Geopolitics

Executive Summary Global Oil Price Pushes Up Inflation Expectations Global Oil Price Pushes Up Inflation Expectations Global Oil Price Pushes Up Inflation Expectations The US cut off of Russian energy exports has limited immediate impact because EU trade with Russia continues. Russia is unlikely to embargo the EU as it needs revenues to wage war. However, the EU will diversify away from Russia over time, which means that Russia will intensify its efforts to replace the government in Ukraine. The Biden administration began with an adversarial posture toward the energy sector, both US producers and Gulf Arab petro-states. Now it is adjusting its stance as prices surge. The OPEC states do not favor Biden but have an interest in calibrating production to avoid global recession and prolong their profit windfall. Even if the US restores the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which we doubt, investors should fade the oil price implications and stay focused on OPEC. Recommendation (Tactical) Inception Level Inception Date Return Long DXY (Dollar Index) 96.19 Feb 23, 2022 2.9% Bottom Line: Stagflation is the likeliest economic outcome of today’s global supply constraints. Feature Biden’s Oil Policy: Implications Will the Ukraine crisis lead to a US recession? The probability of a recession is 7.7% today, according to the bond market, but the oil price shock suggests that the probability will only increase from here. Stagflation, at least, is now highly likely. Short-term interest rates are rising faster than long-term rates, causing the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope to slide toward inversion, though it is not there yet. That would be a telltale sign of a looming recession (Chart 1). The 3-mo/10-year Treasury yield slope is nowhere near inverting and has a better record of predicting recessions than the 2-year/10-year. The Federal Reserve’s interest rate hikes are expected to cause the 10-year yield to rise and the yield curve to steepen. But exogenous shocks may push short rates even higher. When the oil price doubles, a recession often ensues. Out of the past seven recessions, five of them witnessed an oil spike beforehand. True, not every spike causes a recession. But the causality is clear. Today’s spike is large enough to be recessionary (Chart 2). The critical question is where will the price settle? If it settles above $90-$100 per barrel then it will erode global demand. Chart 1An End-Of-Cycle Crisis? An End-Of-Cycle Crisis? An End-Of-Cycle Crisis? Chart 2Oil Price Often Doubles Before Recessions Oil Price Often Doubles Before Recessions Oil Price Often Doubles Before Recessions Most likely the price will settle at around $85 per barrel by the end of 2022, and average $85 in 2023, according to our Commodity & Energy Strategy. High prices will discourage consumption and incentivize new production, leading to a price drop and new equilibrium. The OPEC cartel will increase production because they want to prolong the business cycle. Non-OPEC producers like US shale oil companies will also increase production. It is not likely that the US will significantly lift sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, though that would free up 1.3 million barrels per day and 700,000 barrels per day respectively. More on this below. Even so, this year’s energy spike will feed into a larger bout of inflation that is eroding real incomes. Headline consumer price inflation is running at 7.9% as of February, the highest in four decades. Core inflation is running at 6.4%. The Ukraine war did not prevent the European Central Bank from delivering a hawkish surprise in its fight against inflation on March 10, so it is even less likely to prevent the Fed from delivering a hawkish surprise on March 16. The Fed has a history of hiking rates even during geopolitical crises (as during the Arab oil embargo of 1973), which implies that the war in Ukraine will not prevent the Fed from hiking rates four times or more this year. There is a close relationship between the global oil price and the financial market’s long-term inflation expectations (Chart 3). When the costs of production and transportation go up, investors start to expect higher prices. Expectations are already rising because of the global pandemic, stimulus, supply constraints, wage pressure, and tardy policy normalization. Gasoline prices at the pump will shape consumer expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Oil Price Pushes Up Inflation Expectations Global Oil Price Pushes Up Inflation Expectations Global Oil Price Pushes Up Inflation Expectations Chart 4Geopolitics Compound Inflation Geopolitics Compound Inflation Geopolitics Compound Inflation Yet high commodity prices are not coinciding with strong global growth and a weak dollar, as one might suspect. Global growth is falling and the dollar is strengthening. The energy shock from Russia will rattle importing countries like Europe, China, and India and thus enhance the dollar’s rise (Chart 5). Investor sentiment will suffer as the war in Ukraine reinforces the secular rise in geopolitical risk. Global policy uncertainty is also rising sharply, which will reinforce the dollar, weighing on global economic activity. Chart 5Dollar Strengthens on Weak Global Growth Dollar Strengthens on Weak Global Growth Dollar Strengthens on Weak Global Growth Bottom Line: A stagflationary dynamic is taking shape. Moreover the risk of recession is underrated by the bond market’s measure of recession probability. Investors should maintain tactically bearish trades and cut losses on cyclically bullish trades that suffer from higher rates and persistent inflation. US Boycotts Russia And Begs OPEC The Biden administration’s decision to ban Russian oil exports – and to encourage private sector boycotts of the Russian energy trade – raises the potential for the Russian conflict to escalate beyond Ukraine’s borders. While a total boycott of Russian oil exports is unlikely, it would be one of the larger oil shocks in modern history (Chart 6). Unlike the Iranian attack on the Saudi oil refinery in 2019, the Russian shock would come amid an existing energy shortage. Chart 6Worst Case Oil Risk in Historical Context Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock There are two critical questions about US policy at this stage: Will the US foist its energy boycott on Europe, triggering a Russian retaliation? This could plunge Europe into recession and further upset the global economy. Will the US convince the OPEC cartel to increase oil production? A production boost would reduce prices and help to rebalance the economy, salvaging the business cycle. The next two sections discuss these options. US Boycotts Russia The first question is how Russia will respond to the US boycott and whether the Biden administration will try to force Europe to adopt the boycott. The US is comfortable boycotting Russian energy because oil and gas imports only account for 0.6% of GDP and those from Russia only 0.04%. Europe cannot make the same decision. While O&G imports are only 2.21% of GDP, and Russian O&G imports at 0.4%, these numbers will spike to near 2008 levels as a result of the price shock (Charts 7A & 7B). Major European countries, notably Germany, have already rejected the US boycott, and any EU direct sanctions require unanimity. The EU is instead outlining a plan to diversify away from Russia more gradually. This is a medium-term threat to Russia and hence a major concern for global stability but it is not an instant cutoff, which would cause an immediate recession in Europe. Chart 7AThe US Is Energy Independent... Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Chart 7B...The EU Is Not Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock The EU’s plan would theoretically reduce its dependency on Russian energy by 66% by the end of the year. But that is easier said than done. Also, Europe cannot simply swap the US for Russia. American exports to the rest of the world could be redirected to Europe, but the switch requires an overhaul of supply chains. A total switch of US exports to Europe is impracticable in the short run and would leave other US allies dependent on Russian exports (Charts 8A & 8B). Chart 8AUS Will Not Replace Russian Energy Anytime Soon Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Chart 8BUS Will Not Replace Russian Energy Anytime Soon Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock US shale producers are only starting to increase production. With WTI crude oil at $100, and Henry Hub natural gas spot price at $4.6 per million BTU, American production will speed up. But US companies are more focused on profitability and returns to shareholders than they were at the beginning of the shale boom, which has restrained oil production (Charts 9A & (9B). Chart 9AUS Production And Exports Increase After Pandemic Lull US Production And Exports Increase After Pandemic Lull US Production And Exports Increase After Pandemic Lull Chart 9BUS Production And Exports Increase After Pandemic Lull US Production And Exports Increase After Pandemic Lull US Production And Exports Increase After Pandemic Lull   The Biden administration has not yet fully adopted the tactics necessary: promoting the domestic fossil fuel industry and coordinating it for purposes of national strategy. American oil executives complain that while the Biden administration courts foreign energy producers and contemplates arbitrarily lifting sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, it has not approached domestic producers about facilitating production.1 Meanwhile there is a risk that Russia will retaliate against western sanctions by cutting off natural gas to the EU, for instance via the Nord Stream I pipeline. This is a risk, rather than a base case, because Moscow would prefer to sell energy as long as Europe is buying – and even increase the amount it produces at today’s high prices. Russian energy exports to the EU account for 5% of Russian GDP and thus provide an important lifeline at a time when the country is suffering heavily under banking, technology, and trade sanctions (Chart 10). Russian natural resource exports on average provide 43% of government revenue, which is essential for Moscow to carry on its war effort (Chart 11). Chart 10Russia Will Not Punish EU For US Boycott Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Chart 11Russia Needs EU Energy Imports Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock And yet Russians are now slapping an embargo on agricultural exports, constricting global food supply and pushing up food prices. The implication is that a reduction in energy exports to the EU is not out of the question, especially an incremental reduction aimed at increasing Russian diplomatic pressure on Europe. If the Russians cut off Europe, it will fall into a severe recession and the energy shock will risk a global recession. While US direct trade exposure to Europe is limited, at about 3.8% of GDP (Chart 12A), nevertheless the US would suffer from price pressures. The US is already seeing import prices rise toward 2008 levels (Chart 12B). Chart 12AUS Exposure To The EU Is Limited... US Exposure To The EU Is Limited... US Exposure To The EU Is Limited... Chart 12B...But Its Import Prices Will Rise ...But Its Import Prices Will Rise ...But Its Import Prices Will Rise Bottom Line: The US is boycotting Russian oil but not forcing the EU to join the boycott. Europe is pursuing gradual diversification but Russia is unlikely to cut off Europe’s supply. However, this dynamic is showing signs of faltering, which means investors are justified in taking further risk off the table. US Begs OPEC The Biden administration started off on the wrong foot with the Gulf Arab states by criticizing them for autocratic government and human rights abuses, threatening to withhold arms sales, and trying to restore the 2015 nuclear deal and détente with Iran. Now, with a global energy shock unfolding, Biden is going back to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and imploring them to increase oil production and ease the supply pressure. The Arab states are reportedly giving him the cold shoulder, ignoring his phone calls while answering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calls.2 These states never have an interest in producing oil at any US president’s beck and call. The US and Iran have also reached a critical stage in nuclear negotiations. So it is only fitting that the Arab states play hard to get. While the UAE ambassador to the US suggested that his country supporting increasing production on March 9, the country’s energy minister said the opposite. However, the core OPEC states are even less likely to do Russia’s bidding. Moscow propped up the Syrian regime, arms and subsidizes Iran, and aspires to gain ever greater control over Middle East exports to Europe. The Gulf states also know that the Russians will produce as much energy as they can since they need the revenues to sustain their war (Chart 13). Chart 13Core OPEC Countries Have An Interest In Increasing Oil Supply Core OPEC Countries Have An Interest In Increasing Oil Supply Core OPEC Countries Have An Interest In Increasing Oil Supply The Gulf states rely on the US military for national security, they fear that US-Iran détente will lead to US abandonment and Iranian regional ascendancy, and they seek to sustain their centrality to the global oil market. They want to prolong their export revenues in the context of a growing global economy for the sake of their own delicate internal stability and reforms. They do not aim to incentivize non-OPEC oil production and renewable energy transition with excessive prices, or to trigger a global recession (Chart 14). Hence the Saudi and UAE strategy will be to lower the oil price closer to their fiscal breakeven rate of $82.3 and $62.8 (oil price consistent with a balanced budget) and prolong the business cycle (Chart 15). Chart 14Core OPEC Does Not Want To Threaten Their Fiscal Future Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Chart 15Current Oil Price Comfortably Supports Fiscal Spending In OPEC Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock The critical factor in the negotiation with the Biden administration will be Iran, their chief rival. Biden is trying to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal, which would require removing sanctions in exchange for Iran’s halting its nuclear progress. A deal would bring 1.3 million barrels per day online, at least for the next two years or so. It could also prompt the Saudis or others to increase production to prevent Iran from stealing market share, as occurred in 2014 (Chart 16). Any deal would reduce the risk of military conflict in the short term and as such would remove some risk premium from oil prices. If Biden agrees to walk away from the Iran deal, then perhaps the Saudis and UAE will oblige him with a larger and quicker production boost. They know the Democratic Party is doomed in this year’s midterm elections anyway. Sanctions are not preventing the Iranians from exporting oil today and there is very little chance that they will truly abandon their quest for nuclear weapons (Chart 17). Chart 16Production Ramped Up Ahead Of The Iran Deal In 2015 Production Ramped Up Ahead Of The Iran Deal In 2015 Production Ramped Up Ahead Of The Iran Deal In 2015 Chart 17Production May Ramp Up Again As Iran Managed To Evade Sanction Production May Ramp Up Again As Iran Managed To Evade Sanction Production May Ramp Up Again As Iran Managed To Evade Sanction Either way the core OPEC members need to adjust the oil supply to maintain market share and prolong the business cycle. Taking it all together, investors should expect oil prices to remain volatile and for oil supply risks to remain elevated, meaning that oil prices will likely resume their rise after the expected OPEC intervention. Biden is also tinkering with the idea of easing sanctions on Venezuela. This would take a long time and require regime change to come to fruition. Venezuela produces about 700,000 barrels per day at present, down from about 2 million bpd in 2017.Given the lack of capital, investment, and engineering expertise, the Venezuelans probably cannot increase production beyond 1 million bpd over the next year or so. Of that, maybe 600,000 barrels could be sent to export markets, according to our Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan. The US cannot remove all sanctions from Venezuela as it does not recognize the legitimacy of President Nicolas Maduro’s regime. The Department of Justice indicted Maduro in 2020. Accommodating Maduro will create even more bad blood between the Democrats and the Cuban-American voters in electorally critical Florida. US companies will be reluctant to get involved in oil production in Venezuela on such a flimsy basis, as they will fear future sanctions if Republicans win in 2024. So investment in Venezuela, and hence oil production, will remain limited even if Biden waives some sanctions. Bottom Line: Biden’s attempts to ease sanctions on Iran and Venezuela are unlikely to have a lasting impact on oil prices. But it is possible that he will convince the OPEC states to increase production, as their own interests support such a move. Investment Takeaways Comparing Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine to the original invasion in 2014, the major trends are parallel: stocks are falling relative to bonds, cyclical sectors are underperforming defensives, and small caps are outperforming large caps (Chart 18A). Chart 18AMarket Response 2022 Versus 2014 Market Response 2022 Versus 2014 Market Response 2022 Versus 2014 Chart 18BMarket Response 2022 Versus 2014 Market Response 2022 Versus 2014 Market Response 2022 Versus 2014 If Russia imposes an energy embargo or OPEC refuses to increase production, then there will be an even larger global energy shock and a European recession that will weigh on global growth. The dollar will stay well bid in the near term. Value stocks are far outpacing growth stocks in the 2022 crisis, in keeping with high inflation and rising bond yields (Chart 18B). While we favor value over growth on a structural basis, we took the opposite stance as a tactical trade at the beginning of this year in expectation of falling bond yields, which has backfired. We are closing this trade for a loss of 7.7%.   Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     See Shannon Pettypiece, “White House, oil industry spar anew over drilling as gas prices surge”, NBC News, March 12, nbcnews.com. 2     See Holman Jenkins, “The Putin Endgame,” The Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2022, wsj.com   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Table A3US Political Capital Index Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Chart A1Presidential Election Model Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Chart A2Senate Election Model Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Biden's Oil Shock Biden's Oil Shock

Executive Summary Winners And Losers The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Combining Russia and Ukraine: Taken together, Russia and Ukraine account for a small fraction of global trade. However, Russia is a key player in the global energy and metals markets, providing rare materials like palladium. Ukraine is a sizable agricultural producer, as well as an exporter of specialized products such as neon. Effects on global trade: Shortages of metals and agricultural goods will reverberate across the global economy, exacerbating shortages and supply disruptions. Manufacturer anxiety about the availability of raw input materials catalyzed an explosive rally in the commodity universe.  Effect on the US companies: Most US equity sectors have limited direct sales exposure to Russia. However, self-sanctioning will have an adverse immediate effect on many multinationals, while indirect effects of the war will be even more impactful. Winners and losers: At the margin, the escalation in Ukraine is a net positive for Energy, Big Tech, and Metals & Mining, while Travel, Consumer Staples, Semiconductors Manufacturers, and Automakers will be hit by shortages and surging input costs. Bottom Line:The war in Ukraine has wreaked havoc in the US equity market, even though US trade with Russia and Ukraine is insignificant and is mostly limited to energy, palladium, and other rare metals. However, US companies are affected by the scarcity of selected metals and materials, soaring prices, and supply chain disruptions. Feature Introduction The war in Ukraine has become the proverbial black swan that has blindsided even the most cautious investors. The world simply did not expect Russia to wage such a bloody, and all-out war. As such, tragically, small Ukraine has come out of obscurity, and became a focal point of the world’s attention, mostly for humanitarian reasons. While our heart goes out to the people living under fire, it is our job as investment strategists to conduct a detailed economic analysis of the effect of the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia’s goods and services on US equities. To do so, we will first investigate trade links between Ukraine, Russia, and the US. And then look at the indirect effects of the war on US equity sectors. Russia And Ukraine Effect On Global Trade Taken together, Russia and Ukraine account for about 3.5% of global GDP in PPP terms and only 1.9% in dollar terms. Even a deep recession in each of these economies is unlikely to cause a dent in global growth, at least not directly. Unfortunately, the indirect effects of this war are substantial. What Is Russia Producing? In 2019, Russia exported $407B in goods, which made it the 13th largest exporter in the world. It is the second-largest commodities exporter (after the US) and the second-largest oil producer, accounting for 12% of annual global output. Energy: Russia’s crude oil exports account for 8.4% of global crude consumption, while natural gas exports account for 5.9% of global consumption, and 3.4% for coal (Table 1). These energy products constitute roughly 60% of Russia’s exports. Its exports of natural gas represent close to half of all European gas imports. Table 1Russia’s Global Share In Various Commodities The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Nickel: Russia is also one of the top metal producers. It is the third largest producer of nickel, accounting for 4.4.% of global output. The recent surge in nickel prices reflects manufacturers’ anxiety about the potential shortages of this metal.1 Elon Musk has said that a shortage of nickel is the “biggest challenge” in “producing high-volume, long-range batteries”. Palladium: In addition, to nickel, Russia accounts for 35.6% of global palladium output. Palladium is widely used in catalytic converters, electrodes, and other types of electronics.2 Palladium prices are up 46% since the start of the year. Chart 1War Wreaked Havoc In Commodities Market The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Fertilizers: Together, Russia and Belarus account for about 40% of global potash production, a key ingredient in potassium-based fertilizers. Russia also produces two-thirds of all ammonium nitrate, the main source of nitrogen-rich fertilizers. Wheat and lumber: Russia produces 10% of the global supply of wheat and lumber. While Russia’s trading network is wide, the most common destinations for its exports are China (14%), Netherlands (10%), Belarus (5%), and Germany (4.6%), making its direct effect on global trade limited. What Is Ukraine Producing? Ukraine’s effect on global trade is less significant: In 2019 it exported only $49.5B, with exports dominated by agricultural products and metals (Chart 2). Food: Ukraine’s production is dominated by foodstuffs such as corn, wheat, and seed oils. Russia and Ukraine together account for 25% of global wheat exports, much of which is going to the developing nations of Africa and Asia (Chart 3). Russia and Ukraine are also significant producers of potatoes, sunflowers, and sugar beets. Chart 2Ukraine Exports Metals And Food The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Chart 3Wheat Is Exported To North Africa And Asia The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors With war and sanctions, most of this output will be lost or kept for domestic consumption, accelerating food inflation, which is already rampant. Of course, the rest of the world could try to compensate for lost agricultural output, but there is a major snag: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are significant producers of fertilizer. Metals: Ukraine produces significant amounts of steel. ArcelorMittal and Metinvest suspended production at their Ukrainian plants last week. Auto Components: In addition, Ukraine is a major producer of automotive wire harnesses. Volkswagen, BMW, and Porsche have all had to curtail auto production due to war-related shortages. Neon: Then there are the more esoteric commodities. The bulk of semiconductor-grade neon, used in high-precision lasers, comes from Ukraine. A dearth of this critical gas could exacerbate the semiconductor shortage. While Ukraine trades predominately with its European neighbors, such as Russia, Germany, Poland, and Italy, shortages of agricultural products, semiconductors, and automotive components are likely to reverberate across the globe. The US Is An Island… Almost According to the OEC,3 in 2019 the US was the number two economy in terms of total exports ($1.51T), and the number one economy in total imports ($2.38T). Russia barely registers as the US trading partner, with only $14.B or 0.61% of total imports coming from Russia. Ukraine is even less significant for the US: Its exports constitute only $1.23B. US exports to Ukraine and Russia constitute less than 1% of its total exports. However, to uncover the potential effects of the possible halting of Russian trade on the US economy, let’s look at what goods the US is buying. The reality on the ground may be complex. Petrochemicals Refined and crude petroleum constitute about half of all Russian imports to the US and account for roughly $7 billion (Chart 4). The US sanctioning of Russian oil is unlikely to have a significant effect on the US economy: It constitutes only about 5.7% of all the US oil imports, both crude and refined, which in 2019 were about $123B. As a result, the recent US embargo of Russian oil is unlikely to have much impact. Platinum, Titanium, And Other Rare and Precious Metals US imports roughly $7B worth of platinum, over one-fifth of which is sourced from Russia. Russia also provides about 21.5% of all titanium and 23% of radioactive chemicals that the US imports. Chart 4US Imports Fuels And Rare Metals From Russia The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Palladium The situation with palladium is even more strained: Russia produces 42% of the palladium imported by the US while South Africa supplies another 30%. All other exports of palladium are fragmented, and producers are unlikely to be able to ramp up production fast enough. Nickel US imports only $1.4B worth of nickel per year, 11% of which is coming from Russia. Australia and Canada are the only other large producers of this metal, and it is not clear if they will be able to step in and fill in the void left by Russia. How Much Production From Russia Will Be Curtailed? The West’s official sanctions affect Russian exports of certain commodities but there is also a reluctance on the part of private companies to buy or ship Russian exports. This latter factor makes it nearly impossible to gauge just how much supply of each individual commodity will be curtailed. In addition, Putin has announced his decision to suspend some commodity exports at least until 2023. Assuming in the near term that a considerable share of Russia’s commodity exports will be blocked from global markets, the largest impact will be on oil, palladium, copper, nickel, fertilizer, and grains. The Stock Market Is Not The Economy US Companies Most Exposed To Russian Trade Most US multinational companies have limited direct sales exposure to Russia. Among those that do have some exposure (Table 2), Philip Morris comes on top of the list at 8% of sales, PepsiCo 4.3%, Mondelez 3.1%, and McDonald’s 4.5%. Apple has generated only 1.3% of its sales in Russia. Overall, the Consumer Staples sector has the highest exposure to Russia. Exodus The majority of US multinationals have announced their exit from the Russian market in protest at the war. The exodus affects wide swaths of the Russian economy, including joint ventures in energy, auto manufacturing, finance, retail, entertainment, and fast food (See Appendix for the list). The war affects US sectors in many different way, and there are winners and losers (Chart 5). Table 2US Multinationals With The Highest Exposure To Russia The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Chart 5Winners And Losers The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors The Impact Of The Ukraine War On The US Economy And Equity Sectors Investment Implications Energy Sector – Positive The US embargo of Russian oil does not have a pronounced immediate and direct effect on the US energy sector as US imports from Russia are minor. Exxon’s exit from Russia is not going to have any noticeable short-term effect on the US energy sector. On the contrary, elevated oil and gas prices create an impetus for the US shale producers to ramp up output. Oil Equipment and Services companies will be the key beneficiaries of the new energy Capex cycle. While we closed our overweight in E&P companies with a view that OPEC will open oil spigots and cure high prices, locking in a gain of 60%, we remain overweight E&S Energy industry. Consumer Staples – Negative Companies such as Mondelez, Philip Morris, and PepsiCo are most exposed to the Russian market. All three have announced that they are discontinuing or curtailing Russian operations, taking a direct hit on earnings. However, disruptions in agricultural exports from Russia and Ukraine, and accompanying soaring food prices (Chart 6), are likely to have a broad negative effect on the sector, increasing input prices while sector margins are already razor-thin. So far, the sector had been able to pass on costs to customers, but its pricing power may be limited going forward (Chart 7). Chart 6Food Price Surge Is Parabolic Food Price Surge Is Parabolic Food Price Surge Is Parabolic Chart 7Consumer Staples Have Been Able To Pass Costs On To Customers Consumer Staples Have Been Able To Pass Costs On To Customers Consumer Staples Have Been Able To Pass Costs On To Customers We are overweight Consumer Staples thanks to its defensive attributes in the face of overall market volatility. However, we will be monitoring this position closely. Semiconductors - Neutral Disruptions in supplies of neon, palladium, and nickel, which are essential components of the manufacturing of semiconductors, will exacerbate global chip shortages, and hit profits of semiconductor manufacturers, mostly in Asia. However, the majority of the large US semiconductor companies are chip designers and are unlikely to be affected. The only exception is Intel, which is an integrated semiconductor company. Intel has also announced that it is exiting Russia, which may have an adverse effect on its profitability. Auto Manufacturers - Negative Overall, US car manufacturers have limited direct exposure to Russia. Ford has recently closed its joint venture with a Russian car manufacturer. GM does not have a significant presence in Russia, selling only 3,000 cars a year there, of the six million it sells worldwide. Tesla’s presence in Russia is also insignificant – there are only 700 Teslas registered there. However, there are supply problems. Shortages of metals, such as palladium and nickel, widely used in catalytic converters and electrodes, will compound shortages in tight auto component markets. Travel Complex: Hotels, Restaurants, and Airlines Hilton, Marriott, and Hyatt have announced that they are halting development and new investments in Russia. While these actions on the margin will have a long-lasting negative effect on their business, a more immediate concern is that a war in Europe will suppress travel, which only recently started rebounding after COVID-19 country closures. US airlines will suffer from a double whammy of rising fuel costs, and consumer reluctance for international travel in the light of hostilities in the heart of Europe. International and business travel are the most lucrative segments of their business, the rebound of which is needed for these companies to restore profitability. We were positive on airlines in light of the reopening of international travel as the Omicron wave was receding, but now have to reconsider our optimistic stance if oil prices don’t normalize soon. Fast-food restaurant closures in Russia (Burger King, McDonald’s, Starbucks, etc.) will result in a significant hit to their bottom line. To put these actions in perspective, McDonald’s announced that temporary closures of its 750 restaurants in Russia and 180 in Ukraine will make it lose $50 million a month, resulting in a 9% hit to its revenue. In addition, these businesses are already reeling from rising food prices and consumers shifting their goods and services away from discretionary spending to necessities because of negative wage growth. We are overweight the Travel complex but are likely to downgrade it in the coming days. Big Tech – Positive According to a recent report by the IDC, the global impact of a steep decline in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) spending in Russia and Ukraine will be somewhat limited. Combined, the two countries only account for 5.5% of all ICT spending in Europe and 1% worldwide.4 Meanwhile, tech spending among Western European countries may increase in part due to expanded defense and security allocations. We believe that dislocation also creates an opportunity for US technology companies, especially in the software and cybersecurity space. Exiting the Russian market is likely to have a limited negative effect on US technology companies’ revenue, as most of them derive only a very small proportion of it from Russia. We are overweight the Software and Cybersecurity industries. Metals and Mining - Positive Disruption of the supply of metals from Russia and Ukraine creates an opportunity for US metals and mining companies, with soaring pricing promising a profits windfall. Unlike with oil and gas, an increase of supply in metals not only takes substantial investment but also takes years to bring to production. As a result, there is no respite in sight. As such, we will consider adding to our existing position, bringing allocation to an overweight. Stay tuned. Bottom Line The war in Ukraine has wreaked havoc in the US equity market, even though US trade with Russia and Ukraine is insignificant and is mostly limited to energy, palladium, and other rare metals. However, the US economy is affected by the scarcity of selected metals and materials, soaring prices, and supply chain disruptions. As is often the case, there are winners and losers: Energy, and Metals & Mining are mostly immune to the crisis and are likely to benefit by picking up slack in supply. The Technology sector, especially Software and Cybersecurity, will benefit from the disruption of the war. Consumer Staples, Travel, Auto Manufacturers, and Semiconductor Manufacturers are likely to take a hit because of shortages and soaring input prices.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     Appendix: Companies’ Self-Sanctions In Russia5 Airlines American Airlines, Delta, and United cut ticket sales partnerships with Russian airlines. All three have stopped flying over Russia. Banks Goldman Sachs became the first American bank to announce that it is exiting Russia. Citigroup also indicated that it is curtailing operations in Russia. Technology Accenture is discontinuing its operations in Russia. Airbnb (ABNB) announced that the company is suspending all operations in Russia and Belarus. Amazon (AMZN)’s cloud division, Amazon Web Services (AWS), said it would halt new sign-ups for the service in Russia and Belarus. AWS indicated that it has no data centers in Russia and, as a matter of policy, it does not do business with the Russian government. It stated that while it had Russian customers, they are all headquartered outside of Russia. Apple (AAPL) has stopped selling its products in Russia, and limited access to digital services, such as Apple Pay, inside Russia. Google confirmed that it is no longer accepting new Google Cloud customers in Russia. It has also halted its advertisement operations in the country. IBM (IBM) has suspended all business in Russia. Intel (INTC) has stopped all shipments to Russia and Belarus, the company announced. Microsoft (MSFT) is suspending all new sales of its products and services in Russia. Microsoft (MSFT) also said it will continue aiding in Ukrainian cybersecurity. Netflix (NFLX) said it will be suspending its streaming service in Russia. Spotify (SPOT) said it has closed its office in Russia “indefinitely” and restricted shows “owned and operated by Russian state-affiliated media.” Adobe stopped all new sales in Russia Uber is divesting from internet company Yandex Paypal suspended all services in Russia Big Four Accounting Firms Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, and PwC are pulling out of the country. Energy Exxon pledged to leave its last remaining oil and gas project in Russia and not to invest in new developments in the country. Credit Card Providers All three American credit card giants, Mastercard (MA), Visa (V), and American Express (Amex), have suspended all their network operations in Russia. Credit cards issued by Russian banks will not work in other countries, and cards issued elsewhere will not work for purchases in Russia. Hotels Hyatt (H), Hilton (HLT), and Marriott (MAR) are halting development and new investments in Russia. Hilton and Marriott are closing their corporate offices. Hilton is keeping its existing 26 hotels open (a fraction of the company’s 6,800 properties worldwide). Marriott hotels are franchised and the company is evaluating the ability to keep these hotels open. Industrials 3 has halted operations in Russia. Dow (DOW) has suspended all purchases of feedstocks and energy from Russia. It has also stopped all investments in the region and is supplying only limited essential goods in Russia. General Electric (GE) suspended most of its operations in Russia, with the exception of “providing essential medical equipment and supporting existing power services.” John Deere (DE) has halted shipments of its products to Russia. Caterpillar (CAT) is suspending operations at its Russian manufacturing facilities. Boeing (BA) said it would suspend support for Russian airlines. Automakers Ford (F) announced it was suspending its operations in Russia. The American automaker has a 50% stake in Ford (F) Sollers, a joint venture that employs at least 4,000 workers. GM does not have much of a presence in Russia. Entertainment Disney (DIS) is also suspending the release of its theatrical films in Russia, citing “the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.” WarnerMedia said on February 28 that it would pause the release of “The Batman” in Russia. The company is also pausing all new business in Russia, ceasing broadcast of its channels, halting all new content licensing with Russian entities, and pausing planned theatrical and games releases. Retail Estée Lauder Companies will suspend all commercial activity in Russia, including closing every store and brand site and halting shipments to any of our retailers in Russia. The company had also already suspended business investments and initiatives in Russia. TJX has promised to divest its equity ownership in Familia, an off-price retailer with more than 400 stores in Russia. Consumer Staples Mondelez (MDLZ) said it would scale back all non-essential activities in Russia “while helping maintain continuity of the food supply.” The company said it would focus on “basic offerings,” and discontinue all new capital investments and suspend advertising spending in the country. Procter & Gamble (PG) has discontinued all new capital investments in Russia and is suspending all media, advertising, and promotional activity. The company will continue to provide basic health, hygiene, and personal care items. Philip Morris suspended planned investments and will reduce manufacturing in Russia. PepsiCo will stop selling soda in Russia but will continue to produce dairy and baby food. Restaurants Yum Brands (YUM) is closing 70 company-owned KFC restaurants and 50 Pizza Hut franchises in Russia. It will also suspend all investment and restaurant development in the country. McDonald’s (MCD) is closing some 750 restaurants in Russia. Russia’s restaurants along with another 108 in Ukraine, accounted for 9% of the company’s revenue in 2021. The company said that halting Russian operations will cost it $50 million a month. Restaurant Brands International (owner of Burger King) will end corporate support for 800 locations in Russia and will not approve any additional investment or expansion. Starbucks is closing all of its locations in Russia. Transportation UPS, DHL, and FedEx have suspended operations in Russia and Belarus.       Footnotes 1     The nickel price increase was compounded by a margin call on a major Chinese nickel producer that had accumulated a large short position through forward contracts in order to lock in a price for future delivery. 2     Palladium - Wikipedia 3    United States (USA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity 4    A New Report from IDC Looks at the Initial Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Global ICT Markets. 5    Which Companies Have Pulled Out of Russia? Here’s a List. - The New York Times (nytimes.com) and https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/02/business/companies-pulling-back-russia-ukraine-war-intl-hnk/index.html Recommended Allocation

Executive Summary Failure Of Iran Deal Tightens Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply The US and Iran suspended their attempt to negotiate a nuclear deal on March 11. Countries often get cold feet before major agreements but there are good reasons to believe this suspension will be permanent. A confirmed failure to restore the US-Iran strategic détente will lead to Middle Eastern instability. Iran will be on a trajectory to achieve nuclear weapons in a few years while Israel and the US will have to underscore their red lines against weaponization. The Strait of Hormuz will come under threat again. The immediate impact on oil prices should be positive: sanctions will continue to hinder Iran’s exports, while Iranian conflict with its neighbors will sharply increase the odds of oil disruptions caused by militant actions. Not to mention the Russia-induced energy supply shock. However, a decisive move by the Gulf Arab states to boost crude production would counteract the effect of Iranian sanctions and drive oil down. The Gulf Arabs will be more inclined to coordinate with the Biden administration as long as the Iran deal is ruled out. Thus oil volatility is the main implication beyond any short term oil spike.     Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Long Gold (Strategic) 2019-12-06 36.8% Bottom Line: Go long US equities relative to global; long US and Canadian stocks versus Saudi and UAE stocks. Stay long XOP ETF, S&P GSCI index, and COMT ETF for exposure to oil prices and backwardation in oil forward curves. Feature The current Iran talks would have restored Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), which created a strategic détente between the US and Iran. Iran froze its nuclear program while the US lifted sanctions. President Barack Obama negotiated the deal in 2015, without congressional approval, while President Donald Trump nullified it in 2018, arguing that it did not restrict Iran’s ballistic missile development or support for regional militant groups. Chart 1Bull Market In Iran Tensions Will Be Super-Charged Bull Market In Iran Tensions Will Be Super-Charged Bull Market In Iran Tensions Will Be Super-Charged Since then there has been a bull market in Iran tensions (Chart 1), a secret war in which sporadic militant attacks, assassinations, and acts of sabotage occurred but neither side pursued open confrontation. These attacks can be significant, as with the Iran-backed attack on the Abqaiq refinery in Saudi Arabia, which took 6mm b/d of oil-processing capacity offline briefly in September 2019. The implication of this trend is energy supply disruption. Now the trend will be super-charged in the context of a global energy shortage. If no US-Iran détente is achieved, the Middle East will be set on a new trajectory of conflict, or at least a nuclear arms race and aggressive containment strategy. Since Trump turned away from the US-Iran détente and reimposed sanctions on Iran we have given a 40% chance of large-scale military conflict, according to our June 2019 decision tree (Diagram 1). The basis for such a conflict is Iran’s likelihood of obtaining nuclear arms and the need of Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the US to prevent that from happening. Diagram 1US-Iran Conflict: Critical Juncture In Our Decision Tree US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Between now and then, tit-for-tat military exchanges will increase, posing risks to oil supply in the short and medium run. Without a major diplomatic breakthrough that halts Iran’s nuclear weaponization, a bombing campaign against Iran will be the likeliest long-term consequence, due to the fateful logic of Israel’s strategic predicament (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Over Medium Term, Unilateral Israeli Military Action Is Possible US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Why Rejoining The US-Iran Deal Was Unlikely Under the Biden administration’s new plan, Iran would have frozen its nuclear program once again while Biden would have relaxed US “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran, opening the way for foreign investment and the development of Iran’s energy sector and economy. The basis for a deal was the belief among some US policymakers that engagement with Iran would open up its economy, reducing regional war risks (especially in Iraq), expanding global energy supply, and fomenting pro-democratic sentiment in Iran. Also the Washington military-industrial complex wanted to reduce the US’s commitment to the Middle East and arrange a grand strategic “pivot to Asia” so as to counter the rise of China. Up till August 2021, we viewed a deal as likely, but that view changed when Iran’s hawkish or hardline faction came back into the presidency. Biden had a very small window of opportunity to negotiate with outgoing Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who negotiated the original 2015 deal and whose administration fell apart after President Trump withdrew from the deal. When the hawkish Iranian faction took back power, this opportunity slipped. Iran’s hawks were vindicated for having opposed détente with the US in the first place. Since then we have argued that strategic tensions would escalate, for the following reasons: The Iranians could not trust the Americans, since they knew that any new deal could be torn up as early as January 20, 2025 if the Republican Party took back the White House. Indeed, former Vice President Mike Pence recently confirmed this view explicitly. The Iranians were not compelled to agree to the deal because high oil prices ensured that they could export oil regardless of US sanctions (Chart 2). The US no longer has the diplomatic credibility to galvanize a coalition that includes the Russians and Chinese to isolate Iran, like it did back in 2014-15. Chart 2Iranians Not Compelled To A Deal, Can Circumvent Sanctions Iranians Not Compelled To A Deal, Can Circumvent Sanctions Iranians Not Compelled To A Deal, Can Circumvent Sanctions As for Iran’s weak economy spurring social unrest and forcing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to agree to a deal, the US has had maximum pressure sanctions in place since 2019 and it has not produced that effect. Yes, Iran is ripe for social unrest, but the regime is consolidating power under the hardliners rather than taking any risky course of opening up and reform that could foment pro-democratic and pro-western demands for change. With oil revenues flowing in, the regime will be more capable of suppressing domestic opposition. The Americans could not trust the Iranians because they knew that they would ultimately pursue nuclear weapons regardless of any short-term revival of the 2015 deal. The Iranians have a stark choice between North Korea, which achieved nuclear weaponization and now has a powerful guarantee of future regime survival, and countries like Ukraine and Libya, which gave up nuclear weapons or programs only to be invaded by foreign armies. Moreover the Iranian nuclear deal lacked popular support, even among Obama Democrats back in 2015, not to mention today in the wake of the deal’s cancellation. The deal’s provisions would have begun expiring in 2025 under any conditions. The Israelis and Gulf Arabs opposed the deal. The Russians also switched to opposing the deal and made new demands at the last minute as a result of the US sanctions imposed on Russia in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. The Russians do not have an interest in Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon and they supported the 2015 deal and the 2021-22 renegotiation while demanding their pound of flesh in the form of Ukraine. But they also know that Israel and the US will use military force to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, so they are not compelled to join any agreement. Crippling US sanctions over Ukraine likely caused them to interfere with the deal. Our pessimistic view is now confirmed, with the suspension of talks. True, informal talks will continue, diplomacy could somehow revive, and it is still possible for a deal to come together. But given our fundamental points above, we would give any durable diplomatic solution a low probability, say 5%. That means that the US and Iran will not engage, which means Iran will re-activate its regional militant proxies and begin pursuing nuclear weaponization. Iran has a powerful incentive to increase regime security before the dangerous leadership succession that looms over the nearly 83 year-old Khamenei and the threatening possibility of a Republican’s reelection in 2024. At present, it is unknown which side of the Iran nuclear deal talks suspended them. While the Iranians were not compelled by an international coalition to join the deal as they were in 2015, we cannot ignore the possibility the suspension in talks arises from a deal being reached between the US and core OPEC 2.0 producers (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait). Very simply, such a deal would entail that the Arab states increase output, to ease the global shortage, in return for the US walking away from the flawed Iran deal and pledging to work with Israel and the Gulf Arabs to contain Iran. Israel and the Gulf Arabs are increasingly aligned in their goal of countering Iran under the Abraham Accords, negotiated in 2020 by the Trump administration. If the US and Gulf states agreed, then the Gulf states are likely to increase production to ease the global shortage and prolong the business cycle, meaning that oil prices could fall rather than rise as their next move. Either way they will remain volatile as a result of global developments. What Next? Escalation In The Middle East The Iranians have made substantial nuclear progress since 2018, despite Israeli attempts at sabotaging critical facilities. Today Iran stands on the brink of achieving “breakout” levels of highly enriched uranium – levels at which it is possible to construct a nuclear device (Table 1). Table 1Iran Will Reach ‘Breakout’ Nuclear Capability US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down The suspension of talks means the Iranians will soon reach breakout capacity, which will splash across global headlines. This news will rattle global financial markets as it will point to a nuclear arms race in the most volatile of regions. There is a gap of one-to-two years between breakout uranium enrichment and deliverable nuclear weapon, according to most experts.1 However, it is much easier to monitor nuclear programs than missile programs, which means western intelligence will lose visibility when it comes to knowing precisely when Iran will obtain a functional nuclear warhead that it can mount on a ballistic missile. The Iranians are skillful at ballistic missiles. The clock will start ticking once nuclear breakout is achieved and the Israelis and Americans will be forced to respond by underscoring their red line against weaponization. Starting right away, Israel and the US will need to demonstrate publicly that they have a “military option” to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weaponization. They will refrain from immediate military action but will seek to re-establish a credible threat through shows of force. They will also redouble their efforts to use special operations and cyber attacks to set back the Iranian programs. The Iranians will seek to deter them from attacking and will want to highlight the negative consequences. The US-Iran talks were not only about the nuclear program but also about a broader strategic détente. The Iranians will no longer rein in their regional militant proxies, whether the militias in Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon. In effect we are now looking at a major escalation of militant attacks in the Middle East at a time when oil is already soaring. In many cases the express intent of the Iran-backed groups will be to threaten oil supply to demonstrate the leverage that they have to intimidate the US and its allies and discourage them from applying too much pressure too quickly. Bottom Line: On top of the current oil shock, we are about to have a higher risk premium injected into oil from Middle Eastern proxy conflict involving Iran. If OPEC does not act quickly to boost production then financial markets face additional commodity price pressures, on top of the existing Russia-induced supply shock. Commodity And Energy Implications Our Commodity & Energy Strategist, Bob Ryan, outlines the following implications for the oil market: In BCA Research's oil supply-demand balances, while we recognized the Geopolitical Strategy view that the US-Iran deal would not materialize, nevertheless we assumed that Iran would return up to 1.3mm b/d of production by 2H22, which would have been available for export markets. This would have given a significant boost to oil supply as the market continues to tighten. Chart 3Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply The failure of these barrels to return to the market will result in an oil-price increase of about $15/bbl in 2023, based on our modeling (Chart 3). We can expect backwardations to increase in Brent and WTI, as demand for precautionary inventories increases. The modelled prices include the oil risk premium of ~USD 9/bbl in H2 2022 and USD 5/bbl in 2023. Relative to 2021, we expect core- OPEC - KSA, UAE and Kuwait – and total US crude supply to increase by 1.7 mmb/d and 0.65 mmb/d respectively in 2022. Compared to 2022, core-OPEC supply will level off in 2023, and will increase by 0.6 mmb/d for total US. If the US has a deal with core OPEC, then, based on the reference production levels agreed by OPEC 2.0 in July 2021, core OPEC’s production capacity could cover a large bit of the volumes markets are short (Table 2). This is due to lower monthly additions of output that was supposed to be returned to markets – now above 1mm b/d – and the lost Iranian output (Table 2). Table 2OPEC 2.0 Reference Production Levels US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Per the OPEC 2.0 reference production schedule released following the July 2021 meeting in Vienna, Saudi Arabia’s output is free to go to 11.5mm b/d by May, the UAE's to 3.5mm b/d, and Kuwait's to just under 3mm b/d. Iraq also could raise output, but its output is variable and it will lie at the center of the new escalation in military tensions, so we do not count it as core OPEC 2.0 production. Assuming these numbers are consistent with actual capacity for core OPEC 2.0, that means Saudi Arabia could lift production by ~ 1.1mm b/d, UAE by ~ 0.5m b/d, and Kuwait by close to 0.3mm b/d. That’s almost 2mm b/d. These reference-production levels might be on the high side of what core OPEC 2.0 is able or willing to do. But they would be close to covering most of the deficit resulting from less-than-anticipated return of 400k b/d from OPEC 2.0 producers beginning last August ( ~ 1.2mm b/d). Most of Iran’s lost output also would be covered. More than likely, these barrels will find their way to market "under the radar" (i.e., smuggled out of Iran) over the next year or so. This was one reason our geopolitical strategists did not view Iran as sufficiently pressured to sign a deal. US shale-oil output will be increasing above the 0.9 mm b/d that we forecast last month for 2022, and the 0.5mm b/d we expect next year, given the sharp price rally prompted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service will be updating our estimate next week when we publish new supply-demand balances and price forecasts. Releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of the US and OECD are available to tide the market over for brief periods due to Middle East shocks or sanctions on Russian oil. Releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of the US and OECD are available to tide the market over for brief periods due to Middle East shocks or sanctions on Russian oil. Over time, a significant share of these displaced Russian barrels will find their way to China, and the volumes being displaced will be re-routed to other Asian and western buyers. Investment Takeaways One of our key geopolitical views for 2022 is that oil producers have enormous strategic leverage, specifically Russia and Iran. The Ukraine war and now the suspension of US-Iran détente bears out this view. It is highly destabilizing for global politics and economy. One of our five black swans for 2022 is that Israel could attack Iran – this is a black swan because it is highly unlikely on such a short time frame. However, if the US-Iran deal cannot be salvaged, then the clock is ticking to a time when Israel and/or the US will have to decide whether to prevent Iran from going nuclear or instead choose containment strategy as with North Korea. Yet the Iran dilemma is less stable than the Korean dilemma because the Israelis are committed to preventing weaponization. The Israelis will not act unilaterally until the last possible moment, when all other options to prevent weaponization are exhausted, as the operation would be extremely difficult and they need American military assistance. If diplomacy fails on Iran, the two options for the future are a major war or a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The latter would involve an aggressive containment strategy. The global economy faces a major new risk to energy supply as a result of this material increase in Middle East tensions. A stagflationary outcome is much more likely. Europe’s energy security will be far more vulnerable now as it tries to diversify away from Russia but faces a more volatile Middle East (Chart 4). Undoubtedly Russia and Iran recognize their tremendous leverage. China, India, and other resource imports face a larger energy shock if the Gulf Arabs do not boost production promptly. They certainly face greater volatility. China’s policy support for the economy will remain lackluster in an environment in which inflation continues to threaten economic stability. China’s internal stability was already at risk and now it will have to scramble to secure energy supplies amid a global price shock and looming Middle Eastern instability. China has no choice but to accept Russia’s decision to cut ties with the West and lash itself to China as a strategic ally for the foreseeable future (Chart 5). Chart 4The EU’s Two-Pronged Energy Insecurity US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down ​​​​​ Chart 5China's Energy Insecurity China's Energy Insecurity China's Energy Insecurity ​​​​​ Chart 6AGo Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE ​​​​​ Chart 6BGo Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE ​​​​​ Geopolitical Strategy recommends investors go long US equities relative to global equities on a strategic basis. We also recommend long US / short UAE equities and long Canadian / short Saudi equities (Charts 6A and 6B). Chart 7Worst Case Oil Risk In Historical Context US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Unlike Ukraine, the onset of a new Middle East crisis may not come with “shock and awe.” Weeks or months may pass before Iran reaches nuclear breakout. But make no mistake, if diplomacy fails, Iran will ignite a nuclear race and activate its militant proxies, while its enemies will increase sabotage, rattle sabers, and review military options. The Iranians will not be afraid to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, their other nuclear option (Chart 7). A total blockage of Hormuz is not by any means imminent. But war becomes more likely if Iran achieves nuclear breakout and diplomacy continues to fail.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Ariel Eli Levite, “Can a Credible Nuclear Breakout Time With Iran Be Restored?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 24, 2021, carnegieendowment.org. See also Simon Henderson, “Iranian Nuclear Breakout: What It Is and How to Calculate It,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3457, March 24, 2021, washingtoninstitute.org.   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally. But on a cyclical (12-month) horizon, the short-term inflationary impulse combined with sanctions will be massively demand-destructive, at which point the cavalry of lower bond yields will charge to the rescue. Therefore: Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond, both in absolute terms and relative to other 30-year sovereign bonds. Overweight equities. Overweight long-duration US equities versus short-duration non-US equities. Fractal trading watchlist: Brent crude oil, and oil equities versus banks equities. The DAX Has Sold Off ##br##Because It Expects Profits To Plunge… The DAX Has Sold Off Because It Expects Profits To Plunge... The DAX Has Sold Off Because It Expects Profits To Plunge... …But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off ##br##Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off ...But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off ...But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off   Bottom Line: In the Ukraine crisis, the protection from lower bond yields and fiscal loosening will not come as quickly and as powerfully as it did during the pandemic. If anything, the fixation on inflation and sanctions may increase short-term pain for both the economy and the stock market, before the cavalry of lower bond yields ultimately charges to the rescue. Feature Given the onset of the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War, with the potential to escalate to nuclear conflict, you would have thought that the global stock market would have crashed. Yet since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 to the time of writing, the world stock market is down a modest 4 percent, while the US stock market is barely down at all. Is this the stock market’s ‘Wile E Coyote’ moment, in which it pedals hopelessly in thin air before plunging down the chasm? Is this the stock market’s ‘Wile E Coyote’ moment, in which it pedals hopelessly in thin air before plunging down the chasm? Admittedly, since the invasion, European bourses have fallen – for example, Germany’s DAX by 10 percent. And stock markets were already falling before the invasion, meaning that this year the DAX is down 20 percent while the S&P 500 is down 12 percent. But there is a crucial difference. While the DAX year-to-date plunge is due to an expected full-blooded profits recession that the Ukraine crisis will unleash, the S&P 500 year-to-date decline is due to the sell-off in the long-duration bond (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). This difference in drivers will also explain the fate of these markets as the crisis evolves, just as in the pandemic.   Chart I-1The DAX Has Sold Off Because It Expects Profits To Plunge... The DAX Has Sold Off Because It Expects Profits To Plunge... The DAX Has Sold Off Because It Expects Profits To Plunge...   Chart I-2...But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off ...But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off ...But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off During The Pandemic, Central Banks And Governments Saved The Day… We can think of a stock market as a real-time calculator of the profits ‘run-rate.’ In this regard, the real-time stock market is several weeks ahead of analysts, whose profits estimates take time to collect, collate, and record. For example, during the pandemic, the stock market had already discounted a collapse in profits six weeks before analysts’ official estimates (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3The German Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead Of Analysts The German Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead Of Analysts The German Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead Of Analysts Chart I-4The US Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead ##br##Of Analysts The US Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead Of Analysts The US Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead Of Analysts We can also think of a stock market as a bond with a variable rather than a fixed income. Just as with a bond, every stock market has a ‘duration’ which establishes which bond it most behaves like when bond yields change. It turns out that the long-duration US stock market has the same duration as a 30-year bond, while the shorter-duration German stock market has the same duration as a 7-year bond. Pulling this together, and assuming no change to the very long-term structural growth story, we can say that: The US stock market = US profits multiplied by the 30-year bond price (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). The German stock market = German profits multiplied by the 7-year bond price (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-5US Profits Multiplied By The 30-Year Bond Price... US Profits Multiplied By The 30-Year Bond Price... US Profits Multiplied By The 30-Year Bond Price... Chart I-6...Equals The US Stock Market ...Equals The US Stock Market ...Equals The US Stock Market Chart I-7German Profits Multiplied By The 7-Year Bond Price... German Profits Multiplied By The 7-Year Bond Price... German Profits Multiplied By The 7-Year Bond Price... Chart I-8...Equals The German Stock Market ...Equals The German Stock Market ...Equals The German Stock Market When bond yields rise – as happened through December and January – the greater scope for a price decline in the long-duration 30-year bond will hurt the US stock market both absolutely and relatively. But when bond yields decline – as happened at the start of the pandemic – this same high leverage to the 30-year bond price can protect the US stock market. When bond yields decline, the high leverage to the 30-year bond price can protect the US stock market. During the pandemic, the 30-year T-bond price surged by 35 percent, which more than neutralised the decline in US profits. Supported by this surge in the 30-year bond price combined with massive fiscal stimulus that underpinned demand, the pandemic bear market lasted barely a month. What’s more, the US stock market was back at an all-time high just four months later, much quicker than the German stock market. …But This Time The Cavalry May Take Longer To Arrive Unfortunately, this time the rescue act may take longer. One important difference is that during the pandemic, governments quickly unleashed tax cuts and stimulus payments to shore up demand. Whereas now, they are unleashing sanctions on Russia. This will choke Russia, but will also choke demand in the sanctioning economy. Another crucial difference is that as the pandemic took hold in March 2020, the Federal Reserve slashed the Fed funds rate by 1.5 percent. But at its March 2022 meeting, the Fed will almost certainly raise the interest rate (Chart I-9). Chart I-9As The Pandemic Took Hold, The Fed Could Slash Rates. Not Now. As The Pandemic Took Hold, The Fed Could Slash Rates. Not Now. As The Pandemic Took Hold, The Fed Could Slash Rates. Not Now. As the pandemic was unequivocally a deflationary shock at its outset, it was countered with a massive stimulatory response from both central banks and governments. In contrast, the Ukraine crisis has unleashed a new inflationary shock from soaring energy and food prices. And this on top of the pandemic’s second-round inflationary effects which have already dislocated inflation into uncomfortable territory. Our high conviction view is that this inflationary impulse combined with sanctions will be massively demand-destructive, and thereby ultimately morph into a deflationary shock. Yet the danger is that myopic policymakers and markets are not chess players who think several moves ahead. Instead, by fixating on the immediate inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices, they will make the wrong move. In the Ukraine crisis, the big risk is that the protection from lower bond yields and fiscal loosening will not come as quickly and as powerfully as it did during the pandemic. If anything, the fixation on inflation and sanctions may increase short-term pain for both the economy and the stock market. Compared with the pandemic, both the sell-off and the recovery will take longer to play out. In the Ukraine crisis, the big risk is that the protection from lower bond yields and fiscal loosening will not come as quickly and as powerfully as it did during the pandemic. One further thought. The Ukraine crisis has ‘cancelled’ Covid from the news and our fears, as if it were just a bad dream. Yet the virus has not disappeared and will continue to replicate and mutate freely. Probably even more so, now that we have dismissed it, and Europe’s largest refugee crisis in decades has given it a happy hunting ground. Hence, do not dismiss another wave of infections later this year. The Investment Conclusions Continuing our chess metaphor, a tactical investment should consider only the next one or two moves, a cyclical investment should be based on the next five moves, while a long-term structural investment (which we will not cover in this report) should visualise the board after twenty moves. All of which leads to several investment conclusions: On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally (Chart I-10). Chart I-10When Stock Markets Sell Off, The Dollar Rallies When Stock Markets Sell Off, The Dollar Rallies When Stock Markets Sell Off, The Dollar Rallies But on a cyclical (12-month) horizon, the short-term inflationary impulse combined with sanctions will be massively demand-destructive, at which point the cavalry of lower bond yields will charge to the rescue. Therefore: Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond, both in absolute terms and relative to other 30-year sovereign bonds. Overweight equities. Overweight long-duration US equities versus short-duration non-US equities. How Can Fractal Analysis Help In A Crisis? When prices are being driven by fundamentals, events and catalysts, as they are now, how can fractal analysis help investors? The answer is that it can identify when a small event or catalyst can have a massive effect in reversing a trend. In this regard, the extreme rally in crude oil has reached fragility on both its 65-day and 130-day fractal structures. Meaning that any event or catalyst that reduces fears of a supply constraint will cause an outsized reversal (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Extreme Rally In Crude Oil Is Fractally Fragile The Extreme Rally In Crude Oil Is Fractally Fragile The Extreme Rally In Crude Oil Is Fractally Fragile Equally interesting, the huge outperformance of oil equities versus bank equities is reaching the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that has reliably signalled major switching points between the sectors (Chart I-12). Given the fast-moving developments in the crisis, we are not initiating any new trades this week, but stay tuned. Chart I-12The Huge Outperformance Of Oil Equities Versus Banks Equities Is Approaching A Reversal The Huge Outperformance Of Oil Equities Versus Banks Equities Is Approaching A Reversal The Huge Outperformance Of Oil Equities Versus Banks Equities Is Approaching A Reversal Fractal Trading Watchlist Biotech To Rebound Biotech Is Starting To Reverse Biotech Is Starting To Reverse US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Greece’s Brief Outperformance To End Greece Is Snapping Back Greece Is Snapping Back Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? Are We In A Slow-Motion Crash? 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary US Equity Drawdowns During Geopolitical Crises/Commodity Shocks US Equity Drawdowns During Geopolitical Crises/Commodity Shocks US Equity Drawdowns During Geopolitical Crises/Commodity Shocks ​​​​​​ The most recent examples of geopolitical and commodity price shocks similar the current one include the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the oil embargo of 1973 in response to the Yom Kippur War as well as the Gulf War of 1990. The magnitude of the S&P 500 selloff was 28% in 1962, 23% in 1973 and 20% in 1990 (Chart of the week). Neither of our capitulation indicators for the S&P 500 or for EM stocks have reached their previous lows. As for commodity prices, the only thing that is certain in the next couple of months is that volatility will remain very elevated. Having incurred considerable costs, Russia will push to maximize its gains and secure a new, more favorable agreement with NATO. This will keep geopolitical tension elevated.   Bottom Line: The drawdown in global and EM stocks in not over yet. The US dollar has more upside in the near term. This is consistent with the S&P500 outperforming and EM stocks underperforming. A rising US dollar bodes ill for EM fixed-income markets. Feature Chart 1US Equity Drawdowns During Geopolitical Crises/Commodity Shocks US Equity Drawdowns During Geopolitical Crises/Commodity Shocks US Equity Drawdowns During Geopolitical Crises/Commodity Shocks The world is experiencing geopolitical and commodity price shocks that have not been seen in over a generation. The most recent examples of this kind of shock include the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the oil embargo of 1973 in response to the Yom Kippur War as well as the Gulf War of 1990. Chart 1 illustrates the current trajectory of the S&P 500 with selloffs that occurred during those three episodes. The magnitude of the S&P 500 selloff was 28% in 1962, 23% in 1973 and 20% in 1990. The S&P 500 is down only 11% from its peak. Based on the above three profiles, the current selloff in US stocks has further to go. This also means that non-US equities, including EM, will continue to suffer. What are the conditions needed for global stocks to bottom? In our opinion, a durable bottom in share prices will occur when measures of capitulation in equity markets reach their previous lows, commodity prices (particularly crude prices) decline and geopolitical tensions peak. We elaborate on each below. Equity Capitulation Neither of our capitulation indicators for the S&P 500 or for EM stocks have reached their previous lows. Chart 2 displays our capitulation indicator for US equities. Its construction is based on four equal-weighted components: the composite momentum indicator, the US equity sentiment indicator, industry group breadth and the advance-decline line (shown individually in Chart 7-8 below). Chart 2US Stocks Have Not Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Reached Their Selling Climax This indicator has not reached its lows of 2010, 2011, 2018 and 2020. In 2011 and 2018, the S&P500 selloffs were 19.5% and 19.8%, respectively. Hence, our best guess for the magnitude of an equity drawdown in this selloff is about 20%. This puts the potential S&P500 low at 3600-3700. The latter is consistent with the technical support (3-year moving average) that held up in 2011, 2016 and 2018 (Chart 2, top panel).  Chart 3 illustrates our EM equity capitulation indicator. Its four equal-weighted components are the composite momentum indicator, EM equity sentiment, industry group breadth and net EPS revisions (shown individually in Chart 9-10 below). We believe that EM share prices will drop until this capitulation indicator comes to the levels reached in the 2011, 2013 and 2018 selloffs. Chart 3The EM Equity Capitulation Has Further To Run The EM Equity Capitulation Has Further To Run The EM Equity Capitulation Has Further To Run Concerning the magnitude of further EM equity selloff, the next technical defense line for the MSCI EM stock index in USD is 10%, or in the worst-case scenario, 25% below current levels (Chart 3, top panel). The Commodity Shock Global share prices have become negatively correlated with commodity (primarily oil) prices and such an inverse relationship will likely persist for now. In fact, an important signal of the bottom in the S&P 500 during the 1990 oil spike was the peak in crude prices (the latter is shown inverted in Chart 4). In the case of the oil embargo of 1973-74, the oil market was not developed, and US share prices were negatively correlated with US 10-year Treasury yields (Chart 5). Chart 4The 1990 Oil Shock The 1990 Oil Shock The 1990 Oil Shock Chart 5The 1973 Oil Shock The 1973 Oil Shock The 1973 Oil Shock   Presently, given that US stocks were reacting negatively to rising US bond yields prior to the Ukraine crisis, it is reasonable to expect American share prices to bottom only when two conditions are satisfied: (1) oil prices start falling on a sustainable basis and (2) US bond yields do not rise much. How much will oil and other commodity prices rise? It is hard to know because multiple forces are in play. First, Russia is the second largest commodity exporter in the world (after the US). Russia’s crude oil exports account for 8.4% of global crude consumption, natural gas exports for 5.9% of global consumption and 3.4% for coal (Table 1). Across metals, Russia is a large producer too – 35.6% for palladium, 4.4% for nickel and 4.2% for copper (Table 1).  In turn, Russia and Ukraine production together accounts for 14% of global wheat consumption. Table 1Russia’s Global Share In Various Commodities Equity Capitulation, A Commodity Shock And Geopolitics Equity Capitulation, A Commodity Shock And Geopolitics The West’s official sanctions affect Russian exports of certain commodities but there is also a reluctance on the part of private companies to buy or ship Russian exports. This latter factor makes it nearly impossible to gauge just how much supply of each individual commodity will be curtailed. Assuming in the near term that a considerable share of Russia’s commodity exports will be blocked from global markets, the largest impact will be on oil, palladium, copper, nickel and fertilizer. While ratcheting sales of resources to China is a saving grace for Russia, it might take some time until shipments can be rerouted and reorganized. Second, the US is pressuring allied nations in the Gulf as well as other countries like Venezuela to produce and bring more oil to the market. Finally, the surge in commodity prices is probably already destroying demand. Oil and wheat prices have risen to record highs in many EM currencies (Chart 36 and 37 below). This will push inflation higher and herald more rate hikes from central banks. High interest rates along with tight fiscal policy and eroding discretionary spending (due to high energy and food prices) entail weak demand in developing economies. Bottom Line: In the very short run, risks to many commodity prices are skewed to the upside due to supply constraints. Yet, enormous uncertainty over factors driving their demand and supply makes prices over the next three months impossible to forecast. During this period, individual commodity prices might be driven by idiosyncratic factors. The only thing that is certain in the next couple of months is that volatility in commodity prices will remain very elevated. Price surges might be followed by large drawdowns and vice versa. Geopolitical Tensions The Kremlin will continue its military assault until it establishes firm control over Kyiv and the Black Sea coast, including the city of Odessa. As we wrote in our March 2 report, Putin’s objective is to install a very loyal government in Kyiv and to control the territory east of the Dniepr river. It is not clear to us whether the Kremlin has the appetite to control the Ukraine territory west of the Dniepr river. Western Ukraine has always been very anti-Russian and Putin might realize that it will be too costly to capture and control it. We do not think Putin has ambitions to go beyond Ukraine (Moldova being an exception). That said, there is no doubt that the Kremlin will be presenting more demands to NATO and threatening if those demands are not met. Having incurred considerable costs, Russia will push to maximize its gains and secure a new, more favorable agreement with NATO. It is not clear how many geopolitical concessions or what security guarantees the US is willing to provide to Russia. On the whole, geopolitical tensions between Russia and NATO/the US will continue until there is a new deal between the parties. Investment Strategy Chart 6No Trend Change In EM And US Relative Equity Performance No Trend Change In EM And US Relative Equity Performance No Trend Change In EM And US Relative Equity Performance The drawdown in global and EM stocks in not over yet. Within a global equity portfolio, we continue to recommend underweighting EM and Europe and overweighting the US. Interestingly, the EM relative equity performance versus the global stock index has rolled over at its 200-day moving average, while the US’s relative performance has found a support at its 200-day moving average (Chart 6). Such a technical configuration suggests that EM stocks will continue underperforming for now while US equities will have another upleg in relative terms. The US dollar has more upside in the near term. This is consistent with the S&P500 outperforming and EM stocks underperforming. A rising US dollar bodes ill for EM fixed-income markets. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Not all components of our US Equity Capitulation Indicator have reached their previous lows. Given the backdrop of still expensive US equity valuations, heightened geopolitical risks, very elevated inflation and high inflation expectations as well as the little maneuvering room that the Fed has, odds are that US share prices will drop further. Chart 7Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Chart 8Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our US Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator Not all components of our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator have reached their previous lows either. The share of industry groups above their 200-day moving average, analysts’ net EPS revisions as well as the momentum and equity sentiment indicators remain above their lows. Further downside in EM share prices is likely. Chart 9Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator Chart 10Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator Components Of Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax The NYSE’s advance/decline line has broken down and is dropping, signifying a broadening equity rout. Yet, we doubt the US equity indexes will bottom when 35% of NYSE listed stocks are above their 200-day moving average. Finally, the US median stock has broken below its 200-day moving average. Given the fundamental backdrop, all of these technical signposts point to a larger than 10% correction in the S&P 500. Chart 11US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax Chart 12US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax Chart 13US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax Chart 14US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax US Stocks Have Not Yet Reached Their Selling Climax Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Although Global ex-US stocks are much more oversold than US stocks, their growth and profit backdrops are worse. As we argued in the front section of this report (Chart 6 above), odds are that US stocks will continue outperforming non-US stocks in the near term. Despite crashing, European stocks might not have found a support yet. Chart 15Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Chart 16Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Chart 17Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Chart 18Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities Global Overall And Global ex-US Equities European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? Investor sentiment on European stocks has become depressed. Yet, European economies will decelerate due to the energy shock (natural gas prices have shot up two-fold since October 1) as well as falling consumer and business confidence. A bottom for euro area stocks might be lower than current prices. Chart 19European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? Chart 20European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? Chart 21European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? European Stocks: Is A Support At Hand? EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook According to our cyclically adjusted P/E ratio, EM stocks are slightly cheap in absolute terms and are very attractive versus US equities. However, this valuation indicator should be used by long-term investors. In the short run and even from a cyclical perspective, this valuation indicator is not very useful. Besides, investor sentiment on EM equities was neutral in the middle of February. It might take more weakness before bad news get priced in EM share prices. Chart 22EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook Chart 23EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook Chart 24EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Equities: Cheap But Mind The Profit Outlook EM Profits In A Soft Spot As projected by our EM narrow money (M1) aggregate, EM corporate earnings will continue to disappoint. This is the key risk to EM share prices. In fact, EM EPS has been broadly flat over the past 15 years. That is why EM stocks appear cheap. Plus, EM ex-TMT stocks have not yet fallen much and downside risks remain. Chart 25EM Profits In A Soft Spot EM Profits In A Soft Spot EM Profits In A Soft Spot Chart 26EM Profits In A Soft Spot EM Profits In A Soft Spot EM Profits In A Soft Spot Chart 27EM Profits In A Soft Spot EM Profits In A Soft Spot EM Profits In A Soft Spot Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Offshore and onshore Chinese shares prices have been falling hard. Not only have Chinese corporate profit expectations been downshifting but also Chinese Investable stocks have been derating (their multiples have been compressing). This has been due to foreign investors projecting/extrapolating the US-Russia confrontation to a possible future US-China geopolitical standoff, and therefore possible sanctions the West can impose on China. Chart 28Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chart 29Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chart 30Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chart 31Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows Chinese Investable Stocks Are At Their March 2020 Lows China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet The improvement in China’s total social financing has been entirely due to local government bond issuance. Corporate and household credit have not improved at all. Consistently, traditional infrastructure investment has probably bottomed. Yet, outside this sector the outlook is uninspiring. Property construction remains at risk, consumer spending is very sluggish and private business sentiment is downbeat. Chart 32China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet Chart 33China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet Chart 34China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet Chart 35China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet China: No "All-In" Stimulus Yet EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices Many low-income developing countries will be suffering from elevated food and energy prices. Oil and wheat prices in EM currencies have surged to all-time highs. This will lift headline inflation in many emerging economies, lead to monetary tightening and reduce household income available for discretionary spending. All of these and the lack of fiscal easing in many developing countries entail growth disappointments this year. Chart 36EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices Chart 37EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices Chart 38EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices Chart 39EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Woes: Energy And Food Prices EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM sovereign and corporate spreads have broken out. Such spread widening is not simply due to Russian credit. The pace of spread widening differs among countries. However, directionally, credit spreads seem to have embarked on a widening path. In a nutshell, Chinese USD corporate in general and property bond prices in particular are tanking (see below). This foreshadows the poor outlook for Chinese housing. Chart 40EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly Chart 41EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly Chart 42EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly Chart 43EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Spreads Are Widening Rapidly EM Credit Markets And EM Equities Historically, rising EM corporate USD bond yields led to a selloff in EM share prices. This is the cost of capital that matters for EM equities. Unless EM sovereign and corporate bonds yields start falling on a sustainable basis, EM equities will continue to struggle. Chart 44EM Credit Markets And EM Equities EM Credit Markets And EM Equities EM Credit Markets And EM Equities Chart 45EM Credit Markets And EM Equities EM Credit Markets And EM Equities EM Credit Markets And EM Equities Chart 46EM Credit Markets And EM Equities EM Credit Markets And EM Equities EM Credit Markets And EM Equities Global Resource Stocks The relative performance of global energy and basic materials versus the global equity index has bottomed. In the medium term, odds are that TMT stocks will underperform while resource companies outperform. Yet, the outlook for energy stocks and basic materials in absolute terms is complicated (in line with the elevated volatility in commodity prices we discussed in the front section). Notably, even though commodity prices have skyrocketed, basic materials and energy share prices have not yet broken out. It seems the market is doubting the sustainability of high commodity prices. Chart 47Global Resource Stocks Global Resource Stocks Global Resource Stocks Equity Capitulation, A Commodity Shock And Geopolitics Equity Capitulation, A Commodity Shock And Geopolitics Equity Capitulation, A Commodity Shock And Geopolitics Equity Capitulation, A Commodity Shock And Geopolitics Footnotes

Executive Summary Nuclear Worries Take Center Stage Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Vladimir Putin has now committed himself to orchestrating a regime change in Kyiv. Anything less would be seen as a defeat for him. Assuming he succeeds, and it is far from obvious that he will, the resulting insurgency will drain Russian resources. Along with continued sanctions, this will lead to a further deterioration in Russian living standards and growing domestic discontent. If Putin concludes that he has no future, the risk is that he will decide that no one else should have a future either. Although there is a huge margin of error around any estimate, subjectively, we would assign an uncomfortably high 10% chance of a civilization-ending global nuclear war over the next 12 months. These odds place some credence on Brandon Carter’s highly controversial Doomsday Argument. Even if World War III is ultimately averted, markets could experience a freak-out moment over the next few weeks, similar to what happened at the outset of the pandemic. Google searches for nuclear war are already spiking. Despite the risk of nuclear war, it makes sense to stay constructive on stocks over the next 12 months. If an ICBM is heading your way, the size and composition of your portfolio becomes irrelevant. Thus, from a purely financial perspective, you should largely ignore existential risk, even if you do care about it greatly from a personal perspective. Bottom Line: The risk of Armageddon has risen dramatically. Stay bullish on stocks over a 12-month horizon. All In on Sanctions In the criminal justice system, there is a reason why the punishment for armed robbery is lower than for murder. If the punishment were the same, an armed robber would have a perverse incentive to kill his victim in order to better conceal his crime. The same logic applies, or at least used to apply, to geopolitics: You do not impose maximum sanctions from the get-go because that removes your ability to influence your enemy with the threat of further sanctions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West chose to go all in on sanctions, levying every type imaginable with the exception of those entailing a big cost to the West (such as cutting off Russian energy exports). Most notably, many Russian banks have been blocked from the SWIFT messaging system while the Russian central bank’s foreign exchange reserves have been frozen. Even FIFA has barred Russia from international competition, just weeks before it was set to participate in the qualifying rounds of the 2022 World Cup. At this point, there is not much more that can be done on the sanctions front. This leaves military intervention as the only avenue available to further pressure Russia. A growing chorus of Western pundits, some of whom could not have picked out Ukraine on a map two weeks ago, have begun clamoring for regime change… this time, in Moscow. As one might imagine, this is not something that sits well with Putin. Last week, he declared that “No matter who tries to stand in our way or … create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” To ensure there was no uncertainty about what he was talking about, he proceeded to place Russia’s nuclear forces on “special regime of combat duty.” Yes, It’s Possible The Putin regime has used nuclear weapons of a sort in the past. The FSB likely orchestrated the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with polonium-210 in 2006, leaving traces of the radioactive substance scattered in dozens of places across London. As former US presidential advisor and Putin biographer Fiona Hill said in a recent interview with Politico, “Every time you think, “No, he wouldn’t, would he?” Well, yes, he would.” Admittedly, there is a big difference between dropping polonium into a cup of tea at the Millennium hotel in Mayfair and dropping a 10-megaton nuclear bomb on London or any other major Western city. Still, if Putin feels that he has no future, he may try to take everyone down with him. The collapse in the ruble, and what is sure to be a major plunge of living standards across Russia, could foment internal opposition to Putin. A quiet retirement is not an option for him. Based on the latest exchange rates, Russia’s GDP is smaller than Mexico’s and barely higher than that of Illinois (Chart 1). While denying gas to Europe is a very real threat, it has a limited shelf life. Europe will aggressively build out infrastructure to process LNG imports. Chart 1Russia's Economic Power Has Faded Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse In a few years, the one viable weapon that Russia will have at its disposal is its nuclear arsenal. As Dutch historian Jolle Demmers has said, “It is precisely the decline and contraction of Russian power, coupled with the possession of nuclear weapons and a tormented repressive president, that poses great risks.” Some of the world’s most prominent strategic thinkers flagged these risks before the invasion, but with little effect. The Mother of All Risks In simulated war games, it is generally difficult to get participants to cross the nuclear threshold, but once they do, a full-blown nuclear exchange usually ensues.1 The idea of “limited” nuclear war is a mirage.  How high are the odds of such a full-blown war? I must confess that my own feelings on the matter are heavily colored by my writings on existential risk. As I argued in Section XII of my special report, “Life, Death, and Finance in the Cosmic Multiverse,” we are probably greatly understating existential risk, especially when we look prospectively into the future. Although there is a huge margin of error around any estimate, subjectively, we would assign an uncomfortably high 10% chance of a civilization-ending global nuclear war over the next 12 months. These odds place some credence on Brandon Carter’s highly controversial Doomsday argument (See Box 1). A Paradox for Investors For investors, existential risk represents a paradoxical concept. If an ICBM is heading your way, the question of whether you are overweight or underweight stocks would be pretty far down on your list of priorities. And even if you were inclined to think about your portfolio, how would you alter it? In a full-blown global nuclear war, most stocks would go to zero while governments would probably be forced to default or inflate away their debt. Gold might retain some value – provided that you kept it in your physical possession – but even then, you would still have trouble exchanging it for anything of value if nothing of value were available to purchase. This means that from a purely financial perspective, you should largely ignore existential risk, even if you do care greatly about it from a personal perspective. What, then, can we say about the current market environment? I touched on many of the key issues in Monday’s Special Alert, in which we tactically downgraded global equities from overweight to neutral. I encourage readers to consult that report for our latest market views. In the remainder of today’s report, allow me to elaborate on a couple of key themes. A Freak-Out Moment Is Coming Chart 2Nuclear Worries Take Center Stage Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse The market today reminds me of early 2020. We wrote a report on February 21 of that year entitled “Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus,” in which we noted that a full-blown pandemic “could lead to 20 million deaths worldwide,” and that “This would likely trigger a global downturn as deep as the Great Recession of 2008/09, with the only consolation being that the recovery would be much more rapid than the one following the financial crisis.” Many saw that report as alarmist, just as they saw our subsequent decision to upgrade stocks in March as cavalier.  Even if you knew in February 2020 that the S&P 500 would reach an all-time high later that year, you should have still shorted equities aggressively on a tactical basis. I feel the same way about the present. Google searches for nuclear war are spiking (Chart 2). A freak-out moment is coming, which will present a good buying opportunity for investors. Just to be on the safe side, I picked up a couple of bottles of Potassium Iodide earlier this week. When I checked the pharmacy again yesterday, all the bottles were sold out. They are now being hawked on Amazon for ten times the regular price. From Cold War to Hot Economy? The spike in commodity prices – especially energy prices – will have a negative near-term impact on global growth, while also limiting the ability of central banks to slow the pace of planned rate hikes (Chart 3). In general, inflation expectations and oil prices move together (Chart 4).   Chart 3Central Banks: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place Central Banks: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place Central Banks: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place   Chart 4Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Go Hand-In-Hand Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Go Hand-In-Hand Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Go Hand-In-Hand Assuming the geopolitical situation stabilizes in a few months, oil prices should come down. The forward curve for oil is heavily backwardated now: The spot price for Brent is $111/bbl while the December 2022 price is $93/bbl (Chart 5). BCA’s commodity strategists expect the price of Brent oil to fall to $88/bbl by year-end. The decline in energy prices should provide some relief to global growth and risk assets in the back half of the year, which is one reason we are more constructive on equities over a 12-month horizon than a 3-month horizon. Looking out beyond the next year or two, the new cold war will lead to higher, not lower, interest rates. Increased spending on defense and alternative energy sources will prop up aggregate demand, especially in Europe where the need to diversify away from Russian gas is greatest. As Chart 6 shows, capex in the euro area cratered following the euro debt crisis. Capital spending via the Recovery Fund and other sources will rise significantly over the next few years. Chart 5The Brent Curve Is Heavily Backwardated Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Chart 6European Capex Is Poised To Increase European Capex Is Poised To Increase European Capex Is Poised To Increase In addition, the shift to a multipolar world will expedite the retreat from globalization. Rising globalization was an important force restraining inflation – and interest rates – over the past few decades. Lastly, the ever-present danger of war could prompt households to reduce savings. It does not make sense to save for a rainy day if that day never arrives. Lower savings implies a higher equilibrium rate of interest. As we discussed in our recent report entitled “A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle,” after raising rates modesty this year, the Fed will resume hiking rates towards the end of 2023 or in 2024, as it becomes clear that the neutral rate in nominal terms is closer to 3%-to-4% rather than the 2% that the market assumes. The secular bull market in equities will likely end at that point. In summary, equity investors should be somewhat cautious over the next three months, more optimistic over a 12-month horizon, but more cautious again over a longer-term horizon of 2-to-5 years. Box 1The Doomsday Argument In A Nutshell Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1     For example, an article from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation discusses a Reagan administration war game called “Proud Prophet,” an exercise the Americans hatched to test the theory of limited nuclear strikes. The result of this exercise was that the “Soviet Union perceived even a low-yield nuclear strike as an attack, and responded with a massive missile salvo.” Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse

Executive Summary No Contagion Yet No Contagion Yet No Contagion Yet The risk of contagion into other FX pairs from the collapse of the RUB remains contained but is rising. The main transmission mechanism will be a global rush into dollars, should the crisis trigger a global recession. For now, European countries with big trade and financial relationships with Russia are the ones in the firing range of any escalation. The euro has already adjusted lower. As such, while the crisis could get worse before it gets better, the broad DXY index is unlikely to rally much beyond 100. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve will be swift in addressing any offshore dollar funding crises, via facilities revived during the depths of the COVID-19 crisis. Crude prices could be near capitulation highs. A reversal in oil prices (as the forward curve suggests) will benefit oil consumers versus producers. Long EUR/CAD and short NOK/SEK positions are on our shopping list.   Recommendations Inception Level Inception Date Return Short NOK/SEK 1.11 Mar 3/2022 - Bottom Line: Bottom Line: If a further escalation in the crisis triggers a global recession, it will lead to another down leg in stocks, and a rally in the dollar. Meanwhile, a détente will allow the bull market in stocks to continue, and the dollar rally to reverse. As we argue below, while the crisis could get worse before it gets better, the broad DXY index is unlikely to rally much beyond 100. Feature The market is treating the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as a localized event that is unlikely to trigger a global recession. While the DXY index is fast approaching the psychological 100 level, other FX pairs forewarning a major risk-off event on the horizon remain rather sanguine. For example, the AUD/JPY cross is toppy but has tracked the mild correction in global stocks. The big losers in the DXY index have been the Swedish krona and the euro, currencies directly in the firing range of any escalation in the crisis (Chart 1). Chart 2Investors Have Bought FX Hedges Investors Have Bought FX Hedges Investors Have Bought FX Hedges Chart 1No Contagion Yet No Contagion Yet No Contagion Yet Specific to the euro, risk reversals — the difference in implied volatility between out-of-the-money calls versus puts — have collapsed below COVID-19 lows. Across a broad spectrum of currencies, investors have been building hedges against losses (Chart 2). The mirror image of this is near record-high net speculative positioning in the dollar. Given this market configuration, the key question is where next? Clearly, if a further escalation in the crisis triggers a global recession, it will lead to another down leg in stocks, and a rally in the dollar. Meanwhile, a détente will allow the bull market in stocks to continue, and the dollar rally to reverse. As we argue below, while the crisis could get worse before it gets better, the broad DXY index is unlikely to rally much beyond 100. A Review Of The Fed Put Chart 3The Fed And Liquidity Crises The Fed And Liquidity Crises The Fed And Liquidity Crises Both a global pandemic and fear of a global war are existential threats which have occurred throughout history. As such, should we survive an escalation in tensions, the DXY could behave as it did during the COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, the pandemic triggered a rush into dollars amidst a global shortage. This was a key reason why the DXY punched above 100. Fast forward to today, and a lot of the facilities that were tapped into during the COVID-19 crisis can be reactivated. A review of the sequence of events back then is instructive: The Fed began by offering unlimited funding through swap lines to five major central banks at the overnight index swap + 25 basis points.1 This was effective as of the week of March 16, 2020 (Chart 3). When this proved insufficient to satiate the demand for dollars, the swap lines were extended to nine more central banks, with a cap of US$60 billion and a maturity of 84 days.2 This was announced on March 19, 2020. Finally, FIMA account holders were allowed to temporarily exchange their Treasury securities held with the Fed for US dollars. This was announced on March 24, 2020. In hindsight, it turned out that the Fed’s actions on March 19 marked the peak in the dollar at 103, even though we continue to live with Covid-19 today. That peak was 5% above current levels. What ensued was a period of volatility, with periodic rallies towards 100, but these provided excellent shorting opportunities for the DXY. The behavior of the DXY today could be more sanguine, with the benefit of hindsight. Barometers Of Contagion Chart 4Defaults Less Likely Outside Russia Defaults Less Likely Outside Russia Defaults Less Likely Outside Russia No two crises are the same. It is likely that holders of Russian US dollar debt will never be made whole, with coupon payments already suspended. As a result, the risk is that investors liquidate other holdings of emerging market dollar bonds to cover margin calls. This will lead to a self-reinforcing spiral which will transform a localized liquidity crisis into a global solvency one. Credit default swaps in major EM economies are rising, as they blow out for Russian debt (Chart 4). That said, there are a few similarities with past Russian incursions: The selloff in Russian debt during the invasion of Crimea was a localized event. The invasion of Georgia took place at the heart of the global financial crisis of 2008. In the former, a self-reinforcing feedback loop of higher refinancing rates and defaults did not ensue. The reaction from other EM currencies and equity markets has been rather constructive, despite the wholesale liquidation in Russian assets (Chart 5). As adjustment mechanisms, currencies are good at sniffing out the risk of contagion. That is not the case yet. Finally, the DXY and the RUB have already decoupled, as they did in previous episodes of a Russian invasion (Chart 6). In the past, this was a good indication that the event was localized, even though the RUB only bottomed after falling 35% and 47% in 2008 and 2014, respectively. While the risk today can be characterized as much greater, this dynamic remains the same (the dollar is up only 1.6% since the incursion).  Chart 5Spot The Outlier Spot The Outlier Spot The Outlier Chart 6The Dollar And Rouble Have Already Decoupled The Dollar And Rouble Have Already Decoupled The Dollar And Rouble Have Already Decoupled What is clear is that the longer the conflict lasts, the less likely it is that the Fed will deliver the aggressive rate hikes originally priced by the market this year. This will keep US policy very accommodative, at a time when the real fed funds rate is still well below estimates of neutral (Chart 7). Chart 7The Fed Is Still Very Accomodative The Fed Is Still Very Accomodative The Fed Is Still Very Accomodative The message from the Bank of Canada this week could be a model for other central banks, where quantitative tightening (QT) and rate hikes complement each other. This could signal a slower pace of hikes than the market expects and, in turn, could help lead to a steeping of yield curves, especially as growth eventually recovers. Applying The Russian Template The bigger question for currency markets longer term is what happens to foreign holders of US assets when the dust settles. Russian holdings of US Treasurys peaked during the Georgian war and have since fallen to nearly 0% of total reserves (Chart 8). This has been replaced by gold, RMB assets, euro assets, and other currencies. With US geopolitical rivals having seen how vulnerable the Russian economy has been to a cut-off from the SWIFT messaging system, currency alliances outside the scope of the dollar are likely to solidify. China is the number one contributor to the US trade deficit, which is hitting record lows. It is also the largest holder of US Treasurys, which it continues to destock. This could be a subtle retaliation against past US policies, or perhaps a way to make room for the internationalization of the RMB (Chart 9). What is clear is that nations getting cutoff from the US financial system can only accelerate this trend. Chart 8Template For US Geopolitical Rivals? Template For US Geopolitical Rivals? Template For US Geopolitical Rivals? Chart 9China Has Stopped Recycling Surpluses Into Treasurys China Has Stopped Recycling Surpluses Into Treasurys China Has Stopped Recycling Surpluses Into Treasurys From a broader perspective, the process of reserve diversification out of US dollars, into other currencies has been accelerating in recent years. International Monetary Fund (IMF) data shows that the global allocation of foreign exchange reserves to the US dollar peaked at about 72% in the early 2000s and has been in a downtrend ever since. Meanwhile, allocations to other currencies as well as gold have been surging. Ever since the trend began to accelerate in 2015, the DXY has been unable to sustainably punch through the 100 level (Chart 10). Chart 10The DXY: 100 Is The Line In The Sand The DXY: 100 Is The Line In The Sand The DXY: 100 Is The Line In The Sand Portfolio Strategy Deflationary shocks tend to be bullish for US Treasurys and the dollar. An inflationary dislocation will push investors towards gold (and currencies that act as an inflation hedge such as the NOK, CAD, AUD, and NZD). So far, the market seems to be betting on stagflation, where both Treasury yields and gold rise in tandem (Chart 11). The response of the Federal Reserve will be the key arbiter. A growth slowdown arising from the pandemic will slow the pace of rate hikes. As such, rising inflation and low real yields will reduce the appeal of US Treasurys and boost the appeal of gold in the near term. Historically, this has been bearish for the US dollar (Chart 12). Chart 11Competing Safe-Haven Assets Have Diverged Competing Safe-Haven Assets Have Diverged Competing Safe-Haven Assets Have Diverged Chart 12The Bond-To-Gold Ratio And The Dollar The Bond-To-Gold Ratio And The Dollar The Bond-To-Gold Ratio And The Dollar In our portfolio, we have two trades: A short CHF/JPY position, as we believe the yen will be a better hedge than the franc given higher real rates in Japan; and a long EUR/GBP position, given that the euro is closer to pricing in a recession, compared to the pound (or even the Canadian dollar). We will adjust our positions accordingly as the crisis unfolds.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 These included the Bank of Canada, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank. 2 These include the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark), the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Norges Bank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank. Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Russia Not Prepared To Invade West Ukraine Yet Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Russia is escalating its aggressiveness in Ukraine, marked by the shelling of a nuclear power station, troop reinforcements, and rhetorical threats of nuclear attack. Global financial markets will continue to suffer from negative news arising from this event until Russia achieves its aims in eastern Ukraine. Private sector boycotts on Russian commodity exports are imposing severe strains on the Russian economy, provoking it to apply more pressure on Ukraine and the West. Western governments are losing the ability to control the pace of strategic escalation, a dangerous dynamic. Moscow’s demand for security guarantees from Finland and Sweden will lead to a further escalation of strategic tensions between Russia and the West. During the Cold War the US and USSR saw a “balance of terror” due to rapidly expanding nuclear arms, which prevented them from waging war against each other. Today the same balance will probably prevent nuclear war but a nuclear scare that rattles financial markets may be required first. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Long Gold (Strategic) 2019-12-06 32.1% Bottom Line: Russia’s aggressiveness toward the US and Europe, including nuclear threats and diplomatic demands, will continue to escalate until it achieves its core military objectives. Investors should stick to safe havens and defensive equity markets and sectors on a tactical basis. Book profits on tactical trade long Japan/Germany industrials at close of trading on March 4. Feature Russian military forces shelled the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station on March 4, causing a fire. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared that “essential equipment” was not damaged and that the facility possessed adequate containment structures to prevent a nuclear meltdown. Local authorities said the facility was “secured.” This incident, which may or may not be settled, should be added to several others to highlight that Russia is escalating its aggression in Ukraine and global financial markets face more bad news that they will be forced to discount. Signposts For Further Escalation Map 1 shows the status of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, along with icons for the nuclear power plants. Map 1War In Ukraine, Status Of Russian Invasion As Of March 2, 2022 Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) To understand the end-game in Ukraine – and why we think the war will escalate and are keeping open our bearish trade recommendations – we need to review our net assessment for this conflict: Our 65% “limited invasion” scenario included the seizure of strategic territory east of the Dnieper river and all of the southern coastline. Energy trade would be exempt from sanctions, saving Europe from a recession and limiting the magnitude of global energy shock. We gave 10% odds to a “full-scale invasion of all of Ukraine” (deliberate wording) because we viewed it as highly unlikely that Russia would invade the mountainous and guerilla-happy far west, the ethnic Ukrainian core. Energy trade would be sanctioned, delivering a global energy shock and European recession. A handful of clients have criticized us for not predicting that Russia would attack Kiev and for not defining a full-scale invasion as one that involved replacing the government. We never gave a view on whether Russia would invade Kiev. It is not clear that the focus on Kiev is warranted since the US and EU had committed to powerful sanctions in the event of any invasion at all. This fixed price of invasion may have given Moscow the perverse incentive to invade Kiev. Either way, Russia invaded Kiev and eastern Ukraine and the US and EU imposed crippling sanctions but exempted the energy trade. Thus anything that breaks off energy trade between the EU and Russia – and any Russian attempt to invade the west of the country to Poland – should be seen as a significant escalation. Unfortunately there are signs that the energy trade is being disrupted. Any westward campaign to Poland will be delayed until Putin sacks Kiev and controls the east and south of Ukraine, at which point he will be forced either to invade the west to cut off the supply lines of the insurgency or, more likely, to negotiate a ceasefire that partitions Ukraine. Global investors will not care about the war in Ukraine as long as strategic stability is achieved between Russia and the West. But that is far away. Today, as Russia’s economic situation deteriorates, Putin is escalating on the nuclear front. Bottom Line: Russia’s showdown with the West is escalating. Good news for the Ukrainians will lead to bad news for financial markets. Global investors should not view the situation as stabilized and should maintain safe haven trades and defensive equity positioning. Energy Boycotts Will Antagonize Russia Chart 1Russia Not Prepared To Invade West Ukraine Yet Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) So far Russia has not conducted a full-scale invasion of all of Ukraine. The reason is that it does not have the necessary military forces, as we have highlighted. Russia is limiting its invasion force to around 200,000 troops while Ukraine consists of 30 million prime age citizens (Chart 1). Unless Russia massively reinforces its troops, it does not have the basic three-to-one troop ratio that is the minimum necessary to invade, conquer, and hold the entire country. However, Russia is likely to increase troop sizes. We are inclined to believe that Russia has started shifting troops from its southern and eastern military districts to reinforce the Ukraine effort, according to the Kyiv Independent, citing the Ukrainian armed forces’ general staff. Apparently it aims to conquer the east and then either invade further west or negotiate a new ceasefire with greater advantage. Investors should not accept the consensus narrative in the western world that Russia is losing the war in the east. Russia is encountering various difficulties but it is gradually surrounding and blockading Ukraine and cutting its power supply. It is capable of improving its supply lines and increasing the size and destructiveness of its forces. Remember that the US took 20 days to sack Baghdad in 2003. Russia has only been fighting for nine days. Having incurred crippling economic sanctions, Putin cannot afford to withdraw without changing the government in Kiev. The odds of Ukraine “winning” the war are low, while the odds of Russia dramatically intensifying its efforts are high. This is why new developments on the energy front and worrisome: Chart 2Energy Trade Remains The Fulcrum Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) While western governments refrained from sanctioning Russian energy as predicted, private companies are boycotting Russian energy to avoid sanctions and unpopularity. Estimates vary but about 20% of Russian oil exports could be affected so far.1 Russian oil will make its way to global markets – Russian, Chinese, and other third parties will pick up the slack – but in the meantime the Russian economy is suffering more than expected due to the cutoff. Energy is the vital remaining source of Russian economic stability and Russo-European relations (Chart 2). If it fails then Russia could grow more desperate while Europe’s economy would fall into recession and Europe would become less stable and less coordinated in its responses to the conflict. These private boycotts make it beyond the control of western governments to control the pace and intensity of pressure tactics, since it is politically impractical to demand that companies trade with the enemy. Bottom Line: With the rapidly mounting economic pressure, it should be no surprise that Russia is escalating its threats – it is under increasing economic pressure and wants to drive the conflict to a quick decision in its favor. Russia’s Nuclear Threats And Putin’s Mental State Russia is terrorizing Ukraine and the western world with threats of either nuclear missile attacks or a nuclear meltdown. Putin put the country’s nuclear deterrent forces on “special combat status” on February 27. His forces began shelling the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant on March 4. Russia is also demanding security guarantees from Finland and Sweden, which are becoming more favorable toward joining the NATO alliance.2 Their lack of membership in NATO, while maintaining a strong military deterrent with defense support from the US, was a linchpin of stability in the Cold War but is now at risk. They will retain the right to choose their alliances at which point Russia will need to threaten them with attack. Since Russia cannot plausibly invade them with full armies while invading Ukraine, it may resort to nuclear brinksmanship. The western media is greatly amplifying a narrative in which Russia’s actions can only be understood in the context of Putin’s insanity or fanaticism. This may be true. But it is also suspicious because it saves the West from having to address the problem of NATO enlargement, which, along with Russia’s domestic weaknesses, contributed to Russia’s decision over the past 17 years to stage an aggressive campaign to control Ukraine and the former Soviet Union. There is a swirl of conspiracy theories in the news about Putin’s illnesses, age, vaccines, or psychology, none of which are falsifiable. Putin has an incentive to appear reckless and insane so that his enemies capitulate sooner. The decision to invade a non-NATO member, rather than a NATO member, suggests that he is still making rational calculations. Rational, that is, from the perspective of Russian history and an anarchic international system in which nation states that seek to survive, secure themselves, and expand their power. If Ukraine were to become a military ally of the US then Russian security would suffer a permanent degradation. Of course, Putin may be a fanatic and it is possible that he grows desperate or miscalculates. The western public (and global investors) will thus be reminded of the “balance of terror” that prevailed throughout the Cold War, in which the world lived and conducted business under the shadow of nuclear holocaust. Today Russia has 1,588 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, contra the US’s 1,644. Both countries can deliver nuclear weapons via ballistic missiles, submarines, and bombers and are capable of destroying hundreds of each other’s cities on short notice (Table 1). While the US has at times contemplated the potential for nuclear attacks to occur but remain limited, the Soviet Union’s nuclear doctrine ultimately rejected the likelihood of limitations and anticipated maximum escalation.3 Table 1The Return Of The Balance Of Terror Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Ultimately the US and Russia avoided nuclear war in the Cold War because it entailed “mutually assured destruction” which violated the law of self-preservation. Neither Stalin nor Mao used nukes on their opponents, including when they lost conflicts (e.g. to Afghanistan and Vietnam). The US tied with North Korea and lost to Vietnam without using nukes. However in the current context the US has been wary of antagonizing Putin for fear of his unpredictable and aggressive posture. In response to Putin’s activation of combat-ready nuclear forces, the US called attention to its own nuclear deterrent subtly by canceling the regular test of a ballistic missile and issuing a press statement highlighting the fact and saying that it was too responsible to bandy in nuclear threats. Yet the autocratic nature of Putin’s regime means that if Putin ultimately does prove to be a lunatic then large parts of the world face existential danger. Our Global Investment Strategist Peter Berezin ascribes Russian Roulette odds to nuclear Armageddon – while arguing that investors should stay invested over the long run anyway. Sanctions on the Russian central bank have frozen roughly half of the country’s $630 billion foreign exchange reserves (Table 2). If the energy trade also stops, then the economy will crash and Putin could become desperate. Table 2Western Sanctions On Russia As Of March 4, 2022 Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Bottom Line: Global financial markets have yet to experience the full scare that is likely as Russia escalates its aggression and nuclear brinksmanship to ensure it achieves it strategic aims in Ukraine and prevents Finland from joining NATO. GeoRisk Indicators In March In what follows we provide our monthly update of our quantitative, market-based GeoRisk Indicators. Russian geopolitical risk is surging as the ruble and equity markets collapse (Chart 3). The violent swings of the underlying macroeconomic variables as Russia saw a V-shaped recovery from the COVID-19 lockdowns, then sharply decelerated again, prevented our risk indicator from picking up the full scale of the geopolitical risk until recently. But alternative measures of Russian risk show the historic increase more clearly – and it can also be demonstrated by reducing the weighting of the underlying macroeconomic variables relative to the USD-RUB exchange rate in the indicator’s calculation (Chart 4). Chart 3Russian GeoRisk Indicator Russian GeoRisk Indicator Russian GeoRisk Indicator Chart 4Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk This problem of dramatically volatile pandemic-era macro data skewing our risk indicators has been evident over the past year and is more apparent with some indicators than with others. China’s geopolitical risk as measured by the markets is starting to peak and stall but we do not recommend investors try to take advantage of the situation. China’s domestic and international political risk will remain elevated through the twentieth national party congress this fall. The sharp increase in commodity prices will amplify the problem. The earliest China’s political environment can improve substantially is in 2023 after President Xi Jinping cements another ten years’ in power (Chart 5). And yet that very process is negative for long-term political stability. Chart 5China GeoRisk Indicator China GeoRisk Indicator China GeoRisk Indicator British geopolitical risk is contained. It enjoys some insulation from the war on the continent, underpinning our long GBP-CZK trade and long UK equities trade relative to developed markets other than the United States (Chart 6). Chart 6United Kingdom GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom GeoRisk Indicator German and French geopolitical risk is being priced higher as expected (Charts 7 and 8). Of these two Germany is the more exposed due to the risk of energy shortages. France is nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered, and unlikely to see a change of president in the April presidential elections. Italian risk was already at a higher level than these countries but the Russian conflict and high energy supply risk will keep it elevated (Chart 9). Chart 7Germany GeoRisk Indicator Germany GeoRisk Indicator Germany GeoRisk Indicator Chart 8France GeoRisk Indicator France GeoRisk Indicator France GeoRisk Indicator Chart 9Italy GeoRisk Indicator Italy GeoRisk Indicator Italy GeoRisk Indicator Canada’s trucker strikes are over and the loonie will benefit from the country’s status as energy producer and insulation from geopolitical threats due to proximity with the United States (Chart 10). Chart 10Canada GeoRisk Indicator Canada GeoRisk Indicator Canada GeoRisk Indicator Spain still has substantial domestic political polarization but this will have little impact on markets amid the Ukraine war. Spain is distant from the fighting and will act as a conduit for liquefied natural gas imports into Europe (Chart 11). Chart 11Spain GeoRisk Indicator Spain GeoRisk Indicator Spain GeoRisk Indicator Australia’s political risk will remain elevated due to its clash with China amid the emerging global conflict between democracies and autocracies as well as the country’s looming general election, which threatens a change of ruling party (Chart 12). However, as a commodity and LNG producer and staunch US ally the country’s risks are overrated. Chart 12Australia GeoRisk Indicator Australia GeoRisk Indicator Australia GeoRisk Indicator Markets are gradually starting to price the risk of an eventual China-Taiwan military conflict as a result of the Ukrainian conflict. China is unlikely to invade Taiwan on Russia’s time frame given the greater difficulties and risks associated with an amphibious invasion of a much more strategically critical territory in the world. But Taiwan’s situation is comparable to that of Ukraine and it is ultimately geopolitically unsustainable, so we expect Taiwanese assets to suffer a higher risk premium over the long run (Chart 13). Chart 13Taiwan Territory GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Territory GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Territory GeoRisk Indicator South Korea faces a change of ruling parties in its March 9 general election as well as uncertainties emanating from China and a new cycle of provocations from North Korea (Chart 14). However these risks are probably not sufficient to prevent a rally in South Korean equities on a relative basis as China stabilizes its economy. Chart 14Korea GeoRisk Indicator Korea GeoRisk Indicator Korea GeoRisk Indicator Turkey’s international environment has gotten even worse as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and effective closure of the Black Sea to international trade. Turkey has invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits to Russian warships, although it will let those ships return to home from outside the Black Sea. The Black Sea is highly vulnerable to “Black Swan” events, highlighted by the sinking of an Estonian ship off Ukraine’s coast in recent days. Turkey’s domestic political situation will also generate a political risk premium through the 2023 presidential election (Chart 15), as President Recep Erdogan’s reelection bid may benefit from international chaos and yet he is an unorthodox and market-negative leader, and if he loses the country will be plunged into factional conflict. Chart 15Turkey GeoRisk Indicator Brazil GeoRisk Indicator Brazil GeoRisk Indicator South Africa looks surprisingly attractive in the current environment given our assessment that the government is stable and relatively friendly to financial markets, the next general election is years away, and the search for commodity alternatives to Russia amid a high commodity price context will benefit South Africa (Chart 16). Chart 16South Africa GeoRisk Indicator South Africa GeoRisk Indicator South Africa GeoRisk Indicator India And Brazil: A Tale Of Two Emerging Markets Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have a minimal impact on the growth engines of India and Brazil. This is because Russia directly accounts for a smidgeon of both these countries trade pie. However, the main route through which this war will be felt in both markets is through commodity prices. Brazil by virtue of being a commodity exporter is better positioned as compared to India which is a commodity importer and is richly valued to boot. The year 2022 promises to be important from the perspective of domestic politics in both countries and will add to the policy risks confronting both EMs. Our Brazilian GeoRisk indicator has collapsed but is highly likely to recover and rise from here (Chart 17). Chart 17Brazil GeoRisk Indicator Brazil GeoRisk Indicator Brazil GeoRisk Indicator Commodity Price Spike – Advantage Brazil Politically India and Brazil have a lot in common today. The popularity ratings of their respective right-leaning heads of states, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India and President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, have suffered over the last two years. The economic prospects of the median voter in both countries have weakened over the last year (Chart 18). Policymakers in both countries face a dilemma: they cannot stimulate their way out of their problems without an adverse market reaction since both countries are loaded with public debt. Chart 18Economic Miseries Rising For Both India's And Brazil's Median Voter Economic Miseries Rising For Both India's And Brazil's Median Voter Economic Miseries Rising For Both India's And Brazil's Median Voter Despite these commonalties, Brazil’s equity markets have outperformed relative to EMs whilst India has underperformed (Chart 19). On a tactical horizon, we expect this divergent performance to continue as the effects of the Russian invasion feed through commodity markets. Chart 19India Is Richly Valued, Brazil Has Outperformed EMs India Is Richly Valued, Brazil Has Outperformed EMs India Is Richly Valued, Brazil Has Outperformed EMs ​​​​​ Commodity markets were tight even before the Russian invasion. The ongoing war will force inventories to draw across a range of commodities including oil, iron ore and even corn. Given that India is a net importer of oil whilst Brazil is a net commodity exporter, the current spike in commodity prices will benefit Brazil over India in the short term. However, our Commodity & Energy Strategy team expects supply responses from oil producers to eventually come through, thereby sending the price of Brent crude to $85 per barrel by the end of 2022. Hence if Indian equities correct in response to the current oil spike or domestic politics (see below), then investors can turn constructive on India on a tactical horizon. Elections Stoke Policy Risks – In India And Brazil Results of key state elections in India will be announced on March 10, 2022. Of all the state elections, the results that the market will most closely watch will be those of Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state of India. In a base case scenario, we expect the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) which rules this state, to cross the 50% seat share mark and retain power. But the BJP will not be able to beat the extraordinary 77% seat share it won at the 2017 elections in Uttar Pradesh. A sharp deviation from this benchmark may lead the BJP to focus on populism ahead of the next round of state elections due in 4Q 2022. At a time when the Indian government’s appetite to take on structural reforms is waning, we worry that such a populist tilt could perturb Indian equity markets. Also, general elections are due in India in 2024. If the latest state election results suggest that the BJP has ceded a high vote share to regional parties (such as the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh or Aam Aadmi Party in Punjab), then this would mean that regional parties can pose a credible threat to BJP’s ability to maintain a comfortable majority in 2024. In Brazil, some polls show that left-leaning former president Lula da Silva's lead on President Bolsonaro may have narrowed. While we expect Lula to win the presidential elections due in Brazil in October 2022, the road to victory will not be as smooth as markets expect. If the difference between the two competitors’ popularity stays narrow, then there is real a chance that President Bolsonaro will make a last-ditch effort to cling to power. He will resort to fiscal populism and attacks on Brazil’s institutions, potentially opening up institutional or civil-military rifts that generate substantially greater uncertainty among investors. Bolsonaro already appears to be planning a cut in fuel prices and a bill to further this could be tabled as soon as next week. He has coddled Russian President Putin to shore up his base of authoritarian sentiment at home. To conclude, investors must balance these two opposing forces affecting Brazilian markets today. On one hand are the latent policy risks engendered by a far-right populist who still has a few months left in office. On the other hand, in a year’s time Bolsonaro will likely be gone while Brazil stands to benefit as commodity prices rise and EM investors shift funds into commodity exporters like Brazil. Against this backdrop, we re-iterate our view that investors should take-on selective tactical exposure in Brazil. Risk-adjusted returns in Brazil at this juncture can be maximized by buying into sectors like financials as these sectors’ inherent political and policy sensitivity is low. Postscript: Is India’s Foreign Policy Reverting To Non-Alignment? India traditionally has followed a foreign policy of non-alignment, carefully maintaining ties with both America and Russia through the Cold War. Things changed in the 2000s as Russia under President Putin courted closer ties with China while the US tried to warm up to India. India’s decision to join the newly energized US-led “quadrilateral” alliance in 2017 is a clear sign that India is gradually shedding its historical stance of neutrality and veering towards America. However, this thesis is being questioned as India, like China, is continuing to trade and transact with Russia despite its invasion of Ukraine, providing Russia with a lifeline as it suffers punishing sanctions from the US and European Union. India repeatedly abstained from voting resolutions critical of Russia at the United Nations in recent weeks. In other words, India’s process of transitioning over to the US alignment will be “definitive yet slow,” owing to reasons of both history and practicality. The former Soviet Union’s support played a critical role in helping India win several regional battles like the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Russia’s military and security influence in Central Asia makes it useful to India, which seeks a counter to Pakistan on its flank in Afghanistan. India sees Russia as a fairly dependable partner that cannot be abandoned until America is willing to provide much greater and more reliable guarantees and subsidies to India – through military support and beneficial trade deals. The backbone of Indo-Russia relations has been their arms trade (Chart 20). India’s reliance on Russia for arms could decline in the long term. But in the short term, as India tilts towards the US at a calibrated pace, India could remain a source of meaningful defense revenue for Russia. It is possible but not likely that the US would impose sanctions on India for maintaining this trade. Chart 20India Today Is A Key Buyer Of Russian Weapons Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) Imbalance Of Terror (GeoRisk Update) The fundamental long-term dynamic is that Russia has foreclosed its relations with the West and will therefore be lashed to China, at least until the Putin regime falls and a Russian diplomatic reset with the West can be arranged. In the face of this combined geopolitical bloc, India will gradually be driven to cooperate more closely with the United States. But India will not lead the transition away from Russia – rather it will react appropriately depending on the US’s focus and resolve in countering China and assisting India’s economy.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Energy Aspects long-term estimate. 2     Tzvi Joffre, “Russian FM repeats nuclear war rhetoric as invasion of Ukraine continues,” Reuters, March 3, 2022. 3     Jack L. Snyder, “The Soviet Strategic Culture : Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations,” Rand Corporation, R-2154-AF (1977), argues that Soviet and American strategic cultures differ greatly and that the US should not be “sanguine about the likelihood that the Soviets would abide by American-formulated rules of intrawar restraint." Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades (2022) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar