Global vs Domestic

Dear Client, I will be visiting clients in Paris, Amsterdam, and London next week. In lieu of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report from Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Matt argues that US politics and the 2020 election represent the greatest source of geopolitical risk over the coming year, and possibly beyond. Best regards, Peter Berezin Highlights Having underperformed for more than ten years, non-US stocks are set to gain the upper hand over their US peers. A reacceleration in global growth, a weaker US dollar, and favorable valuations should all support non-US stocks next year. Meanwhile, one of the greater drivers of US equity outperformance – the stellar returns of tech stocks – is likely to dissipate. Investors should remain overweight global equities relative to bonds, but start increasing allocations to non-US stocks at the expense of US stocks. US Stocks: From Leaders To Laggards? US equities have handily outperformed their global peers since 2008. About half of that outperformance was due to faster sales-per-share growth in the US, a third was due to faster growth in US margins, and the rest was due to relative P/E expansion in favor of the US (Chart 1). Looking ahead, non-US stocks are set to gain the upper hand over their US peers thanks to an improving global growth backdrop, a weaker US dollar, and an increasingly irresistible valuation tailwind. Chart 1Faster Sales Growth, Rising Margins, And Relative PE Expansion Helped Drive US Outperformance Over The Past Decade A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks Improving Global Growth Outlook Global growth should benefit next year from the dovish pivot by most central banks. The share of central banks cutting/raising rates leads global growth by about 6-to-9 months (Chart 2). Chart 2Lower Rates Should Help Spur Growth Lower Rates Should Help Spur Growth Lower Rates Should Help Spur Growth Chart 3The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy The Effects Of Easing Monetary Policy Should Soon Trickle Down To The Economy The global manufacturing downturn is also coming to end as inventories continue to be run down. The auto sector, which has been at the forefront of the manufacturing slowdown, is finally showing signs of life. US banks stopped tightening lending standards for auto loans in the third quarter. They are also reporting stronger demand for vehicle financing (Chart 3). In Europe, the new orders-to-inventory ratio of the Markit Europe Automobile PMI has moved back to parity for the first time since the autumn of 2018. In China, vehicle production and sales are rebounding on a rate-of-change basis (Chart 4). Both automobile ownership and vehicle sales in China are still a fraction of what they are in most other economies (Chart 5). Chart 4Chinese Auto Sector Is Bottoming Out Chinese Auto Sector Is Bottoming Out Chinese Auto Sector Is Bottoming Out Chart 5China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright China: Structural Outlook For Autos Is Bright The trade war is a clear and present danger to our bullish outlook on global growth. The good news is that President Trump has a strong incentive to make a deal. A resurgence in the trade war would hurt the economy, which is Trump’s best selling point (Chart 6). As a self-described master negotiator, Trump has to produce a “tremendous” deal for the American people. Had he negotiated an agreement a year or two ago, he would currently be on the hook for showing that it resulted in a smaller trade deficit with China. But with the presidential election only a year away, he can semi-credibly claim that the trade balance will improve only after he is re-elected. Assuming a “Phase 1” agreement is concluded, global business sentiment should improve. Chart 6Trump Gets Reasonably High Marks On His Handling Of The Economy, But Not Much Else A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A détente in the trade war is unlikely to cause China to restart its deleveraging campaign. Credit growth is currently only a few points above trend nominal GDP growth, implying that the ratio of credit-to-GDP is barely increasing (Chart 7). The combined Chinese credit and fiscal impulse is still rising; it reliably leads global growth by about nine months (Chart 8). Chart 7China: The Deleveraging Campaign Has Been Put On The Backburner China: The Deleveraging Campaign Has Been Put On The Backburner China: The Deleveraging Campaign Has Been Put On The Backburner Chart 8Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth Chinese Stimulus Should Boost Global Growth Faster Global Growth Should Disproportionately Benefit Non-US stocks The sector composition of international stocks is more skewed towards cyclicals than defensives compared to US stocks (Table 1). As a result, non-US stocks generally outperform their US peers when global growth accelerates (Chart 9). Table 1Cyclicals Are More Heavily Weighted Outside The US Stock Market A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks We would include financials in our definition of cyclical sectors. As global growth improves, long-term bond yields will increase at the margin (Chart 10). Since central banks are in no hurry to raise rates, yield curves will steepen. This will boost bank net interest margins, flattering profits and share prices (Chart 11). Chart 9Non-US Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Non-US Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Non-US Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves Chart 10Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields Stronger Economic Growth Will Put Upward Pressure On Government Bond Yields   The US Dollar Should Weaken Compared to most other economies, the United States has a large service sector and a small manufacturing base. This makes the US a “low beta” play on global growth. As a result, capital tends to flow from the US to the rest of the world when global growth picks up, putting downward pressure on the US dollar in the process (Chart 12). Chart 11Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials Steeper Yield Curves Will Benefit Financials Chart 12The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency   Interest-rate differentials have been moving against the dollar for most of this year (Chart 13). This makes the greenback more vulnerable to a correction. Chart 13The Dollar Has Been Diverging From Rate Differentials This Year The Dollar Has Been Diverging From Rate Differentials This Year The Dollar Has Been Diverging From Rate Differentials This Year Chart 14Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Long Dollar Is A Crowded Trade Bullish sentiment towards the dollar also remains somewhat stretched. Net long speculative positions are near the top of their historic range (Chart 14). Our tactical MacroQuant model, which has an excellent track record of predicting short-to-medium term moves in the dollar, has dropped its bullish bias towards the currency (Chart 15).   Chart 15MacroQuant Has Soured On The US Dollar A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A weaker dollar will help boost commodity prices, which is usually good news for cyclical stocks (Chart 16). A softer dollar will also raise the USD value of overseas shares, thus making international stocks more attractive in common-currency terms. Valuations Favor Non-US Stocks There is an old investment adage which says that valuations are useless as a short-term timing tool. That is only partially true. While valuations by themselves offer little guidance as to where the stock market is going in the short run, combined with a catalyst, valuations can make a big difference. When stocks are cheap, a bullish catalyst can cause prices to surge; whereas when stocks are expensive, a bearish catalyst can cause them to plunge. Looking ahead, non-US stocks are set to gain the upper hand over their US peers thanks to an improving global growth backdrop, a weaker US dollar, and an increasingly irresistible valuation tailwind. Non-US stocks are currently trading at 13.8-times forward earnings. This represents a significant discount to US stocks, which trade at a forward PE ratio of 17.7. The valuation discount is even greater if one looks at other measures such as the cyclically-adjusted PE, price-to-book, price-to-sales, and the dividend yield (Chart 17). Chart 16A Weaker Dollar Tends To Support Commodity Prices A Weaker Dollar Tends To Support Commodity Prices A Weaker Dollar Tends To Support Commodity Prices Chart 17US Stocks Are More Expensive... US Stocks Are More Expensive... US Stocks Are More Expensive...   Differences in sector weights account for about a quarter of the valuation gap between the US and the rest of the world (Chart 18). The rest of the gap is due to cheaper valuations within sectors. Financials, utilities, and consumer discretionary stocks, in particular, are quite a bit more expensive in the US than elsewhere (Chart 19). Chart 18…Even When Adjusting For Sector Weights A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks Chart 19AEquity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (I) Equity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (I) Equity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (I) Chart 19BEquity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (II) Equity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (II) Equity Sector Valuations: US Versus The Rest Of The World (II)   The valuation gap between the US and the rest of the world is even starker if we compare earnings yields with bond yields. Since bond yields are lower outside the US, the implied equity risk premium is markedly higher for non-US stocks (Chart 20). An examination of the relative performance of US vs non-US companies over the past 50 years reveals two major tops, and one potential top. Some commentators have argued that the loftier valuations enjoyed by US stocks are warranted due to their superior growth prospects. While there may be some truth to that, it is worth noting that the IMF projects GDP growth (based on MSCI country weights) will be faster outside the US over the next five years (Chart 21). Chart 20Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High Chart 21Growth Prospects Brighter Outside The US Growth Prospects Brighter Outside The US Growth Prospects Brighter Outside The US   One should also keep in mind that relatively fast US earnings growth is a fairly recent phenomenon. Between 1970 and 2008, European EPS actually grew slightly faster than US EPS (Chart 22). Earnings in emerging markets also increased more rapidly than in the US during the two decades leading up to the Global Financial Crisis. Chart 22US Earnings Have Not Always Outperformed US Earnings Have Not Always Outperformed US Earnings Have Not Always Outperformed The Role Of US Tech The large weight of the tech sector in the US stock market explains much of the superior performance of US stocks over the past decade. As Chart 23 illustrates, EPS in the I.T. sector has grown a lot more quickly than in other sectors. Chart 23US Earnings: Who Has Been Doing The Heaving Lifting? A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks Chart 24S&P 500: Much Of The Increase In Margins Has Occurred In The I.T. Sector S&P 500: Much Of The Increase In Margins Has Occurred In The I.T. Sector S&P 500: Much Of The Increase In Margins Has Occurred In The I.T. Sector Looking out, there are four reasons why US tech stocks may be due for a breather. First, tech valuations have gotten stretched relative to the broader market. Second, tech margins have risen to unprecedented high levels. We estimate that about half of the increase in S&P 500 profit margins since 2007 has been due to I.T. (Chart 24). Even that understates the role of tech in the expansion of profit margins because Standard & Poor’s no longer classifies some large-cap behemoths such as Google and Facebook as I.T. companies. Third, tech companies may face increased regulatory scrutiny in the years ahead stemming from alleged privacy violations, perceived monopolistic behavior, and worries about the censorship of online speech. This could weigh on sales and earnings growth. Fourth, the growth in private equity funds is likely to limit the number of tech companies that go public at a very early stage. Stock market investors were very lucky that companies such as Microsoft, Cisco, Nvidia, Qualcomm, Oracle, Amazon, and Netflix issued shares to the public at a young stage in their development (Table 2). All seven had market caps below $1 billion when they went public. Such hidden gems are becoming less common: The number of publicly listed companies in the US has fallen by more than half over the past two decades (Chart 25). The median age of tech companies at the time of IPO has risen from around 7 in the 1990s to 12 years today (Chart 26). Table 2Big Gains From Once Small Companies A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks Chart 25The Number Of Publicly Listed Companies Fell The Number Of Publicly Listed Companies Fell The Number Of Publicly Listed Companies Fell   Chart 26Tech Companies Entering The Public Arena Are Now More Mature A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks Had Uber gone public as a small, upstart company not long after it was founded in 2009, it probably would have also made public shareholders a lot of money. Instead, it ended up going public this year with a market cap of $75 billion, only to see it shrink to as low as $40 billion in the ensuing six months. We won’t even mention what would have happened if WeWork had gone public. Investment Conclusions An examination of the relative performance of US vs non-US companies over the past 50 years reveals two major tops, and one potential top: The first during the “Nifty 50” era of the late 1960s, the second during the 1990s dotcom boom, and the third during the recent FAANG craze (Chart 27). It is too early to say whether FAANG stocks have peaked, but it is worth noting that the group has underperformed the S&P 500 since May (Chart 28). Chart 27Putting The Recent FAANG Craze Into Context Putting The Recent FAANG Craze Into Context Putting The Recent FAANG Craze Into Context Chart 28FAANG Stocks And The Market FAANG Stocks And The Market FAANG Stocks And The Market Chart 29Has The Underperformance Of Value Run Its Course? Has The Underperformance Of Value Run Its Course? Has The Underperformance Of Value Run Its Course?   Regardless of whether the secular outperformance of US equities is ending, the cyclical backdrop that we foresee over the next 12-to-18 months – characterized by faster global growth, a weakening dollar, and higher commodity prices – is likely to favor non-US stocks. As such, investors should remain overweight global equities relative to bonds, but start increasing allocations to non-US stocks at the expense of US stocks. Consistent with this, we are initiating a new recommendation to go long the MSCI ACWI ex USA index versus the MSCI USA index in dollar terms. Looking across the various stock markets outside the US, we are particularly fond of Europe. Net profit margins among companies in the STOXX Europe 600 index are about three percentage points below the S&P 500. This gives European companies greater scope to boost earnings. European banks are especially attractive, sporting a forward PE of 8.3, a price-to-book ratio of 0.6, and a dividend yield of 6.1%. Lastly, on the question of style investing, we would note that the relative performance of the MSCI value and growth indices closely tracks the performance of global financials versus I.T. (Chart 29). Given our preference for the former over the latter, we suspect that value will outperform growth next year.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks A Window Of Opportunity For International Stocks Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Worrisome Signs Worrisome Signs Following up from our earnings preview from the July 8thWeekly Report, the latest ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment made for grim reading. BCA’s global ex-U.S. ZEW took a turn for the worse and is challenging seven year lows. Given that roughly 40% of SPX revenues are internationally sourced, deteriorating global ex-U.S. sentiment will dampen sales and profit prospects. Using national accounts data, the chart shows that corporate profits sourced overseas are on the verge of contraction. While part of this reflects the income translation drag from the appreciating greenback, persistently scarce final demand abroad also weighs on earnings. Bottom Line: Stay cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market on a cyclical three-to-twelve month time horizon.

Highlights U.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade. How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge. We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best. When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS. When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio. However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further. Feature Some 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today. But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following: 1. A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart II-1.1A, top panel). Chart II-1.1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Chart II-1.1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)   2. Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart II-1.1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity. 3. Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart II-1.1A, bottom panel). 4. Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart II-1.1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available. 5. Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart II-1.1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart II-1.1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money? We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment. In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4  BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade. In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only. We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments. Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart II-1.2 and Table II-1.1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them. Chart II-1 Chart II- Summary Of Results Table II-1.2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below. Chart II- Which assets perform best when inflation is rising? Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is. Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation. Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high. U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge. Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising? Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high. Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses. Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising? With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles. Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high. Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility. What is the cost of inflation hedging? Chart II-1 To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging: 1. Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities/40% bonds. 2. Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities/40% bonds/5% TIPS/5% commodities 3. Medium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities/30% bonds/15% TIPS/15 % commodities 4. Pure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS/50% commodities. While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart II-1.3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart II-1.3, panel 3). What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart II-1.3, panel 4). Investment Implications High inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following: 1. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. 2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now. 3.   Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate. 4.   When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio. 5.   When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Asset Classes Global Equities Chart II-2 The relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-2.1, top panel). This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations: Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-2.1, bottom panel). When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation. When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations. With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-2.1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile. Chart II- U.S. Treasuries Chart II-2 U.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2.2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices. The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2.2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs. Chart II- U.S. REITs Chart II-2 While REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-2.3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6 The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-2.3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles. Chart II- Commodity Futures Chart II-2 Commodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-2.4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return: Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-2.4, bottom panel). When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return. Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-2.4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive. Chart II- U.S. Inflation-Protected Bonds Chart II-2 While inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-2.5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7 The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-2.5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation. Chart II- Sub-Asset Classes Global Equity Sectors Chart II-3 For the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data. Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results: When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart II-3.1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart II-3.1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods. When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart II-3.1, panel 3). When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart II-3.1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. Equities Chart II-3 How do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities? The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart II-3.2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar. When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart II-3.2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environment. U.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart II-3.2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period. U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart II-3.2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual Commodities Chart II-3 Our analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8 Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart II-3.3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart II-3.3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period. When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart II-3.3, panel 3). We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart II-3.3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns 64% of the time compared to 52% for silver. Other Assets U.S. Direct Real Estate Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform? We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues: Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies. The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate. Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation. Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart II-4.1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart II-4.1, bottom panel). Chart II-4 Chart II-4   Cash Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample (Chart II-4.2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart II-4.2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa Ossa Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation Footnotes 1       Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004). 2       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, and “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3       We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. 4       Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill. 5       Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018.  6       Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 7       It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations. 8       We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile.

Highlights The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance is slightly accommodative for the U.S., but it is too tight for the rest of the world. Inflation is likely to slow further before making a durable bottom toward year-end. The Fed will remain on an extended pause, maybe all the way through to December 2020. The trade war is not going away, and investors should not be complacent. However, it also guarantees that Chinese policymakers will redouble on their reflationary efforts. As a result, global growth is still set to improve in the second half of 2019. The dollar rally is in its last innings; the greenback will depreciate in the second half of this year. Treasury yields have limited downside and their recent breakdown is likely to be a fake-out. Use any strength in bond prices to further curtail portfolio duration. The correction in stocks is not over. However, the cycle’s highs still lie ahead. Feature Ongoing Sino-U.S. tensions and weakness in global growth are taking their toll. The S&P 500 has broken below its crucial 2,800 level, EM equities are quickly approaching their fourth-quarter 2018 lows, U.S. bond yields have fallen to their lowest readings since 2017, copper has erased all of its 2019 gains and the dollar is attempting to break out. In response, futures markets are now pricing in interest rate cuts by the Fed of 54 bps and 64 bps, over the next 12 and 24 months, respectively. Will the Fed ratify these expectations? Last week’s release of the most recent Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee meeting minutes, as well as comments from FOMC members ranging from Jerome Powell to Richard Clarida, are all adamantly clear: U.S. monetary policy is appropriate, and a rate cut is not on the table for now. However, the avowed data-dependency of the Fed implies that if economic conditions warrant, the FOMC will capitulate and cut rates. Even as U.S. inflation slows, a recession is unlikely. Moreover, the Sino-U.S. trade war will catalyze additional reflationary policy from China, putting a floor under global growth. In this context, the Fed is likely to stay put for an extended period, but will not cut rates. While the S&P 500 is likely to fall toward 2,600, the high for the cycle is still ahead. We therefore maintain our positive cyclical equity view, especially relative to government bonds, but we are hedging tactical risk. Fed Policy Is Neutral For The U.S…. If the fed funds rate was above the neutral rate – the so-called R-star – we would be more inclined to agree with interest rate markets and bet on a lower fed funds rate this year. However, it is not clear that this is the case. Chart I-1Mixed Message From The R-Star Indicator Mixed Message From The R-Star Indicator Mixed Message From The R-Star Indicator Admittedly, the inversion of the 10-year/3-month yield curve is worrisome, but other key variables are not validating this message. Currently, our R-star indicator, based on M1, bank liquidity, consumer credit, and the BCA Fed monitor, is only in neutral territory (Chart I-1). Moreover, we built a model based on the behavior of the dollar, yield curve, S&P homebuilding relative to the broad market and initial UI claims that gauges the probability that the fed funds rate is above R-star. Currently, the model gives a roughly 40% chance that U.S. monetary policy is tight (Chart I-2). Historically, such a reading was consistent with a neutral policy stance.   Chart I-2Today, Fed Policy Is At Neutral Today, Fed Policy Is At Neutral Today, Fed Policy Is At Neutral Models can be deceiving, so it is important to ensure that facts on the ground match their insights. Historically, housing is the sector most sensitive to monetary policy.1 Key forward-looking activity measures are not showing signs of stress: mortgage applications for purchases have jumped to new cyclical highs, and the NAHB homebuilders confidence index has smartly rebounded after weakening last year (Chart I-3). Also, homebuilder stocks have been in a steady uptrend relative to the S&P 500 since last October (Chart I-3, bottom panel). These three developments are not consistent with tight monetary policy. Chart I-3This Would Not Happen If Policy Were Tight This Would Not Happen If Policy Were Tight This Would Not Happen If Policy Were Tight The corporate sector confirms the message from the housing sector. While capex intentions have weakened, they remain at elevated levels, despite slowing profit growth and elevated global uncertainty. Moreover, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that banks have again eased credit standards for commercial and industrial loans. Netting out all these factors, we are inclined to agree with the Fed that monetary policy in the U.S. is broadly neutral. If anything, the rebound in leading indicators of residential activity would argue that policy is even slightly accommodative. … But Not For The Rest Of The World Congress gave the Fed a U.S.-only mandate, but the U.S. dollar is the global reserve currency. Because the dollar is the keystone of the global financial architecture, between US$12 trillion and US$14 trillion of foreign-currency debt is issued in USDs, and the greenback is used as a medium of exchange in roughly US$800 trillion worth of transaction per year.2 Therefore, the Fed may target U.S. monetary conditions, but it sets the cost of money for the entire world. While U.S. monetary conditions may be appropriate for the U.S., they are not entirely appropriate for the world as a whole. Indeed, the green shoots of growth we highlighted two months ago are rapidly turning brown: Korean and Taiwanese exports, which are highly sensitive to the global and Asian business cycles, are still contracting at a brisk pace (Chart I-4, top panel). Japan, an economy whose variance in GDP mostly reflects global gyrations, is weakening. Exports are contracting at a 4.3% yearly pace, machine tool orders are plunging at a 33% annual rate and the coincident indicator is below 100 – a sign of shrinking activity. The semiconductor space is plunging (Chart I-4, second panel). Our EM Asia diffusion index, which tallies 23 variables, is near record lows (Chart I-4, third panel). Europe too is feeling the pain, led by Germany, another economy deeply dependent on global activity. The flash estimate for the euro area manufacturing PMI fell to 47.7 and plunged to 44.3 in Germany, its lowest level since July 2012 (Chart I-4, bottom panel). These developments show that the world economy remains weak, in part because the Chinese economy has yet to meaningfully regain any traction. The rebound in Chinese PMI in March proved short lived; in April, both the NBS and Caixin measures fell back to near the 50 boom/bust line. Since inflation lags real activity and global growth has yet to bottom, it could take some time before inflation finds a floor. A strong dollar is a natural consequence of an outperforming U.S. economy, especially when global growth weakens. Thus, the rally in the Fed’s nominal trade-weighted dollar to its highest level since March 2002 is unsurprising (Chart I-5). A strong Greenback will have implications for inflation, and thus the Fed. Chart I-4Global Growth: No Green Shoots Here Global Growth: No Green Shoots Here Global Growth: No Green Shoots Here Chart I-5A Strong Dollar Is A Natural Consequence Of Weak Growth A Strong Dollar Is A Natural Consequence Of Weak Growth A Strong Dollar Is A Natural Consequence Of Weak Growth   Transitory Inflation Weakness Is Not Over The Fed believes the current inflation slowdown is transitory. We agree. With a tight labor market and rising wages, the question is not if inflation will rise, but when. In the current context, it could take some time. As Chart I-6 shows, inflation has been stable for more than 20 years. From 1996 to today, core PCE has oscillated between 0.9% and 2.6%, while core CPI has hovered between 0.6% and 2.9%, with the peaks and troughs determined by the ebbs and flows of global growth. Since inflation lags real activity and global growth has yet to bottom, it could take some time before inflation finds a floor, likely around 1.3% and 1.5% for core PCE and core CPI, respectively. Chart I-6Stable U.S. Inflation Since 1996 Stable U.S. Inflation Since 1996 Stable U.S. Inflation Since 1996 A few dynamics strengthen this judgment: The strength in the dollar is deflationary (Chart I-7, top panel). Not only does an appreciating greenback depress import prices, it tightens U.S. and global financial conditions. It also undermines dollar-based liquidity, especially if EM central banks try to fight weakness in their own currencies. All these forces harm growth, commodity prices and ultimately, inflation. Chart I-7More Downside Ahead In Inflation For Now More Downside Ahead In Inflation For Now More Downside Ahead In Inflation For Now After adjusting for their disparate variance, the performance of EM stocks relative to EM bonds is an excellent leading indicator of global core inflation (Chart I-7, second panel). This ratio is impacted by EM financial conditions, explaining its forecasting power for prices. Since goods inflation – which disproportionally contributes to overall variations in core CPI – is globally determined, U.S. inflation will suffer as well. U.S. capacity utilization is declining (Chart I-7, third panel). The U.S. just underwent a mini inventory cycle. The 12-month moving averages of the Philadelphia Fed and Empire State surveys’ inventory indexes still stand above their long-term averages. U.S. firms will likely use discounts to entice customers, especially as a strong dollar and weak global growth point to limited foreign outlets for this excess capacity. Finally, the growth in U.S. unit labor costs is slowing sharply, which normally leads inflation lower (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Average hourly earnings may now be growing at a 3.2% annual pace, but productivity rebounded to a 2.4% year-on-year rate in the first quarter, damping the impact of higher salaries on costs. If global growth is weak and U.S. inflation decelerates further, the Fed is unlikely to raise interest rates anytime soon. As the Fed policy remains modestly accommodative and the labor market is at full employment, the balance of probability favors an extended pause over a cut. But keep in mind, next year’s elections may mean this pause could last all the way to December 2020. How Does The Trade War Fit In? An additional irritant has been added to the mix: the growing trade tensions between the U.S. and China. The trade war has resurrected fears of a repeat of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs, which prompted a wave of retaliatory actions, worsening the massive economic contraction of the Great Depression. There is indeed plenty to worry about. Today, global trade represents 25% of global GDP, compared to 12% in the late 1920s. Global growth would be highly vulnerable to a freeze in world trade. Besides, global supply chains are extremely integrated, with intra-company exports having grown from 7% of global GDP to 16% between 1993 and 2013. If a full-blown trade war were to flare up, much of the capital invested abroad by large multinationals might become uneconomic. As markets price in this probability, stock prices would be dragged down. Chart I-8Trade Uncertainty Alone Will Delay The Recovery Trade Uncertainty Alone Will Delay The Recovery Trade Uncertainty Alone Will Delay The Recovery The fear of a full-fledged trade war is already affecting the global economy. The fall in asset prices to reflect the risk of stranded capital is tightening financial conditions and hurting growth. Moreover, the rise in U.S. and global economic uncertainty is depressing capex intentions (Chart I-8). Since capex intentions are a leading variable for actual capex, global exports and manufacturing activity, the trade war is deepening and lengthening the current soft patch. Markets need to be wary of pricing in a quick end to the Sino-U.S. trade conflict. Table I-1 presents BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist Matt Gertken’s odds of various outcomes to the trade negotiations and their implications for stocks. Matt assigns only a 5% probability to a grand compromise between the U.S. and China on trade and tech. He also foresees a 35% chance that a deal on trade excluding an agreement on tech will be reached this year. This leaves 10% odds that the two sides agree to extend the negotiation deadline beyond June, 20% odds of no deal at all and a minor escalation, and 30% odds of a major escalation. In other words, BCA is currently assigning 60% odds of a market-unfriendly outcome, and only a 40% chance of a genuinely market-friendly one.3 Chart I- Chart I-9 Why the gloom? The U.S. and China are geopolitical rivals in a deadlock. Moreover, both parties are feeling increasingly emboldened to play hardball. On the U.S. side, President Donald Trump has threatened to expand his tariffs to all of China’s exports to the U.S., which would represent a major escalation in both the conflict and its cost (Chart I-9). However, despite the scale of the threat, even if it were fully borne by U.S. households, its impact should be kept in perspective. Imports of consumer goods from China only represent 2% of total household spending (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, households are not currently overly concerned with inflation, as goods prices are already muted (Chart I-10, middle panel) and family income is still growing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Finally, a weak deal could easily be decried as a failure in the 2020 election. On the Chinese side, the 9.5% fall in the yuan is already absorbing some of the costs of the tariffs, and the RMB will depreciate further if the trade war escalates. Additionally, Chinese exports to the U.S. represent 3.4% of GDP, while household and capital spending equals 81% of output. China can support its domestic economy via fiscal and credit policy, greatly mitigating the blow from the trade war. The outlook for Chinese reflationary efforts is therefore paramount. In sharp contrast to its limited upside, the dollar’s downside will be much more significant once global growth improves. Not only do Chinese policymakers have the room to stimulate, they also have the will. In the first four months of 2019, Chinese total social financing flows have amounted to CNY 9.6 trillion, which compares favorably to the same period during the 2016 reflation campaign. Yet, the economy has not fully responded to the injection of credit and previously implemented tax cuts amounting to CNY 1.3 trillion or 1.4% of GDP. Consequently, GDP per capita is now lagging well behind the required path to hit the government’s 2020 development targets (Chart I-11). Moreover, Chinese policymakers’ recent comments have increasingly emphasized protecting employment. This combination raises the likelihood of additional stimulus in the months ahead. Chart I-10...But Do Not Overstate Trump's Constraints ...But Do Not Overstate Trump's Constraints ...But Do Not Overstate Trump's Constraints Chart I-11Chinese Stimulus: Scope And Willingness Chinese Stimulus: Scope And Willingness Chinese Stimulus: Scope And Willingness   Therein lies the paradox of the trade war. While its immediate effect on world growth is negative, it also increases the chance that Chinese authorities pull all the levers to support domestic growth. A greater reflationary push would thus address the strongest headwind shaking the global economy. It could take two to six more months before the Chinese economy fully responds and lifts global growth. Ultimately, it will. Hence, even as the trade war continues, we remain skeptical that the Fed will cut interest rates as the market is discounting. We are therefore sticking to our call that the Fed will not cut rates over the next 12 months and will instead stay on an extended pause. Investment Conclusions The Dollar So long as global growth remains soft, the dollar is likely to rally further. That being said, the pace of the decline in global growth is decelerating. As a corollary, the fastest pace of appreciation for the greenback is behind us (see Chart I-5 on page 6). The risk to this view is that the previous strength in the dollar has already unleashed a vicious cycle whereby global financial conditions have tightened enough to cause another precipitous fall in world growth. The dollar’s strong sensitivity to momentum would then kick in, fomenting additional dollar strength in response to the greater growth slowdown. In this environment, the Fed would have no choice but to cut interest rates. However, growing reflationary efforts around the world currently confine this scenario to being a risk, not a central case. Additional factors also limit how far the dollar can rally. Speculators have already aggressively bought the greenback (Chart I-12). The implication is that buyers have moved in to take advantage of the dollar-friendly fundamentals. When looking at the euro, which can be thought of as the anti-dollar, investors are imputing a large discount in euro area stocks relative to U.S. ones, pointing to elevated pessimism on non-U.S. growth (Chart I-13). It would therefore require a much graver outcome in global growth to cause investors to further downgrade the outlook for the rest of the world relative to the U.S. and bring in new buyers of greenbacks. Chart I-12USD: Supportive Fundamentals Are Already Reflected USD: Supportive Fundamentals Are Already Reflected USD: Supportive Fundamentals Are Already Reflected Chart I-13Plenty Of Pessimism In European Assets... Plenty Of Pessimism In European Assets... Plenty Of Pessimism In European Assets...   In sharp contrast to its limited upside, the dollar’s downside will be much more significant once global growth improves. The same factors that are currently putting the brakes on the dollar’s rise will fuel its eventual downturn. As global growth bounces, a liquidation of stale long-dollar bets will ensue. European growth will also rebound (Chart I-14), and euro pessimism will turn into positive surprises. European assets will be bought, and the euro will rise, deepening the dollar’s demise. We are closely following the Chinese and global manufacturing PMIs to gauge when global growth exits its funk. At this point, it will be time to sell the USD. Government Bonds Bonds are caught between strong crosscurrents. On the one hand, rising economic uncertainty caused by the trade war, slowing global economic activity and decelerating inflation are all bond-bullish. On the other hand, bond prices already reflect these tailwinds. The OIS curve is baking in 54 basis points of Fed cuts over the next 12 months, as well as a further 10 basis points over the following 12 months (Chart I-15, top panel). Meanwhile, term premia across many major bond markets are very negative (Chart I-15, middle panel). Finally, fixed-income investors have pushed their portfolio duration to extremely high levels relative to their benchmark (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-14...Creates Scope For Positive Surprises ...Creates Scope For Positive Surprises ...Creates Scope For Positive Surprises Chart I-15Fade The Treasury Rally Fade The Treasury Rally Fade The Treasury Rally   Last week, Treasury yields broke down below 2.34%. For this technical break to trigger a new down-leg in yields, investors must curtail their already-depressed expectations of the fed funds rate in 12-months’ time. However, the fed funds rate is not yet restrictive, and global growth should soon find a floor in response to expanding Chinese stimulus. Under these circumstances, the Fed is unlikely to cut rates, and will continue to telegraph its intentions not to do so. Hence, unless the S&P 500 or the ISM manufacturing fall below 2,500 and 50, respectively, any move lower in yields is likely to be transitory and shallow. Cyclically, yields should instead move higher. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service’s duration indicator has already turned the corner (Chart I-16). Moreover, in the post-war period, Treasury yields have, on average, bottomed a year before inflation. Expecting an inflation trough in late 2019 or even early 2020 is therefore consistent with higher yields by year-end. Finally, when the Fed does not cut interest rates as much as the markets had been anticipating 12-months’ prior, Treasurys underperform cash. This is exactly BCA’s current Fed forecast. Chart I-16Global Yields Now Have More Upside Than Downside Global Yields Now Have More Upside Than Downside Global Yields Now Have More Upside Than Downside While we expect the bond-bearish forces to emerge victorious, yields may only rise slowly. The list of aforementioned supports for Treasury prices is long, the equity market will remain volatile and has yet to trough, and the trade war is likely to linger. We continue to closely monitor the AUD, the SEK versus the EUR, and copper to gauge if our view is wrong. These three markets are tightly linked to Chinese growth. If China’s stimulus is working, these three variables will rebound, and our bond view will be validated. If these three variables fall much further, U.S. yields could experience significantly more downside. Equities Equities are at a difficult juncture. The trade war is a bigger problem for Wall Street than for Main Street, as 43.6% sales of the S&P 500’s are sourced abroad. Moreover, the main mechanism through which trade tensions impact the stock market is through the threat that capital will be stranded – and thus worthless. This is a direct hit to the S&P 500, especially as global growth has yet to clearly stabilize and the Chinese are only beginning to make clearer retaliatory threats. Oil could also hurt stocks. Energy prices have proven resilient, despite weaker global economic activity. OPEC and Russia have been laser-focused on curtailing global crude inventories; even after the U.S. declined to extend waivers on Iranian exports, the swing oil producers have not meaningfully increased supply. Problems in Venezuela, Libya, and potential Iranian adventurism in Iraq could easily send oil prices sharply higher, especially as the U.S. does not have the export capacity to fulfill foreign demand. Thus, the oil market could suddenly tighten and create a large drag on global growth. This backdrop also warrants remaining overweight the energy sector. Stocks remain technically vulnerable. Global and U.S. stock market breadth has deteriorated significantly, as shown by the number of countries and stocks above their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-17). Moreover, since March, the strength in the S&P 500 has been very narrow, as shown by the very poor performance of the Value Line Geometric Average Index (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, the poor relative performance of small-cap stocks in an environment where the dollar is strong, where U.S. growth is holding steady compared to the rest of the world and where multinationals have the most to lose from a trade war, is perplexing. Chart I-17Stocks Remain Technically Fragile Stocks Remain Technically Fragile Stocks Remain Technically Fragile Chart I-18Dangerous Internal Dynamics Dangerous Internal Dynamics Dangerous Internal Dynamics   The U.S. stock market has the most downside potential in the weeks ahead. Like last summer, U.S. equity prices remain near record highs while EM and European stocks, many commodities and bond yields have been very weak. Moreover, the broad tech sector, the U.S.’s largest overweight, has defied gravity, despite weakness in the semiconductor sector, the entire industry’s large exposure to foreign markets, and the consequential slowdown in our U.S. Equity Strategy service's EPS model (Chart I-19).4 Thus, any bad news on the trade front or any additional strength in the dollar could prove especially painful for tech. This would handicap U.S. equities more than their already beaten-up foreign counterparts. Chart I-19The Tech Sector Profit Outlook Remains Poor The Tech Sector Profit Outlook Remains Poor The Tech Sector Profit Outlook Remains Poor These forces mean that the global equity correction will last longer, and that U.S. equities could suffer more than other DM markets. However, we do not see the S&P falling much beyond the 2,700 to 2,600 zone. Again, the fed funds rate is slightly accommodative and a U.S. recession – a prerequisite for a bear market (Chart I-20) – is unlikely over the coming 12 months. Moreover, global growth should soon recover, especially if China’s reflationary push gathers force. Additionally, an end to the dollar’s rally would create another welcomed relief valve for stocks. Chart I-20The Absence Of A Recession Means This Is A Correction, Not A Bear Market The Absence Of A Recession Means This Is A Correction, Not A Bear Market The Absence Of A Recession Means This Is A Correction, Not A Bear Market In this context, we recommend investors keep a cyclical overweight stance on stocks. Balanced portfolios should also overweight stocks relative to government bonds. However, the near-term risks highlighted above remain significant. Consequently, we also recommend investors hedge tactical equity risks, a position implemented by BCA’s Global Investment Strategy service three weeks ago.5 As a corollary, if stocks correct sharply, the associated rise in implied volatility will also cause a violent but short-lived pick up in credit spreads. In Section II, we look beyond the short-term gyrations. One of BCA’s long-term views is that inflation is slowly embarking on a structural uptrend. An environment of rising long-term inflation is unfamiliar to the vast majority of investors. In this piece, Juan-Manuel Correa, of our Global Asset Allocation team, shows which assets offer the best inflation protection under various states of rising consumer and producer prices. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 30, 2019 Next Report: June 27, 2019 II. Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises U.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade. How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge. We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best. When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS. When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio. However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further. Some 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today. But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following: 1. A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart II-1.1A, top panel). Chart II-1.1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Chart II-1.1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)   2. Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart II-1.1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity. 3. Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart II-1.1A, bottom panel). 4. Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart II-1.1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available. 5. Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart II-1.1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart II-1.1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money? We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment. In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4  BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade. In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only. We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments. Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart II-1.2 and Table II-1.1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them. Chart II-1 Chart II- Summary Of Results Table II-1.2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below. Chart II- Which assets perform best when inflation is rising? Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is. Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation. Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high. U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge. Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising? Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high. Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses. Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising? With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles. Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high. Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility. Chart II-1 What is the cost of inflation hedging? To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging: 1. Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities/40% bonds. 2. Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities/40% bonds/5% TIPS/5% commodities 3. Medium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities/30% bonds/15% TIPS/15 % commodities 4. Pure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS/50% commodities. While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart II-1.3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart II-1.3, panel 3). What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart II-1.3, panel 4). Investment Implications High inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following: 1. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. 2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now. 3.   Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate. 4.   When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio. 5.   When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Asset Classes Global Equities Chart II-2 The relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-2.1, top panel). This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations: Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-2.1, bottom panel). When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation. When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations. With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-2.1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile. Chart II- U.S. Treasuries Chart II-2 U.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2.2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices. The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2.2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs. Chart II- U.S. REITs Chart II-2 While REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-2.3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6 The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-2.3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles. Chart II- Commodity Futures Chart II-2 Commodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-2.4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return: Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-2.4, bottom panel). When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return. Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-2.4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive. Chart II- U.S. Inflation-Protected Bonds Chart II-2 While inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-2.5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7 The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-2.5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation. Chart II- Sub-Asset Classes Global Equity Sectors Chart II-3 For the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data. Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results: When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart II-3.1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart II-3.1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods. When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart II-3.1, panel 3). When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart II-3.1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. Equities Chart II-3 How do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities? The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart II-3.2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar. When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart II-3.2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environment. U.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart II-3.2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period. U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart II-3.2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual Commodities Chart II-3 Our analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8 Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart II-3.3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart II-3.3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period. When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart II-3.3, panel 3). We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart II-3.3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns 64% of the time compared to 52% for silver. Other Assets U.S. Direct Real Estate Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform? We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues: Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies. The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate. Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation. Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart II-4.1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart II-4.1, bottom panel). Chart II-4 Chart II-4   Cash Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample (Chart II-4.2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart II-4.2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa Ossa Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Last month, we argued that the S&P 500 would most likely enter a period of digestion after its furious gains from December to April. This corrective episode is now upon us as the S&P 500 is breaking below the crucial 2,800 level. Moreover, our short-term technical indicators are deteriorating, as the number of stocks above their 30-week and 10-week moving averages have rolled over after hitting elevated levels, but have yet to hit levels consistent with a durable trough. This vulnerability is especially worrisome in a context where pressure will continue to build, as Beijing is only beginning to retaliate to the U.S.’s trade belligerence. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is not flashing a buy signal either. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. It will require either cheaper valuations, a pick-up in global growth or further policy easing before stocks can resume their ascent. On the plus side, our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. and Japan continues to improve. However, it remains flat in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The current readings in major advanced economies thus suggest that investors are still inclined to add to their stock holdings. Hence, stock weaknesses are likely to prompt buy-the-dip behaviors by investors. Therefore, the expected downdraft will remain a correction and stocks have more cyclical upside. Our Monetary Indicator remains in stimulative territory, supporting our cyclical constructive equity view. The Fed is firmly on hold and global central banks have been opening the monetary spigots, thus monetary conditions should stay supportive. The BCA Composite Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of 11 measures, is in overvalued territory, but it is not high enough to negate the positive message of our Monetary Indicator, especially as our Composite Technical Indicator has moved back above its 9-month moving average. These dynamics confirm that despite the near-term downside, equities have more cyclical upside. According to our model, 10-year Treasurys are slightly expensive. Moreover, our technical indicator flags a similar picture. However, duration surveys show that investors have very elevated portfolio duration, and both the term premium and Fed expectations are very depressed. Taking this positioning into account, BCA’s economic view is consistent with limited yield downside in the short-run, and higher yields on a 6 to 12 month basis. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar is only getting ever more expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator is not only in overbought territory, it is also starting to diverge from prices. Normally, this technical action points to a possible trend reversal, especially when valuations are so demanding. However, this downside will only materialize once global growth shows greater signs of strength. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes   Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       Edward E. Leamer, "Housing is the business cycle," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 149-233, 2007. 2       This includes both real and financial transactions. 3       Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Trump Became A War President,” dated May 17, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Stay Cyclically Overweight Global Equities, But Hedge Near-Term Downside Risks From An Escalation Of A Trade War,” dated May 10, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5       Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Trader's Paradise,” dated January 28, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6       Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004). 7       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, and “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8       We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. 9       Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill. 10       Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018.  11       Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 12       It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations. 13       We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

HighlightsU.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade.How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge.We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best.When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS.When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio.However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further.FeatureSome 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today.But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following:A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart I-1A, top panel).Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart I-1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity.Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart I-1A, bottom panel).Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart I-1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available.Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart I-1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart I-1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. Chart I-1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)   Chart I-1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (II) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (II) Structural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (II)  If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money?We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment.In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4 BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only.We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments.Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart I-2 and Table I-1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them. Chart I-2 Chart I- Summary Of ResultsTable I-2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below. Chart I- Which assets perform best when inflation is rising?Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is.Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation.Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high.U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge.Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising?Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high.Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses.Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising?With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles.Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high.Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility.What is the cost of inflation hedging?To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging:Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities / 40% bonds.Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities / 40% bonds / 5% TIPS / 5% commoditiesMedium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities / 30% bonds / 15% TIPS / 15 % commoditiesPure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS / 50% commodities. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Chart I-3Inflation Hedging Comes At A Cost Inflation Hedging Comes At A Cost Inflation Hedging Comes At A Cost  While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart I-3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart I-3, panel 3).What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart I-3, panel 4).Investment ImplicationsHigh inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following:1.  At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation.2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now.3.  Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate.4.  When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio.5.  When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio.Asset ClassesGlobal EquitiesThe relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-1, top panel). Chart II-1 This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations:Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-1, bottom panel).When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation.When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations.With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile. Chart II- U.S. Treasuries Chart II-2 U.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices.The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs. Chart II- U.S. REITs Chart II-3 While REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles. Chart II- Commodity Futures Chart II-4 Commodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return:Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-4, bottom panel).When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return.Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive. Chart II- U.S. Inflation-Protected Bonds Chart II-5 While inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation. Chart II- Sub-Asset ClassesGlobal Equity Sectors Chart III-1 For the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data.Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results:When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart III-1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple.When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart III-1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods.When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart III-1, panel 3).When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart III-1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. Equities Chart III-2 How do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities?The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart III-2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar.When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart III-2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environmentU.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart III-2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period.U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart III-2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual Commodities Chart III-3 Our analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart III-3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns.When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart III-3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period.When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart III-3, panel 3).We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart III-3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns  64% of the time compared to 52% for silver.Other AssetsU.S. Direct Real Estate Chart IV-1Direct Real Estate Is A Good Inflation Hedge Direct Real Estate Is A Good Inflation Hedge Direct Real Estate Is A Good Inflation Hedge  Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform?We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues:Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies.The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate.Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation.Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart IV-1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart IV-1, bottom panel). Cash Chart IV-2Very High Inflation Erodes The Value Of Cash Very High Inflation Erodes The Value Of Cash Very High Inflation Erodes The Value Of Cash  Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample. (Chart IV-2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart IV-2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa OssaSenior Analystjuanc@bcaresearch.com Footnotes1      Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004).2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.3      We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004.4      Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill.5      Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018. 6      Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.7      It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations.8      We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile.       

Highlights The upcoming changes to the Global Industry Classification Standard will substantially alter the sector composition of the MSCI China Investable index, by hollowing out the information technology sector (to the benefit of consumer discretionary and the new communication services sector). The new communication services sector will become a market-neutral (but barbelled) sector from the perspective of cyclicality, with high- and low-beta components. The inclusion of Alibaba in the consumer discretionary sector warrants the closure of our most successful trade over the past year: long consumer staples / short discretionary. Feature S&P Dow Jones and MSCI Inc. will be implementing major structural changes to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), effective after the market close on September 28, 2018. The changes are among the most significant since the GICS was launched in 1999, and there are meaningful implications for investors. In this brief special report, we summarize the key changes as they pertain to the Chinese investable equity benchmark, and provide a counterfactual simulation of historical performance had the upcoming changes been in effect over the past three years.1 For the MSCI China index, the main investable equity benchmark, the changes to the GICS structure will largely impact three sectors: information technology, consumer discretionary, and telecommunication services: The telecommunication services sector will be renamed to "communication services", and this new level 1 sector will be much broader in scope. Communication services will include companies that facilitate transformation in the way of communication, entertainment, and information seeking. In addition to the companies currently classified within telecommunication services, communication services will include media stocks formerly in the consumer discretionary sector, including advertising, broadcasting, cable & satellite, publishing, movies & entertainment sub-sectors. In addition, home entertainment software and some internet software & services companies, currently classified under the information technology sector, will also move to communication services. These include prominent stocks like Baidu, Tencent, Sina, and Sohu. The consumer discretionary sector will include online retailers, such as Alibaba, from information technology sector under its internet & direct marketing retail sub-sector. Chart 1 shows that these changes will have a very substantial impact on the sector composition of the MSCI China index. The weight of the information technology sector will drop dramatically from 37% to 3% after the GICS changes occur, because all three of the BAT stocks (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) will move to other sectors. The weight of consumer discretionary is set to rise from 8% to 20%, as the inclusion of Alibaba offsets the removal of media (Alibaba alone will account for 60% of the consumer discretionary sector after the GICS changes). Relative to the current weight of telecommunication services, the new communication services sector weight will be substantially higher, at 27% (versus its 5% current weight). Chart 2 provides both factual and counterfactual perspectives on what relative performance for these three sectors would have looked like since 2016, had the upcoming changes been in effect. The chart shows that the relative performance of consumer discretionary and communication services sector would have been considerably stronger, while the tech sector would have underperformed (in sharp contrast to what has actually occurred). Chart 3 provides some perspective on the cyclicality of China's new communication services sector. The telecommunication services sector is clearly a defensive sector, and has exhibited a beta less than 0.5 over the past year. However, the chart shows that communication services (had it existed), would have basically been a market-neutral sector in terms of market beta because of the offsetting impact of both including high-beta internet software & services companies and low-beta telecommunication services. In effect, the new communication services will become a barbelled sector from the perspective of cyclicality, with high- and low-beta components. Chart 1A Hollowing Out Of The Information Technology Sector A Hollowing Out Of The Information Technology Sector A Hollowing Out Of The Information Technology Sector Chart 2CD And Comm Services Would Have Outperformed Over The Past Three Years CD And Comm Services Would Have Outperformed Over The Past Three Years CD And Comm Services Would Have Outperformed Over The Past Three Years Chart 3Comm Services: A Market-Neutral, Barbelled Sector Comm Services: A Market-Neutral, Barbelled Sector Comm Services: A Market-Neutral, Barbelled Sector Finally, the beta of consumer discretionary sector would have been higher over the past two years in our counterfactual scenario, thanks to the inclusion of Alibaba. Consumer discretionary stocks have fared poorly in response to a trade war with the U.S., but the imminent inclusion of Alibaba in the discretionary sector will substantially alter the character of its future performance. As such, we have decided to close our long MSCI China Consumer Staples / short MSCI China Consumer Discretionary trade at a fantastic return of 47.6%. Qingyun Xu, Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com 1 For China, we proxy the upcoming changes to the GICS structure using a simple set of rules that aims to capture an overwhelming majority (but not all) of the upcoming changes. As such, investors should view our methodology as an approximation, rather than an exact application of the firm-by-firm changes that MSCI will make. Clients who are interested in a similar exercise for the global IMI benchmark should refer to Neeraj Dabake, Craig Feldman. (September, 2018) The New GICS Communication Services Sector. MSCI Research Paper, Retrieved from https://www.msci.com/www/research-paper/the-new-gics-communication/01107886967. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

There is growing evidence that Trump and the U.S.A. are winning not only the war of words, but also the actual trade war, even though it is still early days. Chart 1 clearly depicts that the S&P 500 is having a stellar year compared with the rest of the world's bourses, leaving in the dust the MSCI All Country World Index. As trade policy uncertainty has skyrocketed to two-decade highs (only the 1993/4 Clinton era trade spat hit a higher mark),1 U.S. stocks have been primary beneficiaries. Even in absolute terms, the SPX is also enjoying a healthy and positive return year. Chart 1U.S. Is Winning The Trade War... U.S. Is Winning The Trade War... U.S. Is Winning The Trade War... Similarly, the U.S. dollar, boosted by rising interest rate differentials, has greatly benefited from increased trade rhetoric as the rest of the world bears the brunt of American trade protectionism (Chart 2). Granted, the U.S. profit backdrop remains upbeat, easily surpassing the rest of the world courtesy of the tax fillip for the current calendar year. But, even 10% EPS growth slated both for next year and 2020, at this later stage in the cycle is nothing less than rock-solid. Thus, relative EPS euphoria is a key pillar of the U.S. equity market's global dominance as, at the margin, global capital has flowed to the growth delta of the U.S. (Chart 3). Chart 2... And So Is The U.S. Dollar ... And So Is The U.S. Dollar ... And So Is The U.S. Dollar Chart 3EPS Also Explains The U.S. Outperformance EPS Also Explains The U.S. Outperformance EPS Also Explains The U.S. Outperformance In more detail, Chart 4 breaks down the MSCI ACWI performance in its major components and makes abundantly clear that the U.S. comes out on top, whereas both its DM and EM peers trail far behind. Keep in mind that the U.S. remains a mostly closed economy (70% PCE driven, top panel, Chart 5) and the ultimate consumer of the world, while Europe and Japan are open economies sporting trade surpluses and levered to net exports (bottom panel, Chart 5). This backdrop is also reflected in country equity composition with the U.S. being the most defensive index compared with its European and Japanese peers that are more cyclically exposed. Chart 4Rest Of The World Bears Brunt Of Trade War Rest Of The World Bears Brunt Of Trade War Rest Of The World Bears Brunt Of Trade War Chart 5U.S. Is A Closed Economy U.S. Is A Closed Economy U.S. Is A Closed Economy Nevertheless, U.S. stocks are not 100% insulated from the Administration's trade policy. Chart 6 shows a bifurcated deep cyclical equity market. Materials and industrials stocks have underperformed the SPX year-to-date as the appreciating greenback has dealt a blow both to the CRB raw industrials and base metals indexes. An exception is energy, which has ground higher as crude oil has up to now escaped the greenback's wrath, but may not do so indefinitely. Chart 6Bifurcated Deep Cyclical Market Bifurcated Deep Cyclical Market Bifurcated Deep Cyclical Market Tech has been the shining star, but it is also a risk that can bring the SPX down given its hefty 25% plus market capitalization weighting and the highest export exposure among GICS1 sectors at 60% of sales. The purpose of this Special Report is to delve deeper into the current Administration's increasing trade protectionism rhetoric and document if the equity market cares, using empirical evidence. A Unique Entry Into The U.S. National Archives Much hay has been made over Donald Trump's use of Twitter in the White House. Parsing 280 characters that are as likely to reveal a consequential new trade policy or fire a key staffer as they are to complain about news coverage has become sport for pundits and an endless source of fodder for the media. However, at BCA, we are focused on the wealth preservation of our clients. As such, it is incumbent upon us to perform an analysis of the market implications of these tweets in order to determine whether @realDonaldTrump is a source of investable strategies or merely noise. For the purposes of our analysis, we are examining only tweets relating to trade over the past six months (including those subsequently deleted). These should have the broadest stock market impact. They are plentiful, as summarized in Table 1. The Broad Market Does Not Care... Our analysis begins with the S&P 500's performance on the dates noted in Table 1. The result of the analysis (Table 2) is that there is no statistical correlation between the S&P 500's performance on those dates as the market both rose and fell relatively indiscriminately. In other words, the market does not appear to care what Donald Trump is tweeting with respect to trade. The absence of a confirming result is logical; somewhat less than 40% of the S&P 500's revenues are generated overseas, implying limited negative market repercussions from trade rhetoric. Further, the S&P 500 is far more international than the broad U.S. corporate sector. We thus glean two lessons from the analysis: trade rhetoric does not materially impact the stock market and has even less bearing on the health of corporate America. Table 1Trump Tweets About Trade Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? Table 2S&P 500 Reaction To Trade Tweets Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? ...Nor Do Sectors... Still, we presume there must be some market impact from trade rhetoric. Accordingly, we deepened our analysis to the relative performance of the 11 GICS1 sectors vis-à-vis the S&P 500 on the dates noted in Table 1. The results are presented in Table 3. Table 3GICS1 Reaction To Trade Tweets Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? As with the broad market, there appears to be little correlation between internationally-geared indexes and negative trade tweets. S&P technology, the most international of the GICS1 sectors, underperformed in 75% of the iterations but only by an average of 0.1%, hardly significant enough to make a claim that the market was focused on the president's Twitter account. Further, S&P health care, a mostly trade-insulated index, underperformed the same number of times as S&P technology and by a greater amount. We therefore conclude that sectors do not materially react to trade tweets. ...But The International Champions Do Our last effort to find a correlation between Donald Trump's use of Twitter and the stock market's performance met with greater success. We assumed that the trade bellwether stocks would likely have a greater reaction function to negative trade tweets. We accordingly built an equal-weighted index of Apple, Boeing, Caterpillar, General Electric and 3M that we coined "The Internationals". The relative performance of this index is shown in Table 4. Table 4International Stocks Reaction To Trade Tweets Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? Trump, Trade, Tweets & Tumult - Does The Stock Market Care? The Internationals underperformed the S&P 500 in every iteration we tested. Most notable was on March 22, 2018 when the S&P 500 fell 2.5%, the Internationals underperformed even that low mark by 1.8%. The inference is that market implications of negative trade tweets are largely confined to these few international stocks. Considering their heft (these five stocks comprise 6.5% of the S&P 500's weight), they are largely responsible for weighing on the S&P 500 around trade rhetoric iterations. Conclusions: Rhetoric Matters Less Than Reality Chart 7U.S. Has The Upper Hand U.S. Has The Upper Hand U.S. Has The Upper Hand The upshot of our analysis is that, aside from a few notable international trade bellwethers, Donald Trump's trade rhetoric does not have material broad market implications. However, negative trade tweets pose a threat to a few of BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy portfolio recommendations, as we maintain high-conviction overweight ratings on the S&P 500 technology hardware, storage & peripherals and S&P 500 construction machinery & heavy trucks indexes. Apple and Caterpillar each represent more than 60% of the weight of these respective indexes. Nevertheless, we think the rhetoric is mostly noise and any impact will likely be transitory. Of much greater importance are the real world impact of tariffs and the potential earnings impact of a decline in global trade and especially a continuation in the U.S. dollar rally. The U.S. dollar appreciation remains the key risk to U.S. Equity Strategy's cyclically-oriented portfolio positioning. Meanwhile, we recently highlighted the U.S. equity sector implications of a mounting U.S./China trade war in a Special Report. In it, we identified service-oriented industries and defense stocks as relative winners should the dispute escalate - both BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy are already bullish defense stocks2 - though few stocks would likely be absolute positive performers. Recent news of a new round of U.S. and China talks is a step in the right direction, but as likely to disappoint as to mark the peak of a protectionist cycle. Bottom Line: Empirical evidence suggests that Trump's trade rhetoric has yet to short-circuit the broad U.S. equity market, despite affecting a select few internationally exposed bellwether stocks. The rest of the world has borne the brunt of hawkish trade comments from the U.S. administration Chart 7 that has helped to put a solid bid under the U.S. dollar. We continue to expect an earnings led advance in the S&P 500 in the coming 9-12 months, but are closely monitoring the U.S. currency given the heightened EPS sensitivity. BCA Geopolitical Strategy Housekeeping On a separate housekeeping note, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy is closing its South Korean curve steepener trade for a gain of 0.2%. Instead, to play our constructive view on the Korean peninsula, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy will go long Korean equities relative to Emerging Markets. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 In a similar effort to address the trade deficit with Japan, President Clinton threatened a combination of tariffs, quotas and sanctions on Japanese autos. The culmination was a broad agreement on automotive trade. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Brothers In Arms," dated January 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights A broad survey on various valuation ratios suggests that Chinese investable equities' exceptional cheapness in the past several years has essentially vanished. Valuation is no longer a compelling reason for staying positive. Multiples of Chinese equities have been rerated in the past two years. This asset class is currently trading at a slight premium over its historical norms as well as other emerging markets, but it is still at discounts to developed bourses and the all-country-world averages. Remain bullish on Chinese investable equities due to our positive stance on the cyclical outlook of economy and profits. Feature Chinese industrial profits increased by 16.5% in July from a year ago, as released early this week. This is a mild deceleration compared with the 19.1% pace a month earlier, which the authorities attributed to temporary factory shutdowns due to extreme summer heat. Irrespective, the latest profit numbers confirm that the economy is passing its peak growth rate in this mini cycle upturn, but overall business activity remain fairly robust. Looking forward, we see limited downside in China's cyclical growth outlook, as discussed in various recent reports.1 Chinese equities have also experienced a mini melt-up in recent weeks. So far this year, Chinese investable stocks, measured by the MSCI China Free index, have rallied by almost 40% in dollar-terms, significantly outpacing all major global and EM benchmarks. Importantly, the total return index of Chinese investable stocks, price appreciation and dividend income combined has recently broken above a long-term resistance, reaching an all-time high (Chart 1). While the strong performance of Chinese equities has validated our positive stance on China's growth and profit profile, the sharp rally in prices also raises a red flag on potential froth and complacency. A closer look at the valuation picture of Chinese equities is well warranted. Conventional Valuation Indicators At the onset, conventional valuation indicators for the broad Chinese investable equity universe currently do not look demanding compared with historical norms (Chart 1, bottom panel). Our composite valuation indicator, which combines several conventional yardsticks such as trailing and forward price-to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-cash and dividend yield, has crawled out of the "undervalued" extreme that lasted for several years, but it is not yet overvalued. Most conventional valuation indicators are currently roughly in line with their respective long-term averages (Chart 2). Chart 1Chinese Investable Stocks Are No Longer ##br##Exceptionally Cheap Chinese Investable Stocks Are No Longer Exceptionally Cheap Chinese Investable Stocks Are No Longer Exceptionally Cheap Chart 2Most Valuation Indicators ##br##Are Back To Historical Means Most Valuation Indicators Are Back To Historical Means Most Valuation Indicators Are Back To Historical Means Compared with other emerging bourses, Chinese investable equities have also been re-rated. In fact, Chinese equities' outperformance against the EM benchmark since mid-last year has been entirely driven by relative multiples expansion (Chart 3). Our relative composite valuation indicator suggests Chinese investable equities are trading at a moderate premium over the EM benchmark, after a few years of deep discount. Most valuation indicators of Chinese equities are slightly higher than the EM benchmark, but are still significantly lower than their peers in the developed market (Chart 4). Chart 3Chinese Equities Have Been Rerated ##br##Against EM Chinese Equities Have Been Rerated Against EM Chinese Equities Have Been Rerated Against EM Chart 4Chinese Equities Are Trading At Premium##br## Against EM, But Not DM Chinese Equities Are Trading At Premium Against EM, But Not DM Chinese Equities Are Trading At Premium Against EM, But Not DM Weight-Adjusted Valuation Indicators A major issue of conducting historical and cross-country comparisons of valuation indicators is the ever-changing constituents in the indexes. The benchmark to evaluate P/B ratios of tech companies should be categorically different from those of banks, as should the price-to-cash ratios for retailers and utility firms. A simple lump-sum aggregate of a conventional valuation indicator ignores the different sector weights among different markets, which could be misleading. This is particularly important for China, as its juvenile equity universe is constantly evolving and rapidly changing (Chart 5). The largest sector by weight in the Chinese investable market in the past 10 years has shifted from telecom to energy to banks, with the baton more recently being passed to information technology. Currently, IT firms account for over 40% of the MSCI China Free index, up from less than 10% three years ago, while banks have dropped from a peak of 44% to 25% currently. The shifting sector weights within the Chinese equity universe also reflect the rapidly changing structure of the underlying Chinese economy. Chart 5Chinese Investable Equities Sector Breakdown A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations One way to deal with this issue is some sort of "controlled weight" valuation indicator by holding sector weights constant. Chart 6 shows the simple averages of various valuation ratios of the 10 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors.2 With the exception of dividend yield, the equal-weighted valuation indicators are more expensive than their respective market weight-based versions, according to our calculation. This means that some smaller-weight sectors are more dearly valued compared with the large weights, particularly banks. However, none of the valuation ratios appear extreme in a historical context. How do Chinese equities compare with other markets? Table 1 summarizes equal-sector-weight valuation indicators. Overall, Chinese equities are trading at a slight premium over emerging markets, but are still at 10-20% discounts to developed bourses and the all-country-world averages. Table 1 A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratios The Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings (CAPE) multiple (also known as the Shiller P/E) compares the equity price to the earnings in a full business cycle extended over many years, rather than just one random year. Typically, CAPEs are calculated by dividing the equity price by the 10-year average of real earnings, which smooths out the business cycle and theoretically better captures what equity investors are paying for companies' long term earning streams. Chart 7 shows that CAPEs are well above 20 times for the U.S. and Japanese markets, and around 16 times for U.K. and euro area stocks - all have experienced some multiples expansion since the global financial crisis. In China's case, the CAPE for investable equities has been hovering at around 10 times, near a record low and significantly below the level of the other major indexes. In fact, the CAPE of investable Chinese shares has barely stopped falling amid the rally in prices. Chart 6Average Versus Market-Weight Valuation Ratios Average Versus Market-Weight Valuation Ratios Average Versus Market-Weight Valuation Ratios Chart 7Cyclically Adjusted P/E: A Global Comparison Cyclically Adjusted P/E: A Global Comparison Cyclically Adjusted P/E: A Global Comparison Investment Conclusions Taken together, the valuation picture of Chinese investable stocks has become mixed, as its total return index has reached an all-time high. This asset class is no longer obviously undervalued compared with both historical norms and its EM peers. Some viewed Chinese equities' exceptional cheapness in the past several years as a "value-trap," which has proven to be a costly mistake and has been discredited. Now the "easy trade" is over, and valuation is no longer a compelling reason for staying positive on Chinese equities. On the other hand, a broad survey on various valuation ratios does yet not conjure up images of an overly extended market, both compared with historical averages and other global benchmarks, particularly DM bourses. Lack of valuation froth means Chinese investable shares are not yet subject to the pull of mean reversion. Cyclically, we remain optimistic on China's growth and earnings outlook, which should continue to push up stock prices. Valuation indicators are never good timing tools, but they should be closely monitored going forward to assess the risk-return tradeoff of holding Chinese equities. We will dig deeper into domestic A shares in an upcoming report. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process", dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Includes Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Information Technology, Materials, Telecommunication Services and Utilities. Real Estate is included in Financials, due to its limited data availability as a stand-alone GICS sector. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. The recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. Feature Chinese domestic stocks and bonds have taken a beating of late as the authorities ramped up scrutiny to rein in excesses in the country's financial sector. While it is warranted to control accumulated financial risk - especially associated with shadow banking activity - the "campaign" style administrative crackdown has caused widespread confusion and mini-panics among domestic investors. The actions and corresponding reactions illustrate the authorities' primitive control tools, which are increasingly at odds with the rapidly developing financial sector, and how blanket actions can spur undue financial volatility and provoke unintended consequences. For now, we expect the economic fallout to be limited, unless the financial crackdown causes further spikes in interest rates and a sudden halt in credit flows. Chinese shares listed overseas will continue to grind higher in the absence of a major policy mishap that short-circuits the broad growth improvement and the profit cycle upturn. Domestic A shares will remain largely trendless, while the more richly valued bubbly segments of the market will continue to deflate. Domestic corporate bonds are starting to look attractive after the most recent panic selloff. What Do They Want To Achieve? Policymakers' primary focus has been on cracking down on excessive speculation in financial markets and restricting lending activities that are not in compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Financial sector deregulation in recent years has increasingly blurred the lines between banks, insurance companies, brokers and trust companies, and regulators are constantly challenged to monitor all the increasingly sophisticated moving parts. From the banking sector's point of view, regulators are concerned that lenders have been aggressively boosting their exposure to other banks and non-bank financial institutions instead of providing credit to the "real economy." Overall commercial banks' claims on other banks and non-bank financial institutions have increased from 12% of their total assets in 2006 to over 25% as of January 2017, while their liabilities to other banks and non-bank financial firms have increased from 7% to 12% (Chart 1). Smaller banks are even more dependent on interbank financing for loanable funds. Interbank transactions and repo activities account for about 14% of smaller lenders' total source of funding, compared with 2% for large banks (Chart 2). Some small banks regularly borrow at lower costs through the interbank market or use negotiable certificate of deposits to purchase "wealth management products" offering higher returns issued by other banks or financial institutions. The duration mismatch leads to constant pressure to roll over these short-term financial instruments. The increasing interdependence among the country's financial institutions also creates the risk of a chain reaction in the financial system should some type of credit event erupt. Chart 1Increasing Interdependence Among Financial Institutions China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications The Chinese authorities have long regarded preventing systemic financial risk as a top priority, and the recent growth improvement has provided a window of opportunity for some housecleaning without a major adverse impact on the economy. Therefore, it is unlikely that regulators will back off from tightening regulatory supervision going forward. Overall, the authorities will continue to discourage overtrading within the financial system, and enforce full disclosure of off-balance-sheet items and shadow lending activities. The saving grace is that tightened macro prudential measures have already begun to curtail banks' aggressive expansion to non-bank financial institutions. Commercial banks' claims to these firms have slowed sharply since last year's peak (Chart 3). Meanwhile, the recent rise in interbank rates should also further discourage the perceived "risk-free" funding arbitrage to play the interest rate gap between long- and short-dated financial assets. All of this reduces the pressure of an escalation in the regulatory crackdown. Chart 2Smaller Banks Depend More On##br## Wholesale Funding Smaller Banks Depend More On Wholesale Funding Smaller Banks Depend More On Wholesale Funding Chart 3Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms ##br##Has Been Scaled Back Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms Has Been Scaled Back Banks' Exposure To Non-Bank Financial Firms Has Been Scaled Back Should Investors Be Concerned? In essence, banks' rising claims to other financial institutions means a lengthening of the credit intermediation channel, in which financing goes from credit providers through multiple layers of intermediaries to reach final borrowers in the real economy. In other words, banks, instead of lending directly to borrowers, channel loans to trust companies or securities brokers, who in turn transfer the funds to the real economy through "shadow banking" activities such as trust loans or various forms of "wealth management products", typically at higher rates. From this perspective, cracking down on lending excesses within the financial system in of itself should not have a material impact on credit flows to final corporate borrowers. In fact, streamlining the financial intermediation channel holds the promise of increasing accessibility to bank credit for the corporate sector and reducing its funding cost, which should benefit the overall economy in the long run. In the near term, liquidity tightening and the regulatory crackdown could push up interest rates and disrupt credit flows, which should be closely monitored to assess near-term negative impact on the economy. So far, the impact does not appear material. Chart 4Regulatory Crackdown ##br## Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Regulatory Crackdown Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Regulatory Crackdown Has Not Interrupted Credit Flows Interbank rates have increased by about 100 basis points across the board since the beginning of this year, and 10-year government bond yields have risen by 50 basis points - both of which pale in comparison to the significant improvement in overall business activity. Nominal GDP growth expanded by 11.8% in the first quarter, compared with 9.6% in Q4, 2016. Furthermore, the central bank early this week re-started its medium-term lending facility (MLF), which was designed to avoid liquidity overkill in the domestic financial sector. Overall, the risk of overtightening of liquidity is not high. The regulatory crackdown since early this year has not had a meaningful impact on credit expansion. Banks' claims to other financial institutions have slowed sharply, but overall loan growth has been rather stable. Importantly, medium- and long-term loans to the corporate sector, pivotal for overall capital spending, have in fact accelerated (Chart 4). In short, increased regulatory scrutiny on the domestic financial sector may continue to create some headline risks and financial volatility, but the real economic impact should be marginal. We expect the authorities to remain highly vigilant and avoid policy overkill. Reading Market Tea Leaves There have been some notable divergences among different classes of Chinese stocks (Chart 5). Chinext, the domestic small-cap venture board, has suffered heavy losses of late, while large-cap A shares have been much more resilient. Meanwhile, offshore Chinese shares have barely felt any pressure at all. H shares have moved higher of late, while Chinese firms listed in the U.S. have decisively broken out. The divergence between onshore and offshore Chinese stocks' performance confirms the recent regulatory crackdown has mainly caused liquidity issues in the domestic market rather than any sort of real growth issue. Barring major policy mistakes, we expect the Chinese economy to stay buoyant, as discussed in detail in our recent report.1 As such, a few investment conclusions can be drawn. Tighter liquidity will likely continue to place downward pressure on domestic stock prices, but the downside is limited by overall buoyant activity and improving profits. We expect the broad-A share market will remain narrowly range-bound. Overseas-listed Chinese shares are not subject to domestic liquidity constraints, and will likely continue to grind higher supported by growth improvement, profit recovery and low valuation multiples. The small-cap Chinext market has long been viewed as the more speculative segment of the domestic financial market, with higher multiples and greater volatility than large-cap A shares. As such, this market will remain vulnerable to domestic liquidity tightening. Even after the most recent selloff, the bourse's trailing price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio are still at 38.4 and 4.6, respectively, much higher than for broader onshore and offshore Chinese stocks. The recent selloff in the onshore corporate bond market has also been driven by liquidity pressure, which in our view is overdone. While it's true that economic acceleration justifies higher yields, corporate spreads have also widened sharply, which is at odds with the broad growth acceleration and profit recovery. In addition, after the most recent selloff, Chinese corporate spreads are significantly higher than in most other major markets (Chart 6). In the near term, tighter liquidity may continue to induce more selling pressure in the domestic bond market. Cyclically we expect Chinese corporate bond spreads to narrow. Chart 5Diverging Market Trends Diverging Market Trends Diverging Market Trends Chart 6The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate ##br##Spreads Is Overdone The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate Spreads Is Overdone The Sharp Spike In Chinese Corporate Spreads Is Overdone Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Has China's Cyclical Recovery Peaked?" dated May 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

One of our favored themes over the past few months has been to tilt portfolios in favor of domestic vs. globally-oriented industries. With the U.S. dollar breaking above its trading range, a catalyst now exists to spur an imminent recovery in the domestic vs. global share price ratio. The latter had become extremely oversold as the U.S. dollar consolidated and the Chinese economy began to stabilize, but economic fundamentals are shifting decisively back in favor of the U.S. The U.S. PMI is already making small strides vs. the Chinese and euro area PMI (second panel), heralding a rebound in cyclical share price momentum. World export growth remains anemic, and world export prices continue to deflate, albeit at a lesser rate. Protectionist rhetoric and/or policies would only serve to undermine trade. When compared with the reacceleration in U.S. retail sales, the outlook for domestic-sourced profits is even brighter. We reiterate our theme of tilting to domestic vs. globally-oriented industries. bca.uses_in_2016_11_17_001_c1 bca.uses_in_2016_11_17_001_c1