Financials

Highlights Overweighting the SIFI banks is our highest-conviction call, … : Our enthusiasm for the four banks deemed to be systemically important financial institutions is founded on the view that generous monetary and fiscal policy will lead to considerably smaller credit losses than the SIFIs’ depressed valuations imply. … but investors are none too sure of it, inside and outside of BCA: The SIFIs have underperformed the broad market since we overweighted them in late April, and they will likely run in place until our mild-credit-loss thesis can be borne out. Banks’ fortunes are not tied to the slope of the yield curve … : Banks do not borrow short to lend long and the widespread belief that their stocks are hostage to the yield curve has no empirical support. … and the US banking industry is not in structural decline: US banks have experienced steady growth in real loans, net interest income and net income. Their businesses have yet to be disrupted by new entrants; so far, technology has increased profitability and we expect that the pandemic will point the way to future efficiency improvements. Feature In response to ongoing client questions and a lively internal debate, we are devoting this week’s report to reviewing our highest-conviction call: overweighting the SIFI banks.1 After restating our thesis and what it would take to get us to abandon it, we challenge two arguments that have been cited in support of a bearish view. We hold fast to our underlying rationale, though we concede that it will likely take more time for the call to pan out. We always recommended it for investors with a time frame of at least a year, and it may take until first quarter 2021 earnings to start generating alpha, but we still believe it will. A Feature, Not A Bug Our entire editorial staff gathers every month to define the consensus view on all the major asset classes, which becomes the BCA House View until we revisit it the next month (or sooner, if need be). The House View is not a party line that we all parrot; any individual managing editor is free to express an opposing view, provided s/he clearly states that s/he is departing from the House View and, ideally, explains why. Although this policy does not always lead to neatly packaged views, it affords clients a window on our internal debates, allowing them to evaluate the merits of opposing points of view for themselves. It also helps us attract and retain the informed, opinionated researchers we seek. Banking On Washington The pandemic, and the lockdown measures imposed to limit its spread, tore a huge hole in the economy. Policymakers swiftly mobilized to build a bridge across the hole until the virus could be contained. Before March was out, the Fed had soothed the Treasury market, prized open the corporate bond market and had set bond spreads on a path to tighten. Congress passed measures providing nearly $3 trillion of aid, highlighted by the massive CARES Act. Although another significant round of federal aid is not assured, it would be in the House's, the Senate's and the White House's interest, so we expect it will eventually materialize. Thanks to the CARES Act’s copious household support, personal income reversed its March slide and comfortably exceeded February's pre-pandemic level in April, May, June and July (Chart 1). With much of the economy still in suspended animation, absent another round of direct payments to households, unemployment insurance benefit supplements, support for badly disrupted businesses and aid to state and local governments facing severe revenue shortfalls, potentially dire economic consequences loom. With even run-of-the-mill recessions dooming incumbent administrations’ election prospects, it is in the White House’s best interests to advocate for more spending to hold back the flood. Republican control of the Senate also lies in the balance. Chart 1Fiscal Transfers Have Kept Households Afloat Fiscal Transfers Have Kept Households Afloat Fiscal Transfers Have Kept Households Afloat With the Democrats seeking to demonstrate that bigger government is the solution, House, Senate and White House interests all align with the passage of a major new aid package ahead of the election. Despite the worsening climate, we expect that elected officials’ self-interest will carry the day. All creditors stand to benefit, since fiscal transfers have been vital to limiting bankruptcies and defaults, and the SIFIs would get a major boost as we attribute their dreadful year-to-date performance to market fears of credit losses well in excess of the loan loss reserves they’ve already set aside. The key to our pro-SIFIs call is that we see them as the foremost beneficiary of continued fiscal largesse. Just The SIFIs, Please We are not enamored of the entire banking industry. Low rates are likely to undermine net interest margins for an extended period and weakening loan growth, a function of borrower and lender caution, will hurt lending volumes. Banks that principally take deposits and make loans to the households and businesses within their geographic footprint will suffer. Several community banks face stiff headwinds as do some regionals. The SIFIs have quite a few earnings streams, though, and only get around half of their revenues from net interest income. They are hybrids that combine investment banks boasting bulge-bracket underwriting, top-tier sales and trading, and formidable wealth management businesses with a nationwide commercial banking footprint. These companies do not live and die by loan volumes and interest rate spreads, as much of their loan originations are securitized and their loan books are not bound to the intrinsic risk of their local economies. The SIFIs trade slightly below book value and only slightly above tangible book value (Table 1, left panel). This would be cold comfort if their book values were at risk of falling because of optimistic carrying values for their assets or impending reserve builds that would eat away at retained earnings. We are not at all worried about bad marks, however – post-GFC regulation kept the SIFIs from getting out over their skis in the just-concluded expansion – and we think that they are adequately reserved in the aggregate. Assuming that the virus will be contained by the end of the year, we stick to our initial projection that they would need to build sizable loan loss reserves only through this year's first three quarters. Table 1SIFI Book Values Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs On their second quarter earnings calls, the SIFIs were of the view that their reserve building was nearly complete. National infection rates have remained high, however, and the supplemental federal unemployment insurance benefit has since lapsed. We expect that the rollback of re-opening measures and the interruption of CARES Act relief provisions will force the SIFIs to add to their reserves this quarter in amounts approaching first and second quarter levels, but if Congress does provide another round of meaningful aid this month or next, we think that will be the end of the big builds. Equity investors do not seem to have recognized that the SIFIs’ earnings power has allowed them to take their sizable reserve builds in stride. Book values didn’t budge in the first two quarters (Table 1, right panel), and if they continue to hold their ground, the selling in their stocks is way overdone. We are quite happy to find a group that’s so inexpensive against a backdrop in which nearly every public security is trading at elevated levels relative to history, especially when that group will be a clear winner from continuing fiscal support. If further aid on a meaningful scale is not forthcoming, however, we will exit our SIFI overweight. We are not irresolute, but we close out positions when their underlying rationale no longer applies. Psst. The Yield Curve Doesn’t Matter Old superstitions die hard. US Investment Strategy has been presenting evidence for ten years that the yield curve does not drive bank earnings.2 Although the intuition behind the view is logical, it fails to acknowledge that banks do not borrow short to lend long. As the gargantuan interest rate swap market and the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile demonstrate, all but the smallest community banks rigorously match the duration of their assets and liabilities. We typically show line charts overlaying the slope of the yield curve (the 10-year Treasury yield less the 3-month T-bill rate) with aggregate net interest income or net income, showing that there has been no consistent relationship between the two series. We’ve even shown that the yield curve is largely uncorrelated with bank net interest margins. Alas, one may as well try to convince a native New Yorker that s/he is not the most important element of the universe, or an English soccer fan that his/her side is not among the favorites to capture the next World Cup. Fiscal aid has held defaults way below levels that would typically be associated with such a severe economic shock and another hearty round of it would position SIFI credit losses to come in way below the market's worst fears. This time around, we present over 60 years of monthly data in one scatterplot after another that takes the shape of an amorphous blob. They demonstrate that there is no coincident relationship between the level of the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ performance relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 2), or the change in the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ relative performance (Chart 3). They also show that there is no leading relationship over six- (Chart 4A) or twelve-month periods (Chart 4B) between the level of the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ relative performance. The change in the slope of the yield curve also comes a cropper with six- (Chart 5A) and twelve-month lead times (Chart 5B). With every one of the six regressions generating r-squareds below 1%, we conclude that neither the level of the slope of the yield curve, nor its direction, explains any element of relative bank stock performance. Chart 2The Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Influence Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs Chart 3The Change In The Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Influence Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs Chart 4AThe Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 6 Months Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs Chart 4BThe Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 12 Months Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs Chart 5AChanges In Yield Curve Steepness Do Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 6 Months Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs Chart 5BChanges In Yield Curve Steepness Do Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 12 Months Defending The SIFIs Defending The SIFIs Rumors Of The Banks’ Structural Decline Have Been Greatly Exaggerated We submit that US banks are not in the throes of a structural decline. Adjusted for inflation, growth in their core lending business has been steady, except during recessions and their aftermath, for 70 years (Chart 6). Despite a persistent trend toward increasing non-bank intermediation that has reduced the industry’s market share, loan volumes continue to expand. Chart 6Real Bank Loan Balances Have Steadily Grown For 70 Years Real Bank Loan Balances Have Steadily Grown For 70 Years Real Bank Loan Balances Have Steadily Grown For 70 Years Industry viability is not only about sales volume, however. Participants in a declining industry could retain or even grow volumes, only to see their profits shrink in the face of competition from incumbents or new entrants. Real net interest income has continued to grow, however, more or less in line with real loan growth (Chart 7), demonstrating that margins have not eroded. Real net income, which includes credit costs and fees and other non-interest items that are more sensitive to the business cycle, is much more volatile, but has also followed a broad upward trend (Chart 8). Chart 7Real Net Interest Income Growth Has Decelerated, But It's Still Positive ... Real Net Interest Income Growth Has Decelerated, But It's Still Positive ... Real Net Interest Income Growth Has Decelerated, But It's Still Positive ... Chart 8... While Real Net Income Quickly Surpassed Its Pre-GFC Peak ... While Real Net Income Quickly Surpassed Its Pre-GFC Peak ... While Real Net Income Quickly Surpassed Its Pre-GFC Peak Futurists see fintech and cryptocurrencies as looming disruptive threats to the banking industry, but they have yet to make a significant dent in its volumes or its profits. To this point (Chart 9), technological advances have done more to reduce the industry’s operating costs than they have to undermine its moat. One would expect that a meaningful downward move in the efficiency ratio might be in store, based on what the banks have learned from the pandemic about optimizing human inputs, virtual applications and their costly branch footprints. The data do not support the claim that the industry is in the midst of a structural decline and an efficiency tailwind is likely in the offing once the acute phase of the pandemic passes. Chart 9Banks' Non-Interest Expenses Relative To Revenue Are Structurally Declining Banks' Non-Interest Expenses Relative To Revenue Are Structurally Declining Banks' Non-Interest Expenses Relative To Revenue Are Structurally Declining Concluding Thoughts Stocks that are oversold can become even more oversold and cheap does not necessarily mean valuable. It is entirely possible that the SIFI banks are a value trap; our call has underperformed since the late May/early June backup in long yields was summarily unwound (Chart 10). Something seems off, however, when the SIFIs are performing nearly as badly year-to-date as office and retail REITs. The latter face a structural shrinking of their businesses while banks are looking at nothing more than a cyclical ebb. Chart 10A Marathon, Not A Sprint A Marathon, Not A Sprint A Marathon, Not A Sprint Fiscal policymakers demonstrated their ability to counter the cyclical drag over the spring and summer; if they recover their willingness to do so, the SIFIs' outlook is far less grim than markets are currently discounting. Given our view that both the administration’s re-election prospects and Republican control of the Senate depend on staving off severe adverse economic consequences from the pandemic, we think that Congress will rediscover its resolve. If it doesn’t, we will have to close our position and potentially seek a better entry point after the new session of Congress convenes in January. It won't be all hearts and rainbows for the SIFIs over the next year, but concerns about the yield curve and the banking industry's trend earnings and revenue growth are misplaced. They are positioned to climb a wall of worry as soon as the pandemic begins to loosen its grip. Under our base-case policy scenario, the selling in the SIFIs has gone way too far. With policymakers squarely in the SIFIs’ corner, we’re thrilled to have a chance to take a shot at them from the long side below book value. The market is right to recognize that the banks will not have smooth sailing even if Congress eventually comes through, but we think it has failed to consider how much more protected the SIFIs are than their smaller brethren. If it’s holding them down because of yield curve concerns, or the idea that the banking industry is in the midst of a long-run decline, it simply has its facts wrong and we’re confident that they will rise over the next six to nine months. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     JPM, BAC, C and WFC are the commercial/universal banks that regulators have deemed systemically important. 2     Please see the February 28, 2011 US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Banks And The Yield Curve,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

No Relief For Banks No Relief For Banks Neutral - Downgrade Alert Bank stocks fail to catch a break. Following the recent Fed stress results and the resulting dividend cuts, banks have continued to trail both the broad equity market and their early cyclical peers: consumer discretionary stocks. Worryingly, on all three income generation fronts, dark clouds are gathering for banks, the nervous system of the US economy. While the initial knee jerk reaction of corporates was to tap their existing credit lines in order to fight the pandemic that caused an exponential rise in C&I loan growth, going forward a steep reversal is looming (middle & bottom panels). Bankers are tightening lending standards at the fastest pace in a decade despite ZIRP, weighing heavily on relative share prices (top panel). On the price of credit front, the Fed’s recent perching of the fed funds rate on the zero line for as far as the eye can see all but guarantees a tough pricing power environment for banks. The latest FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile revealed that the banking industry broke the 3 handle on net interest margins coming in at 2.81%, the lowest level since the history of the data dating back to 1984. Finally, with regard to credit quality, a double digit unemployment rate, along with commercial real estate ails will propel non-performing loans, which are extremely lagging by nature. While credit quality deterioration is late to show up, it wreaks immediate havoc on bank income statements as loan loss provisions. Aggressive provisioning will likely continue at least until the end of the year. Bottom Line: Stay neutral the S&P banks index, but it is now on downgrade alert.  

Dear Client, I am on vacation this week. Instead of our regular report, we are sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan explores the risks posed to commercial real estate and the banking system from work from home policies and the potential for urban flight towards less populated and more affordable areas. I hope you find his report insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Despite pronouncements that the “office is dead,” there are several arguments against the idea that working from home policies or urban flight will become broad-based and spell disaster for commercial real estate loans and the economy. However, the reality is that no one truly knows what the office environment will look like as a result of COVID-19. It is quite likely to be negative on balance for owners of office properties, but it is not yet clear whether it will be a marginal or catastrophic effect. Within the US, small banks clearly have more commercial real estate loan exposure than large banks. Applying the recent Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) to small US banks highlights that roughly 2/3rds of small banks might need to raise capital in the scenario modeled by the Fed, underscoring that forbearance and fiscal relief are essential to avoid a very widespread erosion in small bank capital. Still, of the nearly 5,100 banks included in our analysis, only 5 would see their equity capital wiped out by the simulated losses. Incorporating outsized, Work From Home (WFH)-driven CRE loan losses into our test of small banks highlights that WFH policies may act as a moderate “kicker” to severe pandemic-related bank loan losses were they to occur. But it is clear that the latter is by far the core risk facing both the US economy and its financial system. To the extent that the “white flight” phenomenon of the 1950s to 1970s is a reasonable historical analogue for large-scale urban flight today, the experience of Michigan in the 1960s suggests that it would not likely cause widespread problems in the housing market and/or systemic stress in the banking system. But even if large-scale urban flight does not initially occur due to time-saving WFH policies or health & safety concerns, there are some concerning parallels to the severe decay and decline of the city of Detroit that could play out over the coming few years in America’s cities if not prevented by policymakers. This could spur large-scale urban flight for reasons unrelated to WFH policies. The possibility of inadequate fiscal support is the chief risk to our positive cyclical stance towards risk assets and must be continually monitored by investors over the next several months. We expect large bank outperformance at some point over the coming year, reinforcing our positive stance towards value over growth. Feature Chart 1Rising CRE Prices And Deteriorating Fundamentals, Even Before The Pandemic Rising CRE Prices And Deteriorating Fundamentals, Even Before The Pandemic Rising CRE Prices And Deteriorating Fundamentals, Even Before The Pandemic Concern had already been growing among investors over the past few years about the potentially systemic implications of a possible crash in sky-high US commercial real estate (CRE) prices. Chart 1 highlights that overall CRE prices have doubled over the past decade, which has occurred alongside falling real rents (and thus deteriorating fundamentals) in most CRE subcategories. But the COVID-19 pandemic has introduced new risks for US CRE that many investors view as potentially acute. CMBS delinquency rates surged in May and June (but fell in July), led by accommodation and retail properties. And while multifamily and office delinquencies have so far remained low, many investors have questioned whether this can continue if recently enacted work from home policies become permanent and “urban flight” towards less populated and more affordable areas durably takes hold in major US cities. In this report we focus on the issue of WFH policies, the potential for urban flight, and the risk that these factors may pose to the CRE loans of small domestically-chartered US banks (sometimes informally referred to as “community banks”). There are arguments for and against the idea that work from home policies and/or migration out of city centers will have an extremely negative impact on office properties, but the truth is that it is currently a risk of largely unknown magnitude. It is not likely to be positive for owners of office properties, but it is yet unclear how negative it will be. As a result, we address the question as a “what if?” scenario, by stress testing small bank balance sheets. We conclude that the impact of potential WFH-driven CRE loan losses on the banking system is minor compared with the core risks facing the economy and its capital markets: The deeply negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on production and spending, and the risk that fiscal relief will fall short of what is required. Did COVID-19 Really Kill The Office? Chart 2Employers Found That Teleworking Worked Well Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? In mid-to-late March, COVID-19 was spreading rapidly in industrialized economies. Following recommended or mandatory stay at home orders from governments, most office-based businesses rapidly shifted to WFH arrangements as an emergency response. However, in the month or two following the beginning of stay at home orders, several national US surveys found many office workers preferred the flexibility afforded by WFH arrangements. Many employers, correspondingly, found that the productivity of their employees did not suffer while working from home, or that it even improved (Chart 2). These findings led many in the business community to conclude that WFH policies are not, in fact, emergency measures that will ultimately be reversed and instead reflect the “new normal” for work. The arrangement ostensibly appears to be a win-win scenario for workers and firms: Employees save time and money not commuting to the office and gain more control over their work schedules, and businesses save money on the rental or purchase of office space. The conclusion for many in the marketplace has thus been that “the office is dead,” with the focus shifting to the potential investment implications. When thinking about the potential consequences that permanent and widespread WFH options may have, there are two distinct issues that must be considered. The first is the degree to which these policies will push up office property vacancy rates, and the second is whether the availability of WFH policies will cause significant urban flight towards less populated and more affordable areas. On the margin, we agree that both events will occur at least to some degree, and thus are likely to be highly unwelcome developments for owners of prime central business district real estate. This is in line with the conclusions of a recent Special Report by my colleague Garry Evans.1 But there are at least a few arguments against the idea that these trends will occur en masse, or that they will spell economic disaster on their own: While surveys show that many employees expect to continue to work remotely after the pandemic ends, these results likely reflect the desire to retain some flexibility afforded by WFH policies. In terms of office property utilization, there is a large difference between an employee never working from an office again and permanently working from home one day per week, and many surveys that have been conducted on the topic are not structured to distinguish between the two. Surveys that specifically ask how long employees expect it will take for them to return to the office and that include “never” as a possible answer imply a considerably lower impact on office space utilization than other surveys would suggest (Chart 3). If the percentage of never-returning workers shown in Chart 3 (5%-7%) is accurate and maps closely to the expected rise in the office vacancy rate, Chart 4 highlights that the corresponding increase in vacancy would not be unprecedented: It rose from roughly 8% in 2000 to 17% in 2003, without causing a disastrous collapse in office property prices (they fell, but not enormously). Today the vacancy rate would be rising from a much higher level than in 2000, but the point is that very significant changes have occurred in the vacancy rate before without substantially destabilizing the office property market. Chart 3Employers Found That Teleworking Worked Well Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? For offices that reopen before the end of the pandemic, the need for physical distancing will act to at least somewhat restrain a rise in the vacancy rate over the coming several months, as it implies the need for more physical space per employee rather than less. Chart 4Large, Non-Impactful Rises In The Office Vacancy Rate Have Occurred Before Large, Non-Impactful Rises In The Office Vacancy Rate Have Occurred Before Large, Non-Impactful Rises In The Office Vacancy Rate Have Occurred Before Some surveys suggest that Americans are already starting to change their minds about their desire to move out of the city. In April and early-May, upwards of 35%-40% of people responding to a Harris poll said that the pandemic made them want to live either in a rural area more than 21 miles outside of a major city or a suburb within 10 miles of a major city. As of late-July / early-August, that number had fallen to 26% (Chart 5), with only 9% reporting that it is “very likely.” This suggests that the end or reduction of lockdown measures may have returned a sense of normality for many Americans, and that the ultimate degree of urban flight may end up being considerably smaller than some investors expect. Chart 5Few People Say It Is Very Likely They Will Move Due To COVID-19 Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Finally, the example set by Facebook in May suggests that employees who wish to work from home permanently and relocate to more affordable areas will experience salary reductions, as part of a plan to “localize employees' compensation.”2 If adopted on a widespread basis among firms offering their employees the option to permanently work from home, localized compensation will very likely erode some of the cost advantages of moving to a cheaper area, and thus is likely to result in even fewer employees choosing permanent WFH arrangements. However, even after considering these arguments, the bottom line for investors is that no one truly knows what the office environment will look like as a result of COVID-19, because it hinges both on the evolution/resolution of the pandemic as well as potentially ephemeral human sentiment and behavior – both of which are extraordinarily difficult to predict with high accuracy. It is quite likely to be negative on balance for owners of office properties, but it is not yet clear whether it will be a marginal or catastrophic effect. As such, we agree that the chance of a major and lasting shock to the holders of US commercial real estate loans warrants a thorough investigation, focused on its potential to affect the stability of the US financial system. We first present an overview of CRE exposure for all US banks, and then examine in detail the risk facing small domestically-chartered US banks. Reviewing US Bank CRE Exposure Table 1 presents an overview of CRE loan exposure for domestically-chartered US banks from the Fed’s H.8 data release (Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States), as well as a breakdown in exposure for large and small banks. Investors should note that different definitions of “large banks” exist in the US, and in the H.8 release they are defined as the top 25 domestically-chartered banks ranked by domestic assets. Table 1Most US Commercial Real Estate Loans Are Held By Small Banks Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Table 1 highlights two points. First, while CRE loans account for approximately 13% of total US domestically-chartered bank assets, exposure is clearly more concentrated for smaller banks than for the largest banks. CRE loans account for a full 1/4th of total assets for small banks, compared to just 6% for the top 25 domestic banks. Given this, the focus of our report will be on small rather than large bank exposure to CRE loans. Second, the table makes it clear that loans backed by nonfarm nonresidential structures account for just 2/3rds of total CRE exposure; the remaining exposure is to apartment buildings, construction and land development loans, and farmland. While not shown in Table 1, bank call reports also highlight that 1-4 family residential construction loans are included in the overall construction and land development category, accounting for up to 20% of those loans for small domestically-chartered banks. Chart 6Office Properties Make Up About 40% Of The Value Of Commercial Structures Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Unfortunately, it is difficult to break down small bank nonfarm nonresidential structure exposure by property type from a top-down perspective. Chart 6 highlights that office properties (including all financial buildings) make up approximately 37% of the current-cost net stock of US nonresidential commercial and health care structures, whereas office loans make up approximately 30%-40% of those included in US commercial mortgage-backed securities. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that 40% of small domestically-chartered US banks’ nonfarm nonresidential property loans are secured by office properties. Stress Testing Small US Banks The first step in stress testing small US bank CRE exposure is to simply apply the recent Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) that was focused on large banks to the approximately 5,100 small banks in the US. We use Q1 bank call reports (which we use as a pre-COVID benchmark) sourced from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to test the breadth of the impact on small banks, and include essentially all US banks in our list except the top 25 banks by assets (those designated as “large” in the Fed’s H.8 release). The Federal Reserve recently released the 2020 DFAST results, which examined the impact on capital ratios of 33 large US banks in a “severely adverse” economic scenario. The scenario modeled by the Fed resulted in $553 billion in projected losses on loans and other positions for the banks included in the test over a 2-year period, of which $433 billion were from accrual loan portfolios (Table 2). These projected loan losses corresponded to a 6.3% loan portfolio loss rate; for comparison, Chart 7 highlights that this would represent even higher losses than what occurred during the worst two-year period following the global financial crisis (Q1 2009 – Q4 2010) by roughly one percentage point. Table 2The Fed’s Recent Stress Test Modeled A 6.3% Loan Loss Rate Over 2 Years Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Chart 7The Fed's Main Loss Scenario Is Meaningfully Worse Than What Occurred After 2008 The Fed's Main Loss Scenario Is Meaningfully Worse Than What Occurred After 2008 The Fed's Main Loss Scenario Is Meaningfully Worse Than What Occurred After 2008 In combination with additional provisioning, these assumed losses caused a 1.8% projected decline in the aggregate tier 1 capital ratio for the 33 firms participating in the stress test – from 13.6% to 11.8% – and a 1.7% projected decline in the common equity tier 1 capital ratio – from 12% to 10.3% (Table 3). While these declines are not trivial, they are far from a disastrous outcome for the US financial system. The capital ratios shown in Table 3 are relative to risk-weighted assets, and it is important to note that the projected change in capital ratios shown do not match the projected loan losses (plus provisioning) as a percent of risk-weighted assets. This is because projected losses are netted out against the banks’ projected pre-provision net revenue (“PPNR”) in the Fed’s exercise. In short, while the banks’ capital ratios declined roughly 2% in the DFAST scenario, simulated loan losses amounted to roughly 4% of risk-weighted assets and about 1/3rd of tier 1 common equity capital. Table 3Large Bank Capital Ratios Fell In The Stress Test, But Not Dramatically So Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? To avoid the need to project PPNR for thousands of small US banks, we use these loan loss metrics (4% of risk-weighted assets and 33% of tier 1 common equity capital) from the 2020 DFAST to represent whether any individual small bank would likely have to raise capital. We also use the overall portfolio loan loss rate of 6.3% to stress small bank balance sheets, rather than a set of loan loss rates by loan type. Chart 8In The Fed’s Main Stress Test Scenario, Many Small Banks Would Likely Have To Raise Capital Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Chart 8 illustrates the number of small US banks that would “fail” the stated tier 1 common equity and risk-weighted asset thresholds given the DFAST assumptions. Roughly 64% of small banks would fail the equity test and 94% would fail the risk-weighted assets test. Weighting these results by bank assets rather than the number of banks does not generate a materially different result; instead, 63% and 97% of small bank assets would be held by banks failing the equity and risk-weighted assets tests, respectively. This exercise clearly highlights how much better capitalized large US banks are relative to smaller banks, and underscores that the existing forbearance programs and fiscal relief are essential to avoid a very widespread erosion in small bank capital. Still, of the nearly 5,100 banks included in our analysis, only 5 would see their equity capital wiped out by the simulated losses – meaning that while widespread capital raising and the accompanying tightening in lending standards would undoubtedly have a major impact on the economy and capital markets, the solvency of the US banking system is not in question in the scenario modeled by the Fed. Stress Testing Outsized CRE Losses As noted above, we employed the same average loan portfolio loss rate across all loan categories when testing the impact of the DFAST scenario on small banks, including commercial real estate loans. In order to gauge the specific risks facing commercial properties if recent WFH trends persist, we perform two additional exercises. First, we raise CRE loan losses beyond what was assumed in the DFAST scenario (see Box 1) while employing the same 6.3% loan loss rate on all other loan types to measure the incremental WFH effect on small bank balance sheets in a very negative economic scenario. Second, we examine a high CRE loan loss scenario alone, in order to isolate the potential impact of sustained WFH policies. Box 1Simulating Outsized CRE Loan Loss Rates Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? The assumptions detailed in Box 1 result in an overall CRE loan loss estimate of 11.1%, versus the 6.3% assumed in the DFAST. Chart 9 replicates the DFAST scenario shown in Chart 8 but with our outsized CRE loss rate, whereas Chart 10 highlights the isolated impact (i.e., without any losses assumed for other loan categories). Chart 9Adding Outsized CRE Loans To The Stress Test Scenario Only Moderately Increases “Failure” Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Chart 10Big CRE Losses Alone, With No Other Loan Losses, Would Be A Relatively Minor Problem Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Two important observations emerge from Charts 9 and 10. First, despite the fact that small US banks carry disproportionately higher exposure to commercial real estate loans than large banks, it seems clear that the isolated effect of WFH policies on CRE loans, even in the extreme, do not amount to a major risk for the banking system. 80% of small US banks would pass our equity capital test, and 70% would pass the risk-weighted assets test, with absolutely devastating and unprecedented office and retail property losses but no losses outside of their commercial real estate portfolio. Second, while our outsized CRE losses would raise the number of banks that fail our equity capital test relative to the base DFAST scenario (from 64% to 74%), it is clear that this pales in comparison to the effect of the other loan losses assumed in the Fed’s stress test. The bottom line for investors is that while WFH policies may act as a “kicker” to severe pandemic-related bank loan losses were they to occur, it is clear that the latter is by far the core risk facing both the US economy and its financial system. Outsized Residential Real Estate Losses: The Elephant In The Room As noted above, the results shown in Charts 8 - 10 only include outsized losses on nonresidential CRE loans (excluding multifamily) in order to test the risk to bank balance sheets of widespread and continued use of highly permissive WFH policies and significantly reduced demand for office properties. On top of that, banks also face the risk of additional potential disruptions to residential real estate loans if the WFH phenomenon morphs into full-blown urban flight. In this scenario, migration out of densely-populated urban areas towards considerably cheaper suburbs and exurbs could possibly lead to significant house price declines in richly-valued metro-areas, leading in turn to defaults on underwater mortgages. Table 2 highlighted that the Fed’s base 2020 DFAST scenario assumed a 1.5% loan loss rate on first-lien mortgages, and a 3.1% loss rate on junior liens and HELOCs over a two-year period. Unfortunately for investors, it is exceedingly difficult to pinpoint the magnitude of urban migration that would be necessary to cause loss rates in line with the DFAST scenario or higher, forcing us to rely on an inferential approach based on historical example. Chart 11“White Flight” In The US: An Analogue For Urban Flight Today? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? The only meaningful historical analogue that we can identify for the idea of WFH-driven urban flight is the “white flight” phenomenon that occurred in the US from the 1950s to 1970s. During this period, many white middle-class Americans moved from increasingly racially mixed city centers to racially homogenous suburban or exurban areas. The city of Detroit is often cited as an example of the "white flight" phenomenon. Chart 11 shows Detroit’s white population over time, and highlights the sharp decline in the number of white residents that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. The white share of Detroit’s population fell earlier, beginning after WWII, but this mostly reflected larger increases of the non-white population. Actual “white flight” occurred during the 50s and 60s, when several episodes of racial violence occurred in the United States. In Detroit, this was most clearly epitomized by the 12th Street Riot in 1967, which involved Federal troop deployment and resulted in over 40 deaths and the damage or destruction of over 2,500 businesses. Did “white flight” cause widespread problems for urban housing markets and/or systemic stress in the banking system? Table 4 and Chart 12 suggest that the answer is no. Table 4 highlights that the median real house price in Michigan rose in the 1960s, grew faster than nationwide house prices, and was modestly higher than the national average in 1970. While it is very likely that this reflects outsized suburban house price gains and that urban center prices fell, Chart 12 highlights that there was no noticeable uptick in US banking failures as a share of total depository institutions in the 1960s. Chart 13 also highlights that the late-1960s did not exhibit any particularly unusual behavior for bank stock prices, after considering interest rates and the state of the business cycle. Table 4Real Michigan Home Prices “Outperformed” The US In The 60s Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Chart 12No Uptick In Bank Failures In The 1960s No Uptick In Bank Failures In The 1960s No Uptick In Bank Failures In The 1960s Chart 13No Unusual Bank Underperformance In The 1960s No Unusual Bank Underperformance In The 1960s No Unusual Bank Underperformance In The 1960s     The US economy is very different today than it was in the 1960s, and it is possible that “white flight” serves as an insufficient analogue for potential urban flight today. It is also true that real house prices today are considerably higher than in the 1960s and thus have room to fall further. Nevertheless, based on the Detroit experience, our best inference (for now) is that urban flight does not pose a risk of outsized mortgage loan losses for banks. This is reinforced by the fact that mortgage interest rates have fallen to a record low and have the potential to fall even further based on their spread to 30-year Treasury yields (Chart 14), which may act to boost house prices outright or cushion any potential declines. Chart 14Low And Potentially Lower Mortgage Rates Will Help Cushion Any House Prices Declines Low And Potentially Lower Mortgage Rates Will Help Cushion Any House Prices Declines Low And Potentially Lower Mortgage Rates Will Help Cushion Any House Prices Declines Is The Real Risk To Cities Urban Flight, Or Urban Blight? In our view, the city of Detroit is a useful case study for two reasons. First, as noted above, it provides us with some sense of whether urban flight has the potential to pose a systemic threat to the financial system. But, second, it also serves as an example of another potential risk of the COVID-19 pandemic: urban “blight,” or decay. Chart 15Progressive Post-War Deindustrialization Hammered Cities Like Detroit Progressive Post-War Deindustrialization Hammered Cities Like Detroit Progressive Post-War Deindustrialization Hammered Cities Like Detroit The economic and sociological decay of the city of Detroit has taken place over several decades and has been caused by multiple factors whose relative importance is still debated today. But broadly-speaking, Detroit’s decline can be boiled down to three interacting and self-reinforcing sets of factors: Sociological factors: the general post-WWII trend towards suburbanization, rising levels of violent crime, the “white flight” phenomenon, and the outright decline in Detroit’s population that began in the 1950s; Economic factors: the progressive deindustrialization of the US economy that began in the early 1950s, as well as the debilitating effects of high inflation and energy prices in the 1970s and the double-dip recession of the early-1980s on manufacturing employment (Chart 15); Policy factors: the negative impact on city finances, tax competitiveness, and service quality from the previous two factors, as well as poor governance and outright corruption. Even if large-scale urban flight does not initially occur due to time-saving WFH policies or pandemic-related health & safety concerns, there are some worrying parallels to Detroit’s experience that could play out over the coming few years in America’s cities that could cause similarly self-reinforcing effects if not prevented by policymakers. On the economic front, very acute income and wealth inequality arrayed against stout house price gains over the past decade have made home ownership unaffordable for some, increasing the allure of urban flight even if localized compensation programs apply. In addition, the pandemic has most severely affected small retail businesses, raising the specter of a “hollowed out” or abandoned urban retail landscape which could push consumers to avoid shopping and travelling downtown. On the policy front, there is a clear risk that inadequate state & local government funding could contribute to a potential downward spiral of higher taxes, reduced city services, and economic decay – similar to what occurred in Detroit. Chart 16 highlights that the financial situation of state & local governments following the global financial crisis caused persistent fiscal drag for several years into the expansion that followed. This significant fiscal drag contributed importantly to the subpar nature of the expansion, and the odds that this will occur again without federal funding are high. Chart 16 shows that the contribution to real GDP growth from state & local government spending has again turned negative, and the US Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is currently forecasting state budget shortfalls of approximately $555 billion over state fiscal years 2020-2022 – in line with the $510 billion cumulative shortfall that occurred from 2009-2011.4 Finally, in this scenario, the sociological factor somewhat mimicking Detroit’s experience could be a significant rise in urban crime (especially if violent). This could cause urban flight for reasons totally unrelated to WFH policies, but if it occurred it would likely reinforce both the failure of urban center businesses and the deterioration in state & local government finances (risking a downward spiral). Chart 17 highlights that murders have already significantly increased this year in major American cities (by mid-year) relative to 2019, although other types of violent crimes have fallen.5 A trend of rising urban crime could also be sparked or accelerated if recent calls to cut police department funding in favor of other social services succeed, and if those newly funded initiatives fail to effectively prevent criminal activity. Chart 16Persistent State & Local Fiscal Drag Must Be Prevented This Time Persistent State & Local Fiscal Drag Must Be Prevented This Time Persistent State & Local Fiscal Drag Must Be Prevented This Time Chart 17Will US Cities Become Unsafe? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? While this scenario is far from our base case view, it underscores how urban flight and the accompanying second round effects on commercial real estate loans and the banking system could occur following the pandemic even if not triggered by WFH policies. It also underscores the great importance of Federal fiscal relief efforts: not only to households and businesses, but as well to state & local governments. Investment Conclusions Our analysis above points to three main investment conclusions: First, while there are arguments for and against the idea of significant CRE losses stemming from the widespread adoption of permanent WFH policies and the potential for large-scale urban flight, the uncertainty surrounding the question will likely linger for the coming few months, at a minimum. This suggests that the equity risk premium applied to bank stock prices may remain elevated in the near term. Chart 18Large US Banks Unduly Cheap Large US Banks Unduly Cheap Large US Banks Unduly Cheap Second, while large-cap banks may struggle to outperform in the near term due to this elevated risk premium, it is clear that large banks are far less susceptible than small banks to not only potential CRE loan losses, but also to the severely adverse economic scenario modeled in the Fed’s recent stress test. Our calculations suggest that large bank capital ratios would only marginally decline from the ending ratios shown in the DFAST scenario even with the outsized CRE loan loss scenarios that we used to stress test small bank balance sheets, and we highlighted how the Fed’s main stress test scenario involved 2-year loan losses in excess of what occurred in 2009-2010. Consequently, the collapse in large-cap bank valuation ratios seems unwarranted (Chart 18), and we would expect large banks to outperform the broad market at some point over the coming 6-12 months (and possibly even over the coming 0-3 months). This is also consistent with our expectation that value stocks are likely to outperform growth stocks at some point over the coming year.6 Third, while investors are often right to ask what risk they are “missing,” our analysis above highlights that the impact of potential WFH-driven CRE loan losses on the banking system is minor compared with the core risk facing the economy and its capital markets: The deeply negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on production and spending, and the risk that fiscal relief will fall short of what is required. This need for relief extends very significantly to state & local governments, and a failure to adequately resolve the substantial state budget shortfalls that will occur due to the pandemic and its aftermath would all but guarantee a repeat of the persistent fiscal drag that contributed to the subpar nature of the recent economic expansion. Our base case view remains that US policymakers will do what is necessary to avoid a very negative economic outcome and that the hiccup in congressional negotiations is temporary, but the possibility of inadequate fiscal support is the chief risk to our positive cyclical stance towards risk assets and must be continually monitored by investors over the next several months. Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President Special Reports Footnotes 1  Please see Global Asset Allocation / Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The World After COVID-19: What Will Change, What Will Not?” dated August 7, 2020. 2 “Facebook employees could receive pay cuts as they continue to work from home,” USA Today, dated May 21, 2020. 3 Please see US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Mallpocalypse, Part 1: An Overnight Collapse Decades In The Making,” dated August 17, 2020 for the first of two reports presenting a detailed analysis of the challenges facing US retail properties. 4 Elizabeth McNichol and Michael Leachman, “States Continue to Face Large Shortfalls Due to COVID-19 Effects,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Updated July 7, 2020. 5 Jeff Asher and Ben Horwitz, “It’s Been ‘Such a Weird Year.’ That’s Also Reflected in Crime Statistics.,” The New York Times, Updated August 24, 2020. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Return Of Nasdog,” dated August 21, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Current MacroQuant Model Scores Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get? Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get?  

Highlights ‘Value’ sector profits are in terminal decline. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain. Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources. Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources. As such, structurally overweighting the value-heavy European market versus the growth-heavy US market is a ‘widow maker’ trade. The caveat is that a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. This would create a burst of outperformance from Europe, but any such snapback would be a brief interruption to the mega downtrend. Fractal trade: Long RUB/CZK. Feature Chart of the WeekValue' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over Value' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over Value' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over I have just returned from a summer holiday, on which I took a clean break from the financial markets. A clean break that is highly recommended for anybody who looks at the markets day in, day out. Nevertheless, I made two market-relevant observations. First, that having to wear a face mask on an aeroplane was an unpleasant experience. Tolerable for a short-haul flight lasting a couple of hours, but something that would be unbearable for the duration of a long-haul flight. Second, that even the most popular bars and restaurants in the most popular places were operating at half capacity. They were fully booked, yet the requirements of physical distancing at the bar, and between tables, meant that their operating capacity and revenues had collapsed. Worse, the owners feared a further hit in the winter when eating and drinking in their outdoors spaces became impossible. The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others. These first-hand experiences simply confirm the message in An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs.1 The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others – like flying, or drinking and eating out. Hence, if governments remove the financial incentives for employers to retain workers while the pandemic is still rampant, expect structural unemployment to rise sharply. In which case, expect bond yields to remain ultra-low, and where possible, go even lower. And expect ‘growth’ sectors to continue outperforming ‘value’ sectors. Explaining Recent Market Action Returning to the financial markets after a break, several things stood out. Apple has become America’s first $2 trillion company, while HSBC’s share price is within a whisker of its 2008 crisis low. This vignette encapsulates that growth sectors – broadly defined as tech and healthcare – have been roaring ahead, while value sectors – broadly defined as banks, oil and gas, and basic resources – have been struggling. Hence, the growth-heavy S&P500 has reached a new all-time high, while the value-heavy FTSE100 and other European indexes are still deeply in the red for 2020 and have recently drifted lower (Chart I-2). The combined effect is that the strong recovery in global stocks has taken a breather. Chart I-2US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red In turn, the breather in the stock market explains the recent support to the dollar. Significantly, the 2020 evolution of the dollar is a perfect mirror-image of the stock market. Nothing more, nothing less. If the stock market gives back some of its gains, expect the countertrend strengthening in the dollar to continue (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market Yet the best performing major asset-class in 2020 is not growth equities, nor is it gold. Instead, it is the US 30-year T-bond, which has returned a spectacular 32 percent (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond Suddenly, everything becomes crystal clear. If the ultra-long bond has surged, then other ultra-long duration investments must also surge. Within equities, this means that growth sectors, whose profits are skewed to the very distant future, must receive a huge boost to their valuations. Whereas value sectors whose profits are not growing will receive a smaller (or no) valuation boost. In fact, the value sectors have a much bigger structural problem. Not only are their profits not growing. Their profits are in terminal decline. Since 2008, Overweighting Value Has Been A ‘Widow Maker’ In the 34 years through 1975-2008, value trebled relative to growth.2 Albeit, with the occasional vicious countertrend move, such as the dot com bubble. But through 2009-2020, the tables turned. For the past 12 years, value has structurally underperformed growth and given back around half of its 1975-2008 outperformance (Chart of the Week). This means that for the past 12 years ‘proxy’ value versus growth positions have also structurally underperformed. The best example of such a proxy position is overweighting the value-heavy European market or Emerging Markets versus the growth-heavy US market. Since 2008, underweighting the US market has been a ‘widow maker’ trade. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. It is a widow maker because it can kill your career, or your finances, or both. The big danger is that a widow maker trade can last for decades. As the uptrend in value versus growth lasted more than three decades, there is no reason to suppose that the downtrend cannot also last a very long time. What drove value’s outperformance for 34 years, and what is driving its underperformance for the past 12 years? The simple answer is the structural trend in profits. Until 2008, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources kept up with, or even beat, the profits of technology and healthcare. This, combined with the higher yield on these value sectors, resulted in the multi-decade 200 percent outperformance of value versus growth. But since 2008, while the profits of technology and healthcare have continued their strong uptrends, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources have entered major structural downtrends. It is our high conviction view that these declines are terminal, and the reasons are nothing to do with the pandemic (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend Sector Profit Outlooks In One Sentence Each When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Essentially, the sector has entered a terminal decline. As strong believers in brevity, we can summarise the reason for the terminal declines in one sentence per sector, as follows: When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Bank Profits In Terminal Decline Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline Conversely: Technology profits can grow, because we now rely more on information, ideas, and advice, and over half of the world’s population is still not connected to the internet (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Technology Profits Continue To Grow Technology Profits Continue To Grow Technology Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare profits can grow, because as economies (and people) mature, they spend a much greater proportion of their income on healthcare to improve the quality and quantity of life (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow Nevertheless, a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible. Indeed, it is to be expected when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. But any such snapback, even if vicious, will be a brief countertrend rally in a terminal decline. This is because the megatrends driving down value sector profits were already in place long before the pandemic hit. The pandemic just gave the megatrends an extra nudge. This is our high conviction view. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is long RUB/CZK, with the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss set at 5 percent. In other trades, the explosive rallies in precious metals reached exhaustion as anticipated by their fragile fractal structures. This has taken our short gold versus lead position into profit. However, short silver was stopped out before its rally eventually ended. The rolling 1 year win ratio now stands at 60 percent. Chart I-11RUB/CZK RUB/CZK RUB/CZK When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs", dated July 30, 2020 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 In total return terms. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

China: The Recovery And Equity Dichotomy China’s economic recovery has been gathering steam, and policymakers have become reasonably confident about the growth outlook. In fact, transaction activity in the property market has recovered to year-ago levels, auto sales and construction starts have bottomed following a 18 to 20-month contraction (Chart I-1). In line with this economic revival, authorities issued a statement following last week’s Politburo meeting contending that monetary policy should aim “to maintain adequate growth of money supply and credit.” This statement is a change in the monetary policy stance in May when the stated objective was to “significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year.” This change in language highlights that authorities have become more comfortable with the recovery and are now becoming a bit concerned about amplifying credit and property market excesses. There will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. In short, there will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. Policymakers will therefore be in a wait-and-see mode for now, monitoring how economic conditions improve as the enacted stimulus works its way into the economy. Odds are high that the business cycle recovery will continue in China for now. Chart I-2 shows that the amount of credit and fiscal stimulus has been considerable, and that broad money and bank assets impulses remain in uptrend. All these should support the recovery into early next year. Chart I-1China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway Chart I-2China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy As to the risks to Chinese growth emanating from depressed demand in the rest of the world, they are not substantial. First, global demand has already bottomed. Second, China’s total exports account for 17% of GDP, while investment expenditures and consumer spending account for 42% and 38% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-3). Hence, rising capital expenditures and household spending will offset the drag from exports. Finally, China exports many household and medical goods that are currently in very high demand worldwide due to the lockdowns and the pandemic. As a result, Chinese exports have recently done a bit better than global shipments in volume terms (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports Chart I-4Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments As to domestic growth drivers, output has been rising faster than consumer demand. Furthermore, capital spending and production by state-owned enterprises has been much stronger than that of private enterprises. However, with the stimulus in full force, both consumer demand and private investment will pick up in the second half of this year. An Equity Market Dichotomy Chart I-5Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks On the surface, the strong rally in Chinese equity indexes has validated the economic recovery thesis. However, a closer examination of the equity performance of various equity sectors reveals that the rebound in cyclical sectors has been rather tame and that the large gains in the equity indexes have been primarily due to tech and new economy businesses, benefiting from working and shopping from home, and to health care stocks (Chart I-5). Chart I-6 illustrates that industrials, materials, autos and real estate stocks are only modestly above their March lows. More importantly, large bank stocks trading in Hong Kong are reaching new lows in absolute terms (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks Is such lackluster performance by Chinese cyclical stocks a warning sign to its business cycle recovery? Not necessarily. In our opinion, poor performance of cyclical stocks and banks in China reflects the long-term ramifications of repeated episodes of credit frenzy. A credit-driven growth recovery is always a double-edged sword for both borrowers and creditors. Companies that borrow and invest in new projects accumulate debt. Critically, it is unclear whether these investments will produce new recurring cash flows that would allow the debtors to service their debt. Hence, many companies that take on more debt and invest in financially non-viable projects undermine shareholder value. China has again doubled down on the same policies it has been deploying since the 2008 Lehman crisis. Namely, it has encouraged another boom in money and credit creation, as well as in infrastructure investment. Another outcome of this is that excess money creation leaks into the property market, further fueling the real estate bubble. As for banks, if debtors are unable to service their debt, bank shareholders will be at risk too. This does not mean that banks will be liquidated, but that their shareholders will be diluted. It is critical to put this round of stimulus into perspective: it comes amid already elevated debt levels, following a decade-long credit frenzy and a two decade-long capital spending boom (Chart I-7). Therefore, we doubt that the latest round of investments will be able to substantially increase shareholder value. On the whole, we believe the rally in Chinese stocks outside secular growth plays – such as Alibaba, Tencent – is cyclical not structural. The basis is that while more credit produces a cyclical recovery, it often undermines shareholder value. Chart I-6 on page 4 illustrates that Chinese cyclical stocks and bank share prices have been flat-to-down in the past 10 years despite recurring stimulus.   Finally, the near-term risks for Chinese stocks do not stem from the domestic economy, but from geopolitics and a correction in US FAANG stocks. President Trump may escalate the confrontation with China in order to “rally the nation behind the flag” if his polling does not improve ahead of the November elections. Chart I-8 illustrates that the Americans’ view of China has deteriorated significantly in recent years. This might be exploited by President Trump to boost his re-election chances. A heightened confrontation could produce a correction in Chinese stocks. Chart I-7China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger Chart I-8Americans’ Perception Of China Has Deteriorated In Recent Years China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Also, if the FAANG mania is either paused or reversed, then Chinese tech and mega-cap stocks will correct, pulling down the broad Chinese equity indexes. Bottom Line: The current round of stimulus in China has made the credit, money and property excesses even larger. As we have written over the years, easy money and credit generally fuel a misallocation of capital. Ultimately, this slows productivity growth on the macro level and destroys shareholder value on the company level.   Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Nevertheless, given that the cyclical recovery in China will endure for now, we continue overweighting Chinese investable stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Finally, we are closing our short CNY/long USD position given the change in our USD outlook on July 9. This position has produced a 4.2% loss since its initiation on December 9, 2015. A Stress Test For Bank Stocks Chart I-9China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Chart I-9 demonstrates that the risk-weighted assets of smaller banks have risen much faster, and are presently larger, than those of large banks. We have performed a new stress test for both the Big Five and small & medium listed banks. Concerning large banks, our base-case scenario calls for risk-weighted non-performing assets to rise to 13% of total. Accordingly, their equity will be diluted by 46% if they were to provision for these losses (Table I-1). Consequently, the true (adjusted) price-to-book (PBV) ratio will be 1.1. Assuming that the fair value of these large banks corresponds to a PBV ratio of one, then Big Five banks remain moderately (10%) overpriced. For small banks, our baseline scenario assumes a risk-weighted non-performing asset ratio of 13%. If these banks were to provision for these write offs, their equity will be diluted by 61%, pushing the adjusted PBV ratio to 2 (Table I-2). If we use a PBV fair value ratio of 1.3, then small and medium listed banks are substantially overpriced. Table I-1Stress Test Of 5 Large Banks China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Table I-2Stress Test Of The Other 25 Listed Medium & Small Banks China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Chart I-10Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Bottom Line: Chinese banks stocks could rebound, but their structural outlook has deteriorated further following another round of credit binge. Among banks stocks, we reiterate our strategy of favoring large banks over smaller ones (Chart I-10).  Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com  Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: Struggling To Recover Indonesian stocks and the rupiah have rebounded in line with global risk assets. However, the rebound might be waning. The rupiah has begun weakening anew against the US dollar despite a major weakness in the latter. Relative to EM, Indonesian equities are underperforming again (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Crumbling Economic Activity And Insufficient Stimulus Indonesia is experiencing its worst recession since the Asian Crisis in 1997. Consumer income has dwindled and consumer confidence collapsed (Chart II-2, top panel). In turn, passenger car and truck sales have contracted by 90% and 84%, respectively, from a year ago (Chart II-2, second and third panel). Meanwhile, domestic cement consumption plunged by 17% (Chart II-2, bottom panel). In the meantime, the Coronavirus pandemic is not subsiding and will continue weighing on the Indonesian economy. The authorities have been attempting to prop up domestic demand. Yet the total fiscal stimulus announced so far – which amounts to $48 billion or 4.3% of GDP – is unlikely to be enough, given the harsh nature of this recession. For instance, the commercial banks loan impulse has already dipped to -2.7% of GDP (Chart II-3, top panel). Provided that demand for credit stays weak and banks continue to be reluctant to lend, the credit impulse will drop even further. As a result, the negative credit impulse will offset the fiscal thrust. Chart II-2Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Chart II-3Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High   On the monetary policy front, Bank Indonesia (BI) has been aggressively cutting its policy rate and injecting banking system liquidity into the market. The BI has been also purchasing government bonds on the secondary and primary markets, de facto conducting quantitative easing. Still, the ongoing monetary easing has not translated into lower lending rates for the real economy. In particular, although the BI lowered its policy rate by 200 basis points since July 2019, bank lending rates have only fallen by 100 basis points (Chart II-3, middle panel). This is a major sign that the monetary transmission mechanism is broken. Furthermore, the commercial banks’ lending rate, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, remains elevated (Chart II-3, bottom panel). This is severely hurting credit demand (Chart II-3, top panel). The deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. As a result, the deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. The top panel of Chart II-4 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation. Meanwhile, both core and headline inflation have undershot the central bank’s target (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Very low inflation and crumbling real growth have caused nominal GDP growth to drop below borrowing rates (Chart II-5). This is hitting borrowers’ ability to service their debt and is leading to swelling non-performing loans (NPLs). Chart II-4Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Chart II-5Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates   Bank Stocks Remain At Risk The outlook for bank stocks that make up 48% of the Indonesia MSCI equity index is bleak. Chart II-6 shows that non-performing loans and special-mention loans (which are composed of doubtful loans) were rising before the pandemic shock. This has forced commercial banks to boost their bad loans provisioning, which has hurt their profitability. Additionally, Indonesian commercial banks’ net interest margins (NIM) have been falling sharply (Chart II-7). This has occurred because, on the revenues side, interest earnings have mushroomed as debtors have halted their interest payments while, on the expenditures side, commercial banks were forced to keep on paying interests to depositors. To protect their profitability, commercial banks have kept their lending rates stubbornly high. However, doing so will end up backfiring – as elevated lending rates punish borrowers and end up causing NPLs to rise, leading to more profit weakness. Chart II-6Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Chart II-7Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling   Crucially, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat – which now account for a whopping 37% of the Indonesia MSCI market cap – are vulnerable. Both commercial banks are heavily exposed to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and small and medium (SME) companies. Particularly, 40% of Bank Central Asia’s loan book is linked to SOEs and government-led projects across electricity, ports, airports and cement among other sectors. Meanwhile, 68% of Bank Rakyat’s loan book is leveraged to the SME sector and 20% to large companies, including SOEs. Worryingly, both SOEs and SMEs have been undergoing stress. Their profitability and debt servicing ability were questionable even before the COVID-19 pandemic. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): The debt servicing ability for these companies has deteriorated. The debt-to-EBITDA ratio has risen considerably while the EBITDA coverage of interest expenses is set to fall from already low levels (Chart II-8). Small & Medium Enterprises (SME): The debt serviceability of the top 40% of the MSCI-listed small cap stocks is also deteriorating. The top panel of Chart II-9 shows that these companies’ debt-to-EBITDA has risen substantially, and that the EBITDA-to-interest expense ratio has plunged (Chart II-9, bottom panel). Chart II-8Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Chart II-9Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity   Chart II-10Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps All in all, both Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat are set to experience a considerable new NPL cycle emanating from the poor profitability of SOEs and SMEs. Importantly, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat’s respective NPLs at 1.3% and 2.6% were relatively low at the start of this year and have much room to rise. Neither are their valuations appealing. At a price-to-book value of 4.4 Bank Central Asia is expensive. As for Bank Rakyat while its multiples are not as high as Bank Central Asia’s (which is trading at a price-to-book value of 1.8), it is not particularly cheap either, considering its enormous exposure to Indonesia’s struggling SME sector.  Bottom Line: The outlook for bank stocks is murky (Chart II-10). Apart from banks, the rest of the Indonesian stock market has been performing very poorly and there is no obvious evidence that this will change (Chart II-10, bottom two panels). Investment Conclusions Continue underweighting the Indonesian stock market. Bank stocks remain at risk. Moreover, there is evidence that retail investors have been active in the stock market as of late. When the stock market does relapse, retail investors will likely rush to sell their holdings, thereby magnifying the equity selloff. Dedicated EM local currency bonds and credit portfolios should continue underweighting Indonesia. Investors in Indonesia’s corporate US dollar bonds should tread carefully as the largest issuers are those SOEs that have experienced deteriorating creditworthiness. Chart II-11Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies If the US dollar continues to depreciate, the rupiah could stabilize and rebound but it will underperform other EM and DM currencies. Return on capital (ROC) is the ultimate driver of EM currencies. Given the magnitude of the recession Indonesia is in and the slow recovery it will experience, its ROC will remain weak. This will weigh on the rupiah (Chart II-11). We continue shorting the rupiah against an equally weighted basket of the euro, Swiss franc and Japanese yen. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkey: The Ramifications Of A Money Plethora Turkey is facing another currency turmoil. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Chart III-1 demonstrates that narrow money (M1) and broad money (M3) are booming at 90% and 50%, respectively, from a year ago. These measures exclude foreign currency deposits. Bank loan annual growth has surged to 45% and commercial bank purchases of government bonds are skyrocketing (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Turkey's Money Overflow Turkey's Money Overflow Turkey's Money Overflow Chart III-2Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks     In turn, the Central Bank of Turkey’s (CBRT) funding of commercial banks has surged (Chart III-3). By providing ample liquidity the CBRT has enabled commercial banks to engage in a credit frenzy and levy of government debt. The latter has capped local currency bond yields at a time when the private sector and foreign investors have been reluctant to finance the government bond given its current yields. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Consistent with this expanding money bubble, inflation in Turkey remains in a structural uptrend (Chart III-4). Core and service sector consumer price inflation is close to 12% and will rise even further due to the overflow of money in the economy. Besides, residential property prices are already soaring, in local currency terms, as residents are fleeing from liras. Chart III-3Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Chart III-4Structurally Rising Inflation Structurally Rising Inflation Structurally Rising Inflation   Still, the central bank refuses to acknowledge these inflationary pressures and to tighten its policy stance. Monetary authorities remain well behind the inflation curve. The policy rate, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), is -2%. In the past, when real policy rates have dropped to this level, the exchange rate has often tumbled, as in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2018 (Chart III-5). Chart III-5Numerous Headwinds For The Lira Numerous Headwinds For The Lira Numerous Headwinds For The Lira In regard to balance of payments, the current account deficit is widening again due to the plunge in exports and tourism revenues and the recovering imports (Chart III-5, bottom panel). Historically, a widening current account deficit has weighed on the currency. Lastly, the central bank is not in the position to defend the exchange rate much longer. Not only has it depleted its own reserves but it has also used up $70 billion of commercial banks deposits and entered a $55 billion foreign exchange swap. Hence, its is massively short on US dollars. Bottom Line: As part of our broader currency strategy, on July 9, we replaced our short Turkish lira versus the US dollar position with a short in TRY versus a basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This switch has proved to be very profitable and we continue recommending it. Consequently, investors should continue underweighting Turkish stocks, local currency bonds and credit markets relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed-income investors should consider betting on higher inflation expectations, i.e. going long domestic inflation adjusted yields and shorting nominal yields. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, we will be sending you a Special Report from my colleague Garry Evans, Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist. Garry will be discussing the social and industrial changes that will remain in place even after the COVID-19 pandemic is over, and how investors should tilt their portfolios to take advantage of them. I hope you find his report insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The number of coronavirus cases in the US appears to have peaked. Negotiations to avert a fiscal cliff continue in Washington. While we expect a deal to be reached, markets could tread nervously until this happens. The US dollar will weaken further over the next 12 months. Narrowing interest rate differentials, a revival in global growth, deteriorating momentum, and pricey valuations all bode poorly for the greenback. Global equities in general, and non-US stocks in particular, tend to fare well in a weak dollar environment. Small cap and value stocks usually outperform when the dollar weakens. Bank shares should start to do better as yield curves steepen and faster economic growth reduces concerns over non-performing loans. US Virus Wave Cresting, But Fiscal Risks Intensifying Chart 1US: Number Of New Cases Seems To Be Peaking The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Last week, we argued that the two biggest near-term threats to stocks and other risky assets were the rising number of coronavirus cases in parts of the US and the looming fiscal cliff.1 Since then, the news on the virus has been broadly positive, while developments on the fiscal front have been mixed. Chart 1 shows that the number of new cases seems to have peaked in the US. In Texas, Florida, California, and Arizona, the share of doctor visits linked to suspected Covid infections is trending lower. This metric leads diagnoses by about one-to-two weeks (Chart 2).   Chart 2Doctor Visits, Which Lead Diagnoses, Are Trending Lower The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Over half the US population lives in states that have either suspended or reversed reopening plans (Chart 3). Assuming the number of infections keeps falling and fiscal policy is not unduly tightened, household spending and employment growth – which appear to have stalled out in the second half of July – should begin to pick up. Chart 3Not So Fast The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Unfortunately, the assumption that fiscal policy will remain stimulative looks somewhat shaky. Expanded unemployment benefits for 30 million Americans, consisting mainly of an additional $600 per week for unemployed workers, are set to expire at the end of July. Congressional Republicans have suggested trimming benefits to $200 per week. However, even that would represent a fiscal tightening of nearly 3% of GDP. A Question Of Incentives The Republican position is understandable, given that two-thirds of unemployed workers are currently receiving more in unemployment benefits than they earned while working. Thus, some scaling back of benefits is not only inevitable, but desirable. The question is one of timing. While job openings have risen from their lows, they are still 23% below where they were at the start of the year. According to the NFIB survey, the share of small businesses reporting difficulty in finding qualified workers has also fallen from year-ago levels. When the binding constraint on employment is a shortage of jobs rather than a shortage of workers, higher unemployment benefits will likely boost hiring. This is because increased benefits will increase spending on goods and services across the economy, thus augmenting the demand for labor. Debt, Gold, And The Dollar Chart 4Gold Prices Have Risen On The Back Of Falling Real Yields Gold Prices Have Risen On The Back Of Falling Real Yields Gold Prices Have Risen On The Back Of Falling Real Yields Does the inevitable increase in government debt due to ongoing fiscal stimulus portend disaster down the road? According to many commentators, the recent drop in the dollar and the surge in gold prices is surely telling us that it does. While it is a compelling story, it is mainly false. The yield on the 30-year Treasury bond currently stands at 1.20%, down from 1.5% in mid-June and 2.33% at the start of the year. Bondholders may be many things, but masochistic is not one of them. If they really thought a fiscal crisis was around the corner, yields would be a lot higher. So why is the dollar falling and gold rallying? The answer is inflation expectations have risen off very low levels, which has pushed down real yields. Gold prices are almost perfectly correlated with real interest rates (Chart 4). The Real Reason The Dollar Has Fallen Going into this year, US real yields had a lot more room to decline than rates abroad. For example, at the start of 2019, US real 2-year yields were 221 bps above comparable euro area yields. Today, US real rates are 35 bps lower – a swing of 256 bps. Yield differentials have narrowed against other economies as well, which has pushed down the value of the dollar (Chart 5). In addition, relative growth dynamics have hurt the greenback. The US economy tends to be less cyclical than most of its trading partners. While the US benefits from faster global growth, the rest of the world benefits even more. This causes capital to flow from the US to other countries, leading to a weaker dollar (Chart 6). Chart 5The Greenback Has Been Losing Interest Rate Support The Greenback Has Been Losing Interest Rate Support The Greenback Has Been Losing Interest Rate Support Chart 6The Dollar Usually Weakens When Global Growth Accelerates The Dollar Usually Weakens When Global Growth Accelerates The Dollar Usually Weakens When Global Growth Accelerates   Chart 7The Dollar And Cycles The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategist, Chester Ntonifor, has stressed that the dollar typically fares worst in the initial stages of business cycle recoveries (Chart 7). That is the stage we are in today. Indeed, the gap in growth between the US and the rest of the world is likely to be larger than usual over the next few quarters because the pandemic has hit the US harder than most other developed economies. Momentum is also working against the dollar. Being a contrarian is usually a smart investment strategy. That is not the case when it comes to trading the dollar. With the dollar, you want to follow the herd.  This is because the dollar is a high momentum currency (Chart 8). A simple trading rule that buys the dollar when it is trading above its 50-day or 200-day moving average, and sells the dollar when it is trading below its respective moving averages, has historically made a lot of money. Likewise, the dollar performs best prospectively when sentiment is bullish and improving (Chart 9). Currently, the dollar is trading below its various moving averages. Sentiment is also poor and deteriorating (Chart 10).   Chart 8USD Is A High Momentum Currency The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Chart 9Trading The Dollar: The Trend Is Your Friend The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Chart 10The Dollar Has Started Breaking Down The Dollar Has Started Breaking Down The Dollar Has Started Breaking Down   Chart 11The Dollar Is Still Fairly Expensive The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar If the dollar were cheap, all the factors discussed above could be overlooked. But the dollar is not cheap. It is still pricey based on purchasing power parity measures which compare the common-currency cost of identical consumption bundles from one country to the next (Chart 11). A Weaker Dollar is Bullish For Stocks, Especially Non-US Stocks Global equities in general, and non-US stocks in particular, tend to perform well when the dollar is weakening (Chart 12). Chart 12A Weaker Dollar Should Help Global Equities A Weaker Dollar Should Help Global Equities A Weaker Dollar Should Help Global Equities   Chart 13Cyclicals Tend To Outperform Defensives In A Falling Dollar Environment Cyclicals Tend To Outperform Defensives In A Falling Dollar Environment Cyclicals Tend To Outperform Defensives In A Falling Dollar Environment Cyclical sectors such as industrials, energy, and materials normally outperform defensives in a weak dollar environment (Chart 13). Relative profit growth in these sectors tends to rise when the dollar depreciates (Chart 14). To the extent that cyclicals are overrepresented in stock market indices outside the US, this gives non-US equities a leg up. Chart 14Relative Profit Growth In Cyclical Sectors Tend To Rise When The USD Depreciates Relative Profit Growth In Cyclical Sectors Tend To Rise When The USD Depreciates Relative Profit Growth In Cyclical Sectors Tend To Rise When The USD Depreciates EM Is The Big Winner From Dollar Weakness A weaker dollar is particularly beneficial to emerging markets. Commodity prices usually rise when the dollar drops (Chart 15). Rising resource prices are good news for many emerging markets. EM debt dynamics also tend to improve when the dollar weakens. EM external debt has grown in recent years (Chart 16). About 80% of EM foreign currency denominated debt is in dollars. A falling dollar reduces the local-currency value of US dollar-denominated liabilities, thus strengthening the balance sheets of many EM companies and governments. Emerging markets with large current account deficits and significant dollar liabilities such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, and Mexico will outperform EMs that generally run current account surpluses and have little in the way of foreign-currency debt. Chart 15Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Falls Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Falls Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Falls Chart 16EM External Debt Has Grown In Recent Years EM External Debt Has Grown In Recent Years EM External Debt Has Grown In Recent Years The Federal Reserve today is trying to engineer an easing in US financial conditions. A weaker dollar is facilitating that goal. Historically, EM stocks have been almost perfectly inversely correlated with US financial conditions (Chart 17). Chart 17EM Equities Benefit From Easier US Financial Conditions EM Equities Benefit From Easier US Financial Conditions EM Equities Benefit From Easier US Financial Conditions What About DM? The impact of a weaker dollar on the stock markets of developed economies is more nuanced. Consider the euro area, for example. On the one hand, a stronger euro hurts the euro area economy, which can ultimately push down domestic profits. A stronger EUR/USD also reduces the profits of European companies with operations in the US when those profits are converted back into euros. That can also hurt European stocks. On the other hand, the overall reflationary effect of a weaker dollar on global growth tends to push up profits. In practice, the latter effect usually dominates the former. Thus, euro area stocks, just like stocks in most other markets, generally outperform the US when the dollar is weakening (Chart 18). Chart 18ANon-US Stock Markets Do Well Vis-À-Vis The US When The Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stock Markets Do Well Vis-À-Vis The US When The Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stock Markets Do Well Vis-À-Vis The US When The Dollar Is Weakening Chart 18BNon-US Stock Markets Do Well Vis-À-Vis The US When The Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stock Markets Do Well Vis-À-Vis The US When The Dollar Is Weakening Non-US Stock Markets Do Well Vis-À-Vis The US When The Dollar Is Weakening Small Caps And Value Stocks Tend To Outperform When The Dollar Weakens Even though companies in the small cap Russell 2000 index generate less of their sales from abroad than those in the S&P 500, small caps still tend to outperform large caps in weak dollar environments (Chart 19). This is partly because smaller companies are more cyclical in nature. It is also because the US dollar performs best in a risk-off setting when investors are pouring money into the safe-haven Treasury markets. In contrast, small caps excel in a risk-on environment. Value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks in a weaker dollar environment (Chart 20). Like small caps, cyclical equity sectors are overrepresented in value indices. Financials also tend to punch above their weight in value indices. Chart 19Small Caps Tend To Outperform Large Caps During Weak Dollar Environments... Small Caps Tend To Outperform Large Caps During Weak Dollar Environments... Small Caps Tend To Outperform Large Caps During Weak Dollar Environments... Chart 20...The Same Goes For Value Stocks ...The Same Goes For Value Stocks ...The Same Goes For Value Stocks Small caps and value stocks outperformed between 2000 and 2008, a time when the US dollar was generally weakening. That period saw both a commodity boom and a wave of debt-fueled housing booms. The former lifted commodity prices, while the latter buoyed financials. Commodity prices should rise over the next 12 months thanks to a rebound in global growth and copious Chinese stimulus. Chart 21 shows that the Chinese credit impulse is on track to reach the highest levels since the Global Financial Crisis, while the fiscal deficit will probably hit a record 8% of GDP. The Outlook For Financial Stocks Gauging the outlook for financials is trickier. Credit growth has slowed sharply since the Global Financial Crisis, which has weighed on bank profits. The structural decline in bond yields has also been toxic for bank shares (Chart 22). Lower bond yields tend to translate into flatter yield curves, which can depress net interest margins. Chart 21China Has Opened The Spigots China Has Opened The Spigots China Has Opened The Spigots Chart 22The Structural Decline In Bond Yields Has Been Negative For Bank And Value Stocks The Structural Decline In Bond Yields Has Been Negative For Bank And Value Stocks The Structural Decline In Bond Yields Has Been Negative For Bank And Value Stocks A falling dollar has historically been associated with higher bond yields (Chart 23). As global growth recovers over the next 12 months, bond yields will edge higher. That said, central bank bond purchases, coupled with aggressive forward guidance, will keep bond yields from rising as much as they normally would. And even if nominal yields do rise, inflation expectations will rise even more, implying that real yields will fall further. Falling real yields tend to benefit growth stocks more than they benefit value stocks. Chart 23Bond Yields Tend To Rise When The Dollar Weakens Bond Yields Tend To Rise When The Dollar Weakens Bond Yields Tend To Rise When The Dollar Weakens Still, even a modest steepening of the yield curve will be good for bank earnings. A recovery in economic activity should also dampen concerns about a spike in bad loans. Credit spreads normally fall when economic growth is improving and the dollar is weakening (Chart 24). Banks have significantly increased provisions since the start of the year, which has depressed reported earnings. If some of those provisions are reversed, profits will jump. Chart 24Credit Spreads Tend To Fall When Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening Credit Spreads Tend To Fall When Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening Credit Spreads Tend To Fall When Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening Credit Spreads Tend To Fall When Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening Credit Spreads Tend To Fall When Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening Chart 25Bank And Value Stocks Are Quite Cheap The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Moreover, bank stocks in particular, and value stocks in general, are extremely cheap by historic standards (Chart 25). Thus, while the case for favoring value over growth is not as clear-cut as it could be, it is strong enough that long term-oriented investors should consider moving capital from high-flying tech stocks to unloved value stocks.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Will Bond Yields Ever Go Up?” dated July 24, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar The Stock Market Implications Of A Weaker Dollar  

Highlights China’s healthcare expenditure is projected to rise due to the increasing affluence and rapid aging of its population. The desire to access healthcare services beyond the basic coverage provided by the public health insurance will increasingly prompt people to purchase health insurance products from private insurers. We recommend going long Chinese insurance stocks in absolute terms. We also recommend accumulating and overweighting Chinese healthcare stocks on a 15% correction. Feature The aging population and the rapidly expanding middle class in China entail that healthcare expenditures will remain on a secular growth trajectory. The COVID-19 outbreak will function as a catalyst for the rapid transformation of China's healthcare system. In fact, many game changing trends in global healthcare systems will probably be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Healthcare Expenditures: Still Low Health expenditures per capita in China grew substantially over the same period of time, but their level is still below those in most countries. Chart 1Chinese Healthcare Expenditure Will Grow 10% CAGR Chinese Healthcare Expenditure Will Grow 10% CAGR Chinese Healthcare Expenditure Will Grow 10% CAGR Health expenditures in China have grown considerably since the economic reforms started in 1978.  Between 1978 and 2018, total health expenditures in China grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 17% in nominal terms, higher than the 15% growth in nominal GDP (Chart 1, top panel). Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of China’s healthcare market, expenditures remained at a modest 6.4% of China’s GDP in 2018 (Chart 1, bottom panel), far below the OECD average of 9%. Health expenditures per capita in China grew substantially over the same period of time, but their level is still below those in most countries. In 2017, health expenditures per capita in China were $841 in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms, ranking 92nd worldwide. Japan, by comparison, ranks 18th with $4,550, and Korea ranks 31th with $3,000, both in PPP terms (Chart 2). Chart 2China Ranks Low In Health Expenditure Per Capita Worldwide China: Healthcare Now And Beyond China: Healthcare Now And Beyond Healthcare Capacity And Healthy China 2030 Chart 3China Healthcare Capacities Are Rising Fast China Healthcare Capacities Are Rising Fast China Healthcare Capacities Are Rising Fast Access to adequate healthcare is crucial to social and economic development, as healthy human capital fosters productivity and economic growth. In China, healthcare capacity is still subdued. After the pandemic, authorities will divert resources to this sector to ensure it expands quickly. In 2018, the number of physicians and nurses per 1000 Chinese people was 2.6 and 2.9, respectively (Chart 3), far below the OECD average of 3.5 physicians and 8.8 nurses per 1,000 people. Hospital beds per 1000 people is 4.3 in China, compared to an average of 4.7 across OECD countries. In Japan and Korea, the measure is much higher, at 13.1 and 12.3 beds per 1,000 people, respectively (Chart 3, bottom panel). China released the Healthy China 2030 (HC 2030) blueprint in 2016, covering public health services, environmental management, the medical industry, and food and drug safety. The five specific goals of this blueprint are to improve the population’s health, control against major risks, increase the capacity of healthcare services, grow the scale of the healthcare industry, and improve the health service system generally. This program has set targets for health service capacity, including an increase in the number of doctors, nurses and beds per 1,000 people to 3, 4.7 and 6, respectively, by the year 2030. The blueprint also aims to further ease the financial burden imposed on the population by the cost of healthcare and medical treatments. Currently, in China, 29% of health costs are paid by individuals; HC 2030 recommends a reduction to 25%. We will discuss these objectives in the next section. Healthcare Financing: A Looming Funding Crunch The aging population, along with its rising income, will drive up health expenditures in the years to come. Chart 4China Elderly Population Will Rise Significantly China Elderly Population Will Rise Significantly China Elderly Population Will Rise Significantly There are currently more than 167 million people over the age of 65 in China. By this measure, China is already the largest eldercare market in the world in terms of the absolute number of elderly people. What is more, China’s elderly population is growing rapidly and is expected to reach almost 200 million by 2025 (Chart 4). The aging population, along with its rising income, will drive up health expenditures in the years to come. As health expenditures grow, so will investment opportunities. Global healthcare systems can generally be classified into the three categories shown in Table 1. China’s health insurance system more closely resembles Germany’s national social health insurance system than the US commercial health insurance model. China’s healthcare system and insurance scheme is illustrated in Table 2. Table 1Overview Of Major Healthcare Systems Worldwide China: Healthcare Now And Beyond China: Healthcare Now And Beyond Table 2Main Features Of China's Three Basis Social Health Insurance Schemes China: Healthcare Now And Beyond China: Healthcare Now And Beyond In 2000, just over 20% of Chinese citizens had healthcare coverage. The SARS outbreak in 2003 was a wake-up call for Chinese leaders. Thanks to heavy government subsidies and political commitments, China achieved universal health insurance coverage in 2011, when nearly 95% of its 1.4 billion people had health insurance. This represents the largest and fastest expansion of insurance coverage in human history. Chart 5Individuals Health Expenditures Remain High Individuals Health Expenditures Remain High Individuals Health Expenditures Remain High However, the government-sponsored health insurance plan provides for only basic coverage. Government budgetary spending accounted for 28% of total health expenditures in 2018 and the population’s out-of-pocket costs amounted to 29%, such that the remaining 43% was covered by the public social health insurance contributions (Chart 5). China’s health insurance is supervised at the national level and guided by the principle that all citizens are entitled to receive basic healthcare. Nevertheless, local governments are ultimately responsible for funding and offering these health services. This leads to unevenly distributed healthcare capacities across different provinces, as more resources are concentrated in wealthier jurisdictions. People can only receive a reimbursement for healthcare costs from their province of residence, as indicated on their hukou registration documents. Migrant urban professionals and laborers have to return to the place of their household registration to access healthcare. Chinese policy makers have been working on reforming the reimbursement system now for many years. As of the end of 2019, 3.95 million people have benefited from inter-provincial health insurance settlements. Relying heavily on local government contributions to healthcare expenditures is the primary reason why government spending on healthcare is relatively low, at only 1.7% of GDP and 7% of total general (central and local) government spending1 (Chart 6). Government expenditures on social security (which includes contributions to social health insurance, pension, unemployment and work injury insurance) make up 12% of overall government spending.1 The outbreak of COVID-19 sounded the alarm across Chinese society. Building a comprehensive and effective healthcare system with adequate capacity will become one of the most important priorities over the coming decade. The people’s well-being will be critical to social stability as its increasingly affluent population is asking for better healthcare services. Chart 6Government Spending In Healthcare Government Spending In Healthcare Government Spending In Healthcare Chart 7China: A Rapidly Aging Population China: A Rapidly Aging Population China: A Rapidly Aging Population However, the overall sustainability of the current healthcare financing scheme is questionable. Chart 7 shows the old age-dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of older dependents (people over the age of 64) to the working-age population (25 to 64-year old). The ratio is expected to increase from the current 19% to 30% in 2030. This means a decreasing contribution to social insurance budgets from the working population and an increase in healthcare spending on seniors. What makes the situation worse is the opacity of the National Social Security Fund (SSF). The SSF manages money reserved for pension and insurance disbursements related to medical, unemployment and injury needs for future use. Of the 2.6 trillion RMB under SSF management, at the end of 2019, over 90% are invested domestically. The fund’s average 10-year investment return is close to 6%, which is lower than the average nominal GDP growth rate of 11%, over the same period. With declining revenues from workforce contributions and rising healthcare costs, the ability of the social security system to finance proper healthcare service provisions  is endangered. Furthermore, the replenishing of the SSF, so far, has depended on central government contributions and asset transfers from state-owned enterprises to the SSF. Bottom Line: As demand for healthcare services increases, the current public scheme for financing healthcare is going to be increasingly unable to cover the costs. Private Health Insurance Private health insurance offers a more extensive level of protection than the state-based coverage. Currently, most private health insurance plans provide supplementary insurance products to complement public health insurance plans. Supplementary insurance and critical illness products are the most popular because the public insurance systems cannot fully cover the cost of catastrophic illnesses. The private health insurance industry has been thriving in recent years and is expected to continue growing  because of increased consumer awareness. The written premiums attributed to health insurance registered a compound annual growth rate of 36% between 2013 and 2019 (Chart 8). However, penetration into China’s health insurance market remains far behind that of more developed markets, signaling huge growth potential. One measure of insurance industry penetration is insurance depth. It is defined as the percentage of the GDP attributed to the total written premium for insurance. China’s insurance depth is currently 0.7% for health insurance and 4.2% for overall insurance (Chart 9), whereas the overall insurance depth is 11% in South Korea, 9% in Japan, and 7% in the US. Chart 8Health Insurance Premiums Are Skyrocketing Health Insurance Premiums Are Skyrocketing Health Insurance Premiums Are Skyrocketing Chart 9China: Health Insurance Penetration China: Health Insurance Penetration China: Health Insurance Penetration Faced with financial strains and a growing demand for healthcare services, the government is supporting private healthcare providers by relaxing regulatory restrictions and offering tax incentives to Chinese consumers when they buy health insurance. Private health insurance offers the growing middle-income class a more extensive level of protection than the state-based coverage. In regard to insurance companies’ asset management, the regulators raised the equity investment cap for all insurers earlier this month from 30% to 45% of total assets. In May of this year, regulators also allowed insurers to invest in the secondary capital bonds issued by banks, as well as in perpetual bonds. This expanded investment opportunity should help insurers diversify their investment portfolios and therefore increase the efficacy of their asset/liability management (ALM). Bottom Line:  Private health insurance offers the growing middle-income class a more extensive level of protection than the state-based coverage. This underdeveloped private insurance market presents substantial opportunities. Investment Conclusions As China’s population ages, incomes rise and private healthcare services expand, investment opportunities will also increase. In short, the growth trajectory of China’s healthcare sector warrants investors’ attention. To play on this healthcare theme in China, we are initiating two strategic investment positions: First, go long Chinese insurance companies in absolute terms. Chinese insurer stocks have rallied in absolute terms since March lows, but then lagged relative to the benchmark (Chart 10 & 11); Chart 10Chinese Insurance Stocks: Rising In Absolute Terms... Chinese Insurance Stocks: Rising In Absolute Terms... Chinese Insurance Stocks: Rising In Absolute Terms... Chart 11…But Underperforming The Benchmark ...But Underperforming The Benchmark ...But Underperforming The Benchmark Double-digit CAGR of insurance premiums entails a steady asset expansion (Chart 8 on page 8). High and steady growth at a time of a low discount factor warrants high equity multiples. The private insurance industry’s gross profit margin proxy, calculated as insurance premiums minus insurance payments, divided by insurance premiums, amount to a whopping of 67%, with health insurance at 65% and life insurance at 87% (Chart 12). The equity valuations are reasonable. Unlike the tech and media sectors of the new economy, that have sky-high multiples, the trailing price to earnings ratio for insurers is still 8.8, 45% lower than the 10-year average. (Chart 13). Chart 12Chinese Insurance Companies: Outstanding Gross Profit Margins Chinese Insurance Companies: Outstanding Gross Profit Margins Chinese Insurance Companies: Outstanding Gross Profit Margins Chart 13Attractive Valuations Attractive Valuations Attractive Valuations Insurance company assets will be better managed going forward due to the new asset/liability management (ALM) requirements imposed by the regulators. The ALM requirements were announced in March 2018 and then fully implemented in July 2019. The rules introduced quantitative risk-adjusted measurements to help insurers more accurately capture the risk of duration mismatch, negative spread and liquidity strain. The CBIRC regularly evaluates and ranks the competence of insurers’ ALM against peers. The key risk to shareholders of insurance companies is the credit risk of their portfolio. 39% of insurance sector portfolios are invested in other investments, which include long-term equity investments, project-based debt schemes, trust plans and asset management (Chart 14). Credit risks stemming from credit claims and asset management products warrant careful investor consideration. Chart 14Investment Portfolio Of The Insurance Industry China: Healthcare Now And Beyond China: Healthcare Now And Beyond Chart 15Healthcare Stocks Have Rallied Massively... Healthcare Stocks Have Rallied Massively... Healthcare Stocks Have Rallied Massively... Second, accumulate Chinese healthcare stocks on a 15% correction in absolute terms (Chart 15). While we believe that healthcare stocks are in a secular bull market, they have already rallied a lot since recent lows, and they are pricing in a lot of short-term good news. Chinese investable healthcare stocks registered 55% returns since the outbreak of COVID-19. The trailing P/E ratio reached 51, a decade high since 2010 (Chart 16). We are reluctant to buy and overweight this sector now and would wait for a better entry point. Chart 16...And Are Now Too Expensive ...And Are Now Too Expensive ...And Are Now Too Expensive   Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst LinX@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Does not include quasi-fiscal (off-balance sheet) government spending.