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Highlights Biden’s chances of winning the US election are rising, but it is still unsettled and could bring negative surprises to financial markets. The fiscal cliff will not subside immediately as the Senate Republicans have been vindicated for their fiscally hawkish approach. We doubt Democrats will win both Senate seats in Georgia to restore the lost “Democratic Sweep” scenario that offered maximum policy reflation. President Trump’s lame duck period, if he loses, lasts for three months and could bring negative surprises on China, the Taiwan Strait, Big Tech, Iran, or North Korea. The US remains at “peak polarization,” though we expect a growing national consensus over the long haul. Go long a basket of Trans-Pacific Partnership countries on a strategic time horizon to capitalize on what we believe will be Biden’s pro-trade-ex-China policy. Feature Chart 1Market Response To US Election Market Response To US Election Market Response To US Election The US presidential election remains undecided despite former Vice President Joe Biden’s increasing likelihood of victory. Votes will be recounted in several states while one potential tipping-point state, Pennsylvania, could easily swing on a Supreme Court decision. The Senate is likely to remain in Republican hands, though there is still a ~20% chance that it will flip if Democrats win both of the likely Georgia runoff elections on January 5. Thus our base case is the same as in our final forecast: Biden plus a Republican Senate. Financial markets first rallied and have now paused (Chart 1). The pause makes sense to us. Ultimately the best-case scenario of this election was always Biden plus a Republican Senate – neither tariffs nor taxes would increase. But this same scenario also always posed the highest risk of near-term fiscal tightening that would undermine the US recovery and global reflation trade. GOP Senators will insist on a smaller fiscal relief bill and may wait too long to enact it. Below we discuss these dynamics and why we maintain a tactically defensive position amid this contested election. We will not go full risk-on until the critical short-run risks subside: the contested election, the fiscal impasse, Trump’s “lame duck” executive orders, and the international response. Biden Not Yet President-Elect Biden is leading the vote tally in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as we go to press. To all appearances he has reclaimed the “Blue Wall” (MI, PA, WI) and made inroads in the Sun Belt (AZ, GA). We will not go full risk-on until the critical short-run risks subside. Map 1 shows tentative election results. Unsettled states are colored lightly while settled states are solid red or blue. This map points to a Biden victory even if Georgia and Pennsylvania slip back to Trump. The President would need to reclaim the latter two and one other state to reach 270 Electoral College votes. Map 1US 2020 Election Results (Tentative) Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Chart 2 shows the final prediction of our quantitative model. While our model predicted a Trump victory at 51% odds, we subjectively capped Trump’s odds at 45% because we disagreed that Trump would win Michigan.1 We did not do the same for our Senate model as the results matched with our subjective judgment that Republicans would keep control. Chart 2Our Presidential Quant Model Versus Actual Results Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Investors cannot yet conclude that the contested election risks have abated. If Biden wins only AZ, NV, MI, and WI, then he will end up with 270 Electoral College votes. This is the minimal vote needed for a victory. It is legitimate, but it means that a net of one faithless elector, or a disqualified elector, could throw the nation into a historic and nearly unprecedented crisis. If the Electoral College becomes indecisive for any reason, the House of Representatives will decide the election. Each state will get one vote. The results of the election suggest Republicans have four-to-ten seat majority of state delegations in the House (Table 1). Trump would win. Polarization and unrest would explode. Not for nothing did we brand this election cycle “Civil War Lite.” Table 1State Delegations In US House Of Representatives Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization The greater the margin of victory in the Electoral College, the less vulnerable the nation is to indecision in the college, or to a result decided in the courts. The Republicans have a strong case in Pennsylvania that votes that arrived after November 3 should not be counted. It is not clear if the Supreme Court will revisit the case, having left it unresolved prior to the election. If Pennsylvania’s 20 electoral votes become the fulcrum of the election, and the Supreme Court rules to exclude votes received after November 3, and if Trump thereby wins the count, a national crisis will erupt. This is not high probability at the moment because Biden can afford to lose Pennsylvania if he wins Nevada or Georgia. But the history of contested elections teaches that investors should not rush to conclusions. Senate Gridlock Will Survive Georgia Runoffs The most likely balance of power is a Democratic president with a Republican Senate and Democratic House, i.e. gridlock. Chart 3 shows the likely balance of power in Congress. Democrats would need to win both runoff elections in Georgia to win 50 seats, which would give them a de facto majority if Biden wins, since Vice President Kamala Harris would become President of the Senate and break any tie votes there. They are unlikely to do so. Chart 3AGridlock In US Government Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Chart 3BGridlock In US Government Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Why do we doubt that Democrats will win both Georgia seats, given that Trump is now falling short in the statewide presidential vote? First, Republicans tend to do well in runoffs as Georgia is a conservative-leaning state (Chart 4). Second, the Republican vote was greater than the Democratic vote in both Senate elections, though falling short of 50%. Third, exit polls show that voters leaned Republican in the suburbs and were mostly concerned about the economy, not the coronavirus. Fourth, also clear from exit polls, Republican voters will be more motivated to retain control of the Senate with Trump out, while Democratic voters will be less motivated with Biden in (Chart 5). Voter turnout will drop in the special election as usual. Neither Trump nor the presidency will be on the ballot on January 5. Still, it is possible for Democrats to win both seats and hence de facto control of the Senate. We would say the odds are roughly 20% (0.5 x 0.4 = 0.2). Chart 4GOP Does Well In Georgia Runoffs Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Chart 5Georgia 2020 Election Results (So Far) Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization If Democrats pulled off two victories in Georgia, the “Blue Sweep” scenario would be reaffirmed and several legislative proposals that had a 0% chance of passage in a Republican Senate would become at least possible. Certainly taxes would go up – the Democrats would be able to use the reconciliation process to push through reforms to the health care system paid for by partially repealing the Trump Tax Cut and Jobs Act. They would also be able to pass legislation that is popular with moderate Democrats who would then hold the balance in the Senate. The Green New Deal would become possible, if highly improbable. There would be a small chance of removing the filibuster in an exigency, but a vanishingly small chance of other radical structural changes, like creating new seats on the Supreme Court or granting statehood to Washington DC and Puerto Rico. A 50-50 count in the Senate, with Harris breaking the tie, would produce a larger increase in the budget deficit than otherwise. Stocks would have to discount the tax hike but they would recover quickly on the prospect of combined monetary and fiscal ultra-dovishness. Fiscal Impasse Prolonged Biden plus a Republican Senate is positive for the US corporate earnings outlook over the 24 months between now and the 2022 midterm election. It is also positive for the global earnings outlook over the four-year period due to the drastically reduced odds of a global trade war. But it is negative in the near term because it will result in a smaller and delayed fiscal relief package – and sooner than later the market will need a signal that the government will not pull the rug out from under the recovery. Biden plus a GOP Senate is negative in the near term due to fiscal risks but positive beyond that. True, the US economy continues to bounce back rapidly, which is why the Republicans performed so well in this election despite a recession, a pandemic, and a failure to pass another round of stimulus beforehand. In October the unemployment rate fell to 6.9%. Yet previous rounds of fiscal support are drying up. The job market is showing some signs of underlying weakness and these will worsen as long as benefits run out and COVID-19 cases discourage economic activity (Chart 6). Personal income has dropped off from its peak when the first round of stimulus was passed in March. Without the dole it will relapse (Chart 7). Chart 6US Job Market Weakening Sans Stimulus US Job Market Weakening Sans Stimulus US Job Market Weakening Sans Stimulus Chart 7US Personal Income Will Drop Sans Stimulus US Personal Income Will Drop Sans Stimulus US Personal Income Will Drop Sans Stimulus Will Senate Republicans agree to a fiscal deal in the “lame duck” session before the new Congress sits on January 3? We have no basis for a high-conviction view. They might agree to a deal in the range of $500 billion to $1 trillion, but only if the Democrats come down to these levels in the talks. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is one of the big winners of the election. He held his seat and likely maintained Republican control of the Senate without capitulating to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s demands of a $3 trillion-plus relief bill. He wagered that Republicans would do better with voters if they concentrated on reopening the economy (and confirming Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court) while limiting any fiscal bill to targeted COVID response measures. He drew a hawkish line against broad-based social spending and bailouts for state and local governments. The gambit appears to have worked. House Democrats, far from gaining seats, lost five. We would not be surprised if Pelosi were replaced as speaker in 2021. Her plan backfired so badly that if Trump had stayed on message in his campaign, he might even have won. The implication is that unless Pelosi comes down to McConnell’s number, the fiscal impasse will extend into January and February. The American public approves of fiscal relief, but that did not force McConnell’s hand earlier, as the economy was recovering regardless (Table 2). Unless the economy slumps or financial markets selloff drastically, he will likely insist on a skinny deal that includes liability protections for businesses while minimizing bailouts for indebted blue states. Table 2Americans Support Fiscal Stimulus Package Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Hence investors are likely to get bad news before good news on the US fiscal front. And if other bad news arises, the absence of fiscal support will be sorely felt. This motivates our tactically defensive posture until the fiscal impasse is resolved. Peak Polarization Polarization is at peak levels in the US and the election result suggests it will remain elevated. Whichever party wins will win with a narrow margin. There is simply no commanding mandate for either party, as has been the case this century, so the struggle will continue (Chart 8). Chart 8Polarization Will Continue With Narrow Margins Of Victory Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Of course, polarization may subside temporarily, assuming Trump loses. At least under Biden the Electoral College vote will coincide with the popular vote, improving popular consent. Biden will have a lower disapproval rating, probably throughout his term. High disapproval tends to coincide with crises in modern US history, but in 2021, after the dust clears from this election, the country may catch its breath (Chart 9). Chart 9Presidential Disapproval Will Fall Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Much will depend on whether the presumed Biden administration is willing to sideline the left-wing of the Democratic Party to court the median voter. Exit polling in the swing states strongly suggests that the Biden administration won the election (if indeed it did) by improving Democratic support among the majority white population, non-college educated voters, and senior citizens, all groups that delivered Trump the victory in 2016. The Democrats had mixed results among ethnic minorities and suburban voters. Their biggest liability was their focus on issues other than the economy (Chart 10). Chart 10Exit Polls Say Focus On Bread And Butter Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Over the coming decade we think the combination of (1) cold war with China and (2) generational change on fiscal policy will produce a new national consensus. But we are not there yet. The contested election is not guaranteed to end amicably. If Trump wins on a technicality, the country will erupt into mass protests; if he loses and keeps crying stolen election, isolated domestic terrorist incidents are entirely possible. Moreover the battle over the 2020 census and redistricting process will be fierce. Democrats will be hungry to take the Senate in 2022, failing Georgia in January, to achieve major legislative objectives while Biden is in office. And the 2024 election will be vulnerable to the fact that Biden may have to bow out due to old age, depriving the Democrats of an incumbent advantage. The bottom line is that Republicans outperformed and will not be inclined to help the Biden administration start off on strong footing. The implication is the fiscal battle will extend into the New Year unless a stock market selloff forces Republicans to compromise. Fiscal cliffs will be a recurring theme until at least the 2022 election. A deflationary tail risk will persist. Obama’s Legacy Secured? The sole significance of a gridlocked Biden presidency will lie in regulatory affairs, foreign policy, and trade policy. These are the policy areas where presidents have unilateral authority and Biden can act without the Senate’s approval. In this context, Biden’s sole focus will be to consolidate the legacy of the Barack Obama administration, in which he served. 1. Obamacare (ACA): Republicans failed to repeal and replace this bill despite a red sweep in 2016. Biden’s election ensures that Obamacare will be implemented, if not expanded, as he will have the power to enforce the law at the executive level. The risk is that the conservative-leaning Supreme Court could strike it down. Based on past experience, the health care sector will benefit from the drop in uncertainty once the court’s decision is known (Chart 11). For investors the lesson of the past four election cycles is that Obamacare is here to stay, but Americans will not adopt a single-payer system until 2025 at the earliest conceivable date. We are long health equipment and see this outcome as beneficial to the health sector in general, particularly health insurance companies. Big Pharma, however, will suffer from bipartisan populist pressures to cap prices. 2. Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPA): Biden will seek to restore Obama’s signature foreign policy accomplishment, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, i.e. the Iran nuclear deal of 2015. The purpose of the deal was to establish a modus vivendi in the Middle East so that the US could “pivot to Asia” and focus its energy on the existential strategic challenge posed by China. Biden will stick with this plan. The Iranians also want to restore the deal but will play hard to get at first. Israel and Saudi Arabia could act to thwart Iran and tie Biden’s hands in the final three months of Trump’s presidency while they have unmitigated American backing. Chart 11Obamacare Preserved Obamacare Preserved Obamacare Preserved The implication is that Iranian oil production will return to oil markets (Chart 12), but that conflict could cause production outages, and Saudi Arabia could increase production to seize market share. Hence price volatility is the outcome, which makes sense amid fiscal risks and COVID risks to demand as well. 3. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): Biden claims he will “renegotiate” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was the Obama administration’s key trade initiative. The idea was to group like-minded Pacific Rim countries into an advanced trade deal that addressed services, the digital economy, labor and environmental standards, and pointedly excluded China. Trump withdrew from the deal out of pique despite the fact that it served the purpose of diversifying the American supply chain away from China. The impact of rejoining is miniscule from an economic point of view (Chart 13), but it will be a boon for small emerging markets like Mexico, Chile, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Chart 12Restoring The Iran Nuclear Deal Restoring The Iran Nuclear Deal Restoring The Iran Nuclear Deal Chart 13Rejoining The Trans-Pacific Partnership Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization The bigger takeaway is that Biden will continue the US grand strategic shift toward confronting China, which will be a headwind toward Chinese manufacturing and a tailwind for India, Latin America, Southeast Asia. The US will cultivate relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a more coherent economic bloc and a manufacturing counterweight to China (Chart 14). A lame duck Trump will  attempt to cement his legacy by targeting China/Taiwan, Iran, North Korea, or Big Tech. When it comes to on-shoring, Biden’s focus will be reducing dependency on China and improving the US’s supply security in sensitive areas like health and defense. Trade and strategic tensions with China will persist, but a global trade war is not in the cards. Manufacturing economies ex-China stand to benefit. 4. The Paris Climate Accord: Biden will not be able to pass his own version of the Green New Deal without the Senate, so investor excitement over a government-backed surge in green investment will subside for the time being (Chart 15). He will also moderate his stance on the energy sector after his pledge to phase out oil and gas nearly cost him the election. He was never likely to ban fracking comprehensively anyway. Chart 14ASEAN's Moment ASEAN's Moment ASEAN's Moment Biden will be able to rejoin the international Paris Agreement and reverse President Trump’s deregulation of the energy sector. He will re-regulate the economy to lift clean air, water, environment, and sustainability standards. This is a headwind for the energy sector, but stocks are already heavily discounted and congressional gridlock is a positive surprise. Chart 15Returning To The Paris Climate Accord Returning To The Paris Climate Accord Returning To The Paris Climate Accord There may be some room for compromise with Senate Republicans when it comes to renewables in a likely infrastructure package next year. Post-Trump Republicans may also be interested in Biden’s idea of a “carbon adjustment fee” on imports, which is another way of saying tariffs on Chinese-made goods. Like the health care sector, the election is tentatively positive for US energy stocks – especially once fiscal risks are surmounted. Investment Takeaways Chart 16Lame Duck Trump Risk: Taiwan Strait Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Civil War Lite And Peak Polarization Three near-term risks prevent us from taking a tactically risk-on investment stance. First, the contested election, which could still throw up surprises. Second, the fiscal stimulus impasse, which could persist into January or February and will reduce the market’s margin of safety in the event of other negative surprises. Third, a lame duck Trump will attempt to cement his legacy via executive orders. He could target China/Taiwan, Iran, North Korea, or even Big Tech. On China, Trump is already tightening export controls on China and selling a large arms package to Taiwan (Chart 16). The lame duck period of any presidency is a useful time for the US to advance strategic objectives. Trump will also blame China and the coronavirus for his defeat. He could seek reparations for the virus, restrictions on Chinese manufacturing and immigration to the US, export controls or sanctions on tech companies, secondary sanctions over Iran or North Korea, delisting of Chinese companies listed in the US, sanctions over human rights violations in China’s autonomous regions, or travel bans on Communist Party members. During these three months, Big Tech will face crosswinds – risks from Trump, but opportunities from gridlock. Polarization has helped support US equity and tech outperformance over the past decade. Frequent hold-ups over the budget in Congress weigh on growth and inflation expectations, thus favoring growth stocks and tech. Internal divisions have prompted the US to lash out abroad, increasing risks to international stocks and driving safe-haven demand into the dollar and tech. More broadly the second wave of the pandemic is a boon for tech earnings and Biden will restore the Obama administration’s alliance with Silicon Valley. But tech is already priced for perfection and this favorable trend will be cut short when COVID restrictions ease and Biden works out a compromise with the Senate GOP over stimulus and the budget (Chart 17). Beyond these near-term risks, we have a constructive outlook for risk assets over the next 12 months. Chart 17Biden, Peak Polarization, And Big Tech Biden, Peak Polarization, And Big Tech Biden, Peak Polarization, And Big Tech Chart 18Global Stocks, Cyclicals Benefit When US Fiscal Impasse Resolved Global Stocks, Cyclicals Benefit When US Fiscal Impasse Resolved Global Stocks, Cyclicals Benefit When US Fiscal Impasse Resolved Insofar as Biden seeks to restore US commitment to global free trade, and more stable and cooperative relations with allies and partners ex-China, global policy uncertainty should fall relative to the United States. Once near-term fiscal hurdles are cleared, the dollar’s strength can subside and global stocks and global cyclicals can start to outperform (Chart 18). Chart 19Trump An Exclusively Commercial President Trump An Exclusively Commercial President Trump An Exclusively Commercial President We also favor stocks over bonds on a strategic horizon. Trump was an exclusively commercial president whose approval rating had a tight correlation with the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 19). A surge in stocks would help power Trump’s approval. This relationship is not standard across presidents. But it does make sense during periods of policy change that affect earnings. Trump’s tax cuts are the best example. Equities outpaced bonds in anticipation of tax cuts in 2017. Trump’s approval rating recovered once the bill was passed. President Obama’s approval rating also correlated somewhat with the stock-to-bond ratio during the critical fiscal cliff negotiations under gridlock from 2010-12. Once Biden works out a compromise with GOP Senators, bond yields will rise and stocks will power upward. The takeaway from these points is that volatility can remain elevated over the next 0-3 months (Chart 20). We would not expect it to go as high as in 2000, when the dotcom bubble burst, but Trump’s lame duck maneuvers against China could generate a massive selloff. But this cannot be ruled out. Indeed, Trump’s constraints have almost entirely fallen away regardless of whether he loses or wins. Investors should take a phased and conservative approach to adding risk in the near term. The outlook will brighten up when the president is known, a fiscal deal is reached, and President Trump’s legacy as the Man Who Confronted China is complete. Chart 20Volatility Will Stay Elevated In Short Run Volatility Will Stay Elevated In Short Run Volatility Will Stay Elevated In Short Run Chart 21Go Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Go Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Go Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Given our view that Biden will be hawkish on China, especially amid gridlock at home, we are maintaining our short CNY-USD trade. We also recommend buying a basket of Trans-Pacific Partnership bourses, weighted by global stock market capitalization, on a strategic time-frame to capture what we expect will be Biden’s pro-trade-ex-China policy (Chart 21). Finally, to capture the views expressed above regarding Biden’s likely market impacts, over the short and long run, we will go long US health care relative to the broad market on a tactical basis and long US energy on a strategic basis.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 As things stand, the model overrated the Republicans in Arizona and Georgia as well, though really Georgia looks to be the only state Democrats won that the model gave high odds of staying Republican. If we had used the level rather than the range of Trump’s approval rating – or if we had neglected opinion polling altogether – the model would have called a Biden win.

Highlights Our base case of a Biden win with a GOP Senate may come to pass. But the US election is not over yet. Trump still has a chance of victory by winning Pennsylvania and one other state. If the vote count does not settle the outcome clearly this week, a full-fledged contested election will emerge that may not be settled until just before December 14 (or even January). Risk-off sentiment will prevail in the interim, given the importance of the executive-legislative configuration for the pandemic response and the fiscal policy outlook. What we know is that Republicans kept the Senate, in line with our final forecast last week. This means gridlock is assured – which is positive for US stocks beyond near-term fiscal risks. Stay long JPY-USD, short CNY-USD, long stocks over bonds, long health care equipment, and long infrastructure plays. Keep dry powder for the presidential outcome, as global trade hangs in the balance. Feature The US presidential election is unsettled as we go to press, but we know that Republicans will keep control of the Senate and hence that American government will be divided or “gridlocked” for the next two years. As things stand, Democrats picked up two senate seats, Arizona and Colorado, but fell short everywhere else. They may even have lost a seat in Michigan. This leaves the balance of power at ~52-48 in favor of Republicans – which is one seat better than our final 51-49 forecast in their favor (Chart 1).1 Chart 1Our Senate Election Model Correctly Predicted Republican Control Gridlock Gridlock Table 1Gridlock Is Inevitable Regardless Of Presidential Outcome Gridlock Gridlock Gridlock is the inevitable consequence. If President Trump pulls off a victory in any two of the upper Midwestern states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin), then he will still face a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives. If former Vice President Joe Biden pulls off a victory in two of these states, then he will face a Republican controlled Senate (Table 1). Chart 2Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Historically gridlock offers more upside for the S&P 500 than a single-party sweep (Chart 2), and we agree with this expectation when it comes to the long-run impact of this election. However, we have also warned against the fiscal risks of a Biden win with a Republican Senate in the short run. The status quo Trump gridlock is reflationary at first but later problematic due to trade war. The Biden gridlock is deflationary at first but the best outcome for investors over the long run. Consider the following: Trump with Senate Republicans: Trump is a spendthrift and he and his party joined the House Democrats in blowing out the budget deficit from 2018-20. Trump’s victory will force House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to concede to a Republican-drafted ~$1-$1.5 trillion new COVID-19 fiscal relief bill right away. For the second term, Trump will push an infrastructure bill, border security, and make his tax cuts permanent. The fiscal thrust in 2021 will be flat-to-up. The budget deficit will probably end up somewhere between the Republican “high spending” scenario and the Democratic “low spending” scenario in our budget deficit projections (Chart 3). This is positive for US growth and especially corporate earnings, but it comes with a catch: Trump will be emboldened in his trade wars, which could expand beyond China to Europe or others. Tariffs and currency depreciation will weigh on global growth. Still, Trump’s second term will occur in the early stages of the business cycle and the Fed is committed not to hike rates until 2023, so the overall picture is reflationary.   Chart 3Trump Gridlock Reflationary, Biden Gridlock Deflationary Over Short Run Gridlock Gridlock Biden with Senate Republicans: Since Senate Republicans did not capitulate to large Democratic spending demands prior to the election, when their seats were at risk, they will have less incentive to do so afterwards when the president hails from the opposing party. The only way they will agree to a new fiscal stimulus in the “lame duck” session (November-December) is if the Democrats concede to their skinny proposals for the time being. But Democrats will probably insist on their demands having made electoral gains. In this case, either financial markets will sell off, forcing Republicans to capitulate, or investors will have to wait until early 2021 to receive a new fiscal bill that is uncertain in size and timing. The first battle of Biden’s presidency will be with the GOP Senate. The Republican “low spending” scenario in Chart 3 is most likely. It is not realistic that Congress will allow the baseline scenario, in which the budget deficit contracts by ~7.4% of GDP. Republican senators today are not the Tea Party House Republicans of 2010, who were rabid fiscal hawks. Still, uncertainty will weigh heavily and markets will have to fall before GOP senators wake up to the underlying risk to the economic recovery. The consolation is that beyond this 3-6 month period of negative sentiment and deflationary fiscal risk, the outlook will be fairly positive. Biden will not use broad-based unilateral tariffs the way Trump did, with the possible exception of China later in his term. And the Republican Senate will not agree to tax hikes at any point, making taxes a concern for 2023 or thereafter. This is the best of both worlds for US business sentiment and the corporate earnings outlook over the two-year period. Risk-off sentiment will prevail until the election is decided. This could be in a couple of days if the vote count is clear in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Or it could extend until just before December 14, when the Electoral College votes, if the litigation and court rulings in these critical states drag on, which we discuss below. The reason risk-off sentiment will prevail is that the US economy is burning through its remaining stimulus funds rapidly, the fiscal trajectory is unclear until the presidency is decided, Europe is going into partial lockdowns over the pandemic, and a Biden victory would imply more US lockdowns. Diagram 1 outlines the macro and market implications as we see them, depending on the presidential outcome. We never took the view that a Democratic sweep of White House and Senate would be the best outcome for the overall investment outlook, though we conceded that it was the most reflationary and bullish in the short term. But now this point is moot. Investors will have to wait another two years at minimum for the full smorgasbord of Democratic spending proposals to have a chance at passage. Diagram 1Gridlock Rules Out Massive Fiscal Boost Gridlock Gridlock Bottom Line: The presidency is indeterminate as we go to press. What is clear is that Republicans retained the Senate. Therefore gridlock will prevail. This is generally market positive, though a Biden win would weigh on risk assets in the near term until financial markets force Republican senators to capitulate to a new fiscal bill. A Controversial Election Or A Contested Election? The critical battleground states are undecided as we go to press. Trump needs to win any two of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin to retain the White House. The vote count will last through Wednesday and possibly beyond. The Republican and Democratic legal teams are preparing for trench warfare. Major legal challenges are highly likely and will delay the final outcome into December or even January. The first thing is to finish counting the absentee and mail-in ballots. Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona are not accepting ballots after election day, so they will finish counting soon. Then all that remains is to see if any legal disputes arise that prevent the Electoral College members from being settled in these states, which is still possible. For example, Wisconsin is within a percentage point. Nevada will accept ballots by November 10 and North Carolina by November 12 as long as they are postmarked by election day. It is likely but not certain that Democrats will keep Nevada (~75% counted) while Republicans will keep North Carolina (~100% counted). Thus Pennsylvania poses the biggest risk of a contested result – and this was anticipated. The deadline to receive mailed ballots is Friday, November 6, but a legal dispute is already underway as to whether the original November 3 deadline should be reinstated.2 We will not pretend to predict the final court verdict on Pennsylvania, but it would not be surprising at all if the Supreme Court ruled that ballots received after election day cannot be accepted. The constitution grants state legislatures the sole power of choosing a state’s electors. Each state passes its own election laws. The Pennsylvania state legislature clearly stated that ballots must be returned by election day. It was a court decision that extended the deadline. The Supreme Court could easily determine that a lower court does not have the power to change the deadline. But nobody will know until the court rules. The fact that Trump appointed several of the judges has little bearing on their decisions because they serve lifetime appointments. Once election disputes rise above state vote-counting to the federal level, Trump gets a lifeline. First, the two-seat conservative leaning on the Supreme Court should produce strict readings of the law that could favor his bid. Second, the GOP’s victory in the Senate means that Democrats cannot unilaterally settle disputed electoral votes in their own favor at the joint session of Congress on January 6, which they could have done with a united Congress. Third, the Republicans are likely to have maintained a one or two-state majority of state delegations in the House of Representatives (based on results as we go to press), which means that Trump would win if the candidates failed to reach a 270-vote majority on the Electoral College or tied at 269. Note that an Electoral College tie is a distinct possibility in this election. Right now, if Trump loses in Michigan and Wisconsin, but wins Pennsylvania, and nothing else changes, then an Electoral College tie could result at 269-269 electoral votes.3 Polls … And Exit Polls Before condemning the entire profession of opinion pollsters to death it will be important to receive the verified results of the election and compare them with the final polling averages. It is clear that Trump was widely underrated yet again, but it is not yet clear that this was primarily or exclusively the fault of pollsters. Right now Trump is down by 1.8% in the nationwide popular vote, whereas he lagged by 7.2% in the average of the national polls and 2.3% in the battleground average on election day. This is a big 5.4% gap in the national poll, but in the battleground poll it is a minor 0.5% polling gap and as such merely confirms what many observers knew, that the battleground polls were the ones that really mattered due to the Electoral College. Trump’s battleground support average was 46.6% and his approval rating was 45.9% on election day, which respectively is 1.8% and 2.5% below his tentative share of the national vote at 48.4%. These gaps are within the average 3% margin of error – and normally sitting presidents outperform their polling by around 1%. State opinion polling had huge errors like the national poll. Charts 4 and 4B shows the final election polling in the critical swing states along with a “T” or “B” to mark Trump’s and Biden’s tentative vote share as we go to press. Swing state polls showed Trump staging a major rally in the final weeks of the campaign, which is what prompted us to upgrade his odds to 45%. Neither major pundits nor the mainstream media paid enough attention to this shift. Several prominent outlets denied that there was any real tightening in the polls even in late October. Chart 4APundits Overlooked Trump’s Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Chart 4BPundits Overlooked Trump’s Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks What this demonstrates to us is the power of momentum in opinion polling, especially in the final week before an election when people’s attitudes harden and they bare more of their true opinions. It does not tell us that opinion polling is dead. What about the exit polls? Biden cut into Trump’s lead in key demographic groups just as the Democratic Party machinery anticipated, but it is not clear if it was enough to win the election. Trump lost ground and Democrats gained ground, relative to 2016, with white voters, old folks, and non-college-educated voters. But Trump improved his support among blacks and Hispanics, a signal point that gives the lie to much of this year’s media hype (Charts 5A and 5B). Chart 5ADemocrats Gained Ground With White, Elderly, And Non-College-Educated Voters; GOP Gained Among Blacks And Hispanics Gridlock Gridlock Chart 5BDemocrats Gained Ground With White, Elderly, And Non-College-Educated Voters; GOP Gained Among Blacks And Hispanics Gridlock Gridlock By far voters cared most about the issues, not personalities, and the biggest issue was the economy (35% of voters versus 20% on racial inequality and 17% on the coronavirus, which was apparently overrated as an issue by Democrats). The economic focus is the only explanation for Trump’s outperformance – the law and order narrative was less popular. Trump’s vote share may end up exactly equal to the number of respondents who said the economy was “good” or “excellent” (48%). Otherwise Trump’s base is well known: it consists predominantly of white people, rural people, those in the Midwest and South, those who have been fairly successful in income, and those who think America needs a “strong leader” more than a unifier with good judgment who seems to care about the average person. If Trump is defeated, the clear implication is that he failed to expand his base. If he wins, the clear implication is that Democrats suffered in the key regions for their aggressive approach to COVID lockdowns, their condoning of lawlessness, and their divisive handling of racial inequality and police brutality. With such a close vote for the White House, sweeping narratives are questionable. It is not clear yet whether liberalism or nationalism won, and at any rate the margin was thin. What is clear is that Democrats substantially disappointed in the Senate and they might even have failed to gain the White House. Given that this year witnessed a recession, pandemic, and widespread social unrest – well-attested historical signs that point to the failure of the incumbent party and recession – Democrats apparently failed to capitalize. National exit polls suggest the fault lay in their relative neglect of bread and butter in favor of the coronavirus or left-wing social theory. This is true not so much in the House of Representatives but in the presidential and senate races. If Trump wins – especially through a contested election – then US political polarization will rise due to the continued divergence of popular opinion and the constitutional system. “Peak polarization” will last another four years at least. But if Trump loses, given that Republicans held the Senate, there is room for compromise that would reduce polarization. But it is too early to say. Investment Takeaways Trade and foreign policy hinge on the presidency. Trump is favored in several of the key states at the moment and he is especially favored in a contested election process, but it is too soon to make investment recommendations on the executive branch other than that US equity outperformance is likely to continue on both of the scenarios at hand. Table 2Earnings Shock From Partial Repeal Of Trump Tax Cuts Has Been Averted Gridlock Gridlock For now we recommend investors stay long JPY-USD, short CNY-USD, long health care equipment, and overweight stocks relative to bonds. On the Senate, the key takeaway is that Biden and the Democrats will not be able to raise taxes. This is a big benefit to the sectors that faced the greatest earnings shock from a partial repeal of Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act – namely real estate, tech, health care, utilities, consumer discretionary, and financials (Table 2). A simple play on these sectoral benefits courtesy of Anastasios Avgeriou, our US equity strategist, would be to go long small caps versus large caps, i.e. S&P 600 relative to the S&P 500, but wait till the fiscal hurdle is cleared. The BCA infrastructure basket should benefit regardless, as infrastructure is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement, especially amid a large output gap.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We upgraded the Republicans to favored status last week based on our quantitative Senate election model, which showed a 51% chance that Republicans would maintain control, with 51-49 votes. Our presidential model also showed Trump winning with a 51% chance, but we subjectively capped his odds at 45% due to our doubts about his ability to win Michigan given Biden’s 4% lead in head-to-head public opinion polls there. 2 It is possible that Nevada’s November 10 deadline or North Carolina’s November 12 deadline could become relevant, but we doubt it. 3 Precise Electoral College outcomes cannot be predicted due to faithless electors, i.e. electoral college members who vote differently than required based on their state’s popular vote. In 2016 there were seven faithless electors and in 2020 there could be several and they could make the difference. Material punishments may not prevent an elector from making a conscientious decision to stray from his or her state’s results in an election viewed as having historic importance.

Highlights Our base case of a Biden win with a GOP Senate may come to pass. But the US election is not over yet. Trump still has a chance of victory by winning Pennsylvania and one other state. If the vote count does not settle the outcome clearly this week, a full-fledged contested election will emerge that may not be settled until just before December 14 (or even January). Risk-off sentiment will prevail in the interim, given the importance of the executive-legislative configuration for the pandemic response and the fiscal policy outlook. What we know is that Republicans kept the Senate, in line with our final forecast last week. This means gridlock is assured – which is positive for US stocks beyond near-term fiscal risks. Stay long JPY-USD, short CNY-USD, long stocks over bonds, long health care equipment, and long infrastructure plays. Keep dry powder for the presidential outcome, as global trade hangs in the balance. Feature The US presidential election is unsettled as we go to press, but we know that Republicans will keep control of the Senate and hence that American government will be divided or “gridlocked” for the next two years. As things stand, Democrats picked up two senate seats, Arizona and Colorado, but fell short everywhere else. They may even have lost a seat in Michigan. This leaves the balance of power at ~52-48 in favor of Republicans – which is one seat better than our final 51-49 forecast in their favor (Chart 1).1 Chart 1Our Senate Election Model Correctly Predicted Republican Control Gridlock Gridlock Table 1Gridlock Is Inevitable Regardless Of Presidential Outcome Gridlock Gridlock Gridlock is the inevitable consequence. If President Trump pulls off a victory in any two of the upper Midwestern states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin), then he will still face a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives. If former Vice President Joe Biden pulls off a victory in two of these states, then he will face a Republican controlled Senate (Table 1). Chart 2Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Historically gridlock offers more upside for the S&P 500 than a single-party sweep (Chart 2), and we agree with this expectation when it comes to the long-run impact of this election. However, we have also warned against the fiscal risks of a Biden win with a Republican Senate in the short run. The status quo Trump gridlock is reflationary at first but later problematic due to trade war. The Biden gridlock is deflationary at first but the best outcome for investors over the long run. Consider the following: Trump with Senate Republicans: Trump is a spendthrift and he and his party joined the House Democrats in blowing out the budget deficit from 2018-20. Trump’s victory will force House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to concede to a Republican-drafted ~$1-$1.5 trillion new COVID-19 fiscal relief bill right away. For the second term, Trump will push an infrastructure bill, border security, and make his tax cuts permanent. The fiscal thrust in 2021 will be flat-to-up. The budget deficit will probably end up somewhere between the Republican “high spending” scenario and the Democratic “low spending” scenario in our budget deficit projections (Chart 3). This is positive for US growth and especially corporate earnings, but it comes with a catch: Trump will be emboldened in his trade wars, which could expand beyond China to Europe or others. Tariffs and currency depreciation will weigh on global growth. Still, Trump’s second term will occur in the early stages of the business cycle and the Fed is committed not to hike rates until 2023, so the overall picture is reflationary.   Chart 3Trump Gridlock Reflationary, Biden Gridlock Deflationary Over Short Run Gridlock Gridlock Biden with Senate Republicans: Since Senate Republicans did not capitulate to large Democratic spending demands prior to the election, when their seats were at risk, they will have less incentive to do so afterwards when the president hails from the opposing party. The only way they will agree to a new fiscal stimulus in the “lame duck” session (November-December) is if the Democrats concede to their skinny proposals for the time being. But Democrats will probably insist on their demands having made electoral gains. In this case, either financial markets will sell off, forcing Republicans to capitulate, or investors will have to wait until early 2021 to receive a new fiscal bill that is uncertain in size and timing. The first battle of Biden’s presidency will be with the GOP Senate. The Republican “low spending” scenario in Chart 3 is most likely. It is not realistic that Congress will allow the baseline scenario, in which the budget deficit contracts by ~7.4% of GDP. Republican senators today are not the Tea Party House Republicans of 2010, who were rabid fiscal hawks. Still, uncertainty will weigh heavily and markets will have to fall before GOP senators wake up to the underlying risk to the economic recovery. The consolation is that beyond this 3-6 month period of negative sentiment and deflationary fiscal risk, the outlook will be fairly positive. Biden will not use broad-based unilateral tariffs the way Trump did, with the possible exception of China later in his term. And the Republican Senate will not agree to tax hikes at any point, making taxes a concern for 2023 or thereafter. This is the best of both worlds for US business sentiment and the corporate earnings outlook over the two-year period. Risk-off sentiment will prevail until the election is decided. This could be in a couple of days if the vote count is clear in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Or it could extend until just before December 14, when the Electoral College votes, if the litigation and court rulings in these critical states drag on, which we discuss below. The reason risk-off sentiment will prevail is that the US economy is burning through its remaining stimulus funds rapidly, the fiscal trajectory is unclear until the presidency is decided, Europe is going into partial lockdowns over the pandemic, and a Biden victory would imply more US lockdowns. Diagram 1 outlines the macro and market implications as we see them, depending on the presidential outcome. We never took the view that a Democratic sweep of White House and Senate would be the best outcome for the overall investment outlook, though we conceded that it was the most reflationary and bullish in the short term. But now this point is moot. Investors will have to wait another two years at minimum for the full smorgasbord of Democratic spending proposals to have a chance at passage. Diagram 1Gridlock Rules Out Massive Fiscal Boost Gridlock Gridlock Bottom Line: The presidency is indeterminate as we go to press. What is clear is that Republicans retained the Senate. Therefore gridlock will prevail. This is generally market positive, though a Biden win would weigh on risk assets in the near term until financial markets force Republican senators to capitulate to a new fiscal bill. A Controversial Election Or A Contested Election? The critical battleground states are undecided as we go to press. Trump needs to win any two of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin to retain the White House. The vote count will last through Wednesday and possibly beyond. The Republican and Democratic legal teams are preparing for trench warfare. Major legal challenges are highly likely and will delay the final outcome into December or even January. The first thing is to finish counting the absentee and mail-in ballots. Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona are not accepting ballots after election day, so they will finish counting soon. Then all that remains is to see if any legal disputes arise that prevent the Electoral College members from being settled in these states, which is still possible. For example, Wisconsin is within a percentage point. Nevada will accept ballots by November 10 and North Carolina by November 12 as long as they are postmarked by election day. It is likely but not certain that Democrats will keep Nevada (~75% counted) while Republicans will keep North Carolina (~100% counted). Thus Pennsylvania poses the biggest risk of a contested result – and this was anticipated. The deadline to receive mailed ballots is Friday, November 6, but a legal dispute is already underway as to whether the original November 3 deadline should be reinstated.2 We will not pretend to predict the final court verdict on Pennsylvania, but it would not be surprising at all if the Supreme Court ruled that ballots received after election day cannot be accepted. The constitution grants state legislatures the sole power of choosing a state’s electors. Each state passes its own election laws. The Pennsylvania state legislature clearly stated that ballots must be returned by election day. It was a court decision that extended the deadline. The Supreme Court could easily determine that a lower court does not have the power to change the deadline. But nobody will know until the court rules. The fact that Trump appointed several of the judges has little bearing on their decisions because they serve lifetime appointments. Once election disputes rise above state vote-counting to the federal level, Trump gets a lifeline. First, the two-seat conservative leaning on the Supreme Court should produce strict readings of the law that could favor his bid. Second, the GOP’s victory in the Senate means that Democrats cannot unilaterally settle disputed electoral votes in their own favor at the joint session of Congress on January 6, which they could have done with a united Congress. Third, the Republicans are likely to have maintained a one or two-state majority of state delegations in the House of Representatives (based on results as we go to press), which means that Trump would win if the candidates failed to reach a 270-vote majority on the Electoral College or tied at 269. Note that an Electoral College tie is a distinct possibility in this election. Right now, if Trump loses in Michigan and Wisconsin, but wins Pennsylvania, and nothing else changes, then an Electoral College tie could result at 269-269 electoral votes.3 Polls … And Exit Polls Before condemning the entire profession of opinion pollsters to death it will be important to receive the verified results of the election and compare them with the final polling averages. It is clear that Trump was widely underrated yet again, but it is not yet clear that this was primarily or exclusively the fault of pollsters. Right now Trump is down by 1.8% in the nationwide popular vote, whereas he lagged by 7.2% in the average of the national polls and 2.3% in the battleground average on election day. This is a big 5.4% gap in the national poll, but in the battleground poll it is a minor 0.5% polling gap and as such merely confirms what many observers knew, that the battleground polls were the ones that really mattered due to the Electoral College. Trump’s battleground support average was 46.6% and his approval rating was 45.9% on election day, which respectively is 1.8% and 2.5% below his tentative share of the national vote at 48.4%. These gaps are within the average 3% margin of error – and normally sitting presidents outperform their polling by around 1%. State opinion polling had huge errors like the national poll. Charts 4 and 4B shows the final election polling in the critical swing states along with a “T” or “B” to mark Trump’s and Biden’s tentative vote share as we go to press. Swing state polls showed Trump staging a major rally in the final weeks of the campaign, which is what prompted us to upgrade his odds to 45%. Neither major pundits nor the mainstream media paid enough attention to this shift. Several prominent outlets denied that there was any real tightening in the polls even in late October. Chart 4APundits Overlooked Trump’s Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Chart 4BPundits Overlooked Trump’s Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Pundits Overlooked Trump's Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks What this demonstrates to us is the power of momentum in opinion polling, especially in the final week before an election when people’s attitudes harden and they bare more of their true opinions. It does not tell us that opinion polling is dead. What about the exit polls? Biden cut into Trump’s lead in key demographic groups just as the Democratic Party machinery anticipated, but it is not clear if it was enough to win the election. Trump lost ground and Democrats gained ground, relative to 2016, with white voters, old folks, and non-college-educated voters. But Trump improved his support among blacks and Hispanics, a signal point that gives the lie to much of this year’s media hype (Charts 5A and 5B). Chart 5ADemocrats Gained Ground With White, Elderly, And Non-College-Educated Voters; GOP Gained Among Blacks And Hispanics Gridlock Gridlock Chart 5BDemocrats Gained Ground With White, Elderly, And Non-College-Educated Voters; GOP Gained Among Blacks And Hispanics Gridlock Gridlock By far voters cared most about the issues, not personalities, and the biggest issue was the economy (35% of voters versus 20% on racial inequality and 17% on the coronavirus, which was apparently overrated as an issue by Democrats). The economic focus is the only explanation for Trump’s outperformance – the law and order narrative was less popular. Trump’s vote share may end up exactly equal to the number of respondents who said the economy was “good” or “excellent” (48%). Otherwise Trump’s base is well known: it consists predominantly of white people, rural people, those in the Midwest and South, those who have been fairly successful in income, and those who think America needs a “strong leader” more than a unifier with good judgment who seems to care about the average person. If Trump is defeated, the clear implication is that he failed to expand his base. If he wins, the clear implication is that Democrats suffered in the key regions for their aggressive approach to COVID lockdowns, their condoning of lawlessness, and their divisive handling of racial inequality and police brutality. With such a close vote for the White House, sweeping narratives are questionable. It is not clear yet whether liberalism or nationalism won, and at any rate the margin was thin. What is clear is that Democrats substantially disappointed in the Senate and they might even have failed to gain the White House. Given that this year witnessed a recession, pandemic, and widespread social unrest – well-attested historical signs that point to the failure of the incumbent party and recession – Democrats apparently failed to capitalize. National exit polls suggest the fault lay in their relative neglect of bread and butter in favor of the coronavirus or left-wing social theory. This is true not so much in the House of Representatives but in the presidential and senate races. If Trump wins – especially through a contested election – then US political polarization will rise due to the continued divergence of popular opinion and the constitutional system. “Peak polarization” will last another four years at least. But if Trump loses, given that Republicans held the Senate, there is room for compromise that would reduce polarization. But it is too early to say. Investment Takeaways Trade and foreign policy hinge on the presidency. Trump is favored in several of the key states at the moment and he is especially favored in a contested election process, but it is too soon to make investment recommendations on the executive branch other than that US equity outperformance is likely to continue on both of the scenarios at hand. Table 2Earnings Shock From Partial Repeal Of Trump Tax Cuts Has Been Averted Gridlock Gridlock For now we recommend investors stay long JPY-USD, short CNY-USD, long health care equipment, and overweight stocks relative to bonds. On the Senate, the key takeaway is that Biden and the Democrats will not be able to raise taxes. This is a big benefit to the sectors that faced the greatest earnings shock from a partial repeal of Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act – namely real estate, tech, health care, utilities, consumer discretionary, and financials (Table 2). A simple play on these sectoral benefits courtesy of Anastasios Avgeriou, our US equity strategist, would be to go long small caps versus large caps, i.e. S&P 600 relative to the S&P 500, but wait till the fiscal hurdle is cleared. The BCA infrastructure basket should benefit regardless, as infrastructure is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement, especially amid a large output gap.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We upgraded the Republicans to favored status last week based on our quantitative Senate election model, which showed a 51% chance that Republicans would maintain control, with 51-49 votes. Our presidential model also showed Trump winning with a 51% chance, but we subjectively capped his odds at 45% due to our doubts about his ability to win Michigan given Biden’s 4% lead in head-to-head public opinion polls there. 2 It is possible that Nevada’s November 10 deadline or North Carolina’s November 12 deadline could become relevant, but we doubt it. 3 Precise Electoral College outcomes cannot be predicted due to faithless electors, i.e. electoral college members who vote differently than required based on their state’s popular vote. In 2016 there were seven faithless electors and in 2020 there could be several and they could make the difference. Material punishments may not prevent an elector from making a conscientious decision to stray from his or her state’s results in an election viewed as having historic importance.

Highlights China’s 14th Five Year Plan and broader national strategy will continue to provoke opposition from the US and the West, regardless of the US election. China’s economic blueprint will focus on self-sufficiency, “dual circulation” (import substitution), state subsidies, and high-tech advancement – all factors that will continue to provoke western ire. US political polarization creates geopolitical risks, particularly for China, which will support the dollar and US equity outperformance, depending on the election result. If Trump wins, polarization will persist, he will face gridlock at home, and he will thus continue his aggressive foreign and trade policies, with China facing disruptive consequences. The CNY, EUR, and especially TWD would suffer. If Biden wins, he could face either gridlock or full Democratic control. The former case presents a greater risk of a focus on trade and foreign policy. The latter would result in a domestically focused Washington, which gives China breathing space. The CNY and EUR would benefit, but the TWD would face limited upside. Either way, investors are likely to become over-exuberant about assets that are exposed to the US-China relationship in the event of a Biden victory. Over the long run, this is a bull trap.  Feature In the years after the 2008 financial crisis, the global news media proclaimed the rise of China and the demise of the United States as a global leader. The US’s free-wheeling democracy and capitalism led to economic collapse, partisan gridlock, and nearly a self-inflicted default on sovereign debt. Meanwhile China’s state-controlled system stimulated its economy, cracked down on the first inklings of unrest in the spring of 2011, and expanded its regional and global influence.  The conclusion is similar today in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. The US has squandered its response to the pandemic, while partisan gridlock threatens the economic recovery. China has suppressed the virus that started within its borders and its economy is rapidly on the mend. The orgy of social unrest and political dysfunction in the US has weighed on its international image and leadership. What the past decade showed, however, is that the first narrative to take hold after a global crisis is not likely to be the final narrative. In fact, the past decade was the most difficult for China since the 1980s. The next decade will be even more challenging. The COVID-19 pandemic brought to an official conclusion the unprecedented economic boom of the past four decades (Chart 1). Though Chinese policy makers have navigated relatively well, the social and political system faces greater challenges in a new economic and international environment. Chinese potential GDP growth has now fallen to 3%, as the labor force contracts and productivity remains flat. Chart 1China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China Already Plucked The Long-Hanging Fruit China is well-situated in the short run to benefit from domestic and global economic stimulus, but over the long run its challenges are significantly underrated. China Faces Headwinds From Abroad Chinese leaders are prepared for any of the possible outcomes in the US election. With regard to US foreign and trade policy, the election is about tactics, not strategy. US grand strategy clearly dictates that Washington focus on curbing China, which is the only country that can challenge the US for global supremacy over the long run. But the US is not alone – other countries are also taking a more skeptical stance toward China’s geopolitical prominence. The result is that China will continue to emphasize self-sufficiency, a centrally guided economic model, and state-supported technological advancement in its fourteenth Five Year Plan for 2021-25 (see Appendix). This policy trajectory, combined with the key policy developments of the past decade, suggests that China’s self-sufficiency drive will continue to attract geopolitical opposition from the US and the West: Capital Controls: China tightened its capital controls aggressively during the financial turmoil of 2015-16. This emergency decision undercut the liberal reform agenda and alienated the western world on one of its critical structural demands. With China having grown its money supply from 175% to 197% of GDP since 2009, and capital flowing out again amid this year’s crisis (Chart 2), Beijing will not be able to fully liberalize its capital account anytime soon. Chart 2China's Capital Controls China's Capital Controls China's Capital Controls Chart 3China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived China's State-Owned Enterprises Revived State-Owned Enterprises: The current administration has struggled with slowing trend growth and deflationary pressures. This is not an environment opportune for restructuring or liquidating inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is the opposite of the 1990s, when SOEs were last culled. The regime has instead promised to make SOEs bigger and stronger (Chart 3). While it has pursued reforms to allow more private ownership of state assets, it has also encouraged public ownership of private assets, thus producing “mixed ownership” and a fusion of state and corporate power. The US and western countries resent this reassertion of state-backed economic power, notwithstanding the fact that all countries are increasing state support amid the collapse in global demand. Notably, China will likely resist cutting manufacturing capacity any faster than it will already be cut due to the global recession and foreign protectionism, meaning that stimulus-fueled overcapacity will continue to be a problem for foreign competitors. Chart 4The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race Continues The Tech Race: Beijing is continuing a frantic dash to upgrade its science and technology capabilities in order to lift total factor productivity, which is essential to maintaining growth in the coming decades in the post-export-industrial phase. Expenditures on research and development are skyrocketing, now rivaling the United States. True, R&D spending is flattening out as a percentage of GDP, but this is likely temporary — even faster R&D spending will probably become an official target for the next five years (Chart 4). The full weight of the political system is being thrown behind the goal of creating a “Great Leap Forward” in advanced and emerging technologies. Western countries are increasingly sensitive to China’s advances in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, new vehicles, new energy, new materials, and computing. The new strategy of “dual circulation” will consist of import substitution, especially for critical tech goods, and will incorporate programs like “Made in China 2025” as well as “new infrastructure” that are high tech and have become targets of the West. The US and others are openly adopting export controls and reducing supply chain dependency on China. Beijing will struggle to maintain its rapid innovation drive without inviting more punitive measures from the West. Chart 5US Fears China’s Military Rise Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Military Spending: China adopted a more assertive foreign policy in the mid-2000s and intensified this approach after 2012. Military spending has risen along with economic heft and western experts have long believed that China spends considerably more than it lets on. If we assume that China began to spend 3.75% of GDP per year after its strategic break with the US – a reasonable number in keeping with Russia’s long-term average – then China is narrowing the defense spending gap with the US more rapidly than is widely believed (Chart 5). Given the US’s giant defense spending, this is a continual source of distrust. Bear in mind that China’s defense and security aims are more limited than those of the US, at least in the short run. While the US must maintain the ability to project power globally, China need only grow its regional sphere of influence. Regionalism: While the Xi administration consolidates power within the Communist Party and central government in Beijing, it is also consolidating Beijing’s authority within Greater China. This includes efforts to bring to heel wayward provinces and regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Much of this is a fait accompli that western governments can do little about. Even in Hong Kong, public opinion is showing signs of resignation to the new legislative powers that Beijing has asserted. However, Taiwan is the clear outlier. Public opinion has shifted sharply against mainland China. Given that Taiwan is the epicenter of the new cold war with the US, both for reasons of political legitimacy as well as technological capability, a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is looming (Chart 6). China has economic leverage to use first, but if this fails then a military confrontation cannot be ruled out. The above points do not hinge on the US election outcome or other cyclical factors, and highlight that geopolitical tensions will persist, particularly with the United States. The US’s adoption of a confrontational rather than cooperative posture toward China is a paradigm shift in international relations. Unlike Washington’s crackdown on Japanese trade in the 1980s, the US and China do not have an underlying trust or sense of shared security interests. Beijing’s willingness to increase US imports or appreciate its currency arbitrarily, to suit the shifting demands of US administrations, have substantial limits. Economic decoupling will continue in an environment of strategic insecurity (Chart 7). Chart 6Struggles In Greater China Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Chart 7US Redistributes Trade Deficit US Redistributes Trade Deficit US Redistributes Trade Deficit   President Trump’s biggest mistake in pursuing his trade war with China lies in his failure to build a grand alliance, or coalition of the willing, among likeminded liberal democracies. This would have amplified his leverage over China in making demands for structural reform and opening up. But this point can be overstated. China’s international image has collapsed, in Europe and Asia as well as in North America, despite the Trump administration’s diplomatic failures. Much of this effect stems from COVID-19, but that does not mean it is less grave. If the US courts allies in the trade conflict with China, it will find governments willing to cooperate (Chart 8). Chart 8China’s Image Suffers Under Trump Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Map 1Proxy Battles In Asia Pacific Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Chart 9US Arms Sales To Taiwan US Arms Sales To Taiwan US Arms Sales To Taiwan China’s perennial geopolitical challenge is shown in Map 1. It is geographically encircled by nations that have grown increasingly wary of its regional ambitions and will reach out to the US and West. These countries wish to continue benefiting from China’s economic rise but seek security guarantees to offset China’s rising strategic clout. The result will be “proxy battles,” in some cases political, in others military (Chart 9). Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam each face substantial geopolitical risk. In the case of South Korea and the Philippines, this risk is partially priced by financial markets. But in the case of Taiwan and Vietnam, it is almost entirely underrated. Taiwan has only an ambiguous defense commitment from the US, while Vietnam is a Chinese rival that entirely lacks a security guarantee from the United States. Bottom Line: Geopolitical risk will remain elevated in Asia Pacific regardless of what occurs in the US election. The growth of Chinese power, and its state-led economic model, will ensure that trade tensions persist. These will culminate in strategic conflicts in certain neighboring countries. China Will Re-Consolidate Power When Trump was inaugurated in January 2017, we argued that the looming US-China trade war would not be determined solely by relative economic size and export exposure. Instead, political unity would be a critical factor. While the US ostensibly had the economic advantage, China had the political advantage. The nineteenth National Party Congress would see Xi Jinping consolidate power domestically, while President Trump would struggle with domestic opposition and divisions within the US and the West over his protectionism. Having secured an economic rebound this year, China is likely to consolidate domestic power even further in 2021-22. This period culminates in the critical twentieth National Party Congress. Originally Xi Jinping was expected to step down at this time and hand the reins to the leader of the opposing faction. Now the opposing faction has been laid low, and Xi is likely to promote his faction and entrench his rule. The period will likely be marked with at least one major crackdown on the regime’s political rivals. Ultimately, social and political control will be tightened, particularly beginning in late 2021. These events provide good reasons for anticipating that Chinese monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy will not tighten drastically, but rather will merely normalize by mid-2021, assuming that the recovery stays on track (Chart 10). Yet this logic only goes so far – it is more bullish for the macro view today and in 2021, than it is in 2022. Obviously the regime wants to avoid a slump in 2021, the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party, and investors should keep this in mind. But the 2017 party congress was attended by a deleveraging campaign that surprised the world in its intensity. The point is that stability, not rapid growth, is the imperative in 2022. If speculative bubbles have become a greater threat by that time, then the monetary and fiscal policy backdrop will lean hawkish rather than dovish. Tightening central control over the economy helps the Xi administration consolidate power. Chart 10China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 China Still Consolidating Domestic Power, 2021-22 US Polarization A Risk For China If China continues to consolidate, the key question is what will happen in the United States. The answer will be known in short order, but what is critical to observe is that US political polarization is a geopolitical risk, and therefore if it continues to escalate it will be positive for the US dollar and negative for Chinese and other emerging market assets. The past several years have been marked by an increase in US social and political instability. Indeed, according to Worldwide Governance Indicators, the US’s governance has declined while China’s has improved, notably on the issue of political stability and the absence of violence (Chart 11). While these rankings are partial, nevertheless they point to the reality of US political division. The decade’s giant increase in political polarization has coincided with a bull market in US equities and the greenback, best exemplified by the outperformance of the US technology sector (Chart 12). Chart 11US Instability A Source Of Global Risk Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? If President Trump prevails, this trend will continue. Trump cannot win the popular vote, but his regional support could grant him a victory in the Electoral College. Or he could prevail through a contested election adjudicated by the Supreme Court or the House of Representatives. If this should occur, polarization will intensify, as the government’s legitimacy will suffer due to lack of popularity in a democracy. Facing gridlock at home, Trump would pursue trade war – not only with China, but also conceivably with the European Union. The consequence is that a surprise Trump victory (45% odds) would be negative for the euro, the renminbi, and especially the Taiwanese dollar (Chart 13). Chart 12US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status US Polarization Reinforces Safe-Haven Status Chart 13Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD Trump Second Term Would Weigh On CNY, EUR, TWD However, if former Vice President Biden prevails, he could win in two possible ways: one with gridlock in Congress, the other with a Democratic sweep of the House and Senate. In the former case, US polarization will persist. Biden will be incapable of executing his domestic agenda, as he will be obstructed by a Republican Senate. This will drive him into foreign policy, where he will ultimately prove to be tough on China – and certainly tougher than the Obama administration. In the latter case, a Democratic sweep of legislative and executive branches, Biden will not face domestic constraints and will be primarily focused on an ambitious agenda for rebuilding and rebalancing the US economy, with elements of the New Deal and the Green New Deal. He will be less focused on international affairs, at least initially. Trade risks will decline, along with US fiscal risks, thus producing a higher-growth macro policy environment. In both cases, while we expect a President Biden to seek a diplomatic “reset” with China, he is unlikely to repeal President Trump’s tariffs. Instead he will seek to utilize the leverage that Trump has built up, while pursuing a new strategic and economic dialogue with China. Ultimately this dialogue will be undermined by China’s state-backed economic policies and foreign policy assertiveness (see previous section), as well as Biden’s simultaneous courting of Europe and other liberal democracies. But clearly there is more room for Chinese assets to outperform under a Biden victory, especially a Democratic sweep. Investment Takeaways If Biden wins, the stock market is likely to become overly exuberant about a Biden administration’s positive implications for China-exposed companies (Chart 14). The same can be said for Chinese tech companies that are highly export-oriented (Chart 15). In a Democratic sweep, this rally can be prolonged, as US equities will face greater political risk than international equities. But any rally in assets exposed to the US-China relationship will ultimately be a bull trap, as US grand strategy calls for containing China, while Chinese grand strategy calls for breaking through containment. The US and Chinese tech sectors and Taiwanese assets are by far the most vulnerable to this dynamic, given their lofty valuations. Chart 14Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Market Over-Optimistic On Biden Boost To China Plays Chart 15Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions Chinese Tech Faces Trade Tensions If we are correct that geopolitical risk will persist for China regardless of US political party, then the primary beneficiaries of Chinese stimulus and US decoupling will be domestic-oriented Chinese equities as well as “China plays” – external markets that export machinery and resources to China, such as Australia, Brazil, and Sweden. China will still invest heavily in traditional infrastructure, property, and manufacturing to shore up demand whenever it sags amid the difficulties of the economic transition. Our China Play Index, designed by Mathieu Savary of our flagship The Bank Credit Analyst, neatly captures the potential for this index to outperform on the back of Chinese stimulus, which will be even more necessary if US policy continues to be punitive (Chart 16). The near term could involve substantial US fiscal risks as well as geopolitical risks with China, which can occur under a gridlocked Biden administration or a second term Trump administration. Over the next year, the looming Chinese and global recovery, combined with ultra-dovish US monetary policy, spells continued downside for the US dollar and upside for Chinese and emerging market currencies and risk assets (Chart 17). But while the dollar may face challenges to its reserve currency dominance, China’s geopolitical risks, at home and abroad, will prevent the renminbi from making more than incremental gains on the dollar. The euro is a much likelier alternative for the foreseeable future. Chart 16China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation China Plays Will Benefit From Reflation Chart 17King Dollar Persists … But Cyclical Downside Looms King Dollar Persists ... But Cyclical Downside Looms King Dollar Persists ... But Cyclical Downside Looms   Appendix Table 1China’s 14th Five Year Plan Goals Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden? Is China Afraid Of Big Bad Biden?   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Latin America faces a deep economic contraction and a new surge of social unrest and political unrest. However, the risks are increasingly priced into financial markets – especially if global monetary and fiscal stimulus continue. A looming global cyclical upturn, massive US and Chinese stimulus, a weaker dollar, and rising commodity prices will lift Latin American currencies and assets. Mexico faces lower trade risk and lower political risk. Colombia’s fundamentals are sound and political risk is contained. Chile’s political risk is significant but will benefit from the macro backdrop. Brazil will remain volatile. We are bearish on Argentina. Venezuela’s regime will be replaced before long. Our tactical positioning is defensive on COVID-19 and US political risk, but we see Latin America as an opportunity over the long run. Feature Cracks in the edifice of this year’s global stock market recovery are emerging with COVID-19 cases rebounding and US political risks rising. Emerging markets that rallied earlier this year have fallen back. This includes Latin America, where the pandemic’s per capita death toll is comparable only to Europe and the United States (Chart 1). Latin America is a risky region for investors because the past decade was a lost decade, particularly after the commodity bust in 2014. Poor macro fundamentals, deep household grievances, heavy dependency on commodity prices, and preexisting political polarization and social unrest have weighed on the region’s currencies and government bonds. Latin American equities have underperformed emerging markets over the period (Chart 2). Chart 1Pandemic Adds To Latin America’s Many Woes Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 2Global Reflation Needed For LATAM To Outperform Global Reflation Needed For LATAM To Outperform Global Reflation Needed For LATAM To Outperform Looking beyond near-term risks, however, global economic recovery and gargantuan monetary and fiscal stimulus hold out the prospect of a sustained recovery in growth and trade, a weakening US dollar, and a boost to commodity prices (Chart 3). This outlook is favorable for Latin American economies and companies. Chart 3Global Stimulus Keeps Up Commodity Prices Global Stimulus Keeps Up Commodity Prices Global Stimulus Keeps Up Commodity Prices In this report, we analyze the coronavirus outbreak and its likely political impact in six Latin American markets: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. The crisis is exacerbating the region’s longstanding problems and freezing attempts at supply-side reforms. However, a lot of political risk is already priced, particularly in Mexico and Colombia. Bullish Mexico: Trade War And Leftism Already Peaked As it stands, Mexico has over 740,000 confirmed cases and over 77,000 deaths, with new cases increasing daily (Chart 4). Testing occurs at a rate of 15,300 tests per 1 million people, one of the lowest rates of any major country. Hence the true number of cases is likely well higher than the official count. The health care system is overwhelmed. Chart 4Mexico Not Too Bad On Virus Death Toll Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long The crisis has been a rude awakening for President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), but we see Mexico as an investment opportunity rather than a risk. Chart 5Mexico: Left-Wing Unlikely To Outdo 2018 Win Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long AMLO and his National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) swept to power in 2018 as champions of the poor fed up with the country’s corrupt political establishment. Two tailwinds fueled MORENA’s rise: First, the failure of Mexico’s ruling elites. The 2008 financial crisis knocked one of the dominant parties out of power, while the brief comeback of the traditional ruling party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI) faltered amid the slow-burn recovery of the 2010s. Second, AMLO’s victory was an answer to the populist and protectionist turn in the United States under President Trump, who had vowed to build a wall and make Mexico pay for it as well as to renegotiate NAFTA to be more favorable to the United States. Mexicans voted to fight fire with fire. Neo-liberalism and supply-side structural reform seemed discredited in a blaze of Yankee imperialism and AMLO and his movement offered the only viable alternative. AMLO became Mexico’s first left-wing populist president in recent memory, while MORENA won an outright majority in the Senate and, with its coalition partners, a three-fifths majority in the Chamber of Deputies (Chart 5). From this back story it is clear that investors interested in Mexican assets faced two primary structural risks: (1) a left-wing “revolution,” given AMLO’s lack of legislative roadblocks (2) American protectionism. About 29% of Mexico’s GDP consists of exports to the US (Chart 6). Chart 6Mexico Will Benefit From US Mega-Stimulus Mexico Will Benefit From US Mega-Stimulus Mexico Will Benefit From US Mega-Stimulus Investors took these risks seriously, judging by the relative performance of Mexican energy and industrial equities (Chart 7). Trade war threatened exporters while AMLO aimed to revitalize the moribund state-owned energy company at the expense of foreign investors admitted by his predecessor’s structural reforms Chart 7Investors DisappointedAfter AMLO Election Rally Investors DisappointedAfter AMLO Election Rally Investors DisappointedAfter AMLO Election Rally However, the left-wing revolution threat was always overstated: Mexico has become the largest fiscal hawk in the region under AMLO. Moreover, monetary policy had remained overly tight before the pandemic. Indeed, AMLO’s track record as mayor of Mexico City in the early 2000s showed his penchant for fiscal frugality. His left-wing policies have been focused on reviving the state-owned oil company PEMEX and increasing signature social programs, which have been funded by slashing other government expenditures, even during the COVID-19 outbreak. Going forward, Mexico’s orthodox economic policy is a major positive relative to emerging markets with out-of-control debt dynamics, often exacerbated by populist leaders, such as Brazil (Chart 8). MORENA will face greater constraints going forward. AMLO’s approval rating has normalized at around 60%, roughly the average for Mexican presidents (Chart 9). MORENA’s support rate has fallen from 45% to below 20%. With midterm elections looming in July 2021, MORENA is unlikely to outperform its 2018 landslide. So while AMLO will win his proposed 2021 presidential “referendum,” he will do so with a smaller share of the vote and a weakened parliament. Reality has set in for Mexico’s new ruling party. Chart 8Mexico’s Low Debts A Boon Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 9AMLO’s Approval Rating Solid, But Normalizing Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long AMLO and MORENA are likely to be chastened but not to fall from power, which means there is unlikely to be a wholesale reversal in national policy. The crisis has killed AMLO’s honeymoon but not his presidency. He still has 60% approval and his term in office lasts until 2024. The main opposition parties are still floundering (Chart 10). The creation of six new parties since 2018 will help MORENA either by adding to its coalition or taking votes away from the opposition. US fiscal stimulus and shift away from China benefit Mexico over the long run. Second, we now know that the US protectionist threat was also overstated: President Trump’s first term demonstrates that even if the US elects a populist and protectionist president who pledges to take an aggressive approach toward Mexico, the ties that bind the two countries will not be easily broken. One of the few times Senate Republicans openly defied President Trump was their refusal in June 2019 to allow sweeping 5%-25% unilateral tariff rates on Mexican imports. Hence even if Trump wins and the GOP retains the Senate, Mexico has some safeguards here. Trump would also be constrained by House Democrats on the issue of building a border wall and reforming the US immigration system. AMLO visited Trump in Washington to sign the USMCA ahead of the election. The trade deal is part of Trump’s legacy so Trump is more likely to attack other trade surplus countries than Mexico. Former Vice President Joe Biden and the Democratic Party are more likely to win the US election. In that case, US policy toward Mexico will turn more dovish. House Democrats helped negotiate the USMCA deal and voted to pass it. Biden is unlikely to impose large tariffs on Mexico. It is still possible that US-Mexico tensions will reignite later, if immigration swells under Biden, but the latter is not guaranteed. Two additional macro and geopolitical factors also play to Mexico’s favor over the long run: First, the US’s profligate fiscal policy will benefit its neighbor and trading partner. Massive American monetary and fiscal stimulus – about to receive another dollop of around $2-$2.5 trillion in new spending – will total upwards of 20% of US GDP in 2020 (Chart 11). This is especially likely in the event of a Democratic clean sweep. Yet Democrats are likely to retain the House, preventing Republicans from slashing spending too much even if they convince Trump to adopt their fiscal hawkishness in any second term. Chart 10MORENA’s Approval Comes Down To Earth Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 11Mexican Exports Will Benefit From US Stimulus Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 12US Leaving China Will Boost Mexico Industrialization US Leaving China Will Boost Mexico Industrialization US Leaving China Will Boost Mexico Industrialization Second, the US is leading a global movement to diversify supply chains away from China. This shift is rooted in US grand strategy and began under the Obama administration, and it is highly likely to continue whether Trump or Biden wins. A Biden victory will result in a more multilateral approach that is more beneficial for global trade, but still penalizes China – which is good for Mexico. No country has suffered a greater opportunity cost from China’s industrialization than Mexico (Chart 12). Both Biden and Trump are advertising a policy of on-shoring that will, in effect, benefit US trading partners ex-China. US current account deficits stem from its domestic savings-investment balance and therefore will persist even if China is cut out, driving production elsewhere. Bottom Line: We are optimistic about Mexico. Trade risk from the US is unlikely to rise higher than during 2017-19, while legislative hurdles facing AMLO and MORENA cannot get much lower than they are today. The currency is fairly valued and equities are not too pricey. Gargantuan US stimulus and a shift away from China dependency will boost growth and investment in Mexico. We will look for opportunities to go long the Mexican peso and assets. Volatile Brazil: Fiscal Restraint Is Gone While much of the world is focused on a second wave of Covid-19, Brazil has struggled to hurdle its first. The country has over 4.8 million confirmed cases (23 000 cases per 1 million people), and 143,000 deaths, second only to the United States. Coronavirus testing in Brazil stands at 73,900 tests per 1 million people, i.e. higher than Mexico’s but not enough to paint a complete picture of the virus’ course (Chart 13). The Brazilian government’s response has been chaotic. With a nearly universal health care system, albeit one that is under-funded, Brazil was not as poorly prepared as some countries. However, like his populist counterparts in Mexico and the United States, Bolsonaro chose to prioritize the economy over the virus response. Brazil was one of the few major countries in the world not to impose a national lockdown. The Ministry of Health, consumed with political turmoil, failed to develop a nationwide plan of action.1 Bolsonaro quarreled with governors who imposed state lockdown measures. With conflicting state and federal messages, Brazilians were unsure about the benefits of social isolation, hand washing, and face coverings, leading to a widespread lack of compliance and a major outbreak of the disease. Bolsonaro’s approach has led to some benefits, however, and the government implemented the largest fiscal response in the region at a whopping 16% of GDP. The economy is recovering faster than that of neighboring countries (Chart 14). Bolsonaro’s approval rating has also improved. The polling looks like a short-term “crisis bounce,” but Bolsonaro is now ahead of his likeliest rivals in 2022, including former President Lula Da Silva and former Justice Minister Sergio Moro. The crisis has catapulted Bolsonaro back into the approval range of other Brazilian presidents, at least for the moment (Chart 15). Chart 13Bolsonaro And Trump Prioritize Recession Over Pandemic Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 14Bolsonaro's Economy Roaring Back Bolsonaro's Economy Roaring Back Bolsonaro's Economy Roaring Back All eyes will next turn to the municipal elections slated for November 15, 2020. The first elections since Bolsonaro came to power will be a test of whether the left-wing opposition can recover. One of the key pillars of Bolsonaro’s political capital was the collapse of the Worker’s Party after the economic crisis and Car Wash corruption scandal of the 2010s. The local government election will also reflect public views of the pandemic. Local governments are important when it comes to combating COVID-19. On April 15, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court gave them the power to set quarantine restrictions and rules with regard to public transit, transport, and highway use. They are in charge of utilizing numerous rounds of aid from the federal government to mitigate the health and economic effects of the virus. Many have rejected Bolsonaro’s cavalier attitude, imposed stricter health measures, and established local teams comprised of medical professionals, public officials, and private donors to monitor the outbreak. If the Worker’s Party fails to recover from the shellacking it suffered in Brazil’s local elections in 2016, then Bolsonaro’s polling bounce would be reinforced and his administration would get a new lease on life. The opposite is also true: a strong recovery will undercut his political capital, especially because it is still possible that Da Silva will be cleared of corruption charges and capable of running for office in 2022. Bolsonaro also faces a test on another pillar of his political capital: the fight against corruption. A criminal investigation of the administration emerged after the resignation of popular justice Minister, Sergio Moro, who accuses the president of wrongdoing. There is an additional pending investigation for his team’s use of “fake news” during the 2018 campaign, which many deem illegal. So far, however, talk of impeachment has not hurt the president. Only about 46% of Brazilians support impeachment (Chart 16), which is not enough to get him removed from office. Any future impeachment push will depend on the following factors: Chart 15Bolsonaro Enjoys Popularity Boost Amid Pandemic Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 16Nowhere Near Enough Support For Bolso Impeachment Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long First, the president has allied with an alliance of center-right parties, called the Centrao, that controls 40% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and has played a historic role in the rise and fall of Brazilian presidents (Chart 17). The Centrao can shield Bolsonaro from impeachment just as its opposition ultimately led to former President Dilma Rousseff’s removal in August 2016. By the same token, if these allies turn on him, removal will become the likely outcome. Second, powerful politicians like House Speaker Rodrigo Maia are reluctant to impeach because it would add “more wood in the fire,” i.e. worsen political instability. It would be bad politics for the impeachment directors as well. But this could change. The other two pillars of Bolsonaro’s political capital are law and order and structural economic reform. Bolsonaro has maintained his law-and-order image through cozy relations with the military, as well as through a slight decline in homicides (Chart 18). Chart 17Brazil: Presidential Parties Small, Need Support From ‘Centrists’ Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 18Bolsonaro's "Law And Order" Message Works So Far Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Structural reform is the critical factor for investors, but the crisis has slowed the reform agenda, particularly on the fiscal front. The main way for Brazil to reform is to reduce the size of government. The government takes up a large share of national output, comparable to Argentina, and public debt is soaring. The country was already hurtling toward a sovereign debt crisis prior to COVID-19 (Chart 19). Bolsonaro’s signature legislative achievement, pension reform, has done little to arrest this trajectory, as it was watered down to gain passage and then the pandemic wiped out the fiscal gains. Ironically, Bolsonaro’s improved popularity is negative for fiscal consolidation, since it will encourage him to play the populist ahead of the 2022 election. Pension reform was never popular and passing it did nothing to boost Bolsonaro’s approval rating. On the contrary, his approval began to rise when the pandemic struck and he loosened fiscal policy. Going forward he will need to maintain fiscal spending to rebuild the economy. He is already jeopardizing Brazil’s key fiscal rules. As for the election, Brazil always increases government spending in the year before and year of a presidential election, as all parties hope to buy votes (Chart 20). Chart 19Brazil's Fiscal Crisis Accelerates Brazil's Fiscal Crisis Accelerates Brazil's Fiscal Crisis Accelerates Chart 20Brazil Cranks Up Spending Ahead Of Elections Brazil Cranks Up Spending Ahead Of Elections Brazil Cranks Up Spending Ahead Of Elections The implication is that any fiscal hawkishness will have to wait until Bolsonaro’s second term. Of course, if Bolsonaro loses the vote, left-wing parties may return to power and fiscal profligacy will be the order of the day. So investors do not have a good prospect for fiscal consolidation anytime soon, barring a successful candidacy by the aforementioned Moro on a reformist and anti-corruption ticket. Fiscal expansion and loose monetary policy are positive for domestic demand initially but negative for the out-of-control debt profile and hence ultimately the currency and government bond prices over the long term. Outside Brazil, geopolitical conditions are reasonably favorable. If Trump wins, Bolsonaro’s right-wing populism will gain some legitimacy and he may be able to negotiate good trade relations with the United States. If Trump loses, Bolsonaro will become politically isolated, but Brazil will benefit economically, as Joe Biden is friendlier to global trade than Trump. Brazil’s trade openness has grown rapidly, one area of reform that will continue. China is also interested in closer relations with Brazil as it faces trade conflict with the US and Australia. If Trump wins, Bolsonaro benefits from further Chinese substitution away from the United States. If Trump loses, Beijing will not return to former dependencies on the United States. Also, while China cannot substitute Brazil for Australia entirely, it is likely to increase imports from Brazil on the margin (Chart 21). Chart 21Brazil Benefits If China Diversifies From US And Oz Brazil Benefits If China Diversifies From US And Oz Brazil Benefits If China Diversifies From US And Oz Chart 22Brazilian Political Risk Down From 2015-16 Peak Brazilian Political Risk Down From 2015-16 Peak Brazilian Political Risk Down From 2015-16 Peak Ultimately Brazil is a country filled with political risk due to extreme inequality and indebtedness. But as long as the global economy and commodity prices recover, Bolsonaro will be able to ride the wave and short-term political risks will continue to subside from the extremely elevated levels of 2016 (Chart 22).   Bottom Line: Bolsonaro’s popularity bounced in the face of the national crisis. Local elections in November are an important barometer of whether his administration and its neoliberal structural reform agenda can survive beyond 2022. Either way, fiscal consolidation is on hold prior to the 2022 election. We are long Brazilian equities as a China play, but the outlook is ultimately negative for the currency. Bearish Argentina: Peronism Restored Argentina has 751,000 cases of coronavirus (16,800 cases per 1 million people) and about 16,900 deaths. Testing stands at 41,700 test per 1 million people. After the federal government eased quarantine restrictions and began reopening most of the country on June 7, total cases followed the general trend of the region (Chart 23). Chart 23Argentina’s COVID-19 Suppression Losing Steam Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Despite early measures to flatten the curve, Argentina lacks hospital beds, doctors, and medical supplies, especially in the capital of Buenos Aires where 88% of the country’s confirmed cases are found. The coronavirus has exposed stark differences between the rich and poor in terms of access and quality of health care, with about a third of the population uninsured. Politically secure, Fernandez has prioritized the medical crisis over the economy, imposing some of the world’s strictest lockdown measures in mid-March and declaring a one-year national health emergency – the first country in Latin America to do so. However, Argentina’s multi-decade economic mismanagement and recent policy vacillations mean that the crisis came at a bad time. Argentina has been in a deep recession for over two years, with skyrocketing inflation and peso devaluation, excessive budget deficits and external debts, and a 10% poverty rate in 2018 (Chart 24). Former President Mauricio Macri’s badly needed but ultimately failed attempt at supply-side reforms resulted in an economic collapse that saw the left-wing Peronist/Kirchnerista faction regain power in 2019. Argentina’s fiscal problems will continue on the back of populist economic unorthodoxy. Sovereign risk has temporarily fallen. Argentina received a $300 million emergency loan from the World Bank and another $4 billion loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. The country has defaulted on sovereign debt nine times, but the Fernandez government reached a deal with its largest creditors to restructure $65 billion in early August. The government agreed to bring some debt payments forward, thus buying itself immediate debt relief. It now has a little more than five years until the debt pile’s biggest wave of maturities comes due (Chart 25). Chart 24Poverty Rates Spike Amid Crisis, Including In Argentina Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 25Argentina's Sovereign Risk Will Rise From Here Argentina's Sovereign Risk Will Rise From Here Argentina's Sovereign Risk Will Rise From Here This deal will give President Fernandez a significant boost. He took office in December 2019 so he has time to ride out the crisis before facing voters again in 2023. However, his reliance on populist economic unorthodoxy ensures that Argentina’s fiscal problems will continue. Consider the following: Before Covid-19, in an attempt to regain credibility among international lenders, Fernandez appointed Martin Guzman, as Minister of Economy. Guzman is an academic and a disciple of American Nobel-prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, but has little policy-making experience. Fernandez pushed an Economic Emergency Law through Congress, giving him emergency powers to renegotiate debt terms and intervene in the economy. He re-imposed import-substitution policies, such as large tax increases on agricultural exports, currency controls, and utility price freezes. In Fernandez’s inauguration speech, he justified a return to leftist policies by saying, “until we eliminate hunger we will ask for greater solidarity from those who have more capacity to give it.” This is a traditional trap for Argentina which results in worse economic outcomes over the long run. Chart 26Argentina’s Government Scores Well In Opinion Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Fernandez’s government has increased fiscal spending on food aid and other safety nets for the unemployed and furloughed. It has required banks to give out loans at reduced interest rates. Initially it pledged 2% of GDP to social and welfare relief programs, but that number has risen since the onset of the pandemic. For now, Fernandez has considerable political capital. The crisis will wipe out the memory of the Kirchneristas’ previous failings. Social spending is now flowing to Fernandez’s political base and the informal sector of the economy, which accounts for almost half of all Argentine workers. Public support for Fernandez has remained strong through the economic woes and pandemic, with his approval rating at around 67%. Over 80% of people polled have confidence in the government’s handling of the virus (Chart 26), according to opinion polls. Profligate spending will likely continue beyond the cyclical demands of the current crisis, adding to Argentina’s unsustainable debt profile. When the pandemic subsides, international lenders will be less willing to extend credit to Argentina and invest, given their record of default and high tax rates. International companies and even small caps have fled the country due to its draconian currency controls. Bottom Line: Argentina has witnessed a fall in uncertainty but going forward political risk will revive. Populist Kirchnerista policies do not create productivity improvements or reduce debt, and the country’s macro fundamentals will underperform in the long run. RIP Venezuela: The Final (Final) Nail In The Coffin For years, Venezuela has suffered an economic crisis with high levels of unemployment, hyperinflation, and mass shortages of food, medical supplies, and even gasoline. Many citizens claim they’re more likely to die from starvation than the coronavirus. Out of the country’s 47 hospitals that are supposedly dedicated to COVID-19, only 57% have a regular water supply, while 43% have a shortage of PPE kits for medical staff and practitioners. Nicolas Maduro – the hapless successor to Hugo Chavez – declared a state of emergency and implemented a nationwide and long-lasting lockdown, enforced by police. The government issued a unique “7 + 7” plan, where strict lockdowns are imposed for seven days, relaxed for another seven days, re-imposed, and so on. Nevertheless, cases have been increasing. Over time the crisis in Venezuela has forced around five million Venezuelans, including skilled workers and medical doctors, to leave the country (Chart 27). Spillover effects are straining neighboring Colombia, which has taken in 1.5 million of the refugees, and Brazil. Although thousands of Venezuelans have returned home during the pandemic, the massive movements will only make the virus more prevalent. In early June, Maduro reopened borders with Colombia after closing them in February when opposition leader (and rival claimant to the presidency) Juan Guaidó tried to import foreign aid. Maduro denied that Venezuela is in humanitarian crisis and warned against a coup d'état by the United States. The political opposition is stymied for now. In January 2019, Guaidó declared himself president of Venezuela over Maduro, whose government has circumvented the constitutional system since losing the parliamentary election of 2015. Guaido receives broad support from the international community, including Europe and the United States, while Maduro is backed by China, Russia, and Iran. Over 18 months later, Guaidó wields nearly no power at home and Maduro remains in place with the army’s top generals still backing him. However, the Trump administration has expanded sanctions throughout its term. Maduro is unable to access international financing from the IMF, after requesting an emergency $5 billion loan to combat COVID-19, partly due to US opposition. Food prices in Venezuela have risen 259% since January. Low worldwide demand for oil – representing 32% of Venezuelan GDP – means the last leg of the economy has weakened. The government has little room to maneuver fiscally or otherwise combat the virus. Maduro has used the crisis to strengthen his domestic security grip. The military, police, and revolutionary militias are enforcing lockdowns to thwart demonstrations. The opposition is divided, with Guaidó now quarreling with former opposition leader Henrique Capriles over whether to contend the parliamentary elections on December 6. The elections will inevitably be rigged; but to boycott them is to allow Maduro officially to retake the key constitutional body that he lost (and then sidelined) back in 2016. Nevertheless, the material foundations of the country have long collapsed (Chart 28). The pandemic and recession will ultimately prove the final (final, final) nail in the coffin. The military is ruling from behind the scenes but will not want to jeopardize its own status when the Bolivarian revolution is finally abandoned. The timing of this denouement is, as always, anybody’s guess. Chart 27Venezuela’s Refugees Show State Collapse Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 28Venezuela's Regime Cannot Survive Venezuela's Regime Cannot Survive Venezuela's Regime Cannot Survive   Bottom Line: President Trump will maintain maximum on Maduro and Venezuela as long as he is in office. The regime will struggle to survive long enough to enjoy the benefits of the commodity price upswing next year. Whenever Maduro falls, the prospect of an eventual resuscitation of oil production will open up. Bullish Colombia: Political Risk Contained (For Now) Chart 29Colombia Flattened The Curve Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long The Colombian government responded swiftly to COVID-19. President Ivan Duque shut seven border crossings with Venezuela, declared a state of emergency, and imposed lockdown measures in mid-March. The measures have been stringent and extended. The effect on the spread of the disease is discernible compared to Colombia’s neighbors (Chart 29). The city of Medellin, with 2.5 million residents and only 2,399 coronavirus deaths, became the best-case scenario for combating the virus. Through the use of an online app, the city government connected people with money and food, while obtaining important data to track cases. Despite the lockdowns, fiscal policy has been tight. True, the government provided payroll subsidies for formal and informal workers unable to work during lockdowns.2 But government spending as a whole is limited (Chart 30). This is positive for the country’s currency and government bonds but will exacerbate political tensions later. Chart 30Colombia's Fiscal Hawkishness Good For Currency, But Will Spur Opposition Colombia's Fiscal Hawkishness Good For Currency, But Will Spur Opposition Colombia's Fiscal Hawkishness Good For Currency, But Will Spur Opposition Duque’s approval ratings were low back in February (23%) but nearly doubled when the crisis struck (Chart 31). However, they have since fallen back to around 40% and high unemployment and fiscal restraint will challenge his government in coming years. Chart 31Colombia’s President Struggling, But Has Time To Recover Pre-Election Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Colombia is relatively politically stable but tensions are building beneath the surface that will challenge the country’s recent improvements in governance and the 2016 peace deal. On August 4, former President Alvaro Uribe was put under house arrest by a section of the Colombian Supreme Court amid an investigation on witness tampering. He was the first ex-president to be detained in Colombia’s history. Subsequently he resigned from the Senate to obtain better treatment at the hands of the more friendly Attorney General’s office. Uribe is powerful. He created Centro Democratico, which is the largest party in the Senate and the second largest in Congress. He also hand-picked President Duque. His case will continue to be a source of political polarization. Right-leaning factions have not yet convinced moderates to oppose the country’s UN-backed 2016 peace deal, which ended decades of fighting between government forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the leading rebel group. If that changes, then domestic security will decline and investor sentiment will decline at least marginally. Colombia’s political polarization will be contained by Venezuela’s collapse – as long as the economy recovers. In the wake of the oil bust in 2014, Colombia saw the left-wing factions unite around a single candidate – Gustavo Petro, an ex-guerilla – who challenged the conservative establishment in the 2018 election, pledging to tackle inequality. Petro was soundly defeated, giving markets reason to cheer. Now, however, inequality is combining with a deep recession, austerity, and the potential for a failed peace process to challenge the conservatives in 2022. Table 1Latin America Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 32MXN, COL, And CLP Outperform While BRL Lags MXN, COL, And CLP Outperform While BRL Lags MXN, COL, And CLP Outperform While BRL Lags The saving grace for the conservatives will likely be the global cyclical upswing, combined with Venezuela’s collapse continuing to unite the right and divide the left. However, the Uribe faction’s dominance is getting long in the tooth and Colombia is vulnerable to social unrest based on our COVID-19 Unrest Index (Table 1). The election is not all that soon. The Colombian peso is still relatively cheap and yet has outperformed other emerging market currencies due to the strong COVID-19 response and the oil rally (Chart 32). Bottom Line: Tight fiscal policy combined with a strong pandemic response – and the recovery in oil prices – will benefit the Colombian peso. Equities are attractively valued. Political risk will build as the 2022 election draws closer, however. Volatile Chile: Tactical Buys Hinge On Politics, China Chile has been a hotspot for the coronavirus. Its lackluster response to the pandemic is fanning the embers of the social unrest that erupted last year. Unrest is tied to a larger political crisis unfolding over the constitutional order, which evolved from the 1980 constitution of dictator Augusto Pinochet. Chile is transitioning from a neoliberal economic model to a welfare state, as Arthur Budaghyan and Juan Egaña of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy showed in an excellent special report last year. This transition raises headwinds for an currency, equities, and government bonds. The Chilean government, led by President Sebastián Piñera, declared a state of emergency in March and boosted health care spending throughout the country. The government also passed numerous emergency relief packages to small businesses, workers of the informal economy, and local governments. However, high levels of poverty and overcrowding, especially in the capital of Santiago, have hindered efforts to contain the coronavirus (Chart 33). The government imposed strict lockdowns, including a nationwide increase in police and up to five-year prison penalties for violating quarantines. The political opposition argues that Piñera’s extension of the “state of catastrophe” has allowed him to use emergency powers to restrict citizens’ rights in the name of curbing the pandemic. His approval rating has fallen beneath 22% while popular disapproval has surged above 68% (Chart 34). Chart 33Chile’s Handling Of COVID-19 Largely Successful Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 34Chile’s Govt Embattled Amid Constitutional Rewrite Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chart 35Chile: Inequality Falling, But High Level Still Sparks Unrest Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Chile was already a tinderbox before the pandemic. Beginning with a small hike to subway fares in Santiago in October 2019, pent-up social grievances erupted against the country’s elite. Protests have continued even during lockdowns and morphed into demands for broader social reform (Chart 35). Chile's top rank on our COVID-19 Social Unrest Index belies the fact that it has high wealth inequality, a threadbare social safety net, high debt levels, and now higher unemployment (Table 1). Table 1Latin America Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long In a concession to protesters, the Piñera administration agreed to revise the constitution. A popular referendum will be held on October 25, though it has already been delayed once. The referendum will determine whether to hold a direct constitutional assembly, whose members are drawn from the population as a whole, or a mixed constitutional assembly, in which congress takes up half of the seats. The latter is the more conservative option; the former is more progressive and will deepen political polarization as the political establishment will resist it (Chart 36). The process to revise the constitution is supposed to last until the end of 2022 but it could drag on longer. Moreover it will be complicated by presidential and legislative elections slated for November 2021. The timing of these events ensures that short-term partisan factors will have a major impact on constitutional revision, which bodes ill for resolving structural political problems. The Piñera administration’s goal is to pacify the protesters with some reforms, thus winning his party re-election, while preserving key elements of the current political establishment. But the pandemic has made it harder to do this, requiring either greater government concessions or a new round of unrest. The implication is that political risk will remain elevated over the next few years. Political risk will thus undermine good news on the macro front, including the peso’s strong performance this year so far (Chart 32 above). Of course, there are positive macro factors countervailing this political risk. One of which is China’s recovery. Beijing accounts for 51% of global copper demand, and Chile provides 28% of mine supply, and China is stimulating aggressively. Chilean exports track even more closely with China’s credit impulse than those of other Latin American economies (Chart 37). Chart 36COVID-19 Unrest Index: If Chile Faces Unrest, Then All Latin America Faces Unrest Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long Latin America: Get Ready To Go Long However, the market has partly priced China’s boost whereas Chile’s political risk will erupt again soon. With regard to the US election, Chile stands to benefit from a Democratic victory that improves the outlook for China’s economy and global trade. Like Peru, Chile is a member of the CPTPP and stands to benefit if Biden is elected and eventually rejoins this pact. Chart 37Chile Constitutional Battle Will Increase Political Risk Chile Constitutional Battle Will Increase Political Risk Chile Constitutional Battle Will Increase Political Risk   Bottom Line: A secular rise in domestic political risk as the country is pressured to expand the social safety net is a negative factor for the peso and stock market that will weigh on its otherwise positive macro backdrop. Investment Takeaways The above review reveals some common threads. First, the last decade has not led to lasting neoliberal reforms or major strides in promoting productivity. Attempts at supply-side structural reform have been modest or have failed entirely in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Colombia’s attempt at a peace deal may falter. Venezuela is a failed state. Second, populism, whether left-wing or right-wing, entails that most governments will pursue economic growth at any cost. Fiscal hawkishness has been put on pause, with the exception of Mexico and Colombia, where it will benefit the currencies. Near-term risks abound in Q4 2020 but the long term is favorable for Latin American financial assets due to global reflation. China is stimulating its economy aggressively. US sanctions will weigh on China, but it will need to stimulate more in response to maintain internal stability. This will boost commodity prices. The dollar will eventually weaken as global growth recovers, the Fed avoids raising rates, and the US maintains large twin deficits. This is ultimately true even if Trump is re-elected. A weaker dollar helps commodities and Latin American countries with US dollar debts. All things considered, Mexico and Colombia will come out looking the best, but we will also look for opportunities when discounts on Chilean assets become excessive. The US’s secular confrontation with China over trade tensions holds out the prospect of Latin American markets reversing their long equity underperformance relative to Asian manufacturers (Chart 38). Latin American manufacturers like Mexico will benefit from American trade diversification. If the US joins the CPTPP, then Chile and Peru will also benefit. Metals producers like Chile will benefit most from China’s stimulus. Chart 38China's Stimulus A Boon For Latin America China's Stimulus A Boon For Latin America China's Stimulus A Boon For Latin America   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Daniel Kohen Consulting Editor Footnotes 1 The Ministry of Health exemplifies growing fractures across the administration. In mid-May, the Health Minister (Nelson Teich) resigned just four weeks into the job, after Bolsonaro fired the previous one (Luiz Henrique Mandetta) for defending lockdown measures imposed by some mayors and governors. 2 There are about 1.8 million Venezuelan refugees in Colombia. They rely on the informal work, with many falling back into poverty as a result of the mandatory quarantines.

Highlights Near-Term Uncertainties: Investors have grown a bit more nervous in recent weeks, amid signs of a second wave of the coronavirus in Europe and with the contentious US presidential election only five weeks away. The pro-growth cyclical investment backdrop, however, remains unchanged. From a strategic perspective (6-12 months), maintain an overall neutral stance on interest rate duration, with a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government bonds while staying up in quality. EM USD-Denominated Debt: The main drivers of the emerging market hard currency debt rally since March – a weakening US dollar, improving global growth momentum, and massively accommodative global monetary policies – remain in place. Valuations, however, appear more attractive for EM USD-denominated corporates relative to USD-denominated sovereigns. Favor the former over the latter, within an overall neutral strategic allocation to EM hard currency debt. Feature Chart of the WeekMarkets Starting To Get Cautious Markets Starting To Get Cautious Markets Starting To Get Cautious As the third quarter of 2020 draws to a close, investors have developed a slight case of the jitters about the near-term outlook for global financial markets. The positives that drove risk assets higher during the spring and summer - rebounding global economic activity, fueled by aggressive policy stimulus and a slowing of the spread of COVID-19, along with a weaker US dollar – have given way to some fresh uncertainties. Economic data releases have started to disappoint versus expectations, the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets in the major developed economies has temporarily stalled, a second wave of new COVID-19 cases appears to have started in Europe and the US, and the US dollar has strengthened by 2.7% from the 2020 lows (Chart of the Week). Risk assets have pulled back in response, with the MSCI World equity index down -6.1% from the 2020 peak and US high-yield corporate credit spreads 66bps wider from recent lows. So far, these moves appear more a correction of overbought markets, rather than a change in trend. From the perspective of our strategic (6-12 months) investment recommendations, we remain generally positive on risk assets. Within global fixed income, that means maintaining a modest overall overweight stance on spread products versus government bonds, while focusing more on relative opportunities between countries and sectors to generate alpha. A Quick Assessment Of The Cyclical Backdrop The recent in increase in market volatility has started to shake out crowded positioning in popular winning trades. For example, high-flying US tech stocks have seen deeper pullbacks than the overall US equity market, while investors yanked nearly $5 billion from US junk bond funds in the week ending last Wednesday according to the Financial Times – the highest such outflow since the apex of the COVID-19 market rout in mid-March. We prefer to judge the health of a market rally by assessing the state of macroeconomic fundamentals underpinning that particular asset class Mainstream financial pundits often dub such corrections of overheated markets as a “healthy” way to ensure the continuation of medium-term bullish trends. We prefer to judge the health of a market rally by assessing the state of macroeconomic fundamentals underpinning that particular asset class – the most important of which remain positive for risk assets, in general, and global fixed income spread products, in particular. Economic Data Chart 2Economic Data Is Mostly Optimistic Economic Data Is Mostly Optimistic Economic Data Is Mostly Optimistic While data surprise indices like the widely followed Citigroup series are topping out, this is more because of an improvement in beaten-up growth expectations, rather than a sharp decline in the actual data. The global ZEW economic expectations survey continues to point in an optimistic direction, while other reliable measures of business confidence like the German IFO and the US NFIB small business surveys have also continued to improve in recent months. Our own global leading economic indicator (LEI) is firming, with a majority of countries seeing a rising LEI (Chart 2). At the same time, the preliminary release of manufacturing PMI data for September showed continued improvements in the US and Europe. While the news is not 100% upbeat – the services PMI for the overall euro area fell -2.9 points in September, possibly due to the increase in new reported cases of COVID-19 in Europe – the tone of global economic data remains consistent with improving cyclical momentum. The US Dollar Chart 3Growth And Yield Differentials Signalling Dollar Weakness Growth And Yield Differentials Signalling Dollar Weakness Growth And Yield Differentials Signalling Dollar Weakness The most likely medium-term path of least resistance for the US dollar remains downward. Economic growth remains stronger outside the US, based on the differential between the US and non-US manufacturing PMI data – an indicator that our currency strategists follow closely given its strong correlation to US dollar momentum (Chart 3). Relative interest rate differentials also remain less positive for the US dollar, with the decline in real US bond yields seen in 2020 pointing to additional medium-term dollar depreciation (bottom panel). US Politics The US general election is now only 35 days away, with the latest polling data showing President Trump closing the lead on the Democratic Party candidate, Joe Biden. Our colleagues at BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy remain of the view that a Biden victory is the more probable outcome, given the more difficult time Trump will have in winning all the key swing states that gave him his narrow election victory in 2016. Chart 4A "Blue Sweep" Is Bearish For Markets A "Blue Sweep" Is Bearish For Markets A "Blue Sweep" Is Bearish For Markets The recent peak in US equity markets, and trough in the VIX index, coincided with improving odds of a Democratic Party sweep of the White House, House of Representatives and Senate (Chart 4). Such an outcome would give a President Biden the power, and perceived mandate, to implement many of the more progressive elements of the Democratic Party agenda – including a hike in corporate tax rates that could damage equity market sentiment. Our political strategists think that a “Blue Sweep” would only occur if the Republican Party fails to agree with the Democrats on a new fiscal stimulus bill.1 Both sides are playing hardball in the current negotiations, which is keeping investors on edge given how much of the US economy still requires fiscal support because of the pandemic. The Republicans will not want to take the blame for a failure to reach a stimulus deal, which would likely hand the Democrats the keys to the White House and Congress. Thus, a fiscal deal of sufficient size to calm jittery markets – most likely in the $2-2.5 trillion range sought by the Democrats – should be announced within the next couple of weeks before the final run up to the election. Financial/Monetary Conditions It will take more than a corrective pullback in equity and credit markets to threaten the economic recovery from the COVID-19 recession, given how highly stimulative financial conditions have become since the spring (Chart 5). In more normal times, booming equity and credit markets would eventually lead to upward pressure on government bond yields, since all would be reflecting improving economic growth and, eventually, expectations of faster inflation and tighter monetary policy. That move higher in yields would eventually act to restrain growth and depress the value of growth-sensitive risk assets. Chart 5Financial Conditions Remain Supportive For Growth Financial Conditions Remain Supportive For Growth Financial Conditions Remain Supportive For Growth As we discussed in last week’s report, government bond yields are now likely to stay very low for a period measured in years, with major central banks like the US Federal Reserve leaning dovishly to support growth during the pandemic and trigger a temporary overshoot of inflation expectations.2 Thus, loose monetary settings (including more quantitative easing) will remain a critical underpinning for keeping risk assets well supported, by eliminating the typical cyclical threat from rising bond yields. Summing it all up, the fundamental economic and political backdrop remains cyclically bullish for risk assets, despite recent investor nervousness. Of course, a major wild card could be that the latest surge in new COVID-19 cases becomes large enough to trigger renewed economic restrictions in the US or Europe. Yet any such moves would likely not be as severe as those that occurred back in the spring, given the much lower mortality rates seen during the current upturn in COVID-19 cases, which is reducing the public’s willingness to accept more economy-crushing lockdowns. Bottom Line: Investors have grown a bit more nervous in recent weeks, amid signs of a second wave of the coronavirus in Europe and with the contentious US presidential election only five weeks away. The pro-growth cyclical investment backdrop, however, remains unchanged. From a strategic perspective (6-12 months), maintain an overall neutral stance on interest rate duration, with a moderate overweight to global spread product versus government bonds while staying up in quality. EM USD-Denominated Credit: Focus On Corporates Relative To Sovereigns Chart 6An Overview of USD-Denominated EM Debt An Overview of USD-Denominated EM Debt An Overview of USD-Denominated EM Debt Back in July of this year, we turned more positive on emerging market (EM) USD-denominated spread product, upgrading our recommended allocation to both EM USD sovereign and corporate debt to neutral from underweight in our model bond portfolio.3 The change was motivated by signs of rebounding global economic growth after the COVID-19 lockdowns and a loss of upward momentum in the US dollar, coming at a time when EM spreads still looked relatively cheap (wide) compared to developed market corporate debt. An underweight stance was inconsistent with that backdrop. EM credit has done well since our upgrade (Chart 6). Using Bloomberg Barclays index data, the yield on the EM USD-denominated sovereign index has fallen from 5.2% to 4.4%, while the option-adjusted spread (OAS) on that same index tightened from 447bps to 368bps. It has been a similar story for EM USD-denominated corporates, with the index yield falling from 4.1% to 3.9% and the index OAS narrowing from 361bps to 344bps.4 Given the close correlations typically exhibited between EM USD sovereign and corporate yields and spreads, we have tended to change our recommended allocations to both asset classes at the same time and in the same direction. Yet the EM credit universe is quite diverse, incorporating many different issuers of highly varying credit quality and risk (Table 1). Treating the allocations to EM USD sovereign debt and USD corporate debt separately may reveal more profitable relative return opportunities. The fundamental economic and political backdrop remains cyclically bullish for risk assets, despite recent investor nervousness. Table 1Details Of The USD-Denominated EM Sovereign And EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Indices Stay The Course Stay The Course A first step to analyzing the EM USD sovereigns versus corporates investment decision is to develop a list of macro factors that correlate to the relative performance of EM sovereign and corporate credit. From there, we can build a list of directional indicators that can help inform that sovereign versus corporates decision. Treating the allocations to EM USD sovereign debt and USD corporate debt separately may reveal more profitable relative return opportunities. Our colleagues at BCA Research Emerging Markets Strategy have long held the view that overall EM debt performance is mostly driven by just two important macro factors: industrial commodity prices and the US dollar. Specifically, they have shown that the broad cyclical swings in EM sovereign and corporate spreads correlate strongly to the price momentum of a simple blend of industrial metal and oil prices, as well as the price momentum of a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar (Chart 7). Chart 7EM Credit Spreads: A Commodity And Currency Story EM Credit Spreads: A Commodity And Currency Story EM Credit Spreads: A Commodity And Currency Story On that basis, the recent moderate widening of EM credit spreads is justified by the corrective pullback in industrial commodity prices and a bit of US dollar strength – trends that our EM strategists believe can continue in the near-term. Although they share our view that the medium-term trend in the US dollar is still bearish, thus any near-term EM debt selloff will represent a longer-term buying opportunity.5 The demand for industrial commodities remains largely driven by economic trends in the world’s largest commodity consumer, China. Thus, our China credit impulse (the change in overall Chinese credit relative to GDP), which leads Chinese economic activity, is a good leading indicator of industrial commodity prices. We will use the China credit impulse in our list of directional indicators to forecast EM sovereign versus corporate performance. We also will include the annual rate of change of the index of EM currencies versus the US dollar (shown in Chart 7). We also believe that a global monetary policy variable should be included in our indicator list, particularly in the current environment of super-low developed market interest rates and central bank purchase of government bonds – both of which tend to drive yield-starved investors into higher-yielding EM assets and, potentially, can influence the relative performance of EM sovereigns and corporates. To capture the global monetary policy trend in our indicator list, we use the combined annual growth rate of the balance sheets of the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. The message from our indicator list is that EM USD corporates should outperform EM USD sovereign debt over the next 6-12 months. In Charts 8 & 9, we show the relative total return of the Bloomberg Barclays EM USD corporate and USD sovereign indices, expressed in year-over-year percentage terms, versus our list of three potential directional indicators of the relative total return. We have broken up the overall EM universe by broad credit quality, with index data used for investment grade issuers in Chart 8 and below investment grade (high-yield) issuers in Chart 9. For all three of our directional indicators, we have pushed them forward in the charts to look for a potential leading relationship to the relative returns. Chart 8EM Investment Grade Corporates Looking Set to Outperform ... EM Investment Grade Corporates Looking Set to Outperform ... EM Investment Grade Corporates Looking Set to Outperform ... Chart 9... But The High Yield Space Tells A More Mixed Story ... But The High Yield Space Tells A More Mixed Story ... But The High Yield Space Tells A More Mixed Story The charts show that China credit impulse leads the relative total returns of EM USD corporates versus EM USD sovereigns by between 9-18 months for investment grade and high-yield EM credit. The growth of the major central bank balance sheets also leads the relative performance of EM USD corporates versus EM USD sovereigns by one full year, both for investment grade and high-yield EM credit. Finally, the annual growth of EM currencies leads the relative return of EM USD corporates versus sovereigns by around nine months, although the correlation is the weakest of the three indicators in our list. In terms of current investment strategy, the message from our indicator list is that EM USD corporates should outperform EM USD sovereign debt over the next 6-12 months, both for investment grade and high-yield, largely due to aggressive credit stimulus in China and the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets. In terms of the attractiveness of EM USD-denominated yields in a global fixed income portfolio, however, there is a difference between higher-rated and lower-rated EM debt. In Chart 10, we present a scatter chart that plots the yields on various global fixed income sectors, all hedged into US dollars and compared to trailing yield volatility, versus the average credit rating of each sector. Investment grade EM USD corporate and sovereign issuers offer relatively more attractive yields compared to other sectors with similar credit ratings, like investment grade corporates in the US and Europe. The same cannot be said for high-yield EM USD corporates and sovereigns, which only offer a more attractive volatility-adjusted yield compared to euro area high-yield corporates among the lower-rated global credit sectors. Chart 10EM USD-Denominated High Yield Debt Not Especially Attractive On A Risk-Adjusted Basis Stay The Course Stay The Course Based on this analysis, we are making the following changes in our model bond portfolio on page 14: Upgrading EM USD corporates to overweight Downgrading EM USD sovereigns to underweight Keeping the combined EM USD credit allocation at neutral. This fits with our current overall investment theme of keeping overall spread product exposure relative close to benchmark, while taking more active risks on relative allocations between fixed income sectors. Bottom Line: The main drivers of the emerging market hard currency debt rally since March – a weakening US dollar, improving global growth momentum, and massively accommodative global monetary policies – remain in place. Valuations, however, appear more attractive for EM USD-denominated corporates relative to USD-denominated sovereigns. Favor the former over the latter, within an overall neutral strategic allocation to EM hard currency debt.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Stimulus Will Come … But May Not Save Trump", dated September 25, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "What Would It Take To Get Bond Yields To Rise Again?", dated September 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2020 Performance Review & Current Allocations: Selective Optimism", dated July 14, 2020, available at gfis.bcaraesearch.com. 4 Note that the index data we are using here includes both EM corporate and so-called “quasi-sovereign” debt, the latter being bonds issued by EM companies that are majority-owned by their local governments. 5 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "A Reset In The Making", dated September 24, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Stay The Course Stay The Course Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

With the group stage of the 2018 FIFA World Cup in the books, it is time to assess the performance of our forecast and re-run the model for the playoff stage of the competition. As a reminder, our approach includes micro (player level) and macro (team level) factors to forecast game matches. For data, we relied on the database of player statistics used in Electronic Arts (EA) Sports FIFA computer simulation, eschewing the conventional wisdom of relying on overall team rankings. Because our report was penned in May, not all 32 teams had made official their final list of 23 players. We therefore relied on our own expertise (soccertise, if you will) to determine the most likely team composition for the tournament. We have since re-ran the group stage model with the rosters announced by all 32 team federations, with Chart 1 showing the difference in predicted results.1 Chart 1Probability Of Proceeding To The Knockout Stage Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts To forecast match outcomes, we developed two separate models, one for the group stage and one for the knockout phase. In this report, we will only briefly touch on the composition of the two models and focus instead on their performance. Clients wishing to study our model in depth can read the original special report, The Most Important Of All Unimportant Forecasts: 2018 FIFA World Cup.2 Step One: The Group Stage Model Overall, our group stage model performed adequately. We forecast 60% of the total games correctly and got 14 out of the 16 teams passing to the next round right. In addition, we correctly ranked 12 of those teams according to their group seeding. If we average the model estimated probability of each team we said would make it to the knockout phase, we had a conviction of ~71% in our model. To simulate the group stage matches, we developed an Ordered Probit (OP) model estimated on past World Cup group stage games. Based on our sample of group-stage matches from the past three World Cups, we found that the best explanatory variables for this stage of the competition are: Team Average Player Rating Average Age - Forwards Average Number of Caps - Defenders Speed Positions Average Rating Our model had one major flaw, giving Germany the highest probability of passing to the next stage (Table 1). However, it picked up the weakness in Argentina by assigning them only the 10th highest ranking of proceeding to the next stage. Other notable successes were the strong performances of Belgium, England, Russia, Denmark, and Mexico. Group-by-group, we had an essentially flawless track record in groups A, B, C, E, and G. The decision to award Russia a "home advantage bonus" proved prescient. After all, history tells us that hosting the World Cup provides a clear advantage to almost any team (Table 2). We are also particularly proud of our correct forecast in Group E, the true "group of death." Our assessment of Switzerland's quality ultimately carried the day. Table 1Group Stage Ranking Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Table 2Home Advantage Is Real Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Our Group D forecast misfired by expecting Argentina to go through in first place. To the model's credit, it only gave Argentina 47% probability to beat Iceland, 49% to beat Nigeria, and a paltry 43% to defeat Croatia (Table 3). While we had Argentina going all the way to the quarterfinals, we did flag their weaknesses in our qualitative assessment, calling them the "greatest underperformer in the last three decades of international football."3 Ultimately, our model had Spain dispatching La Albiceleste easily, giving Argentina only 10% chance of an upset. Table 3Group D Summary Results Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts There was no moral victory with our Group F forecast. We gave Mexico only a 21% probability of defeating Germany and an even lower 11% probability that South Korea would do the same (Table 4). We should have been more in tune with history, especially given that there appears to exist somewhat of a "winners' curse" when it comes to World Cup performance (Table 5). Table 4Group F Summary Results Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Table 5The World Cup 'Champions' Curse' Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts What explains this curse? We suspect that World Cup winners hesitate to replace heroes from the previous campaign with fresh blood. In the case of Germany in 2018, the team left the 22-year old Manchester City phenom Leroy Sané off the team but stuck with the uninspiring Mesut Ozil and the mummified Sami Khedira. Because the World Cup is on a four-year cycle, nostalgia can be a fatal flaw. Germany stuck to much the same team while its peers refreshed their rosters with youth and in-form talent. In addition, a number of crucial players from Germany's 2014 victory retired or are no longer part of the national team, including Philipp Lahm, Bastian Schweinsteiger, Lukas Podolski, and Miroslav Klose Finally, our Group H forecast misfired as well (Table 6). However, we correctly flagged the group as essentially unforecastable. Picking Colombia to top the group was a good call, at the very least. Table 6Group H Summary Results Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Chart 2 shows the probabilities we assigned to each team to clear the knockout stage. Generally speaking, we are satisfied with the results. However, we do have to apologize to our Swedish clients, our model has clearly failed them by the greatest margins. Chart 2With Apologies To Our Swedish And Japanese Clients! Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Step Two: The Knockout Stage Model The knockout stage is somewhat easier to model given that the set of possible outcomes is reduced to only {loss; win}. This difference with the group stage is not only relevant for the math behind our model. It is also relevant for the strategy teams employ during the games. Therefore, we simulated this part of our analysis using a probit model estimated on a sample of only knockout stage games from the 2006, 2010, and 2014 World Cups. In this stage of the competition, we found the following factors to be the most important: Team Average Player Rating Club Level Synergy Player GINI Coefficient Average Rating - Midfielders Team Average Rating As with the group stage, the overall rating of the team - based on the average of individual rankings from the EA Sports database - is the most powerful explanatory variable. Despite the higher marginal effect of the rating variables in the knockout stage sample, the standard deviation and average of these variables are significantly smaller than in the group stage.4 In other words, the gap in player quality between teams in the group stage is often vast. However, the knockout stage culls the minnows, narrowing the gap in overall player quality between teams. At this stage of the competition, our model has to be supplemented with variables that test for teamwork and synergy. Club Level Synergy Teams with more players playing in the same club tend to perform better in the knockout stages. This is evident from all the World Cup winners in our sample.5 Given the limited practice time that national teams have ahead of the tournament, the year-round experience of playing with teammates in club competition can provide a huge advantage. Especially for football teams from countries with major leagues - such as Germany, Spain and Italy. Their players are more likely to cluster on the major clubs in those leagues, whereas players from smaller footballing nations have to ply their trade in dispersed leagues and teams across the globe. Great Man Theory (Player GINI Coefficient) Teams win games, but heroes win World Cups. To test whether superstars are relevant to winning games, we designed a player quality GINI measure. We find that teams with a higher GINI coefficient outperform those with a lower measure. It seems that having a superstar, or two or three, surrounded with role players is a superior strategy to having balanced talent across all positions. This variable only becomes significant in the knockout stages, where the overall talent level between teams narrows. While more skilled teams tend to be more balanced (Chart 3), once we normalize for skill, a higher GINI becomes a predictor of success. Chart 3The Great Man Theory At Play Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Average Rating - Midfielders Once we decompose the different positions in the field, we find that the midfield is more important to success than other positions in the knockout matches. Research has shown that midfielders, particularly those forming the "spine" of the team, are the most involved in a team's passing play, regardless of the tactics or strategy used.6 Precise and creative passing is key in knockout matches where tactically disciplined defenses are difficult to unlock. Defensive prowess in the midfield is also paramount to prevent the opposition from developing their attack.7 Lessons Learned From The Group Stage Have we learned anything thus far from group play that would make us modify our four predictive variables? Yes, two observations stick out as potentially dangerous to our assumptions. The Pressing Renaissance Liverpool manager Jürgen Klopp has internationalized Genenpressing -counter pressing - during his tenure at Anfield. When Klopp's team loses the ball, players immediately attack the space where the opponents have won possession, allowing the rest of the team to re-set the defense. But the point is not to just recover on defense, but rather to win the ball right after the team has lost it. This is when the opponent is at their most vulnerable as they are looking to pass and get out of their own defensive zone. Chart 4Is Tiki-Taka Dead? Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts This frantic pace of football, which Klopp himself termed "Heavy Metal Football," requires fitness, discipline, and superior tactical awareness. It also requires defenders to play up the field, which opens them to counter attacks. The Genenpress is a perfect antidote to possession football. However, it is difficult for national football teams to replicate as it requires discipline that can only be achieved through meticulous training. Or, at least, that was the conventional view until this World Cup. In Russia, goals scored out of open play are considerably down (Chart 4), suggesting that possession football has seen a fall in its ROI. Small national teams, that in the past would have been content to sit back and absorb the pressure, are now zone pressing like the finely synchronized European clubs. Morocco, Iran, Iceland, and especially Mexico in its stunning victory over Germany all employed the press well enough to either stun opponents or threaten to do so. This augurs poor results for possession heavy teams in the knockout stage, particularly our favorite Spain. The Return Of The "Big 9" There was a time, not long ago, when football analysts thought that the hulking center-forward was extinct. Instead of big strikers, teams opted for either an extra midfielder or a winger-type forward like Spain's David Villa or Germany's Mario Götze, heroes of the past two World Cups. In 2018, this is not the case. With the proliferation of pressing, scoring from open play becomes more difficult, which means that both set pieces and long ball passes become more important, increasing the value of the big center-forward.8 Table 7 shows the top scorers through the group stages in 2014, Table 8 shows the data in 2018. What is striking is the 7-centimeter difference in the median height of the top-scorers in the group stages of the two competitions. Table 7Top Scorer 2018 By Height In The Group Stage Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Table 8Top Scorer 2014 By Height In The Group Stage Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Luckily for our top-pick Spain, it sports probably the most lumbering, hulking, mean, brute of a center-forward in modern football, Diego Costa of Atletico Madrid. As such, it may still have the requisite combination of strength and possession play to defeat Heavy Metal Football. In addition, its defenders are more than capable of skipping over the press by targeting Costa with long balls. Knockout Stage: Results Table 9 shows our model's forecast for the round of 16, while Chart 5 gives the conditional probability of advancing to the quarter-finals. Conditional probability takes into account the original probability of passing the group stage. Table 9The Magnificent Eight Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Chart 5Conditional Probability Of Passing To The Quarter-Final Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts We fully agree with our model when it comes to the Spain-Russia matchup. The model is correctly dismissive of the hosts, who were "brought to earth" by their matchup against Uruguay. Russia's run of good fortune will run out against our favorite, Spain. The model is also correct to favor Croatia over Denmark. However, this represents a "trap" game for the Vatreni, who after dispatching Argentina 3-0 may be looking "beyond" Danes to the quarter-final matchup with Spain. Look for Denmark to "muddy" the game up and turn it into a classic UEFA heavyweight fight. We also have nothing to add to the England-Colombia matchup and agree that the former is favored to pass to the quarterfinals. The model may be overly dismissive of Mexico, however. Brazil has looked shaky in group games, so we would give Mexico more than 3% probability, especially given that El Tri will be buoyed by its surprisingly well represented fan base in Russia. We also think that the model is far too confident in Portugal's chances against Uruguay. Ronaldo's talent should be enough to push Portugal through, but 70% probability of a victory may be too high. The model is also far too pessimistic when it comes to the France-Argentina matchup. It is highly unlikely that Argentina will be able to squeak through against the extremely physical Les Bleus. The one matchup where we truly are torn is in the Sweden-Switzerland matchup. Our model is correct to be cautious, essentially styling the matchup a "too-close-to-call" affair, but still giving Sweden the nod. This is hard to justify after the inspired play of Switzerland against Brazil and Serbia. However, Sweden has the momentum, having defeated a fired-up Mexico 3-0 in a must-win game for El Tri. Switzerland, on the other hand, only managed a tie against Costa Rica. Quarter-Finals Making it into the quarter-finals of the World Cup is an extraordinary success reserved for only eight footballing nations. At this point, teams have played four intense and decisive games over three weeks. Fatigue sets in, especially given that the superstars are playing at the end of a grueling club season in what is normally their off-season. Our model bets strongly on Spain and England (Table 10), while Brazil and France are expected to have tight games against strong opponents. Belgium and Portugal are left to wonder what might have been, although for Belgium the pain will be greater. Not only will they yet again fail to meet expectations, but also they will waste the highest conditional probability of advancing to the next stage of the four teams that do not advance (Chart 6). Table 10The Final Four Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Chart 6Conditional Probability Of Passing To The Semi-Final Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts France Vs. Portugal: Setting The Record Straight The loss to Portugal in the final of the 2016 Euro, on home soil no less, still stings for France. The loss was particularly painful given that Portugal's superstar, Real Madrid's Cristiano Ronaldo, had to leave the game due to an injury and spent the majority of the game hopping on one leg, yelling instructions to his teammates from the sidelines. Our model gives France a 56% probability of winning the game. The French team is superior in every facet of the game, other than in the speed positions (Diagram 1). France also sports the game's best defensive midfielder, Chelsea's N'Golo Kanté, to whom it will fall on to neutralize Portugal's Great Man. The duo of Kanté and Paul Pogba reminds us of the legendary Claude Makélélé and Patrick Vieira partnership that took France to the 2006 finals. French coach Didier Deschamps has also benefited from the overall improvement in the French Ligue 1, calling upon players that play together in the local league. We expect a tight match, with intense man-on-man coverage of Ronaldo. France will dominate the ball, slowly building chances against Portugal's defense. In 2016, a young and inexperienced French team wasted a plethora of chances against Portugal's version of the Maginot Line. Since then, superstars Ousmane Dembélé (F.C. Barcelona) and Kylian Mbappé (Paris Saint Germain) have joined the French rankes. We do not see history repeating itself. Brazil Vs. Belgium: Red Devils Don't Dance Samba Our model sees Brazil as the favorite against Belgium, but not by an extraordinary margin. As with the France-Portugal matchup, the underdog has a solid chance - in this case one-in-three - of winning the game. What makes Belgium so dangerous is their solid midfielder rating and the extremely physical Romelu Lukaku in the front. However, the two Brazilian center backs Thiago Silva and Miranda have been more than reassuring in the group stage and are more than capable of dealing with Lukaku or Hazard. The problem for the Red Devils is that they trail Brazil by a lot in the other facets of the game (Diagram 2). Its defense is particularly suspect. Diagram 1Les Bleus Vs. A Selecao Das Quinas Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Diagram 2A Selecao Vs. The Red Devils Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Spain Vs. Croatia: Winner Gets The Mediterranean Croatia has been a revelation at this year's tournament. Its high midfield line of Ivan Perišic (Inter Milan), Ivan Rakitic (F.C. Barcelona), Luka Modric (Real Madrid), and super-sub Mateo Kovacic (Real Madrid) may be one of the best mid-fields at the tournament. It wreaked havoc against Argentina, rendering Messi useless. Juventus forward Mario Mandzukic supplies the threat at the front and Inter defensive midfielder Marcelo Brozovic cleans up the mistakes at the back. Our model is overly dismissive of Croatia, giving Spain a ludicrous 93% to win the game. But just as the biggest threat to Croatia is overlooking the unassuming Danes in the round of 16, so too Spain may be in for a fight of its life against the stacked Vatreni. Croatia has a team with enough quality to match its 1998 fourth-place performance. We predict that, if these two teams really do meet in the quarter-finals, that it could be the match of the century. Ultimately, Spain comes on top on all the rating measures against Croatia (Diagram 3). We fear, however, that the gap is overstated. Croatia's starting 11 against Argentina sported seven players from Europe's top four-five clubs. This is more than enough to challenge Spain. Yes, Croatia's defense is shaky, but if it ends up dominating the midfield against Spain - we know, a sacrilegious thought! - its defenders may have a night off. Sweden Vs. England: Who Will Shock The World? This was not supposed to be England's year. The Lions are the youngest team (average age 26) and the least experienced (average caps 20). This was supposed to be the World Cup where England finally breaks out into the elite-eight and sets the stage for a 2022 campaign as a favorite. Instead, England will face off against Sweden, ranked 24 in the FIFA World Ranking. Our model gives England an 84% probability to defeat Sweden, even higher than the odds it assigns to its round-of-16 matchup against Colombia (68%), largely due to a considerable mismatch in quality (Diagram 4). Diagram 3La Furia Roja Vs. Vatreni Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Diagram 4Blagult Vs. The Three Lions Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Sweden is in much the same situation. Nobody expected Sweden to do much at this world cup, including our model. We originally assigned Sweden a solid 22.7% probability of getting out of its group (still behind Mexico at 62.4% and Germany at 91.4%). Once we updated our model with Sweden's final roster and updated player data, that probability collapsed to 10.9%! And yet, here is Sweden, in the quarter-finals with a chance to emerge as one of the four best footballing countries in the world. We are well aware of Sweden's extraordinary history. As with everything else - the economy, finance, culture, food, design, art, history, music - Sweden punches way above its weight. When it qualifies for the tournament, it almost always gets out of the group stage. It came second - at home - in 1958, fourth in 1938, and third in 1950 and 1994. The experienced Sweden will go into its matchup with England with nothing to lose. Whereas the weight of England's underwhelming track record - and the hysterics of its media - could be too much for the young Lions to bear. We would not bet on it, but Sweden could be the shock of this tournament.9 Semi-Finals Our model sees Spain as a lock for the finals, but throws its hands up for the Brazil-France matchup (Table 11). If we were to put money on either Brazil or France getting to the finals, it would be an obvious call. Brazil's conditional probability of getting to the big game is a solid 36% compared to just 11% for France (Chart 7). This is because Les Bleus have a terrifying road to the Finals, having to go through Portugal, Argentina, and Brazil. While Brazil is clearly the safer pick to get through to the finals, we still like France to win the game. Table 11And Then There Were Two Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Chart 7Conditional Probability Of Passing To The Final Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts France Vs. Brazil: Painful Memories Of the remaining four teams, France is actually the most accomplished remaining club, having practically coasted to the finals of the Euro 2016. Brazil's latest title, meanwhile, is a distant 2007 Copa América victory. In terms of quality, the two teams are even on forwards. Brazil takes a big advantage in speed positions and defenders, but the two teams are essentially equal in the midfield (Diagram 5). The French squad also displays better results on the club synergy variable, the second-best reading for the teams in the knockout stage behind Spain. This is the result of improvements to its domestic league. Meanwhile, Brazil's top players continue to be dispersed across a number of different top clubs. In terms of momentum, France wins big. It survived a challenge from a tricky Australia and dangerous Peru. Its performances have not been pretty, but it has been clinical. Brazil, on the other hand, proved to be vulnerable against Switzerland, which stymied it with physical play. Newsflash: France is one of the most physical teams at the World Cup. Brazil will avenge its disastrous result from 2014 with a solid showing in Russia. Its pride will be reestablished and memories of the 7-1 drubbing softened. However, it will fail yet again against a European power. Spain Vs. England: Where Is Francis Drake When You Need Him?! Spain's superiority across the pitch makes it the overwhelming favorite against England (Diagram 6). To this we should add experience, both in age and in big-game performance. Diagram 5Les Bleus Vs. A Selecao Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Diagram 6La Furia Roja Vs. The Three Lions Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts The revamped Spain is much better at scoring goals, which will be a problem for England's untested defense. In 2010, the year of Spain's last title, the team relied heavily on what made F.C. Barcelona unbeatable in Europe: heavy possession of the ball and gameplay built on crisp passes. This still holds true today, as tiki-taka has become part of Spain's footballing DNA. However, after underperforming in the 2014 World Cup and at the 2016 Euro, new coach Julen Lopetegui has slowly improved overall play. This has particularly involved raising the quality of the Spanish attack. As Spain discovered in the last two major competitions, it is not enough to have possession for 80% of the game if one cannot do anything with the ball. England's group stage games against Tunisia, Panama, and Belgium tell us absolutely nothing about its big-game performance. Judging by their effort, Tunisia and Panama may have been the two weakest teams at this World Cup. England's premier matchup against Belgium turned into a warmup, as both teams rested their starters. Its games against Colombia and Sweden would be tough, but nowhere near the type of a test that Spain will represent. As such, we see the Spanish Armada prevailing this time around. The Finals: Spain Vs. France BCA's Two-Step World Cup model predicts that, on July 15, 2018, the world will see Spain dispatch France in the finals of the world's sporting pilgrimage (Diagram 7). Our model gives Spain an 83% probability of beating France. It is undeniable that Spain has superior quality across the pitch save for in attack (Diagram 8). However, its midfield has not yet "clicked." Other than the play of Isco, the Spanish midfield has been underwhelming. If this continues into the knockout round, the team could be in trouble against physical France. Diagram 7The Road To Glory Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts What of the game for third place? Surprisingly, it may be the game of the tournament!10 Sure, third place means little. However, this game will mean a lot for the young England. Brazil could overlook the game, despite its better quality (Diagram 9). For Brazil, yet another third-place matchup will be seen as a failure. But England will see in the game a launching pad for an exciting 2020 Euros and 2022 World Cup. Diagram 8La Furia Roja Vs. Les Bleus Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Diagram 9A Selecao Vs. The Three Lions Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Chart 8Conditional Probability Of Immortality Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts How does our forecast compare with current betting odds? Chart 8 shows that our model gives Spain an extraordinarily high probability of winning the tournament. Spain has not shown the quality thus far that would justify such a high conviction level. Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts Updating The 2018 World Cup Forecasts 1 We have also uploaded the most recent player statistics from the Electronic Arts database. 2 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "The Most Important Of All Unimportant Forecasts: 2018 FIFA World Cup," dated May 23, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 We went on to say that, "in another twenty years of unfulfilled promises, fans will look back at its past success the way we think of Uruguay's two World Cups, won in 1930 and 1950." 4 Remember that the marginal effect represents the impact of a 1-unit change in the rating variable on the probability of winning. This is why we need to be careful when comparing both stages' marginal effect. A 1-unit change in the rating variable is less frequent, but extremely important in the knockout stage, hence the higher coefficient. 5 In 2006, Italy had 10 players form either Juventus or AC Milan; in 2010, Spain had 12 players from either F.C. Barcelona or Real Madrid; and in 2014, Germany had 11 players from either Bayern Munich or Borussia Dortmund. 6 Please see M. Clemente et al, "Midfielder as the prominent participant in the building attack: A network analysis of national teams in FIFA World Cup 2014," International Journal of Performance Analysis in Sport 15:2 (2015), 704-722. 7 Please see F. M. Clemente et al, "Using Network Metrics in Soccer: A Macro-Analysis," Journal of Human Kinetics 45 (2015), 123-134. 8 Think of Spain's first goal at this World Cup: a long pass to Diego Costa who then bullies his way against five defenders to a score. 9 In which case, someone should check that Zlatan is ok. 10 This would not be the first time that the third-place game steals the spotlight. Going back to 1978, the third-place game has outscored the final by a considerable margin. Teams usually enter the game with no pressure and therefore commit to a flowing, attacking style of play. Some of the most exciting games in World Cup history were played for third place: think Germany's 3-2 win over Uruguay in 2010, or Turkey's thrilling 3-2 win against South Korea.

Dear Client, In light of recent market turbulence, we are publishing our weekly report earlier than usual. Caroline Miller, Garry Evans, and I will also be hosting a webcast Wednesday morning at 10am EST to discuss the investment outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Monday's stock market rout was largely driven by technical factors. Strong economic growth and positive earnings surprises should keep the equity bull market intact. Nevertheless, investors need to adjust to the fact that volatility is likely to pick up, just as it did in the last few years of the 1990s bull market. The market's expectations of where the funds rate will be over the next two years have almost converged with the Fed dots. In the near term, this will limit the ability of the 10-year Treasury yield to rise much above 3%. Looking further out, inflation is likely to move above the Fed's target early next year, setting the stage for a recession starting in late 2019. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Feature VIX Kicks Last week's Global Investment Strategy report, entitled "Take Out Some Insurance," argued that equities had become dangerously overbought and were highly vulnerable to a correction.1 We noted that the VIX had likely bottomed for the cycle and that going long volatility had now become an attractive hedge against stock market declines. As many of my colleagues have noted, betting on continued low volatility had become an increasingly crowded trade in recent years. Back in January, we observed that net short volatility positions had reached record-high levels (Chart 1). We warned that "traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility."2 Precisely such a vicious cycle erupted on Monday, causing the S&P 500 to suffer its worst daily percentage loss since August 18, 2011. The question is where do we go from here? So far, the sell-off in stocks looks largely technical in nature. Chart 2 shows that the VIX soared by roughly four times more on Monday than one would have expected based solely on the decline in equity prices. This suggests that the spike in volatility caused the stock market plunge, rather than the other way around. The relatively muted reaction of other "risk gauges" such as junk bonds, EM stocks, and gold prices over the past few days is consistent with this thesis. Chart 1Volatility Is Back Volatility Is Back Volatility Is Back Chart 2Monday's VIX Spike Was Abnormally Large The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Cyclical Outlook Still Solid It is impossible to know if today's rebound will persist or if the correction still has further to run. What we do know is that the cyclical underpinnings for the bull market remain intact. Leading economic data remain buoyant (Chart 3). Corporate earnings continue to come in above expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Chart 4Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth None of our recession-timing indicators are flashing red (Chart 5). The Conference Board's LEI is rising at a healthy 5.5% y/y pace. Historically, a decisive break below zero in the year-over-year change in the LEI has been a reliable recession indicator. Likewise, while the U.S. 2/10-year Treasury curve has flattened, it has not inverted yet. Moreover, even once the yield curve inverts, the lags can be quite long before the recession begins. For example, in the last cycle, the yield curve inverted in early 2006, but the recession did not begin until December 2007. This does not mean that everything will be smooth sailing from here. Monday's sell-off marked an inflection point in the low-volatility world that has prevailed over the past few years. The VIX Humpty-Dumpty has been irrevocably broken. Going forward, volatility will remain elevated relative to what investors have come to expect. As the experience of the 1990s shows, stocks can still go up when volatility is trending higher (Chart 6), but this is going to make for a much more challenging investment environment. Chart 5No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle Chart 6Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise The Powell Put? How the Fed and other central banks react to this new world will be critical. It is perhaps not a complete coincidence that Monday's crash occurred on the first day that Jay Powell took over the helm of the Fed. Investors are increasingly worried that the Fed will turn from friend to foe. The faster-than-expected increase in average hourly earnings in January put those fears in stark relief. Accelerating wage growth suggests supply-side constraints are beginning to bite. This, in turn, means that the runway for low inflation and easy monetary policy may not be as long as some had hoped. As BCA editors discussed in our 2018 Outlook, "Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," central banks are in the process of winding down the extraordinary stimulus that investors have gotten used to.3 Whether this undermines the case for holding stocks and other risk assets depends on how quickly the adjustment occurs. On the plus side, we continue to think the adjustment will be fairly gradual, at least for the time being. Core CPI inflation outside of shelter is still running at 0.7% (Chart 7). This gives the Fed plenty of wiggle room. Just like Janet Yellen, Jay Powell will seek to build a consensus among his colleagues. Granted, the composition of the FOMC is likely to shift in a somewhat more hawkish direction. However, the evolution will be slow. In the meantime, the recommendations of career Fed staff will represent an important, and often underappreciated, source of continuity. As in the past, the Fed will continue to monitor incoming economic and financial data and react accordingly. The stock market rout has led to some tightening in financial conditions, but FCIs in the U.S. and most other countries remain more expansionary than they were six months ago (Chart 8). Chart 7Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Chart 8Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Just as importantly, the implosion of volatility funds is unlikely to reverberate across the financial system in the same way as it did during the financial crisis. What made the mortgage crisis so toxic was that the losses were concentrated in the books of highly leveraged financial institutions. In the case of volatility funds, that does not appear to be the case. Investment Implications Global bond yields remain quite low by historic standards and this should continue to support stocks. Indeed, even after the recent bond sell-off, average global bond yields are still close to half of what they were in 2011 - a time when global excess capacity was much greater than it is today (Chart 9). In keeping with our structurally bearish view on bonds, which we first articulated on July 5, 2016 in a note entitled "The End of 35-Year Bond Bull Market," we expect global bond yields to grind higher.4 However, in rate-of-change terms, the swift repricing of yields over the past few months has likely run its course. Chart 10 shows that market expectations of where the funds rate will be at the end of 2018 and 2019 have almost converged with the Fed dots. This convergence helped our short December-2018 fed funds futures trade, which we closed at our stop for a gain of 70 bps last Friday. A sustained move above 3% on the 10-year Treasury yield will require a more durable increase in inflation. Ultimately, we do expect core inflation to move above 2%, forcing the Fed to lift interest rates into restrictive territory. However, this is likely to be a story for 2019 rather than 2018. Stocks tend to peak about six months before the start of recessions (Table 1). If the next recession occurs in late 2019, as we expect, the equity bull market could last a while longer. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Chart 9Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Chart 10Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Table 1Too Soon To Get Out The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed?" dated January 12, 2018. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Dear Client, In light of recent market turbulence, we are publishing our weekly report earlier than usual. Caroline Miller, Garry Evans, and I will also be hosting a webcast Wednesday morning at 10am EST to discuss the investment outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Monday's stock market rout was largely driven by technical factors. Strong economic growth and positive earnings surprises should keep the equity bull market intact. Nevertheless, investors need to adjust to the fact that volatility is likely to pick up, just as it did in the last few years of the 1990s bull market. The market's expectations of where the funds rate will be over the next two years have almost converged with the Fed dots. In the near term, this will limit the ability of the 10-year Treasury yield to rise much above 3%. Looking further out, inflation is likely to move above the Fed's target early next year, setting the stage for a recession starting in late 2019. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Feature VIX Kicks Last week's Global Investment Strategy report, entitled "Take Out Some Insurance," argued that equities had become dangerously overbought and were highly vulnerable to a correction.1 We noted that the VIX had likely bottomed for the cycle and that going long volatility had now become an attractive hedge against stock market declines. As many of my colleagues have noted, betting on continued low volatility had become an increasingly crowded trade in recent years. Back in January, we observed that net short volatility positions had reached record-high levels (Chart 1). We warned that "traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility."2 Precisely such a vicious cycle erupted on Monday, causing the S&P 500 to suffer its worst daily percentage loss since August 18, 2011. The question is where do we go from here? So far, the sell-off in stocks looks largely technical in nature. Chart 2 shows that the VIX soared by roughly four times more on Monday than one would have expected based solely on the decline in equity prices. This suggests that the spike in volatility caused the stock market plunge, rather than the other way around. The relatively muted reaction of other "risk gauges" such as junk bonds, EM stocks, and gold prices over the past few days is consistent with this thesis. Chart 1Volatility Is Back Volatility Is Back Volatility Is Back Chart 2Monday's VIX Spike Was Abnormally Large The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Cyclical Outlook Still Solid It is impossible to know if today's rebound will persist or if the correction still has further to run. What we do know is that the cyclical underpinnings for the bull market remain intact. Leading economic data remain buoyant (Chart 3). Corporate earnings continue to come in above expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Global Economic Backdrop Remains Buoyant Chart 4Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth Optimism Over 2018 Earnings Growth None of our recession-timing indicators are flashing red (Chart 5). The Conference Board's LEI is rising at a healthy 5.5% y/y pace. Historically, a decisive break below zero in the year-over-year change in the LEI has been a reliable recession indicator. Likewise, while the U.S. 2/10-year Treasury curve has flattened, it has not inverted yet. Moreover, even once the yield curve inverts, the lags can be quite long before the recession begins. For example, in the last cycle, the yield curve inverted in early 2006, but the recession did not begin until December 2007. This does not mean that everything will be smooth sailing from here. Monday's sell-off marked an inflection point in the low-volatility world that has prevailed over the past few years. The VIX Humpty-Dumpty has been irrevocably broken. Going forward, volatility will remain elevated relative to what investors have come to expect. As the experience of the 1990s shows, stocks can still go up when volatility is trending higher (Chart 6), but this is going to make for a much more challenging investment environment. Chart 5No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle No Signs Of An Imminent End To This Business Cycle Chart 6Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase As Stock Prices Rise The Powell Put? How the Fed and other central banks react to this new world will be critical. It is perhaps not a complete coincidence that Monday's crash occurred on the first day that Jay Powell took over the helm of the Fed. Investors are increasingly worried that the Fed will turn from friend to foe. The faster-than-expected increase in average hourly earnings in January put those fears in stark relief. Accelerating wage growth suggests supply-side constraints are beginning to bite. This, in turn, means that the runway for low inflation and easy monetary policy may not be as long as some had hoped. As BCA editors discussed in our 2018 Outlook, "Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," central banks are in the process of winding down the extraordinary stimulus that investors have gotten used to.3 Whether this undermines the case for holding stocks and other risk assets depends on how quickly the adjustment occurs. On the plus side, we continue to think the adjustment will be fairly gradual, at least for the time being. Core CPI inflation outside of shelter is still running at 0.7% (Chart 7). This gives the Fed plenty of wiggle room. Just like Janet Yellen, Jay Powell will seek to build a consensus among his colleagues. Granted, the composition of the FOMC is likely to shift in a somewhat more hawkish direction. However, the evolution will be slow. In the meantime, the recommendations of career Fed staff will represent an important, and often underappreciated, source of continuity. As in the past, the Fed will continue to monitor incoming economic and financial data and react accordingly. The stock market rout has led to some tightening in financial conditions, but FCIs in the U.S. and most other countries remain more expansionary than they were six months ago (Chart 8). Chart 7Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Core Inflation Outside Housing Is Still Low Chart 8Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Financial Conditions Have Tightened Recently, But Are Still Easier Than They Were Last Year Just as importantly, the implosion of volatility funds is unlikely to reverberate across the financial system in the same way as it did during the financial crisis. What made the mortgage crisis so toxic was that the losses were concentrated in the books of highly leveraged financial institutions. In the case of volatility funds, that does not appear to be the case. Investment Implications Global bond yields remain quite low by historic standards and this should continue to support stocks. Indeed, even after the recent bond sell-off, average global bond yields are still close to half of what they were in 2011 - a time when global excess capacity was much greater than it is today (Chart 9). In keeping with our structurally bearish view on bonds, which we first articulated on July 5, 2016 in a note entitled "The End of 35-Year Bond Bull Market," we expect global bond yields to grind higher.4 However, in rate-of-change terms, the swift repricing of yields over the past few months has likely run its course. Chart 10 shows that market expectations of where the funds rate will be at the end of 2018 and 2019 have almost converged with the Fed dots. This convergence helped our short December-2018 fed funds futures trade, which we closed at our stop for a gain of 70 bps last Friday. A sustained move above 3% on the 10-year Treasury yield will require a more durable increase in inflation. Ultimately, we do expect core inflation to move above 2%, forcing the Fed to lift interest rates into restrictive territory. However, this is likely to be a story for 2019 rather than 2018. Stocks tend to peak about six months before the start of recessions (Table 1). If the next recession occurs in late 2019, as we expect, the equity bull market could last a while longer. A modest overweight on global risk assets is warranted for now, but investors should consider reducing risk exposure later this year. Chart 9Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Yields Are Still Low By Historic Standards Chart 10Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Market Pricing Has Almost Caught Up To The Fed's Dots Table 1Too Soon To Get Out The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed?" dated January 12, 2018. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. Strategy & Market Trends* The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Tactical Trades The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Strategic Recommendations The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol Trades Closed In 2015-2018 The Return Of Vol The Return Of Vol

Highlights An increase in the "synthetic" supply of bitcoins via financial derivatives, along with the launch of bitcoin-like alternatives by large established tech companies, will cause the cryptocurrency market to collapse under its own weight. Other areas that could see supply-induced pressures over the coming years include oil, high-yield debt, global real estate, and low-volatility trades. In contrast, the U.S. stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. Investors should consider going long U.S. equities relative to high-yield credit, while positioning for higher volatility. Such an outcome would be similar to what happened in the late 1990s, a period when the VIX and credit spreads were trending higher, while stocks continued to hit new highs. A breakdown in NAFTA talks remains the key risk for the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso. Feature Bubbles Burst By Too Much Supply The "cure" for higher prices is higher prices. The dotcom and housing bubbles did not die fully of their own accord. Their demise was expedited by a wave of new supply hitting the market. In the case of the dotcom bubble, a flood of shares from initial and secondary public offerings inundated investors in 2000 (Chart 1). This put significant downward pressure on the prices of internet stocks. The housing boom was similarly subverted by a slew of new construction - residential investment rose to a 55-year high of 6.6% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 2). Chart 1Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Chart 2Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Is bitcoin about to experience a similar fate? On the surface, the answer may seem to be "no." As more bitcoins are "mined," the computational cost of additional production rises exponentially. In theory, this should limit the number of bitcoins that can ever circulate to 21 million, about 80% of which have already been created (Chart 3). Yet if one looks beneath the surface, bitcoin may also be vulnerable to a variety of "supply-side" factors. Chart 3Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined First, the expansion of financial derivatives tied to the value of bitcoin threatens to create a "synthetic" supply of the cryptocurrency. When someone writes a call option on a stock, the seller of the option is effectively taking a bearish bet while the buyer is taking a bullish bet. The very act of writing the option creates an additional long position, which is exactly offset by an additional short position. Moreover, to the extent that a decision to sell a particular call option will depress the price of similar call options, it will also depress the underlying price of the stock. This is simply because one can have long exposure to a stock either by owning it outright or owning a call option on it. Anything that hurts the price of the latter will also hurt the price of the former. As bitcoin futures begin to trade, investors who are bearish on bitcoin will be able to create short positions that cause the effective number of bitcoins in circulation to rise. This will happen even if the official number of bitcoins outstanding remains the same. Imitation Is The Sincerest Form Of Flattery An increase in synthetic forms of bitcoin supply is one worry for bitcoin investors. Another is the prospect of increased competition from bitcoin-like alternatives. There are now hundreds of cryptocurrencies, most of which use a slight variant of the same blockchain technology that underpins bitcoin. Chart 4Governments Will Want Their Cut Governments Will Want Their Cut Governments Will Want Their Cut So far, the proliferation of new currencies has been largely driven by technologically savvy entrepreneurs working out of their bedrooms or garages. But now companies are getting in on the act. The stock price of Kodak, which apparently is still in business, tripled earlier this week when it announced the launch of its own cryptocurrency. That's just a small taste of what's to come. What exactly is stopping giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google from issuing their own cryptocurrencies? After all, they already have secure, global networks. Amazon could start giving out a few coins with every sale, and allow shoppers to purchase goods from the online retailer using its new currency. It's simple.1 The only plausible restriction is a legal one: The threat that governments will quash upstart cryptocurrencies for fear that will drive down demand for their own fiat monies. As we noted several weeks ago, the U.S. government derives $100 billion per year in seigniorage revenue from its ability to print currency and use that money to buy goods and services (Chart 4).2 As large companies get into the cryptocurrency arena, governments are likely to respond harshly - sooner rather than later. This week's news that the South Korean government will consider banning the trading of cryptocurrencies on exchanges is a sign of what's to come. Who Else? What other areas are vulnerable to an eventual tsunami of new supply? Four come to mind: Oil: BCA's bullish oil call has paid off in spades. Brent has climbed from $44 last June to $69 currently. Further gains may not be as easily attainable, however. Our energy strategists estimate that the breakeven cost of oil for U.S. shale producers is in the low-$50 range.3 We are now well above this number, which means that shale supply will accelerate. This does not mean that prices cannot go up further in the near term, but it does limit the long-term potential for crude. Real estate: Ultra-low interest rates across much of the world have fueled sharp rallies in home prices. Inflation-adjusted home prices in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Europe are well above their pre-Great Recession levels (Chart 5). U.S. real residential home prices are still below their 2006 peak, but commercial real estate (CRE) prices have galloped to new highs (Chart 6). Rent growth within the U.S. CRE sector is starting to slow, suggesting that supply is slowly catching up with demand (Chart 7). Chart 5Where Low Rates Have ##br##Fueled House Prices Where Low Rates Have Fueled House Prices Where Low Rates Have Fueled House Prices Chart 6Commercial Real Estate Prices Have ##br##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Commercial Real Estate Prices Have Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 7Rent Growth Is Cooling Rent Growth Is Cooling Rent Growth Is Cooling Corporate debt: Low rates have also encouraged companies to feast on credit. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP in the U.S. and many other countries is close to record-high levels (Chart 8A and Chart 8B). Credit spreads remain extremely tight, but that may change as more corporate bonds reach the market. Chart 8ACorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Chart 8BCorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Corporate Debt-To-GDP Is Close To Record Highs Low-volatility trades: A recent Bloomberg headline screamed "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash."4 The number of volatility contracts traded on the Cboe has increased more than tenfold since 2012. Net short speculative positions now stand at record-high levels (Chart 9). Traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting that volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility. In contrast to the aforementioned areas, the stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. The S&P divisor is down by over 8% since 2005. The number of U.S. publicly-listed companies has nearly halved since the late 1990s (Chart 10). This trend is unlikely to reverse any time soon, given the elevated level of profit margins and the temptation that many companies will have to use corporate tax cuts to step up the pace of share repurchases. Chart 9Low Volatility Is In High Demand Low Volatility Is In High Demand Low Volatility Is In High Demand Chart 10Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Bet On Higher Equity Prices, But Also Higher Volatility And Higher Credit Spreads The discussion above suggests that the relationship between equity prices and both volatility and credit spreads may shift over the coming months. This would not be the first time. Chart 11 shows that the VIX and credit spreads began to trend higher in the late 1990s, even as the S&P 500 continued to hit new record highs. We may be entering a similar phase now. Continued above-trend growth in the U.S. and rising inflation will push up Treasury yields. We declared "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" on July 5, 2016 - the exact same day that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%.5 Higher interest rates will punish financially-strapped borrowers, leading to wider credit spreads. Equity volatility is also likely to rise as corporate health deteriorates and the timing of the next downturn draws closer. Our baseline expectation is that the U.S. and the rest of the world will fall into a recession in late 2019. Financial markets will sniff out a recession before it happens. However, if history is any guide, this will only happen about six months before the start of the recession (Table 1). This suggests that global equities can continue to rally for the next 12 months. With this in mind, we are opening a new trade going long the S&P 500 versus high-yield credit. Chart 11Volatility Can Increase And Spreads ##br##Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase And Spreads Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Volatility Can Increase And Spreads Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed? Will Bitcoin Be DeFANGed? Four Currency Quick Hits Four items buffeted currency and fixed-income markets this week. The first was a news story suggesting that China will slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt. China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) decried the report as "fake news." Lost in the commotion was the fact that China's holdings of Treasurys have been largely flat since 2011 (Chart 12). China still has a highly managed currency. Now that capital is no longer pouring out of the country, the PBoC will start rebuilding its foreign reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's largest and most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States. The second item this week was the Bank of Japan's announcement that it will reduce its target for how many government bonds it buys. This just formalizes something that has already been happening for over a year. The BoJ's purchases of JGBs have plunged over the past twelve months, mainly because its ¥80 trillion target is more than double the ¥30-35 trillion annual net issuance of JGBs (Chart 13). Chart 12China's Holdings Of Treasurys: ##br##Largely Flat Since 2011 China's Holdings Of Treasurys: Largely Flat Since 2011 China's Holdings Of Treasurys: Largely Flat Since 2011 Chart 13BoJ Has Been Reducing ##br##Its Bond Purchases BoJ Has Been Reducing Its Bond Purchases BoJ Has Been Reducing Its Bond Purchases Ultimately, none of this should matter that much. The Bank of Japan can target prices (the yield on JGBs) or it can target quantities (the number of bonds it owns), but it cannot target both. The fact that the BoJ is already doing the former makes the latter irrelevant. And with long-term inflation expectations still nowhere near the BoJ's target, the former is unlikely to change. What does this mean for the yen? The Japanese currency is cheap and its current account surplus has swollen to 4% of GDP (Chart 14). Speculators are also very short the currency (Chart 15). This increases the likelihood of a near-term rally, as my colleague Mathieu Savary flagged this week.6 Nevertheless, if global bond yields continue to rise while Japanese yields stay put, it is hard to see the yen moving up and staying up a lot. On balance, we expect USD/JPY to strengthen somewhat this year. Chart 14Yen Is Already Cheap... Yen Is Already Cheap... Yen Is Already Cheap... Chart 15...And Unloved ...And Unloved ...And Unloved The third item was the revelation in the ECB's December meeting minutes that the central bank will be revisiting its communication stance in early 2018. The speculation is that the ECB will renormalize monetary policy more quickly than what the market is currently discounting. If that were to happen, EUR/USD would strengthen further. All this is possible, of course, but it would likely require that euro area growth surprise on the upside. That is far from a done deal. The euro area economic surprise index has begun to edge lower, and in relative terms, has plunged against the U.S. (Chart 16). Unlike in the U.S., the euro area credit impulse is now negative (Chart 17). Euro area financial conditions have also tightened significantly relative to the U.S. (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area Economic ##br##Surprises Edging Lower Euro Area Economic Surprises Edging Lower Euro Area Economic Surprises Edging Lower Chart 17Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro ##br##Area Will Weigh On Growth Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro Area Will Weigh On Growth Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro Area Will Weigh On Growth Chart 18Diverging Financial Conditions ##br##Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Diverging Financial Conditions Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Diverging Financial Conditions Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Meanwhile, EUR/USD has appreciated more since 2016 than what one would expect based on changes in interest rate differentials (Chart 19). Speculative positioning towards the euro has also gone from being heavily short at the start of 2017 to heavily long today (Chart 20). Reasonably cheap valuations and a healthy current account surplus continue to work in the euro's favor, but our best bet is that EUR/USD will give up some of its gains over the coming months. Chart 19The Euro Has Strengthened More Than ##br##Justified By Interest Rate Differentials The Euro Has Strengthened More Than Justified By Interest Rate Differentials The Euro Has Strengthened More Than Justified By Interest Rate Differentials Chart 20Euro Positioning: From Deeply ##br##Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Euro Positioning: From Deeply Short To Record Long Lastly, the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso came under pressure this week on news reports that the U.S. will be pulling out of NAFTA negotiations. Of the four items discussed in this section, this is the one that worries us most. The global supply chain has become highly integrated. Anything that sabotages it would be greatly disruptive. At some level, Trump realizes this, but he also knows that his base wants him to get tough on trade, and unless he does so, his chances of reelection will be even slimmer than they are now. Ultimately, we expect a new NAFTA deal to be reached, but the path from here to there will be a bumpy one. Housekeeping Notes Our long global industrials/short utilities trade is up 12.4% since we initiated it on September 29. We are raising the stop to 10% to protect gains. We are also letting our long 2-year USD/Saudi Riyal forward contract trade expire for a loss of 2.9%. Given the recent improvement in Saudi Arabia's finances, we are not reinstating the trade. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 My thanks to Igor Vasserman, President of SHIG Partners LLC, for his valuable insights on this topic. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," dated December 22, 2017. 3 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017. 4 Dani Burger, "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash," Bloomberg, November 6, 2017. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Alert, "End Of The 35-year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!" dated January 12, 2018. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades