Geopolitics

Highlights We cannot predict how China will manage Evergrande precisely but we have a high conviction that it will do whatever it takes to prevent contagion across the property sector. However, China’s stimulus tools are losing their effectiveness over time. The country is due for a prolonged struggle with financial and economic instability regardless of whether Evergrande defaults. A messy default would obviously exacerbate the problem. China’s regulatory crackdowns target private companies and will continue to weigh on animal spirits in the private sector. The government will be forced to use fiscal policy to compensate. The US’s and China’s switch from engagement to confrontation poses a persistent headwind for investor sentiment toward China. The new consensus that investors should buy into China’s “strategic sectors” to avoid arbitrary regulatory crackdowns is vulnerable to its own logic and to sanctions by the US and its allies. Feature China poses a unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks and global markets are now pricing them. Property giant Evergrande could default on $120 million in onshore and offshore interest payments as early as September 23, or next month, prompting investors to run for cover. Is this crisis fleeting or part of a larger systemic failure? It is a larger systemic failure. We expect a slow-motion, Japanese-style crisis over the coming decade, marked with periodic bailouts and stimulus packages. We recommend investors stay the course: steer clear of China and stay short the renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Tactically, stick with large caps, defensive sectors, and developed markets within the global equity universe. Strategically, prefer emerging markets that benefit from forthcoming Chinese (and American) stimulus. 1. A “Minsky Moment” Cannot Be Ruled Out The chief fear is whether the approaching default of Evergrande marks China’s “Minsky Moment.” Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis held that long periods of stable revenues lead to risky financial deals and large accumulations of systemic risk that are underpriced. When revenues cannot cover interest payments, a crash ensues followed by deleveraging. Minsky’s hypothesis speaks to debt crises in an entire economy, yet nobody knows for sure whether China’s economy has reached such a breaking point. China’s national savings rate stands at 45.7% of GDP and nominal growth exceeds the long-term government bond yield. However, a sharp drop in asset prices, especially in the property sector, could change everything, as it could lead to balance sheet recession among corporates and a fall in national income. Evergrande is supposed to make an $84 million interest payment on offshore debt and a $36 million payment on onshore debt this week, and after 30 days it would default. It owes $37 billion in debt payments over the next 12 months but only has $13 billion cash on hand (as of June 30, 2021). Authorities can opt for a full bailout or a partial bailout, in which the company defaults on offshore bonds but not onshore. They could even let the company fail categorically, though that would produce exactly the kind of precipitous drop in property asset prices that would lead to wider financial contagion. State intervention to smooth the crisis is more likely – and the government can easily pressure other companies into acquiring Evergrande’s assets and business divisions. Chart 1Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Chart 1 shows that China’s corporate debt-to-GDP ratio stands head and shoulders above other countries that experienced financial crises in recent decades, courtesy of our Emerging Markets Strategy. While China can undoubtedly bear large debts due to its savings, the implication is that China has large enough financial imbalances to suffer a full-fledged financial crisis, even if the timing is hard to predict. Household credit is also elevated at 61.7% of GDP, and the household debt-to-disposable-income ratio is now higher than in the United States. About two-thirds of China’s corporate debt is held by state-owned or state-controlled entities, prompting some investors to dismiss the gravity of the risk. However, financial crises often involve the transfer of debt from the state to private sector or vice versa. 59% of bond defaults in H1 2021 have involved state companies. Total debt is the main concern. Don’t take our word for it: China’s Communist Party has warned for the past decade about the danger of “implicit guarantees” and “moral hazard” that encourage financial excesses in the corporate sector. The Xi Jinping administration has tried to induce a deleveraging process since it came to power in 2012-13. Xi’s “three red lines” for the property sector precipitated the current turmoil. Even if Evergrande’s troubles are managed, China’s systemic risks will continue to boil over as its potential growth rate slows and the government continues trying to wring out financial excesses. Chart 2Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher More broadly China is experiencing an unprecedented overlap of economic and political crises: The population is aging and labor force is shrinking; The economic model since 2009 has been changing from export-manufacturing to domestic-oriented, investment-driven growth; Indebtedness is spreading from corporates to households and ultimately the government; The governance model is shifting from “single-party rule” to “single-person rule” or autocracy; The population is reaching middle class status and demanding better quality of life; The international trade environment is turning from hyper-globalization to hypo-globalization; The geopolitical backdrop is darkening with the US and its allies attempting to contain China’s ambitions of regional supremacy. Almost all of these changes bring more risks than opportunities to China over the long haul. The need for rapid policy shifts provides the ostensible reasoning for President Xi Jinping’s decision not to step down but to remain president for the foreseeable future. He will clinch this position at the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. The implication is that policy uncertainty will continue climbing up to at least 2019 peaks while offshore equity markets will continue to trend lower, as they have done since the onset of the US trade war (Chart 2). Credit default swap rates have so far been subdued but they are showing signs of life. A sharp rise in policy uncertainty and property sector stress would pull them up. Domestic equities (A-shares) have rallied since 2019 but we would expect them to fall back given China’s historic confluence of structural and cyclical challenges, which will create further negative surprises (Chart 2, bottom panel). 2. Beijing Will Provide Bailouts And Stimulus Ad Nauseum Evergrande’s future may be in doubt but Beijing will throw all its power at stopping nationwide financial contagion. True, a policy miscalculation is possible. A tardy or failed intervention cannot be ruled out. However, investors should remember that a clear pattern of bailouts and stimulus has emerged over the course of the Xi Jinping administration whenever a “hard landing” or financial collapse loomed. The government tightens controls on bloated sectors until the financial fallout threatens to undermine general economic and social stability, at which point the government eases policy. It is often forced to stimulate the economy aggressively. Chart 3 shows these cycles in two ways: China’s control of credit through the state-controlled banks, and the frequency of news stories mentioning important terms associated with financial and economic distress: defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies. These three terms used to be unheard of among China watchers. Under the Xi administration, a higher tolerance of creative destruction has served as the way to push forward reform. The current rise in distress is not extended, suggesting that more bad news is coming, but it also shows that the government has repeatedly been forced to provide stimulus even under the Xi administration. Chart 3Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Could this time be different? Not likely. The American experience and the pandemic will also force China’s government to ease policy: China learns from US mistakes. The US lurched from Lehman’s failure into a financial crisis, an impaired credit channel, a sluggish economic recovery, a spike in polarization, policy paralysis, a near-default on the national debt, a surge in right- and left-wing populism, the tumultuous Trump presidency, widespread social unrest, a contested leadership succession, and a mob storming the nation’s capitol (Chart 4). This is obviously the nightmare of any Chinese leader and a trajectory that the Xi administration will avoid at any cost. Chart 4Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Chinese households store their wealth in the property sector, so any attempt at policy restraint or austerity faces a massive constraint. Only a few countries are comparable to China with respect to the share of non-financial household wealth (property and land) within total household wealth. All of them are hosts of property sector bubbles, including the bubbles in Spain and Ireland back in 2007 (Chart 5). A property collapse would destroy the savings of the Chinese people over four decades of prosperity. Chart 5Property Is The Bedrock Of Chinese Households Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Social instability is already flaring up. Almost all China experts agree that “social stability” is the Communist Party’s bottom line. But note that the Evergrande saga has already led to protests, not only at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen but also in other cities such as Shenyang, Guangzhou, Chongqing. Protests were filmed and shown on social media (posts have been censored). Protesters demanded repayment for wealth management products gone sour and properties they are owed that have not been built. This is only a taste of the cross-regional protests that would emerge if the broader property sector suffered. The lingering COVID-19 pandemic is still relevant. Investors should not underrate the potential threat that the pandemic poses to the regime. Severe epidemics have occurred about 11% of the time over the course of China’s history and they often have major ramifications. Disease has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties – and in four cases it played a major role. It would be suicidal for any regime to add self-inflicted economic collapse to a lingering pandemic (Table 1). Table 1Disease Threatens Chinese Dynasties – Not A Time To Self-Inflict A Recession Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Easing policy does not necessarily mean bringing out the “bazooka” and splurging on money and credit growth, though that is increasingly likely as the crisis intensifies. Notably the July Politburo statement specifically removed language that said China would “avoid sharp turns in policy.” In other words, sharp turns might be necessary. That can only mean sharp reflationary turns, as there is very little chance of doubling down on policy tightening. A counterargument holds that the Chinese government is now exclusively focused on power consolidation to the neglect of financial and economic stability. Perhaps the leadership is misinformed, overconfident, or thinks a financial collapse will better purge its enemies – along the lines of the various political purges under Chairman Mao Zedong. Wealthy tech magnates and property owners could conceivably challenge the return of autocracy. After all, the US political establishment almost “fell” to a rich property baron – why couldn’t China’s Communist Party? Political purges should certainly be expected ahead of next year’s party congress. But not to the point of killing the economy. The government would not be trying to balance policy tightening and loosening so carefully if it sought to induce chaos. It must be admitted, however, that the change to autocracy means that the odds of irrational or idiosyncratic policy have gone up substantially and permanently. Of course, the high likelihood that Beijing will provide bailouts and stimulus should not be read as a bullish investment thesis, even though it would create a pop in oversold assets. The Chinese system is saturated with money and credit, which have been losing their effectiveness in driving growth. Financial imbalances get worse, not better, with each wave of credit stimulus. Beijing is caught between a rock and a hard place. Hence stimulus comes only reluctantly and reactively. But it does come in the end because a financial crash would threaten the life of the regime and preclude all other policy priorities, domestic and foreign. 3. Yes, China’s Regulatory Crackdown Targets The Private Sector Global growth and other emerging economies will get most of the benefit once China stimulates, since China’s own firms will still face a negative domestic political backdrop. Bullish investors argue that the government’s regulatory tightening is misunderstood and overblown. The claim is that China is not targeting the private sector generally but only isolated sectors causing social problems. Costs need to be reduced in property, education, and health to improve quality of life. China shares the US’s and EU’s desire to rein in tech giants that monopolize their markets, abuse consumer data and privacy, and benefit from distorted tax systems. Most of these arguments are misleading. China does not have a strong record on data privacy, equality, social safety nets, rule of law, or “sustainable” growth (as opposed to “unsustainable,” high-debt, high-polluting growth). China actively encourages state champions that monopolize key sectors. Many developed markets have better records in these areas, notably in Europe, yet China is eschewing these regulatory models in preference for an approach that is arbitrary and absolutist, i.e. negative for governance. As for the private sector, animal spirits have been in a long decline throughout the past decade. This is true whether judging by money velocity – i.e. the pace of economic activity relative to the increase in money supply – or by households’ and businesses’ marginal propensity to save (Chart 6). The 2015-16 period shows that even periodic bouts of government stimulus have not reversed the general trend. Regulatory whack-a-mole and financial turmoil will not improve the situation. Chart 6Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Chart 7Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Surveys of sentiment confirm that the latest developments will have a negative effect (Chart 7). Cumulatively, the changes in China’s domestic and international policy context are being interpreted as negative for business, entrepreneurship, and economic freedom – notwithstanding the government’s claims to expand opportunity in its “common prosperity” plan. 4. The Withdrawal Of US Friendship Is A Headwind For China Chart 8Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired All of the successful Asian economies – including China for most of the past forty years of prosperity – have tried to stay on the good side of the United States. By contrast, China and the US today are shifting from engagement to confrontation and breaking up their economic ties (Chart 8). This is a problem for China because the US and to some extent its allies will seek to undermine China’s economy and its autocratic model as part of this great power competition. The rise in geopolitical risk is underscored by the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) agreement, by which the US will provide Australia with nuclear submarines over the next decade. This was a clear demonstration of the US’s “pivot to Asia” and the fact that the US and China are preparing for war – if only to deter it. China’s return to autocracy and clash with the US and Asian neighbors is also leading to a deterioration of its global image, particularly over issues of transparency and information sharing. The dispute over the origins of COVID-19 is a major source of division with the US and other countries. Transparency is important for investors. The World Bank has discontinued its “Ease of Doing Business” rankings after a scandal was revealed in which China’s ranking was artificially bumped up. The last-published trend is still downward (Chart 9). Most recently China has stepped up censorship of its financial news media amid the current market turmoil, which makes it harder for investors to assess the full extent of property and financial risks.1 The US political factions agree on China-bashing if nothing else. The Biden administration has little political impetus to eschew tariffs and export controls. One important penalty will come from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is likely to ban Chinese firms from US stock exchanges unless they conform to common accounting standards. Hence the dramatic fall in the share prices of Chinese companies listed via American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in both absolute and relative terms (Chart 10, top panel). This threat prompted China’s recent crackdown on its own firms that were attempting to hold initial public offerings on US exchanges. Chart 9US Conflict Exposes China’s Global Influence Campaign Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis The Quadrilateral Forum – the US, Japan, Australia, and India – has agreed to link the semiconductor supply chain to human rights standards, foreclosing China’s participation in that supply chain. US semiconductor firms are among the most exposed to China but they have not suffered over the course of the US-China tech war, suggesting that US vulnerabilities are limited (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down The point is not to exaggerate the strength of the US and its allies but rather the costs to China of actively opposing them. The US has a difficult enough time cobbling together a coalition of states to impose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, not to mention forming any coalition that would totally exclude and isolate China. China is far more important to US allies than Iran – it is irreplaceable in the global economy (Chart 11). The EU and China’s Asian neighbors will typically restrain the US’s more aggressive impulses so as not to upset the global recovery or end up on the front lines of a war.2 Chart 11No Substitute For China In Global Economy Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis This diplomatic constraint on the US is probably positive for global growth but not for China per se. American allies are still able to increase the costs on China for pursuing its own state-backed development path and geopolitical sphere of influence. Japan, Australia, and others are likely to veto China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while the UK and eventually the US are likely to join it. Investors should view US-China ties as a headwind at least until the two powers manage to negotiate a diplomatic thaw, i.e. substantial de-escalation of tensions. A thaw is unlikely in the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and the US midterm elections in fall 2022. Presidents Biden and Xi are still working on a bilateral summit, not to mention a more substantial improvement in ties. We doubt a diplomatic thaw would be durable anyway but the important point is that until it happens China will face periodic bouts of negative sentiment from the emerging cold war. Other Asian economies thrived under US auspices – China is sailing in uncharted waters. 5. Global Investors Cannot Separate Civilian From State And Military Investments The word on Wall Street is that investors should align their strategies with those of China’s leaders so as not to run afoul of arbitrary and draconian regulators. For example, instead of “soft tech” or consumer-oriented companies – like those that give people rides, deliver food, or make creative video games – investors should invest in “hard tech” or strategic companies like those that make computer chips, renewable energy, biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, and capital equipment. There is no question that the trend in China – and elsewhere – is for governments to become more active in picking winners and losers. Industrial policy is back. Investors have no choice but to include policy analysis in their toolbox. However, for global investors, an investment strategy of buying whatever the government says is far from convincing. The most basic investment strategy in keeping with the Xi administration’s goals would be to invest in state-owned enterprises in domestic equity markets. So SOEs should have outperformed the market, right? Wrong. They were in a downtrend prior to the 2015 bubble, the burst of which caused a further downtrend (Chart 12, top panel). Similarly, the preference for “hard tech” over “soft tech” is promising in theory but complicated in practice: hard tech is flat-to-down over the decade and down since COVID-19 (Chart 12, middle panel). It has underperformed its global peers (Chart 12, bottom panel). China’s policy disposition should be beneficial for industrials, health care, and renewable energy. First, China is doubling down on its manufacturing economy. Second, the population is aging and health care is a critical part of the common prosperity plan. Third, green energy is a way of diversifying from dependency on imported oil and natural gas. However, the profile of these sectors relative to their global counterparts is only unambiguously attractive in the case of industrials, which began to outperform even during the trade war (Chart 13). Chart 12State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks Chart 13Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades In Table 2 we outline the valuations and political risks of onshore equity sectors. Valuations are not cheap. Domestic and foreign risks are not fully priced. Table 2China Onshore Equities, Valuations, And (Geo)Political Risks Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis There is a bigger problem for global investors, especially Americans: investing in China’s strategic sectors directly implicates investors in the Communist Party’s domestic human rights practices, state-owned enterprises, and national security goals. “Civil-military fusion” is a well-established doctrine that calls for the People’s Liberation Army to have access to the cutting-edge technology developed by civilians and vice versa. These investments will eventually be subject to punitive measures since the US policy establishment believes it can no longer afford to let US wealth buttress China’s military and technological rise. Investment Takeaways China may or may not work out a partial bailout for Evergrande but it will definitely provide state assistance and fiscal stimulus to try to prevent contagion across the property sector and financial system. Bad news in the coming weeks and months will be replaced by good news in this sense. However, the fact that China will eventually be forced to undertake traditional stimulus yet again will increase its systemic financial risks, in a well-established pattern. The best equity opportunities will lie outside of China, where companies will benefit from global recovery yet avoid suffering from China’s unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks. We prefer developed markets and select emerging markets in Latin America and Asia-ex-China. Chinese households and businesses are downbeat. This behavior cannot be separated from the historic changes in the economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy. It is hard to see an improvement until the government boosts growth and the 2022 political reshuffle is over. American opposition is a bigger problem for China than global investors realize. Not only are the two economies divorcing but other democracies will distance themselves from China as well – not because of US demands but because their own manufacturing, national security, and ideological space is threatened by China’s reversion to autocracy and assertive foreign policy. Investing in China’s “hard tech” and strategic sectors with government approval is not a simple solution. This approach will directly funnel capital into China’s state-owned enterprises, domestic security forces, and military. As such the US and West will eventually impose controls. Investments may not be liquid since China would suffer if capital ever fled these kinds of projects. Both American and Chinese stimulus is looming this winter but the short run will see more volatility. We are closing our long JPY-KRW tactical trade for a gain of 4.4%   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We have often noted in these pages over the past decade that multilateral organizations overrated improvements in China’s governance based on policy pronouncements rather than structural changes. 2 Still, tensions among the allies should not be overrated since they share a fundamental concern over China’s increasing challenge to the current global order. The EU is pursuing trade talks with Taiwan, and there are ways that the US can compensate France over the nullification of its submarine sales to Australia (most of which are detrimental to China’s security).

Highlights The House Ways and Means Committee’s tax proposals are a slight positive surprise for investors. They envision raising $1.5 trillion in new revenue, down from expectations of $2.6 trillion. The House’s tax plans would see the corporate rate at 26.5%, creating a likely range of 25%-26.5%, confirming our view that the proposal would be closer to Biden’s 28% than Trump’s 21%. Combining the Senate spending proposals with the House tax proposals, our updated scenarios for the budget reconciliation bill point to a net deficit impact of $1.2-$1.6 trillion over ten years. We still assign 80% subjective odds of passage to the bipartisan infrastructure bill and, if it passes, 65% odds to the reconciliation bill’s passage. We still expect the debt ceiling showdown to create only temporary volatility as Democrats have the power to raise or suspend the ceiling unilaterally. The major risk to our cyclically bullish view comes from Chinese corporate debt defaults, not a default on the US national debt. We are closing our consumer discretionary trade for a 9% gain to mitigate risks ahead of looming increase in volatility but we expected cyclical plays on Biden’s forthcoming stimulus bills to grind higher this fall. Feature President Biden’s big budget battle is upon us. The House Ways and Means Committee unveiled its tax proposals for the Democrats’ nominal $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill this fall. Spending proposals are soon to follow. The House tax proposals help to define the range of tax hikes that US businesses and investors face next year. An updated timeline of this fall’s budget battle is shown in Diagram 1. The various House committees are supposed to complete their proposals by September 15, just after we go to press. We will update the spending side next week. After that, on September 27, Democratic lawmakers will have a chance to vote on the bipartisan infrastructure bill that the Senate has already passed. Diagram 1Timeline Of Biden’s Big Budget Battles This Fall The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Bipartisan infrastructure will pass sometime this fall even if there are delays. Pelosi and other Democratic leaders will be forced to de-link this bipartisan bill from their partisan reconciliation bill that expands social welfare. Republicans cannot be associated with reconciliation so any linkage of the two bills could scupper the bipartisan infrastructure bill. But neither President Biden nor moderate Democrats can afford to let the infrastructure deal fail. Table 1 shows the nine House moderates who delayed the passage of the House budget resolution in August to demand a separate vote on bipartisan infrastructure. Five are true centrists, with narrow margins of victory in districts that Biden narrowly won. This is more than the three votes that Pelosi can spare. Table 1Moderate Democrats In Competitive Districts Need the Infrastructure Deal The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Therefore Pelosi will have to separate the two bills. Senator Bernie Sanders and the progressive Democrats cannot afford to let both bills fail – that is merely a progressive bluff. This means we still give an 80% subjective chance that infrastructure will pass. The reconciliation bill has a subjective 65% chance of passing, assuming infrastructure passes. However, it will be greatly modified from current proposals. The $3.5 trillion headline price tag is too high for Senate moderates while the $1-$1.5 trillion price tag outlined by the Moderate-in-Chief, West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin, is too low for progressives. Other points of negotiation and the net deficit impact will be discussed below. Moderate Senate Democrats like Manchin and Arizona Senator Kyrsten Sinema will pass the reconciliation bill because it is the least bad option both for them and their party. They have four main options: Vote to abolish the Senate filibuster, making way for Democrats to push through their controversial voting rights bill. Vote in favor of Biden’s signature reconciliation bill. Vote against both initiatives, thwarting their party and the Biden presidency without necessarily saving their seat in future elections. Vote for both initiatives and face the wrath of their more moderate voter base in their home state. The least bad option is to refrain from abolishing the filibuster but vote in favor of Biden’s reconciliation – they will then save their skin with both their constituents and the Democratic Party. The concessions they extract from party leaders can be sold as victories on the campaign trail back home, along with the bipartisan infrastructure bill. Thus while all kinds of twists and turns can happen this fall, the base case is that the moderate senators fall in line over the reconciliation bill, enabling it to pass by Christmas. Update On The Debt Ceiling September will see a showdown over keeping the government running (avoiding a shutdown) and raising or suspending the national debt ceiling, or the government’s credit card limit. The showdown will cause equity market volatility but it will be temporary – not a compelling reason to sell stocks but rather a possible buying opportunity. This is because a US default on the national debt will be averted. A continuing resolution must be passed by September 30, end of the fiscal year, to avoid a government shutdown. This stop-gap measure is expected to last until December 10, when a new solution on regular budget appropriations will be required. The Democratic tactic is to link the continuing resolution with $24 billion in disaster relief for the Gulf of Mexico and $6.4 billion in emergency funds for Afghan refugees. Republicans would have trouble voting against these worthy causes only to suffer the opprobrium of shutting down the government during a lingering pandemic. Even if this gambit fails, there is little chance the US will default on the national debt. There are four key aspects to this view: 1.   Neither party wants to be blamed for causing a default, which would trigger a financial crisis and deprive seniors and veterans of their federal checks, among other politically intolerable consequences. 2.   The 46 Republicans who signed a letter pledging not to raise the debt ceiling specifically said they will not actively vote to raise or increase the ceiling. They did not explicitly rule out a suspension or delay of the debt ceiling, nor did they say they would filibuster any attempt to raise it.1 Suspending the debt ceiling is the more politically palatable alternative these days because it does not require specifying a certain new dollar amount of debt to which the limit will be raised. It merely suspends or delays the operation of the debt limit for a period of time. In other words, some Republicans could vote for a suspension in the eleventh hour to avoid a national default. You would need six of them to do so (in addition to four Republicans who did not sign the letter, and all 50 Democrats), if there were a Republican filibustering the debt ceiling suspension. But then again, Republicans will likely refuse to filibuster. Any senator who filibusters a suspension of the debt ceiling would personally be responsible for a national default. A senator who goes rogue would encourage his moderate colleagues to break ranks and join the Democrats to reach the 60-vote threshold. Otherwise Democrats plus four Republican moderates are more than enough to meet the 51-seat simple majority requirement. The bipartisan infrastructure bill cannot even function if the debt ceiling is not raised to authorize new spending. So Republicans will be twice the fools if they vote for infrastructure but refuse to suspend the debt limit (as well as natural disaster and Afghan refugee relief). And really thrice the fools, because they are already unpopular as they are tainted with the accusation of inciting an insurrection on January 6 at the Capitol. 3.   Republicans do not control the House or the Senate, so Democrats have the means at their disposal to suspend the debt ceiling unilaterally. 4.   If all options fail, Democrats have the ability to revise the budget resolution so as to include a suspension of the debt ceiling in the reconciliation bill. This point is controversial because it is not certain that the Senate parliamentarian, Elizabeth MacDonough, will allow Democrats to revise the budget resolution to include the debt ceiling. Democrats are already making several demands of her on what can be included in reconciliation, and she has already shot them down once earlier this year over the minimum wage. Our view is that MacDonough would allow the budget resolution to be modified to suspend the debt ceiling if the country were immediately at risk of debt default.2 Moreover the President of the Senate, Vice President Kamala Harris, could always overrule the parliamentarian. This is a key point both for the debt ceiling and the contents of the reconciliation bill. Still, there is serious problem of timing mismatch between the debt ceiling and the reconciliation bill. The government’s technical debt default could happen “during the month of October,” according to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, whereas the reconciliation bill may not be ready to pass by Thanksgiving or Christmas. It is very hard to speed up a historic multi-trillion reconciliation bill to meet a much narrower statutory requirement of suspending the debt ceiling. Therefore suspending the debt ceiling via reconciliation, even if we are correct that it is legal, would be very difficult in execution – and hence very volatility-inducing for equities. The Democrats’ refusal to suspend the debt ceiling on their own is the weak link in the chain and will break under pressure if the Republicans unite in opposition. But the latter is not a foregone conclusion since the GOP would take the blame for a national default. If Republicans regain the House but not the Senate after the November 2022 midterm elections then our assessment of the debt ceiling risk may change. But for 2021, financial markets should view national default as a passing risk. Comparing The House Tax Plan To Previous Expectations The House Ways and Means Committee released tax proposals for the nominal $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill. These proposals will change significantly in the House, and in conference with the Senate, but the new proposals help to determine the range of policies under negotiation. Table 2 outlines the “tax expenditures” or tax breaks that the Democrats propose. The key features are tax breaks for households (e.g. a large and fully refundable child tax credit, an expanded earned income tax credit and dependent tax credit) and tax breaks for corporations to switch to renewable energy and electric vehicles. Table 3 high lights the “revenue raisers” or new taxes. The top marginal corporate rate would be set at 26.5%. While Senate moderates prefer 25%, which has determined consensus expectations, the implicit range is now between these two numbers. This is a confirmation of our prediction that it would be about 26%-27%. The new rate will thus be closer to the 21% rate established by the Trump administration than the previous 35% status quo, which was the highest in the OECD (Chart 1). Table 2House Ways & Means Tax Expenditure Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table 3House Ways & Means Tax Revenue Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Indeed that is the common thread across these tax hikes: the Biden administration, in a nod to the median voter, is only partially reversing President Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Chart 1Corporate Tax Rate Under House Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Chart 2Individual Tax Rate Under House Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan   The top marginal individual rate would be 39.6% — no surprise to anyone (Chart 2). The long-term capital gains tax rate would be set at 25%. In addition, a new 3% surtax would be levied on incomes greater than $5 million. These, combined with the Obamacare surtax of 3.8%, would yield a top marginal rate of 31.8%, close to our expected 32% (Chart 3). The international minimum corporate rate would be set at 16.6%, which, when various tax breaks are included, will end up close to the nominal 15% minimum that Biden agreed with a range of other countries this summer (Chart 4). Putting it all together, the House is projecting a hike in taxes worth $1.5 trillion in total revenue, about 58% of the $2.6 trillion previously envisaged (Table 4). Chart 3Capital Gains Tax Rates Under House Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Chart 4Minimum Corporate Rate Under House Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan  Table 4Comparison Of House And Senate Tax Plan For Reconciliation Bill The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan This news constitutes a slight positive surprise for investors relative to expectations earlier this year. Senate tax writers will probably propose more ambitious taxes but Senate moderates will constrain them when it comes to what can gain 51 votes. So the final bill is unlikely to hike taxes more aggressively. However, we still expect the news of rising taxes to be negative in absolute terms – i.e. to create a one-off knock against corporate earnings that investors will have to digest. The historical record shows that there is no correlation between corporate tax rates and economic growth. However, it is not only corporate rates that are rising. The Biden administration is hiking taxes across the board, which could combine to weigh on business sentiment if growth or earnings disappoint.. A look at tax rates over the long run shows that these hikes are not insignificant, though they are moderate (Chart 5). Chart 5The Long View Of US Tax Rates The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Going forward, however, investors must consider that the political environment in the US suggests that the median voter has shifted to the left due to generational, ethnic, geopolitical, and ideological shifts affecting the electorate. Tax hikes are more likely to become the norm over the long run than tax cuts, the opposite of the case during the long Reagan era. Hence our expectation is that investors will “buy the rumor, sell the news” of the reconciliation bill. The bill will stimulate economic growth – it increases the budget deficit over the coming ten years relative to expectations. But by the time the Senate passes the bill, this effect may be priced in, whereas any unintended consequences of across-the-board tax hikes will have to be accounted for later. And not only will 2022 see tax hikes but it will also see the Federal Reserve preparing for interest rate hikes. The budget deficit will shrink in 2022 but grow over the coming 10 years under Biden’s legislation. Until the House releases its spending plans, we must combine the House tax plan with the Senate spending plan to update our deficit projections. Table 5 provides descriptions of the various legislative scenarios and Table 6 provides the results in terms of revenue, expenditure, and net deficit impact. Note that these tables include the bipartisan infrastructure bill. Table 5Scenario Descriptions For Budget Deficit Under House Ways And Means Tax Proposals (Sept 2021) The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table 6Scenario Results For Budget Deficit Under House Ways And Means Tax Proposals (Sept 2021) The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The deficit impact falls into the same general range we highlighted in the past albeit a bit larger: the Baseline Scenario would amount to a $1.6 trillion net expansion of the deficit over the 10-year budget window, , while the moderate/compromise Scenario 6 would amount to a $1.2 trillion net expansion. Previously we estimated $1-$1.6 trillion, so the difference is a drop in the bucket but the point is that Democrats cannot afford to let tax ambitions sink the entire bill or the economic recovery. The risk to the deficit lies to the upside given that several of the “pay-fors,” or revenue offsets, are chimerical. For example, doubling the size of the Internal Revenue Service may not yield the $140 billion that is projected in higher tax collections, as the Congressional Budget Office pointed out in its scoring of the bipartisan infrastructure bill. The use of “dynamic scoring” to project higher tax revenues from putatively faster economic growth is the favorite gimmick of the US political parties. Investment Takeaways Higher taxes – and a higher labor share of national income via rising wages and social transfers – will weigh on the net profit margins of business. If interest rates rise along with wages and taxes, in a context of hypo-globalization, the result will be a squeeze on margins (Chart 6). The one-off impact of the corporate tax hike on earnings could range from 5%-8%, according to our Global Investment Strategy. President Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act created a 16% gap in the growth of earnings after tax relative to pre-tax earnings growth (Chart 7). A partial reversal of Trump’s hikes could produce half of this effect in the opposite direction. Our US Investment Strategy and US Equity Strategy still expect positive earnings growth in 2022. Chart 6Drivers Of Profit Margins Drivers Of Profit Margins Drivers Of Profit Margins Chart 7Gauging The Tax Hit To Earnings Gauging The Tax Hit To Earnings Gauging The Tax Hit To Earnings The sectors that pay the lowest effective taxes in the US are the ones that stand to suffer most from broadening the corporate tax base, raising rates, and tightening enforcement. This would include Big Tech as well as health care and utilities (although we are bullish on health care in general). Sectors like tech that gain a large share of earnings from abroad also stand to suffer. These low-tax sectors will especially suffer on a relative basis if Biden’s stimulus pushes up growth and inflation expectations and hence interest rates. Companies that pay high effective rates, such as energy, industrials, and materials, could also lose out. But as long as the pandemic continues to wane and the global economy recovers, some of these high-tax firms should still perform well, as will companies with a high share of earnings from abroad. The relative performance of these different baskets suggests that markets are still much more concerned about global recovery than about higher taxes (Chart 8). Cyclical and “value” stocks surged on the advent of the coronavirus vaccines despite the political result in the US indicating that tax hikes were coming. This was a key signal and we would expect something similar, on a smaller scale, as the pandemic recedes. Chart 8Higher Taxes Will Hit The Trump Winners Higher Taxes Will Hit The Trump Winners Higher Taxes Will Hit The Trump Winners American populism is visible in that the Biden administration is coopting Trump’s agenda in various areas despite outward acrimony (e.g. infrastructure, China, trade protectionism). It is only partially reversing Trump’s legacy even in the areas of greatest disagreement, such as taxes. When all is said and done this Christmas, the United States will likely be left with a net tax cut relative to the levels seen under President Obama’s administration. We would not be surprised if across-the-board tax hikes caused or contributed to an equity market correction sometime in the wake of the bill’s passage. But that would not be a reason to grow cyclically bearish. Instead, the fate of China’s economic growth is the big risk to the cyclical view. While we expect equities to grind higher, we are booking a 9% gain on our consumer discretionary trade to mitigate risks ahead of the looming volatility this fall. Fundamentally we remain bullish on this sector due to economic recovery, fiscal stimulus, income redistribution, and the relative costs of the upcoming tax hikes.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table A1USPS Trade Table The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table A2Political Risk Matrix The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Chart A1Presidential Election Model The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Chart A2Senate Election Model The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table A3Political Capital Index The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets The House Ways And Means Tax Plan The House Ways And Means Tax Plan Footnotes 1     See Senator Shelley Moore Capito, “Debt Ceiling Letter,” United States Senate, August 10, 2021, capito.senate.gov. 2     Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer of New York said “We have a number of different ways we’re going to look at getting the debt ceiling done. We must get it done,” in the context of whether Democratic leaders would revise the budget resolution’s reconciliation instructions to lift the debt ceiling. See Jennifer Shutt, “Yellen: Treasury could hit debt ceiling in October without congressional action,” Roll Call, September 8, 2021, rollcall.com.  For the parliamentarian’s role, see James Wallner, “Parliamentarian’s Guidance Contradicts Budget Rules,” Legislative Procedure, June 21, 2021, legislativeprocedure.com.

Congress’ passage of the American Families Act is a keystone of the President Biden’s legislative agenda. However, to pay for the additional spending, Democrats will seek to levy more taxes on corporations and higher-income earners. The Biden Administration is aiming to raise the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%, bringing it halfway back to the 35% level that prevailed prior to the Trump tax cuts. Joe Manchin, a key swing voter in the Senate, has indicated a preference for 25%. PredictIt, a popular betting site, assigns 31% odds to no tax hike. Among bettors forecasting higher tax rates, the median estimate is around 25% (Chart 1).  BCA’s Geopolitical team thinks that corporate taxes will rise more than current market expectations suggest. Chart 1 Only Death And Taxes… Only Death And Taxes… Meanwhile, analyst estimates do not appear to reflect the prospect of higher taxes. However, even under President Biden’s baseline scenario of 28% tax rate, higher tax rates will cut earnings-per-share for S&P 500 companies by about 5% in 2022. Given that earnings are expected to rise by 9% next year, this would leave earnings growth in a positive territory, but just about (BCA Research - Five Risks We Are Monitoring). That’s concerning, given that earnings—particularly earnings estimates—have been driving the S&P 500 higher. The market, however, hasn’t even begun to consider the potential impact (Chart 2). Chart 2 CHART 2 CHART 2 Bottom Line: Corporate taxes are slated for a rise, yet the market has not yet priced this in.  Even base case scenario tax hike to 28% is bound to reduce earnings growth by 5%, and have an adverse effect on the US equity market returns.

Highlights Canada has been a G10 leader in innoculating its population. This should allow economic activity to resume, boosting the CAD/USD. A cresting in COVID-19 infections should permit the Bank of Canada to reintroduce a hawkish bias in upcoming policy meetings. While the CAD/USD is likely to strengthen, it will underperform at the crosses. Feature The Canadian dollar has been rather resilient amid broad US dollar strength this year. While the DXY is up 2.8%, the loonie has still managed to outperform marginally. This is a remarkable feat, given that the Canadian dollar is very much a procyclical currency, and is usually held hostage by broad movements in the trade-weighted dollar. The vaccination campaign in Canada has been very successful, pinning the country as a leader in the G10. This has partly helped curtail the number of new infections from the Delta variant of COVID-19, allowing the economy to reopen faster than its peers (Chart I-1). This is important because there has been a very clear correlation between currency markets and vaccination rates. In general, the countries with higher vaccination rates (UK, Canada, US) have seen better currency performance than countries with the worst vaccination rates (Australia, Japan, Chart I-2). Chart I-1Vaccinations Have Worked For Canada Vaccinations Have Worked For Canada Vaccinations Have Worked For Canada Chart I-2CAD/USD An Outperformer This Year An Update On The Canadian Dollar An Update On The Canadian Dollar In our October 20, 2020 report, we suggested the loonie will hit 82 cents, a level around which it peaked this year. Going forward, the key question is whether Canada’s vaccination success will allow the loonie to eventually overtake these highs. The outlook hinges on two critical calls: What happens to natural resource prices, specifically crude oil; and the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) monetary policy stance relative to the Federal Reserve. Our bias is that a cresting in COVID-19 infections should allow the BoC to reintroduce a hawkish bias in upcoming policy meetings, while oil prices should stay well bid over a cyclical horizon. This will allow the loonie to strengthen in a 12-18 month timeframe. This said, we also expect the loonie to underperform other commodity currencies. Improving Domestic Conditions The latest GDP report out of Canada was surprisingly weak, but by most measures, this represents a temporary blip. Canada is adding jobs at the fastest pace in decades, an average of 102 thousand per month this year. This is leading to the quickest recovery in the unemployment rate on record (Chart I-3). A total of 18.9 million Canadians are currently employed, a smidgen away from the February 2020 high of 19.1 million. At the current pace of job additions, employment should overtake pre-pandemic levels during the next couple of job reports. There remains a sizeable deficit of jobs in service-producing industries (Chart I-4). This suggests that as mobility trends improve, job gains should accrue. The majority of job losses since the pandemic have been in the accommodation, food services, wholesale trade, and retail trade sectors. Chart I-3Canadians Are Quickly Getting Back ##br##To Work Canadians Are Quickly Getting Back To Work Canadians Are Quickly Getting Back To Work Chart I-4Pent Up Recovery In Services Jobs Still Ahead of Us An Update On The Canadian Dollar An Update On The Canadian Dollar Strong employment growth has spurred an improvement in consumer demand. Consumer confidence is rebounding in Canada. Retail sales are robust, having handily overtaken pre-pandemic levels. Mortgage credit has also rebounded amidst low interest rates (Chart I-5).   Chart I-5Lower Rates Are Boosting Household Borrowing Lower Rates Are Boosting Household Borrowing Lower Rates Are Boosting Household Borrowing It is therefore no surprise that inflationary pressures have begun to surface in the Canadian economy. In the latest Business Outlook Survey, capacity pressures were at a decade high. Firms reported that shortages in skilled and specialized labor will persist. There are obviously fewer workers with the skills needed in a post-COVID-19 world, but government support schemes have also eaten up labor supply in traditionally fluid labor demand/supply sectors such as hospitality. Meanwhile, supply bottlenecks have also led to production constraints. This is beginning to show up in the key inflation prints to which the BoC pays attention (Chart I-6). Both the trimmed-mean and median CPI are well above the midpoint of the central bank’s 1%-3% target. While the BoC maintains that some upward pressure on inflation is due to temporary factors, the Canadian unemployment rate is declining faster than that in the US, giving scope for the BoC to normalize policy before the Fed, and putting upward pressure on the CAD (Chart I-7). Asset purchases have already been cut in half from C$4 billion to C$2 billion a week. Chart I-6CPI Is Above Midpoint Of The BoC Target Range CPI Is Above Midpoint Of The BoC Target Range CPI Is Above Midpoint Of The BoC Target Range Chart I-7Canada Versus US ##br##Employment Canada Versus US Employment Canada Versus US Employment Meanwhile, house prices are rising quite strongly. The rise in prices has been very broad based, making housing unaffordable for most Canadians (Chart I-8). Residential investment represents almost 9% of Canadian GDP, a significant chunk of aggregate demand (Chart I-9). This suggests that if left unchecked, a housing market bust will deal a severe blow to the Canadian economy. Chart I-8Surging Home Prices A Headache For The BoC Surging Home Prices A Headache For The BoC Surging Home Prices A Headache For The BoC Chart I-9Canadian GDP Is Highly Exposed To Residential Housing Canadian GDP Is Highly Exposed To Residential Housing Canadian GDP Is Highly Exposed To Residential Housing In a nutshell, despite the BoC standing aside this week, the path of least resistance for Canada is towards tighter monetary policy. This dovetails with the recommendation from our Global Fixed Income Strategy colleagues, who recommend an underweight position in Canadian bonds. Elections And Fiscal Policy A snap federal election will be held in Canada on September 20. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s bet is that an astute handling of the pandemic, combined with massive fiscal stimulus, gives him a legitimate shot at a majority government. During his Throne Speech last year, he vowed to do “whatever it takes” to support people and businesses throughout the crisis. The rationale is to deliver on this promise going into 2022. The Conservatives have taken a slight lead over the Liberals in the opinion polls, even though a similar state of affairs did not secure them a victory back in the 2019 election (Chart I-10). In general, the Liberals are pushing for more fiscal spending, but are also focused on issues that Canadians care about, such as housing and climate change. The Conservatives, on the other hand, are focused on balancing the budget, which could jeopardize the nascent economic recovery that Canada currently enjoys. Historically, minority governments tend to be positive for the Canadian dollar, while majority governments generally nudge the loonie lower post-election (Chart I-11). In the current context, a Liberal minority will allow fiscal policy to stay easy, giving room for the BoC to curtail accommodative monetary conditions. Tighter monetary policy and easy fiscal policy tend to be positive for a currency in a Mundell-Fleming framework. Meanwhile, a Conservative minority might dial back a little on fiscal stimulus, but not by much due to political gridlock. Chart I-10Polling Ahead Of The ##br##Election An Update On The Canadian Dollar An Update On The Canadian Dollar Chart I-11Historically, The Market Likes A Minority Government Historically, The Market Likes A Minority Government Historically, The Market Likes A Minority Government In a nutshell, a Liberal minority is likely to be positive for the loonie. Should the Trudeau government win a majority, then fiscal policy might become much more profligate, which will boost inflation expectations in Canada and depress real rates. This will be negative for the loonie, unless the BoC aggressively tightens monetary policy. The Canadian Dollar And Crude Oil The above synopsis highlights that a key driver of the Canadian dollar is the BoC’s monetary policy stance, particularly vis-à-vis the Fed. The other critical variable is what happens to natural resource prices, specifically crude oil. The loonie has a strong correlation with the price of oil, chiefly the Western Canadian Select (WCS) blend (Chart I-12). Chart I-12The Loonie Tracks WCS Oil Prices The Loonie Tracks WCS Oil Prices The Loonie Tracks WCS Oil Prices Going forward, the path for oil prices will be highly dependent on the interplay between demand and supply, especially given the various waves of COVID-19. Oil demand tends to follow the ebbs and flows of the business cycle, with over 60% of global petroleum consumed by the transportation sector. A population under lockdown is negative for crude. Nonetheless, our commodity strategists expect oil prices to average $73 per barrel next year, around today’s levels for Brent, as supply dynamics adjust to the current paradigm. With the WCS blend trading at a discount to this price, there is room for upside surprises due to the following reasons: Investment in the Canadian oil sands has dropped tremendously, while the environmental efficiency (emissions per barrel) has been improving (Chart I-13). This has narrowed the spread between WCS and Brent, something that is likely to persist. Canadian producers have gained market share in the heavy crude oil market, on the back of a drop in Venezuelan production. Production cuts in Alberta have also helped mitigate the oversupply of heavy crude. Canadian oil exports remain near record highs, even though the US is rapidly becoming energy independent (Chart I-14). A lot of refining capacity in the US has been fine-tuned to handle the cheaper, heavier blend from Canada. Finally, pipeline capacity remains a major hurdle in Canada but it is slated to ease. The Trans Mountain Expansion project (590K additional barrels), connecting Alberta to the Westridge Marine Terminal and Chevron refinery in Burnaby, is slated to be competed by the end of 2022. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives support the project. This could narrow the discount between WCS and WTI crude oil. Chart I-13Will A Cleaner Oil Sector See A Bottom In Investments? An Update On The Canadian Dollar An Update On The Canadian Dollar Chart I-14The Energy Independent US Still Likes Canadian Oil The Energy Independent US Still Likes Canadian Oil The Energy Independent US Still Likes Canadian Oil Netting it all out, we expect crude oil prices to stay firm, in line with our colleagues at the Commodity and Energy Strategy team, and the Canadian discount not to widen by much. This should provide modest upside for the Canadian dollar, which has lagged the improvement in terms of trade (Chart I-15). It is remarkable that long-term portfolio flows into Canadian assets have started picking up, a sign of bargain hunting by international investors (Chart I-16). This should provide a modest tailwind to the Canadian dollar over the next 9-to-12 months. Chart I-15The Loonie Is Undervalued Based On Terms Of Trade The Loonie Is Undervalued Based On Terms Of Trade The Loonie Is Undervalued Based On Terms Of Trade Chart I-16Will The Rising Capital Inflow Provide A Support For The Loonie? Will The Rising Capital Inflow Provide A Support For The Loonie? Will The Rising Capital Inflow Provide A Support For The Loonie? Investment Implications We expect the CAD/USD to break above the recent 82-cent high, towards 85 and eventually 90 cents. The key catalysts are both favorable interest rates versus the US and a gradual recovery in WCS oil prices as global economic activity picks up. According to our fundamental models, the CAD is still very undervalued (Chart I-17). Chart I-17The Loonie Is Undervalued By 19% According To Our Model The Loonie Is Undervalued By 19% According To Our Model The Loonie Is Undervalued By 19% According To Our Model Chart I-18The NOK Will Lead The CAD ##br##For Now The NOK Will Lead The CAD For Now The NOK Will Lead The CAD For Now Relative to other commodity currencies, the CAD should lag the AUD as the green energy revolution exhibits staying power, which will benefit metals more than oil over the longer term. In the shorter term, Canadian crude is likely to remain trapped in the oil sands for now, while North Sea crude will face fewer transportation bottlenecks. This suggests that the path of least resistance for the CAD/NOK is down (Chart I-18). Rising oil prices are a terms-of-trade boost for oil exporters, but lead to demand destruction for oil importers. In general, a strategy for playing oil upside is to be long a basket of energy producers versus energy consumers. This suggests that the CAD has upside against the euro, the Indian rupee, and the Turkish lira. But given that the latter currencies are oversold, we will wait for a better buying opportunity.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Germany’s election on September 26 is more of an opportunity than a risk for global investors. Coalition formation will prolong uncertainty but the key takeaway is that early or aggressive fiscal tightening is off the table for Germany … and hence the EU. Germany’s left wing is surprising to the upside as predicted, but it is the Social Democrats rather than the Greens who have momentum in the polls. This is a market-positive development. A coalition of only left-wing parties is entirely possible, but there is a 65% chance that the Christian Democrats (or Free Democrats) will take part in the next coalition to get a majority government. This would constrain business unfriendly outcomes. The German economy is likely to slow for the remainder of 2021, but the outlook for 2022 remains bright as the current headwinds facing the country will dissipate, especially if the risk of an aggressive fiscal drag is low. The underperformance of German equities relative to their Eurozone counterparts is long in the tooth. A combination of valuation, earnings momentum and technical factors suggests that German stocks will beat their peers next year. German equities will also outperform Bunds, which offer particularly unattractive prospective returns. Feature Germany’s federal election will be held on September 26. Our forecast that the left wing will surprise to the upside remains on track, albeit with the Social Democrats rather than the Greens surging to the forefront of opinion polls (Chart 1). However, the precise composition of the next government is very much in the air. Chart 1German Election: Social Democrats Take The Lead German Election: Social Democrats Take The Lead German Election: Social Democrats Take The Lead Our quantitative German election model – which we introduce in this special report – predicts that the ruling Christian Democratic Union will outperform their current 21% standing in opinion polls, winning as much as 33% of the popular vote. Subjectively, this seems like an overestimation, but it goes to show that outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s popularity, a historically strong voting base, and the economic recovery will help the party pare its losses this year. This finding, combined with the strong momentum for the Social Democrats, suggests that the election outcome will not be decisive. Germany will end up with either a grand coalition that includes Merkel’s Christian Democrats or a left-wing coalition that lacks a majority in parliament.1 Investors should note that none of the election outcomes are hugely disruptive to domestic or foreign policy. The status quo is unexciting but not market-negative, while a surprise left-wing victory would mean more reflation in the short run but a roll back of some pro-business policies in the long run. More broadly Germany has established a national consensus that rests on European integration, looser fiscal policy, renewable energy, and qualified engagement with autocratic powers like Russia and China. The chief takeaway is that fiscal policy will not be tightened too soon – and could be loosened substantially. Germany’s Fiscal Question Outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel is stepping down after ruling Germany since 2005. The Christian Democratic Union, and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union, together form the “Union” that is hard to beat in German elections, having occupied the chancellor’s office for 57 out of 72 years. However, both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, their main rivals, have been shedding popular vote share since 1990, as other parties like the Greens, Free Democrats, the Left, and Alternative for Germany have gained traction (Table 1). Table 1Germany: Traditional Parties Lose Vote Share Over Time German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change The Great Recession and European sovereign debt crisis ushered in a new geopolitical and macroeconomic context that Merkel reluctantly helped Germany and the EU navigate. Germany’s clashes with the European periphery ultimately resulted in deeper EU integration, in accordance with Germany’s grand strategy and Merkel’s own strategy. But just as the euro crisis receded, a series of shocks elsewhere threatened to upend Germany’s position as one of the biggest economic winners of the post-Cold War world. The sluggish aftermath of the financial crisis, the Russian invasion of Crimea, the Syrian refugee crisis, the Brexit referendum, and President Trump’s election in the US sparked a retreat from globalization, a direct threat to an export-oriented manufacturing economy like Germany. In the 2017 election the Union lost 13.4 percentage points compared to the 2013 election. Minor parties have gradually gained ground since then. However, through a coalition with the Social Democrats, Merkel and her party managed to retain control of the government. This grand coalition eased the country’s fiscal belt in response to the trade war and global slowdown in 2019, signaling Germany’s own shift away from fiscal austerity. Then COVID-19 struck, prompting a much larger fiscal expansion to tide over the economy amid social lockdowns. Germany was not the largest EU member in terms of fiscal stimulus but nor was it the smallest (Chart 2). It joined with France to negotiate a mutual debt plan to rescue the broader EU economy and deepen integration. Chart 2Germany’s Fiscal Stimulus Ranks In The Middle Of Major Countries German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change Germany’s pro-EU perspective has been reinforced by Brexit and is not on the ballot in 2021. Immigration and terrorism have temporarily subsided as voter concerns. The focus of the 2021 election is how to get through the pandemic and rebuild the German economy for the future. For investors the chief question is whether conservatives will have enough sway in the next government to try to semi-normalize policy and consolidate budgets in the coming years, or whether a left-wing coalition will take charge, expanding on Germany’s proactive fiscal turn. The latter has consequences for broader EU fiscal normalization as well since Germany is traditionally the prime enforcer of deficit limits. The latest opinion polls point to more proactive fiscal policy. The country’s left-leaning ideological bloc has taken the lead (Chart 3A) and the Social Democratic leader Olaf Scholz has sprung into first place among the chancellor candidates (Chart 3B). Chart 3AGermany: Voting Intentions Favor Left-Leaning Parties Germany: Voting Intentions Favor Left-Leaning Parties Germany: Voting Intentions Favor Left-Leaning Parties Chart 3BSocial Democrats Likely To Take Chancellery German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change Scholz has served as finance minister and is the face of the country’s recent fiscal stimulus efforts. Public opinion is clearly rewarding him for this stance as well as his party, which was previously in the doldrums.2 The Social Democrats and Greens are calling for more fiscal expansion as well as wage hikes and tax hikes (wealth redistribution) in pursuit of social equality and a greener economy (Table 2). If the Christian Democrats retain a significant role in the future coalition, these initiatives will be blunted – not to say halted entirely. But if the left parties put together a ruling coalition without the Christian Democrats, then they will be able to launch more ambitious tax-and-spend policies. Opinion polls show that voters still slightly favor coalitions that include the Christian Democrats, although momentum has shifted sharply in favor of a left-wing coalition (Chart 4). Table 2German Party Platforms German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change Chart 4Voters Evenly Split On Whether Next Coalition Should Include CDU German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change This shift is what we forecast in previous reports but now the question is whether the left-wing parties can actually win enough seats to put together a majority coalition. That is a tall order. Our quantitative election model suggests that the Christian Democrats, having suffered a long overdue downgrade in expectations, will not utterly collapse when the final vote is tallied. While we do not expect them to retain the chancellorship, momentum will have to shift even further in the opposition’s favor over the next two weeks to produce a majority coalition that excludes the Union. Our Quantitative German Election Model Our model is based off the work of Norpoth and Geschwend, who created a simple linear model to predict the vote share that incumbent governing parties or coalitions will obtain in impending elections.3 Their model utilizes three explanatory variables and has a sample size of 18 previous elections, covering elections from 1953 to 2017. Our model updates their original work to make estimates for the 2021 election. Unlike our US Political Strategy Presidential Model, which makes use of both political and economic explanatory variables in real time, our German election model makes predictions based solely on historical political variables, all of which display a high degree of correlation with popular vote share. We will look at economic factors that may affect the election later in this report. The Three Explanatory Variables 1. Chancellor Approval Rating: This variable captures the short-term support rate of the incumbent chancellor. A positive relationship exists between chancellor approval and vote share: higher approval equates to higher vote share for the incumbent party. Merkel’s approval stands at 64% today which is a boon for the otherwise beleaguered Christian Democrats (Chart 5). Chart 5Merkel's Coattails A Boon But Not Enough To Save Her Party Merkel's Coattails A Boon But Not Enough To Save Her Party Merkel's Coattails A Boon But Not Enough To Save Her Party 2. Long-term partisanship: This variable shows the long-term support rate of voters for specific parties or coalitions in past elections. It is measured as the average vote share of the incumbent party over the past three elections. A positive relationship with vote share exists here too: higher historical partisanship equates to a higher share of votes in forthcoming elections, and vice versa. This variable clearly gives a boost to the Christian Democrats – although it could overrate them based on past performance, as occurred in 2017 when they underperformed the model’s prediction.4 3. “Time For Change”: This is a categorical variable measured by how many terms the parties or coalition have held office leading into an election. This variable has a negative relationship with vote share outcomes. The longer an incumbent party or coalition holds office, the less vote share they will receive. Effectively, our model punishes parties that hold office for long periods of time. In this case that would be the long-ruling Christian Democrats. Model Estimation And Results Our model is estimated by the following simple equation: Popular Vote Share = constant + ßChancellor Approval Rating + ßLong-Term Partisanship + ßTime For Change Estimating the above model for the 2021 election predicts that the Union will win 32.7% of the vote share (Table 3). If this prediction came true, it would suggest that the ruling party performed almost exactly the same as in 2017. In other words, the party’s strong voter base combined with Merkel’s long coattails are expected to shore up the party. This flies in opinion polling, however, so we think the model is overestimating the Christian Democrats. Table 3Our German Election Quant Model Says CDU Will Not Collapse German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change Note that even if the Union performs this well, it still will not win enough seats to govern on its own. Potential Union-led coalitions are shown in Table 3, excluding the Social Democrats (see below). For a majority government, a coalition with the Free Democrats and the Greens would need to be formed. This coalition would equate to 53% of the vote share. Otherwise, to obtain a majority, the Union would have to team up with the Social Democrats, which is today’s status quo. We can use the same methodology to predict the vote share for the Social Democrats. We use the support rate of Social Democratic chancellor-candidate Olaf Scholz and calculate the long-term partisanship variable using past Social Democratic vote shares. In this case our model predicts that the Social Democrats will win 22.1% of the vote. If this result were to come true, it would not be enough for the party to govern own its own. Potential Social Democratic-led coalitions are shown in Table 4. The best coalition would be with the Greens and either the Left or the Free Democrats. But in this case the Social Democrats cannot form a government with a vote share above 50%, unless it pairs up with the Christian Democrats. Table 4Our German Election Quant Model Says SPD Has Not Yet Won It All German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change In other words, either the left-wing parties must build on their current momentum and outperform their historical record in the final election tally, or they will need to form a coalition with the Christian Democrats. This kind of left-wing surge is precisely what we have predicted. But the model helps put into perspective how difficult it will be for the left-leaning parties to get a majority. Scholz is single-handedly trying to overcome the long downtrend of the Social Democrats. His party is rising at the expense of the Greens, and the Left, which puts a lid on the total left-wing coalition size. If these three parties all beat the model and slightly surpass their top vote share in recent memory (SPD at 26%, Greens at 11%, and the Left at 12%), they still only have 49% of the vote. While our model is reliant on historical political data, it is a robust predictor for past election results (Chart 6). The average vote share error between the predicted and realized outcomes over from 1953 to 2013 is 1.7 percentage points. The problem with relying on the model is that the Christian Democrats have broken down from their long-term trend in opinion polls. And while Merkel’s approval is strong, she is no longer on the ballot and her hand-picked successor, Armin Laschet, is floundering in the polls (see Chart 3B above). Chart 6Our German Election Quant Model Has Solid Track Record, But Merkel’s High Approval Rating Caused Overestimate In 2017 And May Do So In 2021 German Election: Winds Of Change German Election: Winds Of Change In short, the model is probably overrating the Union but it is also calling attention to the extreme difficulty of the left-wing parties forming a majority coalition. Scholz may have to form a coalition with the Free Democrats or pursue another grand coalition. And if the Social Democrats fail to get the largest vote share, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier may ask Armin Laschet to try to form a government first. Still, Scholz is the most likely chancellor when all is said and done. Election Model Takeaway Our German election model predicts that the Union will receive 32.9% of the popular vote, while the Social Democrats will receive 22.1%. At the same time, the left-leaning parties, specifically the Social Democrats, clearly have the momentum. Therefore the model may be overrating the incumbent party. But it still calls attention to a high level of uncertainty, the likelihood of a messy election outcome, and a tricky period of coalition formation. The Social Democrats will have to pull off a major surprise, outperforming both history and our model, to lead a majority government without the Christian Democrats.5 We still think this is possible. But we will stick with our earlier subjective probabilities: 65% odds that the Christian Democrats take part in the next coalition, 35% odds that they do not. Bottom Line: The chancellorship will go to the Social Democrats but the coalition will constrain the business unfriendly aspects of their agenda. This is positive for Germany’s corporate earnings outlook. Macro Outlook: A Temporary Economic Dip Our election model does not account for the economic backdrop and hence ignores the “pocketbook voter.” Germany is recovering from the pandemic, which is marginally supportive for an otherwise faltering ruling party. However, the economic data is only good enough to suggest that the Union will not utterly collapse. A rise in unemployment, inflation, and the combination of the two (the “Misery Index”) is a tell-tale sign that the incumbent party will suffer a substantial defeat (Chart 7). However the German economy’s loss of momentum is temporary. Growth will re-accelerate in early 2022. The timing is politically inconvenient for the ruling party but positive news for investors. German economic confidence is deteriorating. The Ifo Business Climate survey has rolled over, lowered by a meaningful decline in the Expectations Survey. Additionally, consumer confidence is turning south, despite already being low (Chart 8). Chart 7Spike In German Misery Index A Tell-Tale Sign Of Poor Election For Incumbent Party Spike In German Misery Index A Tell-Tale Sign Of Poor Election For Incumbent Party Spike In German Misery Index A Tell-Tale Sign Of Poor Election For Incumbent Party Chart 8Deteriorating German Confidence Deteriorating German Confidence Deteriorating German Confidence A combination of factors weighs on German confidence: First, global supply chain bottlenecks are hurting growth. The automotive industry, which is paralyzed by a global chip shortage, accounts for about 20% of industrial production, and its output is once again declining after a sharp but short-lived rebound last year (Chart 9). Similarly, inventories of finished goods are collapsing, which is hurting growth today (Chart 9, second panel). Second, the Delta variant of COVID-19 is causing a spike in infections. The rise in cases prevents containment measures from easing as much as expected, while it also hurts the willingness of households to go out and spend their funds (Chart 9, third panel). Third, German real wages are weak. Negotiated wages are only growing at a 1.7% annual rate, and wages and salaries are expanding at 2.1% annually. Meanwhile, German headline CPI runs at 3.9%. The declining purchasing power of German households accentuates their current malaise. Three crucial forces counterbalance these negatives: First, German house prices are growing at a 9.4% annual rate, which is creating a potent, positive wealth effect (Chart 10). Chart 9Germany's Headwinds Germany's Headwinds Germany's Headwinds Chart 10A Strong Wealth Effect A Strong Wealth Effect A Strong Wealth Effect Second, German household credit remains robust. According to the Bundesbank, the strength in household credit mostly reflects the strong demand for mortgages. Historically, a healthy housing sector is an excellent leading indicator of economic vigor. Third, the Chinese credit impulse is too depressed for Beijing’s political security. The recent decline in the credit impulse to -2.4% of GDP reflects a policy decision in the fall of 2020 to trim down the credit expansion. As a result, Chinese economic growth is slowing. For example, both the Caixin Manufacturing and Services PMIs stand below 50, at post-pandemic lows of 49.2 and 46.7, respectively. In July authorities became uncomfortable and cut the Reserve Requirement Ratio as well as interbank rates to free liquidity and stabilize the economy. A boom is not forthcoming, but the drag on global activity will ebb by next year. Including the headwinds and tailwinds to the economy, German activity will slow down for the remainder of the year before improving anew in 2022. Our election case outlined above – that the conservatives will lose the chancellorship and either be excluded from power or greatly diminished in the Bundestag – means that fiscal policy will not be tightened abruptly and will not create a material risk to this outlook. Chart 11Vaccines Work Vaccines Work Vaccines Work Many of the headwinds will dissipate. The Delta-wave of COVID-19 will diminish. Already, Germany’s R0 is tentatively peaking, which normally precedes a drop in daily new cases. Moreover, Germany’s vaccination campaign is progressing, which limits the impact of the current wave on hospitalization and intensive care-unit usage (Chart 11). Inflation will peak in Germany, which will salvage real wages. As European Investment Strategy wrote last Monday,6 European inflation remains concentrated in sectors linked to commodity prices or directly affected by bottlenecks. Instead, trimmed-mean CPI is muted (Chart 12), which implies that underlying inflationary pressures are small, especially as wage gains are still well contained. Moreover, the one-off impact of the end of the German VAT rebate will also pass. Finally, a stabilization and eventual revival of the Chinese credit impulse will put a floor under German exports, industrial production, and capex (Chart 13). For now, the previous decline in the Chinese credit impulse is consistent with slower German output growth for the remainder of 2021. However, next year, the German industrial sector will start to feel the effect of the current efforts to improve Chinese liquidity conditions. Chart 12Narrow European Inflation Narrow European Inflation Narrow European Inflation Bottom Line: The German economy is set to deteriorate for the remainder of 2021. However, as the current wave of COVID-19 infections ebbs, real wages recover, and China’s credit impulse stabilizes, Germany’s economic activity will re-accelerate in 2022, especially if the upcoming election does not generate a meaningful fiscal shock. We do not think it will. Chart 13China: From Headwinds To Tailwind? China: From Headwinds To Tailwind? China: From Headwinds To Tailwind? Market Implications: German Stocks To Shine German equities are set to outperform their European counterparts and will significantly beat Bunds over the coming 18 months. During the past 5 months, the German MSCI index has underperformed the rest of the Eurozone by 6.2%. The poor performance of German equities is worse than meets the eye. If we adjust for sectoral differences by building equal sector-weight indexes, Germany has underperformed the Euro Area by 22% since early 2017 (Chart 14). Chart 14Not Delivering The Goods Not Delivering The Goods Not Delivering The Goods This underperformance is long in the tooth and should reverse because of four important dynamics. First, German equities are cheap relative to the European benchmark. As Chart 15 highlights, the relative performance of German stock prices has lagged that of profits. This underperformance is also true once we account for the different sectoral composition of the German market. As a result, Germany is cheap on a forward price-to-earnings, price-to-sales, and price-to-book basis versus the Euro Area. Additionally, analysts embed significantly lower long-term and one-year expected growth rates of earnings in Germany than in the rest of the Eurozone, which depresses the German PEG ratios. Second, German operating metrics do not justify the valuation discount of German equities. The return on equity of German stocks stands at 11.39%, which is similar to that of the Euro Area. Profit margins are also comparable, at 5.91% and 5.74%, respectively. However, German firms utilize their capital more efficiently, and their asset turnover stands at 0.3 times compared to 0.2 times for the Eurozone average. Meanwhile, German non-financial firms are less indebted than their Eurozone competitors, which implies that Germany’s return on assets is greater than that of Europe at large (Chart 16). Chart 15Lagging Prices, Not Earnings Lagging Prices, Not Earnings Lagging Prices, Not Earnings Chart 16Why The Discount? Why The Discount? Why The Discount? Third, the drivers of earnings support a German outperformance. Over the past thirty years, commodity prices led the performance of German stocks relative to that of the rest of the Eurozone (Chart 17). While the near-term outlook for natural resource prices is muddy, BCA’s commodity strategists expect Brent prices to average more than $80/bbl in 2023 and industrial metals to outperform energy over the coming years.7 Additionally, German Services PMI are bottoming compared to that of the Eurozone. Over the past decade, this process preceded periods of outperformance by German stocks (Chart 18). Similarly, the collapse in the Chinese credit impulse relative to the robust domestic economic activity in Europe is well reflected in the underperformance of German shares. The Eurozone’s Service PMI is near all-time highs and unlikely to improve further; however, the Chinese credit impulse should recover in the coming quarters. This phenomenon will help German stocks (Chart 19). Chart 17Commodity Bulls Pull Germany Commodity Bulls Pull Germany Commodity Bulls Pull Germany Chart 18German Vs European Activity Matters German Vs European Activity Matters German Vs European Activity Matters Chart 19German Vs Chinese Activity Matters German Vs Chinese Activity Matters German Vs Chinese Activity Matters The German MSCI index is also oversold. The 52-week rate of change of its performance compared to the rest of the Eurozone plunged to its lowest reading since the introduction of the euro in 1999 (Chart 20). Meanwhile, the 13-week rate of change remains low but has begun to improve (not shown). This combination usually heralds a forthcoming rebound in German relative performance. In relation to equities, German Bunds remain an unappealing investment. Based on historical experience, the current yield of -0.36% offered by German 10-year bonds condemns investors to negative returns over the next five years (Chart 21). Chart 20Oversold! Oversold! Oversold! Chart 21Bounded Bunds' Returns Bounded Bunds' Returns Bounded Bunds' Returns Even if realized inflation ebbs in Germany and Europe, inflation expectations remain low and an eventual return to full employment will force CPI swaps higher, especially if the ECB maintains easy monetary conditions and invites further risk-taking in the Eurozone. The global economic cycle will also move from a friend to a foe for Bunds. As Chart 22 illustrates, the recent deceleration in global export growth was consistent with the fresh uptick in the returns of German paper. However, if Chinese credit flows stabilize by year-end and reaccelerate in 2022 while supply-chain bottlenecks dissipate, global export growth will improve. This should hurt Bund prices, especially as the long-term terminal rate proxy embedded in the German curve remains too low. As a result, not only should Bunds underperform German equities, but the German yield curve will also steepen further relative to that of the US, where the Fed will lift the short-end of the curve faster than the ECB. Chart 22Economic Momentum And Bunds Prices Economic Momentum And Bunds Prices Economic Momentum And Bunds Prices Bottom Line: The underperformance of German equities relative to those of the rest of the Eurozone is well advanced, which makes German stocks a bargain. The current deceleration in global and German growth will not extend beyond 2021, which suggests that German stocks prices should converge toward their earnings outperformance next year. Our political forecast suggests that the odds of an early or aggressive fiscal retrenchment are very low. Additionally, German equities will outperform Bunds, which offer particularly poor prospective returns.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary Senior Vice President Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Jingnan Liu Research Associate JingnanL@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Note that minority governments are rare and have a bad reputation in Germany, partly as a result of the series of weak governments leading up to the 1932 election and Nazi rule. 2 In addition, while the center-left parties can work with the far-left in the Bundestag, the center-right parties cannot work with the far-right Alternative for Germany. Indeed the slightest imputation of a willingness to work with Alternative for Germany cost Merkel’s first pick for successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, her job. 3 See: Norpoth, Helmut & Gschwend, Thomas (2010) The chancellor model: Forecasting German elections, International Journal of Forecasting. 26. 42-53. 4 Our model performs well in back-testing but 2017 was an outlier. It correctly predicted the Union to win the highest share of the popular vote but overestimated that vote by seven percentage points. Our only short-term variable, the chancellor’s approval rate, caused a deviation from long-term voting trends. Our other two variables capture medium and long-term effects, which clearly favored the Union. The implication is that Merkel’s high approval rating today could give a misleading impression about the Christian Democrats’ prospects. 5 If they are forced to rely on the Free Democrats instead, that will also constrain the most anti-business elements of their agenda. 6 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The ECB Taper Dilemma", dated September 6, 2021, available at eis.bcareseach.com. 7 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Permian Output Approaches Pre-Covid Peak", dated August 19, 2021, available at ces.bcareseach.com.

Highlights Economic policy uncertainty is rising in the US and will generate volatility this fall. But by the end of the year the result should be more fiscal reflation. Biden’s approval rating is now “underwater” – net negative – but this was expected. Unless he suffers another black eye, he can still shepherd his two big bills through Congress by year’s end. Public support for Biden’s tax hikes is weak. Some tax hikes are likely but aggressive hikes are now off the table. The midterm elections were already likely to produce a Republican win in the House. History supports this consensus. But the Senate is still an open game. The presidential election outlook is only marginally affected, at most, by the messy Afghanistan pullout. Value stocks are re-testing their low point against growth stocks. We do not expect them to break down when Congress is about to pass historic new spending increases. Feature Economic policy uncertainty is reviving in the US and set to increase this fall. This is true in absolute terms and relative to global uncertainty, even at a time when China’s sweeping regulatory crackdown is generating a lot of global uncertainty  (Chart 1). Chart 1US Relative Policy Uncertainty Reviving US Relative Policy Uncertainty Reviving US Relative Policy Uncertainty Reviving Chart 2Policy Uncertainty Breakdown Policy Uncertainty Breakdown Policy Uncertainty Breakdown The latest increase in the policy uncertainty index is largely driven by rising uncertainty over future government spending (Chart 2, panel 2) and expiring tax provisions (Chart 2, panel 3), more so than by public sentiment reflected in the mainstream media or even the inflation debate. The looming budget battle this fall will have major implications for taxes and spending and will lift the uncertainty indicators regarding sentiment and consumer prices. Volatility will ensue in the coming months. But by the end of the year, Congress will have passed at least one, likely two, new laws that will increase government fiscal support for the economy and dispel deflationary tail risks. The lingering pandemic will if anything help concentrate lawmakers’ minds on passing more stimulus. Therefore we expect US equities and cyclical sectors to grind higher. The passage of these bills will mark the high point in policy reflation, after which clouds will loom on the horizon in 2022. Biden’s Net Negative Approval Rating President Biden’s job approval rating is now officially “underwater” – more people disapprove of his leadership than approve (Table 1). This is raising serious doubts about his ability to shepherd legislation through Congress this fall. However, these doubts are overrated. Table 1Biden’s Net Approval Is Officially Negative Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden’s approval has mostly fallen due to his mishandling of the US military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan – which most Americans agree was necessary, however much they deplored the commander-in-chief’s handling of it. Therefore Biden’s approval rating will not fall much farther – at least not until he suffers another black eye.       Until that happens, Biden’s approval will stabilize in the range of Obama’s and above Trump’s. The reason is that he retains a solid political base of support – and his political base is larger than President Trump’s, so his general approval will stay higher. Indeed his approval is still stronger than Obama’s among Democrats (Charts 3A and 3B). This is counterintuitive since Obama was a charismatic, young, and progressive Democrat. The reason is that Democrats are still very cognizant and fearful of the alternative: President Trump. This anti-Trump tailwind will help Biden for some time. Support among Democrats is critical for maintaining party discipline in passing the reconciliation bill this fall. It is also important for the midterm elections. Chart 3ABiden’s Job Approval Collapses Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Chart 3BBiden’s Approval Holding Up Among Democrats Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float   On specific issues, Biden is weaker than Obama on foreign policy and than Trump on the economy (Charts 4A and 4B). The economy will remain the central concern, notwithstanding Afghanistan, and on this front Biden should stabilize or improve. However, other foreign policy issues could rise to the fore and hurt him at any time given today’s fraught geopolitical environment. Chart 4ABiden’s Falling Approval On Economy Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Chart 4BBiden’s Falling Approval On Foreign Policy Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float   We say Biden’s score on the economy will improve because consumer confidence will rebound once the Delta variant of COVID-19 subsides (Chart 5). Both manufacturing and service sectors are performing better than when Biden was elected and employment is holding up in both sectors. The new orders-to-inventories measures suggest the service sector will continue to improve (Chart 6). The headline unemployment rate has dropped to 5.2%. Chart 5Consumer Confidence Should Support Biden Consumer Confidence Should Support Biden Consumer Confidence Should Support Biden Chart 6PMIs Also Offer Some Support For Biden PMIs Also Offer Some Support For Biden PMIs Also Offer Some Support For Biden Given the above, Biden still has enough clout to steer his signature legislation through Congress this fall, albeit with major modifications to his unwieldy $3.5 trillion American Families Plan. Moderate Democratic Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia has called for a pause in new big spending legislation, but a close look at his words shows that he does not oppose the bill, he merely wants to water it down, which is not a change from his earlier position.1 He speaks for other moderates. The left-wing faction led by Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont will make counter-threats yet ultimately has no choice other than to support the most progressive social legislation in recent memory. The bill will be watered down. Could this watering down process result in a total jettison of the Democrats’ proposed tax hikes? The Wall Street Journal reports that congressional support for tax hikes is losing steam.2 While aggressive tax hikes are off the table, we highly doubt that all tax hikes will be removed.   Financial markets have not responded much to the threat of higher taxes. Small business owners, who are most sensitive to the risk of new taxes and regulation imposed by Democrats, have not shown much concern for either issue this year – they are much more worried about inflation (Chart 7). We assume the equity market would rally if tax hikes were dropped but we do not think this is likely to happen. Americans support higher taxes – but only Democrats are enthusiastic about across-the-board hikes on individuals, corporations, and capital gains. Polls show that 59% of independent voters, not to mention Democrats, support higher taxes on high-income earners, although the proposed 28% corporate is increasingly likely to be cut down (Chart 8). This is the fundamental reason for investors to expect Democrats to band together in the eleventh hour and include tax hikes in their reconciliation bill. If nothing else, a partial reversal of President Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act will be necessary to give a veneer of affordability to Biden’s giant spending bill to get it past Senate moderates. Chart 7Business Will Worry About Tax Hikes When (If) They Pass Business Will Worry About Tax Hikes When (If) They Pass Business Will Worry About Tax Hikes When (If) They Pass Chart 8Look Out: Americans Support Higher Taxes Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float   The impact of Biden’s corporate tax hike is expected to be a 5%-8% one-off hit to corporate earnings, according to our Global Investment Strategy. The impact could be less than that but the combination of popular opinion and the Democratic Party’s need to finance their social agenda suggests that investors should plan for the worst, which in this case is not that bad – key tax rates will still be lower than they were under President Obama. The chief risk to Biden’s legislation is that passing the bipartisan infrastructure bill (80% subjective odds) consumes so much political capital that there is not enough left for Biden’s reconciliation bill (50%-65% subjective odds, depending on circumstances). This is possible. Congressional Democrat leaders want to tie these two bills together but most likely the quick success of infrastructure, which is more popular than social welfare, will lead Democrats to conclude that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. They will pass infrastructure on less-than-perfect assurances from Senate moderates that they will support reconciliation. Then a separate battle over reconciliation will ensue, in which Biden must cajole the left-wing and moderate factions of his party into a “yea” vote while Republicans obstruct. The second major risk to Biden’s legislation – and the macro backdrop – comes if he mismanages foreign policy more generally, such as with the looming crisis over Iran. A foreign policy failure beyond Afghanistan could cause permanent damage to his political capital. And yet Democrats would be even more desperate for a legislative victory then, as they would face a wipeout in the midterm elections if they had no legislative victories and two foreign policy humiliations. In other words, Biden is nowhere near so unpopular that moderate Democrats will abandon his signature legislative agenda and condemn their party and his administration to a heavy defeat in 2022. Bottom Line: Biden’s legislation will pass, including some tax hikes. The revised magnitude of tax hikes will not be known until later this fall when the Senate and House start producing legislative text. Policy uncertainty and equity volatility will trend upward this fall but the end-game is more reflationary policy, which should keep equities grinding higher at least through Christmas. Midterm Elections: The Best Case For Democrats Is Not Good Enough Are Republicans more likely to take Congress now that Biden’s approval is underwater? How would this impact the policy and macroeconomic outlook? While Republicans are highly likely to retake the House of Representatives, the Senate is still slightly tipped for the Democrats. Biden would have to fail to pass legislation or commit another major policy mistake to give Republicans full control of Congress, although this outcome is slightly favored in online betting markets. The House currently consists of 220 Democrats and 212 Republicans. There is always some fluctuation in the exact numbers. Three vacancies should be filled in November’s special elections, which could bring the count to 222 Democrats and 213 Republicans.3 With 218 votes needed to pass legislation on an absolute majority vote, Democrats can only afford to lose three votes at present. This is an extremely tight margin and shows that this fall’s reconciliation bill is at risk in the House as well as the Senate. In the midterm elections, Republicans only need to take five-to-six seats to regain the majority (218). This is easy on paper: the average seat gain for the opposition in midterm House elections is 35. Biden’s latest approval rating puts Democrats in line to lose 37 seats based on history. The opposition typically makes gains in the midterm because it is fired up whereas the presidential party is complacent. In addition Republicans are expected to gain two seats (possibly as many as four) via gerrymandering in 2022. True, Democrats have some underrated supports in 2022. In all probability the pandemic will be waning while the economy will be waxing. Biden will likely have passed at least a bipartisan infrastructure deal. The divisions within Republican ranks over Trumpism will also persist, which may or may not increase Democratic turnout and vote-switching from suburban Republicans. Hence it is reasonable to ask whether Democrats could surprise to the upside and retain the House. Online betting markets put the probability at 29%, and these odds make sense to us. The historical record helps to define what kind of events might alter the outlook for the midterms. Table 2 shows the midterm elections in which the presidential party performed best (the opposition party disappointed the historical norm). The following points are salient: Table 2Best-Case Outcomes For Presidential Party In Midterm Elections Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float There are only two cases in which the presidential party gained seats (Clinton 1998, Bush 2002) and three cases in which they only lost a few seats (Kennedy 1962, Reagan 1986, arguably Bush 1990). The Democratic victory of 1998 occurred at the top of an economic boom while the Republican victory of 2002 occurred one year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Neither is likely to be replicated for Democrats in 2022. Republicans’ mild losses in 1990 occurred just after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Republican’s mild losses in 1986 occurred despite a big legislative victory (tax reform). If either of the last two scenarios played out for Democrats in 2022, Democrats would likely lose the House by a whisker. Only if the Democrats’ 1962 scenario played out would Democrats retain the House in 2022, and only by a single seat. Yet the 1962 election occurred in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis! The takeaway is that a foreign policy crisis could help Democrats pare their losses in the midterms if Biden is deemed to have handled the crisis adroitly. But even then the ruling party would likely lose the House judging by history. Needless to say these are just historical examples. They also show that Democratic fortunes could turn around drastically between now and next fall (e.g. Kennedy went from a recession and the Bay of Pigs fiasco to gaining his party seats). The Senate outlook is less straightforward. Biden’s approval rating suggests a loss of four seats for Democrats based on the historical pattern. But the same pattern suggested Republicans would lose four seats in 2018 and instead they gained two. Our quantitative Senate election model, which we update every week in the Appendix, still tips the Democrats to gain one seat (a 51-49 majority) or at least retain their de facto one seat majority (50-50).  Chart 9Presidential Vetoes In History Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float What are the macroeconomic implications? A Republican House and Democratic White House would play “constitutional hardball,” just as occurred from 2011-14, given that the country is still at historically peak levels of political polarization.4 There are likely to be critical differences between 2011 and 2023 – populism has fundamentally weakened support for fiscal austerity – but the most likely result is gridlock and deadlock. Republicans will not be able to slash spending or cut taxes as Biden will have the presidential veto, but Democrats will not be able to increase spending or hike taxes (Chart 9). The problem for Biden would be the need to avoid a national default when and if the Republicans insist on spending cuts to raise the debt ceiling. The looming debt ceiling showdown this fall will increase uncertainty and volatility but ultimately Democrats have the votes to avoid a default. That would not necessarily be the case if Republicans controlled the House. And this time around Republicans could be driven to impeach the president, for whatever reason, in retaliation for President Trump’s impeachment in 2019. This situation obviously cannot be ruled out, even though it would be virtually impossible for the Senate to convict. At the same time, some bipartisanship could occur, as it did under Trump following the 2018 midterms. Anti-trust legislation and immigration reform are the two most important policy areas to watch on this front. Republican gains in Congress would marginally weaken the Democrats’ hold on the White House in 2024, though we continue to believe that Democrats are favored. American voters are likely to be better off in November 2024 than they were in November 2020, amid a pandemic, recession, and nationwide social unrest. Our quantitative model tips Democrats with 308 electoral votes (Appendix). Professor Allan Lichtman’s “13 Keys” to the presidency – a nearly flawless prediction system since 1984 – currently suggest that the Democrats only have three keys turned against them. They would need to see six or more in order to lose the White House (Table 3). Obviously the long-term status of the economy will be a critical factor (Chart 10). Table 3Lichtman’s Keys To The Presidency (Updated Sept 2021) Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Chart 10Will Biden's Economy Grow Faster Than That Of His Two Predecessors? Will Biden's Economy Grow Faster Than That Of His Two Predecessors? Will Biden's Economy Grow Faster Than That Of His Two Predecessors? Bringing it all together, US fiscal policy has taken a more proactive turn but it is still likely to freeze after this fall. It will be hard to pass major budget bills in 2022 ahead of the election and gridlock is the likeliest outcome, making 2025 the next realistic chance for major fiscal changes. The immediate implication is that Biden and Democratic leaders will have to disconnect the bipartisan infrastructure bill from the partisan social welfare reconciliation bill this autumn. This will require a major concession from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Otherwise both bills could collapse and with them the Democratic Party’s fortunes. Biden and moderate Democrats that face competitive races in 2022 will demand a quick victory before moving onto the less popular part. Investment Takeaways Value stocks are re-testing their cycle lows against growth stocks (Chart 11). The Delta variant and global growth jitters continue to weigh on this trade. Chart 11S&P Value Re-Tests Lows Versus Growth S&P Value Re-Tests Lows Versus Growth S&P Value Re-Tests Lows Versus Growth The S&P 500’s “Big Five” are rallying and outperforming the other 495 companies once again (Chart 12). Chart 12S&P 5 Recovery Versus 495 S&P 5 Recovery Versus 495 S&P 5 Recovery Versus 495 We expect politically induced volatility throughout the fall but we also expect it to be resolved in new and reflationary legislation. Signs that Biden’s legislation will pass should enable cyclical sectors and value stocks to recover, though the pandemic, global growth, and Chinese stability may prevent them from outperforming defensive sectors and growth stocks. A new set of hurdles will face markets if Republicans regain the House and halt fiscal easing from 2022-24. However, they will not be rewarded by voters if they create a fiscal or economic crisis, implying that the proactive fiscal turn in public opinion will prevail over the long run. If Biden’s legislation fails then it suggests that US fiscal policy is dysfunctional even under single-party control. This would heighten the deflationary tail risk and force us to reassess our macro and policy outlook. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table A1USPS Trade Table Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Table A2Political Risk Matrix Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Chart A1Presidential Election Model Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Chart A2Senate Election Model Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Table A3Political Capital Index Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float Biden Is Underwater But His Legislation Will Float ​​​​​​​ Footnotes 1 See Senator Joe Manchin, “Why I Won’t Support Spending Another $3.5 Trillion,” Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2021, wsj.com.  2 Richard Rubin, “Progressives’ Tax-The-Rich Dreams Fade As Democrats Struggle For Votes,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2021, wsj.com. 3 The three special House elections are: Florida’s 20th District, previously Democratic held; Ohio’s 11th District, previously Democratic held; Ohio’s 15th District, previously Republican held. 4 See Mark V. Tushnet, “Constitutional Hardball,” John Marshall Legal Review 37 (2004), pp. 523-53, scholarship.law.georgetown.edu.