High-Yield

Highlights Investment Grade: Investment grade corporate bond total returns will be close to zero or negative during the next 12 months. The bonds are also likely to outperform duration-matched Treasuries during that period, but excess returns are probably capped at 85 bps. High-Yield: High-yield total returns will fall between -0.29% and +1.80% during the next 12 months, but with a much higher likelihood of being positive than investment grade corporates. Junk will outperform duration-matched Treasuries by between 0.94% and 1.84%, besting the excess returns earned in investment grade. Inflation & The Fed: The Fed will announce asset purchase tapering before the end of this year, and tapering will proceed at a pace that opens the door to a potential rate hike before the end of 2022. Ultimately, whether the Fed lifts rates in 2022 will depend on trends in core CPI excluding COVID-impacted services and autos, along with wage growth and inflation expectations. Feature Chart 1Valuations Are Stretched Valuations Are Stretched Valuations Are Stretched There are two broad factors that must be considered when deciding whether to favor corporate bonds over Treasuries in a US bond portfolio: (i) The cyclical macroeconomic environment and (ii) valuation. The problem is that, as it stands today, these two factors are sending contrasting signals. The cyclical macroeconomic environment is consistent with strong positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. However, corporate bond spreads and yields are extremely low relative to history (Chart 1). We view the slope of the yield curve as the single best indicator of the cyclical macro environment and have shown in prior research that corporate bonds tend to deliver positive excess returns versus Treasuries when the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is above 50 bps, even when corporate spreads are tight.1 At present, the 3-year/10-year slope sits at 90 bps and our bias will be toward an overweight allocation to corporates until the slope breaks below 50 bps. A flatter yield curve is negative for corporate bond performance because it suggests that monetary conditions are less accommodative. It also makes it more likely that an unforeseen shock will lead to yield curve inversion, a highly reliable recession indicator. While the macro environment is consistent with continued corporate bond outperformance versus Treasuries, valuation suggests that we should anticipate lower returns than usual from corporate bonds. Table 1 shows annualized corporate bond excess returns during each of the past six cycles. Additionally, it splits each cycle into three phases based on the slope of the 3-year/10-year Treasury curve. Phase 1 of the cycle lasts from the end of the prior recession until the slope breaks below 50 bps. Phase 2 encompasses the period when the slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps. Phase 3 lasts from when the yield curve inverts until the start of the next recession. Table 1Corporate Bond Excess Returns In Different Phases Of The Cycle Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds The first conclusion to draw from Table 1 is that excess returns tend to be lower in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 and lower in Phase 3 than in Phase 2. Second, we see that investment grade corporates have returned an annualized 7.55% in excess of duration-matched Treasuries so far this cycle and high-yield corporates have delivered 15.15% of outperformance. These figures are well above even those seen in prior Phase 1 periods. Based on this, an expectation for lower – but still positive – excess corporate bond returns seems like a reasonable base case for the next 6-12 months. Table 2 is identical to Table 1 except that it shows total returns instead of excess returns. We observe that, so far this cycle, junk bond total returns have outpaced prior Phase 1 periods. Investment grade total returns have been slightly lower given the greater exposure to interest rate risk of those securities. Table 2Corporate Bond Total Returns In Different Phases Of The Cycle Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds As noted above, our expectation is that corporate bonds will outperform Treasuries during the next 6-12 months, but that both excess returns and total returns will take a step down. The next section of this report presents a scenario analysis that puts some more specific numbers on the sorts of excess and total corporate bond returns investors might expect to earn during the next year. Corporate Bond Returns: Scenario Analysis Methodology To run our scenario analysis for investment grade corporate bond returns we use the following equations: Excess Return = OAS0  – D0 (dOAS) Total Return = OAS0+ TSY0 – D0 (dOAS+dTSY) Where: Excess Return = The expected corporate index excess return versus duration-matched Treasuries during the next 12 months Total Return = The expected corporate index total return during the next 12 months OAS0 = Today’s average index option-adjusted spread D0 = Today’s average index duration TSY0 = Today’s Treasury yield that matches the duration of the corporate index dOAS = The expected change in the index option-adjusted spread during the next 12 months dTSY = The expected change in the duration-matched Treasury yield during the next 12 months These equations are obviously simplifications. For example, the impact of convexity is ignored. However, Chart 2 shows that our proxies track actual index returns very closely over time, assuming the estimated yield and spread changes are accurate. Chart 2Estimating IG Returns Estimating IG Returns Estimating IG Returns We use similar equations for assessing high-yield corporate returns, with the additional complication that we must include an assumption for default losses. Excess Return= OAS0 – (DR × (1 - RR)) –D0(dOAS) Total Return= OAS0 + TSY0 – (DR × (1 – RR)) –D0 (dOAS + dTSY) In these equations: DR = The expected issuer-weighted default rate for the next 12 months RR = The expected average recovery rate on defaulted debt for the next 12 months Once again, though these equations are relatively simple, they do a good job of capturing actual returns over time (Chart 3). Chart 3Estimating HY Returns Estimating HY Returns Estimating HY Returns Scenarios With the above equations in hand, we can easily make some educated guesses about future yields, spreads and default losses and translate those assumptions into expected return forecasts. Specifically, we test three different scenarios (bullish, neutral and bearish) for corporate spreads, Treasury yields and default losses. For corporate index spreads, both investment grade and high-yield, our bullish scenario assumes that spreads reach the all-time tight levels seen in the mid-1990s. For investment grade bonds this spread level is 58 bps, 27 bps below the current level. For high-yield bonds this spread level is 233 bps, 41 bps below the current level. Our neutral scenario assumes that index spreads remain at their current levels (85 bps for investment grade and 274 bps for junk). Finally, our bearish scenario assumes that spreads widen back to the average levels seen during the 2017-2019 period (112 bps for investment grade and 369 bps for junk), this implies 27 bps of widening for investment grade and 95 bps of widening for junk. Given our view that bond yields will rise as we approach the next Fed tightening cycle, none of our scenarios assume that Treasury yields will fall during the next 12 months. Our bullish Treasury yield scenario assumes that yields stay flat at current levels. Our neutral Treasury yield scenario assumes that yields follow the path implied by current forward rates, and our bearish Treasury yield scenario assumes that yields rise to levels consistent with fair value estimates assuming the market prices-in a December 2022 Fed liftoff followed by 100 bps of rate hikes per year until the fed funds rate levels-off at 2.08%.2 We use the 7-year and 6-year Treasury yields as our inputs for the investment grade and high-yield scenarios, respectively, as those yields most closely match the interest rate component embedded in the corporate indexes. For default losses, our bullish scenario assumes a 1.8% default rate – consistent with the rate at which defaults are tracking so far this year – and a recovery rate of 50%. Our neutral scenario assumes a 3% default rate and a 40% recovery rate. Our bearish scenario assumes a 4% default rate and 30% recovery rate. Investment Grade Results Table 3 shows the results of our scenario analysis for investment grade corporate bond returns. Table 3Investment Grade Corporate Bond Expected Return Scenarios Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Starting with excess returns, we think it is most likely that spreads remain near current levels, or perhaps widen a bit, during the next 12 months. We think it’s extremely unlikely that spreads will tighten to the levels seen in the mid-1990s because the average duration of the index is much higher today than it was back then. All else equal, it’s generally true that securities with higher duration also have higher OAS. This means we expect investment grade corporate bond excess returns to be between -153 bps and +85 bps during the next 12 months, probably closer to +85 bps. Obviously, this represents a significant step down from the +550 bps earned during the past year. In fact, even the most bullish scenario where spreads tighten back to all-time lows only implies an excess return of +323 bps, well below the recent rate of outperformance. As for total returns, we estimate that a neutral scenario where the index spread holds steady and Treasury yields follow the forward curve will lead to total returns being close to zero during the next 12 months. In fact, our results suggest that it’s highly likely that investment grade corporate bonds will deliver negative total returns during the next 12 months. Yes, the index is expected to deliver a total return of 1.98% if both the index spread and duration-matched Treasury yield remain at their current levels, but an environment where growth is slow enough to keep Treasury yields flat is much more likely to coincide with spread widening than with steady corporate spreads. For some additional historical perspective, the columns labeled “Historical Percentile Rank” show how the returns in each scenario would rank relative to actual returns earned during the past 31 calendar years. For example, even the most bullish total return scenario of 4.36% ranks at the 27th percentile relative to history. This means that it would only be better than 27% of historical 12-month return observations for that index. High-Yield Results Tables 4A, 4B and 4C summarize the results of our high-yield scenario analysis. Table 4A assumes the bullish scenario for default losses, Table 4B assumes the neutral scenario for default losses and Table 4C assumes the bearish scenario for default losses. Table 4AHigh-Yield Corporate Bond Expected Return Scenarios: Bullish Default Loss Scenario* Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Table 4BHigh-Yield Corporate Bond Expected Return Scenarios: Neutral Default Loss Scenario* Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Table 4CHigh-Yield Corporate Bond Expected Return Scenarios: Bearish Default Loss Scenario* Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Expected Returns In Corporate Bonds Looking at excess returns, the first result that jumps out is that even the most bullish scenario leads to an expected 12-month excess return of +3.43%, this would be equivalent to the median return earned during the past 31 calendar years. In our view, it’s more likely that excess returns will be in the +0.94% to +1.84% range during the next 12 months. This is consistent with flat spreads and a range for default losses between our neutral and bullish scenarios. Our sense is that junk bonds are less likely to deliver negative total returns than investment grade bonds. Though even the most bullish scenario puts expected junk total returns at +4.54%, consistent with the 39th percentile relative to history. Investment Implications To summarize, our expectation is that investment grade corporate bond total returns will be close to zero or negative during the next 12 months. The bonds are also likely to outperform duration-matched Treasuries during that period, but excess returns are probably capped at 85 bps. Our best guess places high-yield total returns at between -0.29% and +1.80%, but with a much higher likelihood of earning positive total returns than a position in investment grade. We estimate that excess junk returns will fall between +0.94% and +1.84%, above returns earned in investment grade. In general, the message is that investors should remain overweight corporate bonds versus Treasuries, but should retain a preference for high-yield over investment grade and should expect to earn far lower returns than were earned during the past year. Given low expected returns, investors should also seek out creative ways of adding additional spread to a bond portfolio. We offered some suggestions in a recent report.3 CPI Update And FOMC Preview This week’s FOMC meeting could be significant for bond markets. First off, there is a possibility that the Fed will announce a timeline for tapering its asset purchases. Our sense is that last month’s weak employment report probably delays this announcement, but we still expect it to come before the end of the year. We expect that the actual tapering of purchases will start in January 2022 and that net Fed purchases will reach zero by Q3 of next year. More broadly, we continue to think that the market is already priced for a tapering announcement in 2021. In other words, any information about asset purchases probably won’t move bond yields that much. What will move bond yields is any hint about when the Fed thinks it may want to start lifting rates. Such news could come in the form of revisions to the Fed’s interest rate forecasts, or in any information that the Fed provides about the pace of asset purchase tapering. Because the Fed has indicated a strong preference for having net purchases at zero prior to liftoff, any pace of tapering that gets net purchases to zero by the middle of next year opens the door to a possible rate hike before the end of 2022. Of course, the economic data between now and the end of 2022 will have a lot to say about whether the Fed actually starts to hike. In particular, last week’s report made the case that next year’s inflation data will determine when rate hikes begin.4 With that in mind, last week’s CPI release showed a significant deceleration in core inflation, driven by the COVID-impacted service and auto sectors that had previously caused inflation to spike (Chart 4). Interestingly, core inflation excluding COVID-impacted services and autos jumped on the month (Chart 4, bottom panel). From the Fed’s perspective, it ignored the transitory rise of COVID-impacted service and auto inflation on the way up, it will also be inclined to ignore its descent. What will ultimately matter for monetary policy is whether underlying inflationary pressures start to build throughout 2022. It is therefore much more important for us to focus on trends in core inflation excluding the COVID-impacted services and autos, along with wage growth and inflation expectations. Our view is that underlying inflationary pressures will be strong enough for the Fed to lift rates before the end of 2022. This will, in large part, be due to an acceleration of shelter inflation (Chart 5). Owner’s Equivalent Rent and Rent of Primary Residence inflation have already jumped, and leading indicators of shelter inflation like the unemployment rate (Chart 5, panel 3) and the Apartment Market Tightness Index (Chart 5, bottom panel) are consistent with further acceleration. Chart 4Looking For Underlying Inflation Looking For Underlying Inflation Looking For Underlying Inflation Chart 5Shelter Inflation Will Keep Rising Shelter Inflation Will Keep Rising Shelter Inflation Will Keep Rising Bottom Line: The Fed will announce asset purchase tapering before the end of this year, and tapering will proceed at a pace that opens the door to a potential rate hike before the end of 2022. Ultimately, whether the Fed lifts rates in 2022 will depend on trends in core CPI excluding COVID-impacted services and autos, along with wage growth and inflation expectations.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 2 Last week’s report provides more detail on this fair value analysis. Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “2022 Will Be All About Inflation”, dated September 14, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “2022 Will Be All About Inflation”, dated September 14, 2021. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Highlights Chart 1Employment Growth Will Rebound Employment Growth Will Rebound Employment Growth Will Rebound August’s weak employment growth reflects the surge of Delta variant COVID cases in the United States. This is evidenced by the fact that Leisure & Hospitality sector payrolls held flat in August after having grown by 415k in July and 397k in June (Chart 1). While Delta could still be a drag on employment growth for another month or two, there is mounting evidence that the daily new case count is close to its peak. Leisure & Hospitality employment growth will regain its prior pace as new Delta cases trend down. This will lead to a resumption of strong monthly payroll reports (500k – 1000k) as we head into the new year. For monetary policy, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 414k will be sufficient for the Fed to start rate hikes before the end of 2022 (bottom panel). We anticipate that this threshold will easily be met. The Treasury curve will bear-flatten as employment growth improves and the market prices-in an earlier start and quicker pace of Fed rate hikes. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and stay short the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +166 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports continued positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 91 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains steep. This is a strong signal that monetary conditions are accommodative. But despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade valuations are extremely tight (Chart 2). A recent report looked at what different combinations of Treasury slope and corporate spreads have historically signaled for corporate bond excess returns.1 It shows that tight corporate spreads only correlate with negative excess returns once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is below 50 bps. Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, better value can be found outside of the investment grade corporate sector. Specifically, we recommend that investors shift into high-yield corporates, municipal bonds and USD-denominated Emerging Market sovereigns and corporates. We also advise investors to favor long-maturity corporate bonds and those corporate sectors with elevated Duration-Times-Spread.2  Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* The Delta Drag The Delta Drag High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 66 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +502 bps. A recent report looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.3 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.0% (Chart 3). Using a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we estimate that the 12-month default rate will fall to between 2.3% and 2.8%, below what the market currently discounts. Notably, the corporate default rate is tracking at an annualized rate of roughly 1.7% through the first seven months of the year, well below the estimate generated by our macro model. Another recent report looked at the incremental spread pick-up investors can earn by moving out of investment grade corporates and into junk.4 It concluded that the extra spread available in high-yield is worth grabbing and that B-rated bonds look particularly attractive in risk-adjusted terms.   MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -67 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries tightened 4 bps in August. The spread is wide compared to recent history, but it remains tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened 2 bps in August (panel 2), and it is now starting to look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread sectors. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS sits at 38 bps, below the 56 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds but above the 20 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 35 bps offered by Agency CMBS. In a recent report we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.5 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will be higher in 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons (4%, 4.5%) over low coupons (2%, 2.5%, 3%) within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 27 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +84 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 122 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 8 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +44 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 9 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +382 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 3 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +30 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +31 bps. USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign bonds outperformed US corporates in August and relative valuation between the two sectors is starting to equalize (panel 4). That said, we retain a preference for EM sovereigns over US corporates, particularly the bonds of Russia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar where value remains attractive. A recent report looked at valuation within the investment grade USD-denominated EM corporate space.6 It found that EM corporates are attractively priced relative to US corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum. It also found that EM corporates are attractive relative to EM sovereigns within the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns have the edge in the Aa credit tier. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +262 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The economic and policy back-drop remains favorable for municipal bond performance. Trailing 4-quarter net state & local government savings were already positive through the end of Q1 2021 and they received another significant boost in Q2 as funds from the American Rescue Plan were doled out (Chart 6). With state & local government balance sheets in such good shape, we are comfortable moving down in quality within municipal bonds. A move down in quality is especially compelling because of tight Aaa muni valuations relative to Treasuries (top panel). Valuation is more compelling in the lower investment grade credit tiers, especially at the long-end of the curve.7 GO munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a 5% breakeven tax rate versus corporates with the same credit rating and duration. 12-17 year Revenue munis actually offer a before-tax yield pick-up (panel 2). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 23% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them susceptible to extension risk if bond yields rise. Treasury Curve: Buy 2/10 Barbell Versus 5-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields moved higher in August, with the 5-year and 7-year maturities bearing the brunt of the sell-off. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope steepened 5 bps to end the month at 110 bps. The 5-year/30-year slope flattened 5 bps to end the month at 115 bps. We expect bond yields to be higher in 6-12 months, but we also anticipate that the next significant move higher in bond yields will coincide with curve flattening, not steepening. At 1.93%, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is not that far below our target fair value range of 2% - 2.25%. In a recent report, we demonstrated that yield curve steepening only occurs when either the Fed is cutting rates or the 5-year/5-year forward yield rises.8 This means that the 2/10 Treasury curve is more likely to flatten than steepen during the next 6-12 months, even as bond yields move higher. Similarly, we observe that the overnight index swap (OIS) curve is priced for the fed funds rate to be 0.21% in one year’s time and 1.47% in five years (Chart 7). The latter rate has 146 bps of upside if it converges all the way back to its 2018 high, but this pales in comparison to the 265 bps of upside in the 12-month forward rate. The yield curve will flatten as the 12-month forward OIS rate converges with the 5-year forward rate (panel 3). Investors should position in yield curve flatteners on a 6-12 month horizon. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell.  TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS performed in line with the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index in August, leaving year-to-date excess returns unchanged at +578 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates both fell by 7 bps in August. At 2.37%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the middle of the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.21%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is only just below target (panel 3). With long-dated inflation expectations close to the Fed’s target levels, we see limited upside on a 6-12 month investment horizon. We also see the cost of short-maturity inflation protection falling during the next few months as realized inflation continues to moderate from its current extremely high level. This will lead to some modest steepening of the inflation curve (bottom panel). While the inflation curve has some room to steepen, we don’t see it returning to positive territory. An inverted inflation curve is simply more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one. This is because the Fed’s new framework calls for it to attack its inflation target from above rather than from below. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +40 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 2 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +30 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES Act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. That excess savings has still not been spent and the most recent round of stimulus checks has only added to the stockpile (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum.     Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +193 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 10 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +92 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 9 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +529 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +91 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread held flat on the month. It currently sits at 35 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have recovered to well below pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight.    Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of August 31st, 2021) The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of August 31st, 2021) The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 12 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 12 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of August 31st, 2021) The Delta Drag The Delta Drag Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 2 For ideas on how to increase the average spread of a US bond portfolio please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 8 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Bump On The Road To Recovery”, dated July 27, 2021.

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (August 17 at 10:00 AM EDT, 15:00 PM BST, 16:00 PM CEST and August 18 at 9:00 HKT, 11:00 AEST). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Scheduling Note: There will be no US Bond Strategy report next week. The following week (August 31), clients will receive a report written by our Global Fixed Income Strategist Rob Robis. The regular US Bond Strategy publication schedule will resume on September 8 with the publication of September’s Portfolio Allocation Summary. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

Please note: There will be no European Investment Strategy report Monday, August 23. Our next report will be on Monday, August 30. Feature The past year has seen an unprecedented explosion of nonfinancial corporate debt as companies took on extraordinary leverage to weather the pandemic (Chart 1). This is a risk we recently highlighted in BCA Research European Investment Strategy, arguing that while euro area debt loads are not bad enough to make us turn bearish on European credit immediately, they still represent a concern for the future.  Rising debt servicing costs are also a risk, with aggregate euro area nonfinancial corporate debt servicing costs, as a percentage of operating cash flows, now pulling ahead of global peers. This increase has been led by France, where debt servicing costs now eat up a whopping 73.2% of cash flows. At the same time, value has steadily disappeared from European credit markets, with investment grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) spreads nearing 2018 lows (Chart 2). Our 12-month breakeven spread metric, which measures the amount of spread widening required over a 12-month period for corporate bond returns to break even with a duration-matched position in government bond securities, confirms this message. Ranked against their own history, IG and HY breakeven spreads are now at only their 16th and 13th percentiles, respectively. Chart 1Euro Area Debt Loads Are Rising Euro Area Debt Loads Are Rising Euro Area Debt Loads Are Rising Chart 2Value Has Disappeared From European Credit Value Has Disappeared From European Credit Value Has Disappeared From European Credit Against this backdrop, it pays to adopt a more cautious approach towards European credit. To that end, we are introducing our new and improved bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors (CHMs) for investment grade and high-yield issuers in the euro area. The CHMs are composite indicators of balance sheet and income statement ratios that are designed to assess the financial well-being of the overall non-financial corporate sectors in major developed economies. Before we jump into the message from our new European CHMs, however, it is important to review the methodology used to construct these indicators. A Quick Note On Methodology We begin by constructing a representative sample of euro area issuers to assess broader nonfinancial corporate health in the euro area. To accomplish this, we use the list of issuers from the Bloomberg Barclays IG and HY Corporate Bond Indices. Financials (mostly banks) are excluded from the calculations as they have very different balance sheet profiles, requiring a different set of metrics to properly assess the health of that sector. As an improvement of the previous euro area CHMs, we now use a dynamic sample of issuers that is updated every year. This allows us to account for the changing compositions of these indices over time, as issuers move up and down in quality, and are added or dropped from the index. This also accounts for the survivorship bias that arises as companies that go out of business are dropped from the sample. Note that our sample is static prior to 2012. Before this date, we do not have the data on index constituents needed to construct a dynamic sample. As of Q1/2021, the sample for the euro area IG CHM consists of roughly 200 issuers, covering 50% of the index, while the sample for HY consists of 50 issuers or so, covering only 25% of the index. As we can only get bottom-up data for publicly-listed companies, we are unable to include private companies that issue corporate debt but do not necessarily tap into the public equity market.    We then pull key financial statement ratios for these issuers on a quarterly basis. Specifically, we use the following six ratios: Profit Margins: Operating profits as a percent of corporate sales Return On Capital: After-tax earnings plus interest expense, as a percent of capital stock Debt Coverage: After-tax cash flow less capital expenditures, as a percent of all interest bearing debt Interest Coverage: EBIT divided by value of interest expense Leverage: Total debt as a percent of market value of equity Liquidity: Total current assets excluding total inventories divided by the value of total current liabilities It is important to note that we are using the same financial ratios as the CHMs that we have previously published for other developed markets. This could prove useful later when we search for relative performance relying exclusively on CHMs. To construct the CHM, we pick the medians of the individual ratios for every quarter, which we then de-trend, by subtracting out the 12-quarter moving average, and standardize. Finally, we take an equal-weighted average of all six ratios to calculate the CHM. Using median ratios precludes excessive influence from outliers, while de-trending them introduces more cyclicality into the CHM and allows it to better capture major turning points in corporate well-being. Lastly, we calculate a version of the CHM that includes only domestic issuers, which allows us to look at the health of European nonfinancial firms in isolation. This is important, as foreign issuers make up roughly 60% of both the IG and HY samples. US issuers account for most of the foreign issuers for both samples, meaning that part of the message from our overall indicator is on US corporate health. However, we include our overall indicator for the sake of completeness. Unveiling Our New European Corporate Health Monitors Chart 3 presents the all-issuer and domestic issuer versions of our new European IG corporate health monitor. A negative indicator signals improving nonfinancial corporate health and vice versa. Both indicators have shown steady improvement since Q2/2020, with the domestic indicator peaking out in Q1/2020. However, there has recently been a notable divergence between the two, with domestic issuers recovering at a significantly slower pace. The recovery in the IG CHMs has been broad-based, with all component ratios showing an improving trend (Chart 4). However, domestic firms have clearly lagged behind, with the overall indicator especially outperforming on the return on capital, leverage, and interest coverage metrics. It is important when looking at falling leverage, however, to consider the “denominator effect” of rising share prices on equity market value. Chart 3Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Health Monitor Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Health Monitor Euro Area Investment Grade Corporate Health Monitor Chart 4Euro Area IG CHM: Component Ratios Euro Area IG CHM: Component Ratios Euro Area IG CHM: Component Ratios The HY monitor offers a more balanced picture between the domestic and all-issuer CHMs, with both indicators signaling a modest improvement in corporate health (Chart 5). This picture is confirmed by the constituent ratios, which, in the case of HY, tend to track more closely between domestic and all-issuer (Chart 6). Again, decreasing leverage contributed positively to the situation, while rebounding profits provided a strong boost to interest coverage ratios.     Chart 5Euro Area High-Yield Corporate Health Monitor Euro Area High-Yield Corporate Health Monitor Euro Area High-Yield Corporate Health Monitor Chart 6Euro Area HY CHM: Component Ratios Euro Area HY CHM: Component Ratios Euro Area HY CHM: Component Ratios Overall, the underperformance of domestic issuers on corporate health can largely be explained by a delayed reopening in Europe and weaker overall European fiscal stimulus response relative to the US. However, we expect this picture to change in coming quarters as vaccination rates continue to climb, European stimulus expands, and pent-up demand is released.  For both HY and IG, metrics such as profit margins or leverage have not yet returned to pre-Covid levels. While it may appear difficult to reconcile this with the highly optimistic readings from the CHM, we note again that the ratios are de-trended before they are incorporated into the CHM. That makes the CHM a better indicator of how corporate health is turning on the margin rather than in absolute terms.    Chart 7Euro Area: CHMs Vs. Spreads Euro Area: CHMs Vs. Spreads Euro Area: CHMs Vs. Spreads Our new CHMs undoubtedly provide an important signal on corporate health, but we are interested in the implication for corporate credit spreads. Chart 7 shows that the domestic issuer CHMs have been reliable at catching periods of major spread widening/tightening. Generally speaking, the year-over-year change in the CHM is a coincident indicator and can be used to confirm if movements in spreads are in line with underlying corporate fundamentals. Clearly, the recent narrowing in spreads has not kept pace with the drastic improvement in the CHM over the past two quarters. This likely reflects how close spreads are to post-crisis lows, meaning that they have little room left to fall regardless of how much corporate health improves. This asymmetry of returns, where credit has little to benefit from improving nonfinancial corporate health while remaining exposed to a deterioration, is a longer-term concern for investors. While spreads in level terms have been on a slow and steady narrowing trend this year, they are, on a rate of change basis, moving towards a more neutral level. This message will be confirmed by the CHMs in coming quarters as the monitors revert to the mean from their most recent optimistic readings. While Chart 7 displays the coincident properties of the indicators, we can also tune into the forward-looking aspect by looking at how spreads have performed historically over different time horizons given the levels of the CHMs. Table 1 presents the performance of both IG and HY spreads over the subsequent 3-12 month period when their respective CHMs were positive or negative. Table 1CHM Direction And Subsequent Spread Performance Over 3-12 Months Introducing Our New European Corporate Health Monitors Introducing Our New European Corporate Health Monitors For both IG and HY, there are a few key conclusions. Firstly, when the domestic-only CHM is negative, spreads tend to widen in the subsequent 3-12 months. Conversely, they narrow, on average, when it is positive. This reflects the mean-reverting property of our indicators. After the indicator has been positive for a while, indicating deteriorating health, it is naturally going to trend back towards zero. Spreads tighten in the coming quarters as a reaction to this marginal improvement in corporate health. The same relationship holds in the opposite direction.    On the whole, however, the domestic-only CHM is more reliable than the overall CHM as an indicator of whether spreads are going to widen/narrow. This discrepancy is most pronounced for HY, where the all-issuer version largely provides a misleading signal, with spreads usually continuing to narrow after the CHM is negative and widening after it is positive. One possible explanation for this is that European spreads are sensitive to European events, and since the overall CHM has a large presence of US corporate issuers, it does not properly reflect how investors should be compensated with regard to nonfinancial corporate health. Beyond just looking at the change in spreads following a positive or a negative reading on the CHMs, we can also see how spreads change when the CHMs fall into different ranges. Table 2 presents spread performance for periods when the CHM was within specific ranges: below -1, between -1 and 0, between 0 and +1, and greater than +1. This analysis makes an even stronger point on the mean reverting property of the indicator. When the CHMs reach extremely stretched positive (negative) readings, spreads tend to narrow (widen) a lot. The impact is also most pronounced over a 12-month horizon, with HY spreads narrowing, on average, a whopping 452bps twelve months after the CHM hits a level greater than +1. Table 2CHM Level And Subsequent Spread Performance Over 3-12 Months Introducing Our New European Corporate Health Monitors Introducing Our New European Corporate Health Monitors Bottom Line: Our new bottom-up European CHMs have been signaling a broad-based and consistent improvement in corporate health since Q2/2020. The CHMs are coincident indicators that can be used to confirm if changes in spreads are in line with fundamentals. On a forward-looking basis, stretched positive (negative) levels of the CHM indicate potential for future spread tightening (widening). Investment Conclusions While our CHMs are currently flashing a positive message on nonfinancial corporate health, there are some reasons to be cautious on European credit. Firstly, debt loads are at historically high levels in the euro area, a message confirmed by the bottom-up data shown in Charts 4 and 6. Spreads, on an absolute and breakeven basis, are also near post-crisis lows, implying meagre prospects for further tightening and are, on the other hand, exposed to any deterioration in corporate health. Lastly, the mean-reverting property of our CHM indicates that the monitors are likely to move back towards “deteriorating” territory on the margin, a historically negative sign for spreads. However, it is hard to recommend staying out of European credit at a time when fiscal and monetary policy are overly accommodative, and growth looks poised to surprise to the upside. The European Central Bank has already marked itself as one of the most dovish developed market central banks and will likely do “whatever it takes” to prevent a blow-up in spreads and the associated tightening in financial conditions. And currently, spreads still offer a decent yield pickup over sovereigns, even if they do not have much room to tighten. Thus, balancing the positives and negatives suggests it still makes sense to hold neutral exposure to credit within a European fixed-income portfolio, but adding to this exposure is now unwarranted. In the euro area, BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy is currently neutral on investment grade and overweight on high-yield credit.  Within high-yield, we recommend staying up in quality, favoring Ba-rated credit and avoiding lower tiers which will be hit first if corporate health deteriorates and do not offer adequate compensation for credit risk. Likewise, our European Investment Strategy recommends a selective approach, favoring sectors with more defensive risk profiles. Bottom Line: Even though there is some cause for concern on the horizon, it is too early to pivot out of European credit with the macro backdrop still accommodative. Remain neutral on euro area investment grade and overweight high-yield while avoiding riskier sectors and credit tiers within the high-yield allocation.               Jeremie Peloso,                         Associate Editor                          JeremieP@bcaresearch.com  Shakti Sharma, Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Chart 1Still Close To Fair Value Still Close To Fair Value Still Close To Fair Value Treasury yields fell significantly in July, particularly at the long end of the curve. We continue to view this move as an overreaction to mediocre economic data that will be reversed this fall when labor supply constraints ease and employment surprises to the upside. It’s important to note, however, that despite the drop in long-dated yields the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield remains within the bounds of its 1.75% to 2.5% fair value range (Chart 1). That is, shorter-maturity Treasury yields have much more upside than long-dated yields on a 6-12 month investment horizon. We expect the next big move in bonds to be a bear-flattening of the yield curve as the market prices in a Fed rate hike cycle that we see starting near the end of 2022. Investors should position for that outcome today by keeping portfolio duration low and by entering yield curve flatteners. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +172 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports continued positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 89 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains steep. This is a strong signal that monetary conditions are accommodative. But despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade valuations are extremely tight (Chart 2). A recent report looked at what different combinations of Treasury slope and corporate spreads have historically signaled about corporate bond excess returns.1 It shows that tight corporate spreads only correlate with negative excess returns once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is below 50 bps. Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, better value can be found outside of the investment grade corporate sector. Specifically, we recommend that investors shift into high-yield corporates, municipal bonds and USD-denominated EM sovereigns and corporates. We also advise investors to favor long-maturity corporate bonds and those corporate sectors with elevated Duration-Times-Spread.2   Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +433 bps. A recent report looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.3 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.2% (Chart 3). Using a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we estimate that the 12-month default rate will fall to between 2.3% and 2.8%, below what the market currently discounts. Notably, the corporate default rate is tracking at an annualized rate of roughly 1.6% through the first six months of the year, well below the estimate generated by our macro model. Another recent report looked at the incremental spread pick-up investors can earn by moving out of investment grade corporates and into junk.4 It concluded that the extra spread available in high-yield is worth grabbing and that B-rated bonds look particularly attractive in risk-adjusted terms.   MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -64 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries widened 8 bps in July. The spread is wide compared to recent history, but it remains tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened 3 bps in July (panel 3), and it is now starting to look more competitive compared to other similarly risky spread sectors. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS sits at 36 bps, below the 54 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds but above the 20 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 34 bps offered by Agency CMBS. In a recent report we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.5 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will be higher in 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons (4%, 4.5%) over low coupons (2%, 2.5%, 3%) within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related Index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +57 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 149 bps in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -113 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 11 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +35 bps. Local Authority bonds underperformed by 19 bps in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +372 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 2 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +28 bps. Supranationals performed in line with Treasuries in July, year-to-date excess returns held flat at +26 bps. USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign bonds continue to offer an attractive spread pick-up versus investment grade US corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Russia. A recent report looked at valuation within the investment grade USD-denominated EM corporate space.6 It found that EM corporates are attractively priced relative to US corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum. It also found that EM corporates are attractive relative to EM sovereigns within the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns have the edge in the Aa credit tier. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +271 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bond performance. Trailing 4-quarter net state & local government savings were already positive through the end of Q1 2021 and they received another significant boost in Q2 as funds from the American Rescue Plan were doled out (Chart 6). With state & local government balance sheets in such good shape, we are comfortable moving down in quality within municipal bonds. A move down in quality is especially compelling because of tight Aaa muni valuations relative to Treasuries (top panel). Valuation is more compelling in the lower investment grade credit tiers, especially at the long-end of the curve.7 GO munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a 10% breakeven tax rate versus corporates with the same credit rating and duration. The breakeven tax rate for Revenue munis is just 2% (panel 2). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 25% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them susceptible to extension risk if bond yields rise. Treasury Curve: Buy 2/10 Barbell Versus 5-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-flattened in July. Bond yields were down across the curve, but by much more at the long end. The 2-year/10-year slope flattened 15 bps to end the month at 105 bps. The 5-year/30-year slope steepened 1 bp to end the month at 120 bps. While we expect the recent decline in bond yields to reverse during the next 6-12 months, we do not think this reversal will coincide with a re-steepening of the 2/10 yield curve. We noted on the first page of this report that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield remains close to its fair value range. Last week’s report demonstrated that yield curve steepening only occurs when either the Fed is cutting rates or the 5-year/5-year forward yield rises.8 This means that the 2/10 Treasury curve is more likely to flatten than steepen during the next 6-12 months, even as bond yields move higher. Similarly, we observe that the overnight index swap (OIS) curve is priced for the fed funds rate to be 0.17% in one year’s time and 1.36% in five years (Chart 7). While the latter rate has 157 bps of upside if it converges all the way back to its 2018 high, this pales in comparison to the 269 bps of upside in the 12-month forward rate. The yield curve will flatten as the 12-month forward OIS rate converges with the 5-year forward rate (panel 3). Investors should position in yield curve flatteners on a 6-12 month horizon. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell.   TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 112 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +578 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose by 9 bps and 8 bps, respectively, on the month. At 2.43%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the middle of the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.26%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is just below target (panel 3). With long-dated inflation expectations close to the Fed’s target levels, we see limited upside on a 6-12 month investment horizon. We also see the cost of short-maturity inflation protection falling during the next few months as realized inflation moderates from its extremely high level. This will lead to some modest steepening of the inflation curve (bottom panel). While the inflation curve has some room to steepen, we don’t see it returning to positive territory. An inverted inflation curve is simply more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one. This is because the Fed’s new framework calls for it to attack its inflation target from above rather than from below.  ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +37 bps. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed by 3 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +28 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +88 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. That excess savings has still not been spent and the most recent round of stimulus checks has only added to the stockpile, pushing the savings rate higher yet again (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum.   Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +187 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS performed in-line with Treasuries in July, keeping year-to-date excess returns steady at +82 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 16 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +539 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 28 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +87 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 5 bps on the month and it currently sits at 34 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have recovered to well below pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of July 30TH, 2021) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of July 30TH, 2021) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 26 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 26 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of July 30TH, 2021) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 2 For ideas on how to increase the average spread of a US bond portfolio please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 8 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Bump On The Road To Recovery”, dated July 27, 2021.

Highlights Q2/2021 Performance Breakdown: Our recommended model bond portfolio underperformed the custom benchmark index by -6bps during the second quarter of the year. Winners & Losers: The government bond side of the portfolio underperformed by -21bps, led overwhelmingly by our underweight to US Treasuries (-18bps). Spread product allocations outperformed by +15bps, primarily due to overweights on US high-yield (+11bps) and US CMBS (+3bps). Portfolio Positioning For The Next Six Months: We are maintaining an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, against a backdrop of persistent above-trend global growth and a highly stimulative fiscal/monetary policy mix. We are maintaining a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government debt, concentrated on an overweight to US high-yield where valuations look the least stretched. We are making two changes to the portfolio allocations heading into Q3: shifting the Treasury curve exposure to have more of a flattening bias, while downgrading EM USD-denominated corporates to neutral. Feature The trend in global bond yields so far in 2021 has been a tale of two quarters. The first three months of the year saw a surge in yields worldwide on the back of rapidly improving economic data, the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines and supply squeezes triggering rapid increases in inflation. During the second three months of the year, however, global yields drifted a bit lower in response to more mixed economic data, the spread of the Delta variant and slightly hawkish shifts from a few key central banks – most notably, the Fed – even with economic confidence measures remaining upbeat across the developed economies. The decline in yields has not been seen across the maturity spectrum, though. The yield-to-maturity of the Bloomberg Barclays Global and US Treasury 10+ year indices fell by -12bps and -30bps, respectively, from recent peaks. At the same time, shorter term bond yields have been relatively stable as central banks continue to signal that interest rate hikes are still well off into the future. In contrast to government bonds, credit markets have remained calm with spreads tight for developed market corporates and emerging market (EM) debt. With that in mind, we present our quarterly review of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio during the second quarter of 2021. We also present our recommended positioning for the portfolio for the next six months (Table 1), as well as portfolio return expectations for our base case and alternative investment scenarios. The latter half of 2021 should prove to be even more challenging for bond investors, who must disentangle less consistent messages across countries on the Delta variant, vaccinations, inflation and the outlook for both monetary and fiscal policy. Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. We do this by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q2/2021 Model Bond Portfolio Performance: Mixed Returns Chart 1Q2/2021 Performance: Credit Gains & Duration Losses Q2/2021 Performance: Credit Gains & Duration Losses Q2/2021 Performance: Credit Gains & Duration Losses The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into US dollars) in the second quarter was +1.13%, slightly underperformed the custom benchmark index by -6bps (Chart 1).1 In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated -21bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter outperformed by +15bps. We have remained significantly underweight US Treasuries and positioned for a bearish steepening of the US Treasury curve since just before last year's US presidential election. That tilt was a big contributor to the excess return of the portfolio in Q1 (+63bps) that was partially given back (-18bps) in Q2 as longer maturity Treasury yields fell during the quarter. Our inflation-linked bond allocations in the US and Europe (+5bps) helped mitigate the loss on the government bond side from our below-benchmark duration stance and general curve steepening bias in most countries in the portfolio (Table 2). Table 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Overall Return Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks The sum of excess returns during the quarter from countries that we overweighted (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Japan) was zero. Improving growth momentum and stronger economic confidence helped push yields higher in those countries. Therefore, those positions could not offset the losses from the underweight to US Treasuries. We did make two shifts in the country allocation within the government bond portion of the portfolio during Q2, downgrading Canada to underweight on April 20 and upgrading Australia to overweight on June 9. Neither change meaningfully contributed to the return of the portfolio. Meanwhile, our moderate overall overweight tilt on spread product versus government bonds fueled the outperformance from the credit side of the portfolio, led by US high-yield (+11bps) and US CMBS (+3bps). Overall gains from spread product were impressive in both USD-hedged total return terms (+95bps) and relative to our custom benchmark (+15bps), despite spreads entering Q2 at fairly tight levels. In the second quarter, improving economic confidence and easing credit conditions allowed spreads to narrow even further for corporate debt in the US and Europe, as well as for EM USD-denominated credit. The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 & 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Government Bond Performance Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Spread Product Performance Attribution By Sector GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Biggest Outperformers: Overweight US high-yield: Ba-rated (+5bps), B-rated (+4bps), and Caa-rated (+3bps) Overweight US TIPS (+4bps) Overweight US CMBS (+3bps) Overweight Euro Area high-yield (+1bps) Biggest Underperformers: Underweight US Treasuries with a maturity greater than 10 years (-17bps), Underweight US Treasuries with a maturity between 7 and 10 years (-3bps) Underweight US Treasuries with a maturity between 5 and 7 years (-2bps) Underweight EM USD sovereigns (-1bps) Underweight UK GIlts with a maturity greater than 10 years (-1bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q2/2021. Returns are hedged into US dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q2 (red for underweight, dark green for overweight, gray for neutral). Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Universe In Q2/2021 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Ideally, we would look to see more green bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. In Q2, the picture on that front was mixed. We were only neutral some of the biggest outperformers like UK Gilts (+312bps in USD-hedged duration-matched total return terms) and investment grade credit in the US (+430bps) and UK (+231bps). Our relative value allocation within EM, overweight corporates (+430bps) versus sovereigns (+527bps), also underperformed during Q2. We remained overweight government debt markets in the euro area which were the worst performers during the quarter (Germany: -25bps, Spain: -59bps, Italy: -67bps, and France: -83bps). The news was better on the credit side, where our significant overweight to US high-yield (+146bps) was a big positive contributor, as were overweights to US CMBS (+137bps) and euro area high-yield (+92bps). Bottom Line: Our model bond portfolio slightly underperformed its benchmark index in the second quarter of the year by -6bps – a negative result mainly driven by our underweight allocation to the US Treasury market but with an overweight to US high-yield providing a meaningful offset. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns & Scenario Analysis Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will continue to be driven primarily by swings in global government bond yields, most notably US Treasuries. Our most favored cyclical indicators for global bond yields are still, in aggregate, signaling more upside potential over at least the next six months, although the nature of the signal is changing (Chart 5). Our Global Duration Indicator, comprised of leading economic indicators and measures of future economic sentiment, remains elevated but appears to have peaked. At the same time, the global manufacturing PMI, which typically leads global real bond yields by around six months, continues to climb to new cyclical highs. This suggests that the recent downdraft in global real bond yields could prove to be short-lived. Our Global Central Bank Monitor is climbing steadily, indicating greater upward pressure on bond yields from the combination of strong growth, rising inflation and loose financial conditions. Admittedly, bond yields are lagging the upward trajectory implied by the Monitor with central banks deliberately responding far more slowly to the cyclical pressures that would have triggered bond-bearish monetary tightening in the past. Nonetheless, the Monitor, the Global Duration Indicator and the global manufacturing PMI and all sending the same message – global bond yields remain too low, suggesting a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance remains appropriate. With regards to country allocation within the government bond side of our model portfolio, we continue to overweight countries where central banks are less likely to begin normalizing pandemic-era monetary policy quickly (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Japan, Australia), while underweighting countries where normalization is expected to begin within the next 6-12 months (the US and Canada). We remain neutral the UK, although we have them on “downgrade watch” until there is greater clarity on how severely the spread of the Delta variant is impacting UK growth. The US remains the biggest underweight. The modestly hawkish turn by the Fed at the June FOMC meeting likely marked the end of the cyclical bear-steepening trend of the US Treasury curve. A full-blown turn to a bear-flattening of the US curve will be slow to develop, but we fully expect the cyclical pressures that drove the underperformance of longer-maturity US Treasuries over the past year to begin leaking into shorter-maturity bonds. That trend already appears to be underway with 5-year US yields starting to drift upward at a faster pace compared to other developed market peers (Chart 6). Chart 5Cyclical Indicators Suggest Global Yields Still Have More Upside Cyclical Indicators Suggest Global Yields Still Have More Upside Cyclical Indicators Suggest Global Yields Still Have More Upside Chart 6UST Underperformance Will Shift To Shorter Maturities UST Underperformance Will Shift To Shorter Maturities UST Underperformance Will Shift To Shorter Maturities This leads us to make a change to our model portfolio allocations this week, reducing the exposure to the belly of the US Treasury curve (the 3-5 year and 5-7 year maturity buckets), while modestly increasing the allocation to the 7-10 year bucket. To neutralize the duration-extending implication of that marginal shift, we added a new allocation to US Treasury bills, thus turning this US Treasury shift into a “butterfly” trade, essentially selling the 5-year bullet for a cash/10-year barbell. Longer-term Treasury yields, however, are still in the process of working off an oversold condition that developed in Q1 (Chart 7). Duration positioning remains quite short, according to the JP Morgan survey of bond investors, while speculators are still working off a huge net short position in 30-year Treasury futures according to data from the CFTC. We anticipate that it will take another month or two to work off such an extreme oversold condition for US Treasuries, based on similar episodes over the past two decades. After that, longer-maturity Treasury yields will begin to begin climbing again, to the benefit of the US underweight (and below-benchmark duration stance) in our model portfolio. Chart 7Longer-Maturity USTs Working Off Oversold Condition Longer-Maturity USTs Working Off Oversold Condition Longer-Maturity USTs Working Off Oversold Condition Chart 8A Sharply Diminished Impulse From Global QE A Sharply Diminished Impulse From Global QE A Sharply Diminished Impulse From Global QE Outside the US, the bond-friendly impact of quantitative easing programs is fading, on the margin, with the growth of central bank balance sheets slowing (Chart 8). While outright tapering of bond buying has only occurred in Canada and the UK (within our model bond portfolio universe), we expect the Fed to begin tapering in early 2022. Financial stability concerns are expected to play an increasingly important role in future tapering decisions, with house prices booming in many countries, most notably Canada which supports our underweight stance on Canadian government debt. Australia is the notable exception to this trend towards slowing balance sheet growth, with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) maintaining a healthy pace of bond buying given underwhelming realized inflation. The recent wave of COVID-19 cases, which has left half of Australia under lockdowns that were largely avoided in 2020, will ensure that the RBA stays dovish for longer, to the benefit of our overweight stance on Australian government bonds. We continue to see the overall dovish stance of global central bankers as being conducive to the outperformance of inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. However, inflation breakevens in most countries have largely completed the rebound from the depressed levels reached during the 2020 COVID-19 global recession. Our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators combine three measures to determine the upside potential for 10-year inflation breakevens: the distance from fair value based on our models, the spread between headline inflation and central bank target inflation, and the gap between market-based and survey-based measures of inflation expectations. Those indicators suggest that the most attractive markets to position for further upside potential for breakevens are in Italy and France, with breakevens looking more stretched in the US, Canada and Australia (Chart 9). On the back of this, we are maintaining our allocations to inflation-linked bonds in the euro area in our model portfolio. Chart 9Less Scope For Wider Global Inflation Breakevens Less Scope For Wider Global Inflation Breakevens Less Scope For Wider Global Inflation Breakevens Chart 10Fading Support For Credit Markets From Global QE Fading Support For Credit Markets From Global QE Fading Support For Credit Markets From Global QE Moving our attention to the credit side of our model portfolio, we feel that a moderate overweight stance on overall global corporates versus governments remains appropriate. However, the slowing trend in developed market central bank balance sheets, as an indicator of the incremental shift away from the COVID-era monetary policies from 2020, is flashing a warning sign for the performance of global spread product. The annual growth rate of the combined balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England has been an excellent leading indicator of the excess returns of both global investment grade and high-yield corporates over the past decade (Chart 10). That growth rate peaked back in February of this year, suggesting a peak of global corporate bond excess returns around February 2022 Although given the current tight level of global corporate bond spreads, both for investment grade and high-yield, we expect future return outperformance from corporates versus government debt to come from carry rather than spread compression. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads is the historical percentile ranking of 12-month breakeven spreads, which measure how much spreads would need to widen to eliminate the carry advantage over duration-matched government bonds on a one-year horizon. Currently, only the lower-rated high-yield credit tiers in the US and euro area offer 12-month breakeven spreads above the bottom quartile of their history, within the credit sectors of our model portfolio (Chart 11). Chart 11Lower-Rated High-Yield Offers Relatively Attractive Spreads GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Given the sharply reduced default risks on both sides of the Atlantic, and with nominal growth in good shape amid low borrowing rates, we are maintaining our overweights to high-yield bonds in both the US and euro area. At the same time, we are sticking with only a neutral stance on investment grade corporates in the US, euro area and the UK. We do anticipate starting to reduce the overall corporate bond exposure later this year, however, based on the ominous leading signal from the growth of central bank balance sheets – and what that signals about the future path for global monetary policy. Within the euro area, we continue to prefer owning Italian government bonds (and to a lesser extent, Spanish government debt) over investment grade corporates, given the more explicit support for the sovereigns through ECB quantitative easing (Chart 12). We expect the ECB to be the most accommodative central bank within our model portfolio universe over at least the next year, with even tapering of any kind unlikely in 2022. Chart 12Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area Investment Grade Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area Investment Grade Favor Italian BTPs Over Euro Area Investment Grade One area of the spread product universe where we are starting to reduce risk in the model portfolio is EM USD-denominated credit. EM debt has benefited from a bullish combination of global policy stimulus, a weakening US dollar and rising commodity prices over the past year. We have positioned for that in our model portfolio through an overall overweight stance on EM USD-denominated debt, but one that favors investment grade corporates over sovereigns. Now, all of those supportive factors for EM credit are fading. Chinese policymakers have reigned in both credit stimulus and fiscal stimulus this year, with the combined impulse suggesting a slower pace of Chinese economic growth in the latter half of 2021 (Chart 13). Given China’s huge share of the global consumption of industrial commodities, slowing Chinese growth should cool the momentum of commodity prices over the next few quarters. A slowing liquidity impulse from global central bank asset purchases is also a negative for EM debt performance, on the margin. The same can be said for the US dollar, which is no longer depreciating as markets start to pull forward the expected future path for US interest rates (Chart 14). A stronger US dollar typically correlates with softer commodity prices and wider EM credit spreads. Chart 13Major EM Risks: China Tightening & Global QE Tapering Major EM Risks: China Tightening & Global QE Tapering Major EM Risks: China Tightening & Global QE Tapering Chart 14EM Supportive USD Weakness Is Fading EM Supportive USD Weakness Is Fading EM Supportive USD Weakness Is Fading In response to these growing risks to the bullish EM backdrop - including the rapid spread of the Delta variant made worse by the less-effective vaccines available in those countries - we are downgrading our overall EM USD credit exposure in the model bond portfolio to underweight from neutral. We are doing this by cutting the EM corporate exposure from overweight to neutral, while maintaining an underweight tilt on EM USD sovereigns. We expect to further cut the EM exposure in the coming months by moving to a full underweight on EM corporates. Summing it all up, our overall allocations and risks in our model portfolio leading into Q3/2021 look like this: An overall below-benchmark stance on global duration, equal to nearly one full year versus the custom index (Chart 15) A moderate overweight stance on global spread product versus government debt, equal to five percentage points of the portfolio (Chart 16). This overweight comes almost entirely from overweight allocations to US and euro area high-yield corporate debt. Chart 15Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Stay Below Benchmark Chart 16Overall Portfolio Allocation: Small Spread Product Overweight GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks After the changes made to our US Treasury and EM positions, the tracking error of the portfolio, or its expected volatility versus that of the benchmark index, is quite low at 34bps (Chart 17). The main reason for this is that our positioning remains focused heavily on the US (Treasury underweight, high-yield overweight), with much of the other positioning close to neutral or largely offsetting other positions in a relative value sense (overweight Australia vs underweight Canada, overweight US CMBS versus underweight US Agency MBS). This fits with our desire to maintain only a moderate level of overall portfolio risk. The yield of the portfolio is now slightly higher than that of the benchmark, with a small “positive carry”, hedged into USD, of 13bps (Chart 18). Chart 17Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk: Moderate Chart 18Overall Portfolio Yield: Small Positive Carry Vs. Benchmark Overall Portfolio Yield: Small Positive Carry Vs. Benchmark Overall Portfolio Yield: Small Positive Carry Vs. Benchmark Scenario Analysis & Return Forecasts After making the shifts to our model bond portfolio allocations in the US and EM, we now turn to scenario analysis to determine the return expectations for the portfolio for the next six months. On the credit side of the portfolio, we use risk-factor-based regression models to forecast future yield changes for global spread product sectors as a function of four major factors - the VIX, oil prices, the US dollar and the fed funds rate (Table 2A). For the government bond side of the portfolio, we avoid using regression models and instead use a yield-beta driven framework, taking forecasts for changes in US Treasury yields and translating those in changes in non-US bond yields by applying a historical yield beta (Table 2B). For our scenario analysis over the next six months, we use a base case scenario plus two alternate “tail risk” scenarios. We see global growth momentum and the Fed monetary policy outlook as the two most important factors for fixed income markets in the second half of 2021, thus our scenarios are defined along those lines. Table 2AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate Spread Product Yield Changes GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Table 2BEstimated Government Bond Yield Betas To US Treasuries GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Base Case Global growth stays above-trend in both Q3 and Q4, putting downward pressure on unemployment rates and keeping realized inflation elevated. Ongoing global vaccinations lead to more of the global economy fully reopening, with the Delta variant not having serious widespread impact on economic confidence outside of parts of the emerging world. Excess savings built up during the pandemic are run down by both consumers and businesses as optimism stays ebullient within the developed economies. China credit tightening slows growth enough to cool off upward commodity price momentum. At the same time, falling US unemployment and surprisingly “sticky” domestic US realized inflation embolden the Fed to signal a move to begin tapering its bond purchases starting in January 2022. Real bond yields globally bottom out, while inflation expectations recover some of the pullback seen in Q2/2021. The entire US Treasury curve shifts higher, led by the 10-year reaching 1.65% and a modest bear-flattening of the 5-year/30-year curve. The VIX stays near 15, the US dollar rises +3%, the Brent oil price goes nowhere and the fed funds rate is unchanged at 0% Upside Growth Surprise The Delta variant proves to be far less deadly than feared. A rapid pace of global vaccinations leads to booming growth led by the US but including a fully reopened euro area. Chinese policymakers begin to reverse some of the H1/2021 credit tightening. Unemployment rates rapidly fall worldwide, while supply bottlenecks persist, keeping upward pressure on realized inflation. Markets pull forward the timing and pace of future central bank interest rate hikes, most notably in the US when the Fed begins tapering bond purchases sooner than expected before year-end. Real bond yields drift higher globally, but inflation breakevens stay elevated with the earlier surge in realized inflation proving not to be “transitory”. The US Treasury curve modestly bear-flattens, with the 10-year reaching 1.9% and the 5-year/30-year spread narrowing by 25bps. The VIX rises to 25 as risk assets struggle in response to rising bond yields even with faster growth. The US dollar falls -5% on the back of improving global growth expectations, the Brent oil price climbs +5% and the fed funds rate stays unchanged. Downside Growth Surprise The global economy gets hit on multiple fronts: the rapid spread of the Delta variant overwhelms the positive momentum on vaccinations, most notably in EM countries; Europe struggles to fully reopen; China policy tightening results in a larger-than-expected drag on global growth; and US households are reluctant to draw down on excess savings after government income support measures expire in September. Diminished economic optimism leads to a pullback in global equity values, lower government bond yields and wider global credit spreads. The US Treasury curve bull flattens as longer-maturity yields fall in a risk-off move, with the 10-year yield moving back down to 1.25% alongside lower inflation breakevens. The VIX rises to 30, the safe-haven US dollar rises +5%, the Brent oil price falls -10% and the fed funds rate stays at 0%. Chart 19Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factor Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Chart 20US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis US Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis The inputs into the scenario analysis are shown in Chart 19 (for the USD, VIX, oil and the fed funds rate), while the US Treasury yield scenarios are in Chart 20. The excess return scenarios for the model bond portfolio, using the above inputs in our simple quantitative return forecast framework, are shown in Table 3A (the scenarios for the changes in US Treasury yields are shown in Table 3B). Table 3AGFIS Model Bond Portfolio Scenario Analysis For The Next Six Months GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Table 3BUS Treasury Yield Assumptions For The 6-Month Forward Scenario Analysis GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks The model bond portfolio is expected to deliver a positive excess return over the next six months of +46bps in the base case scenario and +28bps in the optimistic growth scenario, but is projected to underperform by -36bps in the pessimistic growth scenario. Bottom Line: We are maintaining an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, against a backdrop of persistent above-trend global growth and a highly stimulative fiscal/monetary policy mix. We are maintaining a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government debt, concentrated on an overweight to US high-yield where valuations look the least stretched. We are making two changes to the portfolio allocations heading into Q3: shifting the Treasury curve exposure to have more of a flattening bias, while downgrading EM USD-denominated corporates to neutral. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high-quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2021 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Hitting A Few Roadblocks Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1Employment Growth Employment Growth Employment Growth June’s employment report revealed that 850 thousand jobs were added to nonfarm payrolls during the month. This is well above the 416k to 505k threshold that is required to hit the Fed’s “maximum employment” target in time for a rate hike in 2022 (Chart 1). The bond market, however, didn’t see things this way. Treasury yields fell across the entire curve following the report’s release on Friday. This is likely because, in contrast to the establishment survey’s strong +850k print, the household employment survey showed a decline of 18k jobs and an uptick in the unemployment rate from 5.8% to 5.9%. Importantly, the household survey tends to be more volatile than the establishment survey, and we expect it will catch up in the coming months. We see the bond market as overly complacent in the face of what is shaping up to be a rapid labor market recovery that will only accelerate once schools re-open and expanded unemployment benefits lapse in September. US bond investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration.   Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 50 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +209 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports continued positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 99 bps, the 3/10 Treasury slope remains very steep and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is below the Fed’s 2.3% to 2.5% target range. The message from these two indicators is that the Fed is not yet ready for monetary conditions to turn restrictive. Despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is at its lowest since 1995 (Chart 2). Last week’s report looked at what different combinations of Treasury slope and corporate spreads have historically signaled about corporate bond excess returns.1 We found that tight corporate spreads only correlate with negative excess returns once the 3/10 Treasury slope is below 50 bps. Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, better value can be found outside of the investment grade corporate sector. Specifically, we recommend favoring high-yield over investment grade. We also prefer municipal bonds, USD-denominated EM sovereigns and USD-denominated EM corporates over investment grade US corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 122 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +468 bps. Last week’s report looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.2 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 2.8% (Chart 3). Using a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we estimate that the 12-month default rate will fall to between 2.3% and 2.8%, slightly below what the market currently discounts. This estimate assumes 7% real GDP growth (an input we use to forecast corporate profit growth) and corporate debt growth of between 0% and 8%. Notably, the corporate default rate is tracking at an annualized rate of roughly 1.8% through the first five months of the year, below the estimate generated by our macro model. At 267 bps, the average option-adjusted spread on the High-Yield index is at its lowest since 2007. However, our above analysis suggests that these spread levels are still consistent with earning positive excess returns versus duration-matched Treasuries because default losses will also be low. High-yield spreads also look relatively attractive compared to investment grade spreads. Investors still receive an additional 97 bps of spread as compensation for moving out of the Baa credit tier and into the Ba tier (panel 2). Given the accommodative macro environment, we advise investors to grab this extra spread. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 36 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -45 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries tightened 8 bps in June. The spread remains wide compared to recent history, but it is still tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened 13 bps in June (panel 3), and it is now starting to look more competitive compared to other similarly risky spread sectors. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS sits at 34 bps, below the 49 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds but above the 17 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 30 bps offered by Agency CMBS. In a recent report we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.3 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will rise during the next 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons (4%, 4.5%) over low coupons (2%, 2.5%, 3%) within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS.  Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +91 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 16 bps in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +36 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +46 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 31 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +392 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 1 bp, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +26 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 3 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +26 bps. USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign bonds continue to offer an attractive spread pick-up versus investment grade US corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Russia. Last week’s report looked at valuation within the investment grade USD-denominated EM corporate space.4 We found that EM corporates are attractively priced relative to US corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum. We also found that EM corporates are attractive relative to EM sovereigns within the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns have the edge in the Aa credit tier. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +309 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We took a detailed look at municipal bond performance and valuation in a recent report and come to the following conclusions.5 First, the economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bond performance. The recently enacted American Rescue Plan includes $350 billion of funding for state & local governments, a bailout that came after state & local government revenues already exceeded expenditures in 2020 (Chart 6). Second, Aaa-rated municipal bonds look expensive relative to Treasuries (top panel). Muni investors should move down in quality to pick up additional yield. Third, General Obligation (GO) and Revenue munis offer better value than investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration, particularly at the long-end of the curve. Revenue munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a before-tax yield pick-up versus corporates. GO munis offer a breakeven tax of just 6% (panel 2). Fourth, taxable munis offer a yield advantage over credit rating and duration-matched investment grade corporates that investors should grab (panel 3). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 20% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them susceptible to extension risk if bond yields rise. Treasury Curve: Buy 2/10 Barbell Versus 5-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve underwent a massive re-shaping in June. Yields at the front-end of the curve rose significantly after the June FOMC meeting while longer-maturity yields declined. All told, the yield curve flattened dramatically on the month. The 2/10 slope flattened 24 bps to end the month at 120 bps. The 5/30 slope flattened 28 bps to end the month at 119 bps. As we wrote in a recent report, we believe that the June FOMC meeting marks an inflection point for the yield curve.6 Prior to the meeting, the yield curve up to the 10-year maturity point had generally been in a bear-steepening/bull-flattening regime, where the slope of the yield curve was positively correlated with the average level of yields (Chart 7). But bond investors appear to have left the June FOMC meeting with a sense that we are now marching toward a Fed rate hike cycle. In that new world, it makes more sense for the yield curve to be negatively correlated with the average level of yields: a bear-flattening/bull-steepening regime. Given that we expect the Fed to lift rates before the end of 2022, we are now sufficiently close to a tightening cycle that the yield curve should bear-flatten between now and then. We therefore recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet and go long a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This position offers a negative yield pick-up, but it looks modestly cheap on our fair value model (see Appendix A) and it will earn capital gains as the 2/10 slope flattens. TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 22 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +461 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates both fell 10 bps on the month. At 2.35%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is just within the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.18%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is below where the Fed would like it to be (panel 3). We see some upside in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates during the next 6-12 months, as we expect that the 5-year/5-year forward breakeven will find its way back into the Fed’s target range before the first rate hike. However, once the Fed starts tightening it will have a strong incentive to keep long-maturity breakevens below 2.5%. This means that a long position in TIPS versus nominal Treasuries has limited upside. We also see the cost of short-maturity inflation protection falling somewhat during the next few months, as realized inflation is likely at its peak. This will lead to some modest steepening of the inflation curve (panel 4). We do expect, however, that the inflation curve will remain inverted. An inverted inflation curve is simply more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one, as the Fed will be attacking its inflation target from above rather than from below. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +39 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 5 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +31 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 14 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +84 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. That excess savings has still not been spent and the most recent round of stimulus checks has only added to the stockpile by pushing the savings rate higher yet again (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum.     Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +183 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 4 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +82 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 66 bps in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to a whopping +522 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Even with the economic recovery well underway, commercial real estate loan demand continues to contract and banks are not making lending standards more accommodative (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +116 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 3 bps on the month and it currently sits at 30 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have recovered to well below pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of June 30TH, 2021) On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of June 30TH, 2021) On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 9 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 9 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of June 30TH, 2021) On Track For 2022 Liftoff On Track For 2022 Liftoff   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Making Money In Municipal Bonds”, dated April 27, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How To Re-Shape The Yield Curve Without Really Trying”, dated June 22, 2021.

Highlights Spread Product: The macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries in US bond portfolios. High-Yield: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. EM Corporates: Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Feature Chart 1Fed Meeting Didn't Shock Credit Markets Fed Meeting Didn't Shock Credit Markets Fed Meeting Didn't Shock Credit Markets Last week’s report looked at how the June FOMC meeting prompted a massive re-shaping of the Treasury curve.1 It didn’t discuss, however, the impact that June’s meeting had on credit spreads. There’s a simple reason for this. Corporate bond spreads didn’t move very much post-FOMC. In fact, neither investment grade nor high-yield spreads have widened significantly during the past two weeks, despite the Fed’s apparent “hawkish turn” (Chart 1). The VIX jumped briefly above 20 in the days following the Fed meeting but it has since re-discovered its lows (Chart 1, bottom panel). This week’s report considers whether the corporate bond market is too complacent. The first section updates our assessment of where we are in the credit cycle based on two indicators that did see large swings post-Fed. The second section updates our outlook for high-yield defaults and considers whether junk spreads continue to offer adequate compensation. Finally, the third section of this report presents an introductory look at valuation in the USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) corporate sector. We find that, for the most part, investment grade EM corporates are attractively valued relative to EM sovereigns and US corporates of the same credit rating and duration. Credit Cycle Update Chart 2Credit Cycle Indicators Credit Cycle Indicators Credit Cycle Indicators As we have repeatedly stated in past research, the slope of the yield curve is a very important credit cycle indicator.2 We have documented that spread product tends to outperform duration-matched Treasuries by a wide margin when the yield curve is steep. This outperformance tapers off once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope falls below 50 bps and it falls off even more when the slope dips below zero.3 With that in mind, it is notable that the Treasury curve flattened dramatically following the June FOMC meeting (Chart 2). At 106 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains well above the 50 bps threshold that would start to get concerning for spread product. However, it’s likely that the yield curve will continue to flatten as we approach a Fed rate hike in 2022. In other words, we expect that monetary conditions will turn sufficiently restrictive for us to reduce our recommended spread product allocation within the next 12-18 months. On the other hand, one positive development for spread product returns is that the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate declined following the June FOMC meeting. In fact, it is now below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 2, bottom panel). This is a positive development for spread product because the Fed will strive to ensure that monetary conditions stay accommodative at least until these long-dated inflation expectations are consistent with the 2.3% to 2.5% target. Or put differently, a rebound in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates back to the target range will slow the near-term pace of curve flattening, giving the credit cycle a small amount of extra running room. In short, the macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Investment Grade Corporates The highly supportive macro environment applies to investment grade corporate bonds, just as it does to all spread sectors. However, investment grade corporates have the problem that valuation is extremely tight. Much like a flat yield curve environment, a tight spread environment tends to coincide with low excess corporate bond returns. However, our research reveals that tight spreads alone are not sufficient for investment grade corporates to underperform duration-matched Treasuries. Table 1 classifies each month since May 1973 based on the investment grade corporate bond spread and the 3/10 Treasury slope. It then shows a 90% confidence interval for corporate bond excess returns during the following 12 months. It shows that, even when the corporate bond spread is below 100 bps (it is 81 bps today), investment grade corporates still tend to outperform duration-matched Treasuries as long as the 3/10 Treasury slope is above 50 bps. Table 1Expected 12-Month Corporate Bond Excess Return* (BPs) Based On OAS And Yield Curve Slope The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The Post-FOMC Credit Environment Bottom Line: The yield curve has started to flatten but it remains very steep, consistent with spread product outperforming duration-matched Treasuries. We remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries but will re-consider this position once the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. We expect this could happen within the next 12-18 months. We maintain only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds because of stretched valuations. We see more attractive opportunities in high-yield corporates (see next section), municipal bonds, USD-denominated EM sovereigns and USD-denominated EM corporates (see final section below). High-Yield Default Update We last updated our default rate outlook in March.4 At that time, we concluded that junk spreads offered adequate compensation for expected default losses. Since then, we have received nonfinancial corporate sector profit and debt growth data for the first quarter of 2021, crucial inputs to our macro-based default rate model. Our macro-based model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (i.e. pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards (Chart 3). Lending standards enter our model with a lag, but we need a forward-looking estimate of gross leverage for our model to generate predictions. Chart 3Macro-Driven Default Rate Model Macro-Driven Default Rate Model Macro-Driven Default Rate Model To estimate gross leverage we first model corporate profit growth based on real GDP (Chart 4) and assume that real GDP grows by 7% over the next four quarters, consistent with the Fed’s median forecast. This gives us a profit growth expectation of roughly 30%. Chart 4Profit & Debt Growth Profit & Debt Growth Profit & Debt Growth We also need an estimate for corporate debt growth. Corporate debt exploded last year, growing 10% in 2020, but it then slowed to an annualized rate of 4% in Q1 2021. We think corporate debt growth will remain slow going forward. The nonfinancial corporate sector financing gap has been negative in each of the past four quarters (Chart 4, bottom panel), meaning that retained earnings have exceeded capital expenditures. In other words, firms have built up a lot of excess capital that can be deployed in place of debt to finance new investment opportunities. Table 2 shows our model’s predicted 12-month default rate based on different assumptions for profit and debt growth. If we assume corporate profit growth of 30% and corporate debt growth between 0% and 8%, then our model predicts that the 12-month default rate will fall from its current 5.5% to a range of 2.3% - 2.8%. Table 2Default Rate Scenarios The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The Post-FOMC Credit Environment Next, we need to consider what sort of expected default rate is priced into the High-Yield index. Our analysis of historical junk spreads and returns suggests that we should require a minimum excess spread of 100 bps in the High-Yield index after subtracting default losses to be confident that junk bonds will outperform Treasuries.5 If we also assume a recovery rate of 40% on defaulted debt, then we calculate that the High-Yield index is fairly priced for a 12-month default rate of 2.9% (Chart 5). That is, junk spreads appear slightly cheap compared to the 2.3% - 2.8% range predicted by our macro model.  Finally, it’s worth noting that actual corporate default events have been quite rare in recent months. In the first five months of 2021 we’ve seen between 1 and 3 default events per month. If we extrapolate that trend and assume we see 3 defaults per month going forward, then we calculate that the 12-month trailing default rate will fall to 2.0% by December, before leveling off at 2.2% (Chart 6). In other words, the recent trend has been one of significantly fewer defaults than predicted by our macro model Chart 5Spread-Implied Default Rate Spread-Implied Default Rate Spread-Implied Default Rate Chart 6Recent Default Trends Recent Default Trends Recent Default Trends Bottom Line: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. An Attractive Opportunity In EM Corporates This week we present an introductory look at the risk/reward opportunity in USD-denominated EM corporate bonds. Specifically, we look at the investment grade Bloomberg Barclays USD-denominated EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index. We compare this index to both the investment grade USD-denominated EM Sovereign index and the US Credit index.6 First, we look at recent performance trends and average index statistics (Table 3). Both the EM Corporate and EM Sovereign indexes have average credit ratings between A and Baa, so we compare their performance to the A-rated and Baa-rated US Credit indexes. We observe a significant option-adjusted spread (OAS) advantage in both the EM indexes, though part of the extra spread offered by the Sovereign index is compensation for its longer duration. The EM Corporate index sticks out as offering an extremely attractive OAS per unit of duration. Table 3Performance Trends & Index Statistics The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The Post-FOMC Credit Environment As for performance, we see that the EM Corporate index experienced less of a drawdown (in excess return terms) during the COVID recession, though it has also returned less than both the EM Sovereign index and the Baa Credit index during the recent upswing. Chart 7Spreads Versus Credit Rating & Duration-Matched US Credit The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The Post-FOMC Credit Environment Next, we look at each individual credit tier of both the EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index and the EM Sovereign index, and we calculate the spread relative to a credit rating and duration-matched position in the US Credit index (Chart 7). In general, we see that both EM indexes offer a spread advantage versus duration-matched US Credit across all credit rating tiers. EM sovereigns look better than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. This is the result of attractive spreads on the sovereign bonds of UAE and Qatar. However, EM corporates clearly dominate sovereigns in both the A and Baa credit tiers. Finally, we consider the risk/reward trade-off in our EM indexes by using our Excess Return Bond Map. Our Excess Return Bond Map shows the relationship between expected return (on the vertical axis) and risk (on the horizontal axis). In Chart 8A our risk measure is the 12-month spread widening required for each index to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries divided by that index’s historical spread volatility. It can be thought of as the number of standard deviations of spread widening required for the index to provide an excess return of -100 bps. A higher value corresponds to less risk, and vice-versa. Chart 8B uses the same risk measurement, only we use the spread widening required to lose 500 bps versus Treasuries to assess the risk of a large drawdown. Both Charts 8A and 8B use OAS as the measure of expected return. Chart 8AExcess Return Bond Map (100 BPs Loss Threshold) The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The Post-FOMC Credit Environment Chart 8BExcess Return Bond Map (500 BPs Loss Threshold) The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The Post-FOMC Credit Environment The first thing that sticks out in Charts 8A & 8B is that Baa-rated EM corporates offer greater expected return and less risk than the EM Sovereign index and the Baa US Credit Index. This is true whether our loss threshold is set at 100 bps or 500 bps. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to split the EM Sovereign index by credit tier in these charts. A-rated EM corporates offer slightly less expected return than the EM Sovereign index but with significantly less risk, they also clearly dominate the A-rated US Credit Index. Aa-rated EM corporates appear to offer a similar risk/reward trade-off as the EM Sovereign index, though we know from Chart 7 that sovereigns have a spread advantage in the Aa credit tier. The bottom line is that USD-denominated EM corporates are attractively valued relative to investment grade US corporate bonds with the same duration and credit rating. EM corporates also look preferable to EM sovereigns in the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns are more attractive than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How To Re-Shape The Yield Curve Without Really Trying”, dated June 22, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think”, dated May 25, 2021. 3 We use the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope in place of the more widely tracked 2-year/10-year slope in our credit cycle research only because using the 3-year/10-year slope allows us to include more historical cycles in our analysis. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “That Uneasy Feeling”, dated March 30, 2021. 5 Please see page 33 of the US Bond Strategy Quarterly Chartpack, “Testing The Limits Of Transitory Inflation”, dated May 18, 2021. 6 The US Credit Index consists predominantly of US corporate bonds, but also some non-corporate credit such as: Sovereigns, Foreign Agencies, Domestic Agencies, Local Authority bonds and Supranationals. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Euro Area debt loads have increased significantly during the pandemic. Debt loads are not uniform. While Germany and, to a lesser extent, Spain look best, France has a less attractive total debt profile than Italy. Government debt-service ratios are not a problem for Europe. Private sector debt service ratios do not represent an imminent risk, but the French corporate sector is an important source of long-term vulnerability for the region. As a result of this indebtedness, Euro Area bond yields will not rise much and will be capped below 1.5% over this business cycle. For now, Eurozone corporate bonds remain attractive within a European fixed-income portfolio. High-yield bonds are appealing, but investors should avoid the energy sector. Feature Like the US, the Eurozone economy has witnessed a large increase in debt following the COVID-19 crisis. This debt load will have a long legacy that will impact the ability of the European Central Bank to increase interest rates over the coming years. The French corporate sector will be a particularly vulnerable pressure point. Nonetheless, in the short-term, this uptick in indebtedness will not have a major impact on European debt markets. Disparate Debt Loads… Chart 1The Eurozone's Heavy Debt Load The Eurozone's Heavy Debt Load The Eurozone's Heavy Debt Load After a period of decline in the wake of both the GFC and the European debt crisis, total nonfinancial debt rose by 29% of GDP since the COVID-19 pandemic began (Chart 1). While some of this increase reflects a declining GDP, Euro Area Households and Corporations together added EUR609 billion of debt, while governments accumulated over EUR1 trillion more to their borrowings. The aggregate European picture does not impart the more complex reality. While all countries experienced a marked rise in indebtedness, some major economies are in a much more precarious position than others. The Good Among the largest Eurozone economies, Germany sports the most favorable debt profiles and represents the smallest threat to the Eurozone. Compared with the other major Euro Area countries, Spain shows healthier trends, even if its overall debt load remains important. At 202%, Germany’s nonfinancial-debt-to-GDP ratio is still below its all-time high of 211% (Chart 2, top panel). During the crisis, household debt rose by EUR296 billion or 4% of GDP, but it still stands well below the 72% registered at the turn of the millennium. In absolute terms, nonfinancial corporate debt has increased to a record, but it remains 5% below its 2003 high (Chart 2, third panel). Despite a 9% rebound to 70% of GDP, government debt still lies nearly 12% below its 2010 summit (Chart 2, bottom panel). In Spain, total nonfinancial debt rose by 45% of GDP since the pandemic started, but remains 12% below its 2013 all-time high of 301%. However, the private sector’s borrowing is well behaved, and it has only risen to 170% of GDP, well below the 227% level recorded in 2010 (Chart 3, top panel). Both the household and corporate sectors have gone a long way toward improving their debt situation, with borrowing 23% and 33%, respectively, below their crisis peaks (Chart 3, second and third panel). Spain’s problem is government debt. The pandemic forced the public sector to borrow EUR316 billion, which pushed its debt load to 120% of GDP (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 2Germany Is The Best Student Germany Is The Best Student Germany Is The Best Student Chart 3Spain's Previous Efforts Have Paid Off Spain's Previous Efforts Have Paid Off Spain's Previous Efforts Have Paid Off The Bad Chart 4Italy Remains Problematic Italy Remains Problematic Italy Remains Problematic Italian debt remains a troublesome spot for the Eurozone, which sheds some light on the higher interest rate commanded by BTPs. Burdened by tepid GDP growth, Italy’s total nonfinancial debt did not decline much in the years between the European debt crisis and the onset of the pandemic. As a result, overall nonfinancial debt jumped to an all-time high of 276% of GDP in response to COVID-19 (Chart 4, top panel). Private sector nonfinancial credit is high by Italian standards, but at 120% of GDP, it is low compared with other major European or G-10 nations. Italian household debt has hit a record high of 45% of GDP, which also compares well to other countries, while corporate debt rose to 76% of GDP, which is also well below historical highs and other nations (Chart 4, second and third panels). Italy’s perennial problem remains the public sector’s debt, which stands at 156% of GDP, the highest reading among major Eurozone nations. The Ugly The major Eurozone country with the worst debt situation is France, and we expect this country to become an increasingly large hurdle on the ability of the ECB to lift rates in the future. Next week, we will devote a Special Report to the French situation. Chart 5France's Debt Binge France's Debt Binge France's Debt Binge France’s nonfinancial debt towers above 350% of GDP, and the private sector nonfinancial debt has also hit an all-time high of 240% of GDP (Chart 5, top panel). No sector is spared. French households have accumulated EUR239 billion of liabilities during the pandemic, which pushed their leverage ratio to an all-time high of nearly 70% of GDP (Chart 5, second panel). Meanwhile, after rising by 21%, nonfinancial corporate credit stands above 170% of GDP (Chart 5, third panel). Finally, at 116% of GDP, public debt may not be as high as in Italy, but it is comparable to that of Spain (Chart 5, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The Eurozone indebtedness has hit a record high, but considering this factor in isolation oversimplifies a complicated picture. Among the major economies, Germany has the cleanest balance sheet, especially in terms of its private sector. Spain continues to sport high leverage, but the private sector remains in much better shape than last decade. Italy has made little progress, but it still looks good compared with France, where both the public and private sector borrowings stand at record highs. … And Debt Servicing Costs With the exception of the French corporate sector, debt-servicing costs do not represent a great risk for Europe. Chart 6Interest Payments Are Not The Government's Problem Interest Payments Are Not The Government's Problem Interest Payments Are Not The Government's Problem When it comes to governments, the picture is particularly benign. As Chart 6 illustrates, debt-servicing costs as a percentage of GDP or tax revenues are extremely low in both France and Germany. While these two variables are higher in Italy and Spain, they remain distant from the levels recorded during the European debt crisis. Beyond their low levels, a very accommodative policy environment limits the risk created by Europe’s public debt servicing costs. The ECB has purchased EUR1.3 trillion of government bonds since April 2020, which added to its already large ownership. Moreover, BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy service, as well as this publication, anticipates that the ECB will roll the stock of government paper purchased under the PEPP into the PSPP. Beyond the ECB’s actions, the NGEU funds also create the embryo of fiscal risk sharing in the EU, which limits how far yields (and thus debt servicing costs) will rise in the Italy or Spain. For the private sector, the picture is more nuanced. In Germany, household debt-servicing costs are low, both historically and compared with other nations. Meanwhile, BIS data highlights that the nonfinancial corporate debt services consume a larger share of operating cash flows than at any point over the past 20 years, but they remain low by international standards (Chart 7, top panel). Meanwhile, in Spain and Italy, both the household and nonfinancial corporate sectors sport historically low debt servicing costs (Chart 7, second and third panels), which also compare well to other OECD nations. Once again, France stands out. Its household debt servicing costs are historically elevated, even if they are not particularly demanding at a global level. However, the corporate sector spends a substantial share of its cash flow on debt, both compared with its own history and internationally (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7Debt Servicing Costs Across Europe Debt Servicing Costs Across Europe Debt Servicing Costs Across Europe Bottom Line: Generally, the debt-service picture in Europe does not represent a major threat for now. While risks are particularly well contained on the government front, the French corporate sector creates danger for the private sector. Investment Implications The elevated debt load in the Euro Area, especially in the corporate sector, constitutes a crucial limiting factor for interest rates in Europe over the coming business cycle. Compared with global economies, the Eurozone corporate sector sports elevated debt ratios. As Chart 8 illustrates, the Eurozone’s net debt-to-equity ratio is higher than that of the US across most sectors, and even surpasses that of Canada, another country with a heavily indebted corporate sector, for telecommunication firms and financials. The picture is even worse when looking at the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio. Except for energy and utilities, the Eurozone carries poorer numbers than both the US and Canada (Chart 9). Chart 8Debt-To-Equity Ratio Comparison A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Chart 9Net Debt-To-EBITDA Comparison A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt The picture for debt service payments is even more damning. Despite the very low European corporate bond rates, Eurozone corporations generally have poorer interest rate coverage ratios than both the US and Canada (Chart 10). This indicates that, unless the subpar European profitability is resolved, significantly higher interest rates will cause significant damage to the European corporate sector. Chart 10Interest Coverage Lags In Europe A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Chart 11The French Corporate Sector And Dutch Households Will Limit The ECB A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt On this front, the French corporate sector once again stands out as the most likely place for an accident. As the top panel of Chart 11 shows, French firms are positioned especially poorly, with both their debt-to-GDP and debt-servicing costs among the highest in advanced economies. Meanwhile, in the household sectors, only the Netherlands represents a potential risk (Chart 11, bottom panel). The level of corporate debt in the Eurozone and in France in particular suggests that the current level of yields in Canada may represent a cap on European long-term rates. Thus, it will be difficult for German yields to move beyond the 1% to 1.5% zone this cycle. For now, despite the elevated debt loads of the European corporate sector, we continue to overweight corporate bonds within European fixed-income portfolios. The ECB will maintain very accommodative monetary conditions for the next 24 months, at least. Moreover, the European recovery, especially in the service sector, will improve the operating cash flows of the corporate sector, and thus, increase the tolerance of the private sector for higher yields in the near terms. Finally, the strength in the Euro anticipated by BCA’s Foreign Exchange strategists will limit the upside to Eurozone inflation, and thus, to yields in the region. Nonetheless, investors should avoid certain sectors (see next section). Market Focus: How To Play Euro Area High Yield Bonds? Chart 12Valuations Are Getting Expensive Valuations Are Getting Expensive Valuations Are Getting Expensive We have argued that investors should continue to favor investment grade corporate bonds within European fixed-income portfolios over high-yield corporate bonds. Eurozone investment grade credit still offered enough value to delay a move down in quality (Chart 12). However, this value cushion is thinning and spreads are only 10 bps from their 2018 lows. BCA Research’s Global Fixed-Income strategists have recently increased their allocation to Euro Area high-yield to overweight, with a focus on the Ba-rated credit tier, while maintaining a neutral weighting in IG credit.  However, European high-yield is also becoming expensive. The yield on the overall index is a meagre 44 bps away from its lows of 2018. Moreover, the breakeven spreads of European junk bonds have only been more expensive 11% of the time since 2000 (Chart 12, bottom panel). Despite these observations, high-yield credit is not a uniform block. Caa-rated debt still offers decent value, with a breakeven spread historical percentile standing at 27%. The stretched level of valuation suggests that investors should become more selective in the high-yield space, in order to avoid the industries with the worst risk profiles. To assess the sectors most at risk of experiencing significant spread widening or default occurrences in the coming quarters, we evaluate how the 10 main high-yield industry groups, as defined by Bloomberg Barclays, perform on the following credit metrics: Risk profile The share of firms rated Caa Growth in value of debt outstanding over the past 10 years Change in net debt-to-EBITDA ratio over the past 10 years Risk Profile Chart 13Risk Profile Of HY Sectors A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt We look at the duration-times-spread (DTS) ratio to determine the risk profile of each sector (Chart 13). The DTS is a simple measure that correlates closely with excess return volatility for corporate bonds. The ratio of an issue’s, or sector’s DTS, to that of the benchmark index is loosely equivalent to the beta of a stock or industry to the equity benchmark. A DTS ratio above 1.0 signals that the sector is cyclical (or “high beta”); a DTS ratio below 1.0 indicates that the sector is defensive (or “low beta”). Cyclical sectors are expected to outperform (underperform) the benchmark when spreads are narrowing (widening), while the opposite is expected of defensive sectors. In Europe, only three sectors sport a high DTS. Within these cyclical sectors, energy clearly stands out as essentially being the one most at risk of underperforming during the next episode of spread widening. Meanwhile, materials, healthcare, and utilities display the lowest DTS ratios and should trade defensively relative to the high-yield benchmark index. Share of Caa-rated debt Chart 14High Share Of Caa-Rated Debt Implies Higher Risk Of Default A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt The bulk of defaults happens in the Caa-rated space and below. Hence, evaluating sector risk starts by assessing the share of Caa-rated (and below) debt sported by each industry (Chart 14). Sectors bearing a larger share of low-rated debt should display higher spreads. Consumer non-cyclicals and healthcare have the highest instance of low-rated debt, 16% and 13% respectively, and yet their spreads do not adequately compensate investors for this threat. The energy sector also stands out: spreads are wide because, despite the low percentage of Caa-rated debt, this sector has amassed considerable debt and has seen a meaningful deterioration in net debt-to-EBITDA (see below). Meanwhile, utilities shine under this metric, as they have not issued debt rated Caa or lower. Debt Growth Chart 15Debt Growth Justify Spread Levels A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt The speed and amount of debt accumulated during economic recoveries are other important determinants of future spread volatility, because the sectors that have rapidly levered-up are more likely to experience defaults. Chart 15 shows that, if we ignore the outlying utilities, then there is a robust positive linear relationship between this metric and spreads. Utilities, energy, and the tech sectors have added the most debt, while debt accumulation in the basic materials and health care sectors has lagged over the past 10 years. Crucially, tech and communications spreads trade below what their debt growth implies. Net Debt-To-EBITDA Chart 16Only Financials Have Improved Their Net Debt-To-EBITDA A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt A rapid debt accumulation is not a concern, as long as earnings are rising more rapidly or at least at the same pace. From this case, we infer that companies are using the new debt issued efficiently, for CAPEX or to pursue projects exceeding their IRR. In this light, wide spreads are justified for the energy, consumer cyclical, and consumer non-cyclical sectors (Chart 16). Conversely, financials have seen improvement. Bottom Line: After surveying Euro area high-yield corporate sectors based on four credit metrics, it appears that the sectors most at risk are energy and consumer non-cyclical. By contrast, basic materials seem to be a good sector in which to hide.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Currency Performance A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Corporate Bonds A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Equity Performance Major Stock Indices A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Geographic Performance A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt Sector Performance A Lot Of Debt A Lot Of Debt

Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will not immediately change its policy stance in response to rising inflation and inflation expectations. Rather, it will follow its current forward guidance and only lift rates off zero once the labor market has reached “maximum employment”. However, once the first rate hike has occurred, the Fed will shift its focus toward inflation and inflation expectations. Duration: The overnight index swap curve is priced for a total of 77 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023. We see strong odds that more hikes will be delivered and therefore continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Corporate Bonds: High and rising inflation expectations will eventually pose a risk to credit spreads, but only once the Fed tightens policy in response. For now, we remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries, though we maintain a preference for high-yield corporates, USD-denominated EM Sovereigns and municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds. Feature Recent inflationary trends are making the Fed’s job more difficult. Not only was April’s increase in core CPI the largest since 1981, but measures of long-term inflation expectations have also jumped. The 5-year/5-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has quickly risen to levels that are consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target (Chart 1). What’s more, survey measures of inflation expectations have also moved up, in many cases to uncomfortably high levels (Chart 2). Chart 1Back To Target Back To Target Back To Target Chart 2Inflation Expectations Have Jumped Inflation Expectations Have Jumped Inflation Expectations Have Jumped All of this makes the Fed’s zero-lower-bound interest rate policy look increasingly untenable. Can the Fed really just sit on the sidelines as inflation and inflation expectations rise to above-target levels? Our expectation is that the Fed will ignore rising inflation until the labor market is fully recovered, but it may then need to move quickly to contain inflationary pressures. The result could very well be a rate hike cycle that takes a long time to start, but then proceeds at a rapid pace. The Fed’s Liftoff Criteria Are Different Than Its Criteria For Pace A crucial point about the Fed’s forward guidance is that the criteria that will determine the timing of the first rate hike are different than the criteria that will determine the post-liftoff pace of rate hikes. Liftoff Criteria Table 1A Checklist For Liftoff Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think For liftoff, the Fed has been very explicit that three conditions must be met before it will raise rates off the zero bound (Table 1). Of the three conditions listed in Table 1, the timing of when the labor market will reach “maximum employment” is the most uncertain. We have written extensively about how the Fed defines “maximum employment” and about the pace of employment growth that’s necessary to achieve that goal by specific future dates.1 To summarize, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of at least 698k is required to reach “maximum employment” by the end of this year and average monthly payroll growth of at least 412k is required to hit that target by the end of 2022 (Chart 3). Chart 3Employment Growth Employment Growth Employment Growth Chart 4Labor Demand Is Strong Labor Demand Is Strong Labor Demand Is Strong Our assessment is that “maximum employment” will be achieved in time for the Fed to lift rates in 2022, largely because employment growth must rise quickly in order to catch up with skyrocketing indicators of labor demand (Chart 4). The risk, of course, is that inflation continues to run hot as the Fed waits for its “maximum employment” condition to be met. If this occurs, we believe that the Fed will stick to its current forward guidance. It will ignore rising inflation until its liftoff criteria are met. Only then, will Fed policy turn toward containing inflation. Pace Criteria In a recent speech, Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida laid out three indicators that he will track to guide the pace of policy tightening post Fed liftoff.2 First, he pointed to inflation expectations. In particular, the Fed’s index of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE):3 Other things being equal, my desired pace of policy normalization post-liftoff to return inflation to 2 percent […] would be somewhat slower than otherwise if the CIE index is, at time of liftoff, below the pre-ELB level. [ELB = effective lower bound]. Chart 2 shows that the CIE index has already broken above its 2018 peak. It stands to reason that, all else equal, an elevated CIE index would speed up the post-liftoff pace of rate hikes. Chart 5Inflation Since August 2020 Inflation Since August 2020 Inflation Since August 2020 Second, Clarida noted that: Another factor I will consider in calibrating the pace of policy normalization post-liftoff is the average rate of PCE inflation since the new framework was adopted in August 2020. The annualized rate of change in core PCE since August 2020 is almost at the Fed’s 2% target already, and it will certainly rise to above-target levels when the April data are released, as was the case with core CPI (Chart 5). Finally, Clarida offered up a detailed Taylor-type monetary policy rule that he says he will consult once the conditions for liftoff are met: Consistent with our new framework, the relevant policy rule benchmark I will consult once the conditions for liftoff have been met is an inertial Taylor-type rule with a coefficient of zero on the unemployment gap, a coefficient of 1.5 on the gap between core PCE inflation and the 2 percent longer-run goal, and a neutral real policy rate equal to my SEP forecast of long-run r*. Chart 6Balanced Approach (Shortfalls) Rule* Recommendations Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think Chart 6 shows the results of a very similar policy rule using median FOMC estimates for r*, NAIRU and the path of inflation. We use a slightly more pessimistic forecast for the unemployment rate and assume that it reaches 4.5% by the end of 2022 and 4% by the end of 2023. Even with those conservative assumptions, the rule still recommends a policy rate of 1.5% by the end of 2022 and 2.65% by the end of 2023. This is not to say that the Fed will immediately lift rates to those levels once it is ready to hike, only that the Fed will have a strong incentive to pursue a rapid pace of rate hikes once it finally lifts rates off the zero bound. Investment Implications For investors, the bottom line is that the Fed will not immediately change its policy stance in response to rising inflation and inflation expectations. Rather, it will follow its current forward guidance and only lift rates off zero once the labor market has reached “maximum employment”. However, once the first rate hike has occurred, the Fed will shift its focus toward inflation and inflation expectations. If inflation and inflation expectations rise further, or even remain sticky near current levels, the Fed will lift rates more quickly than many anticipate. At present, the overnight index swap curve is priced for a total of 77 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023. We see strong odds that more hikes will be delivered and therefore continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Is Inflation A Risk For Spread Product? Yes it is, but not just yet. In past reports, we’ve often pointed to 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates in a range between 2.3% and 2.5% as a reason to turn more cautious on spread product (see Chart 1), and the recent rise in inflation expectations certainly does set off some alarm bells. High inflation expectations pose a risk to credit spreads because of what they signal about the future course of Fed policy. If the Fed responds to high inflation expectations by tightening policy into restrictive territory, then economic growth and credit spreads are at risk. All this remains true, but the Fed’s willingness to ignore rising inflation expectations – at least until “maximum employment” and fed funds liftoff are achieved – gives spread product a little more runway than usual. One way to illustrate this dynamic is with the slope of the yield curve (Chart 7). Historically, corporate bond (both investment grade and junk) excess returns are strong at least until the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps (Table 2). Currently, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is well above 100 bps and has shown few signs of rolling over. If the Fed was still following its old forward-looking policy framework, then the yield curve would likely be much flatter today. That is, the curve would be pricing-in some policy tightening in response to high and rising inflation expectations. However, as discussed above, inflation expectations are not currently the Fed’s primary concern and they will only become the Fed’s primary concern once “maximum employment” has been achieved and the funds rate has been lifted off the zero bound. Chart 7Spread Product Returns Are Strong When The Curve Is Steep Spread Product Returns Are Strong When The Curve Is Steep Spread Product Returns Are Strong When The Curve Is Steep Table 2Corporate Bond Performance In Different Phases Of The Cycle Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think All in all, we are concerned that, if inflation expectations remain elevated, the Fed may quickly ramp up its post-liftoff pace of rate hikes, sending credit spreads wider. But we are reluctant to position for that outcome when we are still many months away from Fed liftoff and the slope of the yield curve remains so steep. Chart 8Low Expected Returns In IG Low Expected Returns in IG Low Expected Returns in IG Another factor to consider is that value in spread product is extremely tight. In fact, our measure of the 12-month breakeven spread for the quality-adjusted investment grade corporate bond index is almost at its most expensive level since 1995 (Chart 8). This doesn’t change our assessment of when restrictive Fed policy will cause spreads to widen, but it does reduce our return expectations in the interim. All else equal, since the rewards from being overweight spread product versus Treasuries are low, we will be quicker to reduce our recommended spread product allocation when our indicators start to point toward the end of the credit cycle. Though, at the very least, we will still want to see the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope start to flatten and approach 50 bps before we get too pessimistic on spread product. The bottom line is that high and rising inflation expectations will eventually pose a risk to credit spreads, but only once the Fed tightens policy in response. For now, we remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries, though we maintain a preference for high-yield corporates, USD-denominated EM Sovereigns and municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Overshoot Territory”, dated April 13, 2021. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20210113a.htm 3 The CIE is a composite measure of different market-based and survey-based indicators of inflation expectations. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/index-of-common-inflation-expectations-20200902.htm  Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification