Global vs Domestic

Highlights Biden’s first 100 days are characterized by a liberal spend-and-tax agenda unseen since the 1960s. It is not a “bait and switch,” however. Voters do not care about deficits and debt. At least not for now. The apparent outcome of the populist surge in the US and UK in 2016 is blowout fiscal spending. Yet the US and UK also invented and distributed vaccines faster than others. US growth and equities have outperformed while the US dollar experienced a countertrend bounce. While growth will rotate to other regions, China’s stimulus is on the wane. Of Biden’s three initial geopolitical risks, two are showing signs of subsiding: Russia and Iran. US-China tensions persist, however, and Biden has been hawkish so far. Our new Australia Geopolitical Risk Indicator confirms our other indicators in signaling that China risk, writ large, remains elevated. Cyclically we are optimistic about the Aussie and Australian stocks. Mexico’s midterm elections are likely to curb the ruling party’s majority but only marginally. The macro and geopolitical backdrop is favorable for Mexico. Feature US President Joe Biden gave his first address to the US Congress on April 28. Biden’s first hundred days are significant for his extravagant spending proposals, which will rank alongside those of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, if not Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, in their impact on US history, for better and worse. Chart 1Biden's First 100 Days - The Market's Appraisal Biden's First 100 Days - The Market's Appraisal Biden's First 100 Days - The Market's Appraisal The global financial market appraisal is that Biden’s proposals will turn out for the better. The market has responded to the US’s stimulus overshoot, successful vaccine rollout, and growth outperformance – notably in the pandemic-struck service sector – by bidding up US equities and the dollar (Chart 1). From a macro perspective we share the BCA House View in leaning against both of these trends, preferring international equities and commodity currencies. However, our geopolitical method has made it difficult for us to bet directly against the dollar and US equities. Geopolitics is about not only wars and trade but also the interaction of different countries’ domestic politics. America’s populist spending blowout is occurring alongside a sharp drop in China’s combined credit-and-fiscal impulse, which will eventually weigh on the global economy. This is true even though the rest of the world is beginning to catch up in vaccinations and economic normalization. As for traditional geopolitical risk – wars and alliances – Biden has not yet leaped over the three initial foreign policy hurdles that we have highlighted: China, Russia, and Iran. In this report we will update the view on all three, as there is tentative improvement on the Russian and Iranian fronts. In addition, we will introduce our newest geopolitical risk indicator – for Australia – and update our view on Mexico ahead of its June 6 midterm elections. Biden’s Fiscal Blowout From a macro point of view, Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was much larger than what Republicans would have passed if President Trump had won a second term. His proposed $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan (AJP) is also larger, though both candidates were likely to pass an infrastructure package. The difference lies in the parts of these packages that relate to social spending and other programs, beyond COVID relief and roads and bridges. The Republican proposal for COVID relief was $618 billion while the Republicans’ current proposal on infrastructure is $568 billion – marking a $3 trillion difference from Biden. In reality Republicans would have proposed larger spending if Trump had remained president – but not enough to close this gap. And Biden is also proposing a $1.8 trillion American Families Plan (AFP). Biden’s praise for handling the vaccinations must be qualified by the Trump administration’s successful preparations, which have been unfairly denigrated. Similarly, Biden’s blame for the migrant surge at the southern border must be qualified by the fact that the surge began last year.1 A comparison with the UK will put Biden’s administration into perspective. The only country comparable to the US in terms of the size of fiscal stimulus over 2019-21 so far – excluding Biden’s AJP and AFP, which are not yet law – is the United Kingdom. Thus the consequence of the flare-up of populism in the Anglo-Saxon world since 2016 is a budget deficit blowout as these countries strive to suppress domestic socio-political conflict by means of government largesse, particularly in industrial and social programs. However, populist dysfunction was also overrated. Both the US and UK retain their advantages in terms of innovation and dynamism, as revealed by the vaccine and its rollout (Chart 2). Chart 2Dysfunctional Anglo-Saxon Populism? Dysfunctional Anglo-Saxon Populism? Dysfunctional Anglo-Saxon Populism? No sharp leftward turn occurred in the UK, where Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservatives had the benefit of a pre-COVID election in December 2019, which they won. By contrast, in the US, President Trump and the Republicans contended an election after the pandemic and recession had virtually doomed them to failure. There a sharp leftward turn is taking place. Going forward the US will reclaim the top rank in terms of fiscal stimulus, as Biden is likely to get his infrastructure plan (AJP) passed. Our updated US budget deficit projections appear in Chart 3. Our sister US Political Strategy gives the AJP an 80% chance of passing in some form and the AFP only a 50% chance of passing, depending on how quickly the AJP is passed. This means the blue dashed line is more likely to occur than the red dashed line. The difference is slight despite the mind-boggling headline numbers of the plans because the spending is spread out over eight-to-ten years and tax hikes over 15 years will partially offset the expenditures. Much will depend on whether Congress is willing to pay for the new spending. In Chart 3 we assume that Biden will get half of the proposed corporate tax hikes in the AJP scenario (and half of the individual tax hikes in the AFP scenario). If spending is watered down, and/or tax hikes surprise to the upside, both of which are possible, then the deficit scenarios will obviously tighten, assuming the economic recovery continues robustly as expected. But in the current political environment it is safest to plan for the most expansive budget deficit scenarios, as populism is the overriding force. Chart 3Biden’s Blowout Spending Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s campaign plan was even more visionary, so it is not true that Biden pulled a “bait and switch” on voters. Rather, the median voter is comfortable with greater deficits and a larger government role in American life. Bottom Line: The implication of Biden’s spending blowout is reflationary for the global economy, cyclically negative for the US dollar, and positive for global equities. But on a tactical time frame the rotation to other equities and currencies will also depend on China’s fiscal-and-credit deceleration and whether geopolitical risk continues to fall. Russia: Some Improvement But Coast Not Yet Clear US-Russia tensions appeared to fizzle over the past week but the coast is not yet clear. We remain short Russian currency and risk assets as well as European emerging market equities. Tensions fell after President Putin’s State of the Nation address on April 21 in which he warned the West against crossing Russia’s “red lines.” Biden’s sanctions on Russia were underwhelming – he did not insist on halting the final stages of the Nord Stream II pipeline to Germany. Russia declared it would withdraw its roughly 100,000 troops from the Ukrainian border by May 1. Russian dissident Alexei Navalny ended his hunger strike. Putin attended Biden’s Earth Day summit and the two are working on a bilateral summit in June. Chart 4Russia's Domestic Instability Will Continue Russia's Domestic Instability Will Continue Russia's Domestic Instability Will Continue De-escalation is not certain, however. First, some US officials have cast doubt on Russia’s withdrawal of troops and it is known that arms and equipment were left in place for a rapid mobilization and re-escalation if necessary. Second, Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists will be emboldened, which could increase fighting in Ukraine that could eventually provoke Russian intervention. Third, the US has until August or September to prevent Nord Stream from completion. Diplomacy between Russia and the US (and Russia and several eastern European states) has hit a low point on the withdrawal of ambassadors. Fourth, Russian domestic politics was always the chief reason to prepare for a worse geopolitical confrontation and it remains unsettled. Putin’s approval rating still lingers in the relatively low range of 65% and government approval at 49%. The economic recovery is weak and facing an increasingly negative fiscal thrust, along with Europe and China, Russia’s single-largest export destination (Chart 4). Putin’s handouts to households, in anticipation of the September Duma election, only amount to 0.2% of GDP. More measures will probably be announced but the lead-up to the election could still see an international adventure designed to distract the public from its socioeconomic woes. Russia’s geopolitical risk indicators ticked up as anticipated (Chart 5). They may subside if the military drawdown is confirmed and Biden and Putin lower the temperature. But we would not bet on it. Chart 5Russian Geopolitical Risk: Wait For 'All Clear' Signal Russian Geopolitical Risk: Wait For 'All Clear' Signal Russian Geopolitical Risk: Wait For 'All Clear' Signal Bottom Line: It is possible that Biden has passed his first foreign policy test with Russia but it is too soon to sound the “all clear.” We remain short Russian ruble and short EM Europe until de-escalation is confirmed. The Russian (and German) elections in September will mark a time for reassessing this view. Iran: Diplomacy On Track (Hence Jitters Will Rise) While Russia may or may not truly de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, the spring and summer are sure to see an increase in focus on US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Geopolitical risks will remain high prior to the conclusion of a deal and will materialize in kinetic attacks of various kinds. This thesis is confirmed by the alleged Israeli sabotage of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility this month. The US Navy also fired warning shots at Iranian vessels staging provocations. Sporadic attacks in other parts of the region also continue to flare, most recently with an Iranian tanker getting hit by a drone at a Syrian oil terminal.2 The US and Iran are making progress in the Vienna talks toward rejoining the 2015 nuclear deal from which the US withdrew in 2018. Iran pledged to enrich uranium up to 60% but also said this move was reversible – like all its tentative violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) so far (Table 1). Iran also offered a prisoner swap with the US. Saudi Arabia appears resigned to a resumption of the JCPA that it cannot prevent, with crown prince Mohammed bin Salman offering diplomatic overtures to both the US and Iran. Table 1Iran’s Nuclear Program And Compliance With JCPA 2015 Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Still, the closer the US and Iran get to a deal the more its opponents will need to either take action or make preparations for the aftermath. The allegation that former US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shared Israeli military plans with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is an example of the kind of political brouhaha that will occur as different elements try to support and oppose the normalization of US-Iran ties. More importantly Israel will underscore its red line against nuclear weaponization. Previously Iran was set to reach “breakout” capability of uranium enrichment – a point at which it has enough fissile material to produce a nuclear device – as early as May. Due to sabotage at the Natanz facility the breakout period may have been pushed back to July.3 This compounds the significance of this summer as a deadline for negotiating a reduction in tensions. While the US may be prepared to fudge on Iran’s breakout capabilities, Israel will not, which means a market-relevant showdown should occur this summer before Israel backs down for fear of alienating the United States. Tit-for-tat attacks in May and June could cause negative surprises for oil supply. Then there will be a mad dash by the negotiators to agree to deal before the de facto August deadline, when Iran inaugurates a new president and it becomes much harder to resolve outstanding issues. Chart 6Iran Deal Priced Into Oil Markets? Iran Deal Priced Into Oil Markets? Iran Deal Priced Into Oil Markets? Hence our argument that geopolitics adds upside risk to oil prices in the first half of the year but downside risk in the second half. The market’s expectations seem already to account for this, based on the forward curve for Brent crude oil. The marginal impact of a reconstituted Iran nuclear deal on oil prices is slightly negative over the long run since a deal is more likely to be concluded than not and will open up Iran’s economy and oil exports to the world. However, our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects the Brent price to exceed expectations in the coming years, judging by supply and demand balances and global macro fundamentals (Chart 6). If an Iran deal becomes a fait accompli in July and August the Saudis could abandon their commitment to OPEC 2.0’s production discipline. The Russians and Saudis are not eager to return to a market share war after what happened in March 2020 but we cannot rule it out in the face of Iranian production. Thus we expect oil to be volatile. Oil producers also face the threat of green energy and US shale production which gives them more than one reason to keep up production and prevent prices from getting too lofty. Throughout the post-2015 geopolitical saga between the US and Iran, major incidents have caused an increase in the oil-to-gold ratio. The risk of oil supply disruption affected the price more than the flight to gold due to geopolitical or war risk. The trend generally corresponds with that of the copper-to-gold ratio, though copper-to-gold rose higher when growth boomed and oil outperformed when US-Iran tensions spiked in 2019. Today the copper-to-gold ratio is vastly outperforming the oil-to-gold on the back of the global recovery (Chart 7). This makes sense from the point of view of the likelihood of a US-Iran deal this year. But tensions prior to a deal will push up oil-to-gold in the near term. Chart 7Biden Passes Iran Test? Likely But Not A Done Deal Biden Passes Iran Test? Likely But Not A Done Deal Biden Passes Iran Test? Likely But Not A Done Deal Bottom Line: The US-Iran diplomacy is on track. This means geopolitical risk will escalate in May and June before a short-term or interim deal is agreed in July or August. Geopolitical risk stemming from US-Iran relations will subside thereafter, unless the deadline is missed. The forward curve has largely priced in the oil price downside except for the risk that OPEC 2.0 becomes dysfunctional again. We expect upside price surprises in the near term. Biden, China, And Our Australia GeoRisk Indicator Ostensibly the US and Russia are avoiding a war over Ukraine and the US and Iran are negotiating a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Only US-China relations utterly lack clarity, with military maneuvering in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and tensions simmering over the gamut of other disputes. Chart 8Biden Still Faces China Test Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) The latest data on global military spending show not only that the US and China continue to build up their militaries but also that all of the regional allies – including Japan! – are bulking up defense spending (Chart 8). This is a substantial confirmation of the secular growth of geopolitical risk, specifically in reaction to China’s rise and US-China competition. The first round of US-China talks under Biden went awry but since then a basis has been laid for cooperation on climate change, with President Xi Jinping attending Biden’s virtual climate change summit (albeit with no bilateral summit between the two). If John Kerry is removed as climate czar over his Iranian controversy it will not have an impact other than to undermine American negotiators’ reliability. The deeper point is that climate is a narrow basis for US-China cooperation and it cannot remotely salvage the relationship if a broader strategic de-escalation is not agreed. Carbon emissions are more likely to become a cudgel with which the US and West pressure China to reform its economy faster. The Department of Defense is not slated to finish its comprehensive review of China policy until June but most US government departments are undertaking their own reviews and some of the conclusions will trickle out in May, whether through Washington’s actions or leaks to the press. Beijing could also take actions that upend the Biden administration’s assessment, such as with the Microsoft hack exposed earlier this year. The Biden administration will soon reveal more about how it intends to handle export controls and sanctions on China. For example, by May 19 the administration is slated to release a licensing process for companies concerned about US export controls on tech trade with China due to the Commerce Department’s interim rule on info tech supply chains. The Biden administration looks to be generally hawkish on China, a view that is now consensus. Any loosening of punitive measures would be a positive surprise for Chinese stocks and financial markets in general. There are other indications that China’s relationship with the West is not about to improve substantially – namely Australia. Australia has become a bellwether of China’s relations with the world. While the US’s defense commitments might be questionable with regard to some of China’s neighbors – namely Taiwan (Province of China) but also possibly South Korea and the Philippines – there can be little doubt that Australia, like Japan, is the US’s red line in the Pacific. Australian politics have been roiled over the past several years by the revelation of Chinese influence operations, state- or military-linked investments in Australia, and propaganda campaigns. A trade war erupted last year when Australia called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 and China’s handling of it. Most recently, Victoria state severed ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the rise in Sino-Australian tensions, the economic relationship remains intact. China’s stimulus overweighed the impact of its punitive trade measures against Australia, both by bidding up commodity prices and keeping the bulk of Australia’s exports flowing (Chart 9). As much as China might wish to decouple from Australia, it cannot do so as long as it needs to maintain minimum growth rates for the sake of social stability and these growth rates require resources that Australia provides. For example, global iron ore production excluding Australia only makes up 80% of China’s total iron ore imports, which necessitates an ongoing dependency here (Chart 10). Brazil cannot make up the difference. Chart 9China-Australia Trade Amid Tensions China-Australia Trade Amid Tensions China-Australia Trade Amid Tensions Chart 10China Cannot Replace Australia China Cannot Replace Australia China Cannot Replace Australia This resource dependency does not necessarily reduce geopolitical tension, however, because it increases China’s supply insecurity and vulnerability to the US alliance. The US under Biden explicitly aims to restore its alliances and confront autocratic regimes. This puts Australia at the front lines of an open-ended global conflict. Chart 11Introducing: Australia GeoRisk Indicator (Smoothed) Introducing: Australia GeoRisk Indicator (Smoothed) Introducing: Australia GeoRisk Indicator (Smoothed) Our newly devised Australia GeoRisk Indicator illustrates the point well, as it has continued surging since the trade war with China first broke out last year (Chart 11). This indicator is based on the Australian dollar and its deviation from underlying macro variables that should determine its course. These variables are described in Appendix 1. If the Aussie weakens relative to these variables, then an Australian-specific risk premium is apparent. We ascribe that premium to politics and geopolitics writ large. A close examination of the risk indicator’s performance shows that it tracks well with Australia’s recent political history (Chart 12). Previous peaks in risk occurred when President Trump rose to power and Australia, like Canada, found itself beset by negative pressures from both the US and China. In particular, Trump threatened tariffs and the Australian government banned China’s Huawei from its 5G network. Today the rise in geopolitical risk stems almost exclusively from China. There is potential for it to roll over if Biden negotiates a reduction in tensions but that is a risk to our view (an upside risk for Australian and global equities). Chart 12Australian GeoRisk Indicator (Unsmoothed) Australian GeoRisk Indicator (Unsmoothed) Australian GeoRisk Indicator (Unsmoothed) What does this indicator portend for tradable Australian assets? As one would expect, Australian geopolitical risk moves inversely to the country’s equities, currency, and relative equity performance (Chart 13). Australian equities have risen on the back of global growth and the commodity boom despite the rise in geopolitical risk. But any further spike in risk could jeopardize this uptrend. Chart 13Australia Geopolitical Risk And Tradable Assets Australia Geopolitical Risk And Tradable Assets Australia Geopolitical Risk And Tradable Assets An even clearer inverse relationship emerges with the AUD-JPY exchange rate, a standard measure of risk-on / risk-off sentiment in itself. If geopolitical risk rises any further it should cause a reversal in the currency pair. Finally, Australian equities have not outperformed other developed markets excluding the US, which may be due to this elevated risk premium. Bottom Line: China is the most important of Biden’s foreign policy hurdles and unlike Russia and Iran there is no sign of a reduction in tension yet. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator supports the point that risk remains very elevated in the near term. Moreover China’s credit deceleration is also negative for Australia. Cyclically, however, assuming that China does not overtighten policy, we take a constructive view on the Aussie and Australian equities. Biden’s Border Troubles Distract From Bullish Mexico Story The biggest criticism of Biden’s first 100 days has been his reduction in a range of enforcement measures on the southern border which has encouraged an overflow of immigrants. Customs and Border Patrol have seen a spike in “encounters” from a low point of around 17,000 in 2020 to about 170,000 today. The trend started last year but accelerated sharply after the election and had surpassed the 2019 peak of 144,000. Vice President Kamala Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, both with Mexico and Central American states. She does not have much experience with foreign policy so this is her opportunity to learn on the job. She will not be able to accomplish much given that the Biden administration is unwilling to use punitive measures or deterrence and will not have large fiscal resources available for subsidizing the nations to the south. With the US economy hyper-charged, especially relative to its southern neighbors, the pace of immigration is unlikely to slacken. From a macro point of view the relevance is that the US is not substantially curtailing immigration – quite the opposite – which means that labor force growth will not deviate from its trend. What about Mexico itself? It is not likely that Harris will be able to engage on a broader range of issues with Mexico beyond immigration. As usual Mexico is beset with corruption, lawlessness, and instability. To these can be added the difficulties of the pandemic and vaccine rollout. Tourism and remittances are yet to recover. Cooperation with US federal agents against the drug cartels is deteriorating. Cartels control an estimated 40% of Mexican territory.4 Nevertheless, despite Mexico’s perennial problems, we hold a positive view on Mexican currency and risk assets. The argument rests on five points: Strong macro fundamentals: With China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse slowing sharply, and US stimulus accelerating, Mexico stands to benefit. Mexico has also run orthodox monetary and fiscal policies. It has a demographic tailwind, low wages, and low public debt. The stars are beginning to align for the country’s economy, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy. US and Canadian stimulus: The US and Canada have the second- and third-largest fiscal stimulus of all the major countries over the 2019-21 period, at 9% and 8% of GDP respectively. Mexico, with the new USMCA free trade deal in hand, will benefit. US protectionism fizzled: Even Republican senators blocked President Trump’s attempted tariffs on Mexico. Trump’s aggression resulted in the USMCA, a revised NAFTA, which both US political parties endorsed. Mexico is inured to US protectionism, at least for the short and medium term. Diversification from China: Mexico suffered the greatest opportunity cost from China’s rise as an offshore manufacturer and entrance to the World Trade Organization. Now that the US and other western countries are diversifying away from China, amid geopolitical tensions, Mexico stands to benefit. The US cannot eliminate its trade deficit due to its internal savings/investment imbalance but it can redistribute that trade deficit to countries that cannot compete with it for global hegemony. AMLO faces constraints: A risk factor stemmed from politics where a sweeping left-wing victory in 2018 threatened to introduce anti-market policies. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) and his MORENA party gained a majority in both houses of the legislature. Their coalition has a two-thirds majority in the lower house (Chart 14). However, we pointed out that AMLO’s policies have not been radical and, more importantly, that the midterm election would likely constrain his power. Chart 14Mexico’s Midterm Election Looms Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) These are all solid points but the last item faces a test in the upcoming midterm election. AMLO’s approval rating is strong, at 63%, putting him above all of his predecessors except one (Chart 15). AMLO’s approval has if anything benefited from the COVID-19 crisis despite Mexico’s inability to handle the medical challenge. He has promised to hold a referendum on his leadership in early 2022, more than halfway through his six-year term, and he is currently in good shape for that referendum. For now his popularity is helpful for his party, although he is not on the ballot in 2021 and MORENA’s support is well beneath his own. Chart 15AMLO’s Approval Fairly Strong Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) MORENA’s support is holding at a 44% rate of popular support and its momentum has slightly improved since the pandemic began. However, MORENA’s lead over other parties is not nearly as strong as it was back in 2018 (Chart 16, top panel). The combined support of the two dominant center-right parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the National Action Party, is almost equal to that of MORENA. And the two center-left parties, the Democratic Revolution Party and Citizen’s Movement, are part of the opposition coalition (Chart 16, bottom panel). The pandemic and economic crisis will motivate the opposition. Chart 16MORENA’s Support Holding Up Despite COVID Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Traditionally the president’s party loses seats in the midterm election (Table 2). Circumstances are different from the US, which also exhibits this trend, because Mexico has more political parties. A loss of seats from MORENA does not necessarily favor the establishment parties. Nevertheless opinion polling shows that about 45% of voters say they would rather see MORENA’s power “checked” compared to 41% who wish to see the party go on unopposed.5 Table 2Mexican President’s Party Tends To Lose Seats In Midterm Election Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) Biden’s First 100 Days In Foreign Policy (GeoRisk Update) While the ruling coalition may lose its super-majority, it is not a foregone conclusion that MORENA will lose its majority. Voters have decades of experience of the two dominant parties, both were discredited prior to 2018, and neither has recovered its reputation so quickly. The polling does not suggest that voters regret their decision to give the left wing a try. If anything recent polls slightly push against this idea. If MORENA surprises to the upside then AMLO’s capabilities would increase substantially in the second half of his term – he would have political capital and an improving economy. While the senate is not up for grabs in the midterm, MORENA has a narrow majority and controls a substantial 60% of seats when its allies are taken into account. In this scenario AMLO could pursue his attempts to increase the state’s role in key industries, like energy and power generation, at the expense of private investors. Even then the Supreme Court would continue to act as a check on the government. The 11-seat court is currently made up of five conservatives, two independents, and three liberal or left-leaning judges. A new member, Margarita Ríos Farjat, is close to the government, leaving the conservatives with a one-seat edge over the liberals and putting the two independents in the position of swing voters. Even if AMLO maintains control of the lower house, he will not be able to override the constitutional court, as he has threatened on occasion to do, without a super-majority in the senate. Bottom Line: AMLO will likely lose some ground in the lower house and thus suffer a check on his power. This will only confirm that Mexican political risk is not likely to derail positive underlying macro fundamentals. Continue to overweight Mexican equities relative to Brazilian.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix 1 The market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd and as such our Geopolitical Risk Indicators were not designed to predict political risk but to answer the question of whether and to what extent markets have priced that risk. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator (see Chart 11-12 above) uses the same simple methodology used in our other indicators, which avoid the pitfall of regression-based models. We begin with a financial asset that has a daily frequency in price, in this case the AUD, and compare its movement against several fundamental factors – in this case global energy and base metal prices, global metals and mining stock prices, and the Chilean peso. Australia is a commodity-exporting country. It is the largest producer of iron ore and is among the largest producers of coal and natural gas. It is also a major trading partner for China. Due to the nature of its economy the Australian dollar moves with global metal and energy prices and the global metals and mining equity prices. Chile, another major commodity producer also moves with global metal prices, hence our inclusion of the peso in this indicator. The AUD has a high correlation with all of these assets, and if the changes in the value of the AUD lag or lead the changes in the value of these assets, the implication is that geopolitical risk unique to Australia is not priced by the market. We included the peso as Chile is not as affected as Australia by any conflict in the South China Sea or Northeast Asia, which means that a deviation of the AUD from CLP represents a unique East Asia Pacific risk. Our indicator captures the involvement of Australia in a few regional and international conflicts. The indicator climbed as Australia got involved in the East Timor emergency and declined as it exited. It continued declining even as Australia joined the US in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which showed that investors were unperturbed by faraway wars, while showing measurable concern in the smaller but closer Timorese conflict. Risks went up again as the nation erupted in labor protests as the Howard government made changes to the labor code. We see the market pricing higher risk again during the 2008 financial crisis, although it was modest and Australia escaped the crisis unscathed due to massive Chinese stimulus. Since then, investors have been climbing a wall of worry as they priced in Northeast Asia-related geopolitical risks. These started with the South Korean Cheonan sinking and continued with the Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku islands. They culminated with the Chinese ADIZ declaration in late 2013. In 2016, Australia was shocked again when Donald Trump was elected, and investor fears were evident when the details of Trump-Turnbull spat were made public. The risk indicator reached another peak during the trade wars between the US and the rest of the world. Investors were not worried about COVID-19 as Australia largely contained the pandemic, but the recent Australian-Chinese trade war pushed the risk indicator up, giving investors another wall of worry. If the Biden administration forces Australia into a democratic alliance in confrontation with autocratic China then this risk will persist for some time.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) ... The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, And The Fate Of Liberty This book is a sweeping review of the conditions of liberty essential to steering the world away from the Hobbesian war of all against all. In this unofficial sequel to the 2012 hit, Why Nations Fail: The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty, Daron Acemoglu (Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and James A. Robinson (Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago) further explore their thesis that the existence and effectiveness of democratic institutions account for a nation’s general success or failure. The Narrow Corridor6 examines how liberty works. It is not “natural,” not widespread, “is rare in history and is rare today.” Only in peculiar circumstances have states managed to produce free societies. States have to walk a thin line to achieve liberty, passing through what the authors describe as a “narrow corridor.” To encourage freedom, states must be strong enough to enforce laws and provide public services yet also restrained in their actions and checked by a well-organized civil society. For example, from classical history, the Athenian constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes “were helpful for strengthening the political power of Athenian citizens while also battling the cage of norms.” That cage of norms is the informal body of customs replaced by state institutions. Those norms in turn “constrained what the state could do and how far state building could go,” providing a set of checks. Though somewhat fluid in its definition, liberty, as Acemoglu and Robinson show, is expressed differently under various “leviathans,” or states. For starters, the “Shackled Leviathan” is a government dedicated to upholding the rule of law, protecting the weak against the strong, and creating the conditions for broad-based economic opportunity. Meanwhile, the “Paper Leviathan” is a bureaucratic machine favoring the privileged class, serving as both a political and economic brake on development and yielding “fear, violence, and dominance for most of its citizens.” Other examples include: The “American Leviathan” which fails to deal properly with inequality and racial oppression, two enemies of liberty; and a “Despotic Leviathan,” which commands the economy and coerces political conformity – an example from modern China. Although the book indulges in too much jargon, it is provocative and its argument is convincing. The authors say that in most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Importantly, many states believe that once liberty is achieved, it will remain the status quo. But the authors argue that to uphold liberty, state institutions have to evolve continuously as the nature of conflicts and needs of society change. Thus society's ability to keep state and rulers accountable must intensify in tandem with the capabilities of the state. This struggle between state and society becomes self-reinforcing, inducing both to develop a richer array of capacities just to keep moving forward along the corridor. Yet this struggle also underscores the fragile nature of liberty. It is built on a precarious balance between state and society; between economic, political, and social elites and common citizens; between institutions and norms. If one side of the balance gets too strong, as has often happened in history, liberty begins to wane. The authors central thesis is that the long-run success of states depends on the balance of power between state and society. If states are too strong, you end up with a “Despotic Leviathan” that is good for short-term economic growth but brittle and unstable over the long term. If society is too strong, the “Leviathan” is absent, and societies suffer under a pre-modern war of all against all. The ideal place to be is in the narrow corridor, under a shackled Leviathan that will grow state capacity and individual liberty simultaneously, thus leading to long-term economic growth. In the asset allocation process, investors should always consider the liberty of a state and its people, if a state’s institutions grossly favor the elite or the outright population, whether these institutions are weak or overbearing on society, and whether they signify a balance between interests across the population. Whether you are investing over a short or long horizon, returns can be significantly impacted in the absence of liberty or the excesses of liberty. There should be a preference among investors toward countries that exhibit a balance of power between state and society, setting up a better long-term investment environment, than if a balance of power did not exist.