Inflation/Deflation

Executive Summary Biden Taps China-Bashing Consensus Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan reflects one of our emerging views in 2022: the Biden administration’s willingness to take foreign policy risks ahead of the midterm elections. Biden’s foreign policy will continue to be reactive and focused on domestic politics through the midterms. Hence global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated at least until November 8.  Biden is seeing progress on his legislative agenda. Congress is passing a bill to compete with China while the Democrats are increasingly likely to pass a second reconciliation bill, both as predicted. These developments support our view that President Biden’s approval rating will stabilize and election races will tighten, keeping domestic US policy uncertainty elevated through November. These trends pose a risk to our view that Republicans will take the Senate, but the prevailing macroeconomic and geopolitical environment is still negative for the ruling Democratic Party. We expect legislative gridlock and frozen US fiscal policy in 2023-24. Close Recommendation (Tactical) Initiation Date  Return Long Refinitiv Renewables Vs. S&P 500 Mar 30, 2022 25.4% Long Biotech Vs. Pharmaceuticals Jul 8,  2022 -3.3% Bottom Line: While US and global uncertainty remain high, we will stay long US dollar, long large caps over small caps, and long US Treasuries versus TIPS. But these are tactical trades and are watching closely to see if macroeconomic and geopolitical factors improve later this year. Feature President Biden’s average monthly job approval rating hit its lowest point, 38.5%, in July 2022. However, Biden’s anti-inflation campaign and midterm election tactics are starting to bear fruit: gasoline prices have fallen from a peak of $5 per gallon to $4.2 today, the Democratic Congress is securing some last-minute legislative wins, and women voters are mobilizing to preserve abortion access.  These developments mean that the Democratic Party’s electoral prospects will improve marginally between now and the midterm election, causing Senate and congressional races to tighten – as we have expected. US policy uncertainty will increase. Investors will see a rising risk that Democrats will keep control of the Senate – and conceivably even the House – and hence retain unified control of the executive and legislative branches. This “Blue Sweep” risk will challenge the market consensus, which overwhelmingly (and still correctly) expects congressional gridlock in 2023-24. A continued blue sweep would mean larger tax hikes and social spending, while gridlock would neutralize fiscal policy for the next two years. Investors should fade this inflationary blue sweep risk and continue to plan for disinflationary gridlock. First, our quantitative election models still predict that Democrats will lose control of both House and Senate (Appendix). Second, Biden’s midterm tactics face very significant limitations, particularly emanating from geopolitics – the snake in this report’s title. Pelosi’s Trip To Taiwan Raises Near-Term Market Risks One of Biden’s election tactics is our third key view for 2022: reactive foreign policy. Initially we viewed this reactiveness as “risk-averse” but in May we began to argue that Biden could take risky bets given his collapsing approval ratings. Either way, Biden is using foreign policy as a means of improving his party’s domestic political fortunes. In particular, he is willing to take big risks with China, Russia, Iran, and terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. The template is the 1962 congressional election, when President John F. Kennedy largely defied the midterm election curse by taking a tough stance against Russia in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chart 1). If Biden achieves a foreign policy victory, then Democrats will benefit. If he instigates a crisis, voters will rally around his administration out of patriotism. Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei is the prominent example of this key view. The trip required full support from the US executive branch and military and was not only the swan song of a single politician. It was one element of the Biden administration’s decision to maintain the Trump administration’s hawkish China policy. Thus while Congress passes the $52 billion Chips and Science Act to enhance US competitiveness in technology and semiconductor manufacturing, Biden is also contemplating tightening export controls on computer chip equipment that China needs to upgrade its industry.1 Biden is reacting to a bipartisan and popular consensus holding that the US needs to take concrete measures to challenge China and protect American industry (Chart 2). This is different from the old norm of rhetorical China-bashing during midterms. Chart 1Biden Provokes Foreign Rivals Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Chart 2Biden Taps China-Bashing Consensus Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Reactive US foreign policy will continue through November and possibly beyond – including but not limited to China. The US chose to sell long-range weapons to Ukraine and provide intelligence targeting Russian forces, prompting Russia to declare that the US is now “directly” involved in the Ukraine conflict. The US decision to eradicate Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri also reflects this foreign policy trend. Reactive foreign policy will increase the near-term risk of new negative geopolitical surprises for markets. Note that the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis analogy is inverted when it comes to the Taiwan Strait. China is willing to take much greater risks than the US in its sphere of influence. The same goes for Russia in Ukraine. If US policy backfires then it may assist the Democrats in the election – but not if Biden suffers a humiliation or if the US economy suffers as a result. Chart 3US Import Prices Will Stay High From Greater China US Import Prices Will Stay High From Greater China US Import Prices Will Stay High From Greater China US import prices will continue to rise from Greater China (Chart 3), undermining Biden’s anti-inflation agenda. Supply kinks in the semiconductor industry will become relevant again whenever demand rebounds  (Chart 4). Global energy prices will also remain high as a result of the EU’s oil embargo and Russia’s continued tightening of European natural gas supplies. Chart 4New Semiconductor Kinks Will Appear When Demand Recovers New Semiconductor Kinks Will Appear When Demand Recovers New Semiconductor Kinks Will Appear When Demand Recovers OPEC has decided only to increase oil production by 100,000 barrels per day, despite Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia cap in hand. We argued that the Saudis would give a token but would largely focus on weakening global demand rather than pumping substantially more oil to help Biden and the Democrats in the election. The Saudis know that Biden is still attempting to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran that would free up Iranian exports. So the Saudis are not giving much relief, and if Biden fails on Iran, oil supply disruptions will increase. Bottom Line: Price pressures will intensify as a result of the US-China and US-Russia standoffs – and probably also the US-Iran standoff. Hawkish foreign policy is not conducive to reducing inflationary ills. Global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain high throughout the midterm election season, causing continued volatility for US equities. Abortion Boosts Democratic Election Odds Earlier this year we highlighted that the Supreme Court’s overturning of the 1972 Roe v. Wade decision would lead to a significant mobilization of women voters in favor of the Democratic Party ahead of the midterm election. The first major electoral test since the court’s ruling, a popular referendum in the state of Kansas, produced a surprising result on August 2 that confirms and strengthens this thesis. Kansas is a deeply religious and conservative state where President Trump defeated President Biden by a 15% margin in 2020. The referendum was held during the primary election season, when electoral turnout skews heavily toward conservatives and the elderly. Yet Kansans voted by an 18% margin (59% versus 41%) not to amend the constitution, i.e. not to empower the legislature to tighten regulations on abortion. Voter turnout is not yet reported but likely far higher than in recent non-presidential primary elections. Kansans voted in the direction of  nationwide opinion polling on whether abortion should be accessible in cases where the mother’s health is endangered. They did not vote in accordance with more expansive defenses of abortion, which are less popular (Chart 5). If the red state of Kansas votes this way then other states will see an even more substantial effect, at least when abortion is on the ballot. Chart 5Abortion Will Mitigate Democrats’ Losses Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake The question is how much of this Roe v. Wade effect will carry over to the general congressional elections. The referendum focused exclusively on abortion. Voters did not vote on party lines. Voters never like it when governments try to take away rights or privileges that have previously been granted. But in November the election will center on other topics, including inflation and the economy. And midterm elections almost always penalize the incumbent party. Our quantitative election models imply that Democrats will lose 22 seats in the House and two seats in the Senate, yielding Congress to the Republicans next year (Appendix). Still, women’s turnout presents a risk to our models. Women’s support for the Democratic Party has not improved markedly since the Supreme Court ruling, as we have shown in recent reports (Chart 6). But the polling could pick up again. Women’s turnout could be a significant tailwind in a year of headwinds for the Democrats. Bottom Line: Democrats’ electoral prospects have improved, as we anticipated earlier this year (Chart 7). This trend will continue as a result of the mobilization of women. Republicans are still highly likely to take Congress but our conviction on the Senate is much lower than it is on the House. Chart 6Biden’s And Democrats’ Approval Among Women Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Chart 7Democrats’ Odds Will Improve On Margin Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Reconciliation Bill: Still 65% Chance Of Passing Ultimately Democrats’ electoral performance will depend on inflation, the economy, and cyclical dynamics. If inflation falls over the course of the next three months, then Democrats will have a much better chance of stemming midterm losses. That is why President Biden rebranded his slimmed down “Build Back Better” reconciliation bill as the “Inflation Reduction Act.” We maintain our 65% odds that the bill will pass, as we have done all year. There is still at least a 35% chance that Senator Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona could defect from the Democrats, given that she opposed any new tax hikes and the reconciliation bill will impose a 15% minimum tax on corporations. A single absence or defection would topple the budget reconciliation process, which enables Democrats to pass the bill on a simple majority vote. We have always argued that Sinema would ultimately fall in line rather than betraying her party at the last minute before the election. This is even more likely given that moderate-in-chief, Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, negotiated and now champions the bill. But some other surprise could still erase the Democrats’ single-seat majority, so we stick with 65% odds. Most notably the bill will succeed because it actually reduces the budget deficit – by an estimated $300 billion over a decade (Table 1). Deficit reduction was the original purpose of lowering the number of votes required to pass a bill under the budget reconciliation process. Now Democrats are using savings generated from new government caps on pharmaceuticals (a popular measure) to fund health and climate subsidies. Given deficit reduction, it is conceivable that a moderate Republican could even vote for the bill. Table 1Democrats’ Inflation Reduction Act (Budget Reconciliation) Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Bottom Line: Democrats are more likely than ever to pass their fiscal 2022 reconciliation bill by the September 30 deadline. The bill will cap some drug prices and reduce the deficit marginally, so it can be packaged as an anti-inflation bill, giving Democrats a legislative win ahead of the midterm. However, its anti-inflationary impact will ultimately be negligible as $300 billion in savings hardly effects the long-term rising trajectory of US budget deficits relative to output. The bill will add to voters’ discretionary income and spur the renewable energy industry. And if it helps the Democrats retain power, then it enables further spending and tax hikes down the road, which would prove inflationary. The reconciliation bill, annual appropriations, and the China competition bill were the remaining bills that we argued would narrowly pass before the US Congress became gridlocked again. So far this view is on track.   Investment Takeaways Companies that paid a high effective corporate tax rate before President Trump’s tax cuts have benefited relative to those that paid a low effective rate. They stood to suffer most if Trump’s tax cuts were repealed. But Democrats were forced to discard their attempt to raise the overall corporate tax rate last year. Instead the minimum corporate rate will rise to 15%, hitting those that paid the lowest effective rate, such as Big Tech companies, relative to high-tax rate sectors such as energy (Chart 8, top panel). Tactically energy may still underperform tech but cyclically energy could outperform and the reconciliation bill would feed into that trend. Similarly, companies that faced high foreign tax risk, because they made good income abroad but paid low foreign tax rates, stand to suffer most from the imposition of a minimum corporate tax rate (Chart 8, bottom panel). Again, Big Tech stands to suffer, although it has already priced a lot of bad news and may not perform poorly in the near term. Chart 8Market Responds To Minimum Corporate Tax Market Responds To Minimum Corporate Tax Market Responds To Minimum Corporate Tax Chart 9Market Responds To New Climate Subsidies Market Responds To New Climate Subsidies Market Responds To New Climate Subsidies Renewable energy stocks have rallied sharply on the news of the Democrats’ reconciliation bill getting back on track (Chart 9). We are booking a 25.4% gain on this tactical trade and will move to the sidelines for now, although renewable energy remains a secular investment theme. Health stocks, particularly pharmaceuticals, have taken a hit from the new legislation as we expected. However, biotech has not outperformed pharmaceuticals as we expected, so we will close this tactical trade for a loss of 3.3%. The reconciliation bill will cap drug prices for only the most popular generic drugs and does not pose as much of a threat to biotech companies (Chart 10). Biotech should perform well tactically as long bond yields decline – they are also historically undervalued, as noted by Dhaval Joshi of our Counterpoint strategy service. So we will stick to long Biotech versus the broad market. US semiconductors remain in a long bull market and will be in heavy demand once global and US economic activity stabilize. They are also likely to outperform competitors in Greater China that face a high and persistent geopolitical risk premium (Chart 11).  Chart 10Market Responds To Drug Price Caps Market Responds To Drug Price Caps Market Responds To Drug Price Caps Chart 11Market Responds To China Competition Bill Market Responds To China Competition Bill Market Responds To China Competition Bill Tactically we prefer bonds to stocks, US equities to global equities, defensive sectors to cyclicals, large caps to small caps, and growth stocks to value stocks (Chart 12). The US is entering a technical recession, Europe is entering recession, China’s economy is weak, and geopolitical tensions are at extreme highs over Ukraine, Taiwan, and Iran. The US is facing an increasingly uncertain midterm election. These trends prevent us from adding risk in our portfolio in the short term. However, much bad news is priced and we are on the lookout for positive economic surprises and successful diplomatic initiatives to change the investment outlook for 2023. If the US and China recommit to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, if Russia moves toward ceasefire talks in Ukraine, if the US and Iran rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal, then we will take a much more optimistic attitude. Some political and geopolitical risks could begin to recede in the fourth quarter – although that remains to be seen. And even then, geopolitical risk is rising on a secular basis. Chart 12Tactically Recession And Geopolitics Will Weigh On Risk Assets Tactically Recession And Geopolitics Will Weigh On Risk Assets Tactically Recession And Geopolitics Will Weigh On Risk Assets Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Alexandra Alper and Karen Freifeld, “U.S. considers crackdown on memory chip makers in China,” Reuters, August 1, 2022, reuters.com.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A3US Political Capital Index Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Chart A1Presidential Election Model Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Chart A2Senate Election Model Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort  Table A4House Election Model Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake

Executive Summary Government bond yields worldwide are falling due to fears of a global recession that will lead to monetary easing in 2023. This pricing is too optimistic with inflation likely to remain well above central bank targets next year. Even though US real GDP contracted modestly in the first half of 2022, the broader flow of US economic data is more consistent with an economy that is slowing substantially but not yet in recession. The Fed welcomes sharply slower growth to deal with high inflation, but will not unwind the 2022 rate hikes as quickly as markets expect given sticky core/wage inflation. The Fed rate cuts now discounted for 2023 will likely not be delivered. No Major Recessionary Signal From Global Yield Curves … Yet No Major Recessionary Signal From Global Yield Curves . . . Yet No Major Recessionary Signal From Global Yield Curves . . . Yet Bottom Line: Falling global bond yields have helped stabilize risk assets – a path that will eventually lead to a rebound in yields if easier financial conditions help avoid a deep recession. Stay neutral overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios. The Great Recession Debate Begins Global bond yields have seen substantial declines over the past few weeks, as the market narrative has quickly changed from surging inflation and rate hikes to imminent recession and eventual rate cuts (Chart 1). The truth is somewhere in the middle, with global inflation in the process of peaking and global growth slowing rapidly but not yet in full-blown recession. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyMixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields Bond markets are expecting central banks, most importantly the Fed, to quickly abandon the fight against high inflation for a new battle to tackle decelerating economic growth. The problem for investors is that weaker growth is needed – and, indeed, welcomed by policymakers - to create economic slack to help bring down elevated inflation. There is little evidence of such a disinflationary slack being created, with unemployment rates still near cyclical lows in the US, Europe and most of the developed world. The link between longer-term bond yields and shorter-term interest rate expectations remains strong in an environment of very flat government yield curves. For example, in the US, the 10-year Treasury yield has fallen from a peak of 3.47% in mid-June to 2.67% at the end of July. Over the same period, the 1-month interest rate, two-years ahead priced into the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve fell from a peak of 3.1% to 2.1% (Chart 2). Chart 1A Downward Adjustment Of Interest Rate Expectations A Downward Adjustment Of Interest Rate Expectations A Downward Adjustment Of Interest Rate Expectations ​​​​​​ Chart 2A Lower Trajectory For Rates Priced In As Growth Slows A Lower Trajectory For Rates Priced In As Growth Slows A Lower Trajectory For Rates Priced In As Growth Slows ​​​​​​ An even more dramatic decline in yields has been seen in Europe. The 10-year German Bund yield has fallen from a mid-June peak of 1.75% to 0.83% at the end of July, while the 1-month/2-year forward European OIS rate fell from 2.5% to 1.1%. The 2-year German yield, most sensitive to ECB rate hike expectations, also fell dramatically from 1.15% to 0.24%. There have also been substantial declines in bond yields and rate expectations in the UK, Canada and Australia over the past six weeks. As central banks continue to raise policy rates towards levels perceived to be at least neutral, if not mildly restrictive, there should a stronger correlation between future rate hike expectations and longer-term bond yields. Put another way, yield curves tend to flatten and eventually invert as policymakers move rates to levels that should slow growth and, eventually, reduce inflation. Currently, the “global” 2-year/10-year government bond yield curve, using Bloomberg Global Treasury index data, is slightly inverted at -13bps (Chart 3). More deeper curve inversions typically precede major contractions in global growth and equity prices. Chart 3No Major Recessionary Signal From Global Yield Curves . . . Yet No Major Recessionary Signal From Global Yield Curves . . . Yet No Major Recessionary Signal From Global Yield Curves . . . Yet At the moment, global equities have performed in line with deeper curve inversions and contracting growth, with the MSCI World equity index down -7% on a year-over-year basis (bottom panel). Yet actual global growth is not yet in contraction. Global industrial production, while slowing, is still growing at a +3% year-over-year rate. The global manufacturing PMI remains above 50, indicative of a still-expanding manufacturing sector. Euro area, which is widely believed to already be in recession, saw real GDP growth (non-annualized) of +0.5% and +0.7%, respectively, in Q1 and Q2 of this year. Meanwhile, US real GDP shrank modestly over the first half of 2022, down only -0.6% (non-annualized) over Q1 and Q2, but with no corroborating evidence of recession from the labor market with the headline unemployment rate falling from 4.0% to 3.6% over that same period. Further adding to the confusing mix of signals between yield curves and growth is that the curve inversion at the global level is not yet evident across all countries. For example, the 2-year/10-year curve is inverted in the US and Canada, countries where central banks have been more aggressive on hiking rates in 2022 (Chart 4A) Yet in both countries, there have only been moderate declines in leading economic indicators and composite PMIs (combining manufacturing and services). In contrast, the 2-year/10-year curve in Germany and the UK – where the ECB and Bank of England have delivered fewer rates than the Fed and Bank of Canada – remains positively sloped but with similar moderate declines in leading economic indicators and composite PMIs to those seen in the US and Canada (Chart 4B). Chart 4AA Policy-Driven Slowdown In North America A Policy-Driven Slowdown In North America A Policy-Driven Slowdown In North America ​​​​​​ Chart 4BAn Energy-Driven Slowdown In Europe An Energy-Driven Slowdown In Europe An Energy-Driven Slowdown In Europe ​​​​​​ Chart 5Central Banks Cannot Pivot Dovishly Against This Backdrop Central Banks Cannot Pivot Dovishly Against This Backdrop Central Banks Cannot Pivot Dovishly Against This Backdrop The deceleration of growth seen so far in this countries is nowhere near enough for central banks to begin contemplating a pivot away from hawkish rate hikes in 2022 to dovish rate cuts in 2023/24, as markets are now discounting. Inflation rates remain far too elevated, and labor markets remain far too tight, for policymakers to switch from the brake pedal to the gas pedal (Chart 5). This exposes global bond yields to a rebound from recent lows as central banks disappoint the market’s growing belief that policymakers’ focus will turn to growth from inflation. The language from recent central bank policy decisions, from the ECB’s 50bp hike on July 21 to the Fed’s 75bp hike last week to yesterday’s 50bp hike by the Reserve Bank of Australia, has been consistent, calling for a continued need to tighten policy. All three central banks essentially abandoned forward guidance, but described future rate moves as being “data dependent”, particularly inflation data. There is likely to be some relief from elevated inflation rates over the next few months. There have already been substantial declines in the growth of commodity prices, with the CRB Raw Industrials index now contracting in year-over-year terms (Chart 6). Global shipping costs and supplier delivery times have also declined, as evidence of some easing of supply chain disruptions that is helping bring down goods inflation. Yet given the starting point of such high headline inflation rates – at or above 9% in the US, UK and euro area – it is unlikely that there will be enough disinflation from the commodity/goods space to quickly bring inflation down by enough for central banks to breathe easier. This is especially true given that stickier domestically generated inflation stemming from wages and services will remain well above central bank targets over at least the next year, or at least until there is a substantial increase in slack-producing unemployment (i.e. a recession). What does all this mean for our view on the direction of global bond yields? We still see the current environment as more consistent with broad trading ranges for yields, rather than the start of a new major downtrend or uptrend. Europe was the one exception to this view, given how markets were pricing in a rise in ECB policy rates that was too aggressive, but even that has now corrected after the dramatic collapse in core European yields from the mid-June peak. Our Global Duration Indicator has been calling for a loss of cyclical upward momentum of bond yields in the latter half of 2022, which is now starting to play out (Chart 7). That indicator is focused on growth indicators like our global leading economic indicator and the ZEW expectations index for the US and Europe, all of which have been declining for the past several months. Chart 6Global Inflation Is Peaking Global Inflation Is Peaking Global Inflation Is Peaking ​​​​​ Chart 7Stay Neutral On Global Duration Exposure Stay Neutral On Global Duration Exposure Stay Neutral On Global Duration Exposure ​​​​​​ However, there is a potential note of economic optimism from another key component of the Global Duration Indicator - the diffusion index of our global leading economic indicator, which measures the number of countries with rising leading indicators versus those with falling ones. That diffusion index has hooked up as the leading economic indicators of some important countries that are typically leveraged to global growth – China, Japan, Brazil, Korea and Malaysia – have started to move higher. If this trend continues in the months ahead, our Duration Indicator may signal a reacceleration of global bond yield momentum in the first half of 2023 as the global growth outlook improves. Bottom Line: Bond markets are overreacting to slowing global growth momentum by pricing in a quick reversal of 2022 rate hikes in 2023 across the developed world. Do not chase bond yields lower. The Fed Will Respond To Inflation Before Recession The Q2/2022 US GDP report showed an annualized decline of -0.9%, following on the annualized -1.6% fall in Q1 real GDP (Chart 8). This fulfills the so-called “technical definition” of a recession widely cited by the financial media. However, the official arbiters of recession dating – the National Bureau of Economic Research, or NBER – use a broader list of data to identify recessions that focus on income growth, employment and industrial production. None of those indicators contracted in the first half of the year, when the GDP-defined recession allegedly took place. We are sympathetic to the view that the US has not yet entered recession. However, recession odds are increasing, with many reliable cyclical data series slowing to a pace that has preceded past recessions. In Chart 9, we show a “cycle-on-cycle” comparison of the latest readings on some highly cyclical US economic data with readings from past recessions dating back to the late 1970s. In the chart, the data series are lined up such that the vertical line represents the NBER-designated start date of each recession, starting with the 1979/80 recession up to the 2008 recession. We show both the average path for each series across all of those recessions (the dotted line) and the range of outcomes from each recession (the shaded zone). Given the unique nature of the 2020 COVID recession, which was limited to just one quarter of collapsing activity due to pandemic lockdowns rather than typical business cycle forces, we did not include that episode in this chart. Chart 8No US Growth In H1/2022 No US Growth In H1/2022 No US Growth In H1/2022 The selected variables in this cycle-on-cycle analysis are: The year-over-year growth of the Conference Board leading economic indicator The ISM manufacturing index The University Of Michigan consumer expectations index The year-over-year growth of housing starts The year-over-year growth rate of non-financial (top-down) corporate profits. Chart 9The US Is Definitely Flirting With Recession The US Is Definitely Flirting With Recession The US Is Definitely Flirting With Recession ​​​​​ All five series selected have slowed over past several months, consistent with the run-up to previous recessions. However, in terms of timing, not all of the indicators shown are at levels that would be consistent with the US already being in a recession, as the real GDP contractions in Q1 and Q2 would suggest. Typically, the ISM index falls below 50 at the start of the recession, while the growth in the leading indicator turns negative about six months before the start of the recession. The current readings on both are still modestly above levels seen at the start of those past recessions. Corporate profit growth typically contracts for a full year ahead of recessions, and the latest complete reading available from Q1 was still showing positive, albeit slowing, growth. Chart 10The Fed Is OK With This Outcome, Given High Inflation The Fed Is OK With This Outcome, Given High Inflation The Fed Is OK With This Outcome, Given High Inflation Some of the indicators shown are looking recessionary. The current contraction in the growth of housing starts is in line with the timing from the average of past recessions. The same can be said for falling consumer expectations, although the latest decline is particularly severe compared to past recessions. From the point of view of investors, the semantics over the “official” declaration of a recession are irrelevant. There has already been a major pullback in US equity markets and widening of US corporate credit spreads as investors have priced in substantially slower growth – and the Fed tightening that is helping engineer that economic outcome. The pullback in risk assets has tightened US financial conditions, exacerbating the hit to business and consumer confidence from high inflation and declining real incomes (Chart 10). Equity and credit markets did stage healthy recoveries in the month of June as markets began to price out Fed rate hikes in response to the US potentially entering recession. However, Fed rate hikes have already flattened the US Treasury curve, which has raised the odds of a US recession NEXT year. According to the New York Fed’s recession probability model, the current spread between the 10-year US Treasury yield and the 3-month US Treasury bill rate of 23bps translates to a 26% probability of a US recession occurring one year from now (Chart 11). That model uses data going back to the 1960s, which includes the Volcker-era Fed tightenings in the 1970s that resulted in dramatic increases in real US interest rates and steep inversions of the US Treasury curve. Using the post-1980 range of recession probabilities, ranging from 0-50%, the latest 26% probability is more like a 50/50 bet on a 2023 US recession. Chart 11A US Recession Is More Likely In 2023, Says The UST Curve A US Recession Is More Likely In 2023, Says The UST Curve A US Recession Is More Likely In 2023, Says The UST Curve The Fed will need to continue delivering rate hikes until there is evidence that core inflation has peaked and will begin the path of falling back to the Fed’s 2% target. That is certainly not a story for 2022, or even for 2023, given the rapid acceleration of US wage growth (Chart 12). If the Fed were to begin pivoting away from rate hikes now, with the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker and the Employment Cost Index accelerating at a 5-7% pace, the result would be an unwanted increase in inflation expectations. Chart 12The Fed Must Stay Hawkish With Labor Costs Still Accelerating The Fed Must Stay Hawkish With Labor Costs Still Accelerating The Fed Must Stay Hawkish With Labor Costs Still Accelerating The Fed is fighting hard to regain the inflation-fighting credibility lost in 2022 when “Team Transitory” ruled the FOMC and policy did not respond to rapidly rising inflation. The Fed’s aggressive rate hikes in 2022 have helped restore some of that credibility with bond markets, judging by the pullback in longer-term CPI-based TIPS breakevens seen in recent months, which are now back in line with the 2.3-2.5% range we have deemed consistent with the Fed’s 2% PCE inflation target (Chart 13). The evidence from survey-based measures of inflation expectations is a bit mixed, but still consistent with improved Fed credibility. The New York Fed’s Consumer Survey shows 1-year-ahead inflation expectations still elevated at 6.8%, but the 3-year-ahead expectation has drifted back below 4% (bottom panel). The University of Michigan 5-10 year consumer inflation expectation is even lower, falling to 2.8% in July from 3.1% in June. The Fed will not risk those hard-earned declines in longer-term inflation expectations by turning dovish too quickly – especially as it is not year clear if the US is even in a recession. Investors betting on a dovish pivot by the Fed before year end, leading to substantial rate cuts in 2023, are likely to be disappointed. In our view, this is setting up a potential opportunity to reduce US duration exposure to position for a rebound in Treasury yields. However, a meaningful increase in yields will be difficult to achieve, as yields are still adjusting to downside data surprises and duration positioning among investors is still below benchmark, according to the JPMorgan client duration survey (Chart 14). We suggest staying neutral on US duration exposure, for now, until the technical backdrop becomes more conducive to higher yields. Chart 13Mixed Messages On US Inflation Expectations Mixed Messages On US Inflation Expectations Mixed Messages On US Inflation Expectations ​​​​​ Chart 14Stay Neutral On US Duration - For Now Stay Neutral On US Duration - For Now Stay Neutral On US Duration - For Now ​​​​​ Bottom Line: US recession odds have increased, but the economy is not yet in recession. The Fed welcomes sharply slower growth to deal with high inflation, but will not unwind the 2022 rate hikes as quickly as markets expect given sticky core/wage inflation. The Fed rate cuts now discounted for 2023 will likely not be delivered. Treasury yields are more likely to stay rangebound over the next 3-6 months than move lower.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Dovish Central Bank Pivots Will Come Later Than You Think Dovish Central Bank Pivots Will Come Later Than You Think The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Dovish Central Bank Pivots Will Come Later Than You Think Dovish Central Bank Pivots Will Come Later Than You Think

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Following last week’s sharp post-FOMC rally, we shifted our 12-month equity recommendation from overweight to neutral. We expect stock prices to rise further during the remainder of the year as US recession risks abate, but then to give up most of their gains early next year as it becomes clear that the Fed has no intention of cutting rates and may even need to raise rates. We have more conviction that US growth will hold up over the next 12 months than we do that inflation will fall as fast as the Fed expects or the breakevens imply. These varying degrees of conviction stem from the same reason: The neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than widely believed. A high neutral rate implies that it may take significant monetary tightening to slow the economy. That reduces the risk of a recession in the near term, but it raises the risk that inflation will remain elevated. A recession is now our base case for the euro area. However, we expect the European economy to bounce back early next year, as gas supplies increase and fiscal policy turns more stimulative. The euro has significant upside over the long haul. Bottom Line: Stocks will continue to recover over the coming months before facing renewed pressure early next year. We are retaining our tactical (3-month) overweight on global equities but are shifting our 12-month recommendation to neutral. Taking Some Chips Off the Table Following last week’s sharp post-FOMC rally, we shifted our cyclical 12-month equity recommendation from overweight to neutral. This note lays out the key considerations in a Q&A format.   Q: Have any of your underlying views about the economy changed recently or has the market simply moved towards pricing in your benign outlook? A: Mainly the latter. While we continue to see a higher-than-normal risk of a US recession over the next 12 months, our baseline (60% odds) remains no recession.   Q: Many would say that we are in a recession already. A: While two consecutive quarters of negative growth does not officially constitute a recession, it is correct to say that every time real GDP has contracted for two quarters in a row, the NBER has ultimately deemed that episode a recession (Chart 1). Chart 1In The Past, Two Consecutive Quarters Of Negative Growth Have Always Coincided With A Recession In The Past, Two Consecutive Quarters Of Negative Growth Have Always Coincided With A Recession In The Past, Two Consecutive Quarters Of Negative Growth Have Always Coincided With A Recession That said, one should keep two things in mind. First, preliminary GDP estimates are subject to significant revisions. According to our calculations, there is a 35% chance that real GDP growth in Q2 will ultimately be revised into positive territory (Chart 2). Even Q1 may eventually show positive growth. Real Gross Domestic Income (GDI), which conceptually should equal GDP, rose by 1.8% in Q1. Chart 2After Further Revisions, It Is Possible That GDP Growth Ends Up Being Positive In Q2 2022 Shifting Into Neutral: A Q&A Shifting Into Neutral: A Q&A Second, every single US recession has seen an increase in the unemployment rate (Chart 3). So far, that has not happened, and there is good reason to think it will not happen for some time: There are 1.8 job openings per unemployed worker (Chart 4). For the foreseeable future, most people who lose their jobs will be able to walk across the street to find a new one. Chart 3Recessions And Spikes In The Unemployment Rate Go Hand-In-Hand Recessions And Spikes In The Unemployment Rate Go Hand-In-Hand Recessions And Spikes In The Unemployment Rate Go Hand-In-Hand Chart 4A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market   Chart 5Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Q: Aren’t other measures of economic activity such as the ISM, consumer confidence, and homebuilder sentiment all signaling that a major slowdown is in progress? A: They are but we should take them with a grain of salt. The composition of consumer spending is shifting from goods to services. This is weighing on manufacturing output. As Chart 5 shows, goods spending has already retraced two-thirds of its pandemic surge, with no ill effects on the labor market. Consumer confidence tends to closely track real wages (Chart 6). Despite an extraordinarily tight labor market, real wages have been shrinking all year. As supply-chain bottlenecks abate, inflation will fall, allowing real wages to rise. This will bolster consumer confidence and spending. Falling gasoline prices will also boost disposable incomes. Prices at the pump have fallen for seven straight weeks and the futures market is pointing to further declines in the months ahead (Chart 7). Chart 6Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence Chart 7The Futures Market Points To Further Declines In Gasoline Prices The Futures Market Points To Further Declines In Gasoline Prices The Futures Market Points To Further Declines In Gasoline Prices It is also critical to remember that the Fed is trying to slow the economy by tightening monetary policy. At the start of the year, investors expected the Fed funds rate to be 0.9% in early 2023. Today, they expect it to be 3.4% (Chart 8). Chart 8Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Investors Are Pricing In A Much More Aggressive Tightening Cycle Than At The Start Of The Year Chart 9Housing Activity Should Recover Now That Mortgage Rates Have Stabilized Housing Activity Should Recover Now That Mortgage Rates Have Stabilized Housing Activity Should Recover Now That Mortgage Rates Have Stabilized   Rising rate expectations curb aggregate demand. This temporarily leads to lower growth. However, once rate expectations stabilize – and demand resets to a lower level – growth will tend to return to trend. The 6-month mortgage yield impulse has already turned up. This suggests that housing and other interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy will begin to recover by the end of the year (Chart 9). Admittedly, if the unemployment rate rises in response to lower aggregate demand, this could set off a vicious circle where higher unemployment leads to less spending, leading to even higher unemployment. However, as noted above, given that the current starting point is one where labor demand already exceeds labor supply by a wide margin, the odds of a such a labor market doom loop are much lower than during past downturns.   Q: Does the question of whether we officially enter a recession or not really matter that much? A: It is a matter of degree. As Chart 10 shows, macroeconomic factors are by far the most important determinant of equity returns over medium-term horizons of about 12 months. As a rule of thumb, bear markets almost always coincide with recessions (Chart 11). Chart 10Macro Forces Are An Important Driver Of Equity Returns On Cyclical Horizons Macro Forces Are An Important Driver Of Equity Returns On Cyclical Horizons (I) Macro Forces Are An Important Driver Of Equity Returns On Cyclical Horizons (I) Chart 11Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand-In-Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand-In-Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand-In-Hand   Chart 12Soaring Energy Prices Have Boosted Earnings Estimates This Year Soaring Energy Prices Have Boosted Earnings Estimates This Year Soaring Energy Prices Have Boosted Earnings Estimates This Year Q: Are you surprised that earnings estimates have not come down faster this year as economic risks have intensified? A: Most analysts have not baked in a recession in their forecasts, so from that perspective, if our baseline scenario of no recession does not pan out, earnings estimates will almost certainly come down (Chart 12). That said, the bar for major downward earnings revisions is quite high. This is partly because we think that if a recession does occur, it is likely to be a mild one. It is also because earnings are reported in nominal terms. In contrast to real GDP, nominal GDP grew by 6.6% in Q1 and 7.8% in Q2.   Q: Let’s turn to interest rates. Why do you think the Fed will not cut rates next year as markets are discounting? A: It all boils down to the neutral rate of interest. In past reports, we made the case that the neutral rate in the US is higher than widely believed. The fact that job vacancies are so plentiful provides strong evidence in favor of our thesis. If the neutral rate were low, the labor market would not have overheated. But it did, implying that monetary policy must have been exceptionally accommodative. The good news for investors is that a high neutral rate implies that the Fed is unlikely to induce a recession by raising rates in accordance with its dot plot. That reduces the risk of a recession in the near term. The bad news is that a high neutral rate will essentially preclude the Fed from cutting rates next year. The economy will simply be too strong for that. Worse still, if the Fed is too slow in bringing rates to neutral, inflation – which is likely to fall over the coming months as supply-chain pressures ease – could reaccelerate at some point next year. That could force the Fed to start hiking rates again.   Chart 13Real Yields Have Scope To Rise Further Real Yields Have Scope To Rise Further Real Yields Have Scope To Rise Further Q: What is your estimate for the neutral rate in the US? A: In the past, we have written that the neutral rate in the US is around 3.5%-to-4%. However, I must admit, I’m not a big fan of this formulation. Real rates matter more for economic growth than nominal rates, and long-term rates matter more than short-term rates. Thus, a better question is what level of real long-term bond yields is consistent with stable inflation and full employment. Based on research we have published in the past, my best bet is that the neutral long-term real bond yield is between 1.5%-and-2%. That is substantially above the 10-year TIPS yield (0.27%) and the 30-year TIPS yield (0.79%) (Chart 13). Given that the yield curve is inverted, the Fed may have to raise policy rates well above 4% in order to drag up the long end of the curve. It is a bit like how oil traders say you need to lift spot crude prices in order to push up long-term futures prices when the oil curve is backwardated.   Chart 14Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly Over The Next Few Years Shifting Into Neutral: A Q&A Shifting Into Neutral: A Q&A Q: So presumably then, you would favor a short duration position in fixed-income portfolios? A: Yes, if the whole yield curve shifts higher, you will lose a lot less money in short-term bonds than in long-term bonds. Relatedly, we would overweight TIPS versus nominal bonds. The TIPS market is pricing in a very rapid decline in inflation over the next few years (Chart 14). The widely followed 5-year, 5-year forward TIPS inflation breakeven rate is trading at 2.28%, toward the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5%.1   Q: What about credit? A: US high-yield bonds are pricing in a default rate of 6.1% over the next 12 months. This is up from an expected default rate of 3.8% at the start of the year and is significantly higher than the trailing 12-month default rate of 1.4%. In a typical recession, high-yield default rates rise above 8% (Chart 15). Thus, spreads would probably increase if the US entered a recession. That said, it is important to keep in mind that many corporate borrowers took advantage of very low long-term yields over the past few years to extend the maturity of their debt. Only 7% of US high-yield debt, and less than 1% of investment-grade debt, held in corporate credit ETFs matures in less than two years. This suggests that the default cycle, if it were to occur, would be less intense and more elongated than previous ones. Chart 15High-Yield Bonds Are Pricing In Higher Default Rates High-Yield Bonds Are Pricing In Higher Default Rates High-Yield Bonds Are Pricing In Higher Default Rates On balance, we recommend a modest overweight to high-yield bonds within fixed-income portfolios.   Chart 16High Energy Prices Are Weighing On The European Economy High Energy Prices Are Weighing On The European Economy High Energy Prices Are Weighing On The European Economy Q: Let’s turn to non-US markets. The dollar has strengthened a lot against the euro this year as the economic climate in Europe has soured. Can Europe avoid a recession? A: Probably not. European natural gas prices are back near record highs and business surveys increasingly point to recession (Chart 16). That said, the nature of Europe’s recession could turn out to be quite different from what many expect. There are a few useful parallels between the predicament Europe finds itself in now and what the global economy experienced early on during the pandemic. Just like the Novel coronavirus, as it was called back then, represented an external shock to the global economy, the partial cut-off in Russian energy flows represents an external shock to the European economy. Policymakers in advanced economies responded to the pandemic by showering their economies with various income-support measures. European governments will react similarly to the energy crunch. In fact, the political incentive to respond generously is even greater this time around because the last thing European leaders want is for Putin to succeed in his efforts to destabilize the region. For its part, the ECB will set an extremely low bar for buying Italian bonds and the debt of other vulnerable economies. Just like the world eventually deployed vaccines, Europe is taking steps to inoculate itself from its dangerous addiction to Russian energy. The official REPowerEU plan seeks to displace two-thirds of Russian natural gas imports by the end of the year. While some aspects of the plan are probably too optimistic, others may not be optimistic enough. For example, the plan does not envision increased energy production from coal-fired plants, which is something that even the German Green Party has now signed on to. The euro is trading near parity to the dollar because investors expect growth in the common-currency bloc to remain depressed for an extended period of time. If investors start to price in a more forceful recovery, the euro will rally.   Q: China’s economy remains in the doldrums. Could that undermine your sanguine view on the global economy? A: China’s PMI data disappointed in July, as anxiety over the zero-Covid policy and a sagging property market continued to weigh on activity (Chart 17). We do not expect any change to the zero-Covid policy until the conclusion of the Twentieth Party Congress later this year. After that, the government is likely to ease restrictions, which will help to reignite growth. Chart 17The Zero-Covid Policy And Slumping Property Market Are Weighing On Chinese Economic Activity The Zero-Covid Policy And Slumping Property Market Are Weighing On Chinese Economic Activity The Zero-Covid Policy And Slumping Property Market Are Weighing On Chinese Economic Activity Chart 18China Faces A Structural Decline In The Demand For Housing China Faces A Structural Decline In The Demand For Housing China Faces A Structural Decline In The Demand For Housing The property market has probably entered a secular downturn (Chart 18). If a weakening property market were to cause a banking crisis, similar to what happened in the US and parts of Europe in 2008, this would destabilize the global economy. However, we doubt that this will happen given the control the government has over the banking system. In contrast, a soft landing for the Chinese real estate market might turn out to be a welcome development for the global economy, as less Chinese property investment would keep a lid on commodity prices, thus helping to ease inflationary pressures. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on           LinkedIn & Twitter   Footnotes 1     The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of 2.3%-to-2.5%. View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Shifting Into Neutral: A Q&A Shifting Into Neutral: A Q&A

Dear client, There will be no regular bulletin from the European Investment Strategy team next week to allow us to take some time off. We will return to our regular publishing schedule on August 15, 2022. Kind regards, The European Investment Strategy team   Executive Summary Global Headwinds For Europe Global Headwinds For Europe Global Headwinds For Europe Ahead of our summer break, we review our EIS main themes for the remainder of the year. We expect European growth to be poor in the latter half of 2022, but a recession toward the new year will be shallow. European inflation is set to crest in the fall. While the ECB will only modestly underwhelm the current €STR curve pricing, the TPI will be activated. European equities have entered a bottoming process, but cyclicals will continue to underperform defensive equities in the short-term. European investment grade credit is more attractive than local equities and US investment grade debt. The euro is also in a bottoming process, but near-term downside risk remains considerable. Bottom Line: European stocks are in the process of forming a bottom; yet, the economic softness will prevent cyclical shares from outperforming their defensive counterparts. Additionally, European IG debt offers more attractive risk-adjusted returns than equities in the near-term. Finally, the euro still faces potent front-loaded headwinds, despite a seductive long-term outlook.   The month of August is starting, which often corresponds to a period of lower volumes on the markets, since a large percentage of the financial industry goes on vacation for the summer. This year, those vacations are even more merited than usual, as the first seven months of the year have been particularly tumultuous. Chart 1Deteriorating European Growth Deteriorating European Growth Deteriorating European Growth So far, the European economy has experienced a rare set of consecutive shocks. First, inflation has jumped to its highest level since the euro was introduced 23 years ago. This inflationary shock, however, does not reflect booming demand, as it is accompanied by a sharp economic growth slowdown and thus has a strong connotation of stagflation. PMIs have fallen below the 50 boom/bust line and the growth expectations component of the Ifo survey is now firmly at recessionary levels (Chart 1). Ultimately, what Europe faces is an inward shift in the supply curve caused by a sudden curtailment of energy flows from Russia. Chart 2A Tough First Half of 2022 A Tough First Half of 2022 A Tough First Half of 2022 Second, and largely because of this inflationary shock, the policy backdrop is in upheaval. On July 21, 2022, the ECB increased interest rates for the first time in eleven years and delivered its first 50 bps hike in more than two decades. At last, negative interest rates are not the determinant feature of Eurozone rates. Yet, despite the end of this longstanding policy distortion, the euro cannot catch a break and has tested parity. Meanwhile, German yields hit 1.9% in June, inflicting a YTD loss of 13% on their holders, and Italian spreads have blown up, raising the specter of financial fragmentation in Europe (Chart 2). Third, the environment has also been rough for equity investors. The pan-European Euro STOXX and the Eurozone Euro STOXX 50 have entered into bear markets, falling 23% and 24% respectively from their January 5 peak to their trough on July 5, 2022 (Chart 2, bottom panel). At this juncture, we will review our main themes for the remainder of the year, which also gives us an opportunity to align our recommendations with our core views.  Key Views For The Remainder Of The Year We continue to expect European growth in the latter half of the year to be weak, probably around 0%. Too many hurdles are mounting. We continue to witness signs that global growth is deteriorating. The slowdown in manufacturing activity is not a phenomenon unique to Europe. Global inventories are rising in the manufacturing and retail sectors, which is likely to reduce global industrial production in the coming quarters. As a result, global trade and European exports are set to weaken further (Chart 3). Moreover, the global credit impulse is contracting rapidly in response to tightening monetary conditions. This, too, will weigh on global trade, and thus, on export-oriented nations like Europe. Chart 3Global Headwinds For Europe Global Headwinds For Europe Global Headwinds For Europe Chart 4Households Aren't Alright Households Aren't Alright Households Aren't Alright Inside Europe, the household sector’s malaise is deepening further, as highlighted by crashing consumer confidence (Chart 4). This degeneration reflects the hit to real income caused by elevated inflation, but it has been compounded by rising borrowing costs and falling financial asset prices. Chart 5Running Out Of Gas Running Out Of Gas Running Out Of Gas Meanwhile, the risks from the energy market remain most salient and could even force a contraction in output somewhere between Q4 2022 and Q1 2023. Russian natural gas flows are minimal and are unlikely to rebound enough to allow for the hoped-for build-up in natural gas inventories by the winter (Chart 5). As a result, to keep the lights on, European countries will have to rely on a combination of coal power and energy cuts. Nonetheless, BCA’s commodity and energy strategists estimate that the 14GW of coal-fired generation capacity announced so far and the 15% cut in demand pushed by the European Commission will allow Europe to limp along this winter and avoid the nightmare scenarios delineated by the Bundesbank four months ago.   Ultimately, we expect European economic activity to rebound rapidly in the second quarter of 2023. European governments will not sit idly by when their economies are suffering from a major drag caused by a conflict. Households and the sectors that will be most affected by energy rationing (industrials, such as chemicals and cement) will receive help. Thus, fiscal policy will remain accommodative. Moreover, any production curtailed during the winter will be postponed, which means that activity will likely rebound sharply once the weather warms up. On the inflation front, we continue to see a peak in inflation in the coming months. Commodity inflation is peaking and supply-side constraints are ebbing, which will lessen overall inflation (Chart 6). Additionally, the current weakening demand in Europe, tighter financial conditions, and slowing money supply growth are all consistent with a slowdown in inflation (Chart 7). Chart 6Weaker Commodity Inflation Weaker Commodity Inflation Weaker Commodity Inflation Chart 7Domestic Conditions Becoming Disinflationary Domestic Conditions Becoming Disinflationary Domestic Conditions Becoming Disinflationary Regarding monetary policy, the ECB wants to hike — and hike it will. Our base case scenario calls for a 50bps hike in September, but risks are skewed to the downside because of the weakening economic activity. We also expect two 25bps interest rate increases in October and December, which is somewhat under the €STR curve pricing, but only marginally so (Chart 8). However, we do expect the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) to be activated in the fall to facilitate higher policy rates because of the vast difference in r-star between Germany and the periphery.  Chart 8A Tad To High A Tad To High A Tad To High For government bonds, since we foresee a small dovish surprise by the ECB as well as lower inflation, we anticipate slightly more downside for German Bund yields for the rest of the year. Italian government bonds remain risky in the near-term as market participants test the ECB’s resolve regarding the TPI and Italian politics remain in a state of flux. However, the eventual ECB purchases render them an attractive bet in medium- to long-term portfolios. Despite the slowdown in activity, European equities have already entered a bottoming process. They are cheap and their multiples are already consistent with deep stagflation fears (Chart 9, top panel). Moreover, earnings revisions are already contracting (Chart 9, bottom panel). The collapse in the euro, however, is providing a potent counterweight to economic weaknesses and is allowing European firms to beat analyst expectations. This positive view on the aggregate stock level does not translate yet into an overweight stance on cyclical equities versus defensive ones. Lower inflation and potentially lower global yields help defensive stocks, not cyclical ones. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy continues to struggle with the impact of Beijing’s zero-COVID policy and the disarray in the housing market. These forces suggest that European cyclicals could suffer further underperformance in the coming months (Chart 10), especially if European activity and global trade remain under stress. Additionally, the risks caused by the energy market will continue to warrant a discount in European cyclical equities. Chart 9The Bottoming Process For Stock Has Begun The Bottoming Process For Stock Has Begun The Bottoming Process For Stock Has Begun Chart 10Cyclicals Are Still Handicapped Cyclicals Are Still Handicapped Cyclicals Are Still Handicapped Chart 11IG Prices In A Recession Already IG Prices In A Recession Already IG Prices In A Recession Already European credit, especially investment-grade corporate, offers more appealing risk-adjusted returns than equities. Valuations in the IG space are clearly discounting a severe recession, with the 12-month breakeven spreads in their 80th historical percentile (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the combination of shallower than-once-feared recession with continued fiscal support and further ECB buying will help spreads narrow. As a result, we continue to favor IG to increase risk exposure in Europe. We also favor European IG debt over their US counterparts, especially on a USD hedge basis. The euro remains at a complex juncture. As we wrote three weeks ago, EUR/USD is increasingly attractive for long-term holders. It is cheap and a turnaround in growth next year will help this pro-cyclical currency. However, in the near-term, the euro must cope with the negative impact of China’s growth weakness, Europe’s more pronounced recession risk relative to the US, and the evolving threat of a severe energy crunch. As a result, we continue to see a very fat left tail in EUR/USD in the near-term and prefer the CHF to other European currencies as a vehicle to garner exposure to Europe. Bottom Line: European growth will remain challenged in the near-term, but a severe recession will be avoided. With inflation also peaking this fall, European stocks are in the process of forming a bottom; yet, economic softness will prevent cyclical shares from outperforming their defensive counterparts. Additionally, European IG debt offers more attractive risk-adjusted returns than equities in the near-term. Finally, the euro still faces potent front-loaded headwinds, despite a seductive long-term outlook. Consequently, investors should favor the CHF to gain exposure to European currencies. House Cleaning We take this opportunity to restate our view for the remainder of the year, and to clean up our recommendation and focus on those most aligned with the aforementioned views. The trades from our rotation framework are not impacted, as they are not linked to our key views. Tactical Trades We keep the following tactical trades on the books: Neutral stance on cyclicals relative to defensives: This trade is aligned with our worries that weak global growth will continue to hurt the performance of cyclical equities. Long German / short Italian industrials: This is an uncorrelated trade that benefits from the extreme valuation discount of German industrials relative to their southern counterparts. Moreover, the German economy is faring better than that of Italy, while German financial and monetary conditions are looser than those in Italy. Long Swiss equities / short Eurozone defensives: This is another uncorrelated trade. Swiss stocks are pricey and defensive. However, they are less exposed to the energy rationing this winter than their Eurozone counterparts. Moreover, this position is an implicit bet on a weaker EUR/CHF. Long / short basket based on Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator: This is another uncorrelated trade, based strictly on the most extreme signals from our CMVI methodology. It is a risk averse approach that focuses on buying assets discounting the worst outcome and buying those pricing in some excessively optimistic scenarios. Short European tech firms / long European healthcare shares: This is a defensive trade that seeks to avoid taking a directional bet on the performance of high duration stocks relative to the market. It corresponds to our worry about cyclicals relative to defensives Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator Top 20: This position is similar to our country-selected CMVI trade, but here, it picks the most extreme signals in terms of valuation among 2,000+ sectoral trades across nine European countries. Short European consumer discretionary / long telecom services: This is another defensive trade that is supported by valuations and that benefits from the negative impact on real household income of inflation. It will also gain if energy prices additionally increase and further hurt discretionary spending. Overweight Spanish and Italian bonds: This position has now become a cyclical bet. Italian and Spanish bonds could suffer some additional near-term volatility; however, the upcoming activation of the ECB’s TPI will cause these spreads to widen, offering investors the opportunity to enjoy a much higher yield than Bunds and capital gains as well. Long Eurozone Investment Grade corporate: We are moving this position to become a cyclical trade. It is a direct bet on our positive stance on European IG corporates. Sell EUR/JPY: This trade is a play on the near-term downside risk to the euro. Cyclical Trades: We keep the following cyclical trades on the books: Underweight French consumer discretionary stocks relative to the French equity benchmark: The overbought and expensive status of the entire French stock benchmark comes from the consumer discretionary sector. These stocks are treated as growth stocks; however, the decline in global consumer confidence is historically associated with a vanishing premium for this sector. Long Swedish Industrials / short Eurozone and US industrials: This is a sector neutral trade that avoids overexposure to cyclicals. Instead, it takes advantage of the fact that Swedish industrials have a higher return on assets and profit margins than that of their competitors in the Eurozone and the US. Moreover, the SEK is particularly cheap, which boosts the competitiveness of Swedish industrial equities. Favor Eurozone aerospace & defense stocks relative to the benchmark: Defense stocks are our favorite sector at the moment. They benefit from both European re-armament and from the need for power projection in a multipolar world. Favor Eurozone aerospace & defense stocks relative to industrials: Industrials are likely to see their valuation premium diminish once inflation recedes. They currently trade as an inflation hedge because of their comparatively robust pricing power. Meanwhile, defense equities benefit from the structural tailwind described above. Favor Spanish over Italian equities: Spain’s competitiveness has improved considerably relative to the rest of the Eurozone, notably relative to Italy. Importantly, Spain’s political risk is currently lower than that of Italy. Underweight German Bunds within European fixed-income portfolios: This trade is similar to our overweight stance on Italian and Spanish bonds. Overweight Gilts within European fixed-income portfolios: The British economy is weak, which constraints the ability of the BoE to push up rates as much as what is priced into the SONIA curve. Short EUR/SEK: This trade is being move to a structural position. The Swedish economy is more cyclical than that of Europe, but Sweden is less at risk than the Eurozone from Russia’s energy curtailments. Moreover, Swedish returns on assets are superior to those of the Euro Area, which is positive for the currency on a long-term basis. Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations

Executive Summary Italy’s right-wing alliance, led by Brothers of Italy, will likely outperform in  the upcoming election. The new government will prioritize the economy, posing a risk to the EU’s united front against Russia. It is conducive to an eventual ceasefire, which is marginally positive for risk assets in 2023. We recommend investors underweight Italian assets on a tactical basis. China’s political risks will remain elevated until Xi consolidates power this fall, positive news will come after, if at all. Geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait will remain high and persistent until China and the US reach a new understanding. Separately, we are booking a 9% gain on our long US equities relative to UAE equities trade. Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG US / UAE EQUITIES (CLOSED) 2022-03-11 9.0% Bottom Line: Italy’s political turmoil suggests a more pragmatic policy toward Russia going forward. Europe’s energy cutoff will also motivate governments to negotiate with Russia. Feature In this report we update our GeoRisk Indicators, with a special focus on Italy’s newest political turmoil. Italy Over the past several months, we have argued that Italy was a source of political risk within the European Union and that the market underestimated the probability of an early Italian election. In the past two weeks, this forecast has become a reality (Chart 1). Chart 1Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator The grand coalition under Prime Minister Mario Draghi had fulfilled its two main purposes – to distribute EU recovery funds and secure an establishment politician in the Italian presidency. At the same time, headline inflation hit 8.5% in June, the highest since 1986, even as the Italian and global economy slowed down, Italian government bonds sold off, and Russia induced an energy crisis. The stagflationary economic environment is biting hard and the different coalition members are looking to their individual interests ahead of election season. On July 14, Giuseppe Conte, the former prime minister, pulled its populist Five Star Movement (M5S) out of Mario Draghi’s national unity government, triggering a new round of political turmoil in Italy. Draghi’s first resignation was rejected by Italian President Mattarella later that day. However, on July 21, the League and Forza Italia also defected from the grand coalition. After Draghi’s plan of reviving the coalition collapsed, President Mattarella accepted his resignation and called for a snap election to be held on September 25, ten months ahead of the original schedule. Based on the latest public opinion polls, right-wing political parties are well-positioned for the upcoming election. The far-right Brothers of Italy is now the front runner in the election race and is expected to win around 23% of the votes. Another far-right party, the League, is the third most popular party, with nearly 15% support despite a drop in support during its time within the grand coalition. In addition, the center-right Forza Italia receives 8.5% of the support. Together, the right-wing conservative bloc amounts to 46.5% of voting intentions. There is still positive momentum for Brothers of Italy to harvest more support given that they are the flag-bearer for anti-incumbent sentiment amid the stagflationary economy. By contrast, the left-wing parties – the Democrats, the Left, and the Greens – only command about 27%. The possibility of an extended left-wing coalition, even with the inclusion of the M5S, is looking slim. On July 25, Enrico Letta, the leader of the Democratic Party, publicly expressed his anger against party leader Giuseppe Conte and ruled out any electoral pact with the M5S because of the recent political chaos they caused. He stressed that the Democratic Party would seek ties with parties that had remained loyal to Draghi’s national unity. However, there are not many parties left for the Democrats to partner with. Apart from the Left and the Greens, the Democrats’ best chance would be the center-left Action Party and Italia Viva, which is led by Matteo Renzi, who served as the secretary of the Democratic Party from 2013 to 2018. However, these four parties are small and will not enable the Democrats to form a government. Courting M5S is the Democrats’ only chance to set up an alternative to the right-wing bloc, but that will require the election to force the two parties together. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyLe Pen And Other Hurdles (GeoRisk Update) The Democratic Party was the biggest supporter of Draghi’s government, while the Brothers of Italy were the sole major opposition. Thus the September 25 election will be a race between these two major parties. Both are expected to outperform current polling, as they will attract the most supporters from each side. The other right-wing parties, Forza Italia and the League, will at least perform in line with their polling, while the other left-wing parties will underperform. In the meantime, M5S’ popularity will continue to decline – the party is bruised over its role in Draghi’s coalition and divided over how to respond to the Ukraine war. Foreign policy is a major factor in this election. Italy has the highest share of citizens in the Eurozone who support solving the Russia-Ukraine conflict through peaceful dialogue (52% versus the Eurozone average of 35%). Italy has long maintained pragmatic relations with Russia, including the Putin administration, as it imported 40% of its natural gas from there prior to 2022. The EU is struggling to maintain a united front against Russia, and war policy will be a key focal point among the different parties. Draghi and the Democratic Party are the strongest supporters of the EU’s oil embargo on Russia and decision to send arms to support Ukraine. On the other side, the right-wing Forza Italia and the League have been more equivocal due to their traditional friendship with Russia. What’s more important is the stance of the Brothers of Italy on Russia, as it is the largest party now and will probably lead a right-wing government after the election. On July 27, the three right-wing parties struck a deal to officially form an alliance in the upcoming election and whichever party wins the most votes would determine the next prime minister if the alliance wins. This deal puts Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Brothers of Italy, one step closer to becoming Italy’s first female PM. Giorgia Meloni, unlike her right-wing peers, has endorsed Draghi’s hawkish stance towards Russia. Recently, she stressed that Italy would keep sending arms to Ukraine if her party forms a government after the election. However, Meloni’s speech could be a tactical move to win the election more than an unshakeable policy position. First, like the other two right-wing parties, the Brothers of Italy have had close connections with Russia. After the 2018 Russian presidential election, Meloni congratulated Putin and claimed his victory was “the unequivocal will of Russians.” In addition, she is close to Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary and National Rally leader Marine Le Pen of France, both of whom have criticized the EU’s decision to provide military support to Kyiv. Hence her sharp change of stance this year seems calculated to avoid accusations of being pro-Russian. But that does not preclude a more pragmatic approach to Russia once in office. Second, Meloni has compromised other far-right positions to broaden her voter base. She has reversed the party’s original anti-EU stance and claimed it does not seek to leave the EU, as most European anti-establishment parties have had to do in order to make themselves electable. Being the only female in the election race, Meloni also pledged to protect women’s access to safe abortions in Italy, also a softer stance than before. Even if the Brothers of Italy distance themselves from some unpopular right-wing positions, including on Ukraine, they probably cannot form a government on their own. They will need to court Forza Italia and the League. These two parties prefer a more pragmatic approach to Russia and a peaceful resolution to the war. Thus while it will be hard to find a middle ground on the issue of Ukraine, the election will likely prevent Italy from taking a more confrontational stance toward Russia. It will probably do the opposite. Consider the context in which the next Italian government will operate. Russia declared on July 25 that it will further reduce natural gas supplies to Europe through Nord Stream 1, as we expected, bringing pipeline flows to 20% of its full capacity.  Energy prices will go up even as European economic activity and industry will suffer greater strains. If Meloni is elected as the new prime minister this September, she will have to keep talking tough on Russia while simultaneously seeking a solution to soaring energy prices and economic crisis. This solution will be diplomacy – unless Russia seeks to expand its invasion all the way to Moldova. A right-wing victory is the most likely outcome based on opinion polling, the negative cyclical economy, and the underlying structural factors supporting populism in Italy that we have monitored for years. Such a coalition will not be pro-Russian but it will be pragmatic and focused on salvaging Italy’s economy, which means it will be highly inclined toward diplomacy. If Russia halts its military advance – does not attempt to conquer southwestern Ukraine to Moldova – then this point will be greatly reinforced. Italy will become a new veto player within the European Union when it comes to any major new sanctions on Russia. While Europeans will continue diversifying their energy mix away from Russia, it will be much harder for the EU to implement a natural gas embargo in the coming years if Italy as well as Hungary oppose it. Even if we are wrong, and the Democratic Party or other left-wing parties surprise to the upside in the election, the new coalition will most likely have to focus on mitigating the economic crisis and thus pursuing diplomacy with Russia. That is, as long as Russia pushes for a ceasefire after it achieves its military aims in Donetsk, the last holdout within the south-southeastern territories Russia is trying to conquer. Bottom Line: Due to persistent political uncertainty, we recommend investors underweight Italian stocks and bonds at least until a new government takes shape, which could take months even after the election. However, government bonds will remain vulnerable if a right-wing coalition assumes power, since it will pursue loose fiscal policies and will eschew structural reforms. Overall Italy’s early elections will lead to a new government that is focused on short-term economic growth, likely including pragmatism toward Russia. From an investment point of view that will not be a negative development, though much depends on whether Russia expands its invasion or declares victory after Donetsk. Russia Market-based measures of Russian geopolitical risk are rebounding after subsiding from peak levels hit during the invasion of Ukraine in February (Chart 2). Chart 2Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia’s continued tightening of natural gas supplies (and food exports) this week is precisely what we predicted would happen despite a wave of wishful thinking from investors over the past month. The optimists claimed that Russia would resume Nord Stream 1 pipeline flows after a regular “maintenance” period. They also said that Canada’s cooperation in resolving some “technical” issues around turbines would stabilize natural gas supply. The truth is that Russia is seeking to achieve its war aims in Ukraine. Until it has achieved its aims, it will use a range of leverage, including tightening food and energy supplies. Most likely Russia will halt the advance after completing the conquest of the Donbas region and land-bridge to Crimea. Then it will seek to legitimize its conquests through a ceasefire agreement. However, it could launch a new phase of the war to try to take Odessa and Transniestria, which would cement European resolve, even in Italy, and trigger a new round of sanctions. Bottom Line: Russia faces a fork in the road once it completes the conquest of Donetsk. Most likely it will declare victory and start pushing for a ceasefire late this year or early next year. Movement toward a ceasefire would reduce geopolitical risk for global financial markets in 2023. But there is still a substantial risk that Russia could expand the invasion to eastern Moldova, which would escalate the overarching Russia-West conflict and sustain the high level of geopolitical risk for markets. China Chinese political and geopolitical risk will continue to rise and the bounce in Chinese relative equity performance is faltering as we expected (Chart 3). Chart 3China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China’s leaders will hold their secretive annual meeting at Beidaihe in August ahead of the critical Communist Party national congress this fall. General Secretary Xi Jinping is attempting to cement himself as the paramount leader in China, comparable to Chairman Mao Zedong, transforming China’s governance from that of single-party rule to single-person rule. The reversion to autocratic government is coinciding with a historic economic slowdown consisting of cyclical factors (weak domestic demand, weakening foreign demand, draconian Covid-19 restrictions) and structural factors (labor force contraction, property sector bust, social change and unrest). Both Xi and US President Biden face major domestic political challenges in the coming months with the party congress and the US midterm election. Hence they are holding talks to try to stabilize relations. But we do not think they will succeed. China cannot reject Russia’s strategic overture, while the US cannot afford to re-engage with a China that is partnering with Russia in a challenge to the liberal-democratic world order. In addition, US policies are erratic and the US cannot credibly promise China that it will not pursue a containment strategy even if China offers trade concessions. Bottom Line: China-related political and geopolitical risks will remain very high until at least after the twentieth party congress. At that point we expect President Xi to loosen a range of policies to stabilize the economy and foreign trade relations. These policies may bring positive news in 2023, though China’s biggest macroeconomic and geopolitical problems remain structural in nature and we remain underweight Chinese assets. Taiwan For many years we have warned of a “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” due to the unsustainable geopolitical situation between China, Taiwan, and the United States. After the war in Ukraine we argued that the US would try to boost its strategic deterrence around Taiwan, since it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, but that the increased commitment to Taiwan would in fact provoke China (Chart 4). Chart 4Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Until the US and China reach a new understanding over Taiwan, we argued that the region would be susceptible to rising tensions and crisis points that would send investors fleeing from risky assets, especially risky regional assets. It is possible that we have arrived at this crisis now, with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi making preparations to visit Taiwan, China pledging “forceful” countermeasures if she does, President Biden suggesting that the US military thinks Pelosi should not visit, and Biden and Xi preparing for a phone conversation. In essence China is giving an ultimatum and setting a new bar, and a very low bar, for taking some kind of action on Taiwan, i.e. the mere visit of a US House speaker, which has happened before (House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1997). China’s purpose is to lay the groundwork for preventing the US from upgrading Taiwan relations in any more substantial way, whether political or military. If the Biden administration calls off the Pelosi visit, then American relations with Taiwan will have been curtailed, at least for this administration. If Biden goes forward with the visit, then Beijing will need to respond with an aggressive show of force to prevent any future president from repeating the exercise or building on it. And if this show threatens US personnel or security, a full-blown diplomatic or military crisis could ensue. While we doubt it would lead to full-scale war, it could lead to a frightening confrontation. Biden may want to stabilize relations with China, since he is primarily focused on countering Russia, but his options are limited. China cannot save him from inflation but it can solidify the public perception that he is weak. Hence he is more likely to maintain his administration’s hawkish approach. Biden’s approval rating is 38% and his party faces a drubbing in the midterm elections. A confrontation with Russia, China, Iran, or anyone else would likely help his party by producing a public rally around the flag. Any unilateral concessions will merely strengthen Xi’s power consolidation at the party congress, which is detrimental to US interests. Only if the Biden administration pursues a dovish policy of re-engagement that is subsequently confirmed by the 2024 presidential election will there be potential for a substantial US-China economic re-engagement. We are pessimistic. Bottom Line: Taiwan-related geopolitical risk will rise in the short run. If there is a new US-China understanding over Taiwan, then regional and global geopolitical risk will decline over the medium term. But we remain short Taiwanese assets. Investment Takeaways Investors should remain defensively positioned until the US midterm election ends with congressional gridlock; the Chinese party congress is over and Xi Jinping launches a broad pro-growth policy; and Russia starts pushing for a ceasefire in Ukraine. We also expect that markets will need to get over new, unexpected oil supply shocks arising from the failure of US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which remains off the radar and therefore a source of negative surprises. Any US-Iran nuclear deal would be a major positive surprise that postpones this risk for a few years. Having said that, we are booking a 9% gain on our long US versus UAE equity trade for technical reasons. Democrats have reached a deal to pass a budget reconciliation bill in an effort to mitigate midterm election losses. This development reinforces the 65% odds of passage that we have maintained for this bill’s passage in our US Political Strategy reports since last year.   Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix UK Chart 5UK: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Chart 6Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France Chart 7France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Chart 8Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Chart 9Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Chart 10Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Chart 11Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Chart 12Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Chart 13Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa Chart 14South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades Geopolitical Calendar

Executive Summary If a loss of wealth persists for a year or more, it hurts the economy. The recent $40 trillion slump in global financial wealth is larger than that suffered in the pandemic of 2020, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the dot com bust of 2000-01. Partly countering this slump in global financial wealth is a $20 trillion uplift in global real estate wealth. However, Chinese home prices are already stagnating. And the recent disappearance of US and European homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers warns that US and European home prices will cool over the next 6 months. With the loss of wealth likely to persist, it will amplify a global growth slowdown already in train, aided and abetted by central banks that are willing to enter recession to slay inflation. The optimal asset allocation over the next 6-12 months is: overweight bonds, neutral stocks, and underweight commodities. A variation on this theme is: overweight conventional bonds and stocks versus inflation-protected bonds and commodities. Fractal trading watchlist: US telecoms versus utilities, and copper. We Have Just Suffered The Worst Loss Of Financial Wealth In A Generation The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters Bottom Line: On a 6-12 month horizon, overweight bonds, neutral stocks, and underweight commodities. Feature Since the end of last year, the world has lost $40 trillion of financial wealth, evenly split between the crashes in stocks and bonds (Chart I-1). The slump in financial wealth, both in absolute and proportionate terms, is the worst suffered in a generation, larger than that in the pandemic of 2020, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the dot com bust of 2000-01.1 Chart I-1Global Stocks And Global Bonds Have Both Slumped By $20 Trillion Global Stocks And Global Bonds Have Both Slumped By $20 Trillion Global Stocks And Global Bonds Have Both Slumped By $20 Trillion Partly countering this $40 trillion slump in global financial wealth is a $20 trillion uplift in global real estate wealth. But in total, the world is still $20 trillion ‘asset poorer’ than at the end of last year. Given that global GDP is around $100 trillion, we can say that we are asset poorer, on average, by about one fifth of our annual income. Does this loss of wealth matter? A Loss Of Wealth Matters If It Persists For A Year Or More Some argue that we shouldn’t worry about the recent slump in our wealth, because we are still wealthier than we were, say, at the start of the pandemic (Chart I-2). Yet this is a facile argument. Whatever loss of wealth we suffer, there is always some point in the past against which we are richer! Chart I-2We Have Just Suffered The Worst Loss Of Financial Wealth In A Generation We Have Just Suffered The Worst Loss Of Financial Wealth In A Generation We Have Just Suffered The Worst Loss Of Financial Wealth In A Generation Another argument is that people do not care about a short-lived dip in their wealth. This argument has more truth to it. For example, in the extreme event of a flash crash, an asset price can drop to zero and then bounce back in the blink of an eyelid. In this case, most people would be oblivious, or unconcerned, by this momentary collapse in their wealth. But people do care if the slump in their wealth becomes more prolonged. How long is prolonged? The answer is, if the slump persists for a year or more. Why a year? Because that is the timeframe over which governments, firms, and households make their income and spending plans. Governments and firms do this formally in their annual budgets that set tax rates, wages, bonuses, and investment spending. Households do it informally, because their wages, bonuses, and taxes – and therefore disposable incomes – also adjust on an annual basis. Into this yearly spending plan will also come any change in wealth experienced over the previous year. For example, firms often do this formally by converting an asset write-down to a deduction from profits, which will then impact the firm’s future spending. This illustrates that what impacts your spending is not the level of your wealth, but the yearly change in your wealth. Spending Is Impacted By The Change In Wealth The intellectual battle here is between Economics and Psychology. The economics textbooks insist that it is the level of your wealth that impacts your spending, whereas the psychology and behavioural finance textbooks insist that it is the change in your wealth that impacts your spending. (Chart I-3and Chart I-4). In my view, the psychologists and behavioural finance guys have nailed this better than the economists, through a theory known as Mental Accounting Bias. Chart I-3The Change And Impulse Of Stock Market Wealth Are Both Negative The Change And Impulse Of Stock Market Wealth Are Both Negative The Change And Impulse Of Stock Market Wealth Are Both Negative Chart I-4The Change And Impulse Of Bond Market Wealth Are Both Negative The Change And Impulse Of Bond Market Wealth Are Both Negative The Change And Impulse Of Bond Market Wealth Are Both Negative Nobel Laureate psychologist Daniel Kahneman points out that we categorise our money into different accounts, which are sometimes physical, sometimes only mental – and that there is a clear hierarchy in our willingness to spend these ‘mental accounts’. Put simply, we are willing to spend our income mental account, but we are much less willing to spend our wealth mental account. Still, wealth can generate income through interest payments and dividends, which we are willing to spend. Clearly, the level of income generated will correlate with the amount of wealth – $10 million of wealth will likely generate much more income than $1 million of wealth. So, economists get the impression that it is the level of wealth that impacts spending, but the truth is that it is the income generated by the wealth that impacts spending.    We are willing to spend our income ‘mental account’, but we are much less willing to spend our wealth ‘mental account’. What about someone like Amazon founder Jeff Bezos who has immense wealth but seemingly negligible income – Mr. Bezos receives only a token salary, and his huge holding of Amazon shares pays no dividend – how then can we explain his largesse? The answer is that Mr. Bezos’ immense wealth generates tens of billions in trading income. So again, it is his income that is driving his spending. Wealth also generates an ‘income substitute’ via capital gains. For example, you should be indifferent between a $100 bond giving you $2 of income, or a $98 zero-coupon bond maturing in one year at $100, giving you $2 of capital gain. In this case the capital gain is simply an income substitute and fully transferred into the spending mental account. Nowhere is this truer than in China, where the straight-line appreciation in house prices through several decades has allowed homeowners to regard a reliable capital gain as an income substitute (Chart I-5). Which justifies rental yields on Chinese housing that are the lowest in the world and lower even than the yield on risk-free cash. In other words, which justifies a stratospheric valuation for Chinese real estate. Image Usually though, we tend to transfer only a proportion of our capital gains or losses into our spending mental account. As described previously, a firm will do this formally by transferring an asset write-down into the income statement. And households will do it informally by transferring some proportion of their yearly change in wealth into their spending mental account. The important conclusion is that spending is impacted by the yearly change in wealth. Meaning that spending growth is impacted by the yearly change in the yearly change in wealth, known as the wealth (1-year) impulse, where a negative impulse implies negative growth. Cracks Appearing In The Housing Market Given the recent slump in financial wealth, the global financial wealth impulse is in deeply negative territory. Yet by far the largest part of our wealth comprises housing, meaning the value of our homes2 (Chart I-6). In China, the recent stagnation of house prices means that the housing wealth impulse has turned negative. Elsewhere in the world though, the recent boom in house prices means that the housing wealth impulse is still positive, meaning a tailwind – albeit a rapidly fading tailwind – to spending (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-6Housing Comprises By Far The Largest Part Of Our Wealth Housing Comprises By Far The Largest Part Of Our Wealth Housing Comprises By Far The Largest Part Of Our Wealth Chart I-7Chinese House Prices Have Stagnated, US House Prices Have Surged The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters Chart I-8The Chinese Housing Wealth Impulse Is Negative, The US Housing Wealth Impulse Is Fading The Chinese Housing Wealth Impulse Is Negative, The US Housing Wealth Impulse Is Fading The Chinese Housing Wealth Impulse Is Negative, The US Housing Wealth Impulse Is Fading In China, the recent stagnation of house prices means that the housing wealth impulse has turned negative. Still, as we explained in The Global Housing Boom Is Over, As Buying Becomes More Expensive Than Renting, the disappearance of homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers is a tried and tested indicator that US and European home prices will cool over the next 6 months. US new home prices have already suffered a significant decline in June (Chart I-9). Some of this is because US homebuilders are building smaller and less expensive homes. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that the non-China housing wealth impulse will also turn negative later this year. Chart I-9US New Home Prices Fell Sharply In June US New Home Prices Fell Sharply In June US New Home Prices Fell Sharply In June To be clear, the wealth impulse is just one driver of spending growth. Nevertheless, it does have the potential to amplify the growth cycle in either direction. With global growth clearly slowing, and central banks willing to enter recession to slay inflation, the rapidly fading global wealth impulse will amplify the slowdown. Therefore, the optimal asset allocation over the next 6-12 months is: Overweight bonds. Neutral stocks. Underweight commodities. A variation on this theme is: Overweight conventional bonds and stocks versus inflation-protected bonds and commodities. Fractal Trading Watchlist After a 35 percent decline since March, copper has hit a resistance point on its short-term fractal structure, from which it could experience a countertrend move. Hence, we are adding copper to our watchlist. Of note also, the underperformance of US telecoms versus utilities has reached the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that has signalled previous major turning points in 2012, 2014, and 2017 (Chart I-10). Hence, the recommended trade is long US telecoms versus utilities, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 8 percent. Chart I-10US Telecoms Versus Utilities Are At A Potential Turnaround US Telecoms Versus Utilities Are At A Potential Turnaround US Telecoms Versus Utilities Are At A Potential Turnaround Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions Copper’s Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     The value of global equities has dropped by $20tn to $80tn, the value of global bonds by $20tn to around $100tn, while the value of global real estate has increased by $20tn to an estimated $370tn. 2     Strictly speaking, housing wealth should be measured net of the mortgage debt that is owed on our homes. But as the wealth impulse is a change of a change, and mortgage debt changes very slowly, it does not matter whether we calculate the impulse from gross or net housing wealth. Chart 1CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 2Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Copper's Selloff Has Hit Short-Term Resistance Chart 3US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 4CAD/SEK Is Reversing CAD/SEK Is Reversing CAD/SEK Is Reversing Chart 5Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Chart 6The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended Chart 7The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended Chart 8FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 9Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Chart 10The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 11The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 12Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 13German Telecom Outperformance Has Started To Reverse German Telecom Outperformance Has Started To Reverse German Telecom Outperformance Has Started To Reverse Chart 14Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15ETH Is Approaching A Possible Capitulation ETH Is Approaching A Possible Capitulation ETH Is Approaching A Possible Capitulation Chart 16The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended Chart 17The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Has Ended Chart 18A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 19Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 20Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 21Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 22Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Chart 23USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 24The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 25A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 26GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 27US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 28The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted   Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters The World Is $20 Trillion Poorer. Why That Matters 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area     Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed     Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations     Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

The Global Investment Strategy service tactically downgraded equities in February but then upgraded them in May. The decision to upgrade equities to overweight in May was clearly premature, as stocks fell significantly in June. However, the rally in July has brought stocks back above the level where we upgraded them. Hence, we are using this opportunity to shift our recommended equity allocation back to neutral. While our base case forecast still foresees no recession in the US over the next 12 months, the risks to this view have increased. In Europe, we see a recession as more likely than not. China’s economy will remain under pressure due to Covid lockdowns, a shift in global spending away from manufactured goods, and a weakening property market. Even if the US avoids a recession, this could prove to be a bittersweet outcome for stocks: While earnings will hold up, the Fed is unlikely to cut rates next year, as markets are currently discounting. Real bond yields, which have already risen steeply this year, will rise further, weighing on equity valuations.  Time to Take Some Chips Off the Table The consensus view among investors these days seems to be that the US is heading into a recession (or may already be in one), which will cause stocks to fall during the remainder of the year as earnings estimates are slashed. Looking out to 2023, most investors expect stocks to recover as the Fed begins to cut rates. I have the opposite view. While the risks to growth have increased, the US will probably avoid a recession over the next 12 months. This will allow stocks to rise modestly from current levels into year-end. However, as we enter 2023, it will become obvious that the Fed has no reason to cut rates. This could cause stocks to give up some of their gains, thus producing a fairly flat profile for equities over a 12-month horizon. In past reports, we have argued that the neutral rate of interest – the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation – is higher than widely believed in the US. The nice thing about a high neutral rate is that it insulates the economy from tighter monetary policy: Even if the Fed raises rates to 3.8% next year, as the dots are currently forecasting, that will only put rates in the middle of our fair value range of 3.5%-to-4% for the US neutral rate. The downside of a high neutral rate is that eventually, investors will need to value stocks using a higher discount rate. The 10-year TIPS yield has already increased from -0.97% at the start of the year to +0.36% today. It will rise to 1%-to-1.5% by the middle of 2023. A higher-than-expected neutral rate also raises inflation risks because it could cause the Fed to inadvertently keep monetary policy too loose. Inflation is likely to fall significantly over the coming months as supply-chain bottlenecks ease. However, this decline in inflation could sow the seeds of its own demise: As inflation falls, real wage growth – which is now negative – will turn positive. Rising real wages will booster consumer confidence and spending. A reacceleration in inflation in the second half of next year could prompt the Fed to start hiking rates again in late 2023, thus producing a recession not in 2022 but in 2024. Outside the US, the outlook is more challenging. In Europe, a recession is more likely than not in the second half of the year. We expect the recession to be fairly short-lived, with European governments moving aggressively to mitigate the fallout from gas shortages through various income support schemes for the private sector. Chinese growth should rebound in the second half of the year. However, the specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening property sector will continue to weigh on activity. We will have much more to say about this view change early next week. In the meantime, please review our report from last week entitled “The Downside Of A Soft Landing” for further color on some of the points made in this short bulletin. Tomorrow, my colleague Ritika Mankar will be sending you a Special Report making the case that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies may become increasingly compromised over the next decade.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn & Twitter.

Executive Summary Peak Fed Funds? Peak Fed Funds? Peak Fed Funds? The bond market is priced for a fed funds rate that will peak in February 2023 at 3.44% before trending down. We survey several interest rate cycle indicators and conclude that the market’s expected peak is too low and occurs too early. These indicators include: the unemployment rate, financial conditions, PMIs, the yield curve and housing starts. We also update our default rate forecast and are now looking for the default rate to rise to between 4.7% and 5.9% during the next 12 months. While our default rate forecasts imply a reasonably attractive 12-month junk bond valuation, we hesitate to turn too bullish on high-yield given that the next peak in the default rate is still not in sight. Bottom Line: We recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark for the time being, though we will be looking for opportunities to reduce duration in the second half of this year. Similarly, we recommend a neutral (3 out of 5) allocation to junk bonds but will recommend reducing exposure if spreads rally back to average 2017-19 levels. Feature Last week’s report presented three conjectures about the US economy.1 One of those was that a recession will be required to get inflation back to 2%. But when will that recession occur? The question of timing is a vital one for bond investors. Are we on the cusp of recession right now? If so, then bond investors should extend portfolio duration in anticipation of Fed rate cuts and a return to 2% inflation. Conversely, if the recession is delayed, interest rates probably move higher before the cycle ends and investors should consider reducing portfolio duration. This week’s report addresses the topic of timing the next recession and discusses the implications for bond portfolio construction. Timing The Interest Rate Cycle From a bond market perspective, the question of whether the economy is in recession is less important than whether the Fed is hiking or cutting rates. Therefore, for the purposes of this report we will define a “recession” as an economic slowdown that is significant enough for the Fed to start cutting interest rates. Chart 1Peak Fed Funds? Peak Fed Funds? Peak Fed Funds? Now, let’s start by looking at what sort of interest rate cycle is priced in the market. The overnight index swap curve is currently discounting a peak fed funds rate of 3.44% (Chart 1). It is also priced for that peak to occur in 7 months, or by February 2023 (Chart 1, bottom panel). As bond investors, the question we must ask is whether this pricing seems reasonable. To do so, we will perform a survey of different indicators that have strong track records of sending signals near the peaks of interest rate cycles. Unemployment The first indicator we’ll look at is the unemployment rate. Economist Claudia Sahm has shown that a recession always occurs when the 3-month moving average of the unemployment rate rises to 0.5% above its trailing 12-month minimum.2 Table 1 dispenses with the moving average and simply shows the deviation of the unemployment rate from its trailing 12-month minimum on the dates of first Fed rate cuts since 1990. We see that the Fed has typically started to cut rates once the unemployment rate is 0.3-0.4 percentage points off its low. The exception is 2019 when the unemployment rate was only 0.1% off its low, but when inflation was below the Fed’s 2% target. Table 1Unemployment And Inflation When The Fed Starts Easing Recession Now Or Recession Later? Recession Now Or Recession Later? At 3.6%, the unemployment rate is currently at its cycle low. Based on the numbers shown in Table 1, this means that we should only expect the Fed to cut interest rates if the unemployment rises to at least 3.9% or 4.0%. We say “at least” because it’s also important to note that the inflation picture is a lot different today than it was during the periods shown in Table 1. With inflation so much higher, it is reasonable to think that the Fed will tolerate a greater increase in the unemployment rate before pivoting to rate cuts. Looking ahead, initial unemployment claims appear to have bottomed for the cycle and changes in initial claims are highly correlated with changes in the unemployment rate (Chart 2). That said, the trend in claims is currently consistent with a leveling-off of the unemployment rate, not a large increase. Financial Conditions Second, we turn to financial conditions. Fed officials often assert that monetary policy works through its impact on broad financial conditions. Therefore, it’s not too surprising that rate cuts tend to occur only after the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index has moved into restrictive territory. Currently, despite the Fed’s dramatic hawkish shift, the index still shows financial conditions to be accommodative (Chart 3). Chart 2Jobless Claims Moving Higher Jobless Claims Moving Higher Jobless Claims Moving Higher Chart 3Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions   The same caveat we applied to the unemployment rate applies to financial conditions. As long as inflation is above the Fed’s target, it’s highly likely that the Fed will be comfortable with financial conditions that are somewhat restrictive. Therefore, the Fed may not pivot as soon as the Goldman Sachs index moves above 100, as has been the pattern in the recent past. Yield Curve Third, we note that an inverted Treasury curve almost always precedes the start of a Fed rate cut cycle, and the Treasury curve is certainly inverted today (Chart 4). The logic behind this indicator is somewhat circular in the sense that an inverted Treasury curve simply tells us that the market anticipates Fed rate cuts. If data emerge to suggest that Fed rate cuts will be postponed, then the Treasury curve could re-steepen. It’s for this reason that the Treasury curve often inverts well in advance of an economic recession and Fed rate cuts. We explored the relationship in more detail in a recent Special Report.3 Chart 4Interest Rate Cycle Indicators Interest Rate Cycle Indicators Interest Rate Cycle Indicators Chart 5Manufacturing PMIs Manufacturing PMIs Manufacturing PMIs PMIs Typically, the ISM Manufacturing PMI is below 50 by the time of the first Fed rate cut (Chart 4, panel 3). Currently, the ISM Manufacturing PMI is a healthy 53.0, but it has been falling quickly and trends in regional PMI surveys suggest that it will dip below 50 within the next few months (Chart 5). Interestingly, both the ISM and regional PMI surveys show that manufacturing supplier delivery times have come down a lot (Chart 5, panel 2). This gives some hope that goods inflation will trend lower during the next few months, as is our expectation. Recently, there’s also been an unusual divergence between the employment components of the ISM and regional Fed surveys. The New York and Philadelphia Fed surveys are showing strength in their employment components. Meanwhile, the ISM employment figure is below 50 (Chart 5, bottom panel). This divergence likely boils down to labor shortages that complicate how firms are responding to the employment question in the surveys. For example, despite the sub-50 employment figure, the latest ISM release noted that “an overwhelming majority of panelists […] indicate that their companies are hiring.”4 Housing In a recent report, we developed a rule of thumb that says that Fed rate cuts typically don’t occur until after the 12-month moving average of housing starts falls below the 24-month moving average.5 That indicator is coming down, but it still has a lot of breathing room before it dips into negative territory (Chart 4, bottom panel). That same report also outlined that we see the housing market slowdown proceeding in three stages. First, higher mortgage rates will suppress housing demand. This is already happening at a rapid pace as indicated by trends in mortgage purchase applications and existing home sales (Chart 6A). Second, lower housing demand will push up inventories and send prices lower. This has not yet shown up in the data (Chart 6B). Finally, once lower prices and higher inventories sufficiently disincentivize construction, we will see a marked deterioration in housing starts. Currently we see that housing starts have dipped, and homebuilder confidence has plummeted, but starts still haven’t decisively broken their uptrend (Chart 6C). Chart 6AHousing Demand Housing Demand Housing Demand Chart 6BPrices & Inventories Prices & Inventories Prices & Inventories Chart 6CBuilding Activity Building Activity Building Activity Putting It All Together To make sense of all the different indicators that could signal a Fed pivot toward rate cuts, we turn to our Fed Monitor. The Fed Monitor is a composite indicator that includes many of the individual indicators we have already examined in this report, as well as some others. The Fed Monitor is constructed so that a positive reading suggests that the Fed should be hiking rates and a negative reading suggests the Fed should be cutting rates. As can be seen in Chart 7, the Monitor is currently deep in positive territory. Chart 7Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Money Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Money Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Money The Fed Monitor consists of three main sub-components, an economic growth component, an inflation component and a financial conditions component (Chart 7, bottom 3 panels). We see that the economic growth component of the Monitor is consistent with a neutral Fed policy stance – neither hikes nor cuts - and financial conditions point to a mildly restrictive stance. However, unsurprisingly, the inflation component is the highest it has been since the early-1980s and this is applying a ton of upward pressure to the Monitor. While our Fed Monitor is not a perfect indicator, it does speak to the tradeoff between inflation and economic growth that we have already hinted at in this report. Specifically, the Monitor illustrates that as long as inflation remains elevated it will take a significant deterioration in economic growth and financial conditions before the overall Monitor recommends a dovish Fed pivot. To us, this argues for a higher and later peak in the fed funds rate than is currently priced in the curve. Bottom Line: The peak fed funds rate that is currently priced in the market for 2023 is too low, and the funds rate will also likely peak later than what is priced in the curve. That said, falling inflation and economic growth concerns will probably keep a lid on bond yields during the next few months. We advise investors to keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for the time being, but to look for opportunities to reduce exposure. We will consider reducing our recommended portfolio duration stance to ‘below-benchmark’ if the 10-year Treasury yield falls to 2.5% or if core inflation reverts to our estimate of its 4%-5% underlying trend. Timing The Default Rate Cycle The interest rate cycle is not the only important one for bond investors. The default rate cycle is also crucial for spread product allocations because default trends are responsible for a significant amount of the volatility in corporate bond spreads. In this section we consider the outlook for corporate defaults and high-yield bond performance. We model the trailing 12-month speculative grade default rate using gross leverage (total debt over pre-tax profits) and C&I lending standards (Chart 8). Conservatively, if we assume 5% corporate debt growth for the next 12 months and corporate profit growth of between -10% and -20%, our model projects that the default rate will rise to between 4.7% and 5.9% (Chart 8, top panel). It’s notable that, like us, banks are also preparing for an increase in corporate defaults by raising their loan loss provisions (Chart 8, panel 2). Meanwhile, job cut announcements – another reliable indicator of corporate defaults – still don’t point to a higher default rate (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8The Default Rate Has Troughed The Default Rate Has Troughed The Default Rate Has Troughed Interestingly, our model’s conservative projections suggest that in 12 months the default rate will be lower than its typical recession peak. Given today’s cheap junk valuations, this sort of analysis is encouraging a lot of people to turn bullish on high-yield bonds. Chart 9Default-Adjusted Spread Default-Adjusted Spread Default-Adjusted Spread This line of reasoning is not totally unfounded. Using the same forecasted default rate scenarios from Chart 8 along with an assumed 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, we calculate that the excess spread available in the junk index after subtracting 12-month default losses is between 136 bps and 208 bps. This is below the historical average (Chart 9), but still above the 100 bps threshold that often delineates between junk bond outperformance and underperformance versus duration-matched Treasuries.6 More specifically, Chart 10 shows the relationship between our default-adjusted spread and high-yield excess returns versus Treasuries for each calendar year going back to 1995. We see that, in general, there is a positive relationship between spread and returns and that excess returns are more often positive than negative whenever the default-adjusted spread is above 100 bps. However, Chart 10 also shows periods when a pure analysis of junk bond performance based on the 12-month default-adjusted spread didn’t pan out. The year 2008 is a prime example. The default-adjusted spread came in at 249 bps for 2008, above the historical average. However, junk spreads widened dramatically in 2008 and excess returns were dismal. Chart 10The Default-Adjusted Spread And High-Yield Returns Recession Now Or Recession Later? Recession Now Or Recession Later? The reason the default-adjusted spread valuation framework failed in 2008 is that while the default rate only moved up to 4.9% in 2008, it wasn’t done increasing for the cycle. In fact, the rise in the default rate accelerated in 2009 until it hit 14.6% in November of that year. So, while default losses were low compared to the starting index spread in 2008, junk index spreads widened sharply in 2008 as the market prepared for worse default losses in 2009. The lesson we draw from the 2008 example is that even if the junk bond market is attractively priced relative to expected default losses on a 12-month horizon, unless we can forecast a peak in the default rate it is unwise to be overly bullish on high-yield bonds. Even if a recession doesn’t occur within the next 6-12 months, it will likely occur within the next 12-24 months. In that environment, investors are unlikely to realize the full potential of today’s attractive 12-month junk bond valuations. Chart 11Junk Spreads Junk Spreads Junk Spreads The bottom line is that we maintain a neutral (3 out of 5) allocation to high-yield within US fixed income portfolios for now. Junk spreads are elevated compared to past rate hike cycles and could tighten during the next few months as inflation converges to its underlying 4%-5% trend. That said, we will not turn outright bullish on junk bonds until we can reasonably forecast a peak in the default rate. In the meantime, a sell on strength strategy is more appropriate. We will reduce our recommended allocation to high-yield bonds if the average index spread tightens to its average 2017-19 level (Chart 11) or once inflation converges with its underlying 4%-5% trend. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Conjectures About The US Economy”, dated July 19, 2022. 2     https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Sahm_web_20190506.pdf 3    Please see US Bond Strategy / US Investment Strategy / US Equity Strategy Special Report, “The Yield Curve As An Indicator”, dated March 29, 2022. 4    https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism… 5    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bond Market Implications Of A 5% Mortgage Rate”, dated April 26, 2022. 6    For a more complete analysis of the link between the default-adjusted spread and excess high-yield returns please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Turning Defensive On US Corporate Bonds,” dated April 12, 2022.   Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Executive Summary Iran Reaches Nuclear Breakout Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East The next geopolitical crisis will stem from the Middle East. The US, Russia, and China are striving for greater influence there and Iran’s nuclear quest is reaching a critical juncture. The risk of US-Israeli attacks against Iran remains 40% over the medium term and will rise sharply if Iran attempts to construct a deliverable nuclear device. Saudi Arabia may increase oil production but only if global demand holds up, which OPEC will assess at its August 3 meeting. Global growth risks will prevail in the short term and reduce its urgency. Russia will continue to squeeze supplies of energy and food for the outside world. The restart of Nord Stream 1 and the Turkey-brokered grain export proposal are unreliable signals. Russia’s aim is victory in Ukraine and any leverage will be used. The US may be done with the Middle East but the Middle East may not be done with the US. Structurally we remain bullish on gold and European defense stocks but we are booking 17% and 18% gains on our current trades. The deterioration in global growth and likely pullback in inflation will temporarily undercut these trades. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GOLD (CLOSED) 2019-06-12 17.1% LONG EUROPEAN AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / EUROPEAN TECH EQUITIES (CLOSED) 2022-03-18 17.9% Bottom Line: Global demand is weakening, which will weigh on bond yields and commodities. Yet underlying oil supply constraints persist – and US-Iran conflict will exacerbate global stagflation. Feature Chart 1Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility US President Joe Biden visited Saudi Arabia last week in a belated attempt to make amends with OPEC, increase oil production, and reduce inflation ahead of the midterm election. Biden also visited Israel to deter Iran, which is the next geopolitical crisis that markets are underrating. Meanwhile Russian President Vladimir Putin went to Iran on his second trip outside of Russia since this year’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin sought an ally in his conflict with the West, while also negotiating with Turkish President Recep Erdogan, who sought to position himself as a regional power broker. In this report we analyze Biden’s and Putin’s trips and what they mean for the global economy and macro investors. Macroeconomics is bearish for oil in the short term but geopolitics is bullish for oil in the short-to-medium term. The result is volatility (Chart 1). OPEC May Pump More Oil But Not On Biden’s Time Frame Here are the important developments from Biden’s trip: A credible threat against Iran: The US and Israel issued a joint declaration underscoring their red line against Iranian nuclear weaponization.1 Meanwhile the Iranians claimed to have achieved “nuclear breakout,” i.e. enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device (Chart 2). A balance-of-power coalition to contain Iran: Israel and Saudi Arabia improved relations on the margin. Each took action to build on the strategic détente between Israel and various Arab states that is embodied in the 2020 Abraham Accords.2 This strategic détente has staying power because it is a self-interested attempt by the various nations to protect themselves against common rivals, particularly Iran (Chart 3). Biden also tried to set up a missile defense network with Israel and the Arabs, although it was not finalized.3 Chart 2Iran Reaches Nuclear Breakout Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East A reaffirmed US-Saudi partnership: The US and Saudi Arabia reaffirmed their partnership despite a rocky patch over the past decade. The rocky patch arises from US energy independence, China’s growth, and US attempts to normalize ties with Iran (Chart 4). These trends caused the Saudis to doubt US support and to view China as a strategic hedge. Chart 3Iran: Surrounded And Outgunned Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East ​​​​​​ President Biden came into office aiming to redo the Iran deal and halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Since then he has been chastened by high energy prices, a low approval rating, and hawkish Iranian policy. On this trip he came cap in hand to the Saudis in a classic example of geopolitical constraints. If the US-Iran deal is verifiably dead, then US-Saudi ties will improve sustainably. (Though of course the Saudis will still do business with China and even start trading with China in the renminbi.) What global investors want to know is whether the Saudis and OPEC will pump more oil. The answer is maybe someday. The Saudis will increase production to save the global business cycle but not the Democrats’ election cycle. They told Biden that they will increase production only if there is sufficient global demand. Global Brent crude prices have fallen by 6% since May, when Biden booked his trip, so the kingdom is not in a great rush to pump more. Its economy is doing well this year (Chart 5). Chart 4Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety ​​​​​ Chart 5Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak ​​​​​​ At the same time, if global demand rebounds, the Saudis will not want global supply constraints to generate punitive prices that cap the rebound or kill the business cycle. After all, a global recession would deplete Saudi coffers, set back the regime’s economic reforms, exacerbate social problems, and potentially stir up political dissent (Chart 6). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThird Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Hence the Saudis will not increase production substantially until they have assessed the global economy and discussed the outlook with the other members of the OPEC cartel in August and September, when the July 2021 agreement to increase production expires. We expect global demand to weaken as Europe and China continue to struggle. Our Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan argues that further escalation in the energy war between the EU and Russia could push prices above $220 per barrel by Q4 2023, whereas an economic collapse could push Brent down to $60 per barrel. His base case Brent price forecast remains $110 per barrel on average in 2022 and $117 per barrel in 2023 (Chart 7). Chart 6Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession ​​​​​​ Chart 7BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast ​​​​​​ The geopolitical view suggests upside oil risks over the short-to-medium time frame but the macroeconomic view suggests that downside risks will be priced first. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia may increase production but not at any US president’s beck and call. The Saudis are not focused on US elections, they benefit from the current level of prices, and they do not suffer if Republicans take Congress in November. The downside risk in oil prices stems from demand disappointments in global growth (especially China) rather than any immediate shifts in Saudi production discipline. Volatility will remain high. US-Iran Talks: Dying But Not Dead Yet In fact the Middle East underscores underlying and structural oil supply constraints despite falling global demand. While Iran is a perennial geopolitical risk, the world is reaching a critical juncture over the next couple of years. Investors should not assume that Iran can quietly achieve nuclear arms like North Korea. Since August 2021 we have argued that the US and Iran would fail to put back together the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPA). This failure would in turn lead to renewed instability across the Middle East and sporadic supply disruptions as the different nations trade military threats and potentially engage in direct warfare. This forecast is on track after Biden’s and Putin’s trip – but we cannot yet say that it is fully confirmed. Biden’s joint declaration with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid closed any daylight that existed between the US and Israel. Given that there was some doubt about the intentions of Biden and the Democrats, it is now crystal clear that the US is determined to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons even if it requires military action. The US specifically said that it will use “all instruments of national power” to prevent that outcome. Chart 8Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Judging by the tone of the statement, the Israelis wrote the document and Biden signed it.4 Biden’s foreign policy emphasizes shoring up US alliances and partnerships, which means letting allies and partners set the line. Israel’s Begin Doctrine – which says that Israel is willing to attack unilaterally and preemptively to prevent a hostile neighbor from obtaining nuclear weapons – has been reinforced. The US is making a final effort to intimidate Iran into rejoining the deal. By clearly and unequivocally reiterating its stance on nuclear weapons, and removing doubts about its stance on Israel, there is still a chance that the Iranian calculus could change. This is possible notwithstanding Ayatollah Khamenei’s friendliness with Putin and criticisms of western deception.5 After all, why would the Iranians want to be attacked by the US and Israeli militaries? Iran will need to think very carefully about what it does next. Khamenei just turned 83 years old and is trying to secure the Islamic Republic’s power transition and survival after his death. Here are the risks: Iran’s economy, buoyed by the commodity cycle, is not so weak as to force Khamenei to capitulate. Back in 2015 oil prices had collapsed and his country was diplomatically isolated. Today the economy has somewhat weathered the storm of the US’s maximum pressure sanctions (Chart 8). Iran is in bad shape but it has not been brought to its knees. Another risk is that Khamenei believes the American public lacks the appetite for war. Americans say they are weary of Middle Eastern wars and do not feel particularly threatened by Iran. However, this would be a miscalculation. US war-weariness is nearing the end of its course. The US engages in a major military expedition roughly every decade. Americans are restless and divided – and the political elite fear populism – so a new foreign distraction is not as unlikely as the consensus holds. Moreover a nuclear Iran is not an idle threat but would trigger a regional nuclear arms race and overturn the US grand strategy of maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East (as in other regions). In short, the US government can easily mobilize the people to accept air strikes to prevent Iran from going nuclear because there is latent animosity toward Iran in both political parties (Chart 9). Chart 9Risk: Iran Overrates US War-Weariness Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Another risk is that Iran forges ahead believing that the US and Israel are unwilling or unable to attack and destroy its nuclear program. The western powers might opt for containment like they did with North Korea or they might attack and fail to eliminate the program. This is hard to believe but Iran clearly cannot accept US security guarantees as an alternative to a nuclear deterrent when it seeks regime survival. At the same time Russia is courting Iran, encouraging it to join forces against the American empire. Iran is planning to sell drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, while Russia is maintaining nuclear and defense cooperation with Iran. Putin’s trip highlighted a growing strategic partnership despite a low base of economic ties  (Chart 10).6 Chart 10Russo-Iranian Ties Russo-Iranian Ties Russo-Iranian Ties ​​​​​​ Chart 11West Vulnerable To Middle East War Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East While Russia does not have an interest in a nuclear-armed Iran, it is not afraid of Iran alone, and it would benefit enormously if the US and Israel got bogged down in a new war that destabilized the Middle East. Oil prices would rise, the US would be distracted, and Europe would be even more vulnerable (Chart 11). Chart 12China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China’s interest is different. It would prefer for Iran to undermine the West by means of a subtle and long-term game of economic engagement rather than a destabilizing war in the region that would upset China’s already weak economy. However, Beijing will not join with the US against Iran, especially if Iran and Russia are aligned. Ultimately China needs to access Iranian energy reserves via overland routes so that it gains greater supply security vis-à-vis the American navy (Chart 12). Since June 2019, we have maintained 40% odds of a military conflict with Iran. The logic is outlined in Diagram 1, which we have not changed. Conflict can take various forms since the western powers prefer sabotage or cyber-attacks to outright assault. But in the end preventing nuclear weapons may require air strikes – and victory is not at all guaranteed. We are very close to moving to the next branch in Diagram 1, which would imply odds of military conflict rise from 40% to 80%. We are not making that call yet but we are getting nervous. Diagram 1Iran Nuclear Crisis: Decision Tree Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Moreover it is the saber rattling around this process – including an extensive Iranian campaign to deter attack – that will disrupt oil distribution and transport sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: The US and Iran could still find diplomatic accommodation to avoid the next step in our decision tree. Therefore we are keeping the odds of war at a subjective 40%. But we have reached a critical juncture. The next step in the process entails a major increase in the odds of air strikes. Putin’s Supply Squeeze Will Continue As we go to press, financial markets are reacting to President Putin’s marginal easing of Russian political pressure on food and energy supplies. First, Putin took steps toward a deal, proposed by Turkish President Erdogan, to allow Ukrainian grain exports to resume from the Black Sea. Second, Putin allowed a partial restart of the Nord Stream 1 natural gas pipeline, after a total cutoff occurred during the regular, annual maintenance period. However, these moves should be kept into perspective. Nord Stream 1 is still operating at only 40% of capacity. Russia reduced the flow by 60% after the EU agreed to impose a near-total ban on Russian oil exports by the end of the year. Russia is imposing pain on the European economy in pursuit of its strategic objectives and will continue to throttle Europe’s natural gas supply. Russia’s aims are as follows: (1) break up European consensus on Russia and prevent a natural gas embargo from being implemented in future (2) pressure Europe into negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine that legitimizes Russia’s conquests (3) underscore Russia’s new red line against NATO military deployments in Finland and Sweden. Europe, for its part, will continue to diversify its natural gas sources as rapidly as possible to reduce Russia’s leverage. The European Commission is asking countries to decrease their natural gas consumption by 15% from August to March. This will require rationing regardless of Russia’s supply squeeze. The collapse in trust incentivizes Russia to use its leverage while it still has it and Europe to try to take that leverage away. The economic costs are frontloaded, particularly this winter. The same goes for the Turkish proposal to resume grain exports. Russia will continue to blockade Ukraine until it achieves its military objectives. The blockade will be tightened or loosened as necessary to achieve diplomatic goals. Part of the reason Russia invaded in the first place was to seize control of Ukraine’s coast and hold the country’s ports, trade, and economy hostage. Bottom Line: Russia’s relaxation of food and energy flows is not reliable. Flows will wax and wane depending on the status of strategic negotiations with the West. Europe’s economy will continue to suffer from a Russia-induced supply squeeze until Russia achieves a ceasefire in Ukraine. So will emerging markets that depend on grain imports, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. Investment Takeaways The critical juncture has arrived for our Iran view. If Iran does not start returning to nuclear compliance soon, then a fateful path of conflict will be embarked upon. The Saudis will not give Biden more oil barrels just yet. But they may end up doing that if global demand holds up and the US reassures them that their regional security needs will be met. First, the path for oil over the next year will depend on the path of global demand. Our view is negative, with Europe heading toward recession, China struggling to stimulate its economy effectively, and the Fed unlikely to achieve a soft landing. Second, the path of conflict with Iran will lead to a higher frequency of oil supply disruptions across the Middle East that will start happening very quickly after the US-Iran talks are pronounced dead. In other words, oil prices will be volatile in a stagflationary environment. In addition, while inflation might roll over for various reasons, it is not likely to occur because of any special large actions by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are waiting on global cues. Of these, China is the most important. We are booking a 17% gain on our long gold trade as real rates rise and China’s economy deteriorates (Chart 13). This is in line with our Commodity & Energy Strategy, which is also stepping aside on gold for now. Longer term we remain constructive as we see a secular rise in geopolitical risk and persistent inflation problems. Chart 13Book Gains On Gold ... For Now Book Gains On Gold ... For Now Book Gains On Gold ... For Now We are booking an 18% gain on our long European defense / short European tech trade. Falling bond yields will benefit European tech (Chart 14). We remain bullish on European and global defense stocks. Chart 14Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now ​​​​​​ Chart 15Markets Underrate Middle East Geopolitical Risk Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East ​​​​​ Stay long US equities relative to UAE equities. Middle Eastern geopolitical risk is underrated (Chart 15). Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022, whitehouse.gov. 2     Israel and the US will remove international peacekeepers from the formerly Egyptian Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir, which clears the way for Saudi Arabia to turn them into tourist destinations. Saudi Arabia also removed its tight airspace restrictions on Israel, enabling civilian Israeli airlines to fly through Saudi airspace on normal basis. Of course, Saudi allowance for Israeli military flights to pass through Saudi airspace would be an important question in any future military operation against Iran. 3     The US has long wanted regional missile defense integration. The Biden administration is proposing “integrated air defense cooperation” that would include Israel as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A regional “air and missile defense architecture” would counter drones and missiles from rival states and non-state actors such as Iran and its militant proxies. Simultaneously the Israelis are putting forward the proposed Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD) in meetings with the same GCC nations. Going forward, Iran’s nuclear ambitions will give more impetus to these attempts to cooperate on air defense. 4     This is apparent from the hard line on Iran and the relatively soft line on Russia in the document. Israel is wary of taking too hard of a line against Russia because of its security concerns in Syria where Russian forces are present. See footnote 1 above. 5     Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran; he justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a defense against NATO encroachment; he called for the removal of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. See “Khamenei: Tehran, Moscow must stay vigilant against Western deception,” Israel Hayom, July 20, 2022, israelhayom.com. 6     Russia’s natural gas champion Gazprom signed an ostensible $40 billion memorandum of understanding with Iran’s National Oil Company to develop gas fields and pipelines. See Nadeen Ebrahim, “Iran and Russia’s friendship is more complicated than it seems,” CNN, July 20, 2022, cnn.com. However, while there are longstanding obstacles to Russo-Iranian cooperation, the West’s tough new sanctions on Russia and EU diversification will make Moscow more willing to invest in Iran. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary The odds of a recession in the US are lower than widely perceived. The probability of a recession is higher in Europe, although this week’s partial resumption of gas flows through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, along with increased use of coal-fired power plants, should soften the blow. Chinese growth should rebound in the second half of the year. However, the specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening property sector will continue to weigh on activity. With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, it is increasingly likely that the authorities will open up a firehose of stimulus. Fading recession risks will buoy stocks in the near term. However, a brighter economic outlook also means that the Fed, and several other central banks, may see little need to cut policy rates in 2023, as the markets are currently discounting. The end result is that government bond yields will rise from current levels, implying that stock valuations will not return to last year’s levels even if a recession is averted. After Rapidly Raising Rates, Markets Expect Some DM Central Banks To Start Easing Next Year The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Bottom Line: We recommend a modest overweight on global equities for now but would turn neutral if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050.   Dear Client, I am delighted to announce that Ritika Mankar, CFA, has joined the Global Investment Strategy team. Ritika will be writing occasional special reports on a variety of topical issues. Next week, she will make the case that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies may become increasingly compromised over the next decade. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist The Case for a Soft Landing in the US Chart 1Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Over the last few months, investors have become concerned that the Fed and many other central banks will need to engineer a recession in order to bring inflation down to more comfortable levels. While these fears have abated over the past trading week, they still continue to dominate market action (Chart 1). We place the odds of a US recession at about 40%. This is arguably more optimistic than the consensus view. According to Bank of America, the majority of fund managers saw recession as likely in this month’s survey. Not surprisingly, investors consider recession to be a major risk for equities over the next 12 months (Chart 2). Chart 2Many Investors Now See Recession As Baked In The Cake The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Even if a recession does occur, we have contended that it will likely be a mild one, perhaps so mild that it will be difficult to distinguish it from a soft landing. A number of things make a soft landing in the US more probable than in the past: Labor supply has scope to increase. The labor participation rate is still 1.2 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, two-thirds of which is due to decreased participation among workers under the age of 55 (Chart 3). The share of workers holding multiple jobs is also below its pre-pandemic level (Chart 4). The number of multiple job holders has been rising briskly lately. That is one reason why job growth in the payroll survey – which double counts workers if they hold more than one job – has been stronger than job growth in the household survey. Increased labor supply would obviate the need for the Fed to take drastic actions to curtail labor demand in its effort to restore balance to the labor market. Chart 3Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Chart 4The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels A high level of job openings creates a moat around the labor market. There are almost two times as many job openings as there are unemployed workers in the US (Chart 5). Many firms are likely to pull job openings before they cut jobs in response to a slowing economy. A high level of job openings will also allow workers who lose their jobs to find employment more quickly than usual, thus limiting the rise in so-called frictional unemployment. It is worth noting that the job openings rate has declined from a record 7.3% in March to a still-high 6.9% in May, with no change in the unemployment rate over this period. Chart 5A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A steep Phillips curve implies that only a modest increase in unemployment may be necessary to knock down inflation towards the Fed’s target. Just as was the case in the 1960s, the Phillips curve has proven to be kinked near full employment (Chart 6). Unlike in the late 1960s, however, when rising realized inflation caused long-term inflation expectations to reset higher, expectations have remained well anchored this time around (Chart 7). Chart 6The Phillips Curve Is Kinked At Very Low Levels Of Unemployment The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 7Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored   The unwinding of pandemic and war-related dislocations should push down inflation. A recent study by the San Francisco Fed estimates that about half of May’s PCE inflation print was the result of supply-side disturbances (Chart 8). While the ongoing war in Ukraine and the threat of another Covid wave in China will continue to unsettle global supply chains, these problems should fade over time. Falling inflation would allow real wages to start rising again. This would bolster confidence, making a soft landing more likely (Chart 9). Chart 8Supply Factors Explain Half Of The Increase In Prices Over The Past Year The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 9Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence A lack of major financial imbalances makes the US economy more resilient to economic shocks. As a share of disposable income, US household debt is 34 percentage points below its 2008 peak (Chart 10). Relative to net worth, household debt is at multi-decade lows. About two-thirds of mortgages carry a FICO score above 760 compared to only one-third during the housing bubble (Chart 11). Non-mortgage consumer credit also remains in good shape, as my colleague Doug Peta elaborated in this week’s US Investment Strategy report. While corporate debt has risen over the past decade, the ratio of corporate debt-to-assets today is still below where it was during the 1990s. Moreover, thanks to stronger corporate profitability, the interest coverage ratio is near an all-time high (Chart 12).   Chart 10AUS Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) Chart 10BUS Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) Chart 11FICO Scores For Residential Mortgages Have Improved Considerably Since The Pre-GFC Housing Bubble The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 12Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Chart 13Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Just like the US does not suffer from major financial imbalances, it does not suffer from any major economic imbalances either. The homeowner vacancy rate is near a record low, which should put a floor under residential investment (Chart 13). Outside of investment in intellectual property, which is not especially sensitive to the business cycle, nonresidential investment is still below pre-pandemic levels and not much above where it was as a share of GDP during the Great Recession (Chart 14). Spending on consumer durable goods has retraced four-fifths of its pandemic surge, with little ill-effect on aggregate employment (Chart 15). Chart 14Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Chart 15Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Europe: A Deep Freeze Will Likely Be Avoided Chart 16Russia Can Potentially Cause Significant Economic Damage In The EU If It Closes The Taps The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing The macroeconomic picture is less benign outside the US. Four years ago, German diplomats laughed off warnings that their country had become dangerously dependent on Russian energy. They are not laughing anymore. German industry, just like industry across much of Europe, is facing a major energy crunch. The IMF estimates that output losses associated with a full Russian gas shutoff over the next 12 months could amount to as much as 2.7% of GDP in the EU (Chart 16). In Central and Eastern Europe, output could shrink by 6%. Among the major economies, Germany and Italy are the most at risk. Fortunately, Europe is finally stepping up to the challenge. The highly ambitious REPowerEU plan seeks to displace two-thirds of Russian gas by the end of 2022. The plan does not include any additional energy that could be generated by increased usage of coal-fired power plants, a strategy that the European political establishment (including the German Green Party!) has only recently begun to champion. It is possible that EU leaders felt the need to generate a crisis mentality to justify the decision to burn more coal. Dire warnings about how Europe is prepared to ration gas also send a message to Russia that the EU is ready to suffer in order to thwart Putin’s despotic regime. Whether Europe actually follows through is a different story. It is worth noting that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline resumed operations this week after Germany received, over Ukrainian objections, a repaired turbine from Canada. The resumption of partial flows through the pipeline, along with increased fiscal support for households and firms, reduces the risks of a “deep freeze” recession in Europe. The unveiling of the ECB’s new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) this week should also help anchor sovereign credit spreads across the euro area. While the exact conditions under which the TPI will be engaged have yet to be fleshed out, we expect the terms to be fairly liberal, reflecting not only the lessons learned from last decade’s euro debt crisis, but also to serve as a powerful bulwark against Putin’s efforts to destabilize the EU economy. China: Government’s Growth Target Looks Increasingly Unrealistic Stronger growth in China would help European exporters (Chart 17). Chinese real GDP grew by just 0.4% in the second quarter from a year earlier as the economy was battered by Covid lockdowns. Activity should pick up in the second half of the year, but at this point, the government’s 5.5% growth target looks completely unachievable. The specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening Chinese property sector are all weighing on the economy (Chart 18). Chart 17European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy The authorities will likely seek to stimulate the economy by allowing local governments to bring forward $220 billion in bond issuance that had been originally slated for 2023. The problem is that land sales – the main source of local government revenue – have collapsed. Worried about the ability of local governments to service their obligations, both retail investors and banks have shied away from buying local government debt. Chart 18A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the inability of property developers to secure adequate financing to complete construction projects has left a growing number of home buyers in the lurch. In most cases, these properties were purchased off-the-plan. Understandably, home buyers have balked at the prospect of having to make mortgage payments on properties that they do not possess.  With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, it is increasingly likely that the authorities will open up a firehose of stimulus, including increased assistance for property developers and banks, as well as income-support measures for households. While such measures will not address China’s myriad structural problems, they will help keep the economy afloat. Equity Valuations in a Soft-Landing Scenario A few weeks ago, the consensus view was that stocks would tumble in the second half of the year as the global economy fell into recession but would then rally in 2023 as central banks began lowering rates. We argued the opposite, namely that stocks would likely rebound in the second half of the year as the economy outperformed expectations but would then face renewed pressure in 2023 as it became clear that the Fed and several other central banks had no reason to cut rates (Chart 19). Chart 19After Rapidly Raising Rates, Markets Expect Some DM Central Banks To Start Easing Next Year The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 20Real Rates Have Jumped This Year Real Rates Have Jumped This Year Real Rates Have Jumped This Year In a baseline scenario where a recession is averted, we argued that the S&P 500 could rise to 4,500 (60% odds). In contrast, we noted that the S&P 500 could fall to 3,500 in a mild recession scenario (30% odds) and to 2,900 in a deep recession scenario (10% odds). It is worth stressing that even at 4,500, the S&P 500 would still be 11% lower in real terms than it was on January 4th. At the stock market’s peak in January, the 10-year TIPS yield stood at -0.91%, while the 30-year TIPS yield stood at -0.27%. Today, they stand at 0.58% and 0.93%, respectively (Chart 20). If real rates do not return to their prior lows, it is unlikely that equity valuations will return to their prior highs. This limits the upside for stocks, even in a soft-landing scenario. The sharp rally in stocks over the past week has priced out some of this recession risk, moving equity valuations closer towards what we regard as fair value. As we noted last week, we will turn neutral on equities if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050. As we go to press, we are only 1.3% from that level.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on         LinkedIn & Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing