Fixed Income

Dear Client, We are sending you our Strategy Outlook today, where we outline our thoughts on the macro landscape and the direction of financial markets for 2021 and beyond. Next week, please join me for a webcast on Thursday, December 17 at 10:00 AM EST (3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT) where I will discuss the outlook. Our publishing schedule will resume early next year. On behalf of the entire Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and a Healthy New Year! Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Macroeconomic outlook: The global economy will strengthen in 2021 as the pandemic winds down. Inflation will remain well contained for the next 2-to-3 years before moving sharply higher by the middle of the decade. Global asset allocation: Stocks are technically overbought and vulnerable to a short-term correction. Nevertheless, investors should favor equities over bonds in 2021 given the likelihood that earnings will accelerate while monetary policy stays accommodative. Equities: This year’s losers will be next year’s winners. In 2021, international stocks will outperform US stocks, small caps will outperform large caps, banks will outperform tech, and value stocks will outperform growth stocks. Fixed income: Bond yields will rise modestly next year, implying that investors should maintain below average duration exposure. Spread product will outperform safe government bonds. Favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Currencies: The US dollar will continue to weaken in 2021. The collapse in US interest rate differentials versus its trading partners, stronger global growth, and a widening US trade deficit are all bearish for the greenback. Commodities: Tight supply conditions and a cyclical recovery in oil demand will support crude prices. Investors should favor gold over bitcoin as a hedge against long-term inflation risk. I. Macroeconomic Outlook V Is For Vaccine Chart 1Efficacy Rates Of Seasonal Flu Vaccines Are Well Below Those Of The Covid-19 Vaccines Ten months after the start of the pandemic, there is a light at the end of the tunnel. Both of the vaccines developed by Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna using mRNA technology have demonstrated efficacy rates of around 95%. AstraZeneca’s vaccine, produced in collaboration with Oxford University, showed an efficacy rate of 90% in one of its clinical arms. Russia and China have also launched vaccines. The Russian vaccine, Gamaleya, displayed an efficacy rate of 91% based on 22,000 test participants. Such high efficacy rates are on par with the measles and smallpox vaccines, and well above the typical 30%-to-50% success rate for the seasonal flu vaccine (Chart 1). Inoculating most of the world’s population will not be easy. Nevertheless, large-scale vaccine production has already begun. More than half of the professional forecasters enrolled in the Good Judgement Project expect enough doses to be available to vaccinate 200 million Americans (about 60% of the US population) by the end of the second quarter of 2021 (Chart 2). Chart 2Mass Distribution Of Covid-19 Vaccines Expected By Mid-2021 According to opinion polls, public concern about the potential side effects from the vaccines, while still high, has diminished over the past few weeks (Chart 3). Most countries will start by vaccinating health care workers and other at-risk groups. Assuming no major side effects are reported, the successful deployment of the vaccines among health care professionals should bolster confidence within the general public. Chart 3The Public Is Slowly Becoming Less Worried About Covid-19 Vaccines Vaccines And Growth: A Short-Term Paradox? There is no doubt that the availability of a safe and effective vaccine will bolster economic activity over the medium-to-long term. The short-term impact, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, vaccine optimism could reduce household precautionary savings. It could also prompt more firms to invest in new capacity. On the other hand, the expectation that a vaccine is coming could motivate people to take even greater efforts to avoid getting sick in the interim. Think about what happens when you take cover under a tree after it starts to rain. Your decision to stay under the tree depends on how long you expect the rain to continue. If the rain will last for only 10 minutes, staying put makes sense. However, if it will rain continuously for the next two days, you are better off going home. You are going to get wet anyway. Who wants to get sick just as the pandemic is winding down? It is like being the last soldier killed on the battlefield. Growth In Europe Suffering More Than In The US… So Far The number of new daily cases has declined by 45% in the EU from the highs reached in the second week of November. That said, progress on the disease front has come at a cost. As Covid infections surged, European governments were forced to reimplement a variety of lockdown measures (Chart 4). Correspondingly, growth indicators have weakened across the region (Chart 5). At this point, it looks highly likely that GDP will contract in the euro area and the UK in the fourth quarter. Chart 4The Latest Viral Surge Led To Lockdowns In Europe   In contrast to Europe, the US economy should expand in the fourth quarter. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is pointing to growth of 11.2% in Q4, led by a recovery in personal consumption, strength in residential and nonresidential investment, and inventory restocking. Nevertheless, dark clouds are forming. After a short-lived dip in late November, the number of new daily cases in the US is on the rise again. The 7-day average of confirmed new cases has jumped to around 200,000. The Centers for Disease Control  (CDC) estimates that for every single case that is caught, seven go undiagnosed.1 This implies that over 11 million people are being infected each week, or about 3% of the US population. With the weather getting colder and the Christmas holiday season approaching, a further viral surge looks probable. Just as in Europe, we may see more lockdowns and more voluntary social distancing in the US over the coming weeks. Building A Fiscal Bridge To A Post-Pandemic World Lockdowns would be less of a problem if governments provided enough income support to struggling households and businesses. Unfortunately, at least in the US, considerable uncertainty remains about whether such support will be forthcoming. After a burst of stimulus earlier this year, US fiscal policy has tightened sharply. Since peaking in April, real disposable personal income has dropped by 9%, reflecting a steep decline in government transfer payments (Chart 6). The latest data suggest that real disposable income will be down in Q4 compared to the preceding quarter. Chart 5Renewed Lockdowns Are Weighing On Economic Activity In The Euro Area Chart 6Less Transfers Mean Less Income   President Trump tried to offset some of the sting from the expiration of emergency unemployment benefits in the CARES Act by diverting funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to support jobless workers. However, this money has now run out (Chart 7). Likewise, the resources in the Paycheck Protection Program for small businesses have been depleted, and many state and local governments are facing a cash crunch. Chart 7Drastic Drop In Unemployment Insurance Payments Chart 8People Are Eager For More Stimulus The US Congress has been squabbling over a new stimulus bill since May. Ultimately, we think a bill will be passed, potentially as part of a year-end omnibus spending package. Public opinion still very much favors maintaining stimulus. A survey conducted by Pew Research after the election found that about 80% of respondents supported passing a new stimulus package (Chart 8). Similarly, according to a recent NY Times/Siena College poll, 72% of voters supported a hypothetical $2 trillion stimulus package that would extend emergency unemployment insurance benefits, distribute direct cash payments to households, and provide financial support to state and local governments (Table 1). Such a package is basically what the Democrats are proposing. Strikingly, when this package is described in non-partisan terms, even the majority of Republicans are in favor of it. Table 1Even Republicans Want More Stimulus Peak Chinese Stimulus Even though it originated there, China has weathered the pandemic better than any other major country. Chinese export growth accelerated to 21.1% year-over-year in November. The Caixin manufacturing PMI rose to 54.9 on the month, the strongest reading since November 2010. The service sector PMI increased to a healthy 57.8. The “official” PMIs published by the National Bureau of Statistics also rose. Chinese growth will moderate over the coming months. The magnitude of China’s policy support has peaked, as evidenced by the rise in bond yields and interbank rates (Chart 9). The authorities have also permitted more corporate issuers to default, while tightening rules on online lending. Turning points in Chinese domestic demand and imports tend to lag policy developments by about 6-to-9 months (Chart 10). Thus, the tailwind from Chinese stimulus should fade by the middle of next year, hopefully just in time for the baton to be passed to a more organic, vaccine-driven global growth recovery. Chart 9China: Bond Yields And Interbank Rates Have Been Rising Chart 10Tailwind From Chinese Stimulus Will Fade By The Middle Of Next Year Japan: Near-Term Wobbles Japan is in the midst of its third wave of the pandemic. While not as bad as the latest waves in the US and Europe, it has still been disruptive enough to slow the economy. Although it did tick up in November, the manufacturing PMI remains below the crucial 50 boom/bust line, notably weaker than in other APAC countries. The outlook component of the Economy Watchers Survey fell to 36.5 in November (from 49.1), while the current situation component slid to 45.6 (from 54.5). Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs. The number of new Covid cases seems to be stabilizing. Machine tool orders rose to 8% year-over-year in November, the first positive print since September 2018. Retail sales have recovered from a low of -14% year-over-year in April to around +6% in October. Broad money growth has reached a record high. The Japanese government is also considering a new ¥73 trillion fiscal stimulus package to fight the pandemic. Global Monetary Policy To Stay Accommodative Chart 11Service And Shelter Inflation Tend To Be Largely Determined By Labor Market Slack Could a vaccine-led economic recovery cause central banks to remove the punch bowl? We think not. Inflation is likely to rise in the first half of 2021 as the “base effects” from the pandemic-induced drop in prices reverse. However, central banks will see through these short-term oscillations in inflation. Inflation in modern economies is largely driven by services and shelter (goods account for only 25% of the US core CPI and 37% of the euro area core CPI). Both service inflation and shelter inflation tend to be largely determined by labor market slack (Chart 11). In its October 2020 World Economic Outlook, the IMF projected that the unemployment rate in the main developed economies would fall back to its full employment level by around 2025 (Chart 12). While this is too pessimistic in light of the subsequent progress that has been made on the vaccine front, it is probable that unemployment will remain too high to generate an overheated economy for the next 2-to-3 years. Chart 12Unemployment Rate Is Projected To Decline Towards Pre-Covid Lows In The Coming Years Chart 13Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Still Subdued   Moreover, despite vaccine optimism, long-term inflation expectations are still below target in most of the major economies (Chart 13). Not only do central banks want inflation to return to target, they want inflation to overshoot their targets in order to make up for the shortfall in inflation in the post-GFC era. Had the core PCE deflator in the US risen by 2% per year since 2012, the price level would be about 3.3% higher than it currently is. In the euro area, the price level is about 9.5% below where it would have been if consumer prices had risen by 2% over this period. In Japan, the price level is 11.6% below target (Chart 14). Chart 14Central Banks Have Missed Their Inflation Targets II. Financial Markets A. Global Asset Allocation Remain Overweight Equities Versus Bonds On A 12-Month Horizon Equities have run up a lot since the start of November. Bullish sentiment has surged in the American Association of Individual Investors weekly bull-bear poll, while the put-to-call ratio has fallen to multi-year lows (Chart 15). This makes equities vulnerable to a short-term correction. Nevertheless, rising odds of an effective vaccine and continued easy monetary policy keep us bullish on stocks over a 12-month horizon. Stronger economic growth should lift earnings estimates. Stocks have usually outperformed bonds when growth has been on the upswing (Chart 16). Chart 15A Lot Of Bullishness Chart 16Stocks Rarely Underperform Bonds When The Global Economy Is Strengthening Valuations also favor stocks. As Chart 17 illustrates, the global equity risk premium – which we model by subtracting real bond yields from the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield – remains quite high. Along the same lines, dividend yields are above bond yields in the major markets. Even if one were to pessimistically assume that nominal dividend payments stay flat for the next 10 years, real equity prices would have to fall by 24% in the US for stocks to underperform bonds (Chart 18). In the euro area, real equity prices would need to tumble 32%. In Japan, they would have to drop 20%. Chart 17Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated Chart 18Stocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds As such, investors should overweight global equities relative to bonds. We recommend a neutral allocation to cash to take advantage of any short-term dip in stock prices. Our full suite of asset allocation and trade recommendations are shown at the back of this report.   B. Equity Sectors, Regions, Styles This Year’s Losers Will Be Next Year’s Winners The “pandemic trade” is giving way to the “reopening trade.” We are still in the early innings of this transition. Hence, going into next year, it makes sense to favor stocks that were crushed by lockdown measures but could thrive once restrictions are lifted. Chart 19 shows relative 12-months forward earnings estimates for US/non-US, large caps/small caps, and tech/overall market. In all three cases, the tables have turned: Estimates are now rising more quickly for non-US stocks, small caps, and non-tech sectors. Non-US Stocks To Outperform Stocks outside the US are significantly cheaper than their US peers based on price-to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-sales, and dividend yields (Chart 20). The macro outlook also favors non-US stocks, which tend to outperform when global growth is strengthening and the US dollar is weakening (Chart 21). Chart 19Relative Earnings Expectations For Non-US Stocks, Small Caps, And Non-Tech Are Improving   Chart 20Non-US Stocks Are Cheaper Chart 21Non-US Equities Tend To Outperform Their US Peers When Global Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening As we discuss below, the dollar is likely to depreciate further over the next 12 months. A weaker dollar benefits cyclical sectors of the stock market more than defensives (Chart 22). Deep cyclicals are overrepresented outside the US (Table 2). Being more cyclical in nature, small caps usually outperform when the dollar weakens (Chart 23). Chart 22Cyclicals Tend To Outperform Defensives In A Falling Dollar Environment Table 2Financials Are Overrepresented In Ex-US Indices, While Tech Dominates The US Market Chart 23Small Caps Also Tend To Outperform When Global Growth Strengthens And The Dollar Weakens   Chart 24Banks’ Net Interest Margins Will Receive A Boost Buy The Banks Banks comprise a larger share of non-US stock markets. Stronger growth in 2021 will put upward pressure on long-term bond yields. Since short-term rates will stay where they are, yield curves will steepen. Steeper yield curves will boost banks’ net interest margins (Chart 24).   In addition, faster economic growth will put a lid on defaults. Banks have set aside considerable capital for pandemic-related loan losses. Yet, the wave of defaults that so many feared has failed to materialize. According to the American Bankruptcy Institute, commercial bankruptcies are lower now than they were this time last year (Chart 25). Personal loan delinquencies have also been trending down. The 60-day delinquency rate on credit card debt fell to 1.16% in October from 2.02% a year earlier. The delinquency rate for mortgages fell from 1.54% to 0.98%. Only auto loan delinquencies registered a tiny blip higher (Table 3). Chart 25Commercial Bankruptcies Are Well Contained Table 3Personal Loan Delinquencies Have Also Been Trending Lower Just A “Value Bounce”? In our conversations with clients, many investors are open to the idea that value stocks are due for a cyclical bounce. However, most still believe that growth stocks will fare best over a longer-term horizon. Such a view is understandable. After all, profit growth is the principal driver of equity returns. If, by definition, growth companies enjoy faster earnings growth, does it not stand to reason that growth stocks will outperform value stocks over the long haul? Well, actually, it doesn’t. What matters is profit growth relative to expectations, not absolute profit growth. If earnings rise quickly, but by less than investors had anticipated, stock prices could still go down. Historically, investors have tended to extrapolate earnings trends too far into the future, which has led them to overpay for growth stocks. Chart 26 demonstrates this point analytically. It features the results of a study by Louis Chan, Jason Karceski, and Josef Lakonishok. The authors sorted companies by projected five-year earnings growth and then compared the analysts’ forecasts with realized earnings. For the most part, they found that there was no relationship between expected profit growth and realized profit growth beyond horizons of two years. In general, the higher the long-term earnings growth estimates, the more likely actual earnings were to miss expectations. Chart 26Investors Tend To Overpay For Growth The Paradox Of Growth Given the difficulty of picking individual stocks that will consistently surpass earnings estimates, should investors simply allocate the bulk of their capital to sectors such as technology that have the best long-term growth prospects while eschewing structurally challenged sectors such as energy and financials? Again, the answer is not as obvious as it may seem. As Chart 27 illustrates, stocks in industries that experience a burst of output growth do tend to outperform other stocks. However, over the long haul, companies in fast growing industries do not outperform their peers (Chart 28). In other words, stock prices seem to respond more to unanticipated changes in industry growth rather than to the trend level of growth. Chart 27Stocks In Industries That Experience A Burst Of Output Growth Do Tend To Outperform Other Stocks … Chart 28… But Over The Long Haul, Companies In Fast-Growing Industries Do Not Outperform Their Peers Explaining Tech Outperformance In this vein, it is useful to examine what has powered the performance of US tech stocks over the past 25 years. Chart 29 shows that faster sales-per-share growth explains less than half of tech’s outperformance since 1996 and none of tech’s outperformance in the period up to 2011. The majority of tech’s outperformance is explained by greater margin expansion and an increase in the P/E ratio at which tech stocks trade relative to the rest of the stock market. Chart 29Decomposing Tech Outperformance What accounts for the significant increase in tech profit margins? In two words, the answer is “monopoly power.” Tech companies are particularly susceptible to network effects: The more people who use a particular tech platform, the more attractive it is for others to use it. Facebook is a classic example. Second, tech companies benefit significantly from scale economies. Once a piece of software has been written, creating additional copies costs almost nothing. Even in the hardware realm, the marginal cost of producing an additional chip is tiny compared to the fixed cost of designing it. All of this creates a winner take-all environment where success begets further success. Normally, structurally fast-growing industries attract more competition, which increases the odds that up-and-coming firms will displace incumbents. The growth of tech monopolies has subverted that process, allowing profits to rise significantly. A Tougher Path Forward For Tech A key question for investors is how much additional scope today’s tech monopolies have to expand profits. While it is difficult to generalize, two broad forces are likely to curtail future earnings growth. First, many tech titans have become so big that their future growth will be driven less by their ability to take market share from competitors and more by the overall size of the markets in which they operate. As it is, close to three-quarters of US households have an Amazon Prime account. Slightly over half have a Netflix account. Nearly 70% have a Facebook account. Google commands 92% of the internet search market. Together, Google and Facebook generate about 60% of all online advertising revenue. Second, the monopoly power wielded by tech companies makes them vulnerable to governmental action, including higher taxes, increased regulation, and stronger anti-trust enforcement. Importantly, it is not just the left that wants greater scrutiny of tech companies. According to a recent Pew Research study, more than half of conservative Republicans favor increasing government regulation of the tech sector (Chart 30). Chart 30Conservatives Favor Increased Government Regulation Of Big Tech Companies We do not expect tech stocks to decline in absolute terms since they still have a variety of tailwinds supporting them. Nevertheless, our bet is that the cyclical shift in favor of value stocks we are seeing now will usher in a period of outperformance for value names that could last for much of this decade. Not only are value stocks exceptionally cheap compared to growth stocks (Chart 31), but as we discuss below, bond yields likely reached a secular bottom this year. This could set the stage for a period of lasting outperformance for value plays. Chart 31Value Stocks Are Extremely Cheap Relative To Growth Stocks C. Fixed Income Position For Steeper Yield Curves As discussed earlier, central banks are unlikely to raise rates over the next 2-to-3 years. In fact, short-term real rates will probably decline further in 2021 as inflation expectations rise towards central bank targets. What about longer-term bond yields? Chart 32 displays the expected path of policy rates in the major developed economies now and at the start of 2020. The chart suggests that there is still scope for rate expectations in the post-2023 period to recover some of the ground they have lost since the start of the pandemic. This implies that bond investors should position for steeper yield curves, while keeping duration risk at below-benchmark levels. They should also favor inflation-linked securities over nominal bonds. Chart 32Policy Rate Expectations Remain Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Avoid “High Beta” Government Bond Markets The highest-yielding bond markets tend to have the highest “betas” to the general direction of global bond yields (Chart 33). This means when global bond yields are rising, higher-yielding markets such as the US usually experience the biggest selloff in bond prices. Chart 33High-Yielding Bond Markets Are The Most Cyclical This pattern exists because faster growth has a more subdued impact on rate expectations in economies such as Europe and Japan where the neutral rate of interest is stuck deep in negative territory. For example, if stronger growth lifts the neutral rate in Japan from say, -4% to -2%, this would still not warrant raising rates. In contrast, if stronger growth lifts the neutral rate from -1% to +1% in the US, this would eventually justify a rate hike.  As such, we would underweight US Treasurys in global government bond portfolios. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to increase to around 1.3%-to-1.5% by the end of 2021, which is above current expectations of 1.15% based on the forward curve. Conversely, we would overweight European and Japanese government bond markets. After adjusting for currency-hedging costs, US Treasurys offer only a small yield pickup over European and Japanese bonds but face a much greater risk of capital losses as rate expectations recover (Table 4). Table 4Bond Markets Across The Developed World BCA’s global fixed-income strategists have a neutral recommendation on Canadian and Australian bonds. While Canadian and Australian yields are also “high beta,” both the BoC and the RBA are very active purchasers in their domestic markets. Stay Overweight High-Yield Developed Market Corporate Debt In fixed-income portfolios, we would overweight corporate debt relative to safer government bonds. In an economic environment where monetary policy remains accommodative and growth is rebounding, corporate default rates should remain contained, which will keep spreads from widening. Within corporate credit, we favor high yield over investment grade. Geographically, we prefer US corporate bonds over euro area bonds. The former trade with a higher yield and spread than the latter (Charts 34A & B). Chart 34AFavor High-Yield Bonds Over Investment-Grade ... Chart 34B… And US Corporates Over Euro Area One way to gauge the attractiveness of credit is to look at the percentile rankings of 12-month breakeven spreads. The 12-month breakeven spread is the amount of credit spread widening that can occur before a credit product starts to underperform a duration-matched, risk-free government bond over a one-year horizon. For US investment-grade corporates, the breakeven spread is currently in the bottom decile of its historic range, which is rather unattractive from a risk-adjusted perspective. In contrast, the US high-yield breakeven spread is currently in the 62nd percentile, which is quite enticing. In the UK, high-yield debt is more appealing than investment grade, although not quite to the same extent as in the US. In the euro area, both high-yield and investment-grade credit are fairly unattractive (Chart 35). Chart 35Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Outside the corporate sector, our US bond strategists like consumer ABS due to the strength of household balance sheets. They also see value in municipal bonds. However, they would avoid MBS, as prepayment risks are elevated in that sector. EM credit should also benefit from the combination of stronger global growth and a weaker US dollar. Long-Term Inflation Risk Is Underpriced As noted earlier in the report, inflation is unlikely to rise significantly over the next three years. Beyond then, a more inflationary environment is probable. Chart 36 shows that the wage-version of the Phillips curve in the US is alive and well. It just so happens that over the past three decades, the labor market has never had a chance to overheat. Something always came along that derailed the economy before a price-wage spiral could develop. This year it was the pandemic. In 2008 it was the Global Financial Crisis. In 2000 it was the dotcom bust and in the early 1990s it was the collapse in commercial real estate prices following the Savings and Loan Crisis. Admittedly, only the pandemic qualifies as a true “exogenous” shock. The prior three recessions were endogenous in nature to the extent that they were preceded by growing economic imbalances, laid bare by a Fed hiking cycle. One can debate the degree to which the global economy is suffering from imbalances today, but one thing is certain: no major central bank is keen on raising rates anytime soon. Central banks want higher inflation. They are likely to get it. D. Currencies, Commodities, And Yes, Bitcoin Dollar Bear Market To Continue In 2021 The dollar faces a number of headwinds going into next year. First, interest rate differentials have moved significantly against the greenback. At the start of 2019, US real 2-year rates were about 190 basis points above rates of other developed economies; today, US real rates are around 60 basis points lower than those abroad. In fact, as Chart 37 shows, the trade-weighted dollar has weakened less than one would have expected based on the decline in interest rate differentials. This suggests that there could be some “catch-up” weakness for the dollar next year even if rate differentials remain broadly stable. Chart 36Is The Phillips Curve Really Dead? Chart 37A Relatively Muted Decline In The Dollar Given The Move In Real Yield Differentials   Second, the US dollar is a counter-cyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of the global business cycle (Chart 38). If the global economy strengthens next year thanks to an effective vaccine, the dollar should weaken. Chart 38The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 39USD Remains Overvalued Third, the US dollar remains about 13% overvalued based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates (Chart 39). This overvaluation is also reflected in the large US current account deficit, which rose in the second quarter to the highest level since 2008 and is on track to swell even further in the second half of the year. Technicals Are Dollar Bearish Admittedly, many investors are now bearish on the dollar. Shouldn’t one be a contrarian and adopt a bullish dollar view? Not necessarily. In most cases, being contrarian makes sense. However, this does not apply to the dollar. The dollar is a high-momentum currency (Chart 40). When it comes to trading the dollar, it pays to be a trend follower. Chart 40The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency One of the simplest and most profitable trading rules for the dollar is to go long the greenback when it is trading above its moving average and go short when it is trading below its moving average (Chart 41). Today, the trade-weighted dollar is trading below its 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, and 2-year moving averages. Along the same lines, the dollar performs best when sentiment is bullish and improving. In contrast, the dollar does worse when sentiment is bearish and deteriorating, as it is now (Chart 42). Chart 41Being A Contrarian Doesn’t Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar (I) Chart 42Being A Contrarian Doesn’t Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar (II) The bottom line is that both fundamental factors – interest rate differentials, global growth, valuations, current account dynamics – and technical factors – moving average rules and sentiment – all point to dollar weakness next year. Top Performing Currencies In 2021 EUR/USD is likely to rise to 1.3 by the middle of next year. The ECB does not want a stronger currency, but with euro area interest rates already in negative territory, there is not much it can do. The Swedish krona, as a highly cyclical currency, should strengthen against the euro. In contrast, the Swiss franc, a classically defensive currency, will weaken against the euro. It is more difficult to forecast the direction of the pound given uncertainty about ongoing Brexit talks. The working assumption of BCA’s geopolitical team is that Prime Minister Boris Johnson has sufficient economic and political incentives to arrive at a trade deal, a parliamentary majority to get it approved, and a powerful geopolitical need to mollify Scotland. This bodes well for sterling. The yen is a very defensive currency. Thus, in an environment of strengthening global growth, the yen is likely to trade flat against the dollar, and in the process, lose ground against most other currencies. We are most bullish about the prospects for EM and commodity currencies going into next year. China is likely to let its currency strengthen further in return for a partial rollback of tariffs by the Biden administration. A stronger yuan will allow other currencies in Asia to appreciate. Stay Bullish On Commodities And Commodity Currencies The combination of a weaker US dollar and stronger global growth should support commodity prices in 2021. Industrial metals outperformed oil this year, but the opposite should be true next year. Chart 43Oil Prices Are Expected To Recover While the long-term outlook for crude is murky in light of the shift towards electric vehicles, the near-term picture remains favorable due to the cyclical rebound in petroleum demand and ongoing OPEC and Russian supply discipline. BCA’s commodity strategists expect the average price of Brent to exceed market expectations by about $14 in 2021, which should help the Norwegian krone, Canadian dollar, Russian ruble, Mexican peso, and Colombian peso (Chart 43). Favor Gold Over Bitcoin As An Inflation Hedge Gold has traditionally served as the go-to hedge against inflation. These days, however, there is a new competitor in town: bitcoin. In traditional economic parlance, money serves three purposes: as a medium of exchange; as a unit of account; and as a store of value. Both gold and bitcoin flunk the test for the first two purposes. Few transactions are conducted in either gold or bitcoin. It is even rarer for prices of goods and services to be set in ounces of gold or units of bitcoin. Gold arguably does better as a store of value. It has been around for a long time and if all else fails, it can always be melted down and turned into nice jewelry. Bitcoin’s Achilles Heel Bitcoin’s defenders argue that the cryptocurrency does serve as a store of value because one day, it will reach a critical mass that will make it a viable medium of exchange and a functional unit of account. Yet, this argument is politically naïve. Countries with fiat currencies derive significant benefits from their ability to create money out of thin air that can then be used to pay for goods and services. In the US, this “seigniorage revenue” amounts to over $100 billion per year. The existence of fiat currencies also gives central banks the power to set interest rates and provide liquidity backstops to the financial sector. Bitcoin’s ability to facilitate anonymous transactions is also its Achilles heel. The widespread use of bitcoin would make it more difficult for governments to tax their citizens. All this suggests that bitcoin will never reach a critical mass where it becomes a viable medium of exchange or functional unit of account. Governments will step in to ban or greatly curtail its usage before then. And without the ability to reach this critical mass, bitcoin’s utility as a store of value will disappear. Hence, investors looking for some inflation protection in their portfolios should stick with gold. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Heather Reese, A. Danielle Iuliano, Neha N. Patel, Shikha Garg, Lindsay Kim, Benjamin J. Silk, Aron J. Hall, Alicia Fry, and Carrie Reed, “Estimated incidence of COVID-19 illness and hospitalization — United States, February–September, 2020,” Clinical Infectious Diseases (Oxford Academic), November 25, 2020. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations This table provides trade recommendations that may not be adequately represented in the matrix on the preceding page. Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Dear Client, Next week I will be presenting our 2021 outlook on China at our last webcasts of the year "China 2021 Key Views: Shifting Gears In The New Decade".  The webcasts will take place next Wednesday, December 16 at 10:00AM EST (English) and at 9:00 AM Beijing/HK/Taipei time, 12:00 PM Australian Eastern time (Mandarin). In addition, our final weekly publication for 2020 will be on Wednesday, December 16, 2020. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist   Highlights Chinese policymakers have shifted their focus from supporting economic growth at all costs to risk management. The trend will likely gather speed in 2021. A deceleration in credit growth next year is almost a certainty. While policymakers will be data dependent and the slowdown will be managed, our baseline scenario suggests a decline of approximately three percentage points in credit impulse in 2021. Chinese stocks could still trend higher in Q1, but prices will falter as the market starts to price in a tighter policy environment and slower profit growth in 2H21. We recommend a tactical neutral stance in both the onshore and offshore markets.  We continue to favor Chinese government bonds on a cyclical basis, while gyrations in the onshore corporate bond market will endure for at least the next six months. Feature China’s economic growth momentum has strengthened in recent months, but the nation’s policy stance has also turned more hawkish. As set out in the 14th Five-Year Plan, 2021 will mark the beginning of a new era in which policymakers will switch gears from building a "moderately prosperous society" to becoming a "great modern socialist nation.” The pivot means China’s top officials may tolerate slower economic growth, implement tougher financial and industry regulations, and accelerate structural reforms by allowing more bankruptcies and industry consolidations. As we pointed out in our November 4, 2020 Strategy Report,1 external challenges combined with a stronger domestic leadership will allow China to initiate more meaningful reforms in the next decade than in the past ten years. The reforms will strengthen our structural view on China’s economy and financial assets, but this restructuring will create headwinds for growth in the short to medium term.  Therefore, investors should maintain low expectations for Chinese growth and financial asset prices. In 2021, credit growth will decelerate, regulations will be tightened and the “old economy” will moderate in the second half of the year.  We will discuss four main themes in our outlook for 2021. Key Theme #1: Macro Policy: Turning More Hawkish Government officials recently stepped up mention of financial risk containment in their public announcements, along with tightened industry regulations. Many market commentators are downplaying the risk of a tighter policy in 2021, citing China’s fragile recovery and a weak global economy. However, the current environment resembles the policy backdrop in late 2016/early 2017 when President Xi Jinping began his financial deleveraging campaign. Our policy framework suggests that China currently faces fewer constraints than in 2016/2017. Thus, the odds are high that the leaders will turn their tough rhetoric into action in the next six to twelve months.   Importantly, despite low year-over-year GDP growth, the pace of China’s domestic economic recovery has been faster than in 2016 (Chart 1). The PMIs in both the manufacturing and service sectors have been above the 50 percent boom-bust threshold for nine consecutive months (Chart 2). The laggards in the economy - manufacturing investment and household consumption - have been consistently improving (Chart 3). Bond yields have climbed sharply, but given that corporate bond issuance only accounts for 10% of total social financing, the economic impact from rising corporate bond yields has been more than offset by the large number of government bonds issued (Chart 4). Moreover, the recovery in China’s export sector and current account balance has fared surprisingly well this year, propelled by the global demand for medical supplies and stay-at-home electronic goods (Chart 5). Portfolio inflows also have been strong, fueling a rapid appreciation in the RMB.  Chart 1Current Economic Recovery In Better Shape Than In 2016 Chart 2PMI Remains Strong Chart 3The Laggards Are Catching Up Chart 4Large Fiscal Stimulus More Than Offset Tighter Monetary Stance Chart 5Exports Surged Chart 6Chinese Business Cycle Upswing Still Has Steam Looking forward, China’s economic recovery should continue for at least another two quarters due to this year’s credit expansion. Economic activities usually lag the turning points in credit growth by six to nine months (Chart 6). Moreover, headline economic data in 1H21 should be impressive, given the deep slump in domestic output during the same period in 2020. The strengthening economic data will provide China’s leadership with a long-awaited opportunity to focus on risk management. Chart 7A Mild Deflation Will Not Stop Policymakers From Reining In Stimulus Furthermore, the ongoing deflation in the ex-factory prices should not stop the authorities from scaling back policy support. It is worth noting that Xi’s administration doubled down on squeezing shadow banking activity in early 2017 when the CPI was decelerating; the PPI turned positive only due to a low base factor from deep contractions in 2016 (Chart 7). In this vein, as long as the deceleration in both the CPI and PPI does not drastically worsen, we think that policymakers will see less need to reflate the economy. China’s external environment will be less challenging in 2021 than in 2016/2017. Geopolitical tensions are set to ease, at least temporarily, with US President-elect Joe Biden taking office in January. This contrasts with 2016/2017 when President Xi began his financial deleveraging campaign despite increasing strain from then newly-elected President Donald Trump. In hindsight, Xi’s intention may have been to solidify China’s financial sector in preparation for a trade war with the US. The same logic can be applied to our view for next year: Xi will accelerate structure reforms to mitigate risk in the domestic economy before the Biden administration turns its focus to China. We do not think the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary next year will prevent Xi from adopting a hawkish policy bias either. Xi plowed ahead with tightening financial regulations in 2017 even as the ruling Communist Party Committee (CPC) was preparing for a generational leadership reshuffle. In the past two years, the escalation in US-China tensions has strengthened Xi’s power in the CPC and Chinese society. The recent large number of changes in provincial CPC leaders should help Xi to further consolidate his centralized power over local governments. All signs indicate that both the domestic and external landscapes should provide Xi with even more room to undertake reforms in 2021 compared with 2017. Key Theme #2: Stimulus: Deceleration Ahead A deceleration in both credit growth and fiscal support in 2021 is almost a certainty in light of the more hawkish tone by Chinese policymakers. Chart 8 shows that between 2017 and 2019, policymakers came close to stabilizing the macro leverage ratio, but the progress was more than reversed this year due to the pandemic. If policymakers are to allow the increase in the 2021 debt-to-GDP ratio to be within the range of the past four years, then credit may expand at a rate slightly above nominal GDP growth in 2021 (assuming nominal output growth at around 10-11% next year). This scenario, which is our baseline view, is in line with recent statements from the PBoC, which calls for aligning credit growth with nominal GDP in 2021.  Our calculation suggests that credit impulse will reach around 29% of next year’s GDP, about 2 to 3 percentage points lower than in 2020 (Chart 9). Chart 8Financial Deleveraging Efforts Erased By COVID-19 Chart 9Credit Growth Will Decelerate In 2021 Even if the PBoC keeps its official policy rate (i.e. the 7-day interbank repo rate) steady, tightening regulations and repricing credit risk will lead to higher funding costs and a lower appetite for borrowing (Chart 10). Banking regulators have made it clear that some of the one-off easing measures from this year, such as the extension of loan payments (through March 2021) and the delay of macro-prudential assessments (through end-2021), will end next year. Financial institutions will need to slow the pace of their asset balance sheet to comply with these regulations. The regulatory pressures will lead to de facto deleveraging. On the fiscal front, we expect the large budget deficit to remain intact next year. Targeted stimulus through subsidies and tax cuts to support household consumption and small businesses will likely continue. Government spending in the new economy sectors such as semiconductor and tech-related infrastructure will even accelerate. However, the new-economy infrastructure investment is estimated to only account for about 1% of China’s total capital formation, having limited impact on the overall economy.2 Chart 10Higher Funding Costs Will Discourage Corporate Borrowing Chart 11Fiscal Boost For Infrastructure Will Scale Back The proceeds from the large number of the local government special purpose bonds (SPBs) this year will continue to provide tailwinds for infrastructure investment into Q1 2021. However, as the laggards in the economic recovery catch up and government tax revenue improves next year, 2021 quotas for government general and SPBs are likely to be scaled back, reining in expenditure growth in the traditional infrastructure sector (Chart 11).   Finally, investors should watch for signs of further hawkishness from China’s leaders at the Central Economic Work Conference this December and the National People’s Congress next March.  While we expect policymakers to be data dependent and keep a controlled deceleration in credit and economic growth, risks of a policy overkill cannot be ruled out. A more bearish scenario would be if policymakers decide to fully revert the pace of debt accumulation to the average rate in 2017-2019. In this case, credit impulse in 2021 could fall by more than 5 percentage points compared with 2020 (Scenario 2 in Chart 9 on Page 6). Key Theme #3: Chinese Equities: Position For A Peak In Prices This year’s cyclical (6- to 12 months) call to overweight Chinese stocks within a global portfolio has panned out. In the next 12 months, the risks in Chinese stocks relative to global benchmarks are to the downside; Chinese stocks are vulnerable to setbacks in policy support next year, in both absolute and relative terms. We are closing the following trades: Long MSCI China Index/Short MSCI All Country World Index, for a 1.5% profit; Long MSCI China A Onshore Index/Short MSCI All Country World Index, for a 5.6% profit; Long MSCI China Ex-TMT/Short MSCI Global EX-TMT, for a 0.7% loss; Long Investable Materials/Short broad investable market, for a 5.6% profit; and Long Onshore Materials/Short broad A-Share market, for a 9.3% profit. Chart 12Onshore Equity Market Investors Will Start To Price In Slower Profit Growth In 2H21 In absolute terms, Chinese onshore stocks on an aggregate level could still inch higher in the next quarter, supported by an improving business and profit cycle (Chart 12). However, in Q2 the market may start to price in slower economic and profit growth in 2H21, erasing the gains from the first quarter.  The resilient performance in Chinese stocks against a tightening policy backdrop in 2017 is not likely to repeat itself next year. Current valuations in both China’s onshore and offshore equity markets are higher than at the end of 2016; the price-to-forward earnings ratios in both markets this year have breached the peak levels achieved in 2017 (Chart 13A and 13B). Recovering earnings in the next year will help to digest the currently elevated valuations, i.e. the market has already priced in a substantial post-pandemic profit recovery and investors’ focus will soon switch to a more pessimistic outlook for corporate earnings in 2H21.  Chart 13AInvestable Stocks Are More Expensive Now Than Prior To The Last Tightening Cycle Chart 13BA-Shares Are Less Expensive, But Valuations Still Elevated Additionally, a property market boom in 2017 boosted the stock performance of real estate developers and related sectors in the supply chain (Chart 14). Policies have already turned much more restrictive in the past month, and deleveraging pressures faced by property developers may weigh on both the sector’s profit growth and stock performance in the next six to twelve months.3 The investable market may not be insulated from tighter domestic policies either. Recent anti-trust regulations in China could create headwinds for mega-cap technology stocks in the near term. Global investors will demand a higher risk premium for China’s tech sector than in the past, as the rich valuations of tech stocks pose more downside risks in a less friendly policy environment (Chart 15).  Chart 14Housing Boom In 2017 Also Helped Sustain A Bull Market Back Then Chart 15Valuations In Chinese Tech Stocks Are Elevated Chart 16A Policy Overkill Will Significantly Raise Prob Of A Earnings Contraction In 12 Months Furthermore, if we presume a policy overkill with more aggressive deleveraging and a further appreciation in the RMB in 2021, our model shows a significant increase in the probability of a profit growth contraction in the next 12 months (Chart 16). In this scenario, selloffs in Chinese stock prices may start in Q1, a risk that cannot be ruled out. In relative terms, Chinese stocks will likely underperform global equities. It is doubtful that the impressive outperformance in Chinese investable stocks throughout 2017 will be repeated in 2021. Chinese equities have benefited from the successful containment of China’s COVID-19 situation in the past year (Chart 17). As breakthroughs in vaccines make the pandemic less threatening to the global economy, Chinese risk assets relative to global ones will become less appealing. Global cyclical stocks, particularly European and Japanese equities, should benefit from improvements in business activities and relatively low valuations (Chart 18). Chart 17Chinese Equities Have Benefited From A Better Control Of COVID-19 This Year... Chart 18...But Vaccines Will Give A Boost To Other Markets Next Year Importantly, despite strong inflows this year from foreign investors to China’s bond market, foreign portfolio flows into China’s onshore equity market have been less than one-third of that in 2019 (Chart 19). Looking ahead, global investors will be less keen to support Chinese stocks, based on the expectation of tighter onshore liquidity conditions and less buoyant economic growth.   Chart 19Foreign Investors Have Not Been So Keen On Chinese Risky Assets This Year Everything considered, we anticipate that Chinese A-shares and investable stocks will start descending in Q2 in absolute terms. Their performance relative to global equities will also peak. We recommend a neutral stance on both bourses in the next three months to minimize the downside risks.  Key Theme #4: Chinese Bonds: Favor Onshore Government Over Corporate Bonds We continue to recommend a cyclical long position in Chinese government bonds within a global fixed-income portfolio. However, we are closing our long Chinese onshore corporate bond trade for now, for a 17% gain (Chart 20). The large interest rate differential between yields in Chinese bonds versus those in other major developed nations should remain intact into the new year. The yield on the short-duration government notes will continue to trend higher in 1H21, based on the prospect of tighter monetary policy. The yield on long-dated bonds will also escalate as the outlook for the economy continues to improve. We are pricing in a 70BPs increase in the 1-year government bond yield and a 40BPs rise in the yield of the 10-year bond from their current levels (Chart 21).   Chart 20Handsome Returns On Chinese Government Bonds Chart 21Our Projections On Government Bond Yield Hikes Next Year Chart 22RMB Appreciation Will Continue In 2021, But At A Slower Pace Than This Year The ongoing appreciation in the RMB will also make Chinese government bonds attractive to global investors. The speed of the gain in the RMB against the US dollar may slow in 2021, but the economic fundamentals do not yet suggest that this trend will reverse. Relative growth and interest rates between China and the US will probably narrow and the geopolitical tailwinds affecting the RMB following the Biden win in the US election will subside in the new year (Chart 22). However, China's strong export sector should still support a record high trade surplus and provide a floor to the Chinese currency against the USD. Chinese onshore corporate bonds have undergone a major shakeout in the domestic corporate bond market in the past month. A slew of state-owned enterprise (SOE) bond defaults has pushed up the yields on the lower-rated corporate bond by nearly 40BPs in one month. In our view, the recent panic selloff in the onshore corporate bond market is overdone and domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive on a cyclical basis. Bloomberg data shows that the value of defaulted bonds in the first three quarters of this year is in fact much lower than in the past two years: it dropped to 85Bn RMB from 142Bn RMB defaults in 2019 and the default of 122Bn RMB in 2018. Bondholders have been spooked by the fact that the Chinese local government and top financial regulators allow defaults by state-backed firms. The policy change to shift risk to the markets should result in a continuation of risk-off sentiment among investors, inducing selling pressure in the domestic corporate bond market in the near term. However, on a cyclical basis, such selloffs could present good buying opportunities. While we expect China’s onshore corporate bond defaults to be higher in 2021, the default rate remains below the global average (Chart 23). As we pointed out in our previous report, since 2017 Chinese onshore corporate bonds have been priced with a significantly higher risk premium than their global peers, which in our view is overdone (Chart 24). Chart 23Chinese Corporate Bond Default Rate Lower Than Global Average... Chart 24...And Much Lower Than Their Risk Premiums Imply Chart 25Chinese Corporate Bonds Can Bring Better Returns Once The Peak Intensity In Policy Tightening Passes In addition, Chart 25 shows that the total returns on Chinese onshore corporate bonds briefly declined in 2017 when the government’s financial de-risking efforts intensified. It sequentially rebounded in 2018, suggesting a turnaround in investors’ sentiment after the first cleanup wave in the corporate sector.  As such, while we do not favor Chinese onshore corporate bonds in the next six months, on a 12-month horizon, conditions could become more favorable to initiate a long position. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Please see China Investment Strategy Report "The 14th Five-Year Plan: Meaningful Transformations Ahead," dated November 4, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Economic Stimulus: How Much For Infrastructure And The Property Market?" dated March 25, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China: The Implications Of Deleveraging By Property Developers," dated October 21, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Chart 1Bond Yields & The CRB/Gold Ratio In our last report of November, we noted that the rising COVID case count was likely to lead to a challenging few months for the US economy, but we also questioned whether financial markets would pay attention or whether they would stay focused on the vaccine roll-out and eventual economic recovery. We now have our answer. November’s employment report was the worst since April, but the Treasury curve has bear-steepened, credit spreads have come in and TIPS have outperformed nominals. What’s more, the jump in the CRB Raw Industrials / Gold ratio suggests that the 10-year Treasury yield has even more near-term upside (Chart 1). With a vaccine on the horizon and Congress closing in on a fiscal relief package, investors should stay positioned for the reflation trade on a 6-12 month horizon: below-benchmark portfolio duration, nominal and real yield curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners, overweight TIPS versus nominals and overweight corporate bonds rated Ba and higher. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 233 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -74 bps. The strong rally in corporate bonds since March has culminated in extremely tight valuations for investment grade corporates. The 12-month breakeven spread for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index (adjusted to keep the average credit rating constant) has only been tighter 4% of the time since 1995 (Chart 2). The same figure for the Baa-rated credit tier is 5%. We retain a positive outlook on corporate credit despite these stretched valuations. In our view, an environment where the economy is recovering and where the Fed will be very cautious about scaling back accommodation is the exact sort of environment where we should expect a lot of enthusiasm for spread product and, as a result, extremely tight spreads. We will not be surprised if our 12-month breakeven spread percentile rank valuation measure reaches its all-time expensive level within the next couple of months. While the macro environment makes it difficult to turn negative on investment grade corporates, we acknowledge that other sectors may offer better opportunities, particularly in the higher credit tiers. Specifically, we find better value in tax-exempt municipal bonds than in corporates and recommend that investors favor the former over the latter. At the sector level, we continue to recommend overweight allocations to subordinate Bank bonds, Healthcare and Energy bonds. We also advise underweight allocations to Technology and Pharmaceutical bonds. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 382 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -5 bps. After last month’s strong outperformance, Ba-rated junk bonds are now beating duration-equivalent Treasuries by 267 bps, year-to-date. The B and Caa credit tiers are lagging by 179 bps and 548 bps, respectively. We still view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We remain underweight B-rated and lower junk bonds for now as those securities are pricing-in a relatively optimistic outlook for the default rate. But, an imminent vaccine roll-out makes that outlook appear more realistic and we could soon upgrade the lower-rated junk credit tiers when we think the value is exhausted in the Ba-rated and higher securities. Looking at value for the junk index as a whole, we see that the index is pricing-in a default rate of 3% for the next 12 months, significantly below the 8.3% that was observed during the most recent 12-month period (panel 3). However, only four corporate issuers defaulted in October down from a monthly peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, are also falling rapidly (bottom panel). At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology and Energy bonds. We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview MBS: Underweight Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by one basis point in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -39 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 1 bp on the month, and it currently sits at 64 bps (Chart 4). This is significantly higher than the 59 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 53 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 25 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the relatively attractive OAS, we continue to view the elevated primary mortgage spread as a risk for MBS investors. It suggests that mortgage rates need not rise alongside Treasury yields in the near-term, meaning that mortgage refinancings can continue at their current rapid pace (panel 3). All else equal, this elevated refinancing activity will pressure MBS spreads wider. The recent spike in the mortgage delinquency rate does not pose a near-term risk to spreads as it is being driven by households that have been granted forbearance from the federal government (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders only comes into play if many households are unable to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period expires early next year. But even in that case, further government intervention to either support household incomes or extend the forbearance period would mitigate the risk. Chart 4MBS Market Overview Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 64 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -222 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 157 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -269 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 46 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -647 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 139 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -228 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 10 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 9 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +2 bps. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, this year’s dollar weakness has occurred mostly relative to other Developed Market currencies (Chart 5). Value has improved somewhat for EM Sovereigns during the past few weeks, but the index continues to offer less spread than the Baa-rated US Credit index (panel 4). At the country level, Turkey, Colombia, Mexico, Russia and South Africa are the only countries that offer a spread pick-up relative to duration and quality-matched US corporates. Of those, only Mexico looks attractive on a risk/reward basis. Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 130 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -340 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads tightened sharply relative to both Treasuries and Corporates in November, but they remain exceptionally attractive relative to history (Chart 6). In fact, as we showed in a recent report, the Bloomberg Barclays Revenue Bond index offers a greater yield than the quality-matched Credit index across the entire maturity spectrum (before adjusting for the tax advantage).1 This is also true for the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation (GO) index beyond the 12-year maturity point. Eight-to-twelve-year maturity GO bonds trade only 1 basis point through the Credit index, implying a breakeven effective tax rate of 4%. Six-to-eight-year maturities trade 11 bps through the Credit index, implying a breakeven effective tax rate of 16%. Extraordinary valuation is the main reason for our recommendation to overweight municipal bonds. The severe ongoing state & local government credit crunch is a concern, but it is a risk we are willing to take. It now looks possible that a relief package containing some federal funds for state & local governments will be passed before the end of the year. This would alleviate a lot of the concern. But even in the absence of federal assistance, the combination of austerity measures (bottom panel) and all-time high State Rainy Day Fund balances should help stave off a wave of municipal downgrades. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell The Treasury curve bull-flattened in November, but then bear-steepened sharply during the first week of December. All told, the 2/10 Treasury slope is currently 81 bps, 7 bps steeper than at the end of October. The 5/30 Treasury slope is 131 bps, 4 bps steeper than at the end of October. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. A timely vaccine roll-out and/or further fiscal stimulus will speed this process up. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year note and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening.     Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar levels. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 70 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 8 bps and 5 bps on the month. They currently sit at 1.91% and 1.96%, respectively. Core CPI was flat in October and the year-over-year rate dropped from 1.73% to 1.63%. The 12-month trimmed mean CPI fell even more – from 2.37% to 2.22% – so the gap between core and trimmed mean inflation continued to narrow (Chart 8). We expect further narrowing in the months ahead, and therefore expect core CPI to come in relatively hot. For this reason, we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is now somewhat expensive according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).2 Inflation pressures may moderate once core and trimmed mean inflation measures converge, and this could give us an opportunity to tactically reduce TIPS exposure sometime next year. We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). Chart 8TIPS Market Overview ABS: Overweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +82 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +68 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 17 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +174 bps (Chart 9). On paper, the Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of the year is quite negative for ABS. However, as we explained in a recent report, we don’t expect a material impact on spreads.3 For one thing, Aaa ABS spreads are already well below the borrowing cost offered by TALF. But more importantly, consumer credit quality remains quite robust. As we first explained back in June, the stimulus received from the CARES act led to a significant increase in disposable income and a jump in the savings rate (panel 4).4  Faced with an income boost and few spending opportunities, many households took the opportunity to pay down consumer debt. Granted, further income support from Congress is needed now that the CARES act’s enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. But given the substantial boost to savings that has already occurred, we are confident that more stimulus will arrive in time to prevent a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Chart 9ABS Market Overview Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -168 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 71 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -2 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 127 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -620 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the imminent expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus will not be negatively impacted.5  Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +55 bps. The average index spread tightened 6 bps on the month. It currently sits at 53 bps, above typical historical levels (bottom panel). At its September meeting, the Fed decided to slow its pace of Agency CMBS purchases. It is no longer looking to increase its Agency CMBS holdings, but rather, it is only purchasing what is “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. This is nonetheless a Fed back-stop of the market, and it does not change our overweight recommendation.    Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations  The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 70 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 70 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Political Risk Will Dominate In A Pivotal Month For The Bond Market”, dated October 13, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Every year we review our best and worst calls – both in terms of geopolitics and markets. This year our geopolitical forecasting and strategic market recommendations performed well, given the COVID-19 shock, but our tactical trades often went awry. We correctly forecast the presidency, Senate, Democratic nomination, and impeachment outcome. We anticipated “stimulus hiccups” but expected them to be resolved by November 3. The Georgia runoff on January 5 presents a 30% risk to our Senate prediction. In the main, we were right on Chinese politics, EU politics, US-Iran tensions, and Russian politics. US-China tensions kept rising, as expected, but the market ignored it. We missed the Saudi-Russia cartel break-up in Q1. The jury is still out on Brexit. Strategically, we got the big market moves right, but we were too risk-averse during the summer and after the election. Stay long cyber-security stocks in general, but close the pair trade versus Big Tech. Close the 10-year Treasury hedge. Feature Chart 1The Black Swan The COVID-19 pandemic took investors by surprise, defined the year 2020, and caused the shortest bear market in history, lasting 33 days (Chart 1). On the whole this year’s crisis illustrates how geopolitical analysis is not primarily concerned with “black swan” events, which are inherently unpredictable. Rather the wholly unexpected pandemic reinforced several of our pre-existing geopolitical themes and trends: de-globalization, American sociopolitical instability, European integration, and US-China conflict. This year our geopolitical forecasting and strategic market recommendations performed well, given the COVID-19 shock, but our tactical trades often went awry. Whether these and other trends will continue in 2021 will be the subject of our strategic outlook due next week. This week we offer our annual report card, which reviews our best and worst calls for the year with a desire to hold ourselves accountable to clients, learn investment lessons from mistakes, and hone our geopolitical method of analysis. Successful Strategy, Debatable Tactics Overall our performance this year was good. Specifically, our political forecasting was on target and our investment recommendations got the big moves correct. But our risk-averse tactical trades were less successful. In last year’s annual outlook, “2020 Key Views: The Anarchic Society,” our main investment recommendation was long gold – based on sky-high geopolitical risk and a shift toward reflationary policy by the Federal Reserve, China, and the European Union (Chart 2). We maintain this trade today, despite its losing some altitude recently, as we expect to see low real rates, reflationary global policy, and rising inflation expectations. Geopolitical risk will also remain elevated despite dropping off from recent peaks, and not only during President Trump’s “lame duck” final days in office. We sounded the alarm for clients in our January 24 report, “Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran,” warning that global equities and risk appetite would suffer “in the very near term” due to conventional political risks as well as the new coronavirus, which we feared would explode as a result of Chinese New Year. In retrospect we were not bearish enough even in these reports. In our March 27 report, “No Depression,” we advised that the extraordinary monetary and fiscal response to the crisis would reflate the global economy and thus went long Brent crude oil. From this point onward we gradually added risk to our strategic portfolio, including by going long global equities relative to bonds in June (Chart 3). Chart 2Gold Paid Off When Black Swan Arose Of course, despite getting these big moves right, we abandoned several of our strategic recommendations during the crisis and some of our tactical trades went awry throughout the year. Chart 3When Crisis Hits, Buy Risk Assets! Our Worst Calls Of 2020 We chose a very bad time, last December, to bet heavily on global equity rotation from growth to value and away from tech sector leadership. US equities and tech stocks surged ahead of global equities on the back of the pandemic. Our long energy / short tech trade proved disastrous. Only now, with a vaccine on the horizon, are these recommendations coming to fruition. On the other hand, we should have remained committed to our long EUR-USD position rather than cutting it short when the crisis erupted (Chart 4). Global stimulus and the Fed’s sharp reduction in interest rates and gigantic infusion of US dollar liquidity ensured that the dollar would plummet. Strategically, we got the big market moves right, but we were too risk-averse during the summer and after the election. In some cases our geopolitical forecast proved dead-on while our market recommendation faltered. One of biggest geopolitical forecasts, in September 2019, was that the US and China could well conclude a trade deal but that it would be extremely limited in scope and strategic tensions would continue to rise dangerously. This prediction has proved accurate, judging by US high-tech export controls and China’s suppression of Hong Kong this year. But we misjudged the market response, particularly after China contained the virus: the renminbi saw a tremendous rally this year while we remained short, suffering a 4.96% loss so far (Chart 5). Chart 4Stick With Your Guns...Even Amidst Crisis Chart 5US-China Tensions Persisted, But The Market Didn't Care Along these lines, President-elect Joe Biden’s statement that he will maintain President Trump’s tariffs is another confirmation of one of our most contrarian views over the past year.1 We would expect the People’s Bank to allow the yuan to slip both to deal with lingering deflationary pressures and to build up some poker chips for the coming negotiations with Biden. We also would expect the US dollar to witness a near-term tactical bounce. However, if we are wrong, our short CNY-USD trade will fall further and we will have to cut our losses. Chart 6You Can't Time The Market Other mistakes occurred when solid economic and political views combined with bad market timing. Our long position in cyber-security stocks is well grounded – we remain invested – but once again we jumped the gun on the rotation away from Big Tech, which constituted the short end of two of our pair trades, now closed. Separately, we coupled our long gold bet with a long silver bet that came far too late into the rally – though we remain strategically optimistic on silver due to its industrial uses, which should revive in the post-pandemic context. Lamentably, we ran up against our stop-loss threshold on our structural position in US aerospace and defense stocks not long before the vaccine announcement would have begun the arduous process of recuperating losses (Chart 6). We have reinitiated the latter trade, albeit in global defense stocks rather than just American. The inverse also occurred, in which our political forecasting proved faulty but our market implications worked out quite well. One of our biggest political forecasting failures stemmed from an initial success. Beginning in May, we signaled that the US Congress would experience “stimulus hiccups” in trying to pass additional fiscal relief for the economy. This view proved prescient as negotiations fell through in July and a range of benefits expired. Real rates began to recuperate at this time. The problem is that we also predicted that the fiscal impasse was merely a hiccup, i.e. would be resolved prior to the election. It remains unresolved to this day. Fortunately, our market recommendation – to go long US municipal bonds relative to duration-matched treasuries – was rooted in the principle of “buy what the Fed is buying” and therefore continued to appreciate, along with our similarly justified position in investment grade bonds (Chart 7). Chart 7Stimulus Hiccup Occurred, But Was Not Resolved Our biggest error of political forecasting was the collapse of OPEC 2.0 at the beginning of the year. We signaled to clients in January that Russia was growing internally unstable and that this would result in an external action that would prove market-negative. This was correct, but we failed to anticipate that the most important consequence would be a temporary Russian rejection of Saudi demands for oil production cuts. Still, we advised clients to stay the course, arguing that the Russians and Saudis were geopolitically constrained and would return to their cartel, which proved to be the case, thus hastening the restoration of balance to oil markets. This view supported our long spot oil recommendation in late March, though the idea that US producers might collaborate proved fanciful. Alternatively we suggested that clients go long oil relative to gold, which has performed well. Other mistakes stemmed from our tactical trades. Generally, we were insufficiently bullish both during the summer and after the US election. In both cases we overemphasized the absence of US fiscal stimulus as a risk to the rally. In reality the first stimulus was sufficient and the V-shaped recovery of the private economy reduced the need for additional support over the course of the year. Our long tactical positions in US treasuries, consumer staples, and JPY-EUR did not pan out. The takeaway going forward, given that the market is not pressuring politicians to act, is that the risk of another congressional fiscal failure prior to Christmas is underrated. Lastly, some minor emerging market trades went awry, such as our long positions in Thai and Malay equities and our shorting the South African rand. We wrongly predicted that Michelle Obama would be Joe Biden’s pick for vice president, when in fact that honor went to Senator Kamala Harris. Our Best Calls Of 2020 While we got the big market moves right in 2020, our best calls were political and geopolitical in nature: Joe Biden won the US election. He won through his ability to win back blue-collar workers and compete in the Sun Belt as well as the Rust Belt, which we outlined as a key geographic strength during his run in the Democratic primary election (Map 1). We downgraded Trump from 55% odds of re-election to 35% in March, when the lockdowns occurred, and we upgraded Trump only to 45% in October when he rallied. The thin margins in the swing states confirmed this higher-than-consensus probability of a Trump win. Map 1Joe Biden Won The Rust Belt And The Sun Belt Republicans retained the Senate. Beginning in late September, we saw that President Trump was rallying and that this would increase the odds of a Republican Senate even if Trump himself fell short. On October 16 we signaled that the Senate was too close to call, and on October 30 we upgraded the GOP again and argued that a Democratic White House plus a Republican Senate was the most likely scenario (Chart 8). There is a lingering risk to this view: a double Democratic victory in the Georgia runoffs on January 5, 2021. But we put the odds of that at 30% at best. Chart 8Republicans Held The Senate (Pending Georgia Runoffs) Chart 9Biden Won The Democratic Primary Nomination Biden won the Democratic nomination, which we first highlighted in November 2018 and June 2019 and consistently thereafter, though we never underrated his challengers (Chart 9). Trump was acquitted of impeachment charges, which seems like ages ago. We said from the start that Democrats did not have the votes (Chart 10). China stimulated the economy massively and avoided massive domestic unrest. Investors doubted that Beijing would stimulate enough to lead to a global recovery, given the leadership’s preference to avoid systemic financial risk. We insisted that constraints would prevail over preferences and the stimulus would be gigantic. Our “China Play Index” skyrocketed, though it did not outperform global equities (Chart 11). We also argued that President Xi Jinping would not face significant domestic unrest after the crisis erupted, though we view domestic political risk as underrated for the coming years. Chart 10Impeachment Failed Long Emerging markets and deep cyclicals recovered. The combination of Chinese stimulus and a US “return to normalcy” led us to go long emerging markets after the election. We articulated this trade by going long Trans-Pacific Partnership countries, on the expectation that Washington will remain hawkish toward China over trade (Chart 12). We also went long deep cyclicals and US infrastructure plays on the basis of Chinese stimulus and the Biden-Trump common denominator on building projects (Chart 13). Chart 11China Stimulated Massively   Chart 12Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Worked As EM Play The Taiwan Strait was a bigger geopolitical risk than the Korean peninsula, which markets are at last recognizing (Chart 14). Unfortunately for investors Taiwan remains a serious geopolitical risk regardless of Trump’s exit. Hong Kong attracted investors’ attention more than Taiwan in 2020, whereas we have treated Hong Kong as a red herring. Chart 13Long Infrastructure And Cyclicals Paid Off   Chart 14Hong Kong Was A Red Herring, Korea Beat Taiwan Brexit has been a red herring throughout 2020, as expected, though an end-of-year failure to agree to a UK-EU trade deal would upend our predictions (Chart 15). Chart 15Brexit Was A Sideshow Germany’s shift to more dovish fiscal policy strengthened European solidarity, keeping peripheral bond yields and “break-up risk” contained (Chart 16). In August 2019 we argued that Germany was easing fiscal policy but would not surge spending until a crisis happened – which proved to be the case when the coronavirus prompted Olaf Scholz to wheel out the “bazooka” this year. We also argued that Europe would be willing to mutualize debt, which was officially confirmed when outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel forged an agreement on an EU Recovery Fund with French President Emmanuel Macron (though not exactly a “Hamiltonian moment”). Chart 16European Solidarity Strengthened Chart 17Peak Shinzo Abe' Theme Boosted The Yen Japan saw “Peak Abenomics,” which was confirmed this year when he handed the helm over to his deputy, Yoshihide Suga, whose policies are continuous. Abe’s late-2019 tax hike was only one of many reasons we anticipated a rally in the yen, which was supercharged by this year’s crisis (Chart 17). Russia’s political risk premium spiked, as we expected, though we did not anticipate that the cause would be a temporary breakdown in OPEC 2.0 (Chart 18). We were more prepared for an event like the poisoning of Alexei Navalny and US sanctions against the Nordstream II pipeline. Our argument that Russia would lie low, for fear of domestic unrest, has so far borne out in the Belarus protests and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Whether it will continue to do so in the face of what will likely be a pro-democracy assault in eastern Europe from the US Democratic Party remains to be seen. Chart 18Russian Geopolitical Risk Spiked As Predicted India-China tensions were a red herring. India benefited from the western world’s turn against China. Partnerships and alliances were already taking shape before the coronavirus spurred a move in the West to diminish reliance on China’s health care exports. Our long Indian pharmaceuticals trade was highly profitable, though our overweight in Indian bonds was less so (Chart 19). Chart 19India Benefited From West's Anti-China Turn Brazilian political risk surged to the highest levels since the 2018 election, and President Jair Bolsonaro suffered a setback in municipal elections, as we expected, especially after witnessing his cavalier attitude toward the pandemic (Chart 20). However, his approval rating rose on the back of fiscal largesse, implying that debt dynamics will continue to trouble this market despite the bullish backdrop for emerging markets in 2021. Chart 20Brazil Remained A Muddle Chart 21Turkish Populism Exacted A Toll Chart 22A Bull Market In Iran Tensions The Turkish lira collapsed, as Turkish President Recep Erdogan maintained reckless domestic economic policies and foreign adventurism (Chart 21). As we go to press, Erdogan appears to be backing down from his aggressive approach to maritime-territorial disputes in the Mediterranean, for fear of European sanctions, which would be a positive surprise, albeit temporary. The “bull market in Iran tensions” continued, with US-Israeli sabotage and assassinations of key Iranian figures bookending the year (Chart 22). With Trump still in office for another 45 days, we would not be surprised to see another move on Iran, where hardliners are ascendant in the unstable advance of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s eventual succession. So far, Trump has taken market-negative actions in his “lame duck” period on Iran, China, and Big Tech, as we argued, which means more is coming despite the market’s enthusiasm over the partly sunny outlook for 2021. Investment Takeaways Geopolitical analysis is about structural themes and trends – not unpredictable black swans, which may even further entrench structural trends. When a crisis triggers a massive selloff, buy risk assets, then reassess. The gargantuan, coordinated monetary and fiscal response to this year’s crisis presented a clear buy signal. Once the virus was revealed not to be as deadly as first suspected, the rally gained steam. Political and geopolitical forecasts may be dead-on and yet fail to drive the market. There is a constant need to refine the ability to articulate and implement trades that seek to generate alpha from policy insight. Tactical views and attempts at cleverness are a liability when one’s strategic views – geopolitical, macro-economic, financial – are firmly grounded.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Thomas L. Friedman, "Biden Made Sure ‘Trump Is Not Going To Be President For Four More Years,’" New York Times, December 2, 2020, nytimes.com.

Our semi-annual virtual meeting with the long-standing client Ms. Mea took place on December 1. Given it is the end of the year, Ms. Mea inquired about our strategies for 2021 and reviewed the evolution of our views during 2020. Below is a transcript of our discussion, which we hope will help clients better grasp our views and analysis. Chart 1EM Relative Equity Performance And EM Currencies Versus DM ex-US Ms. Mea: Before we get to investment recommendations for next year, let’s review which of your views have worked in 2020 and which have not. Answer: From a big picture perspective, we went from being very negative on EM over the last decade to being neutral on EM risk assets in both absolute terms and relative to DM peers. Since April, we have been waiting for a pullback to go long and overweight EM, but a meaningful setback has not materialized. That said, although EM risk assets and currencies have rallied substantially in absolute terms, they have not outperformed their DM peers, as shown in Chart 1. Concerning the evolution of our strategy, as you might recall, we had to chase EM stocks higher late last year after the trade deal between the US and China created euphoria in financial markets, pushing EM assets higher. But even then, we did not change our bullish view on the US dollar and continued recommending an underweight allocation in EM versus DM in global equity and credit portfolios. In our January 23, 2020 report we contended that the risk premium in global markets was extremely low and that risk assets were extremely overbought. The following week, as news of the COVID-19 outbreak in China emerged, we recommended closing the long position in EM stocks. On February 20, we asserted that odds of a breakdown were substantial and recommended shorting EM stocks outright. We closed this position on March 19 with a substantial gain. On March 26, we argued that it was too late to sell but too early to buy. In retrospect, the latter part of this assessment was incorrect. Then, on April 23, we recommended going long duration in EM local currency bonds or buying domestic EM bonds while hedging currency risk. We recommended receiving 10-year swap rates in several EM countries. We changed our long-standing strategic bullish stance on the US dollar to bearish on July 9. Simultaneously, we closed our shorts in various EM currencies versus the greenback and recommended shorting many of these EM currencies versus an equal-weighted basket of the euro, CHF and JPY (please refer to the bottom panel of Chart 1).   We upgraded EM credit from underweight to neutral on June 4 and lifted the allocation to EM stocks from underweight to neutral on July 30. EM relative equity performance versus DM has been in a broad trading range for the whole of 2020 (please refer to the top panel of Chart 1). Chart 2Facing Technical Resistance Ms. Mea: What is your EM outlook going into 2021? Answer: The odds of a major breakout in EM equities, currencies and fixed-income markets have risen, yet there could be a shakeout before the breakout. Both EM equity and the global ex-US equity indexes have risen to their previous highs which proved to be a formidable resistance level (Chart 2). The main reasons to expect a major breakout in EM and global ex-US share prices are as follows: First, the global economy could experience periodic setbacks, but things cannot be worse than they were during the pandemic-induced lockdowns in early 2020. The deployment of vaccines is likely to improve global economic conditions in 2021, especially in hard hit services sectors. Second, asset purchases by major central banks around the world have effectively removed many securities (mostly government bonds) from the marketplace while creating an enormous supply of money (Chart 3). The upshot is that too much money is chasing fewer assets. Chart 4 illustrates this phenomenon in the case of US dollar securities. Cash in both US institutional and retail money market funds is still elevated. As a share of market value of US dollar denominated equities and bonds, the amount in US money market funds has declined but it is still above its February lows. Provided that US money market rates are zero, one can make the case for more flows from money markets into both equities and bonds. Chart 3Booming Money Supply Worldwide Chart 4How Much Cash On-SidelinesIs There Left In The US?   Finally, odds that EM equities will break above the trading range they have been in over the last 10 years have increased. As we discussed in our previous reports, EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan have been facing hard budget constraints due to limited fiscal stimulus packages, a breakdown in their monetary transmission mechanism, and massive foreign capital outflows in early 2020. These harsh conditions have forced many companies to restructure to boost their efficiency. The banking system has been recognizing and provisioning for bad assets. Finally, some governments have adopted difficult structural reforms. These could be sowing seeds of structural transformation in these economies, in turn producing a secular bull market in their equities and currencies. As was discussed in a recent Country In-Depth report, India is one example where structural reforms stand to have a positive effect on its long-term outlook. Indonesia, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil are other candidates that could undergo similar transformations. In a nutshell, unless the global economy craters – which has low odds – one can envision a scenario in which risk assets continue marching higher. Ms. Mea: However, you mentioned that there could be a shakeout before the breakout. What makes you say that? Answer: A potential shakeout before the breakout may occur due to the following three peaks: Peak investor sentiment: Investor sentiment is very elevated and risk assets are overbought. The ZEW global growth expectations index (a survey of analysts on DM economies) has rolled over after reaching an all-time high (Chart 5, top panel). The Sentix survey of investor future expectations has reached an apex (Chart 5, bottom panel). Importantly, net long positions in copper and net bullish sentiment on copper are at their previous highs (Chart 6). This is a plausible proxy for investor sentiment on both China and global growth. Chart 5Investor Expectations Are Elevated Edited Chart 6Investors Are Super Bullish On And Very Long Copper   Chart 7Investors Are Bullish On US Equities Finally, sentiment among US equity investors is also elevated (Chart 7). Peak stimulus: In China, both credit and fiscal stimulus will likely peak in Q4 2020, as demonstrated in Charts 8 and 9. The US and the euro area will experience a negative fiscal thrust in 2021 equal to 7.4% and 3.8% of GDP, respectively. A new fiscal package worth $1.5 trillion is needed in order for the US fiscal thrust to be neutral. As Republicans are likely to retain control of the Senate, even after Georgia’s Senate election vote on January 5, 2021, a new fiscal package larger than $500-750 billion is unlikely. On the whole, many countries in DM and EM are experiencing peak stimulus in 2020. Chart 8China: Peak Credit Stimulus Chart 9China: Peak Fiscal Stimulus   Peak manufacturing growth: We should differentiate between the top in a business cycle and an end in growth acceleration. As far as global manufacturing is concerned, we are likely currently experiencing growth acceleration at its height. Global manufacturing will continue to expand, but at a slower rate. Share prices could either rally or correct when growth begins to decelerate. The stock market reaction is contingent upon how overbought and how expensive equity prices are. The top panel of Chart 10 illustrates that the tops in the US ISM manufacturing new orders-to-inventory ratio have historically marked setbacks in global cyclical stocks. Similarly, EM share prices and industrial metals fluctuate with the EM and China manufacturing PMI (Chart 10, middle and bottom panels). Having risen sharply to very elevated levels, odds are that global and China manufacturing PMIs are probably topping out. Granted, these are diffusion indexes, and declines/rollovers in global manufacturing PMIs do not necessarily imply that a recession is on the horizon. Rather, they signal the end of the acceleration phase in a cycle. Bottom Line: Given how overbought and expensive they are, share prices might react negatively to peak stimulus. Ms. Mea: Your outlook on the Chinese economy has become more nuanced since the spring. How do you see China’s business cycle and financial markets evolving? Answer: We upgraded our view on the Chinese business cycle in late May after it had become apparent that China had again injected enormous credit and fiscal stimulus into the economy. On June 18, we upgraded Chinese stocks to overweight within an EM equity portfolio. We continue to expect decent growth numbers and reviving corporate profits in most of H1 2021. That said, authorities have been tightening monetary policy since May. Policymakers realize that China’s credit excesses have become even larger and they have been proactive in policy tightening to rein in leverage and speculative activities. The central bank has siphoned off banks’ excess reserves causing interbank rates to rise considerably (Chart 11). With a time lag, money/credit will decelerate and the business cycle will follow. We expect the Chinese business cycle to crest around the middle of 2021. Chart 10Cyclical Assets Fluctuate With Manufacturing PMIs Chart 11China: Liquidity Tightening Works With A Time Lag   The recent shakeout in the onshore corporate bond market will lead to a reduction in corporate bond issuance as investors now require higher yields to finance SOEs. In addition, banks and non-bank financial institutions have to comply with the asset management regulation by the end of 2021. This will restrict banks’ ability to expand their balance sheets and curb NBFI risk appetite. All in all, credit-sensitive sectors like capital spending and the property market will decelerate considerably in H2 2021. Provided that they make up a large share in the mainland economy, overall income growth will also slump. Concerning financial markets, if there is a selloff in Chinese stocks in the coming weeks or months, it will give way to another upleg later in H1 2021. Ms. Mea: Going forward, what will be the driving forces of EM risk assets and how will they shape up? Answer: EM risk assets – equities, credit markets and high-yielding domestic bonds – are by and large driven by three factors: (1) China’s import and commodities cycles (which often move in tandem); (2) domestic fundamentals in EM ex-China; and (3) sharp swings in US growth and the S&P500. (1) We elaborated on the intricacies of the Chinese business cycle above and will now offer a few insights on commodities prices. There has been a broad-based recovery in Chinese demand for commodities and various commodities prices have risen substantially. Nevertheless, the outlook for commodities prices is less certain going forward. Chart 12China's Booming Copper Imports Imply Inventory Accumulation In particular, copper prices have surged but the rally is only partially attributable to recovering real demand in China. Other forces, namely inventory restocking in China and financial (investor) demand, have been responsible for the massive rise in copper prices. The mainland’s imports of copper and copper products have boomed since spring, growing at a rate of 70-80% from a year ago. Meanwhile, the recovery in Chinese infrastructure investment in electricity, water, and gas – which are the largest consumers of copper – has been considerable but not extraordinary (Chart 12). This surge leads us to infer that a sizable inventory restocking cycle has been taking place in China since last spring. Such large inventory accumulation has likely been prompted by the easy availability of credit and rising copper prices. Besides, investors hold record net long positions in copper on the New York Mercantile Exchange (refer to Chart 6). In brief, as we discussed in detail in the Special Report from November 25, Chinese purchases of copper will decline even as its real demand for copper continues to expand. Oil prices are at risk of excess supply as many producers are reluctant to continue suppressing their crude output. Saudi Arabia has been trying hard to limit OPEC+ production. However, it will be increasingly difficult for it to do so. The basis is that many producers are naturally looking to maximize the net present value of cash flow from their oil reserves. Due to inflation, $45 today is worth more than $45 in five years. As and when oil producers accept that global demand for oil will stagnate as the world switches to more environmentally friendly sources of energy, they will have an incentive to produce and sell as much crude as possible at current prices. Chart 13EM Sovereign Credit Spreads (Shown Inverted) Fluctuate With Commodities Prices If Saudis lose control over output, they will ramp up their own production to increase their market share. Crude prices will plunge anew. The timing is uncertain, but we expect it to happen sooner rather than later. Overall, even though China’s business cycle recovery will continue in H1 2021, prices for certain important commodities like oil and copper will likely struggle. Setbacks in commodities prices will have ramifications for financial markets in resource-producing EM countries. EM currencies, as well as their sovereign spreads, correlate with commodities prices (Chart 13). (2) Domestic demand in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan will gradually improve but from a very low point. Many developing countries still face major hurdles, including banking systems that are struggling with non-performing loans, a looming fiscal drag, and a lack of control over the pandemic. Further, EM outside North Asia will lag behind advanced countries in procuring and deploying COVID-19 vaccines. Consequently, consumer and business confidence will be slow to recover in these countries, and their business cycle revival will continue to trail that of North Asia (China, Korea and Taiwan) and advanced economies. (3) Finally, any shakeout in the S&P500 will reverberate through EM. Having rallied considerably, North Asian equity and currency markets have already priced in a great deal of good news. In EM ex-North Asia, the level of economic activity, albeit reviving, remains low. This makes these EM ex-North Asian financial markets very sensitive to fluctuations in global/US financial markets. Chart 14EM Equities Have Been A Low-Beta Play On The S&P500 The resilience of US equity and credit markets in recent months in the face of numerous challenges has surprised us. US share prices and credit markets have not corrected meaningfully despite (1) the third wave of COVID-19 which has resulted in partial lockdowns and a deterioration in consumer sentiment; (2) the lack of a second fiscal stimulus package and (3) uncertainty surrounding the presidential elections. In retrospect, investors have been willing to buy any small dip. Interestingly, in the past three years, EM share prices outperformed DM share prices when the S&P500 sold off and underperformed when US stocks rallied (Chart 14). EM versus DM relative share prices are shown inverted on this chart. This reveals that EM stocks are not a high beta on the S&P 500 and rising US equity markets do not guarantee that EM share prices will outperform their DM peers. Overall, the outlook for EM risk assets is convoluted, warranting a neutral stance for now both in absolute terms and relative to DM. Chart 15The US Dollar Is Oversold Ms. Mea:  Where and how does the US dollar enter your analysis? Answer: The dynamics between EM and the US dollar is push-pull in nature, i.e., the causality runs both ways. EM fundamentals – that could be broadly defined as return on capital in these economies – drive their exchange rates’ trends versus the US dollar. Further, US dollar trends are also shaped by several global macro forces, including the global business cycle. The US fiscal position and monetary policy stance also drive fluctuations in the value of the greenback. Over the next several years, the US dollar will likely be in a bear market because US inflation will rise and the Federal Reserve will fall behind the inflation curve. US real rates will remain negative, which will continue to undermine the dollar’s value. All that said, the US dollar has become very oversold and investor sentiment is bearish on the greenback (Chart 15). From a contrarian perspective, the dollar might be set up for a countertrend rebound. Interestingly, after the 2016 US elections, the US dollar rallied strongly for several weeks before selling off violently. It seems that the broad trade-weighted dollar is now following a reverse pattern (Chart 16).  The US dollar in 2016 is shown inverted in this chart. The greenback was selling off before the 2020 US elections and has continued weakening since. If this reverse pattern were to play out, the US dollar will near its bottom soon and then stage a playable rebound. Chart 16The US Dollar Before And After 2016 And 2020 Presidential Elections Chart 17EM Stocks Are Cheap If The Structural EPS Trend Is Up In short, a long-term bear market but near-term rebound in the US dollar is consistent with our view of a shakeout before a breakout for EM equities and risk assets. Ms. Mea: What about EM equity and currency valuations? Are they not still cheap despite their recent rally? Answer: From a secular perspective, EM equities appear modestly cheap as illustrated by our cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio (Chart 17). However, it is vital to realize that this CAPE valuation model assumes that EPS (earnings per share) in real (inflation-adjusted) US dollar terms will revert to its long-term trend sooner rather than later (Chart 17, bottom panel). There is a lot of uncertainty regarding the structural trend in EM EPS. For the past decade – and therefore well before the pandemic – EM EPS in nominal US dollar terms has been fluctuating in a wide range (Chart 18). Not surprisingly, EM share prices have been flat for the past ten years. Further, EM EPS has massively underperformed US EPS in local currency terms for the past ten years (Chart 19). Consistently, EM share prices have underperformed the S&P 500 even in local currency terms. Chart 18EM EPS: No Growth For 10 years Chart 19EM Versus US: Relative Stock Prices And Relative EPS   As for EM currencies, the aggregate real effective exchange rate of EM ex-China, Korea, Taiwan currencies suggests that they are cheap (Chart 20). Overall, to argue that EM stocks are cheap, one should be confident that EM EPS in real (inflation-adjusted) USD terms will be expanding in the years to come (Chart 17, bottom panel). While some EM economies have undertaken some restructuring, there is currently no strong evidence to suggest that EM EPS will be in a structural uptrend. From a cyclical perspective, EM EPS will certainly be recovering in 2021 (Chart 21). However, a notable chunk of this profit recovery has already been largely priced in. Chart 20EM ex-China, Korea, Taiwan: Currency Valuations Chart 21EM Profits Will Recover In 2021   To sum up, a bet on EM share prices breaking out above their decade-long trading range implies betting on EM EPS entering a period of structural growth. Over the past ten years, EM companies have not delivered the secular growth needed to warrant higher equity multiples. We are open to the idea that structural reforms carried out in several nations will allow for higher productivity, income and profit growth. However, it is still too early to jump to that conclusion. Chart 22Will Asian Markets Finally Break Out? Ms. Mea: Where in your analysis and strategy might you be wrong? Answer: The key risks to our view are twofold: First, FOMO (fear of missing out) on the part of investors continues to propel EM risk assets higher while either their fundamentals remain mediocre or they are already very expensive. As we have shown in Chart 4, there is still a lot of US dollar cash sitting in US money market funds and these could feed the EM rally, preventing the materialization of a shakeout. Second, we might be late to recognize structural shifts in certain EM economies and, might therefore miss breakouts in those bourses. Notably, there is no single EM equity market that has clearly broken above its previous highs (Chart 22). Ms. Mea: What are your overweights and underweights for equity, currency and fixed-income portfolios? Answer: For an EM equity portfolio, our strong conviction overweights have been and remain China, Korea and Mexico. Chart 23 shows the performance of our fully-invested EM equity portfolio based on our recommended country allocation. It has outperformed the EM MSCI equity benchmark by 3.7% in 2020 and by 74% since its initiation in May 2008. The latter translates into a 4.7% CAGR outperformance versus the EM MSCI equity benchmark in 10.5 years. Critically, this outperformance has been achieved with very low volatility and small drawdowns. Chart 23Performance Of Our EM Equity Country Allocation Portfolio (Country Recommendations) As for EM local bonds, we continue to recommend receiving ten-year swap rates in Korea, Malaysia, Russia, Mexico, Colombia, South Africa, China and India. We are looking for a setback in their currencies to switch to holding cash bonds, i.e., without hedging currency risk. Among EM currencies, our short basket consists of BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY and IDR while our favored ones have been MXN, RUB, CZK, INR THB and SGD. All these country recommendations and positions as well as the one in the EM sovereign credit space (US dollar bonds) are always presented at the end of our reports (please refer to the following pages). Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Don’t trust market inflation expectations or real interest rates. When inflation is near-zero, think in nominal terms not in real terms. New structural recommendation: Underweight inflation protected bonds versus conventional bonds. For the time being stay overweight stocks versus bonds, but sell stocks if the 10-year T-bond yield rises by 0.3 percent. We address four concerns about inflation raised by clients. Fractal trade: short copper versus gold. Don’t Trust Market Inflation Expectations Or Real Interest Rates Are the markets any good at predicting inflation? No, they are not (Chart of the Week). Both the inflation forwards market and the breakeven inflation rate implied in inflation protected bonds have been lousy predictors of inflation.1 We can forgive that. What we cannot forgive is how these markets derive their inflation forecasts. Chart of the Week AThe Markets Are Lousy At Predicting Inflation Chart of the Week BThe Markets Are Lousy At Predicting Inflation Expected inflation in the UK just tracks the commodity price index (Chart I-2), and expected inflation in the US just tracks the oil price (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). This link between expected inflation and the level of commodity prices is absurd, for three reasons: Chart I-2UK Bond Markets' Expected Inflation Just Tracks Commodity Prices Chart I-3US Bond Markets' Expected Inflation Just Tracks The Oil Price Chart I-4US Inflation Swaps' Expected Inflation Just Tracks The Oil Price Inflation measures a change in a price. Therefore, inflation expectations should not track the price level of anything. Even if expected inflation is incorrectly tracking a price level, a lower price today will increase the scope for future inflation, and vice-versa. Hence, any relationship with the current price level should be an inverse relationship, not a positive relationship. Most absurd of all, how can the level of commodity prices today conceivably forecast the inflation rate five years ahead through 2026-31, as the inflation forwards seem to be suggesting? There are two important takeaways from the absurdity of inflation expectations. First, it follows that the market’s estimates of the real interest rate must also be lousy, and taken with a huge dose of salt. The market’s estimates of the real interest rate must be taken with a huge dose of salt. Second, as the market’s inflation expectations just track commodity prices, the relative performance of UK index-linked gilts versus conventional gilts just tracks commodity prices too (Chart I-5); and the performance of US TIPS versus T-bonds just tracks the oil price. Nothing more and nothing less (Chart I-6). As we expect the structural bear market in commodities has much further to run, the structural recommendation for bond investors is: Chart I-5UK Index-Linked Gilts Vs. Conventional Gilts = Commodity Prices Chart I-6US TIPS Vs. T-Bonds = The Oil Price Underweight inflation protected bonds versus conventional bonds. When Inflation Is Near-Zero, Think In Nominal Terms Not In Real Terms If the market is lousy at predicting long-term inflation, then it might also be lousy at predicting the long-term nominal return on equities. After all, shouldn’t prospective inflation impact the prospective 10-year nominal return on equities? The surprising answer is no. The prospective 10-year nominal return on the stock market depends only on the stock market’s starting valuation. The 10-year nominal return on the stock market does not depend on prospective inflation, it depends only on the stock market’s starting valuation. The same relationship between the stock market’s starting valuation and prospective nominal return applied in the high-inflation 1970s and 1980s as it did in the low-inflation 2000s (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Stock Market's Starting Valuation Establishes The Prospective Nominal Return, Irrespective Of The Inflation Backdrop The reason is that the stock market’s 10-year nominal return has two components: the income through the 10 years, and the terminal value at the end of the 10 years. When inflation is high, the income component is larger, but the terminal value component is smaller – because in an inflationary environment the market will demand a higher subsequent return, requiring a lower price. When inflation is low, the opposite is true: lower income, but higher terminal value. These effects cancel out, so the result is a prospective nominal return that is independent of prospective inflation. Crucially, the required prospective return on equities in excess of bonds is also established in nominal terms. This is because the bond yield’s lower limit is nominal, at say -1 percent. Proximity to this nominal yield limit makes bonds very risky because there is no longer any upside to price, only downside. Witness Swiss bonds this year. As the riskiness of equities and bonds converges, the required prospective nominal return on equities collapses towards the ultra-low bond yields. The upshot is that both the prospective return on equities and the required prospective return on equities should always be calculated in nominal terms, never in real terms. Right now, the high valuation of the aggregate stock market means a very low prospective nominal return, and this valuation is hypersensitive to ultra-low bond yields (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8The Stock Market Is Priced To Generate A Feeble Long-Term Return Chart I-9AUltra-Low Bond Yields Have Created The Greatest Asset-Price Inflation Of All Time Chart I-9BUltra-Low Bond Yields Have Created The Greatest Asset-Price Inflation Of All Time For the time being stay overweight stocks versus bonds, but as we warned two weeks ago, Sell Stocks If The Bond Yield Rises By 0.3 Percent. Four Concerns About Inflation Raised By Clients In this section, which is in question and answer format, we will address four concerns about long-term inflation that our clients have raised. 1, Isn’t the unprecedent fiscal stimulus in 2020 setting us up for inflation down the road? No, not in itself. Understand that the unprecedented stimulus is in response to unprecedented shocks to incomes that have come from the rolling waves of the pandemic. As incomes disappeared, governments provided income-substitution. As and when incomes reappear, governments will withdraw the income-substitution. Indeed, the UK government tried to withdraw its income-substitution (furlough) scheme prematurely and had to backtrack when the virus resurged. This illustrates that the unprecedented fiscal stimulus is a much-needed stabiliser of the economy, rather than a source of inflation. 2. But if governments want a bit of inflation, they can get it, can’t they?  No. Understand that inflation is a non-linear system with two states, price stability and price instability. You can shift between these two states, but you cannot get a ‘little bit of inflation’ in a controlled fashion, or hit an arbitrary inflation target like 2 percent, 3 percent, or 5 percent. This is something that we have been arguing for years, and it is comforting that some great thinkers – like (the late) Paul Volker and William White – fully support our non-linear system thesis. You cannot get a ‘little bit of inflation’ in a controlled fashion. Any government can take its economy into the state of price instability if it so chooses. Witness Turkey and Argentina. But price stability is the much better state to be in. Given that developed economies have expended decades of blood, sweat, and tears to reach the state of price stability, we think that it would be a monumental policy error to embark on the road to price instability (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Inflation Is A Non-Linear System With Two States, Price Stability And Price Instability 3. But doesn’t rampant Argentina-type inflation bail out the heavily indebted? No, not necessarily. It will only bail you out if your debt is a one-off lump sum payment in the distant future. If your debt requires ongoing refinancing, then inflation will not bail you out, because the refinancing interest rate could rise in line with, or even faster than, the inflation rate. Therefore, those highly indebted governments, firms, and households that need to refinance their debts would not benefit from rampant inflation. 4. In which case, isn’t the solution to let inflation rip while keeping interest rates depressed – so-called ‘financial repression?’ No. While it is conceivable that a government could corner its government bond market and thereby repress it, it would be near-impossible to repress the much larger asset-classes of equities and real estate. Once these large and privately priced markets sniffed out the government’s nefarious plan, the required prospective nominal return would surge as a compensation for the higher inflation. The result being an almighty crash in stock and real estate markets. Given that the near $500 trillion combined worth of such markets dwarfs the $90 trillion global economy, the impact of such a crash would make this year’s pandemic feel like a waltz in the park. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is short copper versus gold, given that the spectacular relative outperformance is showing fragility in both its 65-day and 130-day fractal structures. The profit target and symmetrical stop-loss is set at 10 percent. Chart I-11Copper Vs. Gold In other trades, long RUB/CZK reached the end of its holding period with a marginal partial loss. The rolling 12-month win ratio now stands at 53 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Europe and the US have deep and liquid markets in 5-year 5-year inflation swaps (or forwards), which price the expected 5-year inflation rate 5 years ahead. The current swap measures the annual inflation rate expected through 2026-31. The UK and the US also have deep and liquid markets in inflation-protected government bonds: UK index-linked gilts, and US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). The yield offered on such a security is real, which means in excess of inflation. The yield offered on a similar-maturity conventional bond is nominal. This means that the difference between the two yields equates to the market’s expectation for inflation over the maturity, known as the ‘breakeven inflation rate.’ Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations