Gold

Highlights Collective market signals suggest a low but non-negligible probability of a dollar spike due to the coronavirus. Stay long the yen as a portfolio hedge. Short CHF/JPY bets also make sense.  Our limit sell on the gold/silver ratio was triggered at 90. Place a stop at 95, with an initial target of 80. Feature Chart I-1Watching Market Signals Watching Market Signals Watching Market Signals Investors can generally be classified in two camps. There are those who are predisposed to being risk averse. As such, capital preservation trumps the desire for outsized returns. For such investors, defensive equities such as staples and utility stocks, fixed-income assets, or even gold tend to be the favored vehicles over time. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the investors who desire hopping on and riding the next growth unicorn. Their favored investment universe can include technology and biotech concerns, but can also span industries such as automotive and food. The key, however, is that their inherent disposition is to multiply returns rather than preserve capital. There is a crucial difference between this bias and a risk-on/risk-off environment. For example, in a risk-on environment, the more prudent investor might choose high-yielding government bonds, while the high flyer will be in the S&P 500 or private equity. In the currency world, the “preservationist” might choose the euro as an anti-dollar play despite negative yields, while the “high flyer” would rather be in the New Zealand dollar or the Norwegian krone. The oscillation between these two bipolar universes can be measured in various ways, but one that has been prescient in gauging the direction for currency markets is the ratio between the S&P 500 index and gold prices. In general, whenever the S&P 500 has been outperforming gold, the dollar has tended to soar, and vice versa (Chart I-1). As a closed economy, US markets are generally more defensive. So even in a risk-off environment, this ratio can capture the preference for capital preservation versus growth. The collective signals from financial markets suggest there is a low probability of a dollar spike. The SPX/Gold ratio hit a peak of 2.5 in the last quarter of 2018 and has since been exhibiting a bearish pattern of lower highs, with the latest rise peaking a nudge below 2.2. Our belief is that it is less a story of greed versus fear, and more an indication of a powerful underlying preference for investors being revealed in asset prices. Gauging FX Market Signals The coronavirus outbreak has been dominating market headlines in recent weeks. We are not infectious disease specialists, so cannot provide any insight on the potential impact on growth and/or the probability for the virus to become much more widespread. However, the collective signals from financial markets suggest there is a low probability of a dollar spike. The rise in the dollar has been relatively on par with the SARS experience of 2002 (Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B). Back then, the Chinese economy had a much smaller effect on global growth, and so far, the number of reported cases is outpacing the SARS experience. So, it is possible that given the dollar bull market of the last decade or so, there is a dearth of new buyers in the greenback. Chart I-2ARun Of The Mill Virus ? (1) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (1) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (1) Chart I-2BRun Of The Mill Virus ? (2) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (2) Run Of The Mill Virus ? (2) The most recent fall in the S&P 500 index versus gold is definitely a sign of risk aversion, but the much broader peak almost two years ago might be signaling an outright shift in the investment universe. In other words, capital preservation might now be best sought outside US bourses. If this is the case, cheap and unloved value stocks will provide better shelter compared to the growth champions of the last decade. It is interesting that emerging market cyclical stocks (where the epicenter of the crisis is) have not underperformed defensives in a meaningful way during the latest riot (Chart I-3). The typical narrative is that the dollar is now a high-yielding currency within the G10. That means it has now become the object of carry trades. Should the investment universe be shifting to one of prudence, it is plausible though not probable that the greenback will provide both functions. Chart I-3Mixed Message From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Mixed Message From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Mixed Message From Cyclicals Versus Defensives Chart I-4Correlation Break Down Or Unsustainable Gap? Correlation Break Down Or Unsustainable Gap? Correlation Break Down Or Unsustainable Gap? The absolute collapse in the gold-to-bond ratio further confirms that after almost a decade of underperformance, hard money might be coming back into favor versus yield plays (Chart I-4). Gold was a monetary aggregate for centuries, and continues to stand as a viable threat to dollar liabilities. This is not only visible in the rampant accumulation of gold by foreign central banks, notably Russia and China, but also by the breakout in gold in almost every currency, including safe-havens like the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen (Chart I-5). The absolute collapse in the gold-to-bond ratio further confirms that after almost a decade of underperformance, hard money might be coming back into favor. Data from the US Treasury confirms that foreign entities have been fleeing US bond markets at among the fastest pace in recent years. On a rolling 12-month total basis, the US saw an exodus of about US$250 billion in Treasurys from foreigners, one of the largest on record (Chart I-6). Foreign private investors are still net buyers of US Treasurys, but the downtrend in purchases in recent years is evident. In addition, this helps explain why gold has also outperformed Treasurys over this period. Chart I-5Soft Versus Hard ##br##Money Soft Versus Hard Money Soft Versus Hard Money Chart I-6Official Data Shows Less Preference For Treasurys Official Data Shows Less Preference For Treasurys Official Data Shows Less Preference For Treasurys The US dollar’s reserve status remains intact for now. But subtle shifts in this exorbitant privilege are worth monitoring. If balance-of-payment dynamics continue to head in the wrong direction, as  they are now, this will favor hard money and non-US assets, while accelerating divestment out of US Treasurys. This is irrespective of whether we enter a risk-on versus risk-off environment. A good proxy for whether the US government was prudent or profligate over the past four decades can be measured by the gap between unemployment relative to NAIRU (the so-called unemployment gap) and the corresponding budget deficit. In simple terms, full employment should be accompanied by balanced budgets, while governments can step in during recessions to put a floor under aggregate demand. Not surprisingly, using this simple rule, sound fiscal policies in the US were usually accompanied by a strong dollar, and vice versa. Chart I-7The Risk To Long Dollar Positions The Risk To Long Dollar Positions The Risk To Long Dollar Positions Over the next five years, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the US budget deficit will swell to 4.6% of GDP. Assuming the current account deficit remains stable, this will pin the twin deficits at 7.2% of GDP. This assumes no recession, which would have the potential to boost the deficit even further. In the last forty years, there has not been any prolonged period where twin deficits in the US have been expanding while the dollar has been in a bull market (Chart I-7).  In a nutshell, even though the coronavirus is dominating headlines, the lack of a more pronounced greenback strength can be pinpointed to a rising number of negative market signals. Our bias is that when this eventually rolls over and global growth picks up in earnest, dollar bulls may be forced to capitulate. Bottom Line: We are not downplaying the potential impact of the coronavirus, but are skeptical of its ability to catapult the dollar higher. We are short the DXY index, with a target of 90 and a stop at 100. Stick with it. Bullish Both Gold And Silver, But Go Short The GSR If we are right, then both gold and silver will tend to rise in an environment where the dollar is falling. That said, the gold/silver ratio (GSR) hit a three-decade high of 93.3 last summer, opening up an arbitrage opportunity. The history of these reversals is that they tend to be powerful, quick, and extremely volatile (Chart I-8). This not only paves the way for an excellent entry point to short gold versus silver, but provides important information on the battleground between easing financial conditions and a pick-up in economic (or manufacturing) activity. The ratio of the velocity of money between the US and China has tended to track both the gold/silver ratio and the dollar closely.  Just like gold, silver benefits from low interest rates, plentiful liquidity, and the incentive for fiat money debasement. However, the gold/silver ratio is sitting near two standard deviations above its mean. Meanwhile, over the past century, the peak in GSR has been around 100. The gold/silver ratio tends to rally ahead of an economic slowdown, but then peaks when growth is still weak but liquidity conditions are plentiful enough to affect the outlook for future growth. This appears to be the case today. The simple reason is that silver has more industrial uses than gold (Chart I-9). Chart I-8GSR At A Speculative Extreme GSR At A Speculative Extreme GSR At A Speculative Extreme Chart I-9No Recession = Buy Silver No Recession = Buy Silver No Recession = Buy Silver The ratio of the velocity of money between the US and China has tended to track both the gold/silver ratio and the dollar closely (Chart I-10). A falling ratio signifies that the number of times money is changing hands in China is outpacing that number in the US. This also tends to coincide with a preference for US versus non-US assets, since animal spirits (as measured by money velocity) tend to be pronounced in places where returns on capital are higher.  Silver is a more volatile metal than gold. Part of the reason is that the silver market is thinner, with future open interest that is about one-third that of gold. As such, silver tends to rise faster than gold during precious metal bull markets (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Falling GSR = Rising Manufacturing Activity Falling GSR = Rising Manufacturing Activity Falling GSR = Rising Manufacturing Activity Chart I-11Silver Is More Volatile Than Gold Silver Is More Volatile Than Gold Silver Is More Volatile Than Gold This brings us to the sweet spot for silver. Even if global growth remains tepid over the next few months, due to a rise in infections from the coronavirus, a lot of the bad news is already reflected in a high GSR. This means the potential for upside will have to be nothing short of a deep recession. Relative speculative positioning favors gold, which is positive from a contrarian standpoint. Ditto for relative sentiment. More often than not, a positive signal from both these indicators has been a good timing tool for a selloff in the GSR. If global growth bottoms, then the rise in silver prices could be explosive. Silver fabrication demand benefits from new industries such as solar and a flourishing “cloud” industry that are capturing the new manufacturing landscape. Meanwhile, we are also entering a window where any pickup in demand could lead to a sizeable increase in the physical silver deficit. Bottom Line: A falling GSR provides important information about the battleground between easing financial conditions and a pickup in economic activity. We remain bullish on both gold and silver, but a trading opportunity has opened up for a short GSR position. Housekeeping Chart I-12AUD Will Follow Asian Currencies AUD Will Follow Asian Currencies AUD Will Follow Asian Currencies Our limit buy on the Australian dollar was triggered at 68 cents. We discussed the Aussie at length in our report dated  January 17.1 Place an initial target at 0.75 cents and a tight stop at 0.66. The near-term risk to this trade is any escalation in virus infections that will collectively send Asian currencies into a tailspin (Chart I-12).     Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "On AUD And CNY," dated January 17, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar   Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been positive: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 51.7 while the services component increased to 53.2 in January. The Dallas Fed manufacturing index improved from -3.2 to -0.2 in January. Moreover, the Richmond Fed manufacturing index soared to 20 in January. Durable goods orders increased by 2.4% month-on-month in December. The trade deficit widened further to $68.3 billion from $63 billion in December. Annualized GDP growth was unchanged at 2.1% year-on-year in Q4. Initial jobless claims fell to 216K from 223K for the week ended January 24th. The DXY index appreciated by 0.1% this week. While the coronavirus spurred worries about a further slowdown in the global economy, the impact on the US remains to be seen. On Wednesday, the Fed committee voted unanimously to keep interest rates on hold at 1.75% and concluded that the current rate is appropriate to support sustained expansion of the US economy. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The Markit manufacturing PMI jumped to 47.8 in January while the services PMI fell slightly to 52.2. The German IFO current assessment index increased to 99.1 from 98.8 in January, while expectations component fell to 92.9. The economic sentiment indicator increased to 102.8 from 101.3 in January. The unemployment rate fell further to 7.4% in December from 7.5% the prior month. The euro has been flat against the US dollar this week. Though the German IFO expectations component disappointed, the overall assessment has shown tentative signs of recovery. More importantly, changes in the manufacturing PMI indices, especially in Germany, are staging the V-shaped recovery we have been expecting. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Consumer confidence was unchanged at 39.1 in January. Services PPI increased by 2.1% year-on-year in December. Headline inflation increased to 0.8% year-on-year from 0.5% in December. Both manufacturing and services PMIs increased to 49.3 and 52.1, respectively in January. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The flare up in risk aversion was a very potent catalyst, given the yen had become unloved and under owned. Persistent global risks, including Mid East tensions, and more recently, the spread of coronavirus, all warrant holding the Japanese yen as a portfolio hedge. Our last weekly report discussed why we prefer the Japanese yen to the Swiss franc as portfolio insurance. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been solid: Both Markit manufacturing and services PMIs soared to 49.8 and 52.9 respectively in January. Nationwide housing prices increased by 1.9% year-on-year in January, compared with 1.4% the previous month. The saucer-shaped bottom in home prices is becoming more and more evident. The British pound has been flat against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the BoE decided to leave interest rates unchanged at 0.75%. The fact that there were only two dissenters, in line with the previous month, suggests that rising bets for a rate cut were misplaced. The UK is due to leave the EU as of January 31st and enter a transition period that is supposed to last until December 31st 2020. The immediate aftermath of the exit will be business as usual. Trading strategy on the pound should be a buy on dips. We will continue to explore opportunities in GBP in upcoming reports. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: The NAB business conditions index fell to 3 from 4 in December. Moreover, the business confidence index decreased to -2 from 0. Headline inflation increased to 1.8% year-on-year from 1.7% in the fourth quarter. Import prices increased by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, while export prices plunged by 5.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q4. The Australian dollar fell by 2.1% against the US dollar this week, triggering our limit buy position at AUD/USD 0.68. Despite temporary challenges from the bushfires and the coronavirus, we continue to hold our base case view that global growth is likely to rebound in the next 12-to-18 months, which is bullish for the Aussie dollar. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: Headline inflation increased to 1.9% year-on-year in Q4, compared with 1.5% the previous quarter. It also beat expectations of 1.8%. The trade balance shifted to a surplus of NZ$547 million in December. Goods exports rose by 4.8% year-on-year to NZ$5.5 billion, while imports fell by 5.4% year-on-year to NZ$5 billion. Shortly after the rise along with inflation data, the New Zealand dollar fell by more than 2% this week, amid growing risk aversion. New Zealand, as a chief exporter of agricultural products, bore a good brunt of speculative selling. Assuming infections peak in the coming weeks, we remain positive on the kiwi as the Chinese government is likely to inject more stimulus into the economy. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly positive: Retail sales increased by 0.9% month-on-month in November. The Bloomberg Nanos confidence index rose to 56.5 from 56.1 for the week ended January 24th. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. As a petrocurrency, the risk of much reduced travel hit the loonie. We have written at length in various reports about the loonie, but the bottom line is that Canada benefits less than other petrocurrencies in oil bull markets. Ergo, the underperformance of short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD positions this week is expected. In other news, Trump has signed the new USMCA bill into law this week, leaving Canada the only member of the trilateral deal that has yet to ratify the agreement. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mixed: The trade surplus narrowed for a fourth consecutive month in December, falling to CHF 2 billion. Real exports decreased by 3.4% month-on-month while real imports grew by 0.2% month-on-month. The ZEW expectations index fell to 8.3 from 12.5 in January. The KOF leading indicator jumped to 100.1 from 96.2 in January. The Swiss franc has been more or less flat against the US dollar this week. The fall in exports of chemical and pharmaceutical production was the main driver behind the decrease in the Swiss trade balance in December. The SNB is walking a fine line. The improvement in the KOF leading indicator, along with rising inflation and PMI data is definitely a source of comfort, but the surge in EUR/CHF will hurt competitiveness and warrant stealth intervention. Buy EUR/CHF at 1.06. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Retail sales fell by 2% month-on-month in December. The Norwegian krone fell by 1.9% against the US dollar this week. The WTI crude oil price plunged by 20% since the peak earlier this month, due to a combination of falling global travel demand, eased Iran tensions and a bearish EIA inventory report. That being said, our Commodity & Energy strategists continue to be bullish energy prices and expect the WTI crude oil price to reach $63/bbl in 2020, based on recovering global demand and supply constraints. This should eventually lift the Norwegian krone. OPEC is scheduled to meet early March, and plunging prices could be a catalyst for the cartel to cut production. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: Producer prices increased by 1.3% year-on-year in December. The trade surplus shrank to SEK 0.3 billion from SEK 2.7 billion in December. Retail sales grew by 3.4% year-on-year in December. Consumer confidence marginally fell to 92.6 from 94.7 in January, while business confidence jumped to 97.4 in January, the highest in seven months. The Swedish krona fell by 1.3% against the US dollar this week. Recent Swedish data has been disappointing given the steep decline during the trade war, but we are beginning to see second-derivative improvements. The trade surplus is rising on a year-on-year basis. Particularly noteworthy was the improvement in business confidence, which has historically led the Swedbank PMI index tick for tick. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

In Gold We Trust In Gold We Trust Overweight This week we reintroduced a modest portfolio hedge via augmenting exposure to global gold miners to overweight. Global gold miners have a lot going for them. Rising global policy uncertainty plays to their strength as investors seek the refuge of safe haven assets especially when geopolitical risks flare up (top panel). Importantly, real US bond yields have also taken a beating recently underpinning gold prices and gold mining equities. This is significant, as bullion yields nothing and gold miners next to nothing so from an opportunity cost perspective it pays to hold a zero yielding asset when competing yields fall and vice versa (middle panel). Worrisomely, this fall in real US yields is de facto pushing global real yields lower, which might indicate that investors worry that the global economy has more downside. In fact, economists’ estimates for GDP growth (as compiled by Bloomberg, bottom panel) continue to decelerate globally, and they forecast below-trend real output growth in the US for 2020. Bottom Line: Boost global gold miners to an above benchmark allocation via the long GDX/short ACWI exchange traded funds.  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Gold bullion is on the move again, and falling real yields, a soft economic backdrop, a depreciating US dollar and resurgent geopolitical uncertainty, all argue for reintroducing a modest portfolio hedge by overweighting the global gold mining index. Washed out technicals, depressed valuations, the turn in our EPS growth model, rising industry capex and bottoming EM-related financial market data, all signal that it no longer pays to be bearish materials stocks. Augment exposure to neutral. Recent Changes Boost global gold miners to overweight via the long GDX/short ACWI exchange traded funds, today. Book gains and lift the S&P materials sector to neutral, today.  Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Three EPS Scenarios Three EPS Scenarios Feature “There is nothing so disturbing to one's well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich.” - Charles P. Kindleberger “The bubble involves the purchase of an asset, usually real estate or a security, not because of the rate of return on the investment but in anticipation that the asset or security can be sold to someone else at an even higher price; the term the ‘greater fool’ has been used to suggest the last buyer was always counting on finding someone else to whom the stock or the condo apartment or the baseball cards could be sold.”  - Charles P. Kindleberger Equities broke out to fresh all-time highs in the second week of the year, shrugging off the flare up in geopolitical risk. It seems that nothing can derail this juggernaut and the following narrative is now prevalent: Bad news is actually good for equities because the Fed will step in and do more QE and cut interest rates anew. Good news is great because the Fed will not hike interest rates as the economy is chugging along. No news is good news as money has to flow somewhere and equities are the default answer. Kindleberger’s quotes above are instructive.      To put the recent advance in perspective, the SPX is up 425 points uninterruptedly since early October – when the Fed commenced ramping up its Treasury purchases – and it is, at a minimum, headed for a much needed breather. Contrary to popular belief, a handful of tech stocks explain this recent meteoric rise rather than a broad-based advance (Chart 1). Currently, the top five stocks in the S&P 500 (AAPL, MSFT, GOOGL, AMZN & FB) comprise over 18% of its market cap, even higher than the late-1999/early-2000 concentration (top panel, Chart 1). On January 9, 2020, AAPL’s $30bn one day market cap increase was larger than the bottom 300 stocks’ market cap in the S&P 500 and is another anecdote that drives this return concentration point home.   Chart 1Teflon Tech Stocks Teflon Tech Stocks Teflon Tech Stocks   As a reminder, we are neutral the broad tech sector and overweight the largest subgroup, the S&P software index, thus participating in this euphoric rise in stocks that has been defying earnings fundamentals. Granted, such phenomena are prevalent late cycle. While this can go on for a bit longer, it is clearly unsustainable and represents a big risk especially given the proliferation of passive funds. Tack on rising geopolitical risks and the odds of a sharp drawdown increase significantly. Before we proceed to our SPX EPS analysis, however, it is worth noting some disappointing economic data. The decade low in the ISM manufacturing, the deceleration in non-farm payroll growth, the grinding higher in the 4-week average of unemployment insurance claims, the contraction in C&I loans, the sustained pessimism in CEO confidence and the down hook in average hourly earnings all warn that macro headwinds abound despite the looming signing of the “phase one” US/China trade deal (Chart 2). All of the rise in the SPX last year was due to multiple expansion. Now, in order for the SPX to continue rallying, profits will have to do the heavy lifting. However, our analysis shows that the market is fully priced and earnings will have to hit escape velocity in order for equities to grow into their pricey valuations (Chart 3). Chart 2Underwhelming Underwhelming Underwhelming Chart 3Lofty Valuations Lofty Valuations Lofty Valuations Currently, our SPX EPS growth model has no pulse. This four-factor macro model is regression based (out of sample since January 2014) and continues to forecast a contraction into mid-year (Chart 4). Chart 4No EPS Pulse No EPS Pulse No EPS Pulse Table 2 summarizes three EPS scenarios analysis, along with a forward P/E multiple and SPX forecast. Table 2Three Scenarios Three EPS Scenarios Three EPS Scenarios This week we are re-instituting a small portfolio hedge, which lifts a niche deep cyclical sector to neutral from previously underweight. Step 1: We plugged into the model our base, worse and best case estimates of these four variables into mid-year, and we got as output the model’s estimate of EPS growth for end-2020 with a range of -1% to 10% (one important assumption is that the historical correlation of the movement of these variables holds steady). Step 2: Then, we applied these growth rates to the IBES 2019 EPS forecast of $162/share and arrived at our end-2020 three scenarios EPS level estimates with a range of $160/share to $178/share. Step 3: We then assigned probabilities to those three outcomes resulting in an EPS forecast of $169/share. Step 4: In order to get an SPX expected value we needed to assign a forward P/E multiple to our EPS estimate. Thus, we introduced our base, worse and best case forward P/Es (with an equal probability of occurrence) and multiplied them with our $169/share weighted EPS forecast in order to arrive at the SPX 3,049 expected value for end-2020 (please refer to the Appendix below for additional details of our analysis and click here if you would like to request the excel file and insert your own estimates and probabilities). Chart 5 depicts the results of our analysis. Chart 5Projections Projections Projections Currently, sell-side analysts expect 10% profit growth in calendar 2020, a tall order in our view, and the SPX appears 8% overvalued according to our analysis. However, a potential break in historical correlations where the ISM recovers, the bond market sells off fearing an inflationary spurt pushing interest rates higher yet P/E multiples continue to expand indiscriminately, could sustain the melt-up phase in stocks in general and mega cap tech stocks in particular. While the macro data cannot fall indefinitely and a natural trough will occur sometime in the first half of the year, we doubt that a V-shaped recovery is imminent. Our base case is a stabilization of macro data equating to roughly 5% EPS growth for this year as noted above, with risks clearly titled to the downside. Under such a backdrop, perceptive equities will have to, at least, mildly deflate to this EPS reality. This week we are re-instituting a small portfolio hedge, which lifts a niche deep cyclical sector to neutral from previously underweight. In Gold We Trust While the SPX has been on an impressive run, it has failed to outshine gold bullion that has been on a tear lately. The bottom panel of Chart 6 shows that gold could be sniffing out a couple of Fed interest rate cuts, warning that the economic backdrop remains frail. This gold move is compelling us to reintroduce a modest portfolio hedge and today we recommend augmenting exposure to global gold miners to overweight. Chart 6What Is Gold Sniffing Out? What Is Gold Sniffing Out? What Is Gold Sniffing Out? Global gold miners have a lot going for them. Rising global policy uncertainty plays to their strength as investors seek the refuge of safe haven assets especially when geopolitical risks flare up (top panel, Chart 7). If our FX strategists hit the bull’s eye and the greenback loses steam this year,1 then gold related equities should outperform given the inverse correlation most commodities, including bullion, enjoy with the US dollar (bottom panel, Chart 7). Chart 7Solid Backdrop Solid Backdrop Solid Backdrop Importantly, real US bond yields have taken a beating recently underpinning gold prices and gold mining equities. This is significant, as bullion yields nothing and gold miners next to nothing so from an opportunity cost perspective it pays to hold a zero yielding asset when competing yields fall and vice versa (second panel, Chart 7). Worrisomely, this fall in real US yields is de facto pushing global real yields lower, which might indicate that investors worry that the global economy has more downside. In fact, economists’ estimates for GDP growth (as compiled by Bloomberg, third panel, Chart 7) continue to decelerate globally, and they forecast below-trend real output growth in the US for 2020. Global manufacturing also reflects this soft economic backdrop. While the global manufacturing PMI is trying to trough – it ticked down last month and is just a hair above the boom/bust line – both its momentum and diffusion are weak, heralding a catch up phase in global gold miners (PMI momentum shown inverted, Chart 8). Chart 8Global Economy Not Out Of The Woods Yet Global Economy Not Out Of The Woods Yet Global Economy Not Out Of The Woods Yet Boost global gold miners to an above benchmark allocation via the long GDX/short ACWI exchange traded funds. From a gold positioning perspective, on all three fronts we monitor (gold ETF holdings, gold net speculative positions and bullish consensus on gold) we see green lights (Chart 9). Even global gold miners’ extremely overbought positions have now been worked out according to our Technical Indicator (TI). Following the parabolic bull run from May to September last year, our TI is now drifting to the neutral zone. Relative valuations have also corrected offering investors a compelling entry point (Chart 10). Chart 9Enticing Sentiment Enticing Sentiment Enticing Sentiment Chart 10Compelling Entry Levels Compelling Entry Levels Compelling Entry Levels In sum, gold bullion is on the move again and falling real yields, a soft economic backdrop, a depreciating US dollar and resurgent geopolitical uncertainty, all argue for reintroducing a modest portfolio hedge by overweighting the global gold mining index. Bottom Line: Boost global gold miners to an above benchmark allocation via the long GDX/short ACWI exchange traded funds. Lift Materials To Neutral While materials stocks have broken down recently, our fresh gold miners overweight lifts the broad materials sector from previously underweight to currently neutral (Chart 11). Not only have relative share prices given way, but also breadth is weak as measured both by the percentage of groups with a positive year-over-year momentum and by the number of groups trading above their 40-week moving average (Chart 12). Moreover, relative valuations are downbeat (second panel, Chart 12), with relative P/S and P/B cratering. Chart 11Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown On the profit front, earnings breadth fell below neutral recently and net earnings revisions have collapsed. Wall Street analysts are even forecasting a dire relative revenue backdrop for the coming twelve months (Chart 13). Chart 12Washout Washout Washout Chart 13Extreme Pessimism Reigns Extreme Pessimism Reigns Extreme Pessimism Reigns While the sell-side has all but given up on this niche deep cyclical sector, we are going against the grain and posit that it no longer pays to be bearish materials stocks. First, our materials sector profit growth model has troughed and signals that a turnaround in EPS growth is underway and should gain steam this year (second panel, Chart 14). Keep in mind that this niche deep cyclical sector has borne the brunt of the Sino/American trade war and the recent de-escalation can serve as a catalyst for an earnings-led recovery (trade policy uncertainty shown inverted, Chart 11). Book relative gains of 5% since inception and lift the S&P materials sector to a benchmark allocation. Second, this industry is not at a standstill. Contrary to the overall economy, materials executives are investing in new projects as financial market reported materials sector capex clearly shows (third & bottom panels, Chart 14). These investments should bear fruit in coming quarters and translate into higher top line growth, something that is not at all discounted in bombed out relative sales growth expectations (bottom panel, Chart 13). Finally, there is tentative evidence that the EMs in general and China in particular are at least stabilizing. Not only are their manufacturing PMIs above the boom/bust line (not shown), but also financial market data suggest that the selling in materials stocks is nearing exhaustion. JP Morgan’s EM currency index is ticking higher, the CRB metals index is showing some signs of life and EM equities have been outperforming their global peers (Chart 15). Chart 14EPS Model Trough, Rising Capex…   EPS Model Trough, Rising Capex…   EPS Model Trough, Rising Capex…   Chart 15…And Firming Financial Market Data Signal It No Longer Pays To Be Bearish …And Firming Financial Market Data Signal It No Longer Pays To Be Bearish …And Firming Financial Market Data Signal It No Longer Pays To Be Bearish Netting it all out, washed out technicals, depressed valuations, the turn in our EPS growth model, rising industry capex and bottoming EM-related financial market data all signal that it no longer pays to be bearish materials stocks. Bottom Line: Book relative gains of 5% since inception and lift the S&P materials sector to a benchmark allocation.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Appendix Appendix 1 Three EPS Scenarios Three EPS Scenarios Appendix 2 Three EPS Scenarios Three EPS Scenarios footnotes 1     Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “On Oil, Growth And The Dollar” dated January 10, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

Highlights OPEC 2.0 production discipline and the capital markets’ parsimony in re funding US shale-oil producers will restrain oil supply growth. Monetary and fiscal stimulus will revive EM demand. These fundamentals will push inventories lower, further backwardating forward curves. Base metals demand will pick up as EM income growth revives. Demand also will get a boost from the ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war. Gold will remain range-bound for most of next year: A weaker USD and rising inflation expectations are bullish, but rising bond yields and reduced trade tensions will be headwinds. Grain markets will drift, although dry conditions in Argentina and the trade-war ceasefire could provide short-term price support, along with a weaker USD. Risk to our view: Continued elevated global policy uncertainty would support a stronger USD and stymie central bank efforts to revive global growth in 2020. Feature Dear Client, We present our key views for 2020 in this issue of Commodity & Energy Strategy. This will be our last publication of 2019, and we would like to take the opportunity to thank you for your on-going interest in the commodity markets and in our publication. It has been our privilege to serve you. We wish you and your loved ones all the best of this beautiful Christmas season and a prosperous New Year in 2020! Robert Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist Going into 2020, policy uncertainty again will be a key driver of commodity demand, the Sino-US trade-war ceasefire and UK election results notwithstanding.1 As uncertainty has increased, demand for safe havens like the USD and gold have increased. The principal impact of this uncertainty shows up in FX markets. As uncertainty has increased, demand for safe havens like the USD and gold has increased. Indeed, the Fed’s Broad Trade-Weighted USD index for goods (TWIBG) has become highly correlated with the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index (GEPU). The three-year rolling correlation between these indexes reached a record high in November 2019 (Chart of the Week).2 Individually, the record for the TWIBG was posted in September 2019, while the GEPU record was hit in August 2019. Chart of the WeekGlobal Economic Policy Uncertainty Highly Correlated With USD 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets A strong USD affects commodity demand directly, because it slows income growth in EM economies – the engine-house of commodity demand. A stronger USD raises the local-currency cost of consuming commodities – an important driver of EM demand – and reduces the local-currency cost of producing commodities. So, at the margin, demand is pressured lower and supply growth is incentivized – together, these effects combine to push prices lower. Economic policy uncertainty likely will diminish in early 2020, following the Sino-US trade-war ceasefire, the decisive UK election results and continued central-bank signaling – particularly from the Fed – that rates policy will remain accommodative for the foreseeable future. That said, the ceasefire does not mark the end of the Sino-US trade war, and many issues – ongoing US-China tensions, US election uncertainty, global populism and nationalism, rising geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf, ad hoc monetary policy globally – still are to be resolved. Terra Incognita The GEPU index does not measure uncertainty per se, as uncertainty per se cannot be measured.3 The index picks up word usage connected with the word “uncertainty.” So, it is more the perception of uncertainty that is being reported by Economic Policy Uncertainty in its data. Nonetheless, this is a good way to measure such sentiment, as research from the St. Louis Fed found: “Increases in the economic uncertainty index tend to be associated with declines (or slower growth) in real GDP and in real business fixed investment.” In past three years, increased policy uncertainty also has been fueling demand for safe havens, chiefly the USD and gold. This is a highly unusual coincidence – i.e., a rising USD accompanied by a rising gold price. Typically, a weaker USD puts a bid under gold prices. Indeed, this relationship is one of the primary drivers of our gold model, which suggests the effect of the heightened policy uncertainty dominates the USD impact on gold prices in the current environment (Chart 2). Chart 2Gold Typically Rallies When the USD Weakens Gold Typically Rallies When the USD Weakens Gold Typically Rallies When the USD Weakens The flip-side of the deleterious effects of higher economic policy uncertainty is its resolution: Growing cash balances and a higher capacity to lever balance sheets of households, firms and investor accounts means there is a lot of dry powder available to recharge growth in the real and financial economies globally.4 Chart 3BCA's Grwowth Gauges Indicate Global Economy Rebounding BCA's Grwowth Gauges Indicate Global Economy Rebounding BCA's Grwowth Gauges Indicate Global Economy Rebounding Our commodity-driven economic activity gauges are picking up growth impulses, most likely in response to the global monetary stimulus that has been deployed this year (Chart 3). In addition, systemically important central banks have given no indication they are going to be reversing this stimulus. A meaningful reduction in uncertainty could turbo-charge global growth prospects. Below, we provide our key views for each of the commodity complexes we cover. Oil Outlook Energy: Overweight. The oil market is poised to move higher on the back of OPEC 2.0’s deepening of production cuts to 1.7mm b/d, mostly because of actions by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to cut output deeper, to a total of close to 900k b/d vs. its October 2018 production levels.5 Combined with the loss of ~ 1.9mm b/d of production in Iran and Venezuela due to US sanctions, the supply side can be expected to tighten next year (Chart 4). The Vienna meeting – which ended December 6, 2019 – demonstrated commitment to OPEC 2.0’s production-restraint strategy, and we expect member states will deliver. At least they will reduce the incidence of free riding at KSA’s expense – there were subtle hints from the Saudis they will not tolerate such behavior. KSA’s threats in this regard are credible, given its follow-through in 1986 when they surged production and briefly drove WTI prices below $10/bbl to send a message to free riders in the OPEC cartel. The Saudis acted similarly during the 2014 – 2016 market share war. US shale-oil production growth will slow next year to 800k b/d y/y, vs. the 1.35mm b/d we expect for this year. US lower 48 crude production will increase to 10.7mm b/d in 2020, taking total US production to 13.1mm b/d, a ~ 850k b/d increase y/y. On the demand side, we lowered our expectation for 2019 growth to 1.0mm b/d, given the continued downgrades of historical consumption estimates this year from the EIA, IEA and OPEC. Nonetheless, we continue to expect 2020 growth of 1.4mm b/d, on the back of continued easing of global financial conditions, led by central-bank accommodation. Given our view, we remain long oil exposures in several ways. First, we remain long WTI futures outright going into 2020; this position is up 30% from January 3, 2019 when it was initiated. Second, we recommended getting long 2H20 vs. short 2H21 Brent futures, expecting crude oil forward curves to backwardate further as tighter supply and stronger demand force refiners to draw inventories harder next year (Chart 5). Chart 4Markets Will Tighten In 2020 Markets Will Tighten In 2020 Markets Will Tighten In 2020 Chart 5Oil Inventories Will Draw Harder In 2020 Oil Inventories Will Draw Harder In 2020 Oil Inventories Will Draw Harder In 2020 We expect Brent crude oil to average $67/bbl next year, given the fundamentals outlined above. We also expect a weaker dollar to be supportive of demand ex-US. WTI will trade at a $4/bbl discount to Brent next year, based on our modeling (Chart 6). Chart 6Brent, WTI Will Trade Higher Brent, WTI Will Trade Higher Brent, WTI Will Trade Higher We remain overweight energy, crude oil in particular, given our expectation markets will tighten on the supply side and demand growth, particularly in EM economies, will revive. Bottom Line: We remain overweight energy, crude oil in particular, given our expectation markets will tighten on the supply side and demand growth, particularly in EM economies, will revive. This expectation will be challenged by continued economic policy uncertainty. On the flip side, however, a meaningful resolution to this uncertainty could turbo-charge growth as real economic activity picks up and the USD weakens. Base Metals Outlook Base Metals: Neutral. We remain strategically neutral base metals going into 2020, but tactically bullish, carrying a long LMEX and iron-ore spread position into the new year.6 The behavior of base metals prices – used by economists as proxies for EM growth – is indicating industrial demand is picking up (Chart 7). This aligns well with our proprietary indicators of commodity demand and global industrial activity (Chart 8). Base metals prices are more sensitive to changes in global growth than other commodities. For this reason, we use these prices to confirm the signals coming from the proprietary models we use to gauge EM growth. Chart 7Base Metals Prices Signaling EM Growth Revival Base Metals Prices Signaling EM Growth Revival Base Metals Prices Signaling EM Growth Revival The so-called phase-one agreement to reduce tariffs in the Sino-US trade war will support global demand at the margin for base metals. This is a ceasefire in the trade war not a resolution, so we are not expecting a surge in demand. Chart 8BCA Proprietary Indicators Also Signaling Growth Revival BCA Proprietary Indicators Also Signaling Growth Revival BCA Proprietary Indicators Also Signaling Growth Revival That said, base metals – aluminum and copper, in particular – have a tailwind in the form of global monetary accommodation by central banks. This was undertaken to reverse the negative effect on global financial conditions brought about by the Fed’s rates normalization policy last year and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. In addition, our China strategists expect modest fiscal and monetary stimulus from Beijing, which also will be supportive of demand.7 Aluminium and copper comprise 75% of the LMEX index. These are primary industrial markets, in which China accounts for ~ 50% of global demand, and EM ex-China demand remains stout. Even with a trade war raging for most of 2019, the supply and demand of aluminum and copper – the largest components of the LMEX index – was diverging: Consumption outpaced production – a multi-year trend – which forced inventories to draw hard (Charts 9A and 9B). Chart 9AGlobal Aluminum Markets Getting Tighter … Global Aluminum Markets Getting Tighter ... Global Aluminum Markets Getting Tighter ... Chart 9B… As Are Copper Markets ... As Are Copper Markets ... As Are Copper Markets Bottom Line: Inventories in industrial-metals markets have been drawing hard for years – particularly in aluminum – as metals' demand remained above supply. Given this, we are long the LMEX index: Even a marginal growth pick-up could rally prices. Precious Metals Outlook Precious Metals: Neutral. Going into 2020, gold’s outlook could be volatile – especially in 1H20 – as the metal’s key drivers will send conflicting signals (Table 1). Table 1Fundamental And Technical Gold-Price Drivers 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets Gold prices are holding up above $1,450/oz. Our latest fair-value estimate indicates gold will hover around $1,475/Oz over the short-term (Chart 10). We break next year’s gold forecast into two parts: Phase 1: Growth revival and uncertainty respite. These two factors are closely intertwined; the magnitude of global growth’s rebound is conditional on a reduction of global economic policy uncertainty. We expect this relief will come from a ceasefire in the US-China trade war. Combined, accelerating economic activity – mainly driven by EM economies – and falling uncertainty will push the US dollar lower.8 For gold prices, this phase will be characterized by two contrasting forces: A falling USD (bullish gold) vs. lower safe-haven demand and rising US interest rates (bearish gold). US rates will increase early next year as global uncertainty is reduced and bond markets price-out Fed rates cuts. The current unusually high correlation between gold and US rates implies gold will face selling pressures during this period (Chart 11). Nonetheless, we expect the Fed will stay on hold and not start raising rates next year, which will cap price risks to gold. Chart 10High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model Gold Prices Will Rise 4Q20 High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model Gold Prices Will Rise 4Q20 High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model Gold Prices Will Rise 4Q20 Chart 11US Rates Could Hurt Gold Prices In 1H20 US Rates Could Hurt Gold Prices In 1H20 US Rates Could Hurt Gold Prices In 1H20 Phase 2: EM wealth effect and inflation rebound. As income growth accelerates, EM households will slowly accumulate jewelry, coins, and bars – of which China and India are the largest consumers. Demand pressure from these consumers will manifest itself in 2H20, adding to buoyant central-banks purchases of gold. The upside in bond yields will be limited by major central banks’ dovish stance until inflation is well-established above target. Closely monitoring the evolution of inflation will become increasingly important in 2020, given inflation pressures are building in the US and globally (Chart 12). A lower USD – supporting stronger commodity demand – will magnify global inflation trends (Chart 13). There is a very real risk inflation shoots up in 4Q20, keeping real rates low. This differs from our BCA House view, which does not see inflation pressures building until 2021. Chart 12Inflationary Pressures Are Building Up In The US And Globally Inflationary Pressures Are Building Up In The US And Globally Inflationary Pressures Are Building Up In The US And Globally Political uncertainty likely will return ahead of the 2020 US election. A resurgence in popular support for one of the progressive Democratic candidates – Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders – could disrupt US stock markets. Gold would advance in such an environment. Chart 13No Inflation Without A Weaker USD No Inflation Without A Weaker USD No Inflation Without A Weaker USD Progressive populists would lead to domestic policy uncertainty and larger budget deficits, yet would not remove the threat of trade protectionism. We expect the Fed will stay on hold and not start raising rates next year, which will cap price risks to gold. Bottom Line: Gold prices will move sideways in 1H20 and will drift higher in 4Q20 supported by depressed real rates, a lower dollar, and US election uncertainty. Silver Market Chart 14Silver Prices Will Move Higher With Gold Prices Silver Prices Will Move Higher With Gold Prices Silver Prices Will Move Higher With Gold Prices Silver prices have traded closely with gold since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), moreso than with industrial metals (Chart 14). Prior to the GFC, silver traded like a base metal, owing to the high growth rates in EM economies undergoing rapid industrialization. Post-GFC, the evolution of silver’s price more closely tracked gold prices, following the massive injections of money and credit by central banks globally. Thus, we expect it will continue to follow the evolution of gold prices outlined above. Nonetheless, industrial applications still represent ~ 50% of silver’s physical demand and its supply-demand balance is estimated to have been tight this year. Silver likely will outperform gold next year as global growth and industrial activity rebound. PGM Markets The palladium market will remain tight in 2020. According to Johnson Matthey, the 10-year-long supply deficit is expected to widen massively this year, when all’s said and done. Prices surpassed $1,900/oz in December, forcing inventory liquidation (Chart 15). We believe the platinum-to-palladium ratio is at a level that would incentivize substitution in the pollution-control technology in gasoline-powered engines, and supports higher platinum content in diesel catalyzers (Chart 16).9 Nonetheless, swapping palladium for platinum is complex and requires a redesign of the production process. A lot will depend on how much the added cost of the more expensive palladium affects new-car buyers’ demand.10 To date, there are no signs car makers have already – or are willing to – initiate this process on a significant scale. Chart 15Palladium Inventories Are Depleted Palladium Inventories Are Depleted Palladium Inventories Are Depleted A few factors need to align to incentivize substitution of palladium for platinum. The price ratio between the two metals should reach extreme levels; the price divergence should be expected to last for a prolonged period of time, and concerns over supply security of platinum should be low. Chart 16Relative Inventory levels Drive The Palladium To Platinum Price Ratio Relative Inventory levels Drive The Palladium To Platinum Price Ratio Relative Inventory levels Drive The Palladium To Platinum Price Ratio In today’s context, this last condition could slow substitution. South African platinum supply – which represents close to 73% of the world primary supply – is projected to fall by close to 3% next year. Automakers need stable platinum supplies as they increase their demand for the metal and with persistent power-supply issues in South Africa – exacerbated by recent flooding – this condition will be hard to meet. No market has been harder hit by the Sino-US trade war than grains and ags generally. Thus, palladium holds an advantage over platinum on that front. Its supply sources are more diversified, and with 15% comes from stable North American countries and 40% comes from Russia. We believe substitution will commence, but this is a gradual process and will only slowly affect the metals’ price ratio.11 For 2020, we expect palladium prices to continue increasing due to stricter pollution regulation in China, India, and Europe.12 Ag Outlook Chart 17Sino-US Trade War, USD Hammer Grain Prices Sino-US Trade War, USD Hammer Grain Prices Sino-US Trade War, USD Hammer Grain Prices Ags/Softs: Underweight. The final form of the ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war – i.e., the “phase one” deal between China and the US to roll back tariffs – has yet to show itself. Last Friday, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer stated China has agreed to buy $32 billion – over the next two years – of US ag products as part of a “phase one” deal. This news moved corn, wheat and beans prices up 6.3%, 3.2%, and 3.4% respectively as of Tuesday’s close. Another positive news for US farmers was an announcement from the USDA that the final $3.6 billion of the $14.5 billion budgeted for farm subsidies this year to offset the trade war impact on US farmers most likely would be made in the near future by the Trump administration.13 No market has been harder hit by the Sino-US trade war than grains and ags generally. Severe weather across much of the US Midwest should have produced a rally, as offshore demand competed for available supply, which likely would have been lower at the margin last year absent a trade war. Instead, corn, wheat and beans are going into 2020 pretty much at the same price levels they went into 2019. In addition to the deleterious effect of the US-China trade war, ag markets have been particularly hard hit by the strong USD, which makes exports from the US expensive relative to alternative suppliers – e.g., Argentina and Brazil, which are posing serious challenges to US farmers (Chart 17).   Global inventories are, nonetheless, being whittled away, which is good news for farmers generally (Chart 18). And, this likely will continue in 2020, given the physical deficits expected this year (Chart 19). Chart 18GLOBAL GRAIN STOCKS BEING WHITTLED DOWN ... GLOBAL GRAIN STOCKS BEING WHITTLED DOWN ... GLOBAL GRAIN STOCKS BEING WHITTLED DOWN ... Chart 19... Physical Deficits Will Whittle Stocks Further Next Year ... Physical Deficits Will Whittle Stocks Further Next Year ... Physical Deficits Will Whittle Stocks Further Next Year Markets are still awaiting final details of the ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war. The deal is expected to be signed in the first week of January. 2020 could be the year the global ag markets come more into balance, with stocks-to-use levels falling and normal trade resuming. We are not inclined to take a view on this possibility and are therefore remaining underweight the ag complex. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Our outlook last year was entitled 2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets. It was published December 13, 2018, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. This year’s outlook again reflects our House view, which was published in the Bank Credit Analyst on November 28, 2019, entitled OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game. It was sent to all clients last month and is available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Uncertainty is measured using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. GEPU is a monthly GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related to three categories – “economy,” “policy” and “uncertainty.” Newspapers from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP (on an exchange rates-weighted basis) are scoured monthly to create the index. Please see Economic Policy Uncertainty for additional information. We use the Fed's USD broad trade-weighted index for goods (TWIBG) reported by the St. Louis Fed to track the USD. Please see the St. Louis Fed’s FRED website at Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Broad, Goods. 3In a June 2011 interview with the Minneapolis Fed, Ricardo Caballero, a professor of economics at MIT, provided a succinct description of risk and uncertainty, paraphrasing former US Defense Secretary under President George W. Bush Donald Rumsfeld: “(W)hen he talked about the difference between known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The former is risk; the latter is uncertainty. Risk has a more or less well-defined set of outcomes and probabilities associated with them. Uncertainty does not—things are much less clear.” Kevin L. Kliesen of the St. Louis Fed explores the link between rising uncertainty and slower economic growth in Uncertainty and the Economy (April 2013), observing, “If the business and financial community believes the near-term outlook is murkier than usual, then the pace of hiring and outlays for capital spending projects may be unnecessarily constrained, thereby slowing the overall pace of economic activity.” 4The Wall Street Journal reported investors have accumulated a $3.4 trillion cash position, a decade-high level; this is consistent with the risk aversion that can be expected when economic uncertainty is high. Please see Ready to Boost Stocks: Investors’ Multitrillion Cash Hoard, published by The Wall Street Journal November 5, 2019. 5 Accounting for Saudi Arabia's 400k b/d of additional voluntary cuts. 6 The LMEX no long trades on the LME, but we are using the index as a proxy for a position. In iron ore, we are long December 2020 65% Fe futures vs. short 62% Fe futures on the Singapore Exchange, expecting steelmakers will favor the high-grade material in the new mills they’ve brought on line. 7 Our China strategists expect “Chinese policymakers will roll out more stimulus to secure an economic recovery in 2020, and external demand will improve. But we expect growth in both the domestic economy and exports to only modestly accelerate.” Please see 2020 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year, published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy December 11, 2019. It is available at cis.bcareserach.com. 8 The US dollar is a countercyclical – i.e. it is inversely correlated with the global business cycle – due to the fact that the US economy is driven more by services than manufacturing. 9 Palladium is used mostly in pollution-abatement catalysts in gasoline-powered cars, while Platinum is favored in diesel-engine cars (along with a small amount of palladium). Catalysts production represents close to 80% and 45% of palladium's and platinum's total demand. 10 Considering there’s ~ 3.5g of palladium in a new car and palladium trades at ~ $1,900/oz, close to $240 is added to the cost of a new gasoline-powered car by using this metal in pollution-abatement technology. 11 Please see South African Mines Grind To Halt As Floods Deepen Power Crisis, published by reuters.com on December 10, 2019. 12 Stricter emissions standards in the car industry – mainly in China where China 6 emissions legislation is taking effect – are increasing the PGMs loadings in each car, supporting demand growth. 13 Please see China May Agree to Buy U.S. Ag Exports, But a Final Tranche of Cash to Farmers is Still Likely, published by agriculture.com’s Successful Farming news service. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given my many concerns about the outlook. Our portfolio has done well in the past year thanks to the surge in bond prices and the outperformance of defensive equities. However, I am deeply troubled by the amount of monetary stimulus required to support risk assets, and by how expensive bonds and equities are. Moreover, the global economy remains engulfed in deflationary risks, and policymakers are running out of ammunition. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I am also pleased to once again be here to discuss the major risks and opportunities in the global marketplace. A year ago, I held a more positive market view than my father. Directly after our meeting, the deep market correction gave me second thoughts, but ultimately, the rebound in stock prices vindicated my view. Clearly, your assertion that markets would be turbulent proved correct. Since I joined the family firm in early 2017, I have been pushing my father to keep a higher equity exposure than he was normally comfortable with. We agreed to still favor stocks last year, albeit, with a bias toward defensive sectors, and this strategy paid off. But after the past year’s powerful rally in both bonds and stocks, we are again left wondering how to position our portfolio. Ultimately, I do not believe a recession is imminent. Yes, stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. Since I expect economic growth to pick up, I am inclined to tilt the portfolio further into equities and move away from our preference for defensive sectors. As usual, I am very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our core theme for 2019 was that we would face classic late-cycle turbulence. Despite this volatility, a run-up in asset prices was likely. Soon after we met, the stock market plunged, hitting a low on December 26, 2018. We anticipated the Federal Reserve to be much more hawkish than what actually transpired. Wage growth and even core inflation have remained firm in the US, but the weakness in global inflation expectations drove central banks’ reaction functions more powerfully than we anticipated. Moreover, the rapid escalation of the Sino-US trade war added a layer of uncertainty that exacerbated the economic slowdown that had started in mid-2018, forcing global central banks to ease policy as an indemnity against recession. Looking ahead, central bankers are highly unlikely to tighten monetary policy as long as inflation expectations remain below their normal range consistent with a 2% inflation target. We agree that the odds of a US recession in the coming year are still low because financial conditions are set to remain accommodative, Chinese authorities are setting policy to shore up growth, and a trade truce is likely. Global economic activity will rebound in early 2020. Instead, the most probable timeframe for a broad based recession is late 2021/early 2022. As a result, we remain positive on risk assets, especially foreign stocks. We are also underweighting bonds as they offer extremely poor absolute and relative value. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your or my daughter’s optimism. My list of concerns is long, I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: This exercise is always interesting and often humbling, too. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: Tensions between policy and markets would be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the US unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it would take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Ultimately, the Fed would deliver more hikes in 2019 than discounted in the markets. This would push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar would peak in mid-2019. China would also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which would boost global growth. However, until both of these things happened, emerging markets would remain under pressure. We favored developed market equities over their EM peers. We also preferred defensive equity sectors such as healthcare and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the US would outperform Europe and Japan over the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. Stabilization in global growth would ignite a blow off rally in global equities. If the Fed was raising rates in response to falling unemployment, it would be unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints began to bite fully in early 2020 and inflation began to rise well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks would begin to buckle. This would mean that a window would exist in 2019 for stocks to outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from then (late 2018) current levels without a corresponding deterioration in the economic outlook. Corporate credit would underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in credit spreads was unlikely as long as the economy remained in expansion mode, but spreads could still widen modestly. US shale companies had been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices would be unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, we expected production cuts in Saudi Arabia would push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio was likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. As already noted, our forecast for more Fed rate hikes was wrong. This meant that we were offside in our duration call. Ultimately, 10-year Treasuries have generated returns of 10.8% so far this year, and German bunds and Japanese government bonds returns of 5.8% and 1.0% in EUR and JPY terms, or 2.5% and 2.0% in USD terms, respectively (Table 1). Nonetheless, our expectation of a run-up in risk asset prices was spot on. Equities outperformed bonds, with global stocks climbing 22.2% in USD terms. We missed the initial outperformance of corporate bonds relative to Treasuries, as investment grade credit rose by 13.9%. However, our bond team took a more constructive stance on corporates as the year progressed. Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 12019 Was A Good Year For Stocks 2019 Was A Good Year For Stocks 2019 Was A Good Year For Stocks In terms of regional allocation recommendations, we were correct to overweight US equities which beat non-US stocks by 13.4%, partly thanks to the dollar’s appreciation. We were also right to underweight EM equities, with Asia and Latin America generating dollar returns of only 12.6% and 6.9%. Overall, it was a good year for financial markets (Chart 1). Our growth forecasts were mixed. We predicted global growth would slow in the first half of 2019 but improve thereafter. Instead, the slowdown extended and intensified into the second half of the year as the Sino-US trade war escalated more than expected, and Chinese policymakers were more reluctant to reflate than anticipated. The IMF also revised down its growth forecasts. In the October 2019 World Economic Outlook report, growth in advanced economies for the year was cut to 1.7% from 2.1% compared to 2018 forecasts, led by a downward revision to 1.5% from 2% in Europe (Table 2). They also pared down 2019 EM growth estimates to 3.9% from 4.7%. Consequently, inflation was softer than originally predicted. These trends in economic activity meant that our dollar call was partially right. The currency did not peak in the middle of the year as we foresaw, but has been flat since the spring and today trades where it was in April. Meanwhile, the weaker-than-expected growth put our oil call offside, with Brent averaging $62/bbl this year, not $82/bbl. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game The Cycle’s End Game Mr. X: You mentioned that you remain positive on risk assets and stocks for 2020. You will not be surprised that I am extremely skeptical of this view. The Fed could only raise rates to 2.5% before all hell broke loose, and it has now cut them back to 1.75%. The European Central Bank has lowered its deposit rate to -0.5% and is resuming its asset purchase program, while the Bank of Japan is clearly out of ammunition. Yet global growth remains weak. Despite this lack of economic traction, US stocks are at a record high and are unequivocally expensive. This situation seems untenable. If global growth weakens further, there is little more policymakers can do. I think the risk of a recession is a lot more elevated than you believe, especially as we cannot count on a lasting trade détente. Meanwhile, the US presidential election makes me uncomfortable, and I cannot see how business leaders will want to deploy capital to expand capacity given the risk that the regulatory and tax environment could become hostile to the corporate sector. If I’m wrong about growth – and I hope I am – then inflationary pressures will build and central banks will have to tighten policy suddenly. As bond yields rise, stocks will be sold and yet bonds will not offer any protection since they yield so little. Also, I have not even talked about negative interest rates. $12.1 trillion of debt yields less than zero percent. This is obviously preventing creative destruction from purging the system of rot. It is also promoting capital misallocation and undue risk-taking by financial institutions who cannot meet fiduciary liabilities. Ms. X: Based on this tirade, you can easily imagine what life at the office has been like in recent months. I do share some of my father’s concerns. Negative rates cannot be a good thing, especially from a long-term perspective. If growth weakens further, I’m also concerned that central banks have few options left. However, I do not see these risks as imminent. There are nascent signs that the global economy will stabilize soon; both President Trump and President Xi have strong incentives to reach a trade truce; and central banks are nowhere near removing the proverbial punch bowl. While US stocks are expensive, other risk assets offer value if global growth rebounds. The wall of worry is high, but stocks can and will climb that wall. BCA: Your debate is similar to our own internal discussions. It is undeniable that the investing landscape looks shaky at the moment, especially with the S&P 500 currently trading at 18-times forward earnings. However, the situation you are describing is a direct consequence of one BCA’s long running macro themes: The end of the debt supercycle. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular. The private debt load in advanced economies has declined by 20% of GDP since 2009 (Chart 2A). Despite the burgeoning US federal government deficit, public debt accumulation has not been strong enough to cause total debt loads to increase. Instead, aggregate indebtedness has been stuck slightly above 260% of GDP for the past 10 years. Depressed, and in some cases, negative interest rates reflect weak demand for credit. Chart 2AThe Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... The Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... The Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... Chart 2B...But Not In EM ...But Not In EM ...But Not In EM   The end of the debt supercycle has both a negative and positive impact. Without increasing leverage, domestic demand cannot grow faster than trend GDP. Thus, it takes much more time for inflationary pressures to build. Concurrently, in the absence of inflationary pressure, more time passes before monetary policy reaches a restrictive level causing recession. The upshot is that the business cycle can last much longer. Moreover, a world less geared to credit accumulation reduces the fragility of the financial system, at the margin. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular (Chart 2B), where the demand for credit is still very sensitive to changes in monetary settings. EM countries are the major source of volatility in the global business cycle. Chinese policymakers’ management of the tradeoff between growth and leverage will determine whether the global economy can avoid deflation. If they decide to tackle debt excesses head on, EM credit growth will contract and EM final demand will suffer. In this scenario, negative rates will persist in low-growth advanced economies, and the Fed will be incapable of raising rates because global deflationary forces will be too strong. Chart 3The World Is In The Midst Of A Deflationary Episode The World Is Experiencing A Deflationary Episode... The World Is Experiencing A Deflationary Episode... The second half of 2018 and the whole of 2019 gave us a taste of these forces. When China tightened credit conditions, the EM economies slowed first. Trade and manufacturing hubs like Europe, Australia and Japan quickly followed. A deflationary wave spread around the world, as evidenced by a drop in global producer prices (Chart 3). The US is a comparatively closed economy, but it could not avoid this gravitational pull. The ISM manufacturing survey ultimately started to contract in August 2018, converging to weakness in the rest of the world. The trade war’s hit to business confidence added insult to the injury of an already weak economic environment. Looking ahead, our optimism reflects an expectation that Chinese policymakers will adopt a more pro-growth policy stance because they too are spooked by the downtrend in their economy. While the Politburo Standing Committee has not abandoned its structural reform agenda, it realizes that aggressive deleveraging is dangerous. The Chinese economy is growing at its weakest pace in nearly 30 years and deflation is once again taking hold. In response to date, policymakers have lowered China’s reserve requirement ratio by 400 basis points, cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP, increased the issuance of local government bonds to finance public infrastructure projects, and boosted capex at state-owned enterprises. EM economies will respond to these stimulative measures. The Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has stabilized (Chart 4). Meanwhile, the Fed has pushed the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Holston-Laubach-Williams estimate of the neutral rate, and coordinated global policy easing points to a rebound in the global manufacturing sector (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, the global inventory purge that magnified the industrial sector’s pain is getting exhausted and the auto sector is looking up. Finally, we agree with Ms. X that both President Trump and President Xi have their own incentives to deescalate trade policy uncertainty. We are entering the end game of this business cycle and bull market. Global borrowing rates will rise, but only to a limited extent. Rightly or wrongly, major central banks are terrified by the prospect of the Japanification of their economies. Practically speaking, this means that they want inflation expectations to move back up to normal levels (Chart 5). However, after undershooting their 2% targets for 11 years, achieving this objective will require central banks to let realized inflation overshoot these targets first. Thus, central banks are unlikely to tighten policy until late next year at the earliest, which will limit how far yields can climb in 2020. Chart 4…But Do Not Bet Against Reflation ...But Do Not Bet Against Reflation ...But Do Not Bet Against Reflation Chart 5Depressed Inflation Expectations Depressed Inflation Expectations Depressed Inflation Expectations   Equities and other risk assets should perform well if global growth re-accelerates but interest rates don’t rise much at first. Some benefit of this fertile backdrop is already priced in, but many pockets of value levered to stronger global growth still exist. We are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. While the general environment favors remaining invested in risk assets in 2020, this is likely the last window of opportunity to do so. Today’s accommodative monetary policy will revive inflationary pressures in 2021, and central banks will ultimately be forced to lift rates much more aggressively. China will continue to resist excessive leverage. Neither the business cycle nor the equity bull market will withstand these final assaults. Mr. X: Your benign outlook reminds me of when we met in December 2007. Do you remember? You told me that the housing slowdown and the credit market seizure were large risks, but central banks would put a floor under global growth. How did that turn out? I agree that in advanced economies, overall debt loads have been stable. But this belies major disparities. For example, US corporate debt has never represented a larger share of GDP than it does today. This must be a major vulnerability. While household balance sheets look healthy, I do not think consumption will save the day if companies are cutting capex and employment while they clean up their balance sheets. Countries like Canada and Australia are drowning in private sector debt. How can you ignore these vulnerabilities? BCA: A comparison with 2008 actually reveals why advanced economies, particularly the US, are not the powder keg that they once were. US corporate debt is elevated when compared to GDP, but profits also represent a much larger share of GDP than they did 10 or 20 years ago, and interest rates are close to historic lows. As a result, interest coverage ratios are still adequate (Chart 6). In 2007, household debt loads were large, but interest payments also accounted for 18.1% of disposable income, the highest proportion since 1972. Additionally, US firms’ debt-to-asset ratio is in line with the post-1970 average of 22.1%. Finally, US businesses have not used rising leverage to fund capital spending, as demonstrated by the elevated age of the capital stock. Thus, the US corporate sector continues to generate positive net savings. Ahead of recessions, US businesses typically generate negative net savings. The composition of the creditors is another important difference. In 2007, an extremely large share of the spurious borrowings resided on banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, the banking system was woefully undercapitalized with a leverage ratio of 17x. Weak banks had to absorb 2.2 trillion of losses after 2008. Consequently, the money creation mechanism broke down, and money multipliers collapsed (Chart 7). Today, US banks boast relatively stronger balance sheets, and they are still judicious about extending credit despite being less exposed to the corporate sector than they were to the mortgage market in 2008. Instead, most corporate debt is held by less levered entities such as ETFs, pension plans, and insurance companies. The leveraged losses that proved so debilitating in 2008 are less likely to be a source of systemic risk in this cycle. Chart 6US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt Chart 72008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money 2008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money 2008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money   Countries like Australia and Canada have much more worrisome private sector debt dynamics, as their servicing costs are elevated (Chart 8). However, these economies are unlikely to collapse when global rates are low, as long as the global economy can avoid a recession, which would reduce export revenue in these trade-sensitive countries. You expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. The bottom line is that both the US corporate sector and at-risk countries like Canada should avoid a day of reckoning until interest rates rise meaningfully. As we have already mentioned, central banks are very clear that they will allow inflation to overshoot before tightening policy anew. We monitor US inflation breakeven rates to gauge the likely timing of that outcome. At 1.6%, they remain well below the 2.3% to 2.5% range, which is historically consistent with central banks durably achieving their inflation target (Chart 9). Until inflation expectations are re-anchored back up in that range, we will not worry about an imminent tightening in monetary conditions. Chart 8Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Chart 9The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten   Chart 10Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game It is true that inflationary pressures are building in the US. Historical evidence points to a kink in the Phillips curve, the link between wage growth and the unemployment rate. Since the labor market is tight, we are already seeing average hourly earnings growth accelerate. Moreover, the output gap is mostly closed. However, keep in mind that inflation is also a lagging economic indicator (Chart 10). Consequently, the recent global economic slowdown is likely to keep US inflation at bay for most of 2020. The sharp fall in US capacity utilization along with the decline in imported goods and core producer price inflation corroborate this picture. Mr. X: So you believe that as long as rates stay low, the day of reckoning will be delayed. But ultimately, that it is unavoidable. BCA: Correct. No matter what, we are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. The current period of easy policy will allow cyclical spending to rise as a share of output, and debt to build up again over the coming 18 months. Because slack is clearly limited, this latest wave of policy easing will generate inflationary pressures. Ultimately, the Fed will be forced to play catch up and tighten more aggressively than expected in 2021. Paradoxically, the longer the onset of recession is delayed, the deeper it is likely to be… Mr. X: Because imbalances and vulnerabilities will only grow larger! BCA: Absolutely! Mr. X: That is something we can agree on. Ms. X: The way you complete one another’s sentences is a testament to how many years you have been talking to each other. For me, the most concerning issue is political risk. While I am more positive on the outlook for trade policy than my father, I do worry about the impact of US election risk on capital spending. Chart 11If The 2012 Election Is Any Guide, Trump Can Still Win A Second Term OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game BCA: On the trade war, we would like to address your father’s concerns. All politicians, even unconventional ones like President Trump, seek re-election. Yet, President Trump’s overall approval rating is low (Chart 11). If the election were held today, his odds of winning would be minimal. However, US presidential elections do ultimately favor the incumbent. If the re-election of President Obama in 2012 is any guide, President Trump has enough time to boost his approval rating over the coming 12 months to secure a second term through the Electoral College. In order to achieve this outcome, he must reverse the large slowdown in wage growth currently plaguing the swing states he won by only a small margin in 2016 (Chart 12). Workers in states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are suffering disproportionately from the uncertainty created by the trade tensions. President Trump will have to pause the tariffs – and even cut tariff rates – to support the economy and reassure voters. Chart 12Trump's Fear Is Coming True Trump's Fear Is Coming True Trump's Fear Is Coming True China is willing to accept a trade truce. The Chinese economy is weak and producer prices are once again deflating. President Xi doesn’t want to preside over another massive surge in leverage or a 1930’s Irving Fisher-style deflationary spiral. Reviving private sector investment sentiment via a reduction in trade policy uncertainty would help stabilize spending and avoid a disorderly economic slump. Moreover, President Xi may not trust the current White House, but the prospect of a Democratic administration that will be tough on both environmental standards and human rights would offer little solace. This brings us to the US election. The recent Bank of America Merrill Lynch positioning survey shows that the investment community shares your concerns. This risk is hard to quantify. The Democratic nomination is wide open. Former Vice President Joe Biden leads the opinion polls, and is a known quantity. Meanwhile, the rising progressive wing of the party, embodied in Senator Elizabeth Warren, is hostile to business and likely to cause concerns in boardrooms across the US, especially in the tech, energy, financial services and healthcare sectors. This could dampen animal spirits. Biden’s and Warren’s odds of beating President Trump are overstated by current polls, especially if the President softens his stance on trade to allow for a growth pick-up. Moreover, to be competitive nationally, Senator Warren will have to abandon some of her more progressive plans and pivot toward the center. The recent upbeat equity market performance of sectors like managed healthcare suggests that markets are discounting this shift. Thus, we doubt the election is currently really weighing on business intentions. The recent pick up in capital spending intentions in various Fed Manufacturing surveys fades this risk. Chart 13A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished What is clear though is that if the economy were to weaken further, Senator Warren’s chances would improve and CEOs would genuinely begin to worry about re-regulation, potentially unleashing a vicious cycle. Thus, the end game is an unstable equilibrium. On a structural basis, whether one looks at the rise of populism or the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US, trade tensions will remain a pesky feature of the global economy. In effect, the trade truce will not be a permanent deal. The global economy has therefore lost the tailwind of deepening global integration achieved through trade (Chart 13). This will limit global potential GDP growth. Ms. X: Thank you. I think the time is right to explore your economic outlook in more detail. The Economic Outlook Chart 14China: Modest Reflation Is Underway China: Modest Reflation Is Underway China: Modest Reflation Is Underway Mr. X: From your arguments, it seems that the outlook for China and Emerging Markets is critical, so let’s start there. My impression is that President Xi is not abandoning his structural reform agenda. Avoiding the middle-income trap will require decreasing China’s dependence on credit as a growth driver. Can economic activity really stabilize under those circumstances? BCA: You are correct: Senior Chinese administrators are reluctant to allow another major phase of debt accumulation to take hold. However, as we already highlighted, policymakers are taking steps to end the most severe economic slowdown since the first half of the 1990s. China is currently implementing a middling stimulus program. The positive impact of the lower bank reserve requirement ratio, the tax cuts and increased public infrastructure spending is being mitigated by strong regulatory constraints on the shadow banking system and small financial institutions, by efforts to limit real estate speculation, and by the cash crunch facing real estate developers. These crosscurrents make it unlikely that the credit impulse will rise as sharply as it did following the reflationary campaigns of 2009, 2012 or 2016. Nonetheless, the Chinese economy is indeed exhibiting some mildly positive signals. Our monetary indicator and state-owned enterprise capital spending point to a rebound in overall Chinese economic activity (Chart 14). Moreover, household spending is trying to bottom. If China stabilizes, then the EM slowdown will end soon. Without a deepening drag from the Chinese economy, EM countries should be able to take advantage of the easing in global financial and liquidity conditions. But the end of the Chinese drag on EM growth does not mean a massive tailwind will be forthcoming. Additionally, deflationary forces remain stronger in the emerging world than in the US. As a result, EM real rates will remain stubbornly above the level that real economic activity warrants, posing a headwind for capital and durable goods spending. Generally speaking, EM and China are moving from a headwind for the world to a mild tailwind. Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone. Ms. X: I’m somewhat more positive than you on global growth next year. The policy easing around the world looks very promising for economic activity. How do you factor the impact of improving global liquidity conditions into your outlook for 2020? BCA: It is undeniable that global liquidity conditions have eased massively. As we already highlighted, the majority of global central banks cutting rates is a very positive dynamic for global growth. Trends in measures of liquidity ratify this message. Foreign exchange reserves are again growing and our BCA US Financial Liquidity index has rallied sharply over the past 12 months. Historically, this indicator forecasts the trend in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator, commodity prices and EM export prices by 18 months (Chart 15). Moreover, money aggregates are growing faster than credit across the major advanced economies. Such developments typically foretell an acceleration in global economic activity (Chart 16). Chart 15Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Chart 16Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing   The duration of the current slowdown also warrants optimism. We have often highlighted that since the early 1990s, the global manufacturing sector evolves over 36-month symmetric cycles (Chart 17). The current soft patch has lasted more than 18 months. In the context of easing liquidity and depleted inventories, pent-up demand can easily translate into actual spending. The recent surge in the new orders-to-inventories ratio confirms that global manufacturing activity should soon pick up (Chart 18). The auto sector’s weakness, which was exacerbated by previous inventory buildups, changing emission standards, and rising borrowing costs, is also ebbing. Chart 17The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth Chart 18The New Order-To-Inventory Ratio Points To A Global Rebound The New Orders-To-Inventories Ratio Points To A Global Rebound The New Orders-To-Inventories Ratio Points To A Global Rebound     Various growth indicators are sniffing out this positive inflection point. The recent trough in the global ZEW survey is revealing (Chart 19). It materialized quickly after Sino-US trade tensions began to ease. Enough positive global economic momentum exists such that a minor decline in policy uncertainty could unleash a large improvement in growth expectations. The rebound in Taiwanese equities and European luxury stocks confirms that the global economy should soon bottom. There are two things we cannot emphasis enough. First, this is the end game of the business cycle, after which a recession will ensue. Second, investors should not expect the kind of strong synchronized growth rebound witnessed in 2017. Without a Chinese and EM boom, a crucial source of demand will be wanting. Mr. X: What about US growth? The yield curve inverted this summer and deteriorating consumer and business confidence raised the specter of an imminent recession. Moreover, the fiscal stimulus that helped the economy in the first half of 2019 is now over. In fact, with a $1 trillion federal deficit despite an unemployment rate of only 3.6%, we have run out of fiscal room to support activity if and when a recession materializes. BCA: The recent yield curve inversion most likely overstated the risk of an economic contraction. First, in the mid-1990s, if the term premium had been as low as it is today, the curve would have also inverted without any recession materializing from 1995 to 2000. Second, this summer, the curve inverted up to the 5-year tenor and steepened for longer maturities. Prior to recessions, the curve inverts across all maturities. Recessions are not born out of thin air. They are caused by imbalances and tight monetary policy. The large debt buildup and other investment imbalances that have preceded prior US recessions are not yet apparent. Prior to the 1991, 2001 and 2008 recessions, the private sector debt load had increased by 20.6%, 14.6% and 25.6% of GDP in the previous five years, not the current 1.4% run rate. The Fed’s policy is now clearly accommodative. Not only is the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Fed’s favored estimate of the neutral rate of interest, but also real estate, the most interest-rate sensitive economic sector, is rebounding. In 2018, real estate activity collapsed in response to mortgage rates rising to 4.9%. Today, the NAHB Homebuilding index has retraced 79% of its losses; mortgage demand has improved; and housing starts and building permits have recovered (Chart 20). When policy is tight, real estate activity never recovers this quickly, even as yields fall. Chart 19Positive Signals For Global Growth Positive Signals For Global Growth Positive Signals For Global Growth Chart 20The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative   Chart 21Robust Household Financial Health OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game A counterargument is that real estate price appreciation is weak. However, tight monetary policy is not the cause. Two forces are dampening house prices. First, the Jobs and Tax Act of 2017 lowered allowable mortgage interest and state and local tax deductions. High-end properties in high-tax states such as California, New York and Massachusetts have suffered from this adjustment. Second, the US housing market has an overhang of large, pricey homes relative to strong demand for smaller, starter homes. Median home prices outpacing average ones show this divergence. We also to need to gauge if consumer spending is likely to follow the manufacturing sector lower. If it does, a recession will be unavoidable. On this front, we are hopeful because: The outlook for household income is positive. As you noted, the unemployment rate is still extraordinarily low, and more Americans will be working by the end of 2020 than today. Additionally, the rising employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers is tightly linked to stronger wages (Chart 21). Also, the recent pick up in productivity growth points to higher real wage growth. The household savings rate is elevated and has limited upside. Households already have a large cushion insulating them from unforeseen shocks. At 8.1% of disposable income, the savings rate is in the 65th percentile of its post-1980 distribution. It is especially lofty if we take into account robust American households’ net worth (Chart 21, bottom panel). Consumer credit demand is rising, according to the Fed’s Senior Loan officer survey. Since household liquid assets are quickly expanding and the household formation rate is robust, consumption of durable goods should pick up, especially in light of the large decrease in borrowing costs. This is particularly true since the household debt-to-assets ratio is at its lowest level since 1985 and debt-servicing costs only represent 9.7% of disposable income, the lowest share for nearly 40 years. The corporate sector outlook should brighten soon. The modest rise in productivity protects margins from higher wages, an effect that will linger given that capacity expansion is consistent with further productivity gains (Chart 22). Crucially, the combined fiscal and monetary easing in China should bolster capital-spending intentions around the world, including the US (Chart 23). Rising productivity will only consolidate these trends. Chart 22Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Chart 23Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending   The most positive development for the US corporate sector is our outlook for non-US growth. If the global manufacturing sector mends itself, so will the US. Ample liquidity is a positive for the world economy, as well as for US manufacturing conditions (Chart 24). On the fiscal front, we appreciate your worries, but they are not a story for 2020. The US fiscal thrust will not be as positive as it was in 2018 or 2019, but it is set to remain a small tailwind, not a drag. Furthermore, given that 2020 is an election year it is unlikely that politicians will tighten purse strings over the coming 12 months. Fiscal risks are undoubtedly greater in the long run. However, a sudden fiscal consolidation is a remote probability because fiscal austerity has gone out of style. Instead, the federal debt burden will be a major source of long-term inflation because there is no other easy way to address this gigantic pile of liabilities. The path of least resistance will be more spending and financial repression. In other words, real rates will stay too low and excess government spending will push prices higher, conveniently eroding the real value of that high federal debt burden. This was a big story in the 20th century and it will remain so in the 21st (Chart 25), especially since an aging population and the peak in globalization will weigh on global savings. Chart 24The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course Chart 25Inflation Is About Political Decisions Inflation Is About Political Decisions Inflation Is About Political Decisions   Ms. X: Your point about demographics makes me think of Europe and Japan. Brexit has not been resolved; populism remains a concern in Italy; and the European banking system is still fragile. Japan suffers from an even worse demographic profile and the recent VAT increase was ill-timed, economically. Given these headwinds, can these regions participate in the global recovery you foresee? BCA: The short answer is yes, albeit to varying degrees. The outlook for Europe is more promising than Japan. A No-Deal Brexit is now a very low probability event, even after next month’s UK election. The conservatives’ support for Prime Minister Johnson’s Brexit plan will ensure as much. A large source of uncertainty is being lifted, which will allow European businesses to resume investment planning. The situation in the European periphery is also improving. Non-performing loans in Spain and Italy are falling (Chart 26), which is allowing for a normalization of credit origination. The narrowing Italian and peripheral spreads to German bunds will be helped by easing financial conditions in the European economies that need it most. Higher Italian bond prices improve banks’ solvency and cut borrowing costs for the private sector. Finally, populism is alive and well in Europe, rejecting fiscal austerity, but not embracing euro-skepticism. More generous fiscal spending would be a positive for Europe. European liquidity conditions are also generous. Deposit growth has strengthened and financial conditions have benefited from lower German yields and a cheap euro, which trades 15% below fair-value estimates. Our model for European banks’ return on tangible equity is rising, which is a clear indication that easy financial and liquidity conditions should deliver stronger incremental economic activity (Chart 27). Chart 26Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Chart 27European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020   The fiscal outlook is murkier. European fiscal thrust was a positive 0.4% of GDP in 2019, but it will decline to 0.1% in 2020. However, fiscal policy affects economic activity with a lag. The impact of this year’s easing has yet to be fully felt. Since European rates are so low and the economy is not operating at full capacity, the fiscal multiplier is greater than one. Therefore, Europe can still reap a substantial fiscal dividend next year. Finally, Europe remains a very pro-cyclical economy. A large share of euro area GDP is connected to manufacturing and exports. As a result, Europe will be one of the prime beneficiaries of a pickup in global growth. Already, the sharp rebound in the German and euro area ZEW survey expectation components point to a brighter outlook for the region. Japan is also a very pro-cyclical economy, which will reap a dividend from a bottom in global manufacturing activity. However, the Land of the Rising Sun is still subject to idiosyncratic constraints. Japanese financial conditions have not improved as much as those in Europe. The yen has appreciated 2.6% in trade-weighted terms this year, while Japanese yields have not melted as much as European ones (because Italian and peripheral yields fell so much in 2019). Japan will also have to reckon with the impact of the October VAT increase. Ahead of the tax hike, retail sales spiked by 9.1% on a year-on-year basis, or 7.1% compared to the previous month, a script similar to 2014. 2015 was a payback year where consumption was depressed. This scenario will play out again, even if the Abe government has implemented some fiscal offsets. Ultimately, the Japanese economy will lag Europe’s in the first half of the year but should catch up in the second half. The impact of the tax hike will dissipate. Most importantly, rebounding global growth will hurt the yen, at least on a trade-weighted basis, providing a lift to export prospects and easing Japanese financial conditions relative to the rest of the world, which will produce a growth dividend later in 2020. Ms. X: To summarize, you expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. EM activity will also pick up but will not generate fireworks. The US will be okay but Europe will probably deliver the largest positive growth surprise as external and domestic conditions align positively. Japan will also stabilize on the back of stronger global growth, but domestic headwinds mean that a true reacceleration won’t happen until the latter part of the year. This recovery constitutes the business cycle’s end game as inflation will become a concern in 2021, forcing the Fed to tighten then. BCA: Yes, this is correct. Ms. X: Thank you! Bond Market Prospects Chart 28Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Ms. X: I do not like US Treasuries at current yields. They do not protect me against an inflation surprise and will do nothing for me in an economic recovery. However, my bearishness is tempered by the large stock of bonds with negative yields in Europe and Japan. As long as this strange situation persists, I doubt US yields will experience much upside. US paper is too attractive to foreign asset managers right now. BCA: We share your view and are recommending an underweight to global government bonds. Global yields offer little value and are vulnerable to a rebound in economic activity or a trade détente. Our Global Bond Valuation index is flashing a clear sell signal (Chart 28). As yields rise, global yield curves are bound to steepen. We also agree that the upside for Treasury yields is limited, but we disagree with the limiting factor. Foreign investors are not the major buyers of Treasuries. Indeed, the data shows that European and Japanese investors have not been aggressive purchasers of US government securities. The US yield curve is flat and US short rates tower above European and Japanese ones, hedging currency exposure when buying Treasuries is expensive. In euro or yen terms, a hedged Treasury yields -67 basis points and -60 basis points, less than 10-year bunds or JGBs, respectively. Meanwhile, EM central banks are diversifying their FX reserves away from the US dollar into gold. Instead, our view is governed by the concept we dub the “Golden Rule of Treasury Investing.” According to this principle, the outperformance of Treasuries relative to cash is a direct function of the Fed’s ability to surprise the market. If the Fed cuts rates more than the OIS curve anticipated 12 months prior, Treasuries outperform. The opposite happens if the Fed delivers a hawkish surprise (Chart 29). Chart 29The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone, because the OIS curve is now only pricing in 28 basis points of rate cuts over the next year. It is not just the US OIS curve that has priced out a large amount of rate cuts; this phenomenon has materialized around the world over the past five weeks. Chart 30The Term Premium Is Too Low The Term Premium Is Too Low The Term Premium Is Too Low Any upside risk to that 2.25% to 2.5% forecast for 2020 will come from the inflation expectations and term premium components of yields. Central banks, including the Fed, have telegraphed an intention to allow inflation expectations to rise, initially, in response to stronger global growth. Moreover, declining risk aversion should also allow the exceptionally depressed term premium to normalize (Chart 30). Only in late 2020 or early 2021 will Treasury yields durably move above this 2.25-2.5% zone. Punching above these levels will require core PCE inflation to have been above target long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations back up to their 2.3% to 2.5% target zone. Only then will the Fed give the all-clear signal to the bond market to lift yields higher. Mr. X: You still have not directly addressed the question of negative yields in Europe and Japan. This story will not end well. Do you worry about these bond markets over the next year? BCA: Our answer is an emphatic yes. But we assume you will not let us leave it at that. Mr. X: You know me too well. BCA: Over the course of the past 50 years, we have learned a thing or two about you. In all seriousness, let’s start with our simple but effective valuation ranking. It compares the current level of real yields for each country to their historical averages and standard deviations. You can see that the most unattractive bond markets right now are all in Europe (Chart 31). Chart 31European Bonds Are Too Dear OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 32Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition The lower bound of interest rates is another reason to avoid these markets. This floor seems to lie around -1% in nominal terms. Because of these constraints, in recent months, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch and German 10-year bonds have failed to rally as much as their higher-yielding US, Canadian or Australian counterparts when global yields are declining. However, they also underperform when yields are rising (Chart 32). They have become a lose-lose proposition. The only pockets of value left in DM bond markets are Greece, Portugal or Italy. Despite their apparent risks, we still like them. Support for the euro in Greece and Italy is 70% and 65%, respectively. Even populist governments in these nations are reluctant to attack euro membership anymore. Moreover, the ECB remains committed to the survival of the euro area in its current form. Christine Lagarde will not change that. For 2020 or 2021, the risk of euro breakup is practically zero. The same may not be true on a 5- to 10-year investment horizon, but for the coming year, these bonds offer an attractive risk-adjusted carry. Ms. X: Unsurprisingly, my father does not like corporate bonds because of highly levered corporate balance sheets. I think this is a long-term problem, but not a risk for 2020, so I’m looking to stay overweight spread product relative to Treasuries. Where do you stand on this market? BCA: On this issue, we sit somewhere between you both. Our Corporate Health Monitor continues to deteriorate (Chart 33). The high debt load of the US business sector coupled with the decline of the return on capital worries us. Furthermore, the covenant-lite trend in recent issuance suggests that corporate borrowers, not lenders, are getting the good deals. Essentially, too much cash is still chasing too little available yield pick-up. In this environment, capital is sure to be misallocated, and money ultimately lost. We find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. On a short-term basis, the spreads will not widen much. An easy Fed, recovering global growth, and the gigantic pile of negative-yielding bonds around the world will make sure of that. We advocate a neutral stance on investment grade corporates because IG bonds have high modified duration such that breakeven spread compensation versus Treasuries is near the bottom of its historical distribution across the IG credit spectrum (Chart 34). This means that credit will generate poor returns if government bond yields rise. Chart 33Dangerous Long-Term Picture For US Corporates A Precarious Long-Term Picture For US Corporates A Precarious Long-Term Picture For US Corporates Chart 34No Value Left In IG No Value Left In IG No Value Left In IG   Chart 35EMs Still Experiencing Deflation EMs Still Experiencing Deflation EMs Still Experiencing Deflation Thankfully, they are ways around this problem: emphasizing exposure to high-yield (HY) bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) instead. HY breakeven spreads remain much more attractive than in the IG space, and option-adjusted spreads will benefit if our growth and inflation forecasts materialize. Investors reluctant to commit capital to these products should look into high quality agency MBS. After the recent wave of mortgage refinancing, these securities’ duration has collapsed to 3.0 compared to 7.9 for IG corporates. These securities therefore offer much better protection in a rising-yield environment. Ms. X: Before we move on to equities, where do you stand on EM bonds? BCA: We need to differentiate between EM local-currency bonds and EM USD-denominated bonds. We do like some EM local currency bonds. Inflation in EM countries is low and dropping. Money and credit growth is slowing, which implies that the disinflationary trend will remain in place through 2020 (Chart 35). Weaker nominal growth means that central banks in EM will continue to cut rates, providing a nice tailwind for local-currency bond prices. This comes with a caveat. Lower policy rates will boost bond prices but hurt EM currencies, especially because most EM currencies are not cheap and are already over-owned. Next year, it will be preferable to garner exposure to those countries interest rate moves via the swap market rather than the cash bond market. Chart 36The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap There are some exceptions, like Mexico. The MXN is already very cheap because of fears surrounding the economic policies of President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador (AMLO) (Chart 36). However, we doubt he will turn out to be as dangerous as feared. Hence, MXN Mexican bonds are attractive to foreign investors in unhedged terms. We are currently avoiding EM USD-denominated debt, corporate and sovereign. Since emerging markets sport $5.1 trillion of dollar-denominated debt, falling EM exchange rates will increase the cost of servicing this debt, which makes it riskier. Mr. X: I think we will continue to underweight corporate and EM bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. I must admit that I find your recommendation to overweight MBS intriguing. We will need to ponder this idea further. Ms. X: And please wish me luck trying to convince my father to buy some high-yield bonds. Equity Market Outlook Mr. X: US stocks are too expensive for my taste, with the S&P 500 trading at a forward P/E ratio of 18. I’m well aware of the argument that equities may be expensive but that they are actually cheap compared to bonds, which implies that I should favor stocks over bonds. However, you know that I emphasize capital preservation. With stocks this rich already, equities offer no margin of safety. If I own stocks, I am therefore exposed to any unexpected shocks. Because I do not share your optimism on the economy, I am more worried about downside risk. Moreover, even if the economy performs better than I fear, I suspect stocks will respond poorly to higher yields. Chart 37The S&P Is Very Expensive The S&P Is Very Expensive The S&P Is Very Expensive Ms. X: I agree with my father that stocks are expensive. Nonetheless, as Keynes famously quipped, “Markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” In today’s context, to me this means that stocks can ignore their overvaluation so long as liquidity is plentiful, rates are low, and a recession is avoided. BCA: On this question, we agree with Ms. X. We all agree that US equities are expensive. As you mentioned, their price-to-earnings ratio is 18. Only at the apex of the tech bubble and in early 2018 was the S&P 500 more expensive. Worryingly, the price-to-sales ratio is at 2.3, an even larger historical outlier than the P/E (Chart 37). Chart 38Low Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Low Bond Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Low Bond Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Ms. X is correct that we cannot look at stock valuations in isolation. Investing is about opportunity cost and the macroeconomic context. On this front, even US equities have their merit. Despite the S&P 500’s expensive multiples, our Composite Valuation Indicator is no more elevated than it was in 2013. Meanwhile, our Monetary Indicator has rarely been as supportive of stock prices as it is today, and our Speculation Indicator is in line with its January 2016 reading (Chart 38). Moreover, BCA’s Composite Sentiment indicator is still below its long-term historical average and margin debt has declined by $47.5 billion to the lowest share of US market capitalization since June 2005. These are hardly signs of irrational exuberance. Ultimately, bear markets and recessions travel together. A durable 20% drop in stock prices requires a significant and long-lasting decline in earnings. These developments happen during recessions (Chart 39). Our call is for a recession in the next 24 months or so. We must also remember that while equities perform poorly six months ahead of a recession, the end of a bull market, its last 12 to 18 months, tend to be very rewarding (Table 3). We are within this window. Chart 39Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Table 3The End Game Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Based on our forecast for interest rates, we do not share the concerns that rising bond yields will topple stocks right away. Stock prices are an inverse function of risk-free rates, but a positive function of growth expectations. Higher yields will initially reflect stronger growth, not restrict it. But remember: the upside for yields is limited because central banks do not want to choke off the recovery. They will maintain accommodative policy. In other words, we expect real rates to lag behind growth expectations. Because long-term growth expectations, whether from sell-side analysts or extracted out of market prices using the Gordon Growth Model, are low, we are willing to make this bet (Chart 40). Equities will suffer if the global bond yield rises above 2.5%. This is more a story for 2021, and not our central scenario for 2020. It is nonetheless a reminder that we are entering the end game of the business cycle, so we are also entering the end-game of the bull market. Mr. X: I think you are playing with fire. Stocks are so expensive that if you are wrong on either the growth call or the yield call, they will suffer. I would rather miss the last melt-up in stocks than unnecessarily expose my portfolio to a meltdown. Additionally, you have not addressed the fact that S&P 500 margins have begun to soften but are still extremely elevated. Shouldn’t this dampen your optimism? BCA: Aggregate S&P 500 margins have some downside. Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion index and Corporate Pricing Power indicator all remain weak (Chart 41). The deceleration in the crude PPI excluding food and energy and the past strength in the dollar confirm this insight, especially as the corporate wage bill climbs in a tight labor market. The biggest mitigating factor is that productivity is also on the mend, which curbs the negative impact of higher worker pay. Chart 40Growth Expectations Are Muted Profit Growth Expectations Are Muted Profit Growth Expectations Are Muted Chart 41US Margins Under Pressure US Margins Under Pressure US Margins Under Pressure   This danger must be put into perspective though. Margin expansion has been dominated by the tech sector (Chart 42). Excluding this industry, S&P 500 margins are roughly in line with their previous peak, and are not declining. The aggregate softness in margins is a reflection of the sharper decline in tech margins. Declining margins do not spell the imminent end of the bull market either. Table 4 shows that on average, the S&P 500 rises by 9.5% following the peak in margins. Equities can rise after margins crest because this is often an environment where wages are climbing, which boosts consumption. Consequently, top-line growth can accelerate and earnings can rise even if they represent a lower proportion of sales. This is the environment we foresee over 2020. Chart 42Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Table 4Margin Peaks Do Not Spell S&P Doom OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game   Chart 43Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Ms. X: You have talked about the tech sector being a drag on overall margins. How would you position a US stock portfolio? BCA: First, around the world, we prefer cyclical sectors to defensive ones. Cyclical stocks are depressed relative to defensive firms’ shares. Rebounding global growth and rising bond yields will favor cyclical sectors. Globally, the performance of cyclical equities relative to defensive ones correlates with Taiwanese equities, which are currently rallying smartly (Chart 43). This suggests that at the margin, the most cyclical asset markets are beginning to express optimism about global growth. Within the S&P 500, our favorite pair trade to express this bias is to overweight energy stocks at the expense of utilities. Utilities are bond proxies which will substantially underperform energy stocks when the rate of change of Treasury yields moves up (Chart 44). Moreover, based on our valuation indicators, energy stocks have never traded at such a deep discount to utilities, nor have they ever been as oversold. Chart 44Favor Energy Over Utilities Favor Energy Over Utilities Favor Energy Over Utilities Second, we are currently neutral on tech stocks but have put them on a downgrade alert. Tech equities are expensive, trading at a forward P/E ratio 21% above the other cyclicals. Moreover, since software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown, it will likely lag investment in machinery and structures when industrial demand rebounds. Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Tech multiples will also suffer when bond yields rise. As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate We implement this view by way of an underweight in tech and an overweight to industrials. Industrials have suffered disproportionately from the trade war. Any near term truce is unlikely to contain a grand bargain on intellectual property rights transfer that galvanizes tech exports, but it will remove some of the uncertainty weighing on industrials. Moreover, industrials are a much cheaper play on a global growth rebound. The global manufacturing slowdown has caused industrial equities to trade at their greatest discount to the tech sector since the financial crisis. Finally, the wage bill for the industrial sector is melting relative to tech, and our margin proxy is surging (Chart 45). This has created a very positive backdrop for this pair trade. We also like financials. They will be a key beneficiary of rising yields and a steepening yield curve. Additionally, household credit demand has picked up and overall credit growth should accelerate as central banks will maintain very accommodative monetary conditions. The yield impulse already points toward higher bank credit growth and companies are issuing an increasingly large stock of bonds (Chart 46). Chart 45Operating Metrics Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Operating Leverage Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Operating Leverage Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Chart 46Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation   Ms. X: When combining valuation analysis with your fundamental sectoral slant, I am guessing that you must favor European, Japanese and EM stocks over the S&P 500? BCA: We do favor European and Japanese equities. Based on valuation alone, all the regions you mentioned offer higher expected long-term real rates of return than the US (Chart 47). Moreover, the dollar is expensive relative to advanced economies’ currencies. Hence, these markets are cheaper vehicles than the S&P 500 to bet on a global economic recovery. But valuation alone is not enough. US stocks are trading at unprecedented levels relative to global equities because of the FAANG craze (Chart 48). Looking at sector representation, our positive view on non-tech cyclicals also flatters exposure to Europe and Japan (Table 5). Chart 47Non US Equities Offer Better Value OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 48FAANG-Driven US Outperformance FAANG-Driven US Outperformance FAANG-Driven US Outperformance   Table 5Equity Market Sector Composition OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 49European Banks Are Cheap European Banks Are Cheap European Banks Are Cheap Europe is particularly attractive because of its large skew towards industrials and financials, which represent 32.3% of the market versus 22.3% in the US. Moreover, European financials are also a tantalizing bet because they trade at a 50% discount to US financials, according to their price-to-book ratio. Additionally, their return on tangible equity will benefit from higher German yields, easing financial conditions, declining non-performing loans in the periphery and rebounding global growth. Our RoE model for European banks already points to a resurgence in their stock prices (Chart 49). Of the major markets we track, Japan offers the highest prospective long-term real returns. Its strong cyclical slant and low share of tech stocks means it is another market investors should overweight to bet on a global recovery. The biggest problem for Japanese equities is the yen. When global yields climb higher, a weak JPY will clip some of the Nikkei’s gains for foreign investors. Finally, we are reluctant to overweight EM stocks just yet. In this space, median P/E ratios are much higher than on a market capitalization-weighted basis (Chart 50). State-owned companies explain this bifurcation, Chinese banks in particular. Since we expect Chinese banks to remain a conduit for policy, credit origination may flatter economic growth more than shareholders’ interests. Moreover, we have a negative outlook on EM currencies, and hedging this exposure is expensive. Finally, if China’s economic activity improves only modestly in 2020, the 2012 experience suggests that EM stocks can still underperform the global equity universe as global growth improves and yields rise (Chart 51). In other words, we find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. Chart 50EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet Chart 51EM Stocks Can Underperform When Global Growth Improves EM Stocks Can Underperform Even When Global Growth Improves EM Stocks Can Underperform Even When Global Growth Improves     Mr. X: Thank you. I am still not sure what share of our portfolio will be dedicated to stocks. However, I think that whatever this proportion will be, buying global equities makes more sense than US ones. Your valuation argument alone is swaying me, considering my more conservative instincts. Ms. X: I’m glad we will not have to argue on this point, but I know we will nonetheless battle on the stock/bond/gold split. Should we move on to your currency and commodity forecasts? BCA: It would be our pleasure. Currencies And Commodities Mr. X: You have often argued that the dollar is a countercyclical currency. Based on our discussion so far, you must expect the dollar to decline until we get closer to the next recession. I am not fully convinced. Specifically, I remember that in the back half of 2016 global growth was rebounding, but the dollar soared. Therefore, the growth/dollar relationship can be more complex than you argue. Meanwhile, with negative interest rates in Europe, Japan and Switzerland, why would I even consider divesting out of my positive yielding dollar assets? Chart 52The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency BCA: You raise interesting questions, and you are correct that we expect the dollar to depreciate if our constructive view on global growth pans out for 2020. The inverse relationship between global industrial production (excluding the US) and the trade-weighted dollar is unambiguous (Chart 52). As you also mentioned, the reality is a little bit more nuanced. To understand why, it is important to remember how currencies function. We can think of an exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism that solves for the gap in growth between any two countries. This is at the root of the dollar’s counter-cyclicality. When global growth is picking up, returns tend to be higher in cyclical markets, which are highly concentrated outside of the US. Flows then gravitate from the US to other markets and the dollar declines. After a while, the dollar becomes cheap enough that these flows reverse. In the second half of 2016, three factors drove the dollar rebound. First, US manufacturing was improving at a faster pace than that of the rest of the world. Second, the Fed resumed its interest rate hikes, so interest rate differentials suddenly flattered the dollar anew. Finally, the election of President Trump, who campaigned on large scale fiscal stimulus, elicited memories of the Reagan dollar bull market of the first half of the 1980s. These factors eventually faded as global growth rebounded. Today, the Fed’s policies are hurting the dollar. Aside from recent interest rate cuts, the Fed has been injecting liquidity into the banking system through repurchase agreements and renewed asset (T-Bills) purchases. Moreover, the rate cuts are also easing global funding conditions and promoting a re-steepening of the yield curve. This will incentivize banks to lend and boost the US money supply. As growth re-accelerates and demand for imports (machinery, commodities, and consumer goods) rises, the current account deficit will widen further. This process will increase the international supply of dollars. Historically, these dynamics usually hurt the dollar. What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. Like you, we are deeply uncomfortable with negative interest rates. Thankfully, the nascent pickup in global economic activity is lifting global bond yields. So far, foreign bond markets have led this move. More specifically, countries that have suffered most from the global manufacturing slowdown are now seeing their bond yields rise the quickest (Chart 53). For example, yields in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen by a lot more than those in the US since global yields troughed in September. Should the initial signals of stabilization in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, the US yield advantage will evaporate. In a nutshell, interest rates might be negative in Europe and Switzerland, but the positive carry offered by US assets is rapidly fading. Chart 53AAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Chart 53BAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates?   Chart 54Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries For international investors, the currency risk inherent in owning US bonds is just too large at the current juncture. Remember, the trade-weighted dollar stands 25% above its long-term equilibrium and the US twin deficits are expanding. Markets priced in cheap currencies with some potential upside, such as Australia, Canada, Norway or even the European periphery, might be better bets. Flows highlight just how precarious the situation is for the US dollar. Since last August, overall flows into the US Treasury market have been negative. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive at an annualized US$180 billion, but they are clearly rolling over. Moreover, official net outflows are running at $350 billion, easily cancelling out the private sector’s inflows (Chart 54). Essentially, foreigners’ appetite for US fixed-income assets is waning exactly as interest rate differentials have started moving against the dollar. Ms. X: I share my father’s concerns, but how would you implement your negative dollar view. Which currencies should I be loading up on as we enter the business cycle’s end game? BCA: The more export-dependent economies (and currencies) should benefit the most from a rebound in global growth. Within the G-10, we particularly like the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone and the British pound. Bond yields for these currencies are rising the fastest vis-à-vis the US. As a result, the currencies themselves should soon follow (previously mentioned Chart 53). We also expect commodity currencies to benefit, but only upon clearer signs that the resource-thirsty Chinese economy is improving. Until then, they are likely to lag the pro-cyclical European currencies, which are less directly dependent on Chinese stimulus. The euro could become the greatest beneficiary from a weaker dollar because a large headwind for European economic activity is disappearing for now. For the past ten years, European real interest rates have been too low for the most productive, competitive exporter – Germany – but too high for others such as Spain and Italy. Consequently, the euro has been caught in a tug-of-war between a rising neutral rate of interest for Germany and a very low one for the peripheral economies. Via its rate cuts, asset purchase programs, and aggressive TLTRO packages, the ECB may have now finally eased policy to the point where nearly all Eurozone countries enjoy an accommodative monetary environment. 10-year government bond yields in France, Spain, Portugal and even Italy now all sit close to the neutral rate of interest for the entire eurozone (Chart 55). Chart 55The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough Finally, the euro is likely to benefit from inflows into European equity markets. The euro’s drop since 2018 has eased financial conditions and made euro area businesses more competitive. This is an important tailwind for European corporate profits and thus stocks. Moreover, European equities, especially those in the periphery, remain unloved, as illustrated by their cheap valuations compared to other advanced economies. Additionally, analysts’ earnings expectations for eurozone equities are perking up relative to US stocks. If the sell-side is right, powerful inflows into the region will lift the euro in 2020. Mr. X: Thank you. I find it difficult to share your enthusiasm for the euro, a currency backed by such a flimsy edifice. While I would agree that it could rebound next year, I find currencies highly unpredictable on such a time horizon. I prefer to think about them on a long-term basis, and while the euro is cheap, its weak institutional underpinning is too concerning. Let’s move on to commodities. Following our meeting last year, we took your advice on oil and gold. Overall, these calls helped our portfolio. Going forward, these markets are extremely perplexing. There is so much risk in oil markets, such as the tensions in the Middle East and the uncertainty stemming from the trade war between the US and China. How would you recommend playing the oil market in 2020? Chart 56Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil BCA: Your assessment of these markets is spot on. Yet, price risk is skewed to the upside because fiscal and monetary stimulus will revive commodity demand. The oil-producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia will continue to restrain production, and will probably extend its 1.2mm b/d production cut due to expire at the end of March to year-end 2020. In the US, market-imposed capital discipline will keep reducing the growth of US shale-oil supply. Additionally, US shale-oil supply growth is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Ms. X: What about the demand side of the oil markets? The fall in the growth rate of demand this year caught most participants off guard. What do you make of that? BCA: Demand data shows a lot of lingering weakness, much of which was caused by tight financial conditions last year in the US and China. But now, most global central banks are pursuing highly accommodative monetary policy and many governments are also easing fiscal policy. As a result, this demand weakness will fade next year. We think next year growth will clock in at 1.4mm b/d. Not as robust as 2017, but still respectable. This should stop the downward pressure on oil prices that has prevailed since May (Chart 56). Mr. X: You’re describing a fairly strong market for next year. What are the downside risks to your view? BCA: Global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. Uncertainty is one of the key factors driving demand for USD, which is one of the most popular safe havens in the world (Chart 57). A strong dollar creates a headwind for commodity demand. It raises the local-currency costs of consumers in the EM economies that drive oil demand, and lowers production costs outside of the US, encouraging supply growth at the margin. Chart 57Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Has Kept The USD Well Bid OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 58Gold: A Valuable Portfolio Hedge OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Ms. X: So, pulling it all together, what is your call for 2020? BCA: The weaker 2019 demand data and the upward revisions to global oil inventories pushed our 2020 Brent Oil forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We still expect WTI to trade at a $4/bbl discount to Brent. As we mentioned earlier, the risk to our forecast is to the upside: a resolution of the US-China trade war, and lower global economic policy uncertainty could trigger a sharp rally in crude prices. Mr. X: Thank you for your insight on oil. I would like to hear your thoughts on gold. You can tell that I see little absolute value in stocks or bonds at the moment, so I have an outsized preference for the yellow metal this year. Also, how could the US dollar and gold both rally at the same time in 2019? BCA: Let’s start with your dollar/gold question. It is very rare to see gold and the dollar rally together. Normally a strong dollar hurts gold. As you know, we’ve been recommending an allocation to gold since 2017, mostly as a portfolio hedge. We like that gold strongly outperforms other safe havens in equity bear markets and can participate in the upside (even if to a limited extent) in bull markets. We think the safe-haven properties of gold and the US dollar really have come to the fore over the past couple of years (Chart 58). Economic policy uncertainty, and divisive politics globally have raised the level of uncertainty to record levels. In such an environment, the dollar and gold both provide a safe haven and a portfolio hedge. Hence, their joint popularity this past year. We should also remember that gold is a good inflation hedge, and is particularly negatively correlated with real interest rates. A Fed that is willing to let the economy overheat is a Fed that will limit how high real rates climb. Moreover, global liquidity is plentiful. Finally, EM central banks have been slowly divesting from Treasuries and diversifying into gold lately, buying most of the new supply in the process. This backdrop, along with our forecast of a weaker dollar, should support gold again in 2020. That being said, because gold is tactically overbought and could face temporary headwinds if global uncertainty recedes, we prefer silver, which is not as stretched. Furthermore, silver’s higher industrial use means that it should also benefit from a global manufacturing recovery. Geopolitics Chart 59Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Mr. X: Let’s return to geopolitical and policy risks, both of which abound. Global economic policy uncertainty is the highest it has been since academics began measuring it. The world is fraught with populism, authoritarianism, war, immigration, technological disruption, inequality, and corruption. With so much chaos, and so little consensus, is there anything solid for an investor to grasp about the political backdrop next year? BCA: Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to short circuit this long bull market, given that the Federal Reserve, the usual culprit, has paused its rate tightening campaign. On a secular basis, geopolitical risk is rising because the United States’ national power is declining relative to that of other world powers (Chart 59). China’s rise, in particular, is stirring conflict with the US and its allies in the western Pacific. Beijing’s technological and military advance is generating fear across the American political establishment. Russia and China continue to deepen their relationship in the face of an increasingly unpredictable United States. These strategic tensions will persist despite any tariff ceasefire with China. Chart 60Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Competition among the great powers makes for a world of contested authority. As the rules of the road have become less certain, the tailwind behind international trade and investment has weakened (Chart 60). Deglobalization is a headwind for the earnings of large cap global companies in the long run. Emerging markets, which are exposed to trade, face persistent unrest. Mr. X: Given the above, how can an investor take an optimistic view of the global economy and markets next year? BCA: We have a framework for analyzing politics: constraints over preferences. We cannot predict what the chief politicians will prefer at any given time, but we can try to identify and measure the constraints that will restrict their freedom of movement. With global growth slowing, world leaders have become more sensitive to their constraints. The Fed has reversed rate hikes; China is easing policy; President Trump has refrained from attacking Iran; and President Trump and President Xi are negotiating a ceasefire. The UK has avoided a “no deal” Brexit – not once but twice. In short, the risk of recession (or conflict) has been sufficient to alter the policy trajectory. As a result, there is a prospect for global geopolitical risks to abate somewhat in 2020. Both the American and Chinese administrations need to see growth stabilize despite their ongoing strategic conflict. Both the British and European governments need to avoid a disorderly Brexit despite their lack of clarity beyond that. Geopolitical risk is declining, albeit from an extremely elevated level. Mr. X: The US and China have already come close to a deal only to get cold feet and back away from it. The British Prime Minister is committed to leaving the EU with or without a deal. Surely you cannot believe that the Middle East, Russia, other emerging markets, or North Korea will be any bastion of stability. BCA: The US-China trade war is still the single greatest threat to the equity bull market. Brexit is not resolved and a new deadline for a trade deal looms at the end of 2020. Investors must remain vigilant and hedge their portfolios, particularly with gold. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore this year’s reaffirmation of the Fed put, the China put, and Trump’s “Art of the Deal.” The base case for next year should be constructive, albeit with vigilant attention to the major risks: President Trump, China and Iran. The other issues you mention have varying degrees of market relevance. Russia is focusing on pacifying domestic discontent. North Korea is on a diplomatic track with the United States. Emerging market unrest is particularly relevant where it can have a bearing on global stability: Iraq, Iran and Hong Kong in particular. Ms. X: If I may interject: It seems to me that the worst of the trade war has passed, that the risk of a no-deal Brexit is negligible, and that Iran is unlikely to outdo its attack against Saudi Arabia in September. Doesn’t this imply that geopolitical risk is overrated and that investors should rush to capture the risk premium in equities? BCA: What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. After all, any fall in global risks will be amply made up for by the impending rise in US domestic political risk. Indeed, US politics are the chief source of global political risk in 2020. First, if President Trump becomes a “lame duck” then he could take actions that are hugely disruptive to global markets in a desperate attempt to win reelection as a “war president.” Chart 61European Political Risk Is Now Low Europe Political Risk Is Now Low Europe Political Risk Is Now Low Second, if President Trump is reelected, then his disruptive populism will have a new mandate and his “America First” foreign and trade policy will be unshackled. Third, if the opposition Democrats succeed in unseating an incumbent president, they will likely take the Senate too, removing the main hurdle to a dramatic policy change. That would mark the third 180-degree reversal in national policy in 12 years. Moreover, investors may find the country merely exchanged right-wing populism for left-wing populism, which has a more negative impact on corporate earnings prospects. Polarization and institutional erosion will continue. The election results may be razor thin; swing states may have to recount votes; and the outcome could hinge on rare or unprecedented developments in the Electoral College, the Supreme Court or cyberspace. A crisis of legitimacy could easily afflict the next administration. In short, there are few scenarios in which US political risk does not rise over the next 12-24 months. Rising American risk stands in stark contrast to Europe (Chart 61), where the will to integrate has overcome several challenges since the sovereign debt crisis. Substantial majority of voters support the euro and the European Union. Germany is on the brink of a major political succession but it is not turning its back on the European project. France is successfully pursuing structural reforms. Italy remains the weakest link, but even the populist Northern League accepts the euro. This leaves two remaining global risks: China and Iran. Chinese political risk is generally understated. President Xi Jinping, lacking President Trump’s electoral constraint, could overestimate his leverage. He could overreach in the trade talks, in his battle to prevent excessive debt growth, or in his handling of Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, or Iran. The result could be a breakdown in the trade talks or a separate strategic crisis with the United States. Another cold war-style escalation in tensions could easily kill the green shoots in global growth. As for Iran, the regime is under crippling American sanctions and faces unrest both at home and within its regional sphere of influence. There is a non-negligible risk that it will lash out and cause an extended oil supply shock. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground but I remain deeply concerned that staying invested in risk assets today is akin to picking-up pennies in front of a steamroller. I accept your opinion that a recession is unlikely in 2020, but valuations of both stocks and bonds are uncomfortably stretched for my taste. As a result, I believe stocks could suffer whether growth is good or bad next year. Finally, since so many things need to go right for the global economy to continue to defy gravity, a recession may hit faster than you envision. To me, there is simply not enough margin of safety in stocks to compensate me for the risk! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks are high because we are entering the end game of the cycle. But I also see pockets of value, some of which you have mentioned today. Moreover, I am sympathetic to your view that global growth will recover next year. Corporate earnings should therefore expand. Hence, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful, especially because policy is quite accommodative. While stocks may not perform as well as they did in 2019, I expect them to outperform bonds handily. I’m therefore willing to continue holding risk assets, even if I need to be more judicious in my sector and regional allocation. BCA: Your family debate mirrors our own internal discussions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term return prospects. Because so many assets have become more expensive this year, long-term returns are likely to be uninspiring compared to recent history. Table 6 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.4% over the next ten years, or 2.4% after adjusting for inflation. That is a noticeable deterioration from our inflation-adjusted estimate of 2.8% from last year, and also still well below the 6.5% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2019. Table 6Asset Market Return Projections OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Our outlook for next year hinges on global growth rebounding and policy uncertainty receding. Monetary policy is less of a threat to equities than it was last year because central banks have already eased considerably and have been very open about their willingness to let inflation run above target for a while before retightening the monetary screws. We propose the following list of easy-to-track milestones to monitor whether or not our central scenario for the global economy and asset markets is playing out, and how close we are to the end of the cycle: Chinese money and credit numbers. Chinese credit growth must stabilize for the economy to do so. If credit origination continues to decelerate, this will indicate that Beijing has decided to tolerate the slowdown and prioritize its reform and deleveraging agenda. In this case, the Chinese debt supercycle is over sooner and the global economy will pay the price. Our China Investment Strategy Activity Index. Global policy is accommodative and liquidity conditions have improved significantly. However, if the Chinese economy continues to deteriorate, global growth will not rebound. The China Activity Index must stabilize and even improve somewhat for our global growth view to come to fruition. Progress in the “phase one” deal. China and the US must agree to a trade détente. As long as uncertainty around immediate tariffs remain high and retaliation risks stay alive, global capital spending intentions and thus the global manufacturing sector will be hamstrung. Surveys of global growth. The Global manufacturing PMI and the global growth expectation component of the ZEW survey must both recover. If these variables cannot gain any traction, the global economy is sicker than we estimate and risk assets will suffer. Commodity prices and the dollar. In the first quarter, industrial commodity prices must rebound and the dollar must start to depreciate. These two developments will not only reflect an improvement in global growth. They will also alleviate deflationary pressures around the world, revive profits and sponsor a business spending recovery. Moreover, a weaker dollar will also ease global financial conditions by decreasing the global cost of capital. 10-year inflation breakeven rate. If US breakevens move above the 2.3% to 2.5% zone, the Fed will become more proactive about raising rates. This would provoke a quicker end to the business cycle. President Trump’s approval rating. If President Trump’s approval rating stabilizes below 42%, he could give up on the economy and instead bet on a “rally around the flag” as his best strategy for re-election. This would result in a much more hawkish and confrontational White House that would become an even greater source of uncertainty for the economy, and thus risk asset prices. Ms. X: Thank you for this comprehensive list of variables to monitor. As always, you have left us with much to think about. We look forward to these discussions every year. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: It will be our pleasure. The key points are as follow: Global equities are entering the end game of their nearly 11-year bull market. Stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. As a result, if global growth can recover and the US can avoid a recession in 2020, earnings will not weaken significantly and stocks will again outperform bonds. Low rates reflect the end of the debt supercycle in the advanced economies. However, the debt supercycle is still alive in EM in general, and in China, in particular. The global economic slowdown that begun more than 18 months ago started when China tried to limit debt growth. If Beijing continues to push for more deleveraging, global growth will continue to suffer as the EM debt supercycle will end. Nonetheless, we expect China to try to mitigate domestic deflationary pressures in 2020. As a result, a small wave of Chinese reflation, coupled with the substantial easing in global monetary and liquidity conditions should promote a worldwide re-acceleration in economic activity. Policy uncertainty will recede next year. Domestic constraints are forcing China and the US toward a trade détente. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is now marginal, and President Trump is still the favorite in 2020. A decline in policy risk will foster a global economic rebound. That being said, some pockets of risk remain, such as in the Middle East. Global central banks are highly unlikely to remove the punch bowl anytime soon. Not only will it take some time before global deflationary forces recede, monetary authorities in the G10 want to avoid the Japanification of their economies. As a result, they are already announcing that they will allow inflation to overshoot their 2% target for a period of time. This will ultimately raise the need for higher rates in 2021, which will push the global economy into recession in late 2021, or early 2022. These dynamics are key to our categorization of 2020 as the end game. US growth will re-accelerate. The US consumer remains in good shape thanks to healthy balance sheets and robust employment and wage growth prospects. Meanwhile, corporate profits and capex should benefit from a decline in global uncertainty and a pick-up in global economic activity. China will continue to stimulate its economy but will not do so as aggressively as it did over the past 10 years. Consequently, EM growth will also bottom but is unlikely to boom. Europe and Japan will re-accelerate in 2020. Bond yields will grind higher in 2020. However, Treasury yields are unlikely to break above the 2.25% to 2.5% range until much later in the year. Inflationary pressures won’t resurface quickly, so the Fed is unlikely to signal its intention to raise interest rates until late 2020 or later. European bonds are particularly unattractive. Corporate bonds are a mixed offering. Investment grade credit is unattractive owing to low option-adjusted spreads and high duration, especially when corporate health is deteriorating. Agency mortgage-backed securities and high-yield bonds offer better risk-adjusted value. Global stocks will enjoy their last-gasp rally in 2020. As global growth recovers, favor the more cyclical sectors and regions which also happen to offer the best value. US stocks are the least attractive bourse; they are very expensive and loaded with defensive and tech-related exposure, two groups that could suffer from higher bond yields. We are neutral on EM equities. Investors should pare exposure to equities after inflation breakevens have moved back into their 2.3% to 2.5% normal range and the Fed funds rate has moved closer to neutral. We anticipate this to be a risk in 2021. The dollar is likely to decline because it is a countercyclical currency. Balance of payment dynamics and valuation considerations are also becoming headwinds. The pro-cyclical European currencies and the euro should be the main beneficiary of any dollar depreciation. Oil and gold will have upside next year. Crude will benefit from both supply-side discipline and a recovery in oil demand on the back of the improving growth outlook. Gold will strengthen as global central banks limit the upside to real rates by allowing inflation to run a bit hot. A weaker dollar will flatter both commodities. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.4% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.5% a year between 1982 and 2019. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 22, 2019

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook for the year ahead. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given my many concerns about the outlook. Our portfolio has done well in the past year thanks to the surge in bond prices and the outperformance of defensive equities. However, I am deeply troubled by the amount of monetary stimulus required to support risk assets, and by how expensive bonds and equities are. Moreover, the global economy remains engulfed in deflationary risks, and policymakers are running out of ammunition. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I am also pleased to once again be here to discuss the major risks and opportunities in the global marketplace. A year ago, I held a more positive market view than my father. Directly after our meeting, the deep market correction gave me second thoughts, but ultimately, the rebound in stock prices vindicated my view. Clearly, your assertion that markets would be turbulent proved correct. Since I joined the family firm in early 2017, I have been pushing my father to keep a higher equity exposure than he was normally comfortable with. We agreed to still favor stocks last year, albeit, with a bias toward defensive sectors, and this strategy paid off. But after the past year’s powerful rally in both bonds and stocks, we are again left wondering how to position our portfolio. Ultimately, I do not believe a recession is imminent. Yes, stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. Since I expect economic growth to pick up, I am inclined to tilt the portfolio further into equities and move away from our preference for defensive sectors. As usual, I am very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our core theme for 2019 was that we would face classic late-cycle turbulence. Despite this volatility, a run-up in asset prices was likely. Soon after we met, the stock market plunged, hitting a low on December 26, 2018. We anticipated the Federal Reserve to be much more hawkish than what actually transpired. Wage growth and even core inflation have remained firm in the US, but the weakness in global inflation expectations drove central banks’ reaction functions more powerfully than we anticipated. Moreover, the rapid escalation of the Sino-US trade war added a layer of uncertainty that exacerbated the economic slowdown that had started in mid-2018, forcing global central banks to ease policy as an indemnity against recession. Looking ahead, central bankers are highly unlikely to tighten monetary policy as long as inflation expectations remain below their normal range consistent with a 2% inflation target. We agree that the odds of a US recession in the coming year are still low because financial conditions are set to remain accommodative, Chinese authorities are setting policy to shore up growth, and a trade truce is likely. Global economic activity will rebound in early 2020. Instead, the most probable timeframe for a broad based recession is late 2021/early 2022. As a result, we remain positive on risk assets, especially foreign stocks. We are also underweighting bonds as they offer extremely poor absolute and relative value. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your or my daughter’s optimism. My list of concerns is long, I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: This exercise is always interesting and often humbling, too. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: Tensions between policy and markets would be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the US unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it would take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Ultimately, the Fed would deliver more hikes in 2019 than discounted in the markets. This would push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar would peak in mid-2019. China would also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which would boost global growth. However, until both of these things happened, emerging markets would remain under pressure. We favored developed market equities over their EM peers. We also preferred defensive equity sectors such as healthcare and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the US would outperform Europe and Japan over the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. Stabilization in global growth would ignite a blow off rally in global equities. If the Fed was raising rates in response to falling unemployment, it would be unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints began to bite fully in early 2020 and inflation began to rise well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks would begin to buckle. This would mean that a window would exist in 2019 for stocks to outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from then (late 2018) current levels without a corresponding deterioration in the economic outlook. Corporate credit would underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in credit spreads was unlikely as long as the economy remained in expansion mode, but spreads could still widen modestly. US shale companies had been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices would be unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, we expected production cuts in Saudi Arabia would push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio was likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. As already noted, our forecast for more Fed rate hikes was wrong. This meant that we were offside in our duration call. Ultimately, 10-year Treasuries have generated returns of 10.8% so far this year, and German bunds and Japanese government bonds returns of 5.8% and 1.0% in EUR and JPY terms, or 2.5% and 2.0% in USD terms, respectively (Table 1). Nonetheless, our expectation of a run-up in risk asset prices was spot on. Equities outperformed bonds, with global stocks climbing 22.2% in USD terms. We missed the initial outperformance of corporate bonds relative to Treasuries, as investment grade credit rose by 13.9%. However, our bond team took a more constructive stance on corporates as the year progressed. Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 12019 Was A Good Year For Stocks 2019 Was A Good Year For Stocks 2019 Was A Good Year For Stocks In terms of regional allocation recommendations, we were correct to overweight US equities which beat non-US stocks by 13.4%, partly thanks to the dollar’s appreciation. We were also right to underweight EM equities, with Asia and Latin America generating dollar returns of only 12.6% and 6.9%. Overall, it was a good year for financial markets (Chart 1). Our growth forecasts were mixed. We predicted global growth would slow in the first half of 2019 but improve thereafter. Instead, the slowdown extended and intensified into the second half of the year as the Sino-US trade war escalated more than expected, and Chinese policymakers were more reluctant to reflate than anticipated. The IMF also revised down its growth forecasts. In the October 2019 World Economic Outlook report, growth in advanced economies for the year was cut to 1.7% from 2.1% compared to 2018 forecasts, led by a downward revision to 1.5% from 2% in Europe (Table 2). They also pared down 2019 EM growth estimates to 3.9% from 4.7%. Consequently, inflation was softer than originally predicted. These trends in economic activity meant that our dollar call was partially right. The currency did not peak in the middle of the year as we foresaw, but has been flat since the spring and today trades where it was in April. Meanwhile, the weaker-than-expected growth put our oil call offside, with Brent averaging $62/bbl this year, not $82/bbl. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game The Cycle’s End Game Mr. X: You mentioned that you remain positive on risk assets and stocks for 2020. You will not be surprised that I am extremely skeptical of this view. The Fed could only raise rates to 2.5% before all hell broke loose, and it has now cut them back to 1.75%. The European Central Bank has lowered its deposit rate to -0.5% and is resuming its asset purchase program, while the Bank of Japan is clearly out of ammunition. Yet global growth remains weak. Despite this lack of economic traction, US stocks are at a record high and are unequivocally expensive. This situation seems untenable. If global growth weakens further, there is little more policymakers can do. I think the risk of a recession is a lot more elevated than you believe, especially as we cannot count on a lasting trade détente. Meanwhile, the US presidential election makes me uncomfortable, and I cannot see how business leaders will want to deploy capital to expand capacity given the risk that the regulatory and tax environment could become hostile to the corporate sector. If I’m wrong about growth – and I hope I am – then inflationary pressures will build and central banks will have to tighten policy suddenly. As bond yields rise, stocks will be sold and yet bonds will not offer any protection since they yield so little. Also, I have not even talked about negative interest rates. $12.1 trillion of debt yields less than zero percent. This is obviously preventing creative destruction from purging the system of rot. It is also promoting capital misallocation and undue risk-taking by financial institutions who cannot meet fiduciary liabilities. Ms. X: Based on this tirade, you can easily imagine what life at the office has been like in recent months. I do share some of my father’s concerns. Negative rates cannot be a good thing, especially from a long-term perspective. If growth weakens further, I’m also concerned that central banks have few options left. However, I do not see these risks as imminent. There are nascent signs that the global economy will stabilize soon; both President Trump and President Xi have strong incentives to reach a trade truce; and central banks are nowhere near removing the proverbial punch bowl. While US stocks are expensive, other risk assets offer value if global growth rebounds. The wall of worry is high, but stocks can and will climb that wall. BCA: Your debate is similar to our own internal discussions. It is undeniable that the investing landscape looks shaky at the moment, especially with the S&P 500 currently trading at 18-times forward earnings. However, the situation you are describing is a direct consequence of one BCA’s long running macro themes: The end of the debt supercycle. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular. The private debt load in advanced economies has declined by 20% of GDP since 2009 (Chart 2A). Despite the burgeoning US federal government deficit, public debt accumulation has not been strong enough to cause total debt loads to increase. Instead, aggregate indebtedness has been stuck slightly above 260% of GDP for the past 10 years. Depressed, and in some cases, negative interest rates reflect weak demand for credit. Chart 2AThe Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... The Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... The Debt Supercycle Is Dead In DM... Chart 2B...But Not In EM ...But Not In EM ...But Not In EM   The end of the debt supercycle has both a negative and positive impact. Without increasing leverage, domestic demand cannot grow faster than trend GDP. Thus, it takes much more time for inflationary pressures to build. Concurrently, in the absence of inflationary pressure, more time passes before monetary policy reaches a restrictive level causing recession. The upshot is that the business cycle can last much longer. Moreover, a world less geared to credit accumulation reduces the fragility of the financial system, at the margin. While the debt supercycle is dead in advanced economies, it remains very much alive in emerging markets, and China in particular (Chart 2B), where the demand for credit is still very sensitive to changes in monetary settings. EM countries are the major source of volatility in the global business cycle. Chinese policymakers’ management of the tradeoff between growth and leverage will determine whether the global economy can avoid deflation. If they decide to tackle debt excesses head on, EM credit growth will contract and EM final demand will suffer. In this scenario, negative rates will persist in low-growth advanced economies, and the Fed will be incapable of raising rates because global deflationary forces will be too strong. Chart 3The World Is In The Midst Of A Deflationary Episode The World Is Experiencing A Deflationary Episode... The World Is Experiencing A Deflationary Episode... The second half of 2018 and the whole of 2019 gave us a taste of these forces. When China tightened credit conditions, the EM economies slowed first. Trade and manufacturing hubs like Europe, Australia and Japan quickly followed. A deflationary wave spread around the world, as evidenced by a drop in global producer prices (Chart 3). The US is a comparatively closed economy, but it could not avoid this gravitational pull. The ISM manufacturing survey ultimately started to contract in August 2018, converging to weakness in the rest of the world. The trade war’s hit to business confidence added insult to the injury of an already weak economic environment. Looking ahead, our optimism reflects an expectation that Chinese policymakers will adopt a more pro-growth policy stance because they too are spooked by the downtrend in their economy. While the Politburo Standing Committee has not abandoned its structural reform agenda, it realizes that aggressive deleveraging is dangerous. The Chinese economy is growing at its weakest pace in nearly 30 years and deflation is once again taking hold. In response to date, policymakers have lowered China’s reserve requirement ratio by 400 basis points, cut taxes by 2.8% of GDP, increased the issuance of local government bonds to finance public infrastructure projects, and boosted capex at state-owned enterprises. EM economies will respond to these stimulative measures. The Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has stabilized (Chart 4). Meanwhile, the Fed has pushed the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Holston-Laubach-Williams estimate of the neutral rate, and coordinated global policy easing points to a rebound in the global manufacturing sector (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, the global inventory purge that magnified the industrial sector’s pain is getting exhausted and the auto sector is looking up. Finally, we agree with Ms. X that both President Trump and President Xi have their own incentives to deescalate trade policy uncertainty. We are entering the end game of this business cycle and bull market. Global borrowing rates will rise, but only to a limited extent. Rightly or wrongly, major central banks are terrified by the prospect of the Japanification of their economies. Practically speaking, this means that they want inflation expectations to move back up to normal levels (Chart 5). However, after undershooting their 2% targets for 11 years, achieving this objective will require central banks to let realized inflation overshoot these targets first. Thus, central banks are unlikely to tighten policy until late next year at the earliest, which will limit how far yields can climb in 2020. Chart 4…But Do Not Bet Against Reflation ...But Do Not Bet Against Reflation ...But Do Not Bet Against Reflation Chart 5Depressed Inflation Expectations Depressed Inflation Expectations Depressed Inflation Expectations   Equities and other risk assets should perform well if global growth re-accelerates but interest rates don’t rise much at first. Some benefit of this fertile backdrop is already priced in, but many pockets of value levered to stronger global growth still exist. We are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. While the general environment favors remaining invested in risk assets in 2020, this is likely the last window of opportunity to do so. Today’s accommodative monetary policy will revive inflationary pressures in 2021, and central banks will ultimately be forced to lift rates much more aggressively. China will continue to resist excessive leverage. Neither the business cycle nor the equity bull market will withstand these final assaults. Mr. X: Your benign outlook reminds me of when we met in December 2007. Do you remember? You told me that the housing slowdown and the credit market seizure were large risks, but central banks would put a floor under global growth. How did that turn out? I agree that in advanced economies, overall debt loads have been stable. But this belies major disparities. For example, US corporate debt has never represented a larger share of GDP than it does today. This must be a major vulnerability. While household balance sheets look healthy, I do not think consumption will save the day if companies are cutting capex and employment while they clean up their balance sheets. Countries like Canada and Australia are drowning in private sector debt. How can you ignore these vulnerabilities? BCA: A comparison with 2008 actually reveals why advanced economies, particularly the US, are not the powder keg that they once were. US corporate debt is elevated when compared to GDP, but profits also represent a much larger share of GDP than they did 10 or 20 years ago, and interest rates are close to historic lows. As a result, interest coverage ratios are still adequate (Chart 6). In 2007, household debt loads were large, but interest payments also accounted for 18.1% of disposable income, the highest proportion since 1972. Additionally, US firms’ debt-to-asset ratio is in line with the post-1970 average of 22.1%. Finally, US businesses have not used rising leverage to fund capital spending, as demonstrated by the elevated age of the capital stock. Thus, the US corporate sector continues to generate positive net savings. Ahead of recessions, US businesses typically generate negative net savings. The composition of the creditors is another important difference. In 2007, an extremely large share of the spurious borrowings resided on banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, the banking system was woefully undercapitalized with a leverage ratio of 17x. Weak banks had to absorb 2.2 trillion of losses after 2008. Consequently, the money creation mechanism broke down, and money multipliers collapsed (Chart 7). Today, US banks boast relatively stronger balance sheets, and they are still judicious about extending credit despite being less exposed to the corporate sector than they were to the mortgage market in 2008. Instead, most corporate debt is held by less levered entities such as ETFs, pension plans, and insurance companies. The leveraged losses that proved so debilitating in 2008 are less likely to be a source of systemic risk in this cycle. Chart 6US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt US Businesses Can Still Service Their Debt Chart 72008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money 2008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money 2008 Heralded A Destruction Of Money   Countries like Australia and Canada have much more worrisome private sector debt dynamics, as their servicing costs are elevated (Chart 8). However, these economies are unlikely to collapse when global rates are low, as long as the global economy can avoid a recession, which would reduce export revenue in these trade-sensitive countries. You expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. The bottom line is that both the US corporate sector and at-risk countries like Canada should avoid a day of reckoning until interest rates rise meaningfully. As we have already mentioned, central banks are very clear that they will allow inflation to overshoot before tightening policy anew. We monitor US inflation breakeven rates to gauge the likely timing of that outcome. At 1.6%, they remain well below the 2.3% to 2.5% range, which is historically consistent with central banks durably achieving their inflation target (Chart 9). Until inflation expectations are re-anchored back up in that range, we will not worry about an imminent tightening in monetary conditions. Chart 8Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Canada And Australia Are Close To Their Debt Walls Chart 9The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten The Fed Is In No Rush To Tighten   Chart 10Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game It is true that inflationary pressures are building in the US. Historical evidence points to a kink in the Phillips curve, the link between wage growth and the unemployment rate. Since the labor market is tight, we are already seeing average hourly earnings growth accelerate. Moreover, the output gap is mostly closed. However, keep in mind that inflation is also a lagging economic indicator (Chart 10). Consequently, the recent global economic slowdown is likely to keep US inflation at bay for most of 2020. The sharp fall in US capacity utilization along with the decline in imported goods and core producer price inflation corroborate this picture. Mr. X: So you believe that as long as rates stay low, the day of reckoning will be delayed. But ultimately, that it is unavoidable. BCA: Correct. No matter what, we are entering the end game of this already long business cycle. The current period of easy policy will allow cyclical spending to rise as a share of output, and debt to build up again over the coming 18 months. Because slack is clearly limited, this latest wave of policy easing will generate inflationary pressures. Ultimately, the Fed will be forced to play catch up and tighten more aggressively than expected in 2021. Paradoxically, the longer the onset of recession is delayed, the deeper it is likely to be… Mr. X: Because imbalances and vulnerabilities will only grow larger! BCA: Absolutely! Mr. X: That is something we can agree on. Ms. X: The way you complete one another’s sentences is a testament to how many years you have been talking to each other. For me, the most concerning issue is political risk. While I am more positive on the outlook for trade policy than my father, I do worry about the impact of US election risk on capital spending. Chart 11If The 2012 Election Is Any Guide, Trump Can Still Win A Second Term OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game BCA: On the trade war, we would like to address your father’s concerns. All politicians, even unconventional ones like President Trump, seek re-election. Yet, President Trump’s overall approval rating is low (Chart 11). If the election were held today, his odds of winning would be minimal. However, US presidential elections do ultimately favor the incumbent. If the re-election of President Obama in 2012 is any guide, President Trump has enough time to boost his approval rating over the coming 12 months to secure a second term through the Electoral College. In order to achieve this outcome, he must reverse the large slowdown in wage growth currently plaguing the swing states he won by only a small margin in 2016 (Chart 12). Workers in states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are suffering disproportionately from the uncertainty created by the trade tensions. President Trump will have to pause the tariffs – and even cut tariff rates – to support the economy and reassure voters. Chart 12Trump's Fear Is Coming True Trump's Fear Is Coming True Trump's Fear Is Coming True China is willing to accept a trade truce. The Chinese economy is weak and producer prices are once again deflating. President Xi doesn’t want to preside over another massive surge in leverage or a 1930’s Irving Fisher-style deflationary spiral. Reviving private sector investment sentiment via a reduction in trade policy uncertainty would help stabilize spending and avoid a disorderly economic slump. Moreover, President Xi may not trust the current White House, but the prospect of a Democratic administration that will be tough on both environmental standards and human rights would offer little solace. This brings us to the US election. The recent Bank of America Merrill Lynch positioning survey shows that the investment community shares your concerns. This risk is hard to quantify. The Democratic nomination is wide open. Former Vice President Joe Biden leads the opinion polls, and is a known quantity. Meanwhile, the rising progressive wing of the party, embodied in Senator Elizabeth Warren, is hostile to business and likely to cause concerns in boardrooms across the US, especially in the tech, energy, financial services and healthcare sectors. This could dampen animal spirits. Biden’s and Warren’s odds of beating President Trump are overstated by current polls, especially if the President softens his stance on trade to allow for a growth pick-up. Moreover, to be competitive nationally, Senator Warren will have to abandon some of her more progressive plans and pivot toward the center. The recent upbeat equity market performance of sectors like managed healthcare suggests that markets are discounting this shift. Thus, we doubt the election is currently really weighing on business intentions. The recent pick up in capital spending intentions in various Fed Manufacturing surveys fades this risk. Chart 13A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished A Structural Tailwind Has Vanished What is clear though is that if the economy were to weaken further, Senator Warren’s chances would improve and CEOs would genuinely begin to worry about re-regulation, potentially unleashing a vicious cycle. Thus, the end game is an unstable equilibrium. On a structural basis, whether one looks at the rise of populism or the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US, trade tensions will remain a pesky feature of the global economy. In effect, the trade truce will not be a permanent deal. The global economy has therefore lost the tailwind of deepening global integration achieved through trade (Chart 13). This will limit global potential GDP growth. Ms. X: Thank you. I think the time is right to explore your economic outlook in more detail. The Economic Outlook Chart 14China: Modest Reflation Is Underway China: Modest Reflation Is Underway China: Modest Reflation Is Underway Mr. X: From your arguments, it seems that the outlook for China and Emerging Markets is critical, so let’s start there. My impression is that President Xi is not abandoning his structural reform agenda. Avoiding the middle-income trap will require decreasing China’s dependence on credit as a growth driver. Can economic activity really stabilize under those circumstances? BCA: You are correct: Senior Chinese administrators are reluctant to allow another major phase of debt accumulation to take hold. However, as we already highlighted, policymakers are taking steps to end the most severe economic slowdown since the first half of the 1990s. China is currently implementing a middling stimulus program. The positive impact of the lower bank reserve requirement ratio, the tax cuts and increased public infrastructure spending is being mitigated by strong regulatory constraints on the shadow banking system and small financial institutions, by efforts to limit real estate speculation, and by the cash crunch facing real estate developers. These crosscurrents make it unlikely that the credit impulse will rise as sharply as it did following the reflationary campaigns of 2009, 2012 or 2016. Nonetheless, the Chinese economy is indeed exhibiting some mildly positive signals. Our monetary indicator and state-owned enterprise capital spending point to a rebound in overall Chinese economic activity (Chart 14). Moreover, household spending is trying to bottom. If China stabilizes, then the EM slowdown will end soon. Without a deepening drag from the Chinese economy, EM countries should be able to take advantage of the easing in global financial and liquidity conditions. But the end of the Chinese drag on EM growth does not mean a massive tailwind will be forthcoming. Additionally, deflationary forces remain stronger in the emerging world than in the US. As a result, EM real rates will remain stubbornly above the level that real economic activity warrants, posing a headwind for capital and durable goods spending. Generally speaking, EM and China are moving from a headwind for the world to a mild tailwind. Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone. Ms. X: I’m somewhat more positive than you on global growth next year. The policy easing around the world looks very promising for economic activity. How do you factor the impact of improving global liquidity conditions into your outlook for 2020? BCA: It is undeniable that global liquidity conditions have eased massively. As we already highlighted, the majority of global central banks cutting rates is a very positive dynamic for global growth. Trends in measures of liquidity ratify this message. Foreign exchange reserves are again growing and our BCA US Financial Liquidity index has rallied sharply over the past 12 months. Historically, this indicator forecasts the trend in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator, commodity prices and EM export prices by 18 months (Chart 15). Moreover, money aggregates are growing faster than credit across the major advanced economies. Such developments typically foretell an acceleration in global economic activity (Chart 16). Chart 15Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Liquidity Dynamics: Fueling A Global Growth Recovery Chart 16Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing Rising Money Supply Is A Good Thing   The duration of the current slowdown also warrants optimism. We have often highlighted that since the early 1990s, the global manufacturing sector evolves over 36-month symmetric cycles (Chart 17). The current soft patch has lasted more than 18 months. In the context of easing liquidity and depleted inventories, pent-up demand can easily translate into actual spending. The recent surge in the new orders-to-inventories ratio confirms that global manufacturing activity should soon pick up (Chart 18). The auto sector’s weakness, which was exacerbated by previous inventory buildups, changing emission standards, and rising borrowing costs, is also ebbing. Chart 17The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth The Mid-Cycle Slowdown Is Long In The Tooth Chart 18The New Order-To-Inventory Ratio Points To A Global Rebound The New Orders-To-Inventories Ratio Points To A Global Rebound The New Orders-To-Inventories Ratio Points To A Global Rebound     Various growth indicators are sniffing out this positive inflection point. The recent trough in the global ZEW survey is revealing (Chart 19). It materialized quickly after Sino-US trade tensions began to ease. Enough positive global economic momentum exists such that a minor decline in policy uncertainty could unleash a large improvement in growth expectations. The rebound in Taiwanese equities and European luxury stocks confirms that the global economy should soon bottom. There are two things we cannot emphasis enough. First, this is the end game of the business cycle, after which a recession will ensue. Second, investors should not expect the kind of strong synchronized growth rebound witnessed in 2017. Without a Chinese and EM boom, a crucial source of demand will be wanting. Mr. X: What about US growth? The yield curve inverted this summer and deteriorating consumer and business confidence raised the specter of an imminent recession. Moreover, the fiscal stimulus that helped the economy in the first half of 2019 is now over. In fact, with a $1 trillion federal deficit despite an unemployment rate of only 3.6%, we have run out of fiscal room to support activity if and when a recession materializes. BCA: The recent yield curve inversion most likely overstated the risk of an economic contraction. First, in the mid-1990s, if the term premium had been as low as it is today, the curve would have also inverted without any recession materializing from 1995 to 2000. Second, this summer, the curve inverted up to the 5-year tenor and steepened for longer maturities. Prior to recessions, the curve inverts across all maturities. Recessions are not born out of thin air. They are caused by imbalances and tight monetary policy. The large debt buildup and other investment imbalances that have preceded prior US recessions are not yet apparent. Prior to the 1991, 2001 and 2008 recessions, the private sector debt load had increased by 20.6%, 14.6% and 25.6% of GDP in the previous five years, not the current 1.4% run rate. The Fed’s policy is now clearly accommodative. Not only is the real fed funds rate 74.4 basis points below the Fed’s favored estimate of the neutral rate of interest, but also real estate, the most interest-rate sensitive economic sector, is rebounding. In 2018, real estate activity collapsed in response to mortgage rates rising to 4.9%. Today, the NAHB Homebuilding index has retraced 79% of its losses; mortgage demand has improved; and housing starts and building permits have recovered (Chart 20). When policy is tight, real estate activity never recovers this quickly, even as yields fall. Chart 19Positive Signals For Global Growth Positive Signals For Global Growth Positive Signals For Global Growth Chart 20The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative The Housing Market Signals That Policy Is Accommodative   Chart 21Robust Household Financial Health OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game A counterargument is that real estate price appreciation is weak. However, tight monetary policy is not the cause. Two forces are dampening house prices. First, the Jobs and Tax Act of 2017 lowered allowable mortgage interest and state and local tax deductions. High-end properties in high-tax states such as California, New York and Massachusetts have suffered from this adjustment. Second, the US housing market has an overhang of large, pricey homes relative to strong demand for smaller, starter homes. Median home prices outpacing average ones show this divergence. We also to need to gauge if consumer spending is likely to follow the manufacturing sector lower. If it does, a recession will be unavoidable. On this front, we are hopeful because: The outlook for household income is positive. As you noted, the unemployment rate is still extraordinarily low, and more Americans will be working by the end of 2020 than today. Additionally, the rising employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers is tightly linked to stronger wages (Chart 21). Also, the recent pick up in productivity growth points to higher real wage growth. The household savings rate is elevated and has limited upside. Households already have a large cushion insulating them from unforeseen shocks. At 8.1% of disposable income, the savings rate is in the 65th percentile of its post-1980 distribution. It is especially lofty if we take into account robust American households’ net worth (Chart 21, bottom panel). Consumer credit demand is rising, according to the Fed’s Senior Loan officer survey. Since household liquid assets are quickly expanding and the household formation rate is robust, consumption of durable goods should pick up, especially in light of the large decrease in borrowing costs. This is particularly true since the household debt-to-assets ratio is at its lowest level since 1985 and debt-servicing costs only represent 9.7% of disposable income, the lowest share for nearly 40 years. The corporate sector outlook should brighten soon. The modest rise in productivity protects margins from higher wages, an effect that will linger given that capacity expansion is consistent with further productivity gains (Chart 22). Crucially, the combined fiscal and monetary easing in China should bolster capital-spending intentions around the world, including the US (Chart 23). Rising productivity will only consolidate these trends. Chart 22Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Capacity Growth Provides Some Support For Productivity Chart 23Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending Chinese Reflation Will Revive US Capital Spending   The most positive development for the US corporate sector is our outlook for non-US growth. If the global manufacturing sector mends itself, so will the US. Ample liquidity is a positive for the world economy, as well as for US manufacturing conditions (Chart 24). On the fiscal front, we appreciate your worries, but they are not a story for 2020. The US fiscal thrust will not be as positive as it was in 2018 or 2019, but it is set to remain a small tailwind, not a drag. Furthermore, given that 2020 is an election year it is unlikely that politicians will tighten purse strings over the coming 12 months. Fiscal risks are undoubtedly greater in the long run. However, a sudden fiscal consolidation is a remote probability because fiscal austerity has gone out of style. Instead, the federal debt burden will be a major source of long-term inflation because there is no other easy way to address this gigantic pile of liabilities. The path of least resistance will be more spending and financial repression. In other words, real rates will stay too low and excess government spending will push prices higher, conveniently eroding the real value of that high federal debt burden. This was a big story in the 20th century and it will remain so in the 21st (Chart 25), especially since an aging population and the peak in globalization will weigh on global savings. Chart 24The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course The US Manufacturing Slowdown Has Run Its Course Chart 25Inflation Is About Political Decisions Inflation Is About Political Decisions Inflation Is About Political Decisions   Ms. X: Your point about demographics makes me think of Europe and Japan. Brexit has not been resolved; populism remains a concern in Italy; and the European banking system is still fragile. Japan suffers from an even worse demographic profile and the recent VAT increase was ill-timed, economically. Given these headwinds, can these regions participate in the global recovery you foresee? BCA: The short answer is yes, albeit to varying degrees. The outlook for Europe is more promising than Japan. A No-Deal Brexit is now a very low probability event, even after next month’s UK election. The conservatives’ support for Prime Minister Johnson’s Brexit plan will ensure as much. A large source of uncertainty is being lifted, which will allow European businesses to resume investment planning. The situation in the European periphery is also improving. Non-performing loans in Spain and Italy are falling (Chart 26), which is allowing for a normalization of credit origination. The narrowing Italian and peripheral spreads to German bunds will be helped by easing financial conditions in the European economies that need it most. Higher Italian bond prices improve banks’ solvency and cut borrowing costs for the private sector. Finally, populism is alive and well in Europe, rejecting fiscal austerity, but not embracing euro-skepticism. More generous fiscal spending would be a positive for Europe. European liquidity conditions are also generous. Deposit growth has strengthened and financial conditions have benefited from lower German yields and a cheap euro, which trades 15% below fair-value estimates. Our model for European banks’ return on tangible equity is rising, which is a clear indication that easy financial and liquidity conditions should deliver stronger incremental economic activity (Chart 27). Chart 26Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Declining Non-Performing Loans Are A Positive For The European Periphery Chart 27European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020 European Banks' Return On Equity Will Improve In 2020   The fiscal outlook is murkier. European fiscal thrust was a positive 0.4% of GDP in 2019, but it will decline to 0.1% in 2020. However, fiscal policy affects economic activity with a lag. The impact of this year’s easing has yet to be fully felt. Since European rates are so low and the economy is not operating at full capacity, the fiscal multiplier is greater than one. Therefore, Europe can still reap a substantial fiscal dividend next year. Finally, Europe remains a very pro-cyclical economy. A large share of euro area GDP is connected to manufacturing and exports. As a result, Europe will be one of the prime beneficiaries of a pickup in global growth. Already, the sharp rebound in the German and euro area ZEW survey expectation components point to a brighter outlook for the region. Japan is also a very pro-cyclical economy, which will reap a dividend from a bottom in global manufacturing activity. However, the Land of the Rising Sun is still subject to idiosyncratic constraints. Japanese financial conditions have not improved as much as those in Europe. The yen has appreciated 2.6% in trade-weighted terms this year, while Japanese yields have not melted as much as European ones (because Italian and peripheral yields fell so much in 2019). Japan will also have to reckon with the impact of the October VAT increase. Ahead of the tax hike, retail sales spiked by 9.1% on a year-on-year basis, or 7.1% compared to the previous month, a script similar to 2014. 2015 was a payback year where consumption was depressed. This scenario will play out again, even if the Abe government has implemented some fiscal offsets. Ultimately, the Japanese economy will lag Europe’s in the first half of the year but should catch up in the second half. The impact of the tax hike will dissipate. Most importantly, rebounding global growth will hurt the yen, at least on a trade-weighted basis, providing a lift to export prospects and easing Japanese financial conditions relative to the rest of the world, which will produce a growth dividend later in 2020. Ms. X: To summarize, you expect a moderate rebound in global growth next year, but not a sharp acceleration because Chinese stimulus will not be that aggressive. EM activity will also pick up but will not generate fireworks. The US will be okay but Europe will probably deliver the largest positive growth surprise as external and domestic conditions align positively. Japan will also stabilize on the back of stronger global growth, but domestic headwinds mean that a true reacceleration won’t happen until the latter part of the year. This recovery constitutes the business cycle’s end game as inflation will become a concern in 2021, forcing the Fed to tighten then. BCA: Yes, this is correct. Ms. X: Thank you! Bond Market Prospects Chart 28Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Global Bonds Are Extremely Overvalued Ms. X: I do not like US Treasuries at current yields. They do not protect me against an inflation surprise and will do nothing for me in an economic recovery. However, my bearishness is tempered by the large stock of bonds with negative yields in Europe and Japan. As long as this strange situation persists, I doubt US yields will experience much upside. US paper is too attractive to foreign asset managers right now. BCA: We share your view and are recommending an underweight to global government bonds. Global yields offer little value and are vulnerable to a rebound in economic activity or a trade détente. Our Global Bond Valuation index is flashing a clear sell signal (Chart 28). As yields rise, global yield curves are bound to steepen. We also agree that the upside for Treasury yields is limited, but we disagree with the limiting factor. Foreign investors are not the major buyers of Treasuries. Indeed, the data shows that European and Japanese investors have not been aggressive purchasers of US government securities. The US yield curve is flat and US short rates tower above European and Japanese ones, hedging currency exposure when buying Treasuries is expensive. In euro or yen terms, a hedged Treasury yields -67 basis points and -60 basis points, less than 10-year bunds or JGBs, respectively. Meanwhile, EM central banks are diversifying their FX reserves away from the US dollar into gold. Instead, our view is governed by the concept we dub the “Golden Rule of Treasury Investing.” According to this principle, the outperformance of Treasuries relative to cash is a direct function of the Fed’s ability to surprise the market. If the Fed cuts rates more than the OIS curve anticipated 12 months prior, Treasuries outperform. The opposite happens if the Fed delivers a hawkish surprise (Chart 29). Chart 29The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing The Golden Rule Of Treasury Investing Treasury yields are unlikely to move significantly higher than the 2.25% to 2.5% zone, because the OIS curve is now only pricing in 28 basis points of rate cuts over the next year. It is not just the US OIS curve that has priced out a large amount of rate cuts; this phenomenon has materialized around the world over the past five weeks. Chart 30The Term Premium Is Too Low The Term Premium Is Too Low The Term Premium Is Too Low Any upside risk to that 2.25% to 2.5% forecast for 2020 will come from the inflation expectations and term premium components of yields. Central banks, including the Fed, have telegraphed an intention to allow inflation expectations to rise, initially, in response to stronger global growth. Moreover, declining risk aversion should also allow the exceptionally depressed term premium to normalize (Chart 30). Only in late 2020 or early 2021 will Treasury yields durably move above this 2.25-2.5% zone. Punching above these levels will require core PCE inflation to have been above target long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations back up to their 2.3% to 2.5% target zone. Only then will the Fed give the all-clear signal to the bond market to lift yields higher. Mr. X: You still have not directly addressed the question of negative yields in Europe and Japan. This story will not end well. Do you worry about these bond markets over the next year? BCA: Our answer is an emphatic yes. But we assume you will not let us leave it at that. Mr. X: You know me too well. BCA: Over the course of the past 50 years, we have learned a thing or two about you. In all seriousness, let’s start with our simple but effective valuation ranking. It compares the current level of real yields for each country to their historical averages and standard deviations. You can see that the most unattractive bond markets right now are all in Europe (Chart 31). Chart 31European Bonds Are Too Dear OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 32Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition Swiss Bonds Are A Lose-Lose Proposition The lower bound of interest rates is another reason to avoid these markets. This floor seems to lie around -1% in nominal terms. Because of these constraints, in recent months, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch and German 10-year bonds have failed to rally as much as their higher-yielding US, Canadian or Australian counterparts when global yields are declining. However, they also underperform when yields are rising (Chart 32). They have become a lose-lose proposition. The only pockets of value left in DM bond markets are Greece, Portugal or Italy. Despite their apparent risks, we still like them. Support for the euro in Greece and Italy is 70% and 65%, respectively. Even populist governments in these nations are reluctant to attack euro membership anymore. Moreover, the ECB remains committed to the survival of the euro area in its current form. Christine Lagarde will not change that. For 2020 or 2021, the risk of euro breakup is practically zero. The same may not be true on a 5- to 10-year investment horizon, but for the coming year, these bonds offer an attractive risk-adjusted carry. Ms. X: Unsurprisingly, my father does not like corporate bonds because of highly levered corporate balance sheets. I think this is a long-term problem, but not a risk for 2020, so I’m looking to stay overweight spread product relative to Treasuries. Where do you stand on this market? BCA: On this issue, we sit somewhere between you both. Our Corporate Health Monitor continues to deteriorate (Chart 33). The high debt load of the US business sector coupled with the decline of the return on capital worries us. Furthermore, the covenant-lite trend in recent issuance suggests that corporate borrowers, not lenders, are getting the good deals. Essentially, too much cash is still chasing too little available yield pick-up. In this environment, capital is sure to be misallocated, and money ultimately lost. We find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. On a short-term basis, the spreads will not widen much. An easy Fed, recovering global growth, and the gigantic pile of negative-yielding bonds around the world will make sure of that. We advocate a neutral stance on investment grade corporates because IG bonds have high modified duration such that breakeven spread compensation versus Treasuries is near the bottom of its historical distribution across the IG credit spectrum (Chart 34). This means that credit will generate poor returns if government bond yields rise. Chart 33Dangerous Long-Term Picture For US Corporates A Precarious Long-Term Picture For US Corporates A Precarious Long-Term Picture For US Corporates Chart 34No Value Left In IG No Value Left In IG No Value Left In IG   Chart 35EMs Still Experiencing Deflation EMs Still Experiencing Deflation EMs Still Experiencing Deflation Thankfully, they are ways around this problem: emphasizing exposure to high-yield (HY) bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) instead. HY breakeven spreads remain much more attractive than in the IG space, and option-adjusted spreads will benefit if our growth and inflation forecasts materialize. Investors reluctant to commit capital to these products should look into high quality agency MBS. After the recent wave of mortgage refinancing, these securities’ duration has collapsed to 3.0 compared to 7.9 for IG corporates. These securities therefore offer much better protection in a rising-yield environment. Ms. X: Before we move on to equities, where do you stand on EM bonds? BCA: We need to differentiate between EM local-currency bonds and EM USD-denominated bonds. We do like some EM local currency bonds. Inflation in EM countries is low and dropping. Money and credit growth is slowing, which implies that the disinflationary trend will remain in place through 2020 (Chart 35). Weaker nominal growth means that central banks in EM will continue to cut rates, providing a nice tailwind for local-currency bond prices. This comes with a caveat. Lower policy rates will boost bond prices but hurt EM currencies, especially because most EM currencies are not cheap and are already over-owned. Next year, it will be preferable to garner exposure to those countries interest rate moves via the swap market rather than the cash bond market. Chart 36The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap There are some exceptions, like Mexico. The MXN is already very cheap because of fears surrounding the economic policies of President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador (AMLO) (Chart 36). However, we doubt he will turn out to be as dangerous as feared. Hence, MXN Mexican bonds are attractive to foreign investors in unhedged terms. We are currently avoiding EM USD-denominated debt, corporate and sovereign. Since emerging markets sport $5.1 trillion of dollar-denominated debt, falling EM exchange rates will increase the cost of servicing this debt, which makes it riskier. Mr. X: I think we will continue to underweight corporate and EM bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. I must admit that I find your recommendation to overweight MBS intriguing. We will need to ponder this idea further. Ms. X: And please wish me luck trying to convince my father to buy some high-yield bonds. Equity Market Outlook Mr. X: US stocks are too expensive for my taste, with the S&P 500 trading at a forward P/E ratio of 18. I’m well aware of the argument that equities may be expensive but that they are actually cheap compared to bonds, which implies that I should favor stocks over bonds. However, you know that I emphasize capital preservation. With stocks this rich already, equities offer no margin of safety. If I own stocks, I am therefore exposed to any unexpected shocks. Because I do not share your optimism on the economy, I am more worried about downside risk. Moreover, even if the economy performs better than I fear, I suspect stocks will respond poorly to higher yields. Chart 37The S&P Is Very Expensive The S&P Is Very Expensive The S&P Is Very Expensive Ms. X: I agree with my father that stocks are expensive. Nonetheless, as Keynes famously quipped, “Markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” In today’s context, to me this means that stocks can ignore their overvaluation so long as liquidity is plentiful, rates are low, and a recession is avoided. BCA: On this question, we agree with Ms. X. We all agree that US equities are expensive. As you mentioned, their price-to-earnings ratio is 18. Only at the apex of the tech bubble and in early 2018 was the S&P 500 more expensive. Worryingly, the price-to-sales ratio is at 2.3, an even larger historical outlier than the P/E (Chart 37). Chart 38Low Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Low Bond Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Low Bond Yields And Plentiful Liquidity Are Still Fertile Ground For Stocks Ms. X is correct that we cannot look at stock valuations in isolation. Investing is about opportunity cost and the macroeconomic context. On this front, even US equities have their merit. Despite the S&P 500’s expensive multiples, our Composite Valuation Indicator is no more elevated than it was in 2013. Meanwhile, our Monetary Indicator has rarely been as supportive of stock prices as it is today, and our Speculation Indicator is in line with its January 2016 reading (Chart 38). Moreover, BCA’s Composite Sentiment indicator is still below its long-term historical average and margin debt has declined by $47.5 billion to the lowest share of US market capitalization since June 2005. These are hardly signs of irrational exuberance. Ultimately, bear markets and recessions travel together. A durable 20% drop in stock prices requires a significant and long-lasting decline in earnings. These developments happen during recessions (Chart 39). Our call is for a recession in the next 24 months or so. We must also remember that while equities perform poorly six months ahead of a recession, the end of a bull market, its last 12 to 18 months, tend to be very rewarding (Table 3). We are within this window. Chart 39Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Bear Markets And Recessions Travel Together Table 3The End Game Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Based on our forecast for interest rates, we do not share the concerns that rising bond yields will topple stocks right away. Stock prices are an inverse function of risk-free rates, but a positive function of growth expectations. Higher yields will initially reflect stronger growth, not restrict it. But remember: the upside for yields is limited because central banks do not want to choke off the recovery. They will maintain accommodative policy. In other words, we expect real rates to lag behind growth expectations. Because long-term growth expectations, whether from sell-side analysts or extracted out of market prices using the Gordon Growth Model, are low, we are willing to make this bet (Chart 40). Equities will suffer if the global bond yield rises above 2.5%. This is more a story for 2021, and not our central scenario for 2020. It is nonetheless a reminder that we are entering the end game of the business cycle, so we are also entering the end-game of the bull market. Mr. X: I think you are playing with fire. Stocks are so expensive that if you are wrong on either the growth call or the yield call, they will suffer. I would rather miss the last melt-up in stocks than unnecessarily expose my portfolio to a meltdown. Additionally, you have not addressed the fact that S&P 500 margins have begun to soften but are still extremely elevated. Shouldn’t this dampen your optimism? BCA: Aggregate S&P 500 margins have some downside. Our Composite Margin Proxy, Operating Margins Diffusion index and Corporate Pricing Power indicator all remain weak (Chart 41). The deceleration in the crude PPI excluding food and energy and the past strength in the dollar confirm this insight, especially as the corporate wage bill climbs in a tight labor market. The biggest mitigating factor is that productivity is also on the mend, which curbs the negative impact of higher worker pay. Chart 40Growth Expectations Are Muted Profit Growth Expectations Are Muted Profit Growth Expectations Are Muted Chart 41US Margins Under Pressure US Margins Under Pressure US Margins Under Pressure   This danger must be put into perspective though. Margin expansion has been dominated by the tech sector (Chart 42). Excluding this industry, S&P 500 margins are roughly in line with their previous peak, and are not declining. The aggregate softness in margins is a reflection of the sharper decline in tech margins. Declining margins do not spell the imminent end of the bull market either. Table 4 shows that on average, the S&P 500 rises by 9.5% following the peak in margins. Equities can rise after margins crest because this is often an environment where wages are climbing, which boosts consumption. Consequently, top-line growth can accelerate and earnings can rise even if they represent a lower proportion of sales. This is the environment we foresee over 2020. Chart 42Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Tech Margins Have Likely Peaked Table 4Margin Peaks Do Not Spell S&P Doom OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game   Chart 43Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Taiwanese Stocks Are Sniffing Out Better Global Growth Ms. X: You have talked about the tech sector being a drag on overall margins. How would you position a US stock portfolio? BCA: First, around the world, we prefer cyclical sectors to defensive ones. Cyclical stocks are depressed relative to defensive firms’ shares. Rebounding global growth and rising bond yields will favor cyclical sectors. Globally, the performance of cyclical equities relative to defensive ones correlates with Taiwanese equities, which are currently rallying smartly (Chart 43). This suggests that at the margin, the most cyclical asset markets are beginning to express optimism about global growth. Within the S&P 500, our favorite pair trade to express this bias is to overweight energy stocks at the expense of utilities. Utilities are bond proxies which will substantially underperform energy stocks when the rate of change of Treasury yields moves up (Chart 44). Moreover, based on our valuation indicators, energy stocks have never traded at such a deep discount to utilities, nor have they ever been as oversold. Chart 44Favor Energy Over Utilities Favor Energy Over Utilities Favor Energy Over Utilities Second, we are currently neutral on tech stocks but have put them on a downgrade alert. Tech equities are expensive, trading at a forward P/E ratio 21% above the other cyclicals. Moreover, since software spending has remained surprisingly resilient despite the global economic slowdown, it will likely lag investment in machinery and structures when industrial demand rebounds. Consequently, tech earnings will lag other traditional cyclical sectors. Tech multiples will also suffer when bond yields rise. As high-growth stocks, tech equities derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred cash flows and their terminal value. Thus, tech multiples are highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate We implement this view by way of an underweight in tech and an overweight to industrials. Industrials have suffered disproportionately from the trade war. Any near term truce is unlikely to contain a grand bargain on intellectual property rights transfer that galvanizes tech exports, but it will remove some of the uncertainty weighing on industrials. Moreover, industrials are a much cheaper play on a global growth rebound. The global manufacturing slowdown has caused industrial equities to trade at their greatest discount to the tech sector since the financial crisis. Finally, the wage bill for the industrial sector is melting relative to tech, and our margin proxy is surging (Chart 45). This has created a very positive backdrop for this pair trade. We also like financials. They will be a key beneficiary of rising yields and a steepening yield curve. Additionally, household credit demand has picked up and overall credit growth should accelerate as central banks will maintain very accommodative monetary conditions. The yield impulse already points toward higher bank credit growth and companies are issuing an increasingly large stock of bonds (Chart 46). Chart 45Operating Metrics Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Operating Leverage Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Operating Leverage Will Boost Industrials Versus Tech Equities Chart 46Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Credit Creation   Ms. X: When combining valuation analysis with your fundamental sectoral slant, I am guessing that you must favor European, Japanese and EM stocks over the S&P 500? BCA: We do favor European and Japanese equities. Based on valuation alone, all the regions you mentioned offer higher expected long-term real rates of return than the US (Chart 47). Moreover, the dollar is expensive relative to advanced economies’ currencies. Hence, these markets are cheaper vehicles than the S&P 500 to bet on a global economic recovery. But valuation alone is not enough. US stocks are trading at unprecedented levels relative to global equities because of the FAANG craze (Chart 48). Looking at sector representation, our positive view on non-tech cyclicals also flatters exposure to Europe and Japan (Table 5). Chart 47Non US Equities Offer Better Value OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 48FAANG-Driven US Outperformance FAANG-Driven US Outperformance FAANG-Driven US Outperformance   Table 5Equity Market Sector Composition OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 49European Banks Are Cheap European Banks Are Cheap European Banks Are Cheap Europe is particularly attractive because of its large skew towards industrials and financials, which represent 32.3% of the market versus 22.3% in the US. Moreover, European financials are also a tantalizing bet because they trade at a 50% discount to US financials, according to their price-to-book ratio. Additionally, their return on tangible equity will benefit from higher German yields, easing financial conditions, declining non-performing loans in the periphery and rebounding global growth. Our RoE model for European banks already points to a resurgence in their stock prices (Chart 49). Of the major markets we track, Japan offers the highest prospective long-term real returns. Its strong cyclical slant and low share of tech stocks means it is another market investors should overweight to bet on a global recovery. The biggest problem for Japanese equities is the yen. When global yields climb higher, a weak JPY will clip some of the Nikkei’s gains for foreign investors. Finally, we are reluctant to overweight EM stocks just yet. In this space, median P/E ratios are much higher than on a market capitalization-weighted basis (Chart 50). State-owned companies explain this bifurcation, Chinese banks in particular. Since we expect Chinese banks to remain a conduit for policy, credit origination may flatter economic growth more than shareholders’ interests. Moreover, we have a negative outlook on EM currencies, and hedging this exposure is expensive. Finally, if China’s economic activity improves only modestly in 2020, the 2012 experience suggests that EM stocks can still underperform the global equity universe as global growth improves and yields rise (Chart 51). In other words, we find the reward-to-risk tradeoff more attractive in Europe and Japan than in emerging markets. Chart 50EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet EM Stocks Are No Bargain Yet Chart 51EM Stocks Can Underperform When Global Growth Improves EM Stocks Can Underperform Even When Global Growth Improves EM Stocks Can Underperform Even When Global Growth Improves     Mr. X: Thank you. I am still not sure what share of our portfolio will be dedicated to stocks. However, I think that whatever this proportion will be, buying global equities makes more sense than US ones. Your valuation argument alone is swaying me, considering my more conservative instincts. Ms. X: I’m glad we will not have to argue on this point, but I know we will nonetheless battle on the stock/bond/gold split. Should we move on to your currency and commodity forecasts? BCA: It would be our pleasure. Currencies And Commodities Mr. X: You have often argued that the dollar is a countercyclical currency. Based on our discussion so far, you must expect the dollar to decline until we get closer to the next recession. I am not fully convinced. Specifically, I remember that in the back half of 2016 global growth was rebounding, but the dollar soared. Therefore, the growth/dollar relationship can be more complex than you argue. Meanwhile, with negative interest rates in Europe, Japan and Switzerland, why would I even consider divesting out of my positive yielding dollar assets? Chart 52The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Counter Cyclical Currency BCA: You raise interesting questions, and you are correct that we expect the dollar to depreciate if our constructive view on global growth pans out for 2020. The inverse relationship between global industrial production (excluding the US) and the trade-weighted dollar is unambiguous (Chart 52). As you also mentioned, the reality is a little bit more nuanced. To understand why, it is important to remember how currencies function. We can think of an exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism that solves for the gap in growth between any two countries. This is at the root of the dollar’s counter-cyclicality. When global growth is picking up, returns tend to be higher in cyclical markets, which are highly concentrated outside of the US. Flows then gravitate from the US to other markets and the dollar declines. After a while, the dollar becomes cheap enough that these flows reverse. In the second half of 2016, three factors drove the dollar rebound. First, US manufacturing was improving at a faster pace than that of the rest of the world. Second, the Fed resumed its interest rate hikes, so interest rate differentials suddenly flattered the dollar anew. Finally, the election of President Trump, who campaigned on large scale fiscal stimulus, elicited memories of the Reagan dollar bull market of the first half of the 1980s. These factors eventually faded as global growth rebounded. Today, the Fed’s policies are hurting the dollar. Aside from recent interest rate cuts, the Fed has been injecting liquidity into the banking system through repurchase agreements and renewed asset (T-Bills) purchases. Moreover, the rate cuts are also easing global funding conditions and promoting a re-steepening of the yield curve. This will incentivize banks to lend and boost the US money supply. As growth re-accelerates and demand for imports (machinery, commodities, and consumer goods) rises, the current account deficit will widen further. This process will increase the international supply of dollars. Historically, these dynamics usually hurt the dollar. What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. Like you, we are deeply uncomfortable with negative interest rates. Thankfully, the nascent pickup in global economic activity is lifting global bond yields. So far, foreign bond markets have led this move. More specifically, countries that have suffered most from the global manufacturing slowdown are now seeing their bond yields rise the quickest (Chart 53). For example, yields in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen by a lot more than those in the US since global yields troughed in September. Should the initial signals of stabilization in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, the US yield advantage will evaporate. In a nutshell, interest rates might be negative in Europe and Switzerland, but the positive carry offered by US assets is rapidly fading. Chart 53AAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Chart 53BAre Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates? Are Interest Rate Differentials Flashing A Signal About Exchange Rates?   Chart 54Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries Foreigners Are Selling Treasuries For international investors, the currency risk inherent in owning US bonds is just too large at the current juncture. Remember, the trade-weighted dollar stands 25% above its long-term equilibrium and the US twin deficits are expanding. Markets priced in cheap currencies with some potential upside, such as Australia, Canada, Norway or even the European periphery, might be better bets. Flows highlight just how precarious the situation is for the US dollar. Since last August, overall flows into the US Treasury market have been negative. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive at an annualized US$180 billion, but they are clearly rolling over. Moreover, official net outflows are running at $350 billion, easily cancelling out the private sector’s inflows (Chart 54). Essentially, foreigners’ appetite for US fixed-income assets is waning exactly as interest rate differentials have started moving against the dollar. Ms. X: I share my father’s concerns, but how would you implement your negative dollar view. Which currencies should I be loading up on as we enter the business cycle’s end game? BCA: The more export-dependent economies (and currencies) should benefit the most from a rebound in global growth. Within the G-10, we particularly like the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone and the British pound. Bond yields for these currencies are rising the fastest vis-à-vis the US. As a result, the currencies themselves should soon follow (previously mentioned Chart 53). We also expect commodity currencies to benefit, but only upon clearer signs that the resource-thirsty Chinese economy is improving. Until then, they are likely to lag the pro-cyclical European currencies, which are less directly dependent on Chinese stimulus. The euro could become the greatest beneficiary from a weaker dollar because a large headwind for European economic activity is disappearing for now. For the past ten years, European real interest rates have been too low for the most productive, competitive exporter – Germany – but too high for others such as Spain and Italy. Consequently, the euro has been caught in a tug-of-war between a rising neutral rate of interest for Germany and a very low one for the peripheral economies. Via its rate cuts, asset purchase programs, and aggressive TLTRO packages, the ECB may have now finally eased policy to the point where nearly all Eurozone countries enjoy an accommodative monetary environment. 10-year government bond yields in France, Spain, Portugal and even Italy now all sit close to the neutral rate of interest for the entire eurozone (Chart 55). Chart 55The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough The ECB Has Eased Policy Enough Finally, the euro is likely to benefit from inflows into European equity markets. The euro’s drop since 2018 has eased financial conditions and made euro area businesses more competitive. This is an important tailwind for European corporate profits and thus stocks. Moreover, European equities, especially those in the periphery, remain unloved, as illustrated by their cheap valuations compared to other advanced economies. Additionally, analysts’ earnings expectations for eurozone equities are perking up relative to US stocks. If the sell-side is right, powerful inflows into the region will lift the euro in 2020. Mr. X: Thank you. I find it difficult to share your enthusiasm for the euro, a currency backed by such a flimsy edifice. While I would agree that it could rebound next year, I find currencies highly unpredictable on such a time horizon. I prefer to think about them on a long-term basis, and while the euro is cheap, its weak institutional underpinning is too concerning. Let’s move on to commodities. Following our meeting last year, we took your advice on oil and gold. Overall, these calls helped our portfolio. Going forward, these markets are extremely perplexing. There is so much risk in oil markets, such as the tensions in the Middle East and the uncertainty stemming from the trade war between the US and China. How would you recommend playing the oil market in 2020? Chart 56Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil Inventory Drawdown Will Support Oil BCA: Your assessment of these markets is spot on. Yet, price risk is skewed to the upside because fiscal and monetary stimulus will revive commodity demand. The oil-producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia will continue to restrain production, and will probably extend its 1.2mm b/d production cut due to expire at the end of March to year-end 2020. In the US, market-imposed capital discipline will keep reducing the growth of US shale-oil supply. Additionally, US shale-oil supply growth is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Ms. X: What about the demand side of the oil markets? The fall in the growth rate of demand this year caught most participants off guard. What do you make of that? BCA: Demand data shows a lot of lingering weakness, much of which was caused by tight financial conditions last year in the US and China. But now, most global central banks are pursuing highly accommodative monetary policy and many governments are also easing fiscal policy. As a result, this demand weakness will fade next year. We think next year growth will clock in at 1.4mm b/d. Not as robust as 2017, but still respectable. This should stop the downward pressure on oil prices that has prevailed since May (Chart 56). Mr. X: You’re describing a fairly strong market for next year. What are the downside risks to your view? BCA: Global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. Uncertainty is one of the key factors driving demand for USD, which is one of the most popular safe havens in the world (Chart 57). A strong dollar creates a headwind for commodity demand. It raises the local-currency costs of consumers in the EM economies that drive oil demand, and lowers production costs outside of the US, encouraging supply growth at the margin. Chart 57Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Has Kept The USD Well Bid OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Chart 58Gold: A Valuable Portfolio Hedge OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Ms. X: So, pulling it all together, what is your call for 2020? BCA: The weaker 2019 demand data and the upward revisions to global oil inventories pushed our 2020 Brent Oil forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We still expect WTI to trade at a $4/bbl discount to Brent. As we mentioned earlier, the risk to our forecast is to the upside: a resolution of the US-China trade war, and lower global economic policy uncertainty could trigger a sharp rally in crude prices. Mr. X: Thank you for your insight on oil. I would like to hear your thoughts on gold. You can tell that I see little absolute value in stocks or bonds at the moment, so I have an outsized preference for the yellow metal this year. Also, how could the US dollar and gold both rally at the same time in 2019? BCA: Let’s start with your dollar/gold question. It is very rare to see gold and the dollar rally together. Normally a strong dollar hurts gold. As you know, we’ve been recommending an allocation to gold since 2017, mostly as a portfolio hedge. We like that gold strongly outperforms other safe havens in equity bear markets and can participate in the upside (even if to a limited extent) in bull markets. We think the safe-haven properties of gold and the US dollar really have come to the fore over the past couple of years (Chart 58). Economic policy uncertainty, and divisive politics globally have raised the level of uncertainty to record levels. In such an environment, the dollar and gold both provide a safe haven and a portfolio hedge. Hence, their joint popularity this past year. We should also remember that gold is a good inflation hedge, and is particularly negatively correlated with real interest rates. A Fed that is willing to let the economy overheat is a Fed that will limit how high real rates climb. Moreover, global liquidity is plentiful. Finally, EM central banks have been slowly divesting from Treasuries and diversifying into gold lately, buying most of the new supply in the process. This backdrop, along with our forecast of a weaker dollar, should support gold again in 2020. That being said, because gold is tactically overbought and could face temporary headwinds if global uncertainty recedes, we prefer silver, which is not as stretched. Furthermore, silver’s higher industrial use means that it should also benefit from a global manufacturing recovery. Geopolitics Chart 59Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Multipolarity Creates An Unstable Environment Mr. X: Let’s return to geopolitical and policy risks, both of which abound. Global economic policy uncertainty is the highest it has been since academics began measuring it. The world is fraught with populism, authoritarianism, war, immigration, technological disruption, inequality, and corruption. With so much chaos, and so little consensus, is there anything solid for an investor to grasp about the political backdrop next year? BCA: Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to short circuit this long bull market, given that the Federal Reserve, the usual culprit, has paused its rate tightening campaign. On a secular basis, geopolitical risk is rising because the United States’ national power is declining relative to that of other world powers (Chart 59). China’s rise, in particular, is stirring conflict with the US and its allies in the western Pacific. Beijing’s technological and military advance is generating fear across the American political establishment. Russia and China continue to deepen their relationship in the face of an increasingly unpredictable United States. These strategic tensions will persist despite any tariff ceasefire with China. Chart 60Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Competition among the great powers makes for a world of contested authority. As the rules of the road have become less certain, the tailwind behind international trade and investment has weakened (Chart 60). Deglobalization is a headwind for the earnings of large cap global companies in the long run. Emerging markets, which are exposed to trade, face persistent unrest. Mr. X: Given the above, how can an investor take an optimistic view of the global economy and markets next year? BCA: We have a framework for analyzing politics: constraints over preferences. We cannot predict what the chief politicians will prefer at any given time, but we can try to identify and measure the constraints that will restrict their freedom of movement. With global growth slowing, world leaders have become more sensitive to their constraints. The Fed has reversed rate hikes; China is easing policy; President Trump has refrained from attacking Iran; and President Trump and President Xi are negotiating a ceasefire. The UK has avoided a “no deal” Brexit – not once but twice. In short, the risk of recession (or conflict) has been sufficient to alter the policy trajectory. As a result, there is a prospect for global geopolitical risks to abate somewhat in 2020. Both the American and Chinese administrations need to see growth stabilize despite their ongoing strategic conflict. Both the British and European governments need to avoid a disorderly Brexit despite their lack of clarity beyond that. Geopolitical risk is declining, albeit from an extremely elevated level. Mr. X: The US and China have already come close to a deal only to get cold feet and back away from it. The British Prime Minister is committed to leaving the EU with or without a deal. Surely you cannot believe that the Middle East, Russia, other emerging markets, or North Korea will be any bastion of stability. BCA: The US-China trade war is still the single greatest threat to the equity bull market. Brexit is not resolved and a new deadline for a trade deal looms at the end of 2020. Investors must remain vigilant and hedge their portfolios, particularly with gold. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore this year’s reaffirmation of the Fed put, the China put, and Trump’s “Art of the Deal.” The base case for next year should be constructive, albeit with vigilant attention to the major risks: President Trump, China and Iran. The other issues you mention have varying degrees of market relevance. Russia is focusing on pacifying domestic discontent. North Korea is on a diplomatic track with the United States. Emerging market unrest is particularly relevant where it can have a bearing on global stability: Iraq, Iran and Hong Kong in particular. Ms. X: If I may interject: It seems to me that the worst of the trade war has passed, that the risk of a no-deal Brexit is negligible, and that Iran is unlikely to outdo its attack against Saudi Arabia in September. Doesn’t this imply that geopolitical risk is overrated and that investors should rush to capture the risk premium in equities? BCA: What we have described is a tentative abatement in geopolitical risk at best – but it would be cavalier to get overly enthusiastic. After all, any fall in global risks will be amply made up for by the impending rise in US domestic political risk. Indeed, US politics are the chief source of global political risk in 2020. First, if President Trump becomes a “lame duck” then he could take actions that are hugely disruptive to global markets in a desperate attempt to win reelection as a “war president.” Chart 61European Political Risk Is Now Low Europe Political Risk Is Now Low Europe Political Risk Is Now Low Second, if President Trump is reelected, then his disruptive populism will have a new mandate and his “America First” foreign and trade policy will be unshackled. Third, if the opposition Democrats succeed in unseating an incumbent president, they will likely take the Senate too, removing the main hurdle to a dramatic policy change. That would mark the third 180-degree reversal in national policy in 12 years. Moreover, investors may find the country merely exchanged right-wing populism for left-wing populism, which has a more negative impact on corporate earnings prospects. Polarization and institutional erosion will continue. The election results may be razor thin; swing states may have to recount votes; and the outcome could hinge on rare or unprecedented developments in the Electoral College, the Supreme Court or cyberspace. A crisis of legitimacy could easily afflict the next administration. In short, there are few scenarios in which US political risk does not rise over the next 12-24 months. Rising American risk stands in stark contrast to Europe (Chart 61), where the will to integrate has overcome several challenges since the sovereign debt crisis. Substantial majority of voters support the euro and the European Union. Germany is on the brink of a major political succession but it is not turning its back on the European project. France is successfully pursuing structural reforms. Italy remains the weakest link, but even the populist Northern League accepts the euro. This leaves two remaining global risks: China and Iran. Chinese political risk is generally understated. President Xi Jinping, lacking President Trump’s electoral constraint, could overestimate his leverage. He could overreach in the trade talks, in his battle to prevent excessive debt growth, or in his handling of Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, or Iran. The result could be a breakdown in the trade talks or a separate strategic crisis with the United States. Another cold war-style escalation in tensions could easily kill the green shoots in global growth. As for Iran, the regime is under crippling American sanctions and faces unrest both at home and within its regional sphere of influence. There is a non-negligible risk that it will lash out and cause an extended oil supply shock. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground but I remain deeply concerned that staying invested in risk assets today is akin to picking-up pennies in front of a steamroller. I accept your opinion that a recession is unlikely in 2020, but valuations of both stocks and bonds are uncomfortably stretched for my taste. As a result, I believe stocks could suffer whether growth is good or bad next year. Finally, since so many things need to go right for the global economy to continue to defy gravity, a recession may hit faster than you envision. To me, there is simply not enough margin of safety in stocks to compensate me for the risk! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks are high because we are entering the end game of the cycle. But I also see pockets of value, some of which you have mentioned today. Moreover, I am sympathetic to your view that global growth will recover next year. Corporate earnings should therefore expand. Hence, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful, especially because policy is quite accommodative. While stocks may not perform as well as they did in 2019, I expect them to outperform bonds handily. I’m therefore willing to continue holding risk assets, even if I need to be more judicious in my sector and regional allocation. BCA: Your family debate mirrors our own internal discussions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term return prospects. Because so many assets have become more expensive this year, long-term returns are likely to be uninspiring compared to recent history. Table 6 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.4% over the next ten years, or 2.4% after adjusting for inflation. That is a noticeable deterioration from our inflation-adjusted estimate of 2.8% from last year, and also still well below the 6.5% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2019. Table 6Asset Market Return Projections OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game Our outlook for next year hinges on global growth rebounding and policy uncertainty receding. Monetary policy is less of a threat to equities than it was last year because central banks have already eased considerably and have been very open about their willingness to let inflation run above target for a while before retightening the monetary screws. We propose the following list of easy-to-track milestones to monitor whether or not our central scenario for the global economy and asset markets is playing out, and how close we are to the end of the cycle: Chinese money and credit numbers. Chinese credit growth must stabilize for the economy to do so. If credit origination continues to decelerate, this will indicate that Beijing has decided to tolerate the slowdown and prioritize its reform and deleveraging agenda. In this case, the Chinese debt supercycle is over sooner and the global economy will pay the price. Our China Investment Strategy Activity Index. Global policy is accommodative and liquidity conditions have improved significantly. However, if the Chinese economy continues to deteriorate, global growth will not rebound. The China Activity Index must stabilize and even improve somewhat for our global growth view to come to fruition. Progress in the “phase one” deal. China and the US must agree to a trade détente. As long as uncertainty around immediate tariffs remain high and retaliation risks stay alive, global capital spending intentions and thus the global manufacturing sector will be hamstrung. Surveys of global growth. The Global manufacturing PMI and the global growth expectation component of the ZEW survey must both recover. If these variables cannot gain any traction, the global economy is sicker than we estimate and risk assets will suffer. Commodity prices and the dollar. In the first quarter, industrial commodity prices must rebound and the dollar must start to depreciate. These two developments will not only reflect an improvement in global growth. They will also alleviate deflationary pressures around the world, revive profits and sponsor a business spending recovery. Moreover, a weaker dollar will also ease global financial conditions by decreasing the global cost of capital. 10-year inflation breakeven rate. If US breakevens move above the 2.3% to 2.5% zone, the Fed will become more proactive about raising rates. This would provoke a quicker end to the business cycle. President Trump’s approval rating. If President Trump’s approval rating stabilizes below 42%, he could give up on the economy and instead bet on a “rally around the flag” as his best strategy for re-election. This would result in a much more hawkish and confrontational White House that would become an even greater source of uncertainty for the economy, and thus risk asset prices. Ms. X: Thank you for this comprehensive list of variables to monitor. As always, you have left us with much to think about. We look forward to these discussions every year. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: It will be our pleasure. The key points are as follow: Global equities are entering the end game of their nearly 11-year bull market. Stocks are expensive, but bonds are even more so. As a result, if global growth can recover and the US can avoid a recession in 2020, earnings will not weaken significantly and stocks will again outperform bonds. Low rates reflect the end of the debt supercycle in the advanced economies. However, the debt supercycle is still alive in EM in general, and in China, in particular. The global economic slowdown that begun more than 18 months ago started when China tried to limit debt growth. If Beijing continues to push for more deleveraging, global growth will continue to suffer as the EM debt supercycle will end. Nonetheless, we expect China to try to mitigate domestic deflationary pressures in 2020. As a result, a small wave of Chinese reflation, coupled with the substantial easing in global monetary and liquidity conditions should promote a worldwide re-acceleration in economic activity. Policy uncertainty will recede next year. Domestic constraints are forcing China and the US toward a trade détente. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is now marginal, and President Trump is still the favorite in 2020. A decline in policy risk will foster a global economic rebound. That being said, some pockets of risk remain, such as in the Middle East. Global central banks are highly unlikely to remove the punch bowl anytime soon. Not only will it take some time before global deflationary forces recede, monetary authorities in the G10 want to avoid the Japanification of their economies. As a result, they are already announcing that they will allow inflation to overshoot their 2% target for a period of time. This will ultimately raise the need for higher rates in 2021, which will push the global economy into recession in late 2021, or early 2022. These dynamics are key to our categorization of 2020 as the end game. US growth will re-accelerate. The US consumer remains in good shape thanks to healthy balance sheets and robust employment and wage growth prospects. Meanwhile, corporate profits and capex should benefit from a decline in global uncertainty and a pick-up in global economic activity. China will continue to stimulate its economy but will not do so as aggressively as it did over the past 10 years. Consequently, EM growth will also bottom but is unlikely to boom. Europe and Japan will re-accelerate in 2020. Bond yields will grind higher in 2020. However, Treasury yields are unlikely to break above the 2.25% to 2.5% range until much later in the year. Inflationary pressures won’t resurface quickly, so the Fed is unlikely to signal its intention to raise interest rates until late 2020 or later. European bonds are particularly unattractive. Corporate bonds are a mixed offering. Investment grade credit is unattractive owing to low option-adjusted spreads and high duration, especially when corporate health is deteriorating. Agency mortgage-backed securities and high-yield bonds offer better risk-adjusted value. Global stocks will enjoy their last-gasp rally in 2020. As global growth recovers, favor the more cyclical sectors and regions which also happen to offer the best value. US stocks are the least attractive bourse; they are very expensive and loaded with defensive and tech-related exposure, two groups that could suffer from higher bond yields. We are neutral on EM equities. Investors should pare exposure to equities after inflation breakevens have moved back into their 2.3% to 2.5% normal range and the Fed funds rate has moved closer to neutral. We anticipate this to be a risk in 2021. The dollar is likely to decline because it is a countercyclical currency. Balance of payment dynamics and valuation considerations are also becoming headwinds. The pro-cyclical European currencies and the euro should be the main beneficiary of any dollar depreciation. Oil and gold will have upside next year. Crude will benefit from both supply-side discipline and a recovery in oil demand on the back of the improving growth outlook. Gold will strengthen as global central banks limit the upside to real rates by allowing inflation to run a bit hot. A weaker dollar will flatter both commodities. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.4% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.5% a year between 1982 and 2019. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 22, 2019

In lieu of our regular weekly report, we are sending you a special report by our colleagues Bob Ryan, Chief Commodity and Energy Strategist, and Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst, from BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy. The report highlights how global economic policy uncertainty over the past year has enabled gold and the USD unusually to rise together. In the near term, the combination of global economic stimulus and a US-China trade ceasefire should reduce policy uncertainty and encourage global demand for commodities. On a cyclical basis this should allow the dollar to fall back, inflation expectations to revive, and gold to appreciate. We trust you will find this research useful and insightful. All very best, Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategy Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD was indefinitely suspended beginning in 4Q18 by the pervasive economic uncertainty we identified last week as the culprit holding back global oil demand growth via a super-charged dollar.1 This uncertainty is most pronounced in the US and Europe vis-à-vis gold, and partly explains the performance of safe havens, particularly the USD, which has soared to new heights on a trade-weighted goods basis, and gold (Chart of the Week). So far, gold has held its ground after breaking above $1,500/oz from the low $1,200s in mid-2018, indicating investors are much more concerned about economic risks arising from economic policy uncertainty than inflation and other diversifiable risks gold typically hedges (Chart 2). Cyclically we remain positive on gold prices on the back of a lower dollar and rising inflation pressure in the US. Chart of the WeekDemand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Demand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Demand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Economic policy uncertainty in Europe and the US supports gold prices. Chart 2AUS, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices US, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices US, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Chart 2BUS, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices US, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices US, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Even so, we are putting a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long gold portfolio hedge to cover tactical risks showing up in our technical indicators. In addition, as is the case with oil demand, if the ceasefire we are expecting in the Sino-US trade war materializes in 1H20 and limited trade – mostly in ags and energy – is forthcoming, demand for safe-haven assets could weaken gold prices at the margin. Fiscal and monetary stimulus globally also could revive economic growth and commodity demand, pushing global yields higher, which would put negative pressure on gold at the margin, as well, given the high correlation between real rates and gold prices. Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term tactical horizon – 3 to 6 months – as economic policy uncertainty continues to stoke global demand for safe havens.2 This can be seen in the elevated correlations between the USD’s broad trade-weighted goods index with the Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes for the US and Europe (Chart 3).3 Rising economic uncertainty – particularly since 4Q18 – has created a rare environment in which both the USD and gold trended up simultaneously and continue to move in the same direction. The implication of this is that gold’s correlation with both the USD and EPU is weaker than before because economic policy uncertainty now is positively correlated with the dollar. Chart 3Strong USD, EPU Correlation Strong USD, EPU Correlation Strong USD, EPU Correlation Chart 4Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher   There is a possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the US and China can agree on a trade ceasefire... The typically negative correlation between daily returns of gold and the USD also is weakening, moving toward positive territory (Chart 4), as both the USD and gold trend higher simultaneously (Chart 5). Chart 5Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher ...If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. Our short-term technical indicator is signaling an overbought gold market (Chart 6), and our fair-value model indicates gold should be trading ~ $1,450/oz (Chart 7). The latter signal off our fair-value model is less concerning, given the demand for safe-haven assets like the USD and gold now dominates gold’s typical drivers. Chart 6Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Chart 7High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model However, to be on the safe side, we are placing a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long-term gold position, which as of Tuesday’s close was up 21% since inception on May 14, 2017. This is a precautionary measure, which recognizes the possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the US and China can agree on a trade ceasefire, and global fiscal and monetary policy are successful in reviving EM income growth, which would revive commodity demand generally, pushing up global bond yields. If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. During that period, the monetary and fiscal aggregates we track as explanatory variables for gold prices will reassert themselves as the dominant drivers of gold prices (see below). This could produce tension between a falling USD and rising real rates as growth picks up, which would send us to a risk-neutral setting re gold, given the current high correlation between gold and real rates, which should remain strong until the Fed starts hiking rates again, most likely in 2020 (Chart 8). This is part of the reason we are including the stop-loss at $1,450/oz for our existing gold position: During this risky period going into 1H20 economic uncertainty could dissipate, and real rates could rise. Although the USD depreciation would mute these effects, rising real rates would be a risk to gold prices. Chart 8Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Economic Uncertainty Dominates Gold’s Fundamentals At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. In Table 1, we collect the variables we consider when assessing gold’s fair value. At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. This variable broadly falls in the geopolitical risk we regularly account for in our analysis of gold markets. Table 1Fundamental And Technical Gold-Price Drivers Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Lifts Gold And USD Together Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Lifts Gold And USD Together If the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Checking off each of these groups, we see: · Demand for inflation hedges remaining muted over the short-term, as inflationary pressures remain weak. In line with our House view, however, we do expect inflation could move higher toward the end of next year and overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for the US. This would support gold prices. · Monetary and financial aggregates are working less well as explanatory variables for gold prices in a market dominated by economic policy uncertainty. The USD-gold correlation continues to be disrupted by strong demand for safe-haven assets. As inflation picks up next year, we expect nominal bond yields to rise. Real rates, however, could remain subdued, as long as the Fed is not aggressively raising rates to get out ahead of a possible revival of inflation (Chart 9). Later in 2020, the correlation between rates and gold should be supportive for gold prices – the correlation fades when the Fed tightens, which creates a demand for safe-haven assets like gold. All the same, an increase in real rates would be a risk to gold prices in 1H20. · At present, demand for portfolio-diversification assets via safe-haven assets is a powerful force in gold’s price evolution. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that if global economic uncertainty is resolved and global growth does rebound, recession fears will diminish, thus reducing the marginal impact of geopolitical shocks. On the other hand, if the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Should that happen, short-term volatility in gold will rise (Chart 10). Chart 9Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Chart 10Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investment Implications Over a tactical horizon – i.e., 3 to 6 months – we expect global economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated. Going into 2020 – and particularly in 2H20 – we expect the USD to weaken on the back of global monetary accommodation policies and increased fiscal stimulus. We also are expecting a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, which will revive trade somewhat and support EM income growth and commodity demand. These assumptions, which we’ve laid out in previous research, will be bullish cyclical factors supporting commodities generally. Bottom Line: A ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, coupled with global fiscal and monetary stimulus, will reduce some of the economic uncertainty dogging aggregate demand. This should be apparent in the data in 1H20. As a result, we continue to expect rising EM income growth to be cyclically bullish for commodities generally. This will allow inflation to revive – again, assuming the Fed does not become aggressive in raising rates. Net, this will be bullish for gold: As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries (Chart 11) Chart 11EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1               Please see “Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth,” published October 17, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2              We expect a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war to be announced in 1H20, which will defuse – but not eliminate – an important risk for global growth in our analytical framework.  We expect this will allow the relationship between the USD and gold to move back to its previous equilibrium in 1Q20 or 2Q20. 3              For more info on the Baker-Bloom-Davis index, please see policyuncertainty.com