used car prices have soared. Vehicle prices have essentially moved sideways since the mid-1990s (Chart 17). Thus, it is doubtful that the recent surge in prices represents a structural break. More likely, prices will come down as supply increases. According to a recent report from Goldman Sachs, auto production schedules already imply an almost complete return to January output levels in June. Chart 17Vehicle Prices Have Essentially Moved Sideways Since The Mid-1990s Vehicle Prices Have Essentially Moved Sideways Since The Mid-1990s Vehicle Prices Have Essentially Moved Sideways Since The Mid-1990s Chart 18Rebounding Pandemic-Affected Services Prices Are Pushing Up Overall CPI Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet As Chart 18 shows, more than half of the increase in consumer prices in April and May can be explained by higher vehicle prices, along with a rebound in pandemic-affected service prices (airfares, hotels, and event admissions). Outside those sectors, the level of the CPI remains below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 19). Chart 19Unwinding Of "Base Effects" Unwinding Of "Base Effects" Unwinding Of "Base Effects"   Chart 20"Supercore" Inflation Measures Remain Well Contained "Supercore" Inflation Measures Remain Well Contained "Supercore" Inflation Measures Remain Well Contained More refined measures of underlying inflation such as the trimmed-mean CPI, median CPI, and sticky price CPI are all running well below their official core CPI counterpart (Chart 20). While certain components of the CPI basket, such as residential rental payments, are likely to exhibit higher inflation in the months ahead, others such as vehicle and food prices will see lower inflation, and perhaps even outright deflation. Slower Chinese Credit Growth Should Temper Commodity Inflation Chart 21Chinese Credit Growth And Metal Prices Move Together Chinese Credit Growth And Metal Prices Move Together Chinese Credit Growth And Metal Prices Move Together Chinese credit growth and base metals prices are strongly correlated (Chart 21). We do not expect the Chinese authorities to embark on a new deleveraging campaign. Credit growth has already fallen back to 11%, which is close to the prior bottom reached in late-2018. Nevertheless, to the extent that changes in Chinese credit growth affect commodity prices with a lag of about six months, metals prices could struggle to maintain altitude over the summer months. China’s plan to release metal reserves into the market could further dampen prices. We remain short the global copper ETF (COPX) relative to the global energy ETF (IXC) in our trade recommendations. The trade is up 18.4% since we initiated on May 27, 2021. We will close this trade if it reaches our profit target of 30%. Bank Shares Are A Better Hedge Against Inflation Than TIPS We have been overweight TIPS in our view matrix. However, with 5-year/5-year forward breakevens trading near pre-pandemic levels, any near-term upside for inflation expectations is limited (Chart 22). As such, we are downgrading TIPS from overweight to neutral in our fixed-income recommendations. Investors looking to hedge inflation risk should consider bank shares. Our baseline view is that the 10-year Treasury yield will rise to about 1.9% by the end of the year. If inflation fails to come down as fast as we anticipate, bond yields would increase even more than that. Chart 23 shows that banks almost always outperform the S&P 500 when bond yields are rising. Chart 22Limited Near-Term Upside For Inflation Expectations Limited Near-Term Upside For Inflation Expectations Limited Near-Term Upside For Inflation Expectations Chart 23Bank Shares Thrive in A Rising Yield Environment Bank Shares Thrive in A Rising Yield Environment Bank Shares Thrive in A Rising Yield Environment   Banks are also cheap. US banks trade at 12.2-times forward earnings compared with 21.9-times for the S&P 500. Non-US banks trade at 10-times forward earnings compared to 16.4-times for the MSCI ACW ex-US index. Finally, we like gold as a long-term inflation hedge. We would go long gold in our structural trade recommendations if the price were to fall to $1700/ounce. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Special Trade Recommendations Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Current MacroQuant Model Scores Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet Don’t Sweat US Inflation…Just Yet

Highlights Asset Management Regulation (AMR) represents a critical and successful structural reform that is defusing risks in the most hazardous parts of China’s credit system. This bodes well for long-term sustainability of the nation’s financial system and, hence, its long-term economic outlook. That said, the sheer size of risky products and shadow banking makes it impossible to reduce systemic risk without hampering overall credit origination. AMR will dampen bank and shadow banking credit growth further and the credit impulse will be negative by year-end. As a result, China's growth will decelerate. The risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks remains poor. Favor Chinese local currency government bonds as yields will drop further. Feature Chart 1China’s Growth Is Set To Decelerate China's Growth Is Set To Decelerate China's Growth Is Set To Decelerate China’s broad credit and money growth have relapsed substantially. Given that they have historically been reliable leading indicators of business cycles (Chart 1), the question is: how far will credit growth decelerate. When gauging the magnitude of a money/credit slowdown, one should not only look at borrowing costs but also at the willingness and capacity of creditors to extend credit. In this context, it is essential to examine the impact of Asset Management Regulation (AMR) in China on both bank and non-bank credit growth. Please refer to Box 1 below for a more detailed discussion on AMR.     BOX 1 What Is AMR? AMR (Asset Management Regulation) was introduced in 2018 to mitigate financial system risks, increase transparency of financial products, and, hence, enhance investor protection. Financial institutions (banks and non-banks) were originally obliged to meet AMR requirements by the end of 2020. However, after the pandemic broke out, this term was extended to the end of 2021. The main objectives of AMR are: To restrict financial institutions from dodging financial regulations and prevent them from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. To prohibit financial institutions from providing other financial organizations with “channels” for evading regulatory requirements. To preclude banks from investing in high-risk assets. To forbid financial institutions from providing explicit or implicit guarantees for the principal and return on asset management products. AMR non-compliant products need to be either terminated or revamped to become AMR compliant before December 31, 2021. Assessing the value of outstanding AMR non-compliant products will help to gauge the actual impact of AMR on credit growth over the course of this year. A portion of banks’ wealth management products (WMP) and single fund trust products are AMR non-compliant and will need to be terminated or revamped. Commercial banks’ WMPs represent fund investment and management plans developed, designed and sold by commercial banks to individuals or institutions. In China, individual investors are the main customers for banks’ WMPs. In 2020, individual investors accounted for more than 99% in number of investors and 87% in investment amounts.1 The outstanding amount of WMPs is presently RMB 25 trillion. Single fund trusts have one investor – usually a bank or another financial institution. Given the disclosure regulation for single fund trusts is much looser than other fund trusts, it was prevalently used by financial institutions, including banks, to channel funds into investments to achieve regulatory arbitrage. Chart 2China Has Not Yet Deleveraged China Has Not Yet Deleveraged China Has Not Yet Deleveraged AMR represents regulatory tightening and will negatively affect bank and non-bank credit growth over the course of this year. In this report we examine what its impact will be on broad credit growth as banks and shadow banking attempt to comply with AMR by end of December this year. Authorities in China have been conducting well-thought-out surgical reforms – AMR being the cornerstone of these – to curb and restructure the risky elements of the credit system. By doing so, they have already dramatically reduced systemic risk in the financial system. Regardless of how deft and precise these reforms have been, they will continue to weigh on bank and shadow banking credit growth. The basis is that the sheer size of risky products and shadow banking makes it impossible to reduce systemic risk without hampering overall credit origination. It should also be noted that China has not yet deleveraged (Chart 2). How Large Are AMR Non-Compliant Assets? We reckon that AMR’s effect on broad credit is mainly through its impact on commercial banks’ Wealth Management Products (WMP) and single fund trusts. S&P Global2 estimates that by the end of 2020, banks will still have RMB 8.5 trillion in off-balance sheet WMP to restructure.  Single fund trusts’ assets stood at RMB 7.7 trillion in March 2021. However, to avoid double counting, flows from banks to trust funds (“bank-trust cooperation”) should be deducted from this value. The basis is that channeling funds by banks via trust companies is already captured in banks’ WMP statistics. Overall, non-compliant AMR assets that need to be revamped by year-end are as follows: Banks’ non-compliant WPM          8.5 trillion Single fund trust assets excluding “bank-trust cooperation”                   1.2 trillion Total                                          RMB 9.7 trillion This RMB 9.7 trillion represents 3.6% of total social financing (TSF) excluding equity issuance and 4.2% of private credit. The latter is defined as TSF excluding equity and central and local government bond issuance as well as special bonds.  Chart 3China: Various Borrowing Costs China: Various Borrowing Costs China: Various Borrowing Costs SP Global2 estimates that around RMB 5 trillion WMP will be revamped and made AMR compliant during this year. To put this figure into perspective, banks revamped RMB 4.8 trillion in 2020 and RMB 5.7 trillion in 2019. This will leave RMB 3.5 trillion of non-compliant WMP that banks are likely to take on their balance sheet before year-end. Even in the case of revamped WMP and single fund trusts, there will be unintended consequences for borrowers. In particular, the cost of borrowing could rise and/or the maturity of loans could be shortened. Both will weigh down on economic activity in general, and investment in the real economy in particular.   With full transparency and no implicit guarantee from banks, investors will require higher interest rates to invest in these products (Chart 3). In addition, investors will opt for shorter maturities of these products. Impact On Bank Credit… Chart 4China: Bank Loan Approvals And Bank Credit Impulse China: Bank Loans Approvals And Bank Credit Impulse China: Bank Loans Approvals And Bank Credit Impulse As banks take these AMR non-compliant WMP onto their balance sheets, their assets will automatically expand even though they will not originate new loans/provide financing to the real economy. The estimated RMB 3.5 trillion of WMP is equivalent to 1.5% of commercial bank broad credit and 1.2% of their assets. Hence, AMR will reinforce the deceleration in new credit origination. Both bank assets and broad bank credit will slow and their impulses will contract further (Chart 4).   Importantly, bringing these assets onto their balance sheet will require banks to both (1) allocate more capital to support these new assets and (2) increase provisions for the portion of these assets that are non-performing. The non-performing share of these AMR-non-compliant assets could be significant given that funds from off-balance sheet WMP were often invested in high-risk, high-return projects. These often represent claims on risky businesses, including property developers and local government financing vehicles (LGFV). In brief, there were reasons why banks did not initially put these assets on their balance sheets and doing so now will not be inconsequential. Overall, this move will hinder commercial banks’ ability and willingness to originate new credit, i.e., to provide new funding to the real economy (Chart 4). …And Shadow Banking Chart 5 demonstrates that shadow banking credit – comprised of trust loans, entrust loans, and unrealized banker acceptance bills – has been contracting. Outstanding shadow banking credit at RMB 23.9 trillion makes up 9% of TSF excluding equity issuance. Single fund trust loans – please refer to Box 1 above for more information – are the most vulnerable part of shadow banking to AMR. Despite their having contracted since 2017, single fund trust assets excluding “bank-trust cooperation” still amount to RMB 1.2 trillion or 0.5% of TSF, excluding equity issuance (Chart 6). Chart 5China’s Shadow Banking Continues To Shrink China's Shadow Banking Continues To Shrink China's Shadow Banking Continues To Shrink Chart 6Single Fund Trusts Are The Most Vulnerable To AMR Regulation Single Fund Trusts Are The Most Vulnerable To AMR Regulation Single Fund Trusts Are The Most Vulnerable To AMR Regulation     This type of financing will continue to shrink, weighing on aggregate credit flow. Although investors in these products might reinvest their funds in AMR-compliant funds, they will demand higher interest rates to offset higher credit risk. The basis is that full transparency will inform them that the trust companies and banks can neither guarantee principal nor interest on their investments. Higher interest rates demanded by investors in trust funds or their reduced financing will affect borrowers that rely on funding from this source. Specifically, trust funds investment in property developers and LGFV has been and will continue to shrink (Chart 7).      Impact On Property Developers And LGFV Property developers and LGFV are among the most vulnerable segments to reduced financing because of AMR. Trust companies have meaningful exposure to both real estate developers and LGFV. RMB 2.3 trillion in trust funds are invested in real estate and RMB 1.2 trillion in government projects, mostly representing claims on LGFV. Trust companies’ claims to both segments have been and will continue contracting (Chart 7). Property developers and LGFV are not only vulnerable to curtailed funding due to AMR but also from authorities’ campaign to limit their debt. Three Red Lines policy for property developers imposes caps on their debt. In addition, bank regulators have imposed limits on banks’ claims on property developers as well as residential mortgages (Chart 8, top panel). Loans are capped at 40% for the largest state-owned lenders, while banks’ mortgage lending should be no more than 32.5% of large banks’ outstanding credit. The regulations are even more rigorous for smaller banks. For smaller banks, caps on loans to real estate and mortgage loans are 27.5% and 20%, respectively.3 Banks’ credit to property developers and household mortgages are growing at a historically low pace and will likely decelerate further (Chart 8, bottom panel). To sum up, banks and shadow banking will curtail their exposure to property developers and LGFV. Consequently, these credit-intensive sectors will have to shrink their capital spending and construction activity. The latter will have ramifications for raw materials and industrial sectors exposed to traditional infrastructure and construction. Chart 7Trust Funds’ Exposure To Property Developers And LGFVs Trust Funds' Exposure To Property Developers And LGFVs Trust Funds' Exposure To Property Developers And LGFVs Chart 8Banks’ Exposure To Property Developers And Residential Mortgages Banks' Exposure To Property Developers And Residential Mortgages Banks' Exposure To Property Developers And Residential Mortgages   Investment Conclusions On the positive side, AMR represents critical and successful structural reform that is defusing risks in the most hazardous parts of China’s credit system. This bodes well for long-term sustainability of the nation’s financial system and, hence, its long-term economic outlook. Nevertheless, this regulatory tightening along with clampdown on the property market and local government debt will weigh on the Chinese business cycle over the next six-to-nine months: Private credit growth will continue downshifting and its impulse will turn negative, weighing on credit-exposed sectors (Chart 9). Although the private credit impulse is unlikely to reach -10% of GDP like it did in 2018, it will likely turn negative by year-end. Our guess it might be negative 3-4 % of GDP later this year. Chart 9China: Private Credit Impulse Will Turn Negative By Year-End China: Private Credit Impulse Will Turn Negative By Year-End China: Private Credit Impulse Will Turn Negative By Year-End Chart 10China: Fiscal Spending Impulse Will Be Modestly Positive In 2021 China: Fiscal Spending Impulse Will Be Modestly Positive In 2021 China: Fiscal Spending Impulse Will Be Modestly Positive In 2021   Public sector credit – measured as borrowing by central and local government, including special-purpose bonds – will continue decelerating according to bond quotas for this year. Still, higher government revenue will offset the slump in government borrowing so that government spending will grow in 2021 from a year ago. In aggregate, the fiscal spending impulse for all of 2021 will be positive at 1.6% of GDP (Chart 10). Overall, the fiscal spending impulse of 1.6% of GDP in 2021 will not offset the private credit impulse that we reckon to be about negative 3-4% of GDP. The upshot will be a modestly negative aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse. The latter will be slightly worse than the readings of this indicator during the 2011 and 2014-15 slowdowns but more positive than in 2018 (please refer to Chart 1 above). This heralds a non-trivial business cycle slowdown. The latter will be concentrated in areas that usually benefit from credit and fiscal stimulus. Construction activity and traditional infrastructure spending are the most vulnerable areas. This entails that Chinese demand for raw materials will disappoint and base metals prices are vulnerable. With regard to investment strategy, investors should continue favoring Chinese local currency government bonds over stocks. As the economy decelerates, bond yields will drift lower. Share prices remain vulnerable. Chart 11 illustrates that net EPS revisions for the MSCI China A-share index has rolled over but has not yet dropped to their previous lows. Our hunch that EPS slowdown is not yet fully priced into the Chinese onshore equity market. Concerning MSCI China Investable non-TMT stocks, they have rolled over at their previous high (Chart 12). Given the negative corporate profit outlook, the risk-reward is unattractive both in absolute terms and relative to global equities. Chart 11Chinese Stocks: EPS Growth Expectations Will Downshift Further Chinese Sotkcs: EPS Growth Expectations Will Downshift Further Chinese Sotkcs: EPS Growth Expectations Will Downshift Further Chart 12An Intermediate-Term Top In Chinese Non-TMT Stocks? An Intermediate-Term Top In Chinese Non-TMT Stocks? An Intermediate-Term Top In Chinese Non-TMT Stocks?   In the long run, however, the de-risking of the credit system is bullish for Chinese share prices. Declining systemic financial risks entail a lower equity risk premium. Consequently, equity valuations will ultimately be re-rated. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu Associate Editor Qingyun@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 2020 Bank’s Wealth Management Product Report 2 Source: SP Global "China Banks May Still Have RMB3 Trillion In Shadow Assets By Year-End Deadline." 3 https://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=955074&ite…   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Underweight As a follow up to yesterday’s Sector Insight report where we reiterated our S&P financials downgrade, today we cover banks that were used as the vehicle to trim financials to a neutral allocation. Housing starts and permits came off the boil last week and failed to live up to economists’ upbeat expectations. Lumber is getting clobbered and entered a bear market having first surged to five standard deviations above its five decade mean. Moreover, the latest news from the University of Michigan survey of consumers’ sentiment on buying conditions for houses made for grim reading signaling that a key bank loan category, mortgage credit, is in for a rough summer/fall season (top panel). Tack on the nosedive in mortgage applications for purchasing a new home courtesy of rising mortgage rates, albeit from a low base, and factors are falling into place for a housing-catalyzed underperformance phase in banks (bottom panel). Bottom Line: This week we trimmed the S&P banks index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – JPM, BAC, C, WFC, USB, PNC, TFC, FRC, FITB, SIVB, KEY, MTB, RF, CFG, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT. For more details, please refer to this Tuesday's Strategy Report. Shy Away From Banks Shy Away From Banks