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan – Province Of China Taiwan-Province of China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan-Province of China: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Footnotes 1 "President Biden’s first 100 days as president fact-checked," BBC News, April 29, 2021, bbc.com. 2 "Oil tanker off Syrian coast hit in suspected drone attack," Al Jazeera, April 24, 2021, Aljazeera.com. 3 See Yaakov Lappin, "Natanz blast ‘likely took 5,000 centrifuges offline," Jewish News Syndicate, jns.org. 4 John Daniel Davidson, "Former US Ambassador To Mexico: Cartels Control Up To 40 Percent Of Mexican Territory," The Federalist, April 28, 2021, thefederalist.com. 5 See Alejandro Moreno, "Aprobación de AMLO se encuentra en 61% previo a campañas electorales," El Financiero, April 5, 2021, elfinanciero.com. 6 Penguin Press, New York, NY, 2019, 558 pages. Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Clients countered our opinion that China’s economy has reached its cyclical peak. However, we have already incorporated the supporting facts into our analysis so they will not alter our cyclical outlook for the economy. The favorable external backdrop is a potential downside risk to China’s domestic economy, because the country’s pain threshold for reform is often positively correlated with global growth. We agree that an acceleration in local governments’ special-purpose bond issuance could boost infrastructure investment in the next six months, but we are skeptical about the magnitude of such support. China’s onshore and offshore stock markets remain firmly in a risk-off mode. For now, we recommend investors stay on the sidelines until some of the early indicators turn more bullish. Feature We spent the past week hosting virtual meetings with BCA’s clients in Europe and Asia. We presented our view that China’s economic recovery has likely peaked and escalating risks of a policy overtightening warrant an underweight position on Chinese stocks for the next six months. Most clients shared our concern that policymakers may keep financial and industry regulations more restrictive than the market is currently pricing in, leading to more downside surprises to risk asset prices. Clients also brought up a few opposing views which challenged our analytical framework. In this and next week’s reports we will highlight some of the counterpoints we discussed in these meetings. Interestingly, most of our clients - even ones who are more sanguine about China’s economic outlook - prefer to wait on the sidelines before jumping back into China’s equity market. They foresee sustained volatility in the coming months as the market continues to struggle between digesting high valuations and adjusting expectations for future earnings growth. Has China’s Economic Recovery Reached An Apex? The primary discussion centered around whether the strength in China’s economy has reached a cyclical peak. Q1 GDP points to slower sequential economic momentum from Q4 last year (Chart 1). Some of the high-frequency economic data also indicate that economic activity peaked in Q4 last year (Chart 2).  Chart 1Q1 Sequential Growth Was The Slowest In A Decade Q1 Sequential Growth Was The Slowest In A Decade Q1 Sequential Growth Was The Slowest In A Decade Chart 2Has Economic Activity Peaked? Has Economic Activity Peaked? Has Economic Activity Peaked? Chart 3Our Framework Suggests A Slower Growth Momentum Ahead Our Framework Suggests A Slower Growth Momentum Ahead Our Framework Suggests A Slower Growth Momentum Ahead The view fits perfectly into our analytical framework, which has worked well in the past decade. Historically, China’s credit formation has consistently led economic activity by about six to nine months. A turning point in the credit impulse occurred last October, which suggests that economic activity should start to slow in Q2 this year (Chart 3). However, our clients countered with the following arguments, which support a notion that sequential economic growth rate can still trend higher in the next six months: Aggregate demand in Europe and the US continues to improve, while the COVID-19 resurgence in major emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, has forced their production recoveries to pause. Thus, China’s exports will remain robust and should continue to make substantial contributions to the economy (Chart 4). Infrastructure spending could get a meaningful boost when local governments speed up issuing special-purpose bonds (SPB) in Q2 and Q3. Infrastructure investment growth was relatively weak in Q1, probably the result of a slower pace in credit growth and government expenditures (Chart 5). However, a delay in local government SPB issuance in Q1 this year means more support for infrastructure investment in the rest of the year (Chart 6). Chart 4Counterpoint #1: Chinese Exports Will Stay Strong Counterpoint #1: Chinese Exports Will Stay Strong Counterpoint #1: Chinese Exports Will Stay Strong   Chart 5Slower Credit Growth Led To A Subdued Q1 Infrastructure Investment Growth Slower Credit Growth Led To A Subdued Q1 Infrastructure Investment Growth Slower Credit Growth Led To A Subdued Q1 Infrastructure Investment Growth     Travel restrictions imposed during the Chinese New Year weighed heavily on the service sector in Q1 (Chart 7). If China’s domestic COVID-19 cases remain well controlled, then the trend could reverse and the pent-up demand for service consumption may usher in a significant improvement in Q2 when three major public holidays occur. The service sector accounts for more than half of China’s GDP, therefore, an improvement in this sector should significantly bolster future GDP growth. Chart 6Counterpoint #2: More LG SPBs, More Spending On Infrastructure Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Chart 7Counterpoint #3: Service Sector Activities Will Pick Up Counterpoint #3: Service Sector Activities Will Pick Up Counterpoint #3: Service Sector Activities Will Pick Up Our Analytical Framework The viewpoints expressed by clients have not changed our cyclical view of China’s economy, since our broad analysis of Chinese business cycle already incorporates the main points that clients raised. Additionally, data such as GDP growth figures are coincident and lagging indicators, and do not explain the direction of forward-looking financial markets. The authorities will shift their policy trajectories only if the data significantly deviate from expectations. We view Q1 GDP and underlying data broadly in line with Chinese leadership’s short- and medium-term economic growth targets and, therefore, will not lead to any policy adjustment. Chart 8If Demand For Chinese Exports Stays Strong, Reform Efforts Will Intensify Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) To our clients’ point that strong exports ahead will support China’s overall GDP growth, we regard a favorable external backdrop as a potential downside risk to the domestic economy. The willingness of Chinese authorities to pursue painful reforms is often positively correlated with global growth (Chart 8). BCA has written extensively about how China has taken advantage of a stronger export sector by increasing the pace of domestic reforms and in the past has embarked on a multi-year reform plan that weighed on growth. At the beginning of this year, Chinese policymakers were set out to “keep credit growth in line with nominal GDP growth in 2021.” Nonetheless, policymakers’ targets for credit and nominal GDP growth rates could change during the year, contingent on their perception of the broad growth outlook and unemployment. Chart 9Both Credit And Economic Growth Rates Are Moving Targets And Subject To Policy Finetuning Both Credit And Economic Growth Rates Are Moving Targets And Subject To Policy Finetuning Both Credit And Economic Growth Rates Are Moving Targets And Subject To Policy Finetuning Even if policymakers keep the country’s leverage ratio steady in 2021, which is our base case view and assuming China’s nominal GDP grows by 11%, then the credit impulse (measured by the 12-month difference in total social financing as a percentage of GDP) will likely fall to about 28% of GDP, down from 32% of GDP in 2020 (Chart 9).  The rate of credit formation increased by 13.6% in the first three months from Q1 last year, above government’s target. We expect a further pullback in credit growth in the rest of the year, to bring the annual pace at or below 12%. Construction capex, which is sensitive to both credit creation and tightening regulations in the housing sector, will likely experience a slowdown. At more than 90% of GDP, China’s economy is mainly driven by domestic demand and a weakening in the domestic economy can more than offset positive contributions from a robust export sector. Infrastructure And Services We expect infrastructure investment will grow by 4-5% this year, which is in line with its rate of expansion in 2020. However, the sequential growth in the sector in Q2 – Q4 this year will be slower than during the same period in 2020 (Chart 10). We agree that a more concentrated issuance of local government SPBs in Q2 and Q3 could help to buttress infrastructure investment. However, SPBs made up only about 15% of overall infrastructure spending in the past three years, so we are dubious that SPBs can provide the crucial support. The rest of the gap for local governments to finance their spending on infrastructure projects will need to be filled through public-private partnerships (PPP) financing, government-managed funds’ (GMFs) revenues, government budgets and bank loans. Note that only non-household medium- and long-term (MLT) bank lending showed a positive impulse so far (Chart 11). While not all of MLT loans are used for infrastructure, they have a positive correlation with investments in infrastructure projects which are generally long term in nature. Chart 10Sequential Growth In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Slower Than In Q2 – Q4 Last Year Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Chart 11MLT Bank Loans Have Been Supportive To Infrastructure Spending... MLT Bank Loans Have Been Supportive To Infrastructure Spending... MLT Bank Loans Have Been Supportive To Infrastructure Spending... On the other hand, the contribution of PPPs to total infrastructure spending has been plunging in recent years due to tighter regulations aimed at controlling increased risks related to local government debt (Chart 12). Depressed revenues from land sales and extended corporate tax cuts this year will also curb the ability of local governments to finance infrastructure projects (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Public-Private Partnerships Have Become Too Small To Fill The Financing Gap ...But Public-Private Partnerships Have Become Too Small To Fill The Financing Gap ...But Public-Private Partnerships Have Become Too Small To Fill The Financing Gap Chart 13Government-Managed Funds Also Face Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Government-Managed Funds Also Face Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Government-Managed Funds Also Face Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Finally, although the service sector accounts for 54% of China’s GDP (2019 statistic), transport, retail and accommodation, which were hardest hit by COVID-19, accounted for less than 30% of China’s tertiary GDP. This compares with a slightly larger share of tertiary GDP from finance- and housing-related sectors (financial intermediation, leasing & business services, and real estate) –the sectors that have been thriving since the second half of last year when both the equity and housing markets boomed (Chart 14). Nonetheless, it is unreasonable to expect these areas to strengthen even more in an environment where the policy has shifted to contain risks in the financial and housing arenas. The net result to tertiary GDP growth is that the deterioration in finance- and real estate-related segments will likely offset an improvement in transport, retail and accommodation. Chart 14More Than 70% Of China’s Services Sector Is Finance And Real Estate Related Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Opposing Views From Client Meetings (Part 1) Investment Conclusions The ultimate question we got from almost every client meeting was: What would make us turn bullish on Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months?  Chart 15Changes In Domestic Policy Dominate Chinese Stock Performance Changes In Domestic Policy Dominate Chinese Stock Performance Changes In Domestic Policy Dominate Chinese Stock Performance Since most monthly and quarterly economic data do not provide enough market-moving catalysts, we rely on our assessment of the changes in policy direction, such as interbank liquidity conditions and excess reserves, in addition to overall credit growth (Chart 15). We will also continue to watch for the following signs before upgrading our tactical and cyclical calls from underweight to overweight: Chart 16 shows that cyclical stocks remain depressed relative to defensives in both onshore and offshore markets, underscoring investors’ concerns about China’s economy. A breakout in cyclicals versus defensives would signify a major improvement in investor sentiment towards policy support and economic growth. A technical breakdown in the performance of healthcare and utility stocks relative to investable stocks would be another bullish indicator (Chart 17). These equities have historically led China’s economic activity, core inflation and stock prices by one to three months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would signify that market participants anticipate a meaningful economic upturn in China.   Chart 16Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Chart 17...Before Upgrading Chinese Stocks ...Before Upgrading Chinese Stocks ...Before Upgrading Chinese Stocks   Given that the above mentioned indicators remain firmly in a risk-off mode, we maintain our view that China’s economy has reached its peak, and policy has tightened meaningfully. Our cyclical underweight position on Chinese stocks, in both absolute terms and within a global portfolio, is warranted.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights After staging a tentative rebound in the first three months of the year, the US dollar has resumed its weakening trend. We expect the greenback to drift lower over the next 12 months, as global growth momentum rotates from the US to the rest of the world, the Fed maintains its ultra-accommodative monetary stance, and the US struggles to finance its burgeoning trade deficit. China will provide adequate fiscal and monetary support for its economy, which will buoy commodity prices, the yuan, and other EM currencies. The Canadian dollar should strengthen as the Bank of Canada continues to shrink its balance sheet with the goal of lifting rates by the end of 2022. EUR/USD is on track to rise to 1.25 by year-end. The pound will strengthen against the euro. While the yen’s defensive nature will limit any gains in the currency, a cheap valuation and relatively high Japanese real rates will keep downside risks in check. Global Growth Momentum To Rotate From The US To The Rest Of The World Sizable upward revisions to US growth projections gave the US dollar a modest boost in the first quarter of 2021 (Chart 1). According to Bloomberg consensus estimates, US real GDP grew by 5.4% in the first quarter, spurred on by massive fiscal stimulus and a speedy vaccination rollout. In contrast, real GDP in the euro area, the UK, and Japan contracted (Table 1). Chart 1A Dovish Fed Kept The Dollar From Strengthening Much This Year Despite Strong US Growth Vis-À-Vis The Rest Of The World A Dovish Fed Kept The Dollar From Strengthening Much This Year Despite Strong US Growth Vis-À-Vis The Rest Of The World A Dovish Fed Kept The Dollar From Strengthening Much This Year Despite Strong US Growth Vis-À-Vis The Rest Of The World Table 1Growth In Major Advanced Countries Is Expected To Start Catching Up To The US Later This Year What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback? While economic momentum still favors the US in the second quarter, the gap with other countries will narrow dramatically. The US economy is on track to expand by 8.1% in the current quarter. Bloomberg consensus expects the euro area to grow by 7.4%, the UK by 17.4%, and Japan by 4.7%. Looking out to the third quarter, both the euro area and the UK are poised to grow faster than the US. Continental Europe, in particular, should see much stronger growth in the second half of 2021 following a sluggish start to the vaccine rollout. Enough Vaccines For All? The vaccination campaign has gotten off to a slow start in most emerging markets. The spread of more contagious Covid-19 variants has led to a surge in infections in some regions. Notably, India is reporting over 300,000 new cases a day. Matters should improve on the pandemic front for many developing economies later this year. Assuming that vaccine makers are able to achieve their production targets, the Duke University Global Health Innovation Center estimates that 12 billion vaccine doses will be produced in 2021. This would be enough to vaccinate 75% of the world’s population, close to most measures of “herd immunity.” China Will Maintain Ample Policy Support Chart 2Real Rate Differentials Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve In Q1, But Not At The Short End Real Rate Differentials Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve In Q1, But Not At The Short End Real Rate Differentials Moved In Favor Of The Dollar At The Long End Of The Curve In Q1, But Not At The Short End Investor concerns that the Chinese authorities are about to reverse stimulus measures are overblown. Jing Sima, BCA’s chief China strategist, expects the general government budget deficit to average 8% of GDP in 2021, largely unchanged from 2020 levels. She sees credit growth falling from 15% in 2020 to 12% this year (in line with her estimate of nominal GDP growth). Given that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 270%, credit growth of 12% would leave the outstanding stock of credit roughly 33 trillion yuan (32% of GDP) higher at the end of 2021 compared to end-2020. That is a lot of new credit formation, all of which should buoy commodity prices, the yuan, and other EM currencies. Rate Differentials Remain Dollar Bearish Despite strong US growth, US 2-year real rates have continued to decline in relation to rates abroad. Long-term yield differentials did rise in favor of the US in the first three months of the year, giving the dollar a lift. However, long-term differentials have since reversed course, which helps account for the dollar’s renewed weakness (Chart 2). The Fed’s dovish stance explains why stronger growth has given so little support to the dollar. The 10-year Treasury yield generally tracks the expected Fed funds rate two-to-three years out (Chart 3). At present, the markets are as hawkish relative to the median Fed dot as they have ever been (Chart 4). Chart 3Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Rise Much Unless The Market Lifts Its Estimate Of Where The Fed Funds Rate Will Be 2-To-3 Years Out Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Rise Much Unless The Market Lifts Its Estimate Of Where The Fed Funds Rate Will Be 2-To-3 Years Out Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Rise Much Unless The Market Lifts Its Estimate Of Where The Fed Funds Rate Will Be 2-To-3 Years Out Chart 4The Market Is Very Hawkish Relative To The Fed Dots The Market Is Very Hawkish Relative To The Fed Dots The Market Is Very Hawkish Relative To The Fed Dots This doesn’t mean that market expectations cannot get more hawkish from here. However, for this to happen, the Fed would need to start aggressively talking up the prospect of tapering asset purchases and accelerating the timeline to hiking rates. This does not seem probable to us. Chart 5Prime-Age Employment Remains Well Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Prime-Age Employment Remains Well Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Prime-Age Employment Remains Well Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The prime-age employment-to-population ratio is still 3.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 5). Overall US employment is about 5% below where it was in January 2020. Among workers earning less than $20 per hour, employment is down more than 10% (Chart 6). While some firms have complained about a shortage of workers, this likely reflects the combination of generous unemployment benefits (which expire in September) and lingering fears about catching the virus from work (which will abate as more people are vaccinated). Just as was the case following the Great Recession – when market commentary was rife with talk about a permanent increase in “structural unemployment” – concerns that the pandemic has led to lasting labor market damage will prove to be largely unfounded.   Chart 6US Employment Still Down About 5% From Its Pre-Pandemic Levels What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback?   The Dollar Faces Balance Of Payments Pressures The dollar is not a cheap currency. It is 13% overvalued based on Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates (Chart 7). One of the consequences of the dollar’s overvaluation has been a persistent trade deficit. As Chart 8 shows, the US trade deficit in goods and services has widened sharply since early 2020. Chart 7The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value The Dollar Is Expensive Based On Its PPP Fair Value Chart 8The Widening US Trade Deficit The Widening US Trade Deficit The Widening US Trade Deficit Excessively large budget deficits drain national savings, leading to a larger current account deficit. Hence, the dollar has usually weakened whenever the government has eased fiscal policy beyond what was necessary to close the output gap (Chart 9). Foreigners have been net sellers of Treasurys this year. To a large extent, equity inflows have supported the dollar (Chart 10). However, if growth rotates from the US to the rest of the world, non-US stock markets are likely to outperform. This could cause foreign equity inflows into the US to turn into outflows. The dollar would then need to weaken to make US stocks more attractive in foreign-currency terms. Chart 9The Dollar Usually Weakens Whenever The Government Eases Fiscal Policy Beyond What Is Necessary To Close The Output Gap The Dollar Usually Weakens Whenever The Government Eases Fiscal Policy Beyond What Is Necessary To Close The Output Gap The Dollar Usually Weakens Whenever The Government Eases Fiscal Policy Beyond What Is Necessary To Close The Output Gap Chart 10Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year Equity Inflows Supported The Dollar This Year   Technicals Point To A Weaker Dollar For many investment decisions, being a contrarian is a smart strategy. This does not apply to trading the US dollar, however. The dollar is a high momentum currency (Chart 11). When it comes to the dollar, you want to be a trend follower. Chart 11The Dollar Is A High Momentum Currency What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback?   Chart 12 shows that a simple trading rule that bought the dollar index when it was trading above its moving average would have made money, whereas a rule that bought the index when it was below its moving average would have lost money. While trading rules using short-term moving averages work best, even long-term moving average rules yield profitable results. Chart 12ATrading The Dollar: Follow Momentum (I) What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback? Chart 12BTrading The Dollar: Follow Momentum (II) Trading The Dollar: Follow Momentum Trading The Dollar: Follow Momentum   Today, the dollar is trading below all of its various moving averages, which points to further downside for the currency. The dollar’s momentum status extends to sentiment. In general, the dollar is more likely to strengthen when sentiment is already bullish. On the flipside, the dollar is more likely to weaken when sentiment is bearish. At present, dollar sentiment is bearish, which increases the odds of further dollar weakness (Chart 13). Chart 13ABeing A Contrarian Doesn’t Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar (I) What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback? Chart 13BBeing A Contrarian Doesn't Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar (II) Being A Contrarian Doesn't Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar Being A Contrarian Doesn't Pay When It Comes To Trading The Dollar   Chart 14Seasonality In The FX, Bond, And Equity Markets What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback? Finally, the dollar has tended to exhibit seasonal fluctuations. In general, the greenback has strengthened in the first half of the year and weakened in the second half (Chart 14). It is not entirely clear what explains this phenomenon, but it is worth noting that since 1985, almost all of the cumulative decline in Treasury yields has occurred in the back half of the year. Cyclical Currencies Are Most Likely To Strengthen Against The US Dollar Cyclical (i.e., high-beta) currencies will fare best against the US dollar over the next 12 months. In the EM space, strong global growth will benefit the Mexican peso, Chilean peso, Brazilian real, South African rand, Korean won, and the Indonesian rupiah. In the developed economy sphere, the Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and Australian and Canadian dollars are poised to appreciate the most. We are particularly bullish on the loonie. The Bank of Canada announced on Wednesday that it will reduce the weekly pace of government bond purchases from C$4 billion to C$3 billion. Even before this announcement, the BoC’s balance sheet was shrinking following the decision to scale back repo operations and discontinue several other asset purchase programs. The BoC also indicated that it expects the Canadian economy to return to full employment in the second half of 2022, which should set the stage for the first rate hike by the end of next year. We expect EUR/USD to reach 1.25 by year-end. The British pound will strengthen to 1.50 against the dollar and 1.20 against the euro. Chart 15 shows that GBP/USD has closely tracked the rise and fall of global equities. Notably, the pound is 15% undervalued against the euro based on real 2-year interest rate differentials (Chart 16). Chart 15GBP/USD Has Closely Tracked Global Equities GBP/USD Has Closely Tracked Global Equities GBP/USD Has Closely Tracked Global Equities Chart 16The Pound Is Undervalued Against The Euro Based On Real Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials The Pound Is Undervalued Against The Euro Based On Real Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials The Pound Is Undervalued Against The Euro Based On Real Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials   The Japanese yen is a highly defensive currency. Hence, stronger global growth will pose a headwind to the yen. Nevertheless, the yen is quite cheap, trading at a 20% discount to its Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate (Chart 17). Moreover, real yields are higher in Japan than they are in the other major economies, reflecting ongoing deflationary pressures (Chart 18). On balance, we expect the yen to move sideways against the US dollar over the next 12 months. Chart 17The Yen Is Quite Cheap The Yen Is Quite Cheap The Yen Is Quite Cheap Chart 18Real Yields Are Higher In Japan Than In The Other Major Economies Real Yields Are Higher In Japan Than In The Other Major Economies Real Yields Are Higher In Japan Than In The Other Major Economies   Equity Implications Of A Weaker Dollar Cyclical stocks tend to outperform defensives when the dollar is weakening. To the extent that cyclicals are overrepresented in stock market indices outside the US, a weaker dollar favors non-US equities (Chart 19). Chart 19Cyclical Stocks Tend To Outperform Defensives When The Dollar Is Weakening Cyclical Stocks Tend To Outperform Defensives When The Dollar Is Weakening Cyclical Stocks Tend To Outperform Defensives When The Dollar Is Weakening Chart 20Value Stocks Generally Do Best In A Weak Dollar Environment Value Stocks Generally Do Best In A Weak Dollar Environment Value Stocks Generally Do Best In A Weak Dollar Environment Value stocks also tend to do best in a weak dollar environment (Chart 20). As such, we recommend that investors overweight cyclicals, non-US, and value stocks over the next 12 months.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback? Special Trade Recommendations What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback? Current MacroQuant Model Scores What’s Next For The Greenback? What’s Next For The Greenback?

Highlights The Biden administration is combining Trumpian nationalism with a renewed push for US innovation in a major infrastructure bill that is highly likely to become law. Populism and Great Power struggle with China and Russia are structural forces that give enormous momentum to this effort. Don’t bet against it. President Biden’s $2.4 trillion infrastructure and green energy plan has a subjective 80% chance of passing into law by the end of the year, as infrastructure is popular and Democrats control Congress. The net deficit increase will range from $700 billion to $1.3 trillion depending on the size of corporate tax hikes in the final bill. The second part of Biden’s plan, the roughly $2 trillion American Families Plan, has a much lower chance of passage – at best 50/50 – as the 2022 midterm elections will loom and fiscal fatigue will set in. While the US infrastructure package is a positive cyclical catalyst, it was largely expected, and the Biden administration still faces early stress-tests on China/Taiwan, Russia, Iran, and even North Korea. Game theory helps explain why financial markets cannot ignore the 60% chance of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. A full-fledged war is still low-probability but Taiwan remains the world’s preeminent geopolitical risk. In emerging markets, stay short Russian and Brazilian currency and assets – and continue favoring Indian stocks over Chinese. Feature The “arsenal of democracy” is a phrase that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used to describe the full might of US government, industry, and labor in assisting the western allies in World War II. The US is reviving this combination of productive forces today, with President Joe Biden’s $4 trillion-plus American Jobs and Families Plan unveiled in Pittsburgh on March 31. The context is once again a global struggle among the Great Powers, albeit not world war (at least not yet … more on that below). The US is reviving its post-WWII pursuit of global liberal hegemony – symbolized by its role, growing once again, as the world’s chief consumer and chief warrior (Chart 1). Biden promoted his plan to build up the US’s infrastructure and social safety net explicitly as a historic and strategic investment – “in 50 years, people are going to look back and say this was the moment that American won the future.”1 It is critical for investors to realize that they are not witnessing another round of COVID-19 fiscal relief. That task is already completed with the Republican spending of 2020 and Biden’s own $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), which together with the vaccine rollout are delivering a jolt to growth (Chart 2). Chart 1America Pursues Hegemony Anew America Pursues Hegemony Anew America Pursues Hegemony Anew Chart 2Consensus Expects 6.5% US GDP Growth After American Rescue Plan Consensus Expects 6.5% US GDP Growth After American Rescue Plan Consensus Expects 6.5% US GDP Growth After American Rescue Plan Our own back-of-the-envelope estimates of growth suggest that there is considerable upside risk even under current law (Chart 3). The output gap is also guesstimated here, and it will tighten faster than expected, especially as the service sector revives on economic reopening. Chart 3Back-Of-Envelope: US GDP And Output Gap Show Upside Risk After American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy A growth overshoot is even more likely considering that the first part of Biden’s proposal, the $2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan consisting mostly of infrastructure and green energy, is highly likely to pass Congress (by July at earliest and December at latest, most likely late fall). Our revised estimates for the US budget deficit show that this bill will add considerably to the deficit in the coming years, peaking in three or four years, thus averting the “fiscal cliff” in 2022-23 and adding to aggregate demand in the years after the short-term COVID-era cash handouts dry up (Chart 4). The net deficit increase will be $700 billion if Biden gets all of his tax hikes and $1.3 trillion if he only gets half of them, according to our sister US Political Strategy. Chart 4US Budget Deficit Will Remain Fat In Coming Years The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy We give Biden’s $2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan an 80% chance of passing through Congress by the end of the year. Infrastructure is broadly popular – as President Trump’s own $2 trillion infrastructure campaign proposal revealed – and Democrats have just enough votes to push it through the Senate via budget reconciliation, which requires zero votes from Republicans. Biden’s political capital is still strong given that his approval rating will stay above 50% as long as Trump is the obvious alternative and the Republicans are deeply divided over their own future (Chart 5).2 The second part of his plan, the $1.95 trillion American Families Plan, is much less likely to pass before the 2022 midterm elections – we would say 50/50 odds at best, if the infrastructure deal passes quickly. Chart 5Biden’s Political Capital Is Sufficient To Pass Another Major Law The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy Of course there are very important differences between Biden’s $2.4 trillion infrastructure plan and the similarly sized proposal that Trump would have unveiled this month had he been re-elected: Biden’s proposal is probably heavier on innovation and research and development, and certainly heavier on unionization and labor regulation, than Trump’s would have been. Biden’s plan integrates infrastructure with sustainability, renewable energy, and climate change initiatives that will help the US catch up with Europe and China on the green front. The plan will consist of direct government spending – rather than government seed money to promote private investment. It will be partially offset by repealing the corporate tax cuts in Trump’s signature Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Most importantly – from a geopolitical point of view – Biden is making a bid for the US to resume its post-WWII quest for global liberal hegemony. He argued that the US stands at the crossroads of a global choice between “democracies and autocracies” and that rebuilding US infrastructure is ultimately about proving that democracies can create consensus and “deliver for their people.” Autocratic regimes, fairly or not, routinely call attention to the divisiveness of modern party politics in the West and the resulting policy gridlock which produces bad outcomes for many citizens, resulting in greater domestic dysfunction and “chaos.” It is important to note that this bid for hegemony will be more, not less, destabilizing for global politics as it will make the US economy more self-sufficient and insulated from the world. It will intensify the US-China and US-Russia strategic competition while making it more difficult for Biden to conduct bilateral diplomacy with these states given their differences in moral values and frequent human rights violations. What is happening now is the culmination of political shifts that pre-date the pandemic, but were galvanized by the pandemic, and it is of global, geopolitical significance for the coming decade and beyond.3 Biden and the establishment Democrats – embattled by populism on their right and left flanks – are shamelessly coopting President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” nationalism with a larger-than-life, infrastructure-and-manufacturing initiative that emphasizes productivity as well as “Buy American” protectionism. Biden explicitly argued that Americans need to boost innovation to “put us in a position to win the global competition with China in the upcoming years.” At Biden’s first press conference on March 25, he made a similar point about China: So I see stiff competition with China. China has an overall goal, and I don’t criticize them for the goal, but they have an overall goal to become the leading country in the world, the wealthiest country in the world, and the most powerful country in the world. That’s not going to happen on my watch because the United States are going to continue to grow and expand.4 The US trade deficit is set to widen a lot further under this massive domestic buildout. It aims to be the largest government investment program since Dwight Eisenhower’s building of the highways or the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon space race. But it explicitly aims to diminish China’s role as a supplier of US goods and materials and the US trade deficit already shows evidence of economic divorce (Chart 6). The US is bound to have a larger trade deficit due to its own savings-and-investment imbalances but it has a powerful interest in redistributing this trade deficit to its allies and reducing over-dependency on China, which is itself pursuing strategic self-sufficiency and military modernization in anticipation of an ongoing rivalry this century. Chart 6Biden's Coopts Trump's Trade And Manufacturing Agenda Biden's Coopts Trump's Trade And Manufacturing Agenda Biden's Coopts Trump's Trade And Manufacturing Agenda Bottom Line: Biden’s $2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan has an 80% chance of passing Congress later this year with a net increase to the fiscal thrust of between $700 billion and $1.3 trillion, depending on how many and how high the corporate tax hikes. The other $2 trillion social spending part of Biden’s plan has only a 50/50 chance of passage. The infrastructure and green energy rebuild should be understood as a return of Big Government motivated by populism and Great Power competition – it is a geopolitical theme with enormous momentum. The result will be faster US growth and higher inflation expectations, with the upside risk of a productivity boom (or boomlet) from the combination of public and private sector innovation. Investors should not bet against the cyclical bull market even though any increase in long-term potential GDP is speculative. A Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis And The Cuban Missile Crisis Biden’s American Jobs Plan reserves $50 billion for US semiconductor manufacturing, a vast sum, larger than expectations and far larger than the relatively small public investments that helped revolutionize the US chip industry in the 1980s. But it will take a long time for these investments to pay off in the form of secure and redundant supply chains, while a semiconductor shortage is raging today that is already entangled with the US-China rivalry and tensions over the Taiwan Strait. The risk of a diplomatic or military incident is urgent because the chip shortage exacerbates China’s vulnerabilities at a time when the Biden administration is about to make critical decisions regarding the tightness of new export controls that cut off China’s access to US semiconductor chips, equipment, and parts. If the Biden administration appears to pursue a full-fledged tech blockade, as the Trump administration seemed bent on doing, then China will retaliate economically or militarily. Before going further we should point out that there are still areas of potential US-China cooperation under the Biden administration that could reduce tensions this year (though not over the long run). Biden and Xi Jinping might meet virtually as early as this month to discuss carbon emission reduction targets. Meanwhile China is positioning itself to serve as power-broker on two major foreign policy challenges – Iran and North Korea. Biden expressly seeks Chinese and Russian assistance based on the mutual interest in nuclear non-proliferation. Notably, Beijing’s renewed strategic dealings with Iran over the past month highlight its confidence that Biden does not have the appetite to stick with Trump’s “maximum pressure” but rather will seek to reduce sanctions and restore the 2015 nuclear deal. Hence China will seek to parlay influence over Tehran in exchange for reduced US pressure on its trade and economy (Chart 7). Beijing is making a similar offer on North Korea. Chart 7China Holds The Key To Iran, As With North Korea? China Holds The Key To Iran, As With North Korea? China Holds The Key To Iran, As With North Korea? Ironically both Iranian and North Korean geopolitical tensions should skyrocket in the short term since high-stakes negotiations are beginning, even though they are ultimately more manageable risks than the mega-risk of US-China conflict over Taiwan. China cannot gain the advanced technology it needs to achieve a strategic breakthrough if the US should impose a total tech blockade, e.g. draconian export controls enforced on US allies. Yet it is highly unlikely to gain the tech by seizing Taiwan, since war would likely destroy the computer chip fabrication plants and provoke global sanctions that would crush its economy. The result is that China is launching a massive campaign of domestic production and indigenous innovation while circumventing US restrictions through cyber and other means. Still, a dangerous strategic asymmetry is looming because the US will retain access to the most advanced computer chips via its alliances and on-shoring, whereas China will remain vulnerable to a tech blockade via Taiwan. This brings us to our chief global geopolitical risk: a US-China showdown in the Taiwan Strait. Highlighting the urgency of the risk, Admiral John Aquilino, the nominee for Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that China might not wait six years to attack Taiwan: “My opinion is that this problem is much closer to us than most think and we have to take this on.”5 To illustrate the calculus of such a showdown – and our reasons for maintaining an alarmist tone and building up market hedges and safe-haven investments – we turn to game theory. Game theory is not a substitute for empirical analysis but a tool to formalize complex international systems with multiple decision-makers. An obvious yet fair analogy to a US-China-Taiwan crisis is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.6 The standard construction of the Cuban missile crisis in game theory goes as follows: if the US maintains a blockade and the Soviets withdraw their missiles a compromise is achieved and war is averted; if the US conducts air strikes and the Soviets maintain or use their missiles then war ensues. The payouts to each player are shown in the matrix in Diagram 1. Diagram 1Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy One concern about this construction is that the payouts may underestimate the costs of war since nuclear arms could be used. We insert a comment into the diagram highlighting that the payouts could be altered to account for nuclear war. Note that this alteration does not change the final outcome: the equilibrium scenario is still US blockade and Soviet withdrawal, which is what happened in reality. If we model a US-China-Taiwan conflict along similar lines, the US takes the role of the Soviet Union while China stands where the US stood in 1962 (Diagram 2). This is a theoretical scenario in which the US offers Taiwan a decisive improvement in its security or offensive military capabilities. However, because of the unique circumstances of the Chinese civil war, in which the victors established the People’s Republic of China in Beijing in 1949 and the defeated forces retreated to Taiwan, China’s regime legitimacy is at stake in any showdown over Taiwan. If Beijing suffered a defeat that secured Taiwan’s independence while degrading Beijing’s regime legitimacy and security, the Chinese regime might not survive the domestic blowback.7 Diagram 2Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis – What Happens If The US Offers Game-Changing Military Support To Taiwan? The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy Thus we reduce the Chinese payout in the case of American victory. In the top right cell of Diagram 2, the row player’s payout falls from two points (2ppt) in the first diagram to one point (1ppt) in this diagram. This seemingly slight change entirely alters the outcome of the game. Beijing now faces equally bad outcomes in the event of defeat, whereas victory remains preferable to a tie. Therefore as long as China believes that the US will not resort to nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan (a reasonable assessment) then it may make the mistake of opting for military force to ensure victory. Fortunately for global investors the US is not providing Taiwan with game-changing military capabilities, although it is ultimately up to China to decide what threatens its security and the US is in the process of upgrading Taiwan’s defense in an effort to deter Beijing from forceful reunification. Thus the exercise demonstrates why we do not expect immediate war – no game-changer yet – but at the same time it shows why war is much likelier than the consensus holds if the military or political status quo changes in a way that China deems strategically unacceptable. A lower-degree Taiwan crisis should be expected – i.e. one in which the US maintains tech restrictions, offers arms sales or military training that do not upend the military balance, or signs free trade agreements or other significant upgrades to the US-Taiwan relationship.8 We would give a 60% probability to some kind of crisis over the next 12-24 months. The global equity market could at least suffer a 10% correction in a standard geopolitical crisis and it could easily fall 20% if US-China war appears more likely. What would trigger a full-fledged Taiwan war? We would grow even more alarmed if we saw one of three major developments: Chinese internal instability giving rise to a still more aggressive regime; the US providing Taiwan with offensive military capabilities; or Taiwan seeking formal political independence. The first is fairly likely, the second lends itself to miscalculation, and the third is unlikely. But it would only take one or two of these to increase the war risk dramatically. Bottom Line: The Taiwan Strait is still the critical geopolitical risk and Biden’s policy on China is still unclear. Iranian and North Korean tensions will escalate in the short run but the fundamental crisis lies in Taiwan. Since some kind of showdown is likely and war cannot be ruled out we advise clients to accumulate safe-haven assets like the Japanese yen and otherwise not to bet headlong against the US dollar until it loses momentum. Emerging Markets Round-Up In this section we will briefly update some important emerging market themes and views: Chart 8Favor USMCA Over Putin's Russia Favor USMCA Over Putin's Russia Favor USMCA Over Putin's Russia Russia: US-Russia tensions are escalating in the face of Biden’s reassertion of the US bid for liberal hegemony, which poses a direct threat to Russia’s influence in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is expected to see a renewed conflict this spring. The top US and Russian military commanders spoke on the phone for the second time this year after Ukrainian military reports indicated that Russia is amassing forces on the border. We also assign a 50/50 chance that the US will use sanctions to prevent the completion of the NordStream II pipeline from Russia to Germany, an event that would shake up the German election as well as provoke a Russian backlash. The Russian ruble has suffered a long slide since Putin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 and the country’s currency and equities have not staged much of a comeback amid the global cyclical upswing and commodity price rally post-COVID. We recommend investors favor the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso as oil plays in the context of American stimulus and persistent Russian geopolitical risk (Chart 8). We also favor developed market European stocks over emerging Europe, which will suffer from renewed US-Russia tensions. Brazil: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s domestic political troubles are metastasizing as expected – the rally-around-the-flag effect in the face of COVID-19 has faded and his popular approval rating now looks dangerously like President Trump’s did, relative to previous presidents, which is an ominous warning for the “Trump of the South,” who faces an election in October 2022 (Chart 9). The COVID-19 deaths are skyrocketing, with intensive care units reaching critical levels across the country. The president has reshuffling his cabinet, including all three heads of the military in an unprecedented disruption that compounds fears about his willingness to politicize the military.9 Meanwhile the judicial system looks likely (but not certain) to clear former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to run against Bolsonaro for the presidency, a potent threat (Chart 10). Bolsonaro’s three pillars of political viability have cracked under the pandemic: the country remains disorderly, the systemic corruption and the “Car Wash” scandal under the former ruling party are no longer at the center of public focus, and fiscal stimulus has replaced structural reform. Chart 9Brazil: Will ‘Trump Of The South’ Face Trump’s Fate? The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy Our Brazilian GeoRisk Indicator has reached a peak with Bolsonaro’s crisis – and likely breaking of the fiscal spending growth cap put in place at the height of the political crisis in 2016 – while Brazilian equities relative to emerging markets have hit a triple bottom (Chart 11). It is too soon for investors to buy into Brazil given that the political upheaval can get worse before it gets better and a Lula administration is no cure for Brazil’s public debt crisis, though a short-term technical rally is at hand. Chart 10Brazil’s Lula Looks To Be A Contender In 2022? The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy Chart 11Brazil: Policy Risk Peaks, Equities Hit Triple-Bottom Versus EM Brazil: Policy Risk Peaks, Equities Hit Triple-Bottom Versus EM Brazil: Policy Risk Peaks, Equities Hit Triple-Bottom Versus EM India: A lot has happened since we last updated our views on India, South Asia, and the broader Indian Ocean basin. Farmer protests broke out in India, forcing Prime Minister Narendra Modi to temporarily suspend his much-needed structural reforms to the agricultural sector, while China-backed military coup broke out in Myanmar, and the US election set up a return to negotiations with Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire, despite boiling tensions over India’s decision to make Jammu and Kashmir a federal union territory. The ceasefire is temporary but it does highlight a changing geopolitical dynamic in the region. India and Pakistan ceased fire along the Line of Control where they have fought many times. The ceasefire does not resolve core problems – Pakistan will not stop supporting militant proxies and India will not grant Kashmir autonomy – but it does show their continued ability to manage the intensity of disputes while dealing with the global pandemic. An earlier sign of coordination occurred after the exchange of air strikes in early 2019, which preceded the Indian election and suggested that India and Pakistan had the ability to control their military encounters. India’s move to revoke the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, along with various militant operations, created the basis for another major conflict this year. After all, the Kargil war in 1999 followed nuclear weaponization, while the 2008 conflict followed the Mumbai attack. But instead India and Pakistan have agreed to a temporary truce. A major India-Pakistan conflict would be a “black swan” as nobody is expecting it at this point. Not coincidentally, India and China also reduced tensions after the flare-up in their Himalayan territorial disputes in 2020. China may be reducing tensions now that it no longer has to distract its population from Trump and the US election. China is shifting its focus to the Myanmar coup, another area where it hopes to parlay its influence with a Biden administration preoccupied with democracy and human rights. Sino-Indian tensions will resume later, especially as China continues its infrastructure construction at the farthest reaches of its territory for the sake of economic stimulus, internal control, and military logistics. The Biden administration is adopting the Trump administration’s efforts to draw India into a democratic alliance. But more urgently it is trying to withdraw from Afghanistan and cut a deal with Iran, which means it will need Indian and Pakistani cooperation and will want India to play a supportive role. Typically India eschews alliances and it will disapprove of Biden’s paternalism. For both China and Pakistan, making a temporary truce with India discourages it from synching up relations with the US immediately. Still, we expect India to cooperate more closely with the US over time, both on economic and security matters. This includes a beefed up “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) with Japan and Australia, which already have strong economic ties with India. Biden’s attempt to frame US foreign policy as a global restoration of democracy and liberalism will not go very far if he alienates the largest democracy in the world and in Asia. Nor will his attempt to diversify the US economy away from China or counter China’s regional assertiveness. Therefore Biden will have to take a supportive role on US-India ties. We are sticking with our contrarian long India / short China equity trade (Chart 12). India cannot achieve its geopolitical goals without reforming its economy and for that very reason it will redouble its structural reform drive, which is supported by changing voting patterns in favor of accelerating nationwide economic development. India will also receive a tailwind from the US and its allies as they seek to diversify production sources and reduce supply chain dependency on China, at least for health, defense, and tech. Meanwhile China’s government is pursing import substitution, deleveraging, and conflict with its neighbors and the United States. While Chinese equities are much cheaper than Indian equities on a P/E basis, they are not as pricey on a P/B and P/S basis (Chart 13) – and valuation trends can continue under the current macro and geopolitical backdrop. Indian equities are more volatile but from a long-term and geopolitical point of view, India’s moment has arrived. Chart 12Contrarian Trade: Stick To Long India / Short China Contrarian Trade: Stick To Long India / Short China Contrarian Trade: Stick To Long India / Short China Bottom Line: Stay long Indian equities relative to Chinese and stay short Russian and Brazilian currencies and assets. These views are based on political and geopolitical themes that will remain relevant over the long run but are also seeing short-term confirmation. Chart 13Indian Stocks Not As Over-Priced On Price-To-Book, Price-To-Sales Indian Stocks Not As Over-Priced On Price-To-Book, Price-To-Sales Indian Stocks Not As Over-Priced On Price-To-Book, Price-To-Sales Investment Takeaways To conclude we want to highlight two investment takeaways. First, while the market has rallied in expectation of the US stimulus package, Biden must now get the package passed. This roller coaster process, combined with the inevitable European recovery once the vaccine rollout gets on its feet (Chart 14), will power an additional rally in cyclicals, value stocks, and commodities. This is true as long as China does not tighten monetary and fiscal policy too abruptly, a risk we have highlighted in previous reports. Chart 14Europe's Vaccination Problem Europe's Vaccination Problem Europe's Vaccination Problem While the US is pursuing “Buy American” provisions within its stimulus package, its growing trade deficit shows that it will be forced to import goods and services to meet its surging demand. This is beneficial for its nearest trade partners, Canada and Mexico, and Europe – as well as China substitutes further afield in some cases. Our European Investment Strategist Mathieu Savary has pointed out the opportunities lurking in Europe at a time when vaccine troubles and lockdowns are clouding the medium-term economic view, which is brightening. He recommends going long the “laggard” sectors and sub-sectors that have not benefited much relative to “leaders” that rallied sharply in the wake of last year’s stimulus, vaccine discovery, and defeat of President Trump (Chart 15). The laggard sectors are primed to outperform on rising US interest rates and decelerating Chinese economy as well (Chart 16). Therefore we recommend going long his basket of Euro Area laggards and short the leaders. Chart 15Europe’s Laggards And Leaders The Arsenal Of Democracy The Arsenal Of Democracy Chart 16Macro Forces Favor The Laggards over the Leaders Macro Forces Favor The Laggards over the Leaders Macro Forces Favor The Laggards over the Leaders Chart 17Will OPEC 2.0 Maintain Production Discipline To Keep Oil Supplies Tight? Will OPEC 2.0 Maintain Production Discipline To Keep Oil Supplies Tight? Will OPEC 2.0 Maintain Production Discipline To Keep Oil Supplies Tight? Commodities – especially base metals – will continue to benefit from the global and European reopening as well as the US infrastructure buildout, assuming that China does not shoot its economy in the foot. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy highlights that global oil prices should remain in a $60-$80 per barrel range over the coming years on the back of tight supply/demand balances and ongoing OPEC 2.0 production management (Chart 17). We continue to see upside oil price risks in the first half of the year but downside risks in the second half. The US pursuit of a deal with Iran may trigger sparks initially – i.e. unplanned supply outages – but this will be followed by increased supply from Iran and/or OPEC 2.0 as a deal becomes evident.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 White House, "Remarks by President Biden on the American Jobs Plan," Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, March 31, 2021, whitehouse.gov. 2 A bipartisan bill is conceivably, barely, since Republicans face pressure to join with such a popular bill, but they cannot accept the corporate tax hikes, unionization, or green boondoggles that will inevitably occur. 3 The pandemic and President Trump’s hands-off attitude toward it helped galvanize this revival of Big Government, but the revival was already well on its way prior to the pandemic. 4 White House, "Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference," March 25, 2021, whitehouse.gov. 5 Again, "the most dangerous concern is that of a military force against Taiwan," though he implied that Beijing would wait until after the February 2022 Winter Olympics before taking action. He requested that the US urgently increase regional military defense. See Senate Armed Services Committee, "Nomination – Aquilino," March 23, 2021, armed-services.senate.gov. 6 At that time the Soviet Union stationed nuclear missiles in Cuba that threatened the US homeland directly and sent a convoy to make the missile installation permanent. The US imposed a blockade. A showdown ensued, at great risk of war, until the Soviets withdrew and the Americans made some compromises regarding missiles in Turkey. 7 Note that this was not the case for the US in 1962: Cuba did not have special significance for the legitimacy of the American republic and the American regime would have survived a defeat in the showdown, although its security would have been greatly compromised. 8 Taiwan is proposing to buy a missile segment enhancement for its Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile defense system for delivery in 2025, though this is not yet confirmed by the Biden administration. See for example Yimou Lee, "Taiwan To Buy New U.S. Air Defence Missiles To Guard Against China," Reuters, March 31, 2021, reuters.com. 9 See Monica Gugliano, "I Will Intervene! The Day Bolsonaro Decided To Send Troops To The Supreme Court," Folha de São Paulo, August 2020, piaui.folha.uol.com.br.

  The BCA Research Global Asset Allocation (GAA) Forum will take place online on May 18th. We have put together a great lineup of speakers to discuss issues of importance to CIOs and asset allocators. These include the latest thinking on portfolio construction, factor investing, alternatives, and ESG. Our keynote speaker will be Keith Ambachtsheer, founder of KPA Advisory and author of many books on investment management including "The Future of Pension Management: Integrating Design, Governance and Investing" (2016). His presentation will be followed by a panel discussion of top CIOs including Maxime Aucoin of CDPQ, James Davis of OPTrust, and Catherine Ulozas of the Drexel University Endowment. The event is complimentary for all GAA subscribers, who can see a full agenda and register here. Others can sign up here. We hope you can join us on May 18th for what should be a stimulating and informative day of ideas and discussion. Highlights Recommended Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Global growth will rebound later this year, fueled by an end of lockdowns and generous fiscal stimulus. Despite that, central banks will not move towards tightening until 2023 at the earliest. This remains a very positive environment for risk assets like equities, though the upside is inevitably limited given stretched valuations. We continue to recommend a risk-on position, with overweights in equities and higher-risk corporate bonds. It is unlikely that long-term rates will rise much further over the coming months. But there is a risk that they could, and so we become more wary on interest-sensitive assets. Accordingly, we cut our overweight on the IT sector to neutral, and go overweight Financials. We continue to prefer cyclical sectors, and stay overweight Industrials and Energy. Chinese growth is slowing and so we cut our recommendation on Chinese equities to underweight. Some Emerging Markets will suffer from tighter US financial conditions, so we would be selective in our positions in both EM equity and debt. We stay firmly underweight government bonds, and recommend an underweight on duration, and favor linkers. Within alternatives, we raise Private Equity to overweight. The return to normality will give PE funds a wider range of opportunities, and allow them to pick up distressed assets at attractive valuations. Overview What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation The past few months have seen a sharp rise in long-term interest rates everywhere (Chart 1). These have reflected better growth prospects, but also a greater appreciation of the risk of inflation over the next few years (Chart 2). Our main message in this Quarterly Portfolio Outlook is that we do not expect long-term rates to rise much further over the coming months, but that there is a risk that they could. This would be unlikely to undermine the positive case for risk assets overall, but it would affect asset allocation towards interest-rate sensitive assets such as growth stocks and Emerging Markets, and could have an impact on the US dollar. Chart 1Rates Are Rising Everywhere Rates Are Rising Everywhere Rates Are Rising Everywhere Chart 2...Because Of Both Growth And Inflation Expectations Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation     We accordingly keep our recommendation for an overweight on equities and riskier corporate credit on the 12-month investment horizon, but are tweaking some of our other allocation recommendations. The macro environment for the rest of the year continues to look favorable. Pent-up consumer demand will be released once lockdowns end. In the US, this should be mid-July by when, at the current rate, the US will have vaccinated enough people to achieve herd immunity (Chart 3). Excess household savings in the major developed economies have reached almost $3 trillion (Chart 4). At least a part of that will be spent when consumers can go out for entertainment and travel again. Chart 3US On Track To Hit Herd Immunity By July US On Track To Hit Herd Immunity By July US On Track To Hit Herd Immunity By July Chart 4Global Excess Savings Total Trillion Global Excess Savings Total $3 Trillion Global Excess Savings Total $3 Trillion     Fiscal stimulus remains generous, especially in the US after the passing of the $1.9 trillion package in March (with another $2 trillion dedicated towards infrastructure spending likely to be approved within the next six months). The OECD estimates that the recent US stimulus alone will boost US GDP growth by almost 3 percentage points in the first full year and have a significant knock-on effect on other economies (Chart 5). Central banks, too, remain wary of the uneven and fragile nature of the recovery and so will not move towards tightening in the next 12 months. The Fed is not signalling a rate hike before 2024 – and it is likely to be the first major central bank to raise rates. In this environment, it is not surprising that long-term rates have risen. We showed in March’s Monthly Portfolio Update that, since 1990, equities have almost always performed strongly when rates are rising. This is likely to continue unless there is either (1) an inflation scare, or (2) the Fed turns more hawkish than the market believes is appropriate. Inflation could spike temporarily over the coming months, which might spook markets (see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 9 for more discussion of this). But sustained inflation is improbable until the labor market recovers to a level where significant wage increases come through (Chart 6). This is unlikely before 2023 at the earliest. Chart 5US Fiscal Stimulus Will Help Everyone Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Chart 6Labor Market Still Well Away From Full Employment Labor Market Still Well Away From Full Employment Labor Market Still Well Away From Full Employment   BCA Research’s fixed-income strategists do not see the US 10-year Treasury yield rising much above 1.8% this year.1 Inflation expectations should settle down around the current level (shown in Chart 2, panel 2) which is consistent with the Fed achieving its 2% PCE inflation target on average over the cycle. Treasury yields are largely driven by whether the Fed turns out to be more or less hawkish than the market expects (Chart 7). The market is already pricing in the first Fed rate hike in Q3 2022 (Chart 8). We think it unlikely that the market will start to price in an earlier hike than that. Chart 7The Fed Unlikely To Hike Ahead Of What Market Expects... The Fed Unlikely To Hike Ahead Of What Market Expects... The Fed Unlikely To Hike Ahead Of What Market Expects... Chart 8...Since This Is As Early As Q3 2022 ...Since This Is As Early As Q3 2021 ...Since This Is As Early As Q3 2021 How much would a further rise in rates hurt the economy and stock market? Rates are still well below a level that would trigger problems. First, long-term rates are considerably below trend nominal GDP growth, which is around 3.5% (Chart 9). Second, short-term real rates are well below r* – hard though that is to measure at the moment given the volatility of the economy in the past 12 months (Chart 10). Finally, one of the best indicators of economic pressure is a decline in cyclical sectors (consumer spending on durables, corporate capex, and residential investment) as a percentage of GDP (Chart 11). This is because these are the most interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy. But, at the moment, consumers are so cashed up they do not need to borrow to spend. The same is true of corporates, which raised huge amounts of cash last year. The only potential problem is real estate, buoyed last year by low rates which are now reversing (Chart 12). But mortgage rates are still very low and this is not a big enough sector to derail the broader economy. Chart 9Long-Term Rates Well Below Damaging Levels... Long-Term Rates Well Below Damaging Levels... Long-Term Rates Well Below Damaging Levels... Chart 10...Such As The R-Star Fed Still Below Neutral ...Such As The R-Star Fed Still Below Neutral ...Such As The R-Star   Chart 11Interest-Rate Sensitive Sectors Are Robust... Interest-Rate Sensitive Sectors Are Robust... Interest-Rate Sensitive Sectors Are Robust... Chart 12...With The Possible Exception Of Housing ...With The Possible Exception Of Housing ...With The Possible Exception Of Housing   Chart 13Debt Levels Are High In Emerging Markets... Debt Levels Are High In Emerging Markets... Debt Levels Are High In Emerging Markets... Chart 14...Which Makes Them Vulnerable To Tightening Financial Conditions ...Which Makes Them Vulnerable To Tightening Financial Conditions ...Which Makes Them Vulnerable To Tightening Financial Conditions         This sanguine view may not apply to Emerging Markets, however. Given the amount of foreign-currency debt they have built up in the past decade (Chart 13), they are very sensitive to US financial conditions, particularly a rise in rates and an appreciation of the US dollar (Chart 14). Accordingly, we have become more cautious on the outlook for both EM equity and debt over the next 6-12 months.   Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   What Our Clients Are Asking What will happen to inflation? How can we tell if it is trending up? Chart 15Watch The Trimmed Mean Inflation Measure Watch The Trimmed Mean Inflation Measure Watch The Trimmed Mean Inflation Measure How much inflation rises will be a key driver of asset performance over the next 12-18 months. Too much inflation will push up long-term rates and undermine the case for risk assets. But the picture is likely to be complicated. US inflation will rise sharply in year-on-year terms in March and April because of the base effect (comparison with the worst period of the pandemic in 2020), pricier gasoline, rising import prices due to the weaker dollar, and supply-chain bottlenecks that are pushing up manufacturing costs. Core PCE inflation could get close to 2.5% year-on-year (Chart 15, panel 1). In the second half, too, an end to lockdowns could push up service-sector inflation – which has unsurprisingly been weak in the past nine months – as consumers rush out to restaurants and on vacation (panel 3). The Fed has signalled that it will view these as temporary effects. But they may spook the market for a while. Next year, however, it would be surprising to see strong underlying inflation unless employment makes a miraculous recovery. Payrolls would have to increase by 420,000 a month to get back to “maximum employment” by end-2022.2 Absent that, wage growth is likely to stay muted. Conventional inflation gauges may not be very useful at indicating underlying inflation pressures, in a world where consumers switch their spending depending on what is currently allowed under pandemic regulations. The Dallas Fed’s Trimmed Mean Inflation indicator (which excludes the 31% of the 178 items in the consumer basket with the highest price rises each month, and the 24% with the lowest) may be the best true measure. Research shows that historically it has been closer to trend headline PCE inflation in the long run than the core inflation measure, and predicts future inflation better (panel 4). Currently it is at 1.6% year-on-year and trending down. Investors should focus on this measure to see whether rising inflation is becoming a risk.   How can investors best protect against rising inflation? In May 2019 we released a report describing how to best to hedge against inflation.3 In that report, we analyzed every period of rising inflation dating back to the 1970s. Our conclusions were the following: The level of inflation will determine how rising inflation affects assets. When inflation goes from 1% to 2%, the macro environment is entirely different from when it goes from 5% to 6%. Thus, inflation hedging should not be thought of as a static exercise but a dynamic one (Table 1). Table 1Winners During Different Inflationary Regimes Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation As long as the annual inflation rate is below about 3%, equities tend to be the best performing asset during high inflation periods, surpassing even commodities. This is because monetary policy tends to stay accommodative and cost pressures remain benign for most companies. However, as inflation passes this threshold, things start to change. Central banks start to become restrictive as they seek to curb inflation. This rise in policy rates starts to choke off the bull market. Meanwhile cost pressures become more significant and, as a result, equities begin to suffer. It is at this time when commodities – particularly oil and industrial metals – and US TIPS become a much better asset to hold. Finally, if the central bank fails to quash inflation, inflation expectations become unanchored, creating a toxic cocktail of rising prices and poor growth. During such periods, the best strategy is to hold the most defensive securities in each asset class, such as Health Care or Utilities within the equity market, or gold within commodities.   Can the shift to renewables drive a new commodities supercycle? Chart 16The Shift To Renewables Is Likely To Be A Tailwind For Metal Prices... The Shift To Renewables Is Likely To Be A Tailwind For Metal Prices... The Shift To Renewables Is Likely To Be A Tailwind For Metal Prices... The rise in commodity prices in H2 2020 has made investors ask whether we are on the verge of a new commodities “supercycle” (Chart 16). Our Commodity & Energy strategists argue that the fundamental drivers of each commodities segment differ. Here we focus on industrial metals – particularly those pertaining to renewable energy and transport electrification. Prices of metals used in electric vehicles (EVs) have risen by an average 53% since July 2020, reflecting strong demand that is outstripping supply (Chart 16). In the short-term, metals markets are likely to be in deficit, especially as demand recovers after the pandemic. Modelling longer-term demand is tricky since it relies on assumptions for the emergence of new technologies, metals’ efficiency, recycling rates, and the share of renewables. A study by the Institute for Sustainable Futures showed that, in the most positive scenarios, demand for some metals will exceed available resources and reserves (Table 2).4 The most pessimistic scenarios – which, for example, assume no major electrification of the transport system – show demand at approximately half of available resources. It is likely that demand will lay somewhere between those scenarios. Table 2...As Future Demand Exceeds Supply Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Supply is concentrated in a handful of countries: For example, the DR Congo is responsible for more than 65% of cobalt production and 50% of the world’s reserves;5 Australia supplies almost 50% of the world’s lithium and has 22% of its reserves.6 Production bottlenecks could therefore put significant upside pressures on prices. Factoring in supply/demand dynamics, as well as an assessment of future technological advancements, we conclude that industrial metals might be posed for a bull market over the upcoming years.   How can we add alpha in the bond bear market? Chart 17Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs Government Bond Yield Sensitivities To USTs For a portfolio benchmarked to the global Treasury index, one way to add alpha is through country allocation. BCA’s Fixed Income Strategy recommends overweighting low yield-beta countries (Germany, France, and Japan) and underweighting high yield-beta countries (Canada, Australia, and the UK).7 The yield beta is defined as the sensitivity of a country’s yield change to changes in the US 10-year Treasury yield, as shown in Chart 17. BCA’s view is that the Fed will be the first major central bank to lift interest rate, therefore investors' underweights should be concentrated in the US Treasury index. It’s worth noting, however, that yield beta is influenced by many factors, and can change over time. When applying this approach, it’s important to pay attention to key factors in each country, especially those that are critical to central bank policy decisions (Table 3). Table 3A Watch List For Bond Investors Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Global Economy Chart 18US Growth Already Looks Strong... US Growth Already Looks Strong... US Growth Already Looks Strong... Overview: Growth continues to recover from the pandemic, although the pace varies. Manufacturing has rebounded strongly, as consumers spend their fiscal handouts on computer and household equipment, but services remain very weak, especially in Europe and Japan. Successful vaccination programs and the end of lockdowns in many countries should lead to strong growth in H2, as consumers spend their accumulated savings and companies increase capex to meet this demand. Perhaps the biggest risk to growth is premature tightening in China, but the authorities there are very aware of this risk and so it is unlikely to drag much on global growth. US: Although the big upside surprises to economic growth are over (Chart 18, panel 1), the US continues to expand more strongly than other major economies, due to its relatively limited lockdowns and large fiscal stimulus (which last year and this combined reached 25% of GDP, with another $2 trillion package in the works). Fed NowCasts suggest that Q1 GDP will come in at around 5-6% quarter-on-quarter annualized, with the OECD’s full-year GDP growth forecast as high as 6.5%. Nonetheless, there is still some way to go: Consumer expenditure and capex remain weak by historical standards, and new jobless claims in March still averaged 727,000 a week. Euro Area: More stringent pandemic regulations and slow vaccine rollout mean that the European service sector has been slow to recover. The services PMI in March was still only 48.4, though manufacturing has rebounded strongly to 64.2 (Chart 19, panel 1). Fiscal stimulus is also much smaller than in the US, with the EUR750 billion approved in December to be spent mostly on infrastructure over a period of years. Growth should rebound in H2 if lockdowns end and the vaccination program accelerates. But the OECD forecasts full-year GDP growth of only 3.9%. Chart 19...But Chinese Growth Has Probably Peaked ...But Chinese Growth Has Probably Peaked ...But Chinese Growth Has Probably Peaked Japan has seen the weakest rebound among the major economies, slightly puzzlingly so given its heavy weight in manufacturing and large exposure to the Chinese economy. Industrial production still shrank 3% year-on-year in February (Chart 19, panel 2), exports were down 4.5% YoY in February, and the manufacturing PMI is barely above 50. The main culprit remains domestic consumption, with confidence very weak and wages still declining, leading to a 2.4% YoY decline in retail sales in January. The OECD full-year GDP growth forecast is just 2.4%. Emerging Markets: The Chinese authorities have been moderately tightening policy for six months and this is starting to impact growth. Both the manufacturing and services PMIs have peaked, though they remain above 50 (panel 3). The policy tightening is likely to be only moderate and so growth this year should not slow drastically. Nonetheless, there remains the risk of a policy mistake. Elsewhere, many EM central banks are struggling with the dilemma of whether to cut rates to boost growth, or raise rates to defend a weakening currency. Real policy rates range from over 2% in Indonesia to below -2% in Brazil and the Philippines. This will add to volatility in the EM universe. Interest Rates: Policy rates in developed economies will not rise any time soon. The Fed is signalling no rise until 2024 (although the futures are now pricing in the first hike in Q3 2022). Other major central banks are likely to wait even longer. A crucial question is whether long-term rates will rise further, after the jump in the US 10-year Treasury yield to a high of 1.73%, from 0.92% at the start of the year. We see only limited upside in yields over the next nine months, as underlying inflation pressures should remain weak and central banks will remain highly reluctant to bring forward the pace of monetary policy normalization.   Global Equities Chart 20Has The Equity Market Priced In All The Earnings Growth? Has The Equity Market Priced In All The Earnings Growth? Has The Equity Market Priced In All The Earnings Growth? The global equities index eked out a 4% gain in Q1 2021, completely driven by a rebound in the profit outlook, since the forward PE multiple slightly contracted by 4%. Forward EPS has now recovered to the pre-pandemic level, while both the index level and PE multiple are 52% and 43% higher than at the end of March 2020 (Chart 20). While BCA’s global earnings model points to nearly 20% earnings growth over the next 12 months and analysts are still revising up earnings forecasts, the key question in our mind is whether the equity market has priced in all the earnings growth. Equity valuations are still not cheap by historical standards despite the small contraction in PEs in Q1. In addition, the VIX index has come down to 19.6, right at its historical average since January 1990, and profit margins in both EM and DM have come under pressure. As an asset class, however, stocks are still attractively valued compared to bonds (panel 5). Given our long-held approach of taking risk where risk will most likely be rewarded, we remain overweight equities versus bonds at the asset-class level, but we are taking some risk off the table in our country and sector allocations by downgrading China to underweight (from overweight) and upgrading the UK to overweight (from neutral), and by taking profits in our Tech overweight and upgrading Financials to overweight (see next two pages). To sum up, we are overweight the US and UK, underweight Japan, the euro area, and China, while neutral on Canada, Australia, and non-China EM. Sector-wise, we are overweight Industrials, Financials, Energy, and Health Care; underweight Consumer Staples, Utilities, and Real Estate; and neutral on Tech, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, and Materials.   Country Allocation: Downgrade China To Underweight From Overweight Chart 21China Is Risking Overtightening China Is Risking Overtightening China Is Risking Overtightening We started to separate the overall EM into China and Other EM in the January Monthly Portfolio Update this year. We initiated China with an Overweight and “Other EM” with a Neutral weighting in the global equity portfolio. The key rationale was that Chinese growth would remain strong in H1 2021 due to its earlier stimulus, while some EM countries would benefit from Chinese growth but others were still suffering from structural issues. In Q1, China underperformed the global benchmark by 4.5%, while the other EM markets underperformed slightly. China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) indicated that Chinese policymakers will gradually pull back policy support this year. BCA’s China Investment Strategists think that fiscal thrust will be neutral in 2021 while credit expansion will be at a lower rate compared to 2020. The Chinese economy should remain strong in H1 but will slow to a benign and managed growth rate afterwards. Therefore, the risk of policy overtightening is not trivial and could threaten China’s economic growth and corporate profit outlook. The outperformance of Chinese stocks since the end of 2019 has been largely driven by multiple expansion (Chart 21, panel 1), but the slowdown in the credit impulse implies that the recent underperformance of Chinese equities has not run its course because multiple contraction will likely have to catch up and will therefore put more downward pressure on price (panels 2 and 3). We remain neutral on the non-China EM countries, implying an underweight for the overall EM universe. We use the proceeds to fund an upgrade of the UK to Overweight from Neutral because the UK index is comprised largely of globally exposed companies and because we have upgraded GBP to overweight (see page 21).   Sector Allocation: Upgrade Financials To Overweight By Downgrading Tech To Neutral Chart 22Financials And Tech: Trading Places Financials And Tech: Trading Places Financials And Tech: Trading Places One year ago, we upgraded Tech to overweight and downgraded Financials to neutral given our views on the impact of the pandemic and interest rates.8 This position has netted out an alpha of 1123 basis points in one year. BCA Research’s House View now calls for somewhat higher global interest rates and steeper yield curves (especially in the US) over the next 9-12 months. Accordingly, we are downgrading Tech to neutral and upgrading Financials to overweight. Financials have outperformed the broad market by about 20% since September 2020 after global yields bottomed in July 2020. We do not expect yields to rise significantly from the current level, nor do we expect Tech earnings growth to slow significantly (Chart 22, panel 5). So why do we make such shift between Financials and Tech? There are three key reasons: First, the Tech sector is a long-duration asset with high sensitivity to changes in the discount rate. In contrast, Financials’ earnings benefit from steepening yield curves. If history is any guide, we should see more aggressive analyst earnings revisions going forward in favor of Financials (Chart 22, panel 3). Second, the performance of Financials relative to Tech has been on a long-term structural downtrend since the Global Financial Crisis. A countertrend rebound to the neutral zone from the currently very oversold level would imply further upside (Chart 22, panel 1). Last, Financials are trading at an extremely large discount to the Tech sector (Chart 22, panel 2). In an environment where overall equity valuations are stretched by historical standards, it is prudent to rotate into an extremely cheap sector from an extremely expensive sector.   Government Bonds Chart 23Policy Mix Is Bond-Bearish Policy Mix Is Bond-Bearish Policy Mix Is Bond-Bearish Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration. Global bond yields have climbed sharply in Q1, supported by strong economic growth, mostly smooth rollout of vaccination and the Biden Administration’s very stimulative fiscal package of USD1.9 trillion. The US stimulus package changes the trajectory of the 2021 US fiscal impulse from a $0.8 trillion contraction to a $0.3 trillion expansion, according to estimates from the US Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Going forward, the path of least resistance for global yields is still up, though the upside will be limited given the resolve of central banks to maintain accommodative monetary policies (Chart 23). Chart 24Stay Long TIPS Stay Long TIPS Stay Long TIPS Still Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. Our overweight position in inflation-linked bonds relative to nominal bonds has panned out well so far this year, as has our positioning for a flattening inflation-protection curve. Even though inflation expectations have run up quickly, the 5 year-5 year forward inflation breakeven rate is still below 2.3-2.5%, the range that is consistent with core PCE reaching the Fed’s 2% target in a sustainable fashion (Chart 24). The US TIPS 5/10-year curve is inverted already, but our fixed income strategists are still reluctant to exit the curve-flattening position for two key reasons: 1) The Fed has indicated that it will tolerate core PCE overshooting the 2% target because it will try to hit the target from above rather than from below; and 2) the short end of the inflation expectation curve is more sensitive to actual inflation than the long end. There are signs (core producer prices, prices paid in the ISM manufacturing survey, and NFIB reported prices are all rising) that core PCE will reach 2% in the next 12 months.   Corporate Bonds Chart 25High-Yield Offers Best Value In Fixed Income Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: What Higher Rates Mean For Asset Allocation Since the beginning of the year, investment-grade bonds have outperformed duration-matched Treasurys by 62 basis points, while high-yield bonds have outperformed duration-marched Treasurys by 232 basis points. In the current reflationary environment, we believe that the best strategy within fixed-income portfolios is to overweight low-duration assets and maximize credit exposure where the spread makes a large portion of the yield. Thus, we remain overweight high-yield bonds. We believe that high yield offers much better value than higher quality credits. Currently spreads for high-yield bonds are in the middle of their historical distribution – a stark contrast from their investment-grade counterparts, which are trading at very expensive levels (Chart 25, panel 1). Moreover, the reopening of the economy should help the more cyclical sectors of the bond market, where the lower credit qualities are concentrated. But could a rise in yields start hurting sub-investment-grade companies and increase their borrowing costs? We do not think this is likely for now. Most of the bonds in the US high-yield index mature in more than three years, which means that high-risk corporates will not have to finance themselves with higher rates yet (Chart 25, panel 2). On the other hand, we remain underweight investment-grade credit. Not only are these bonds expensive, but they offer very little upside in any scenario. On the one hand, these bonds should underperform further if raise continue to rise – a result of their high duration. On the other hand, if a severe recession were to hit, spreads would most likely widen, which will also result in underperformance.   Commodities Chart 26Limited Upside For Oil From Here Limited Upside For Oil From Here Limited Upside For Oil From Here Energy (Overweight): Despite the recent mid-March selloff, which was most likely triggered by profit taking, oil prices are still up 25% since the beginning of the year. This happened on the back of the restoration of some economic activity, the OPEC 2.0 coalition maintaining production discipline and therefore keeping supply in check, and the recovery in crude demand drawing down inventory. However, earlier forecasts of the 2021 oil demand recovery were a bit too optimistic amid continuing pandemic uncertainty. There is now, therefore, only limited upside for the oil price, at least this year. Our Commodity & Energy strategists expect the Brent crude price to average $65/bbl this year (Chart 26, panels 1 & 2). Industrial Metals (Neutral): We have previously highlighted that Chinese restocking activity in 2020 was a big factor behind the rally in industrial metals prices. As this eases, and Chinese growth slows, commodity prices might correct somewhat in the short term. However, fundamental changes in demand for alternative energy makes us ask whether we are now entering a new commodities “supercycle” for certain metals (for more analysis of this, see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 11). If history is any guide, however, the commodities bear market may have a little longer to run. Historically, commodity bear cycles lasted 17 years on average and we are only 10 years into this one (panel 3). On balance, therefore, we remain neutral on industrial metals for now. Precious Metals (Neutral): After peaking last August, the gold price has continued to tumble, down almost 19% since and 11% since the beginning of the year. We have been wary of the metal’s lofty valuation – the real price of gold remains near a historical high. The recent rise in real rates put more downside pressure on gold. However, the pullback in prices should provide investors who see gold as a long-term inflation hedge and do not buy the metal with a view to strong absolute performance over the next 12 months, with an attractive entry point. We maintain a slight overweight position to hedge against inflation and unexpected tail risks (panel 4).   Currencies US Dollar Chart 27Vaccinations will help USD and GBP in 2021 Vaccinations will help USD and GBP in 2021 Vaccinations will help USD and GBP in 2021 While we still believe that the dollar is in a major bear market, the current environment could see a significant dollar countertrend. Thanks to its gargantuan fiscal stimulus as well as its relatively fast vaccination campaign, the US is likely to grow faster than the rest of the world during 2021 (Chart 27, panel 1). This dynamic should put further upward pressure on US real rates relative to the rest of the world, helping the dollar in the process. To hedge this risk, we are upgrading the US dollar from underweight to neutral in our currency portfolio. Euro The euro should experience a temporary pullback. Economic activity in Europe, particularly in the service sector is lagging the US – a consequence of Europe’s slow vaccination campaign. This sluggishness in economic activity will translate into a worse real rate differential vis-a-vis the US, dragging the euro lower in the process. Thus, we are downgrading the euro from overweight to neutral. British Pound One currency that might perform well in this environment is the British pound. Consumer spending in the UK was particularly hard hit during the pandemic, since such a high share of it is geared towards social activities like restaurants and hotels (Chart 27, panel 2). However, thanks to Britain’s successful vaccination campaign, UK consumption is likely to experience a sharp snapback. As growth expectations improve, real rates should grind higher vis-à-vis the rest of the world, pushing the pound higher. Moreover, valuations for this currency are attractive: The pound currently trades at a 10% discount to purchasing power parity fair value. As a result, we are upgrading the GBP from neutral to overweight.   Alternatives Chart 28Turning More Positive On Private Equity Turning More Positive On Private Equity Turning More Positive On Private Equity Return Enhancers: In last October’s Quarterly Outlook, we advised investors to prepare for new opportunities in Private Equity (PE) as fund managers look to deploy record high dry power. A gradual return to normality is likely to provide PE funds with a wider range of opportunities, while still allowing them to pick up distressed assets at attractive valuations. This is illustrated by the annualized quarterly returns of PE funds in Q2 and Q3 2020, which reached 43% and 56% respectively. PE funds raised in recession and early-cycle years tend to have a higher median net IRR than those raised in the latter stages of bull markets. This suggests that returns from the 2020 and 2021 vintages should be strong. In recent years, capital flows have increasingly gone to the longer established and larger funds, which tend to have better access to the most attractive deals and therefore record the strongest returns. This trend is likely to continue. Given the time it takes to shift allocations in private assets, we increase our recommended allocation in PE to overweight. Inflation Hedges: It is not clear that inflation will come roaring back in the next couple of years. But what is certain is that market participants are concerned about this risk, which should give a boost to inflation-hedge assets. Given this backdrop, we continue to favor commodity futures (Chart 28, panel 2). In other circumstances, real estate would also have been a beneficiary in this environment. But the slowdown in commercial real estate, as many corporate tenants review whether they need expensive city-center space, makes us remain cautious on real estate. Volatility Dampeners: We continue to favor farmland and timberland over structured products, particularly mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Farmland offers attractive yields and should continue to provide the best portfolio protection in the event of any market distress (Chart 28, panel 3).   Risks To Our View The main risks to our central view are to the downside. Because global equities have risen by 55% over the past 12 months, and with the forward PE of the MSCI ACWI index at 19.5x (Chart 29), the room for price appreciation over the next 12 months is inevitably limited. There are several things that could undermine the economic recovery and equity bull market. The COVID-19 pandemic remains the greatest unknown. The vaccination rollout has been very uneven (Chart 30). New strains, especially the one first identified in Brazil, are highly contagious and people who previously had COVID-19 do not seem to have immunity against them. Behavior once COVID cases decline is also hard to predict. Will people be happy again to fly, attend events in large stadiums, and socialize in crowded bars, or will many remain wary for years? This would undermine the case for a strong rebound in consumption. Chart 29Is Perfection Priced In? Is Perfection Priced In? Is Perfection Priced In? Chart 30Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty Vaccination Has Been Spotty   Chart 31China Slowing Again? China Slowing Again? China Slowing Again? As often, a slowdown in China is a risk. The authorities there have signalled a pullback in stimulus, and the credit impulse has begun to slow (Chart 31). Our China strategists think the authorities will be careful not to tighten too drastically (with the fiscal thrust expected to be neutral this year), and that growth will slow only to a benign and moderate rate in the second half.9 But there is a lot of room for policy error. Finally, inflation. As we argue elsewhere in this Quarterly, it will inevitably pick up for technical reasons in March and April, and then again in late 2021 as renewed consumer demand for services (especially travel and entertainment) pushes up prices. The Fed has emphasized that these phenomena are temporary and that underlying inflation will not emerge until the economy returns to full employment. But the market might get spooked for a while when inflation jumps, pushing up long-term interest rates and triggering an equity market correction. Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward,” dated March 23, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward,” dated March 23, 2021, 3 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated May 22, 2019. 4 Dominish, E., Florin, N. and Teske, S., 2019, Responsible Minerals Sourcing for Renewable Energy. Report prepared for Earthworks by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney. The optimistic scenario is referred to as “total metals demand” scenario, which assumed current materials intensity and market share continues into the future without recycling or efficiency improvements. This study is based on 2018 production levels and therefore expansion of future production may vary results. 5US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021. 6 Chile is estimated to have the largest reserve of lithium. 7 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, “Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger,” dated March 16, 2021. 8 Please see Global Asset Allocation, “Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Playing The Optionality,” dated April 1, 2020. 9 Please see China Investment Strategy Report, “National People’s Congress Sets Tone For 2021 Growth,” dated March 17, 2021. GAA Asset Allocation  

Dear client, Next week, in lieu of our weekly report, I will be hosting a webcast on Thursday, March 25 at 10:00 am EDT and Friday March 26 at 9:00 am HKT. I look forward to your comments and questions during the webcast. Best regards, Chester Highlights During bear markets, counter-trend rallies in the dollar are capped around 4%. This time should be no different. Meanwhile, unless the Fed tightens policy to stem the increase in aggregate demand, inflation will rise and real short rates will drop. The relative equity performance of the US is critical for the dollar. Reserve diversification out of dollars has also started to place a natural ceiling against other developed market currencies. An attractive opportunity is emerging to short the AUD/CAD cross. Feature The 1.7% rise in the US dollar this year is reinvigorating the bull case. When presenting our key views last year, we highlighted that the DXY index was at risk of a 2-4% bounce.1 We reaffirmed this view in our January report: Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce. At the time, the DXY index was at the 90 level, suggesting the rally should fizzle around 94. Therefore, the key question is whether the nascent rise in the DXY will punch through this level, or fade as we originally expected. The short-term case for the dollar remains bullish. The currency is much oversold. Meanwhile, real interest rates are moving in favor of the US, vis-à-vis a few countries. Third and interrelated, economic momentum in the US is quite strong, compared to other G10 countries. With the rising specter of a market correction, the dollar could also benefit from safe haven flows towards the US. The Federal Reserve’s meeting yesterday certainly reaffirmed that short-term rates will remain anchored near zero, at least until 2023. The Fed does not see inflation much above 2% a couple of years out. Nevertheless, a lot can change in the coming months. Cycles, Positioning And Interest Rates The dollar tends to move in long cycles, with the latest bull and bear markets lasting about a decade or so. In other words, the dollar is a momentum currency. As such, determining which regime you are in is critical to assessing the magnitude of any rally. This is certainly the case when sentiment remains overly dollar bearish, as now. During bear markets, counter-trend rallies in the dollar are capped around 4-6%. This was what happened in the early 2000s. In bull markets, such as after the financial crisis, the dollar achieves escape velocity, with more durable rallies well into the teens (Chart I-1). So far, the current rise still fits within the narrative of a healthy reset in a longer-term bear market. Chart I-1The Dollar Rally Is Still Benign The Dollar Rally Is Still Benign The Dollar Rally Is Still Benign Long interest rates have also been moving in favor of the dollar, especially relative to the euro area, Japan, and even Sweden. Currencies are driven by real interest rate differentials, and higher US yields are bullish. With the Fed giving no indication it will prevent the curve from steepening further, US interest rates could keep gaping higher. However, currencies are about relative rate differentials, and the rise in US interest rates has not been in isolation. Rates in the UK, Australia and New Zealand, countries that have managed the COVID-19 crisis pretty well, are beginning to rise faster than in the US (Chart I-2). Chart I-2A Synchronized Rise In Global Yields A Synchronized Rise In Global Yields A Synchronized Rise In Global Yields US Versus World Growth The rise in US interest rates has been justified by better economic performance. Whether looking at purchasing managers’ indices, economic surprise indices, or even GDP growth expectations, the US has had the upper hand (Chart I-3). The Fed expects US growth to hit 6.5% this year. This is well above what other central banks expect for their domestic economies. The ECB expects 4%, the BoJ expects 3.9%, and the BoC expects 4.6% (Table I-1). Chart I-3AThe US Leads In Growth This Year The US Leads In Growth This Year The US Leads In Growth This Year Chart I-3BThe US Leads In Growth This Year The US Leads In Growth This Year The US Leads In Growth This Year Table I-1The US Leads In Growth And Inflation This Year Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears However, economic dominance can be transient, especially in a world of flexible exchange rates.  For one, a higher dollar will sap US growth via the export channel. This is especially the case since the starting point is an expensive currency. On a real effective exchange rate basis, the dollar is above its long-term mean (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, we expect the rest of the world to perform better as economies reopen. The services PMI in the US is already close to a cyclical high, similar to Sweden (Chart I-5). These are among the countries with the least stringent COVID-19 measures in the western hemisphere. This suggests that other economies, even manufacturing-centric ones, could see a coiled-spring rebound in growth as we put this pandemic behind us. Chart I-4The Dollar Is Expensive The Dollar Is Expensive The Dollar Is Expensive Chart I-5The US Service PMI Is At A Cyclical High The US Service PMI Is At A Cyclical High The US Service PMI Is At A Cyclical High The sweet spot for most economies is when growth is rising but inflation is low, allowing the resident central bank to keep policy dovish. However, it is an open question if the US can continue to boost spending, without a commensurate rise in inflation. The OECD estimates that the US output gap will close by 2022, with the $1.9-trillion fiscal package. This will put the US well ahead of any G10 country (Chart I-6). Unless the Fed tightens policy to stem the increase in aggregate demand, inflation will rise and real rates will drop (Chart I-7). Rising nominal rates and falling real yields will be anathema to the dollar. Chart I-6The US Output Gap Will Soon Close The US Output Gap Will Soon Close The US Output Gap Will Soon Close Chart I-7Wages And Inflation Should Inch Higher Wages And Inflation Should Inch Higher Wages And Inflation Should Inch Higher Equity Rotation And The Dollar A currency manager once noted that the most important variable to pay attention to when making FX allocations is relative equity performance. This might seem bizarre at first blush, but stands at the center of what an exchange rate is – a mechanism that equalizes rates of return across countries. As such while bond flows are important for exchange rates, equity flows matter as well. The relative equity performance of the US is critical for two reasons. First, the US equity market tends to do relatively better during bear markets. This was the case last year and during the 2008 crisis. Second, the outperformance of the US over the last decade has dovetailed with a dollar bull market (Chart I-8). It is rare to find a currency that has performed well both during equity bull and bear markets. If past is prologue, the near-term risks for the dollar are to the upside, especially if the market rally encounters turbulence as yields rise. The put/call ratio in the US is at a 5-year nadir. A move towards parity could violently pull up the DXY index (Chart I-9). However, a garden-variety 5-10% correction in the SPX should correspond to a shallow bounce in the DXY. This will also fit the pattern of bear market USD rallies, as we already highlighted in Chart I-1. Chart I-8US Equity Relative Performance And The Dollar US Equity Relative Performance And The Dollar US Equity Relative Performance And The Dollar Chart I-9The Dollar Could Rise In ##br##A Market Reset The Dollar Could Rise In A Market Reset The Dollar Could Rise In A Market Reset At the same time, any correction could usher in a violent rotation from cyclicals to defensives, especially if underpinned by higher interest rates. The performance of energy and financials are a leap ahead of other sectors in the S&P 500 this year. Importantly, they also massively outperformed during the February drawdown. Meanwhile, valuations are heavily elevated in the US compared to the rest of the world. This is true for growth sectors compared to value, and cyclicals compared to defensives. Throughout history, both exchange rates and valuations have tended to mean revert. Long-Term Dollar Outlook The 2020 pandemic was a one-in-a-hundred-year event. Coordinated fiscal and monetary stimuli have ushered in a new economic cycle. As a counter-cyclical currency, the dollar tends to do poorly (Chart I-10). This is because monetary stimulus provides more torque to economies levered to the global cycle. Once growth achieves escape velocity, the currencies of these more pro-cyclical economies benefit. The IMF projects that non-US growth should outpace US growth after 2021. Meanwhile, it is an open question that any rally in the dollar will be durable. The key driver behind the dollar increase in 2020 was a global shortage. Not only has the Fed extended its liquidity provisions to foreign central banks until September this year, the share of offshore US dollar debt issuance has fallen by a full 9 percentage points (Chart I-11). Simply put, the Fed is flooding the system with dollar liquidity at the same time that foreign entities are weaning themselves off it Chart I-10The IMF Expects Faster Growth Outside The US After 2021 The IMF Expects Faster Growth Outside The US After 2021 The IMF Expects Faster Growth Outside The US After 2021 Chart I-11Share Of US Dollar Debt ##br##Rolling Over Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears The reason behind this is balance-of-payment dynamics. The market has realized that ballooning twin deficits in the US come at a cost. For foreign issuers, it is the prospect of rolling over US-denominated debt at a much higher coupon rate. For bond investors, it is currency depreciation, especially if fiscal largesse becomes too “sticky,” and stokes inflation. As such, bond investors continue to avoid the US, despite rising rates (Chart I-12). Finally, reserve diversification out of dollars has started to place a natural ceiling on the US dollar, especially against other developed market currencies. Ever since the trend began to accelerate in 2015, the DXY has been unable to sustainably punch through the 100 level (Chart I-13). This will place a durable floor under developed market currencies in general and gold in particular. The Chinese RMB has also been gaining traction in global FX reserves. Chart I-12Little Appetite For US ##br##Treasurys Little Appetite For US Treasurys Little Appetite For US Treasurys Chart I-13Reserve Diversification Has Been A Headwind For The Dollar Reserve Diversification Has Been A Headwind For The Dollar Reserve Diversification Has Been A Headwind For The Dollar More specifically, the role of the USD/CNY exchange rate as a key anchor for emerging market currencies will rise, especially if the RMB remains structurally strong.2 The People’s Bank of China has massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.2 trillion. This means it can provide swap agreements that will almost cover the totality of EM foreign dollar debt. Swap agreements entail no exchange of currency, but are about confidence. The PBoC can instill this confidence in countries that have low and/or falling foreign exchange reserves. The dollar will remain the global reserve currency for years to come. However, a slow pivot towards reserve diversification will act as a structural headwind for the dollar. Housekeeping Chart I-14AUD/CAD Is Correlated To The VIX Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears We were stopped out of our CAD/NOK trade for a profit of 3.1%. The resilience of the US economy is benefiting the CAD more than the NOK for now. However, the Norges Bank confirmed it might be one of the first central banks to lift rates, as early as this year. We are both short USD/NOK and EUR/NOK and recommend sticking with these positions. Second, the growing spat between the EU and the UK could lead to more volatility in our short EUR/GBP position. Our target remains 0.8, but we are tightening stops to 0.865 to protect profits. The BoE left interest rates unchanged, but struck a constructive tone. This will bode well for cable, beyond near-term volatility. Third, our short USD/JPY position was stopped out amid the dollar rally. We are standing aside for now, but will reopen this trade later. Finally, a rise in volatility will boost the dollar, but also benefit short AUD/CAD positions. We are already short the AUD/MXN, but short AUD/CAD could be more profitable should market turmoil persist (Chart I-14).   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “2021 Key Views: Tradeable Themes,” dated December 4, 2020. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Currency In-Depth Report, titled “Will The RMB Continue To Appreciate?,” dated February 26, 2021. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Most data out of the US has been robust: Both PPI, import and export prices were in line with expectations for February. The PPI ex food and energy came in at 2.5% year-on-year. Empire manufacturing was robust at 17.4 in March, versus 12.1 last month. Housing starts and building permits came in a nudge below expectations in February, at 1421K and 1682K. The one disappointment was retail sales, which fell 3.3% year-on-year in February. The DXY index rose slightly this week. The FOMC remained dovish, without any revision to its median path of interest rate hikes. The markets disliked its reticence on rising long-bond yields. As such, equities are rolling over as yields continue to creep higher. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area are mending: The ZEW expectations survey rose to 74 in March, from 69.6. For Germany, the improvement was better at 76.6 from 71.2. The trade balance remained at a healthy €24.2bn euro surplus in January. The euro fell by 0.6% amidst broad dollar strength. With the ECB committed to cap the rise in yields and rise in peripheral spreads, relative interest rates will move against the euro. Sentiment remains elevated, and so a healthy reset is necessary to wash out stale longs. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been mixed: Core machinery orders grew 1.5% year-on-year in January. Exports fell by 4.5% in January, while imports rose by 11.8%. This has shifted the adjusted trade balance to a deficit of ¥38.7bn yen. The Japanese yen fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week, and remains the weakest G10 currency this year. Rising yields have seen Japanese investors stampede into overseas markets such as the UK, while pushing down the yen. We remain yen bulls, but will stand aside for now since it could still go lower in the short term. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been weak: Industrial production and construction output fell by 4.9% and 3% year-on-year in January. Monthly GDP growth fell by 2.9% in January. Rightmove house prices rose 2.7% year-on-year in March. The pound fell by 0.4% against the dollar this week. It however remains the best performing currency this year. The BoE kept monetary policy on hold, but struck a hawkish tone as vaccination progresses, giving way to higher mobility in the summer. We remain long sterling via the euro. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: Home prices rose by 3.6% in the fourth quarter. Modest home appreciation is welcome news by the RBA, given high-flying prices in its antipodean neighbor. The employment report was solid. There were 88.7K new jobs in February, all full-time. This pushed down the unemployment rate to 5.8% from 6.4%. The Aussie fell by 0.4% this week. The Australian recovery is fast approaching escape velocity, forcing the RBA to contain a more pronounced rise in long-bond yields. We remain long AUD/NZD. In the very near term, a market shakeout could pull the Aussie lower, favoring short AUD/CAD positions.  Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data out of New Zealand was weak: Credit card spending fell by 10.6% year-on-year in January. Q4 GDP contracted by 1% both year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter. The current account remains in deficit at NZ$-2.7bn for Q4. The New Zealand dollar fell by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The new rule to include house prices in setting monetary policy will be a logistical nightmare for the RBNZ. In trying to achieve financial stability, the RBNZ will have to forego some economic stability, especially if the country still requires accommodative settings. Confused messaging could also introduce currency volatility. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 There was a data dump in Canada this week: The economy added 259.2K jobs in February. This pushed down the unemployment rate from 9.4% to 8.2%. Wages also increased by 4.3% in February. The Nanos confidence index rose from 60.5 to 62.7 in the week of March 12. Housing starts rose by 246K in February, as expected. The BoC’s preferred measures of CPI came in close to the 2% target. Headline CPI was weaker at 1.1% in February. The Canadian dollar rose by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The correction in oil prices could set the tone for the near-term performance of the loonie, despite robust domestic conditions. However, at the crosses, CAD should have upside. We took profits on our short CAD/NOK position this week. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: Producer and import prices fell by 1.1% year-on-year in February. February CPI releases also suggest the economy remains in deflation. The Swiss franc fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Safe-haven currencies continue to be sold as yields rise, making the Swiss franc the worst performing currency this year after the yen. This is welcome news for the SNB.  We have been long EUR/CHF on this expectation, and recommend investors to stick with this trade. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week: The trade balance remained in surplus of NOK 25.1bn in February. The Norges bank kept interest rates on hold at 0%. The NOK fell by 1.2% against the dollar this week. The trigger was the selloff in oil prices. However, with the Norges bank signaling a rate hike later this year, placing it ahead of its G10 peers, there is little scope for the NOK to fall durably. Inflation in Norway is above target, and higher mobility later this year will benefit oil-rich Norway. We are long the Norwegian krone as a high-conviction bet against both the dollar and the euro. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data releases were a slight miss: Headline CPI came in at 1.4% in February. Core CPI came in at 1.2%. The unemployment rate remained at 8.9% in February. The Swedish krona fell by 0.8% against US dollar this week. Sweden is struggling to contain another wave of the pandemic and this has weighed on the currency this year. The saving grace for the economy has been a global manufacturing cycle that continues humming. Until Sweden is able to get past the pandemic, the currency will continue trading in a stop-and-go pattern. We remain long the SEK on cheap valuations and as a play on the global industrial cycle. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights The Federal Reserve’s ultra-dovish stance is not the only reason for markets to cheer. The US is booming, China is unlikely to overtighten monetary and fiscal policy, and Europe remains a source of positive political surprises. Still, the cornerstone of this cycle’s wall of worry has been laid: Biden faces a series of foreign policy challenges, the US is raising taxes, China is tightening policy, and Europe’s stimulus is not large enough to qualify as a game changer for potential GDP growth. Stay the course by maintaining strategic pro-cyclical trades yet building up tactical hedges and safe-haven plays. Feature Chart 1US Stimulus, Chinese Tightening, German Vaccine Hiccups US Stimulus, Chinese Tightening, German Vaccine Hiccups US Stimulus, Chinese Tightening, German Vaccine Hiccups The US is turning to tax hikes, China is returning to structural reforms, and Europe is bungling its vaccine rollout. Yet synchronized global debt monetization is nothing to underrate. Especially not in the context of a Great Power struggle that features a green energy race as well as a high-tech race. Governments are generating a cyclical growth boom and it is conceivably that their simultaneous pump-priming combined with a new capex cycle and private innovation could generate a productivity breakthrough. This upside risk is keeping global equity markets bullish even as it becomes apparent that construction has begun on this cycle’s wall of worry. The US dollar bounce should be watched closely in this context (Chart 1). After passing the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act, which consists largely but not entirely of short-term cash handouts (Chart 2), President Joe Biden’s policy agenda will now turn to tax hikes. Thus far the tax hike proposals are in line with Biden’s campaign literature (Table 1). It remains to be seen whether the market will “sell the news” that Biden is pivoting to tax hikes. After all, Biden was the most moderate of the Democratic candidates and his tax proposals only partially reverse President Trump’s tax cuts. Chart 2American Rescue Plan Act Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Table 1Biden’s Tax Hike Proposals On The Campaign Trail Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Nevertheless higher taxes symbolize a regime change in the US – it is very unlikely tax rates will go down anytime soon but they could go easily higher than expected in the coming decade – and the drafting process will bring negative surprises, as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen highlighted by courting Europe to cooperate on a 12% minimum corporate tax and halt the global race to the bottom in taxes on multinational corporations. At the same time Biden’s foreign policy challenges are rising across the board: China is demanding a rollback of Trump’s policies: If Biden says yes, he will sacrifice hard-won American leverage on matters of national interest. If he says no, the Phase One trade deal will be null and void, as will sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and the new economic sanctions on Taiwan will expand beyond mere pineapples.1 Russia is recalling its US ambassador: Biden vowed to make Russia pay for alleged interference in the 2020 US election and sanctions are forthcoming.2 The real way to make Russia pay is to halt the construction of the Nordstream II natural gas pipeline, which reduces the leverage of eastern European democracies while increasing Germany’s energy dependence on Russia. But Germany is dead-set on that pipeline. If Biden levies sanctions the centerpiece of his diplomatic outreach to Europe will be further encouraged to chart an independent course from Washington (though the rest of Europe might cheer). North Korea is threatening to restart missile tests: North Korea is pouring scorn on the Biden administration for trying to restart negotiations.3 The North wants sanctions relief and it knows that Biden is willing to offer it but it may need to create an atmosphere of crisis first. China would be happy were that to happen as it could offer the US its good services on North Korea instead of concrete trade concessions. Iran is refusing to rejoin negotiations over the 2015 nuclear deal: Biden has about five months to arrange for the US and Iran to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal. Beyond that he will enter into another long negotiation with the master negotiators, the Persians. But unlike President Obama from 2009-15, he will not have support from Russia and China … unless he sacrifices his doctrine of “extreme competition” from the get-go. It is not clear which of these challenges will be relevant to financial markets, or when. However, with US and global equities skyrocketing, it must be said that the geopolitical backdrop is not nearly as reassuring as the Federal Reserve, which announced on Saint Patrick’s Day that it will not hike interest rates until 2024 even in the face of a 6.5% growth rate and the prospect of an additional, yet-to-be passed $2 trillion in US deficit spending. Herein lies Biden’s first victory. He has stressed that boosting the American economy and middle class is critical to his foreign policy. He envisions the US regaining its global standing by defeating the virus, super-charging the economy, and then orchestrating a grand alliance of European and Asian democracies to write new global rules that will put pressure on China to reform its economy. “I say it to foreign leaders and domestic alike. It's never, ever a good bet to bet against the American people. America is coming back. The development, manufacturing, and distribution of vaccines in record time is a true miracle of science.”4 The pandemic and economic part of this agenda are effectively done and now comes the hard part: creating a grand alliance while China and Russia demonstrate to their neighbors the hard consequences of joining any new US crusade. The contradiction of Biden’s foreign policy is his desire to act multilaterally and yet also get a great deal done. The Europeans are averse to conflict with China and Russia. The Russians and Chinese are not inclined to do any great favors on Iran or North Korea. Nobody is opening up their economy – Biden himself is coopting Trump’s protectionism, if less brashly. Cooperation with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on nuclear proliferation is possible – as long as Biden aborts his democracy agenda and his trade agenda. We continue with our pro-cyclical investment stance but have started building up hedges as we are convinced that geopolitical risk will deliver a rude awakening. This awakening will be a buying opportunity given the ultra-stimulating backdrop … unless it portends war in continental Europe or the Taiwan Strait. In the remainder of this report we highlight the takeaways from China’s National People’s Congress as well as recent developments in Germany. Our key views remain the same: China will not overtighten monetary/fiscal policy; Biden will be hawkish on China; Germany’s election may see an upset but that would be market-positive. China: No Overtightening So Far China concluded its National People’s Congress – the “Two Sessions” of legislation every year – and issued its 2021 Government Work Report. It also officially released the fourteenth five-year plan covering economic development for 2021-25. Table 2 shows the new plan’s targets as compared to the just expired thirteenth five-year plan that covered 2016-20. Table 2China’s Fourteenth Five Year Plan (2021-25) Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry For a full run-down of the National People’s Congress we recommend clients peruse BCA’s latest China Investment Strategy report. From a geopolitical point of view we would highlight the following takeaways: The Tech Race: China added a new target for strategic emerging industry value added as percent of GDP – it wants this number to reach 17% by 2025 but there is nothing solid to benchmark this against. The point is that by including such a target China is putting more emphasis on emerging industries, including: information technology, robotics, green energy, electric vehicles, 5G networks, new materials, power equipment, aerospace and aviation equipment, and others. China’s technological “Great Leap Forward” continues, with a focus on domestic production and upgrading the manufacturing sector that is bound to stiffen the competition with the United States. China’s removal of a target for service industry growth suggests that Beijing does not want de-industrialization to occur any faster – another reason for global trade tensions to stay high. Research and Development: For R&D spending, previous five-year plans set targets for the desired level. For example, over the last five years China vowed to increase annual R&D spending to 2.5% of GDP. A reasonable expectation for the coming five years would have been a 3% target of GDP. However, this time the government set a target of an annual growth rate of no less than 7% during 2021-2025. The point is that China is continuing to ascend the ranks in R&D spending relative to the US and West in coordination with the overarching goal of forging an innovative and high-tech economy. Unemployment: China has restored an unemployment rate target. In its twelfth five-year plan Beijing aimed to keep the urban surveyed unemployment rate below 5% but over the past five years this target vanished. Now China restored the target and bumped it up slightly to 5.5%. This target should not be hard to meet given the reported sharp decline in urban unemployment to 5.2% already. However, China’s unemployment statistics are notoriously unreliable. The real takeaway is that unemployment will be higher as trend growth slows, while social stability remains the Communist Party’s ultimate prize – and any reform or deleveraging process will occur within that context. The Green Energy Race: China re-emphasized its pledge to tackle climate change, aiming for peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. However, no detailed action plans were mentioned. Presumably China will not loosen its enforcement of existing environmental targets. Most of these were kept the same as over the past five years, except for pollution (PM2.5 concentration). Previously the government sought to reduce PM2.5 concentration by 18%. Now the target is set at 10% aggregate reduction, which is lower, though further reduction will be difficult after a 43% drop since 2014. Overall, China has not loosened up its environmental targets – if anything, enforcement will strengthen, resulting in an ongoing regulatory headwind to “Old China” industries. Military Power: Last week we noted that the government’s goals for the military have changed in a way that reinforces themes of persistently high geopolitical tensions. The info-tech upgrades to the People’s Liberation Army were supposed to be met by 2020, with full “modernization” achieved by 2035. However, last October the government created a new deadline, the one-hundredth anniversary of the PLA in 2027 (“military centenary goal”). No specific measures or targets are given but the point is that there is a new deadline of serious importance – an importance that matches the party’s much-ballyhooed centennial on July 1 of 2021 and the People’s Republic’s centennial in 2049. The fact that this deadline is only six years away suggests that a rapid program of military reform and upgrade is beginning. The official defense spending growth target of 6.8% is only slightly bigger than last year’s 6.6% but these targets mask the significance of the announcement. The takeaway is that the Chinese military is preparing for an earlier-than-expected contingency with the United States and its allies. What about China’s all-important monetary, fiscal, and quasi-fiscal credit targets? There is no doubt that China is tightening policy, as we highlight in our updated China Policy Tightening Checklist (Table 3). But will China overtighten? Probably not, at least not judging by the Two Sessions, but the risk is not negligible. Table 3A Checklist For Chinese Policy Tightening Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry The government reiterated that money and credit growth should remain in a reasonable range in 2021, with “reasonable range” referring to nominal economic growth. Chinese economists estimate that the nominal growth rate will be around 8%-9% in 2021. The IMF projection is 8.1%, while latest OECD forecast is at 7.8%.5 Because China’s total private credit (total social financing) growth is inherently higher than M2 growth, we would use pre-pandemic levels as our benchmark for whether the government will tighten policy excessively: If total social financing growth plunges below 12%, then our view is disproved and Beijing is over-tightening (Chart 3). If M2 growth plunges below 8%, we can call it over-tightening. Anything above these benchmarks should be seen as reasonable and expected tightening, anything below as excessive. However, the Chinese and global financial markets could grow jittery at any time over the perennial risk of a policy mistake whenever governments try to prevent excessive leverage and bubbles. As for fiscal policy, the new quotas for local government net new bond issuance point to expected rather than excessive tightening. New bonds can be used to finance capital investment projects. The quota for total new bond issuance is 4.47 trillion CNY, down by 5.5% from last year. Though local governments may not use up all of the quota, the reduction is small. In fact, total local government bond issuance will be a whisker higher in 2021 than in 2020. The quota for net new bonds is only slightly below the 2020 level and much higher than the 2019 level. Therefore the chance of fiscal overtightening is small – and smaller than monetary overtightening. Chart 3China Policy Overtightening Benchmark China Policy Overtightening Benchmark China Policy Overtightening Benchmark Chart 4China’s Real Budget Deficit Is Huge Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry China’s official budget balance is a fiction so we look at the IMF’s augmented net lending and borrowing, which reached a whopping -18.2 % of GDP in 2020. It is expected to decrease gradually to -13.8% by 2025. That level will be slightly higher than the pre-pandemic level from 2017-2019 (Chart 4).6 By contrast, China’s total augmented debt is expected to keep rising in the coming years and reach double the 2015 level by 2025. Efforts to constrain debt could lead to a larger debt-to-GDP ratio if growth suffers as a consequence, as our Global Investment Strategy points out. So China will tighten cautiously – especially given falling productivity, higher unemployment, and the threat of sustained pressure from the US and its allies. US-China: Biden As Trump-Lite Chinese and US officials will convene in Alaska on March 18-19. This is the first major US-China meeting under the Biden administration and global investors will watch closely to see whether tensions will drop. So far tensions have not fallen, highlighting a persistent and once again underrated risk to the global equity rally. Biden’s foreign policy team has not completed its review of China policy and Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are trying to schedule a bilateral summit in April – so nothing concrete will be decided before then. Chart 5US-China: Beijing's Standing Offer US-China: Beijing's Standing Offer US-China: Beijing's Standing Offer The Biden administration is setting up a pragmatic policy, offering areas to engage with China while warning that it will not compromise on democratic values or national interests. China would welcome the opportunity to work with the Americans on nuclear non-proliferation, namely North Korea and Iran, as this would expend US leverage on an area of shared interest while leaving China a free hand over its economic and technological policies. China at least partially enforced sanctions on these countries in response to President Trump’s demands during the trade war and official statistics suggest it continues to do so. Oil imports from Iran remain extremely low while Chinese business with North Korea is, on paper, nil (Chart 5). If this data is accurate then North Korea’s economy has not benefited from China’s stimulus and snapback. If true, then Pyongyang will offer partial concessions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. At the moment, instead of staging any major provocations to object to US-Korean military drills, the North is using fiery language and threatening to restart missile tests. This suggests a diplomatic opening. But investors should be prepared for Pyongyang to stage much bigger provocations than missile tests. In March 2010, while the world focused on the financial crisis, the North Koreans torpedoed a South Korean corvette, the Chonan, and shelled some islands, at the risk of a war. The problem under the Trump administration was that Trump wanted a verifiable and durable deal of economic opening for denuclearization whereas the North Koreans wanted to play for time, reduce sanctions, study the data from their flurry of missile tests during the Obama and early Trump years, and see if Trump would get reelected before offering any concrete concessions. Trump’s stance was not really different from Bill Clinton’s but he tried to accelerate the timeline and go for a big win. By Trump’s losing the election North Korea bought four more years on the clock. Chart 6US-China: Biden Lukewarm On China Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry The Biden administration is willing to play for time if it gets concrete results in phases. This would keep North Korea at bay and retain a line of pragmatic engagement with Beijing. But if North Korea stages a giant provocation Biden will not hesitate to use threats of destruction like Clinton and Trump did. The American public is not much concerned about North Korea (or Iran) but is increasingly concerned about China, with a recent Gallup opinion poll showing that nearly 50% view China as America’s greatest enemy and Americans consistently overrate China’s economic power (Chart 6). Biden will not let grassroots nationalism run his policy. But it is true that he has little to gain politically from appearing to appease China. With progress at hand on the pandemic and economic recovery, Biden will devote more attention to courting the allies and attempting to construct his alliance of democracies to meet global challenges and to “stand up” to China and Russia. The allies, however, are risk-averse when it comes to confronting China. This is as true for the Europeans as it is for China’s Asian neighbors, who stand directly in its firing line. In fact, Europe’s total trade with China is equivalent to that of the US (Chart 7). The Europeans have said that they will pursue tougher trade enforcement through the World Trade Organization, which would tie the Biden administration’s hands. Biden and his cabinet officials insist that they will use the “full array” of tools at their disposal (e.g. tariffs and sanctions) to punish China for mercantilist trade policies. Chinese negotiators are said to be asking explicitly for Biden to roll back Trump’s policies. Some of these policies relate to trade and tech acquisition, others to strategic disputes. We doubt that Biden will compromise on the trade issues to get cooperation on North Korea and Iran. But he will have to offer major concessions if he wants durable denuclearization agreements on these rogue states. Otherwise it will be clear that his administration is mostly focused on competition with China itself and willing to sideline the minor nuclear aspirants. Our expectation is that Americans care about the China threat and the smaller threats will be used as pretexts with which to increase pressure and sanctions on China. Asian equities have corrected after going vertical, as expected. But contrary to our expectations geopolitics was not the cause (Chart 8). This selloff could eventually create a buying opportunity if the Biden administration is revealed to take a more dovish line on China, trade, and tech in exchange for progress on strategic disputes like North Korea. Any discount due to North Korean provocations in particular would be a buy. On Taiwan, however, China’s new 2027 military target underscores our oft-recited red flag. Chart 7EU Risk Averse On China EU Risk Averse On China EU Risk Averse On China Chart 8Asian Equity Correction And GeoRisk Indicators Asian Equity Correction And GeoRisk Indicators Asian Equity Correction And GeoRisk Indicators Bottom Line: Investors should stay focused on the US-China relationship. What matters is Biden’s first actions on tariffs and high-tech exports. So far Biden is hawkish as we anticipated. Investors should fade rumors of big new US-China cooperation prior to the first Biden-Xi summit. Any major North Korean aggression will create a buy-on-the-dips opportunity. Unless it triggers a war, that is – and the threshold for war is high given the Chonan incident in 2010. Germany: Markets Wake Up To Election Risk – And Smile This week’s election in the Netherlands delivered a fully expected victory to Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s liberal coalition. The German leadership ranks next to the Dutch in terms of governments that received an increase in popular support as a result of the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 9). However, in Germany’s case the election outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Chart 9German Leadership Saw Popularity Bounce Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry As we highlighted in our annual forecast, an upset in which a left-wing bloc forms the government for the first time since 2005 is likelier than the market expects. This scenario presents an upside risk for equities and bund yields since Germany would become even more pro-Europe, pro-integration, and proactive in its fiscal spending. In the current context that would be greeted warmly by financial markets as it would reinforce the cyclical rotation into the euro, industrials, and European peripheral debt. Incidentally, it would also reduce tensions with Russia and China – even as the Biden administration is courting Germany. Recent state elections confirm that the electorate is moving to the left rather than the right. In Baden-Wurttemberg, the third largest state by population and economic output, and a southern state, the Christian Democrats slipped from the last election (-2.9%), the Social Democrats slipped by less (-1.7%), the Free Democrats gained (2.2%), the Greens gained (2.3%), and the far-right Alternative for Germany saw a big drop (-5.4%). In the smaller state of Rhineland-Palatinate the results were largely the same although the Greens did even better (Tables 4A & 4B).7 In both cases the Christian Democrats saw the worst result since prior to the financial crisis while the Greens tripled their support in Baden and doubled their support in the Palatinate over the same time frame. Table 4AGerman State Elections Show Voters’ Leftward Drift Continues Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Table 4BGerman State Elections Show Voters’ Leftward Drift Continues Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry To put this into perspective: Outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel and her coalition have seen a net 6% increase in popular support since COVID-19. The coalition, led by the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, still leads national opinion polling. What we are highlighting are chinks in the armor. The gap with the combined left-leaning bloc is less than 10% points (Chart 10). Chart 10German Party Polling German Party Polling German Party Polling Merkel is a lame duck whose party has been in power for 17 years. She is struggling to find an adequate successor. Her current frontrunner for chancellor-candidate, Armin Laschet, is suffering in public opinion, especially after the state election defeats, while her previous successor was ousted last year. Other chancellor-candidates, like Friedrich Merz, Markus Söder, and Norbert Röttgen may find themselves to the right of the median voter, which has been shifting to the left. Merkel’s party’s handling of COVID-19 first received praise and now, in the year of the vote, is falling under pressure due to difficulties rolling out the vaccine. Even as conditions improve over the course of the year her party may struggle to recover from the damage, since the underlying reality is that Germany has suffered a recession and is beset by global challenges. While the Christian Democrats performed relatively well in the 2009 election, in the teeth of the global financial crisis, times have changed. Today the Social Democrats are no longer in free fall – ever since their Finance Minister Olaf Scholz led the charge for fiscal stimulus in 2019 – while third parties like the Free Democrats, Greens, and Die Linke all gained in 2009 and look to gain this year (Table 5). In today’s context it is even more likely that other parties will rise at the ruling party’s expense. Still, the Christian Democrats have stout support in polls and do not have to split votes with the far-right, which is in collapse. Table 5German Federal Election Results Show 2021 Could Throw Curveball For Ruling Party Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Therein lies the real market takeaway: right-wing populism has flopped in Germany. The risk to the consensus view that Merkel will hand off the baton seamlessly to a successor and secure her party another term in leadership is that the establishment left will take power (the Greens in Germany are essentially an establishment party). Chart 11German Bunds Respond To Macro Shifts, State Elections German Bunds Respond To Macro Shifts, State Elections German Bunds Respond To Macro Shifts, State Elections Near-term pandemic and economic problems have caused bund yields to fall and the yield curve to flatten so far this year (Chart 11). But that trend is unlikely to continue given the global and national outlook. Election uncertainty should work against this trend since the only possible uncertainty gives more upside to the fiscal outlook and bond yields. If the consensus view indeed comes to pass and the Christian Democrats remain in power, the election holds out policy continuity – at least on economic policy. Fiscal tightening would happen sooner under the Christian Democrats but it would not be aggressive or premature, at least not in the 2021-22 period. It is the current coalition that first loosened Germany’s belt – and it did so in 2019, prior to COVID-19. Germany’s and the EU’s proactive fiscal turn will have a major positive impact on growth prospects, at least cyclically, though it is probably too small thus far to create a structural improvement in potential growth. Fiscal thrust is negative over next two years even with the EU’s Next Generation Recovery Fund being distributed. A structural increase in growth is possible given that all of the major countries are simultaneously pursuing monetary and fiscal stimulus as well as big investments in technology and renewable energy that will help engender a new private capex cycle. But productivity has been on a long, multi-decade decline so it remains to be seen if this can be reversed. Geopolitically speaking, Germany’s and the EU’s policy shift arrived in the nick of time to deepen European integration before divisions revive. Integration is broadly driven by European states’ need to compete on a grand scale with the US, Russia, and China. But Putin, Brexit, and Mario Draghi demonstrate the more tactical pressures: Brexit discourages states from exiting, especially with ongoing trade disputes and the risk of a new Scottish independence referendum; Putin’s aggressive foreign policy drives eastern Europeans into the arms of the West; and the formation of a unity government in Italy encourages European solidarity and improves Italian growth prospects. The outlook for structural reforms is not hopeless. Prime Minister Draghi’s government has a good chance of succeeding at some structural reforms where his predecessors have failed. Meanwhile French President Emmanuel Macron is still favored to win the French election in 2022, which is good for French structural reform. The fact that the EU tied its recovery fund to reform is positive. Most importantly the green energy agenda is replacing budget cutting for the time being, which, again, is positive for capex and could create positive long-term productivity surprises. Of course, structural reform intensity slowed just prior to COVID, in Spain, France, and Italy. Once the recovery funds are spent the desire to persist with reform will wane. This is clear in Spain, which has rolled back some reforms and has a weak government that could dissolve any time, and Italy, where the Draghi coalition may not last long after funds are spent. If the global upswing persists and Chinese/EM growth improves, then Europe will benefit from a macro backdrop that enables it to persist with some structural reforms and crawl out of its liquidity trap. But if China/EM growth relapses then Europe will fall back into a slump. Thus it is a very good thing for Europe, the euro, and European equities that the US is engaged in an epic fiscal blowout and that China’s Two Sessions dampened the risk of overtightening. Incidentally, if the German government does shift, relations with Russia would improve on the margin. While US-Russia tensions will remain hot, German mediation could reduce Russia’s insecurity and lower geopolitical risks for both Russia and emerging Europe, which are very cheaply valued at present in part because they face a persistent geopolitical risk premium. Bottom Line: German politics will drive further EU integration whether the Christian Democrats stay in power or whether the left-wing parties manage a surprise victory. Europe will have to provide more fiscal stimulus but otherwise the global context is favorable for Europe. Investors should not be too pessimistic about short-term hiccups with the vaccine rollout. Investment Takeaways The US is stimulating, China is not overtightening, and German’s election risk is actually an upside risk for European and global risk assets. These points reaffirm a bullish cyclical outlook on global stocks and commodities and a bearish outlook on government bonds. It is especially positive for global beneficiaries of US stimulus excluding China, such as Canada and Mexico. It is also beneficial for industrial metals and emerging markets exposed to China over the medium term, after frenzied buying suffers a healthy correction. Any premium in European equities should be snapped up. However, the cornerstone has been laid for the wall of worry in this global economic cycle: the US is raising taxes, China is tightening policy, and Europe’s fiscal stimulus will probably fall short. Moreover a consensus outcome from the German election would be a harbinger of earlier-than-expected fiscal normalization. There is not yet a clear green light in US-China relations – on the contrary, our view that Biden would be hawkish is coming to pass. Biden faces foreign policy tests across the board and now is a good time to hedge against the inevitable return of downside risks given the remorseless increase in tensions between the Great Powers. Housekeeping A number of clients have written to ask follow-up questions about our contrarian report last week taking a positive view on cybersecurity stocks despite the tech selloff and a positive view on global defense stocks, especially in relation to cybersecurity. The main request is, Which companies offer the best value? So we teamed up with BCA’s new Equity Analyzer to highlight the companies that receive the best BCA scores utilizing a range of factors including value, safety, payout, quality, technicals, sentiment, and macro context – all relative to a universe of global stocks with a minimum market cap of $1 billion. The results are shown in the Appendix, which we hope will come in handy. Separately our tactical hedge, long US health care equipment versus the broad market, has stopped out at -5%. This makes sense in light of the pro-cyclical rotation. Health care equipment is still likely to outperform the rest of the US health care sector amid a policy onslaught of higher taxes, government-provided insurance, and pharmaceutical price caps.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Appendix Table ABCA Research Equity Analyzer Casts Light On Best Defense And Cybersecurity Stocks Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Appendix Table BBCA Research Equity Analyzer Casts Light On Best Defense And Cybersecurity Stocks Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Appendix Table CBCA Research Equity Analyzer Casts Light On Best Defense And Cybersecurity Stocks Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Building Back … The Wall Of Worry Footnotes 1 China is asking for export controls that have hamstrung Huawei and SMIC to be removed as well as for sanctions and travel bans on Communist Party members and students to be lifted. See Lingling Wei and Bob Davis, "China Plans To Ask U.S. To Roll Back Trump Policies In Alaska Meeting," Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2021, wsj.com; Helen Davidson, "Taiwanese urged to eat ‘freedom pineapples’ after China import ban," The Guardian, March 2, 2021, theguardian.com. 2 "Putin on Biden: Russian President Reacts To US Leader’s Criticism," BBC, March 18, 2021, bbc.com. 3 Pyongyang is likely to test a new, longer range intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time since its self-imposed missile test moratorium began in 2018 after President Trump’s summit with leader Kim Jong Un. See Lara Seligman and Natasha Bertrand, "U.S. ‘On Watch’ For New North Korean Missile Tests," Politico, March 16, 2021, politico.com. 4 See ABC News, "Transcript: Joe Biden delivers remarks on 1-year anniversary of pandemic", ABC News, Mar. 11, 2021, abcnews.com. 5 Please see IMF Staff, "World Economic Outlook Reports", IMF, Jan. 2021, imf.org and OECD Staff, "OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021", OECD, March 9, 2021, oecd.org. 6 Please see IMF Asia and Pacific Dept, "People’s Republic of China : 2020 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the People's Republic of China", IMF, Jan. 8, 2021, imf.org. 7 The other state elections coming up this year will coincide with the federal election on September 26, with one minor exception (Saxony-Anhalt). Opinion polls show the Christian Democrats slipping below the Greens in Berlin and the Social Democrats in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The Alternative for Germany is falling in all regions.

Highlights The pandemic is not yet over, but it appears that infections have peaked in the developed world and in most of the major developing economies. Economic growth will reaccelerate as social distancing abates and vaccination programs gather momentum. The current policy orthodoxy is night-and-day different from the orthodoxy that prevailed in the wake of the global financial crisis, as deficit shaming has given way to deficit positivity. Rapid expansion is more likely than a repeat of last decade’s tepid, plodding recovery and inflation will eventually supplant hysteresis as policymakers’ biggest worry. The impending passage of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Act will vault the US ahead of its major economy counterparts in terms of pandemic spending. Washington’s massive fiscal commitment speeds up the timetable for closing the output gap in the US. Although inflation has become a hot topic among US investors, we do not see it materializing until next year at the earliest. Our base case has the Goldilocks backdrop of solid growth and ample monetary accommodation remaining in place for at least the rest of the year. Markets have fully discounted that scenario but investors should be aware that both downside and upside surprises are possible; bad virus news could drive a growth shortfall while households’ enormous excess savings could power a consumption breakout. The broad take-up of the Goldilocks scenario among equity investors will make it hard for stocks to dazzle in 2021. Nonetheless, we think conditions support mid-to-high single-digit returns, which will allow equities to outperform bonds. The combination of accelerating growth and quiescent central banks is catnip for equities but not so much for bonds, especially investment-grade sovereigns. Fixed-income investors should maintain below-benchmark duration as yield curves steepen. Steepening yield curves have given Financials a shot in the arm while weighing on the high-flying Tech sector. Reopening in the wake of COVID’s retreat should also redound to recent laggards’ benefit and we continue to expect value stocks will outperform their growth counterparts over the rest of the year. The US dollar will resume its downtrend as the virus is beaten back, albeit at a gentler pace than in 2020. Humanity Retakes The Lead Humankind cannot yet declare victory over COVID-19 but it does appear to have gained the upper hand as new case counts have plummeted from their January peak (Chart I-1). Restrictions helped turn the tide in Europe, albeit at the cost of cutting off oxygen to the economy (Chart I-2), but even in Sweden and the US, which eschewed EU-style restrictions, the virus has lost momentum. Increased vigilance apparently trumped fears that the coronavirus would flourish in the northern hemisphere winter. The potential for vaccine-resistant variants is a concern, but the pandemic news is clearly trending in the right direction. Chart I-1The Fever Has Broken The Fever Has Broken The Fever Has Broken Chart I-2Throwing The Merchants Out With The Bathwater Throwing The Merchants Out With The Bathwater Throwing The Merchants Out With The Bathwater As infections fall, so too does the strain on public health care systems. Plunging hospitalizations (Chart I-3) indicate that health care systems have recovered capacity. Hospitalizations are an important metric for tracking COVID’s impact on the economy because they lead restrictions on activity; when they are high and rising, officials are prone to limit person-to-person interaction, and when they are low and falling, officials roll back emergency limits. For services-heavy developed economies, easier restrictions are the key to a return to something more closely resembling normal activity until vaccinations confer herd immunity (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Restrictions Can Be Lifted As Health Care Systems Regain Capacity Restrictions Can Be Lifted As Health Care Systems Regain Capacity Restrictions Can Be Lifted As Health Care Systems Regain Capacity In the meantime, those who continue to be displaced by the pandemic and the distancing measures taken to combat it will fall back on fiscal support. Fourth-quarter deceleration in the United States highlighted the important role that fiscal transfers have played in keeping vulnerable households, businesses and communities afloat. The bulk of the transfers authorized under the CARES Act were distributed in two bursts. The first arrived in April and May via economic impact payments of $1,200 per adult and $500 per child that were paid in full to about two-thirds of American households1 (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-4Lockdowns Are A Drag Lockdowns Are A Drag Lockdowns Are A Drag Chart I-5Transfers Slowed To A Trickle In The Fall March 2021 March 2021 Chart I-6Fewer Transfers, Fewer Sales, ... Fewer Transfers, Fewer Sales, ... Fewer Transfers, Fewer Sales, ... The second burst came in the form of a weekly $600 federal unemployment insurance (UI) benefit supplement in April, May, June and July (Chart I-5, middle panel). Additional aid was provided by the pandemic unemployment assistance (PUA) program, which expanded UI benefits to independent contractors, self-employed individuals and other workers who would not otherwise qualify to receive them. The PUA program was the smallest of the three major transfer plans and the only one that ran until the end of the year, and as the arrival of the direct payment checks and final UI benefit supplements receded further into the past, the US economy began to show some signs of wear. Retail sales fell sequentially in all three months of the fourth quarter (Chart I-6) as total employment hit a wall (Chart I-7) and the economic surprise index swooned (Chart I-8).   Chart I-7... Fewer Jobs ... ... Fewer Jobs ... ... Fewer Jobs ... Chart I-8... And Fewer Positive Surprises ... And Fewer Positive Surprises ... And Fewer Positive Surprises Households’ ability to satisfy their obligations to creditors and landlords slipped as the year wore on as well. Fiscal transfers and forbearance programs have limited credit distress far more effectively than one would have expected when the COVID meteor hit the earth (Table I-1), but leading 30-day delinquency rates reveal a modest erosion since late summer (Chart I-9). The share of apartment renters paying at least some of their rent fell by more than one-and-a-half percentage points from year-ago levels in October, November, December and January, a first since the CARES Act transfers began to flow in time to help with the May rent (Chart I-10). It seems clear that lower-income households who relied most heavily on aid felt its absence as the year wore on. Table I-160- And 90-Day Consumer Delinquencies Are Down Year-Over-Year, ... March 2021 March 2021 Chart I-9... But Leading 30-Day Delinquencies Are On The Rise ... March 2021 March 2021 Chart I-10... And Apartment Rent Collections Have Been Slipping March 2021 March 2021     We take the snapback in January retail sales as evidence that high marginal-propensity-to-consume households needed the second round of transfers provided for in December’s compromise spending bill. Both the economic impact payments ($600 per qualifying adult and $600 per child) and the supplemental UI benefits ($300 per week) were smaller, but the most vulnerable households put them to immediate use. We expect that February rent collections and consumer loan delinquencies will also show improvement, albeit not as dramatically as the retail sales series. With another, larger round of stimulus coming down the pike, it appears that the US economy will avoid a repeat of its fourth quarter fraying around the edges but slumps remain a possibility in economies that allow transfer schemes to lapse before COVID-19 can be tamed. And Now For Something Completely Different The global economy has confronted two significant crises in the space of a dozen years. The events that precipitated them could hardly have been more different: the global financial crisis (GFC) was an endogenous event with enough avarice, hubris, folly and villainy to support a cottage industry of books, movies and TV shows revisiting it, while the pandemic, for all of the official complacency and bumbling it laid bare, was simply an exogenous occurrence of great misfortune. The monetary policy response to both events has been substantially identical; the Fed swiftly took the fed funds rate back to zero, bought copious quantities of Treasury and agency securities, and launched a mix of old and new emergency measures. Other major central banks, which were largely unable to make any moves toward normalization between crises, simply maintained zero or negative interest rate policy and ramped up the pace and/or scope of their own asset purchase programs. The fiscal response has been dramatically different, however, in line with a 180-degree turn in budget orthodoxy. Chastened, perhaps, by Europe’s double-dip recession, or the protractedly tepid US expansion, economic mandarins have experienced a road-to-Damascus conversion. Whereas the OECD and the IMF began wagging their fingers at prodigal legislators while the global economy was still submerged under the GFC rubble, today they counsel that there is no rush to pull back on spending. As the OECD’s chief economist said in a January interview, “The first lesson [from the aftermath of the GFC] is to make sure governments are not tightening in the one to two years following the trough of GDP.2” The IMF has declared that “the near-term priority is to avoid premature withdrawal of fiscal support. Support should persist, at least into 2021, to sustain the recovery and to limit long-term scarring.3” Chart I-11What Goes Up Must ... Go Up Again What Goes Up Must ... Go Up Again What Goes Up Must ... Go Up Again The about-face in terms of fiscal deficits could have a profound effect on the character of the post-pandemic expansions. The plodding and protracted post-GFC recovery/expansion might be viewed as an object lesson in monetary policy’s limits. There is no gainsaying that central banks acted boldly to counter the GFC, cutting policy rates to zero and beyond, purchasing vast quantities of sovereign bonds, government agency securities and even debt and equity issued by private entities. The purchases caused central bank balance sheets to swell (Chart I-11), but the money creation impact was stunted by an offsetting wave of defaults and a general reluctance on the part of lenders and would-be borrowers to add to the stock of debt. Chart I-12GFC Stimulus Was Fleeting March 2021 March 2021 GFC fiscal spending was modest and largely limited to automatic stabilizers once emergency measures ran their course. Even the most celebrated efforts, like the United States’ 2009 Recovery Act, were intentionally modest in scope and limited in duration. Following the prevailing wisdom, national governments quickly moved to withdraw assistance and reduce their budget deficits once the worst of the crisis had passed (Chart I-12). Tepid investment, sluggish employment gains and fiscal drag all weighed on growth, defying the typical bigger-the-decline, bigger-the-bounce business cycle pattern. The picture is quite different today as central banks have gained a powerful and willing partner in their efforts to combat the damage wrought by a sudden shock. Pandemic fiscal stimulus initiatives have dwarfed GFC efforts across the major economies (Chart I-13). Once Congress passes the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Act, the US will have doubled down on its 2020 initiatives, committing to aid equivalent to an extraordinary 25% of its annual output. The ultimate effect on inflation, interest rates and exchange rates remains to be seen, but it is clear that the post-pandemic expansion will not unfold at the plodding pace of the post-GFC expansion. Chart I-13The COVID Fiscal Response Has Dwarfed The GFC's March 2021 March 2021 Goldilocks And The Two Tails Narrowing our focus to the US, which comprises nearly 60% of the market cap of the benchmark MSCI All-Country World Index, our base case is the Goldilocks scenario that markets appear to be discounting. That scenario would entail the just-right outcome of solid growth and continued monetary accommodation (Figure I-1). Since the Fed will only dial back accommodation if the economy appears to be at risk of overheating, it will take a growth disappointment, most likely from a negative virus surprise, for the US economy to tumble into the left-hand tail of the distribution. Figure I-1Goldilocks And The Two Tails March 2021 March 2021 Chart I-14Making Up For Lost Time Making Up For Lost Time Making Up For Lost Time We cannot rule out the possibility of virus-resistant mutations or new rounds of outbreaks from a weary populace that lets its guard down, but a failure to vaccinate at a pace consistent with achieving herd immunity by the end of September looks to be the most likely route to disappointment. To that end, we are monitoring vaccination progress against the pace required to get 50-80% of the population inoculated by the end of the third quarter (Chart I-14). The US got off to a slow start, but we are confident that it will catch up by early spring under an administration that has made crushing the virus its top priority and a Congress that is providing the resources to enable local health authorities to get the job done. The case for an upside near-term surprise stems from the notion that America’s solons have provided considerably more aid to households than was strictly necessary. As Chart I-7 showed, total employment fell by 25 million at the trough in April and close to 9 million fewer people are employed now than at the pre-pandemic peak. They can surely use a lifeline, along with the many Americans who are involuntarily working part time and those who are barely holding on even if they are fully employed. But they number far less than the 100 million households4 (two-thirds of all taxpayers) that received the full $1,800-per-adult economic impact payments ($1,200 last spring and $600 in January), and will be in line for another $1,400, as soon as March, under the terms of the new bill. Households who did not need the largesse have presumably saved the distributions, helping contribute to the $1.5 trillion of excess savings accumulated during the pandemic. Thanks to the transfers provided for by the CARES Act, our US Investment Strategy service estimates that aggregate household income from March through December was $450 billion greater than it would have been in the absence of COVID-19 (Table I-2). With the second round of direct payments amounting to about $150 billion and the third round likely to be more than double the second, household incomes will be boosted by another $500 billion and the excess savings horde will be on its way to $2 trillion and beyond. Even in a $21 trillion economy, that much dry powder has the potential to move the needle. Table I-2Households' Excess Pandemic Savings March 2021 March 2021 In the absence of even a somewhat related antecedent, no one can say for sure how much of the excess savings will be spent. Ricardian equivalence, which posits that households will be reluctant to spend fiscal windfalls if they anticipate that they will have to pay for them with higher future taxes, and Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, which posits that consumption decisions are based on lifetime earnings, both suggest that the multiplier effect of the direct payments to households may not be all it's cracked up to be. Empirical evidence does not definitively support either model, but increased income has only accounted for a third of households’ mountain of savings in any event. The remaining two-thirds, amounting to over a trillion dollars, came from reduced consumption. Even if Ricardo’s and Friedman’s hypotheses are mostly on the mark, if much of the $1 trillion of 2020’s reduced consumption was merely deferred rather than destroyed (Box I-1), pent-up consumer demand could be significant. The range of potential outcomes is wide: on the one hand, money has tended to burn a hole in US households’ pockets; on the other, Ricardo and Friedman aren’t exactly Larry Kudlow or Peter Navarro. It is hard to assert with any conviction how much of the savings cache will be spent, or how quickly, but we highlight its presence to point out that near-term US growth could surprise to the upside. BOX I-1 Demand Deferral Or Demand Destruction? February’s Bank Credit Analyst presented a table with simple estimates of the US pandemic spending gap. It showed that spending on goods is tracking above the level that would have been expected if the pandemic had not occurred but that spending on services is down sharply, with an enormous gap in categories like food service, recreation and transportation. The fate of US households’ massive excess savings might come down to what happens to the forgone consumption. Consumption that is not deferred to some later period will simply disappear. Given that the consumption shortfall is entirely confined to services, the key question becomes: Is forgone services consumption more likely to turn into demand destroyed than forgone goods consumption? We suspect the answer is yes. Considering it from the perspective of the categories that suffered the biggest shortfalls, one cannot catch up by eating multiple restaurant dinners in a day, going back in time to attend last season’s sports and entertainment events, or taking more than one flight and staying in more than one hotel room. Services demand may also incorporate more of a discretionary component: one might want to go to a ballgame or a concert, or get out of town over a long weekend, but one eventually has to replace a sputtering car or refrigerator. Some forgone services demand likely turned into accelerated goods demand as white-collar workers redirected workday spending to building out office capabilities at home. Even more may have been diverted to home theater and exercise equipment, or to making one’s outdoor space into a more inviting place to while away the pandemic. The bottom line is that some goods demand appears to have been pulled forward by the pandemic while some services demand has likely been destroyed. There is surely pent-up consumer demand, and it will begin to be released once the pandemic has been subdued, but only some of the accumulated savings will be directed to satisfying it. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations For investors focused on the coming 6-12 months, the key takeaways from our analysis are as follows: Provided that official measures and personal vigilance continue to curtail COVID-19 until vaccinations can stifle it, the growth outlook should steadily improve. In the United States, where the federal government is determined to err on the side of providing too much fiscal support, growth could pick up a lot of steam. If enough pandemic-weary people fail to maintain their vigilance and observe social distancing measures, vaccine distribution efforts become snagged or vaccine-resistant strains emerge, growth could fall short of the consensus expectation embedded in financial market prices. Based on its plans to double down on its initial infusion of fiscal support, the US is the major economy most likely to exceed expectations, perhaps even to the point of overheating. After drilling into the increased income/foregone consumption components of the mountain of savings American households have amassed during the pandemic, however, we reiterate our conclusion that all of the savings will not be spent. The US economy will accelerate smartly this year but overheating is a low-probability event. Chart I-15The Coming Regional And Style Rotation The Coming Regional And Style Rotation The Coming Regional And Style Rotation Given these conclusions, we recommend the following investment stance over the next 6-12 months: Overweight equities, which will generate excess returns over sovereign bonds and cash in the absence of a negative COVID surprise, and underweight fixed income. Maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed income portfolios. Underweight US stocks and overweight global ex-US stocks, which will benefit from the reopening of the global economy, and value over growth stocks, which will benefit from reopening and a steeper yield curve. The former broke out in January and held their lead last month (Chart I-15, top panel) while value is testing resistance at its 200-day moving average (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Underweight the US dollar versus the euro in particular and other more cyclical currencies in general. We do not expect the greenback to fall as sharply as it did last year from May through December but we do expect it will resume declining over the rest of the year. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com February 25, 2021 Next Report: March 31, 2021 II. Requiem For Volcker And The Gipper For this month’s Special Report, we are sending you a collaboration between our US Investment Strategy and US Political Strategy teams. US Political Strategy is our newest strategy service and it extends the proprietary framework of our Geopolitical Strategy service to provide analysis of political developments that is relevant for US-focused investors. Please contact your relationship manager if you would like more information or to begin trialing the service. Ronald Reagan cast a long shadow over the elected officials who followed him … :The influence of the economic policies associated with Ronald Reagan held such persistent sway that even the Clinton and Obama administrations had to follow their broad outlines. … just as Paul Volcker did over central bankers at home and abroad … : The Volcker Fed’s uncompromising resistance to the 1970s’ runaway inflation established the Fed’s credibility and enshrined a new global central banking orthodoxy. … but it appears their enduring influence may have finally run its course … : The pandemic overrode everything else in real time, but investors may ultimately view 2020 as the year in which Democrats broke away from post-Reagan orthodoxy and the Fed decided Volcker’s vigilance was no longer relevant. … to investors’ potential chagrin: If inflation, big government and organized labor come back from the dead, globalization loses ground, regulation expands, anti-trust enforcement regains some bite and tax rates rise and become more progressive, then the four-decade investment golden age that Reagan and Volcker helped launch may be on its last legs. The pandemic dominated everything in real time in 2020, as investors scrambled to keep up with its disruptions and the countermeasures policymakers deployed to shelter the economy from them. With some distance, however, investors may come to view it as a year of two critical policy inflection points: the end of the Reagan fiscal era and the end of the Volcker monetary era. The shifts could mark a watershed because Reagan’s and Volcker’s enduring influence helped power an investment golden age that has lasted for nearly 40 years. What comes next may not be so supportive for financial markets. Political history often unfolds in cycles even if their starting and ending dates are never as clear cut in real life as they are in dissertations. Broadly, the FDR administration kicked off the New Deal era, a 48-year period of increased government involvement in daily life via the introduction and steady expansion of the social safety net, broadened regulatory powers and sweeping worker protections. It was followed by the 40-year Reagan era, with a continuous soundtrack of limited government rhetoric made manifest in policies that sought to curtail the spread of social welfare programs, deregulate commercial activity, devolve power to state and local government units and the private sector and push back against unions. The Obama and Trump administrations challenged different aspects of Reaganism, but the 2020 election cycle finally toppled it. Ordinarily, that might only matter to historians and political scientists, but the Reagan era coincided with a fantastic run in financial markets. So, too, did the inflation vigilance that lasted long after Paul Volcker’s 1979-1987 tenure at the helm of the Federal Reserve, which drove an extended period of disinflation, falling interest rates and rising central bank credibility. Our focus here is on fiscal policy, and we touch on monetary policy only to note that last summer’s revision of the Fed’s statement of long-run monetary policy goals shut the door on the Volcker era. The end of both eras could mark an inflection point in the trajectory of asset returns. The Happy Warrior The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, “I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.”5 Chart II-1After The Recession, Reagan Was A Hit After The Recession, Reagan Was A Hit After The Recession, Reagan Was A Hit Ronald Reagan held his conservative views with the zeal of the convert that he was.6 Those views were probably to the right of much of the electorate, but his personal appeal was strong enough to make them palatable to a sizable majority (Chart II-1). Substitute “left” for “right” and the sentiment just as easily sums up FDR’s ability to get the New Deal off the ground. Personal magnetism played a big role in each era’s rise, with both men radiating relatability and optimism that imbued their sagging fellow citizens with a sense of comfort and security that made them willing to try something very different. 1980 was hardly 1932 on the distress scale, but America was in a funk after the upheaval of the sixties, the humiliating end to Vietnam, Watergate, stagflation and a term and a half of uninspiring and ineffectual presidential leadership. Enter the Great Communicator, whose initial weekly radio address evoked the FDR of the Fireside Chats – jovial, resolute and confident, with palpable can-do energy – buffed to a shine by a professional actor and broadcaster whose vocal inflections hit every mark.7 The Gipper,8 with his avuncular bearing, physical robustness and ever-present twinkle in his eye, was just what the country needed to feel better about itself. Reaganomics 101 Government does not tax to get the money it needs; government always finds a need for the money it gets.9 President Reagan’s economic plan had three simple goals: cut taxes, tame government spending and reduce regulation. From the start of his entry into politics in the mid-sixties, Reagan cast himself as a defender of hard-working Americans’ right to keep more of the fruits of their labor from a grasping federal government seeking funding for wasteful, poorly designed programs. He harbored an intense animus for LBJ’s Great Society, which extended the reach of the federal government in ways that he characterized as a drag on initiative, accomplishment and freedom, no matter how well intentioned it may have been. That message hung a historic loss on Barry Goldwater in 1964 when inflation was somnolent but it proved to be far more persuasive after the runaway inflation of the seventies exposed the perils of excessive government (Chart II-2). Chart II-2Inflation Rises When The Labor Market Heats Up Inflation Rises When The Labor Market Heats Up Inflation Rises When The Labor Market Heats Up As the Reagan Foundation website describes the impact of his presidency’s economic policies, “Millions … were able to keep more of the money for which they worked so hard. Families could reliably plan a budget and pay their bills. The seemingly insatiable Federal government was on a much-needed diet. And businesses and individual entrepreneurs were no longer hassled by their government, or paralyzed by burdensome and unnecessary regulations every time they wanted to expand.” “In a phrase, the American dream had been restored.” The Enduring Reach Of Reaganomics I’m not in favor of abolishing the government. I just want to shrink it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub. – Grover Norquist Though President-Elect Clinton bridled at limited government’s inherent restrictions, bursting out during a transition briefing, “You mean to tell me that the success of the economic program and my re-election hinges on the Federal Reserve and a bunch of f***ing bond traders?” his administration largely observed them. This was especially true after the drubbing Democrats endured in the 1994 midterms, when the Republicans captured their first House majority in four decades behind the Contract with America, a skillfully packaged legislative agenda explicitly founded on Reagan principles. Humbled in the face of Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, and hemmed in by roving bands of bond vigilantes, Clinton was forced to tack to the center. James Carville, a leading architect of Clinton’s 1992 victory, captured the moment, saying, “I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or … a .400 … hitter. But now I would like to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.” Reagan’s legacy informed the Bush administration’s sweeping tax cuts (and its push to privatize social security), and forced the Obama administration to tread carefully with the stimulus package it devised to combat the Great Recession. Although the administration’s economic advisors considered the $787 billion (5%-of-peak-GDP) bill insufficient, political staffers carried the day and the price tag was kept below $800 billion to appease the three Republican senators whose votes were required to pass it. Even with the economy in its worst state since the Depression, the Obama administration had to acquiesce to Reaganite budget pieties if it wanted any stimulus bill at all. Its leash got shorter after it agreed with House Republicans to “sequester” excess spending under the Budget Control Act of 2011. On the Republican side of the aisle, Grover Norquist, who claims to have founded Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) at Reagan’s request, enforced legislative fealty to the no-new-tax mantra. ATR, which opposes all tax increases as a matter of principle, corrals legislators with the Taxpayer Protection Pledge, “commit[ting] them to oppose any effort to increase income taxes on individuals and businesses.” ATR’s influence has waned since its 2012 peak, when 95% of Republicans in Congress had signed the pledge, and Norquist no longer strikes fear in the hearts of Republicans inclined to waver on taxes. His declining influence is testament to Reaganism’s success on the one hand (the tax burden has already been reduced) and the fading appeal of its signature fiscal restraint on the other. Did Government Really Shrink? When the legend becomes fact, print the legend. – The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance For all of its denunciations of government spending, the Reagan administration ran up the largest expansionary budget deficits (as a share of GDP) of any postwar administration until the global financial crisis (Chart II-3). Although it aggressively slashed non-defense discretionary spending, it couldn’t cut enough to offset the Pentagon’s voracious appetite. The Reagan deficits were not all bad: increased defense spending hastened the end of the Cold War, so they were in a sense an investment that paid off in the form of the ‘90s peace dividend and the budget surpluses it engendered. Chart II-3Cutting The Federal Deficit Is Harder Than It Seems Cutting The Federal Deficit Is Harder Than It Seems Cutting The Federal Deficit Is Harder Than It Seems Nonetheless, the Reagan experience reveals the uncomfortable truth that there is little scope for any administration or Congressional session to cut federal spending. Mandatory entitlement spending on social security, Medicare and Medicaid constitutes the bulk of federal expenditures (Chart II-4) and they are very popular with the electorate, as the Trump campaign shrewdly recognized in the 2016 Republican primaries (Table II-1). Discretionary spending, especially ex-defense, is a drop in the bucket, thanks largely to a Reagan administration that already cut it to the bone (Chart II-5). Chart II-4The Relentless Rise In Mandatory Spending ... The Relentless Rise In Mandatory Spending ... The Relentless Rise In Mandatory Spending ... Chart II-5Overwhlems Any Plausible Discretionary Cuts Overwhlems Any Plausible Discretionary Cuts Overwhlems Any Plausible Discretionary Cuts   Table II-1How Trump Broke Republican Orthodoxy On Entitlement Spending March 2021 March 2021 The Reagan tax cuts therefore accomplished the easy part of the “starve the beast” strategy but his administration failed to make commensurate cuts in outlays (Chart II-6). If overall spending wasn’t cut amidst oppressive inflation, while the Great Communicator was in the Oval Office to make the case for it to a considerably more fiscally conservative electorate, there is no chance that it will be cut this decade. As our Geopolitical Strategy service has flagged for several years, the median US voter has moved to the left on economic policy. Reagan-era fiscal conservatism has gone the way of iconic eighties features like synthesizers, leg warmers and big hair, even if it had one last gasp in the form of the post-crisis “Tea Party” and Obama’s compromise on budget controls. Chart II-6Grover Norquist Is Going To Need A Bigger Bathtub Grover Norquist Is Going To Need A Bigger Bathtub Grover Norquist Is Going To Need A Bigger Bathtub Do Republicans Still Want The Reagan Mantle? Chart II-7“Limited Government” Falling Out Of Fashion March 2021 March 2021 Reaganism is dead, killed by a decided shift in broad American public opinion, and within the Republican and Democratic parties themselves. Americans are just as divided today as they were in Reagan’s era about the size of the government but the trend since the late 1990s is plainly in favor of bigger government (Chart II-7). Recent developments, including the 2020 election, reinforce our conviction that trend will not reverse any time soon. The Republicans are the natural heirs of Reagan’s legacy. Much of President Trump’s appeal to conservatives lay in his successful self-branding as the new Reagan. Though he lacked the Gipper’s charisma and affability, his unapologetic assertion of American exceptionalism rekindled some of the glow of Morning-in-America confidence. Following the outsider trail blazed by Reagan, he lambasted the Washington establishment and promised to slash bureaucracy, deregulate the economy and shake things up. Trump’s signature legislative accomplishment was the largest tax reform since Reagan’s in 1986. He oversaw defense spending increases to take on China, which he all but named the new “evil empire.”10 Like Reagan, he was willing to weather criticism for face-to-face meetings with rival nations’ dictators. Even his trade protectionism had more in common with the Reagan administration than is widely recognized.11 Chart II-8Reagan’s Amnesty On Immigration March 2021 March 2021 But major differences in the two presidents’ policy portfolios underline the erosion of the Reagan legacy’s hold. President Trump outflanked his Republican competitors for the 2016 nomination by running against cutting government spending – he was the only candidate who opposed entitlement reform. His signature proposal was to stem immigration by means of a Mexican border wall. While Reagan had sought to crack down on illegal immigration, he pursued a compromise approach and granted amnesty to 2.9 million illegal immigrants living in America to pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, sparing businesses from having to scramble to replace them (Chart II-8). While Reagan curtailed non-defense spending, Trump signed budget-busting bills with relish, even before the COVID pandemic necessitated emergency deficit spending. Trump tried to use the power of government to intervene in the economy and alienated the business community, which revered Reagan, with his scattershot trade war. Trump’s greater hawkishness on immigration and trade and his permissiveness on fiscal spending differentiated him from Reagan orthodoxy and signaled a more populist Republican Party. Chart II-9Trump Could Start Third Party, Give Democrats A Decade-Plus Ascendancy March 2021 March 2021 More fundamentally, Trump represents a new strain of Republican that is at odds with the party’s traditional support for big business and disdain for big government. If he leads that strain to take on the party establishment by challenging moderate Republicans in primary elections and insisting on running as the party’s next presidential candidate, the GOP will be swimming upstream in the 2022 and 2024 elections. It is too soon to make predictions about either of these elections other than to say that Trump is capable of splitting the party in a way not seen since Ross Perot in the 1990s or Theodore Roosevelt in the early 1900s (Chart II-9).12 If he does so, the Democrats will remain firmly in charge and lingering Reaganist policies will be actively dismantled. Even if the party manages to preserve its fragile Trumpist/traditionalist coalition, it is hard to imagine it will recover its appetite for shrinking entitlements, siding against labor or following a laissez-faire approach to corporate conduct and combinations. Republicans will pay lip service to fiscal restraint but Trump’s demonstration that austerity does not win votes will lead them to downplay spending cuts and entitlement reform as policy priorities – at least until inflation again becomes a popular grievance (Chart II-10). Republicans will also fail to gain traction with voters if they campaign merely on restoring the Trump tax cuts after Biden’s likely partial repeal of them. Support for the Tax Cut and Jobs Act hardly reached 40% for the general public and 30% for independents and it is well known that the tax reform did little to help Republicans in the 2018 midterm elections, when Democrats took the House (Chart II-11). Chart II-10Republicans Have Many Priorities Above Budget Deficits March 2021 March 2021 Chart II-11Trump Tax Cuts Were Never Very Popular March 2021 March 2021 On immigration the Republican Party will follow Trump and refuse amnesty. Immigration levels are elevated and Biden’s lax approach to the border, combined with a looming growth disparity with Latin America, will generate new waves of incomers and provoke a Republican backlash. On trade and foreign policy, Republicans will follow a synthesis of Reagan and Trump in pursuing a cold war with China. The Chinese economy is set to surpass the American economy by the year 2028 and is already bigger in purchasing power parity terms (Chart II-12). The Chinese administration is becoming more oppressive at home, more closed to liberal and western ideas, more focused on import substitution, and more technologically ambitious. The Chinese threat will escalate in the coming decade and the Republican Party will present itself as the anti-communist party by proposing a major military-industrial build-up. Yet it is far from assured that the Democrats will be soft on China, which is to say that they will not be able to cut defense spending substantially. Chart II-12China Is the New "Evil Empire" For GOP China Is the New "Evil Empire" For GOP China Is the New "Evil Empire" For GOP Will Biden Take Up The Cause? One might ask if the Biden administration might seek to adopt some elements of the Reagan program. President Biden is among the last of the pro-market Democrats who emerged in the wake of the Reagan revolution. Those “third-way” Democrats thrived in the 1990s by accommodating themselves to Reagan’s free-market message while maintaining there was a place for a larger federal role in certain aspects of the economy and society. The 2020 election demonstrated that the Democrats’ political base is larger than the Republicans’ and third-way policies could be a way to make further inroads with affluent suburbanites who helped deliver Georgia and Virginia. Alas, the answer appears to be no. The Democrats’ base increasingly abhors Reagan-era economic and social policies, and the country’s future demographic changes reinforce the party’s current, progressive trajectory. That means fiery younger Democrats don’t have to compromise their principles with third-way policies when they can just wait for Texas to turn blue. Chart II-13Democrats Look To New Deal, Eschew ‘Third Way’ March 2021 March 2021 Biden has only been in office for one month but a rule of thumb is that his party will pull him further to the left the longer Republicans remain divided and ineffective. His cabinet appointments have been center-left, not far-left, though his executive orders have catered to the far-left, particularly on immigration. In order to pass his two major legislative proposals through an evenly split Senate he must appeal to Democratic moderates, as every vote in the party will be needed to get the FY2021 and FY2022 budget reconciliation bills across the line, with Vice President Kamala Harris acting as the Senate tie breaker. Nevertheless his agenda still highlights that the twenty-first century Democrats are taking a page out of the FDR playbook and unabashedly promoting big government solutions (Chart II-13). Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan is not only directed at emergency pandemic relief but also aims to shore up state and local finances, education, subsidized housing, and child care. His health care proposals include a government-provided insurance option (originally struck from the Affordable Care Act to secure its passage in 2010) and a role for Medicare in negotiating drug prices. And his infrastructure plan is likely to provide cover for a more ambitious set of green energy projects that will initiate the Democratic Party’s next big policy pursuit after health care: environmentalism. The takeaway is not that Biden’s administration is necessarily radical – he eschews government-administered health care and is only proposing a partial reversal of Trump’s tax cuts – but rather that his party has taken a decisive turn away from the “third-way” pragmatism that defined his generation of Democrats in favor of a return to the “Old-Left” and pro-labor policies of the New Deal era (Chart II-14). The party has veered to the left in reaction to the Iraq War, the financial crisis, and Trumpism. Vice President Harris, Biden’s presumptive heir, had the second-most progressive voting record during her time in the Senate and would undoubtedly install a more progressive cabinet. Table II-2 shows her voting record alongside other senators who ran against Biden in the Democratic primary election. All of them except perhaps Senator Amy Klobuchar stood to his left on the policy spectrum. Chart II-14Democrats Eschew Budget Constraints March 2021 March 2021 Fundamentally the American electorate is becoming more open to a larger role for the government in the economy and society. While voters almost always prioritize the economy and jobs, policy preferences have changed. The morass of excessive inflation, deficits, taxation, regulation, strikes and business inefficiencies that gave rise to the Reagan movement is not remembered as ancient history – it is not even remembered. The problems of slow growth, inadequate health and education, racial injustice, creaky public services, and stagnant wages are by far the more prevalent concerns – and they require more, not less, spending and government involvement (Chart II-15). Insofar as voters worry about foreign threats they focus on the China challenge, where Biden will be forced to adopt some of Trump’s approach. Table II-2Harris Stood To The Left Of Democratic Senators March 2021 March 2021 Chart II-15Public Concern For Economy Means Greater Government Help March 2021 March 2021 When inflation picks up in the coming years, voters will not reflexively ask for government to be pared back so that the economy becomes more efficient, as they did once they had a taste of Reagan’s medicine in the early 1980s. Rather, they will ask the government to step in to provide higher wages, indexation schemes, price caps, and assistance for labor, as is increasingly the case. The ruling party will be offering these options and the opposition Republicans will render themselves obsolete if they focus single-mindedly on austerity measures. Americans will have to experience a recession caused by inflation – i.e. stagflation – before they call for anything resembling Reagan again. The Post-Reagan Market Landscape Many investors and conservative economists were shocked13 that the Bernanke Fed’s mix of zero interest rates and massive securities purchases did not foster runaway inflation and destroy the dollar. They failed to anticipate that widespread private-sector deleveraging would put a lid on money creation (and that other major central banks would follow in the Fed’s ZIRP and QE footsteps). But a longer view of four decades of disinflation suggests another conclusion: Taking away the monetary punch bowl when the labor party gets going and pursuing limited-government fiscal policy can keep inflation pressures from gaining traction. Globalization, technology-enabled elimination of many lower-skilled white-collar functions and the hollowing out of the organized labor movement all helped as well, though they helped foment a revolt among a meaningful segment of the Republican rank-and-file against Reagan-style policies. The Volcker Fed set the tone for pre-emptive monetary tightening and subsequent FOMCs have reliably intervened to cool off the economy when the labor market begins heating up. The Phillips Curve may be out of favor with investors, but wage inflation only gathers steam when the unemployment rate falls below its natural level (Chart II-16), and the Fed did not allow negative unemployment gaps to persist for very long in the Volcker era. Without wage inflation putting more money in the hands of a broad cross-section of households with a fairly high marginal propensity to consume, it’s hard to get inflation in consumer prices. Chart II-16Taking The Punch Bowl Away From The Union Hall Taking The Punch Bowl Away From The Union Hall Taking The Punch Bowl Away From The Union Hall The Fed took the cyclical wind from the labor market’s sails but the Reagan administration introduced a stiff secular headwind when it crushed PATCO, the air traffic controllers’ union, in 1981, marking an inflection point in the relationship between management and labor. That watershed event opened the door for employers to deploy much rougher tactics against unions than they had since before the New Deal.14 Reagan’s championing of free markets helped establish globalization as an economic policy that the third-way Clinton administration eagerly embraced with NAFTA and a campaign to admit China to the WTO. The latter coincided with a sharp decline in labor’s share of income (Chart II-17). Chart II-17Outsourcing Has Not Been Good For US Labor Outsourcing Has Not Been Good For US Labor Outsourcing Has Not Been Good For US Labor The core Reagan tenets – limited government, favoring management over labor, globalization, sleepy anti-trust enforcement, reduced regulation and less progressive tax systems with lower rates – are all at risk of Biden administration rollbacks. While the easy monetary/tight fiscal combination promoted a rise in asset prices rather than consumer prices ever since the end of the global financial crisis, today’s easy monetary/easy fiscal could promote consumer price inflation and asset price deflation. We do not think inflation will be an issue in 2021 but we expect it will in the later years of Biden’s term. Ultimately, we expect massive fiscal accommodation will stoke inflation pressures and those pressures, abetted by a Fed which has pledged not to pre-emptively remove accommodation when the labor market tightens, will eventually bring about the end of the bull market in risk assets and the expansion. Investment Implications Business revered the Reagan administration and investors rightfully associate it with the four-decade bull market that began early in its first term. Biden is no wild-eyed liberal, but rolling back core Reagan-era tenets has the potential to roll back juicy Reagan-era returns. Only equities have the lengthy data series to allow a full comparison of Reagan-era returns with postwar New Deal-era returns (Table II-3), but the path of Treasury bond yields in the three-decade bear market that preceded the current four-decade bull market suggests that bonds generated little, if any, real returns in the pre-Reagan postwar period (Chart II-18). Stagnant precious metal returns point to tame Reagan-era inflation and downward pressure on input costs. Table II-3Annualized Real Market Returns Before And After Reagan March 2021 March 2021 Chart II-18Bond Investors Loved Volcker And The Gipper Bond Investors Loved Volcker And The Gipper Bond Investors Loved Volcker And The Gipper Owning the market is not likely to be as rewarding going forward as it was in the Reagan era. Active management may again have its day in the sun as the end of the Reagan tailwinds open up disparities between sectors, sub-industries and individual companies. Even short-sellers may experience a renaissance. We recommend that multi-asset investors underweight bonds, especially Treasuries. We expect the clamor for bigger government will contribute to a secular bear market that could rival the one that persisted from the fifties to the eighties. Within Treasury portfolios, we would maintain below-benchmark duration and favor TIPS over nominal bonds at least until the Fed signals that its campaign to re-anchor inflation expectations higher has achieved its goal. Gold and/or other precious metals merit a place in portfolios as a hedge against rising inflation and other real assets, from land to buildings to other resources, are worthy of consideration as well. BCA has been cautioning of a downward inflection in long-run financial asset returns for a few years, based on demanding valuations and a steadily shrinking scope for ongoing declines in inflation and interest rates. Mean reversion has been part of the thesis as well; trees simply don’t grow to the sky. Now that the curtain has fallen on the Volcker and Reagan eras, the inevitable downward inflection has received a catalyst. We remain constructive on risk assets over the next twelve months, but we expect that intermediate- and long-term returns will fall well short of their post-1982 pace going forward. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators continue to demonstrate that US stocks are running hot. Our technical, valuation, and speculation indicators are very extended, and margin debt has soared since the S&P 500 bottomed last spring. With so little room for error, a near-term pullback in stock prices remains a significant risk. Our monetary indicator extended its downtrend, reflecting a diminished intensity of monetary support, but it remains above the boom/bust line. The upshot is that while the marginal stimulus provided by monetary policy is falling, the level of stimulus from easy monetary conditions remains significant. Forward equity earnings are pricing in a remarkably swift earnings recovery, but after a third consecutive quarter of double-digit earnings beats, the 2021 earnings outlook continues to gather momentum. Net revisions and positive earnings surprises remain near multi-decade highs. Among global equities, the US extended its modest underperformance after a decade of leading the pack. China continues to outperform, though at a slower rate since it became the first country to escape COVID-19’s grip, while emerging markets and Australia have also outperformed. Euro area stocks continue to lag, but we expect they will eventually take their place among the cyclical winners later this year. The US 10-Year Treasury yield surged in February, following through on January’s convincing break above its 200-day moving average. Our technical indicator shows that long-dated bonds are firmly in oversold territory, though they remain extremely expensive. Our valuation index points to higher yields over the cyclical investment horizon even if the rate of ascent eventually slows. The technical and valuation profile is similar for the US dollar. The greenback is technically oversold, even after its modest rally, but it remains expensive according to our models. If our base-case Goldilocks scenario unfolds globally this year, the counter-cyclical dollar should encounter a mild headwind. As with Treasuries, we expect valuation to trump technicals and see the USD continuing to trend lower over the full year. Commodity prices are surging across the board, ex-gold. Sentiment is bullish and speculative positioning in the CFTC’s 17-commodity aggregate grouping is at its post-GFC high, although it may have peaked for the time being. The move in commodities underscores the risk-on profile across financial markets and aligns with EM, Chinese and Australian equity outperformance. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend. A peak in our global LEI (GLEI) diffusion index suggests that the pace of advance in the GLEI will moderate, but the diffusion index has not yet fallen to a level that would herald a meaningful decline in the LEI. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes   Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist   Footnotes 1 Every single adult taxpayer with adjusted gross income (AGI) of $75,000 or less (and every married filing jointly taxpayer with AGI of $150,000 or less) was eligible for the full payments, and taxpayers with AGIs below $99,000 and $198,000, respectively, were eligible for partial payments. 2 Giles, Chris. “OECD warns governments to rethink constraints on public spending,” Financial Times, January 4, 2021. OECD warns governments to rethink constraints on public spending | Financial Times (ft.com) Accessed February 20, 2021. 3 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2020. Fiscal Monitor: Policies for the Recovery. Washington, October. p. ix. 4 An additional 20 million households have received partial payments. 5 August 12, 1986 Press Conference News Conference | The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute (reaganfoundation.org), accessed February 4, 2021. Reagan makes the quip in his prepared opening remarks. 6 Reagan was a Democrat until he entered politics in his fifties. He claimed to have voted for FDR four times. 7 April 3, 1982 Radio Address President Reagan's Radio Address to the Nation on the Program for Economic Recovery - 4/3/82 - YouTube, accessed February 4, 2021. 8 As an actor, Reagan was perhaps best known for his portrayal of Notre Dame football legend George Gipp, who is immortalized in popular culture as the subject of the “win one for the Gipper” halftime speech. 9 July 22, 1981 White House Remarks to Visiting Editors and Broadcasters reaganfoundation.org, accessed February 8, 2021. 10 Reagan famously urged his followers, in reference to the USSR, “I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire.” See his “Address to the National Association of Evangelicals,” March 8, 1983, voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu. 11 Robert Lighthizer, the Trump administration trade representative who directed its tariff battles, was a veteran of Reagan’s trade wars against Japan in the 1980s. 12 “Exclusive: The Trump Party? He still holds the loyalty of GOP voters,” USA Today, February 21, 2021, usatoday.com. 13 Open Letter to Ben Bernanke,” November 15, 2010. Open Letter to Ben Bernanke | Hoover Institution Accessed February 23, 2021. 14 Please see the following US Investment Strategy Special Reports, “Labor Strikes Back, Parts 1, 2 and 3,” dated January 13, January 20 and February 3, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Increased fiscal assistance in the US and other advanced economies will support economic activity until the practice of social distancing durably ends later this year. The US is not yet vaccinating at a pace that is consistent with herd immunity, but that pace is likely to quicken over the coming weeks. A September herd immunity milestone should allow for a significant increase in public “contacts” over the summer and for a substantial closure of the output gap in the second half of the year. The spending of accumulated household savings in the US would rapidly push the output gap into positive territory if those savings were fully deployed upon reopening. But expectations of eventual tax increases and some permanent reduction in services spending suggests that some of those savings will not be spent, and that major economic overheating this year is not likely. The market has largely priced in the most likely economic outcome over the coming year, suggesting that investors should not expect outsized returns in 2021. But our base case view still favors equities relative to bonds, and implies mid-to-high single-digit returns from stocks in absolute terms. An aggressively hawkish deviation in monetary policy later this year is unlikely, barring a sharp and sustained rise in inflation back to target levels. Still, a closure of the output gap this year will push long-dated bond yields higher, suggesting that fixed-income investors should be short duration. Investors should favor global over US and value over growth stocks over the coming year. The US dollar will continue to trend lower, albeit at a slower pace. Feature Chart I-1The Near-Term Outlook For Economic Growth Is Poor The Near-Term Outlook For Economic Growth Is Poor The Near-Term Outlook For Economic Growth Is Poor The outlook for growth in the US and other developed economies remains poor over the very near term. The combination of another major wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, at least partially driven by more transmissable variants of the virus, as well as the lagged effects of diminished US fiscal support in the second half of last year have led to a slowdown in economic activity that is likely to linger for the coming several weeks (Chart I-1). Outside of the US, the pressure on the medical system has led to the re-imposition of heavy control measures that mechanically weigh on consumer spending. Within the US, some restrictions have been re-imposed, but spending has also slowed due to the exhaustion of the stimulative benefits of last year’s CARES act for a sizeable portion of recipients. There are early signs suggesting that the second wave is cresting in advanced economies: hospitalizations appear to have peaked in the US and a few major European economies, and the number of new cases is either trending lower or has plateaued (Chart I-2). However, even if this is the beginning of the end of the latest wave, the gains in the war against COVID-19 have clearly been won through changes in policy and human behavior, not through inoculation. Chart I-2Infections Are Slowing Because Of Policy And Behavior (Not Vaccinations) Infections Are Slowing Because Of Policy And Behavior (Not Vaccinations) Infections Are Slowing Because Of Policy And Behavior (Not Vaccinations) For example, in the US, some market commentators have highlighted the fact that hotbed midwestern states such as North and South Dakota have administered more doses of the vaccine and that the Midwest is experiencing the largest decline in new cases in the country, inferring a causal relationship. This ignores the fact that new confirmed cases peaked in the Midwest almost a month before the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine was approved by the CDC. This suggests that a decline in cases there, which led the overall US trend, much more likely occurred in response to an exponential rise in hospitalizations in October and early November. We cannot identify a specific policy change in Midwestern states that catalyzed a peak in cases, but we hypothesize that residents of these states took it upon themselves to reduce their contacts as the threat of medical system collapse and health care rationing increased sharply. A cresting second wave is certainly positive from a health perspective, and should reduce the pressure on the medical system. But the fact that additional restrictions and/or growth-negative consumer behavior were required yet again to “flatten the curve” underscores that many of these measures will likely remain in place for the coming few weeks to durably end the wave, and thus will weigh on Q1 growth. They will also likely remain the only viable response to combat future outbreaks until vaccination reaches levels that are sufficient to reduce the impact of the pandemic on economic activity. More Fiscal Support On The Way In Europe and Canada, the fiscal response to the second wave has generally been to extend wage subsidy and income support programs. In the US, after having let unemployment benefit payments lapse in the second half of 2020, the US congress passed a US$900 billion aid bill in late December that provides US$300 per week in supplemental unemployment benefit payments and US$600 in direct checks to most Americans. Chart I-3 highlights that these payments have already begun to reach US households. In addition, following the Democratic Senate wins in Georgia earlier this month, President Biden announced a $1.9 trillion emergency relief package that topped up individual direct payments to US$2,000, assistance to small businesses, aid to state & local governments, and funding for pandemic-related expenses such as testing and the rollout of vaccines. While the size and contents of Biden’s proposal may get scaled down, our geopolitical strategists expect most of the plan to gain approval in Congress early this year. That implies that the federal deficit is on track to fall somewhere between the “Democratic Status Quo” and “Democratic High” scenarios shown in Chart I-4, meaning that the deficit will peak at between 22% and 25% of GDP in fiscal year 2021. Chart I-3Unemployment Benefit Payments Are Rising Again Unemployment Benefit Payments Are Rising Again Unemployment Benefit Payments Are Rising Again Chart I-4A Very Significant Amount Of Stimulus Is Still To Come February 2021 February 2021   This is a very significant amount of stimulus, and will provide a substantial reflationary bridge to help counter the negative impact on Q1 growth from the pandemic. But in the aggregate, some portion of the fiscal stimulus is unlikely to be spent by households until there is no longer a need for social distancing and the economy fully reopens. How long it takes to arrive at that moment depends enormously on the US’ progress at vaccinating its population. Vaccines, Herd Immunity, And Reopening For now, the news on the vaccine front is mixed. Israel, which has vaccinated over 40% of its population with at least one dose (Chart I-5), has demonstrated that it is technically possible to deploy the vaccine at an extremely rapid pace. But it is not clear that Israel’s experience is applicable to other countries, given aggressive efforts by the Israeli government to obtain early access to vaccine doses (which cannot, by definition, be achieved by everyone). While Chart I-5 shows that the US currently ranks highly among other countries at administering vaccines, Chart I-6 highlights that the pace must quicken for herd immunity to be reached later this year. The chart shows the number of actual US doses administered per 100 people, alongside the range that would need to be followed for 50-80% of the US population to be fully immunized by the end of September. Note that more than 100 doses per 100 people will be required in order to vaccinate most of the US population, given that two vaccine doses will need to be administered per person. Chart I-5Israel Is Winning The Vaccine Race Because Of Preferential Access February 2021 February 2021 Chart I-6Although It Likely Will, The Pace Of US Vaccinations Must Quicken Although It Likely Will, The Pace Of US Vaccinations Must Quicken Although It Likely Will, The Pace Of US Vaccinations Must Quicken   The “X” on the chart highlights the Biden administration’s previous goal of 100 million doses administered in the first 100 days following inauguration, which was too timid of an objective to be on any of the herd immunity paths shown in the chart. The administration’s new goal of 1.5 million injections administered per day starting by the middle of February is more promising and suggests that the US will be within the herd immunity range by late April. Chart I-6 is somewhat daunting, in that it highlights the risk that the US may not actually achieve herd immunity this year, and that investors are overestimating the odds of true economic reopening. However, that would be an overly pessimistic assessment, for three reasons: Due to the scaling up of vaccine production, the pace of vaccine dose deliveries will likely soon grow at an exponential rather than linear rate. This implies that the “underperformance” of actual vaccine doses administered versus the herd immunity paths shown in Chart I-6 is temporary. Private industry is likely to help the government meet its new vaccination goals. Amazon has recently offered the federal government assistance at distributing vaccine doses, and CVS, the retail pharmacy chain, has recently suggested that its stores could provide 1 million injections per day. These estimates do not include the likely establishment of large-scale, federally-funded vaccination sites. Despite what health professionals may advise, wide-ranging re-opening of economic activity and the end of social distancing policies will likely occur before herd immunity is technically reached. From the perspective of a health care professional, case minimization should be the objective of policy as it stands to minimize the number of deaths linked to the pandemic. But given the tremendous economic, emotional, and mental health toll inflicted by social distancing, from the perspective of politicians and many members of the public, the objective of policy should instead be to ensure that the medical system remains functional and that rationing of critical care is not required. The fact that vaccines are being administered to those most likely to become hospitalized suggests that the peak impact on the health care system will occur before herd immunity is achieved, which should allow for an increase in public “contacts” over the summer. What Happens When The Economy Re-Opens? In the US and in most advanced countries, the gap in spending is focused entirely on the services side of the economy. Table I-1 presents a simple estimate of the US spending gap for real personal consumption expenditures, broken down by type. The table highlights that goods spending is currently above not just pre-pandemic levels, but also above what would have been expected if the pandemic had not occurred. The only exceptions to this are nondurable goods categories that have been highly impacted by working-from-home policies, such as clothing and footwear and gasoline and other energy goods. The household services consumption gap, on the other hand, was deeply negative in Q3, concentrated within transportation, recreation, and food/accommodation services. Table I-1The Spending Gap Is Almost Entirely On The Services Side February 2021 February 2021 My colleagues Peter Berezin and Doug Peta have recently estimated that US households are sitting on roughly $1.4-1.5 trillion in excess savings as a combined result of the CARES act and the massive services spending gap noted above (Chart I-7). That amounts to approximately 7% of GDP, which significantly exceeds an estimated output gap of roughly 3% at the end of Q4 (Chart I-8). Chart I-7A Massive Horde Of Excess Savings Has Been Accumulated A Massive Horde Of Excess Savings Has Been Accumulated A Massive Horde Of Excess Savings Has Been Accumulated Chart I-8Excess Savings Of 7% Of GDP Dwarf A -3% Output Gap Excess Savings Of 7% Of GDP Dwarf A -3% Output Gap Excess Savings Of 7% Of GDP Dwarf A -3% Output Gap At first blush, this suggests that the deployment of those savings, which seems likely once the pandemic is over and the need for social distancing measures are no longer required, could rapidly push the output gap into positive territory. But that calculation assumes that all excess savings will be spent, which will probably not occur given that some holders of those savings will expect future tax increases. An enormous budget deficit combined with Democratic control of government means that individual and corporate tax increases are highly likely over the coming 12-24 months, suggesting that higher-income individuals will expect some of those excess savings to ultimately be taxed away. In addition, even once social distancing is no longer required, it seems likely that some small portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return. While it seems reasonable to expect that the gap in spending on hospitality and travel will close quickly and even potentially exceed pre-pandemic levels once the health situation allows, it also seems reasonable to expect that some service areas, particularly retail, will experience a permanent loss in demand owing to durable shifts in consumer behavior that occurred during the pandemic (greater familiarity and use of online shopping, a permanent reduction of some magnitude in commuting, etc). Chart I-9So Far, There Is Little Evidence Of Major Permanent Labor Market Damage So Far, There Is Little Evidence Of Major Permanent Labor Market Damage So Far, There Is Little Evidence Of Major Permanent Labor Market Damage It remains unclear how much of a permanent decline will occur, and it is very difficult to forecast because of its dependency on the pace at which vaccination occurs. The faster that economic circumstances return to normal, the less permanent changes are likely to occur. For now, evidence from the labor market remains encouraging, in that permanent job loss has not surged beyond that experienced during a typical income-statement recession (Chart I-9). But the bottom line is that some of the mountain of savings that has been accumulated over the past year has occurred due to a reduction in spending on certain services that may not return once the pandemic is over, meaning that those funds may be permanently saved. This suggests that meaningful output gap closure, rather than major overheating of the economy, is the more likely scenario later this year. Is Re-Opening Priced In? Charts I-10 and I-11 highlight market expectations for growth and earnings over the next 12 months. The charts highlight that expectations are already in line with a meaningful closure of the output gap later this year: consensus growth expectations suggest that real GDP will only be about half a percentage point below potential output by the end of 2021, and bottom-up analysts expect that S&P 500 earnings per share will be approximately 3% higher in 12 months’ time than they were at the onset of the pandemic. Chart I-10Meaningful Output Gap Closure Is Likely This Year Meaningful Output Gap Closure Is Likely This Year Meaningful Output Gap Closure Is Likely This Year Chart I-11Analysts Already Expect A Complete Earnings Recovery Analysts Already Expect A Complete Earnings Recovery Analysts Already Expect A Complete Earnings Recovery   Does the fact that market expectations already reflect what is likely to occur over the coming year mean that stock prices have nowhere to go? At a minimum it suggests that strong, double-digit returns are unlikely, especially given that equities are more technically stretched to the upside than they have been at any point over the past decade and that investor sentiment is very bullish (Chart I-12). However, even if earnings grow exactly in line with analyst expectations over the coming year, it is not correct to say that stocks offer no return potential. Chart I-13 illustrates this point by showing the historical relationship between earnings surprises and the price performance of the S&P 500. Chart I-12US Equities Are Extremely Overbought US Equities Are Extremely Overbought US Equities Are Extremely Overbought Chart I-13Positive Stock Returns Almost Always Accompany In-Line Earnings Performance Positive Stock Returns Almost Always Accompany In-Line Earnings Performance Positive Stock Returns Almost Always Accompany In-Line Earnings Performance   The first point to note from the chart is that positive earnings surprises are quite rare, in that actual earnings tend to underperform expectations of earnings 12 months prior. As such, earnings performance over the coming 12 months that is exactly in line with expectations would be a better fundamental result than what investors can typically expect. The second point to note is that it is rare for stocks to fall when earnings meet or exceed prior expectations, unless faced with a significant growth shock. Earnings met or exceeded expectations in 1995, from 2004-2007, from 2010-2011, and in 2018, and in all four cases, stocks delivered either high single-digit or low double-digit price returns. Negative year-over-year returns occurred only briefly in two of these episodes and were tied to major changes to the economic outlook: the euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012, and the onset of the Sino-US trade war in 2018. Conclusions And Investment Recommendations Chart I-14Investors Should Favor Global Ex-US and Value Stocks This Year Investors Should Favor Global Ex-US and Value Stocks This Year Investors Should Favor Global Ex-US and Value Stocks This Year For investors focused on the coming 6-12 months, the key conclusions of our analysis are as follows: The outlook for economic growth is negative over the very near term, but additional fiscal support will likely provide enough of a reflationary bridge to avoid a serious contraction in activity. The achievement of herd immunity and the end of social distancing must occur this year for consensus 2021 expectations for economic growth and earnings to be realized. The US is not yet vaccinating at a pace that is consistent with herd immunity later this year, but credible projections from the new administration suggest that the pace will meaningfully quicken by the end of February. Some US households have accumulated significant savings over the past year, which would rapidly push the output gap into positive territory were they to all be deployed following full economic reopening. The expectation of eventual tax increases and a permanent reduction in some services spending means that not all of these savings will be spent, suggesting that the output gap will close meaningfully this year – but not overshoot into positive territory. Consensus market expectations already reflect what is likely to occur over the coming year, but the realization of these expectations still implies mid-to-high single-digit returns from equities. Chart I-15The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency, And Will Continue To Trend Lower The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency, And Will Continue To Trend Lower The Dollar Is A Counter-Cyclical Currency, And Will Continue To Trend Lower Given these conclusions, we recommend the following investment stance over the coming 6-12 months: Stock prices are likely to rise in absolute terms despite already elevated multiples, and investors should remain overweight equities relative to government bonds. A meaningful closure of the output gap is consistent with the Fed’s economic projections, suggesting that an aggressively hawkish deviation in monetary policy later this year is unlikely, barring a sharp and sustained rise in inflation back to target levels. Still, a closure of the output gap this year will push long-dated bond yields higher, suggesting that fixed-income investors should be short duration. The “reopening trade” favors global over US stocks, and value over growth stocks. Chart I-14 highlights that global ex-US stocks are now in a clear uptrend versus their US peers, whereas value stocks have yet to decisively break out. We expect the latter will occur over the coming 6-12 months. The US dollar is a reliably counter-cyclical currency, and has behaved exactly as a counter-cyclical currency should have over the past year (Chart I-15). We thus expect a further, albeit less sharp, decline in the dollar over the coming year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 28, 2021 Next Report: February 25, 2021 II. Surging US Money Growth: Should Investors Be Concerned? Generally-speaking, an increase in bank deposits occurs due to either Fed asset purchases, bank asset purchases, or bank loan creation. Deposits have grown massively over the past year because the Treasury has issued an enormous amount of bonds, and these bonds have been purchased both by the Fed and US banks. Relative to the 2008-2009 period, the comparatively better health of US bank balance sheets last year has been an even more important factor than Fed asset purchases in accounting for the difference in money growth between the two periods. Money growth used to be a good predictor of economic activity, but today it makes more sense to focus on interest rates rather than monetary aggregates as a leading economic indicator. Over the past 20 years, only the collapse in velocity that occurred after 2008 is meaningful for investors, and it appears to reflect already “known” information: the persistent household deleveraging that occurred following the global financial crisis, and the effect of Fed asset purchases on the stock of money at several points over the past decade. Our base case view is that a portion of the significant amount of household savings that have accumulated will not be spent, and that the US output gap will close but not move deeply into positive territory this year. But the enormous growth in money over the past year reflects unprecedented fiscal and monetary support, which could eventually change investor expectations about long-term interest rates (even absent rapid overheating). Rising long-term rate expectations could threaten the equity bull market, given the impact the secular stagnation narrative has had in keeping long-term rate expectations low and the extent to which easy money has boosted equity valuation multiples over the past year. Broad money growth has exploded higher over the past year, to a pace that has not been seen since WWII (Chart II-1). This growth in the money supply has vastly exceeded what investors witnessed during and immediately following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, raising concerns among many investors of the potential cyclical and structural consequences. Chart II-1A Nearly Unprecedented Surge In Money Growth A Nearly Unprecedented Surge In Money Growth A Nearly Unprecedented Surge In Money Growth In this report we revisit the deposit creation process, and explain the specific factors that have led to surging money growth over the past year. We also review the usefulness of money growth as an economic indicator, and provide some perspective on the 20-year decline in money velocity. We conclude by noting that the surge in money growth is potentially concerning for investors for two reasons. First, if US households ignore likely future tax increases and decide to fully spend the vast amount of savings that have accumulated over the past year, then the US economy is likely to overheat rather quickly. The second, more likely, threat to investors is if the sharp increase in the money supply ends up changing market expectations about the neutral rate of interest. It remains too early to conclude whether investors will significantly revise up their long-term rate expectations, in large part because the scale of permanent damage in the wake of the pandemic is still unknown. But investors should remain vigilant, given the impact the secular stagnation narrative has had on keeping long-term rate expectations low and the extent to which easy money has boosted equity valuation multiples over the past year. Reviewing The Money And Bank Deposit Creation Process In order to fully understand the spectacular growth of the money supply over the past year and its potential implications for the economy and financial markets, it is important to revisit how money is created in a modern economy. My colleague Ryan Swift, BCA’s US Bond Strategist, reviewed this question in detail in a June 2020 Strategy Report and we summarize the report’s key points below.1 In the US, most of the stock of broad money aggregates is composed of bank deposits. Following the global financial crisis, the textbook view of how banks act purely as intermediaries, taking in deposits from the public and lending them out, was revealed to be a mostly inaccurate description of the financial system in the aggregate. Rather, while individual banks often compete for deposits as a source of funding, bank deposits in the aggregate are typically created by making loans. Central banks can also create money, by purchasing financial assets and crediting the banking system with reserve assets (central bank money). Table II-1 highlights the link between the Fed’s balance sheet and that of US banks in the aggregate, and highlights how changes in deposits – a liability of the banking system – must be offset by increases in bank assets or decreases in other bank liabilities. Table II-1The Link Between The Fed’s Balance Sheet And The Aggregate US Banking System February 2021 February 2021 The typical mechanics of three money-creating operations are described below, alongside the corresponding change in balance sheet items: Fed Asset Purchases: When the Federal Reserve purchases financial assets in the secondary market, it increases securities held (Fed asset) and typically increases reserves (Fed liability). In the increase in reserves (banking system asset) matches the increase in deposits (banking system liability), as the previous holders of the assets purchased by the Fed deposit the proceeds of the sale. Bank Asset Purchases: When banks purchase government securities from non-bank holders they credit the sellers with bank deposits.2 This increases bank holdings of securities or other assets (banking system asset) and increases deposits (banking system liability). Bank Loan Creation: When banks create a loan, they increase their holdings of loans & leases (banking system asset) and deposit the loan amount into the borrowers’ account (banking system liability). At the individual bank level, if Bank A creates a loan and the borrower withdraws the funds to pay someone with an account at Bank B, there will be an asset-liability mismatch relating to that loan transaction between those two banks if no other actions are taken. The result will be that Bank A experiences an increase in equity capital and Bank B experiences a decline. But for the banking system as a whole, the increase in bank assets exactly matched the increase in bank liabilities, and Bank A created the deposits that ended up as a liability of Bank B. The issuance or retirement of long-term bank debt and equity instruments can also create or destroy deposits but, for the purpose of understanding the difference in money growth during the pandemic compared with the 2008-2009 experience, it is sufficient to focus on the three money-creating operations described above. Explaining The Recent Surge In Money Growth The prevalent view among many financial market participants is that the money supply has surged in the US due to the fiscal stimulus provided by the CARES act. But an increase in the government’s budget deficit does not in and of itself create money, because the Treasury issues bonds to finance the difference between revenue and expenditures. If those bonds are purchased entirely by the nonfinancial sector, then an increase in deposits of stimulus recipients is offset by a decrease in deposits of those who purchased the bonds. A more precise answer is that deposits have grown massively over the past year because the Treasury has issued an enormous amount of bonds and these bonds have been purchased both by the Fed and US banks. Charts II-2A and II-2B highlight this by showing the change in the main items on the aggregate banking system balance sheet since the end of 2019. The charts show that the increase in deposits on the liability side of bank balance sheets have been matched by large increases in reserves and other cash (caused by the Fed’s asset purchases) and banks’ securities holdings (caused by bank asset purchases). Chart II-2AOver The Past Year, Fed And Bank Asset Purchases… February 2021 February 2021 Chart II-2B…Account For Most Of The Surge In Deposits February 2021 February 2021   But this does not explain why money growth has been so much larger over the past year than it was in 2008-2009, when total Federal Reserve assets increased from $920 billion to $2.2 trillion. Chart II-1 on page 15 highlighted that growth in M2 has risen to a whopping 25% year-over-year growth rate, a full 15 percentage points above the strongest rate that prevailed following the global financial crisis. Charts II-3A and II-3B explain the discrepancy, by showing the change in the main items on the aggregate banking system balance sheet as a percent of the money supply during each of the two periods, as well as the difference. The charts show that while changes in bank reserves and cash assets – caused by Fed asset purchases – were significantly larger in 2020 than they were on average from 2008 to 2009, changes in loans & leases and securities in bank credit, as well as other assets were also quite significant and account for two-thirds of the difference when added together. Chart II-3ARelative To 2008/2009, The Health Of The Banking System… February 2021 February 2021 Chart II-3B…Helped Facilitate More Money Creation Last Year February 2021 February 2021   Thus, while it is true that the Fed’s accommodation of extraordinary fiscal easing has helped create a sizeable amount of money over the past year, relative to the 2008-2009 period the comparatively better health of US bank balance sheets has been an even more important factor – in the sense that balance sheet restrictions did not prevent US banks from facilitating the creation of money as appears to have been the case in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Money And Growth We noted above that fiscal easing does not create money in and of itself unless the bonds issued to finance an increase in the deficit are purchased either by banks or the Fed. Yet most investors would not disagree that significant increases in budget deficits boost short-term economic growth, particularly during recessions. This implies that the link between money and economic growth may not be particularly strong over a cyclical time horizon, which is in fact what the data shows – at least over the past 30 years. Charts II-4A and II-4B illustrate the historical relationship between real GDP and real M2 growth, pre- and post-1990. The chart makes it clear that the relationship between real money and GDP growth used to be strong, with real money growth somewhat leading economic activity. This relationship completely broke down after the 1980s, and is now mostly coincident and negative. There are three reasons behind the breakdown: 1. The money supply used to be the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy target, meaning that money growth directly reflected monetary policy shifts. Today, the Fed targets interest rates, and the portion of money created through loans simply mirrors the change in interest rates as loan demand rises (falls) and interest rates fall (rise). Specifically, Chart II-4A shows that the ability of money growth to lead economic activity seems to have ended in the late 1980s, when the Fed stopped providing targets for monetary aggregates. Chart II-4AMoney Growth Used To Predict Economic Activity… Money Growth Used To Predict Economic Activity... Money Growth Used To Predict Economic Activity... Chart II-4B…But Ceased To Do So Once The Fed Stopped Targeting The Money Supply ...But Ceased To Do So Once The Fed Stopped Targeting The Money Supply ...But Ceased To Do So Once The Fed Stopped Targeting The Money Supply Chart II-5US Banks Provide Meaningfully Less Private Sector Credit Than In The Past US Banks Provide Meaningfully Less Private Sector Credit Than In The Past US Banks Provide Meaningfully Less Private Sector Credit Than In The Past 2. The share of total US credit provided by US banks has fallen significantly over time – especially during the early 1990s – as corporate bond issuance, securitized loans, and mortgages backed by agency bonds issued to the private sector rose as a proportion of total credit (Chart II-5). 3. Since 2000, a Chart II-4B shows that a clearly negative correlation has emerged between money growth and economic activity during recessions. In 2008-2009 and again last year, money growth reflected emergency Fed asset purchases in the face of a sharp decline in economic activity. In 2000, the Fed did not expand its balance sheet, but the economy diverged from money growth due to the lingering impact of management excesses, governance failures, and elevated debt in the corporate sector in the 1990s. The conclusion for investors is straightforward: while money growth used to be a good predictor of economic activity, today it makes more sense to use interest rates than monetary aggregates as a leading indicator for growth. Money Velocity And Its Implications When discussing the impact of money on the economy, one point often raised by investors is the fact that money velocity has declined significantly over the past two decades. This observation is frequently followed by the question of whether the absence of this decline would have caused real growth, inflation, or both to have been higher over the past 20 years than they otherwise were. It is difficult to prove or refute the point, as monetary velocity is not a well-understood concept – investors do not have a good, reliable theory upon which to predict changes in velocity or understand their economic significance. Velocity is calculated from the equation of exchange as a ratio of nominal GDP to some measure of the money supply (typically a broad measure such as M2) and theoretically represents the turnover rate of money. But long-term changes in velocity do not seem to correlate well with measures of growth or inflation. Short-term changes in velocity correlate extremely well with inflation, but this simply reflects the fact that velocity tends to be driven by the numerator (nominal GDP) over short periods of time (see Box II-1). BOX II-1 Money Velocity Over The Short-Term Some investors have pointed to the relationship shown in Chart II-B1 to argue that M2 money velocity is a significant cyclical predictor of inflation. But Chart II-B2 illustrates that nearly two-thirds of annual changes in velocity since 1990 have been accounted for by changes in the numerator – nominal GDP – rather than the denominator. This underscores that the apparent explanatory power of short-term changes in money velocity at predicting inflation is simply capturing the normal relationship between real growth and inflation, as well as the naturally positive correlation between the implicit GDP price deflator and core consumer prices. Chart Box II-1Velocity Seemingly Predicts Inflation Over The Short-Term… Velocity Seemingly Predicts Inflation Over The Short-Term... Velocity Seemingly Predicts Inflation Over The Short-Term... Chart Box II-2…Because Short-Term Changes In Velocity Are Driven By Nominal Output February 2021 February 2021   The bigger question is why velocity has declined so significantly over the past 20 years, and what this means for investors. Chart II-6Large Declines In Velocity Are Linked To Prolonged Periods Of Deleveraging Large Declines In Velocity Are Linked To Prolonged Periods Of Deleveraging Large Declines In Velocity Are Linked To Prolonged Periods Of Deleveraging Panel 1 of Chart II-6 shows a long-dated history of M2 velocity, and highlights that the average or “normal” level of M2 velocity has historically been just under 1.8. Over the past century, there have been just four major deviations from this level: A major decline that began at the start of the Great Depression and prevailed until the Second World War (WWII) Significant volatility during and in the years immediately following WWII A sharp rise in velocity during the 1990s to a record level A downtrend beginning in the late 1990s that remains intact today Abstracting from the war period in which the economy was heavily distorted by government intervention, Chart II-6 also highlights that persistent declines in velocity appear to be explainable by major deleveraging events. The second panel of the chart shows a measure of the duration of private sector deleveraging, and highlights that the two periods of low velocity have been strongly (negatively) correlated with the prevalence of deleveraging. This explanation is simple but intuitive: excessive leveraging eventually causes households and firms to redirect a larger portion of their income to servicing or paying down debt, which weighs on real growth and, by extension, prices. While it is true that the recent 20-year downtrend in velocity began in the late 1990s and thus well before household deleveraging began in 2008, this seems to mostly reflect the reversal of an anomalous rise in velocity in the late 1990s. We largely view the decline in velocity from the late 1990s to 2008 as a “reversion to the mean.” It remains an option question why velocity rose so sharply in the 1990s. Some evidence seems to point to financial innovation and technological change: Chart II-7 highlights that the number of automated bank teller and point-of-sale payment terminals rose massively in the 1990s, alongside a significant acceleration in real cash in circulation. This is theoretically consistent with an increased “turnover” rate of money. But Chart II-8 highlights that a substantial portion of the rise in velocity during this period was attributable to denominator effects (persistently weak money growth), rather than numerator effects. Chart II-7Some Evidence Of Increased Money Turnover In The 1990s Some Evidence Of Increased Money Turnover In The 1990s Some Evidence Of Increased Money Turnover In The 1990s Chart II-8The Rise In Velocity In The 1990s Was Driven By Slow Money Growth The Rise In Velocity In The 1990s Was Driven By Slow Money Growth The Rise In Velocity In The 1990s Was Driven By Slow Money Growth   Regardless of the cause, velocity was clearly anomalous on the upside in the 1990s, suggesting that it is not the downtrend in velocity over the past 20 years that is significant to investors. Rather, it is the collapse in velocity that has occurred since 2008 that is meaningful, and from the perspective of investors it appears to reflect already “known” information: the persistent household deleveraging that occurred following the global financial crisis, and the effect of Fed asset purchases on the stock of money at several points over the past decade. In the future, any meaningful increases in velocity are only likely to occur due to a significant reduction in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, which is two to three years away at the earliest. The Fed could decide to taper its asset purchases sometime later this year or in early 2022, but tapering would merely slow the pace at which the Fed’s assets are increasing (and would thus not cause velocity to rise via a meaningful slowdown in money growth). Money And Future Inflation The final question to address is the issue of whether the enormous rise in money growth over the past year is likely to lead to higher, potentially much higher, inflation over the coming 6-12 months. This has been the main question from investors who have been unnerved by the surge in money growth and the collapse in the US government budget balance. Any link between money and inflation has to come through spending, so the question of whether a surge in money will lead to higher inflation is akin to asking whether the massive amount of savings that have been accumulated over the past year are likely to be spent, and over what period. We discussed this question in Section 1 of this month’s report, and noted that expectations of future tax increases and a permanent decline in some services spending will likely prevent all of these savings from being deployed once the practice of social distancing durably ends later this year. This implies that a substantial closure of the output gap is likely to occur in the second half of the year, but that major economic overheating will be avoided. Moreover, even if the output gap does rise into positive territory over the coming 6-12 months, this does not necessarily suggest that inflation will rise quickly back above the Fed’s target. In last month’s Special Report, we highlighted two important points about inflation that are often overlooked by investors. First, inflation’s long-term trend is determined by inflation expectations. Second, if inflation expectations are largely formed based on the experience of past inflation, then inflation is ultimately determined by three dimensions of the output gap: whether it is rising or falling, whether it is above or below zero, and how long it has been above or below zero. While market-based expectations of long-term inflation have risen well above the Fed’s target, both our adaptive expectations model for inflation as well as a simple five-year moving average are between 30-60 basis points below the 2% mark (Chart II-9). This may suggest that a persistent period of output above potential may be required in order to raise inflation relative to expectations and to raise expectations themselves above the Fed’s target unless the Fed’s efforts at “jawboning” them higher prove to be highly successful. Measured as a year-over-year growth rate of core prices, inflation is set to spike higher in April and May in the order of 50-60 basis points simply due to base effects (Chart II-10). However, inflation will only sustainably rise to an above-target rate over the coming 6-12 months if demand is even stronger than implied by consensus expectations, which is not our base case view. Chart II-9Adaptive Inflation Expectations Measures Are Still Well Below The Fed's Target Adaptive Inflation Expectations Measures Are Still Well Below The Fed's Target Adaptive Inflation Expectations Measures Are Still Well Below The Fed's Target Chart II-10The Fed Will Look Through Base Effects On Consumer Prices The Fed Will Look Through Base Effects On Consumer Prices The Fed Will Look Through Base Effects On Consumer Prices   Investment Conclusions Investors can draw two conclusions from our analysis above. First, there is reason to be concerned about the enormous rise in the money supply if we are wrong in our assessment that some portion of the savings accumulated over the past year will not ultimately be spent. If US households ignore likely future tax increases and decide to fully spend their savings windfall, then the US economy is likely to overheat rather quickly. The second, more likely, threat to investors is if the sharp increase in the money supply, reflecting monetized fiscal stimulus and a meaningfully healthier financial system compared with the global financial crisis, ends up changing market expectations about the neutral rate of interest. Chart II-11The Pandemic Response May Raise Long-Term Rate Expectations The Pandemic Response May Raise Long-Term Rate Expectations The Pandemic Response May Raise Long-Term Rate Expectations Chart II-11 that while 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yields are not much lower than they were pre-pandemic, that is an artificially low bar. Long-dated bond yields fell over 100 basis points in 2018 and 2019, in response to a global growth slowdown precipitated by the Trump administration’s trade war. While President Biden will pursue some protectionist policies, they are likely to be meaningfully less damaging to global growth than under President Trump and are extremely unlikely to act as the primary driver of macroeconomic activity over the course of Biden’s term (as they were during the period that long-dated bond yields fell). As such, if the pandemic ends this year with seemingly minimal lasting damage to the US economy, long-dated bond yields could re-approach their late 2018 levels or higher towards the end of the year. This would cause a meaningful rise in 10-year Treasury yields, even with the Fed on hold until the middle of 2022 or later. A significant rise in bond yields would be quite unwelcome to stock investors given how stretched equity multiples have become. Table II-2 presents a set of year-end scenarios to gauge the potential impact of an eventual rise in 10-year yields. We assume that forward earnings grow at 5% this year, and we allow the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield and the 10-year yield (a proxy for the equity risk premium) to return to its 2003-2007 average as part of an assumed “normalization” trade. Table II-2Current Multiples Are Justified Only If The 10-Year Treasury Yield Does Not Rise Above 2.5% February 2021 February 2021 The table suggests that a 10-year Treasury yield of 2.5% will be the most that the interest rates could rise before the fair value of the S&P 500 falls below current levels. That roughly equates to a return to the late-2018 levels that prevailed for 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yields, given that the short-end of the curve will remain pinned close to the zero lower bound for some time. For now, it remains too early to conclude whether investors will significantly revise their long-term rate expectations, in large part because the scale of permanent damage in the wake of the pandemic is still unknown. But investors should remain vigilant and attentive to the fact that interest rates may pose a threat to financial markets later this year even in a scenario where the US economy is not immediately overheating, given the impact the secular stagnation narrative has had in keeping long-term rate expectations low and the extent to which easy money has boosted equity valuation multiples over the past year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that a near-term pullback in stock prices remains a significant risk. Our monetary indicator is in a clear downtrend, reflecting a reduced intensity of monetary support, but it remains above the boom/bust line. The upshot is that while the marginal stimulus provided by monetary policy is falling, the level of stimulus from easy monetary conditions remains significant. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions and positive earnings surprises remain solidly positive. Within a global equity portfolio, the US underperformance that we noted last month continues, led by strong gains in emerging markets (including China). Euro area stocks have significantly underperformed EM over the course of the pandemic, are likely to emerge as the new regional leader within a global ex-US portfolio at some point later this year. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has broken convincingly above its 200-day moving average. Long-dated yields are technically stretched to the upside, but our valuation index highlights that bonds are still extremely expensive and that yields have room to move higher over the cyclical investment horizon. The technical and valuation profile is similar for the US dollar. The USD is technically oversold, but it remains expensive according to our models. We noted in Section 1 of this month’s report that the dollar has traded almost exactly in line with what one would expect from a counter-cyclical currency, suggesting that USD will continue to trend lower, at a more moderate pace, over the coming year. Raw industrials prices have recovered not just back to pre-pandemic levels, but also back to 2018 levels (i.e., before the Sino/US trade war). This underscores that many commodity prices are extended, and are likely due for a breather. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend. A peak in our global LEI (GLEI) diffusion index suggests that the pace of advance in the GLEI will moderate, but the diffusion index has not yet fallen to a level that would herald a meaningful decline in the LEI. The waning US payroll momentum that we flagged in last month’s Section 3 culminated in a slowdown in economic activity that is likely to linger for the coming several weeks. However, the very significant amount of stimulus that is still set to arrive will provide a substantial reflationary bridge to help counter the negative impact on Q1 growth from the pandemic. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see USBS Strategy Report "The Case Against The Money Supply," dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see “Money creation in the modern economy,” Bank of England, Q1 2014 Quarterly Bulletin.

Highlights Markets largely ignored the uproar at the US Capitol on January 6 because the transfer of power was not in question. Democratic control over the Senate, after two upsets in the Georgia runoff, is the bigger signal. US fiscal policy will become more expansive yet the Federal Reserve will not start hiking rates anytime soon. This is a powerful tailwind for risk assets over the short and medium run. Politics and geopolitics affect markets through the policy setting, rather than through discrete events, which tend to have fleeting market impacts. The current setting, in the US and abroad, is negative for the US dollar. The implication is positive for emerging market stocks and value plays. Go long global stocks ex-US, long emerging markets over developed markets, and long value over growth. Cut losses on short CNY-USD. Feature Chart 1Market's Muted Response To US Turmoil Market's Muted Response To US Turmoil Market's Muted Response To US Turmoil Scenes of mayhem unfolded in the US Capitol on January 6 as protesters and rioters flooded the building and temporarily interrupted the joint session of Congress convened to count the Electoral College votes. Congress reconvened later and finished the tally. President-elect Joe Biden will take office at noon on January 20. Financial markets were unperturbed, with stocks up and volatility down, though safe havens did perk up a bit (Chart 1). The incident supports our thesis that the US election cycle of 2020 was a sort of “Civil War Lite” and that the country is witnessing “Peak Polarization,” with polarization likely to fall over the coming five years. The incident was the culmination of the past year of pandemic-fueled unrest and President Trump’s refusal to concede to the Electoral College verdict. Trump made a show of force by rallying his supporters, and apparently refrained from cracking down on those that overran Congress, but then he backed down and promised an orderly transfer of power. The immediate political result was to isolate him. Fewer Republicans than expected contested the electoral votes in the ensuing joint session; one Republican is openly calling for Trump to be forced into resignation via the 25th amendment procedure for those unfit to serve. The electoral votes were promptly certified. Vice President Mike Pence and other actors performed their constitutional duties. Pence reportedly gave the order to bring out the National Guard to restore order – hence it is possible that Pence and Trump’s cabinet could activate the 25th amendment, but that is unlikely unless Trump foments rebellion going forward. Vandals and criminals will be prosecuted and there could also be legal ramifications for Trump and some government officials. Do Politics And Geopolitics Affect Markets? The market’s lack of concern raises the question of whether investors need trouble themselves with politics at all. Philosopher and market guru Nassim Nicholas Taleb tweeted the following: If someone, a year ago, described January 6, 2021 (and events attending it) & asked you to guess the stock market behavior, admit you would have gotten it wrong. Just so you understand that news do not help you understand markets.1 This is a valid point. Investors should not (and do not) invest based on the daily news. Of course, many observers foresaw social unrest surrounding the 2020 election, including Professor Peter Turchin.2 Social instability was rising in the data, as we have long shown. When you combined this likelihood with the Fed’s pause on rate hikes, and a measurable rise in geopolitical tensions between the US and other countries, the implication was that gold would appreciate. So if someone had told you a year ago that the US would have a pandemic, that governments would unleash a 10.2% of global GDP fiscal stimulus, that the Fed would start average inflation targeting, that a vaccine would be produced, and that the US would have a contested election on top of it all, would you have expected gold to rise? Absolutely – and it has done so, both in keeping with the fall in real interest rates plus some safe-haven bonus, which is observable (Chart 2). Chart 2Gold Price In Excess Of Fall In Real Rates Implies Geopolitical Risk Gold Price In Excess Of Fall In Real Rates Implies Geopolitical Risk Gold Price In Excess Of Fall In Real Rates Implies Geopolitical Risk The takeaway is that policy matters for markets while politics may only matter briefly at best. Which brings us back to the implications of the Trump rebellion. What Will Be The Impact Of The Trump Rebellion? We have highlighted that this election was a controversial rather than contested election – meaning that the outcome was not in question after late November when the court cases, vote counts, and recounts were certified. This was doubly true after the Electoral College voted on December 14. The protests and riots yesterday never seriously called this result into question. Whatever Trump’s intentions, there was no military coup or imposition of martial law, as some observers feared. In fact the scandal arose from the President’s hesitation to call out the National Guard rather than his use of security forces to prevent the transfer of power, as occurs during a coup. This partially explains why the market traded on the contested election in December 2000 but not in 2020 – the result was largely settled. The Biden administration now has more political capital than otherwise, which is market-positive because it implies more proactive fiscal policy to support the economic recovery. Trump’s refusal to concede gave Democrats both seats in the Georgia Senate runoffs, yielding control of Congress. Household and business sentiment will revive with the vaccine distribution and economic recovery, while the passage of larger fiscal stimulus is highly probable. US fiscal policy will almost certainly avoid the mistake of tightening fiscal policy too soon. Taken with the Fed’s aversion to raising rates, greater fiscal stimulus will create a powerful tailwind for risk assets over the next 12 months. The primary consequence of combined fiscal and monetary dovishness is a falling dollar. The greenback is a counter-cyclical and momentum-driven currency that broadly responds inversely to global growth trends. But policy decisions are clearly legible in the global growth path and the dollar’s path over the past two decades. Japanese and European QE, Chinese devaluation, the global oil crash, Trump’s tax cuts, the US-China trade war, and COVID-19 lockdowns all drove the dollar to fresh highs – all policy decisions (Chart 3). Policy decisions also ensured the euro’s survival, marking the dollar’s bottom against the euro in 2011, and ensuring that the euro could take over from the dollar once the dollar became overbought. Today, the US’s stimulus response to COVID-19 – combined with the Fed’s strategic review and the Democratic sweep of government – marked the peak and continued drop-off in the dollar. Chart 3Euro Survival, US Peak Polarization, Set Stage For Rotation From USD To EUR Euro Survival, US Peak Polarization, Set Stage For Rotation From USD To EUR Euro Survival, US Peak Polarization, Set Stage For Rotation From USD To EUR Chart 4China's Yuan Says Geopolitics Matters China's Yuan Says Geopolitics Matters China's Yuan Says Geopolitics Matters The Chinese renminbi is heavily manipulated by the People’s Bank and is not freely exchangeable. The massive stimulus cycle that began in 2015, in reaction to financial turmoil, combined with the central bank’s decision to defend the currency marked a bottom in the yuan’s path. China’s draconian response to the pandemic this year, and massive stimulus, made China the only major country to contribute positively to global growth in 2020 and ensured a surge in the currency. The combination of US and Chinese policy decisions has clearly favored the renminbi more than would be the case from the general economic backdrop (Chart 4). Getting the policy setting right is necessary for investors. This is true even though discrete political events – including major political and geopolitical crises – have fleeting impacts on markets. What About Biden’s Trade Policy? Trump was never going to control monetary or fiscal policy – that was up to the Fed and Congress. His impact lay mostly in trade and foreign policy. Specifically his defeat reduces the risk of sweeping unilateral tariffs. It makes sense that global economic policy uncertainty has plummeted, especially relative to the United States (Chart 5). If US policy facilitates a global economic and trade recovery, then it also makes sense that global equities would rise faster than American equities, which benefited from the previous period of a strong dollar and erratic or aggressive US fiscal and trade policy. Trump’s last 14 days could see a few executive orders that rattle stocks. There is a very near-term downside risk to European and especially Chinese stocks from punitive measures, or to Emirati stocks in the event of another military exchange with Iran (Chart 6). But Trump will be disobeyed if he orders any highly disruptive actions, especially if they contravene national interests. Beyond Trump’s term we are constructive on all these bourses, though we expect politics and geopolitics to remain a headwind for Chinese equities. Chart 5Big Drop In Global Policy Uncertainty Big Drop In Global Policy Uncertainty Big Drop In Global Policy Uncertainty US tensions with China will escalate again soon – and in a way that negatively impacts US and Chinese companies exposed to each other. Chart 6Geopolitical Implications Of Biden's Election Geopolitical Implications Of Biden's Election Geopolitical Implications Of Biden's Election The cold war between these two is an unavoidable geopolitical trend as China threatens to surpass the US in economic size and improves its technological prowess. Presidents Xi and Trump were merely catalysts. But there are two policy trends that will override this rivalry for at least the first half of the year. First, global trade is recovering– as shown here by the Shanghai freight index and South Korean exports and equity prices (Chart 7). The global recovery will boost Korean stocks but geopolitical tensions will continue to brood over more expensive Taiwanese stocks due to the US-China conflict. This has motivated our longstanding long Korea / short Taiwan recommendation. Chart 7Global Economy Speaks Louder Than North Korea Global Economy Speaks Louder Than North Korea Global Economy Speaks Louder Than North Korea Chart 8China Wary Of Over-Tightening Policy China Wary Of Over-Tightening Policy China Wary Of Over-Tightening Policy Chart 9Global Stock-Bond Ratio Registers Good News Global Stock-Bond Ratio Registers Good News Global Stock-Bond Ratio Registers Good News Second, China’s 2020 stimulus will have lingering effects and it is wary of over-tightening monetary and fiscal policy, lest it undo its domestic economic recovery. The tenor of China’s Central Economic Work Conference in December has reinforced this view. Chart 8 illustrates the expectations of our China Investment Strategy regarding China’s credit growth and local government bond issuance. They suggest that there will not be a sharp withdrawal of fiscal or quasi-fiscal support in 2021. Stability is especially important in the lead up to the critical leadership rotation in 2022.3 This policy backdrop will be positive for global/EM equities despite the political crackdown on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s opponents will occur despite this supportive policy backdrop. The global stock-to-bond ratio has surged in clear recognition of these positive policy trends (Chart 9). Government bonds were deeply overbought and it will take several years before central banks begin tightening policy. What About Biden’s Foreign Policy? Chart 10OPEC 2.0 Cartel Continues (For Now) Accommodative US Monetary Policy, Tighter Commodity Markets Will Stoke Inflation OPEC 2.0 Cartel Continues (For Now) Accommodative US Monetary Policy, Tighter Commodity Markets Will Stoke Inflation OPEC 2.0 Cartel Continues (For Now) Iran poses a genuine geopolitical risk this year – first in the form of an oil supply risk, should conflict emerge in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, or elsewhere in the region. This would inject a risk premium into the oil price. Later the risk is the opposite as a deal with the Biden administration would create the prospect for Iran to attract foreign investment and begin pumping oil, while putting pressure on the OPEC 2.0 coalition to abandon its current, tentative, production discipline in pursuit of market share (Chart 10). Biden has the executive authority to restore the 2015 nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). He is in favor of doing so in order to (1) prevent the Middle East from generating a crisis that consumes his foreign policy; (2) execute an American grand strategy of reviving its Asia Pacific influence; (3) cement the Obama administration’s legacy. The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also has a clear interest in returning to the deal before the country’s presidential election in June. This would salvage his legacy and support his “reformist” faction. The Supreme Leader also has a chance to pin the negative aspects of the deal on a lame duck president while benefiting from it economically as he prepares for his all-important succession. The problem is that extreme levels of distrust will require some brinkmanship early in Biden’s term. Iran is building up leverage ahead of negotiations, which will mean higher levels of uranium enrichment and demonstrating the range of its regional capabilities, including the Strait of Hormuz, and its ability to impose economic pain via oil prices. Biden will need to establish a credible threat if Iran misbehaves. Hence the geopolitical setting is positive for oil prices at the moment. Beyond Iran, there is a clear basis for policy uncertainty to decline for Europe and the UK while it remains elevated for China and Russia (Chart 11). Chart 11Relative Policy Uncertainty Favors Europe and UK Over Russia And China Relative Policy Uncertainty Favors Europe and UK Over Russia And China Relative Policy Uncertainty Favors Europe and UK Over Russia And China The US international image has suffered from the Trump era and the Biden administration’s main priorities will lie in solidifying alliances and partnerships and stabilizing the US role in the world, rather than pursuing showdown and confrontation. However, it will not be long before scrutiny returns to the authoritarian states, which have been able to focus on domestic recovery and expanding their spheres of influence amid the US’s tumultuous election year. Chart 12GeoRisk Indicators Say Risks Underrated For These Bourses GeoRisk Indicators Say Risks Underrated For These Bourses GeoRisk Indicators Say Risks Underrated For These Bourses The US will not seek a “diplomatic reset” with Russia, aside from renegotiating the New START treaty. The Democrats will seek to retaliate for Russia’s extensive cyberattack in 2021 as well as for election interference and psychological warfare in the United States. And while there probably will be a reset with China, it will be short-lived, as outlined above. This situation contrasts with that of the Atlantic sphere. The Biden administration is a crystal clear positive, relative to a second Trump term, for the European Union. The EU and the UK have just agreed to a trade deal, as expected, to conclude the Brexit process, which means that the US-UK “special relationship” will not be marred by disagreements over Ireland. European solidarity has also strengthened as a result of the pandemic, which highlighted the need for collective policy responses, including fiscal. Thus the geopolitical risks of the new administration are most relevant for China/Taiwan and Russia. Comparing our GeoRisk Indicators, which are market-based, with the relative equity performance of these bourses, Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable because markets are increasingly pricing the geopolitical risk yet the relative stock performance is toppy (Chart 12). The limited recovery in Russian equities is also at risk for the same reason. Only in China’s case has the market priced lower geopolitical risk, not least because of the positive change in US administration. We expect Biden and Xi Jinping to be friendly at first but for strategic distrust to reemerge by the second half of the year. This will be a rude awakening for Chinese stocks – or China-exposed US stocks, especially in the tech sector. Investment Takeaways Chart 13Global Policy Shifts Drive Big Investment Reversals Global Policy Shifts Drive Big Investment Reversals Global Policy Shifts Drive Big Investment Reversals The US is politically divided. Civil unrest and aftershocks of the controversial election will persist but markets will ignore it unless it has a systemic impact. The policy consequence is a more proactive fiscal policy, resulting in virtual fiscal-monetary coordination that is positive both for global demand and risk assets, while negative for the US dollar. The Biden administration will succeed in partially repealing the Trump tax cuts, but the impact on corporate profit margins will be discounted fairly mechanically and quickly by market participants, while the impact on economic growth will be more than offset by huge new spending. Sentiment will improve after the pandemic – and Biden has not yet shown an inclination to take an anti-business tone. The past decade has been marked by a dollar bull market and the outperformance of developed markets over emerging markets and growth stocks like technology over value stocks like financials. Cyclical sectors have traded in a range. Going forward, a secular rise in geopolitical Great Power competition is likely to persist but the macro backdrop has shifted with the decline of the dollar. Cyclical sectors are now poised to outperform while a bottom is forming in value stocks and emerging markets (Chart 13). We recommend investors go strategically long emerging markets relative to developed. We are also going long global value over growth stocks. We are not yet ready to close our gold trade given that the two supports, populist fiscal turn and great power struggle, will continue to be priced by markets in the near term. We are throwing in the towel on our short CNY-USD trade after the latest upleg in the renminbi, though our view continues to be that geopolitical fundamentals will catch yuan investors by surprise when they reassert themselves. We also recommend preferring global equities to US equities, given the above-mentioned global trends plus looming tax hikes.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 January 6, 2020, twitter.com. 2 See Turchin and Andrey Korotayev, "The 2010 Structural-Demographic Forecast for the 2010-2020 Decade: A Retrospective Assessment," PLoS ONE 15:8 (2020), journals.plos.org. 3 Not to mention that 2021 is the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary – not a time to make an unforced policy error with an already wobbly economy.