Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Highlights The bond market assumes that when recent inflation has been high, it will be higher than average for the next ten years. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. High inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. This means that the ex-post real yield delivered by 10-year T-bonds will turn out to be much higher than the negative ex-ante real yield that 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) are now offering. Long-term investors should overweight 10-year T-bonds versus 10-year TIPS. Underweight (or outright short) US TIPS. Underweight commodities, and especially underweight those commodities that have not yet corrected. Fractal trading watchlist: the US dollar, alternative energy, biotech, nickel versus silver, and an update on semiconductors. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Real Yield Turns Out To Be Higher Than Expected Real interest rates are negative. Or are they? Given that real interest rates form the foundation of most asset prices, getting this question right is of paramount importance. Over the short term, yes, real interest rates are negative. Policy interest rates in the major developed economies are unlikely to rise quickly from their current near-zero levels. So, they will remain below the rate of inflation. But what about over the longer term, say ten years – are long-term real interest rates truly negative? The Real Bond Yield Is The Mirror Image Of Backward-Looking Inflation The negative US real 10-year bond yield of -0.7 percent comprises the nominal yield of 1.8 percent minus an expected inflation rate of 2.5 percent. This means that the negativity of the real bond yield hinges on the expectation for inflation over the next ten years. Therein lies the big problem. Many people believe that the bond market’s expected 10-year inflation rate is an independent and forward-looking assessment of how inflation will evolve. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. The bond market’s expected inflation is just the result of an algorithm that uses historic inflation. And at that, an extremely short period of historic inflation, just six months.1  The bond market’s expected inflation is just the result of an algorithm that uses historic inflation. Specifically, in the pandemic era, the bond market has derived its expected 10-year inflation rate from the historic six month (annualized) inflation rate, which it assumes will gradually converge to a long-term rate of just below 2 percent during the first four years, then stay there for the remaining six years2 (Figure I-1). We recommend that readers replicate this simple calculation for themselves to shatter any illusion that there is anything forward-looking about the bond market’s inflation expectation! (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Expected 10-Year Inflation Is Just Based On The Last 6 Months Of Inflation! The upshot is that when the backward-looking six month inflation rate is low, like it was in the depths of the global financial crisis in late 2008 or the pandemic recession in early 2020, the market assumes that the forward-looking ten year inflation rate will be low. And when the backward-looking six-month inflation rate is high, like now or in early-2008, the bond market assumes that the forward-looking ten year inflation rate will be high. In other words, the bond market extrapolates the last six months of inflation into the next ten years. This observation leads to an immediate investment conclusion. The US six-month inflation rate has already peaked. As it cools, it will also cool the expected 10-year inflation rate, thereby putting upward pressure on the mirror image Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) real yield. It follows that investors should underweight (or outright short) US 10-year TIPS (Chart I-3). Chart I-3As Inflation Cools, TIPS Will Underperform The Real Bond Yield Is Based On A False Expectation There is a more fundamental issue at stake. The market assumes that when recent inflation has been low, it will be lower than average for the next ten years. And when recent inflation has been high, it will be higher than average for the next ten years. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. Low inflation is followed by higher than average inflation, and high inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. The price level is lower than the 2012 expectation of where it would stand in 2022! Another way of putting this is that the market assumes that any breakout of the consumer price index (CPI) will be amplified over the following ten years (Chart I-4). Yet the reality is that any breakout of the price level tends to trend-revert over the following ten years. This means that after the CPI’s decline in late 2008, the market massively underestimated where the price level would be ten years later. But earlier in 2008, when the CPI had surged, the market massively overestimated where the price level would be ten years later. Chart I-4The Market Exaggerates Any Deviations In The CPI Into The Distant Future Today in 2022, the price level seems to be uncomfortably high. But the remarkable thing is that it is still lower than the 2012 expectation of where it would stand in 2022! (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Market Overestimates Where The Price Level Will Stand 10 Years Ahead The crucial point is that after surges in the price level, realised 10-year inflation turns out to be at least 1 percent lower than the bond market’s expectation (Chart I-6). This means that the ex-post real yield delivered by 10-year T-bonds turns out to be at least 1 percent higher than the ex-ante real yield that 10-year TIPS offered at the start of the ten year period (Chart of the Week). Chart I-6Actual Inflation Turns Out To Be Lower Than Expected It follows that after the current surge in the price level, the (actual) real yield that will be delivered by 10-year T-bonds over the next ten years will not be the -0.7 percent indicated by the TIPS 10-year real yield. Instead, if history is any guide, it will be at least +0.3 percent. Therefore, in answer to our original question, the real long-term interest rate is almost certainly not negative. Of course, the obvious comeback is that ‘this time is different’. But we really wouldn’t bet the farm on it. Many people thought this time is different during the price level surge in early 2008 as well as the lows in late 2008 and early 2020. But those times were not different. And our bet is that this time isn’t any different either. This means that the real yield on T-bonds will turn out to be much higher than that on TIPS. Long-term investors should overweight T-bonds versus TIPS. Commodities Are Vulnerable A final important observation relates to commodities. Commodity prices have been tightly tracking the 6-month inflation rate, but which way does the causality run in this tight relationship? At first glance, it might seem that the causality runs from commodity prices to the inflation rate. Yet on further consideration, this cannot be right. It is not the commodity price level that drives the overall inflation rate, it is the commodity inflation rate that drives the overall inflation rate. And in the past year, overall inflation has decoupled (upwards) from commodity inflation (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Inflation Is Tracking ##br##Commodity Prices... Chart I-8...But Inflation Should Be Tracking Commodity Inflation Therefore, the causality in the tight relationship between the 6-month inflation rate and commodity prices must run from backward-looking inflation to commodity prices. And the likely explanation is that investors are bidding up commodity prices as a hedge against the backward-looking inflation which they are incorrectly extrapolating into the future. Low inflation is followed by higher than average inflation, and high inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. It follows that as 6-month inflation cools, so will commodity prices. The investment conclusion is to underweight commodities, and especially to underweight those commodities that have not yet corrected. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week’s observations relate to the US dollar, alternative energy, biotech, nickel versus silver, and an update on semiconductors. The US dollar reached a point of fragility in early December, from which it experienced a classic short-term countertrend sell-off. As such, the countertrend sell-off is mostly done. Alternative energy versus old energy is approaching a major buying point. Biotech versus the market is very close to a major buying point. Nickel versus silver is very close to a major selling point. Semiconductors versus technology was on our sell watchlist last week, and has now hit its point of maximum fragility (Chart I-9). Therefore, the recommended trade is to short semiconductors versus broad technology, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 6 percent. Chart 9Semiconductors Are Due A Reversal Fractal Trading Watchlist Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The expected 10-year inflation rate = (deviation of 6-month annualized inflation from 1.6)*0.2 + 1.6. 2 Inflation is based on the PCE deflator. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights On US inflation and the Fed: If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2% (from its current level above 4%). Yet, share prices will sell off before inflation converges toward the Fed’s target. On US TIPS yields: Rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US, support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. On China: Despite stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. Besides, a bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. On financial market divergences: Major selloffs evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. Hence, the nature of current market dynamics is more consistent with a major selloff than a short-term correction. On regional allocation within a global equity portfolio: Overweight the euro area and Japan, underweight the US and EM. Feature Ms. Mea is a long-time BCA client and an avid follower of the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) service. Since 2017, I have been meeting with her twice a year to exchange thoughts on the global macro environment, to discuss the nuances of our views and to elaborate on investment strategy. We always publish our conversations for the benefit of all EMS clients. This virtual meeting took place earlier this week. Chart 1A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields Ms. Mea: It has been two years since we last met in person. I did not imagine that world travel would stay so depressed for so long when the pandemic began two years ago. I have also been surprised by the recent behavior of financial markets. There have been divergences that I cannot reconcile, such as the woes in China’s real estate sector and resilient commodity prices, the diverging performance of the S&P 500, US small caps and a significant portion of NASDAQ-listed stocks. I will ask you about these later. But let’s start with your main macro themes. Since early last year, you have been advocating two macro themes: (1) China’s slowdown; and (2) rising and non-transitory US inflation. They were controversial a year ago but have now become widely accepted in the investment community. Financial markets have moved a great deal to reflect these macro themes. Don’t you think financial markets have already fully priced in these macro trends? Answer: You are right that these narratives have become well known and financial markets have been moving to price in these developments. However, our bias is that these themes are not yet fully priced in and these macro forces will continue to impact financial markets over the near term. Let’s first discuss US inflation and interest rate moves. Chart 1 illustrates that US government bond yields have broken above major resistance levels. Such a breakout technically entails higher yields. Odds are that US long-term bond yields will move up by another 50 basis points in the months ahead before they pause or reverse. The fundamental justification for higher US bond yields is as follows: The inflation genie is out of the bottle in the US. If the Fed adheres to its inflation mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2%. In December, trimmed-mean CPI and median CPI printed 4.8% and 3.8% respectively, well above the Fed’s preferred range of 2-2.25% for core inflation (Chart 2). Critically, these inflation measures are not impacted by volatile components. These measures strip out outliers like used and new car prices, auto parts, as well as energy and food. The core CPI and PCE inflation measures will drop this year but super core inflation will remain north of 3%, well above the Fed’s preferred range. Importantly, a wage inflation spiral is already underway in the US. Employees have experienced substantial negative wage growth in real terms in the past 12 months. Labor shortages are prevalent, and the employee quit rate is very high. Employees are demanding very high wage growth and employers will have little choice but to meet these demands (Chart 3). Chart 2US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad-Based Inflationary Pressures Chart 3US Wages Will Be Accelerating Chart 4Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison As a result, the only way to bring down core inflation toward its preferred target range is for the Fed to slow the economy down and curb employment and wage gains. Yet before core inflation converges to the Fed’s target, risk assets will sell off first. Practically, the Fed will talk hawkish and hike until something breaks. The breaking point will be a major selloff in US share prices. US equities have been priced to perfection on the assumption that US interest rates will remain low for many years. As interest rate expectations rise further, US equity multiples are under pressure (Chart 4). Ms. Mea: The recent rise in US bond yields has been largely driven by the real component (TIPS yields), not inflation breakevens. That would usually imply improving US growth prospects. Yet US stocks have corrected as TIPS yields rose. How do you explain this and what should investors expect going forward? Answer: Indeed, the latest rise in US bonds yields is primarily driven by increasing TIPS yields, not inflation breakevens (Chart 5) TIPS yields have not been driven by economic growth expectations in the past couple of years. TIPS yields are breaking out and more upside is likely for reasons unrelated to US economic growth: The Fed’s rhetoric and guidance. TIPS yields typically move with 5-year/5-year forward yields, i.e., expectations for US interest rates in the long run (Chart 6). One of reasons why forward interest rates and TIPS yields have been low is the Fed’s commitment to keep interest rates extremely depressed for so long. As the Fed’s rhetoric has recently changed, so are interest rate expectations and TIPS yields. Given that core inflation will not drop to the Fed’s target range any time soon, the Fed will likely escalate its hawkish rhetoric. Hence, TIPS yields will keep rising, until something breaks. Chart 5US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation Chart 6US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations TIPS demand/supply and momentum. The TIPS market is relatively small, and it has been rigged by the Fed in the past two years or so. As a part of its QE program, the Fed has been buying a large share of TIPS, and it now owns 22% of this market. As a result, TIPS yields have fallen irrespective of economic growth dynamics. As the QE program ends, the Fed will stop purchasing TIPS. There has also been a rush into TIPS by institutional investors. In a quest for inflation protection when the Fed was complacent about inflation, investors have been opting for TIPS. This has also depressed TIPS yields. As the US central bank sounds more hawkish, investors’ demand for inflation protection will likely diminish. In addition, TIPS prices have recently plunged dramatically. Large losses could prompt further liquidation by investors pushing TIPS yields much higher. All of the above and the fact that TIPS yields remain negative suggest that they will continue rising in the coming months. Chart 7Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Ms. Mea: Your point that TIPS yields will continue rising in the months ahead irrespective of US inflation and growth dynamics is interesting. So, what are the implications of rising US bond yields, especially TIPS yields, on various financial markets? Answer: Falling/low TIPS yields have benefited long duration plays like US stocks, and especially US growth stocks. Declining TIPS yields were a drag on the US dollar (Chart 7). Finally, they also prompted portfolio capital flows to EM. Consistently, rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US (Chart 4, above) support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. Ms. Mea: But aren’t US share prices positively correlated with US interest rates? Answer: Not always. Chart 8 illustrates that the correlation between the S&P 500 and US Treasury yields varied over time. Prior to the mid-1960s, it was positive. From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields. Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? We believe US markets are now undergoing a major paradigm shift in the stock prices-bond yields correlation. The latter is about to turn negative like it did in the second half of the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, the reason why the stock-to-bond yields correlation turned negative was because US core inflation surged well above 2% in 1966 (Chart 8, bottom panel). This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. The same is happening now. As we wrote a year ago in our Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship, the proper roadmap for the US stock-to-bond correlation is not the last 10 or 20 years, but the second half of the 1960s. After US core CPI surged substantially above 2%, the S&P 500 became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9). Ms. Mea: Let’s now turn to emerging markets. How will EM financial markets perform amid rising US bonds yields? Also, which US yields matter most for EM financial markets, US Treasury yields or TIPS? Answer: Neither US Treasury yields nor TIPS yields have a stable correlation with EM stock prices. Correlations between US nominal bond yields, EM currencies and EM domestic bond yields vary over time. However, US TIPS yields exhibit a reasonably strong positive correlation with mainstream EM local bond yields and the US dollar's exchange rate versus EM currencies (Chart 10). Mainstream EM includes 16 markets but excludes China, Korea and Taiwan. Hence, as US TIPS yields move up, it is reasonable to expect the US dollar to strengthen against mainstream EM currencies and their local bond yields to rise (Chart 10). Currency depreciation and rising domestic bond yields will prove to be toxic for the share prices of these mainstream emerging markets. To sum up, rising US TIPS yields will jeopardize the performance of EM equities, currencies, local rates and credit markets. Ms. Mea: Aren’t many EMs better prepared for rising US nominal/real yields than they were in 2013? Answer: Yes, they are: many EM countries that were running large current account deficits in 2013 now have current account surpluses or small deficits (Chart 11, top panel). Besides, mainstream EMs ramped up their foreign currency debt in the years preceding 2013 while their foreign debt has changed little in the past 6-7 years (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Chart 11Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Table 1Current Account Balances In Individual EM Countries Table 1 illustrates the current account balance in individual developing countries. Further, the share of foreign investor holdings in EM local currency bonds has declined a great deal in the past 2 years (Table 2). Finally, many mainstream EM central banks have hiked rates aggressively and their local bond yields have already risen considerably in the past 12 months. These also provide some protection against fixed-income portfolio capital outflows. All in all, vulnerability from foreign portfolio capital outflows in EM is much lower than it was in 2013. Nevertheless, EM financial markets will not remain unscathed if US rates march higher, the US dollar rallies and US stocks wobble. Based on the parameters displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the most vulnerable countries among mainstream EMs are Peru, Colombia, Chile and Egypt. Table 2Foreign Ownership Of Domestic Bonds: January 2022 Versus October 2019 Chart 12China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective Ms. Mea: Let’s now move to your second theme - China’s slowdown. This is well known and arguably priced in financial markets. Importantly, policymakers have been ratcheting up stimulus. Don’t you think now is the time to upgrade the stance on Chinese stocks and China-related plays? Answer: Despite the new round of stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. As we wrote in last week’s report titled Chinese Equities: Valuations and Profits, Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next 6 months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Importantly, even though property market woes are well known and housing sales and starts have collapsed, housing construction activity has remained resilient (Chart 12). The bottom panel of Chart 12 demonstrates rising completions, which is one of reasons why raw materials prices have been resilient. However, new funding for property developers has dried up and they will be forced to scale back completions/construction activity. Historically, EM non-TMT share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months (Chart 13). Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in a few months. In brief, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Chart 13China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks Ms. Mea: Another topic I wanted to discuss today is divergences in global financial markets. Some equity markets have already fallen significantly, while the S&P 500 index as well as a couple of individual EM equity bourses (India, Taiwan and Mexico) have been firm. There have been massive divergences within the US equity market in general and the NASDAQ index in particular. Besides, EM high-yield corporate spreads have widened but EM investment grade corporate spreads remain tight. Finally, commodity prices have remained firm despite both China’s slowdown and US dollar strength. How should investors interpret these divergences? Answer: Such divergences in financial markets often occur during major selloffs. Notable financial market downturns evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns, where some markets lead while others lag. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. For example, the EM crises in 1997-98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, and finally to the rest of Asia. By August 1998, Russian financial markets had collapsed, triggering the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle. The last leg of the crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Chart 14Domino Effect In 2007-08 Similarly, the US financial/credit crisis in 2007-08 commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart 14). Despite these developments, commodity prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008 when they finally collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart 14, bottom panel). There was a domino effect in financial markets in both the 2015 and 2018 turbulences. Initially, the selloffs started in the weakest links while other parts were holding up. Then, the selloff spread to all without exception. For example, in 2018, US share prices and high-yield credit spreads were doing quite well until October 2018. Then, a broad-based selloff transpired in the fourth quarter of 2018.  Just as chains break at their weakest links, financial market selloffs begin in the most susceptible sectors. Overpriced US stocks with little or no profits and currencies with zero or negative interest rates have been most vulnerable to rising US interest rates. That is why these segments have sold off first in response to rising US nominal and real rates. Our hunch is that the selloff in global markets due to rising US interest rates will broaden in the coming months. This does not mean that global stocks on the verge of a major bear market, but a double-digit drop in global share prices is likely. The last asset class standing will be commodity prices. These will likely be the last affected by rising US interest rates because many investors buy commodities as an inflation hedge. Besides, oil prices have also been supported by the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine and Iran. It might take investor concerns about the US economy and a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Chart 15Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Ms. Mea: What investment strategy do you recommend in the coming months? Answer: As US interest rates continue rising and China’s recovery fails to transpire immediately, EM financial markets remain at risk. Therefore, we recommend a defensive stance for absolute return investors in EM equity and fixed income. We are also continuing to short a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. As for global equity regional allocation, the outlook for EM performance is less certain than it was in the past 12 months. Clearly, rising US/DM interest rates herald US equity underperformance versus other DM markets, like the euro area and Japan (Chart 15). The basis is that non-US equities are not as expensive as US ones and, hence, are less vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 16EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields Whether EM outperforms or not is mainly contingent on the US dollar, rather than US bond yields. The top panel of Chart 16 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance against DM has a low correlation with US bond yields. Yet, EM equities will underperform their DM peers if the USD strengthens (the greenback is shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 16). However, if the greenback depreciates, EM will certainly outperform the US in both equity and the fixed income space. Putting it all together, asset allocators should overweight the euro area and Japan, and underweight the US and EM in a global equity portfolio. Ms. Mea: What about EM local bonds and EM credit markets? Answer: EM credit spreads will widen, and EM local yields will not drop as US bond yields head higher and EM exchange rates depreciate. We continue to recommend investors underweight EM credit versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As for local rates, we largely remain on the sidelines of this asset class. Our current recommendations are as follows: receiving 10-year rates in China and Malaysia, paying Czech 10-year rates and betting on 10/1-year yield curve inversions in Mexico and Russia. For a detailed list of our country recommendations for equities, credit, domestic bonds and currencies, please refer to Open Position Tables below. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com

Highlights US Vs. Europe: Growth and inflation momentum remains stronger in the US versus Europe. The latter is taking the bigger economic hit from more severe Omicron economic restrictions and a greater exposure to slowing Chinese demand. European inflation has accelerated, but remains slower and less broad-based than elevated US inflation. The backdrop remains more negative for US fixed income compared to Europe. UST-Bund Spread: With markets already priced for multiple Fed rate hikes in 2022, it is now harder to earn significant returns shorting US Treasuries outright compared to 2021. We prefer positioning for higher US bond yields through less-volatile US Treasury-German Bund spread widening positions, with the ECB unlikely to deliver even the single discounted 2022 rate hike. We recommend the position both as a structural allocation in bond portfolios (underweight the US versus Germany) and as a tactical trade (selling US Treasury futures versus Bund futures). Feature Chart of the WeekUS Bond Yields & Bond Volatility Are Both Rising Global fixed income markets are off to a volatile start in 2022, on the back of significant repricing of US interest rate expectations. The 10-year US Treasury yield now sits at 1.85%, up +34bps so far in January and is up +72bps from the August 4/2021 intraday low of 1.13%. The 2-year US yield, which is even more sensitive to changes in Fed expectations, is 1.04%, up +31bps so far this month and up +87bps since early August 2021. Yields are rising in other countries as well, with the 10-year benchmark government bond yield up year-to-date in the UK (+24bps), Canada (+45bps) and even Germany (+18bps) where the Bund yield is threatening to return to positive territory. US Treasuries are selling off as markets have heeded the hawkish shift in the Fed’s interest rate guidance. The US overnight index swap (OIS) curve now discounting 89bps of Fed rate hikes in 2022. Bond volatility further out the Treasury curve has increased as yields have moved higher, with the realized volatility of the Bloomberg 7-10 US Treasury index now at an 19-month high (Chart of the Week). We continue to recommend a defensive strategic posture towards direct US Treasuries with below-benchmark exposure on both duration and country allocations in global bond portfolios. However, we prefer a more efficient way to position for the same theme of rising US yields – betting on a wider 10-year US Treasury-German Bund spread. US Growth & Inflation Fundamentals Support A More Hawkish Fed The rise in global bond yields seen in recent weeks has inflicted damage on risk assets, but not in a consistent fashion. Equity markets have taken the brunt of the hit, with the S&P 500 down around -3% so far in January with the tech-heavy NASDAQ down -6%. Yet the MSCI emerging market equity index is up around +1%, European equities are flat and global high-yield corporate bond spreads are essentially unchanged so far this month. While higher bond yields are reflecting expectations of more global monetary tightening over the next year, medium-term interest rate expectations remain subdued. Our proxy for the market pricing of terminal interest rate expectations – 5-year OIS rates, 5-years forward – remains at or below pre-pandemic levels in the US, the UK, Canada and the euro area (Chart 2). Risk assets are performing relatively well in the face of higher bond yields because markets still do not believe that a major increase in interest rates will be needed in the current global tightening cycle. We see this – the likelihood that interest rates will have to rise much more than markets expect - as the biggest vulnerability for global bond markets over the next couple of years. The US remains the “poster child” for this view. In the US, core CPI inflation accelerated to an 31-year high of 5.5% in December. The pickup in US inflation continues to be broad-based, with the Cleveland Fed median CPI and trimmed mean CPI inflation measures reaching 3.8% and 4.8%, respectively (Chart 3). This massive run-up in US inflation has filtered through to medium-term household inflation expectations; the preliminary University of Michigan consumer survey for January showed that inflation 5-10 years out is expected to be 3.1% - the highest level in 13 years. Chart 2Rising Yields Are Not A Threat To Risk Assets ... Yet​​​​​ Chart 3The Fed Cannot Ignore Elevated Inflation Expectations​​​​​​ Chart 4US Demand Steadily Normalizing From The Pandemic Shock While much of the run-up in US inflation over the past year has been fueled by supply chain disruption and high energy prices, there is still a robust demand component to the high inflation. Consumer spending on goods remains elevated versus its pre-pandemic trend, while services spending is steadily returning back to the pre-pandemic pace (Chart 4). The overall US unemployment rate is now down to 3.9%, the lowest level since February 2020, with broad-based strength in the US labor market across most industries (bottom panel). The rise in consumer inflation expectations has to be most worrisome to Fed officials. Yes, market-based inflation expectations have already seen a significant run-up since the mid-2020 lows, and have even drifted down a bit of late on the back of the more hawkish rhetoric from the Fed. However, survey-based measures of inflation expectations tend to be less volatile than market-based measures, and typically follow trends in realized inflation, which is not slowing down in the US. In other words, rising household inflation expectations are a more reliable indication that an inflationary mindset is becoming entrenched in consumer behavior. US inflation dynamics are transitioning away from supply-driven goods inflation toward more lasting domestically driven forces like tight labor markets, faster wage growth and rising housing costs (Chart 5). Measures of supply chain disruption like global shipping costs are showing signs of peaking (top panel), while commodity price momentum has clearly rolled over – both should eventually feed into slower goods inflation this year. At the same time, tight labor markets will continue to boost US employment costs, which historically have been strongly correlated to US services inflation (middle panel). Chart 5US Inflation Pressures Remain Intense Meanwhile, shelter costs, which represents 32% of the US CPI index, were up 4.2% on a year-over-year basis in December and are likely to continue accelerating given a dearth of housing supply versus demand that is pushing up both house prices and rents (bottom panel). Tying it all together, there are good reasons why the Fed has ramped up the hawkish rhetoric over the past couple of months. However, with the US OIS curve now discounting between 3-4 rate hikes in 2022, it will be harder to generate a second consecutive year of negative returns in the US Treasury market this year. Dating back to the early 1970s, there have only been five calendar years where the Bloomberg US Treasury index delivered an outright negative total return: 1994, 1999, 2009, 2013 and 2021 (Chart 6). None of the four cases prior to last year saw negative returns in the following year, as Treasury yields fell in 1995, 2000, 2010, 2014. Yet even the episodes that saw consecutive years of US yield increases – 1974-75, 1977-81, 1987-88, 2005-06 and 2015-16 – did not see outright negative returns from the Bloomberg US Treasury index. Chart 6Negative Return Years For US Treasuries Are Rare Given the starting point of deeply negative real US bond yields, and interest rate expectations that remain too low beyond 2022, we still see value in staying below-benchmark on US duration exposure on a medium-term basis. However, we see a more efficient way to play for higher Treasury yields this year by positioning US Treasury underweights/shorts versus overweights/longs in government bonds in a region where discounted rate hikes will not happen – Europe. The ECB Is In No Hurry To Hike Rates The same supply driven factors that have pushed up US inflation over the past year have also lifted inflation in the euro area. Headline HICP inflation reached an 30-year high of 5.0% in December, while core HICP inflation hit an all-time high of 2.6%. The European Central Bank (ECB), however, is unlikely to deliver any rate hikes in 2022 even with the high inflation, for several reasons (Chart 7): Growth momentum entering 2022 was soft, thanks to Omicron related economic restrictions at the end of 2021 and also weak demand for European exports from China. It will take time for both of those factors to reverse, thus reducing any growth related pressure to tighten monetary policy. Inflation expectations are not exceeding the ECB 2% inflation target, with the 5-year/5-year forward EUR CPI swap now at 1.9% even with headline inflation of 5.0%. The surge in European energy prices will eventually subside in the first half of 2022, which will reduce inflationary pressure on the ECB to tighten. The ECB is ending its pandemic emergency bond buying program (PEPP) in March, and is only partially replacing that buying activity by upsizing its existing pre-pandemic asset purchase program (APP). The ECB will not want to compound the effect of this “tapering” of bond buying by also hiking interest rates, which would surely tighten financial conditions further through higher Italian government bond yields, rising corporate bond yields and a firmer euro. There is little evidence to date showing any pass-through of higher energy-fueled inflation into more domestically-driven inflation. Euro area wage growth was only 1.3% as of the latest available data in Q3/2021 (which is still well after realized inflation had started to accelerate), highlighting the lack of visible “second round” effects on euro area inflation from high energy prices that would prompt the ECB to consider rate hikes (Chart 8). Chart 7An ECB Rate Hike In 2022 Is Unlikely​​​​​​ Chart 8Limited 'Second Round' Effects From Energy-Driven European Inflation​​​​​​ The EUR OIS curve is discounting 7bps of rate hikes by year-end. Even that modest amount will not be delivered, which will limit how much further European government bond yields will rise this year. A Better Mousetrap: Playing UST Bearishness Through UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades Combining our view of an increasingly hawkish Fed and a still-dovish ECB produces our highest conviction investment recommendation for 2022: positioning for a wider 10-year US Treasury/Germany Bund spread. This can be done by underweighting the US versus core Europe in global bond portfolios, or shorting US Treasury futures versus German Bund futures as we are already recommending in our Tactical Trade Overlay (see page 15). A Treasury-Bund spread widening view is a more efficient way to play for a more hawkish Fed and higher US Treasury yields, for several reasons: There are many examples over past 30 years where the Treasury-Bund spread widened in consecutive years (Chart 9). This is in contrast to the fewer occurrences of consecutive years of rising Treasury yields shown earlier in this report. Thus, there are better odds that last year’s Treasury-Bund spread widening can be repeated in 2022. Chart 9Consecutive Years Of A Rising UST-Bund Spread Happen Often The realized volatility of Treasury-Bund spread trades is almost always lower than that of an outright short position in US Treasuries, but the direction of returns of the two trades is similar (Chart 10). This shows that there is directionality in the Treasury-Bund spread (i.e. it is driven far more by the movements of US yields), but that is a welcome feature given our more bearish view on US Treasuries. The Treasury-Bund spread remains well below fair value on our fundamental valuation model, with fair value increasing due to widening US-European inflation differentials (Chart 11). Tighter relative monetary policies this year (more tapering and rate hikes from the Fed compared to the ECB) also favor a wider fair value spread on our model. Chart 10UST-Bund Wideners Have Lower Volatility Than Outright UST Shorts​​​​​ Chart 11The UST-Bund Spread Looks Very Cheap On Our Model​​​​​​ The gap between our 24-month discounters, which measure the change in policy interest rates over the next two years discounted in OIS curves, for the US and euro area is a reliable leading indicator of the 10-year Treasury-Bund spread (Chart 12, bottom panel). The “discounter spread” is currently calling for the Treasury-Bund spread to widen by more than the current path discounted in US Treasury and German Bund forward rates. Chart 12Position For More UST-Bund Spread Widening In 2022​​​​​​ Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Is Not Technically Stretched​​​​​ The Treasury-Bund spread is not stretched from a technical perspective (Chart 13). The spread is sitting right at its 200-day moving average and the 26-week change in the spread (a measure of price momentum) is rising but remains well below previous peak levels that have capped past spread increases. Summing it all up, the case is strong for including US-Germany spread widening positions as core holdings in investor portfolios in 2022. The current spread is 185bps and we have a year-end target of 225bps. Bottom Line: With markets already priced for multiple Fed rate hikes in 2022, it is now harder to earn significant returns shorting US Treasuries outright compared to 2021. We prefer positioning for higher US bond yields through less-volatile US Treasury-German Bund spread widening positions, with the ECB unlikely to deliver even the single discounted 2022 rate hike. We recommend the position both as a structural allocation in bond portfolios (underweight the US versus Germany) and as a tactical trade (selling US Treasury futures versus Bund futures).   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights We reformatted and added three sections to our existing trade tables: strategic themes, cyclical asset allocations and tactical investment recommendations. An extensive audit of our current trade book shows that our country and sector allocation recommendations have been successful. Of the eight open trades in our book, six have so far generated positive returns. We now recommend closing three out of the eight positions, based on a review of the original basis and subsequent performance of our trades. We have also added one cyclical and two tactical trades. We will look for opportunities to propose new trades to our book in the coming months. Feature In this week's report, we introduce our newly formatted trade tables (on Page 15), which include the following: Strategic themes (structural views beyond 18 months) Cyclical asset allocations within Chinese financial markets (in the next 6 to 18 months) Tactical trades (investment recommendations for the next 0 to 6 months) We revisited the original basis and subsequent performance of our open trades as part of an audit of our trade book. We maintain five of the eight trades and will add one cyclical and two tactical trades. Our new features and the rationale for retaining or closing each trade are presented below. Strategic Themes The new Strategic Themes section now includes the following market relevant structural forces: President Xi Jinping’s “common prosperity” policy initiative, which is intended to narrow the nation’s wealth gap; a demographic shift of a shrinking population by 2025; and secular disputes between the US and China (Table 1). Table 1 These structural aspects will have a macro impact on China’s policy landscape, economy and financial markets. Investors should consider whether the themes point toward a reflationary policy bias; whether they will have a medium- to long-term effect on corporate earnings; and whether these themes will, on a structural basis, warrant higher/lower risk premiums for owning Chinese stocks. Cyclical Equity Index Allocation Recommendations (Relative To MSCI All Country World) Table 2 is a summary of our cyclical recommendations for Greater China equity indexes. We recommend the following equity index allocations within a global equity portfolio, for the next 6 to 18 months: Table 2 Underweight MSCI China (Chinese investable stocks). Underweight MSCI China A Onshore (Chinese onshore or A-share stocks). Neutral stance on MSCI Hong Kong Index. Overweight MSCI Taiwan Index. Chart 1Chinese Stocks Substantially Underperformed Global Equities Our recommendation to underweight MSCI China Index and MSCI China A Onshore Index were extremely successful in 2021 (Chart 1). We will continue to maintain an underweight stance for the time being, based on our concern that the current policy easing measures will be insufficient to revive China’s slowing economy. We expect policy stimulus to step up in the coming months and economic growth to start improving by mid-2022. However, corporate profits are set to disappoint in the first half of the year. This implies that Chinese share prices will remain volatile with substantial downside risks. Chinese investable stocks are in oversold territory and will likely rebound in the near term in both absolute and relative terms (discussed in the Tactical Recommendations section on Page 14) (Chart 2). Nonetheless, on a cyclical basis, they face challenges both from the impact of a slowing economy on earnings growth and ongoing regulatory and geopolitical risks. Our model suggests high odds (70%) of a considerable earnings contraction in Chinese investable stocks in the next 6 to 12 months. We recommend investors upgrade their allocation to the MSCI Hong Kong Index from underweight to neutral within a global equity portfolio. The MSCI Hong Kong equity index appears to be very cheap compared with global equities (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Investable Stocks Are Oversold Chart 3MSCI HK Equities Are Cheap The MSCI Hong Kong equity index includes Hong Kong-domiciled companies and not mainland issuers listed in Hong Kong. Rising US Treasury yields will be a headwind to Hong Kong-domiciled company stock performance because the HKD is pegged to the USD and therefore Hong Kong bond yields tend to follow the direction of bond yields in the US. Chart 4MSCI HK Index Is Defensive In Nature However, an offsetting factor is that due to composition changes over time, the MSCI Hong Kong equity index has become much more defensive and tends to perform better than the emerging Asian and EM equity benchmarks during turbulent times (Chart 4). The weight of insurance companies and diversified financials account for over 40% of the MSCI Hong Kong Index, compared with property stocks, which take up 20% of the equity market cap. The insurance and diversified financials subsectors are less vulnerable to escalating short-term interest rates compared with property stocks. During risk-off phases, the defensive nature in the MSCI Hong Kong Index will support its performance relative to the some of the more industrial- and tech-heavy EM and global equity indexes. We maintain an overweight stance on the MSCI Taiwan Index relative to global equities. The trade (see discussion in the Cyclical Equity And Sector Trades section) has brought an impressive 40% rate of return since its inception in 2019. Cyclical Recommended Asset Allocation (Within Chinese Onshore Assets) We recommend an underweight position in equities in China’s onshore multi-asset portfolios (Table 3). Chinese onshore stocks are not cheap and will likely underperform onshore government bonds as the economy struggles to regain its footing. Chart 5Total Returns In Chinese Onshore Stocks Have Barely Kept Up With Onshore GB Chart 5 shows that in the past decade total returns in Chinese onshore stocks have barely kept up with that in onshore long-duration government bonds. During policy easing cycles Chinese onshore stocks generated positive excess returns over government bonds, however, the outperformance has been extremely volatile and very brief. Given that we do not expect Beijing to allow a significant overshoot in stimulus this year, there is a good chance that the returns in Chinese onshore stocks will underperform onshore government bonds. Cyclical Equity And Sector Trades Our rationale for retaining or closing each trade is described below. Chart 6Chinese Onshore Stocks Outperformance Has Been Passive Long China A-Shares/Short Chinese Investable Stocks (Maintain) We initiated this trade in March 2021. The recommendation has been our most successful trade, generating a 40+% return since then (Chart 6). China’s internet platform giants have a large weight in the MSCI Investable index and they remain vulnerable (Chart 7). Although China’s antitrust regulations may have passed the peak of intensity, they will not be rolled back and multiple compression in these stocks will likely continue in 2022. In contrast, the A-share index is heavily weighted in value stocks. The trade is in line with our view that the global investment backdrop has shifted in favor of global value versus growth stocks due to an above-trend US expansion and climbing US bond yields in the next 6 to 12 months. The relative ratio between China A-shares and investable stocks is overbought and will likely pull back in the near term (Chart 8). However, the cyclical and structural outlook continues to favor onshore stocks versus the investable universe. Chart 7Sizable Underperformance In Investable Consumer Discretionary Stocks Chart 8A Near-Term Pullback In Relative Ratio Is Likely Long CSI500/Short Broad A-Share Market (Maintain) The CSI500 index, which comprises 500 SMID-cap companies, has outperformed the broad A-share market by 32% since mid-February (Chart 9). We think the outperformance in SMID stocks has not fully run its course. Historically, SMID-caps tend to outperform large caps in the late phase of an economic recovery and the valuation premia in small cap stocks remains near decade lows (Chart 10). In addition, the government’s increasing efforts to support small- and medium-sized corporates will help to shore up confidence in those companies. Therefore, SMID will probably continue to outperform large cap stocks this year. Chart 9A Low Valuation Premia And More Policy Support Will Help Lift Prices Of SMID-Caps Chart 10SMID-Caps Tend To Outperform Large-Caps In Late Business Cycle Long MSCI Taiwan Index/Short MSCI All Country World (Maintain) The MSCI Taiwan equity index has consistently outperformed global equities since mid-2019, mostly driven by the rally in Taiwanese semiconductor stocks. Global chip supply shortages since the COVID pandemic have further boosted the sector’s outperformance (Chart 11). Furthermore, Chart 12 highlights improvements in the cyclical case for Taiwanese stocks as an aggregate. Panels 1 & 2 show an uptick in the new export orders component of Taiwanese manufacturing PMI. The new export orders component has historically coincided with both Taiwanese exports to China and the relative Taiwanese manufacturing PMI on a cyclical basis. As such, the economic fundamentals also support a continued outperformance in Taiwanese stocks. Chart 11A Great Run In MSCI Taiwan Equity Index And Semis Chart 12Exports To China, 12-Month Forward EPS, And Relative Stock Prices: All Likely To Improve Long Chinese Onshore Industrial Stocks/Short MSCI China A Index (Maintain) This trade, initiated in September last year, has brought a slightly positive return as of today. Our view was based on improving manufacturing investment and policy support for the sector, even though China’s business cycle had already peaked. Chart 13China Onshore Industrials Closely Track Economic Fundamentals While we maintain the trade for now, we will monitor credit growth in Q1 to assess whether to close the trade. The sector’s performance is highly correlated with our BCA China Activity Index and the Li Keqiang Leading Indicator (Chart 13). A bottoming in both indicators in mid-2022 would suggest that investors should maintain the trade. The caveat, however, is that the sector’s valuations have already become extreme, indicating that the bar may be higher for the sector to outperform even when economic fundamentals improve in 2H22. We will watch for signs of an overshoot in stimulus in the coming three to six months. Conversely, credit growth in Q1 that is at or below expectations will warrant closing this trade. Long Domestic Semiconductor Sector/Short Global Semiconductor Benchmark (Close) Replace with: Long Domestic Semiconductor Sector/Short MSCI China A Onshore The trade has been our biggest loser since its inception in August 2020. Although Chinese onshore semiconductor stocks outperformed the broad A-share market by a large margin, they have underperformed their global peers (Chart 14). Thus, we are closing the trade and replacing it with long Chinese onshore semis relative to the broad A-share market. We remain bullish on Chinese semi stocks, on both a structural and cyclical basis. Secular pressures from the US and the West to curb the advancement of Chinese technology will encourage China’s authorities to double down on supporting state-led technology programs. Moreover, prices of Chinese onshore semis have plummeted since November last year, bringing their lofty valuations closer to long-term trend and providing a better cyclical risk-reward profiles for these stocks (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Onshore Semis Underperformed Global... Chart 15...But Outperformed Domestic Broad Market Long Domestic Consumer Discretionary/Short Broad A-Share Market (Close) Chart 16A Trend Reversal In Chinese Onshore Consumer Discretionary Stocks Performance We placed the trade in May 2020 when China’s economy and household discretionary consumption showed a strong rebound from the deep slump in Q1 2020. As strength waned in the country’s domestic demand for housing, housing-related durable goods and automobiles, the sector’s relative performance also started to dwindle from its peak in the fall of last year (Chart 16). Going forward, even though China’s economy will start to improve on a cyclical basis, domestic consumer discretionary sector will face non-trivial headwinds. The performance of its subsectors, such as hotels, restaurants, and services, will remain subdued due to China’s zero tolerance COVID policy that leads to frequent lockdowns and travel restrictions (Chart 17). Moreover, the internet and direct-marketing retail subsectors are facing tighter regulations, which lowers the sector’s profitability and valuations (Chart 18). Chart 17Domestic COVID Flareups Pose Significant Threat To Chinese Consumer Services Sector Performance Chart 18Online Retailing Also Faces Regylatory Pressures Short Hong Kong 10-Year Government Bond/Long US 10-Year Treasury (Maintain) In the past decade, Hong Kong's 10-year government bond yield has been consistently below that of the US, even though Hong Kong has an exchange rate pegged to the US dollar and its monetary policy is directly tied to that of the US. Chart 19The US-HK Yield Gap Should Widen In The Coming Months The US-Hong Kong 10-year yield spread has substantially narrowed since early 2020 when the US Fed aggressively cut its policy rate. In the coming 6-12 months, however, the spread will likely widen given that the Fed will start to normalize rates (Chart 19, top panel). Chart 19 (bottom panel) highlights that the relative total return profile of the trade (in unhedged terms) trends higher over time due to the carry advantage. Although cyclically the relative total return will likely reverse to its trend line and argues for a short stance on US Treasury, we think it is too early to close the trade. The USD will likely remain strong in the near term, and we have yet to turn positive on Chinese and Hong Kong assets over a 6 to 18-mont time horizon. Therefore, we maintain this trade until the USD starts to weaken, and foreign investment flows into China and Hong Kong shows sustainable momentum. Long USD-CNH (Close) We are closing this trade, which we initiated in May 2020 when tensions between the US and China were rising. The trade has lost more than 10% since its inception because the RMB exchange rate was boosted in 2021 by China’s record current account surplus, wide interest rate differentials and speculation that tension between the US and China would abate. Chart 20A Weaker USD Will Prevent Sizable RMB Depreciation We expect all three favorable conditions supporting the RMB to start reversing in 1H22, suggesting downward pressure on the RMB. However, over a longer period of 6 to 18 months the US dollar also has the potential to trend lower, preventing the RMB from any sizable depreciation (Chart 20). The dollar strength in the past year has been the result of both speculative flows into the US dollar based on rising interest rate expectations and portfolio inflows into the US equity markets.  In the next 6 to 18 months, however, our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor predicts that the dollar could begin a paradigm shift, whereby any actions by the Fed could eventually lead to a weakening of the US dollar. Higher rates than the market expects will initially boost the US dollar, but will also undermine the US equity market leadership, reversing the substantial portfolio inflows from recent years. On the flip side, fewer rate hikes will severely unwind higher rate expectations in the US relative to other developed markets. Chester further predicts that the DXY could touch 98 in the near term but will break below 90 in the next 12-18 months. Tactical Recommendations (0-6 months) We are initiating two tactical trades to go long on the MSCI China Index and MSCI Hong Kong Index relative to global equities. Relative to global stocks, Chinese investable equities are very oversold and offer value. In addition, while US tech stocks are entering a rollercoaster phase due to higher bond yields in the US, Chinese tech stocks will also fall but by a lesser degree because China’s monetary policy cycle is less affected by the Fed’s policy decisions. In other words, Chinese investable stocks may passively outperform global equities. Nonetheless, as noted in our previous reports, Chinese investable stocks face both cyclical and structural challenges. Hence the overweight stance on these stocks is strictly a tactical play rather than a cyclical one. We favor the MSCI Hong Kong Index versus global equities for similar reasons as Chinese investable stocks. The Hong Kong equity index is also technically oversold. Since the composition of the index has become more defensive, it will likely outperform in risk-off phases. In addition, if the US dollar rallies in the near term, share prices of Hong Kong-domiciled companies will materially outperform.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Strategic View Cyclical Recommendations Tactical Recommendations

Highlights Duration: A look at past rate hike cycles shows that Treasury returns are generally low, though not always negative. For the current cycle, we continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance as we don’t think the full extent of Fed rate hikes is adequately priced in the yield curve. Interest Rate Policy: The Fed will deliver its first rate hike in March and will lift rates 2 or 3 more times this year. We see the fed funds rate moving above 2% this cycle, higher than what is currently priced in the market. Fed Balance Sheet: The Fed will start the passive runoff of its securities holdings in the first half of this year, after one or two rate hikes have been delivered. Balance sheet reduction will proceed more quickly than it did last cycle, but the Fed will refrain from outright sales. Feature Chart 1Market Expectations Are Too Low Rate hikes are just around the corner. In fact, there is a growing consensus among FOMC participants that it will be appropriate to deliver the first rate hike in March, as soon as net asset purchases reach zero. Just last week, San Francisco Fed President Mary Daly called a March rate hike “quite reasonable” and Fed Vice-Chair Lael Brainard testified that the Fed will be “in a position” to lift rates as soon as purchases end. Brainard also mentioned that the Fed has discussed shrinking its balance sheet.1 We expect the Fed to follow through with a 25 basis point rate hike in March, and with 2 or 3 more hikes over the course of 2022. We also see the Fed shrinking its balance sheet this year, via the passive runoff of maturing securities. With all that in mind, this week’s report draws on the experience of past rate hike cycles to give us a sense of what Treasury returns to expect as the Fed lifts rates. We also discuss how the Fed’s balance sheet will evolve over the next few years.  Treasury Returns During Rate Hike Cycles Table 1 provides a useful summary of Treasury returns during the prior four rate hike cycles. The table shows excess Treasury returns versus cash for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index as well as its Intermediate Maturity and Long Maturity sub-indexes. Table 1Treasury Returns During Fed Rate Hike Cycles The first conclusion we draw is that Treasury returns are generally poor during Fed tightening cycles. Intermediate maturity Treasuries underperformed cash in all four cycles. Long maturity Treasuries provided only modestly positive returns in two of the four cycles and deeply negative returns in one of them. One important caveat is that our analysis only considers cycles where the Fed lifted rates multiple times in a row. For example, we exclude the 1997-98 period when one rate hike in 1997 was quickly reversed in 1998. We also define the most recent tightening cycle as spanning from 2015 to 2018 even though the Fed kept the policy rate steady from December 2015 to December 2016. Obviously, if the Fed is forced to abandon its tightening cycle after one or two hikes, then Treasury returns will be much stronger than our historical analysis suggests. Next, let’s dig a bit deeper by looking at each rate hike cycle individually. The 2015-2018 Cycle Chart 22015-2018 Cycle The most recent Fed tightening cycle started with a 25 basis point rate hike in December 2015. The Fed then went on hold for 12 months before delivering a string of 8 hikes between December 2016 and December 2018. All in all, the tightening cycle lasted 36 months and the Fed raised the target fed funds rate by 225 bps, from a range of 0% - 0.25% to a range of 2.25% - 2.5% (Chart 2). If we look at the 36-month discounter on the day before the first hike (Chart 2, panel 3), it shows that the market was priced for 159 bps of tightening over the next three years. The fact that the Fed delivered more tightening (225 bps) explains why excess Treasury returns were negative for short and intermediate maturities. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is another useful metric because it is a good approximation of the market’s expected terminal fed funds rate, i.e. the fed funds rate at the end of the tightening cycle. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield stood at 2.92% in December 2015, slightly above where the fed funds rate peaked in 2018 (Chart 2, bottom panel). This explains why long-maturity excess Treasury returns were slightly positive during the cycle.         The 2004-2006 Cycle Chart 32004-2006 Cycle During this cycle, which spanned from June 2004 to June 2006, the Fed lifted rates by 400 bps (sixteen 25 basis point rate hikes). The fed funds rate rose from 1% to 5.25% during the two-year span (Chart 3). The 24-month fed funds discounter stood at 369 bps the day before the first hike (Chart 3, panel 3), indicating that the market discounted 31 bps less tightening than was ultimately delivered. Once again, this explains why excess Treasury returns were negative for short and intermediate maturities. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield was 5.72% just prior to the first hike in June 2004 (Chart 3, bottom panel). But, as was the case in the 2015-2018 cycle, the fed funds rate never reached this level. It peaked at 5.25% in 2006 and long-maturity excess Treasury yields were somewhat positive as a result.                 The 1999-2000 Cycle Chart 41999-2000 Cycle In this cycle, the Fed lifted rates by 175 bps between June 1999 and May 2000, driving the fed funds rate from 4.75% to 6.5% (Chart 4). The 12-month fed funds discounter stood at 108 bps on the day before the first hike (Chart 4, panel 3). Once again, this was slightly less than the 175 bps of tightening that transpired. Excess returns for short and intermediate maturity Treasuries were negative as a result. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield was 5.99% on the day before the first hike (Chart 4, bottom panel). This time, the market’s assessment proved to be too low compared to the funds rate’s 6.5% peak. This divergence explains why long-maturity Treasury excess returns were worse during this period than they were in the 2015-18 and 2004-06 cycles.                 The 1994-1995 Cycle Chart 51994-1995 Cycle The Fed surprised markets by lifting rates extremely quickly during this cycle. The Fed moved rates from 3% to 6% in the span of only 12 months between February 1994 and February 1995 (Chart 5). The 12-month discounter was only 130 bps at the beginning of the tightening cycle, well short of the 300 bps rate increase that was delivered (Chart 5, panel 3). This large divergence explains why excess Treasury returns were so poor during this period. Interestingly, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield stood at 6.69% just prior to the first hike (Chart 5, bottom panel), not that far from the ultimate peak in the fed funds rate. In other words, while market expectations for the near-term path of interest rates were too low, expectations for the ultimate peak in interest rates were fairly accurate. However, terminal rate expectations became unmoored when the Fed started to tighten, and the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield rose all the way to 8.5%, far above the fed funds rate’s ultimate peak. This dramatic shift in terminal rate expectations explains the deeply negative long-maturity Treasury returns observed during the period. Of course, those losses were quickly reversed in H1 1995 once it became clear that the Fed would not lift rates further. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield plummeted back to 6.5%. Investment Implications Let’s apply the above analysis to today’s situation. At present, the 12-month fed funds discounter stands at 93 bps. The 24-month discounter is 151 bps and the 36-month discounter is 159 bps (Chart 1). In other words, the market is discounting that the Fed will deliver between 3 and 4 rate hikes this year, but only 2 more in 2023 before the funds rate stabilizes at roughly 1.5%. Our expectation is that the fed funds rate will rise to at least 2% during the next three years, and we therefore continue to recommend running below-benchmark portfolio duration. For its part, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is currently 2.03%. This is at the low-end of survey estimates for the long-run neutral fed funds rate (Chart 1, bottom panel). We expect the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield to rise closer to the middle of the range of survey estimates (~2.25%) as it becomes clear that the fed funds rate will rise to at least 2%. It’s also possible that, like in the 1994-95 episode, terminal rate expectations will rise dramatically as the Fed lifts rates more quickly than anticipated. This, however, is not our base case outlook given that expectations for a low terminal fed funds rate are very well entrenched. Bottom Line: A look at past rate hike cycles shows that Treasury returns are generally low, though not always negative. For the current cycle, we continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance as we don’t think the full extent of Fed rate hikes is adequately priced in the yield curve. The Balance Sheet Outlook Chart 6Hike First, Then QT We expect the Fed to start shrinking its securities holdings this year. The process will probably begin in the first half of the year after one or two rate hikes have been delivered. To arrive at this conclusion, we first look at how the Fed proceeded during the last tightening cycle. Back then, the Fed waited until the funds rate was around 1% before it started to shrink its balance sheet in September 2017 (Chart 6). Notably, the Fed didn’t immediately move toward the full passive runoff of its portfolio. Rather, it started slowly by permitting only $6 billion of Treasuries and $4 billion of MBS to mature in October 2017. These amounts were gradually increased in the subsequent months. The Fed will move more quickly toward balance sheet reduction this cycle and the pace of said reduction will be faster. Here are the relevant passages from the minutes of the December FOMC meeting: Almost all participants agreed that it would likely be appropriate to initiate balance sheet runoff at some point after the first increase in the target range for the federal funds rate. However, participants judged that the appropriate timing of balance sheet runoff would likely be closer to that of policy rate liftoff than in the Committee’s previous experience. […] Many participants judged that the appropriate pace of balance sheet runoff would likely be faster than it was during the previous normalization episode. Many participants also judged that monthly caps on the runoff of securities could help ensure that the pace of runoff would be measured and predictable…2 From these quotes, we surmise that balance sheet runoff will start earlier than last time – after one or two rate hikes instead of four. Also, while the runoff will proceed more quickly than last time, there is still support for maintaining monthly caps on the pace. The Fed will probably not move immediately to the complete passive runoff of its portfolio, and outright bond sales do not appear to be part of the discussion. One concern that investors might have about the Fed’s balance sheet runoff is the extra supply of Treasuries that will hit the market. As an upper-bound, if we assume complete passive runoff starting in April 2022, the Fed’s Treasury holdings will shrink from $5.7 trillion today to $3.5 trillion by the end of 2024, adding an average of $715 billion extra Treasury supply to the market each year (Chart 7). If we exclude T-bills and TIPS to focus only on coupon-paying nominal Treasury securities, then we calculate that Fed holdings will fall from $4.9 trillion to $3 trillion, adding an extra $639 billion of supply to the market on average for the next three years. However, it’s important to note that Fed policy alone doesn’t dictate the supply of Treasury securities. The Treasury department’s issuance plans also need to be considered. When the Fed allows a maturing bond to passively roll off its portfolio it doesn’t dump that bond directly into the market. Rather, the Treasury Department issues new debt to replace the maturing bond. The Treasury could decide, for example, to increase T-bill issuance instead of coupon issuance. In fact, this sort of decision becomes more likely if Treasury officials are concerned about dumping too much coupon supply on the market. Currently, the Treasury Department targets a range of 15% - 20% for the amount of outstanding T-bills as a proportion of the overall funding mix, a target that it is hitting (Chart 8). However, the minutes from the most recent Quarterly Refunding meeting stressed that the Treasury feels the need to maintain “flexibility” when it comes to this target range and noted that “there is likely more leeway at the top of the recommended range than at the bottom.”3 Chart 7The Pace Of ##br##Runoff Chart 8T-bill Issuance Could Rise As The Fed's Portfolio Shrinks Finally, it is important to consider the extent to which the Fed will be able to shrink its balance sheet. The Fed’s goal will be to achieve a reserve supply that allows it to maintain the funds rate within its target band without putting undue pressure on either its Overnight Reverse Repo Facility (ON RRP) or its new Standing Repo Facility (SRF). Chart 9The Fed's Balance Sheet Was Too Small In September 2019 The ON RRP acts as a floor on interest rates and its usage therefore increases when the Fed’s balance sheet is too large. The third panel of Chart 9 shows that this is currently the case. Conversely, the SRF acts as a ceiling on interest rates and its usage will ramp up if the Fed’s balance sheet becomes too small. This last occurred in September 2019 when the Fed briefly lost control of interest rates and was forced to increase repo holdings and reserve supply (Chart 9).​​​​​​​ Going forward, the Fed will continue to run down its balance sheet until ON RRP usage drops close to zero. However, it will want to stop reducing its holdings before SRF usage picks up. It is highly uncertain when this will occur, but we suspect that the Fed won’t be able to get the balance sheet back to September 2019 levels before seeing SRF usage increase. Bottom Line: The Fed will start the passive runoff of its securities holdings in the first half of this year, after one or two rate hikes have been delivered. Balance sheet reduction will proceed more quickly than it did last cycle, but the Fed will refrain from outright sales. While the size of the Fed’s balance sheet will shrink during the next few years, it will remain larger than it was in September 2019.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see https://www.reuters.com/business/exclusive-feds-daly-march-liftoff-is-quite-reasonable-2022-01-13/ and https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/interest-rate-hike-come-soon-march-feds-brainard-signals-rcna12112 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20211215.pdf 3 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0464 Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Dear Client, Next week there will be no regular strategy report. Instead, we will hold our quarterly webcast which will discuss the outlook for the European economy and assets in 2022. I look forward to this interaction. Best regards, Mathieu Savary   Highlights European and global yields have considerable upside over the coming year, even if inflation peaks in 2022. The post-World War II experience is instructive: massive war-time fiscal and monetary stimulus allowed for an upward re-estimation of the neutral rate as trend nominal growth improved. A similar development is likely to result in an improvement in nominal growth and the neutral rate compared to the post-GFC decade. China and a financial accident outside the US constitute the greatest risks this year to higher yields. European stocks and value stocks will benefit from this rise in yields. Cyclicals in general and industrials in particular are the European sectors most levered to higher yields. Overweight these assets. Defensives will underperform meaningfully if yields rise further. Long Sweden and the Netherlands / Short Switzerland is an appealing trade to bet on higher yields, especially if inflation peaks in 2022. Feature Last week, US Treasury yields finally reached levels that prevailed before the pandemic started. In Europe, German 10-year yields flirted with the symbolic 0% level, rising to their highest reading since May 2019. With the Fed preparing to increase interest rates in March, and global inflation remaining perky, do yields already reflect all the bearish bond news or will they continue to climb higher on a cyclical basis? Moreover, what would be the implications for equity prices of higher yields? BCA expects yields to rise further, for which German Bunds will not be an exception. This process will continue to generate volatility in stock prices, but ultimately, higher equities will prevail. Increasing yields will help European stocks and are strongly associated with an outperformance of cyclical equities. What’s Moving Yields Up? Not all yield increases are created equal. A breakdown of yields helps us understand what investors are pricing in for the future. In the US, the upside in 10-year yields mostly reflects the increase in 5-year yields. This maturity has moved back to levels that prevailed prior to the pandemic, while the 5-year/5-year forward yield remains below its spring 2021 peak (Chart 1, top panel). Moreover, these shifts mirror higher real interest rates, which are rising across maturities, while inflation expectations have been declining in recent weeks or have been flat since mid-2021 on a 5-year/5-year forward basis (Chart 1, middle and bottom panels). This breakdown confirms investors are driving yields higher because they expect more Fed tightening. However, this upgraded view of the Fed’s policy path is limited to the next few years, and long-term policy expectations approximated by the forward rates are not rising as much. In other words, markets do not expect that the Fed will be able to push up interest rates on a long-term basis. In Germany, the breakdown of the most recent shift in yield paints a different picture (Chart 2). As in the US, real yields, not inflation expectations, drove the latest bond selloff. This points toward pricing in an eventual policy tightening in Europe. However, unlike what is happening in the US, 5-year/5-year forward rates are the main force driving yields higher; investors are therefore expecting the ECB to have to follow the Fed later on. Chart 1Near-Term Tightening Is Driving Treasurys Chart 2longer-Term Tightening Is Driving Bunds Can the Yield Upside Continue? While BCA’s target for the 10-year Treasury yield in 2022 stands at 2.25% and the Bund yield at 0.25%, the coming two to three years should witness significantly higher yields. The period after World War II offers an interesting historical equivalent. During the War, government spending as a share of GDP exploded, lifting US gross federal debt from 52% of GDP at the dawn of the conflict to 114% at the end of 1945. However, the Fed kept a lid on interest rates during this period to help finance the war effort. T-Bill rates were pegged at 3/8th of a percent and the Fed also capped T-Bond yields at 2.5%. Chart 3The Post WWII Experience As a consequence of this policy effort, the Fed balance sheet increased significantly and continued to do so after the war (Chart 3). The stimulative fiscal and monetary policy, as well as the capacity constraints associated with shifting production from military goods to consumer and capital goods, contributed to an inflation spike to 20% in March 1947. Moreover, the Korean War boosted government spending between 1950 and 1953, resulting in another inflation spike to 9.5% in 1951. The Fed’s cap on yields ended after the March 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord. It was followed by the beginning of a multi-decade uptrend in bond yields, which culminated in 1981 with T-Bond yields above 15% following the inflationary surge of the 1970s. Nonetheless, the yield increase from 2.5% in 1951 to 4% at the end of the 1950s happened after the inflation peak of the Korean War. This original inflection reflected economic vigor and a normalization of the neutral rate after the trauma of the Great Depression. The current situation is not dissimilar. The neutral rate and the market-based estimates of the terminal rate of interest are still very low in the US and in Europe (Chart 4). However, the vast amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus injected in the economy has jolted a recovery. It has also caused a massive wealth transfer to households and the private sector in general that is likely to increase consumption permanently. As a result, growth in the coming decade will be stronger than it was in the past decade, in both the US and Europe. This process will allow the neutral rate to rise over time, which in turn will lift the terminal rate of interest and yields. In this context, even if inflation were to cool in 2022 because some of the supply constraints that marked 2021 dissipate, yields may continue to rise and do so for the remainder of the decade. This is also true in Europe where the household savings rate still towers near 19% of disposable income and may fall by 6% to reach its pre-pandemic levels, as the US experience presages (Chart 5). Chart 4Terminal Rates Proxies Are Too Low Chart 5European Savings Rate Has Downside A simple modeling exercise confirms that yields will have greater upside over the coming year. Conceptually, yields are anchored by policy rates and the terminal rate, which is somewhere above the neutral rate of interest. One of the key determinants of the nominal neutral rate is the trend growth rate of nominal GDP. While the market cannot know precisely where that growth rate stands, recent experience influences the perception of market participants. Thus, a long-term moving average of nominal GDP growth constitutes a rough proxy of this measure and will relate to investors’ assessment of the neutral rate and the terminal interest rates. Chart 6Bond Yields Are Too Low, Especially If Trend Nominal Growth Picks Up Using this approach reveals two important bearish forces for bonds. Even after accounting for the slow growth rate of both the US and Eurozone economies over the past ten years, as well as extraordinarily low policy rates, T-Notes and Bunds yields are too low (Chart 6). More importantly, if nominal GDP growth is higher this decade than next, this alone will push up the equilibrium level of yields in Advanced Economies. The upside in yields is not without risks. China is still going through a deflationary shock whereby growth is slowing. As China eases policy, Chinese yields will continue to fall, bucking the global trend (Chart 7). In recent years, Chinese yields have rarely diverged from global yields. If Chinese growth plummets from here, the divergence will not be resolved via higher Chinese yields. However, Chinese authorities do not want growth to collapse. Reports from the State Council suggest an acceleration of the implementation of major spending projects under the 14th Five-year plan and that the credit impulse is trying to bottom. Nonetheless, China remains a risk to monitor closely. The second major risk stems from the intertwined nature of the global financial system. The US economy is able to withstand higher Treasury yields, but is the rest of the world? As Chart 8 highlights, US private debt-servicing costs are low today, as a result of minimal interest rates and the decline in debt loads after the GFC. The same is not true for the G-10 outside the US, let alone EM economies. These differences suggest that the US will be much more resilient to rising yields than the rest of the world. A major financial accident outside the US would prompt a wave of risk aversion that would decrease yields around the world. Chart 7An Unusual Divergence Chart 8Will The Rest Of The World Withstand Higher US Yields? Bottom Line: Global yields have much greater upside for the years ahead, even if inflation slows in 2022. While BCA targets 2.25% and 0.25% for, respectively, Treasurys and Bund yields this year, the multi-year upside is much greater as neutral rates are re-adjusted upward. The change will not move in a straight line, but the trend will not be friendly for bondholders. In the near-term, the main culprits preventing higher yields are a further slowdown in China as well as a financial accident outside the US. Investment Implications The most obvious investment implication is that investors should use any pullback in yields to sell duration. As a corollary, investors should maintain an overweight stance on equities relative to bonds. The equity risk premium, especially in Europe, remains elevated, and European dividend yields stand near record highs compared to Bund yields (Chart 9). Moreover, when yields rise because of a higher neutral rate, this also means that the expected long-term growth rate of earnings is firming, which negates some of the adverse impacts on valuations of higher discount rates. Nonetheless, if inflation does not stabilize, the increase in yields could become much more painful for stocks, as the negative correlation between stock prices and bond yields would reassert itself—a possibility we described five weeks ago. A rising neutral rate and terminal rate are also associated with an outperformance of European stocks compared to the US and an outperformance of value stocks over growth stocks in Europe (Chart 10). These relationships reflect the greater procyclicality of European equities and value stocks. Chart 9A Valuation Cushion For Stocks Chart 10Higher Terminal Rates Favor Europe And Value Finally, we looked at the performance of European sectors based on the trend in yields. Table 1 highlights that industrials are the great winner when yields rise, which is a testament to their pro-cyclicality. They beat the market on 3-month, 6-month and 12-month horizons by 1.6%, 2.9% and 5.8%, respectively. The regularity of their benchmark-beating performance is extremely high. When yields rise, financials also see a marked improvement of their relative returns compared to their historical average returns. Surprisingly, so do European tech firms, which reflect the more hardware focus of European tech compared to the US. Table 1Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance Table 2 repeats the same exercise, but, this time, we control for the slope of the yield curve, focusing on periods when the yield curve is positively sloped. Again, industrials are the star sector, but other cyclicals such as materials and consumer discretionary also stand out. European tech remains dominated by its cyclical properties, while the outperformance of financials becomes more marked. Table 2Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance With Postive Yield Curve Slope As A Control Variable Table 3 looks at the behavior of sectors when yields rise and when the Euro Area PMI Manufacturing improves, which is a scenario we expect for most of 2022 once the winter passes. Industrials win more clearly than materials or consumer discretionary. The European tech sector continues to generate a very strong outperformance, while the excess return of financials firms up as well. This scenario also shows a particularly steep underperformance for all the defensive sectors. Table 3Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance With Improving Manufacturing PMI As A Control Variable Table 4 completes the picture, focusing on rising yields when core CPI decelerates, another development we foresee in 2022. Once again, industrials stand out as a result of the extent and regularity of their outperformance. However, under this controlling variable, the performance of materials and consumer discretionary stocks deteriorates significantly. Financials also see a large downgrade to their relative performance. Tech performs best under these circumstances. Here, staples suffer the worst fate, closely followed by utilities and healthcare. Table 4Rising Yields & Sector Relative Performance With Falling Core CPI As A Control Variable Based on these observations, the highest likelihood scenario is that European cyclicals will outperform defensive equities significantly this year after a period of consolidation since last spring. A more targeted approach would be to overweight industrials and tech at the expense of staples and utilities. Geographically, investors should buy a basket of Swedish (overweight industrials) and Dutch stocks (overweight tech), while selling Swiss stocks (overweight healthcare).   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Highlights 2022 Key Views & Allocations: Translating our 2022 global fixed income Key Views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio results in the following conclusions to begin the year. Target a moderate level of overall portfolio risk, maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure, make developed market government bond country allocations based on relative expected central bank hawkishness (underweight the US, UK and Canada; overweight Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Japan), and be selective on allocations to global spread product (overweight high-yield with a bias toward Europe over the US, neutral global investment grade, underweight emerging market hard currency debt). Specific Allocation Changes: Much of the current positioning in our model bond portfolio already reflects our 2022 investment themes. The only significant changes we make to begin the year are reducing emerging market USD-denominated corporate bond exposure to underweight, and shifting some high-yield corporate bond exposure from the US to Europe. Feature In our last report of 2021, we published our 2022 Key Views, outlining the themes and investment implications of the 2022 BCA Outlook for global fixed income markets. In this report, our first of the new year, we translate those views into more specific recommendations and allocations within the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio. The main takeaways are that another year of expected above-trend global growth, even after the risks to start the year from the Omicron variant, will further absorb spare capacity across the developed economies. Realized inflation will slow from the elevated readings of 2021, but will remain high enough to force central banks – led by the US Federal Reserve – to incrementally remove highly accommodative monetary policies put in place during the pandemic. The backdrop for global bond markets will turn far less friendly as a result, with higher bond yields (led by US Treasuries), flatter yield curves and much weaker returns on spread products that have benefited from easy monetary policies like investment grade corporate debt and emerging market (EM) hard currency debt. Against this challenging backdrop for overall fixed income returns, bond investors will need to focus more on relative exposures between countries, sectors and credit ratings to generate outperformance versus benchmarks. Our recommended portfolio allocations to begin 2022 reflect that shift (Table 1). Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months A Review Of The Model Bond Portfolio Performance In 2021 Chart 12021 Performance: A Positive, Yet Volatile, Year Before we begin our discussion of the model bond portfolio for 2022, we will take a final look back at the performance of the portfolio in 2021. Last year, the model bond portfolio delivered a small negative total return (hedged into US dollars) of -0.51%, but this still outperformed its custom benchmark index by +36bps (Chart 1).1 It was a very challenging year for global fixed income markets, in aggregate, with significant swings in bond yields (i.e. US Treasuries were up in Q1, down in Q2/Q3, up then down in Q4) and credit spreads (US high-yield spreads fell in H1/2021 and were rangebound in H2/2021, while EM hard currency spreads were stable in H1/2021 before steadily widening during the rest of the year). Over the full year, the government bond portion of the portfolio outperformed the custom benchmark index by +27bps while the spread product segment outperformed by +9bps (Table 2). The bulk of that government bond outperformance occurred during the first quarter of the year when global bond yields surged higher as COVID-19 vaccines began to be distributed and economic optimism improved in response – trends that benefited the below-benchmark duration tilt within the portfolio. The credit market outperformance was more evenly spread out during the final nine months of the year. Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Full Year 2021 Overall Return Attribution In terms of specific country exposures on government debt (Chart 2), our underweight stance on US Treasuries (both in allocation and duration exposure) generated virtually all of the full-year outperformance of the government bond portion of the portfolio (+38bps versus the benchmark). The biggest underperformer was the UK (-9bps), concentrated at the very end of the year as Gilt yields declined on the back of the Omicron surge, to the detriment of our underweight stance. All other country allocations provided little excess return, in aggregate, over the full year in 2021 – although there was significant variance of those returns during the year. Within spread product (Chart 3), the biggest gains were seen in US high-yield (+19bps) where we remained overweight throughout 2021. The largest drag on performance came from UK investment grade corporates (-9bps), although this all came in Q1/2021 where we maintained an overweight stance at the time and spreads widened. Other spread product sectors delivered little in the way of excess return, although that should not be a surprise as we maintained a neutral stance on US and euro area investment grade corporates – which have a combined 18% weighting within the model bond portfolio custom benchmark index – throughout 2021. In the end, our recommended portfolio tilts during 2021 were generally on the right side of the market, with our overweights outperforming in an overall down year for bond returns (Chart 4). The numbers would have been even better without the drag on performance in the fourth quarter (-17bps for the entire portfolio). That came entirely from our two biggest government bond underweights – US Treasuries and UK Gilts – which saw significant bond yield declines in response to the emergence of the Omicron variant. (the detailed breakdown of the Q4/2021 performance can be found in the Appendix on pages 19-23). Importantly, the surge in bond yields seen in the first week of 2022 has already resulted in a full recovery of that Q4/2021 underperformance, providing a good start to the new year for our model portfolio. Top-Down Bond Market Implications Of Our Key Views We now present the specific fixed income investment recommendations that derive from those themes, described along the following lines: overall portfolio risk, overall duration exposure, country allocations within government bonds, yield curve allocations within countries, and corporate credit allocations by country and credit rating. Overall Portfolio Duration Exposure: BELOW BENCHMARK As we concluded in our 2022 Key Views report, longer-maturity government bond yields are now too low given the mix of very high inflation and very low unemployment seen in many countries. While we expect inflation to come down this year from the very rapid pace of 2021, it will not be by enough to force central banks off the path towards rate hikes that already began at the end of last year in places like the UK and New Zealand. The Fed is now signaling that multiple US rate hikes are likely in 2022, while even some European Central Bank (ECB) officials are expressing concern over very high European inflation. Longer maturity bond yields remain too low, in our view, because investors are discounting very low terminal rates – the peak level of policy rates to be reached in the next monetary tightening cycle. (Chart 5). An upward adjustment of global interest rate expectations is likely this year as central banks like the Fed and the Bank of England (BoE) deliver on expected rate hikes, with more tightening necessary beyond 2022. This will be the primary driver of the rise in global bond yields that we expect this year - an outcome that has already begun in the first week of 2022. Chart 5Global Government Bond Yields Vulnerable To Hawkish Repricing​​​​​​ Chart 6Staying Below-Benchmark On Overall Duration Exposure​​​​​​ We ended 2021 with a model bond portfolio duration that was -0.65 years below that of the custom performance benchmark (Chart 6). We feel comfortable maintaining that position, in that size, to begin the new year. Government Bond Country Allocation: OVERWEIGHT THE EURO AREA (CORE & PERIPHERY), JAPAN & AUSTRALIA; UNDERWEIGHT THE US, UK & CANADA Our country allocation decisions within our model bond portfolio entering 2022 are based on a simple framework. We are overweighting countries where central banks are less likely to raise rates this year, and vice versa. We expect the largest increase in developed market bond yields in 2022 to occur in the US, as markets are still not priced for the cumulative tightening that the Fed will likely deliver over the next couple of years. Markets are also underpricing how much the Bank of England and Bank of Canada will need to raise rates over the full tightening cycle, even with multiple hikes discounted for 2022. We see the necessary upward repricing of post-2022 rate expectations in all three of those countries – the US, UK and Canada – justifying underweight allocations in our model portfolio. Chart 7Our Recommended DM Government Bond Allocations To Start 2022 The opposite is true in core Europe and Australia. Overnight index swap (OIS) curves are discounting multiple rate hikes this year from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and even an ECB rate hike later in 2022. As we discussed in our Key Views report, there is still not enough evidence pointing to rapid wage growth in Australia or Europe that would force the RBA and ECB to turn more hawkish than their current forward guidance which calls for no rate hikes in 2022. While both central banks may talk about the possibility that monetary policy will need to be tightened, we expect the actual rate hikes to occur in 2023 and not 2022. Thus, both markets justify overweight allocations in our model bond portfolio. We are also maintaining an overweight to Japanese government bonds, as Japanese inflation remains far too low – even in an environment of high energy prices and global supply chain disruption – for the Bank of Japan to contemplate any tightening of monetary policy. The country allocations within the model portfolio as of the end of 2021 all fit with the above analysis, thus we see no major changes that need to be made to begin 2022 (Chart 7).2 The only significant move made was to slightly bump up the size of the overweights in Italy and Spain, to be funded by the reduction in EM corporate bond exposure (as we discuss below). We continue to see a positive case for owning Peripheral European government bonds for the relatively high yields within Europe, with the ECB maintaining an overall dovish policy stance in 2022 even as it scales back the size of its bond buying activity starting in March. Inflation-Linked Bond Allocations: MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL OVERALL ALLOCATION TO GLOBAL LINKERS Chart 8Our Recommended Inflation-Linked Bond Allocations To Start 2022 Inflation-linked bonds have been a necessary part of bond investors' portfolios since the lows in global inflation breakeven spreads were seen in mid-2020. Now, with inflation expectations at or above central bank inflation targets in most developed market countries, and with realized inflation likely to subside from current levels this year, the backdrop no longer justifies structural overweights to linkers across all countries. We are sticking with our end-2021 overall neutral allocation to global inflation-linked bonds, focusing more on country allocations based on our inflation breakeven valuation indicators, as discussed in our 2022 Key Views report (Chart 8). This means maintaining a neutral stance on US TIPS and linkers (vs. nominal government bonds) in Canada, Australia and Japan. We are also staying with underweight positions in linkers (vs. nominals) in the UK, Germany, France and Italy where breakevens appear too high based on our indicators. Spread Product Allocation: MAINTAIN A SMALL OVERWEIGHT TO GLOBAL SPREAD PRODUCT FOCUSED ON EUROPEAN & US HIGH-YIELD CORPORATES, WHILE UNDERWEIGHTING EM CREDIT Chart 9Negative Real Yields: Global Bonds' Biggest Vulnerability Our expectation of above-trend global growth in 2022, with still relatively high inflation (compared to pre-pandemic levels), should be positive for spread products like corporate bonds that benefit from strong nominal economic (and revenue) growth. However, the less accommodative global monetary policy backdrop we also expect is a potential negative for credit market performance - specially as rate hikes put upward pressure on deeply negative real interest rates, most notably in the US (Chart 9). Thus, we are entering 2022 with a cautious, but still positive, overall position on spread product in our model bond portfolio. We are focusing more on credit valuation, however - both in absolute terms and between countries and sectors – to try and generate outperformance for the credit portion of the portfolio. We are maintaining a neutral stance on investment grade corporates in the US, euro area and UK given the tight spread valuations in those markets. We prefer to focus our corporate credit exposure on overweights to high-yield bonds in the US and Europe, but with a marginal preference for European junk bonds over US equivalents as we discussed in our 2022 Key Views report (Chart 10). Within EM USD-denominated credit, we remain cautious entering 2022 given the poor fundamental backdrop for EM credit: slowing momentum of Chinese economic growth and global commodity prices, a firmer US dollar, and a less-accommodative global monetary policy backdrop (Chart 11). Thus, an underweight stance on EM credit is appropriate within the portfolio to start the year. Chart 10Increase Euro High-Yield Exposure Vs US High-Yield Chart 11Reduce EM USD-Denominated Corporate Debt Exposure To Underweight​​​​​​   Finally, we are entering 2022 with the same relative tilt within US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that we maintained during the latter half of 2021, with an overweight stance on agency commercial MBS and an underweight on agency residential MBS. Based on our outlook for 2022, we are immediately making two marginal changes to the spread product allocations to the model bond portfolio: Reducing the size of our US high-yield overweight and using the proceeds to increase the size of the European high-yield overweight Reducing our EM USD-denominated corporate bond allocation to underweight from neutral, and placing the proceeds into Italian and Spanish government bonds (hedged into USD) to limit the reduction in the portfolio yield from the EM downgrade. The above moves will lower our overall credit overweight versus government bonds from 5% to 4%, all coming from the EM to Italy/Spain switch (Chart 12). Overall Portfolio Risk: MODERATE The changes made to our spread product allocations had no material impact on the estimated tracking error of the model portfolio – the relative volatility versus that of the benchmark. The tracking error is 78bps, still below our self-imposed limit of 100bps but above the lows seen in early 2021 (Chart 13). That higher tracking error is likely related to our underweight stance on US Treasuries, given the rise in bond volatility evident in measures like the MOVE index (bottom panel). Nonetheless, a moderate level of portfolio risk is reasonable given the combination of solid global economic growth, but with tighter global monetary policy, that we expect in 2022. Chart 13Keeping Overall Portfolio Risk At Moderate Levels​​​​​​ Chart 14Positive Portfolio Carry Via Selective Spread Product Overweights​​​​​​ The overweights to US high-yield, European high-yield and Italian government bonds all contribute to the model bond portfolio having a yield that begins 2022 modestly higher (+14bps) than that of the benchmark index (Chart 14). Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months After making all the changes to our model portfolio allocations, which can be seen in the tables on pages 24-25, we now turn to our regular quarterly scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio during the first half of 2022. On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 2A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 2B). For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios, based on the following descriptions and inputs: Base Case Omicron related economic weakness is visible in some major economies (euro area, Canada), but the US stays resiliently strong and the US labor market continues to tighten. China is a growth laggard, but this will lead to policymakers providing more macro stimulus (credit, monetary, fiscal) starting in Q2/2022. Inflation pressures from supply chain disruption remain stubbornly strong and realized global inflation rates stay elevated for longer. Developed market central banks continue dialing back pandemic-era monetary policy accommodation, led by Fed tapering and a June 2022 liftoff of the funds rate. There is a mild initial bear steepening of the US Treasury curve with additional widening of US inflation breakevens in Q1/2022, leading to bear flattening in Q2 in the run-up to liftoff – the net effect is a parallel shift higher in the entire yield curve. The VIX index stays near current levels at 20, both the US dollar and oil prices are broadly unchanged and the fed funds rate is increased to 0.25%. Hawkish Fed The Omicron wave is short-lived with limited impact on global growth, which remains well above trend. Global inflation only declines moderately from current elevated levels, both from persistent supply squeezes and faster wage growth. China loosens monetary/credit policies and announces new fiscal stimulus in late Q1/2022 – a positive surprise for global growth expectations. Developed economy central banks turn even more hawkish. Fed liftoff is in March, with another hike in June. The US Treasury curve bear-flattens as US inflation breakevens reach their cyclical peak. The VIX index climbs to 25, the US dollar depreciates by -3% (pulled in opposing directions by strong global growth but relatively higher US interest rates), oil prices climb +10% and the fed funds rate is increased to 0.5%. Pessimistic Scenario The Omicron wave persists in many major countries (including the US) and leads to extended lockdowns and weaker consumer spending. Global growth momentum slows sharply. China does not signal adequate stimulus to offset its slowdown, while a weakened Biden administration passes much smaller US fiscal stimulus. Supply chain disruptions persist and are made worse by Omicron, keeping inflation elevated even as growth slows (stagflation). Developed economy central banks, stuck between slowing growth and elevated inflation, are unable to ease in response to economic weakness. The Fed goes for a slower taper that still ends in June, but liftoff is delayed until at least September. The US Treasury curve bull steepens modestly as the front end prices out 2022 hikes. US inflation breakevens remain sticky due to persistent realized inflation. The VIX index climbs to 30, the US dollar appreciates by +5% on a safe haven bid, oil prices fall -10% and the fed funds rate remains at 0%. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 3A. The US Treasury yield assumptions are shown in Table 3B. For the more visually inclined, we present charts showing the model inputs and Treasury yield projections in Chart 15 and Chart 16, respectively. Chart 15Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis​​​​​ Chart 16US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis​​​​​ The model bond portfolio is expected to deliver an excess return over its performance benchmark during the next six months of +54bps in the Base Case and +31bps in the Hawkish Fed scenario, but is projected to underperform by -9bps in the Pessimistic scenario. Importantly, there is virtually no expected excess return from the credit side of model bond portfolio in the Hawkish Fed scenario, even with strong global growth. A faster-than-expected pace of Fed rate hikes in the first half of 2022 would be a clear signal to downgrade exposure to the riskier parts of the fixed income universe like US high-yield. Although in that Hawkish Fed scenario, greater-than-expected China stimulus and a weaker US dollar would also represent signals to begin adding back emerging market credit exposure.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Our model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt and USD-denominated emerging market debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2     We also made very slight adjustments within the US, Japan, Germany and France allocations to refine our allocations across the various maturity buckets while keeping the overall portfolio duration unchanged entering 2022. Appendix Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights Chart 1Stick With Steepeners The new year promises to be one of Fed tightening. The minutes from the December FOMC meeting reinforced the notion that rate hikes will begin as early as March and the market is now priced for 85 bps of rate increases (between 3 and 4 hikes) by the end of 2022. The long-end of the curve has responded to the hawkishness with the 10-year Treasury yield moving above its previous post-pandemic high of 1.74%. Just as interesting, however, is that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has only just climbed back to the lower-end of the range of neutral fed funds rate estimates (Chart 1). This has implications for our preferred yield curve positioning. With the 5-year/5-year forward yield still below our target, it makes sense to position for a bear-steepening of the Treasury curve. A shift from steepeners to flatteners will be warranted once the 5-year/5-year is more consistent with survey estimates of the neutral rate. For now, we recommend keeping portfolio duration low and owning 2/10 Treasury curve steepeners (long 2-year, short cash/10 barbell). Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 60 basis points in December and by 162 bps in 2021. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 7 bps on the month and our quality-adjusted 12-month breakeven spread ticked down to its 6th percentile since 1995 (Chart 2). This indicates that corporate bonds remain expensive, despite the Fed’s pivot toward tightening. The slope of the yield curve is a critical indicator for our corporate bond call. We are very comfortable holding corporate bonds when the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is above 50 bps, but our work suggests that returns to credit risk take a significant step down once the slope flattens into a range of 0 bps to 50 bps.1 The 3-year/10-year Treasury slope recently bounced off the 50 bps level and it currently sits at 59 bps. However, our fair value estimates for the 3/10 slope suggest that it won’t stay above 50 bps for long (bottom panel). The three scenarios we consider all suggest that the 3/10 slope will break below 50 bps within the next six months.2 We will turn more defensive on corporate bonds once that occurs. High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 216 bps in December and by 669 bps in 2021. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 54 bps on the month, ending the year at 283 bps. The 12-month spread-implied default rate – the default rate that is priced into the junk index assuming a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt and an excess spread of 100 bps – also fell back to 3.3% (Chart 3). The odds are good that defaults will come in below 3.3% in 2021, which should coincide with the outperformance of high-yield bonds versus duration-matched Treasuries. For context, the high-yield default rate came in at 1.8% for the 12 months ending in November and we showed in a recent report that corporate balance sheets are in excellent shape.3 Specifically, we noted that the ratio of total debt to net worth for the nonfinancial corporate sector has fallen to 41%, the lowest ratio since 2010 (bottom panel). We recommend that investors favor high-yield over investment grade corporate bonds. While, as noted on page 3, we will turn more defensive on credit risk (including high-yield) once the 3/10 Treasury slope moves sustainably below 50 bps, we will likely retain a preference for high-yield over investment grade based on relative valuations.      MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in December but lagged by 69 bps in 2021. The zero-volatility spread for conventional 30-year agency MBS tightened 6 bps on the month, evenly split between 3 bps of option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightening and a 3 bps drop in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) (Chart 4). We wrote in a recent report that MBS’ poor performance in 2021 was attributable to an option cost that was too low relative to the pace of mortgage refinancings, noting that the MBA Refinance Index was slow to fall in 2021, despite the back-up in yields.4 The robust pace of home price appreciation has been an important factor boosting refis, as homeowners have been increasingly incentivized to tap the equity in their homes. With no indication that cash-out refi activity is about to slow, we expect refinancings to remain stubbornly high in 2022. This will put upward pressure on MBS spreads. We recommend an up-in-coupon bias within an overall underweight allocation to MBS. Higher coupon MBS exhibit more attractive option-adjusted spreads and higher convexity than lower coupon MBS. This makes high-coupon MBS (4%, 4.5%) more likely to outperform low-coupon MBS (2%, 2.5%, 3%) in an environment where bond yields are flat or rising (bottom panel). Government-Related: Overweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in December and by 68 bps in 2021. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 216 bps in December but lagged by 10 bps in 2021. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 6 bps on the month and by 41 bps in 2021. Local Authority bonds underperformed by 37 bps in December but beat duration-matched Treasuries by 368 bps in 2021. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 1 bp in December and were flat versus Treasuries on the year. Supranationals outperformed Treasuries by 2 bps in December and by 20 bps in 2021. The investment grade Emerging Market Sovereign bond index outperformed the duration-equivalent US corporate bond index by 109 bps in December. The Emerging Market Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index outperformed duration-matched US corporates by 16 bps (Chart 5). Both EM indexes continue to offer significant yield advantages versus US corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. We continue to recommend overweighting USD-denominated EM sovereigns and corporates versus investment grade US corporates with the same credit rating and duration.5  Within EM sovereigns, attractive countries include: Philippines, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. Municipal Bonds: Maximum  Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 43 basis points in December and by 416 bps in 2021 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The economic and policy back-drop remains favorable for municipal bond performance. Trailing 4-quarter net state & local government savings are incredibly high (Chart 6) and 2021’s federal spending splurge will support state & local government coffers for some time. A recent report showed that the average duration of municipal bond indexes has fallen significantly during the past few decades, a trend that has implications for how we should perceive municipal bond valuations.6 Specifically, the trend makes municipal bonds more attractive relative to both Treasury securities and investment grade corporates. Long-maturity bonds are especially compelling. We calculate that 12-17 year maturity Revenue munis offer a breakeven tax rate of 19% relative to credit rating and duration matched US corporate bonds. 12-17 year General Obligation Munis offer a breakeven tax rate of 25% versus corporates (panel 2). High-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive compared to high-yield corporates (panel 4), but we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates. The deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them susceptible to extension risk if bond yields rise. Treasury Curve: Buy 2-Year Bullet Versus Cash/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in December but reversed some of that flattening in the first week of January. All in all, the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope has flattened 2 bps since the end of November, bringing it to 89 bps. As noted on the front page of this report, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is rising but it is still only at the low-end of survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate. This argues for continuing to hold curve steepeners in the near term. It will make sense to shift into flatteners once the 5-year/5-year forward yield rises to the middle of the range of survey estimates. We also observe that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is extremely high, both in absolute terms and relative to our model’s fair value (Chart 7). This signals that a 2/10 curve steepening position (long 5-year bullet, short 2/10 barbell) is incredibly cheap. Indeed, the 2/10 slope has already flattened to below the levels that were witnessed on the last two Fed liftoff dates in 2015 and 2004 (panel 4) and the Fed has still not raised rates off the zero bound. A trade long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell looks attractive in this environment. However, we note that the 2/5 Treasury slope has also flattened to below levels seen on the prior two Fed liftoff dates (bottom panel). In other words, the 2/5 slope also has room to steepen. For that reason, we prefer to focus our long positions on the 2-year Treasury note rather than the 5-year. We recommend buying the 2-year bullet versus a duration-matched cash/10 barbell. We also advise investors to own a position long the 20-year bond versus a duration-matched 10/30 barbell. This latter position offers a very attractive duration-neutral yield advantage of 20 bps. TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 85 basis points in December and by 830 bps in 2021. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 8 bps on the month while the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell by 2 bps. The 10-year and 2-year rates currently sit at 2.52% and 3.17%, respectively. The Fed’s preferred 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 5 bps on the month. It currently sits at 2.19%, somewhat below the Fed’s 2.3% - 2.5% target range. Our valuation indicator shows that 10-year TIPS are slightly expensive compared to 10-year nominal Treasuries (Chart 8), and we retain a neutral allocation to TIPS versus nominals at the long-end of the curve. We acknowledge the risk that a prolonged period of high inflation could lead to a break-out in long-dated TIPS breakevens, but this now looks less likely given the Fed’s increasing hawkishness. We see better trading opportunities at the front-end of the TIPS curve where the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate remains well above the Fed’s target range (panel 4). Short-maturity breakevens are more sensitive to swings in CPI than those at the long end. Therefore, the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has considerable downside during the next 6-12 months, assuming inflation moderates as we expect. We recommend an underweight allocation to TIPS versus nominals at the front-end of the curve. Given our view that CPI inflation will be lower in 6-12 months, we recommend shorting 2-year TIPS outright, positioning in 2/10 TIPS breakeven inflation curve steepeners (bottom panel) and 2/10 TIPS (real) yield curve flatteners. All three trades will profit from falling short-maturity inflation expectations. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in December and by 31 bps in 2021. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 4 bps in December and by 17 bps in 2021. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed Treasuries by 9 bps in December and by 103 bps in 2021. During the past two years, substantial federal government support for household incomes has caused US households to build up an extremely large buffer of excess savings. During this period, many households have used their windfalls to pay down consumer debt and credit card debt levels have fallen to well below pre-COVID levels (Chart 9). Though consumer credit growth is starting to rebound, debt levels are still low. This indicates that the collateral quality backing consumer ABS remains exceptionally strong. Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum, favoring non-Aaa rated securities over Aaa-rated ones.       Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in December and by 180 bps in 2021. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 17 bps in December and by 80 bps in 2021. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 42 bps in December and by 513 bps in 2021 (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain relatively high, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in December and by 70 bps in 2021. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 1 bp on the month. It currently sits at 36 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have recovered to well below their pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight.   Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet.   Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of December 31st, 2021) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of December 31st, 2021) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of -58 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope flattens by less than 58 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds”, dated September 21, 2021. 2  We consider three scenarios for the fed funds rate. (1) March liftoff, 100 bps per year hike pace, 2.08% terminal rate. (2) March liftoff, 75 bps per year hike pace, 2.08% terminal rate. (3) March liftoff, 75 bps per year hike pace, 2.33% terminal rate. 3  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed’s Inflation Problem”, dated November 23, 2021. 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Omicron Impact”, dated November 30, 2021. 5  Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2022 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 14, 2021. 6  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Best & Worst Spots On The Yield Curve”, dated October 26, 2021.  

Highlights Global growth will remain above-trend in 2022, although with more divergence between regions than at any time during the pandemic (US strong, Europe steady, China slowing). Global inflation will transition from being driven by supply squeezes towards more sustainable inflation fueled by tightening labor markets - a shift leading to tighter monetary policies that are not adequately discounted in the current low level of bond yields, most notably in the US. Maintain below-benchmark overall global duration exposure. Diverging growth and inflation trends will lead to a varying pace of monetary policy tightening between countries, resulting in greater opportunities to benefit from relative bond market performance and cross-country yield spread moves. Underweight government bonds in countries where central banks are more likely to hike rates in 2022 (the US, the UK, Canada) versus overweights where monetary policy is more likely to remain unchanged (Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Japan). Deeply negative real bond yields reflect an implied path of nominal interest rates that is too low relative to inflation expectations in the majority of developed countries. Real bond yields will adjust higher in countries where rate hikes are more likely, resulting in more stable inflation breakevens compared to 2021. Stay neutral global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. A tightening global monetary policy backdrop and rising real interest rates will weigh on returns in global credit markets, even as strong nominal economic growth minimizes downgrade and default risks. Like government bonds, global growth and policy divergences will create relative investment opportunities between countries, especially later in 2022 when the Fed begins to hike rates and China begins to ease macro policies. Overweight euro area high-yield and investment grade corporates versus US equivalents. Limit exposure to EM hard-currency debt until there are clear signals of China policy stimulus and upside momentum on the US dollar fades. Feature Dear Client, This report, detailing our global fixed income investment outlook for next year, will be our last for 2021. We wish you a very safe, happy and prosperous 2022. We look forward to continuing our conversation in the new year. Rob Robis, Chief Global Fixed Income Strategist BCA Research’s Outlook 2022 report, “Peak Inflation – Or Just Getting Started?”, outlining the main investment themes for the upcoming year based on the collective wisdom of our strategists, was sent to all clients in late November. In this report, we discuss the broad implications of those themes for the direction of global fixed income markets, along with our main investment recommendations for 2022. A Brief Summary Of The 2022 BCA Outlook The tone of the 2022 Outlook report was quite positive on the prospects for global growth, even with the recent development of the rapid spread of the Omicron COVID-19 variant. It remains to be seen how severe this new variant will be in terms of hospitalizations and deaths compared to previous COVID waves. We assume that any negative economic impacts from Omicron in the developed economies will be contained to the first half of 2022, however, given more widespread vaccination rates (including booster shots) and greater access to anti-viral treatments. The baseline economic scenario in 2022 is one of persistent above-trend growth in the developed world (Chart 1) with a closing of output gaps in the US and euro area. The mix of spending in those economies will shift away from goods towards services, although Omicron may delay that transition until later in 2022. Chart 1Another Year Of Above Trend Growth Expected In 2022​​​​​ Chart 2Strong Fundamental Support For US Growth​​​​​ Chart 3China In 2022: Deceleration Leading To Policy Easing The US looks particularly well supported to maintain a solid pace of economic activity. The US labor market is very strong. Monetary policy remains accommodative (although that is slowly changing). Financial conditions are still easy, with the lagged impact of elevated equity and housing values providing a robust tailwind to consumer spending that is already well supported by excess savings resulting from the pandemic (Chart 2). China starts the year as a “one-legged” economy supported only by external demand, and policy stimulus later in the year will eventually be needed for the Chinese government to reach its growth targets (Chart 3).That policy shift will have significant implications for the outlook of many financial assets as 2022 evolves, including emerging market (EM) fixed income, industrial commodity prices and the US dollar (as we discuss later in this report). Global inflation will recede from the overheated pace of 2021 as supply chain bottlenecks become less acute. Inflationary pressures in 2022 will come from more “normal” sources like tightening labor markets, rising wage growth and higher housing costs (rents). This constellation of lower unemployment with still-elevated underlying inflation will look most acute in the US, leading the Fed to begin a tightening cycle that is not fully discounted in US Treasury yields. The broad investment conclusions of the BCA 2022 Outlook are more positive for global equity markets relative to bond markets, although with elevated uncertainty stemming from Omicron and future China stimulus. The views are more nuanced for other assets, like the US dollar (stronger to start the year, weaker later) and oil prices (essentially flat from pre-Omicron levels). Our Four Key Views For Global Fixed Income Markets In 2022 The following are the main implications for global fixed income investment strategy based off the conclusions from the 2022 BCA Outlook. Key View #1: Maintain below-benchmark overall global duration exposure. As we have noted in the title of our report, the investment outlook for 2022 is more complicated for investors to navigate than the relatively straightforward story from this time a year ago. Then, the development of COVID-19 vaccines led to optimism on reopening from 2020 lockdowns, but with no threat of the early removal of pandemic monetary and fiscal policy stimulus. The fixed income investment implications at the time were obvious, in the majority of developed countries - expect higher government bond yields, steeper yield curves, wider inflation breakevens and tighter corporate credit spreads. Today, the story is more complicated, but is still one that points to higher global bond yields. Take, for example, global fiscal policy. According to the IMF, the US is expected to see no fiscal drag in 2022 thanks to the Biden Administration’s spending initiatives, while Europe and EM will see significant fiscal drag (Chart 4). However, in the case of Europe, this should not be viewed negatively as it is the result of expiring pandemic era employment and income support programs that are no longer needed after economies emerged from wholesale lockdowns. So less fiscal stimulus is a sign of a healthier European economy that is more likely to put upward pressure on global bond yields, on the margin. The outlook for global consumer spending is also a bit more complicated, but still one that points to higher bond yields. Consumer confidence was declining over the final months of 2021 in the US, Europe, the UK, Canada and most other developed countries. This occurred despite falling unemployment rates and very strong labor demand, which would typically be associated with consumer optimism (Chart 5). High global inflation, which has outstripped wage gains and reduced real purchasing power, is why consumers have become gloomier in the face of healthy job markets. Chart 4Global Fiscal Policy Divergence In 2022​​​​​​ Chart 5Lower Inflation Will Help Boost Consumer Confidence​​​​​​ The implication is that the expectation of lower inflation outlined in the 2022 BCA Outlook, which sounds bond-bullish on the surface, could actually prove to be bond-bearish if it makes consumers more confident and willing to spend. On that note, there are already signs that the some of the sources of the global inflation surge of 2021 are fading in potency. Commodity price inflation has rolled over, in line with slowing momentum in manufacturing activity and a firmer US dollar (Chart 6). Measures of global shipping costs, while still elevated, have stopped accelerating. The spread of the Omicron variant may delay a further easing of supply chain disruptions in the short-term, but on a rate of change basis, the upward pressure on global inflation from supply squeezes will diminish in 2022. The inflation story will also be more complicated next year. While there will be less inflation from the prices of commodities and durable goods, there will be more inflation from the elimination of output gaps, tightening labor markets and an overall dearth of global spare capacity. Put another way, expect the gap between global headline and core inflation rates to narrow in most countries, but with domestically generated core inflation rates remaining elevated (Chart 7). Chart 6Some Relief On Supply-Driven Inflation On The Way​​​​​​ Chart 7Global Inflation Will Be Lower, But More Sustainable, In 2022 The more complicated investment story for 2022 extends to global bond yields themselves. Longer-maturity government bond yields remain far too low given the mix of very high inflation and very low unemployment in many countries. Chart 8Bond Markets Vulnerable To More Hawkish Repricing Even as major central banks like the Fed are tapering bond purchases and signaling more rate hikes in 2022, and others like the Bank of England (BoE) have actually raised rates, bond yields remain low. The reason for this is that markets are discounting very low terminal rates – the peak level of policy rates to be reached in the next monetary tightening cycle. We proxy this by looking at 5-year overnight index swap (OIS) rates, 5-years forward. A GDP-weighted aggregate of those forward OIS rates for the major developed economies (the US, Germany, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia) is currently 0.9%. This compares to GDP-weighted 10-year government bond yield of 0.8% (Chart 8). Forward OIS rates and 10-year bond yields are typically closely linked, which suggests upward scope for longer-maturity bond yields as markets begin to discount a higher trajectory for policy rates. We see this as the primary driver of higher bond yields in 2022 – an upward adjustment of interest rate expectations as central banks like the Fed, BoE and Bank of Canada (BoC) promise, and eventually deliver, more rate hikes than markets currently expect. We therefore recommend maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall interest rate (duration) exposure in global bond portfolios in 2022. Government bond yield curves will eventually see more flattening pressure as central banks tighten, most notably in the US, but not before longer-term yields rise to levels more consistent with the most likely peak levels of central bank policy rates. Key View #2: Underweight government bonds in countries where central banks are more likely to hike rates in 2022 (the US, the UK, Canada) versus overweights where monetary policy is more likely to remain unchanged (Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Japan). The more complicated fixed income investing story for 2022 also extends to country allocation decisions, with more opportunities to take advantage of diverging bond market performance and cross-country spread moves. Current pricing in OIS curves shows a very modest expected path for interest rates in the major developed economies (Chart 9). Some central banks, like the BoE, BoC and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) are expected to be more aggressive with rate hikes in 2022 compared to the Fed. Yet there are not many rate hikes discounted beyond 2022, even in the US (Table 1). Chart 9Markets Are Pricing Short, Shallow Hiking Cycles Table 1Only Modest Tightening Expected Over The Next Three Years The US OIS curve is currently priced for an expectation that the Fed will struggle to hike the fed funds rate beyond 1.25% by the end of 2024, even with the latest set of FOMC rate forecasts calling for 75bps of rate hikes in 2022 alone. In the case of the UK, markets are pricing in lower rates in 2024 after multiple rate hikes in 2022/23, indicative of an expectation of a policy error of BoE “overtightening” even with the BoE Bank Rate expected to peak just above 1% The relative performance of government bond markets is typically correlated to changes in relative interest rate expectations. That was once again evident in 2021, where the UK, Canada and Australia significantly underperformed the Bloomberg Global Treasury aggregate in the third quarter as markets moved to rapidly price in multiple rate hikes (Chart 10). That volatility of bond market performance was particularly unusual Down Under, as the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) did not signal any desire to begin hiking rates in 2022, unlike the BoE and BoC. As rate expectations in those three countries stabilized in the fourth quarter, their government bonds began to outperform. On the other hand, relative government bond performance was more stable in the euro area, Japan and the US for most of 2021 (Chart 11). In the case of the US, rate hike expectations only began to move higher in September after the Fed signaled that tapering of bond purchases was imminent. Even then, markets have moved slowly to discount 2022 rate hikes. Now, the pricing in the US OIS curve is more in line with the median interest rate “dot” from the latest FOMC projections, calling for three rate hikes next year starting in June. Chart 10Rate Hike Expectations Driving Relative Bond Returns​​​​​​ Chart 11Stay Underweight US Interest Rate Exposure​​​​​​ Looking ahead to next year, we see the widening divergences on growth, inflation and monetary policies between countries leading to the following investible opportunities on country allocation in global bond portfolios. Underweight US Treasuries Chart 12Cyclical Upside Risk To Longer-Dated UST Yields The Fed has already begun to taper its bond buying, which is set to end by March 2022. As shown in Table 1, 79bps of rate hikes are discounted in the US by the end 2022, but only another 41bps are priced over the subsequent two years. Survey-based measures of interest rate expectations are similarly dovish, even with the US unemployment rate now at 4.2% - within the FOMC’s range of full employment (NAIRU) estimates between 3.5-4.5% - and wage inflation accelerating (Chart 12). Markets are underestimating how much the funds rate will have to rise over the next 2-3 years as the Fed belated catches up to a very tight US labor market and inflation persistently above the Fed’s 2% target. Stay below-benchmark on US interest rate risk, through both reduced duration exposure and lower portfolio allocations to Treasuries. Overweight Core Europe While interest rate markets are underestimating how much monetary tightening the Fed will deliver, the opposite is true in Europe. The EUR OIS curve is discounting 39bps of rate hikes to the end of 2024, even with cyclical growth indicators like the manufacturing PMI and ZEW expectations survey well off the 2021 highs (Chart 13). At the same time, there is little evidence to date indicating that the surge in European inflation this year, which has been narrowly concentrated in energy prices and durable goods prices, is feeding through into broader inflation pressures or faster wage growth. We recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to core European government bond markets (Germany, France), particularly versus underweights in US Treasuries. Our expectation of a wider 10-year US Treasury-German bund spread is one of our highest conviction views for 2022, playing on our theme of widening growth, inflation and monetary policy divergences (Chart 14). Chart 13Stay Overweight European Interest Rate Exposure​​​​​​ Chart 14Expect More US-Europe Spread Widening In 2022​​​​​​ Overweight European Peripherals Chart 15Stay O/W European Peripheral Exposure To Begin 2022 The ECB will be allowing its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, or PEPP, to expire at the end of March 2022. Beyond that, the ECB has announced that the pace of buying in the existing pre-pandemic Asset Purchase Program (APP) will be upsized from €20bn per month to between €30-40bn until at least the third quarter of 2022. This represents a meaningful slowing of the pace of ECB bond purchases, which were nearly €90bn per month under PEPP. Nonetheless, unlike most other developed economy central banks that are ending pandemic-era quantitative easing (QE) programs, the ECB will still be buying bonds on a net basis and expanding its balance sheet in 2022 (Chart 15). The central bank has taken great care in signaling that no rate hikes should be expected in 2022, likely to avoid any unwanted surges in Peripheral European bond yields or the euro. A continuation of asset purchases reinforces that message, leaving us comfortable in maintaining an overweight recommendation on Italian and Spanish government bonds for 2022. Underweight the UK and Canada Chart 16Stay U/W UK & Canadian Interest Rate Exposure A combination of rapidly tightening labor markets and soaring inflation is almost impossible for any inflation-targeting central bank to ignore. That is certainly the case in the UK, where the unemployment rate is 4.2% with two job vacancies available for every unemployed person – a series high for that ratio (Chart 16, top panel). UK headline CPI inflation is at a 10-year high of 5.2% and the BoE expects inflation to peak around 6% in April 2022. Medium-term inflation expectations, both market based and survey based, are also elevated and well above the BoE’s 2% inflation target. The BoE surprised markets a couple of times at the end of 2021, not delivering on an expected hike in November and actually lifting rates in December in the midst of the intense UK Omicron wave. We see the latter decision as indicative of the central bank’s growing concern over high UK inflation becoming embedded in inflation expectation. The BoE will likely have to eventually raise rates to a level higher than the 2023 peak of 1.1% currently discounted in the GBP OIS curve. That justifies an underweight stance on UK interest rate exposure (both duration and country allocation) in 2022. A similar argument applies to Canada. The Canadian unemployment rate now sits at 6.0%, closing in on the February 2020 pre-COVID low of 5.7%. The BoC’s Q3/2021 Business Outlook Survey showed a net 64% of respondents reporting intensifying labor shortages (the highest level in the 20-year history of the survey). Wage growth is accelerating, headline CPI inflation is running at 4.7% and underlying inflation (trimmed mean CPI) is now at 3.4% - the latter two are well above the BoC inflation target range of 1-3%. The CAD OIS curve currently discounts 147bps of rate hikes in 2022, which is aggressively hawkish, but very little is priced beyond that in 2023 (another 19bp hike) and 2024 (a rate cut of 24bps). The BoC estimates that the neutral interest rate in Canada is between 1.75% and 2.75%. Thus, markets do not expect the BoC to lift rates to even the low end of that range over the next three years, despite a very tight labor market and an inflation overshoot. We see this as justifying a continued underweight stance on Canadian interest rate exposure (both duration and country allocation) in 2022, even with markets already discounting significant monetary tightening next year. Overweight Australia and Japan Outside of Europe, we recommend overweights on Australian and Japanese government bonds entering 2022 (Chart 17). The RBA has been quite clear in what needs to happen before it will begin to lift rates. Australian wage growth must climb into the 3-4% range that has coincided with underlying Australian inflation sustainably staying in the RBA’s 2-3% target range. Wage growth and trimmed mean CPI inflation only reached 2.2% and 2.1%, respectively, for the latest available data from Q3/2021. As Australian wage and inflation data is only released on a quarterly basis, the RBA will not be able to assess whether wage dynamics are consistent with reaching its inflation target until the latter half of 2022. The AUD OIS curve is currently discounting 119bps of rate hikes in 2022 and an additional 86bps of hikes in 2023. Those are both far too aggressive for a central bank that is unlikely to begin lifting rates until the end of 2022, at the very earliest. Thus, we recommend an overweight stance on Australian bond exposure in global bond portfolios in 2022. The case for overweighting Japanese government bonds is a simple one. There are none of the inflation or labor market pressures seen in other countries to justify a hawkish turn by the Bank of Japan (bottom panel). Japanese core CPI is shockingly in deflation (-0.7%), bucking the trend seen in other countries and showing no pass-through from rising energy prices of global supply chain disruptions. This makes Japan a good defensive “safe haven” bond market against the backdrop of rising global bond yields that we expect in 2022. Chart 17Stay O/W Australian & Japanese Interest Rate Exposure​​​​​​ Chart 18Our Recommended DM Government Bond Country Allocations​​​​​​ In summary, our government allocations reflect the growing gap between expected monetary policy changes in 2022. This gives us a bias to favor lower-yielding markets, with Australia being the notable exception (Chart 18). However, in an environment where global bond volatility is expected to increase as multiple central banks exit QE and begin rate hiking cycles, carry/yield considerations play a secondary role in determining optimal country allocations. Key View #3: Stay neutral global inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt Another part of the global fixed income universe where the investment story has become more complicated is inflation-linked bonds. Overweighting inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt was the right strategy for bond investors as economies reopened from 2020 COVID lockdowns and global growth recovered. Booming commodity prices and supply chain squeezes added to the positive backdrop for linkers in 2021, as realized inflation soared to levels not seen in over a generation in many countries. Yet now, there is much less upside potential for inflation breakevens from current levels. Our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators (CBI) are one of our preferred tools to assess the attractiveness of inflation-linked bonds versus nominals within the developed markets. For each country, the CBI reflects the distance of 10-year inflation breakevens from three different measures – the fair value from our breakeven spread model, medium-term survey-based inflation expectations and the central bank inflation target. The further breakevens are from these three measures, the less scope there is for additional increases in breakevens. As can be seen in Chart 19, there is limited upside potential for breakevens in almost all countries. Only Canada has a CBI below zero, with the CBIs for the UK, US, Germany and Italy well above zero. With central banks belated starting to respond to high realized inflation with tapering and rate hikes, it is still too soon to move to a full-blown underweight stance on global inflation-linked bond exposure versus nominal government debt. Instead, we recommend no more than a neutral exposure in countries where our CBIs are relatively lower – Canada, Australia, Japan – and underweight allocations where the CBIs are relatively higher – the UK, Germany, Italy and France (Chart 20). One country where we are deviating from our CBI signal is the US. We are keeping the recommended US TIPS exposure at neutral to begin 2022, but we anticipate downgrading TIPS later in 2022 if the Fed begins to lift rates sooner and more aggressively than expected. We do recommend positioning within that neutral overall TIPS allocation by underweighting shorter maturities versus longer-dated TIPS, A more hawkish Fed and some likely deceleration of realized US inflation should result in a steeper TIPS breakeven curve and a flatter TIPS real yield curve. Beyond looking at inflation breakevens, the outlook for real bond yields may be THE most complicated part of the 2022 investment story. Perhaps no single topic generates a greater debate among BCA’s strategists than real bond yields, which remain negative across the developed world (Chart 21). Determining why real yields are negative is critical for making calls across other asset classes beyond just government bonds. Valuations for equities and corporate credit have become more closely correlated with real yields in recent years. Real yield differentials are also an important factor driving currency levels. Chart 20Our Recommended Inflation-Linked Bond Allocations We see negative real yields as a reflection of persistent central bank policy dovishness that looks increasingly unrealistic. Chart 22 should look familiar to regular readers of Global Fixed Income Strategy. We show real central bank policy rates (adjusted for realized inflation) and the market-implied expectations for those real rates derived from the forward curves for OIS rates and CPI swap rates. Chart 21Negative Real Yields: Global Bonds' Biggest Vulnerability​​​​​​ In the US, UK and Europe, markets are pricing a future path for nominal short-term interest rates that is consistently lower than the expected path of inflation. If markets believe that central banks will be unwilling (or unable) to ever lift policy rates above inflation, or that neutral medium-term real interest rates are in fact negative in most developed countries, then it should come as no surprise that longer-maturity real bond yields should also be negative. We do not subscribe to the view that neutral real rates are negative across the developed world, especially in the US. Even if we did, however, such a view is already reflected in the future pricing of bond yields and interest rates. As outlined earlier, OIS curves in many countries are underestimating how high nominal policy rates will go in the next 2-3 years. The potential for a “real rate shock”, where central banks tighten policy at a faster pace than markets expect, is a significant risk for global financial markets in the coming years. We see this as more of a risk for markets in 2023, with the Fed likely to become more aggressive on rate hikes and even the ECB likely to begin considering an interest rate adjustment. For 2022, however, we do expect global real yields to stabilize and likely begin to turn less negative as central banks continue to tighten policy. Key View #4: Overweight euro area high-yield and investment grade corporates versus US equivalents. Limit exposure to EM hard-currency debt until there are clear signals of China policy stimulus and upside momentum on the US dollar fades. The outlook for global credit markets in 2022 has also become more complicated, particularly for corporate bonds and EM hard currency debt. On the one hand, the levels of index yields (Chart 23) and spreads (Chart 24) for investment grade and high-yield corporate debt in the US, euro area and UK have clearly bottomed. The Omicron threat to global growth may be playing a role in the recent increases, but the more likely culprit is growing central bank hawkishness and fears of tighter monetary policy. Chart 23Global Corporate Bond Yields Have Reached A Cyclical Bottom​​​​​​ Chart 24Global Corporate Bond Spreads Have Reached A Cyclical Bottom​​​​​​ On the other hand, the fundamental backdrop for corporate debt is not conducive to major spread widening. As outlined at the start of this report, nominal economic growth in the major developed economies remains solid, which supports the expansion corporate revenues. Combined with still-low borrowing rates, this creates a relatively positive backdrop that limits risks from downgrades and defaults. Chart 25Monetary Policy Backdrop Turning More Negative For Credit Markets Corporate bond performance, both absolute returns and excess returns versus government debt, has worsened on a year-over-year basis for the latter half of 2021 (Chart 25). That has coincided with slowing growth in the balance sheets of the Fed and other major central banks and, more recently, the flattening trend of government bond yield curves as markets have discounted 2022 rate hikes. This suggests that monetary policy tightening expectations are dominating the still relatively positive fundamental backdrop for corporate credit. Looking ahead to 2022, we see a greater need to focus on relative value and cross-country valuation considerations when allocating to developed market corporate debt – particularly when looking the biggest markets in the US and euro area. We see a strong case for favoring euro area corporates over US equivalents, both for investment grade and particularly for high-yield. Our preferred method of corporate bond valuation is looking at 12-month breakevens. Breakevens measure the amount of spread widening that would need to occur over a one year horizon to eliminate the yield advantage of owning corporate bonds over government bonds of similar duration. We calculate this as the ratio of the index spread to the index duration for a particular credit market, like US investment grade. We then take a percentile ranking of those 12-month breakevens to determine the attractiveness of spreads versus its own history. On that basis, the 12-month breakeven for US investment grade corporates looks very unattractive, sitting near the bottom of the historical distribution (Chart 26). This reflects not only tight spreads but also the high durations of investment grade credit. US high-yield corporate spreads are not as stretched, but are also not particularly cheap, with the 12-month breakeven sitting at the 34th percentile of its distribution. In the euro area, the 12-month breakeven for investment grade is not as stretched as in the US, sitting in the 36th percentile (Chart 27). The euro area high-yield 12-month breakeven looks similar to the US, at the 24th percentile of its historical distribution. Chart 26US Corporate Spread Valuations Are Not Compelling​​​​​​ Chart 27Euro Area Corporate Spread Valuations Are Also Stretched​​​​​​ Our current recommended strategy on US corporate exposure is to be neutral investment grade and overweight high-yield. We see no reason to change that view to begin 2022. However, we do anticipate downgrading US corporate exposure later in the year when the Fed begins to lift interest rates and the US Treasury curve flattens more aggressively. Earlier, we recommended positioning for a wider US Treasury-German bund spread as a way to play for the growing policy divergence between a more hawkish Fed and a still dovish ECB. Another way to do that is to overweight euro area corporate debt versus US equivalents, for both investment grade and especially for high-yield. In terms of potential default losses, the outlook is positive on both sides of the Atlantic. Moody’s is projecting a 2022 default rate of 2.3% in the US and 2.2% in the euro area (Chart 28). The last two times that the default rates were so similar, in 2014/15 and 2017/18, also coincided with a period of euro area high-yield outperforming US high-yield (on a duration-matched and currency-matched performance). We see that pattern repeating in 2022. Chart 28Favor Euro Area High-Yield Over US Equivalents In 2022​​​​​​ When looking within credit tiers, we see the best value in favoring Ba-rated euro area high-yield versus US equivalents when looking at 12-month breakeven percentile rankings (Chart 29). Yet even looking at just yields rather than spread, lower-rated euro area high-yield corporates offer more attractive yields than US equivalents, on a currency-hedged basis (Chart 30). Chart 31Stay Cautious On EM Hard Currency Debt Turning to EM hard currency debt, we recommend a cautious stance entering 2022. EM fundamentals that typically need to in place to produce tighter EM credit spreads are currently not in place. Chinese economic growth is slowing, commodity price momentum is fading and the US dollar is appreciating versus EM currencies (Chart 31). An improvement in non-US economic growth will help turn around all three trends, especially the strengthening US dollar which typically trades off US/non-US growth differentials. The key to any non-US growth acceleration in 2022 will come from China. When Chinese policymakers announce more aggressive stimulus measures in 2022, as we expect, that would represent an opportunity to turn more positive on EM USD-denominated debt. Until that happens, we recommend staying underweight EM hard currency debt, with a slight bias to favor sovereigns over corporates.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Special Report

This is US Bond Strategy’s final report of the year. Our regular publication schedule will resume on January 11th with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2022. Highlights Interest Rate Policy: The Fed will tighten policy in 2022. Our baseline expectation is that the first hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to tighten more quickly. An abrupt tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to move more slowly. The Flexible Average Inflation Target: The re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations suggests that the Fed’s new FAIT framework is viewed as credible and is working as intended. It is likely here to stay. The Long-Run Neutral Rate: We think it’s likely that consensus estimates of a 2.0% to 2.5% long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be too low, but we don’t recommend trading on that view in 2022. The low neutral rate narrative is very well-entrenched, and it will only be questioned after several rate hikes have been delivered and their economic impact is assessed. A Year Of Tightening The Fed started 2021 with three conditions for lifting rates (Table 1). Now, as we head into 2022, the Fed has officially acknowledged that the two conditions related to inflation have been met, and Fed Chair Jay Powell said that the economy is making “rapid progress” toward the final condition of “maximum employment”. Table 1The Fed's Liftoff Criteria Based on this, it looks like rate hikes are imminent. The Fed recently doubled its pace of asset purchase tapering so that net purchases will reach zero by mid-March. This opens up the March 2022 FOMC meeting as the first “live meeting” where a rate hike could occur. Our base case expectation is that the Fed will wait a tad longer, but that liftoff will occur at the June FOMC meeting. Rate hikes will then proceed through the end of the year at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter. Next, we discuss why the Fed has adopted this hawkish posture. We also consider the factors that would cause tightening to proceed more quickly or more slowly in 2022. Reasons For The Fed’s Hawkish Pivot Chart 1Labor Market Indicators It might sound odd to say that the US economy is rapidly approaching maximum employment. After all, the labor market is still 3.9 million jobs short of where it was in February 2020 (Chart 1). What’s more, only 59.2% of the population is employed today compared to 61.1% prior to the pandemic (Chart 1, panel 2). But Fed Chair Powell wasn’t referring to either of those figures when he said that the economy is making “rapid progress” toward maximum employment. Rather, he was referring to the unemployment rate, which currently sits at 4.2% (Chart 1, panel 3). This is only 0.2% above the Fed’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment and only 0.7% above the pre-pandemic level of 3.5%. The fact that the unemployment rate has declined sharply means that the bulk of the shortfall in the economy-wide number of jobs is the result of people dropping out of the labor force (Chart 1, bottom panel), not the result of an increase in the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed. As recently as the November FOMC meeting, the Fed wasn’t drawing a sharp distinction between these two trends. In fact, Chair Powell said in his post-meeting press conference that “there is still ground to cover to reach maximum employment, both in terms of employment and in terms of participation.” But just one month later, at the December FOMC press conference, Chair Powell struck a much different tone. He said: Chart 2Participation Trends The Demographic Downtrend In Participation But the reality is, we don’t have a strong labor force participation recovery yet and we may not have it for some time. At the same time, we have to make policy now. And inflation is well above target. So this is something we need to take into account. It appears that the Fed is no longer confident that labor force participation is about to rise. There are a few good reasons for this. First, the aging of the US population imparts a structural demographic downtrend to the labor force participation rate as an increasing number of people reach retirement age (Chart 2). In addition, there was a sharp drop in 55+ participation at the onset of the pandemic that has so far not recovered at all (Chart 2, panel 2). It is debatable whether people in this older age cohort will ever return to work. Finally, there is a shortfall in participation for people in their prime working years (ages 25-54) (Chart 2, bottom panel). These people are likely not working because of factors related to the pandemic (e.g. fear of getting sick, caregiving requirements). It is likely that prime-age participation will rise as pandemic concerns fade, but the Fed is no longer confident that these pandemic concerns will fade quickly. Faced with elevated inflation right now, the Fed has decided that it must act against inflation earlier than it had intended, before prime-age labor force participation makes a full recovery. For bond investors, the important takeaway from the recent shift in Fed policy is that a recovery in labor force participation is no longer a pre-condition for liftoff. That being the case, we are very close to the Fed pulling the trigger on rate hikes. Table 2 shows the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth required to reach different target unemployment rates by different future dates, assuming the labor force participation rate remains at its current level. With the participation rate held flat, it only takes average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 224 thousand to reach the pre-COVID unemployment rate of 3.5% by June. That same rate of growth would cause the unemployment rate to fall below the Fed’s 4% natural rate estimate by January. Table 2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth (Thousands) Required To Reach Unemployment Rate Target By Given Date The message is clear. With rising participation no longer a pre-condition for hikes, the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff condition will be met within the next few months. We expect this will lead to the first Fed rate hike at the June 2022 FOMC meeting. What Happened To “Transitory” Inflation? Chart 3Core CPI Components The Fed’s view of the labor force participation rate is very similar to its view of inflation. Both are being influenced by the pandemic, but the Fed is no longer confident that pandemic concerns will fade in a timely manner. Looking at the inflation picture, it’s easy to see the impact of the pandemic. Core goods inflation is running at a year-over-year rate of 9.4%. It was close to 0% prior to COVID (Chart 3). This is obviously the result of pandemic-related supply chain disruptions and the shift in consumer spending away from services and toward goods. Just like with labor force participation, these trends should reverse as pandemic concerns fade. However, given the pandemic’s uncertain duration, the Fed is no longer willing to wait for that to happen. The Fed’s Interest Rate Projections In line with its hawkish shift on the definition of “maximum employment”, FOMC participants revised up their interest rate projections at the December meeting. The median FOMC participant is now looking for three 25 basis point rate hikes in 2022. This is consistent with liftoff in June followed by a pace of one rate hike per quarter (Chart 4). Interestingly, the market is reasonably well priced for this near-term path for rates. The deviation between market pricing and Fed expectations occurs further out the curve. As such, we recommend that US bond investors keep portfolio duration low and favor the 2-year Treasury note over the 10-year.1 Chart 4Rate Expectations What Would Make The Fed Go Faster? Chart 5No Wage/Price Spiral Yet As noted above, our base case forecast is that the Fed will start lifting rates in June 2022 and continue to hike at a pace of 25 bps per quarter. This is roughly consistent with the Fed’s own median projections. However, we acknowledge that the Fed will tighten policy more quickly if it sees evidence of an emerging wage-price spiral. Specifically, the Fed has pointed to the risk that real wage growth might exceed the rate of productivity growth. If that were to occur, the Fed would be worried about a wage-price spiral where firms lift prices to meet wage demands, but that only causes employee inflation expectations to rise further, leading to even greater wage demands. So far, this is not occurring. Real wage growth is negative and long-dated inflation expectations remain well-anchored near the Fed’s target levels (Chart 5). An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations during the next few months would cause the Fed to bring forward the liftoff date and increase the pace of rate hikes in 2022. What Would Make The Fed Go Slower? The main thing that would cause the Fed to tighten more slowly in 2022 would be if its hawkish shift prompted a severe tightening in overall financial conditions. Chart 6 shows that the ends of Fed tightening cycles typically coincide with the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index moving above 100. This tightening in financial conditions also typically precedes a slowdown in economic growth (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6Watch Financial Conditions And Treasury Slope As The Fed Tightens Financial conditions are incredibly easy at present. But it is conceivable that risky assets will sell-off on fears of Fed rate hikes, and a large enough sell-off would cause the Fed to pause. The slope of the Treasury curve could also be a useful indicator in this regard. The 2/10 slope is usually close to inversion when the Fed ends its rate hike cycles (Chart 6, panel 3). Bottom Line: The Fed will tighten policy in 2022. Our baseline expectation is that the first hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. An increase in real wage growth to above the rate of productivity growth and/or a break-out in long-dated inflation expectations would cause the Fed to tighten more quickly. An abrupt tightening of financial conditions would cause the Fed to move more slowly. US bond investors should position for this outcome by keeping portfolio duration low and by favoring the 2-year Treasury note over the 10-year. FAIT Accompli It’s been roughly one year since the Fed concluded its Strategic Review and released a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.2 One year on, it seems appropriate to consider how much Fed policy actually changed as a result. We focus on what, in our view, are the two most significant changes to the Fed’s Statement. 1.  No More Pre-Mature Tightening First, the Fed changed its strategy to focus on “shortfalls of employment from its maximum level” rather than “deviations from its maximum level”. In the Fed’s words, “this change signals that high employment, in the absence of unwanted increases in inflation […], will not by itself be a cause for policy concern.” In the past, the Fed would tighten policy in response to a low unemployment rate on the expectation that inflation was about to increase. The new strategy is to wait for inflation to emerge before tightening, even if the unemployment rate is very low. Inflation has obviously emerged, so policy tightening is justified even under the new framework. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that the Fed has waited longer than usual to tighten. Chart 7A shows the change in the unemployment rate since the previous trough for the current cycle alongside the previous three cycles. For prior cycles, the lines end when the Fed delivers its first rate hike. While it’s notable that the unemployment rate has improved much more quickly this time around, it’s just as notable that the Fed still hasn’t lifted rates. This is despite the fact that the unemployment rate is only 0.7% above its pre-recession trough. This is more progress than was made before tightening in the 1990 and 2000 cycles, and about the same amount of progress as was made in the 107 months since the unemployment rate troughed before the Great Financial Crisis. A broader measure of labor market utilization, the prime-age (25-54) employment-to-population ratio, tells a similar story (Chart 7B). By this metric, the labor market has already made more progress than it did during the prior two cycles and the Fed still hasn’t increased the funds rate. All in all, even though inflation has emerged earlier this cycle than most expected, it’s pretty clear that the Fed’s new focus on employment “shortfalls” instead of “deviations” has made it act more dovishly. 2. Flexible Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT) The second big change that the Fed made to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy was the introduction of a Flexible Average Inflation Target (FAIT). Under the FAIT framework, the Fed will no longer view its 2% inflation target as purely forward looking. Rather, the Fed will seek to achieve average 2% inflation over time. This means that, “following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” While the Fed doesn’t specify a period over which it seeks 2% average inflation, it seems clear that the new inflation target has been achieved. PCE inflation is well above where it would have been if it averaged 2% since the new framework was adopted in August 2020 (Chart 8). This is also true if we pick February 2020, the peak of the last cycle, as our starting point. In fact, PCE inflation has almost made up for the entire inflation shortfall since January 2010. Chart 8The FAIT Framework While it’s interesting to look at average inflation over different lookback periods, it’s more important to note that the actual goal of the FAIT framework is to keep long-dated inflation expectations anchored near target levels. In the Fed’s own words: By seeking inflation that averages 2 percent over time this will help ensure that longer-run inflation expectations do not drift down and remain well anchored at 2 percent.3 If we judge the effectiveness of FAIT based on trends in long-term inflation expectations, then the only reasonable conclusion is that it has been a massive success. By any measure, long-term inflation expectations were well below levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% target in fall 2020. Now, they are very close to target levels. This is true whether we look at market-based measures (Chart 9A), survey measures (Chart 9B), trend measures (Chart 9C) or a composite indicator of many different measures (Chart 9D). Chart 9AMarket-Based Inflation Expectations Chart 9BSurvey-Based Inflation Expectations Chart 9CTrend Measures Of Inflation ##br##Expectations Chart 9DThe CIE Index The Fed's New Index Of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE) The Verdict All told, it looks like the Fed has made good on its promises. It refrained from lifting rates as the unemployment rate fell and has only now moved toward tightening in response to extremely high inflation. Also, the re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations suggests that the Fed’s new FAIT framework is viewed as credible and is working as intended. Neutral Rate Expectations In 2022 Chart 10Neutral Rate Estimates There is one key issue for both Fed policy and bond markets that we have not yet discussed, and that’s the long-run neutral fed funds rate. This is the interest rate that, on average, will be consistent with the Fed’s price stability and maximum employment goals in the long run. As of today, the consensus among central bankers and investors is that the neutral rate is very low compared to history. There is also a widespread belief that it will remain low for the foreseeable future. For example, here is a sentence from the Fed’s Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy: The Committee judges that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with maximum employment and price stability over the longer run has declined relative to its historical average. Therefore, the federal funds rate is likely to be constrained by its effective lower bound more frequently than in the past. The top panel of Chart 10 shows that the Fed has revised its median estimate of the long-run neutral rate substantially lower since 2012, down from 4.3% to 2.5%. And it’s not just the Fed that has done so. The same downward revisions are seen in the Surveys of Market Participants and Primary Dealers (Chart 10, bottom 2 panels). Incidentally, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield – a market-derived proxy for the long-run neutral rate – is below even the survey estimates. This is a key reason for our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Why Does The Fed Believe That The Neutral Rate Is Low And Will Stay Low? Chart 11The Demographic Effect New York Fed President John Williams has cited three key reasons for the low neutral fed funds rate: demographics, lower productivity growth and a heightened demand for safe and liquid assets.4 Of those factors, Fed research has determined that demographics are particularly important. The trend of increasing life expectancy, specifically, has been shown to be an important factor pushing interest rates down as people increase their savings in anticipation of a longer retirement (Chart 11).5 Could The Fed Be Wrong? We aren’t as confident that the neutral rate will stay low. In fact, we think it’s possible that both Fed and investor estimates understate the current long-run neutral rate. Our own Bank Credit Analyst has observed that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield was very close to trend nominal GDP growth up until the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 12). Then, it dipped below as a protracted period of household deleveraging caused private sector credit demand to dry up. With household balance sheets no longer in disrepair, we are starting to see an increase in household debt, one that could eventually push bond yields back toward trend growth.6 It’s not just our own research that is starting to question the popular narrative of a low neutral fed funds rate. At the most recent Jackson Hole summit, Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi presented a paper that shows that rising income inequality is predominantly responsible for today’s low neutral rate (Chart 13), not the demographic effect previously identified by the Fed.7 Chart 13Rising Income Inequality ##br##Since 1980 Chart 12Household Deleveraging Kept Rates Low Post-2008 This research has important implications for the future evolution of the neutral rate. Unlike demographics, income inequality can be altered by changes in tax policy and by shifts in the power struggle between capital owners and workers. In this regard, our US Investment Strategy service has written several reports demonstrating the ongoing structural shift toward greater labor power.8 If this structural trend continues, it suggests that the long-run neutral rate may also rise. Trading The Neutral Rate While we suspect that the long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be higher than both the market and Fed anticipate, we don’t think it’s wise to trade on that view in 2022. The reason is that expectations of a low neutral fed funds rate are extremely well-entrenched. It will take a lot of contrary evidence to shift those expectations, evidence we probably won’t get next year. As noted above, survey estimates of the long-run neutral rate range roughly from 2.0% to 2.5%. Our sense is that those estimates will only be revised higher if the fed funds rate gets much closer to those levels, say at least above 1%, and the economic data suggest that further rate increases will be required. This is a story for 2023, not 2022. A recent paper documented some interesting facts about the relationship between monetary policy and market expectations.9  It observed that the entire decline in the 10-year Treasury yield since 1990 has occurred during 3-day windows around FOMC meetings (Chart 14). This is not what we would expect to see if the long-run neutral rate was determined by independent macroeconomic factors that are distinct from Fed interest rate decisions. Chart 14Fed Rate Decisions Drive Long-Maturity Bond Yields We find this research very compelling. It suggests that the market changes its neutral rate expectations in response to Fed interest rate moves. In our view, this strengthens our conviction that a series of rate hikes will eventually cause the market to push its neutral rate expectations higher, leading to a sell-off in long-maturity bonds. Bottom Line: We think it’s likely that consensus estimates of a 2.0% to 2.5% long-run neutral fed funds rate will turn out to be too low, but we don’t recommend trading on that view in 2022. The low neutral rate narrative is very well-entrenched, and it will only be questioned after several rate hikes have been delivered and their economic impact is assessed.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For our full set of recommendations please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Key Views 2022: US Fixed Income”, dated December 14, 2021. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-to-changes-in-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-qas.htm#7 4 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2018/wil181130#footnote3 5 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2017-27.pdf 6 For more details on this argument please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks”, dated March 31, 2021. 7 https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/8337/JH_paper_Sufi_3.pdf 8 Please see January 13, January 20 and February 3, 2020 US Investment Strategy Special Reports, “An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History”, “Where Strikes Come From And Who Wins Them” and “The Public-Approval Contest”. 9 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550593 Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns