Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Dear client, In addition to this week’s abbreviated report, we are also sending you a Special Report on currency hedging, authored by my colleague Xiaoli Tang. Xiaoli’s previous work mapped out a dynamic hedging strategy for developed market equity investors in various home currencies. In this report, she extends the work to emerging market exposure. I hope you will find the report insightful. Next week, in lieu of our weekly report on Friday, we will be sending you a joint Special Report on the UK on Tuesday, together with our Global Fixed Income colleagues. Kind regards, Chester Highlights The DXY index is up for the year, but further gains will be capped at 2-3% from current levels. Long yen positions are offside amid the dollar rally. This should wash out stale longs, and underpin the bull case. Lower the limit-sell on the gold/silver ratio to 68. We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN position amidst a broad-based selloff in EM currencies. We are reinitiating the trade this week. Feature Chart I-1The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The Dollar Has Been Strong In 2021 The DXY index has once again kissed off the 90 level and is gaining momentum in March. Year-to-date, the DXY index is up 1.1%. This performance has been particularly pronounced against other safe haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. GBP and AUD have fared rather well in this environment (Chart I-1). As the “anti-dollar,” the euro has also suffered.  Our technical indicators continue to warn that the dollar still has upside. Net speculative positions are at very depressed levels, consistent with many sentiment indicators that are bearish USD. However, this time around, any dollar rally could be capped at 2-3%, in sharp contrast to the bounce we witnessed in March 2020.  The Message From Dollar Technical Indicators Our dollar capitulation index has bounced from very oversold levels, and is now sitting above neutral territory (Chart I-2). The index comprises a standardized measure of sentiment, net speculative positioning and momentum. It is very rare that a drop in this index below the -1.5 level does not trigger a rebound in the dollar. This time around, the bounce has been rather muted. Chart I-2BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside BCA Dollar Capitulation Index Suggests Some Upside Part of the reason has been concentration around dollar short positions. Investors throughout most of the pandemic executed their bearish dollar bets through the euro, yen and the Swiss franc (countries that already had negative interest rates). Positioning on risk on currencies such as the Australian dollar and the Mexican peso were neutral. This also explains the underperformance of the yen, as the dollar rises. From a sizing standpoint, ever since the dollar peaked in March 2020, counter-trend moves have been in the order of 2-3%. We expect this time to be no different. What To Do About The Yen The yen has been one of our core holdings on three fundamental pillars: it is cheap, it tends to rise during dollar bear markets and the economy in Japan is more hostage to deflation than the US. This bodes well for real rates in Japan, relative to the US. Over the last month, our long yen position has been put offside. First, demand for safe havens has ebbed as US interest rates have gapped higher (Chart I-3, panel 1). King dollar has once again become the safe haven of choice. As Chart I-1 illustrates, low beta currencies such as the Swiss franc and yen, that tend to do relatively well when the dollar is rallying, have underperformed.  Yield curve control (YCC) in Japan is also negative for the yen as interest rates rise (panel 2). Economic momentum in Japan is also rolling over (panel 3). Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s mulling to extend the state of emergency in the Tokyo region could further cripple any Japanese economic recovery. Chart I-3A Healthy Reset In The Yen A Healthy Reset In The Yen A Healthy Reset In The Yen Chart I-4USD/JPY Support Should Hold USD/JPY Support Should Hold USD/JPY Support Should Hold For short-term investors, USD/JPY is very overbought and is approaching strong resistance (Chart I-4). In our view, a washing out of stale shorts would provide a healthy reset for the bear market to resume. Meanwhile, USD/JPY and the DXY change correlations during risk-off periods, where the yen appreciates versus the dollar.  Therefore, a market reset is also positive for the yen.     Housekeeping Chart I-5Remain Short AUD/MXN Remain Short AUD/MXN Remain Short AUD/MXN We were stopped out of our short AUD/MXN trade last week for a loss of 6.1%. We are reinitiating the trade this week. The case for the trade, made a month ago, remains intact. A short-term recovery in the US economy, relative to the rest of the world, argues for an AUD/MXN short. In fact, a divergence has occurred between the BRL/MXN and the AUD/MXN exchange rate (Chart I-5). Domestic factors have certainly tempered the Brazilian real, but the underperformance of metal prices relative to oil in recent months is also a factor. We expect some convergence to occur, with MXN appreciating much faster than the AUD.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have stepped up: Personal income rose by 10% in January, while personal spending rose by 2.4% month-on-month. The ISM report was stellar. The manufacturing PMI improved from 58.7 to 60.8 in February. Prices paid rose to 86. Factory orders were slightly above expectations at 2.6% month-on-month in January.   The DXY index rose by 165 bps this week.  The narrative of a counter-trend reversal in the DXY index isn playing out. As the story unfolds, it will be important to establish targets. Our bias is that the DXY stalls before 93-94 is reached.  Report Links: Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce - January 15, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area remain weak: Core CPI in the Eurozone came in at 1.1%, in line with expectations. The unemployment rate declined from 8.3% to 8.1% in January. January retail sales were weak at -6.4% year-on-year. The euro fell by 1.7%% against the US dollar this week. It will be almost impossible for the euro to rise in an environment where the dollar is in a broad-based decline. Given elevated sentiment on the euro, a healthy reset is necessary for the bull market to resume. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been marginally positive: The employment report was positive, with the unemployment rate dipping to 2.9% and an improvement in the jobs-to-applicants ratio in January. Consumer confidence in February is rebounding from very low levels. The Japanese yen fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The recovery in the Japanese economy is fragile, and tentative signs of a renewed lockdown will knock down confidence. In this transition phase, yen long positions could be hostage to losses. Longer-term, the yen is cheap and will benefit from a broad-based dollar decline. Report Links: On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been in line: Mortgage approvals rose 99K in January, in line with expectations. The construction PMI rose from 49.2 to 53.3 in February. Nationwide house prices are soaring, rising 6.9% in February on a year-on-year basis. The pound fell by 0.8% against the dollar this week. It is however the best performing currency this year. Our short EUR/GBP trade has benefited from faster vaccination in the UK (that could give way to a faster reopening of the economy) and a nice valuation starting point. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: Home lending remained in an uptrend. Owner-occupied loans increased by 11% in January, while investor loans increased by 9.4%. Terms of trade are soaring, rising 24% year-on-year in February. The current account surplus came in near a record A$14.5 billion in Q4. GDP grew by 3.1% QoQ in Q4. The Aussie fell by 1.8% his week. Terms of trade will continue being a tailwind for the AUD/USD. We also like the AUD/NZD cross, as a valuation and terms-of-trade bet. However, we expect that any positive surprises in the US will hurt AUD relative to the Americas. One way to play this is by shorting AUD/MXN. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of New Zealand this week: Terms of trade rose by 1.3% in Q4. CoreLogic home prices rose 14.5% in February. The New Zealand dollar fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. The kiwi ranks as the most unattractive currency in our FX framework. For one, it has catapulted itself to the most expensive currency in our PPP models. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada was positive: The Nanos confidence index rose from 58.2 to 59.4 in February. Annualized 4Q GDP came in at 9.6%, above expectations. Building permits rose 8.2% month-on-month in January. The Canadian dollar fell 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Oil prices remain very much in an uptrend, which is underpinning the loonie. Better US economic performance in the near term should also help the CAD. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data out of Switzerland have been improving: Swiss GDP rose by 0.3%  quarter-on-quarter in 4Q. The KOF leading indicator rose from 96.5 to 102.7 in February. The February manufacturing PMI rose from 59.4 to 61.3. Switzerland remains in deflation, with the core CPI that came in at -0.3% year-on-year in February. The Swiss franc fell by 2.6% against the US dollar this week. Safe -haven currencies continue to be laggards, as rates rise and gold falls to the wayside. This is bullish on  procyclical currencies, and negative the Swiss franc. We are long EUR/CHF on this basis, but short USD/JPY purely as portfolio insurance. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The data out of Norway has been robust: The unemployment rate fell from 4.4% to 4.3% The manufacturing PMI increased from 51.8 to 56.1 in February. The current account balance was robust in Q4. It should increase significantly in Q1 this year given the large trade balance in January. Being long the Norwegian krone is one of our high-conviction bets in the FX portfolio. The Norwegian krone fell by 1% against the US dollar this week, but outperformed the euro, amongst other currencies. The NOK ticks all the boxes of an attractive currency – cheap valuations, a liquidity discount, and primed to benefit from a global growth rebound. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Most Swedish data releases were in line with expectations: GDP came in at -0.2% quarter-on-quarter, below expectations. Retail sales rose 3.1% year-on-year, above expectations. The trade balance came in at a surplus of SEK 5.2 billion  in January. The manufacturing PMI remained elevated at 61.6 in February. The Swedish krona fell by 2.4% against the US dollar this week. Manufacturing data is improving in Sweden but the economy remains hostage to COVID-19, compared to Norway. That is weighing on the krona. That said, Sweden is a highly levered play on the global cycle. Therefore, once the pandemic is behind us, the SEK will outperform. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Rising Global Yields: The increased turbulence in global bond markets is part of the adjustment process to a more positive outlook for global economic growth. Rising real yields are now the main driver of nominal yield movements, with stable inflation expectations indicating that investors are not overly concerned about a sustained inflation overshoot. Duration: Central bankers will eventually be forced to shift to less dovish interest rate guidance to reflect the new reality of faster growth and increased inflation pressures, but this is likely to not occur until much later in 2021, starting with the Fed. Maintain a below-benchmark cyclical duration stance in global bond portfolios. UST Yields & Spreads: The selloff in US Treasuries has pushed US yields to levels that are starting to look a bit stretched relative to yields from other major developed economies like Germany and Japan. This is especially true on a volatility-adjusted basis. As a result, we are closing our tactical US-Germany spread widening trade in bond futures at a profit of 1.8%. Feature Chart of the WeekBond Yields Are Rising Because Of Growth Bond Yields Are Rising Because Of Growth Bond Yields Are Rising Because Of Growth The rapid surge in global bond yields seen so far in 2021 has led some commentators to declare that the dreaded “bond vigilantes” have returned to dole out punishment for overly stimulative fiscal and monetary policies (most notably in the US). The rapid pace of the bond selloff, with the 10-year US Treasury yield reaching 1.6% on an intraday basis last week, has raised fears that spiking yields could damage a fragile global economic recovery. This logic is backwards – it is surging growth expectations that are driving bond yields sustainably higher from deeply depressed levels. Global growth is projected to accelerate at a very rapid pace over the rest of this year and 2022. The combination of the Bloomberg consensus real GDP growth and inflation forecasts for the major developed economies suggest that nominal year-over-year GDP growth is expected to climb to 7.2% in the US, 8.4% in the UK and 6.4% in the euro area by year-end (Chart of the Week). Nominal growth in 2022 is expected to grow by another 5-7% across the same regions, suggesting a return to a slightly faster pace than prevailed during the pre-pandemic years of 2017-19 - even after a boom in 2021. Nominal longer-term global government bond yields, which had been priced for a pandemic-stricken economic backdrop, are now playing catch-up to the new reality of a post-pandemic, vaccinated world. Bond investors understand that the need for extreme monetary accommodation is ebbing, especially in the US where there will be an enormous fiscal impulse to growth in 2021 (and beyond). As a result, interest rate expectations are moving higher, fueling a repricing towards higher bond yields around the world. This process has more room to run. A Global Move Higher In Yields, For The Right Reasons Chart 2Reflationary Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Reflationary Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Reflationary Bear-Steepening Of Global Yield Curves The cyclical rise in developed market bond yields that began last summer was initially focused on longer-maturity yields boosted by rising inflation expectations (Chart 2). The very front-ends of bond yield curves – which are more sensitive to expectations of changes in central bank policy rates – have remained subdued. The upward pressure on global bond yields is starting to infect some shorter maturities, however. 5-year government bonds yields in the UK, Canada and Australia rose 44bps, 42bps and 35bps, respectively, during the month of February. The latter two represented a near doubling of the level of the 5-year yield. In the case of the UK, the surge in 5-year Gilt yields came from a starting point of negative yields at the end of January. Last week, the 5-year US Treasury yield jumped a massive 22bps on a single day due to a poorly received US Treasury auction. Year-to-date, longer-term global bond yields have been rising more through the real yield component than higher inflation expectations (Charts 3A & 3B). This is a change in the dynamics from the latter half of 2020 when inflation expectations were the dominant force pushing global yields higher. Chart 3AReal Yields Are Driving The Recent Bond Selloff … Real Yields Are Driving The Recent Bond Selloff... Real Yields Are Driving The Recent Bond Selloff... Chart 3B… Even In The Lower-Yielding Markets ...Even In The Lower-Yielding Markets ...Even In The Lower-Yielding Markets This shift in “leadership” of the global bond market selloff has been broad-based. 