Geopolitics

Investors should go long US treasuries and stay overweight defensive versus cyclical sectors, large caps versus small caps, and aerospace/defense stocks. Regionally we favor the US, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, while disfavoring China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

In Section I, we note that the Fed’s new interest rate projections show that US monetary policy is set to rise soon into restrictive territory even relative to what we consider to be the neutral rate of interest, and to a level that has been consistent with the onset of recession since the 1960s. Imminent supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is crucial for the US to avoid a recession over the coming year. Stay neutral stocks versus bonds for now, but the next shift in our recommended asset allocation stance is more likely to be a downgrade to underweight rather than an upgrade to overweight. In Section II, a guest piece from our European Investment Strategy service discusses the outlook for European assets.

Executive Summary Biden And Democrats Arrest Fall In Public Opinion Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation US policy is essential to the global macro, policy, and geopolitical outlook in the fourth quarter. Our three key views for 2022 are still in place: the Biden administration is facing congressional gridlock and shifting to executive action and foreign policy. Gridlock will be marginally positive for the stock market but foreign policy crises and additional energy shocks will be very negative. Stay defensive.  Our three long-term strategic themes – Generational Change, Peak Polarization, and Limited Big Government – are still on track but the first two will take a back seat during the 2022-24 election cycle. Investors should stay overweight defensive sectors versus cyclicals, large caps versus small caps, cyber security, aerospace/defense, oil and gas transportation/storage, and renewable energy. Go tactically long US treasuries but keep the US dollar on watch for a downgrade. Recommendation (Tactical) INITIATION DATE Return Long DXY (Dollar Index) Feb 23, 2022 18.6% Bottom Line: US policy uncertainty will rise then fall over the course of the midterm election, which will produce gridlock. Gridlock is neutral toward inflation, or disinflationary, and a boon for stocks. But geopolitical risk can still wreak havoc and investors should stay defensive. Feature Market-relevant geopolitical analysis begins with the United States, which remains the critical actor in the international system – as reflected today by the US dollar’s extraordinary bull run both in times of global deflation and inflation (Chart 1). Investors need a base case for US national policy over the course of the 2022-24 election cycle to form a base case for global policy and the macroeconomic and financial outlook. Our annual outlook last December argued that the US had entered a period of greater government involvement in the economy and yet that the Biden administration would face rising checks and balances over the course of 2022 due to thin majorities in Congress, midterm elections, an inflationary macroeconomic environment, and an unstable geopolitical backdrop. Chart 1Dollar Strong During Deflation And Inflation Dollar Strong During Deflation And Inflation Dollar Strong During Deflation And Inflation This forecast is largely intact today so the question is whether these checks and balances will inhibit inflation going forward. Biden has achieved significant liberal policy spending but now looks to be seriously constrained, having little ability to pass domestic legislation going forward. However, he faces three foreign policy crises (Ukraine, Taiwan, Iran), all of which are inflationary on the margin. In the coming months Biden’s foreign policy crises could morph into larger global supply shocks, most notably energy shocks from Russia and/or Iran. New shocks could kill demand and tip the economy into recession. If these risks fail to materialize, tighter monetary policy will reduce inflation but likely also at the cost of higher unemployment and recession. While we will maintain our defensive positioning, we may book some gains on bearish trades over the course of the fourth quarter, namely if we see compelling signs of US political and geopolitical risk subsiding and inflation rolling over. But we do not see that yet. Checking Up On Our Three Key Views For 2022 Here we update our three key views for 2022. We show how they have developed so far this year and what we expect in the final quarter: 1.   From Single-Party Rule To Gridlock: In the third quarter the Biden administration made a “last ditch effort” to turn around its fortunes ahead of the midterm election, mainly by focusing on fighting inflation. This effort succeeded in stabilizing support for Biden and the Democratic Party in opinion polls, albeit at low levels (Chart 2). The midterm is usually a check against the party in power and its major policy victories. In 2006 anti-war Democrats imposed a check on the Bush Republicans and the war in Iraq. In 2010 and 2014 Tea Party Republicans imposed a check on Obama Democrats and government intervention into health care. In 2018 anti-Trump Democrats imposed a check on Trump Republicans and tax cuts. In early 2022 the election was shaping up to be a referendum on the Biden Democrats and inflationary spending. But the Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade has muddied the usually clear pattern of the “midterm curse.” In critical swing states a majority of voters opposes extensive new restrictions on abortion access (Chart 3). Chart 2Biden And Democrats Arrest Fall In Public Opinion Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Chart 3Swing States Support Abortion Access Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Young voters and women are especially motivated to vote for Democrats in reaction to the high court’s ruling (Chart 4). However, so far support for the Democrats among these groups is still lower than it was in 2020-21. And young people are not thrilled with old man Biden. Chart 4Youth And Women’s Support For Democrats Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Chart 5Voters Care Most About Economy … Where Biden Scores Lowest Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation As we enter the final stretch of the campaign, the president and his party receive the lowest grades on the economy, which is still voters’ top priority (Chart 5). Democrats face a negative cyclical backdrop and macroeconomic headwinds – namely falling real wages, incomes, and consumer confidence (Chart 6). In the House of Representatives, our quantitative election model considers how many seats the ruling party is defending, Congress’s net approval rating, and popular support for the two parties (the generic congressional ballot). The resulting estimate is that Democrats should lose 21 seats, whereas they only need to lose six to yield to Republican control (Table 1). Democrats can achieve a positive surprise and yet fail to retain control of the lower chamber. Chart 6Pocketbook Voter Is Frowning Pocketbook Voter Is Frowning Pocketbook Voter Is Frowning Table 1Our House Election Quant Model Predicts GOP Victory Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Democrats are more likely to retain the Senate but they cannot afford to lose a single seat on a net basis. State-level economic data, previous Senate margins of victory, presidential approval, the generic congressional ballot, and the tenure of Senate incumbents all suggest that Democrats will lose seats in Arizona and Georgia without gaining any seats, thus yielding control to Republicans. Yet this prediction from our quantitative election model necessarily excludes some of the idiosyncrasies of the 2022 election (Chart 7). Chart 7Our Senate Election Quant Model Favors GOP … But Too Close To Call Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation By contrast, state-level opinion polls suggest that Democrats will hold the Senate: several critical Republican-leaning races are tied while Democrats have a large lead in Arizona (Charts 8A & 8B). In short, the Senate is too close to call. Chart 8ADemocrats Tied In Red-Leaning States, Leading In Blue-Leaning States Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Chart 8BDemocrats Tied In Red-Leaning States, Leading In Blue-Leaning States Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation As long as Republicans gain one chamber the effect is the same: gridlock. The prevailing wind is voter discontent over inflation. The Misery Index (headline inflation plus unemployment) is reminiscent of the stagflationary 1970s and points to a negative outcome for Democrats in the House overall (Table 2). Table 2Misery Index Signals Democratic Losses To Come Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Hence the House will fall to the Republicans and single-party control will be broken. The federal spending spree will grind to a halt in 2023-24, which is positive for investors in an inflationary environment. For example, it is the opposite fiscal outcome from what is happening in the UK and Italy, where bonds are selling off sharply. 2.   From Legislative To Executive Power: We expected Biden and the Democrats to pass a second budget reconciliation bill, which ended up being the inaptly named Inflation Reduction Act, signed into law on August 16. After that we expected the president to shift to executive action as his legislative options dwindled. There have already been some signs of this shift to executive power, such as President Biden’s tapping of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve to release 180 million barrels of oil, which helped lower gasoline prices before the election (Chart 9). Biden also relaxed some regulations on fossil fuel production in a reversal of his 2020 call for “phasing out” oil and natural gas. More generally Biden has imposed a large number of economically significant regulations relative to previous administrations (Chart 10). He also unilaterally forgave $420 billion worth of student debt over 30 years. Chart 9Biden Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserve Biden Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserve Biden Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserve Chart 10Biden Flexes Regulatory Muscles Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation This trend toward executive action will intensify if Congress is indeed gridlocked in 2023-24. It is marginally inflationary but likely to be outweighed by disinflationary fiscal drag in 2023. The same trend also feeds into the next point: Biden’s shift from domestic-oriented to foreign-oriented policy. 3.   From Domestic To Foreign Policy: Biden did not seek out foreign policy crises. His primary focus lay on domestic legislation and the midterms. His foreign policy intention was merely to solidify US alliances after quarrels under the Trump administration. However, looming gridlock is forcing him to focus more heavily on foreign policy, where presidential powers are greatest. In particular Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed foreign policy to the center of the agenda. Once Biden’s approval ratings collapsed he began to take on greater foreign policy risks, as we noted in May. His foreign policy is reactive and defensive in the sense that he is responding to foreign aggression and trying to avoid any blowback that hurts his party in the midterms. But he can no longer be said to be risk-averse. Instead Biden is doubling down on the enlargement of NATO and military support for Ukraine. He is arming Taiwan and pledging an unequivocal US willingness to defend it in the event of an “unprecedented attack.” He has expanded high-tech export controls on China while maintaining President Trump’s tariffs. And he is threatening to respond “decisively” to Russia in the non-negligible chance that it deploys a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine. The US-Iran attempt to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal is faltering, as we expected, due to mutual distrust. Almost immediately after negotiations failed in August, widespread social unrest broke out in Iran. While Iran’s structural conditions are conducive to social unrest, the Iranian government suspects the US of fomenting unrest, which is possible. Iran is threatening to retaliate. Iran will also continuing making nuclear advances prompting Israel to publicly entertain military options. The Biden administration will be forced to counteract Iranian threats against regional political stability and oil infrastructure. Hence Biden can no longer avoid energy supply risks emanating from the Middle East. The shift from domestic to foreign policy will become even more pronounced in 2023-24, as foreign policy will become more proactive due to gridlock at home. Taken together, gridlock will bring neutral fiscal policy and hawkish foreign policy. Any post-election decline in policy uncertainty will be short-lived. The loss of the House will increase the odds of economic policy mistakes in 2023 and a ruling party change in 2024 (Chart 11). A Republican House can impeach (but not remove) President Biden, put pressure on the Federal Reserve, and engage in brinksmanship over the national debt limit, which will need to be renewed in the third quarter of 2023. Obstructionism will put a floor under policy uncertainty, which will skyrocket as the 2024 election cycle approaches. Chart 11Biden’s 2024 Odds Fall If GOP Wins House Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Meanwhile proactive US foreign policy is not positive for investors as it risks escalating global instability. None of America’s rivals will be willing to offer major concessions to forge agreements with the Biden administration in 2023-24 because they will fear that President Trump or another populist Republican will retake the White House in 2025 and impose tariffs or sanctions regardless. The US cannot offer credible guarantees. This is how the Iran deal failed and it is likely to prevent a substantial US-China thaw in relations. Bottom Line: The investment takeaways from our key views for 2022 are mostly on track: inflation and policy uncertainty are rising, stocks are performing poorly, bond yields have spiked, and defensive sectors have outperformed cyclicals. These trends could start to shift in the fourth quarter given that domestic policy uncertainty will at least temporarily abate in the US and China after the fall’s political events. However, geopolitical energy shocks could still escalate if Russia or Iran disrupts global oil supply. And investors must plan for the worst. Even without additional energy shocks, Fed rate hikes are likely to precipitate a recession. Gridlock will have a neutral fiscal impact over the course of the subsequent 24 months, which is marginally disinflationary, but proactive US foreign policy will keep high the risk of energy shocks and global policy uncertainty. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s It is useless to predict specific policy outcomes too far in the future but investors need a framework for understanding the general drift of national policy amid the dramatic macro shifts occurring today. Here is a short update to our strategic themes for the decade: 1.   Millennials/GenZ Rising: The death of the Silent Generation, the retirement of the Baby Boomers, and the rise of Generations X, Y, and Z are causing major shifts in the US economy and markets. First, US population growth is not great but better than its developed market peers. Immigration is robust, though it is likely to be restricted somewhat by future administrations (Chart 12). Relatively strong labor force growth implies higher potential growth than developed market peers, assuming US productivity meets or exceeds that of Europe, as it should (Chart 13). As long as this growth is accompanied by decent policy, i.e. not too inflationary, it will produce relatively attractive real returns for investors. Chart 12US Population Growth And Immigration Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Chart 13US Relative Labor Force And Potential Growth Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Second, however, inflation will be a recurring problem because population aging is driving a vast redistribution of wealth from older to younger and from generations with a high propensity to save to those with a high propensity to consume. The impact is inflationary since there will be fewer savings to fund investments, according to our Global Investment Strategist Peter Berezin. This trend will drive up equilibrium real interest rates and bond yields (Chart 14). Thus America will witness a tug of war in which a new inflation tendency engenders periodic policy backlashes to keep inflation in check, as is likely in the 2022 midterms. Chart 14Major Redistribution Of Wealth Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation 2.   Peak Polarization: There is a large gap when it comes to identity and core values both within the Baby Boomer generation and between the Silent Generation and the younger generations. America has seen rapid change in the population’s ethnicity, religion, education, location, and industry. It is also a free country where self-expression is fully indulged, leading to wide extremes in individual and group behavior. Rapid pluralistic change combined with stark income and wealth inequality have fueled political polarization, which has made it increasingly difficult to generate nationwide policy consensus in recent decades (Chart 15). However, the rising electoral weight of the younger generations will resolve some of the most extreme policy differences in favor of the younger generations. Millennials and Generation Z will become more conservative over time but they will still lean to the left of their parents and grandparents on the economic policy spectrum (positive rights, progressive taxes, social spending, proactive regulation). Meaning that social spending and higher taxes will become more, not less, feasible over the long run (Chart 16). Meanwhile the revival of competition among the world’s great powers (multipolarity) is forcing the US population and policymakers to recognize common foreign challenges. This is leading to a new consensus around certain strategic and national interests having to do with trade protectionism, industrial guidance, and foreign policy realism. Chart 15Inequality As A Driver Of Polarization Inequality As A Driver Of Polarization Inequality As A Driver Of Polarization Chart 16Younger Generations Less ‘Capitalist,’ More ‘Socialist’ Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation This new consensus can be seen in the passage of bipartisan bills to build infrastructure, promote US manufacturing, shift supply chains to US-allied countries, and impose punitive measures against Russia, China, and Iran (Chart 17). Chart 17New Consensus: Nation Building At Home New Consensus: Nation Building At Home New Consensus: Nation Building At Home 3.   Limited Big Government: The emerging policy consensus will be federalism but not authoritarianism – a larger but not overwhelming role for government in the economy. Popular opinion is demanding a larger role for the government to reduce domestic social grievances and political instability. It is also demanding greater protections from global trade. Elite opinion requires sustained high investment in national defense. All of this ostensibly points to a new era of Big Government but there are important caveats. The US constitution, private institutions, and popular opinion will continue to prevent the full adoption of a statist model, with its inefficient bureaucracy and excessive regulation. The cost of too much government has already appeared in this year’s surge of inflation, which is motivating a political backlash that will moderate the liberal spending trajectory. In short US governance is shifting from decentralization to centralization but it is a marginal not absolute change (Chart 18). The insurrection of 2021 failed but so did the cultural revolution of 2020. Chart 18New Consensus: Limited Big Government Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Demographics, politics, and economics all point to a new US policy paradigm in which new generations take over and form a new policy consensus – and yet that consensus is not truly socialist. It is rather a continuation of the American combination of federalism, liberalism, and nationalism. Civil war is likely to be avoided because the economy is stable enough and the political system is flexible enough to prevent the inevitable violent movements and domestic terrorism from causing state fragmentation. Bottom Line: US currency and equity markets have greatly outperformed the rest of the world as financial markets priced the US’s structural advantages in the unstable world after the 2008 financial crisis. This trend is intact for now but could suffer setbacks whenever global growth rebounds and the new US policy consensus leads to higher wages, higher taxes, and lower corporate profitability. Investment Takeaways In our annual forecast we noted that US midterm election years tend to produce a flat stock market, rising bond yields, and the outperformance of defensive sectors. This year has been even worse than normal with the S&P500 down 23% to date and the 10-year Treasury up 243 basis points to date (down 17% in terms of total return). Note, however, that stocks typically rise and bond yields typically fall in the year after the midterm, which may bring some relief in 2023 (Chart 19). We expect this bounce in 2023 but it cannot happen until inflation rolls over decisively. Chart 19Worse Than Average Market Performance In Midterm Election Year Worse Than Average Market Performance In Midterm Election Year Worse Than Average Market Performance In Midterm Election Year The dollar rally is in line with, but exceeding, the interest rate differential between US and European government bonds. This makes sense given the geopolitical risk premium. Dollar strength is not only about euro weakness but is broad-based, as becomes clear when looking at the trade-weighted dollar. We have long argued the dollar would rise in line with global policy uncertainty (Chart 20). While our long DXY trade is long in the tooth, momentum is strong. Defensive sectors will outperform in a strong dollar context. Cyclical sectors have more downside relative to defensives and small caps have more downside relative to large caps. But oil and gas equities have become defensive and have more upside relative to the broad market (Chart 21). Energy volatility will continue to be a driving macro force in the fourth quarter due to the crosswinds of geopolitical supply disruptions and global economic slowdown. We are re-initiating our recommendation to overweight oil and gas transportation and storage stocks relative to the S&P 500. Chart 20US Dollar Reaching Extremes, On Watch For Downgrade US Dollar Reaching Extremes, On Watch For Downgrade US Dollar Reaching Extremes, On Watch For Downgrade Chart 21Energy Volatility To Continue In Q4 Energy Volatility To Continue In Q4 Energy Volatility To Continue In Q4 Renewable energy stocks should also remain an overweight given the new political impetus behind energy security. Tech stocks have more downside in the near term but should bounce back once inflation rolls over and bond yields start to fall. Cyber-security companies will generally trade in line with tech but will also benefit from geopolitical tailwinds. Renewables, cyber-security, and aerospace/defense remain our key overweights (Chart 22), in addition to infrastructure stocks as mentioned earlier in the report. Given the sharp selloff in bonds, the disinflationary aspects of gridlock and eventual recession, and today’s extraordinary geopolitical risks, we recommending buying 10-year treasuries on a tactical basis. Chart 22Stick With Cyber Security, Defense, Renewables Over Long Run Stick With Cyber Security, Defense, Renewables Over Long Run Stick With Cyber Security, Defense, Renewables Over Long Run Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Senior Analyst guyr@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Alice Brocheux Research Associate alice.brocheux@bcaresearch.com Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Table A3US Political Capital Index Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Chart A1Presidential Election Model A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Chart A2Senate Election Model A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks  Table A4House Election Model A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation Fourth Quarter US Political Outlook: Gridlock And Stagflation       Footnotes  

Executive Summary Turkey is staring into an abyss: economic crisis that will morph into political crisis in the June 2023 election cycle. President Erdoğan will pursue populist economic policies and foreign policy adventurism to try to stay in power, leading to negative surprises and “black swan” risks over the coming 9-12 months. While Erdoğan and the ruling party are likely to be defeated in elections, which is good news, investors should not try to front-run the election given high uncertainty. Neither Turkey’s economy and domestic politics nor the global economy and geopolitics warrant a bullish view on Turkish assets. GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY  Recommendation (TACTICAL) Initiation Date Return LONG JPY/TRY 2022-09-23     Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Bottom Line: The Lira will depreciate further versus the dollar. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Feature Turkey – now technically Türkiye – is teetering on the verge of a national meltdown. The inflation rate is the fastest in G20 countries, both because of a domestic wage-price spiral and soaring global food and fuel prices. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in power since 2002, making them highly vulnerable to demands for change in the general election slated for June 18, 2023. Yet Erdoğan is a strongman who won a popular vote to revise the constitution in 2017 and increase his personal power over institutions. His populist Islamist movement is starkly at odds with the country’s traditional elite, including the secular military establishment. Given the poor state of the economy, Erdoğan will likely lose the 2023 election but he could refuse to leave office … or he could win the election and be ousted in a coup d'état, as happened in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980.1 Meanwhile Turkey is beset by foreign dangers – including war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East. Erdoğan will try to use foreign policy to bolster his popular standing. Turkey has inserted itself in various regional conflicts and could instigate conflicts of its own. While global investors are eager to buy steeply discounted Turkish financial assets ahead of what could be a monumental change in national policy in 2023, the country is extremely unstable. It is a source of “black swan” risks. The best bet is to remain underweight Turkish assets unless and until a pro-market election outcome shakes off the two-decade trend toward economic ruin. Turkish Grand Strategy Turkey is permanently at a crossroads. The land-bridge between Europe and Asia, it is secular and cosmopolitan but also Islamist and traditional. Its past consists of the greatness of empires – Byzantine, Ottoman – while its present consists of a frustrating search for new opportunities in a chaotic regional context. The core of the country consists of the disjointed coastal plains around the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and the Sea of Marmara, where Istanbul is located. The Byzantine and Ottoman empires were seated on this strategic location at the juncture of the world’s east-west trade. To secure this area, the Turks needed to control the larger Anatolian peninsula – Asia Minor – to prevent roving Eurasian powers from invading, just as they themselves had originally invaded from Central Asia. During times of greatness the Turks could also expand their empire to control the Balkan peninsula and Danube river valley up to Vienna, Crimea and the Black Sea coasts, and the eastern Mediterranean island approaches. During the Ottoman empire’s golden days Turkish power extended all the way into North Africa, Mesopotamia, the Nile river valley, and Mecca and Medina. The empire – and the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate – collapsed in 1924 after centuries of erosion and the catastrophes of World War I. Subsequently Turkey emerged as a secular republic. It adapted to the post-WWII world order by allying with the United States and NATO, in conflict with the Soviet Union which encircled the Turks on all sides. The Russians are longstanding rivals of Turkey, notably in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Stalin wanted to get his hands on the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits. Hence alliance with the US and NATO fulfilled one of the primary demands of Turkish grand strategy: a navy that could defend the straits and Turkish interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to usher in an era of opportunity for Turkey. Turkey benefited from democratization, globalization, and foreign capital inflows. But then America’s wars and crises, Russia’s resurgence, and Middle Eastern instability created a shatter-belt surrounding Turkey, impinging on its national security. In this context of limited foreign policy options, Turkey’s domestic politics coalesced around Erdoğan, the AKP, political Islam, and investment-driven economic growth. Erdoğan and the AKP represent the Anatolian, religious, and Middle Eastern interests in Turkey, as opposed to the maritime, secular, and Euro-centric interests rooted in Istanbul. This point can be illustrated by observing that the poorer interior regions have grown faster than the national average over the period of AKP rule, whereas the more developed coastal regions have tended to lag (Map 1). Voting patterns from the 2018 general election overlap with these economic outcomes. The AKP has steered investment capital into the interior to fund infrastructure and property construction while currency depreciation, rather than productivity enhancement, has merely maintained the status quo with the manufacturing export sector in the coastal regions (Chart 1). Map 1Turkey’s Anatolian Model And The Struggle With The Coasts Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Chart 1Turkey's Export Competitiveness Turkey's Export Competitiveness Turkey's Export Competitiveness Today Turkey faces three distinct obstacles to its geopolitical expansion: Russian aggression: Russia’s resurgence, especially with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and broader invasion of Ukraine in 2022, threatens Turkey’s interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Turkey must always deal with Russia carefully but over the past 14 years Russia has become belligerent, forcing Turkey to come to terms with Putin while maintaining the NATO alliance. Today Erdoğan tries to mediate the conflict as it does not want to encourage Russian aggression but also does not want NATO to provoke Russia. For instance, Turkey is willing to condone Finland and Sweden joining NATO but only if the West grants substantial benefits to Turkey itself. Ultimately Turkish ties with Russia are overrated. For both economic reasons and grand strategic reasons outlined above, Turkey will cleave to the West (Chart 2). Chart 2Turkey Still Linked To The West Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan ​​​​​ Chart 3Turkish Energy Ties With Russia Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Western liberal hegemony: The EU and NATO foreclosed any Turkish ambitions in Europe. The EU has consolidated with each new crisis while rejecting Turkish membership. This puts limits on Turkish access to European markets and influence in the Balkans. Turkey has guarded its independence jealously against the West. After the Cold War the US expected Turkey to serve American interests in the Middle East and Eurasia. The EU expected it to serve European interests as an energy transit state and a blockade against Middle Eastern refugees. But Turkish interests were often sidelined while its domestic politics did not allow blind loyalty to the West. This led Turkey to push back against the West and cultivate other options, such as deeper economic ties with Russia and China. Turkish dependency on Russian energy is substantial and Turkey has tried to play a mediating role in Russia’s conflict with NATO (Chart 3). Recently Turkey offered to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a military alliance of Asian powers. However, as with trade, Turkish defense and security ties with the Russo-Chinese bloc are ultimately overrated (Chart 4).  There is room for some cooperation but Turkey is not eager to abandon American military backing in a period in which Russia is threatening to control the Black Sea rim, cut off grain exports arbitrarily, and use tactical nuclear weapons. Chart 4Turkey’s Defense Alliance With The West Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Middle Eastern instability: The Middle East is a potential area for Turkey to increase influence, especially given the AKP’s embrace of political Islam. Turkey benefits from regional economic development and maintains relations with all players. But the region’s development is halting and Turkey is blocked by competitors. The US toppled Iraq in 2003, which strengthened Iran’s regional clout over the subsequent decades. But Iran is not stable and the US has not prevented Iran from achieving nuclear breakout capacity. Turkey cannot abide a nuclear-armed Iran. At the same time, the US continues to support Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies, which oppose Turkey’s combination of Islam and democratic populism. Russia propped up Syria’s regime in league with Iran, which threatens Turkey’s border integrity. Developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran have all complicated Turkey’s management of Kurdish militancy and separatism. Kurds make up nearly 20% of Turkey’s population and play a central role in the country’s political divisions. Erdoğan’s Anatolian power base is antagonistic toward the Kurds and regional Kurdish aspirations. China’s strategic rise brings both risks and rewards for Turkey but China is too distant to become the focus of Turkish strategy: China’s dream of reviving the Silk Road across Eurasia harkens back to the glory days of Ottoman power. The Belt and Road Initiative and other investments help to develop Central Asia and the Middle East, enabling Turkey to benefit once again as the middleman in east-west trade (Chart 5). Chart 5Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade But insofar as China’s Eurasian strategy is successful, it could someday impinge on Turkish ambitions, particularly by buttressing Russian and Iranian power. In recent years Erdoğan has experimented with projecting Turkish power in the Middle East (Syria), North Africa (Libya), the Caucasus (Armenia), and the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus). He cannot project power effectively because of the obstacles outlined above. But he can manipulate domestic and foreign security issues to try to prolong his hold on power. Bottom Line: Boxed in by Russian aggression, western liberal hegemony, and Middle Eastern instability, Turkey cannot achieve its geopolitical ambitions and has concentrated on internal development over the past two decades. However, the country retains some imperial ambitions and these periodically flare up in unpredictable ways as the modern Turkish state attempts to fend off the chaotic forces that loom in the Black Sea, Middle East, North Africa, and Caucasus. The Erdoğan regime is focused on consolidating Anatolian control of Turkey and projecting military power abroad so that the military does not become a political problem for his faction at home. Erdoğan’s Domestic Predicament President Erdoğan has stayed in power for 20 years under the conditions outlined above but he faces a critical election by June 18, 2023 that could see him thrown from power. The result will be extreme political turbulence over the coming nine months until the leadership of the country is settled by hook or by crook. Erdoğan has pursued a strongman or authoritarian leadership style, especially since domestic opposition emerged in the wake of the Great Recession. By firing three central bankers, he has pressured the central bank into running an ultra-dovish monetary policy, producing a 12% inflation rate prior to the Covid-19 pandemic and an 80% inflation rate today. He has also embraced populist fiscal handouts and foreign policy adventurism. Taken together his policies have eroded the country’s political as well as economic stability. From the last general election in 2018 to the latest data in 2022: Real household disposable income  growth has fallen from -7.4% to -18.7% (Chart 6). Chart 6Real Incomes Falling Real Incomes Falling Real Incomes Falling ​​​​​​ Chart 7Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election ​​​​​ The manufacturing PMI has fallen from 49.0 to 47.4 (Chart 7). Consumer confidence has fallen from 92.1 to 72.2 (Chart 8). Chart 8Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election ​​​​​​ Chart 9Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan ​​​​​​ Bad economic news is finally altering public opinion, with polls now shifting against the president and incumbent party: Since the pandemic erupted, Erdoğan’s approval rating has fallen from a peak of 57% to 40% today. Disapproval has Erdoğan’s risen to 54%, leaving him a net negative job approval (Chart 9). Bear in mind that Erdoğan won the election with 52.6% of the vote in 2018, only slightly better than the 51.8% he received in 2014 and well below the 80% that his AKP predecessor received in 2007. Meanwhile the AKP, which never performs as well as Erdoğan himself, has fallen from a 45% support rate to 30% today in parliamentary polls, dead even with the main opposition Republican People’s Party (Chart 10). The AKP won 42.6% of the vote in 2018, down from 49.5% in the second election of 2015, 49.8% in 2011, and 46.6% in 2007. Chart 10Justice And Development Party Neck And Neck With Republican Opposition Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan The gap between Erdoğan and his Republican rivals has narrowed sharply since the global food and fuel price spike began to bite in late 2021 (Chart 11). Chart 11Erdoğan Faces Tough Re-Election Race Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan However, the 2023 election is not straightforward. There are several caveats to the clear anti-incumbent tendency of economic and political data: Soft Economic Landing? The election takes place in nine months, enough time for surprises to salvage Erdoğan’s presidential campaign, given his and his party’s heavily entrenched rule. For example, it is possible – not probable – that Russia will resume energy exports, enabling Europe to recover, and that central banks will achieve a “soft landing” for the global economy. Turkey’s economy would bounce just in time to help the incumbent party. This is not what we expect (see below) but it could happen. Foreign Policy Victories? Erdoğan could achieve some foreign policy victories. He has negotiated a tenuous deal with Russia and Ukraine, along with the UN, to enable grain exports out of Odessa. He could build on this process to negotiate a broader ceasefire in Ukraine. He could also win major concessions from the US and NATO to secure Finnish and Swedish membership in that bloc. If he did he would come off looking like a grand statesman and might just buy another term in office. Unfortunately what is more likely is that Erdoğan will pursue an aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to distract voters from their bread-and-butter woes, only to destabilize Turkey and the region further. Stolen Election? Erdoğan revised the constitution in 2017 – winning 51.4% of the votes in a popular referendum – to give the presidency substantial new powers across the political system. Using these powers he could manipulate the election to produce a favorable outcome or even cling to power despite unfavorable election results. He does not face nearly as powerful and motivated of a liberal establishment as President Trump faced in 2020 or as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces in 2022. As noted Erdoğan has a contentious relationship with the Turkish military, so while investors cannot rule out a stolen election, they also cannot rule out a military coup in reaction to an attempted stolen election. Thus the election could produce roughly four outcomes, which we rank below from best to worst in terms of their favorability for global investors: 1.  Best Case: Decisive Opposition Victory – 25% Odds – A resounding electoral defeat for the AKP would reverse its unorthodox economic policies in the short term and serve as a lasting warning to future politicians that populism and economic mismanagement lead to political ruin. This outcome would also provide the political capital and parliamentary strength necessary to impose tough reforms and restore a semblance of macroeconomic stability. 2.  Good Case: Narrow AKP Defeat – 50% Odds – A narrow or contested election would produce a weak new government that would at least put a stop to the most inflationary AKP policies. It would improve global investor sentiment around Turkey’s eventual ability to stabilize its economy. The new government would lack the ability to push through structural reforms but it could at least straighten out the affairs of the central bank so as to ensure a cycle of monetary policy tightening, which would stabilize the currency. 3.  Bad Case: Narrow AKP Victory – 15% Odds – A narrow victory would force the AKP to compromise with opposition parties in parliament and pacify social unrest. Foreign adventurism would continue but harmful domestic policies would face obstructionism. 4.  Worst Case: Decisive AKP Victory – 10% Odds – A resounding victory for the ruling party would vindicate Erdoğan and his policies despite their negative economic results, driving Turkey further down the path of authoritarianism, populism, money printing, currency depreciation, and hyper-inflation. He could also be emboldened in his foreign adventurism. Bottom Line: We expect Erdoğan and the AKP to be defeated and replaced. However, Turkey is in the midst of an economic and political crisis and the next 12 months will bring extreme uncertainty. The election could be indecisive, contested, stolen, or overthrown. The aftermath could be chaotic as well as the lead-up. If the AKP stays in power then investors will abandon Turkey and its economy will suffer a historic shock. Therefore investors should underweight Turkey – at least until the next phase in the economic downturn confirms our forecast that the AKP will fall from power. Macro Outlook: Fade The Equity Rally Chart 12Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM The Turkish economy is beset by hyper-inflation. Headline consumer prices are rising at upwards of 80% and core inflation is 65%. Yet Turkish government 10-year bond yields are low and falling: they are down to 11% currently, from a high of 24% at the beginning of the year. Turkish stocks have also outperformed their Emerging Markets counterparts this year in common currency terms even though the lira has been the worst performing EM currency (Chart 12). So, what’s going on in this market? The answer is hidden in the slew of unorthodox policies adopted by the authorities. These measures caused massive distortions in both the economy and the markets. Specifically, late last year, despite very high inflation, the central bank began to cut policy rates encouraging massive loan expansion. As a result, both local currency loans and money supply surged. Which, in turn, completely unhinged inflation (Chart 13). As inflation rose, so did government bond yields. In a bid to keep government borrowing costs low, policymakers changed several bank regulations to force commercial banks to buy government bonds.2  The upshot was that the bond yields stopped tracking inflation and instead began to fall even as inflation skyrocketed. The rampant inflation meant Turkish non-financial firms’ nominal sales skyrocketed. Indeed, sales of all MSCI Turkey non-financials companies have risen by 40% in US dollar terms and 200% in local currency (Chart 14). Chart 13Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation This was at a time when policy rates were being cut. The policy rate has fallen to 12% today from 19% a year earlier. Firms’ local currency real borrowing costs have fallen deeply into negative territory (Chart 15). It helped reduce firms’ costs significantly. Chart 14Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits ​​​​​ Chart 15Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc ​​​​​ Chart 16Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation ​​​​​ Meanwhile, even though wage growth accelerated, it still fell short of inflation, and therefore of nominal sales of the firms (Chart 16). Firms’ wage costs did not rise as much as their prices. All this boosted non-financial firms’ margins. Total profits have risen by 35% in US dollar terms from a year earlier (200% in lira terms). ​​​​​​​ Chart 17The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket ​​​​​​​ On their part, listed financials’ profits have surged by 50% in USD terms and 220% in local currency terms. They benefited both from surging interest income due to rapid loan growth and from massive capital gains on their holding of government securities (see Chart 14 above). All this is reflected in Turkish companies’ earnings per share as well. The spike in EPS has propped up Turkish stocks for past few months. Over the past year, not only have corporate profits and share prices surged, but also house prices have skyrocketed by 170% in local currency terms and 30% in USD terms (Chart 17). In sum, the abnormally low nominal and deeply negative real borrowing costs have produced a money/credit deluge, which has generated a massive inflationary outbreak and has inflated revenues/profits as well as various asset prices. The Lira To Depreciate Further This macro setting is a recipe for a major currency sell-off.  First, Europe – the destination of 90% of Turkish exports – will likely slide into recession over the coming year (Chart 18).  Chart 18A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A fall in exports will widen Turkey’s current account deficit. Notably, imports will not fall much since the authorities are pursuing easy money policy. Second, the lack of credible macro policies as well as political crisis will assure that foreign capital escapes Turkey. Turkey will find the current account deficit nearly impossible to finance. Third, the country’s net foreign reserves, after adjusting for the central bank’s foreign currency borrowings and commercial banks’ deposits with the central bank, stand at minus 30 billion dollars. In other words, the central bank now has large net US dollar liabilities. As such, it has little wherewithal to defend the currency. There are very high odds that the lira depreciation will accelerate in the months ahead. Fourth, the slew of unorthodox measures taken by the Turkish authorities will encourage banks to buy more government local currency bonds to suppress the government’s borrowing costs. When commercial banks buy government securities from non-banks, they create money “out of thin air.” Hence, the ongoing money supply deluge will continue. This is bearish for the currency. Notably, the economy will likely enter into recession next year – and yet core inflation will stay very high (30% and above). Recent unorthodox bank regulations are meant to encourage a certain kind of lending – loans to farmers, exporters, and small and medium-sized businesses – while discouraging other kinds. Consequently, the overall loan growth will likely slow in nominal terms. There are already signs that credit is decelerating on the margin (Chart 19). Given the very high inflation, slower credit growth will likely lead to a liquidity crunch for many businesses – forcing them to curtail their activity.  Chart 19Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations ​​​​​​ Chart 20Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP ​​​​​​ Indeed, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), local currency loan growth has already slipped into negative territory. This is a bad omen for the overall economy: contracting real loan growth is a harbinger of recession (Chart 20). In short, Turkey is looking into an abyss: a recession amid high inflation (i.e., stagflation) as well as a brewing political crisis (with Erdoğan likely doubling down on unorthodox and populist policies). All this point to another period of a large currency depreciation. While the country will likely change direction to avoid the abyss, investors should wait to allocate capital until after the change in direction is confirmed.    Investment Takeaways The Turkish lira will fall much more vis-à-vis the US dollar in the year ahead. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Turkey is involved in an economic crisis that will devolve into a political crisis over the election cycle. While Erdoğan and the AKP are likely to fall from power as things stand today, they are heavily entrenched and will be difficult to remove, creating large risks of an indecisive or contested election in 2023 that will increase rather than decrease policy uncertainty and the political risk premium in Turkish assets. As a strongman leader Erdoğan has consolidated political power in his own hands, so there is no one to take the blame for the country’s economic mismanagement – other than foreigners. Hence there is a distinct risk that his foreign policy adventurism will escalate between now and next year, resulting in significant military conflicts or saber-rattling. These will shake out western investors who try to speculate on the likelihood that the election or the military will oust Erdoğan and produce sounder national and economic policies. That outcome is indeed likely but Erdoğan is not going without a fight. Our Geopolitical Strategy also recommends tactically shorting the lira versus the Japanese yen in light of global slowdown, extreme geopolitical risk, and the Bank of Japan’s desire to prevent the yen from falling too far.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Consulting Editor Footnotes 1      Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci, “The Turkish constitutional referendum, explained,” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2017, brookings.edu. 2     The central bank replaced an existing 20% reserve requirement ratios for credits with a higher 30% treasury bond collateral requirement. Lenders will have to cut interest rates on commercial loans (except for loans to farmers, exporters, and SMEs). Otherwise, banks will have to maintain additional securities. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary The US inflation surprise increases the odds of both congressional gridlock and recession, which increases uncertainty over US leadership past 2024 and reduces the US’s ability to lower tensions with China and Iran.   Despite the mainstream media narrative, the Xi-Putin summit reinforces our view that China cannot reject Russia’s strategic partnership. The potential for conflict in Taiwan forces China to accept Russia’s overture. For the same reason the US and China cannot re-engage their economies sustainably, even if Biden and Xi somehow manage to reduce tensions after the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. Russia could reduce oil exports as well as natural gas, intensifying the global energy shock. Ukraine’s counter-offensive and Europe’s energy diversification increase the risk of Russian military and economic failure. The Middle East will destabilize anew and create a new source of global energy supply disruptions. US-Iran talks are faltering as expected. Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 19.1% Bottom Line: Stay long US stocks, defensive sectors, and large caps. Avoid China, Taiwan, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Feature Several notable geopolitical developments occurred over the past week while we met with clients at the annual BCA Research Investment Conference in New York. In this report we analyze these developments using our geopolitical method, which emphasizes constraints over preferences, capabilities over intentions, reality over narrative. We also draw freely from the many valuable insights gleaned from our guest speakers at the conference.  China Cannot Reject Russia: The Xi-Putin Summit In Uzbekistan Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Uzbekistan as we go to press and Putin has acknowledged China’s “questions and concern” about the war in Ukraine.1 They last met on February 4 when Xi gave Putin his blessing for the Ukraine invasion, promising to buy more Russian natural gas and to pursue a “no limits” strategic partnership (meaning one that includes extensive military cooperation). The meeting’s importance is clear from both leaders’ efforts to make it happen. Putin is leaving Russia despite rising domestic criticism over his handling of the Ukraine war and European energy war. Ukraine is making surprising gains in the battlefield, particularly around Kharkiv, threatening Russia’s ability to complete the conquest of Donetsk and the Donbas region. Meanwhile Xi is leaving China for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak, despite the fact that he is only one month away from the most important political event of his life: the October 16 twentieth national party congress, where he hopes to clinch another five, ten, or fifteen years in power, expand his faction’s grip over the political system, and take over Mao Zedong’s unique title as chairman of the Communist Party. We do not yet know the full outcome of the Uzbek summit but we do not see it as a turning point in which China turns on Russia. Instead the summit reinforces our key point to investors all year: China cannot reject Russia. Russia broke energy ties with Europe and is fighting a proxy war with NATO. The Putin regime has lashed Russia to China’s side for the foreseeable future. China may not have wanted to move so quickly toward an exclusive relationship but it is not in a position to reject Russia’s diplomatic overture and leave Putin out to dry. The reason is that China is constrained by the US-led world order and like Russia is attempting to change that order and carve a sphere of influence to improve its national security. Beijing’s immediate goal is to consolidate power across the critical buffer territories susceptible to foreign interests. It has already consolidated Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and to some extent the South China Sea, the critical approach to Taiwan. Taiwan is the outstanding buffer space that needs to be subjugated. Xi Jinping has taken it upon himself to unify China and Taiwan within his extended rule. But Taiwanese public opinion has decisively shifted in favor of either an indefinite status quo or independence. Hence China and Taiwan are on a collision course. Regardless of one’s view on the likelihood of war, it is a high enough chance that China, Taiwan, the US, and others will be preparing for it in the coming years. Chart 1US Arms Sales To Taiwan Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions The US is attempting to increase its ability to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It believes it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine – and Taiwan is far more important to US economy and security than Ukraine. The US is already entering discussions with Taiwan and other allies about a package of severe economic sanctions in the event that China attacks – sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. The US Congress is also moving forward with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which will solidify US support for the island as well as increase arms sales (Chart 1).2  Aside from China's military preparation – which needs to be carefully reviewed in light of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine and the much greater difficulty of invading Taiwan – China must prepare to deal with the following three factors in the event of war: 1. Energy: China is overly exposed to sea lines of communication that can be disrupted by the United States Navy. Beijing will have to partner with Russia to import Russian and Central Asian resources and attempt to forge an overland path to the Middle East (Chart 2). Unlike Russia, China cannot supply its own energy during a war and its warfighting capacity will suffer if shortages occur or prices spike. 2. Computer Chips: China has committed at least $200 billion on a crash course to build its own semiconductors since 2013 due to the need to modernize its military and economy and compete with the US on the global stage. But China is still dependent on imports, especially for the most advanced chips, and its dependency is rising not falling despite domestic investments (Chart 3). The US is imposing export controls on advanced microchips and starting to enforce these controls on third parties. The US and its allies have cut off Russia’s access to computer chips, leading to Russian shortages that are impeding their war effort.  Chart 2China’s Commodity Import Vulnerability Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Chart 3China's Imports Of Semiconductors China's Imports Of Semiconductors China's Imports Of Semiconductors     3. US Dollar Reserves: China is still heavily exposed to US dollar assets but its access will be cut off in the event of war, just as the US has frozen Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan, and Cuban assets over the years. China is already diversifying away from the dollar but will have to move more quickly given that Russia had dramatically reduced its exposure and still suffered severely when its access to dollar reserves was frozen this year (Chart 4). Where will China reallocate its reserves? To developing and importing natural resources from Russia, Central Asia, and other overland routes. Chart 4China's US Dollar Exposure China's US Dollar Exposure China's US Dollar Exposure Russia may be the junior partner in a new Russo-Chinese alliance but it will not be a vassal. Russia has resources, military power, and regional control in Central Asia that China needs. Of course, China will maintain a certain diplomatic distance from Russia because it needs to maintain economic relations with Europe and other democracies as it breaks up with the United States. Europe is far more important to Chinese exports than Russia. China will play both sides and its companies will develop parallel supply chains. China will also make gestures to countries that feel threatened by Russia, including the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the crucial point is that China cannot reject Russia. If the Putin regime fails, China will be diplomatically isolated, it will lose an ally in any Taiwan war, and the US will have a much greater advantage in attempting to contain China in the coming years and decades. Russo-Chinese Alliance And The US Dollar Many investors speculate that China’s diversification away from the US dollar will mark a severe downturn for the currency. This is of course possible, given that Russia and China will form a substantial anti-dollar bloc. Certainly there can be a cyclical downturn in the greenback, especially after the looming recession troughs. But it is harder to see a structural collapse of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency. The past 14 years have shown how global investors react to US dysfunction, Russian aggression, and Chinese slowdown: they buy the dollar! The implication is that a US wage-price spiral, a Russian détente with Europe, and a Chinese economic recovery would be negative for the dollar – but those stars have not yet aligned. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThe Geopolitical Consequences Of The Ukraine War The reason China needs to diversify is because it fears US sanctions when it invades Taiwan. Hence reducing its holdings of US treasuries and the dollar signals that it expects war in future. But will other countries rush into the yuan and yuan-denominated bonds if Xi is following in Putin’s footsteps and launching a war of choice, with damaging consequences for the economy? A war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe and would send other countries plunging into the safe-haven assets, including US assets.   Nevertheless China will diversify and other countries will probably increase their yuan trade over time, just as Russia has done. This will be a cyclical headwind for the dollar at some point. But it will not knock the US off the premier position. That would require a historic downgrade in the US’s economic and strategic capability, as was the case with the United Kingdom after the world wars. China will continue to stimulate the economy after the party congress. A successful Chinese and global economic rebound next year – and a decision to pursue “jaw jaw” with the US and Taiwan rather than “war war” – would be negative for the dollar. Hence we may downgrade our bullish dollar view to neutral on a cyclical basis before long … but not yet and not on a structural basis.  Bottom Line: Favor the US dollar and the euro over the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Underweight Chinese and Taiwanese assets on a structural basis. Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive And A Russian Oil Embargo Ukraine launched a counter-offensive against Russia in September and achieved significant early victories. Russians fell back away from Kharkiv, putting Izyum in Ukrainian hands and jeopardizing Russia’s ability to achieve its war aim of conquering the remaining half of Donetsk province and thus controlling the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Russian positions also crumbled west of the Dnieper river, which was always an important limit on Russian capabilities (Map 1). Map 1Status Of Russia-Ukraine War: The Ukrainian Counter-Offensive (September 15, 2022) Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Some commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama in the Washington Post, have taken the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a sign that the Ukrainians will reconquer lost territory and Russia will suffer an outright defeat in this war.3 If Russia cannot conquer the Donbas, its control of the “land bridge” to Crimea will be unsustainable, and it may have to admit defeat. But we are very skeptical. It will be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to drive the Russians out of all of their entrenched positions. US military officials applauded Ukraine’s counter-offensive but sounded a cautious note. The chief problem is that neither President Putin nor the Russian military can afford such a defeat. They will have to double down on the Donbas and land bridge. The war will be prolonged. Ultimately we expect stalemate, which will be a prelude to ceasefire negotiations. But first the fighting will intensify and the repercussions for global economy and markets will get worse. Russia’s war effort is also flagging because Europe is making headway in finding alternatives for Russian natural gas. Russia has cut off flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany, the Yamal pipeline to Poland, and partially to the Ukraine pipeline system, leaving only Turkstream operating normally. Yet EU gas storage is in the middle of its normal range and trending higher (Chart 5).   Chart 5Europe Handling Natural Gas Crisis Well … So Far Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Of course, Europe’s energy supply is still not secure. Cold weather could require more heating than expected. Russia has an incentive to tighten the gas flow further. Flows from Algeria or Azerbaijan could be sabotaged or disrupted (Chart 6). Chart 6Europe’s NatGas Supply Still Not Secure Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Chart 7Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Russia’s intention is to inflict a recession on Europe so that it begins to rethink its willingness to maintain a long-term proxy war. Recession will force European households to pay the full cost of the energy breakup with Russia all at once. Popular support for war will moderate and politicians will adopt more pragmatic diplomacy. After all they do not have an interest in prolonging the war to the point that it spirals out of control. Clearly the economic pain is being felt, as manufacturing expectations and consumer confidence weaken (Chart 7). Europe’s resolve will not collapse overnight. But the energy crisis can get worse from here. The deeper the recession, the more likely European capitals will try to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire.   However, given Ukraine’s successes in the field and Europe’s successes in diversification, it is entirely possible that Russia faces further humiliating setbacks. While this outcome may be good for liberal democracies, it is not good for global financial markets, at least not in the short run. If Russia is backed into a corner on both the military and economic fronts, then Putin’s personal security and regime security will be threatened. Russia could attempt to turn the tables or lash out even more aggressively. Already Moscow has declared a new “red line” if the US provides longer-range missiles to Ukraine. A US-Russia showdown, complete with nuclear threats, is not out of the realm of possibility. Russia could also start halting oil exports, as it has threatened to do, to inflict a major oil shock on the European economy. Investors will need to be prepared for that outcome.  Bottom Line: Petro-states have geopolitical leverage as long as global commodity supplies remain tight. Investors should be prepared for the European embargo of Russian oil to provoke a Russian reaction. A larger than expected oil shock is possible given the risk of defeat that Russia faces (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions Xi-Putin Summit, Ukraine Offensive, Iran Tensions US-Iran Talks Falter Again This trend of petro-state geopolitical leverage was one of our three key views for 2022 and it also extends to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which are faltering as expected. Tit-for-tat military action between Iran and its enemies in the Persian Gulf will pick up immediately – i.e. a new source of oil disruption will emerge. If global demand is collapsing then this trend may only create additional volatility for oil markets at first, but it further constrains the supply side for the foreseeable future. It is not yet certain that the talks are dead but a deal before the US midterm looks unlikely. Biden could continue working on a deal in 2023-24. The Democratic Party is likely to lose at least the House of Representatives, leaving him unable to pass legislation and more likely to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Biden administration wants the Iran deal to tamp down inflation and avoid a third foreign policy crisis at a time when it is already juggling Russia and China. The overriding constraints in this situation are that Iran needs a nuclear weapon for regime survival, while Israel will attack Iran as a last resort before it obtains a nuclear weapon. Yes, the US is reluctant to initiate another war in the Middle East. But public war-weariness is probably overrated today (unlike in 2008 or even 2016) and the US has drawn a hard red line against nuclear weaponization. Iran will retaliate to any US-Israeli aggression ferociously. But conflict and oil disruptions will emerge even before the US or Israel decide to launch air strikes, as Iran will face sabotage and cyber-attacks and will need to deter the US and Israel by signaling that it can trigger a region-wide war. Chart 9If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further Recent social unrest in Iraq, where the nationalist coalition of Muqtada al-Sadr is pushing back against Iranian influence, is only an inkling of what can occur if the US-Iran talks are truly dead, Iran pushes forward with its nuclear program, and Israel and the US begin openly entertaining military options. The potential oil disruption from Iraq presents a much larger supply constraint than the failure to remove sanctions on Iran (Chart 9). A new wave of Middle Eastern instability would push up oil prices and strengthen Russia’s hand, distracting the US and imposing further pain on Europe. It would not strengthen China’s hand, but the risk itself would reinforce China’s Eurasian strategy, as Beijing would need to prepare for oil cutoffs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s attempts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be seen in this context. Ultimately the only factor that could still possibly convince Iran not to make a dash for the bomb – the military might of the US and its allies – is the same factor that forces China and Russia to strengthen their strategic bond. The emerging Russo-Chinese behemoth, in turn, acts as a hard constraint on any substantial reengagement of the US and Chinese economies. The US cannot afford to feed another decade of Chinese economic growth and modernization if China is allied with Russia and Central Asia. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi and Biden administrations will try to prevent a total collapse of US-China relations in 2023. If China is not yet ready to invade Taiwan then there is a brief space for diplomacy to try to work. But there is no room for long-lasting reengagement – because the US cannot simply cede Taiwan to China, and hence China cannot reject Russia, and Russia no longer has any options. Bottom Line: Expect further oil volatility and price shocks. Sell Middle Eastern equities. Favor North American, Latin American, and Australian energy producers. Investment Takeaways Recession Risks Rising: The inflation surprise in the US in August necessitates more aggressive Fed rate hikes in the near term, which increases the odds of rising unemployment and recession. US Policy Uncertainty Rising: A recession will greatly increase the odds of US political instability over the 2022-24 cycle and reduce the incentive for foreign powers like Iran or China to make concessions or agreements with the US. European Policy Uncertainty Rising: We already expected a European recession. Russia’s setbacks make it more likely that it will adopt more aggressive military tactics and economic warfare. Chinese Policy Uncertainty Rising: China will continue stimulating next year but its economy will suffer from energy shocks and its stimulus is less effective than in the past. It will likely increase economic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the US will increase punitive measures against China. It is not clear that it will launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan – that is not our base case – but it is possible so investors need to be prepared. Long US and Defensives: Stay long US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Buy safe-havens like the oversold Japanese yen. Long Arms Manufacturers: Buy defense stocks and cyber-security firms. Short China and Taiwan: Favor the USD and EUR over the CNY. Favor US semiconductor stocks over Taiwanese equities. Favor Korean over Taiwanese equities. Favor Indian tech over Chinese tech. Favor Singaporean over Hong Kong stocks. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Tessa Wong and Simon Fraser, “Putin-Xi talks: Russian leader reveals China's 'concern' over Ukraine,” BBC, September 15, 2022, bbc.com. 2     US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” foreign.senate.gov. 3    Greg Sargent, “Is Putin facing defeat? The ‘End of History’ author remains confident,” Washington Post, September 12, 2022, washingtonpost.com.                                                                                         Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary Inflation Surprise Reinforces Gridlock And Fiscal Drag A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A US recession is increasingly likely as the Fed will have to hike rates more aggressively in the short run to contain inflation. Recession would exacerbate US policy uncertainty during a period of peak polarization in the 2022-24 election cycle. The Fed’s struggle with inflation will become entangled in extreme US politics. The Fed will come under immense pressure to pause rate hikes earlier than warranted in 2023. The Fed could get blamed for both over-tightening and politicization. Investors should fade the risk of another Democratic sweep in the midterm elections. Republicans are still highly likely to gain control of the House, resulting in gridlock and a freeze to fiscal policy.   If Democrats lose the House, their odds of retaining the White House will decline. A recession would greatly reduce their odds. In this context the US faces another tumultuous political cycle, as Republicans will stage a comeback. However, reform of the Electoral Count Act could reduce the risk of a catastrophic breakdown in the electoral system. Recommendation (Tactical) INITIATION DATE Return Long DXY (Dollar Index) Feb 23, 2022 12.6% Bottom Line: Stay long US dollar for now but prepare to downgrade to neutral. Feature BCA Research hosted our annual conference at the Plaza Hotel in New York last week. Clients heard a range of views on various topics, including US politics and policy. In this report we touch on some of the insights from the conference while providing our own views on what to expect going forward. A Politicized Federal Reserve? The real Fed funds rate stands at -2.2% today despite the Federal Reserve’s decision to hike rates by 225 basis points this year. The last time the real Fed funds rate was this low was in 1975, under the chairmanship of Arthur Burns – i.e. the epitome of a politicized Fed (Chart 1). Chart 1A Politicized Federal Reserve? A Politicized Federal Reserve? A Politicized Federal Reserve? Is the Fed already politicized or will it become politicized in the coming years? What would that mean for monetary policy, the economy, and financial markets? The Fed waded into political territory when it began pursuing unorthodox policies in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and again during the Covid-19 pandemic. Ideally monetary policy sets interest rates across the economy and applies equally to all economic actors. But once the Fed began quantitative easing (bond buying) and coordinating its actions with the fiscal authorities (which had bailed out major banks), it entered the game of income and wealth redistribution. Not least because asset price inflation favors asset owners over others. Now that the Fed and other central banks have pioneered these unorthodox policies, they will continue to use them in the face of future economic and political turmoil. They will also innovate new tools to deal with each crisis. As the pandemic response highlighted, the Fed will continue down the path of redistribution, which will continue to provoke political backlash from legislators and the public. At the same time, the Fed’s policy parameters today have been reined in and disciplined by the post-pandemic inflation overshoot. For example, there is not so much excited talk today about implementing Modern Monetary Theory – debt monetization – as there was in the heady days of 2019. Instead the Fed today is focused almost exclusively on fulfilling its price stability mandate, at least until inflation gets down into the 2%-3% range. The market appears over-eager for interest rate cuts in 2023 when the Fed is expecting to continue hiking rates throughout 2023 (Chart 2). The surprise in core and headline inflation in August reinforces this point. If the Fed cannot bring inflation below 3%, what will it do? Could it accept reality and modify the inflation target to 3%? A higher inflation target has long been discussed – it would enable the Fed to stimulate more effectively in the next recession. But Chairman Jerome Powell and his monetary policy strategy review rejected the idea of raising the long-term inflation target from 2% to 3% or above – and that rejection is likely to be sustained at least until the next review in 2024. Even then a higher inflation target seems unlikely as it would be very hard to achieve politically in the wake of the inflation overshoot. Chart 2Will Fed Cut Rates Next Year? Will Fed Cut Rates Next Year? Will Fed Cut Rates Next Year? Of course, a lot can happen by 2024 and new deflationary shocks could conceivably force a change to the inflation target. What is clear to us is that the Fed still has a dovish bias that took a long time to develop and has not yet been entirely overturned by the inflation overshoot (Chart 3).  Chart 3Dovish Consensus Built Up Over Time And Remains In Place For Now A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Meanwhile the Fed’s single-minded focus on restoring price stability will bring an entirely different set of political problems – and accusations of politicization. For example, the Fed wants tighter financial conditions – since that will help to cool the economy and bring down inflation – but cannot well speak openly about deliberately driving down stock market prices and home values. The Fed also believes that a recession with unemployment ranging from 4%-5% would not be the end of the world but it cannot well speak openly about deliberately increasing unemployment. Especially because unemployment rarely stays so low in recessions. The Fed acknowledges that it will need to pause hiking interest rates at some point, hopefully before it tightens monetary conditions so much as to trigger a recession, but it does not want to call it a “pause” since financial markets will take that as a hard stop. It could cause a premature loosening of financial conditions and be blamed for a lack of vigilance when inflation revives. Will the Fed ultimately be prevented from tightening monetary policy enough because of the pressure that higher interest rates will put on the government’s fiscal sustainability? It is entirely possible. Sustaining social programs is more popular than paying bond holders. Since the Fed pays market interest rates on reserve balances, it will stop making a profit if it hikes rates to 3.25% or above (which is slated to happen this month). Very soon the Fed will be turning a loss on its holdings, rather than remitting profits to the Department of Treasury, and it will be amply criticized for spending taxpayer money. In that case there will be plenty of ammunition from critics on all sides. When it comes to the Fed’s specific predicament in 2022-24, Chairman Powell does not want to be the next Arthur Burns, i.e. he does not want to go down in history as the chairman who made a historic mistake by not forcing inflation back into an acceptable and containable range of say 2%-3.5%. Neither he nor the Fed can afford to lose control of price stability, which would damage the US economy and the Fed’s credibility. The implication is that Powell will need to hike rates until price stability is obtained. Yet even a conservative estimate would suggest that hiking rates until inflation falls beneath 3% will require the unemployment rate to rise by more than the estimated 0.5-1.0 percentage points, likely considerably more than this, which historically implies a recession in 2023-24. Recession odds have already risen sharply as priced by the bond market, according to Jonathan LaBerge at our Bank Credit Analyst flagship service (Chart 4). Of course, recession odds have an important implication for the 2022-24 political cycle, implying that the Fed’s handling of the economy will become entangled once again in America’s extreme political polarization. Chart 4Recession Odds Rising Recession Odds Rising Recession Odds Rising Our past research has shown that the Fed does not pay close attention to midterm elections. The Fed is more likely to hike rates than cut rates during a midterm election year – and more likely to hike rates during a president’s first midterm election as opposed to his second. Whereas the Fed is about equally likely to cut rates as to hike them during a presidential election year. Most importantly, the Fed is more likely to hike rates during a non-election year than otherwise (Table 1). Table 1The Fed Doesn’t Care About Midterms … But Prefers To Hike In Off-Years A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks While the Fed had no choice but to hike in 2022, supporting these data, a critical decision will emerge in 2023, when the Fed is still expected to hike but the risk of recession grows. Recessions sharply reduce the odds of the incumbent political party staying in the White House (Table 2). Moreover a recession could bring back President Trump or a Trumpist Republican candidate bent on revenge against the political establishment. The result is that the FOMC will be under immense political pressure not to overtighten monetary policy in 2023-24. In normal times, a Fed chair appointed by a Republican president could conceivably have the license to hike rates aggressively to whip inflation, knowing that if a recession occurs and a Republican comes to power, he would be likely to be reappointed. But Powell can have no such assurance from the erratic President Trump, who is still favored for the Republican nomination as things stand. Even aside from Trump, Powell and the FOMC will fear that a populist Republican Party would seek to audit the Fed or curtail its powers. Table 2Biden’s Odds Fall If Recession Occurs A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks In sum, the Washington political establishment believes it is under attack from right-wing insurrectionists and will put immense pressure on the FOMC to avoid triggering a recession in 2023-24. This could produce an inflationary surprise. Bottom Line: A recession is likely to occur as the Fed continues hiking rates to bring inflation below 3%. This increases political uncertainty for the 2022-24 cycle. But a politicized Fed may compromise when inflation is closer to 4% for fear of a populist win in 2024. That would likely prove to be a historic monetary policy mistake, enabling long-term inflation expectations to rise substantially.   Midterm Elections: Fade The “Blue Sweep” Risk  While the Fed ignores midterm elections, investors are increasingly uncertain over fiscal policy and the outcome of the midterms. Will Congress become gridlocked, as we expect, or will Democrats retain control of Congress and continue the federal spending splurge that has played a large role in the inflation overshoot? Clearly the midterm races have tightened since President Biden changed his tone and started prioritizing the fight against inflation back in June. As inflation has abated, online betting markets have discounted Republican odds of victory, particularly in the Senate where they are now 36% (Chart 5). We anticipated that Biden’s approval ratings would stabilize on the passage of legislation and that the election would tighten in the final months, particularly on the back of women voters turning out to support Democrats in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision to reduce abortion access. However, we also argued that gridlock would still be the most likely result based on the high odds that the House would flip to Republican control regardless of Roe. This is a consensus view that should be challenged and reassessed as November approaches. Chart 5Bookies Still Expect Gridlock In Midterms A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Senate elections are held statewide and are therefore more susceptible to a shift in suburban and women voters. State-level polls leave much to be desired but the overall picture is that the races are closer than they were earlier this year – and closer than the Republicans would want them to be (Charts 6A & 6B). Persistent high inflation should be the clincher in favor of Republicans but the Senate is simply too close to call at this stage. Chart 6ANeck-And-Neck Races In Senate A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Chart 6BNeck-And-Neck Races In Senate A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Yet the Senate is overrated in this election because if Democrats lose either chamber, gridlock will be the result. Gridlock is what matters most for fiscal policy and hence for investors. The gridlock view rests on the House of Representatives. While the president’s party almost always loses seats in the midterm election, losing seats is not the same as losing control. In fact, over the past 120 years, a party that controls the House and/or Senate is more likely than not to retain control in a midterm election (Chart 7). But in the post-WWII era, the president’s party is slightly more likely to lose control of the House. And in almost all midterms, the president’s party loses seats in the House.  Chart 7Presidents Do Not Always Lose Control, But Dems Have Small Cushion In 2022 A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks The key point about 2022 is that the Democrats only have a six-seat buffer in the House. In other words, losing seats is very likely to be equivalent to losing control this year. To save the House, Biden’s Democrats would have to perform as well as John F. Kennedy’s Democrats in 1962, when they only lost four House seats. Our House model predicts they will lose 21 seats (Appendix). While Democrats could beat this prediction, they would be hard pressed to lose fewer than six seats on a net basis: inflation is high and sticky, real wages and incomes have fallen, consumer confidence has fallen, the president’s approval rating is low, and approval of Congress is low. If a president’s party loses control of the House, its odds of keeping the White House in 2024 also fall (Chart 8). This is another reason for investors to expect that fiscal policy will freeze, policy uncertainty will remain high, and the Fed will be under political pressure not to hike rates aggressively in 2023-24. Chart 8Biden’s 2024 Odds Fall If He Loses The House A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Bottom Line: Fade the “Blue Sweep” risk in 2022. The midterm election is tightening but Republicans are still likely to win the House. Fiscal policy will remain a drag on growth and the 2024 election will become even more uncertain, putting political pressure on the Fed to avoid overtightening. Limited Big Government Another Democratic sweep would greatly reinforce the new US policy trajectory of Big Government: a trajectory that points away from the Washington Consensus and Reagan revolution toward a future of higher taxes, larger budget deficits, higher tariffs, and more extensive regulation (Chart 9).1  But Democrats will be forced to share power. This is why we call the new policy paradigm “Limited Big Government.” It is still a shift in the direction of a larger government role in the economy and society, but it is taking place within the context of the US constitutional system of checks and balances and two-party politics. We do not expect the latter two factors to disappear. Looking at the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations together we can see that the turn toward Big Government is also compromised by vested interests: Democrats failed to increase corporate taxes, though they did put a floor under the effective tax rate by imposing a new 15% minimum tax on corporate book income. The budget deficit is normalizing after the gargantuan pandemic stimulus. But Democratic legislation will not reduce the deficit substantially over time, contrary to Biden administration propaganda. But Republicans are fiscally profligate themselves, which is clear from Trump’s term in office as well as previous periods of single-party GOP rule. Republicans joined Democrats in passing the infrastructure bill and the Chips and Science Act, which revives US industrial policy in an era of great power competition. Biden has now accepted Trump’s tariff hikes on China. While Republican leadership may push deregulation in future, they may also believe that government regulation will be required to fight back against “woke” or socially left-wing corporations. Chart 9Buenos Aires Consensus equal Spending, Taxes, Tariffs, Regulations A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Thus the US’s new policy paradigm is bipartisan in nature. Of course, if Republicans take the House they will turn fiscally conservative for tactical reasons. That will put a halt to the spending splurge of 2020-22. But it will not signal a new fiscally austere paradigm since full Republican control in 2025 would be highly likely to lead to another fiscal blowout. This is even more likely to be the case now that Republicans have adopted a populist and pro-working class approach. Bottom Line: The US shift away from limited government toward Big Government is entrenched even if it suffers a setback due to gridlock from 2022-24. Given that partisan checks will prevent the US from moving too radically in any direction, we dub this paradigm “Limited Big Government.” It is marginally inflationary due to the rise in taxes, spending, regulations, and tariffs. US Electoral System: A Possible Positive Surprise Our expectation that the Fed will be politicized and that populist policies will persist stems from the underlying inequality and political polarization in the United States. Yet these same factors serve to increase overall political instability and threaten to cause a fundamental breakdown in political order. Will US institutions be able to handle the strain in the coming election cycle? There can be no doubt that polarization is reaching dangerous extremes. The US has suffered two out of five contested elections in the past 22 years. The last two Republican presidential victories have occurred without gaining the popular vote. The Biden administration’s low approval creates the risk of another tight election in 2024, implying controversy over the vote count and procedure (see Appendix). Another tight election could lead to a single state’s controversy determining the outcome of the entire election. Or it could lead to an electoral college tie in which Congress would decide the election result and could decide against the popular verdict.    It is not hard to think of scenarios where contested elections and social unrest get out of hand. For example, one important consequence of the January 6 rebellion is that future governments will suppress protests with force if they attempt to interfere with the electoral process or the workings of the legislature. But imagine if a Republican administration comes to power through a contested election in Congress and then suppresses the resulting protests against it? Or imagine if Democrats retain power and push their “domestic war on terrorism” far enough to provoke a low-level militant insurgency from disaffected nationalists? It is easy to think of scenarios on either side that could lead to a much greater breakdown in public order than what occurred in 2020.   It is unlikely that an institutional fix will occur in time for the 2024 election. However, there is one exception on the congressional agenda: a possible revision of the Electoral Count Act of 1887. This law was designed to prevent a failure of the electoral system in the wake of the “Stolen Election” of 1876. Its main achievement was to have the governor of each state certify the electoral votes of that state before sending them to Washington. However, the law also leaves open the door for state legislatures, secretaries of state, and governors to influence their state’s electoral votes. Democrats have written a revised version of the law that would close some of the loopholes and ambiguities. So far 10 Senate Republicans have co-sponsored the bill, making it very likely they will vote for it (Table 3). If these Republicans do not change their minds in the critical hour, and if all Democrats can be brought to vote for the measure, then a 60-vote, filibuster-proof majority will exist to pass the law. Table 3Republican Senators Who Support Revising The Electoral Count Act A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks The original Electoral Count Act took ten years to pass, so there is no reason to be overly optimistic. But if 60 votes can be found in the Senate, then the electoral system will be fortified ahead of the 2024 election and structural US political risks will be at least somewhat reduced. Bottom Line: The US faces serious social and political instability in the coming years and remains at “peak polarization.” But a bipartisan law could help solidify the electoral system prior to 2024, which would reduce some of the risk of election controversies spiraling out of control. Investment Takeaways Headline consumer price inflation for August came in at 8.3% year-on-year versus an expected 8.1%, while core inflation accelerated from 5.9% to 6.3%. Financial markets took it on the chin, with the S&P500 falling by 4.3%, due to the disappointed expectation that inflation had already peaked. This disappointment is the second of its kind this year: investors have been over-eager to call the peak in inflation. Market volatility is likely to continue through the fall as investors now expect that the Fed will hike interest rates by another 75-100 basis points in September and continue hiking until inflation falls more convincingly. Twice-bitten investors will be hesitant to endorse a third rally until they are certain that inflation is coming down – but by then a recession may already be upon them. A significant increase in unemployment is likely necessary to cool inflation, which implies recession. Higher inflation will drive real wages further into the red, which is negative for the Biden administration’s midterm campaign. Otherwise the economy looked to be improving just in time for the vote. Manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment is perking up, labor force participation is reaching pre-Covid levels, and consumer confidence ticked up in the latest data, albeit still much lower than in 2021 (Chart 10). Now the tightening of financial conditions will cool the economy and sentiment in the advance of the election, reinforcing the opposition party and the expected gridlock. Inflation may indeed be peaking but not in time for the election.  Throughout this year we bet on the US dollar index. This trade is getting very toppy and net speculative positions have rolled over (Chart 11). The dollar is overvalued but its momentum remains strong given extreme macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty. We have put this trade on watch for a downgrade to neutral but we expect the momentum to be sustained at least through the US election and Chinese party congress this fall. Chart 10Small Bounce In Economy Will Not Save Democrats Small Bounce In Economy Will Not Save Democrats Small Bounce In Economy Will Not Save Democrats Chart 11Dollar Is Overvalued But Has Momentum Dollar Is Overvalued But Has Momentum Dollar Is Overvalued But Has Momentum     Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     This trajectory is the opposite of the Washington Consensus. As such, Marko Papic, the founder of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, has dubbed it the “Buenos Aires Consensus,” as it resembles Argentine economic policy more so than the Thatcher/Reagan policy mix.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)   Table A2Political Risk Matrix A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Table A3US Political Capital Index A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Chart A1Presidential Election Model A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Chart A2Senate Election Model A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks  Table A4House Election Model A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks A Politicized Fed? Another Blue Sweep? And Other Risks  

Executive Summary US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? A US-Iran deal would make for a notable improvement in the geopolitical backdrop during an otherwise gloomy year. It would remove the risk of a major new oil shock. We maintain our 40% subjective odds of a deal, which is well below consensus. The risk of failure is underrated. Our conviction level is only moderate because President Biden can make concessions to clinch a deal – and Supreme Leader Khamenei may want to earn some money and time. Yet we have high conviction in our view that the US will ultimately fail to provide Iran with sufficient security guarantees while Iran will pursue a nuclear deterrent. Hence the Middle East will present a long-term energy supply constraint. In the short term, global growth and recession risk will drive oil prices, not any Iran deal. Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / BROAD MARKET EQUITIES 2020-11-27 9.3% Bottom Line: Any US-Iran deal will be marginally positive for risky assets. However, the failure of a deal would sharply increase the odds of oil supply disruptions in the short run. Feature Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remain in a critical phase. Rumors suggest Iran has agreed to rejoin the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) with the United States. But these rumors are unconfirmed, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) just announced that Iran has started operating more advanced centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear site.1 In this report we provide a tactical update on the topic. A US-Iran nuclear deal is one item on our checklist for global macro and geopolitical stability (Table 1). We are pessimistic about a deal but it would be a positive outcome for markets. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? A decision could come at any moment so investors should bear in mind our key conclusions about a deal: Chart 1Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga 1.  Any deal will be a short-term, stop-gap measure to delay a crisis until 2024 or beyond. This is not a small point because a crisis could lead to a large military conflict. 2.  The short-run implication of any deal is oil volatility, not a drop in oil prices (Chart 1). Global demand is wobbly and OPEC could cut oil production in reaction to a deal. 3.  Over the long run, global supply and demand balances will remain tight even if a deal is agreed. 4.  If there is no deal, then a major new source of global supply constraint will emerge immediately due to a new spiral of conflict in the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program will continue which will prompt threats from Israel and the Gulf Arab states and Iranian counter-threats. We are sticking with our subjective 40/60 odds that a deal will occur – i.e. our conviction level is medium, not high. The Biden administration wants a deal and has the executive authority to conclude a deal. Iran wants sanctions lifted and can buy time with a short-term deal. Our pessimism stems from the fact that neither side can trust the other, the US can no longer give credible security guarantees, and Iran has a strategic interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. A deal can happen but its durability depends on the 2024 US election. Status Of Negotiations Table 2Iran’s Three Demands Of US For Rejoining 2015 Nuclear Deal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Ostensibly there were three outstanding Iranian demands over the month of August that needed to be met to secure a deal (Table 2). Iran reportedly dropped the first demand: that the US remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the US State Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This concession prompted the news media to become more optimistic about a deal. This leaves two outstanding demands. Iran wants the IAEA conclude a “safeguards” investigation into unexplained uranium traces found at unauthorized sites in Iran, indicating nuclear activity that has not been accounted for. The IAEA will be very reluctant to halt such a probe on a political, not technical, basis. But it could happen under US pressure. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter Iran also wants the US to provide a “guarantee” that future presidents will not renege on the nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions like President Trump did in 2019. President Biden cannot give any credible guarantee because the JCPA is an executive action, not a formal treaty, so a different president could reverse it. (The deal always lacked sufficient support in the Senate, even from top Democrats.) Iran is demanding certain diplomatic concessions and/or an economic indemnity in the event of another American reversal. Aside from attempting to incarcerate former President Trump, Biden can only offer empty promises on this front. In what follows we review the critical constraints facing the US and Iran. The US’s Constraints The first constraint on the US is the stagflationary economy. High inflation and oil prices pose a threat to President Biden and the Democrats not only in this year’s midterm elections but also in the 2024 presidential election. A recession is not at all unlikely by that time, given the inverted yield curve (Chart 2). If the US can help maintain stability in the Middle East, then the odds of another major oil supply shock (on top of Russia) will be reduced. Lifting sanctions on Iran will free up around 1 million barrels of oil to feed global demand. With Europe and the US imposing an oil and oil shipping embargo on Russia, the world is likely to lose around two million barrels of crude per day that the Gulf Arab states can only partially make up for, according to our Chief Commodity Strategist Bob Ryan (Table 3). This is a notable material constraint – and the main reason that Bob is more optimistic about an Iran deal than we are. Chart 2US Economic Constraint: Stagflation US Economic Constraint: Stagflation US Economic Constraint: Stagflation ​​​​​ Table 3The Oil Math Behind Any Iran Deal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? However, Saudi Arabia would be alienated by a US-Iran détente. The American view is that Iranian production would threaten Saudi market share and force the Saudis to produce more. But the Saudis are seeing weakening global demand and have signaled that they will cut production. There is still an economic basis for an Iran deal but it is not clear that it will lower prices, especially in the short run. Over the long run the Saudis are a more reliable oil producer than Iran for both economic and geopolitical reasons. The second constraint is political. The US public is primarily concerned about the economy. Stagflation or recession could ultimately bring down the Biden administration. However, in the short run, American voters are much more concerned about domestic social issues (such as abortion access) than they are about foreign policy. In the long run, American voters are likely to maintain their long-held negative view of Iran (Chart 3). So the Biden administration has an incentive to prevent geopolitical events from hurting the economy but not to join arms with Iran in a major diplomatic agreement. The third constraint is military. Americans are not as war-weary today as they were in 2008 or 2016 but they are still averse to any new military conflicts in the Middle East. An Iranian nuclear bomb could change that view – but until a bomb is tested it will persist. Chart 3US Political Constraint: Americans Ignore Foreign Policy, Dislike Iran Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? ​​​​​​ Chart 4US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? If Iran freezes its nuclear program then it will reduce the odds of a Middle Eastern war and large-scale oil supply disruptions. If Iran does not freeze its nuclear program, then Israel will have to demonstrate a credible military threat against nuclear weaponization, and then Iran will have to demonstrate its region-wide militant capabilities, including the ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz (Chart 4). The Biden administration wants to delay this downward spiral or avoid it altogether. Chart 5US Strategic Constraint: Avoid Mideast Quagmires Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? The fourth constraint is strategic. The Biden administration wants to avoid conflict if possible because it is attempting to reduce America’s burden in the Middle East so that it can focus on emerging great power competition in Eastern Europe and East Asia. The original motivation for the Iran deal was to enable the US to “pivot to Asia” and counter China. Iranian hegemony in the Middle East is less of a threat than Chinese hegemony in East Asia (Chart 5). This logic is sound if Iran can really be brought to halt its nuclear program. The Europeans need to stabilize and open up the Middle East to create an alternative energy supply to Russia. The Americans need to avoid a nuclear arms race and war in the Middle East that distracts them from China. However, if Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapon, then the US suffers strategically for doing a short-term deal that provides Iran with time and access to funds. Ultimately the only thing that can dissuade Iran from going nuclear is American power projection in the Middle East – and this capability is also one of the US’s greatest advantages over China. Bottom Line: The US has a strategic, military, and economic interest in concluding a deal that freezes Iran’s nuclear program. It arguably has an interest in a deal even if Iran violates the deal and pursues nuclear weaponization, since that will provide a legitimate basis for what would then become a necessary military intervention. The Biden administration faces some political blowback for a deal but will suffer more if failure to get a deal leads to a Middle Eastern oil shock. For all these reasons Biden administration is attempting to clinch a deal. But Iran is the sticking point. Iran’s Constraints Our reasons for pessimism regarding the nuclear talks hinge on Iran, not the United States. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s goal is to secure the regime and arrange for a stable succession in the coming years. A deal with the Americans made sense in that context. But going forward, if dealing with the Americans does not bring credible security guarantees and yet makes the economy vulnerable again to a future snapback of sanctions, then the justification for the deal falls apart. We cannot read Khamenei’s mind any more than we can read Biden’s mind, so we will look at the material limitations. Chart 6Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation First, the economic constraint: The Iranian economy suffered a huge negative shock from the reimposition of sanctions in 2019 (Chart 6). However, the economy has sputtered through this shock and the Covid-19 shock without collapsing. Social unrest is an ever-present risk but it has not spiraled out of control. There has not been an attempted democratic revolution like in 2009. The upswing in the global commodity cycle has reinforced the regime. Sanctions do not prevent exports entirely. There is still a huge monetary incentive to let the Biden administration lift sanctions if it wants to do so: a deal is estimated to free up $100 billion dollars per year in revenue for the regime for ten years.2 Realistically this should be understood as more than $275 billion for two years since the longevity of the deal is in question. The problem is that Iran’s economy would be fully exposed to sanctions again if the US changed its mind. The bottom line is that the economic constraint does not force Iran to accept a deal but it is enticing. Second comes the political constraint. President Ebrahim Raisi hopes to become supreme leader someday and is loath to put his name on a deal with weak foundations. He originally opposed the deal, was vindicated, and does not now want to jeopardize his political future by making the same mistake as his hapless predecessor, Hassan Rouhani. Opinion polls may not be reliable in putting Raisi as the most popular politician in Iran but they probably are reliable in showing Rouhani at the bottom of the heap (Chart 7). There is a significant political constraint against rejoining the deal. Chart 7Iran’s Political Constraint: Risk Of American Betrayal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Chart 8Iran’s Military Constraint: Outgunned, Unsure Of Allies Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Third comes the military constraint. While Iran is extremely vulnerable to Israeli and American military attack, it is also a fortress of a country, nestled in mountains, and airstrikes may not succeed in destroying the entire nuclear program or bringing down the regime. An attack by Israel could convert an entirely new generation to the Islamic revolution. And Iran may believe that the US lacks the popular support for military action in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran may also believe that China and Russia will provide military and economic support (Chart 8). Ultimately, America has demonstrated a willingness to attack rogue states and Iran will try to avoid that outcome, since it could succeed in toppling the regime. But if Iran believes it can acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon in a few short years, then it may make a dash for it, since this solution would be a permanent solution: a nuclear deterrent against western attack, as opposed to temporary diplomatic promises. We often compare Iran’s strategic predicament to that of Ukraine, Libya, and North Korea. Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear weapons after the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which promised that Russia, the US, the UK, France, and China would guarantee its security. Yet Russia ended up invading 20 years later – and none of the others prevented it or sent troops to halt the Russian advance. Separately Libya gave up its nuclear program in 2003 but NATO attacked and toppled the regime in 2011 anyway. Meanwhile North Korea played the diplomatic game with the US, ever inching along on the path toward nuclear weapons, and today has achieved nuclear-armed status and greater regime security. The outflow of refugees from the various regimes shows why Iran will emulate North Korea (Chart 9). Chart 9Iran’s Strategic Constraint: The Need For A Nuclear Deterrent Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Bottom Line: Iran has a short-term economic incentive to agree to a deal and a long-term military incentive. But ultimately the US cannot provide ironclad security guarantees that would justify halting the quest for a nuclear deterrent. A nuclear deterrent would overcome the military constraint. Therefore Iran will continue on that path. Any deal will be a ruse to buy time. Final Assessment The 2015 deal occurred in a context of Iranian strategic isolation, when American implementation was credible, oil prices were weak, and Iran had not achieved nuclear breakout capacity. Today Iran is not isolated (thanks to US quarrels with Russia and China), American guarantees are not credible (thanks to the polarization of foreign policy), oil prices are not weak (thanks to Russia), and Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout (Table 4). Table 4Iran’s Nuclear Program Status Check, Aug. 31, 2022 Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? The US’s strategic aim is to create a balance of power in the region but Iran’s strategic aim is to ensure regime survival. The US’s emerging balancing coalition (Israel and the Gulf Arab states) increases the strategic threat to Iran and hence its need for a nuclear deterrent. While Russia and China formally support the 2015 deal, they each see Iran as a valuable asset in a great power struggle with the United States. Iran sees them the same way. Russia needs Iran as a partner to bypass western sanctions. Regardless, it benefits from Middle Eastern instability, which could entangle the United States. China must develop a deep long-term partnership with Iran for its own strategic reasons and does not look forward to a time when the US divests from that region to impose tougher strategic containment on China. China can survive a US conflict with Iran – and such a conflict could reduce the US ability to defend Taiwan. While neither Russia nor China positively desire Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, neither power stopped North Korea from obtaining the bomb – far from it. Russia assumes that Israel and the US will take military action to prevent weaponization, which would be catastrophic for the region but positive for Russia. China also assumes Israel and the US will act, which reinforces its need to diversify energy options so that it can access Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern oil via pipeline. Investment Takeaways Our negative view on the global economy and geopolitical backdrop is once again being priced into global financial markets as equities fall anew. An Iran deal would delay a notable geopolitical risk for roughly the next 24 months and hence remove a major upside risk for oil prices. This would be marginally positive for global equities, although it will not be the driver. Europe’s and China’s economic woes are the drivers. The failure of a deal would bring major upside risks for oil into the near term and as such would be negative for equities – and could even become the global driver, as Middle Eastern oil disruptions will follow promptly from any failure of the deal. We continue to recommend that investors overweight US equities relative to global, defensive sectors relative to cyclicals, and large caps relative to small caps. We are overweight aerospace and defense stocks, India and Southeast Asia within emerging markets, and underweight China and Taiwan.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Iran International, “Exclusive: Ex-IAEA Official Says US And Iran To Sign Deal Soon,” August 30, 2022, iranintl.com. See also Francois Murphy, “Iran enriching uranium with more IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz -IAEA,” Reuters, August 31, 2022, reuters.com. 2     See Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Tehran’s $1 Trillion Deal: An Updated Forecast of Iran’s Financial Windfall From a New Nuclear Agreement,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 19, 2022, fdd.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix