Germany

Highlights Macron has won in France; Economic reforms are forthcoming; Euroskeptic parties are moving to the center; Yet Italy remains a real risk; Stick to long French industrials versus German; stay long EUR/USD for now. Feature "A chair, a table, or a bench would be elected rather than her [Le Pen] in this country." - Jean-Luc Mélenchon Third-party candidate Emmanuel Macron is the new president of France following his win over populist and nationalist Marine Le Pen (Table 1). The victory was resounding, with polls underestimating support for the centrist, and vociferously Europhile, Macron (Chart 1). Macron's victory was all the more impressive given the low turnout, which should have favored Le Pen. Table 1Results Of French Presidential Election Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Chart 1Underestimating Emmanuel Underestimating Emmanuel Underestimating Emmanuel There are numerous narratives competing to make sense of the election in France. Our conclusion is simple: Marine Le Pen got trounced by a 39-year old political neophyte with no party organization and an investment-banking background. Le Pen wasn't so much defeated as she was routed, in a veritable Battle of Sedan for the European populists. What does this mean for investors? First, European assets are about to "rip." Second, the EUR/USD may have some more upside in the short term. Third, investors remain overly complacent about Italy, which we think has a good chance of breaking the trend of victories for the centrist forces in Europe. However, this is a story for 2018 and thus off the radar screen for investors at the moment. Le Pen Loses More Than Macron Wins Left-wing firebrand, and surprise first-round performer, Jean-Luc Mélenchon forecast in April that "a chair, a table, or a bench" would defeat Le Pen head-to-head. Naturally, the comment was self-serving for Mélenchon as he was trying to convince swing voters to support his campaign. Nonetheless, we fully agree with his assessment! Not only did Le Pen lose, but she lost to a political neophyte with investment banking on his resume. In France... In 2017... Chart 2Le Pen's Flaw Is The Euro Le Pen's Ceiling Is Support For The Euro Le Pen's Ceiling Is Support For The Euro So what happened? It is not a coincidence that Le Pen got precisely the same proportion of voters as the percent of the French public that does not support the euro, around 30-35%. Le Pen's popularity has in fact closely mirrored French Euroskepticism for years, peaking in 2013. Chart 2 essentially illustrates that Le Pen's ceiling is determined by the Euroskeptic mood of the country. We have stressed to clients since the December 2015 regional elections that Le Pen's Euroskpeticism is a major handicap to her political fortunes. In that election, her Front National (FN) was massacred in the second round despite a highly favorable context for an anti-establishment, nationalist party. The election took place on the heels of an epic migration crisis and a massive terrorist attack (which occurred just 23 days before the election).1 The Front National was defeated in all 13 mainland French regions, despite leading in six following the first round. As such, investors should ignore both the positive and negative hype surrounding the media coverage of Macron. The main lesson of the French election is that Euroskepticism does not pay political dividends, not that Le Pen still has a chance in the next election or that Macron has pulled off an extraordinary victory. The upcoming legislative elections - set for two rounds on June 11 and 18 - will cement our call on Le Pen and FN. Polls are sparse, but what we have thus far suggests that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Républicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature (Table 2). We do not have enough polling data to gauge the reliability of this forecast, but it does make sense given FN's previously weak electoral performances in legislative and regional elections. In fact, following Macron's strong performance on May 7, we would be surprised if FN gets more than 15-20 seats in the National Assembly. Table 2Macron May Have To Work With The Republicans Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture What matters for investors is the likely strong performance in the legislative elections for the center-right Les Républicains. Its presidential candidate François Fillon was the leading centrist candidate to get into the second round for most of early 2017 and only faded due to his corruption scandal (Chart 3). His primary challenger - Bordeaux mayor and former conservative Prime Minister Alain Juppé - in fact was comfortably leading all candidates before he was bested by Fillon in late November in party primaries (Chart 4). Chart 3Scandal, Not Policies, Killed Fillon Scandal, Not Policies, Killed Fillon Scandal, Not Policies, Killed Fillon Chart 4Juppe Led The Race Before Fillon Took Over Juppé Led The Race (Prior To Fillon) Juppé Led The Race (Prior To Fillon) A Macron presidency supported by Les Républicains in the National Assembly could be the best outcome for investors. On the international stage - where the president has no constraints - France will be led by a committed Europhile willing to push Germany towards a more proactive - rather than merely reactive - policy. On the domestic stage - where the National Assembly dominates - Macron's cautiously pro-growth agenda will be pushed further to the right by Les Républicains. In our view, the best outcome would be either genuine "cohabitation," where Macron's En Marche does not get a majority and he is forced to cohabitate with a center-right prime minister, or an En Marche sweep. The worst outcome would be a hung parliament, where Les Républicains refuse to cooperate with En Marche so as not to give Macron any further political wins. We continue to believe that the context is ripe for genuine structural reforms. We expanded on this topic in a February report titled "The French Revolution" and will not repeat the arguments here.2 Suffice it to say that a "silent majority" in France appears ready to incur the pain of reforms (Chart 5). As a play on the reform theme, we have been long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities on a long-term horizon (Chart 6). The idea is that French reforms should suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive vis-à-vis their main competitor, Germany (Chart 7). Chart 5"Silent Majority" Wants Reform Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Chart 6France Will Revive, Germany Is Peaking France Will Revive, Germany Is Peaking France Will Revive, Germany Is Peaking Chart 7Reforms Could Close This Gap Reforms Could Close This Gap Reforms Could Close This Gap Bottom Line: As we have expected for years, Marine Le Pen is unelectable due to her opposition to European integration. At the minimum, this should allay the fears of many investors that Frexit is a possibility. It has never even been close.3 At its most optimistic, Macron's victory will usher in a period of economic reforms in France. The Big Picture: Europe's Populists Defeated In April 2016 - ahead of the U.K. EU referendum and the U.S. general election - we made a controversial call: Anglo-Saxon populists would surprise to the upside in the upcoming plebiscites, whereas continental European would underperform.4 The U.K. has subsequently chosen Brexit and the U.S. electorate has chosen Donald Trump, both outcomes that we noted were more likely than the consensus expected. On the other side of the ledger, populists were defeated in two Spanish elections (December 2015 and June 2016), the Austrian presidential election in December 2016, and the Dutch general election in April 2017. The latest defeat for the anti-globalization populists is surprising because it happened in France, a country with a long tradition of both. One cannot blame relative economic performance for the outcome, as France has clearly underperformed the U.S. on both the growth and employment fronts (Chart 8). Nor can it be blamed on a more sanguine security situation: since 2015, France has experienced far more tragedy due to terrorist attacks than the U.S. and has been in a state of emergency since the November 2015 terror attack (Chart 9). And while France has largely avoided the 2015 European migration crisis, it was at least far more threatened by it than the U.S. due to mere geography. Chart 8Economic Woes Not Lacking In France... Economic Woes Not Lacking In France... Economic Woes Not Lacking In France... Chart 9... Nor Is Threat Of Terrorism Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture In our view, the long-term socio-economic context is more important than the day-to-day economic and security situation in explaining the success of populists. The French social welfare state - which is onerous, inefficient, and clearly in need of reform (Chart 10) - has nonetheless played a crucial role in tempering the appeal of anti-establishment politics. Chart 10France: Welfare State Needs Reform Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Chart 11Anti-Establishment Candidates Win... The Median Voter Has Lost In America... The Median Voter Has Lost In America... Unlike the U.S. - which has seen the real median household income decline over the past two decades and grow much slower than the economy (Chart 11) - European countries have redistributed the gains of globalization in such a way as to ensure that more people benefit from it (Chart 12). Income inequality has grown in Europe regardless, but to a much lower level - and by a lower magnitude - than in the U.S. (Chart 13). This is perhaps most pronounced in France, where the top 10% of households by income retain much the same share of the economy as they did in 1950 (Chart 14). Chart 12Redistributing Globalization's Gains ...And Won In Europe ...And Won In Europe Chart 13U.S. & U.K.: Outliers On Inequality Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Chart 14France: Inequality Flat For 70 Years France: Inequality Flat For 70 Years France: Inequality Flat For 70 Years Many of our clients in the U.S. and the U.K. have reacted negatively to our view above. Our analysis is not meant to endorse French levels of social welfare spending. In fact, we are bullish on France precisely because we expect Emmanuel Macron to reduce French state largesse over time. We merely point out that the political effect of a redistributive socio-economic system is greater stability and centrism of the voting public in the midst of a painful socio-economic context. The median voter in Europe is simply not as angry as the median voter in the U.S. This is not by chance, but rather by design. Europe's "socialism" is a relatively modern development and a product of Europe's disastrous inter-war period, which instilled a fear of a populist backlash against failed economic policies of the time. The inter-war period saw the rise of both left- and right-wing extremism, which fed on each other with increasing intensity. These included a failed communist revolution in Germany (1918-1919), a failed Nazi coup in Germany (1923), a fascist takeover of Italy (1925), a Nazi takeover in Germany (1933), far-right unrest in France (1934), and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). These political upheavals were a product of both the Great Depression and the First World War. But they were also colored by Europe's socio-economic context at the time: very high wealth inequality at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, Europe had a much higher starting level of wealth concentration than the U.S., resulting in a much sharper correction during the inter-war period (Chart 15). What most commentators who forecast Europe's doom after the Great Recession missed is that the socio-economic context matters. It is the reality through which voters filter contemporary events. In Europe's case, the median voter was in a much better place to deal with the post-2008 economic and financial crises because Europe's "socialism" had dampened the negative consequences of globalization. In the U.S., and we would argue in the U.K. to a much lesser extent, the median voter was far more exposed to the vagaries of globalization and thus was (and remains) more open to anti-establishment political outcomes. This is the great paradox of the past 18 months: that the two best performing economies in the developed world - the U.S. and the U.K. - experienced the greatest level of populism. To us, it is not much of a paradox. Economic performance is by nature a study of the mean performance, whereas political forecasting deals with the median outcomes. This is not to say that the French are not angry with elites. After all, nearly 50% of the votes cast in the first round of the election went to anti-establishment candidates (Chart 16). However, French voters are not angry enough to want a dramatic reordering of their society, particularly in terms of their support for European institutions. What about other countries in Europe? A trend is emerging across the continent where anti-establishment parties are retaining their commitment to economic redistribution, anti-immigrant sentiment, or unorthodox foreign policy, but abandoning their Euroskepticism for the sake of competitiveness. The best examples of this trend are Spain's Podemos and Greece's SYRIZA, which have evolved in a short period of time into mainstream left-wing parties. Meanwhile, parties that retain an official strategy of Euroskepticism are increasingly finding out that the "Euroskeptic ceiling" is real. As such, these parties are struggling between remaining politically competitive and staying true to their Euroskeptic ideals: Germany: The German Euroskeptic Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD) party has been beset by massive internal conflict and identity crisis. Ousted leader Frauke Petry tried to move the party towards the center, but was rebuked at an April party congress. The AfD is still polling just under 10% (Chart 17), and will therefore enter the Bundestag in the September 24 election, but its leadership is torn between openly embracing the German alt-right and setting a course as a conservative alternative to Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union. We would expect the party to enter the Bundestag, but only just, in the upcoming election. Chart 15U.S. And France: Different ##br##Starting Points Of Inequality... Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Chart 16French Voters##br## Are Angry French Voters Are Angry And Anti-Establishment Feeling High French Voters Are Angry And Anti-Establishment Feeling High Chart 17German Euroskeptics To ##br##Squeak Into Bundestag, At Best German Euroskeptics To Squeak Into Bundestag, At Best German Euroskeptics To Squeak Into Bundestag, At Best Austria: The presidential candidate of the anti-establishment Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), Norbert Hofer, tried mightily to soften his Euroskepticism ahead of the December 2016 elections. He failed and lost the election despite a solid lead in the polls for much of the year. Austria is set to hold general elections by October 2018 and support for the FPO has clearly peaked (Chart 18). Given that all other parties in Austria are pro-EU, the FPO is likely to remain isolated. Finland: The "True Finns," since rebranded as just "The Finns," were once the only competitive Euroskeptic party in northern Europe. They did very well in the 2015 general election and entered the governing coalition. To do so, they compromised on their Euroskeptic positions and became largely irrelevant, with a big dip in support (Chart 19). April municipal elections went terribly for The Finns, with the Europhile Green League emerging as the big winner. An upcoming party congress in June will determine the future of the party and whether it swings towards populism or centrism. Chart 18Austrian Anti-Establishment Has Peaked Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Chart 19Finnish Anti-Establishment Has Peaked Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Stick To The Macro(n) Picture Italy: The one party to watch over the next several months is Italy's Five Star Movement (5SM). There is evidence that 5SM is itself riven by internal conflict over how far to take its Euroskepticism. And several moves by party leadership - including attempting to leave the legislative alliance with UKIP at the European Parliament level - appear designed to pursue the political center. The problem, however, is that there is little evidence that the Italian median voter is as committed to European integration. This remains the key risk for Europe going forward. Bottom Line: Populism has underperformed in continental Europe, much to the surprise of most commentators. Europe's economic redistribution has dampened demands for anti-establishment outcomes. Evidence suggests that Euroskeptic parties will continue to migrate to the center, at least as far as European integration is concerned, in the near future. One outlier to this view is Italy, which we elaborate on below. Investment Implications European risk assets should continue to outperform the U.S. in the coming months. The European economy continues to fire on all cylinders, whereas the U.S. appears to have hit a soft patch, according to the sharply divergent Economic Surprise Indexes (Chart 20).5 The euro may benefit from the reduction in risk premia for the time being. We will retain our long EUR/USD for now, but look to close it over the summer as we doubt the ECB's commitment to a hawkish turn in monetary policy ahead of critical risks in 2018. At the forefront of those risks is the upcoming Italian election. As we have argued repeatedly for two years, the Italy's Euroskeptic turn is real and underpinned by data. Whereas the median European has been far less Euroskeptic than the conventional wisdom has held, the median Italian is becoming more Euroskeptic. We spent a week in Europe warning clients in London, Paris, and Zurich of the upcoming Italian risks. There was little appetite for our bearish view. Even clients in the U.K. who previously held deeply skeptical views of the Euro Area's ability to survive have changed their view on Italy. Why such complacency? The oft-repeated refrain was that Italian politics have always been a mess. The election, which is highly likely to produce either a weak coalition or a hung parliament, will therefore not produce a definitive outcome worthy of risk premia. We highly disagree with this view. Our concern with Italy is not the current polling of Euroskeptic parties, but rather the underlying turn in the Italian electorate towards greater acceptance of a future outside of Europe (Chart 21). If the median voter is more willing to entertain Euroskeptic outcomes, than the Euroskeptic parties will not be forced to adopt a centrist position, as they have done in the rest of Europe. Chart 20U.S. Economy Hits A Soft Patch U.S. Economy Hits A Soft Patch U.S. Economy Hits A Soft Patch Chart 21Italy: The Real Risk To Euro Area Italy: The Real Risk To Euro Area Italy: The Real Risk To Euro Area Nonetheless, investor complacency tells us that European asset outperformance could last well into late 2017. There will be no immediate risk rotation from the French election to the Italian one. The market will have to be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus, likely in Q1 2018. Until then, the party will continue. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2016: Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Breakout," dated May 5, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Duration: U.S. growth expectations have become overly pessimistic. A Q2 rebound will lead to higher global bond yields and a steeper U.S. Treasury curve. UST / Bund Spread: The extreme divergence between the European and U.S. economic surprise indexes is not sustainable, especially in the face of weakening Chinese economic data. The Treasury / Bund spread is biased wider in the near term, though could tighten in the second half of this year as the ECB shifts to a less accommodative policy. USD Hedging Costs: Declining hedging costs driven by interest rate differentials and negative basis swap spreads make international bond investment very attractive for U.S. investors. Feature Chart 1Global Recovery Will Persist Global Recovery Will Persist Global Recovery Will Persist The synchronized global recovery that took hold in the second half of 2016 has stalled so far this year. Measures of economic sentiment, such as the Global ZEW survey and our own Boom/Bust Indicator, have rolled over from high levels and global bonds have clawed back some of last year's lost returns (Chart 1). Year-to-date, the Bloomberg Barclays Global Government Bond index has returned +3%, after having lost more than 9% between the July trough in the Global ZEW index and the end of last year. In our view, a repeat of early 2016's global growth slowdown and bond market rally, which saw the Global ZEW index fall below zero and the Global Government Bond index return 11.6% in 2016H1, is not in the cards. The global economy is on much firmer footing than at this time last year. U.S. Growth: Past Peak Pessimism First quarter U.S. GDP growth was a disappointing 0.7%, but is poised to bounce back strongly in Q2. The volatile inventories component subtracted 0.9% from overall Q1 growth, harsh weather wreaked havoc on the March employment report and there continue to be problems with residual seasonality depressing first quarter GDP data.1 The outlook is much brighter moving forward. The latest employment report showed that the U.S. economy added a healthy 211k jobs in April and our model is pointing toward a further acceleration (Chart 2). Economic growth can be thought of as a combination of aggregate hours worked and labor productivity (Chart 3). With aggregate hours worked growing at 1.7% year-over-year and labor productivity growth having averaged 0.6% (annualized) per quarter since 2012, real U.S. GDP growth of around 2.3% seems like a reasonable forecast. Chart 2Labor Market Still Strong Labor Market Still Strong Labor Market Still Strong Chart 3Look For Above 2% Growth Look For Above 2% Growth Look For Above 2% Growth There is even some reason to suspect that labor productivity could strengthen during the next few quarters. A recent IMF paper2 attributed weak post-crisis productivity growth to a combination of structural and cyclical factors, but also noted that weak investment in physical capital may be responsible for lowering total factor productivity growth by nearly 0.2 percentage points per year in advanced economies during the post-crisis period. With leading indicators pointing to still further gains in fixed investment (Chart 3, bottom panel), we would not be shocked to see productivity growth enjoy a modest late-cycle rebound. Chart 4Stronger Productivity = Steeper Curve Stronger Productivity = Steeper Curve Stronger Productivity = Steeper Curve All else equal, a late-cycle rebound in productivity growth would slow the increase in unit labor costs. Unit labor costs are a combination of wages (compensation-per-hour) and productivity (output-per-hour), and have historically tracked changes in the slope of the U.S. yield curve (Chart 4). Faster wage growth tends to coincide with Fed tightening, and slower wage growth with Fed easing. For this reason, all wage measures perform reasonably well tracking changes in the yield curve. But unit labor costs perform best because they also incorporate productivity growth, and low productivity growth can flatten the yield curve by pulling down long-dated yields. Rapid increases in compensation-per-hour and muted productivity growth have combined to give the yield curve a strong flattening bias during the past several years. Any increase in productivity growth would slow the uptrend in unit labor costs relative to other wage measures, allowing the yield curve to steepen. In fact, we continue to recommend that investors position for a steeper U.S. yield curve by going long the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This trade produces positive returns when the 2/10 slope steepens (Chart 4, panel 3), but has also returned +19 bps since we initiated the position last December, even though the curve has flattened since then. The reason for the trade's strong performance in an unfavorable curve environment is that the 5-year yield had been unusually elevated compared to the rest of the curve. Our model of the 2/5/10 butterfly spread versus the 2/10 slope showed that the 5-year note was one standard deviation cheap on the curve as recently as mid-March (Chart 4, bottom panel). This undervaluation has mostly dissipated and the 5-year note now appears only slightly cheap. For our curve trade to outperform from here, it will likely require the 2/10 slope to steepen.3 Bottom Line: With weak Q1 GDP now in the rearview mirror, we are likely past the point of peak pessimism on U.S. growth. Expect global bond yields to rise and the U.S. yield curve to steepen as the economic data start to reflect an environment of above-trend growth, in the neighborhood of 2% - 2.5%. European Growth & The Risk From China While the U.S. data have disappointed in recent weeks, as evidenced by the U.S. Economic Surprise Index having dipped below zero (Chart 5), the European economy has consistently bested expectations (Chart 5, panel 2). As a result, the Treasury / Bund spread has narrowed from high levels during the past few months. In practice, economic surprise indexes tend to mean revert because positive data surprises beget increasingly optimistic expectations. Eventually, overly optimistic expectations become too high a hurdle and the data start to disappoint. In our view, U.S. expectations have become unduly pessimistic while the Eurozone surprise index appears overdue for a correction. Against this back-drop, we expect the Treasury / Bund spread to widen in the near term as the large divergence between the U.S. and European surprise indexes starts to narrow. Further making the case for a wider Treasury / Bund spread is the recent performance of the Chinese economy. Our Foreign Exchange Strategy service recently observed that growth differentials between the U.S. and Europe are highly correlated with indicators of Chinese growth.4 This should not be overly surprising since Europe trades more with China and other Emerging Markets than does the United States. Along those lines, the IMF has calculated that a 1% growth shock to Emerging Markets impacts European growth by nearly 40 basis points, while it impacts U.S. growth by only 10 basis points.5 The worry at the moment is that Chinese monetary conditions have started to tighten, and China's Manufacturing PMI is rolling over alongside weaker commodity prices. These trends usually coincide with the underperformance of Europe relative to the U.S. (Chart 6). Chart 5Surprise Indexes Will Converge Surprise Indexes Will Converge Surprise Indexes Will Converge Chart 6Look To China To Trade UST / Bund Spread Look To China To Trade UST / Bund Spread Look To China To Trade UST / Bund Spread Our China Investment Strategy service highlights the importance of the trade-weighted RMB as a driver of Chinese growth.6 The RMB's 30% appreciation between 2012 and 2015 applied a massive deflationary force to China's economy, while its more recent depreciation helped boost producer prices, enhance profit margins and reduce the real cost of funding (Chart 7). Chart 7Monetary Conditions ##br##Still Fairly Stimulative Monetary Conditions Still Fairly Stimulative Monetary Conditions Still Fairly Stimulative More recently, the pace of the RMB's depreciation has slowed and this likely explains the weakness in China's Manufacturing PMI and commodity prices. Our China strategists are quick to note that while the pace of RMB depreciation has slowed, it is still not appreciating, and real interest rates deflated by the producer price index remain negative. In other words, monetary conditions have become somewhat less stimulative, but they should still be supportive of further economic growth. Although the Chinese economic data are likely to moderate in the coming months, barring the major policy mistake of aggressive tightening, Chinese growth will avoid a collapse and remain reasonably buoyant. Similarly, we would also expect European growth expectations to soften in the coming months, but growth is very likely to remain above trend and the ECB is still on track to adopt a less accommodative policy stance over the next year. In the most likely scenario, a few hints will be given at the June ECB meeting, and then an announcement that asset purchases will be tapered in 2018 will be made at the September meeting. The market will correctly assume that rate hikes will follow the taper, and this re-pricing of rate expectations will open up a window in the second half of this year when the Treasury / Bund spread can tighten. However, it is still too soon to adopt this position. Bottom Line: The extreme divergence between the European and U.S. economic surprise indexes is not sustainable, especially in the face of weakening Chinese economic data. The Treasury / Bund spread is biased wider in the near term, though could tighten in the second half of this year as the ECB shifts to a less accommodative policy. U.S. Bond Investors Should Expand Their Borders Divergences that have opened up between U.S. short-term interest rates and short-term rates in other developed countries mean that U.S. bond investors now face much lower currency hedging costs. In addition, increasingly negative cross-currency basis swap spreads have become a permanent feature of the post-crisis investment landscape, and unless significant regulatory changes occur, we expect they are here to stay. Combined, both of these factors make it incredibly attractive for U.S. bond investors to swap their U.S. dollars for foreign currencies and invest in foreign government bonds. In this week's report we explain why this is an attractive trade for U.S. investors and why it will likely remain so for quite some time. What Is The Basis Swap Spread? An excellent definition of the cross-currency basis comes from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) who define it as "the difference between the direct dollar interest rate in the cash market and the implied dollar interest rate in the [currency] swap market".7 In essence, the existence of a negative basis swap spread should mean that there is an opportunity to arbitrage the difference between interest rates in the cash market and implied interest rates in the currency swap market. However, post-crisis regulatory constraints on bank balance sheets appear to have made this arbitrage prohibitive. Banks are either unable or unwilling to arbitrage the basis swap spread back to zero, and this increases the cost of U.S. dollars in FX swap markets. As a quick example, we can calculate the 10-year German Bund yield hedged into U.S. dollars using currency forwards. Hedged yield = Unhedged yield - Cost of hedging Where: Cost of hedging = forward exchange rate / spot exchange rate In this case, we define the exchange rates as euros per 1 U.S. dollar. By covered interest rate parity, we can also calculate the cost of hedging as: Cost of hedging = (1 + euro interest rate + basis swap spread) / (1 + USD interest rate) Using current 3-month interest rates, this means that the cost of hedging from euros into U.S. dollars is: Cost of hedging = (1 - 0.36% - 0.3%) / (1 + 1.18%) = -1.82% This means that the 10-year German Bund yield rises from 0.42% to 2.24%, from the perspective of a U.S. dollar investor, after hedging the currency on a 3-month horizon. In other words, U.S. investors can significantly increase the average yield of their portfolios by lending U.S. dollars over short time horizons and investing the proceeds into non-U.S. bonds. In Chart 8 we show the difference this currency hedging makes for German, Japanese and French 10-year government bonds. Current hedged 10-year yields for all the major bond markets are also shown on page 13 of this report. But for how long can this trade continue? In short, it can continue for as long as U.S. short-term interest rates increase relative to non-U.S. short-term interest rates and for as long as basis swap spreads move further into negative territory. At the moment there is no widespread agreement on what drives the day-to-day fluctuations in the basis swap spread. The BIS has posited a model where dollar strength weakens the capital positions of bank balance sheets, causing them to back away from providing liquidity to the FX swap market, and leading to increasingly negative basis swap spreads (Chart 9, top panel). Chart 8Higher Yields Via Currency Hedging Higher Yields Via Currency Hedging Higher Yields Via Currency Hedging Chart 9Basis Swaps, Reserves And The Dollar Basis Swaps, Reserves And The Dollar Basis Swaps, Reserves And The Dollar Meanwhile, Zoltan Pozsar from Credit Suisse has identified a link between basis swap spreads and reserves on the Fed's balance sheet (Chart 9, bottom panel).8 Specifically, as the Fed winds down its balance sheet it will be draining cash reserves from the banking system and replacing them with Treasury securities. This could cause money to leave the FX swap market and flow into Treasuries. The result is less liquidity in the FX swap market and increasingly negative basis swap spreads. Interestingly, the run-up to the debt ceiling in the U.S. has presented a test of this view. To stay under the debt ceiling the U.S. Treasury department has drawn down its cash account at the Fed and removed T-bill supply from the market. The result has been a temporary increase in reserve balances. As the theory would have predicted, basis swap spreads have moved closer to zero as reserves have increased. Going forward, the Fed is very likely to start winding down its balance sheet later this year. In all likelihood this will serve to pressure basis swap spreads even further below zero. Meanwhile, short-term interest rates in the U.S. will probably continue to rise more quickly than in most other developed markets. This means that the cost of hedging should become increasingly negative for U.S. investors. In Chart 10 we show that as the cost of hedging becomes more negative, total returns from a USD-hedged position in German bunds tend to outpace total returns from a position in U.S. Treasuries. Similarly, Chart 11 shows that USD-hedged Japanese government bonds (JGBs) also tend to outperform U.S. Treasuries when the cost of hedging falls. Chart 10Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Germany Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Germany Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Germany Chart 11Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Japan Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Japan Hedging Costs & Bond Returns: Japan We should note that the relationships between hedging costs and relative total returns shown in Charts 10 & 11 are not perfect, and there will be instances when Treasuries can outperform even if hedging costs continue to decline. However, in the long run, as long as short-term U.S. interest rates continue to rise more quickly than short-term interest rates in the Eurozone or Japan, and especially if the Fed's upcoming balance sheet contraction leads to more deeply negative basis swap spreads, then U.S. investors should continue to boost their yields by lending dollars and investing in bunds and JGBs. Bottom Line: Declining hedging costs driven by interest rate differentials and negative basis swap spreads make international bond investment very attractive for U.S. investors. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Our U.S. Investment Strategy service took up the issue of residual seasonality in a recent report. Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Spring Snapback?", dated April 24, 207, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 IMF Staff Discussion Note, "Gone with the Headwinds: Global Productivity", https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2017/04/03/Gone-with-the-Headwinds-Global-Productivity-44758 3 Our outlook for the U.S. yield curve was discussed in detail in a recent report. Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 IMF Multilateral Policy Issues Report: 2014 Spillover Report https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/062514.pdf 6 Please see China Investment Strategy Weeky Report, "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?", dated May 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 7 http://www.bis.org/publ/work592.pdf 8 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/13/2187317/where-would-you-prefer-your-balance-sheet-banks-or-the-federal-reserve/ Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The global credit impulse is 4 months into a mini-downswing, and it is too soon to position for the next mini-upswing. The euro area economy will remain one of the better performers in a global growth pause. Underweight German bunds in a global bond portfolio. Stay long the euro, especially euro/yuan. Go long euro area Financials versus U.S. Financials, currency unhedged, as a first foray into a beaten-up sector. Feature First the good news: the ECB's latest bank lending data indicate that the euro area 6-month bank credit impulse is stabilizing after a modest but clear decline in recent months (Chart I-2). Now the bad news: the global bank credit impulse continues to weaken. The upshot is that the euro area economy - even with 1.5% growth - will remain one of the better performers in what is now a very clear global growth pause. Chart of the WeekThe Global Bond Yield Has Shown ##br##A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern Chart I-2The 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Stabilized In The ##br##Euro Area... But Not In The U.S. Or China The 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Stabilized In The Euro Area... But Not In The U.S. Or China The 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Stabilized In The Euro Area... But Not In The U.S. Or China How To Play The Euro Area's Economic Outperformance In a global growth pause, the best way to play euro area economic outperformance is through relative positions in the bond markets and through currencies. Specifically, underweight German bunds in a global bond portfolio but stay long the euro, especially euro/yuan. The implication for euro area equities is more ambiguous. The Eurostoxx50 has a very low exposure to Technology, which tends to perform defensively in a growth pause. Conversely, the Eurostoxx50 has a high exposure to Financials, whose relative performance reduces to a play on the bond yield (Chart I-3). Given that the global credit impulse is still weakening, it is premature to expect a sustained absolute rally in Financials anywhere. Therefore, the strong knee-jerk absolute rally in European banks after the French election first round is unlikely to last. That said, with the euro area economy likely to outperform in a global growth pause, and euro area Financials still near a 50-year relative low versus U.S. Financials, euro area bank equities can now outperform banks in other markets (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Global Bond Yield = ##br##Financials Vs. Market Global Bond Yield = Financials Vs. Market Global Bond Yield = Financials Vs. Market Chart I-4T-Bond/German Bond Spread Compression =##br## Euro Area Financials Outperform U.S. Financials T-Bond/German Bond Spread Compression = Euro Area Financials Outperform U.S. Financials T-Bond/German Bond Spread Compression = Euro Area Financials Outperform U.S. Financials As a first foray into a beaten-up sector, go long euro area Financials versus U.S. Financials, currency unhedged. (Caveat: all of this assumes that Emanuel Macron beats Marine Le Pen to the French Presidency on Sunday, as we expect.) Don't Rely On Year On Year Comparisons Nature provides many of our units of time. The earth's orbit around the sun gives us a year; the moon's orbit around the earth gives us a month; the earth's rotation on its axis gives us a day. But there is absolutely no reason why economic and financial cycles should follow nature's cycles. Yet most analysts persist at looking for patterns and cycles in economic and financial data using yearly, monthly, or daily rates of change. Unfortunately, by focusing on years, months and days, they risk completely missing some of the strongest patterns and cycles in the economy and markets. Think about a clock pendulum. If you look at it once a second, it will always seem to be in the same position, motionless. You will miss the cycle. Likewise, if an economy regularly accelerates for 6 months and then symmetrically decelerates for 6 months, the yearly rate of change will be a constant, giving the false appearance that nothing is happening. It will miss the cycle. It turns out that the global economy does indeed regularly accelerate and decelerate - and that each half-cycle averages about 8 months. The strongest evidence of this very clear oscillation comes from the remarkably regular wave like pattern in the global bond yield, illustrated in the Chart of the Week and Chart I-5 and Chart I-6. Chart I-5The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A ##br##Regular Wave Like Pattern... The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern... The Global Bond Yield Has Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern... Chart I-6...Which Is Easier To See ##br##When Detrended ...Which Is Easier To See When Detrended ...Which Is Easier To See When Detrended Furthermore, the acceleration and deceleration of bank credit flows - as measured in the global credit impulse - also exhibits a remarkably regular wave like pattern, with each half-cycle lasting about 8 months. But crucially, a half-cycle length of less than a year means that a year on year analysis would miss this very clear oscillation. Hence, our analysis always uses the 6-month credit impulse (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Global Credit Impulse Has Also Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Credit Impulse Has Also Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern The Global Credit Impulse Has Also Shown A Regular Wave Like Pattern Mini Half-Cycles Average Eight Months It is not a coincidence that the bond yield and bank credit impulse exhibit near identical half-cycle lengths. The bond yield and credit impulse cycles are inextricably embraced in a perpetual feedback loop. A higher bond yield will initiate a mini down cycle. All else being equal, the higher cost of credit will weigh on credit flows. This will slow economic growth, which will then show up in GDP (and other hard) data. The bond yield will respond by readjusting down. In turn, a lower bond yield will then initiate a mini up cycle. And so on... But each stage in the sequence comes with a delay. For a change in the cost of credit to register with households and firms and fully impact credit flows, it clearly takes time. The credit flows do not generate instantaneous economic activity either. Fully spending the credit flows also takes time. Once you accept these assumptions of internal regulating feedback combined with delays in economic response, the economy has to be a naturally-oscillating system whose half-cycle length depends on the delays in economic response. And the important point is that these delays have little connection with nature's cycles. For those who are mathematically inclined, Box I-1 shows the differential equations which define the economic mini-cycle and its half-cycle length. Box 1The Mathematics Of Mini-Cycles Why Europe's 1.5% Growth Will Look Stellar Why Europe's 1.5% Growth Will Look Stellar Still, some commentators counter that credit flows don't just depend on the cost of credit. They also depend on so-called "animal spirits" - optimism or pessimism about the future. These commentators point to sentiment and survey data which show that animal spirits have soared. Our response is yes, for credit flows, heightened animal spirits in isolation are indeed a tailwind. But any rise in the cost of credit is a headwind. It follows that the net impact on credit flows depends on the relative strengths of the tailwind from heightened animal spirits and the headwind from the higher cost of credit. It is the net effect on the 6-month credit impulse - rather than heightened animal spirits per se - that determines the cyclical direction of the economy. We would suggest that the tailwind from heightened animal spirits has been countered by an even stronger headwind - the sharpest proportional rise in borrowing costs for at least 70 years (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Sharpest Proportional Rise In Borrowing Costs For At Least 70 Years! The Sharpest Proportional Rise In Borrowing Costs For At Least 70 Years! The Sharpest Proportional Rise In Borrowing Costs For At Least 70 Years! As anticipated in our 16th February report The Contrarian Case For Bonds, incoming GDP data from the world's largest economies - the U.S., U.K. and France - now confirm this. First quarter growth (at annualised rates) sharply decelerated to 0.7%, 1.2% and 1.0% respectively. And this is not just about so-called first quarter "residual seasonality" as 6-month growth rates have also lost momentum. The global credit impulse is 4 months into a mini-downswing; the global bond yield is 2 months into a mini-downswing. Previous half-cycles have averaged 8 months, with the shortest at around 5 months. Hence, we feel it is somewhat premature to position for the next mini-upswing. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The rally in Portuguese sovereign bonds appears technically overextended. Go short Portuguese sovereign 10-year bonds versus Spanish sovereign 10-year bonds with a profit target and stop loss of 2.5% . For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 10-Year Bonds: Short Portugal / Long Spain 10-Year Bonds: Short Portugal / Long Spain * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights ECB: The ECB is still on track to move to a less accommodative policy stance over the next year. Hints of this will be given at the June policy meeting, while a 2018 asset purchase taper announcement will be made at the September meeting. Rate hikes will follow the taper, unless core inflation surges faster than expected. Position for steeper core Euro Area government curves now, and a narrowing of the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread in the second half of this year. France-Germany Spreads: France-Germany bond spreads are now too narrow relative to the probability-weighted outcomes of this Sunday's final round of the French presidential election. Even with a Macron victory highly likely, we do not recommend long positions in French OATs versus German Bunds. Feature Investors have navigated a minefield of political headline risks over the past few weeks. From French politics to North Korean missile launches, from Donald Trump's tax cuts to Theresa May's snap U.K election, uncertainty abounds. Yet risk assets remain unscathed. That can be mostly be chalked up to the strength of the global cyclical economic upturn, which has boosted corporate profits in the developed world and lifted equity and credit market valuations. The continued accommodative monetary stance of the major central banks is also helping investors see through the political noise, although the winds there are shifting (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekCyclical Upturn Remains Intact Cyclical Upturn Remains Intact Cyclical Upturn Remains Intact In the U.S., financial conditions have eased since the Fed's "dovish hike" in March, and too few rate increases are now discounted with leading indicators pointing to a reacceleration of growth after the soft Q1 print. Across the Atlantic, the European Central Bank (ECB) is having an increasingly open debate about the ongoing need for an exceptionally dovish policy stance given the robust (by European standards) economic expansion. A lack of inflation will keep the Bank of Japan in hyper-easy mode for longer, but the data is presenting a more mixed message for other developed economy central banks like the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England. We continue to see the current level of global bond yields as priced too low given the ongoing cyclical growth and inflation pressures. A pro-growth fixed income investment stance, with below-benchmark portfolio duration and overweight allocations to corporate credit versus sovereign debt (favoring the U.S.), is still appropriate. ECB Outlook: Language Change Coming In June, Policy Change Coming In September Last week's ECB meeting offered few surprises, on the surface. The official statement sounded a cautious note, discussing downside risks to the Euro Area economy from global factors (i.e. trade policy vis-à-vis the U.S. and U.K., geopolitical uncertainty), and that there is still not enough evidence suggesting that inflation was sustainably on course to return to the ECB's 2% target. In the post-meeting press conference, however, the questions aimed at ECB President Mario Draghi turned into an almost farcical dissection of every word in the official statement. Like this exchange, taken directly from the press conference transcript:1 Question: If I got it right, there's one sentence missing in the statement, and this is the sentence, "There are no signs yet of a convincing upward trend in underlying inflation." What is the reason? No? Have I got it wrong? Draghi: No, you're right in a sense that there is one sentence less, but this one is there. On page 2 you have: "Moreover, the ongoing volatility in headline inflation underlines the need..." Constâncio: "...yet to show a convincing upward trend." Draghi: "...convincing upward trend." If you read the end of page 1, beginning of page 2... Question: So there is no change in your assessment of the underlying inflation trend? That was finally the question. Draghi: That is there. No, the one that is not equal exactly like in the last statement is the balance of risks sentence, which repeated twice that the risks remained tilted on the downside in the last statement, and you can find it only once on the second page. That's the difference. Chart 2ECB Policies Are Working... ECB Policies Are Working... ECB Policies Are Working... It is clear that the ECB Governing Council is now stuck in a very difficult position. The domestic Euro Area economic data continues to show a very solid pace of expansion that is soaking up spare capacity, supported by the highly accommodative ECB monetary policies of large-scale asset purchases and rock-bottom interest rates (Chart 2). Yet both wage growth and core inflation remain subdued, suggesting that there is no rush to send any signal that a shift in monetary policy settings is on the horizon - even though the market is aware that the current ECB asset purchase program is set to expire at year-end. The political calendar is playing a role here, as the ECB has not wanted to create additional market volatility by discussing any potential tapering of asset purchases or interest rate hikes during the French election campaign. But with the pro-euro candidate now well-placed to win the French Presidency this Sunday, the market's focus will shift away from ''President Le Pen" disaster scenarios towards timing the ECB's next policy move. The latest round of Euro Area inflation data, released last Friday, showed that the sharp drop in inflation in March was a statistical aberration. Headline HICP inflation (on a year-over-year basis) rose to 1.9% in April from 1.5%, while core inflation jumped to 1.2% from 0.7% - the highest level in almost four years. An acceleration in core inflation now would be consistent with the evidence seen in the Euro Area jobs data, with the unemployment rate steadily falling towards the "full employment" level of 8% (Chart 3). This also fits with the ECB's latest projections that show core inflation returning to just under 2% by 2019. Already, markets are starting to get more jittery about a potential change in the ECB's policy stance in the coming months. Realized bond volatility at the front-end of the German yield curve has risen to the highest level since 2013, although our "months-to-hike" measure is still at 25 months, suggesting that the next ECB rate hike will not occur until 2019 (Chart 4). That pricing makes sense, in our view, as the ECB is likely to taper its asset purchases before considering any interest rate increase. Chart 3...Perhaps Now Too Well? ...Perhaps Now Too Well? ...Perhaps Now Too Well? Chart 4Tightening Pressures Building Tightening Pressures Building Tightening Pressures Building Draghi and other senior members of the ECB (like Chief Economist Peter Praet) have reiterated that exact forward guidance of sequencing - tapering before rate hikes - in recent weeks, citing a desire to not cause an unwanted tightening of financial conditions too soon. That sounds to us like code language for "we do not want to hike rates and cause the euro to appreciate sharply", which is more likely to happen, with greater magnitude, after an increase in policy rates than a taper of bond purchases. We continue to expect that the ECB will move toward a less accommodative monetary stance over the next year, starting with a tapering of asset purchases followed by rate hikes. The initial signal for that will come at the June meeting where a new set of ECB staff economic projections will be prepared, followed by an announcement in September that tapering will begin in early 2018. Rate hikes will not begin until after the tapering ends, likely not until late 2018 or early 2019. This sequencing could change, however, if core inflation was to rise more rapidly than the ECB currently projects, with a rate hike happening sooner in that case. In terms of bond strategy, we recommend curve steepeners in core European government bond markets as an initial way to position for a less accommodative ECB. We anticipate moving to an underweight allocation stance to core Europe (both Germany and France) at some point before the June ECB meeting. We would like to see higher U.S. Treasury yields before making that change, as we expect Treasury-Bund spreads to narrow as the ECB tapers. With the market not pricing in enough rate hikes into the U.S. curve, in our view, we see the Treasury-Bund spread moving wider first as Treasuries reprice, before narrowing after the ECB taper is announced. Bottom Line: The ECB is still on track to move to a less accommodative policy stance over the next year. Hints of this will be given at the June policy meeting, while a 2018 asset purchase taper announcement will be made at the September meeting. Rate hikes will follow the taper, unless core inflation surges faster than expected. Position for steeper core Euro Area government curves now, and a narrowing of the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread in the second half of this year. OAT-Bund Spreads Are Now Fairly Valued Last week, we closed our recommended long 10-year French OAT vs. 10-year German Bund Tactical Overlay trade following the first round of the French presidential election, at a profit of 1.3%.2 While we view the chances of Marine Le Pen winning this Sunday's run-off vote versus Emmanuel Macron as remote, betting on additional spread tightening from the current level of 53bps does not offer an attractive risk/reward opportunity. To judge this, we performed a scenario analysis to determine a probability-adjusted level of the OAT-Bund spread under the two tail events of a Macron or Le Pen victory. In the first scenario, we assigned a 15% probability to Le Pen winning the election, as currently indicated by online betting markets (Chart 5). In the second, we increased the probability to a more pessimistic 40%, which is Le Pen's current level of support in head-to-head opinion polls. We then came up with OAT-Bund spread projections for a victory by either candidate. If Le Pen were to pull off the upset and win the presidency, this would re-ignite fears of a potential Eurozone breakup given her anti-euro stance. Fears of a "Frexit" would likely push the OAT-Bund spread up to at least the same level (around 190bps) reached during the peak of the Euro debt crisis in late 2011 when euro breakup risk was at extreme levels. Even that spread level, however, may not adequately compensate for France's worsening fiscal backdrop, with France's debt/GDP ratio now 40% larger, relative to Germany's, than during the Euro debt crisis (Chart 6). Chart 5Macron Is The Favorite To Win Macron Is The Favorite To Win Macron Is The Favorite To Win Chart 6No Value In Staying Long France Vs Germany No Value In Staying Long France Vs Germany No Value In Staying Long France Vs Germany As a simple way to account for this, we increased the spread target for a Le Pen victory scenario by 1.4 times to account for the increased stock of French sovereign debt, which is all denominated in euros, that would be at risk of default if France was to pull out of the euro. This gives an upside spread target for a Le Pen victory of 266bps. In the event that the poll numbers prove correct, as they did in the first round of the election, and Macron wins as expected, this market-friendly result would prompt the OAT-Bund spread to decline further. Our estimate for a downside spread target after a Macron win is 36bps, which is the average level during 2015-2016 before the rise in uncertainty surrounding the elections. Again, this is adjusted upward in order to reflect changes in the relative debt-to-GDP ratios for France and Germany, with the former nearly 10% higher versus the latter over the past two years. Table 1Probability-Weighted OAT-Bund ##br## Spread Scenarios Don't Sleep On The Central Banks Don't Sleep On The Central Banks Using these spread targets and our base case election odds (85% chance of a Macron victory), we come up with a probability-adjusted spread of 71bps (Table 1). Using the head-to-head probabilities from the polling data (60% chance of a Macron win), the expected spread is 128bps. With the current OAT-Bund spread at 53bps, well below either projection, we conclude that the potential reward of holding onto a long OAT/short Bund position for a Macron victory does not adequately compensate for the non-zero probability that Le Pen pulls out the win this Sunday. Bottom Line: France-Germany bond spreads are now too narrow relative to the probability-weighted outcomes of this Sunday's final round of the French presidential election. Even with a Macron victory highly likely, we do not recommend long positions in French OATs versus German Bunds. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Global Fixed Income Strategy patrick@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2017/html/ecb.is170427.en.html 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report "Global Bond Yields On The Move, Higher", dated April 25, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Don't Sleep On The Central Banks Don't Sleep On The Central Banks Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Safe-haven assets do not simply outperform equities on a relative basis during bear markets. In fact, the average return of nine safe-haven assets has been positive in every bear market since 1972. A safe haven should serve two purposes. First, it should have a negative correlation with equities during bear markets, not necessarily in all markets. Second, it should have an insurance-like payoff, surging during systemic crashes. Low intra-correlations between safe-haven assets, and substantial absolute differences between individual returns and the overall group average suggest that selection adds significant alpha. In the next bear market, we recommend positions in CHF over USD and JPY, due to its greater consistency as a safe-haven asset and more attractive valuations. Favor gold over farmland and TIPS, as gold offers a better hedge against political risks while still protecting against rising inflation. Overweight Treasuries relative to Bunds given a more appealing return distribution and high spreads. Feature Feature ChartSafe Haven Performance Safe Haven Performance Safe Haven Performance As the economic expansion approaches its 100th month, far longer than 38.7 month average1 of cycles starting from 1854, concerns continue to mount over the next recession and equity market crash. Memories of over 50% losses in stocks during the subprime crisis are still ingrained in investors' minds and the importance of capital preservation and safe-haven assets cannot be stressed enough. Safe-haven assets do not simply outperform equities on a relative basis during bear markets. In fact, during the subprime crisis, an equal-weighted portfolio of nine safe-haven assets actually increased in absolute value by 12% (Feature Chart)! This has held consistent through every bear market since 1972 and we expect the next crisis to be the same. While we do not expect a bear market in the next 12 months, we do stress the importance of being prepared and tactically flexible given the substantial relative and absolute performance of safe-haven assets. In this Special Report, we analyze behaviors of safe havens during past bear markets in order to recommend tilts to outperform during the next major equity selloff. Historical Perspective For our analysis, we used monthly return data to more accurately compare across asset classes. We used the following nine safe-haven assets: U.S. Dollar - As the world's reserve currency, the U.S. dollar benefits from massive trade volumes. Japanese Yen - Japan is still the world's 3rd largest economy and runs a current account surplus. Investors' perceptions of safety are intact and the currency benefits from unwinding of carry trades during risk-off environments. Swiss Franc - Switzerland has built a reputation for its international banking prowess, political neutrality and economic stability. U.S. Farmland - Farmland differs from the others in that it is a tangible, hard asset. With finite supply and an increasing population leading to higher needs for farming and food, demand will remain robust. U.S. Treasuries - Treasuries have essentially no default risk. Since its formation in 1776, the U.S. has never failed to pay back its debt. German Bunds - Germany benefits from being economically and politically stable. Bunds are extremely liquid and could receive capital inflows in the event of euro area disintegration. Gold - Gold has a longstanding history as a safe-haven asset, protecting against inflation, currency debasement and geopolitical risks. U.S. TIPS - TIPS are the purest inflation hedge; their historical performance has held a very tight correlation with realized changes in consumer prices. Hedge Funds - Hedge funds are attractive given their lack of restrictions and ability to short. We classified an equity bear market as a decline in the S&P 500, from peak to trough, larger than 19%.2 Using this definition, we recorded eight separate instances since 1972 (See Appendix). On average, these episodes lasted about 14 months and equity prices experienced declines of 34%. We examined returns, correlations and recession characteristics in order to draw conclusions about potential future behavior. Key Findings: During bear markets, the value of these nine safe havens increased on average by 9.2% (Table 1). This certainly does not offset the 34% average decline in equities, but it does provide a considerable buffer, particularly if allocators tilt asset class weightings. However, there is concern that safe havens as a whole will not provide as much protection in the next downturn as they have in the past, given weak equity inflows and still-considerable cash on the sidelines (Chart 2). The average absolute spread between the returns of the nine safe havens and their overall average return was 12.3%. While the correlations between financial assets tend to spike upwards during bear markets, they actually remain very low between safe-haven assets. This indicates a significant opportunity for alpha generation during equity downturns. The region from which a crisis stems has little impact on which safe haven outperforms. For example, U.S. Treasuries and the U.S. dollar both increased in value during the past two recessions, despite the tech bubble and subprime crisis originating from the U.S. (Chart 3). Capital inflows into those assets remained robust given their reputation for safety and quality. U.S. Treasuries and the Swiss franc always had positive absolute returns during the eight bear markets, and therefore have always had a negative correlation with equities (Table 2). These two assets have very stable reputations for safety. Nevertheless, other safe havens, such as gold, USD, JPY and Bunds, still maintained negative correlations with equities during most bear markets. U.S. farmland and U.S. TIPS also had positive returns in the three bear markets since their starting dates. Hedge funds, while known to outperform equities during bear markets, did not provide positive absolute returns in any of the four equity downturns since the index began. Table 1Bear Market Performance Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Chart 2Safe Havens: Less Protection Next Time? Safe Havens: Less Protection Next Time? Safe Havens: Less Protection Next Time? Chart 3Location Doesn't Matter Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Table 2Correlation With Equities Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Investment Implications Chart 4A Near-term Bear Market Is Unlikely A Near-term Bear Market Is Unlikely A Near-term Bear Market Is Unlikely It is crucial to understand the purpose of a safe-haven asset as it pertains to portfolio management. First, a safe-haven asset should have a negative correlation with equities during bear markets, not necessarily in all environments. Secondly, and more importantly, a safe-haven asset should have an insurance-like payoff, surging during systemic crashes. As safe havens naturally receive a smaller allocation in typical portfolios due to their underperformance versus equities in most years, it is imperative that relatively smaller weightings and minor tilts offset large declines in equity prices. It is important, however to note that we view the probability of a bear market as highly unlikely over the next twelve months (Chart 4). First, substantial stock price declines are not very common outside of recessions. As our colleague Martin Barnes points out, the yield curve is not inverted, there are no serious financial imbalances, and the leading economic indicator remains in an uptrend.3 Monetary conditions are still stimulative, and it generally requires Fed tightening to surpass equilibrium before recessions occur. Massive average absolute deviations for each individual safe haven from the overall group average and low intra-correlations suggest that selection adds significant alpha (Chart 5). Unlike most financial assets, intra-correlations between safe havens actually decline during bear markets. In order to best compare and contrast safe havens, we divided the assets into three buckets: currencies, inflation hedges and fixed income. Below, we recommend tilts within these buckets and will revisit these recommendations closer to the next bear market. Chart 5Intra-correlations Remain Low In Bear Markets Intra-correlations Remain Low In Bear Markets Intra-correlations Remain Low In Bear Markets Currencies: Overweight CHF relative to USD and JPY. As a zero-sum game, currency selection offers a critical avenue for alpha generation. As global growth continues to improve and capital flows to more cyclical currencies, or to the USD where policymakers are tightening, the Swiss franc should become even more attractively valued. The franc's considerable excess kurtosis, indicating higher likelihood of outsized returns, best fits the insurance-like payoff quality (Chart 6). It is the only currency to have outperformed, and therefore held a negative correlation with equities, during each of the eight recessions, indicating high reliability as a safe-haven asset. Going forward, we see no reason for Switzerland's reputation for economic stability or political neutrality to be compromised. The biggest risk to this view would be if the Swiss National Bank were to stick stubbornly to its peg of the CHF to the EUR during the next recession, thereby dampening the franc's risk-off properties. The USD has historically been able to outperform even when the crisis originated in the U.S. Historical bear market performance was greatest, however, following sharp Fed tightening such as the Volker crash, when the Fed increased rates in response to high inflation, or in the subprime crisis, when the Fed increased rates to slow growth (Chart 7). While we expect inflation and growth to grind upward over the cyclical horizon, our base case is not for a surge in consumer prices or for economic growth to expand significantly above trend. Chart 6Return Distributions Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Chart 7Fed Tightening = USD Outperformance Fed Tightening = USD Outperformance Fed Tightening = USD Outperformance In the next bear market, the JPY will likely benefit from cheap starting valuations as the BoJ is currently aggressively easing, and its current account surplus raises its fair value. Nevertheless, the yen's returns during equity downturns have not always been consistent with its safe haven reputation. Of the three currencies, since 1970, it has had the lowest probability for large returns. Inflation Hedges: Overweight Gold relative to TIPS and Farmland. Over most of the time frames we tested, gold had the highest correlation with both headline and core inflation (Tables 3 & 4). Table 3Correlation With Core Inflation Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Table 4Correlation With Headline Inflation Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? The main differentiating factor with gold is its ability to hedge against political risk. Our geopolitical strategists found that of all of the safe-haven assets, gold offered the best protection against political shocks4 (Chart 8). As mentioned in one of our recent Special Reports,5 we believe that stagnation in median wages and wealth inequality will continue to fuel the rise in populism and social unrest. Chart 8Gold Is Best At Hedging Political Risk Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time? Farmland has historically offered decent inflation protection, but its history is limited, supply is scarce and the massive runup in prices is a cause for concern. While we currently favor TIPS over nominal bonds, their negative skew and excess kurtosis suggest that they are vulnerable to large negative returns, making them a less-than-ideal safe-haven asset. Fixed Income: Overweight Treasuries relative to Bunds. Concerns that, because government yields are starting at very low levels, bonds will not provide safety in the next bear market, are overblown. Recent history proves that yields can reach negative territory, and historical performance for government fixed income has been robust in almost every significant equity decline. Additionally, the end of the 35-year decline in interest rates should not negatively affect the protection capabilities of Treasuries. Yields actually rose leading up to, and during, the 1972 and 1980 bear markets, and Treasuries still provided positive absolute returns (Chart 9). One caveat is that starting yields are much lower today. If yields were to rise during the next recession, they may not achieve positive absolute returns, though government bonds would still certainly outperform equities by a wide margin. Overall, Treasuries have held a more negative correlation with equities during bear markets, spreads over Bunds will likely continue to rise given diverging monetary policy, and they have historically been more prone to outsized positive returns during crisis periods (Chart 10). Bunds are currently benefitting from flight-to-quality flows resulting from political and policy issues originating in the periphery. However, at some point, concerns that the euro crisis will spread to Germany may eliminate this advantage. Chart 9Rising Yields Were Not A Problem Rising Yields Were Not A Problem Rising Yields Were Not A Problem Chart 10Relative Treasury Valuations Will Become More Attractive Relative Treasury Valuations Will Become More Attractive Relative Treasury Valuations Will Become More Attractive Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor patrick@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 2 While a 20% decline may be a more widely-used measure for bear markets, there have been three instances of 19% declines since 1972, one of which was a recession. We decided to include these in our analysis to increase the number of observations and improve the reliability of our analysis. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated 7 March 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics and Safe Havens" dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Refreshing Our Long-Term Themes," dated 5 December 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Despite President Trump's consternation, the dollar bull market will persist. The euro will reach parity against the greenback by the end of this year. The Fed will deliver more tightening over the next 12 months than the market is expecting, while the ECB will deliver less. The fact that U.S. Treasury-German bund spreads are near record-high levels will not prevent the euro from weakening further. About half of the Treasury-bund spread can be explained by two factors: 1) lower inflation expectations in the euro area; and 2) the hedge that bunds provide against redenomination risk in the event of a breakup of the common currency. The rest can be mostly explained by the fact that the euro area is still well behind the U.S. in its cyclical recovery. It is not the absolute level of interest rate spreads that matters for investors, but how spreads evolve relative to market expectations. The market is already pricing in a substantial amount of spread narrowing over the coming years. Investors expect real rates to be only 17 basis points higher in the U.S. than in the euro area in five years' time. This seems too low to us. Feature Can't Trump The Dollar After an impressive rally from its late-March lows, the dollar hit a roadblock on Wednesday following Trump's remarks on the currency. "I think our dollar is getting too strong," the President said, adding in typical Trumpian style, "and partially that's my fault because people have confidence in me." He went on to say that he prefers that the Fed keep interest rates low. We doubt that Trump will get his wish. If anything, with the Federal Reserve's independence under fire from Republicans in Congress, Fed officials could subconsciously react to Trump's rhetoric by accelerating the pace of rate hikes. Janet Yellen turned 70 last year and she would rather go out in style after serving one term as Fed chair than be perceived as doing Trump's bidding. Soft Versus Hard Data Chart 1U.S. Growth: Broader 'Nowcasts' ##br##Painting A More Flattering Picture U.S. Growth: Broader "Nowcasts" Painting A More Flattering Picture U.S. Growth: Broader "Nowcasts" Painting A More Flattering Picture Of course, the Fed's ability to keep hiking rates is contingent on growth holding up. As discussed in our Q2 Strategy Outlook, while we are worried that growth may disappoint towards the end of 2018, the next 12 months still look reasonably solid.1 Granted, the Atlanta Fed's widely-watched GDP model is pointing to growth of only 0.6% in Q1. However, we would discount this and other narrow tracking estimates, given that the so-called "nowcasts" - which use a broader array of data - paint a much more flattering picture (Chart 1). Some commentators have expressed concern that the nowcasts are being contaminated by "soft data" derived from surveys, which are sending much more bullish signals than the "hard data" published by government statistical agencies. We are less worried about this issue. For one thing, the soft data generally leads the hard data, so some divergence during periods of accelerating growth is not unusual. Second, survey data tends not to be revised, whereas the hard data often is. This is especially important at present because of question marks over seasonal adjustments to Q1 data, which by some calculations are biasing down growth by around one percentage point. Third, the soft data is more consistent with what we are seeing in the labor market. Despite a weak weather-distorted March payrolls report, the overall tone of the labor market data has been positive, as evidenced by near record-low levels of unemployment claims, a rising job openings rate, and ongoing improvement in the Conference Board's perception of job availability measure. Aggregate hours worked still managed to increase by 1.5% at an annualized rate in Q1. If GDP growth was barely above zero as the Atlanta Fed's model suggests, this would imply an outright decline in the level of labor productivity. Even in a world where structural productivity growth is lower than it was in the past, this strikes us as rather implausible. ECB: Doves Are Still In Control There is no denying that economic data from the euro area has been strong this year (Chart 2). The composite PMI stood just shy of a 6-year high in March. Capital goods orders are in a clear uptrend, which bodes well for investment spending over the coming months. Private-sector credit growth reached 2.5% earlier this year, the fastest pace since July 2009. A further acceleration is probable over the coming months, given rising business confidence, firm loan demand, and declining nonperforming loans (Chart 3). Chart 2The Euro Area Economy Will Continue To Recover The Euro Area Economy Will Continue To Recover The Euro Area Economy Will Continue To Recover Chart 3Euro Area: Credit Growth Should Accelerate Euro Area: Credit Growth Should Accelerate Euro Area: Credit Growth Should Accelerate Despite the bevy of good news, the ECB is in no rush to tighten monetary policy. Yes, the central bank did announce a one-off decrease in the size of its asset purchases in December, and will likely do so again in early 2018. However, Mario Draghi has made it clear that he will not raise rates until well after all asset purchases have been completed, which probably won't be until late 2019 at the earliest. The ECB's dovish bias is understandable. While the regionwide unemployment rate is falling, it is still 2% above pre-crisis lows (Chart 4). In Spain and Italy, the unemployment rate stands at 18% and 11.5%, respectively, up from 7.9% and 5.7%. Meanwhile, core inflation is still squarely below the ECB's 2% target and sluggish wage growth across most of the region suggests that this will remain the case for the foreseeable future (Chart 5). Chart 4The ECB's Dovishness Is Merited... The ECB's Dovishness Is Merited... The ECB's Dovishness Is Merited... Chart 5...Especially Given The Muted Inflation Backdrop ...Especially Given The Muted Inflation Backdrop ...Especially Given The Muted Inflation Backdrop Peering Through The Treasury-Bund Spread The usual rejoinder is that all this has been priced into the market. We disagree. The market is currently pricing in less than two Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. In contrast, we expect the Fed to raise rates three or four times over this period. The FOMC is also likely to announce in December that it will allow the size of its balance sheet to shrink as maturing assets roll off. This could put some upward pressure on the term premium. On the flipside, the months-to-hike measure for the ECB has fallen from 60 last summer to only 30 today. We doubt it will go much lower. What about the fact that Treasury-bund spreads stand close to record-high levels? Doesn't that severely limit the downside for EUR/USD? The answer is no. First, one should ideally compare the U.S. Treasury yield with the composite euro area bond yield rather than the bund yield, since the former is what the ECB ultimately cares most about. Chart 6 shows that the GDP-weighted average of 5-year bond yields in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Spain currently stands 55 basis points above comparable bund yields. Second, it is not the absolute level of interest rate spreads that matters for investors, but how spreads evolve relative to market expectations. The euro area is still well behind the U.S. in its cyclical recovery. As such, the 5-year U.S.-euro area spread is currently 173 basis points. However, the 5-year, 5-year forward spread - the spread that investors expect to see in five years' time - is only 92 basis points (Chart 7). This means that investors expect the 5-year spread to fall by 81 basis points over the next half-decade as the business cycles in the two regions converge. Chart 6Bund Yields Remain Below Euro Area Peers Bund Yields Remain Below Euro Area Peers Bund Yields Remain Below Euro Area Peers Chart 7The Vanishing Transatlantic Bond Spread Talk Is Cheap: EUR/USD Is Heading Towards Parity Talk Is Cheap: EUR/USD Is Heading Towards Parity Third, both theory and evidence say that real interest rate differentials are what drive currencies. Investors have long believed that inflation is likely to be structurally lower in the euro area than the U.S. This is underscored by the fact that the CPI swaps market is signaling that inflation will be 0.8% points higher in the latter five years from now. If inflation evolves the way the market expects, U.S. real 5-year yields will be a mere 17 basis points higher than in the euro area in 2022 (Chart 8). This gap does not strike us as being particularly large. Chart 8AU.S. And Euro Area Bond Yields: A Nuanced Picture U.S. And Euro Area Bond Yields: A Nuanced Picture U.S. And Euro Area Bond Yields: A Nuanced Picture Chart 8BU.S. And Euro Area Bond Yields: A Nuanced Picture U.S. And Euro Area Bond Yields: A Nuanced Picture U.S. And Euro Area Bond Yields: A Nuanced Picture We can debate how low the neutral real rate is in the U.S., but whatever it is there, it is likely that it is even lower in the euro area, given the region's worse demographics and higher debt burdens. The anti-growth features of the common currency - namely, the inability to devalue one's currency in response to an adverse economic shock, as well as the austerity bias that comes from not having a central bank that can act as a lender of last resort to solvent but illiquid governments - also imply a lower neutral rate. This brings us back to Trump's rhetoric. If the neutral rate is lower in the euro area than it is in the U.S., any effort to weaken the dollar is bound to backfire. If the Fed raises rates too slowly, the economy could overheat, leading to higher inflation and the need for a sharp increase in rates later on. On the flipside, if the ECB raises rates too quickly, deflationary forces could set in, forcing it to reverse course. Central banks have firm control over many things, but the neutral rate of interest is not one of them.2 As such, we expect real U.S.-euro area spreads to widen over the coming months, which should help push EUR/USD to parity by the end of this year. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Plaza Accord 2.0: Unnecessary, Unfeasible, And Unlikely," dated February 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Dusting Off The BCA Bond Model: As central bankers moving away from the hyper-easy monetary policies of the post-crisis era, reverting back to more traditional bond investing tools, like our BCA Bond Model - which focuses on cyclical economic pressures, valuation and momentum - can be useful. GFIS Composite Bond Indicators: After adding a new element to our classic Bond Model, carry, we come up with a new measure to assess government bond markets - the GFIS Composite Bond Indicators. Current Signals: Our new indicators point to Australia, Canada and the U.K. as looking more attractive on a relative basis than Germany or France. Feature For global fixed income investors, four key questions matter most in selecting which government bond markets to prioritize at the country level: Where each country stands in its economic cycle? Which bonds offer the best value? Which bonds exhibit the strongest price momentum? Which bonds benefit from the best carry? To answer those questions, BCA has built specific macro indicators over the years. The ones related to the cycle, value and momentum form the building blocks of the BCA Bond Model. We have not spent as much time discussing these indicators in recent years. This is because the performance of bond markets has been dominated by extraordinarily easy monetary policies (quantitative easing, negative interest rates) in the major economies since the Great Recession. As more central banks start to question the need for maintaining those crisis-era policy settings, however, the utility of referring back to our classic bond indicators is growing. In this Special Report, we re-examine our bond indicators, explain briefly how they were built, evaluate quantitatively if they still provide a consistent signal and elaborate on the best way to utilize them. To enhance the existing model, we add a "carry" component to it, which is a vital part of bond investing. Since the cyclical, value, momentum and carry indicators often give different asset allocation signals at any given point in time, we propose a way to aggregate the information into one single indicator for each country, i.e. the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) Bond Composite Indicators. We then test these indicators to see if they help bond portfolio managers outperform. The report concludes by comparing the latest message from the GFIS Bond Composite Indicators versus our current recommended portfolio positioning. Specifically, we explain why we are choosing to deviate from our indicators and assess how we could shift our tilts in the future. Evaluating The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators The most important aspect of bond investing is to understand where each country stands in its current economic cycle. As a way to quickly assess this, we developed our Cyclical Bond Indicators many years ago. Tailored for each country, the Indicators are composed of economic data such as: the unemployment rate private sector credit growth the slope of the government bond yield curve commodity prices denominated in local currency terms realized inflation rates Since economies do not always exhibit the same sensitivity to common macro drivers, we created country-specific Cyclical Bond Indicators that each use a different set of variables. After transforming the data, using de-trending and standardizing techniques, the variables are aggregated to form a single indicator for each country.1 Although Developed Market (DM) countries typically appear to be in the same phase of their economic cycle simultaneously, there are always some slight differences between them. These are crucial to identify and can make a huge difference in the government bond asset allocation process. First and foremost, knowing where a country is in its business cycle should impact expected returns on fixed income. Theoretically, bonds should underperform as the economic cycle becomes more advanced and outperform as the economic cycle deteriorates. Statistical Observations To verify that last statement, we separated the cycle for each country in our DM bond universe into seven distinct phases for the economic cycle: Euphoria End of upturn Upturn Downturn End of downturn Crisis Mega Crisis The phases of the cycle are defined by how much the Cyclical Bond Indicator diverges from its mean, which is always zero since the Indicators are standardized (i.e. removing the mean and dividing by the standard deviation). Chart 1 illustrates how our four core countries (U.S., Germany, Japan, U.K.) have gone through those cycles since 1967. At the positive end of the spectrum, the Euphoria state represents instances where economic variables have been especially upbeat (i.e. the Cyclical Bond Indicator is more than two standard deviations above the mean). At the negative end, the Crisis and Mega Crisis periods are when the Cyclical Bond Indicator is more than two and three standard deviations below the mean, respectively. Chart 1The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators For The 'Core Four' Markets The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators For The 'Core Four' Markets The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators For The 'Core Four' Markets To evaluate the usefulness of the Cyclical Bond Indicator as an investment tool, we have calculated the average monthly return during each phase of the cycle for the major DM countries with a one-month lag (i.e. the March 2017 returns are based on the signals given by the February 2017 readings of the Indicators - this is done throughout the rest of this report when testing other bond indicators). The results are shown in Table 1. Table 1Bond Market Performance, Seen Through Our Cyclical Bond Indicator Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model As expected, the average monthly performance tends to increase as an economy enters a downturn. Conversely, as an economic upturn gathers momentum, the performance of the bond market tends to decline.2 In Table 1, we highlighted the current phase for each country. Australia and U.K. are the only countries in Downturn territory right now; compared to their peers, those two countries would have the largest expected return3 of this group. On the other hand, the U.S. economy might be at the End of Upturn phase, when Treasuries should be expected to post the worst return, if history is any guide. In Table 2, we broke out the monthly results into 10-year periods to test the consistency of the indicator performance over time. Unsurprisingly, the End of Upturn phase has been quite detrimental for the DM bond markets during all eras, while the End of Downturn episodes have been good for bond investors in every decade. Table 2Bond Market Returns During ##br##The Various Stages Of Our Cyclical Bond Indicator Are Consistent Across Time Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Chart 2The Gains From Bond Investing##br## According To The Economic Cycle Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Finally, we looked into the usefulness of the Cyclical Bond Indicators in helping construct simple bond portfolios by using them as a ranking tool using the steps described in Box 1. The big picture takeaway is this: the countries with the three highest ranking Cyclical Bond Indicators (i.e. those with the slowest economic growth) outperform by roughly +6 basis points (bps) per month, on average. Similarly, the countries with the lowest-ranked cyclical indicators would underperform by -6bps, on average (Chart 2). Box 1 Ranking Bond Returns Using The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators We calculated the average monthly excess return by buckets using the following steps: We ranked the ten countries in our bond universe by the level of their Cyclical Bond Indicators, from lowest (ranked #1) to highest (ranked #10). We then calculated the monthly currency-hedged excess return of each country versus the average of all the countries in our DM bond universe We then aggregated all the monthly results to have an average excess return for all ten of our ranking buckets We then separated them further into three buckets (the top three, middle four and bottom three ranks) and averaged the monthly excess returns for those groupings. Comments There is nothing particularly out of the ordinary with those findings - the countries with the weakest economies have the best performing government bond markets. However, the results of these statistical exercises confirm that the BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators are reliable and can confidently be used to support our qualitative analysis for each country. Importantly, following those indicators brings a dose of discipline to our bond allocation framework. For example, if our initial qualitative macro analysis diverges markedly from what the Cyclical Bond Indicator is telling us, this would represent a red flag that prompts us to question our initial conclusions. We will highlight situations like this later in this report. Evaluating The BCA Bond Value Indicators To assess the richness or cheapness of DM government bonds, BCA developed a Bond Value Indicator for each country. It is composed of several measures that have a fundamental macroeconomic relationship to bond yields, such as: Central bank policy rate expectations Trend inflation The deviation of the exchange rate from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (as a proxy for the global bond yield) The variables are transformed using regressions, then combined to form a single measure of how far bond yields are from a theoretical fair value. Similar to other components of the BCA Bond Model, the power of these country indicators arises when comparing them amongst each other. Bond markets with yields below fair value should outperform those with yields above fair value. Just like all other asset classes, valuation is a poor tactical timing tool for fixed income. Our Bond Value Indicator is more useful in the long term; value can remain cheap/expensive for an extended period of time. For example, Germany has been the most, or second-most, expensive bond market in our bond universe since June 2013. Due to this shortcoming, the Bond Value Indicator will be given a smaller weighting in our composite indicator laid out later in this report. Statistical Observations To test this indicator, we looked at the hedged excess monthly returns generated using the same ranking procedure laid out in Box 1. The results show that investors can expect to earn about +12bps per month in excess hedged return from countries with the three cheapest valuations according to the Bond Value Indicators, and can expect to lose -6bps/month in countries that are ranked most expensive (Chart 3). Moreover, betting on countries with the cheapest ranked valuations skews favorably the odds of outperforming, from about 46% to 53% (Chart 4). Chart 3The Gains From Bond Investing ##br##According To Value Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Chart 4Favor The Cheaper Bond Markets Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Comments Currently, the U.S. bond market offers the best value (Chart 5). This contrasts unfavorably with our recommended underweight exposure to U.S. Treasuries. Nonetheless, we remain comfortable with this exposure since the U.S. economy is currently in the strongest economic cycle, and its bond market is technically less oversold than its peers (see the next section). Chart 5Bunds Look Rich, Treasuries Look A Bit Cheap Bunds Look Rich, Treasuries Look A Bit Cheap Bunds Look Rich, Treasuries Look A Bit Cheap Also, note that German and Japanese yields look quite expensive, although this is no surprise given the extremely easy monetary policy settings (negative rates, central bank asset purchases) in place from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ). As we have discussed in recent Weekly Reports, we see far greater risks for the ECB moving to a less accommodative monetary bias in the months ahead than the BoJ, and we shifted our country allocations to reflect that view (moving to overweight Japan and cutting Germany to neutral).4 In other words, Japanese bonds will likely stay expensive for longer, unlike German debt. As we mentioned earlier, the value component warrants lesser importance in our tactical and strategic bond allocation framework since it is more long term in nature. In a nutshell, value is something good to have on your side when the macro backdrop shifts, but is not absolutely crucial to generate returns on a month-to-month basis. Evaluating The BCA Bond Momentum Indicator So far, the BCA Bond Cyclical Indicator informed us where the macroeconomic forces were the strongest and the BCA Bond Value Indicator helped us find bargains. This is all great, but bond investors could still underperform if their timing is off. The BCA Bond Momentum Indicator helps in finding the appropriate short-term timing. It has been built simply by looking at how far bond yields are relative to their primary medium-term trend. In theory, bond markets where yields are too stretched to the upside (oversold) should outperform versus countries where yields are too stretched to the downside (overbought). Statistical Observations Using the same ranking methodology explained in Box 1, investors can expect to earn roughly +11bps/month in excess return versus DM peers where conditions are the most oversold and should expect to lose -6bps/month from bond markets with the most overbought conditions (Chart 6). Comments While we do consider technical analysis as part of the tactical component in our bond allocation framework, we put less emphasis on it relative to other more fundamental factors that sustainably drive bond returns over time. Nonetheless, our ranked findings show that choosing markets based on price/yield momentum does generate fairly reliable outperformance. What About Carry? As seen so far, our traditional bond indicators encompass typical variables that would be expected to influence bond returns. Our framework would be incomplete, however, without incorporating the notion of "carry" - the investment return generated by the interest income on bonds. Having instruments that earn too little carry can be very harmful to the returns of a bond portfolio over prolonged periods. A simple observation of the long-term performance of higher-yielding credit markets (i.e. corporate debt or Emerging Market sovereigns) proves that point (Chart 7), especially in the current era where investors continue to stretch for yield given puny risk-free interest rates in so many countries. Chart 6The Gains From Bond Investing ##br##According To Momentum Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Chart 7Carry Plays A Huge Role ##br##For Long-Run Bond Returns Carry Plays A Huge Role For Long-Run Bond Returns Carry Plays A Huge Role For Long-Run Bond Returns Of course, most of the major carry gaps between DM sovereign bond yields disappear after currency hedging. However, even on a hedged basis, the carry differentials remain important. Currently, Italian debt carries the highest hedged yield in our DM bond universe, at 3.95%, versus 1.54% for Japan. The 241bp differential between the two is significant, especially in the current global low yield environment. However, some of that additional yield is compensation for the greater riskiness of Italian debt, given the many structural problems in that country (high debt levels, low productivity, political instability, fragile banks). In other words, a better way to evaluate carry is on a risk-adjusted basis. In Chart 8, we show the hedged 10-year government bond yields of the ten DM countries shown throughout this report, both in absolute terms (top panel) and adjusted for volatility (bottom panel). Note that Italy's ranking moves down two notches after accounting for the greater return volatility of Italian debt, while Spain offers the most attractive yield on a risk-adjusted basis. At the other end of the spectrum, Australia and Canada have less attractive yields relative to their volatilities than Japan - home of the 0% bond yield. Of course, as the old investment saying goes, "you can't eat risk-adjusted returns." As a general rule, bond markets with higher yields should be expected to outperform markets with lower yields over time. Statistical Observations An historical analysis of our DM universe using the methodology laid out in Box 1 confirms that observation. The bond markets with better ranked carry have a tendency to generate positive excess returns (on a currency-hedged basis) and, on average, produce more winning months than losing ones (Chart 9). This is true even though the higher-yielding markets are often those with higher inflation, or greater government debt levels, or more active central banks that create interest rate volatility. Chart 8Peripheral European Carry##br## Is Still The Most Attractive Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Chart 9The Gains From Bond Investing##br## According To Carry Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Comments Currently, the carry factor would favor overweighting Italy, Spain and France, while underweighting Japan, Australia and the U.K. Those relative rankings still generally hold up even after adjusting for volatility. Pulling It All Together: Introducing The GFIS Bond Composite Indicators Now that we have outlined the four elements of our proposed composite bond indicator, the question becomes: how do we aggregate those pieces? The components of our original BCA Bond Model rarely give the same message simultaneously, even after adding a new factor (carry) to the mix. Moreover, as discussed above, some elements (Cyclical and Carry) are more important than others (Value and Momentum) in delivering consistent outperformance of bond returns. Hence, to build a new composite indicator, we need to make a judgment call as to which component should be given more weight. Cyclical (50%). Here at BCA, we spend a fair amount of time trying to deeply understand economic cycles, which are a major driver of financial markets. Bonds are no exception, with changes in growth and inflation expectations forming the fundamental building blocks of yields. As such, we allocate a substantial 50% weight to the cyclical component of our GFIS Bond Composite Indicators. Value (15%). Value moves much more slowly than the other indicators and yields often diverge from fair value for long periods of time. As such, we are giving a smaller weighting of 15% to the value piece of the GFIS Bond Composite Indicators that we are designing to provide a timely signal for country allocation. Momentum (15%). Although technical analysis should be a meaningful part of any investment process, markets can often trend for extended periods before any consolidation, or even reversal, takes place. To reflect that, our momentum indicator will also carry only a 15% weighting in our composite indicator, the same as the weight given to value. Carry (20%). Carry should play an important part in a bond allocation framework. To use a sporting analogy - favoring higher-yielding bonds means starting the game with the score already in your favor. For that reason, we will give carry a 20% weight in our overall bond indicators. After combining our individual bond indicator rankings (from 1 to 10) using the weightings described above, we come up with an overall score for each country which becomes the GFIS Composite Bond Indicator (Table 3). Ranking the countries according to their respective scores gives a new indication as to which bond markets we might want to overweight or underweight. Table 3Combining The BCA Bond Indicators Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Statistical Observations Chart 10Our Composite Bond Indicator ##br##Adds Value At The Extremes Our Composite Bond Indicator Adds Value At The Extremes Our Composite Bond Indicator Adds Value At The Extremes To test the investment performance of our new GFIS Composite Bond Indicators, we created an equally-weighted index using the monthly hedged returns of the ten countries in our DM bond universe. We then created two portfolios: One composed of the countries with the three best composite scores; The other composed of the countries with the three worst composite scores. In both cases, those sample portfolios out-/under-performed the equally-weighted index as expected, proving that value can be extracted by following the recommendations of the GFIS Composite Indicators (Chart 10). Comments This automatic/quantitative ranking of the countries is designed as a guideline only. The goal here is to quickly find what could be the most appealing bond markets on a relative basis. Judgment on whether to apply the findings should and will always take precedence when we make our investment recommendations. Also note, in attributing weightings across the components, we have not used any optimization techniques to find the perfect balance. We simply relied on our judgment for a simple reason: optimization gives the best fit according to a set of historical market volatilities and correlations. During periods when volatilities change, or correlations become less stable, the historically-optimal weightings may produce sub-optimal investment results. We prefer to use a constant set of weights across our individual indicators, derived from our own investment intuition and preferences. What Could Be Our Next Portfolio Tweaks? We compare the latest rankings from our GFIS Composite Bond Indicators to our current fixed income country allocations in Table 4. Deviations between the two can provide some ideas for possible changes to our recommendations. Table 4The GFIS Composite Bond Indicator##br## Vs. Our Current Recommendations Revisiting The BCA Bond Model Revisiting The BCA Bond Model From this table, two observations arise: The three countries that rank the highest, Australia, Canada and U.K. are at neutral in our recommended portfolio (Chart 11). Should we move them to overweight? Among the three countries that rank the worst, we are still only at neutral Germany and France (Chart 12). Should we move to an underweight stance given the signal from our new Composite Bond Indicator? On the first point, we have turned decidedly less negative on Australia and U.K. bonds of late.5 In the next few months, if more signs of cyclical deterioration emerge, we will be tempted to align ourselves with our composite indicators and overweight those markets. Although as we discussed in a recent Special Report, another set of our in-house indicators, the Central Bank Monitors, are pointing to pressures to tighten monetary policy in Australia, Canada and the U.K., perhaps providing some justification for only being neutral on those markets.6 On the second point, we recently downgraded core Europe to neutral from overweight, given our growing concern that the ECB will be forced to announce a tapering of its asset purchases, likely starting in early 2018.7 We anticipate that our next move will be to a full-blown underweight position on both Germany and France, although we prefer to wait until after the upcoming French elections before making that shift. Given our view that the populist Marine Le Pen will not win the presidency, we expect to be cutting Germany before France, as there is still a wide political uncertainty premium built into French-German bond spreads.8 Chart 11Bond Upgrade Candidates Bond Upgrade Candidates Bond Upgrade Candidates Chart 12Bond Downgrade Candidates Bond Downgrade Candidates Bond Downgrade Candidates Going forward, we will continue to monitor our GFIS's Composite Bond Indicators to supplement/confirm our macro analyses and to discover some potential portfolio moves/trades. Additionally, we will look to further test and refine the Composite Bond Indicators by looking at different weighting schemes among the component indicators, how the correlations between the components shift over time (and if there is any information from those changes), and other considerations. Now that we've "dusted off" our classic bond indicators, there is plenty of additional research that can be done to build on the initial results shown in this report. Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 We have built the Cyclical Bond Indicators using data going back to 1967 for most DM countries, allowing for a robust historical analysis across the different bond markets. 2 Since global bonds have experienced a powerful secular bull market over the past 35 years, the majority of monthly returns in the history of the Cyclical Bond Indicator have been positive. As such, shorting bonds in absolute terms has seldom proved to be a value-added proposition. The only exceptions are when the macro landscape has entered the Euphoria state, which has been quite rare. 3 In local currency terms 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Staying Behind The Curve, For Now", dated March 21, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Reports, "Will The Hawks Walk The Talk?", dated March 7, 2017 (on the U.K.), and "It's Real Growth, Not Fake News", dated February 21, 2017 (on Australia), both available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook", dated March 28, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "March Madness", dated March 14, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "Our Views On French Government Bonds", dated February 7, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Either go long Eurodollar / short Euribor June 2019 interest rate futures. Or long the U.S. 5-year T-bond / short German 5-year bund. Or long euro/dollar (though our preferred long euro expression is long euro/pound near term and long euro/yuan structurally). All three of the above are just one big correlated trade. Long-term equity investors should consider a 50:50 combination of Germany (DAX) and Sweden (OMX) as a superior alternative to the Eurostoxx50 or Eurostoxx600. But near term, remain cautious on risk-assets. Feature On the face of it, the ECB has committed to leave interest rates where they are for a very long time. "The Governing Council continues to expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases"1 But take a closer look at this commitment, and an extended period of time could mean as little as a year. As things stand, "the horizon of the net asset purchases" has only nine more months to run, and "well past" could justifiably mean just six months or less beyond that. Furthermore, at the last press conference Draghi emphasized that forward guidance "is an expectation" and that the probabilities of the ECB's expectations are constantly changing. Remember also that the ECB has three policy interest rates:2 the deposit rate (-0.4%), the repo rate (0%) and the marginal lending rate (0.25%) - and the ECB doesn't have to move all three in tandem. Indeed in 2015, the ECB cut the deposit rate before the other two rates (Chart I-2). So it is quite conceivable that the ECB could hike the deposit rate before the other two rates and as soon as a year or so from now. Chart of the WeekGermany/Sweden Combination Has Run A Good Race With The U.S. Germany & Sweden Combination Has Run A Good Race With The U.S. Germany & Sweden Combination Has Run A Good Race With The U.S. Chart I-2The ECB Could Hike Its Deposit Rate Early The ECB Could Hike Its Deposit Rate Early The ECB Could Hike Its Deposit Rate Early ECB council member Ewald Nowotny hinted as much in a Handelsblatt interview last week, saying that all interest rates wouldn't have to be increased simultaneously nor to the same extent. "The ECB could raise the deposit rate earlier than the prime rate." A Major Mispricing: ECB Versus Fed This neatly brings us to one of the most extreme pricings in financial markets at the moment. The expected difference between ECB looseness and Fed tightness two years ahead stands at a 20-year extreme (Chart I-3). Chart I-3An Extreme Pricing: ECB Versus Fed An Extreme Pricing: ECB Versus Fed An Extreme Pricing: ECB Versus Fed Yet the percentage of the euro area population in employment is at an all-time high (Chart I-4), while on an apples for apples comparison, there is no difference between economic growth, inflation, or inflation expectations in the euro area and the U.S.3 Moreover, Draghi points out that "the risks surrounding euro area growth relate predominantly to global factors." If these global risks do materialise, it would prevent both the ECB and the Fed hiking rates through 2018. But if these global risks do not materialise, allowing the Fed to continue hiking through 2018, is it really conceivable that the ECB just sits pat? We think not. On this basis, investors should either go long Eurodollar / short Euribor June 2019 interest rate futures. Or long the U.S. 5-year T-bond / short German 5-year bund. Or long euro/dollar (though we prefer long euro/pound near term and long euro/yuan structurally). We say "either or" because all three positions are just one big correlated trade (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Percentage Of Euro Area Population In##br## Employment Near An All-Time High! Percentage Of Euro Area Population In Employment Near An All-Time High! Percentage Of Euro Area Population In Employment Near An All-Time High! Chart I-5Correlated Trade: Interest Rate Futures,##br## Bond Yield Spreads, Ans EUR/USD Correlated Trade: Interest Rate Futures, Bond Yield Spreads, And EUR/USD Correlated Trade: Interest Rate Futures, Bond Yield Spreads, And EUR/USD The French Election: "System 1" And "System 2" The looming risk to this big correlated trade takes the form of the upcoming French Presidential Election. Two data points do not make a trend, but some people are worried that the same dynamic that delivered shock electoral victories for Brexit and Donald Trump in 2016 could propel Marine Le Pen to the Elysée Palace in 2017. This worry is overdone. In explaining the Brexit and Trump shock victories, an important point has been understated. These days many voters care more about politicians' personalities than policies. Emotional appeal arguably matters more than rational appeal. Behavioural psychologist and Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman calls the emotional way of thinking "System 1", and the colder rational way of thinking "System 2". Both the Brexit and Trump campaigns resonated strongly with emotional System 1. A lot of voters warmed to Boris Johnson, a leader of the Brexit campaign, and to Donald Trump. By contrast, the Bremain and Hillary Clinton campaigns tried to appeal mainly to cold rational System 2. But as Kahneman explains, when cold rational System 2 competes with emotional System 1, emotional System 1 almost always wins. In this regard, the dynamic of the French Presidential election is very different to the U.K.'s EU Referendum and the U.S. Presidential Election. Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, points out that "Emmanuel Macron's personality, and notably his charm, calm authority and courage may well (emotionally) appeal to more voters than Marine Le Pen's simplistic remedies and bitterness." Therefore, a final run off between Le Pen and Macron - as now seems highly likely - does not give us sleepless nights. But we would be concerned if the final run off were between Le Pen and the much less emotionally appealing François Fillon (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6A Final Run Off Between Le Pen & Macron... A Final Run Off Between Le Pen & Macron... A Final Run Off Between Le Pen & Macron... Chart I-7...Does Not Give Us Sleepless Nights ...Does Not Give Us Sleepless Nights ...Does Not Give Us Sleepless Nights Incidentally, both Daniel Kahneman and Charles Grant will be speaking at our forthcoming New York Conference on September 25-26, and promise to provide fascinating investment insights from their areas of expertise. So book your places now! A Better Way To Invest In Europe: Germany And Sweden All of this might suggest that the Eurostoxx50 should outperform the S&P500. Not necessarily. Extreme economic and political tail-events aside, there is almost no connection between national or regional economic relative performance and stock market relative performance. As we demonstrated in the Fallacy Of Division,4 by far the biggest driver of Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 performance is its sector skew. The Eurostoxx50 has a major 15% weighting to banks and a minor 7% weighting to tech. The S&P500 is the mirror image; a minor 7% weighting to banks and a major 22% weighting to tech. Furthermore, this overarching driver is captured in just the three largest euro area banks versus the three largest U.S. tech stocks. So relative performance simply reduces to whether Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING outperform Apple, Microsoft and Google,5 or vice-versa. Everything else is largely irrelevant. But this begs the question: can a different combination of European markets neutralise the sector skew and thereby provide a fairer head-to-head contest with the tech-heavy S&P500? At first glance, the answer seems to be no. Europe simply does not have the same type of technology companies that the U.S. has. So no combination of European markets can match the S&P500 tech exposure. On the other hand, Europe is the world-leader in a different type of technology: innovative industrial equipment and materials. It turns out that a 50:50 combination of Germany (DAX) and Sweden (OMX) matches the exposure to European industrial equipment and materials with the exposure to American tech. At the same time, the DAX/OMX combination largely removes Europe's bank overweight. The upshot is that the DAX/OMX combination has run a very good race with the S&P500 through the past 10 years, while the Eurostoxx50 has failed to keep the pace (Chart of the Week). In effect, DAX/OMX versus S&P500 reduces to Siemens, Bayer and Atlas Copco versus Apple, Microsoft and Google (Chart I-8). Compared to the euro area banks, Europe's innovative industrial equipment and materials are a much better long-term match-up against U.S. tech (Chart I-9). Indeed, my colleague, Brian Piccioni, BCA Technology strategist, points out that Bayer is a good play on the revolutionary new genetic modification technology CRISPR-Cas9.6 Chart I-8DAX/OMX Vs. S&P500 = Siemens, Bayer & Atlas Copco ##br##Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google DAX/OMX Vs. S&P500 = Siemens, Bayer & Atlas Copco Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google DAX/OMX Vs. S&P500 = Siemens, Bayer & Atlas Copco Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Chart I-9European Innovative Industrial Equipment & Materials ##br##Is A Good Match-Up Against American Tech European Innovative Industrial Equipment & Materials Is A Good Match-Up Against American Tech European Innovative Industrial Equipment & Materials Is A Good Match-Up Against American Tech Investors who want a long-term equity exposure to Europe should consider a 50:50 combination of Germany (DAX) and Sweden (OMX) as a superior alternative to the Eurostoxx50 or Eurostoxx600. Nevertheless, those who can fine-tune their timing should await a better entry-point for all risk-assets. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 From the ECB introductory statement to the press conference, March 9 2017. 2 The deposit rate (-0.4%) is the rate at which commercial banks park their excess liquidity; the repo rate (0%) is the usually quoted policy rate for the ECB's standard money market operations; and the marginal lending rate (0.25%) is the rate at which commercial banks borrow from the central bank, usually when they cannot access interbank funding. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Fake News In Europe' January 26, 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com 4 Published on March 9, 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 5 Listed as Alphabet. 6 Please see the Technology Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report 'CRISPR-Cas9: Investment Implications' March 17, 2017 available at www.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. We are expressing a tactical short position in equities through a short exposure to the Netherlands AEX. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Short AEX Short AEX * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Trump's agenda has not derailed ... at least not yet; Europe remains a red herring ... as the Dutch showed; Turkey cannot restart Europe's immigration crisis; Supply-side reforms are still likely in France; The ECB will remain dovish for longer than expected; EUR/USD may rise in the short term, but it will relapse. Feature In this Weekly Report, we focus on the key questions regarding continental European politics. To begin, however, we will briefly address the U.S., since investors are starting to worry about whether President Donald Trump can get his legislative agenda through, given the recent testimony of FBI Director James Comey on the alleged interference of Russia in the U.S. election. There are three points to focus on in the U.S.: Chart 1Trump Not Dead To Republicans Yet Five Questions On Europe Five Questions On Europe The GOP base supports Trump: President Trump was always going to be a controversial president. Anyone who is surprised by it today clearly was not paying attention last year. In the long term, Trump's extraordinarily low popularity will be an albatross around his neck, draining his political capital. However, until the mid-term elections, his popularity with Republican voters is all that matters, and it remains strong (Chart 1). House Republicans have to worry that they could face pro-Trump challengers in primary elections in the summer ahead of the 2018 midterms. As such, as long as the Republican voters support Trump, he still has political capital. Republicans in Congress want tax reform: Budget-busting tax reform is not only a Trump policy, it is a Republican policy. We have already received plenty of signals from fiscal hawks in Congress that they intend to use "dynamic scoring," macroeconomic modeling that takes into account revenue-positive effects of tax cuts when assessing the impact on the budget, in order to justify cuts as revenue-neutral. Republicans are also looking at the repatriation of corporate earnings and a border adjustment tax to raise revenue. Obamacare delay may not mean much: We already pointed out before that the GOP intention to focus on Obamacare first, tax reform second, would get them in trouble.1 This is now playing out. Opposing the Obamacare replacement may make sense to small-government Tea Party members. Repeal, alone, is why they are in Congress in the first place, given the 2010 wave election. But opposing tax cuts - once justified by dynamic scoring as revenue neutral - will be much more difficult. The Tea Party is "small government" first, fiscal restraint second. In other words, if tax reform cuts taxes and reduces revenue available to Washington D.C., "temporary" budget deficits will be easy to swallow. This is not to say that the recent events have not hurt the chances of whopping tax cuts and infrastructure spending. In particular, we think that Congressional GOP members may take over the agenda if Trump loses any more political capital. And this will mean less budget-busting than Trump would have done. Also, tax reform was always going to be difficult as special interests and lobbyists were bound to get involved. Chart 2French Spreads Are Overstated French Spreads Are Overstated French Spreads Are Overstated In addition, the probability of an eventual Trump impeachment - were Republicans to lose the House, or grassroots Republicans to abandon him in droves - has risen. Investors can no longer ignore this issue, even though it was initially a liberal fantasy. However, all of these risks to the Trump agenda will likely spur the GOP in the House to focus on passing tax reform while they still have a majority in Congress and control of the White House. We still expect tax reform to be done this year - within the fiscal year 2018 reconciliation bill - as time now may truly be running out for Republicans. Europe, meanwhile remains a focal point in client meetings. Our view that Europe will be a geopolitical red herring in 2017 - and thus an investment opportunity - remains controversial. We will address Brexit and the new Scottish independence referendum in our report next week, to coincide with London's formal invocation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to initiate the exit proceedings. Popular support for independence in Scotland has been one of our measures of "Bregret" since last summer and it has just sprung back to life, which adds a new source of risk for investors. On the continent, investors are particularly concerned that the upcoming French election will follow the populist script from the U.K. and the U.S. last year. This worry has pushed French bond yield spreads over German bonds to the highest level since 2011, bringing French bonds into the same trend as peripheral bonds (Chart 2). Since the outbreak of the euro area's sovereign debt crisis, a tight correlation between French and Italian/Spanish bonds has signified systemic political risk. We disagree that political events represent a systemic risk to the euro area in 2017. This week, we address five critical questions inspired by challenges to our view presented by our clients in meetings and conference calls. Question 1: Is The Dutch Election Result Important? Few clients have asked for a post-mortem on the March 15 Dutch election, but many asked about the vote beforehand. It has come and gone with little fanfare. Financial media have brushed it aside as it does not fit the neat script of rising Euroskepticism on the continent. To recap, the Euroskeptic and populist Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, gained five seats in the election (13% of the votes cast), bringing its total support to 20 in the 150-seat parliament. Despite the gains, however, the election was an unmitigated disaster for Wilders, as the PVV was polling strong for most of the campaign and was expected to win between 30 and 35 seats (Chart 3). In terms of its share of total votes, the PVV's performance in 2017 trails its performance in the 2010 general election and the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections. Not only did the PVV underperform the past year's polls, but also they only managed to eke out their fourth-best performance ever. Chart 3Dutch Euroskeptics Were Always Overrated Five Questions On Europe Five Questions On Europe Chart 4Austria Leans Euroskeptic... Austria Leans Euroskeptic... Austria Leans Euroskeptic... Chart 5...Yet Chose A Europhile President ...Yet Chose A Europhile President ...Yet Chose A Europhile President It is a mistake to ignore these results. They teach us three valuable lessons: Trend reversal: In April of last year we warned clients that the upcoming Brexit referendum and U.S. elections had a much higher chance of populist outcomes than the European elections in 2017.2 The basis for our controversial claim was the notion that European social-welfare states dampened the pain of globalization for the middle class. We now have two elections that confirm our view that European voters are just not as angry as their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Aside from the Dutch, there is also the lesson from the similarly ignored Austrian presidential election last December. Despite Austria's baseline as a relatively Euroskeptic country (Chart 4), the right wing, populist candidate lost his solid lead in the last few weeks ahead of the election (Chart 5). Clients should not ignore Austria and the Netherlands, since both countries have a long tradition of Euroskepticism and their populist, anti-immigration parties are well established and highly competitive. If Euroskeptics cannot win here, where can they win? It's immigration, stupid: Investors should make a distinction between anti-immigrant and anti-euro sentiment. In both the Netherlands and Austria, it was anti-immigrant sentiment that propelled populist parties in the polls. However, as the migration crisis abated, their polling collapsed. This was clearest in the Netherlands, where asylum applications to the EU - advanced by six months - tracked closely with PVV polling (Chart 6). The distinction is highly relevant as it means that even if the populists had taken power, they would not necessarily have had enough political support to take their country out of the euro area. This is particularly the case in the Netherlands, where support for the euro remains high (Chart 7). Brexit is not helping: Much ink has been spilt in the media suggesting that Brexit would encourage voters in Europe to hold similar popular referendums. We disagreed with this assertion and now the evidence from Austria and the Netherlands supports our view.3 Chart 3 shows that the decline in the PVV's support sped up around the time of the U.K. referendum, suggesting that Brexit may even have discouraged voters from voting for the populist option. Geert Wilders was temporarily buoyed by the kangaroo court accusing him of racial insensitivity. But the sympathy vote quickly dissipated and PVV polling reverted back to the post-Brexit trend.4 Chart 6Dutch Populists Linked To Immigration Dutch Populists Linked To Immigration Dutch Populists Linked To Immigration Chart 7The Dutch Approve Of The Euro The Dutch Approve Of The Euro The Dutch Approve Of The Euro Bottom Line: The election in the Netherlands provides an important data point that should not be ignored. The populist PVV not only failed to meet polling expectations, it failed to repeat its result from seven years ago. Investors are ignoring how important the abating of the migration crisis truly was for European politics. Question 2: Can Turkey Restart The Immigration Crisis? The end of the migration crisis in Europe clearly played a major role in dampening support for the Dutch and Austrian populists. We expected this in September 2015, when we argued with high conviction that the migration crisis would prove ephemeral (Chart 8).5 How did we make the right call at the height of the influx of asylum seekers into Europe? Three insights guided us: Civil wars end: No civil war can last forever. Eventually, battle lines ossify into de facto borders between warring factions and hostilities draw to a close. The Syrian Civil War is still going, but its most vicious phase has ended. Civilians have either moved into safer zones or, tragically, have perished. Enforcement increases: The influx of 220,000 asylum seekers per month - the height of the crisis in October 2015 - was unsustainable. Eventually, enforcement tightens. This happened to the "Balkan route" as countries reinforced their borders and Hungary built a fence. Liberal attitudes wane: European attitudes towards migrants soured quickly as the crisis escalated. After the highly publicized welcoming message from Chancellor Angela Merkel, the tone shifted to one of quiet hostility. This significantly changed the cost-benefit calculus of the economic migrants most likely to be deported. Given that roughly half of asylum seekers in 2015 were not fleeing war, but merely looking for a better life, the change in attitude in Europe was important. Many of our clients are today worried that Turkey might deliberately restart the migration crisis as a way to punish Europe amidst ongoing Euro-Turkish disputes. The rhetoric from Ankara supports this concern: Turkish officials have threatened economic sanctions against the Netherlands, and accused Germany of supporting the July 2016 coup and the U.S. of funding the Islamic State. We call Turkey's bluff on this threat. First, the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean collapsed well before the EU-Turkey deal was negotiated in March 2016. This puts into doubt Turkey's role in dampening the flow in the first place. Second, unlike in 2015, Turkey is now officially involved in the Syrian conflict, having invaded the country last August. By participating directly, Turkey can no longer tolerate the unfettered flow of migrants through its territory to Europe, a luxury in 2015 when it was a "passive" bystander. Today, migrants flowing through its territory are even more likely to be parties active in the Syrian war looking to strike Turkish targets for strategic reasons. Third, the Turkish economy is reliant on Europe for both FDI and export demand (Chart 9). If Turkey were to lash out by encouraging migration into Europe, the subsequent economic sanctions would devastate the Turkish economy and collapse its currency. Investment and trade with Europe make up the vast majority of its current account deficit. Chart 8Migration Crisis Well Past Its Peak Migration Crisis Well Past Its Peak Migration Crisis Well Past Its Peak Chart 9Turkey Depends On Europe Turkey Depends On Europe Turkey Depends On Europe Bottom Line: Turkey can make Europe's life difficult. However, the migration crisis did not end because of Turkey and therefore will not restart because of Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara has its own security to consider and will continue to keep its border with Syria closed and closely monitored. Question 3: Is A Supply-Side Revolution Still Possible In France? In February, we posited that a supply-side revolution was afoot in France.6 Since then, the Thatcherite candidate for presidency - François Fillon - has suffered an ignominious fall in the polls due to ongoing corruption scandals. This somewhat dampens our enthusiasm, given that Fillon's program was by far the most aggressive in proposing cuts to the size of the French state. Still, the new leading candidate Emmanuel Macron (Chart 10) is quite possibly the most right-wing of left-wing candidates that France has ever fielded. He quit the Socialist Party and has received endorsements across the ideological spectrum. In addition, his governing program is largely pro-market: Public expenditure will go down to 50% of GDP (from 57%) by 2022; Corporate taxes will be reduced from 33.3% to 25%; Regulation will be simplified for small and medium-sized businesses; Productive investment will be exempt from the wealth tax, which will focus solely on real estate; Exceptions to the 35-hour work week will be allowed at the company level. More important than Macron's campaign promises is the evidence that the French "median voter" is shifting. Polls suggest that a "silent majority" in France favors structural reform (Chart 11). Chart 10Macron's Huge Lead Over Le Pen Macron's Huge Lead Over Le Pen Macron's Huge Lead Over Le Pen Chart 11France: 'Silent Majority' Wants Reform Five Questions On Europe Five Questions On Europe As such, France may be ready for reforms and Emmanuel Macron could be France's Gerhard Schröder, a centrist reformer capable of pulling the left-wing towards pro-market reforms. What about the fears that Macron will not be able to command a majority in France's National Assembly? Macron's party En Marche! was founded less than a year ago and is unlikely to be competitive in the upcoming June legislative elections (a two-round election to be held on June 10 and 17). This will force Macron, should he win, to "cohabitate" with a prime minister from another party. Most likely, this will mean a prime minister from the center-right Republicans. For investors, this could be very positive. The French constitution gives the National Assembly most power over domestic affairs when the president cannot command a majority. This means that a center-right prime minister who receives his mandate from Macron will be in charge of domestic reforms. We see no reason why Macron would not be able to work with such a prime minister. In fact, the worse En Marche! does in the parliamentary election, the more likely that Macron will be perceived as non-threatening to the center-right Republicans. What if no party wins a majority in parliament? We think that Macron would excel in this situation. He would be able to get support from the right-wing of the Socialist Party and the centrist elements of the Republicans. And if the National Assembly fails to support his program, he could always call for a new parliamentary election in a year's time, given his presidential powers. In other words, investors may be unduly pessimistic about the prospect of reforms under Macron. Several prominent center-right figures - including Alain Juppé and Manuel Valls - have already distanced themselves from Fillon, perhaps opening up the possibility of a premiership under Macron. In addition, Macron himself has refused to accuse Fillon of corruption, a smart strategy given that he will need his endorsement in the second round against Le Pen and that he will likely need to cohabitate with the Republicans to govern. What of Marine Le Pen's probability of winning? At this point, polling does not look good for her. Not only is she trailing Macron by 22% in the second round, but she is even trailing Fillon by 11%. Nonetheless, we suspect that she will close the gap over the next month. Election momentum works in cycles and she should be able to bounce back, giving investors another scare ahead of the election. Bottom Line: Concerns over Emmanuel Macron's ability to pursue structural reforms are overstated. Yes, he is less ideal of a candidate than Fillon from the market's perspective, but no, we do not doubt that he would be able to cohabitate with a center-right parliament. That said, we cannot pass definitive judgment until the parliamentary election takes place in June. Question 4: Will Germans Want A Hawk In 2019? An Austrian member of the ECB Governing Council, Ewald Nowotny, spooked the markets by suggesting that Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann would be one of the two most likely candidates to replace Mario Draghi in 2019. Weidmann is a noted hawk who has opposed the ECB's easy monetary policy and even testified against Angela Merkel's government during the court case assessing the constitutionality of the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). The prospect of a Weidmann ECB presidency fits the narrative that Germans will want a hawk to replace Mario Draghi in 2019. The idea is that by 2019, inflation will be close to the ECB's target of 2% and Germans would be itching to beat it down. We have heard this view from colleagues and clients for some time. And we have disagreed with it for quite some time as well! As we pointed out in 2012, it was a German political decision to shift the ECB towards a dovish outlook.7 This is not to say that the ECB takes its orders from Berlin. Rather, it is that Chancellor Merkel had plenty of opportunities via personnel decisions to ensure that the ECB followed a more monetarist and hawkish line. For example, she could have signed off on former Bundesbank President Axel Weber, who was the leading candidate for the job in 2011. She refused when Weber signaled his opposition to the ECB's initial bond-buying program (the Securities Market Program). Mario Draghi was quickly tapped as the alternative candidate suitable to Berlin. Later in 2011, ECB Executive Board member Jürgen Stark resigned over opposition to the same ECB bond-buying program. Since Stark was the German member of the Executive Board, convention held that Berlin would propose his replacement. In other words, while Merkel had her pick of Germany's foremost economists, she picked her finance minister's deputy, Jörg Asmussen. Neither Draghi nor Asmussen have a strand of monetarist or inflation-hawk DNA between the two of them. ECB policy has not been dovish by accident but by design. While it is true that the ECB will inhabit a different macro environment in 2017-19 from the crisis of 2011-12, nevertheless we suspect that dovishness will continue beyond 2019 for two key reasons: German domestic politics: Germans are not becoming Euroskeptic, they are turning rabidly Europhile! If the polls are to be believed, Germans are now the most pro-euro people in Europe (Chart 12). Martin Schulz, chancellor-candidate of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), is campaigning on an aggressive anti-populist, pro-EU platform. He has accused Merkel of being too reticent and of providing Europe's Euroskeptics with a tailwind due to her policies. The SPD's recent climb in the polls is stunning (Chart 13). But even if Schulz fails to win, Merkel will have to take into account his brand of politics if she intends to reconstitute the Grand Coalition with the SPD. It is highly unlikely that Schulz will sign off on a hawkish ECB president (or on the return of Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble for that matter). Italian risks: While we have been sanguine about this year's political risks, the Italian election slated for February 2018 is set for genuine fireworks. Euroskeptic parties have now taken a lead in the polls (Chart 14). While the election is still too close to call, and a lot of things can happen between now and then, we expect it to be a risk catalyst in Europe. The problem with Italy is that the election is unlikely to provide any clarity. A hung parliament will likely produce a weak, potentially minority government. Given Italy's potential GDP growth rate of about 0%, this means that a weak government will at some point have to deal with a recession, heightening political risks beyond 2018. Chart 12Germans Love The Euro Germans Love The Euro Germans Love The Euro Chart 13Pro-Europe Sentiment Drives SPD Revival Pro-Europe Sentiment Drives SPD Revival Pro-Europe Sentiment Drives SPD Revival Chart 14Italian Elections: The Big Risk Italian Elections: The Big Risk Italian Elections: The Big Risk Bottom Line: Italy will hang over Europe like a Sword of Damocles for quite some time. The ECB will therefore be forced to remain dovish a lot longer than investors think. We see no evidence that Berlin will seek to reverse this policy. In fact, given the political paradigm shift in Germany itself, we suspect that Berlin will turn more Europhile over the next several years. Question 5: What Is The Big Picture For Europe? What explains the dogged persistence of support for European integration on the continent? Even in the case of Italy - where Euroskepticism is clearly on the rise - we would bet on voters supporting euro area and EU membership in a referendum (albeit with a low conviction). Why? In 2011, at the height of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, we elucidated our view on the long-term trajectory of European integration.8 We highly recommend that our clients re-read this analysis, as it continues to inform our net assessment of Europe. Our assertion in 2011 was that Europe is integrating out of weakness, not out of misplaced hope of strength. Much of the analysis in the financial community and media does not understand this point. It therefore rejects the wisdom of integration on the basis that Europhile policymakers are blinded by ambition. In our view, they are driven by necessity. As Chart 15 suggests, the average "hard power" of the five largest economies in the euro area (the EMU-5) is much lower than the average "hard power" of the BRIC states.9 European integration is therefore an attempt to asymptotically approach the aggregate, rather than the average, "hard power" of the EMU-5. Europe will never achieve the aggregate figure, as that will require a level of integration that is impossible. But the effort lies beneath European policymakers' goal of an "ever closer union." The truth of the matter is that European nation-states - as individual sovereign states - simply do not matter anymore. Their economic weight, demographics, and military strength relative to other nations are a far cry from when Europe dominated the world (Chart 16). Chart 15European Integration Is About Geopolitics... European Integration Is About Geopolitics... European Integration Is About Geopolitics... Chart 16...And Global Relevance ...And Global Relevance ...And Global Relevance If European countries seek to shape their geopolitical and macroeconomic environment, they have to act in unison. This is not a normative statement, it is an empirical fact. This means that everything from Russian assertiveness and immigration crises to energy policy and trade negotiations have to be handled as a bloc. But is this not an elitist view? To what extent do European voters think in such grand geopolitical terms? According to polling, they think this way more than most analysts are willing to admit! Chart 17 shows that most Europeans - other than the British and Italians - are "in it" for geopolitical relevance and security, and only secondarily for economic growth. Even in Italy, geopolitical concerns are more important than economic performance, although levels of both suggest that Italy is again the critical risk for Europe. We suspect that it is this commitment to the non-economic goals of European integration that sustains the political commitment of both elites and the general public to the European project. As Chart 18 suggests, European voters continue to doubt that their future will be brighter outside of the bloc. Chart 17Voters Grasp The EU's Purpose ... Five Questions On Europe Five Questions On Europe Chart 18...And Most Want To Stay In It ...And Most Want To Stay In It ...And Most Want To Stay In It Bottom Line: European integration is not just an economic project. Voters understand this - not in all countries, but in enough to sustain integration beyond the immediate risks. Given this assessment, it is not clear to us that the project would collapse even if Italy left. Investment Implications Given our political assessment, we continue to support the recommendation of our colleague Peter Berezin that investors overweight euro area equities in a global portfolio.10 As Peter recently elucidated, capital goods orders continue to trend higher, which is a positive for investment spending on a cyclical horizon - helping euro area assets (Chart 19). Furthermore, private-sector credit growth remains robust, despite political risks (Chart 20). Chart 19European Economy Looking Up European Economy Looking Up European Economy Looking Up Chart 20Credit Growing Well Despite Election Risk Credit Growing Well Despite Election Risk Credit Growing Well Despite Election Risk Over the next 6-12 months, we see EUR/USD rising, especially as the ECB contemplates tapering its bond purchases. We recommend a tactical long EUR/USD trade as a result. The euro could rise higher if the Trump administration disappoints the market on tax reform and infrastructure spending, policies that were supposed to supercharge the U.S. economy and prompt further Fed hawkishness. Over the long term, however, we doubt that the ECB will have the luxury of hawkishness. And we highly doubt that Berlin will rebel against dovish monetary policy. In fact, investors may be using the wrong mental map if they are equating Mario Draghi's taper with that of Ben Bernanke. While Bernanke intended to signal eventual tightening, Draghi will likely do everything in his power to dissuade the market from believing that interest rate hikes are inevitably coming soon. Therefore, we suspect that EUR/USD will eventually hit parity, after a potential rally in 2017. While this long-term depreciation may make sense from a political and macroeconomic perspective for Europe, it will likely set the stage for a geopolitical confrontation between the Trump Administration and Europe sometime next year. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 The media has suggested that the PVV merely suffered because of the Turkey-Netherlands spat over Turkish political campaigning in the Netherlands. We see no evidence of this. First, the PVV's collapse in the polls predates the crisis by several weeks. Second, the crisis had all the hallmarks of a trap for the establishment. It is not the fault of incumbent Prime Minister Mark Rutte for adeptly capitalizing on the situation. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Great Migration - Europe, Refugees, And Investment Implications," dated September 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "Draghi And Asmussen, Not The OMT, Are A Game Changer," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report "Fortuna And Policymakers," dated October 10, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Bank Credit Analyst, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration," dated November 2011, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 As measured by the BCA Geopolitical Power Index. 10 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny," dated March 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights We discuss three "battles" that will shape the investment landscape in the euro area over the remainder of the decade. Battle #1: Reflation Versus Deleveraging - Reflation will triumph over the next 12 months. For the time being, this justifies an overweight position in euro area equities. Beyond then, the outlook is likely to darken. Battle #2: Hawks Versus Doves - The doves will win. Germany will reluctantly accept an overheated economy and higher inflation. Stay short the euro. Battle #3: Globalists Versus Populists - Marine Le Pen will lose this year's election, but Europe's populist parties will finally gain the upper hand by the end of the decade. Buy gold as a long-term hedge. Feature Market Update Global equities are technically overbought in the short term, but the longer-term cyclical (12-month) trend remains to the upside. Chart 1 illustrates the "reflation trade" in a nutshell. The Citigroup global economic and inflation surprise indices have surged and now stand at their highest combined level in the 14-year history of the series. While tracking estimates for Q1 U.S. GDP growth have fallen, this is mainly because of negative contributions from government spending, net exports, and inventories. Taken together, these three factors have shaved about 1.4 percentage points off of Q1 growth according to the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model (Chart 2). Private final domestic demand is still growing at a reasonably robust 2.6% pace, and forward-looking indicators such as the ISM indices suggest that this number could rise over the next few quarters. Chart 1The Reflation Trade In One Chart The Reflation Trade In One Chart The Reflation Trade In One Chart Chart 2Underlying U.S. Growth Is Still Healthy Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny As such, it is not too surprising that U.S. equities have had little trouble digesting the prospect of a March Fed rate hike. The market is still pricing in less than three rate increases this calendar year. Four hikes would not be out of the question. Investors should remain positioned for a stronger dollar and higher Treasury yields. We continue to favor higher beta developed markets such as the euro area and Japan over the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. The Battle For Europe History is often shaped by great battles. Sometimes these are of the military variety. But often they transcend physical conflict, pitting competing ideas, interests, and trends against one another. In the remainder of this week's report, we discuss three economic and political battles that will determine Europe's fortunes over the next 12 months and beyond. Battle #1: Reflation Versus Deleveraging The euro area grew faster than the U.S. in 2016, the first time this has happened since 2008. While the U.S. is likely to resume pole position in 2017, we still expect the euro area economy to expand at an above-trend pace. That should be enough to keep unemployment on a downward trajectory. The euro area economic surprise index remains in positive territory. The composite PMI rose to 56 in February - the highest level since April 2011 - with the forward-looking "new orders" component hitting new cyclical highs. Capital goods orders continue to trend higher, which bodes well for investment spending over the coming months (Chart 3). In addition, private-sector credit growth has sped up to the fastest pace since the 2008-09 financial crisis (Chart 4). All this is good news for the region. Investors should overweight euro area equities on a currency-hedged basis over the next 12 months. Chart 3Euro Area Growth Holding Up Well Euro Area Growth Holding Up Well Euro Area Growth Holding Up Well Chart 4Euro Area: Accelerating Private-Sector ##br##Credit Growth Euro Area: Accelerating Private-Sector Credit Growth Euro Area: Accelerating Private-Sector Credit Growth Beyond then, things look murkier. The ECB's Bank Lending Standards survey showed a modest tightening in lending standards for business loans in Q4 of 2016 (Chart 5). Private-sector debt levels also remain elevated across the region, which is likely to dampen credit demand (Chart 6). Both of these factors suggest that loan growth could begin to moderate later this year. Chart 5Slight Tightening In Lending Standards ##br##For Business Loans And Mortgages In Q4 Of 2016 Slight Tightening In Lending Standards For Business Loans And Mortgages In Q4 Of 2016 Slight Tightening In Lending Standards For Business Loans And Mortgages In Q4 Of 2016 Chart 6Still A Lot Of Debt Still A Lot Of Debt Still A Lot Of Debt If the positive impulse from rising credit growth does begin to fade, GDP growth will fall off. Whether that proves to be just another run-of-the-mill "mid-cycle slowdown" or something more nefarious will depend on the policy response. On the fiscal side, the period of extended austerity has ended. The fiscal thrust in the euro area turned positive last year, the first time this has happened since 2010. The European Commission is advising member states to loosen fiscal policy further this year, but the governments themselves are targeting a modest tightening (Chart 7). With a slew of elections slated for this year, budget overruns will be hard to avoid. Nevertheless, barring a significant economic slowdown, no major European economy is likely to launch a large fiscal stimulus program anytime soon. Thus, while fiscal policy will not be a drag on growth, it will not provide much of a tailwind either. Chart 7European Commission Recommending Greater Fiscal Expansion Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny This puts the ball back in the ECB's court. As we discuss next, monetary policy is likely to stay highly accommodative. That should help extend the cyclical recovery into 2018. Battle #2: Hawks Versus Doves Jean Claude Trichet's decision to raise rates in 2011 would have gone down as the most disastrous blunder the ECB ever made, were it not for his even more disastrous decision to raise rates in 2008. Mario Draghi has gone out of his way to avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessor. Nevertheless, the risk is that the improving growth backdrop instills a false sense of complacency. There is no doubt that Draghi has become more confident about the economic outlook. The ECB revised up its growth and inflation projections for 2017-18 at this week's meeting and signaled that it was unlikely to extend its targeted longer-term refinancing operations, or TLTROs. The ECB is also likely to further reduce the value of its monthly asset purchases in 2018 with a view towards phasing them out completely by the end of that year. It is possible that these steps could trigger a "taper tantrum" in European government debt markets of the sort the U.S. experienced in 2013. If that were to happen, we would see it as a buying opportunity. As Draghi stressed during his press conference, wage growth is anemic. Without faster wage growth, inflationary pressures will remain muted. Granted, euro area headline inflation reached 2.0% in February. However, this was mainly the result of base effects stemming from higher food and energy prices. Our expectation is that headline inflation will fall back close to 1% by the end of the year. This is where core inflation currently stands. One should also keep in mind that the trade-weighted euro has depreciated by 8% since mid-2014 (Chart 8). To the extent that a weaker euro has put upward pressure on import prices, this has caused core inflation to be higher than it would otherwise have been. In contrast, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar has appreciated by 24% over this period. Yet, despite the diverging path between the two currencies, core inflation in the euro area remains noticeably lower than in the U.S. This is true even if one excludes housing costs from the U.S. CPI in order to make it more comparable to the European estimate of inflation. Excluding shelter, U.S. core inflation is currently 43 basis points higher than in the euro area (Chart 9). The point is that the Fed is much further along the path to monetary policy normalization than the ECB. Chart 8A Stronger Dollar Has Restrained U.S. Inflation... A Stronger Dollar Has Restrained U.S. Inflation… A Stronger Dollar Has Restrained U.S. Inflation… Chart 9...Yet Core Inflation In The U.S. ##br##Is Still Higher, Even Excluding Housing ...Yet Core Inflation In The U.S. Is Still Higher, Even Excluding Housing ...Yet Core Inflation In The U.S. Is Still Higher, Even Excluding Housing If that were all to the story, it would be enough to justify the ECB's wait-and-see approach. But there is so much more. Start with the fact that the euro area's poor demographics, high debt levels, and dysfunctional institutions all imply that the neutral rate - the interest rate consistent with full employment - is lower there than in the U.S. How does one ensure that real rates can fall to a low enough level in the event of an economic slowdown? One solution is to target a higher inflation rate. If inflation is running at 1% going into a recession, it might be impossible to bring real rates down much below -1%. But if inflation is running at 3%, real rates can fall to as low as -3%. This implies that the ECB should actually target a higher inflation rate than the Fed. Then there are the internal constraints imposed by the common currency. Countries with flexible exchange rates can adjust to adverse economic shocks by letting their currencies depreciate. That is not possible within the euro area. If one or a few countries in the region are suffering while others are not, the unlucky ones have to engineer an "internal devaluation." This requires that wages and prices in the ill-fated countries decline in relation to those in the better-performing ones. However, if inflation is already low in the latter, outright deflation may be necessary in the former, something that only a deep recession can achieve. The travails experienced by the peripheral countries over the past eight years brought home this lesson in stark and painful terms. Will Germany accept higher inflation? There is little in its recent history to suggest that it won't. Mario Draghi was not the odds-on favorite to become ECB president. That job was supposed to go to Axel Weber, the former president of the Bundesbank. Weber met with Angela Merkel on February 10, 2011. During this meeting with the chancellor, he made it clear that he did not support the ECB's emergency bond buying. Merkel balked and so the next day Weber tendered his resignation. Six months after that, ECB board member and uber-hawk Jürgen Stark quit, leaving the ECB more firmly in the control of the doves.1 Chart 10Germans Turning Radically Europhile Germans Turning Radically Europhile Germans Turning Radically Europhile Merkel's preference for a less hawkish ECB leadership wasn't solely based on altruistic feelings towards her European compatriots. Politically, Merkel knew full well that Germany would be blamed for the breakup of the euro area. Economically, German taxpayers also stood to lose a lot from a breakup. It is easy to forget now, but Germany spent 8% of GDP during the global financial crisis on bailing out its own banks. All that effort would have been for naught if German banks had been forced to write off billions of euros in loans that they had extended to peripheral Europe. Critically, the demise of the euro would have also saddled German exporters with a much more expensive Deutsche Mark, thus blowing a hole through the country's gargantuan current account surplus. The calculus has not changed much over the last six years. Germany may not welcome higher inflation, but the alternative is much worse. If anything, the polls suggest that German voters have become even more Europhile since the euro crisis ended (Chart 10). This gives Draghi even more free rein. For investors, this implies that the ECB is unlikely to raise rates for the next two years, and perhaps not until the end of the decade. As inflation expectations across the euro area drift higher, real rates will fall. This will push down the value of the euro. We expect EUR/USD to approach parity over the course of this year. Battle #3: Globalists Versus Populists First Brexit, then Trump, and now Le Pen? The spread between French and German 10-year government bond yields briefly touched 68 basis points in February, the highest level since the euro crisis (Chart 11). While the spread has edged down since then, investors remain on edge. Betting markets are currently assigning a one-in-three chance that Le Pen will become president, close to the odds that they were giving Donald Trump before his surprise victory (Chart 12). Chart 11Investors Worried About The Coming ##br##French Election Investors Worried About The Coming French Election Investors Worried About The Coming French Election Chart 12Will Le Pen Rule? Wanna Bet? Will Le Pen Rule? Wanna Bet? Will Le Pen Rule? Wanna Bet? There is little doubt that populism is in a secular "bull market." However, that doesn't mean that every populist politician is going to win every single election. For all their faults, U.S. nationwide presidential election polls were not that far off the mark. The RealClearPolitics average had Clinton up by 3.2% going into the election. She won by 2.1 points. Where the polls fell flat was at the state level. They completely underestimated Trump support in the Rust Belt states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. That's not an issue in France, where the presidential vote is tallied at the national level. Le Pen currently trails Macron by 26 percentage points in a head-to-head contest (Chart 13). It is highly unlikely that she will be able to close this gap between now and May 7th, the date of the second round of the Presidential contest. The only way that Le Pen could win is if one of the two leftist candidates drops out.2 However, given the animosity between Benoit Hamon and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, that is almost inconceivable. And even if that did occur, the odds would still favor Macron slipping into the final round. As such, investors should downplay risks of a populist uprising this year. Beyond then, things are likely to get messier. At some point, Europe will face another downturn, either of its own doing or the result of an external shock. Many voters have been reluctant to vote for populist leaders out of fear that the ensuing economic turmoil could leave them out of a job. But if they have already lost their jobs, that reason goes away. Chart 14 shows the strong correlation between unemployment in various French départements, and support for Marine Le Pen's National Front. If French unemployment rises, her support is likely to increase as well. The same goes for other European countries. Chart 13Macron Leads Le Pen By A Mile Macron Leads Le Pen By A Mile Macron Leads Le Pen By A Mile Chart 14Higher Unemployment Would Benefit Le Pen Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny In addition, worries about large-scale immigration from outside Europe will continue to work to the advantage of populist leaders. Recent immigrants and their children have sometimes struggled to integrate into European society. This has manifested itself in the form of low labor participation rates, poor educational achievement, elevated involvement in criminal activity, and high welfare usage. The problem has been especially acute in European countries with very generous welfare states (Chart 15). Chart 15Many Immigrants To Europe Are Lagging Behind Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny Three Battles That Will Determine The Euro Area's Destiny The reaction of establishment parties to mounting concerns about immigration has been completely counterproductive. Rather than acknowledging the problems, they have sought to censor uncomfortable "hatefacts" and stage show trials of populist leaders - such as the one Marine Le Pen will likely be subjected to for her alleged crime of tweeting graphic photos of terrorist atrocities. This strategy will backfire and the result will be a wave of populist victories towards the end of the decade. With that in mind, investors should consider buying some gold as a long-term hedge. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “Europe: Game Was Changed A Long Time Ago,” in a Monthly Report, “Fortuna And Policymakers,” dated October 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “Europe – Election Update, France,” in a Weekly Report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” dated March 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades