Financials

Highlights Stay tactically overweight to equities for the time being. Close the overweight to industrial commodities versus equities. The financials, basic resources, and industrials equity sectors can continue to outperform for a few months longer. EM can also continue to outperform DM for a few months longer. Overweight Germany’s DAX versus German bunds. The second half of the year is going to be much tougher than the first half. Feature Chart of the WeekPessimism Was Overdone: The Classical Cyclicals And EM Are Rebounding Pessimism Was Overdone: The Classical Cyclicals And EM Are Rebounding Pessimism Was Overdone: The Classical Cyclicals And EM Are Rebounding Locked In An Intimate Embrace Last week, we highlighted a frustrating truth: for the past 16 months the broad equity market has been on a journey to nowhere. Yet the journey has been far from boring. There have been exciting detours of 10-15 percent in both directions, albeit these moves have been short-lived, lasting no more than three months at a time. The same truth applies to the broad bond market: for the past sixteen months the global long bond yield – defined here as the average of the yields on the 30-year German bund yield and 30-year T-bond – has also ended up going nowhere. On this journey too, there have been exciting detours of up to 50 basis points in both directions, but these moves have also lasted no more than three months before retracing. It follows that for the past 16 months, the strategic allocation to equities, bonds and cash has had zero impact on investment performance, but the tactical allocation to the asset classes has had a huge impact. Yet here’s the thing: the sharp tactical moves in the bond market and in the stock market have been intimately embraced. When the global long bond yield has approached the top of its range, it has catalysed a sharp sell-off in equities; and when the bond yield has approached the bottom of its range, it has catalysed a sharp rally in equities (Chart I-2). In fact, over the past 16 months, asset allocation has boiled down to a very simple trading rule based on the global long bond yield: above 2.2 percent, sell equities; below 1.95 percent, buy equities. Today, the yield stands at 1.85 percent, suggesting a tactically overweight stance to equities. Chart I-2The Sharp Tactical Moves In The Bond Market And Stock Market Are Intimately Connected The Sharp Tactical Moves In The Bond Market And Stock Market Are Intimately Connected The Sharp Tactical Moves In The Bond Market And Stock Market Are Intimately Connected The Persistent Trends Are In Sectors Some investors cannot shift their portfolios quickly enough to exploit the tactical opportunities in the markets. They need trends that persist for at least six months to a year. The good news is that these more persistent trends do exist, but to find them you have to look at equity sectors, and specifically the classically cyclical sectors (Chart of the Week). The financials and basic resources sectors were in strong relative downtrends through most of 2018; but for the last four months these classically cyclical sectors have flipped into very clear uptrends (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). The same is true for industrials, albeit the end of the downtrend has happened more recently (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Financials Are Rebounding Financials Are Rebounding Financials Are Rebounding Chart I-4Basic Resources Are Rebounding Basic Resources Are Rebounding Basic Resources Are Rebounding Chart I-5Industrials Are Rebounding Industrials Are Rebounding Industrials Are Rebounding For the avoidance of doubt, technology is not a classically cyclical sector because the sales of technology products – particularly to consumers – are relatively insensitive to short-term fluctuations in the economy. In fact, the relative performance of technology is an almost perfect mirror-image of financials (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Technology Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical The Technology Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical The Technology Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical Neither is the chemicals sector a classical cyclical. Given that raw material prices are an input cost for chemical manufacturers, the chemicals sector can underperform when raw material prices are rising in a cyclical up-oscillation (Chart I-7). It follows that the three true classically cyclical sectors are: financials, basic resources and industrials. Chart I-7The Chemicals Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical The Chemicals Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical The Chemicals Sector Is Not A Classical Cyclical What if your investment process does not allow you to invest in sectors and benefit from their well-defined and longer trends? The good news is that you can play these same trends through regional and country stock market indexes. We refer readers to previous reports for the details, but the crucial message is that regional and country relative performances stem from nothing more than the stock markets’ defining sector skews combined with sector relative performances.1 This revelation of what truly drives regional and country relative performance is bittersweet. It is sweet because it simplifies an investment process that can be very complicated. But it is also bitter because it highlights that the investment industry is still replete with unnecessary layers of complexity. Still, just to drive home the point, we would like the charts to do the talking. The relative performance of financials, the relative performance of Italy’s MIB, and the relative performance of Emerging Markets (EM) versus Developed Markets (DM) are all effectively one and the same story (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8One And The Same Story: Financials And Italy... One And The Same Story: Financials And Italy... One And The Same Story: Financials And Italy... Chart I-9...And Financials And EM Versus DM ...And Financials And EM Versus DM ...And Financials And EM Versus DM What Are The Markets Telling Us, And Do We Agree? Another very common question we get is: what is our forecast for economic growth and profits growth? For example, two questions on everyone’s lips right now are: can Germany avoid a technical recession, and what is our forecast for Germany’s growth from here? These are indeed important questions, but for investors they are not the most important questions. Financial markets are a discounting mechanism. So for investors, the most important question should always be: what is discounted in the current market price, and is that too optimistic or too pessimistic? Over-optimism and over-pessimism on the economy are especially important for the classically cyclical sectors because their profits have a very high operational gearing to their sales: a small change in the sales outcome has a huge impact on the profit outcome and, therefore, the price.  If the price is discounting a booming economy and what actually transpires is that the economy grows modestly, then a seemingly benign outcome of respectable growth will paradoxically cause the price to slump. Conversely, if the price is discounting a very pessimistic outcome and what actually transpires is anything better than the ultra-pessimism, then even a bad outcome will paradoxically cause the price to soar. In this regard, the recent underperformance of Germany’s DAX versus German bunds is at an extreme not far from that during the euro sovereign debt crisis in 2011-12 (Chart I-10). So the important question for investors is: will the actual economic outcome transpire to be as extreme as that? Our answer is that the extreme underperformance of the DAX versus bunds is discounting an overly pessimistic outcome, and on that basis the correct stance is to be overweight the DAX versus bunds.   Chart I-10Overly Pessimistic: The DAX Versus Bunds Overly Pessimistic: The DAX Versus Bunds Overly Pessimistic: The DAX Versus Bunds Turning to the classical cyclicals, these sectors have rebounded because their embedded assumptions for growth reached peak pessimism in October. Since then, the pessimism has abated at the margin because of improving short-term impulses from Chinese stimulus, lower global bond yields, and sharply lower energy prices. Given that positive (and negative) impulse phases reliably tend to last for six to eight months, our expectation is that this tailwind for the classical cyclical sectors – financials, basic resources, and industrials – can continue for a few months longer. Which means that the outperformance of EM versus DM can also continue for a few months longer. In terms of asset allocation, long industrial commodities versus equities worked very powerfully at the end of last year, but the relative merits of the two asset classes are now more evenly balanced. Hence, we are now closing this position in profit. Finally, our major concern is for later in the year when the aforementioned improving short-term impulses will inevitably fade, and even potentially reverse. Bear in mind that the impulses arise from the short-term changes in credit flows, bond yields, and the oil price. It follows that to recreate these positive impulses for later in the year, bond yields and/or the oil price have to keep falling. This is not our base case, so enjoy the positive impulses while they last! As the year progresses the investment environment is going to get much tougher. Fractal Trading System* The sharp underperformance of the Nikkei 225 versus the Hang Seng is at the limit of tight liquidity that has signaled all of the recent trend reversals in this relative position. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to go long the Nikkei 225 versus the Hang Seng. Set a profit target of 4.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. We now have seven open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Long Nikkei 225 Vs. Hang Seng Long Nikkei 225 Vs. Hang Seng The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Oil, Banks, And Bonds: The Oddities Of 2018”, dated November 29, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

As Good As It Gets For Financials As Good As It Gets For Financials ​​​​​​​ Overweight In Monday’s Cyclical Indicator Update, we highlight our cyclical portfolio bent, driven by three core catalysts that we think will take U.S. equities higher. These are: a definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback, a continuation of the earnings juggernaut and a positive U.S./China trade resolution. One cyclical sector that looks particularly attractive is S&P financials. The divergence between the directions for our cyclical macro indicator (CMI) and our valuation indicator (VI) for financials has reached stunning levels. The CMI is accelerating into pre-GFC territory as credit quality, loan growth and unemployment are all in the sweet spot while the VI has fallen to two standard deviations below fair value. Our technical indicator (TI) sends a signal that financials are modestly oversold though this relatively neutral message does not diminish the most bullish signal in our cyclical indicator’s history. Bottom Line: We reiterate our overweight recommendation for S&P financials. Please see Monday’s Cyclical Indicator Update for more details on this as well as our cyclical indicator updates on the other GICS1 sectors and our large cap/small cap style preference.

Key Portfolio Highlights The S&P 500 has started 2019 with a bang as dovish cooing from the Fed has proven a tonic for equities. While we have not entirely retraced the path to the early-autumn highs, our strategy of staying cyclically exposed, based on our view of an absence of a recession in 2019, has proven a profitable one as investor capitulation reached extreme levels (Charts 1 & 2). Chart 1Capitulation Capitulation Capitulation Chart 2Selling Is Exhausted Selling Is Exhausted Selling Is Exhausted Importantly, risk premia have been deflating as the end-of-year spike in volatility has subsided and junk spreads have narrowed from the fear-induced heights in December (Chart 3). Chart 3Risk Premia Renormalization Risk Premia Renormalization Risk Premia Renormalization Nevertheless, in order for the reflex rebound since the late-December lows to morph into a durable rally, the macro/policy backdrop has to turn from a headwind to a tailwind. We are closely monitoring three potential positive catalysts: A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback A continuation of the earnings juggernaut A positive U.S./China trade resolution With respect to the first of these, the S&P 500 convulsed following the December 19 Fed meeting and suffered a cathartic 450 point peak-to-trough fall two months ago. The Fed likely made a policy error, and Fed Chair Powell’s resolve is getting tested as has happened with every Chair since Volcker (Charts 4 & 5). Chart 4Powell's Resolve Getting Tested Powell's Resolve Getting Tested Powell's Resolve Getting Tested Chart 5Fed Policy Mistake Fed Policy Mistake Fed Policy Mistake The rising odds of a pause in the Fed tightening cycle, at least for the first half of the year, will likely serve as a welcome respite for equities. Our second catalyst has been gaining steam through the Q4 earnings season which has seen continuation of the double-digit earnings growth of the prior three quarters. Our earnings model points to a moderation of earnings growth in the year to come, in line with sell-side expectations (Chart 6). Our 2019 year-end target remains 3,000 for the SPX, based on $181 2020 EPS and a 16.5x multiple.1 This represents a 6% EPS CAGR, assuming 2018 EPS ends near $162. Chart 6EPS Growth > 0 EPS Growth > 0 EPS Growth > 0 Chart 7 In Chart 7, we show that financials, health care and industrials are responsible for 61% of the SPX’s expected profit growth in 2019 while technology’s contribution has fallen to a mere 7.2%. While the risk of disappointment encompases financials, health care and industrials, there are high odds that tech surprises to the upside as it has borne the brunt of recent negative earnings revisions (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Earnings Revisions... Earnings Revisions... Earnings Revisions... Chart 9...Really Weigh On Tech ...Really Weigh On Tech ...Really Weigh On Tech Lastly, the negativity surrounding the slowdown in China is likely fully reflected in the market (Chart 10), implying an opportunity for a break out should a positive resolution to the U.S./China trade spat be delivered. China’s reflation efforts suggests that the Chinese authorities remain committed to injecting liquidity into their economy (Chart 11). Chart 10China Slowdown Baked In The Cake China Slowdown Baked In The Cake China Slowdown Baked In The Cake Chart 11Reflating Away Reflating Away Reflating Away Already, the PBOC balance sheet, with over $5.5tn in assets, is expanding anew. Empirical evidence suggests that SPX momentum and the ebb and flow of the PBOC balance sheet are joined at the hip, and the current message is positive (Chart 12). All of these underlie our style preferences for cyclicals over defensives2 and international large caps over domestically-geared small caps. Chart 12Heed The PBoC Message Heed The PBoC Message Heed The PBoC Message Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com S&P Financials (Overweight) The divergence between the directions for our CMI and valuation indicator (VI) for S&P financials has reached stunning levels, with the former accelerating into pre-GFC territory and the latter falling to two standard deviations below fair value. Our technical indicator (TI) is sending a relatively neutral message, though this does not diminish the most bullish signal in our cyclical indicator’s history (Chart 13). Chart 13S&P Financials (Overweight) S&P Financials (Overweight) S&P Financials (Overweight) The ongoing strength of the U.S. economy is the driver of such a positive indicator, particularly with respect to the key S&P banks sub index. Our total loans & leases growth model and BCA’s C&I loan growth model (second & bottom panels, Chart 14) are in positive territory. The latter is significant given that C&I loans are the single biggest credit category in bank loan books. Importantly, C&I loans have gone vertical recently topping the 10.5% growth mark despite softening capex intentions and CEO confidence. Further, multi-decade highs in consumer confidence are offsetting the Fed’s tightening cycle and suggest that consumer loans, another key lending category, will also gain traction (third panel, Chart 14). In the context of the generationally high employment rate, the implied lower defaults should drive amplified profit improvement from this credit growth. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 14Loan Growth Drives Profits Loan Growth Drives Profits Loan Growth Drives Profits S&P Industrials (Overweight) The still-solid domestic footing has maintained our industrials CMI close to its cyclical highs, which are also some of the most bullish in the history of the indicator. However, stock prices have not responded accordingly and our VI has descended mildly from neutral to undervalued. Our TI sends a much more definitive message and stands at a full standard deviation into oversold territory (Chart 15). Chart 1515. S&P Industrials (Overweight) 15. S&P Industrials (Overweight) 15. S&P Industrials (Overweight) While their cyclical peers S&P financials are almost exclusively a domestic play, S&P industrials have been weighed down by trade flare ups for most of the past year (bottom panel, Chart 16). Accordingly, much of the benefit of positive domestic capex indicators and the more tangible capital goods orders maintaining a supportive trajectory has failed to show up in relative EPS growth (second & third panels, Chart 16), though the latter has recently hooked much higher. Chart 16Industrial Earnings Growth Has Recovered Industrial Earnings Growth Has Recovered Industrial Earnings Growth Has Recovered S&P Materials (Overweight) Our materials CMI has made a turn, rising off its lowest level in 20 years. This has coincided with our VI bouncing off its cyclical low, though it remains in undervalued territory. The signal is shared by our TI which has only recently recovered from a full standard deviation into the oversold zone, a level that has historically presaged S&P materials rallies (Chart 17). Chart 17S&P Materials (Overweight) S&P Materials (Overweight) S&P Materials (Overweight) When we upgraded the S&P materials sector to overweight earlier this year, we noted that China macro dominates the direction of U.S. materials stocks. On the monetary front, the Chinese monetary easing cycle continues unabated and the near 150bps year-over-year drop in the 10-year Chinese Treasury yield will soon start to bear fruit (yield change shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel, Chart 18). The renminbi also moves in lockstep with relative share prices. The apparent de-escalation in the U.S./China trade tensions has boosted the CNY/USD and is signaling that a playable reflation trade is in the offing in the S&P materials sector (top panel, Chart 18). Chart 18Chinese Data Drives Materials Performance Chinese Data Drives Materials Performance Chinese Data Drives Materials Performance S&P Energy (Overweight) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally for the past six quarters, though this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Meanwhile both our VI and TI have descended steeply into buying territory with the former approaching two standard deviations below fair value (Chart 19). Chart 19S&P Energy (Overweight) S&P Energy (Overweight) S&P Energy (Overweight) As with the CMI, the relative share price ratio for the S&P energy index has moved laterally since our mid-summer 2017 upgrade to overweight. Interestingly, the integrated oil & gas energy subindex neither kept up with the steep oil price advance until the end of September, nor with the recent drubbing in crude oil prices (top panel, Chart 20). Put differently, oil majors never discounted sustainably higher oil prices, and are also refraining from extrapolating recent oil prices weakness far into the future. Chart 2020. The Stage Is Set For A Recovery In Crude Prices 20. The Stage Is Set For A Recovery In Crude Prices 20. The Stage Is Set For A Recovery In Crude Prices Nevertheless, the roughly 30% per annum growth in U.S. crude oil production is unsustainable and, were production to remain near all-time highs and move sideways in 2019, then the growth rate would fall back to the zero line. Such a paring back in the growth rate would likely balance the oil market and pave the way for an oil price recovery (oil production shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 20). This echoes BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, which continues to forecast higher oil prices into 2019, a forecast which should set the stage for a sustainable rebound next year in S&P energy profits, the opposite of what analysts currently expect (Chart 7). S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) An improving macro environment is reflected in our consumer staples CMI that has vaulted higher in recent months. However, the strong recent relative outperformance has also shown up in our VI which, though still in undervalued territory, has recovered significantly. Our TI has fully recovered and now sends a neutral message (Chart 21). Chart 21S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) The surging S&P household products sector has been carrying the S&P consumer staples index on its back as solid pricing efforts have been dragging results and forward guidance higher. While household product sales have been enjoying a multi-year growth phase (second panel, Chart 22), it has largely been driven by volumes. However, the recent resurgence in pricing power (third panel, Chart 22) has given volume gains an added kick, pushing sales further. Meanwhile, exports have continued their two-year ascent despite the tough currency environment and the upshot is that relative EPS growth will likely remain upbeat (bottom panel, Chart 22). In light of challenged EM consumer spending growth, this signal is very encouraging. Chart 22Household Products Is Carrying Staples Household Products Is Carrying Staples Household Products Is Carrying Staples S&P Health Care (Neutral) Our health care CMI has been treading water recently. Further, a recovery in pharma stocks has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, while our TI sends a distinctly bearish message as health care stocks have been overbought (Chart 23). Chart 23S&P Health Care (Neutral) S&P Health Care (Neutral) S&P Health Care (Neutral) Healthcare stocks have outperformed in the back half of 2018. Recently a merger mania that has swept through the pharma and biotech spaces has underpinned relative share prices. The last three months have seen an explosion of deals, including the largest biopharma deal ever (Bristol-Myers Squibb buying Celgene for approximately $90 billion) with other global deals falling not too far behind (Takeda buying Shire for $62 billion mid-last year). Such exuberance has clearly confirmed that merger premia are alive and well in the S&P pharma index. It is not merely rising premia that have taken pharma higher either. Pricing power has entered the early innings of a recovery (top panel, Chart 24) while the key export channel points to increasingly bright days ahead (second panel, Chart 24). However, the rise of regulatory pressure from the Trump administration may cause better pricing to prove fleeting. Chart 24Merger Mania In Pharma Merger Mania In Pharma Merger Mania In Pharma Further, pharma’s consolidation phase has come at a cost to sector leverage ratios that have dramatically expanded (bottom panel, Chart 24). Such profligacy may come to haunt the sector should the pricing power recovery falter. S&P Technology (Neutral) Our technology CMI has been moving laterally for the better part of the last three years, though the S&P technology index has ignored the macro headwinds and soared higher over that time. Our VI remains on the overvalued side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff while our TI has been retrenching into oversold territory (Chart 25). Chart 25S&P Technology (Neutral) S&P Technology (Neutral) S&P Technology (Neutral) Until the end of last year, we maintained a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. However, we recently upgraded the niche semi equipment to overweight for three reasons. First, trade policy uncertainty has dealt a blow to this tech subindex. Not only are 90% of sales foreign sourced, but a large chunk is also China-related sales. Second, emerging market financial indicators are showing some signs of life, underscoring that semi equipment demand may turn out to be marginally less grim than currently anticipated (second panel, Chart 26). Third, long term semi equipment EPS growth estimates have recently collapsed to a level far below the broad market, indicating that the sell side has thrown in the towel on this niche sector (third panel, Chart 26). Chart 26A Bottom In Semi Equipment A Bottom In Semi Equipment A Bottom In Semi Equipment Overall, and despite our more bullish view on semi equipment, we continue to recommend a neutral weighting in S&P technology. S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI has recovered recently, bouncing off its 25-year low, driven by the modest easing in interest rates, (Chart 27). This has also manifested in a recovery in the S&P utilities index as this fixed income proxy has reacted to the recent fall in Treasury yields (change in yields shown inverted, top panel, Chart 28) and jump in natural gas prices. Further, utilities are typically seen as a domestic defensive play and the recent trade troubles have made utilities soar in a flight to safety. Chart 27S&P Utilities (Underweight) S&P Utilities (Underweight) S&P Utilities (Underweight) We think the tailwinds lifting utilities are transitory and likely to shift to headwinds. First, one of our key themes for the back half of the year is rising interest rates; a move higher in yields will have a predictably negative impact on these high-dividend paying equities. Second, a flight to safety looks fleeting; the ISM manufacturing new orders index usually moves inversely in lock step with utilities and the most recent message is negative for the S&P utilities index (ISM manufacturing new orders index shown inverted, second panel, Chart 28). Meanwhile, S&P utilities earnings estimates have continued to trail the broad market, having taken a significant step down this year (third panel, Chart 28). Chart 28Rising Rates In Late-2019 Will Be A Headwind For Utilities Rising Rates In Late-2019 Will Be A Headwind For Utilities Rising Rates In Late-2019 Will Be A Headwind For Utilities Our VI and TI share this bearish message as the VI is deeply overvalued and the TI is in overbought territory (Chart 27). S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has recently started to turn up, though this is off the near decade-low set last year and remains deeply depressed relative to history (Chart 29). This is principally the result of the backup in interest rates since late last year and the lift they have given to the sector, which has been a relative outperformer over the past six months (top panel, Chart 30). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA’s higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. Chart 29S&P Real Estate (Underweight) S&P Real Estate (Underweight) S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Along with the modest reprieve in borrowing rates, multi family construction continues unabated (second panel, Chart 30), likely driven by all-time highs in CRE prices (third panel, Chart 30). In the absence of an outright contraction in construction, recent weakening in occupancy (bottom panel, Chart 30) will likely prove deflationary to rents, and thus profit prospects. Chart 30Falling Occupancy Will Hurt REIT Profits Falling Occupancy Will Hurt REIT Profits Falling Occupancy Will Hurt REIT Profits Our VI suggests that REITs are modestly overvalued, though the recent outperformance has driven our TI to an overbought condition (Chart 29). S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Our consumer discretionary CMI has ticked up recently, pushed higher by resiliency in consumer data. However, the S&P consumer discretionary index has clearly responded, pushing against 40-year highs relative to the S&P 500 and taking our VI to two standard deviations above fair value (Chart 31). Much of this should be attributed to Amazon (roughly 30% of the S&P consumer discretionary index) and their exceptional 12% outperformance relative to the broad market over the past year. Chart 31S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we have an underweight recommendation on the S&P consumer discretionary index, we have varying intra-segment preferences, highlighted by the recent inception of a pair trade going long homebuilders and short home improvement retailers (HIR). Housing starts and building permits are extremely sensitive to interest rates, depend on first time home buyers and move in lockstep with the homeownership rate. Currently, interest rates are easing, the homeownership rate is coming out of its GFC funk and first time home buyers are slated to make a comeback this spring selling season. This is a boon for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (top & middle panels, Chart 32). Further, the price of lumber is a key determinant of relative profitability: lumber represents an input cost to homebuilders whereas it is an important selling item in Big Box building & supply retailers that make a set margin on it. The recent drubbing in lumber prices should ease margin pressures on homebuilders but eat into HIR profits (momentum in lumber prices shown inverted and advanced in bottom panel, Chart 32). Chart 32Long Homebuilders / Short Home Improvement Retailers Long Homebuilders / Short Home Improvement Retailers Long Homebuilders / Short Home Improvement Retailers S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than four months of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 33 with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Chart 33S&P Communication Services (Underweight) S&P Communication Services (Underweight) S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector3 and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years (Chart 34). Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps in the middle of last year,4 and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (bottom panel, Chart 35). This size bias remains a high conviction call for 2019. Chart 34Favor Large Vs. Small Caps Favor Large Vs. Small Caps Favor Large Vs. Small Caps Macro data too has turned against small caps. Recent NFIB surveys have shown that small business optimism has continued to fall through the end of the year, albeit from a very high level (top panel, Chart 35). This has coincided with the continued slide of small cap stocks relative to their large cap peers. Chart 35Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem Further, the percentage of small businesses with planned labor compensation increases continues to set new all-time highs and deviates substantially from the national trend (second panel, Chart 35). This divergence becomes more worrying when plotted against those same firms increasing prices (third panel, Chart 35), which has trailed for some time and recently flattened. The inference is that margin pressure is intensifying and likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In the context of the absence of small cap balance sheet discipline during the past five years, ongoing large cap outperformance seems ever more likely. Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Catharsis,” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Don't Fight The PBoC,” dated February 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “New Lines Of Communication,” dated October 1, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem,” dated May 10, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Regional Consolidation Should Help Propel Bank Stocks Regional Consolidation Should Help Propel Bank Stocks Overweight In a recent Weekly Report,1 we highlighted four reasons to stay overweight banks that more than counter the risk of a 10/2 yield curve inversion. These are: vibrant and broad-based bank credit growth, pristine credit quality, pent up bank buyback demand and a V-shaped recovery in bank ROE. Further, despite the headwind a flat yield curve represents to net interest margins, ultra low deposit rates provide a healthy margin offset (bottom panel). Yesterday gave us a fifth reason to remain overweight banks; a looming consolidation phase of the multitudinous smaller regional banks. BB&T Corp. announced it was buying SunTrust Banks Inc. in a deal valued at about $66 billion to create a firm with approximately $442 billion in assets, making it the sixth-largest U.S. bank. Unusually, both stocks rallied on this merger announcement which should send a confirming message to other regional players that increased scale to compete with much larger peers will be welcomed by shareholders. Bottom Line: Investors should cheer the return of M&A premia to this still-discounted sector, particularly when returns on equity are soaring (second panel). Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB, FRC,. Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.  

  Underweight A seldom considered victim from the slowdown in both the housing and auto markets is the top lines of property & casualty insurers. Relative growth of insurers and home & auto sales have typically shown a reasonably strong correlation and the four-year long deceleration of both overlap (second panel). This is confirmed by the rapid slowdown in insurers’ pricing power which has recently fallen into outright deflation, its worst performance in more than five years (third panel). A confirming anecdote comes from industry bellwether Travelers’ Q4 results released earlier this week which saw their combined ratio (the ratio of losses and costs to premiums) rise 2% to 97.5% as premium growth failed to offset increased expenses. Meanwhile, and despite the flat line in the relative performance of insurers (top panel), the S&P insurance index has rerated since the mid-summer lows. Accordingly, a narrative of bargain shopping in insurance equities does not yet appear plausible. Bottom Line: The bear market for insurers is not over yet; stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INSU - AIG, CB, MET, MMC, PRU, TRV, AFL, AON, ALL, PGR, WLTW, HIG, PFG, L, CINF, LNC, XL, AJG, UNM, TMK, AIZ, RE, BHF. The Deductible Is Still Too High For Insurance Stocks The Deductible Is Still Too High For Insurance Stocks  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Vibrant and broad-based bank credit growth, pristine credit quality, pent up bank buyback demand and a V-shaped recovery in bank ROE more than offset the risk of 10/2 yield curve inversion, and suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for the S&P banks index. Rising residential construction versus stalling residential investment, easing interest rates, cheapened lumber prices, and alluring valuations and technicals all signal that more gains are in store for homebuilders at the expense of home improvement retailers. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P homebuilding/short S&P home improvement retail pair trade today. Table 1 Dissecting 2019 Earnings Dissecting 2019 Earnings Feature Equities have retraced 50% of the peak-to-trough losses, and are still consolidating the post December Fed meeting tremor. Chart 1 shows that the VIX has been cut in half and the high-yield corporate bond option-adjusted spread has dropped 105bps. Retrenching volatility and deflating junk spreads suggest that the equity risk premium (ERP) remains uncharacteristically high. The path of least resistance is for the ERP to narrow in the coming months as we do not foresee recession in 2019. As a reminder, the ERP and the economy are inversely correlated. Chart 1Risk Premia Renormalization Risk Premia Renormalization Risk Premia Renormalization Nevertheless, in order for the reflex rebound since the late-December lows to morph into a durable rally, the macro/policy backdrop has to turn from a headwind to a tailwind. We are closely monitoring three potential positive catalysts: A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback A positive U.S./China trade resolution A continuation of the earnings juggernaut With regard to the macro related catalysts, an update to our reflation gauge (RG) is in order. The trade-weighted U.S. dollar has been depreciating since early November, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has come undone since the early November peak and oil prices are 33% lower than the early-October peak. These three variables comprise our RG and the signal is unambiguously bullish. In other words, a reflationary impulse looms in the months ahead which should pave the way for a rebound in both plunging investor sentiment and the gloomy economic surprise index (RG shown advanced, Chart 2). Chart 2Reflating Away Reflating Away Reflating Away On the earnings front, last week we trimmed our end-2020 SPX EPS forecast to $181 while we sustained the multiple at 16.5 times which resulted in a 3,000 SPX target.1 Drilling beneath the surface and analyzing the composition of SPX profits is revealing. Table 2 highlights sell side analysts’ profit levels and growth projections on a per GICS1 sector basis and also their contribution to overall earnings along with each sector’s projected earnings weight and most recent market capitalization weight. Table 2S&P 500 Earnings Analysis Dissecting 2019 Earnings Dissecting 2019 Earnings Chart 3 shows that financials, health care and industrials are responsible for 61% of the SPX’s profit growth in 2019. Interestingly, technology’s contribution has fallen to a mere 7.2% and even if we add the new communication services sector’s 9.6% contribution it still falls well shy of the tech sector’s market cap and earnings weight. Another worthwhile observation is that energy profits are no longer off the charts, as base effects since the early-2016 $25/bbl oil trough have filtered out of the dataset. Chart 3 While the risk of disappointment surrounds financials, health care and industrials, there are high odds that tech surprises to the upside as it has borne the brunt of recent negative earnings revisions (Charts 4 & 5). In addition, if our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s bullish oil forecast pans out this year, the negative energy sector contribution to SPX profit growth will get a sizable upward revision (please look forward to our GICS1 sector EPS growth models updates and profit margin analysis in next week’s report). Chart 4Earnings Revisions... Earnings Revisions... Earnings Revisions... Chart 5...Really Weigh On Tech ...Really Weigh On Tech ...Really Weigh On Tech ​​​​​​​ In sum, if the Fed pauses its hiking cycle through at least the first half of the year, we see a positive U.S./China trade resolution and SPX profits sustain their upward trajectory, then the SPX budding recovery will morph into a durable rally. This week we are updating an interest rate sensitive index that is highly levered to the surging U.S. credit impulse (Chart 6) and are initiating an early cyclical intra-sector and intra-industry pair trade. Chart 6Heed The U.S. Credit Impulse Signal Heed The U.S. Credit Impulse Signal Heed The U.S. Credit Impulse Signal Stick With Banks While our overweight call in the S&P banks index suffered a setback last month, since inception it has moved laterally, and we continue to recommend an above benchmark allocation to this key financials sub group. Not only are the odds of recession low for this year, but narrowing credit spreads and a reversal in financial conditions are also waving the green flag (junk spread shown inverted & advanced, bottom panel, Chart 7). Chart 7Bank On Banks Bank On Banks Bank On Banks Unlike the previous three reporting seasons when banks revealed blowout numbers and stocks subsequently fell, this season some profit and top line growth misses have been greeted with rising bank stocks prices. Such a reaction suggests that the worst is behind this sector and a sustainable recovery looms. Importantly, on the loan growth front, our credit impulse diffusion index is reaccelerating (Chart 6) and the overall credit impulse is expanding (middle panel, Chart 7). Our total loans & leases growth model and BCA’s C&I loan growth model both corroborate this encouraging credit backdrop (second & bottom panels, Chart 8). The latter is significant given that C&I loans are the single biggest credit category in bank loan books (Chart 9). Importantly, C&I loans have gone vertical recently topping the 10.5% growth mark despite softening capex intentions and CEO confidence. Chart 8Credit Models Flashing Green Credit Models Flashing Green Credit Models Flashing Green Chart 9Credit Models Flashing Green C&I Loans Leading The Pack C&I Loans Leading The Pack Multi-decade highs in consumer confidence are offsetting the Fed’s tightening cycle and suggest that consumer loans, another key lending category, will also gain traction (third panel, Chart 8). The outlook for the second largest credit category, residential real estate, remains upbeat in spite of last quarter’s soft housing related data releases. The recent easing in monetary conditions has breathed life back into the mortgage purchase applications index and also house prices continue to expand at a healthy pace (Chart 10). The upshot is that first-time home buyers will show up this spring selling season. Chart 10Residential Loans Also On Solid Footing Residential Loans Also On Solid Footing Residential Loans Also On Solid Footing Beyond positive credit growth prospects, credit quality remains pristine. BCA’s no recession in 2019 view remains intact, thus NPLs and chargeoffs should stay muted. As a reminder, U.S. banks are the best capitalized banks in the world,2 and their reserve coverage ratio has returned to 124%, a level last seen in 2007 (Chart 11). Chart 11Pristine Credit Quality Pristine Credit Quality Pristine Credit Quality Another important source of support is equity retirement. Banks have been late to the buyback game as the GFC along with the new strict bank regulatory body, the Fed, really tied their hands with regard to shareholder friendly activities. In fact, according to flow of funds data, the financial sector is still a net equity issuer, albeit at a steeply decelerating pace especially relative to the non-financial corporate sector (Chart 12). Pent up financial sector buyback demand is a boon for bank EPS growth. Chart 12Pent Up Buyback Demand Getting Unleashed Pent Up Buyback Demand Getting Unleashed Pent Up Buyback Demand Getting Unleashed This is significant at a time when analysts have been swiftly downgrading EPS growth figures for the SPX. Encouragingly, our bank EPS growth model captures all these positive forces and while it is decelerating it still suggests that profit growth will be stellar in 2019 and easily outpace the overall market (Chart 13). Chart 13Banks EPS Growth Will Outpace The Market Banks EPS Growth Will Outpace The Market Banks EPS Growth Will Outpace The Market Despite all this enticing news, bank valuations remain anchored near rock bottom levels and a resurgent ROE is signaling that a re-rating phase looms (Chart 14). Chart 14Rerating In Still In The Early Innings Rerating In Still In The Early Innings Rerating In Still In The Early Innings Nevertheless, there is one headwind banks face as the business cycle is long in the tooth and on track to become the longest expansion on record: the price of credit. One reason for the deflating relative stock price ratio since the January 2018 peak has been the yield curve slope flattening (Chart 15), as it suppresses bank net interest margins. Banks have been fighting this off partly by keeping their source of funding ultra-low judging by still anemic CD rates, according to Bankrate’s national average (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 15One Minor Headwind One Minor Headwind One Minor Headwind While yield curve inversions have widened all the way out to the 7/1 slope, the key 10/2 slope has yet to invert. Were the 10-year U.S. treasury to resume its selloff, even a mild yield curve steepening will go a long way, as BCA’s bond strategists expect. Clearly a flattening curve is a risk to our sanguine bank view, but the rest of the positives we outlined above more than offset the yield curve blues. Adding it all up, vibrant and broad-based bank credit growth, pristine credit quality, pent up bank buyback demand and a V-shaped recovery in bank ROE more than offset the risk of the 10/2 yield curve inversion, and suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for the S&P banks index. Bottom Line: Maintain the overweight stance in the S&P banks index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB, FRC, . Buy Homebuilders/Sell Home Improvement Retailers While we reiterate our recent overweight call on the S&P homebuilding index3 and the high-conviction underweight call on the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) group,4 it also makes sense to initiate a market neutral trade: long homebuilders/short HIR. This pair trade is levered on the swings of residential construction compared with residential investment. Currently the former is significantly outpacing the latter and suggests that relative share prices have ample room to run (top panel, Chart 16). Chart 16A Play On Residential Construction Vs. Investment A Play On Residential Construction Vs. Investment A Play On Residential Construction Vs. Investment Put differently, this share price ratio moves in tandem with homebuilders breaking new ground versus home owners renovating their existing house. Chart 17 shows the NAHB’s homebuilder sales expectations survey compared with the remodeling expectations survey. This relative sentiment gauge has ticked up recently, confirming the message from national accounts that residential construction has the upper hand over residential investment. The upshot is that the bull market in relative share prices is in the early innings. Chart 17Relative Survey Expectations... Relative Survey Expectations... Relative Survey Expectations... Keep in mind that housing starts and building permits are extremely sensitive to interest rates, depend on first time home buyers and move in lockstep with the homeownership rate. Currently, interest rates are easing, the homeownership rate is coming out of its GFC funk and first time home buyers are slated to make a comeback this spring selling season. This is a boon for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (middle & bottom panels, Chart 16). More specifically on the interest rate front, while both groups move with the oscillation of lending rates, new home sales are more sensitive than HIR sales to the price of credit. Our proxy of mortgage application purchase to refinance index does an excellent job in capturing this relative interest rate sensitivity and the recent jump signals that a catch up phase looms in the relative share price ratio (top panel, Chart 18). Chart 18...Easing Interest Rates... ...Easing Interest Rates... ...Easing Interest Rates... Relative loan growth activity also corroborates that demand for residential real estate is outpacing demand for home renovation (bottom panel, Chart 18). Beyond these macro tailwinds for this intra-sector trade, the price of lumber is a key determinant of relative profitability: lumber represents an input cost to homebuilders whereas it is an important selling item in Big Box building & supply retailers that make a set margin on it. In other words, rising lumber prices are a boon for HIR and a bane to homebuilders and vice versa. The recent drubbing in lumber prices should ease margin pressures on homebuilders but eat into HIR profits (Chart 19). Chart 19...And Cheapened Lumber Prices Favor Homebuilders Over HIR ...And Cheapened Lumber Prices Favor Homebuilders Over HIR ...And Cheapened Lumber Prices Favor Homebuilders Over HIR Finally, oversold relative technicals, depressed valuations and extreme sell side analysts’ relative profit pessimism, offer a very compelling entry point in the pair trade for fresh capital (Chart 20). Chart 20Oversold And Unloved Oversold And Unloved Oversold And Unloved Netting it all out, rising residential construction versus stalling residential investment, easing interest rates, cheapened lumber prices, and relative alluring valuations and technicals all signal that more gains are in store for homebuilders at the expense of home improvement retailers. Bottom Line: Initiate a new long S&P homebuilding/short S&P home improvement retail pair trade today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: BLBG: S5HOME – DHI, LEN and PHM, and BLBG: S5HOMI – HD and LOW, respectively.   Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com footnotes 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Catharsis” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, “Top 10 Reasons We Still Like Banks” dated March 5, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Indurated” dated September 24, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “2019 Key Views: High-Conviction Calls” dated December 3, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Highlights All of our recent investment recommendations have performed very strongly but have further to go: 1.   Own a combination of European banks plus U.S. T-bonds. 2.   Overweight EM versus DM. 3.   Overweight European versus U.S. equities. 4.   Overweight Italian assets versus European assets. 5.   Overweight the JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekBank Outperformance Corroborates A Growth Rebound Bank Outperformance Corroborates A Growth Rebound Bank Outperformance Corroborates A Growth Rebound 2019 will be the investment mirror-image of 2018. Last year started with growth fading and inflation on the cusp of picking up, both in Europe and around the world. This year has started with the European and global economies in the mirror-image configuration: growth likely to rebound, albeit modestly, and inflation set to fade (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Why 2019 Is The Mirror-Image Of 2018 Why 2019 Is The Mirror-Image Of 2018 Why 2019 Is The Mirror-Image Of 2018 However, as 2019 unfolds, the configuration will reverse, requiring a flip from a pro-cyclical to a pro-defensive investment tilt later in the year. This contrasts with 2018 which started pro-defensive and ended pro-cyclical. In this regard, the economic and investment shape of 2019 will be the mirror-image of 2018. Growth To Rebound, Inflation To Fade A tell-tale sign of a growth rebound is the recent outperformance of banks. Around the world, yield curves have flattened – or even inverted – meaning that banks’ net interest margins have compressed. This compression of bank profit margins is normally bad news for bank equities. Yet banks have been outperforming, not just in Europe but globally (Chart I-3). If margins are compressing, the plausible explanation for outperformance would be an improved outlook for asset growth, reflecting both a reduction in bad debt provisioning and a pick-up in bank credit growth. Chart I-3Banks Have Been Outperforming Since October Banks Have Been Outperforming Since October Banks Have Been Outperforming Since October Independently and reassuringly, our proprietary credit impulse analysis supports this thesis (Chart of the Week). Six-month credit impulses have been rebounding not only in Europe, but also in the United States and very impressively in China (Chart I-4).   Chart I-46-Month Credit Impulses Have Rebounded Everywhere 6-Month Credit Impulses Have Rebounded Everywhere 6-Month Credit Impulses Have Rebounded Everywhere At the same time, inflation is set to disappoint as the recent near-halving of the crude oil price feeds into both headline and core consumer price indexes. With central banks now promising even greater “dependence on the incoming data”, this unfolding dynamic will force them to temper any hawkish intentions and rhetoric, limiting the extent of upside in bond yields. In this configuration, the combination of European banks plus U.S. T-bonds which we first recommended in November is still appropriate (Chart I-5). The position is up 3 percent in little more than a month and has further to go.1 Chart I-5Own A Combination Of Banks And Bonds Own A Combination Of Banks And Bonds Own A Combination Of Banks And Bonds Europe’s largest economy, Germany, should benefit from another support to growth. Last year, the auto sector – a major engine of the German economy – spluttered as it absorbed the new WLTP emissions testing standard. Through the middle of 2018 German motor vehicle exports suffered a €20 billion hit which shaved 0.6 percent from Germany’s €3.4 trillion economy (Chart I-6). Now, if auto exports stabilize, this drag will disappear. And if auto exports recover to the pre-WLTP level after this one-off and temporary shock, Germany will receive a 0.6% mirror-image boost to growth.2 Chart I-6German Auto Exports Suffered A WLTP Hit German Auto Exports Suffered A WLTP Hit German Auto Exports Suffered A WLTP Hit Regional Allocation Is Always And Everywhere About Sectors The European equity earnings cycle is tightly connected with global growth oscillations (Chart I-7). The simple reason is that the European equity market is over-exposed to classically growth-sensitive sectors such as banks and industrials. Chart I-7The European EPS Cycle Is Tightly Connected With Global Growth Oscillations The European EPS Cycle Is Tightly Connected With Global Growth Oscillations The European EPS Cycle Is Tightly Connected With Global Growth Oscillations The emerging market earnings cycle is also connected with global growth oscillations (Chart I-8) because emerging markets have a very high exposure to banks. But the much less understood reason is that emerging markets have a near-zero exposure to healthcare (Table I-1). In sharp contrast, the U.S. equity earnings cycle has almost no connection with global growth oscillations (Chart I-9) because the U.S. equity market is over-exposed to technology and healthcare, neither of which are classically cyclical sectors. Chart I-8The EM EPS Cycle Is Also Connected With Global Growth Oscillations... The EM EPS Cycle Is Also Connected With Global Growth Oscillations... The EM EPS Cycle Is Also Connected With Global Growth Oscillations... Chart I-9...But The U.S. EPS Cycle Is Not Connected With Global Growth Oscillations ...But The U.S. EPS Cycle Is Not Connected With Global Growth Oscillations ...But The U.S. EPS Cycle Is Not Connected With Global Growth Oscillations Chart I- Hence the allocation to emerging market (EM) versus developed market (DM) equities, and to Europe versus the U.S. reduce to simple equity sector calls. A quick glance at Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 will reveal two fundamental and inescapable truths: Chart I-10EM Outperforms DM When Global Banks Outperform Healthcare EM Outperforms DM When Global Banks Outperform Healthcare EM Outperforms DM When Global Banks Outperform Healthcare Chart I-11European Equities Outperform U.S. Equities When Global Banks Outperform Technology 11. European Equities Outperform U.S. Equities When Global Banks Outperform Technology 11. European Equities Outperform U.S. Equities When Global Banks Outperform Technology EM outperforms DM when global banks outperform global healthcare. European equities outperform U.S. equities when global banks outperform global technology. But is this just about so-called ‘beta’? No, banks can outperform in a rising market by going up more or, as recently, in a falling market by going down less. So this is always and everywhere about head-to-head sector relative performances. My colleague Arthur Budaghyan, our chief emerging market strategist, remains steadfastly pessimistic on the structural outlook for EM versus DM. We agree with Arthur, albeit we arrive at the structural conclusion from a completely different perspective. To reiterate, for EM to outperform DM global banks must outperform global healthcare. However, over an extended period this will prove to be an extremely tall order. As detailed in European Banks: The Case For And Against, blockchain is a long-term extinction threat to banks’ business models and profitability. Whereas healthcare is still a major growth sector as people focus more spending on improving the quality and quantity of their lifespans.3  Nevertheless, from a purely tactical perspective, the growth up-oscillation phase that started in October can continue for a little while longer allowing the recent countertrend moves to persist – especially as the recent decline in bond yields could further spur credit growth in the near term. So for the moment stay overweight: EM versus DM. European equities versus U.S. equities. Italian assets versus European assets. Bargain Basement Currencies Another of my colleagues Doug Peta, our chief U.S. strategist, has coined a lovely metaphor: “you cannot get hurt falling out of a basement window”. The metaphor beautifully captures the asymmetry when you are near the floor or ‘zero-bound’. Doug uses it to explain that small contributors to an economy have a limited capacity to damage economic growth because they cannot fall very far. We think the metaphor applies equally to interest rates when they are at or near their lower bound, which is to say, in the basement. This begs the obvious question: if interest rates are in the basement, then what is it that cannot get hurt much? The answer is: the exchange rate. The payoff profile for exchange rates just tracks expected long-term interest rate differentials. This means that when the expected interest rate is in or near the basement, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, for any central bank already at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy – such as the BoJ and ECB – policy rate expectations are effectively in the basement. They cannot go significantly lower. In contrast, policy rate expectations for the Federal Reserve are somewhere between the seventh and twelfth storey of the building (Chart I-12). From which you can get seriously hurt if you fall out of the window! Chart I-12You Cannot Get Hurt Falling Out Of A Basement Window You Cannot Get Hurt Falling Out Of A Basement Window You Cannot Get Hurt Falling Out Of A Basement Window The upshot is that currency investors should always own at least one currency whose interest rate is in the basement against one whose interest rate is high up in the building, susceptible to fall out at some point, and get seriously hurt. The near term complication is the risk, albeit low, of a no-deal Brexit which would hurt European economies and currencies to a greater or lesser extent. Until the Brexit fog shows some signs of clearing, we would prefer the currency whose interest rate is in the basement to be a non-European currency. So for the moment, our favourite major currency remains the JPY. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System* We are pleased to report that the 50:50 combination of Litecoin and Ethereum has surged by 42 percent in just two weeks! Also, long EUR/NZD achieved its 2.5 percent profit target and is now closed. This week’s trade is in line with the recommendation in the main body of this report to become pro-cyclical. Go long global industrials versus global utilities with a profit target of 3 percent and a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-13 Long Global Industrials Vs. Global Utilities Long Global Industrials Vs. Global Utilities The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.   *  For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The European banks position is relative to the broader equity market, and the recommended combination is 25 cents in the banks and 75 cents in the bonds. 2 German auto net exports and GDP are quoted at annualized rates. The Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicle test Procedure (WLTP) is a new standard for auto emissions that took effect on September 1, 2018. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “European Banks: The Case For And Against”, November 8, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

This is the second of a two-part Special Report on the structural changes that have occurred as a result of the Great Recession and financial crisis. We look at three issues: asset correlation, the safety of the financial system, and the level of global debt. First, correlations among financial assets shifted dramatically during the financial crisis and the after-effects lingered for years. Some believe that the underlying level of correlation among risk assets has shifted permanently higher for two main reasons: (1) trading factors such as the increased use of exchange-traded funds and algorithms; and (2) the risk-on/risk-off environment in which trading has become more binary in nature, due to the sharp rise in policy uncertainty, risk aversion and risk premiums in the aftermath of the Great Recession. We have sympathy for the second explanation. The equity risk premium (ERP) was forced higher on a sustained basis by the financial crisis, driven by fears that the advanced economies had entered a ‘secular stagnation’. Elevated correlation among risk assets was a result of a higher-than-normal ERP. The ERP should decline as fears of secular stagnation fade, leading to a lower average level of risk asset correlation than has been the case over the last decade. Second, regulators have been working hard to ensure that the financial crisis never happens again. But is the financial system really any safer today? Undoubtedly, banks have improved balance sheet and funding resilience, and have significantly reduced their involvement in complex financial activities. The propensity for contagion among banks has diminished and there has been a dramatic decline in the volume of complex structured credit securities. The bad news is that the level of global debt has increased at an alarming pace. The third part of this report highlights that elevated levels of debt could cause instability in the global financial system. Choking debt levels boost the vulnerability to negative shocks. The number and probability of potential shocks appear to have increased since 2007, including extreme weather events, sovereign debt crises, large-scale migration, populism, water crises and cyber & data attacks. The lack of a fiscal buffer in most countries means that it will be difficult or impossible to provide any fiscal relief in the event of a negative shock. Moreover, the end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend more in most cases. For EM, deleveraging has not even started and more financial fireworks seem inevitable in the context of a strong dollar and rising global yields. China may avoid a crisis, but the adjustment to a less credit-driven economy is already proving to be a painful process. The Great Recession and Financial Crisis cast a long shadow that will affect economies, policy and financial markets for years to come. Rather than reviewing the roots of the crisis, the first of our two-part series examined the areas where we believe structural change has occurred related to the economy or financial markets. We covered the changing structure of the corporate bond market, the inflation outlook, central bank policymaking and equilibrium bond yields. We highlighted that the financial crisis transformed the corporate bond market in several ways that heighten the risk for quality spreads in the next downturn. We made the case that the prolonged inflation undershoot is sowing the seeds of an overshoot in the coming years, in part related to central bank policymakers that are doomed to fight the last war. Finally, we argued that the forces behind the structural and cyclical bull market in bonds reached an inflection point in 2016/2017. In Part II, we examine the theory that the financial crisis has permanently lifted market correlations among risk assets. Next, we look at whether regulatory changes implemented as a result of the financial crisis have made the global financial system safer. Finally, we highlight the implications of the continued rise in global leverage over the past decade in the context of BCA’s Debt Supercycle theme. The bottom line is that the global financial system still faces substantial risks, despite a more highly regulated banking system. (1) Are Risk Asset Correlations Permanently Higher? Correlations among financial assets shifted dramatically during the financial crisis and the after-effects lingered for years. For example, risk assets became more highly correlated, suggesting little differentiation within or across asset classes. Chart II-1 presents a proxy for U.S. equity market correlations, using a sample of current S&P 100 companies. The average correlation was depressed in the 1990s and 2000s relative to the 1980s. It spiked in 2007 and fluctuated at extremely high levels for several years, before moving erratically lower. It has jumped recently and is roughly in the middle of the post-1980s range. Chart II-1Two Factors Driving Correlation bca.bca_mp_2019_01_01_s2_c1 bca.bca_mp_2019_01_01_s2_c1 Correlations will undoubtedly ebb and flow in the coming years and will spike again in the next recession. But a key question is whether correlations will oscillate around a higher average level than in the 1990s and 2000s. The consensus seems to believe that the underlying level of correlation among risk assets has indeed shifted higher on a structural basis for two main reasons: Market Structure Changes: Many investors point to trading factors such as the increased use of index products (exchange-traded funds for example), and high-frequency/algorithmic trading as likely culprits. Macro “theme” investing has reportedly become more popular and is often implemented through algorithms. The result is an increase in stock market volatility and a tendency for risk-asset prices to move up and down based on momentum because they are all being traded as a group. These factors would likely be evident today even if the financial crisis never happened, but the popularity of algorithm trading may have been encouraged by the fact that the macro backdrop was so uncertain for years after Lehman collapsed. Risk On/Off Trading Environment: Trading has become more binary in nature, due to the sharp rise in policy uncertainty, risk aversion and risk premiums in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Even after the recession ended, the headwinds to growth were formidable and many felt that the sustainability of the recovery hinged largely on the success or failure of unorthodox monetary policies. The general feeling was that either the policies would “work”, the output gap would gradually close and risk assets would perform well, or it would fail and risk assets would be dragged down by a return to recession. Thus, markets traded on an extreme “risk-on/risk-off” basis, as sentiment swung wildly with each new piece of economic and earnings data. While the market structure thesis has merit on the surface, the impact should only be short term in nature. It is difficult to see how a change in the intra-day microstructure of the market could have such a fundamental, wide-ranging and permanent impact on market prices. Previous research suggests that any impact on market correlation beyond the very short term is likely to be small. For the sake of brevity, we won’t present the evidence here, but instead refer readers to two BCA Special Reports.1 The risk on/off trading environment thesis is a more plausible explanation. However, we find it more useful to think about it in terms of the equity risk premium (ERP). A higher ERP causes investors to revalue cash flows from all firms, which, in turn, causes structural shifts in the correlation among stocks. A lower ERP results in less homogenization of the present value of future cash flows, and raises the effect of differentiation among business models. A rise in the ERP could occur for different reasons, but the most obvious are an increase in the perceived riskiness of firms, a shift in investor risk aversion, or both. Shifts in the ERP are sometimes structural in nature, but there is also a strong cyclical element in that persistent equity declines historically have had the effect of temporarily raising the ERP and correlations. A simple model based on the ERP and volatility explains a lot of the historical variation in equity correlation, including the elevated levels observed in the years after 2007 (Chart II-2).2 The shift lower in correlations after 2012 reflects both a lower equity risk premium and a dramatic decline in downside volatility. Chart II-2Simple Model Explains Correlation Simple Model Explains Correlation Simple Model Explains Correlation It is tempting to believe that the lingering shell-shock related to the financial crisis means that the underlying equity risk premium has shifted permanently higher. The ERP is still elevated by historical standards, but this is more reflective of extraordinarily low bond yields than an elevated forward earnings yield. Investors evidently believe that the U.S. and other developed economies are stuck in a “secular stagnation”, which will require low interest rates for many years just to keep economic growth near its trend pace. In other words, the equilibrium interest rate, or R-star, is still very low. The ERP and correlations among risk assets will undoubtedly spike again in the next recession. Nonetheless, in the absence of recession, we expect fears regarding secular stagnation to fade further. If the advanced economies hold up as short-term interest rates and bond yields rise, then concerns that R-star is extremely low will dissipate and expectations regarding equilibrium bond yields will shift higher. The ERP will move lower as bond yields, rather than the earnings yield, do most of the adjustment. The underlying correlations among risk asset prices should correspondingly recede. This includes correlations among a wide variety of risk assets, such as corporate bonds and commodities. While this describes our base case outlook, there is a non-trivial risk that the next recession arrives soon and is deep. This would underscore the view that R-star is indeed very low and the economy needs constant monetary stimulus just to keep it out of recession (i.e. the secular stagnation thesis). The ERP and correlations would stay elevated on average in that scenario. What About The Stock/Bond Correlation? Chart II-3 shows the rolling correlation between monthly changes in the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the S&P 500. The correlation was generally negative between the late-1960s and the early-2000s. Bond yields tended to rise whenever the S&P 500 was falling. Over the past two decades, however, bond yields have generally declined when the stock market has swooned. Chart II-3Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Inflation expectations can help explain the shift in stock/bond correlation. Expectations became unmoored after 1970, which meant that inflationary shocks became the primary driver of bond yields. Strong growth became associated with rising inflation and inflation expectations, and the view that central banks had fallen behind the curve. Bond yields surged as markets discounted aggressive tightening designed to choke off inflation. And, given that inflation lags the cycle and had a lot of persistence, central banks were not in a position to ease policy at the first hint of a growth slowdown. This was obviously a poor backdrop for stocks. When inflation expectations became well anchored again around the late 1990s, investors no longer feared that central banks would have to aggressively stomp on growth whenever actual inflation edged higher. Central banks also had more latitude to react quickly by cutting rates at the first sign of slower economic growth. Fluctuations in growth became the primary driver of bond yields, allowing stock prices to rise and fall along with yields. The correlation has therefore been positive most of the time since 2003. Bottom Line: A negative correlation between stocks and bond yields reared its ugly head in the last quarter of 2018. The equity correction reflected several factors, but the previous surge in bond yields and hawkish Fed comments appeared to spook markets. Investors became nervous that the fed funds rate had already entered restrictive territory, at a time when the global economy was cooling off. We expect more of these episodes as the Fed normalizes short-term interest rates over the next couple of years. Nonetheless, we see no evidence that inflation expectations have become unmoored. This implies that the stock-bond correlation will generally be positive most of the time over the medium term. In addition, the average level of correlation among risk assets has probably not been permanently raised, although spikes during recessions or growth scares will inevitably occur. (2) Is The Global Financial System Really Safer Today? The roots of the great financial crisis and recession involved a global banking and shadow banking system that encouraged leverage and risk-taking in ways that were hard for investors and regulators to assess. Complex and opaque financial instruments helped to hide risk, at a time when regulators were “asleep at the switch”. In many countries, credit grew at a much faster pace than GDP and capital buffers were dangerously low. Banking sector compensation skewed the system toward short-term gains over long-term sustainable returns. Lax lending standards and a heavy reliance on short-term wholesale markets to fund trading and lending activity contributed to cascading defaults and a complete seizure in parts of the money and fixed income markets. A vital question is whether the financial system is any less vulnerable today to contagion and seizure. The short answer is that the financial system is better prepared for a shock, but the problem is that the number of potential sources of instability have increased since 2007. Since the financial crisis, regulators have been working hard to ensure that the financial crisis never happens again. Reforms have come under four key headings: Capital: Regulators raised the minimum capital requirement for banks, added a buffer requirement, and implemented a surcharge on systemically important banks. Liquidity: Regulators implemented a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) in order to ensure that banks have sufficient short-term funds to avoid liquidity shortages and bank runs.3 Risk Management: Banks are being forced to develop systems to better monitor risk, and are subject to periodic stress tests. Resolution Planning: Banks have also been asked to detail options for resolution that, hopefully, should reduce systemic risk should a major financial institution become insolvent. Global systemically-important banks, in particular, will require sufficient loss-absorbing capacity. A major study by the Bank for International Settlements,4 along with other recent studies, found that systemic risk in the global financial system has diminished markedly as a result of the new regulations. On the whole, banks have improved balance sheet and funding resilience, and have significantly reduced their involvement in complex financial activities. Lending standards have tightened almost across the board relative to pre-crisis levels, particularly for residential mortgages. Additional capital and liquid assets provide a much wider buffer today against adverse shocks, allowing most banks to pass recent stress tests (Chart II-4). Financial institutions have generally re-positioned toward retail and commercial banking and wealth management, and away from more complex and capital-intensive activities (Chart II-5). The median share of trading assets in total assets for individual G-SIBs has declined from around 20% to 12% over 2009-16. Chart II-4 Chart II-5 Moreover, the propensity for contagion among banks has diminished. The BIS notes that assessing all the complex interactions in the global financial system is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, a positive sign is that banks are focusing more on their home markets since the crisis, and that direct connections between banks through lending and derivatives exposures have declined. The BIS highlights that aggregate foreign bank claims have declined by 16% since the crisis, driven particularly by banks from the advanced economies most affected by the crisis, especially from some European countries (Chart II-6). It is also positive that European banks have made some headway in diminishing over-capacity, although problems still exist in Italy. Finally, and importantly, there has been a distinct shift toward more stable sources of funding, such as deposits, away from fickle wholesale markets (Charts II-7 and II-8). Chart II-6Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently) Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently) Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently)   Chart II-7 Chart II-8 Outside of banking, many other regulatory changes have been implemented to make the system safer. One important example is that rules were adjusted to reduce the risk of runs on money market funds. What About Shadow Banking? Of course, more could be done to further indemnify the financial system. Concentration in the global banking system has not diminished, and it appears that the problem of “too big to fail” has not been solved. And then there is the shadow banking sector, which played a major role in the financial crisis by providing banks a way of moving risk to off-balance sheet entities and securities, and thereby hiding the inherent risks. Shadow banking is defined as credit provision that occurs outside of the banking system, but involves the key features of bank lending including leverage, and liquidity and maturity transformation. Complex structured credit securities, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations, allowed this type of transformation to mushroom in ways that were difficult for regulators and investors to understand. A recent study by the Group of Thirty5 concluded that securitization has dropped to a small fraction of its pre-crisis level, and that growing non-bank credit intermediation since the Great Recession has primarily been in forms that do not appear to raise financial stability concerns. Much of the credit creation has been in non-financial corporate bonds, which is a more stable and less risky form of credit extension than bank lending. Other types of lending have increased, such as corporate credit to pension funds and insurance companies, but this does not involve maturity transformation, according to the Group of Thirty. There has been a dramatic decline in the volume of complex structured credit securities such as collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed commercial paper, and structured investment vehicles since 2007 (Chart II-9). While the situation must be monitored, the Group of Thirty study concludes that the financial system in the advanced economies appears to be less vulnerable to bouts of self-reinforcing forced selling, such as occurred during the 2008 crisis. Chart II-9Less Private-Sector Securitization Less Private-Sector Securitization Less Private-Sector Securitization One exception is the U.S. leveraged loan market, which has swelled to $1.13 trillion and about half has been pooled into Collateralized Loan Obligations. As with U.S. high-yield bonds, the situation is fine as long as profitability remains favorable. But in the next recession, lax lending standards today will contribute to painful losses in leveraged loans. The Bad News That’s the good news. The bad news is that, while the financial system might have become less complex and opaque, the level of debt has increased at an alarming rate in both the private and public sectors in many countries. Elevated levels of debt could cause instability in the global financial system, especially as global bond yields return to more normal levels by historical standards. We discuss other pressure points such as Emerging Markets and China in the next section, although the latter deserves a few comments before we leave the subject of shadow banking. The Group of Thirty notes that 30% of Chinese credit is provided by a broad array of poorly regulated shadow banking entities and activities, including trust funds, wealth management products, and “entrusted loans.” Links between these entities and banks are unclear, and sometimes involve informal commitments to provide credit or liquidity support. The study takes some comfort that most of Chinese debt takes place between Chinese domestic state-owned banks and state-owned companies or local government financing vehicles. Foreign investors have limited involvement, thus reducing potential direct contagion outside of China in the event of a financial event. Still, the potential for contagion internationally via global sentiment and/or the economic fallout is high. The other bad news is that, while regulators in the advanced economies have managed to improve the ability of financial institutions to weather shocks, potential risks to the financial system have increased in number and in probability of occurrence. The Global Risk Institute (GRI) recently published a detailed comparison of potential shocks today relative to 2007.7 The report sees twice the number of risks versus 2007 that are identified as “current” (i.e. could occur at any time) and of “high impact”. The most pressing risks today include extreme weather events, asset bubbles, sovereign debt crises, large-scale involuntary migration, water crises and cyber & data attacks. Any of these could trigger a broad financial crisis if the shock is sufficiently intense, despite improved regulation. The GRI study also eventuates how the risks will evolve over the next 11 years. Readers should see the study for details, but it is interesting that the experts foresee cyber dependency rising to the top of the risk pile by 2030. The increase is driven by the importance of data ownership, the increasing role of algorithms and control systems, and the $1.2 trillion projected cost of cyber, data and infrastructure attacks. Our computer systems are not prepared for the advances of technology, such as quantum computing. Climate change moves to the number two risk spot in its base-case outlook. Space limitations precluded a discussion of the rise of populism in this report, but the GRI sees the political tensions related to income inequality as the number three threat to the global financial system by 2030. Bottom Line: Regulators have managed to substantially reduce the amount of hidden risk and the potential for contagion between financial institutions and across countries since 2007. Banks have a larger buffer against stocks. Unfortunately, the number and probability of potential shocks to the financial system appear to have increased since 2007. (3) Implications Of The Global Debt Overhang The End of the Debt Supercycle is a key BCA theme influencing our macro view of the economic and market outlook for the coming years. For several decades, the willingness of both lenders and borrowers to embrace credit was a lubricant for economic growth and rising asset prices and, importantly, underpinned the effectiveness of monetary policy. During times of economic and/or financial stress, it was relatively easy for the Federal Reserve and other central banks to improve the situation by engineering a new credit up-cycle. However, since the 2007-09 meltdown, even zero (or negative) policy rates have been unable to trigger a strong revival in private credit growth in the major developed economies, except in a few cases. The end of the Debt Supercycle has severely impaired the key transmission channel between changes in monetary policy and economic activity. The combination of high debt burdens and economic uncertainty has curbed borrowers’ appetite for credit while increased regulatory pressures and those same uncertainties have made lenders less willing to extend loans. This has severely eroded the effectiveness of lower interest in boosting credit demand and supply, forcing central banks to rely increasingly on manipulating asset prices and exchange rates. On a positive note, the plunge in interest rates has lowered debt servicing costs to historically low levels. Yet, it is the level, rather than the cost, of debt that seems to have been an impediment to the credit cycle, contributing to a lethargic economic expansion. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publishes an excellent dataset of credit trends across a broad swath of developing and emerging economies. Some broad conclusions come from an examination of the data (Charts II-10 and II-11):7 Chart II-10Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Chart II-11EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started Private debt growth has only recently accelerated for the advanced economies as a whole. There are only a handful of developed economies where private debt-to-GDP ratios have moved up meaningfully in the past few years. These are countries that avoided a real estate/banking bust and where property prices have continued to rise (e.g. Canada and Australia). The high level of real estate prices and household debt currently is a major source of concern to the authorities in those few countries. Even where some significant consumer deleveraging has occurred (e.g. the U.S., Spain and Ireland), debt-to-income ratios remain very high by historical standards. In many cases, a stabilization or decline in private debt burdens has been offset by a continued rise in public debt, keeping overall leverage close to peak levels. This is a key legacy of the financial crisis; many governments were forced to offset the loss of demand from private sector deleveraging by running larger and persistent budget deficits. Weak private demand accounts for close to 50% of the rise in public debt on average according to the IMF. Global debt of all types (public and private) has soared from 207% of GDP in 2007 to 246% today. The Debt Supercycle did not end everywhere at the same time. It peaked in Japan more than 20 years ago and has not yet reached a decisive bottom. The 2007-09 meltdown marked the turning point for the U.S. and Europe, but it has not even started in the emerging world. The financial crisis accelerated the accumulation of debt in the latter as investors shifted capital away from the struggling advanced economies to (seemingly less risky) emerging markets. Both EM private- and public-sector debt ratios have continued to move up at an alarming pace. The lesson from Japan is that deleveraging cycles following the bursting of a major credit bubble can last a very long time indeed. One key area where there has been significant deleveraging is the U.S. household sector (Chart II-12). The ratio of household debt to income has fallen below its long-term trend, suggesting that the deleveraging process is well advanced. However, one could argue that the ratio will undershoot the trend for an extended period in a mirror image of the previous overshoot. Or, it may be that the trend has changed; it could now be flat or even down. Chart II-12U.S. Household Deleveraging... U.S. Household Deleveraging... U.S. Household Deleveraging... What is clear is that U.S. attitudes toward saving and spending have changed dramatically since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) (Chart II-13). Like the Great Depression of the 1930s that turned more than one generation off of debt, the 2008/09 crisis appears to have been a watershed event that marked a structural shift in U.S. consumer attitudes toward credit-financed spending. The Debt Supercycle is over for this sector. Chart II-13...As Attitudes To Debt Change ...As Attitudes To Debt Change ...As Attitudes To Debt Change Developing Countries: Debt And Economic Fundamentals BCA’s long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Trade wars and a tightening Fed are negative for EM assets, but the main headwinds facing this asset class are structural. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries. EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart II-14). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart II-14, bottom panel). Chart II-14EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... The 2019 Key Views8 report from our Emerging Markets Strategy team highlights that excessive capital inflows over the past decade have contributed to over-investment and mal-investment. Much of the borrowing was used to fund unprofitable projects, as highlighted by the plunge in productivity growth, profit margins and return on assets in the EM space relative to pre-Lehman levels (Chart II-15) Decelerating global growth in 2018 has exposed these poor fundamentals. Chart II-15...Along With Deteriorating Profitability ...Along With Deteriorating Profitability ...Along With Deteriorating Profitability As we highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019, emerging financial markets may enjoy a rally in the second half of 2019 on the back of Chinese policy stimulus. However, this will only represent a ‘sugar high’. The debt overhang in emerging market economies is unlikely to end benignly because a painful period of corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization and structural reforms are required in order to boost productivity and thereby improve these countries’ ability to service their debt mountains. China’s Debt Problem Space limitations preclude a full discussion of the complex debt situation in China and the risks it poses for the global financial system. Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to 260% of GDP at present (Chart II-16). Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, China has ended up with a severe overcapacity problem. The rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs (Chart II-17). Chinese banks are currently being told that they must lend more money to support the economy, while ensuring that their loans do not sour. This has become an impossible feat. Chart II-16China's Overinvestment... China's Overinvestment... China's Overinvestment... Chart II-17Has Undermined The Return On Assets Has Undermined The Return On Assets Has Undermined The Return On Assets The previous section highlighted that much of the debt has been created in the opaque shadow banking system, where vast amounts of hidden risk have likely accumulated. Whether or not the central government is willing and/or able to cover a wave of defaults and recapitalize the banking system in the event of a negative shock is hotly debated, both within and outside of BCA. But even if a financial crisis can be avoided, bringing an end to the unsustainable credit boom will undoubtedly have significant consequences for the Chinese economy and the emerging economies that trade with it. Interest Costs To Rise Globally, many are concerned about rising interest costs as interest rates normalize over the coming years. In Appendix Charts II-19 to II-21, we provide interest-cost simulations for selected government, corporate and household sectors under three interest-rate scenarios. The good news is that the starting point for interest rates is still low, and that it takes years for the stock of outstanding debt to adjust to higher market rates. Even if rates rise by another 100 basis points, interest burdens will increase but will generally remain low by historical standards. It would take a surge of 300 basis points across the yield curve to really ‘move the needle’ in terms of interest expense. This does not imply that the global debt situation is sustainable or that a financial crisis can be easily avoided. The next economic downturn will probably not be the direct result of rising interest costs. Nonetheless, elevated government, household and/or corporate leverage has several important long-term negative implications: Limits To Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Government indebtedness will limit the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy during the next economic downturn. Chart II-18 highlights that structural budget deficits and government debt levels are higher today compared to previous years that preceded recessions. The risk is especially high for emerging economies and some advanced economies (such as Italy) where investors will be unwilling to lend at a reasonable rate due to default fears. Even in countries where the market still appears willing to lend to the government at a low interest rate, political constraints may limit the room to maneuver as voters and fiscally-conservative politicians revolt against a surge in budget deficits. This will almost certainly be the case in the U.S., where the 2018 tax cuts mean that the federal budget deficit is likely to be around 6% of GDP in the coming years even in the absence of recession. A recession would push it close to a whopping 10%. Even in countries where fiscal stimulus is possible, the end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend and take on more debt. Chart II-18 Growth Headwinds: The debt situation condemns the global economy to a slower pace of trend growth in part because of weaker capital spending. From one perspective this is a good thing, because spending financed by the excessive use of credit is unsustainable. Still, deleveraging has much further to go at the global level, which means that spending will have to be constrained relative to income growth. The IMF estimates that deleveraging in the private sector for the advanced economies is only a third of historical precedents at this point in the cycle. The IMF also found that debt overhangs have historically been associated with lower GDP growth even in the absence of a financial crisis. Sooner or later, overleveraged sectors have to retrench. Vulnerability To Negative Shocks: If adjustment is postponed, debt reaches levels that make the economy highly vulnerable to negative shocks as defaults rise and lenders demand a higher return or withdraw funding altogether. IMF work shows that economic downturns are more costly in terms of lost GDP when it is driven or accompanied by a financial crisis. This is particularly the case for emerging markets. Bottom Line: Although credit growth has been subdued in most major advanced economies, there has been little deleveraging overall and debt-to-GDP is still rising at the global level. Elevated debt levels are far from benign, even if it appears to be easily financed at the moment. It acts as dead weight on economic activity and makes the world economy vulnerable to negative shocks. It steals growth from the future and, in the event of such a shock, the lack of a fiscal buffer in most countries means that it will be difficult or impossible to provide fiscal relief. The end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend in most cases. For EM, deleveraging has not even started and more financial fireworks seem inevitable in the context of a strong dollar and rising global yields. China may avoid a crisis, but the adjustment to a less credit-driven economy is already proving to be a painful process. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst APPENDIX Chart II-19Corporate Interest Cost Scenarios Corporate Interest Interest Cost Scenarios Corporate Interest Interest Cost Scenarios   Chart II-20Government Interest Cost Scenarios Government Interest Cost Scenarios Government Interest Cost Scenarios   Chart II-21U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ 1      Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "The Bane Of Investors’ Existence: Why Is Correlation High And When Will It Fall?" dated January 4, 2012, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Also see BCA Global ETF Strategy Special Report "The Passive Menace," dated September 13, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2       We use only below average returns in the calculation of volatility (downside volatility) because we are more concerned with the risk of equity market declines for the purposes of this model. 3       The LCR requires a large bank to hold enough high-quality liquid assets to cover the net cash outflows the bank would expect to occur over a 30-day stress scenario. The NSFR complements the LCR by requiring an amount of stable funding that is tailored to the liquidity risk of a bank’s assets and liabilities, based on a one-year time horizon. 4       Structural Changes in Banking After the Crisis. CGFS Papers No.60. Bank for International Settlements, January 2018. 5       Shadow Banking and Capital Markets Risks and Opportunities. Group of Thirty. Washington, D.C., November 2016. 6       Back to the Future: 2007 to 2030. Are New Financial Risks Foreshadowing a Systemic Risk Event? Global Risk Institute. 7       For more details on public and private debt trends, please see BCA Special Report "The End Of The Debt Supercycle: An Update," dated May 11, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 8       Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "2019 Key Views: Will The EM Lost Decade End With A Bang Or A Whimper?" dated December 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com