10-year real yields from inflation-linked bonds have surged higher in the US (+35bps year-to-date), UK (+40bps), Australia (+44bps) and Canada (+25bps). Real 10-year yields have even inched up in France (+9bps), despite euro area growth suffering because of COVID-19 lockdowns. This coordinated rise in real bond yields comes on the heels of a sharp improvement in overall global economic momentum and improving expectations for future growth. Manufacturing PMIs, a reliable leading indicator of real yields in the developed markets, began a cyclical improvement in the middle of last year and, right on cue, global bond yields bottomed out toward the end of 2020 (Chart 4). The link between that strong growth momentum and real bond yields comes from expected changes in central bank policies. Our Central Bank Monitors for the US, euro area, UK, Japan, Canada and Australia – designed to measure cyclical pressures on monetary policy - have all moved significantly higher since mid-2020 (Chart 5). This suggests a diminished need for additional monetary stimulus because of rebounding economic growth and intensifying inflation pressures. The Monitors have climbed to above pre-pandemic levels in the US and Australia. Chart 4Real Yields Starting To Catch Up To Solid Growth Real Yields Starting To Catch Up To Solid Growth Real Yields Starting To Catch Up To Solid Growth Chart 5Markets Starting To Discount Rate Hikes In 2023 Markets Starting To Discount Rate Hikes In 2023 Markets Starting To Discount Rate Hikes In 2023 Interest rate markets are responding to this cyclical pressure to tighten monetary policies by repricing the expected timing and pace of the next rate hiking cycle. Our 24-month discounters, which derive the amount of interest rate changes priced into overnight index swap (OIS) curves up to two years in the future, are now pricing in higher policy rates in the US (+40bps), the UK (+32bps), Australia (+36bps) and Canada (a whopping +82bps) by the first quarter of 2023. This repricing of interest rate expectations does conflict with current central bank forward guidance, to varying degrees. For example, the Fed continues to signal that there will not be any rate hikes until at least the end of 2023. Policymakers will not be overly concerned about higher government bond yields and shifting interest rate expectations, however, if there is limited spillover into broader financial market performance. In the US, the latest increase in real Treasury yields to date has had minimal impact on US equity market valuations or corporate bond yields (Chart 6A), suggesting no tightening of financial conditions that could impact future US economic growth. A similar situation is playing out in Europe, where higher longer-term real yields have had little impact on equity market valuations or the borrowing rates that the ECB is most concerned about, like Italian BTP yields (Chart 6B). Chart 6ANo Tightening Of Financial Conditions In The US... No Tightening Of Financial Conditions In The US... No Tightening Of Financial Conditions In The US... Chart 6B...Or Europe ...Or Europe ...Or Europe Currency valuations are a more important indicator of financial conditions for other central banks. For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has been explicit that its current policies – near-zero policy rates, yield curve control to anchor the level of 3-year bond yields and quantitative easing (QE) to moderate the level of longer-term yields – are intended to not only keep borrowing costs low but also dampen the value of the Australian dollar. At the moment, the US dollar is being pulled in different directions by the typical fundamental drivers. Real rate differentials between the US and other major developed economies remain unattractive for the greenback, even with the latest rise in US real yields (Chart 7). At the same time, growth differentials between the US and the other major economies are turning more USD-positive. For now, rate differentials are the more dominant factor for the US dollar and will remain so until the Fed begins to shift to a less dovish policy stance – an outcome that we do not expect until much later this year when the Fed will begin to prepare the market for a tapering of asset purchases in 2022. A sustainable bottoming of the US dollar, fueled by a shift to a less accommodative Fed, will also likely mark the end of the rising trend for global inflation expectations, given the links between the dollar, commodity prices and inflation breakevens (bottom panel). Central banks outside the US will continue to resist any unwelcome appreciation of their own currencies versus the US dollar. That means doing more QE when bond yields rise too quickly, as the RBA did this week and the ECB has threatened to do in recent comments from senior policymakers (Chart 8). Increasing the size of asset purchases is unlikely to sustainably drive non-US bond yields lower, however, in an environment of improving global growth that is causing investors to reassess the future path of interest rates. All more QE can hope to do at this point in the global business cycle is limit how fast bond yields can increase. Chart 7The USD Remains The Critical Reflationary Variable The USD Remains The Critical Reflationary Variable The USD Remains The Critical Reflationary Variable Chart 8More QE Is Less Effective At Capping Bond Yields More QE Is Less Effective At Capping Bond Yields More QE Is Less Effective At Capping Bond Yields   Chart 9Markets With A Lower Yield Beta To USTs Are Outperforming Markets With A Lower Yield Beta To USTs Are Outperforming Markets With A Lower Yield Beta To USTs Are Outperforming From an investment strategy perspective, the current growth-fueled move higher in global real bond yields does not change any of our suggested tilts. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark overall duration stance within global bond portfolios. Within our recommended country allocation among developed market government bonds, we continue to prefer a large underweight to US Treasuries and overweights to markets that are less susceptible to changes in US Treasury yields like Germany, France, Japan and the UK (Chart 9). We also continue to recommend only neutral allocations to Canadian and Australian government bonds (with below-benchmark duration exposure within those allocations), although we are on “downgrade alert” for both given their status as higher-beta bond markets with central banks more likely follow the Fed down a less dovish path later this year. Bottom Line: Rising real yields are now the main driver of nominal yield movements, with stable inflation expectations indicating that investors are not overly concerned about a sustained inflation overshoot. Central bankers will eventually be forced to shift to less dovish interest rate guidance to reflect the new reality of faster growth and increased inflation pressures, but this is likely to not occur until much later in 2021, starting with the Fed. Maintain a below-benchmark cyclical duration stance in global bond portfolios, with a large underweight allocation to US Treasuries. The UST-Bund Spread Widening Looks Stretched Chart 10Yield Chasing Has Been A Losing Strategy In 2021 Yield Chasing Has Been A Losing Strategy In 2021 Yield Chasing Has Been A Losing Strategy In 2021 Last August, we published a report discussing how “yield chasing” – a strategy of consistently favoring the highest yielding government bond markets – had become the default strategy for bond investors during the early months of the pandemic.1 We concluded that yield chasing would be a successful strategy for only as long as central banks stuck to their promises to maintain very loose monetary policy for the next few years. Investors would be forced to chase scarce yields in that environment, while worrying less about cyclical economic and inflation factors that could push up bond yields. Yield chasing has performed quite poorly so far in 2021. A basket of higher-yielding markets like the US, Canada and Australia has underperformed a basket of low-yielders like Germany, France and Japan by -1.4 percentage points (Chart 10). Obviously, such a carry-driven strategy would be expected to perform poorly during an environment of rising bond volatility as is currently the case. Markets that have been offering relatively enticing yields, like the US or Australia (Table 1), are actually generating the largest total return losses. Those higher-yielders have suffered more aggressive repricing of interest rate expectations, as discussed in the previous section of this report, leading to losses from duration that are dwarfing the higher yields. This is especially true in the US, where there remains the greater scope for an upward repricing of interest rate and inflation expectations. Table 1Government Bond Yields: Unhedged & Hedged Into USD Are Central Banks Losing Control Of Bond Yields? No. Are Central Banks Losing Control Of Bond Yields? No. This suggests that investors must be cautious on determining when to consider increasing exposure to higher yielders like the US, even after Treasury yields have increased substantially. One way to evaluate that is to look at the spreads between US Treasuries and low yielders like Germany and Japan, relative to US bond volatility. In Chart 11, we show the spread of 10-year US Treasuries to 10-year German Bunds. To facilitate a fair comparison between the two, we hedge the Treasury yield into euros while adjusting the spread for duration difference between the two bonds. The currency-hedged and duration-matched Treasury-Bund spread is shown in the middle panel of the chart. In the bottom panel, we adjust that spread for US interest rate volatility by dividing the spread by the level of the MOVE index of US Treasury option volatility. On an unadjusted basis, the 10-year yield gap now sits at 175bps, +70bps higher than the lows seen in August 2020. That spread is narrower on a currency hedged basis, with the 10-year US Treasury yield hedged into euros +73ps higher than the 10-year German bund yield. Two conclusions stand out from the chart: The currency-hedged and duration-matched spread is still well below the prior peaks dating back to 2000; The volatility-adjusted spread is already one standard deviation above the mean value since 2000. In other words, there is scope for US Treasuries yields to continue rising relative to German Bund yields based on levels reached in past cycles. Yet at the same time, the spread provides a reasonable level of compensation compared to the riskiness (volatility) of Treasuries, also based on past cycles. We show the same chart for the spread between 10-year US Treasuries and 10-year Japanese government bonds (JGBs) in Chart 12. In this case, there is also scope for additional spread widening although the volatility-adjusted spread is still not as attractive as at previous peaks since 2000. Chart 11UST-Bund Spread Looking Stretched Vs UST Vol UST-Bund Spread Looking Stretched Vs UST Vol UST-Bund Spread Looking Stretched Vs UST Vol Chart 12UST-JGB Spread Getting Stretched Vs UST Vol UST-JGB Spread Getting Stretched Vs UST Vol UST-JGB Spread Getting Stretched Vs UST Vol The message from the volatility-adjusted Treasury-Bund spread lines up with that of the momentum measures of the unadjusted spread. The latter is historically stretched relative to its 200-day moving average, while the change in the spread over the past six months has been as rapid as any of the moves seen since the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 13). Adding it all up, positioning for additional widening of the Treasury-Bund spread is a much poorer bet from a risk versus reward perspective than it was even a few months ago. On a fundamental medium-term basis, however, there is still room for the Treasury-Bund spread to widen further. Relative inflation and unemployment (spare capacity) trends both argue for relatively higher US bond yields (Chart 14). In addition, the Fed is almost certainly going to start tightening monetary policy well before the ECB, thus policy rate differentials will underpin a wider bond spread – although that is already largely discounted in the spread on a forward basis (top panel). Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Momentum Looks Stretched UST-Bund Spread Momentum Looks Stretched UST-Bund Spread Momentum Looks Stretched Chart 14Fundamentals Still Support A Wider UST-Bund Spread Fundamentals Still Support A Wider UST-Bund Spread Fundamentals Still Support A Wider UST-Bund Spread Chart 15Stay Underweight US Vs. Germany On A Strategic Basis Stay Underweight US Vs. Germany On A Strategic Basis Stay Underweight US Vs. Germany On A Strategic Basis Our fundamental fair value model of the 10-year Treasury-Bund spread shows that the spread is still cheap relative to fair value, which is rising (Chart 15). This suggests more medium-term upside in the spread, perhaps even by more than currently priced into the forwards over the next year. Based on this analysis, we see a case for maintaining a core strategic (6-12 month holding period) underweight position for the US versus Germany in our recommended country allocation within our model bond portfolio. At the same time, with the spread looking a bit stretched on some of the momentum and volatility-adjusted measures, we are taking profits on our tactical (0-6 month holding period) 10-year Treasury-Bund spread widening trade using bond futures, realizing a 1.8% return (see the Tactical Overlay table on page 18). Bottom Line: The selloff in US Treasuries has pushed US yields to levels that are starting to look a bit stretched relative to yields from other major developed economies like Germany and Japan. This is especially true on a volatility-adjusted basis. As a result, we are taking profits on our tactical US-Germany spread widening trade. However, we are maintaining our strategic overweight for Germany versus the US in our model bond portfolio, as fundamentals argue for a wider Treasury-Bund spread on a cyclical and strategic basis.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Are Central Banks Losing Control Of Bond Yields? No. Are Central Banks Losing Control Of Bond Yields? No. Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1Back To Fair Value Back To Fair Value Back To Fair Value February was a terrible month for the bond market. In fact, the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index returned -1.8%, its worst month since November 2016. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield rose 37 bps. At 2.19%, it is now fairly valued for the first time since 2019, at least according to survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rates (Chart 1). We outlined a checklist for increasing portfolio duration in our Webcast two weeks ago. So far, only two of the five items on our list have been checked. In particular, dollar sentiment and cyclical economic indicators continue to point toward higher yields, even though the market is now priced for a rate hike cycle that is slightly more hawkish than the Fed’s median forecast from December. We anxiously await this month’s revisions to the Fed’s interest rate forecasts. If the Fed’s forecasts remain unchanged from December, then we may get an opportunity to add some duration back into our recommended portfolio. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 65 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +68 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. Though Treasury yields have risen in recent weeks, this does not yet pose a risk for credit spreads. The 5-year/ 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate remains below 2%. We won’t be concerned about restrictive monetary policy pushing credit spreads wider until it reaches a range of 2.3% to 2.5%. Despite the positive macro backdrop, investment grade corporate valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is down to its 2nd percentile (Chart 2). This means that the breakeven spread has only been tighter 2% of the time since 1995. The same measure shows that Baa-rated bonds have only been more expensive 3% of the time (panel 3). We don’t anticipate material underperformance versus Treasuries, but we see better value outside of the investment grade corporate space.1 Specifically, we advise investors to favor tax-exempt municipal bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. We also prefer USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Finally, the supportive macro environment means we are comfortable adding credit risk to a portfolio. With that in mind, we encourage investors to pick up the additional spread offered by high-yield corporates. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Stay Bearish On Bonds Stay Bearish On Bonds Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Stay Bearish On Bonds Stay Bearish On Bonds High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 115 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +178 bps. Ba-rated credits outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 111 bps on the month, besting B-rated bonds which outperformed by only 104 bps. The Caa-rated credit tier delivered 138 bps of outperformance versus duration-matched Treasuries. We view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report that the additional spread earned from moving down in quality below Ba is merely in line with historical averages.2 Assuming a 25% recovery rate on defaulted debt and a minimum required risk premium of 150 bps, we calculate that the junk index is priced for a default rate of 2.3% for the next 12 months (panel 3). This represents a steep drop from the 8.3% default rate observed during the most recent 12-month period. However, only 2 defaults occurred in January, down from a peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, have also fallen dramatically (bottom panel). Overall, we see room for spread compression across all junk credit tiers in 2021 but believe that Ba-rated bonds offer the best opportunity in risk-adjusted terms. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 26 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -2 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries widened 6 bps in February, but it remains low relative to the recent pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 1 bp on the month to 24 bps. This is considerably below the 57 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds and the 42 bps offered by Agency CMBS. It is only slightly above the 22 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. The plummeting primary mortgage spread was a key reason for the elevated refi activity seen during the past year. However, the spread has now recovered back to more typical levels (bottom panel). The implication is that further increases in Treasury yields will likely be matched by higher mortgage rates. This means that mortgage refinancings are likely close to a peak. A drop in refi activity would be a positive development for MBS returns, but we aren’t yet ready to turn bullish on the sector. First, relative OAS valuation favors Aa-rated corporates and Agency CMBS over MBS. Second, the gap between the nominal MBS spread and the MBA Refinance Index remains wide (panel 2) meaning that we could still see spreads adjust higher. Last year’s spike in the mortgage delinquency rate is alarming (panel 4), but it will have little impact on MBS returns. The increase was driven by household take-up of forbearance granted by the federal government. Our US Investment Strategy service has shown that a considerable majority of households will remain current on their loans once the forbearance period ends, causing the delinquency rate to fall back down.3  Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +21 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 95 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -116 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 31 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +25 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 63 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +203 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 1 bp, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +16 bps. Supranationals underperformed by 2 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +5 bps. We recently took a detailed look at valuation for USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereigns.4 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage versus US corporates for all credit tiers except Ba. We recommend that investors take advantage of this spread pick-up by favoring investment grade EM Sovereigns over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Russia and Colombia. We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space. Ba-rated high-yield US corporates offer a spread advantage over EM Sovereigns and the extra spread available in B-rated and lower EMs comes from distressed credits in Turkey and Argentina. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +102 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads have tightened dramatically during the past few months and Aaa-rated Munis now look expensive compared to Treasuries, with the exception of the short-end of the curve (Chart 6). That said, if we match the duration and credit rating between the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal bond indexes and the US Credit index, we find that both General Obligation (GO) and Revenue Munis appear attractive compared to US investment grade Credit. Both GO and Revenue Munis offer a before-tax spread pick-up relative to US Credit for maturities above 12 years (bottom panel), the same goes for Revenue bonds in the 8-12 year maturity bucket (panel 3). Revenue bonds in the 6-8 year maturity bucket offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 0.3%. GO bonds in the 8-12 year and 6-8 year maturity buckets offer breakeven effective tax rates of 1% and 10%, respectively. All in all, municipal bond value has deteriorated markedly in recent months and we downgraded our recommended allocation from “maximum overweight” to “overweight” in January. However, investors should still prefer municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields moved up dramatically in February, with the curve steepening out to the 7-year maturity point and flattening thereafter. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 30 bps on the month to reach 130 bps. The 5/30 slope, meanwhile, held steady at 142 bps. Slopes across the entire yield curve traded directionally with yields for the bulk of February. That is, until last Thursday when a surge in bond yields occurred alongside flattening beyond the 5-year maturity point. As a result, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread spiked (Chart 7), moving into positive territory for the first time in a while (panel 4). This curve behavior raises an interesting question. Was last week’s sharp underperformance in the belly a one-off move driven by convexity selling and other technical factors, as many have suggested?5 Or, are we now close enough to a potential Fed liftoff date that we should expect some segments of the yield curve to flatten on days when yields rise? We will be watching the correlations between different yield curve segments and the overall level of yields closely during the next few weeks, but as of today, we think it’s premature to declare that the 5/10 slope has transitioned into a regime where it flattens on days when yields move higher. That being the case, we expect further increases in bond yields to coincide with a falling 2/5/10 butterfly spread, and we retain our recommended position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 39 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +183 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 2 bps on the month to hit 2.17%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 15 bps in February to reach 1.91%. February’s TIPS outperformance was concentrated at the front-end of the curve, as investors started to price-in the possibility of higher inflation during the next year or two that eventually subsides. It’s interesting to note that, despite last month’s surge in bond yields, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell, moving further away from the Fed’s 2.3% to 2.5% target range in the process (Chart 8). The Fed will continue to strive for an accommodative policy stance at least until this target is met. Last month’s price action caused our recommended positions in inflation curve flatteners and real yield curve steepeners to perform very well, but we think further gains are possible in the coming months. The 2/10 CPI swap slope has only just dipped into negative territory (panel 4). With the Fed officially targeting a temporary overshoot of its 2% inflation target, this slope should remain inverted for some time yet. With the Fed also continuing to exert more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, short-maturity real yields will continue to come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +20 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 2 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 9 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +58 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed last April. This excess savings has still not been spent, and now another round of checks is pushing the savings rate higher again (Chart 9). The large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is very high, with many households using their windfall to pay down debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and take advantage of strong collateral performance by moving down in credit quality. The Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 does not alter our recommendation. Spreads are already well below the borrowing cost that was offered by TALF, and these tight spread levels are justified by strong household balance sheets. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +87 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 5 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +37 bps. Meanwhile, non-Aaa CMBS outperformed by 75 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +262 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus won’t be negatively impacted. Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +39 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 3 bps on the month to reach 42 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered back to their pre-COVID lows, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. This is especially true when you consider the Fed’s continued pledge to purchase as much Agency CMBS as “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of February 26TH, 2021) Stay Bearish On Bonds Stay Bearish On Bonds Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of February 26TH, 2021) Stay Bearish On Bonds Stay Bearish On Bonds Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 39 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 39 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Stay Bearish On Bonds Stay Bearish On Bonds Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of February 26th, 2021) Stay Bearish On Bonds Stay Bearish On Bonds Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For a look at alternatives to investment grade corporates please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Big Bank Beige Book, January 2021”, dated January 25, 2021, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/convexity-hedging-haunts-markets-already-reeling-from-bond-rout?sref=Ij5V3tFi Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Dear Client, In addition to this week’s abbreviated report, we are sending you a Special Report on Bitcoin. I don’t recommend you buy it. Best regards, Peter Berezin Highlights Real government bond yields have increased in recent weeks, which could put further downward pressure on equity prices in the near term. Nevertheless, we continue to advocate overweighting equities over a 12-month horizon. Historically, rising real yields have been most toxic for stocks when yields have increased in response to hawkish central bank rhetoric. This is manifestly not the case today. The Fed’s accommodative stance should limit any near-term upward pressure on the US dollar. Investors should favor cyclical and value-oriented stocks over defensive and growth-geared plays. Higher Real Yields: A Near-Term Risk For Stocks Chart 1Government Bond Yields Have Increased Since Bottoming Last Year Government Bond Yields Have Increased Since Bottoming Last Year Government Bond Yields Have Increased Since Bottoming Last Year Bond yields have jumped in recent weeks. After bottoming at 0.52% in August, the US 10-year Treasury yield has climbed to 1.54%, up from 0.93% at the beginning of the year. Government bond yields in the other major economies have also risen (Chart 1). While inflation expectations have bounced, the most recent increase in yields has been concentrated in the real component of bond yields (Chart 2). Optimism about a vaccine-led global growth recovery, reinforced by continued fiscal stimulus – especially in the US – has prompted investors to move forward their expectations of how soon and how high policy rates will rise (Chart 3). Chart 2AThe Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (I) The Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (I) The Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (I) Chart 2BThe Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (II) The Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (II) The Real Component Has Fueled The Most Recent Rise In Bond Yields (II) How menacing is the increase in bond yields to stock market investors? Chart 4 shows that there has been a close correlation between real yields and the forward P/E ratio at which the S&P 500 trades. The 5-year/5-year forward real yield, in particular, has moved up sharply, which could put further downward pressure on stocks in the near term. Chart 3Path Of Expected Policy Rates Being Revised Upwards Path Of Expected Policy Rates Being Revised Upwards Path Of Expected Policy Rates Being Revised Upwards Chart 4Rise In Real Rates Is A Headwind For Equity Valuations Rise In Real Rates Is A Headwind For Equity Valuations Rise In Real Rates Is A Headwind For Equity Valuations Nevertheless, we continue to advocate overweighting equities over a 12-month horizon. As we pointed out two weeks ago, rising real yields have historically been most toxic for stocks when yields have increased in response to hawkish central bank rhetoric. This is manifestly not the case today. In his testimony to Congress this week, Jay Powell downplayed inflation risks, stressing that the US economy was “a long way” from the Fed’s goals. He pledged to tread “carefully and patiently” and give “a lot of advance warning” before beginning the process of normalizing monetary policy. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to stabilize in the 1.6%-to-1.7% range, still well below the level that would threaten the health of the economy. Favor Cyclical And Value-Oriented Stocks In  A Weaker Dollar Environment The Fed’s accommodative stance should limit any near-term upward pressure on the US dollar. Whereas stocks are most sensitive to absolute changes in long-term real bond yields, the dollar is more sensitive to changes in short-term real rate differentials with US trading partners (Chart 5). Since the Fed is unlikely to tighten monetary policy anytime soon, US short-term real rates could fall further as inflation rises.  Chart 5The Dollar Is Sensitive To Changes In Short-Term Real Rate Differentials The Dollar Is Sensitive To Changes In Short-Term Real Rate Differentials The Dollar Is Sensitive To Changes In Short-Term Real Rate Differentials Chart 6Cyclical Stocks Tend To Benefit The Most From Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker Dollar Cyclical Stocks Tend To Benefit The Most From Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker Dollar Cyclical Stocks Tend To Benefit The Most From Stronger Global Growth And A Weaker Dollar   Cyclical stocks, which are overrepresented outside the US, tend to benefit the most from strengthening global growth and a weakening dollar (Chart 6). Value stocks also generally do well in a weak dollar-strong growth environment (Chart 7). Moreover, bank shares – which are concentrated in value indices – typically outperform when long-term bond yields are rising (Chart 8). Chart 7AA Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (I) A Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (I) A Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (I) Chart 7BA Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (II) A Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (II) A Weaker US Dollar And Stronger Global Growth Should Help Value Stocks (II)     Chart 8Bank Shares Typically Excel When Long-Term Bond Yields Are Rising Bank Shares Typically Excel When Long-Term Bond Yields Are Rising Bank Shares Typically Excel When Long-Term Bond Yields Are Rising In contrast, as relatively long-duration assets, growth stocks often struggle when bond yields go up. The same is true for more speculative plays such as cryptocurrencies. In this week’s Special Report, we discuss the fate of Bitcoin, arguing that investors should resist buying it.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com     Global Investment Strategy View Matrix When Good News Is Bad News When Good News Is Bad News Special Trade Recommendations When Good News Is Bad News When Good News Is Bad News Current MacroQuant Model Scores When Good News Is Bad News When Good News Is Bad News

Highlights US Treasuries: The uptrend in US Treasury yields has more room to run. However, the primary driver is starting to shift from increased inflation expectations to higher real yields amid greater confidence on the cyclical US economic outlook. Fed Outlook: It is still too soon to expect the Fed to begin signaling a move to turn less accommodative. However, rising realized US inflation amid dwindling spare economic capacity will make the Fed more nervous about its ultra-dovish policy stance in the second half of 2021. This will trigger a repricing of the future path of US interest rates embedded in the Treasury curve, but a Taper Tantrum repeat will be avoided. US Duration: Maintain below-benchmark US duration exposure, with the 10-year Treasury yield likely to soon test the 1.5% level. Feature Chart 1A Cyclical Rise In Global Bond Yields A Cyclical Rise In Global Bond Yields A Cyclical Rise In Global Bond Yields The selloff in global government bond markets that began in the final few months of 2020 has gained momentum over the past few weeks. The benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield now sits at 1.37%, up 45bps so far in 2021, while the 30-year Treasury yield is at a six-year high of 2.22%. Yields are on the move in other countries, as well, with longer-maturity yields moving higher in the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand – even Germany, where the 30yr is now back in positive yield territory at 0.20%, a 34bp increase over the past month alone. The main reason for this move higher in yields can be summed up in one word: “optimism”. Economic growth expectations are improving according to investor surveys like the global ZEW, which is a reliable leading indicator of global bond yields (Chart 1). Falling global COVID-19 case numbers with rising vaccination rates, combined with very large US fiscal stimulus measures proposed by the Biden administration, have given investors hope that a return to some form of pre-pandemic economic normalcy can be achieved later this year. That means faster global growth and a risk of higher inflation, both of which must be reflected in higher bond yields. With the 10-year US Treasury yield now already in the middle of our 2021 year-end target range of 1.25-1.5%, and the macro backdrop remaining bond-bearish, we think it is timely to discuss the possibility that our yield target is too conservative Good Cyclical News Is Bad News For Treasuries The more recent move higher in US Treasury yields is notable because it has not been all about higher inflation breakevens, as has been the case since yields bottomed in mid-2020; real yields are finally starting to inch higher. The 30-year TIPS yield now sits in positive territory at +0.09%, ending a period of negative real yields dating back to the pandemic-induced market shock of last spring (Chart 2). Real yields across the rest of the TIPS curve are also starting to stir, even at the 2-year point, yet remain negative. Thus, the price action has supported one of US Bond Strategy’s Key Views for 2021 that the real yield curve will steepen.1 This uptick in US real yields has occurred alongside a string of positive developments on the US economy, suggesting that improved growth prospects – and what that means for future US inflation and Fed policy - are the key driver. Improving US domestic demand US economic data is not only showing resilience but gaining positive momentum. The preliminary US Markit composite PMI (combining both manufacturing and services industries) for February rose to the highest level in six years (Chart 3). Retail sales in January rose by an eye-popping 5.3% versus the month prior, due in no small part to the impact of government stimulus checks issued in the December pandemic relief package. The Conference Board measure of consumer confidence also picked up in January. The improving trend in US data so far in 2021 is pointing to some potentially big GDP numbers – the New York Fed’s “Nowcast” is calling for Q1 real GDP growth of 8.3%. Chart 2US Real Yields Starting Are Stirring US Real Yields Starting Are Stirring US Real Yields Starting Are Stirring Chart 3US Growing Faster Than Lockdown-Stricken Europe US Growing Faster Than Lockdown-Stricken Europe US Growing Faster Than Lockdown-Stricken Europe Vaccine rollout success After a sloppy start to the COVID-19 vaccination program in the US, the numbers are starting to improve with 19% of the US population having received at least one dose (Chart 4). Numbers of new cases and hospitalizations due to the virus have been collapsing as well, a sign that new lockdowns can be avoided, particularly in the larger US coastal cities. The vaccination numbers are even higher in the UK, where Prime Minister Boris Johnson this week revealed an ambitious plan to fully reopen the UK economy by June. While the pace of inoculation has been far slower within the euro area and other developed countries like Canada, developments in the US and UK are a hopeful sign that the vaccines can help free the world economy from the shackles of COVID-19. Chart 4The US & UK Leading The Way On The Vaccine Rollout Optimism Reigns Supreme Optimism Reigns Supreme Even more fiscal stimulus Our US political strategists expect the Biden Administration’s $1.9 trillion pandemic relief package (the “American Rescue Plan”) to be passed by the US Senate in mid-March via a simple majority through a reconciliation bill.2 A second bill is likely to be passed this autumn or next spring with a much larger number, potentially up to $8 trillion worth of spending on infrastructure, health care, child care and green projects over the next ten years (Chart 5). These are big numbers for a $21 trillion US economy that will increasingly need less stimulus as lockdowns ease. Chart 5Biden’s Agenda AFTER The American Rescue Plan Optimism Reigns Supreme Optimism Reigns Supreme Chart 6Welcome Back, Inflation? Welcome Back, Inflation? Welcome Back, Inflation? Chart 7Price Pressures From US Manufacturing Bottlenecks Price Pressures From US Manufacturing Bottlenecks Price Pressures From US Manufacturing Bottlenecks The combined impact of fiscal stimulus, accommodative monetary policy, easy financial conditions and fewer pandemic related economic restrictions has the potential to boost US economic growth quite sharply this year. If US GDP growth follows the Bloomberg consensus forecasts, the US output gap will be fully closed by Q1/2022 (Chart 6).That would be a much faster elimination of the spare capacity created by the 2020 recession compared to the post-2009 experience, raising the risk of upside inflation surprises later this year and in 2022. Signs of growing inflation pressures will make many FOMC members increasingly uncomfortable, even under the Fed’s new Average Inflation Targeting strategy where inflation overshoots will be more tolerated. Already, there are signs of sharply increased price pressures in the US economy stemming from factory bottlenecks (Chart 7). US manufacturers have had to deal with pandemic-induced disruptions to supply chains, in addition to the unexpectedly fast recovery of US consumer demand from last year’s recession that left companies short of inventory.3 The ISM Manufacturing Prices Paid index hit a 10-year high in January, fueled by surging commodity prices, which is already showing up in some inflation data. The US Producer Price Index for finished goods jumped 1.3% in January – the largest monthly surge since 2009 – boosting the annual inflation rate to 1.7% from 0.8% the prior month. Chart 8A Boost To US Inflation Coming Soon From Base Effects A Boost To US Inflation Coming Soon From Base Effects A Boost To US Inflation Coming Soon From Base Effects Chart 9Additional Upside US Inflation Risks Additional Upside US Inflation Risks Additional Upside US Inflation Risks Chart 10US Shelter Inflation Set To Bottom Out US Shelter Inflation Set To Bottom Out US Shelter Inflation Set To Bottom Out A pickup in US annual inflation rates over the next few months was already essentially a done deal because of base effect comparisons versus the collapse in inflation during the 2020 COVID-19 recession (Chart 8). Additional inflation pressures stemming from factory bottlenecks could provide an additional lift to realized inflation rates. When looking at the main components of the US inflation data, there is scope for a broad-based pickup that goes beyond simple base effect moves. Core Goods CPI inflation is now rising at a 1.7% year-over-year rate, the highest since 2012, with more to come based on the acceleration of growth in US non-oil import prices (Chart 9). Core Services CPI inflation has plunged during the pandemic and is now growing at a 0.5% annual rate. As the US economy reopens from pandemic restrictions, services inflation should begin to recover and add to the rising trend of goods inflation. This will especially be true if the Shelter component of US inflation also begins to recover in response to a tightening demand/supply balance for US housing (Chart 10). Bottom Line: US Treasury yields are rising in response to positive upward momentum in US economic growth, the likelihood of some pickup in inflation over the next 6-12 months and, most importantly, shifting expectations that the Fed will turn less dovish later this year. Evaluating The Fed’s Next Moves Fed officials have continued to signal that they are not yet ready to consider any change to monetary policy settings or forward guidance on future rate moves. In his semi-annual testimony before US Congress this week, Fed Chair Jerome Powell reiterated that the pace of the Fed’s asset purchases would only begin to slow once “substantial progress” has been made towards the Fed’s inflation and unemployment objectives. Powell also stuck to his previous messaging that the Fed would “continue to clearly communicate our assessment of progress toward our goals well in advance of any change in the pace of purchases”.4 According to the New York Fed’s Primary Dealer and Market Participant surveys for January, however, the Fed is not expected to stay silent on the topic of tapering for much longer. According to the surveys, the Fed is expected to begin tapering its purchases of Treasuries and Agency MBS in the first quarter of 2022 (Chart 11). A full tapering to zero (net of rollovers of maturing debt) is expected by the first quarter of 2023. Clearly, bond traders and asset managers believe that US growth and inflation dynamics will both improve over the course of this year such that the Fed will have little choice but to begin the signaling of tapering sometime before the end of 2021. Chart 11Fed Surveys Expect A Full QE Tapering In 2022 Optimism Reigns Supreme Optimism Reigns Supreme The Fed has been a bit more transparent on the conditions that must be in place before rate hikes would begin. Labor market conditions must be consistent with full employment, while headline PCE inflation must reach at least 2% and be “on track” to moderately exceed that target for some time. On that front, markets believe these conditions will all be met by early 2023, based on pricing in the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve. The first 25bp rate hike is now priced to occur in February 2023 (Chart 12). This is a big shift from the start of the year, when Fed “liftoff” was expected to occur in October 2023. Thus, in a span of just six weeks, interest rate markets have pulled forward the timing of the first Fed rate hike by eight months. Liftoff would occur almost immediately after the Fed was done fully tapering asset purchases, based on the timetable laid out in the New York Fed surveys, although Fed officials have noted that rate hikes could begin before tapering is complete. Chart 12Pulling Forward The Timing Of Future Fed Rate Hikes Pulling Forward The Timing Of Future Fed Rate Hikes Pulling Forward The Timing Of Future Fed Rate Hikes In our view, the timetable laid out in the New York Fed surveys and in the US OIS curve is not only plausible but probable. If the US economy does indeed print the 4-5% real GDP consensus growth forecasts during the second half of this year, with realized inflation approaching 2% as outlined above, then it will be very difficult for the Fed to justify the need to maintain the current pace of asset purchases. The Fed will want to avoid another 2013 Taper Tantrum by signaling less QE well in advance, to avoid triggering a spike in Treasury yields that could upset equity and credit markets or cause an unwelcome appreciation of the US dollar. However, the New York Fed surveys indicate that the bond market is well prepared for a 2022 taper, so the Fed only has to meet those expectations to prevent an unruly move in the Treasury market. That means the Fed will likely signal tapering toward the end of this year. Chart 13Markets Expect A Negative Real Fed Funds Rate Optimism Reigns Supreme Optimism Reigns Supreme The Fed can maintain caution on signaling the timing of the first rate hike once tapering begins, based on how rapidly the US unemployment rate falls towards the Fed’s estimate of full employment. The median projection from the FOMC’s latest Summary of Economic Projections is for the US unemployment rate to fall to 4.2% in 2022 and 3.7% in 2023, compared to the median longer-run estimate of 4.1%. Thus, if the Fed sticks to current guidance on the employment conditions that must be in place before rate hikes can begin, then liftoff would occur sometime in late 2022 or early 2023 – not far off current market pricing – as long as US inflation is at or above the Fed’s 2% target at the same time. Once the Fed begins rate hikes, the pace of the hikes relative to inflation will determine how high real bond yields can rise. The 10-year TIPS yield has become highly correlated over the past few years to the level of the real fed funds rate (Chart 13). The current forward pricing in US OIS and CPI swap curves indicates that the markets are priced for a negative real fed funds rate until at least 2030. That is highly dovish pricing that will be revised higher once the Fed begins tapering and the market begins to debate the timing and pace of the Fed’s next rate hike cycle. Thus, it is highly unlikely that real Treasury yields will stay as low as implied by the forward curves over the next few years. Bottom Line: It is still too soon to expect the Fed to begin signaling a move to turn less accommodative. However, rising realized US inflation amid dwindling spare economic capacity will make the Fed more nervous about its ultra-dovish policy stance in the second half of 2021. This will trigger a repricing of the future path of US interest rates embedded in the Treasury curve, but a Taper Tantrum repeat will be avoided. How High Can Treasury Yields Go In The Current Move? Our preferred financial market-based cyclical bond indicators are still trending in a direction pointing to higher Treasury yields (Chart 14). The ratio of the industrial commodity prices (copper, most notably) to the price of gold, the relative equity market performance of US cyclicals (excluding technology) to defensives, and the total return of a basket of emerging market currencies are all consistent with a 10-year US Treasury yield above 1.5%. With regards to other valuation measures, the 5-year/5-year Treasury forward rate is already at or close to the top of the range of the longer-run fed funds rate projection from the New York Fed surveys (Chart 15). We have used that range to provide guidance as to how high Treasury yields can go during the current bond bear market. On this basis, longer maturity yields do not have much more upside unless survey respondents start to revise up their fed fund rate expectations, something that could easily happen if inflation surprises to the upside in the back-half of the year. Chart 14Cyclical Indicators Support Rising UST Yields Cyclical Indicators Support Rising UST Yields Cyclical Indicators Support Rising UST Yields Chart 15A Rapid Move Higher In UST Forward Rates A Rapid Move Higher In UST Forward Rates A Rapid Move Higher In UST Forward Rates Chart 16This UST Selloff Not Yet Stretched This UST Selloff Not Yet Stretched This UST Selloff Not Yet Stretched Finally, the rising uptrend in longer-maturity Treasury yields is not overly stretched from a technical perspective (Chart 16). The 10-year yield is currently 55bps above its 200-day moving average, but yields got as high as 80-90bps above the moving average during the previous cyclical troughs in 2013 and 2016. The survey of fixed income client duration positioning from JP Morgan shows that bond investors are running duration exposure below benchmarks, but not yet at the bearish extremes seen in 2011, 2014 and 2017. A similar message can be seen in the Market Vane Treasury Sentiment indicator, which has been falling but remains well above recent cyclical lows. Summing it all up, it appears that the 1.5% ceiling of our 2021 10-year Treasury yield target range may prove to be too low. A move 20-30bps above that is quite possible, although those levels would only be sustainable if the Fed alters the forward guidance to pull forward the timing of rate hikes. We view that as a risk for 2022, not 2021. Bottom Line: Maintain below-benchmark US duration exposure, with the 10-year Treasury yield likely to soon test the 1.5% level.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "2011 Key Views: US Fixed Income", dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research US Political Strategy Weekly Report, "Don’t Forget Biden’s Health Care Policy", dated February 17, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com. 3https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-demand-snaps-back-factories-cant-keep-up-11614019305?page=1 4https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/powell20210223a.htm Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Optimism Reigns Supreme Optimism Reigns Supreme Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights US inflation is set to increase sharply over the coming months as base effects kick in. Higher fuel prices, fiscal stimulus, and the partial relaxation of lockdown measures should also boost inflation. The Fed is unlikely to react hawkishly to higher inflation, arguing that it is largely transitory in nature. While the Fed’s relaxed attitude towards inflation risks may be justified in the near term, there is a high probability that inflation will get out of hand later this decade. Contrary to conventional wisdom, many of the factors that led to high inflation in the 1970s could reassert themselves. Investors should overweight stocks for now, but be prepared to reduce equity exposure in about two years. US Inflation Has Bottomed US inflation surprised on the downside in January. The core CPI was flat on the month, compared with the consensus estimate for an increase of 0.2%. We expect US inflation to move higher over the coming months. The weakness in January’s inflation print was concentrated in sectors of the economy that have been hard hit by the pandemic. Airline fares dropped 3.2%, hotel rates fell 1.9%, and entertainment admission prices declined 5.5%. Prices in these sectors should rise on a year-over-year basis as base effects kick in (Chart 1). The relaxation of lockdown measures should also help to partially restore demand in these areas. WTI crude prices have risen 70% since the end of October. Rising energy prices should push up headline inflation, with some bleed-through to core prices. Chart 2 shows that there is a strong correlation between gasoline prices and headline inflation. If gasoline prices evolve in line with what is predicted by the futures market, headline inflation could temporarily rise to 4% this spring. Chart 1Base Effects Will Push Inflation Higher 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Chart 2Strong Link Between Gasoline Prices And Headline Inflation Strong Link Between Gasoline Prices And Headline Inflation Strong Link Between Gasoline Prices And Headline Inflation   In addition, the lagged effects from a weaker dollar should translate into higher goods prices in the US (Chart 3). A stronger labor market and a slower pace of rent forgiveness should also boost housing inflation (Chart 4).  Chart 3A Weaker Dollar Will Be A Tailwind For Inflation A Weaker Dollar Will Be A Tailwind For Inflation A Weaker Dollar Will Be A Tailwind For Inflation Chart 4Stronger Labor Market Will Boost Housing Inflation Stronger Labor Market Will Boost Housing Inflation Stronger Labor Market Will Boost Housing Inflation Fiscal stimulus should further supercharge demand, adding to inflationary pressures. Ironically, Republican unwillingness to offer modest, politically palatable cuts to President Biden’s proposed aid bill has opened the door to the Democrats ramming through the entire $1.9 trillion package via the reconciliation process. As we discussed last week, the amount of stimulus in the pipeline easily dwarfs the size of the output gap.   From Reflation To Inflation? Deflation is bad for stocks, just as is high and accelerating inflation. Somewhere between deflation and inflation, however, lies reflation. Reflation is good for stocks. Chart 5Inflation Expectations Have Recovered But Are Still Below Levels That Would Cause Concern For The Fed Inflation Expectations Have Recovered But Are Still Below Levels That Would Cause Concern For The Fed Inflation Expectations Have Recovered But Are Still Below Levels That Would Cause Concern For The Fed We are currently in a reflationary Goldilocks zone, where inflation expectations have risen but not by enough to force the Fed’s hand. There is a high probability we will stay in this Goldilocks zone for the remainder of the year. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is still below the level that the Fed regards as consistent with its long-term inflation objective, and even farther below the level that would cause the Fed to panic (Chart 5). Jay Powell told The Economic Club of New York last week that the Fed is unlikely to “even think about withdrawing policy support” anytime soon. The Fed minutes released on Wednesday echoed this view. That ‘70s Show? The path to higher interest rates is lined with lower interest rates. A period of ultra-easy monetary policy can sow the seeds for economic overheating, rising inflation, and ultimately, much higher interest rates. Since this is precisely what happened during the 1970s, it is prudent to ask whether something like that could happen again. Investors certainly do not believe a replay of the 70s is in the cards, at least if long-term CPI swaps are any guide (Chart 6). Yet, we think that a 1970s-style inflationary episode is a greater risk than most investors realize. As we discuss below, much of what investors believe about how inflation emerged during that period is either based on myths, or at best, half-truths. Let’s examine each of these misconceptions in turn. Myth #1: High inflation in the 1970s was primarily driven by supply disruptions, with oil shocks being the most prominent. Fact: Oil shocks exacerbated the inflation problem in the 1970s, but it was an overheated economy that permitted inflation to rise in the first place. Inflation took off in 1966, seven years before the first oil shock. By 1969, core CPI inflation was running at close to 6% (Chart 7). Chart 6Investors Do Not Expect Inflation To Vault Higher 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Chart 7Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again   Similar to today, fiscal policy was exceptionally accommodative in the mid-1960s. The escalation of the Vietnam War produced a surge in military expenditures. Social spending rose dramatically with the introduction of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” programs. Medicare and Medicaid took effect in July 1966. Amy Finkelstein has estimated that Medicare, the larger of the two health care programs, led to a 37% increase in real hospital expenditures between 1965 and 1970. Johnson’s “guns and butter” policies caused government spending to surge in the second half of the decade. The budget deficit, which was broadly balanced during the first half of the 60s, swelled to 4% of GDP (Chart 8). As fiscal policy was loosened, the economy began to overheat. The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in 1966, two percentage points below what economists later concluded had been its full-employment level. Chart 8US "Guns And Butter" Policies In The 1960s Caused Government Spending To Swell US "Guns And Butter" Policies In The 1960s Caused Government Spending To Swell US "Guns And Butter" Policies In The 1960s Caused Government Spending To Swell Myth #2: The Phillips curve is much flatter today. Chart 9The Increase In Inflation In 1966 Was Broad-Based The Increase In Inflation In 1966 Was Broad-Based The Increase In Inflation In 1966 Was Broad-Based Fact: The Phillips curve was also flat during the 1960s. Core inflation was remarkably stable during the first half of the 60s, averaging about 1.5%, even as the unemployment rate steadily declined. Then, starting in 1966, core inflation more than doubled within the span of ten months. As Chart 9 illustrates, the sudden spike in inflation in 1966 was fairly broad-based. A “kink” in the Phillips curve had been reached. That the relationship between inflation and unemployment turned out to be non-linear is not surprising. As long as there is some slack in the labor market, employers are likely to resist raising wages. Thus, a decline in unemployment from a high level to a merely moderate level is unlikely to lead to meaningful wage inflation. It takes a truly overheated labor market – one that forces firms to engage in a tit-for-tat battle to entice workers – for the relationship between unemployment and inflation to reassert itself. In the near term, there is little risk that the US economy will reach a kink in the Phillips curve. Jason Furman estimates that the unemployment rate stood at 8.3% in January if one adjusts for the drop in labor force participation and methodological problems with how the BLS defines temporarily furloughed workers. This is well above the level that could trigger a price-wage spiral. Chart 10Is The Phillips Curve Really Dead? Is The Phillips Curve Really Dead? Is The Phillips Curve Really Dead? Yet, it would be naïve to think that such a spiral could not materialize in a few years. As Chart 10 shows, over the past 40 years, every time the US labor market was on the cusp of overheating, something would invariably come along to push up unemployment. Last year, it was the pandemic. In 2008, it was the Global Financial Crisis. In 2000, it was the dotcom bust. In the early 1990s, it was the collapse in commercial real estate prices following the Savings and Loan Crisis. Admittedly, only the pandemic qualifies as a truly exogenous shock. The preceding three recessions were fomented by growing economic imbalances, which were ultimately laid bare by a Fed hiking cycle. One can debate the degree to which the US economy is suffering from non-pandemic related imbalances today, but one thing is certain: The Fed is not keen on raising rates anytime soon. Thus, whatever imbalances exist today may not be exposed before the economy has had the chance to overheat. Myth #3: Inflation expectations are better anchored these days. Chart 11Long-Term Bond Yields Lagged Inflation During The 1960s Long-Term Bond Yields Lagged Inflation During The 1960s Long-Term Bond Yields Lagged Inflation During The 1960s Fact: Inflation expectations certainly became unmoored in the 1970s. However, there is not much evidence that expectations were adrift prior to the sudden increase in inflation in 1966. At the time, the US had not experienced a major episode of inflation since the Civil War. While long-term bond yields did rise in the second half of the 60s, they generally lagged inflation, suggesting that investors were caught off-guard (Chart 11). It should also be noted that the US and other major economies operated under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates during the 1960s. Each US dollar was convertible into gold at the official rate of $35 per ounce. The existence of this quasi-gold standard helped anchor inflation expectations. The system began to fall apart in the late 1960s as inflation rose. When President Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold in August 1971, the US CPI had already increased by nearly 30% from its 1965 level. While the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s undoubtedly caused inflation expectations to become further unhinged, the breakdown of the system would not have occurred if inflation had not risen in the first place. Myth #4: Widespread wage indexation and powerful trade unions fueled an acceleration in the 1960s. Fact: Just as was the case with the unmooring of inflation expectations, wage indexation was more a response to rising inflation than a cause of it. Chart 12 shows that the share of workers covered by cost of living adjustments only jumped after inflation had accelerated. Chart 12Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around As far as unions are concerned, the US unionization rate peaked by the end of the 1950s and was already on a downward path when inflation began to rise. Revealingly, Canada experienced a similar decline in inflation as the US in the early 1980s even though unionization rates remained elevated (Chart 13). This suggests that union power was not a dominant driver of inflation. Chart 13Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate   Myth #5: Today’s globalized economy will limit inflationary pressures. Fact: The empirical evidence generally suggests that the impact of globalization on US inflation has been smaller than widely supposed.1 This is not surprising. The US is a fairly closed economy. Imports account for only 15% of GDP. As a result, a fairly large change in relative prices is necessary to prompt Americans to shift a meaningful fraction of their expenditures towards foreign-made goods. Such a shift in spending would require a real appreciation of the US dollar. A real appreciation could occur either if US inflation exceeds inflation abroad or if the nominal value of the dollar strengthens against other currencies. (Admittedly, the standard terminology can be a bit confusing; just think of a real US dollar appreciation as anything that makes the US economy less competitive). Here’s the thing though: The US dollar is unlikely to strengthen unless the Federal Reserve starts to sound more hawkish. If the Fed remains in the dovish camp, real rates could fall as inflation edges higher. This will put downward pressure on the dollar, leading to a smaller trade deficit and even more aggregate demand.  Myth #6: Demographics are much more deflationary now than they were in the past. Fact: Demographic trends arguably did help push down inflation over the past few decades. However, population aging is likely to boost inflation going forward. Chart 14 shows that the ratio of workers-to-consumers in the US and around the world – the so-called “support ratio” – rose steadily in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s as more women entered the labor force and the number of dependent children per household declined. An increase in the ratio of workers-to-consumers is equivalent to an increase in the ratio of production-to-consumption. A rising support ratio is thus deflationary. More recently, however, the support ratio has begun to decline as baby boomers retire but continue to spend. Consumption actually increases in old age once health care spending is included in the tally (Chart 15). As production falls in relation to consumption, inflation could rise. Chart 14Support Ratios Are Declining Globally After Rising Steadily For Three Decades Support Ratios Are Declining Globally After Rising Steadily For Three Decades Support Ratios Are Declining Globally After Rising Steadily For Three Decades Chart 15Consumption Increases In Old Age Once Health Care Spending Is Factored In 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again   Myth #7: Today’s fast pace of technological innovation will keep inflation down. Chart 16Total Factor Productivity Growth Is Lower Than It Was During The Great Inflation Total Factor Productivity Growth Is Lower Than It Was During The Great Inflation Total Factor Productivity Growth Is Lower Than It Was During The Great Inflation Fact: Total factor productivity growth – a broad measure of innovation – is not just low by historic standards today; it is lower than during the period of the Great Inflation spanning from 1966 to 1982 (Chart 16). Some have argued that productivity growth is mismeasured. We have examined this argument in the past and found it wanting. In any case, economic theory does not necessarily say that technological innovation should be deflationary. Economic theory states that faster innovation should lead to higher real incomes. It does not say whether the increase in real income should come via rising nominal income or falling inflation. Indeed, to the extent that faster innovation leads to higher potential GDP growth, it could fuel inflation. This is because stronger trend growth will tend to raise the neutral rate of interest, implying that monetary policy will become more stimulative for any given policy rate. Myth #8: Policymakers have learned from their mistakes. It is easy to dismiss this claim, but it is worth considering it seriously. Some of the mistakes that policymakers made during the 60s and 70s were far from obvious at the time. Athanasios Orphanides, who formerly served as a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, has documented that central banks in the US and other major economies systematically overestimated the amount of slack in their economies (Chart 17). They also overestimated trend growth, with the result that they came to see the combination of sluggish growth and seemingly high unemployment as evidence of inadequate demand. Chart 17Central Banks Overestimated The Degree Of Slack In Their Economies During The Great Inflation 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Is it possible that economic analysis has improved so much over the past 40 years that such mistakes would not be repeated today? Perhaps, but it is worth noting that not only did most economists fail to predict the productivity boom in the late 1990s, most were not even aware that it had happened until after it had ended. Knowing what is happening to the economy in real time is hard enough. Predicting what will happen to such things as trend growth and the natural rate of unemployment is even more difficult. Myth #9: The Fed is a lot more independent now. Fact: We will only know for sure when this independence is tested. History clearly shows that inflation tends to be higher in countries which lack independent central banks (Chart 18). The Fed’s independence was compromised in the 1970s. In his exhaustive study of the Nixon tapes, Burton Abrams documented how Richard Nixon sought, and Fed Chairman Arthur Burns obligingly delivered, an expansionary monetary policy in the lead-up to the 1972 election. Chart 18Inflation Is Higher In Countries Lacking Independent Central Banks 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Starting with the appointment of Paul Volcker, the Fed sought to regain its independence. Most recently, Jay Powell publicly resisted Donald Trump’s efforts to prod the Fed to ease monetary policy. Yet, the Fed’s independence may turn out to be illusory. The Fed wasted little time in slashing rates and relaunching its QE program once the pandemic began. But will it be as quick to tighten monetary policy if inflation starts getting out of hand? Jay Powell’s four-year term as chair runs through February 2022. He will need to stay in Joe Biden’s good graces if he hopes to be reappointed to a second term. The fact that government debt levels are so high further complicates matters. Higher interest rates would force the government to shift funds from social programs towards bond holders. Will the Fed raise rates even if it faces strong political opposition? Time will tell. Investment Conclusions Chart 19Social Unrest Can Fuel Inflation 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again While no two periods are exactly the same, there are a number of striking similarities between the late 1960s and the present day. As is the case today, fiscal policy was highly expansionary back then. The same goes for monetary policy: Just like today, the Fed kept interest rates well below the growth rate of the economy. In the 1960s, the Federal Reserve was still focused on avoiding a repeat of the Great Depression and the deflationary wave that accompanied it. Today, the Fed is equally focused on reflating the economy. The 1960s was a decade of rising political and social unrest. Crime rates went through the roof, a trend that was eerily matched by rising inflation rates (Chart 19). Early estimates suggest that the US homicide rate jumped by 37% in 2020 – easily the largest one-year increase on record. As was the case in the 1960s, most of the news media has ignored this disturbing development. What should investors do? Our tactical MacroQuant model is flagging some near-term risks for stocks. Nevertheless, as long as the economy is growing solidly and the Fed remains on the sidelines, it is too early for investors with a 12-month horizon to bail on equities. Instead, equity investors should favor sectors that could benefit from higher inflation. Commodity producers are a natural choice. Banks could also gain from an uptick in inflation. Chart 20 shows the remarkably strong correlation between the performance of US banks relative to the S&P 500 and the 10-year Treasury yield. Higher bond yields would boost bank net interest margins, leading to higher profits. Banks are also very cheap and have started to see their earnings estimates rise faster not only relative to the broader market but even relative to tech stocks (Chart 21). Chart 20Bank Shares Are A Buy (I) Bank Shares Are A Buy (I) Bank Shares Are A Buy (I) Fixed-income investors should keep duration risk low. They should also favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Chart 21Bank Shares Are A Buy (II) 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Looking further out, the secular bull market in stocks will end when inflation rises to a high enough level that even the Fed cannot ignore. That day will arrive, but probably not for another two years.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Globalization is often cited as a potential reason behind low inflation in advanced economies, including the US. However, a number of empirical studies have found that globalization did not play a major role. In general, domestic economic conditions are seen as the main factor in the inflation process. Please see Jane Ihrig, Steven B. Kamin, Deborah Lindner, and Jaime Marquez, “Some Simple Tests of the Globalization and Inflation Hypothesis,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (International Finance Discussion Papers No. 891) (April 2007); Laurence M. Ball, “Has Globalization Changed Inflation?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series 12687 (November 2006), and associated blog post “Has Globalization Changed Inflation?” National Bureau of Economic Research,  (June 2007); Janet. L. Yellen, 'Panel discussion of William R. White “Globalisation and the Determinants of Domestic Inflation”,' Presentation to the Banque de France International Symposium on Globalisation, Inflation and Monetary Policy (March 2008); Fabio Milani, “Global Slack And Domestic Inflation Rates: A Structural Investigation For G-7 Countries,” Journal of Macroeconomics, (32:4) (2010); and and Lei Lv, Zhixin Liu, and Yingying Xu, “Technological progress, globalization and low-inflation: Evidence from the United States,” PLoS ONE, (14:4), (April 2019).   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Special Trade Recommendations 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again Current MacroQuant Model Scores 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again

Highlights The post-2008 boom in stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate is a ‘rational bubble’, because the relationship between risk-asset valuations and falling bond yields is exponential. But the ‘rational bubble’ is turning into an ‘irrational bubble’. Stay tactically neutral to stocks for the next few weeks to see whether valuation can revert to rationality. This means keep existing investments in the market, but hold fire on new deployments of cash. If valuation reverts to rationality, then investors can safely deploy new cash into the market. But if valuation moves into irrationality, then it will require a completely different investment mindset, in which fractal analysis will become crucial in identifying the bursting of the bubble, just as it did in 2000. Fractal trade: the Chinese stock market is vulnerable to correction. Feature Chart of the WeekA 'Rational Bubble' And An 'Irrational Bubble' A 'Rational Bubble' And An 'Irrational Bubble' A 'Rational Bubble' And An 'Irrational Bubble' Regular readers will know that we have characterised the post-2008 boom in stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate as a ‘rational bubble’. Rational, because the nosebleed valuations are justified by a fundamental driver. And not just any fundamental driver, but the most fundamental driver of all – the bond yield. However, the ‘rational bubble’ is turning into an ‘irrational bubble’, akin to the dot com mania in which valuations became totally disconnected from fundamentals (Chart of the Week). What should investors do? The Relationship Between Bond Yields And Risk-Asset Valuation Is Exponential Everyone realises that a lower bond yield justifies a lower prospective return from competing investments, such as stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate. As valuation is just the inverse of prospective return, a lower bond yield justifies a higher valuation for all risk-assets. (Chart I-2). Chart I-2House Prices have Decoupled From Rents Again (And It Didn't End Happily Last Time) House Prices have Decoupled From Rents Again (And It Didn't End Happily Last Time) House Prices have Decoupled From Rents Again (And It Didn't End Happily Last Time) But few people realise that a lower bond yield justifies an exponentially higher valuation for risk-assets. To visualise this exponential relationship, look again at the Chart of the Week. The bond yield is plotted on a logarithmic (and inverted) left scale, while the stock market forward price-to-earnings is plotted on a linear right scale. The inverted log versus linear scales demonstrate that, in the ‘rational bubble’, the lower the bond yield, the greater the impact of a given decline in the bond yield on stock market valuation. Few people realise that a lower bond yield justifies an exponentially higher valuation for risk-assets. Chart I-3 and Chart I-4 also demonstrate the exponential relationship using the earnings yield as a proxy for the prospective return on stocks. A 1.5 percent decline in the bond yield had a smaller impact on the earnings yield when the bond yield started at 4 percent in 2014 than when the bond yield started at 3 percent in 2019. At the higher bond yield, the prospective return on stocks fell by 1 percent, but at the lower bond yield, the prospective return on stocks plunged by 2.5 percent. Chart I-3A 1.5 Percent Decline In The Bond Yield Had A Smaller Impact On The Earnings Yield When The Bond Yield Started At 4 Percent... A 1.5 Percent Decline In The Bond Yield Had A Smaller Impact On The Earnings Yield When The Bond Yield Started At 4 percent... A 1.5 Percent Decline In The Bond Yield Had A Smaller Impact On The Earnings Yield When The Bond Yield Started At 4 percent... Chart I-4…Than When The Bond Yield Started ##br##At 3 Percent ...Than When The Bond Yield Started At 3 Percent ...Than When The Bond Yield Started At 3 Percent To repeat, the lower the bond yield, the greater the impact of a given move in the bond yield on the prospective return from stocks. The intriguing question is, why? To answer this question, we must venture into a branch of behavioural psychology developed by Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, called Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory Explains The ‘Rational Bubble’ Prospect Theory’s key finding is that we consistently overvalue the prospect of a tail-event, both positive and negative. For example, if there is a one in a million chance of winning a million pounds, then the expected value of this prospect is one pound. Yet we will consistently pay more than one pound for this positive tail-event. This willingness to overpay for a positive tail-event is the foundation of the multi-billion pound gambling and lottery industry. Now consider an ‘inverse lottery’, in which there is a one in a million chance of losing a million pounds. In theory, we should take on the risky prospect for one pound. Yet in practice, we will consistently demand more than one pound to take on this negative tail-event. In other words, we will demand a substantial ‘risk premium’. Prospect Theory explains that we overvalue tail-events because we are bad at comprehending small probabilities. Hence, the prospect of winning a million pounds, while in practice a negligible possibility, generates excessive optimism which results in overpayment for the bet. Likewise, the possibility of losing a million pounds, while in practice a negligible possibility, generates excessive pessimism, for which we demand payment of a ‘risk premium’. In the financial markets, stock markets tend to ‘gap down’ much more than they ‘gap up’. Hence, the risk of owning stocks is like the discomfort of the inverse lottery. This explains why investors normally demand a risk premium – an excess prospective return – to own stocks versus bonds. However, the risk relationship between stocks and bonds changes when bond yields approach their lower bound. Now, as bond yields have less scope to move down versus up, bond prices can gap down much more than they can gap up. The upshot is that the risk of owning bonds becomes no different to the risk of owning stocks, and the risk premium to own stocks versus bonds disappears. At ultra-low bond yields, the bond yield and the equity risk premium move up and down in tandem. Given that the prospective return on stocks equals the bond yield plus the risk premium, we can now answer our intriguing question. At ultra-low bond yields, the prospective return on stocks moves by more than the move in the bond yield, because the bond yield and the risk premium are moving up and down in tandem. The result is an exponential relationship between the bond yield and risk-asset valuations. And this explains how the post-2008 collapse in bond yields to unprecedented lows has generated a ‘rational bubble’ in stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5A Rational Bubble In Risk-Assets... A Rational Bubble In Risk-Assets... A Rational Bubble In Risk-Assets... Chart I-6...Everywhere ...Everywhere ...Everywhere   The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational The post-2008 boom in risk-asset valuations is rational given the exponential relationship with a collapsed bond yield. But the rational valuation is turning irrational. Over the past few months, the stock market’s forward price-to-earnings multiple has continued to increase despite a backup in the bond yield. Note that this multiple is calculated on the next 12 months of earnings, so it already incorporates a strong post-pandemic earnings rebound (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational Furthermore, since 2009, the bond yield (plus a fixed constant) has defined a reliable lower limit for the technology sector earnings yield, meaning a well-defined upper limit for the technology sector’s valuation. Since 2009, this valuation limit has effectively defined the limit of the rational bubble and hasn’t been breached. That is, until now. The recent breach of the post-2008 valuation limit means that the rational bubble is turning irrational (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Post-2008 Rational Valuation Limit Has Been Breached The Post-2008 Rational Valuation Limit Has Been Breached The Post-2008 Rational Valuation Limit Has Been Breached There are three ways that an irrational valuation can revert to rationality: Stock prices decline. Bond yields decline. Stock prices and bond yields drift sideways while (forward) earnings gradually rise to improve stock valuations. The Investment Decision The decision to be invested in the stock market is probably the most important decision for all investors, including those in Europe. Furthermore, the direction of the stock market is a global rather than a local phenomenon. Our current recommendation is to stay tactically neutral for the next few weeks to see whether risk-asset valuations can revert to rationality. This means keep existing investments in the market, but hold fire on new deployments of cash. Hold fire on new deployments of cash. If valuation reverts to rationality in any of the three ways listed above, then investors can safely deploy new cash into the market. But if valuation turns into irrationality, then it will require a completely different investment mindset. After all, you cannot analyse an irrational market using rational tools! In this case, technical analysis becomes much more important, and front and centre of these techniques is fractal analysis. Specifically, as investors with longer and longer time horizons join the irrational bubble, there will be well-defined moments of heightened fragility, at which correction risk increases. This is what burst the irrational bubble in 2000 (Chart I-9), and will burst any new irrational bubble. Stay tuned. Chart I-9The Dotcom Bubble Burst When All Investment Time Horizons Had Joined It The Dotcom Bubble Burst When All Investment Time Horizons Had Joined It The Dotcom Bubble Burst When All Investment Time Horizons Had Joined It Fractal Trading System* The recent strong rally and outperformance of the Chinese stock market is fragile on all three fractal structures: 65-day, 130-day, and 260-day. A good trade is to underweight China versus New Zealand (MSCI indexes), setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 9 percent. In other trades, the continued momentum of reflation plays has weighed on some recent positions as well as stopping out short MSCI World versus the 30-year T-bond. Nevertheless, the rolling 12-month win ratio stands at 54 percent. Chart I-10MSCI: China Vs. New Zealand MSCI: China Vs. New Zealand MSCI: China Vs. New Zealand When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (today at 10:00 AM EST, 3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist  

Highlights Duration: Long-maturity Treasury yields are closing in on our intermediate-term targets. On balance, cyclical and valuation indicators continue to support an outlook for higher yields, but a few are sending warning signs that the bearish bond move is due for a correction. We maintain our recommended below-benchmark 6-12 month duration stance for now, but are keeping a close eye on the indicators shown in this report. Ba Versus Baa Corporates: From a risk-adjusted perspective, the Ba credit tier still looks like the sweet spot for positioning within corporate bonds. Fallen Angels have performed exceptionally, but no longer look cheap compared to the Baa and Ba corporate indexes. Labor Market: If the current pace of monthly employment growth is maintained, it will be a very long time before the economy reaches full employment. Vaccine effectiveness and distribution rate are the two most important factors that will determine employment growth going forward. We are optimistic that we will see a 4.5% unemployment rate sometime in 2022. Feature Chart 1Uptrend Intact Uptrend Intact Uptrend Intact Bond yields moved higher last week, maintaining their post-August uptrend despite a brief lull in the second half of January (Chart 1). The 30-year yield even touched 1.97%, its highest level since last February. Given the sharp up-move, the first section of this week’s report considers whether bond yields look stretched. More broadly, we discuss several factors that will help us decide when to increase portfolio duration. How Much Higher Can Yields Rise? We have maintained a recommended below-benchmark duration stance since October and have been targeting a range of 2% to 2.25% for the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield.1 That target range is based on median estimates of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s surveys of market participants and primary dealers (Chart 2). The rationale is that in an environment of global economic recovery where the Fed is expected to eventually lift the funds rate back to equilibrium, long-dated forward yields should reflect expectations of that long-run equilibrium. At present, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is 1.97% meaning that there is between 3 bps and 28 bps of upside before our target is met. Chart 2Almost At Target Almost At Target Almost At Target A 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield between 2% and 2.25% would not automatically trigger an increase in our recommended portfolio duration, but it would mean that further increases in yields would need to be justified by upward revisions to survey estimates of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate. In a similar vein, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate has risen considerably in recent months, but at 2.15%, it remains below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that the Fed would consider “well anchored” (Chart 2, bottom panel). In other words, there is still some running room for reflationary economic outcomes to be priced into bond yields. Cyclical Growth Indicators Treasury yields may be encroaching on the lower bounds of our target ranges, but cyclical economic indicators suggest further increases ahead. The CRB Raw Industrials / Gold ratio remains in a solid uptrend, and encouragingly, it is being driven by a surging CRB index and not just a falling gold price (Chart 3). Separately, the outperformance of cyclical equity sectors over defensives has moderated in recent weeks, but not yet by enough to warrant reversing our duration call (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Cyclical Bond Indicators Cyclical Bond Indicators Cyclical Bond Indicators Value Indicators Chart 4Bond Valuation Indicators Bond Valuation Indicators Bond Valuation Indicators While cyclical indicators point to further bond weakness ahead, a couple valuation measures show yields starting to look stretched. Two survey-derived estimates of the 10-year zero-coupon term premium have moved up sharply. The estimate derived from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants has jumped into positive territory and the estimate derived from the Survey of Primary Dealers is close behind (Chart 4). These surveys ask respondents to estimate what they think the fed funds rate will average over the next ten years. By comparing the median survey response to the current spot 10-year Treasury yield we get a measure of how much term premium the median investor expects to earn. These term premium estimates have typically been negative during the past few years, though they did rise to about +50 bps before Treasury yields peaked in 2018. In other words, a positive term premium estimate, on its own, is no reason to extend duration. All it tells us is that if the median investor is correct about the future path of the fed funds rate, then there is more money to be made at the long-end of the curve than in cash. This doesn’t rule out investors revising their funds rate expectations higher, or the term premium becoming even more stretched. Another related bond valuation indicator is the difference between the market’s expected path for the fed funds rate and the path projected by the FOMC (Chart 4, bottom panel). Here we see that, for the first time since 2014, the market is priced for a faster pace of tightening over the next two years than the median FOMC participant anticipates. Again, this is not a decisive signal to buy bonds. The FOMC could revise its funds rate projections higher when it meets next month. However, the longer that market pricing remains more hawkish than the Fed, the stronger the case to increase duration becomes. The Dollar Chart 5Dollar Still Supports Higher Yields Dollar Still Supports Higher Yields Dollar Still Supports Higher Yields Finally, we should note that the trade-weighted dollar appreciated last week as bond yields rose (Chart 5). A stronger dollar certainly supports the case for extending duration, the only question is whether the dollar has strengthened enough to dent US economic growth and pull US yields back down. Our sense is that we haven’t reached that breaking point yet, but we could if US real yields continue to rise relative to real yields in the rest of the world (Chart 5, panels 2 & 3). We think of the relationship between US bond yields and the dollar as a feedback loop. A weaker dollar supports economic reflation, which eventually sends yields higher. However, once higher US yields de-couple too far from yields in the rest of the world, the dollar appreciates. A stronger dollar impairs the economic outlook and sends US yields back down, the dollar then depreciates and the cycle repeats. At present, we appear to be in the stage of the feedback loop where US yields are rising relative to the rest of the world, putting upward pressure on the dollar. However, we don’t think the dollar is yet strong enough to prevent US yields from climbing. Dollar bullish sentiment, for example, remains below 50% suggesting that most investors remain dollar bears. A sub-50 reading on this index also tends to coincide with rising US Treasury yields (Chart 5, bottom panel). A move above 50 in the dollar sentiment index would be another signal that the bond bear market is becoming stretched. Bottom Line: Long-maturity Treasury yields are closing-in on our intermediate-term targets. On balance, cyclical and valuation indicators continue to support an outlook for higher yields, but a few are sending warning signs that the bearish bond move is due for a correction. We maintain our recommended below-benchmark 6-12 month duration stance for now, but are keeping a close eye on the indicators shown in this report. Comparing Baa- And Ba-Rated Corporate Bonds Chart 6The Ba Index OAS Is Unusually High The Ba Index OAS Is Unusually High The Ba Index OAS Is Unusually High We have previously written that the macro environment is extremely positive for credit risk and we recommend moving down in quality within corporate bonds. We have also pointed out that the incremental spread pick-up earned from moving out of Baa-rated bonds and into Ba-rated bonds is elevated compared to typical historical levels. As such, the Ba-rated credit tier looks like the sweet spot for corporate bond allocation from a risk/reward perspective.2 In this week’s report we delve a little deeper into the relative valuation between Baa- and Ba-rated bonds. First, we note the difference between the average option-adjusted spread (OAS) of the Ba index and the average OAS of the Baa index. The Ba index OAS is 126 bps above the Baa index OAS, a level that looks high compared to recent years (Chart 6). One problem with this simple comparison of index OAS is that the average duration of the Ba index is much lower than the average duration of the Baa index (Chart 6, bottom panel). However, after doing our best to match the duration between the two indexes, we still find that Ba offers an attractive yield advantage, particularly compared to levels seen in 2017 and 2018 (Chart 6, panel 2). Going back to our simple OAS differential, we conducted a small study looking at calendar year excess returns between 1989 and 2020. Our results show that the differential between the Default-Adjusted Ba OAS and the Baa OAS does a good job predicting relative excess returns between the two sectors (Table 1).3 The Default-Adjusted Ba OAS is the Ba index OAS at the beginning of the calendar year minus realized Ba default losses that occurred during the year in question. We also use the Baa index OAS from the beginning of the year, but don’t make any adjustments for Baa default losses. Table 1Annual Excess Return Differential & Relative Spreads: Ba Corporates Over Baa Corporates Ba-Rated Bonds Look Best Ba-Rated Bonds Look Best Our results show that Ba excess returns outpaced Baa excess returns in every calendar year for which the Adjusted Ba/Baa OAS differential exceeds 100 bps. The raw Ba/Baa OAS differential is currently 126 bps. This means that we should be very confident that Ba-rated bonds will outperform Baa-rated bonds in 2021, as long as Ba default losses come in below 0.26%. This seems likely. For context, Ba default losses came in at 0.09% in 2020, despite the 12-month default rate spiking to almost 9%. Fallen Angels Another interesting issue to consider when looking at the intersection between the Baa and Ba credit tiers is the presence of fallen angels – bonds that were initially rated investment grade but have been downgraded to junk. The 2020 default cycle coincided with a huge spike in ratings downgrades and the number of outstanding fallen angels jumped dramatically (Chart 7). Not only that, but fallen angels also performed exceptionally well in 2020. Fallen angels outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 800 bps in 2020 compared to 431 bps for the Ba-rated index, -10 bps for the Baa-rated index and -13 bps for the B-rated index (Chart 7, bottom panel). All that outperformance has compressed fallen angel valuations a lot. The incremental spread pick-up in fallen angels over duration-matched Baa-rated bonds is 201 bps, about one standard deviation below its post-2010 average (Chart 8). Fallen angels look even worse compared to the Ba index, offering only a 30 bps spread advantage (Chart 8, panel 2). Chart 7Fallen Angels Dominated In 2020 Fallen Angels Dominated In 2020 Fallen Angels Dominated In 2020 Chart 8Fallen Angels No Longer Look Cheap Fallen Angels No Longer Look Cheap Fallen Angels No Longer Look Cheap Bottom Line: From a risk-adjusted perspective, the Ba credit tier still looks like the sweet spot for positioning within corporate bonds. Fallen Angels have performed exceptionally, but no longer look cheap compared to the Baa and Ba corporate indexes.   Labor Market Update Chart 9Employment Growth Has Slowed Employment Growth Has Slowed Employment Growth Has Slowed Last week’s January employment report was a disappointment with nonfarm payrolls growing only 49k after having contracted by 227k in December (Chart 9).   Two weeks ago, we calculated the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth that will be required for the unemployment rate to reach 4.5% by certain future dates.4 In our view, an unemployment rate of 4.5% would meet the Fed’s definition of maximum employment, making it an important pre-condition for monetary tightening. Revising our calculations to incorporate January’s report, a 4.5% unemployment rate by the end of 2021 still looks like a long shot. Nonfarm payroll growth would have to average between +328k and +705k per month to meet that target, depending on the path of the participation rate (Table 2). That said, we still view a 4.5% unemployment rate by the end of 2022 as achievable. Table 2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment Rate To Reach 4.5% ##br##By The Given Date Ba-Rated Bonds Look Best Ba-Rated Bonds Look Best Yes, even that will require average monthly payroll growth of between +210k and +411k, but we are likely to see a re-opening of certain shuttered sectors – Leisure & Hospitality, for example – during that timeframe. When it occurs, this re-opening will lead to a surge in employment growth that will push average monthly payroll growth dramatically higher. Notice that almost 40% of the 9.9 million drop in overall employment since February 2020 has come from the Leisure & Hospitality sector (Chart 10). Chart 10Waiting For The Post-COVID Snapback Waiting For The Post-COVID Snapback Waiting For The Post-COVID Snapback Bottom Line: If the current pace of monthly employment growth is maintained, it will be a very long time before the economy reaches full employment. Vaccine effectiveness and distribution rate are the two most important factors that will determine employment growth going forward. We are optimistic that we will see a 4.5% unemployment rate sometime in 2022.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Beware The Bond-Bearish Blue Sweep”, dated October 20, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Excess returns are calculated relative to duration-matched Treasury securities in all cases. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Chart 1Inflation Indicators Hook Up Inflation Indicators Hook Up Inflation Indicators Hook Up There’s no doubt that inflationary pressures are building in the US economy. The latest piece of evidence is January’s ISM Manufacturing PMI which saw the Prices Paid component jump above 80 for the first time since 2011 (Chart 1). Large fiscal stimulus is clearly leading to bottlenecks in certain industries that were not negatively impacted by the pandemic, and this could cause consumer price inflation to rise during the next few months. However, the Fed will not view a spike in inflation as sustainable unless it is accompanied by a labor market that is close to maximum employment. The Fed estimates that “maximum employment” corresponds to an unemployment rate of 3.5% to 4.5%, and we calculate that average monthly payroll growth of about +500k is required to reach that target by the end of the year. The bottom line is that rising inflation will not lead to Fed tightening this year. We continue to expect liftoff in late-2022 or the first half of 2023. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month, leaving it 4 bps above its pre-COVID low. As discussed in last week’s report, the combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy means that the runway for spread product outperformance remains long.1 However, given that investment grade corporate bond spreads are extremely tight, investors should look to other spread products when possible. One valuation measure, the investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread – with the index re-weighted to maintain a constant credit rating distribution over time – is down to its 4th percentile (Chart 2). This means that the breakeven spread has only been tighter 4% of the time since 1995. The same measure shows that Baa-rated bonds have also only been more expensive 4% of the time (panel 3). While we don’t anticipate material underperformance versus Treasuries, we see better value outside of the investment grade corporate space. Specifically, we advise investors to favor tax-exempt municipal bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration (see page 9). We also prefer USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration (see page 8). Finally, the supportive macro environment means that we are comfortable adding credit risk to a portfolio. With that in mind, we encourage investors pick up the additional spread offered by high-yield corporates, particularly the Ba credit tier where spreads remain wide compared to average historical levels (see page 6). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* No Tightening In 2021 No Tightening In 2021 Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* No Tightening In 2021 No Tightening In 2021 High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in January. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month, leaving it 47 bps above its pre-COVID low. Ba-rated credits outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 50 bps on the month, besting B-rated bonds which outperformed by only 33 bps. The Caa-rated credit tier delivered 157 bps of outperformance versus duration-matched Treasuries. We view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report that the additional spread earned from moving down in quality below Ba is merely in line with historical averages.2 Assuming a 25% recovery rate on defaulted debt and a minimum required risk premium of 150 bps, we calculate that the junk index is priced for a default rate of 2.8% for the next 12 months (panel 3). This represents a steep drop from the 8.4% default rate observed during the most recent 12-month period. However, only six defaults occurred in December, down from a peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, have also fallen dramatically (bottom panel). Overall, we see room for spread compression across all junk credit tiers in 2021 but believe that Ba-rated bonds offer the best opportunity in risk-adjusted terms. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in January. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries tightened sharply in January, despite a continued rapid pace of refinancing activity (Chart 4). The option-adjusted spread adjusted downward in January and it now sits at 25 bps (panel 3). This is considerably below the 61 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds and the 45 bps offered by Agency CMBS. It is only slightly above the 20 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. The primary mortgage spread has tightened dramatically during the past few months (bottom panel), a key reason why refinancing activity has been so strong despite the back-up in Treasury yields. With the mortgage spread now closer to typical levels, it stands to reason that further increases in Treasury yields will be matched by higher mortgage rates. As such, mortgage refinancing activity could be close to its peak. While a drop in refinancing activity would be a reason to get more bullish on MBS, we aren’t yet ready to pull that trigger. The gap between the nominal MBS spread and the MBA Refinance Index remains wide (panel 2), and we could still see spreads adjust higher. Last year’s spike in the mortgage delinquency rate is alarming (panel 4), but it will have little impact on MBS returns. The increase was driven by household take-up of forbearance granted by the federal government. Our US Investment Strategy service recently showed that a considerable majority of households will remain current on their loans once the forbearance period expires, causing the delinquency rate to fall back down.3 Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in January (Chart 5). Sovereign debt and Foreign Agencies underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 21 bps and 7 bps, respectively, in January. Local Authority bonds outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 140 bps while Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals outperformed by 15 bps and 7 bps, respectively. Last week’s report contains a detailed look at valuation for USD-denominated EM Sovereigns.4 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage versus US corporates for all credit tiers except Ba. We recommend that investors take advantage of this spread pick-up by favoring investment grade EM Sovereigns over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Russia and Colombia. We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space. Ba-rated high-yield US corporates offer a spread advantage over EM Sovereigns and the extra spread available in B-rated and lower EMs comes from distressed credits in Turkey and Argentina.   Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 108 basis points in January (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads have tightened dramatically during the past couple of months and Aaa-rated Munis no longer look cheap compared to Treasuries (Chart 6). That said, if we match the duration and credit rating between the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal bond indexes and the US Credit index, we find that both General Obligation (GO) and Revenue Munis appear attractive compared to US investment grade Credit. Both GO and Revenue Munis offer a before-tax spread pick-up relative to US Credit for maturities above 12 years (bottom panel). Revenue bonds in the 8-12 year and 6-8 year maturity buckets offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with effective tax rates above 3% and 16%, respectively. GO bonds in the 8-12 year and 6-8 year maturity buckets offer breakeven effective tax rates of 21% and 33%, respectively.    All in all, municipal bond value has deteriorated markedly in recent months and we downgraded our recommended allocation from “maximum overweight” to “overweight” in last week’s report. However, investors should still prefer municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in January. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 20 bps to 100 bps. The 5/30 Treasury slope steepened 13 bps to 142 bps. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. A timely vaccine roll-out and stimulative fiscal policy will serve to speed this process along. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening. Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on a duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar valuation levels.       TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 143 basis points in January. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 14 bps and 1 bp on the month. They currently sit at 2.15% and 2.06%, respectively. Core CPI rose 0.09% in December, causing the year-over-year rate to dip from 1.65% to 1.61%. Meanwhile, 12-month trimmed mean CPI ticked up from 2.09% to 2.10%, widening the gap between trimmed mean and core (Chart 8). We expect 12-month core inflation to jump during the next few months, narrowing the gap between core and trimmed mean. As such, we remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate looks expensive on our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).5 We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect short-maturity real yields to come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in January. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 11 bps in January, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 48 bps (Chart 9). The stimulus from the CARES act led to a significant increase in household income when individual checks were mailed out last April. Since then, households have used this stimulus to build up a considerable buffer of excess savings (panel 4). The large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is very high, and this situation won’t change any time soon with even more fiscal stimulus on the way. Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and take advantage of strong collateral performance by moving down in credit quality. The Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 does not alter our recommendation. Spreads are already well below the borrowing cost that was offered by TALF, and these tight spread levels are justified by strong household balance sheets.     Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 75 basis points in January. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 42 bps in January, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 185 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus will not be negatively impacted. Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 28 basis points in January. The average index spread tightened 4 bps on the month to reach 45 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered back to their pre-COVID lows, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. This is especially true when you consider the Fed’s continued pledge to purchase as much Agency CMBS as “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of January 29TH, 2021) No Tightening In 2021 No Tightening In 2021 Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of January 29TH, 2021) No Tightening In 2021 No Tightening In 2021 Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 86 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 86 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) No Tightening In 2021 No Tightening In 2021 Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of January 29th, 2021) No Tightening In 2021 No Tightening In 2021 Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Big Bank Beige Book, January 2021”, dated January 25, 2021, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation