Inflation/Deflation

Executive Summary Upgrade Global Duration Exposure To Neutral Upgrade Global Duration Exposure To Neutral Upgrade Global Duration Exposure To Neutral The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a stagflationary shock that comes at a difficult time for developed market central banks that have been laying the groundwork for a tightening cycle. We tactically upgraded our recommended duration exposure in the US to neutral last week, as the market was pricing in too much Fed tightening in 2022. We are doing similar upgrades in non-US government bonds this week for the same reason. We are maintaining our cyclical country allocations, however, as those remain in line with interest rate pricing beyond 2022. We are underweight markets where terminal rate expectations remain too low (the US, UK & Canada) and overweight countries where markets are discounting too many rate hikes in 2023/24 (Germany, Japan, Australia). In light of the instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we are reducing weightings in our model bond portfolio to credit sectors highly exposed to the war - European high-yield and emerging market hard currency debt. Bottom Line: The Ukraine war comes at a time when global growth momentum was already starting to roll over and with global inflation momentum set to peak soon. Upgrade duration exposure to neutral from underweight in global bond portfolios. Feature Among the tail risks that investors contemplated in their planning for 2022, World War III was likely not ranked too highly on the list. The horrific images of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – and the sharp response of the West to isolate Russia through unprecedented economic and financial sanctions - have shocked global financial markets that had been focused on relatively mundane concerns like the timing of interest rate hikes. BCA sent a short note to all clients late last week that discussed the investment implications of the invasion for several asset classes. In this report, we consider the bond market ramifications of war in Eastern Europe. Our main conclusion is that the Ukraine situation will produce a brief “stagflationary” shock that will boost global inflation and slow global growth, on the margin. High energy prices will be the main driver of that stagflation, given the uncertainties over the availability of Russian oil and natural gas supplies (Chart 1). Tighter financial conditions - beyond what has already occurred so far this year as global equity and credit markets have sold off (Chart 2) – will also contribute to the moderation of the pace of global growth. Chart 1A Mild Inflationary Shock From The Russian Invasion A Mild Inflationary Shock From The Russian Invasion A Mild Inflationary Shock From The Russian Invasion ​​​​​​ Chart 2The Ukraine War Is Adding To 2022 Risk-Off Trends The Ukraine War Is Adding To 2022 Risk-Off Trends The Ukraine War Is Adding To 2022 Risk-Off Trends ​​​​​​ The stagflation shock should be relatively short, perhaps 3-6 months. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects OPEC to eventually supply more oil to the global market – a move that was already likely before the Russian invasion – helping to reduce the Russian supply premium in oil prices. Putin will likely have to be satisfied with claiming eastern Ukraine rather than being stuck in a protracted battle with fierce Ukrainian resistance while Russia suffers under crippling sanctions. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect the conflict to spread beyond Ukraine’s borders, as neither Russia nor NATO have an interest in war with each other (despite the nuclear saber-rattling by Russian President Putin in response to Western sanctions). A mild bout of stagflation will only delay, and not derail, the cyclical move towards tighter global monetary policies in response to elevated inflation and tightening labor markets, particularly in the US. This will take some of the upward pressure off global bond yields as central banks will be less hawkish than expected in 2022, but does not change the outlook for higher bond yields in 2023 and 2024. In terms of changes to our fixed income investment recommendations, and the allocations to our Model Bond Portfolio, we come to the following three conclusions. Upgrade Tactical Non-US Duration Exposure To Neutral We recently upgraded our recommended tactical duration exposure in the US to neutral, with the Fed likely to deliver fewer rate hikes this year than what is discounted by markets. The Ukraine situation makes it even more likely that the Fed will underwhelm expectations. A 50bp rate hike at the March FOMC meeting is now off the table, as the equity and credit market selloffs in response to the conflict have tightened US (and global) financial conditions on the margin. However, the war is not enough of a negative shock to US growth to derail the Fed from starting a gradual tightening process this month with a 25bp hike. Our decision to change our US duration stance was largely predicated on a view that US inflation will soon peak and slow significantly over the rest of 2022. However, there is a strong case to increase non-US duration exposure, as well. Our Global Duration Indicator - comprised of leading cyclical growth indicators and which itself leads the year-over-year change in our “Major Countries” GDP-weighted aggregate of 10-year government bond yields by around six months - peaked back in February 2021 (Chart 3). The Global Duration Indicator is now at a “neutral” level consistent with more stable bond yield momentum. Declines in the ZEW economic expectations survey in the US and Europe, and in our global leading economic indicator, are the main culprits behind the fall in the Global Duration Indicator (Chart 4). Chart 3Upgrade Global Duration Exposure To Neutral Upgrade Global Duration Exposure To Neutral Upgrade Global Duration Exposure To Neutral ​​​​​​ Chart 4Growth Expectations Have Turned Less Bond Bearish ... For Now Growth Expectations Have Turned Less Bond Bearish ... For Now Growth Expectations Have Turned Less Bond Bearish ... For Now ​​​​​ While the ZEW series have rebounded in the first two months of 2022, which could set the stage for a move back to higher yields later this year, the Ukraine situation will likely hurt economic expectations (particularly in Europe) in the near-term. We expect our Global Duration Indicator to continue signaling a more neutral backdrop for global bond yields over the next few months. In our Model Bond Portfolio on pages 13-14, we are expressing our view change by increasing the duration for all countries such that the overall duration of the portfolio is in line with the custom benchmark index (7.5 years). Importantly, we view this as only a tactical view change for the next few months, as developed economy interest rate markets are still discounting too few rate hikes – and in some countries like the UK and US, actual rate cuts – in 2023/24 (Chart 5). Chart 5Priced For Short, Shallow Hiking Cycles Priced For Short, Shallow Hiking Cycles Priced For Short, Shallow Hiking Cycles Maintain Cyclical Government Bond Country Allocations That Favor Lower Inflation Regions Chart 6Oil Is Inflationary Now, Will Be Disinflationary Later Oil Is Inflationary Now, Will Be Disinflationary Later Oil Is Inflationary Now, Will Be Disinflationary Later While we are neutralizing our global duration stance over a tactical time horizon (0-6 months), we are sticking with our current recommended cyclical (6-18 months) government bond country allocations. These are based on underlying inflation trends and the expected monetary policy response over the next couple of years. As noted earlier, BCA’s commodity strategists expect oil prices to fall from current war-elevated levels in response to increased supply from OPEC. The benchmark Brent oil price is forecasted to reach $88/bbl at the end of this year and $87/bbl and the end of 2023. The result will be a sharp decline in the year-over-year growth rate of oil prices that will help bring down headline inflation in all countries (Chart 6). Lower energy inflation, however, will not be the only factor reducing overall inflation across the developed world. Goods price inflation should also slow from current elevated levels over the next 6-12 months, as consumer spending patterns shift away from goods towards services with fewer pandemic-related restrictions on activity. Less goods spending will help ease some of the severe supply chain disruptions that have fueled the surge in global goods price inflation over the past year. That process has likely already begun – indices of global shipping costs have peaked and supplier delivery times have been shortening according to global manufacturing PMI surveys. The shift from less goods spending towards more services spending will lead to trends in overall inflation being determined more by services prices than goods prices. The central banks in countries that have higher underlying inflation, as evidenced by faster services inflation, will be under more pressure to tighten policy over the next couple of years. Therefore, our current cyclical recommended country allocations (and our Model Bond Portfolio weightings) within developed market government bonds reflect the relative trends in services inflation. We are currently recommending underweights in the US, UK and Canada where services inflation is currently close to 4%, well above the central bank 2% inflation targets (Chart 7). At the same time, we are recommending overweights in core Europe (Germany and France) and Australia, where services inflation is around 2.5%, and Japan where services prices are deflating (Chart 8). Chart 7Higher Underlying Inflation In Our Recommended Underweights Higher Underlying Inflation In Our Recommended Underweights Higher Underlying Inflation In Our Recommended Underweights ​​​​​​ Chart 8Lower Underlying Inflation In Our Recommended Overweights Lower Underlying Inflation In Our Recommended Overweights Lower Underlying Inflation In Our Recommended Overweights ​​​​​​ Chart 9Faster Wage Growth In Our Recommended Underweights Faster Wage Growth In Our Recommended Underweights Faster Wage Growth In Our Recommended Underweights The trends in services inflation are also reflected in wage growth in those same groups of countries – much higher in the US, UK and Canada compared to Australia, the euro area and Japan (Chart 9). We expect these relative trends to continue over the next 12-24 months, with higher underlying inflation pressures forcing the Fed, the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Canada (BoC) to be much more hawkish, on a relative basis, than the European Central Bank (ECB), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Our current bond allocations not only fit with underlying inflation trends, but also with market-based interest rate expectations. In Table 1, we show the pricing of interest rate expectations over the next few years, taken from Overnight Index Swap (OIS) forwards. We show the OIS projection for 1-month interest rates 12 months from now and 24 months from now. We also include 5-year/5-year forward OIS rates as a measure of market expectations of the terminal rate, a.k.a. the peak central bank policy rate over the next tightening cycle. In the table, we also added neutral policy rate estimates taken from central bank sources.1 Table 1Medium-Term Interest Rate Expectations Still Too Low In The US & UK Adjusting Our Bond Recommendations For A More Uncertain World Adjusting Our Bond Recommendations For A More Uncertain World In the US and UK, the OIS rate projections two years out, as well as the 5-year/5-year forward rate, are below the range of neutral rate estimates. This justifies an underweight stance on both US Treasuries and UK Gilts with both the Fed and BoE now in tightening cycles. In Japan and Australia, the OIS projections are already within the range of neutral rate estimates, but the RBA and, especially, the BoJ are not yet signaling a need to begin normalizing the level of policy rates. This justifies an overweight stance on Australian government bonds and Japanese government bonds. In the euro area, OIS projections are below the range of neutral rate estimates, but the ECB is now signaling that any monetary tightening actions will need to be delayed because of the growth uncertainties stemming from the Ukraine conflict and high energy prices. Thus, an overweight stance on core European government debt is still warranted. In Canada, the OIS projections are within the range of neutral rate estimates, but the BoC has been preparing markets for a series of rate hikes. This makes our underweight stance on Canadian government bonds a more “mixed” call, although we remain confident that Canadian bonds will underperform in a global bond portfolio context versus European and Japanese government bonds. In sum, we see our recommended country allocations as the most efficient way to express our cyclical (medium-term) central bank views, given the strong link between forward interest rate expectations and longer-term bond yields (Chart 10). This is why we are not making changes to our country allocation recommendations alongside our move to tactically upgrade our global duration stance to neutral. Chart 10Too Much Tightening Priced Over The Next Year Too Much Tightening Priced Over The Next Year Too Much Tightening Priced Over The Next Year ​​​​​ Chart 11Bond Markets Not Priced For A Relatively More Hawkish Fed Bond Markets Not Priced For A Relatively More Hawkish Fed Bond Markets Not Priced For A Relatively More Hawkish Fed ​​​​​ Given our high-conviction view that markets are underestimating how high the Fed will need to lift interest rates in the upcoming tightening cycle – likely more than any other major developed economy central bank - positioning for US Treasury market underperformance on a 1-2 year horizon still looks like an attractive bet with forward rates priced for little change in US/non-US bond spreads (Chart 11). A wider US Treasury-German Bund spread remains our highest conviction cross-country spread recommendation. Reduce Spread Product Exposure In Europe & Emerging Markets Chart 12Cut EM & European High-Yield Exposure, But Stay O/W Italian BTPs Cut EM & European High-Yield Exposure, But Stay O/W Italian BTPs Cut EM & European High-Yield Exposure, But Stay O/W Italian BTPs The geopolitical uncertainty stemming from the Ukraine war and the stagflationary near-term impact of high energy prices are negatives for all risk assets, on the margin. That leads us to tactically reduce the allocation to spread product to neutral versus government debt in our Model Bond Portfolio. We are implementing this by cutting allocations to riskier fixed income sectors that are most impacted by the Russia/Ukraine conflict – European high-yield corporate debt and emerging market (EM) USD-denominated hard currency debt (Chart 12). We had already been cautious on EM debt before the Russian invasion, with an underweight allocation to both USD-denominated sovereigns and corporates, so the latest moves just increase the size of the underweight. European high-yield, on the other hand, had been one of our highest conviction overweight positions – particularly versus US high-yield - entering 2022. However the Ukraine war is likely to have a bigger negative impact on the European economy than the US economy, thus we are cutting our recommended exposure to European high-yield only. The uncertainty of a war on European soil, combined with the spike in energy prices (especially natural gas), is negative for European growth momentum, reducing 2022 euro area real GDP growth by as much as 0.4 percentage points according to ECB estimates. This raises the hurdle for any ECB monetary tightening this year. An early taper of bond buying in the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program, an outcome that ECB officials claim is a required precursor to rate hikes, is now highly unlikely. Fears of reduced ECB bond buying had weighed on the relative performance of Italian government bonds last month, but a more dovish ECB policy stance should lead to lower Italian yields and a narrowing of the BTP-Bund spread (bottom panel). We continue to recommend a cyclical overweight stance on Italian government debt. A Final Thought We need to reiterate that the recommended changes made in this report – increasing global duration exposure to neutral and cutting EM and European high-yield – are over a tactical time horizon, largely in response to the Ukraine conflict. This is more of a “risk management” exercise, rather than a change in our fundamental cyclical views. We still believe global growth will remain above trend in 2022 and likely 2023, which will prevent a complete unwind of last year’s inflation surge, particularly in the US. We expect global bond yields to begin climbing again later this year and into 2023, and we envision an eventual return to a below-benchmark duration stance.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The sources of the neutral rate estimates are listed in the footnotes of Table 1. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Adjusting Our Bond Recommendations For A More Uncertain World Adjusting Our Bond Recommendations For A More Uncertain World The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Adjusting Our Bond Recommendations For A More Uncertain World Adjusting Our Bond Recommendations For A More Uncertain World Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Tactical Overlay Trades

Highlights The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a geopolitical incident that is likely to be limited in scope. A wholesale energy cutoff to Europe is the chief risk to global economic activity, but the sanction response from the US and EU does not point to this outcome. This implies that a large geopolitical risk premium may linger over the very near term, but that equities and other risk assets will ultimately recover. We continue to expect above-trend growth and above-target inflation in the US and other developed economies this year. Q1 growth in the US is likely to be closer to 4% after removing the effect of changing inventories, and incoming information still points to the view that the pandemic will continue to recede in importance over the coming several months. Given the magnitude of the rise in consumer prices in the US and other developed economies, above-trend growth also underpins the significantly hawkish monetary policy shift that has recently occurred. There are legitimate arguments in favor of a very aggressive pace of Fed tightening. Still, our view is that seven rate hikes from the Fed over the coming 12 months is likely too aggressive: A peak in headline inflation over the coming months will help restrain longer-term household inflation expectations, the surge in wage growth continues to reflect pandemic-driven labor market distortions that could unwind, and a significant further flattening of the yield curve – despite likely being a false signal of a recession – would probably cause a temporary period of tighter financial conditions that the Fed would respond to. We believe it is likely that the Fed will initially seek to raise interest rates at a pace that is in line with current market pricing, but that it will likely slow the pace at some point beyond the next 3-4 months. As such, we expect that the Fed will ultimately end up raising interest rates 5 or 6 times over the coming year, less than investors currently expect. The case for aggressive ECB hikes was weak even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European core inflation is nowhere near as strong as it is in the US, and nominal output in the euro area has not yet recovered to its pre-pandemic trend (in heavy contrast to the US). Russia’s invasion has caused a disruption of natural gas flows that will keep European gas prices at elevated levels, and aggressive tightening in response risks repeating the mistakes the ECB made in 2008 and 2011 when it raised rates in the face of an ultimately deflationary supply shock. On a 6-12 month time horizon, we are only likely to recommend downgrading global stocks once 5-year/5-year forward US Treasury yields break above 2.5%, barring a more severe shock to global economic activity from the Ukrainian crisis than currently appears likely. On Russia’s Invasion Of Ukraine Yesterday, BCA Research published a Special Alert in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 In the report, we outlined Russia’s motivation for invading, and noted that it will not withdraw troops until it has changed the government and seized key territories – such as coastal regions to ensure the long-term ability to blockade the country. Crucially, we noted that while the US and EU will levy sweeping sanctions against Russia, that the EU would not halt Russian energy exports. We regard the decision to maintain Russia’s access to the SWIFT system as consistent with that view. Given this, we believe that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a geopolitical incident that is likely to be limited in scope. A wholesale energy cutoff to Europe is the chief risk to global economic activity, but the sanction response from the US and EU does not point to this outcome. This implies that a large geopolitical risk premium may linger over the very near term, but that growth, inflation, and monetary policy will ultimately return as the drivers of equities and other risk assets over the coming weeks and months. Beyond Ukraine: Growth, Inflation, And Monetary Policy In The DM World Chart I-1Recent US Data Has Looked Smoewhat Stagflationary Recent US Data Has Looked Smoewhat Stagflationary Recent US Data Has Looked Smoewhat Stagflationary BCA Research presented three possible growth and inflation scenarios for this year in our 2022 Annual Outlook report. Our base case scenario, to which we assigned 60% odds, was one of above-trend growth and above-target inflation. We assigned 30% odds to a “stagflation-lite” scenario of above-target inflation with below-trend growth, and a 10% chance of a recession. Since we published our Annual Outlook, we raised the odds of the second, stagflation-lite scenario – mostly due to the impact that the Omicron variant of COVID-19 could have on the Chinese supply chain. But until recently, US economic data was also looking somewhat stagflationary: US real GDP only grew at a 2.3% annualized basis in Q3, and the strong Q4 number was mostly boosted by inventories. Real goods spending has slowed over the past few months without a major increase in services spending, and US auto production continues to be restrained by semiconductor shortages (Chart I-1). Supply-side constraints on production and spending have occurred against the backdrop of a significant acceleration in US consumer prices, the combination of which seemingly points more to the second growth and inflation scenario that we outlined, rather than our base case. However, our view is that above-trend growth in the US and other developed economies remains the most likely outcome this year, even given ongoing supply-side constraints and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the sizeable amount of excess savings that have been accumulated during the pandemic and the enormous increase in household net worth that has occurred over the past two years, two other factors point to above-trend DM growth. In the US, following the release of the January retail sales report, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model is forecasting below-trend growth for Q1, but with a -2.3% contribution from the change in private inventories. Chart I-2 highlights that the Atlanta Fed’s model is projecting 3.6% annualized growth in Q1 of final sales of domestic product, a measure of GDP that excludes the effect of changing inventories (whose contribution to growth averages to zero over time). This would be above the trend rate of real GDP growth, and would represent an acceleration relative to the past few quarters. Beyond the next few months, the other factor pointing to above-trend growth is the indication that the pandemic will indeed continue to recede in importance over the course of the year, in line with what we laid out in our Annual Outlook. Chart I-3 highlights that the Omicron-driven surge in hospitalizations in G7 countries has been short-lived, and Chart I-4 highlights that deliveries of Pfizer’s anti-viral treatment Paxlovid, while still in their early stages, have begun. Chart I-2Q1 US Economic Growth Likely To Be Above-Trend Q1 US Economic Growth Likely To Be Above-Trend Q1 US Economic Growth Likely To Be Above-Trend Chart I-3Hospitalizations Are Falling Sharply Hospitalizations Are Falling Sharply Hospitalizations Are Falling Sharply In a recent study, Paxlovid was found to have an 89% efficacy in preventing COVID hospitalizations and deaths, with less serious adverse events or discontinuations than the placebo group.2 Its high effectiveness against all SARS-CoV-2 variants suggests that its increased deployment over the course of the year should significantly reduce the impact of COVID-19 on the medical system as well as lower the fear of the disease amongst consumers, even as new variants of the virus emerge and spread around the world. Consequently, it is likely that the output gap in advanced economies will turn positive this year despite ongoing supply-side constraints unless Russian energy exports to the EU are ceased, triggered either by a European boycott or a Russian embargo. Prior to Russia’s invasion, consensus growth expectations implied above-trend growth for this year (Chart I-5), which we see as consistent with the base case growth and inflation view that we presented in our Annual Outlook if Russian energy exports continue. However, given the magnitude of the rise in consumer prices in the US and other developed economies, above-trend growth also underpins the significantly hawkish monetary policy shift that has occurred over the past 2 months. Chart I-5We Agree With Consensus Expectations For Growth This Year We Agree With Consensus Expectations For Growth This Year We Agree With Consensus Expectations For Growth This Year Chart I-4US Paxlovid Deliveries Are Creeping Higher US Paxlovid Deliveries Are Creeping Higher US Paxlovid Deliveries Are Creeping Higher   The Case For, And Against, Aggressive Fed Tightening Just since the beginning of the year, investors have moved to price in an additional 100 basis points of rate hikes from the Fed (Chart I-6). Earlier this month, comments by St. Louis Fed President James Bullard signaling his desire for a full percentage point of interest rate hikes by July had a sizeable effect on US Treasury yields, with market participants still pricing in meaningful odds of a 50 basis point rate hike in March despite recent pushback from key Fed officials and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Chart I-6The Monetary Policy Outlook Has Shifted Rapidly In A Hawkish Direction The Monetary Policy Outlook Has Shifted Rapidly In A Hawkish Direction The Monetary Policy Outlook Has Shifted Rapidly In A Hawkish Direction Last year, The Bank Credit Analyst service warned on several occasions that a return to maximum employment was likely to occur faster than investors expected, and that a hawkish shift from the Fed was probable. We noted in our July report that the cumulative odds of a rate hike by some point in Q2 2022 were close to 40%,3 and in our September Special Report we reinforced the view that a mid-2022 rate hike was likely.4 Still, even relative to our (then) comparatively hawkish expectations, the monetary policy outlook has shifted very aggressively towards more and earlier rate hikes. This shift has partially occurred due to the labor market dynamics that we projected last year, but also due to a significant broadening of inflation over the past four months. Chart I-7 highlights that the 6-month rate of change in US core CPI excluding cars and COVID-impacted services was not meaningfully different in October than it was in the latter half of late-2019, in heavy contrast to overall headline and core inflation. However, over the past four months this measure has accelerated by 175 basis points, highlighting that inflationary pressures are becoming broader – and that an earlier and more forceful response from the Fed may be warranted. Chart I-7US Inflation Has Broadened, And Quickly So US Inflation Has Broadened, And Quickly So US Inflation Has Broadened, And Quickly So Does the broadening in US inflationary pressure that has occurred over the past few months justify the seven rate hikes currently expected by investors over the coming year? We present the detailed case for and against that view below, and conclude that seven rate hikes over the coming 12 months is likely too aggressive. The Case For Aggressive Tightening The most prominent argument in favor of aggressive Fed rate hikes is not just to slow the pace of inflation, but to address the fact that broadening inflationary pressures risk unanchoring inflation expectations. As we discussed in our January 2021 Special Report,5 inflation is determined not just by the output gap, but as well by inflation expectations. Economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to cyclically fluctuate, but those fluctuations are relative to a level that is determined by inflation expectations – not the Fed’s inflation target. It is only if inflation expectations are consistent with the Fed’s target that actual inflation will equal that target, abstracting from the business cycle and other distorting events. A deeply negative output gap for several years following the global financial crisis caused inflation expectations to be vulnerable to shocks, and the collapse in oil prices in 2014 served as a large enough surprise that expectations unanchored to the downside. This event ultimately motivated the Fed’s introduction of its average inflation targeting policy, but Chart I-8 highlights that inflation expectations are no longer chronically low and that they may unanchor to the upside without meaningfully tighter monetary policy. A temporary period of higher food prices stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also raises the risk of unanchored inflation expectations among households. The second argument in favor of aggressive Fed rate hikes is that the unemployment rate has essentially fallen back to its pre-pandemic level, and median wage growth has already risen to its strongest level in 20 years (Chart I-9). Given that a large amount of excess savings and a very significant wealth effect are likely to continue to support aggregate demand, the inference is that overall wage growth may accelerate significantly further as the unemployment rate continues to fall. Chart I-8Inflation Expectations Are No Longer Depressed Inflation Expectations Are No Longer Depressed Inflation Expectations Are No Longer Depressed Chart I-9Wage Growth Has Risen Very Significantly Wage Growth Has Risen Very Significantly Wage Growth Has Risen Very Significantly The third argument in favor of rapid tightening is that the natural/neutral rate of interest is likely higher than both investors and the Federal reserve believe, meaning that monetary policy is even easier today than is generally recognized. We have written about this issue at length: in March 2020 we explained why the most cited measure of “R-star” was wrong,6 and noted in our April 2021 Special Report why we no longer believe that a gap between interest rates and trend rates of economic growth are justified. This perspective also suggests that investors should look past the quasi-recessionary signal currently being flagged by the 2/10 yield curve, as curve inversion is likely to be a false signal of a recession – as it was in 2019 (see Box I-1). BOX I-1 The Sino-US Trade War, The Yield Curve, And The COVID-19 Pandemic The US yield curve has historically provided a highly reliable signal of the likelihood of a recession. Investors have taken an inverted yield curve as a sign that short-term interest rates have risen to a level that is not likely to be sustained over the longer term, meaning that monetary policy has become tight. An inverted yield curve has indeed preceded several US recessions, although its track record at predicting contractions globally has been less reliable. While it is a counterfactual assertion, we believe that the yield curve provided a false signal when it inverted in 2019. Clearly the inversion did not predict the COVID-19 pandemic; the question is whether the US would have experienced a recession had the pandemic not occurred. In our view, the evidence does not point to that conclusion. Charts I-B1 and I-B2 highlight that the yield curve responded to an economic slowdown that was mostly caused by the Sino-US trade war, as well as an ongoing slowdown in Chinese credit growth and economic activity. It does not appear to have occurred due to interest rates having risen to a level that would be unsustainable absent these non-monetary shocks. Chart I-B1The Yield Curve Inverted Well After The Trade War Hit… March 2022 March 2022 Chart I-B2…And The Economy Started Improving After The Inversion March 2022 March 2022 In addition, the signal from the yield curve lagged that of the equity market: Chart I-B1 highlights that the US equity market fell just shy of 20% eleven months before the yield curve inverted. In fact, stock prices were rising sharply just prior to the emergence of the pandemic in response to expectations of monetary easing and the Phase I US trade deal, and the US Markit manufacturing and services PMIs were also turning up. None of these signs point to the likelihood of a contraction in US output had the COVID-19 pandemic not emerged. The key point for investors is that an inversion of the yield curve, were it to occur over the coming 12-18 months, would not necessarily signal a recession unless it were coupled with a major non-monetary shock. It would, however, be significant from a strategy standpoint, as the Fed would likely take it as a sign of tightening financial conditions. The Case Against Aggressive Fed Action Chart I-10Inflation Expectations Have Risen, But Are Not Out Of Control Inflation Expectations Have Risen, But Are Not Out Of Control Inflation Expectations Have Risen, But Are Not Out Of Control There are several counterpoints to the arguments noted above, as well as a few additional reasons to suggest that 7 rate hikes over the coming year is too aggressive. First, on the issue of inflation expectations, while it is true that expectations are no longer chronically low, longer-term expectations have not yet exceeded their pre-global financial crisis (GFC) range (Chart I-10). In addition, despite the temporary spike in energy and food prices stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, headline inflation is likely to peak at some point over the coming months, which will act to restrain longer-term household inflation expectations. Importantly, inflation is likely to peak even without any Fed tightening. A comparison of the recent pace of advance in both headline and core CPI suggests that the former has up to 200 basis points of downside if crude oil prices remain at $100/bbl. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy team expects that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will prompt increased production from core OPEC producers to reduce the elevated risk premium and allow refiners to boost inventories. We now expect Brent oil to average $85/bbl in the second half of 2022, implying eventual deflation from energy prices and a slowdown in the pace of advance in headline CPI over the coming months – potentially below that of core. That would represent a very significant easing in headline inflation relative to current levels, and we do not expect that long-term household expectations for inflation would rise much further in such a scenario. The easing in the prices paid component of the ISM manufacturing index also points to an imminent peak in headline inflation and, by extension, household inflation expectations (Chart I-11). Second, while it is true that overall wage growth has recently accelerated quite significantly, it is still the case that this is being driven by the lowest-paid workers. Chart I-12 highlights that 1st and 2nd quartile wage growth are between 0.4-1.2% higher than they were prior to the pandemic, but that 3rd and 4th quartile wage growth is either the same or lower. Chart I-12Lower-Pay Wage Inflation Is Due To The Pandemic... Lower-Pay Wage Inflation Is Due To The Pandemic... Lower-Pay Wage Inflation Is Due To The Pandemic... Chart I-11The Prices Paid Components Of Manufacturing PMIs Also Points To Lower Headline Inflation The Prices Paid Components Of Manufacturing PMIs Also Points To Lower Headline Inflation The Prices Paid Components Of Manufacturing PMIs Also Points To Lower Headline Inflation   This surge in wages for low-paid workers largely reflects pandemic-driven labor market distortions, rather than excess demand. Chart I-13 highlights that real US services spending remains close to 5% below its pre-pandemic trend, and Table I-1 highlights that the leisure & hospitality industry now accounts for the vast majority of the jobs gap relative to pre-pandemic levels. Chart I-14 also highlights that while the leisure & hospitality jobs gap is smaller in red states than in blue states (which may be disproportionately affected by lost services jobs in central business districts due to work-from-home policies), it is still larger today that it was during the depths of the 2008/2009 recession. Chart I-13...Not Excessive Services Demand ...Not Excessive Services Demand ...Not Excessive Services Demand The key takeaway from Table I-1 and Charts I-13 and I-14 is that rising 1st and 2nd quartile wage growth is being caused by labor scarcity in low paying industries, which we attribute to the fact that working conditions in these jobs became more difficult during the pandemic and the fact that many of these positions involve close contact with customers. And clearly, raising interest rates will not hasten the return of leisure & hospitality workers to the labor market.   Table I-1Leisure & Hospitality And Education Now Make Up Almost All Of The US Jobs Gap March 2022 March 2022 Chart I-14The Leisure & Hospitality Employment Gap Does Not Seem Related To Work-From-Home Trends The Leisure & Hospitality Employment Gap Does Not Seem Related To Work-From-Home Trends The Leisure & Hospitality Employment Gap Does Not Seem Related To Work-From-Home Trends Third, even though we think the natural/neutral rate of interest is higher than both investors and the Federal reserve believe and that the yield curve provided a false signal of a recession in 2019, a significant further flattening of the yield curve would probably cause a tightening in financial conditions, at least for a time. The Fed is unlikely to be dissuaded from raising rates due to a valuation-driven decline in equity prices, but it is likely to respond to market-based signals of a material slowdown in economic activity – even if those signals ultimately prove to be false. The yield curve is an important reflection of how far bond investors believe the economic cycle has progressed (Chart I-15), and an increase in short-term interest rates at the pace that investors are currently expecting would flatten the 2/10 yield curve very close to (or into) negative territory. It seems likely that a rapid flattening in the curve would precipitate a growth scare in financial markets for a time, leading to falling equity prices (due to concerns about earnings, not just valuation), a rising US dollar, and a widening in corporate credit spreads. Chart I-15For The Fed, The Yield Curve Is An Important Market Indicator Of A Recession For The Fed, The Yield Curve Is An Important Market Indicator Of A Recession For The Fed, The Yield Curve Is An Important Market Indicator Of A Recession To conclude on this point, the Fed will feel that it is justified in hiking rates aggressively while inflation is well above its target levels and the unemployment rate is low and falling, but it is likely to change this assessment if financial markets begin to behave in a way that signals a rising risk of a significant slowdown in jobs growth. That would lead to a tactical period of weakness for risky asset prices, but it would ultimately be cyclically positive if the Fed revises its pace of tightening to a rate that is slower than investors currently expect. Our View Netting out the arguments presented above, the Fed may initially seek to raise interest rates at a pace that is in line with current market pricing, but it will likely slow that pace at some point beyond the next 3-4 months. As such, we expect that the Fed will ultimately end up raising interest rates 5 or 6 times over the coming year, less than investors currently expect. Our view also has important implications for the euro area interest rate outlook, given the significantly weaker case for aggressive ECB action that existed even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A Flimsy Case For Aggressive ECB Rate Hikes, Even Before Russia’s Invasion Chart I-16The European Inflation Situation Is Not As Bad As In The US The European Inflation Situation Is Not As Bad As In The US The European Inflation Situation Is Not As Bad As In The US At the early-February ECB meeting, President Christine Lagarde signaled a more hawkish outlook for euro area monetary policy than investors had been expecting. Since the beginning of the year, the OIS market has moved to price-in roughly 70 bps of hikes over the coming 12 months, German 2-year bund yields have risen 20 basis points, and 10-year yields have risen back into positive territory. Italian and Greek 10-year yield spreads (relative to Bunds) have risen by 35 and 90 basis points, respectively. From our perspective, investors are pricing a too-aggressive path for the ECB policy rate, and we would probably characterize an ECB decision to raise rates in line with current market expectations as a policy mistake. As highlighted in a recent report by my colleague Mathieu Savary, BCA’s Chief European Strategist, several arguments support this view. First, Chart I-16 highlights that euro area core inflation is running at a considerably slower rate than headline inflation or core inflation in the US, and that our core inflation diffusion index for the euro area has peaked. It is true that core inflation is much higher in Germany than in other key euro area economies, and it is also true that aggregate euro area core inflation is above the ECB’s 2% target. But high German core inflation is seemingly driven by particularly acute passthrough effects from high natural gas prices, and recent IMF research underscores that over half of the increase in German manufacturing price inflation has occurred due to supply shocks rather than demand (Chart I-17). Chart I-18 shows that expectations for euro area inflation and actual wage growth do not, in any way, suggest that the ECB’s 2% target is under threat, underscoring that aggressive tightening over the coming several months risks repeating the mistakes the ECB made in 2008 and 2011 when it tightened policy in the face of an ultimately deflationary supply shock. Chart I-17German Core Inflation Is Being Disproportionately Driven By Supply Shocks March 2022 March 2022 The second argument is that nominal output in the euro area has not yet recovered to its pre-pandemic trend, in heavy contrast to the US (Chart I-19). This is particularly true for Italy and Spain, and reflects the nature of the euro area fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Chart I-20 highlights that the cumulative growth in euro area disposable income has been lower than what would have been expected absent the pandemic, unlike what occurred in the US and Canada – two countries that provided sizeable direct transfers to households as part of their fiscal response. Chart I-19Key Euro Area Economies Have Recovered Far Less Than The US Has Key Euro Area Economies Have Recovered Far Less Than The US Has Key Euro Area Economies Have Recovered Far Less Than The US Has Chart I-18Euro Area Inflation Expectations And Wage Growth Do Not Signal The ECB's Inflation Target Is Under Threat Euro Area Inflation Expectations And Wage Growth Do Not Signal The ECB's Inflation Target Is Under Threat Euro Area Inflation Expectations And Wage Growth Do Not Signal The ECB's Inflation Target Is Under Threat     Third, Russia’s invasion has caused a disruption of natural gas flows via Ukraine that will keep European gas prices at elevated levels even beyond the winter period, which will have a negative impact on the euro area economy. Chart I-21 highlights that European natural gas prices are now seven times as high as they were at the beginning of 2021. Unlike the prior rise in European natural gas prices, which was somewhat related to global demand for goods, the post-invasion surge is a pure supply shock – echoing our point about the ECB’s previous policy mistakes. Chart I-20Euro Area Disposable Income Is Lower Than Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, In Contrast To The US March 2022 March 2022 Chart I-21Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Has Created A Pure Natural Gas Supply Shock Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Has Created A Pure Natural Gas Supply Shock Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Has Created A Pure Natural Gas Supply Shock The fact that Italy’s nominal economic recovery has been comparatively weak has helped explain the rise in its 10-year government bond yield relative to 10-year German Bunds. Allowing for a further economic recovery in those countries before raising rates would let the ECB ultimately increase rates further down the road – and thus exit more cleanly from negative policy rates in Europe. Our European Strategy Team continues to expect that the ECB is on track to raise interest rates only once in Q4 2022, to be then followed by more aggressive hikes in 2023. Investment Conclusions For fixed-income investors, the investment implications of policy rates moving higher over the coming year at a pace that is less rapid than currently expected would normally imply that an at or above-benchmark duration stance is warranted. However, Chart I-22 highlights that there is still upside for 10-year US Treasury yields even in a scenario where the Fed raises rates at a pace of 100 basis points per year. As such, we continue to recommend that investors remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon, although we agree with BCA’s fixed-income team’s recommendation to tactically raise duration to neutral given the potential for the European energy crisis to worsen further and the fact that 10-year US Treasury yields do not have as much upside on a cyclical basis as they did when we published our Annual Outlook.7 For equities, we do not find the case for a tactical downgrade to be compelling at current levels, given that global stocks have already fallen 10% from their mid-November highs. Over the near term, we expect the continued underperformance of euro area equities, be we doubt that the negative economic impact of higher natural gas and oil prices would persist beyond a 0-3 month time horizon. On a 6-12 month time horizon, our expectation that monetary policy will tighten at a less aggressive pace than investors expect suggests that the earnings risk to global stocks is not substantial, underscoring that a meaningful contraction in equity multiples would likely be required for stocks to register negative 12-month returns from current levels. In the US, business surveys suggest that sales growth is set to slow to a still-healthy level, and that profit margins are likely to be flat over the coming year (Chart I-23). This is in line with the view that we presented in our Annual Outlook, namely that US earnings growth in 2022 would be driven mainly by top-line growth. Chart I-22Investors Should Still Be Cyclically Short Duration Investors Should Still Be Cyclically Short Duration Investors Should Still Be Cyclically Short Duration Chart I-23Surveys Imply Strong Revenue Growth And Flat Margins, And Thus Positive Earnings Growth Surveys Imply Strong Revenue Growth And Flat Margins, And Thus Positive Earnings Growth Surveys Imply Strong Revenue Growth And Flat Margins, And Thus Positive Earnings Growth Chart I-24Still No Sign That The Secular Stagnation Narrative Is Under Attach. That Is Good For Stocks. Still No Sign That The Secular Stagnation Narrative Is Under Attach. That Is Good For Stocks. Still No Sign That The Secular Stagnation Narrative Is Under Attach. That Is Good For Stocks. Similarly, the risk of a serious interest rate-driven contraction in equity multiples over the coming year does not appear to be elevated. Investors are far more inclined to use long-maturity bond yields to discount future cash flows than short-term interest rates, and we have noted that the rise in long-maturity bond yields is necessarily self-limiting unless investor expectations about the natural/neutral rate of interest change. Chart I-24 highlights that despite an extremely rapid shift in monetary policy outlook amid the highest US headline inflation in 40 years, 5-year/5-year forward US Treasury yields remain only fractionally above 2%. This underscores that fixed-income investors will need to see evidence that a progressively higher Fed funds rate is not disrupting economic activity before they are likely to abandon the secular stagnation narrative. While the equity risk premium will remain elevated over the near term due to the situation in Ukraine, the bond market’s continued belief in secular stagnation will likely support equity multiples – at least for the remainder of the year. As such, we recommend that investors position in favor of the following over the coming 6-12 months: Overweight equities versus long-maturity government bonds Overweight value versus growth stocks Short duration within a fixed-income portfolio, with a neutral tactical overlay Overweight speculative-grade corporate bonds with a credit portfolio Overweight non-resource cyclicals versus defensives and small caps versus large Short the US dollar versus major currencies Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst February 25, 2022 Next Report: March 31, 2022 II. Canada: How High Can Rates Rise? The buildup of excessive household debt in Canada over the past two decades has occurred because of outsized demand for housing, not because of the impact of constrained housing supply on house prices. Outsized demand for housing has occurred because interest rates have been persistently too low, pointing to the need for the Bank of Canada to tighten monetary policy in order to prevent even further leveraging. The burden of Canada’s household sector debt may exceed its pre-pandemic level next year given current market expectations for the path of rate hikes. This implies that the prior peak in the Canadian policy rate (1.75%) likely reflects a high-end estimate of the neutral rate of interest in Canada. Regulatory changes have occurred in recognition of Canada’s extreme levels of household debt. Although a massive decline in Canadian house prices would cause a very severe recession, it would not likely precipitate a Lehman-style collapse of the Canadian financial system. Over the next twelve months, investors should position favorably toward CAD-USD. As the Canadian policy rate approaches our estimate of the neutral rate, a short CAD position and an overweight stance towards long-maturity Canadian bonds versus US Treasurys will likely be warranted. Within a global equity portfolio, exposure to relatively high-yielding Canadian banks should not be reduced until hard evidence of a significant slowdown in the housing market emerges. The outlook for monetary policy in advanced economies has shifted rapidly in a hawkish direction over the past few months. While we believe that the Fed and other central banks will end up raising interest rates this year fewer times than investors currently expect, it is clear that monetary policy will tighten in the DM world over the coming 12-18 months. This has raised the question of how high policy rates may rise before monetary policy begins to restrict economic activity. Some investors have specifically focused this question on countries like Canada, which has a highly indebted household sector and has seen house prices rise at a 7% average annual pace for the past 20 years. In this report, we explore the root cause of Canada’s extreme household debt and argue against the constrained housing supply view. Instead, we conclude that persistently low interest rates have fueled excessive housing demand and that the prior peak in the Canadian policy rate (1.75%) probably reflects a high-end estimate of the neutral rate of interest in Canada – in contrast with that of the US. Finally, we note that the regulatory changes that have occurred in recognition of the risk from excessive household debt suggest that a massive decline in Canadian house prices would not likely precipitate a Lehman-style collapse of the Canadian financial system – it would, however, clearly cause a severe recession. Over the next twelve months, investors should position favorably toward CAD-USD. As the Canadian policy rate approaches our estimate of the neutral rate, a short CAD position and an overweight stance towards long-maturity Canadian bonds versus US Treasurys will likely be warranted. Within a global equity portfolio, exposure to relatively high-yielding Canadian banks should not be reduced until hard evidence of a significant slowdown in the housing market emerges. The Root Cause Of Canada’s Extreme Household Debt Chart II-1Canadian Households Are Massively Indebted Canadian Households Are Massively Indebted Canadian Households Are Massively Indebted Relative to disposable income, Canadian household debt has risen substantially over the past two decades. Chart II-1 highlights that Canada’s household debt to disposable income ratio has risen by 180% since 2000, and is currently over 50 percentage points higher than that in the US, even when nonfinancial noncorporate debt is included in the latter.8 Rising Canadian household indebtedness is a problem that is well known to investors, policymakers, regulators, banks, and consumers themselves. Organizations such as the IMF have repeatedly warned that excess household debt poses a potential economic stability risk. In the years prior to the pandemic, policymakers have responded with a series of macroprudential measures designed to limit speculation and foreign ownership in the housing market and to reduce the incremental risk to the economy posed by new borrowers. When asked why Canadian households have leveraged themselves so significantly over the past 20 years, most market commentators in Canada point to insufficient housing supply as the main driver of excessive house prices. Given normal ongoing demand for housing, they argue, persistent supply-side pressure on housing prices will naturally lead to a rising stock of debt relative to income. According to this narrative, the solution to Canada’s housing crisis is centered squarely on incentives to build more homes. Raising interest rates to cool mortgage demand will simply exacerbate the housing affordability problem, while simultaneously discouraging additional residential investment needed to decrease home prices structurally. Chart II-2The Supply Of Non-Apartment Dwellings Has Indeed Declined Over Time... The Supply Of Non-Apartment Dwellings Has Indeed Declined Over Time... The Supply Of Non-Apartment Dwellings Has Indeed Declined Over Time... We hold a different perspective. We do agree that there are some limitations on the supply side that likely are unduly boosting prices of certain dwelling types. For example, the Greenbelt that surrounds Ontario’s Golden Horseshoe region - a permanently protected area of land - has likely constrained some housing activity, and Chart II-2 highlights that single detached, semi-detached, and row/townhouses have fallen significantly as a share of overall housing completions. Apartments and other dwellings now account for a clear majority of new housing construction in Canada. However, there is a great deal of evidence positioned against the view that supply-side factors are the primary cause of outsized housing inflation and, by extension, a massive increase in Canadian household debt to GDP: Based on real residential investment, the pace of housing construction in Canada has not fallen relative to GDP or the population. Chart II-3 highlights that, compared with the US, residential investment has trended higher over the past 20 years. Based on Canadian housing completion data, Chart II-4 highlights that the number of completions has generally kept pace with half of the change in Canada’s population, a ratio that is easily consistent with two or more people per household. In addition, the chart highlights that the periods when houses were completed at a below-average rate relative to population growth have not been the same as when Canadian household debt has increased relative to disposable income. Chart II-3...But Overall Real Residential Investment Has Kept Pace With Canada's GDP And Population ...But Overall Real Residential Investment Has Kept Pace With Canada's GDP And Population ...But Overall Real Residential Investment Has Kept Pace With Canada's GDP And Population Chart II-4Housing Supply Has Not Been The Main Driver Of Rising Canadian Indebtedness Housing Supply Has Not Been The Main Driver Of Rising Canadian Indebtedness Housing Supply Has Not Been The Main Driver Of Rising Canadian Indebtedness Chart II-5Prices For All Canadian Property Types Have Surged Over The Past Two Decades Prices For All Canadian Property Types Have Surged Over The Past Two Decades Prices For All Canadian Property Types Have Surged Over The Past Two Decades If the rise in Canadian household indebtedness has been caused by the increasing scarcity of single-detached, semi-detached, and row/townhouses, then we would expect to see a persistent and growing divergence between overall Canadian house prices and those of apartment/condominiums. Chart II-5 highlights that this is not the case: while apartment/condo prices have at times grown at a slower rate than overall home prices over the past 15 years (as in the period from 2011 to 2016), they have also at times grown at a faster rate. The chart clearly highlights that the Canadian housing market is driven by a common factor, and that average house price gains have not been significantly different across property types over time. Similarly, if a scarcity of housing supply was the main driver of rising house prices and household debt, we would not expect to see a significant increase in the homeownership rate. Chart II-6 highlights that the Canadian homeownership rate did rise substantially from the mid-1990s to 2016 (the last available datapoint). While it is not clear what the sustainable or “equilibrium” homeownership rate is, it is notable that the most recent datapoint was not significantly lower than the peak rate reached in the US following that country’s massive housing bubble. Finally, Chart II-7 reiterates a point we made in our June 2021 Special Report: in several economies (including Canada), interest rates have remained well below levels that macroeconomic theory would traditionally consider to be in equilibrium over the past two decades. This has occurred alongside significant household sector leveraging. Chart II-7Too-Low Interest Rates Have Fueled Rising Household Indebtedness In Canada (And Other DM Economies) Too-Low Interest Rates Have Fueled Rising Household Indebtedness In Canada (And Other DM Economies) Too-Low Interest Rates Have Fueled Rising Household Indebtedness In Canada (And Other DM Economies) Chart II-6The Canadian Homeownership Rate Has Risen Significantly, Pointing To Excess Housing Demand March 2022 March 2022     These factors strongly point to rising household debt levels as being driven by demand-side rather than supply-side factors – demand that has been fueled by persistently low interest rates. How High Can The Bank Of Canada Raise Interest Rates? Over the next 12 months, investors expect the Bank of Canada (BoC) to raise interest rates by 180 basis points, in line with the Fed (Chart II-8). Over the longer term, the BoC believes that interest rates will average between 1.75% and 2.75%. In the US, the 2/10 yield curve has flattened significantly in response to the Fed’s hawkish shift, and neither the explosion in headline consumer price inflation nor the Fed’s about face have significantly raised the market’s longer-term expectations for interest rates (which are even below the Fed’s estimates). In Canada, investors expect essentially the same long-term interest rate outlook, as evidenced by 5-year / 5-year forward government bond yields (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Investors Expect A Similar Magnitude Of Tightening In Canada And The US Over The Next Year... Investors Expect A Similar Magnitude Of Tightening In Canada And The US Over The Next Year... Investors Expect A Similar Magnitude Of Tightening In Canada And The US Over The Next Year... Chart II-9...And A Similar Average Interest Rate Over The Longer Term ...And A Similar Average Interest Rate Over The Longer Term ...And A Similar Average Interest Rate Over The Longer Term As in the case in the US, the hawkish shift among major central banks has left investors asking how high the BoC can raise interest rates, and what implications that might have for Canadian assets – especially the CAD and long-maturity Canadian government bonds. In our view, the best way for investors to assess the impact of rising interest rates on the private sector – especially a highly indebted one – is to project the impact that an increase in interest rates will have on the debt service ratio (DSR). The burden of servicing debt, rather than the stock of debt relative to income, is the right way to measure the impact of shifting monetary policy because it considers the combined effect of changes in leverage, income, and interest rates. The primary drawback of debt service ratio analysis is that the question of sustainability must be answered empirically. In countries experiencing an ever-rising debt service ratio, it can be difficult for investors to judge where the breaking point will be. Cross-country comparisons may sometimes be helpful in this respect, but Chart II-10 highlights that BIS estimates for household debt service ratios vary widely even among advanced economies. However, in Canada, the 2017-2019 tightening cycle provides a useful framework. As we anticipated in a 2017 Special Report,9 the rise in Canadian interest rates during that period caused the household debt service ratio to exceed the level reached in 2007, which contributed to a collapse in Canadian house price appreciation to its lowest level since the global financial crisis (Chart II-11). The decline in house prices during this period was also caused by the introduction of new macroprudential measures (particularly the introduction of a minimum qualifying rate for mortgages, more commonly referred to as a mortgage “stress test” rule), but the impact of higher interest rates was likely significant. Chart II-11The Last Tightening Cycle In Canada Contributed Significantly To A Major Slowdown In Canadian House Prices The Last Tightening Cycle In Canada Contributed Significantly To A Major Slowdown In Canadian House Prices The Last Tightening Cycle In Canada Contributed Significantly To A Major Slowdown In Canadian House Prices Chart II-10Private Sector Debt Service Ratios Vary Significantly Across DM Countries Private Sector Debt Service Ratios Vary Significantly Across DM Countries Private Sector Debt Service Ratios Vary Significantly Across DM Countries   Chart II-11 highlights that the Canadian household debt service ratio collapsed during the pandemic, which seems to suggest that the Bank of Canada has ample room to raise interest rates. However, the decline in the DSR occurred not only because of falling interest rates, but also because of the significant excess savings amassed as a result of the pandemic. As in the US, excess savings in Canada were the result of reduced spending on services and the generation of significant excess income from government transfers (see Chart I-20 from Section 1 of this month’s report). These fiscal transfers will eventually disappear, implying that the Canadian household DSR is artificially low. Chart II-12 shows our estimate of the evolution of the overall Canadian household sector DSR based on the following assumptions: Mortgage rates rise in line with market expectations for the change in the policy rate Government transfers fall back to their pre-pandemic trend Disposable income growth ex-transfers grows in line with consensus expectations for nominal GDP growth The overall debt-to-disposable income ratio, using our estimate for total disposable income, remains flat. The chart highlights that the Canadian household sector DSR may exceed its pre-pandemic level next year, and that a 1.75% policy rate is the threshold at which the DSR will hit a new high. The implication of our projection is that the re-acceleration in household sector debt that has occurred during the pandemic, shown in Chart II-13, will again contribute to a significant slowdown in the Canadian housing market as the BoC begins to raise interest rates as in 2018/2019. It also implies that the prior peak in the Canadian policy rate probably reflects a high-end estimate of the neutral rate of interest in Canada. Chart II-12Market Expectations For The Canadian Policy Rate Imply A Record High Debt Burden Market Expectations For The Canadian Policy Rate Imply A Record High Debt Burden Market Expectations For The Canadian Policy Rate Imply A Record High Debt Burden Chart II-13Canadian Household Loan Growth Has Reaccelerated During The Pandemic Canadian Household Loan Growth Has Reaccelerated During The Pandemic Canadian Household Loan Growth Has Reaccelerated During The Pandemic   As we discuss below, this is likely to lead to significant implications for CAD-USD and an allocation to long-maturity Canadian government bonds, once investors begin to upwardly revise their expectations for the US neutral rate. Extreme Household Debt And Canadian Financial Stability The question of financial stability is often posed by investors when discussing Canada’s extreme household debt burden. Some investors view the US subprime financial crisis as the likely template for the Canadian economy, given the fact that the US credit bubble also focused on the housing market. Despite our pessimistic assessment of the capacity of the Canadian economy to tolerate higher interest rates (unlike the US today), we do not share the view that the Canadian financial system faces a potential insolvency risk, like the US banking system did in 2008. We see two potential arguments in favor of the instability view. The first is related to the sheer concentration of debt in Canada relative to other countries. Chart II-14 highlights that the median debt-to-income ratio of indebted Canadian households is currently the second highest in the world (after Norway) among the 29 countries that the OECD tracks. This concentration measure has worsened considerably since we published our 2017 Special Report. The combination of a very high average level of debt and extremely high leverage among those who are indebted suggests that Canadian banks may be exposed to significant credit losses in the event of a serious housing market crash. Chart II-14The Degree Of Concentration In Canadian Household Debt Is A Potential Financial Stability Risk March 2022 March 2022 Chart II-15A Decline In The CMHC's Footprint In The Mortgage Insurance Market Is Also Concerning A Decline In The CMHC's Footprint In The Mortgage Insurance Market Is Also Concerning A Decline In The CMHC's Footprint In The Mortgage Insurance Market Is Also Concerning The second argument relates to the declining share of mortgages insured by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). The CMHC is a Crown corporation that provides mortgage-default insurance to Canadian banks. Banks must purchase such insurance when a borrower’s loan-to-value ratio exceeds 80%. The CMHC has seen increased competition from two private mortgage insurers, and Chart II-15 highlights that the number of mortgages with CHMC insurance has been steadily falling over time. In order for the CMHC to be able to reduce systemic risk during a crisis, it must be present enough in the mortgage market to be able to replace private insurers in the event of a shock that causes them to leave the market. In effect, the CMHC should be able to act as a ballast to prevent a sharp tightening in Canadian mortgage lending standards and credit provision, which could occur if banks find themselves unable to purchase mortgage insurance to cover borrowers with relatively small down payments. In this respect, the reduced footprint of the CMHC is concerning. However, these risks have to be weighed against two key structural changes that legitimately lower the systemic risk facing the Canadian banking system (or lower the impact of a major adverse housing event). The first of these changes is the introduction of the minimum qualifying rate for mortgages in Canada (the mortgage stress test), which we regard as one of the most important macroprudential policies that Canada has enacted to reduce the systemic risk of rising household debt. The stress test rules – which apply to all borrowers – force mortgage borrowers to pass the CMHC’s gross debt and total debt service ratio thresholds under the assumption of higher interest rates than borrowers will actually pay: either the contracted mortgage rate plus 2 percentage points, or 5.65% – whichever is higher. Given prevailing mortgage rates in Canada, this effectively means that new borrowers will not exceed the CMHC’s debt service thresholds until the Bank of Canada’s policy rate exceeds 2.5%. That is positive from a financial stability perspective, although it does not rule out the slowdown in household spending that we would expect if the aggregate household debt service ratio hits a new high next year in response to BoC tightening. The second important risk-reducing structural change is a significant improvement in Canadian bank capital levels. Chart II-16 highlights that Tier 1 capital has risen significantly relative to risk-weighted assets for Canadian depository institutions, and is now on par with US levels (in contrast to a typically lower level over the past decade). The IMF stress tested Canadian banks in 2019, when capital levels were lower than they are today. They found that most Canadian banks would run down conservation capital buffers in the adverse economic scenario that they modeled, subjecting them to dividend restrictions for a period of time following the adverse event. However, Canadian banks would not breach their minimum capital requirements in the scenario modeled by the IMF, which involved a 40% decline in house prices and a 2% cumulative decline in Canadian real GDP over a two year period – which is essentially what occurred in the US and Canada in 2008 and 2009 (Chart II-17). Chart II-16Canadian Bank Capital Appears Sufficient To Weather A Storm Canadian Bank Capital Appears Sufficient To Weather A Storm Canadian Bank Capital Appears Sufficient To Weather A Storm Chart II-17The IMF's Stress Tests Modeled A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Crisis The IMF's Stress Tests Modeled A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Crisis The IMF's Stress Tests Modeled A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Crisis To conclude on the question of financial stability, it is clear that the magnitude and concentration of household debt implies that the impact of a serious housing market crash on the Canadian economy would be severe. But the fact that regulatory changes have occurred in recognition of this risk suggests that although a massive decline in Canadian house prices would cause a very severe recession, it would not likely precipitate a Lehman-style collapse of the Canadian financial system. Investment Conclusions Three conclusions emerge from our report. First, when considering the total experience of the past two decades, it is clear that the buildup of excessive household debt in Canada has occurred because of outsized demand for housing, not because of the impact of constrained housing supply on house prices. Outsized demand for housing has occurred because interest rates have been persistently below what traditional monetary policy rules such as the Taylor Rule would prescribe, pointing to the need for the Bank of Canada to tighten monetary policy in order to prevent even further leveraging. While US interest rates were also below what the Taylor Rule would have suggested for several years following the global financial crisis, the US household sector did not leverage itself significantly during that period because of the multi-year impact of the 2008/2009 financial crisis on US household balance sheets (Chart II-18). Canadian households did not suffer the same type of balance sheet impairment, and yet the Bank of Canada wrongly imported hyper-accommodative US monetary policy in an attempt to prevent a significant further increase in the exchange rate (which was still persistently strong for several years following the crisis). Through its actions, the Bank of Canada succeeded in staving off “Dutch Disease”, but at the cost of fueling a substantial housing and credit market bubble. Second, the fact that the Bank of Canada is likely to struggle to raise interest rates above 1.75% implies that a sizeable divergence may emerge between Canadian and US monetary policy over the coming few years if we are correct in our view that the US neutral rate is higher than the Fed currently expects. While such a divergence is not likely to occur over the coming year, Chart II-19 highlights that a 125 basis point policy rate spread – consistent with a nominal neutral rate of 1.75% in Canada and 3% in the US – last occurred in the mid-to-late 1990s, when CAD-USD ultimately declined to 0.65. Chart II-18The Bank Of Canada Staved Off "Dutch Disease", At The Cost Of Fueling A Major Housing And Credit Bubble The Bank Of Canada Staved Off "Dutch Disease", At The Cost Of Fueling A Major Housing And Credit Bubble The Bank Of Canada Staved Off "Dutch Disease", At The Cost Of Fueling A Major Housing And Credit Bubble Chart II-19Some Potentially Large Downside For CAD If US Neutral Rate Expectations Move Higher Some Potentially Large Downside For CAD If US Neutral Rate Expectations Move Higher Some Potentially Large Downside For CAD If US Neutral Rate Expectations Move Higher Over the coming year, we expect Canadian dollar strength rather than weakness: we are generally bearish toward the US dollar on the expectation of above-trend global growth, and our fundamental intermediate-term model suggests that CAD should strengthen. Thus, while it is too early to short the Canadian dollar, we would be inclined to turn bearish in response to rising long-term US interest rate expectations. We would draw similar conclusions for Canadian government bonds: investors should raise exposure to long-dated Canadian government bonds versus similar maturity US Treasurys as the Bank of Canada raises its policy rate toward our estimate of the neutral rate. Chart II-20Relative ROE Justifies A Valuation Premium For Canadian Banks Relative ROE Justifies A Valuation Premium For Canadian Banks Relative ROE Justifies A Valuation Premium For Canadian Banks Finally, the improvements that have been made over the past several years to dampen the impact of a housing market crash on the Canadian financial system suggests that exposure to Canadian banks should not be reduced until hard evidence of a significant slowdown in the housing market emerges. Chart II-20 highlights that the valuation premium of Canadian banks appears to be supported by a sizeable ROE advantage relative to global banks. Panel 2 highlights how composite relative valuation indicator for Canadian banks suggests that they have been persistently expensive for some time, but not extremely so. Canadian banks would certainly underperform their global peers should the adverse scenario modeled by the IMF’s 2019 stress test of the banking system to occur, especially if it implied that Canadian banks would be forced to restrict dividends for a time to bolster capital adequacy. However, we would advise investors against shorting relatively high-yielding Canadian banks as Canadian interest rates rise, until they see clear signs of Canada-specific slowdown in housing demand in response to higher rates. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Gabriel Di Lullo Research Associate III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our valuation, and sentiment indicators remain very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but relatively modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our technical indicator has declined from extremely overbought levels in response to January’s US equity sell-off and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it has not yet reached oversold territory. Still, we believe that the equity market’s reaction to rising bond yields is overdone, especially for value stocks. Forward equity earnings are pricing in a substantial further rise in earnings per share. Net earnings revisions and net positive earnings surprises have rolled over, but from extremely elevated levels and there is no meaningful sign yet of a decline in the level of forward earnings. Bottom-up analyst earning expectations remain too high, but stocks are still likely to be supported by robust revenue growth over the coming year. Within a global equity portfolio, we continue to recommend that investors position for the underperformance of financial assets that are negatively correlated with long-maturity government bond yields (such as growth stocks). The 10-Year Treasury Yield has broken convincingly above its 200-day moving average following the Fed’s hawkish shift, but remains below the fair value implied by our bond valuation index and the FOMC-implied fair value in a March 2022 rate hike scenario. We continue to expect that long-maturity bond yields will move higher over the coming year. Commodity prices remain elevated, and our composite technical indicator highlights that they remain overbought. An eventual slowdown in US goods spending, coupled with eventual supply-chain normalization, could weigh on commodity prices at some point over the coming 6-12 months. We are more comfortable with a bullish view towards industrial metals in the latter half of 2022. US and global LEIs have rolled over from very elevated levels. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined very significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries. Still-strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output gaps are negative in many advanced economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly at some point over the coming year, as the severity of the pandemic wanes. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth US Stock Market Breadth US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1     Please see BCA Special Alert "Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next?," dated February 24, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2    Jennifer Hammond et al. “Oral Nirmatrelvir for High-Risk, Nonhospitalized Adults with Covid-19.” The New England Journal of Medicine, February 16, 2022. 3    Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "July 2021," dated June 24, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4   Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "The Return To Maximum Employment: It May Be Faster Than You Think," dated August 26, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5    Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "The Modern-Day Phillips Curve, Future Inflation, And What To Do About It," dated December 18, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 6    Please see Global Investment Strategy "Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis," dated March 20, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 7    BCA Webcast Positioning For A Rate Hike Cycle, February 15, 2022. 8   For an explanation of why we add US nonfinancial noncorporate debt to the numerator of the US household sector debt to disposable income ratio when comparing Canada to the US, please see: “Reconciling Canadian-U.S. measures of household disposable income and household debt: Update”. 9    Please see Global Investment Strategy "Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story," dated July 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary US Treasury yields have surged in response to high US inflation and Fed tightening expectations. However, the move looks overdone in the near-term. Too many Fed hikes are now discounted for 2022, US realized inflation should soon peak, inflation expectations have stabilized, financial conditions have started to tighten, and positioning in the Treasury market is now quite short. These factors will act to stabilize Treasury yields over the next few months, even with the cyclical backdrop remaining bond bearish. Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later – The Opposite Is More Likely Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later - The Opposite Is More Likely Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later - The Opposite Is More Likely Recommendation Inception Level Inception Date Long Dec 2022/Short Dec 2024 3-Month SOFR Future 0.25 Feb 22/22 New Trade: Go long the December 2022 US SOFR interest rate futures contract versus shorting the December 2024 SOFR contract. The former discounts too many Fed hikes for this year and the latter discounts too few hikes over the next three years. Bottom Line: US Treasury yields now discount the maximum likely hawkish scenario for Fed rate hikes in 2022, with risks all pointing in the direction of the Fed delivering less than expected. Upgrade US duration exposure to neutral from below-benchmark on a tactical basis. Feature Chart 1A Near-Term Overshoot For UST Yields Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now During the BCA Research US Bond Strategy quarterly webcast last week, we announced a shift in our recommended US duration stance, moving from below-benchmark to neutral. This move was more tactical (i.e. shorter-term) in nature, as we still strongly believe that bond markets are underestimating the eventual peak for US bond yields over the next couple of years. In the near term, however, we see several good reasons to expect the recent big run-up in US bond yields to pause, warranting a more neutral tactical duration exposure (Chart 1). We discuss those reasons – and the implications for both US duration strategy - in this report published jointly by BCA Research’s US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy services. Reason #1: Too Many Fed Rate Hikes Are Now Discounted For 2022 The US overnight index swap (OIS) curve currently discounts 146bps of Fed rate hikes by the end of 2022. This is a big change from the start of the year when only 77bps of hikes were priced (Chart 2). The OIS curve repricing now puts the path of the funds rate for this year well above the last set of FOMC interest rate projections published at the December 2021 Fed meeting. In other words, the market has already moved to discount a big upward shift in the FOMC “dots” for 2022, and even for 2023, at next month’s FOMC meeting. Chart 2Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later - The Opposite Is More Likely Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later - The Opposite Is More Likely Markets Think The Fed Will Hike More Sooner And Less Later - The Opposite Is More Likely We think a more likely outcome for 2022 is that the Fed lifts rates four or five times, not six or even seven times as some Wall Street investment banks are forecasting. We set out the reasons why we think the Fed will go less than expected in the rest of this report. At a minimum, there is virtually no chance that the Fed will provide guidance to markets that is more hawkish than current market pricing, which would push bond yields even higher in the near term. Reason #2: US Inflation Will Soon Peak The relentless string of upside surprises on US inflation has been the main reason the bond market has moved so rapidly on pricing in more Fed rate hikes. The story is about to change, however, as US inflation should peak sometime in the next few months and begin to rapidly decelerate toward levels much closer to, but still well above, the Fed’s 2% inflation target. Already, the intense global inflation pressures from commodities and traded goods prices over the past year has started to lose potency. The annual growth rate of the CRB Raw Industrials index has eased from a peak of 45% in June to 18%, in line with slowing growth momentum of global manufacturing activity (Chart 3, top panel). The softening of input price pressures is evident in business survey measures like the ISM Manufacturing Prices Paid index, which typically leads US headline CPI inflation by six months and has fallen by 16 points since the peak in June (middle panel). Chart 3Global Inflation Pressures Easing Global Inflation Pressures Easing Global Inflation Pressures Easing The global supply chain disruptions that have caused inventory shortages in products ranging from new cars to semiconductors also appear to be easing. Supplier delivery times are shortening according to the ISM Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing surveys (bottom panel). Combined with other indications of the loosening of supply chain logjams, like lower shipping costs, the influence of supply disruptions on inflation should diminish, on the margin. Energy prices should also soon contribute to disinflationary momentum (Chart 4). BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service is forecasting the Brent oil price to reach $76/bbl at the end of 2022 and $80/bbl at the end of the 2023. That represents a significant decline from the current $95/bbl price that reflects a large risk premium for the potential oil market supply disruptions in response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine. A war-driven spike in oil prices does risk extending the current period of high US (and global) inflation. However, it should be noted that the annual growth in oil prices has been decelerating even as oil prices have been rising recently, showing the power of base effect comparisons that should lead to a lower contribution to overall inflation from energy prices over the next 6-12 months. ​​​​​​Chart 4Oil Prices Will Soon Turn Disinflationary Oil Prices Will Soon Turn Disinflationary Oil Prices Will Soon Turn Disinflationary Chart 5A Changing Mix Of US Consumer Spending Will Lower Overall Inflation A Changing Mix Of US Consumer Spending Will Lower Overall Inflation A Changing Mix Of US Consumer Spending Will Lower Overall Inflation   Looking beyond the commodity space, a shifting mix of US consumer spending should also help push overall US inflation lower. US core CPI inflation hit a 34-year high of 6.0% in January, fueled by 11.7% growth in core goods inflation (Chart 5). We anticipate that overall core inflation will slow to levels more consistent with the trends seen in more domestically focused sectors like core services and shelter, where inflation is running around 4%. US consumers have started to shift their spending patterns away from goods, which was running well above its pre-pandemic trend, back toward services, which was running below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 6). This will help narrow the gap between goods and services inflation, particularly as easing supply chain disruptions help dampen goods inflation. Chart 6Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak ​​​​​ Chart 7There Are Still Pockets Of Available US Labor Market Supply There Are Still Pockets Of Available US Labor Market Supply There Are Still Pockets Of Available US Labor Market Supply ​​​​​​ Chart 8US Wage Growth Should Soon Begin To Moderate US Wage Growth Should Soon Begin To Moderate US Wage Growth Should Soon Begin To Moderate There is also the potential for some of the pressures stemming from the tight US labor market to become a bit less inflationary in the coming months. While the overall US unemployment rate of 4% is well within the range of full employment NAIRU estimates produced by the FOMC, there are notable differences across employment categories suggesting that there are still sizeable pockets of labor supply. For example, the unemployment rate for managerial and professional workers is a tiny 2.3%, while the unemployment rate for services workers was a more elevated 6.7% (Chart 7, top panel). There are also noteworthy differences in US labor market trends when sorted by wage growth. Employment in industries with lower wages – predominantly in services – has not returned to the pre-pandemic peak, unlike employment in higher wage cohorts (middle panel).1 As the US economy puts the Omicron variant in the rearview mirror, service industries most impacted by pandemic restrictions should see an increase in labor supply as workers return to the labor force. This will help close the one percentage point gap between the labor force participation rate for prime-aged workers (aged 25-54) and its pre-pandemic peak (bottom panel). This will also help to mitigate the current upturn in service sector wage growth, which reached 5.2% at the end of 2021 according to the US Employment Cost Index (Chart 8). When US inflation finally peaks in the next few months – most notably for goods prices and service sector wages – the Fed will be under less pressure to hike rates as aggressively as discounted in current bond market pricing. Reason #3: US Inflation Expectations Have Stabilized Chart 9TIPS Breakevens Are Not Telling The Fed To Be More Aggressive TIPS Breakevens Are Not Telling The Fed To Be More Aggressive TIPS Breakevens Are Not Telling The Fed To Be More Aggressive The Fed always pays a lot of attention to inflation expectations, particularly market-based measures like TIPS breakevens, to assess if its monetary policy stance is appropriate. The current message from breakevens is that the Fed does not have to turn even more hawkish than expected to bring inflation back down to levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% target. The 10-year TIPS breakeven is currently 2.4%, down from a peak of 2.8% and within the 2.3-2.5% range that we deem consistent with the Fed’s inflation target. Inflation expectations are even more subdued on a forward basis, with the 5-year TIPS breakeven, 5-years forward now down to 1.95% (Chart 9). Shorter term TIPS breakevens remain elevated, with the 2-year breakeven at 3.7%. We continue to favor positioning for a narrower 2-year TIPS breakeven spread – realized inflation will soon peak and the New York Fed’s Consumer Expectations survey shows that household inflation expectations for the next three years have already fallen significantly (bottom panel). Lower inflation expectations, both market-based and survey-based, suggest that the Fed can be cautious on the pace of rate hikes after liftoff next month. Reason #4: US Financial Conditions Are Tightening Alongside Cooling US Growth Momentum We have long described the link between financial markets and the Fed’s policy stance as “The Fed Policy Loop.” In this framework, the markets act as a regulator on Fed hawkishness (Chart 10). If the Fed comes across as overly hawkish, risk assets will sell off (lower equity prices, wider corporate credit spreads), the US dollar will appreciate, the US Treasury curve will flatten and market volatility measures like the VIX index will increase. All of those trends act to tighten US financial conditions, threatening a growth slowdown that will force the Fed to back off from its previous hawkish bias. Chart 10The Fed Policy Loop Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now Financial conditions have indeed tightened as markets have priced in more Fed rate hikes in 2022 (Chart 11). Since the start of the year, the S&P 500 is down 9% year-to-date, US investment grade corporate spreads have widened 26bps, the 2-year/10-year US Treasury curve has flattened by 34bps and the VIX index has increased 11 pts. In absolute terms, US financial conditions remain highly stimulative and the risk asset selloff so far poses little threat to US economic growth. However, if the Fed were to deliver all of the rate hikes in 2022 that are currently discounted in the US OIS curve, the market selloff would deepen as investors began to worry about a Fed-engineered economic slowdown. This would lead to a more significant tightening of financial conditions, representing an even bigger risk to US growth. The Fed cannot risk appearing too hawkish too soon, with US growth momentum already showing signs of slowing (Chart 12). The Conference Board US leading economic indicator has stopped accelerating and may be peaking, US business confidence is softening and consumer confidence is very depressed according to the University of Michigan survey. Importantly, high inflation is cited as the main reason for weak consumer confidence, as wage increases have not matched price increases. If realized inflation falls, as we expect, this could actually provide a boost to consumer confidence as households would feel an improvement in real incomes and spending power – a development that could eventually lead to more Fed rate hikes in 2023 if consumer spending improves, especially if inflation stays above the Fed’s 2% target. Chart 11Fed Hawkishness Has Already Tightened Financial Conditions Fed Hawkishness Has Already Tightened Financial Conditions Fed Hawkishness Has Already Tightened Financial Conditions ​​​​​​ Chart 12Not The Best Time For The Fed To Be More Aggressive Not The Best Time For The Fed To Be More Aggressive Not The Best Time For The Fed To Be More Aggressive ​​​​​ For now, however, the risk of a preemptive tightening of financial conditions will ensure that the Fed delivers fewer rate hikes than the market expects this year. Reason #5: Treasury Market Positioning Is Now Very Short Chart 13Reliable Bond Indicators Calling For A Pause In The UST Selloff Reliable Bond Indicators Calling For A Pause In The UST Selloff Reliable Bond Indicators Calling For A Pause In The UST Selloff The final reason to increase US duration exposure now is that Treasury market positioning has become quite short and has become a headwind to higher bond yields and lower bond prices. The JP Morgan fixed income client duration survey shows that bond investors are running duration exposures well below benchmark (Chart 13). Speculators are also running significant short positions in longer-maturity US Treasury futures. This suggests limited selling power in the event of more bond bearish news and increased scope for short-covering in the event of risk-off event – like a shooting war in Ukraine – or surprisingly negative US economic data. On that front, the Citigroup US data surprise index, which is typically highly correlated to the momentum of US Treasury yields, has dipped a bit recently but remains at neutral levels (top panel). A similar measure of neutrality is sent by some of our preferred cyclical bond indicators like the ratio of the CRB raw industrials index to the price of gold – the 10-year yield is now in line with that ratio, which appears to be peaking (middle panel). Investment Conclusions Given the five reasons outlined in this report – too many Fed hikes are now discounted for 2022, US realized inflation should soon peak, inflation expectations have stabilized, financial conditions have started to tighten, and positioning in the Treasury market is now quite short – we decided last week to upgrade our recommended US portfolio duration to neutral from below-benchmark. However, this move is only for a tactical investment horizon. We still see the cyclical backdrop as bond bearish, as Treasury yields do not yet reflect how high US interest rates will rise in the upcoming tightening cycle. The 5-year Treasury yield, 5-years forward is currently at 2.0%. This lies at the low end of the range of estimates of the longer-run neutral fed funds rate (Chart 14) from the New York Fed’s survey of bond market participants (2%) and the median FOMC longer-run interest rate projection from the Fed dots (2.5%). We see the Fed having to lift rates faster than markets expect in 2023 and 2024. US inflation this year is expected to settle at a level above the Fed’s 2% target before picking up again next year alongside renewed tightening of labor market conditions once the remaining supply of excess labor is fully absorbed. Chart 14The Cyclical UST Bear Market Is Not Over Yet The Cyclical UST Bear Market Is Not Over Yet The Cyclical UST Bear Market Is Not Over Yet Chart 15Go Long The Dec/22 SOFR Contract Vs. The Dec/24 Contract Go Long The Dec/22 SOFR Contract Vs. The Dec/24 Contract Go Long The Dec/22 SOFR Contract Vs. The Dec/24 Contract As a way to position for the Fed doing fewer rate hikes than expected in 2022, but more hikes than expected in 2023/24, we are entering a new trade this week – going long the December 2022 3-month SOFR US interest rate futures contract versus a short position in the December 2024 3-month SOFR contract.  The implied interest rate spread on those two contracts has tightened to 25bps (Chart 15). We expect that trend to reverse, however, with the spread increasing as markets eventually move to price out rate hikes in 2022 and price in much more Fed tightening in 2023 and 2024. We will discuss the implications of the shift in our US duration stance for our views on non-US bond markets in next week’s Global Fixed Income Strategy report. Our initial conclusion is that our country allocation recommendations for government bonds will remain unchanged – underweighting the US, UK, and Canada; overweighting core Europe, peripheral Europe, Japan and Australia – but we will also increase duration exposure within most (if not all) countries. As in the US, we also see markets pricing in too many rate hikes in the UK and Canada for 2022 but too few rate hikes over the next two years. On the other hand, markets are pricing in too many rate cumulative hikes over the next 2-3 years in Europe, Australia and Japan (Table 1). Table 1Markets Have Pulled Forward Rate Hikes Everywhere Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The definitions for the wage cohorts can be found in the footnote of Chart 7. Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now Five Reasons To Tactically Increase US Duration Exposure Now Tactical Overlay Trades

Executive Summary While inflation has unquestionably surprised to the upside, the US will not enter a self-reinforcing spiral unless an inflation mindset takes hold throughout the economy. The two leading surveys have wildly different takes on consumer confidence. The available evidence sides with the Conference Board’s robust reading rather than the University of Michigan’s dismal one. We are not concerned about housing’s near-term outlook. There is an undersupply of homes in America and mortgage rates have not backed up enough to put a meaningful dent in demand. Financial markets are jumpy and will likely remain hypersensitive to speculation about the Fed’s policy choices. We nonetheless continue to favor risk assets over the next twelve months and will look out for tactical buying opportunities whenever volatility is on the cusp of easing. Consumers Aren't Chasing High Prices And That's A Good Sign Consumers Aren't Chasing High Prices And That's A Good Sign Consumers Aren't Chasing High Prices And That's A Good Sign Bottom Line: The ride is likely to be bumpy for financial markets this year, but we expect it will ultimately be rewarding. Growth will hold up despite recurring fears. Feature Our recent discussions with colleagues and investors indicate that US financial market participants are preoccupied with one of three issues: a potential inflation breakout, a slowdown induced by a consumption shortfall or, worse yet, both. We add to our thoughts on inflation and consumption after digging into some less-watched series, and check in on the housing market following the surge in mortgage rates. Our conclusion remains unchanged: we still expect potent growth in 2022, and we think investors should maintain at least equal weight exposures to risk assets. Amidst elevated volatility brought on by Fed uncertainty, however, investors should be willing to act more opportunistically. Consumers Are Not Adding Fuel To The Fire … We have spoken repeatedly about the inflation mindset, a concept lifted from Japan’s ongoing experience with chronic stagnation. The malaise ailing Japan is in large part attributable to the deflation mindset that has swept consumers, businesses and investors. Economic participants conditioned to expect continuously falling prices change their behavior to adapt to them, so consumers have put off discretionary purchases, anticipating that goods will be cheaper (and better) next year; businesses confronting steadily falling revenue have shunned investment in favor of shrinking their cost bases to preserve profit; and investors have been willing to funnel capital to the lowest-yielding sovereign bonds in the world, content with meager purchasing power accretions. The central theorem of macroeconomics – my spending is your income and your spending is my income – has sentenced the economy to quietly wither in a self-reinforcing loop. Conversely, we believe an inflation mindset in which economic actors expect continually rising prices is a necessary precondition for an upward inflation spiral. The spiral is stoked by a chain reaction of worker and investor demands for increased compensation, wholesale and retail price hikes, and consumers’ rush to maximize their declining purchasing power by buying ahead of the next inevitable increase. Despite all the inflation agita, Treasury investors are untroubled about its long-run prospects, as their 5-year inflation expectations five years from now remain below the bottom end of the Fed’s target range (Chart 1). The hedgers, speculators and market makers who compose the CPI swaps market are also serene (Chart 2). Though all parties see intense price pressures lasting for another year, they expect them to dissipate over time (Table 1). Chart 1Long-Run Inflation Expectations Are Subdued, ... Long-Run Inflation Expectations Are Subdued, ... Long-Run Inflation Expectations Are Subdued, ... Chart 2... Despite Big Near-Term Swings It All Depends On Whom You Ask It All Depends On Whom You Ask Per the University of Michigan’s sentiment survey, consumers also anticipate that near-term inflation pressures will fade in the intermediate term (Chart 3). They are consequently wary about making large purchases at a price they’ll later come to regret. Viewing today’s high prices as temporary, they think it is a historically inopportune time to buy cars, houses and large household durables. Their responses suggest that the inflation mindset has yet to make any headway with consumers; for now, there is no danger that shoppers harbor inflation fears that could become self-fulfilling. Table 1The Inflations Expectations Curve Is Sharply Inverted It All Depends On Whom You Ask It All Depends On Whom You Ask Chart 3Survey Says: Temporary! Survey Says: Temporary! Survey Says: Temporary! The share of respondents citing sticky/rising prices as a reason for buying cars now is at very low levels (Chart 4, top panel) while those citing high prices as a reason not to buy continues to make record highs (Chart 4, middle panel). The spread between the two has never been wider (Chart 4, bottom panel) – a sizable majority of consumers with discretion over when they buy is committed to waiting out the conditions that have sent prices zooming higher. Chart 4Resisting A Spiral Resisting A Spiral Resisting A Spiral Michigan respondents have been on the right side of chronically deflating new car prices, as those who think prices won’t come down have been nearly continuously outnumbered for the last 40 years (Chart 5, bottom panel). Since vehicle buying conditions became a regular survey component, there have been only three stretches when consumers reported a net urgency to buy, all of which coincided with real increases in new car prices (Chart 5, top panel). The chart is silent on the direction of causality, though we would suspect that consumer urgency follows from observed price increases, which it then amplifies and/or extends. Chart 5Just Say No Just Say No Just Say No The Michigan surveyors also ask consumers about the timeliness of buying houses and major household durables. Charts for houses (not shown) and durables (Chart 6) look much like cars, though the Good-Won’t Come Down/Bad-Prices Are High spread for houses is as persistently negative as it is for cars (ex-the 2012 to 2015 recovery from the aftermath of the housing bust). Consumer demand for the biggest-ticket items is apparently more elastic than it is for major appliances. Chart 6Consumers Aren't Chasing Household Durables Prices Higher,Either Consumers Aren't Chasing Household Durables Prices Higher,Either Consumers Aren't Chasing Household Durables Prices Higher,Either Bottom Line: Consumers are disinclined to go along with surging prices on big-ticket items. An inflationary spiral will not take hold while they are committed to putting off major purchases with the expectation that they will get a better deal in the future. … But Could They Be Losing Their Nerve? Consumers’ discipline has positive inflation implications, but the bombed-out vehicle buying conditions chart in the Executive Summary could be sending a worrisome growth signal. Foregone spending is lost income, and if enough buyers defer purchases, a recession could be just around the bend. True enough, but investors should keep in mind that the buying conditions indexes measure demand urgency, not overall demand. Those with discretion over the timing of their purchases may be holding off, but American consumers are not turning Japanese. Surging home and new and used car prices eloquently testify to fierce competition among buyers. We do not therefore see cause for concern in the diverging consumer confidence surveys. Over time, the indexes produced by the Conference Board and the University of Michigan have tended to send similar messages (Chart 7). The relationship has frayed over the last five years, however, and the two series completely diverged last spring. That would be of no more than passing interest if the composite average of both surveys’ expectations component had not formerly been such a reliable coincident indicator of real consumption growth (Chart 8). Chart 7Parting Company Parting Company Parting Company Chart 8The Confidence-Consumption Link Has Been Severed The Confidence-Consumption Link Has Been Severed The Confidence-Consumption Link Has Been Severed Investors may wonder whether consumption will take its lead from the Conference Board’s cheer or Michigan’s gloom. The Conference Board survey consists of just five questions asking respondents to assess current business and employment conditions and offer their six-month expectations about business conditions, employment conditions and their family’s income. The more extensive Michigan survey runs to twelve full pages, touching on business conditions; personal finances; economic policy; unemployment, interest-rate, inflation and home-price expectations; and buying conditions for homes, household durables and motor vehicles. A layperson reading through the Michigan survey might think it was designed to provoke anxiety in unsuspecting respondents – what are the chances your income will keep pace with inflation, that you or your spouse will involuntarily lose a job over the next five years, that you will have enough money for retirement, etc. – but its readings are not uniformly bleak. Since the financial crisis, it has tended to be cheerier than the Conference Board survey when inflation is low or negative while its relative nosedive has coincided with inflation’s breakout (Chart 9). The relationship would logically follow from the Michigan survey’s explicit focus on inflation and one’s personal relation to it. The Conference Board survey is linked much more closely to perceptions of the job market (Chart 10) and it may therefore be expected to lag during disinflationary/deflationary periods but outperform when inflation accelerates. Chart 9The Michigan Survey Is Sensitive To Inflation, ... The Michigan Survey Is Sensitive To Inflation, ... The Michigan Survey Is Sensitive To Inflation, ... Chart 10... While The Conference Board's Tracks Strength In The Labor Market ... While The Conference Board's Tracks Strength In The Labor Market ... While The Conference Board's Tracks Strength In The Labor Market Bottom Line: Given the robust growth outlook, we are inclined to side with the Conference Board’s upbeat consumer confidence reading. We do not expect that flush households with pent-up demand will turn into misers. The 2,400-Square-Foot Gorilla Chart 11Level Trumps Direction Level Trumps Direction Level Trumps Direction The sharp backup in mortgage rates so far this year has many observers concerned about the potential consequences of a housing slowdown. A major slump would idle construction workers, pressure housing industry suppliers, and dampen demand for the furnishings and major appliances that fill homes. We think the concerns are overdone and believe that the housing market will be well supported through the rest of the year. Affordability concerns come back to the level-versus-direction debate that has flared ever since real economic growth began to decelerate from its torrid 6.5% pace in the first half of last year. 3% or 4% is nothing to sneeze at for an economy with a long-run trend growth rate of 1.75 – 2%, however. Deceleration from an extremely high level to a very high level still leaves room for ample corporate earnings gains and risk assets duly delivered chunky excess returns across last year’s second half. 30-year fixed mortgage rates have risen 100 basis points from their pandemic low but remain extremely low relative to history (Chart 11, middle panel). As a result, homes remain quite affordable (Chart 11, top panel), despite the relative increase in median home prices (Chart 11, bottom panel). The horizontal line across the affordability series puts its level into a fuller context. Except for a few years in the early seventies, when the median home price was just two-and-a-half times median household income, affordability never exceeded 140 before the global financial crisis ushered in zero interest rate policy. A supply shortfall will bolster the market. Household formations have outstripped housing starts by a wide margin over the last two years (Chart 12, top panel) and available inventory (Chart 12, middle panel) and vacant units (Chart 12, bottom panel) are at all-time lows. Homebuilder sentiment is firing on all cylinders (Chart 13, top panel), as current sales are strong (Chart 13, second panel), buyer traffic remains elevated (Chart 13, third panel) and future sales expectations are rosy (Chart 13, bottom panel). Chart 12There Isn't Enough Supply ... There Isn't Enough Supply ... There Isn't Enough Supply ... ​​​​​​ Chart 13... And Builders Know It ... And Builders Know It ... And Builders Know It ​​​​​​ Bottom Line: Despite the backup in mortgage rates and twelve months of turbo-charged home price appreciation, housing will do just fine this year. A slump weighing on employment and activity is not in store. Investment Implications 2022 has so far been characterized by the serial emergence of issues that have roiled financial markets. Rising rates/falling tech stocks, impending Fed rate hikes, persistent upside inflation surprises and Ukraine have combined to push the VIX into the 20s and 30s, knock the S&P 500 down 9% and drive losses in Treasuries and spread product. We expect that concerns about Fed policy, growth and inflation will linger throughout the year and across the entirety of the Fed’s rate hiking cycle, waxing and waning with the news and data flow. Our base case is that 2022 growth will be quite strong, boosted by avid consumption and investment underpinned by savings and wealth gains, easy monetary conditions, and a tight job market. We expect that stout macro fundamentals will support earnings gains and that a dearth of alternatives to equities that can be expected to generate positive inflation-adjusted returns will keep earnings multiples elevated. If the mildness of Omicron variant infections points to a future in which COVID-19 becomes no more than a nuisance, global growth will get an additional fillip and some supply-chain pressures should ease, allowing inflation to come off the boil. While we reiterate our constructive view on financial markets and the economy, however, we do not expect a smooth ride to our year-end destination. Most investors lack first-hand experience managing against an inflation backdrop that has not been in place since the early ‘80s and volatility will likely be elevated as they find their footing. We are therefore adopting a more tactical perspective, seeking out opportunities to exploit temporary volatility, and we advise that clients consider shortening timeframes and increasing turnover to the extent their individual mandates will allow it. We do not think that the major inflection point marked by a shift from accommodative to restrictive monetary policy settings will arrive until the second half of 2023 at the earliest, but the run-up to it will likely be bumpy.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com  

Executive Summary The Market Thinks The Fed Will Be Unable To Raise Rates Much Above 2% The Market Thinks The Fed Will Be Unable To Raise Rates Much Above 2% The Market Thinks The Fed Will Be Unable To Raise Rates Much Above 2% The Fed tightening cycle is likely to proceed in two stages. In the first stage, which is now well anticipated, the Fed will seek to restore its credibility by raising rates to 2% – the lower bound of what it regards as “neutral” – by early next year. The decline in goods inflation over the next 12 months, facilitated by the easing of supply-chain bottlenecks, will allow the Fed to take a break from tightening for most of 2023. Unfortunately, the respite from rate hikes will not last. The neutral rate of interest is around 3%-to-4%, significantly higher than what either the Fed or investors believe. A wage-price spiral will intensify starting in late 2023, setting the stage for the second, and more painful, round of tightening. Trade Inception Level Initiation Date Stop Loss Long June 2023 3-month SOFR futures contract (SFRM3) / December 2024 (SFRZ4) -8 bps Feb 17/2022 -30 bps New Trade: Go short the December 2024 3-month SOFR futures contract versus the June 2023 contract. Investors expect the fed funds rate to be somewhat higher in mid-2023 than at end-2024. They are wrong about that. Bottom Line: The market has priced in the first stage of the Fed’s tightening cycle, which suggests that bond yields will stabilize over the next few quarters. However, the market has not priced in the second stage. Once it starts to do so, the bull market in equities will end. Investors should remain bullish on stocks for now but look to reduce equity exposure by the middle of 2023.   Dear Client, Instead of our regular report next week, we will be sending you a Special Report written by Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, discussing Russia’s geopolitical outlook over the long run. I hope you will find it insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Who’s the Boss? Who sets interest rates: The economy or the Fed? The answer is both. In the short run, the Fed has complete control over interest rates. In the long run, however, the economy calls the shots. If the Fed sets rates too high, unemployment will rise, forcing the Fed to cut rates. If the Fed sets rates too low, the opposite will happen. Chart 1The Fed's Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Is Still Quite Low By Historical Standards The Fed's Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Is Still Quite Low By Historical Standards The Fed's Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Is Still Quite Low By Historical Standards Thus, over the long haul, it all boils down to where the neutral rate of interest – the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation – happens to be. In the latest Summary of Economic Projections, released on December 15th, 9 out of 17 FOMC participants penciled in 2.5% as their estimate of the appropriate “longer run” level of the federal funds rate. Six participants thought the neutral rate was lower than 2.5%, while two participants thought it was higher (both put down 3%). Back in 2012, when the Fed began publishing its dot plot, the median FOMC participant thought the neutral rate was 4.25%. Investors have revised up their estimate of the neutral rate over the past two months. But at 2.09%, the 5-year/5-year forward bond yield – a widely-used proxy for the neutral rate – is still exceptionally low by historic standards (Chart 1). Desired Savings and Investment Determine the Neutral Rate Chart 2The Savings-Investment Balance Determines The Neutral Rate Of Interest A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle One can think of the neutral rate as the interest rate that equates aggregate demand with aggregate supply at full employment. If interest rates are above neutral, the economy will suffer from inadequate demand; if interest rates are below neutral, the economy will overheat. As Box 1 explains, the difference between aggregate demand and aggregate supply can be expressed as the difference between how much investment an economy needs to undertake and the savings it has at its disposal. Savings can be generated domestically by deferring consumption or imported from abroad via a current account deficit. Anything that reduces savings or raises investment will lead to a higher neutral rate of interest (Chart 2). With this little bit of theory under our belts, let us consider the forces shaping savings and investment in the United States. Desired Savings Are Falling in the US There are at least six reasons to expect desired savings to trend lower in the US over the coming years: Households will spend down their accumulated pandemic savings. US households are sitting on $2.3 trillion (10% of GDP) in excess savings, the result of both decreased spending on services during the pandemic and generous government transfer payments (Chart 3). While some of that money will remain sequestered in bank deposits, much of it will eventually be spent. Household wealth has soared. Personal net worth has risen by 128% of GDP since the start of the pandemic, the largest two-year increase on record (Chart 4). Conservatively assuming that households will spend three cents of every additional dollar in wealth, the resulting wealth effect could boost consumption by 3.8% of GDP. Chart 3Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Chart 4Net Worth Has Soared Net Worth Has Soared Net Worth Has Soared The household deleveraging cycle is over (Chart 5). Household balance sheets are in good shape. After falling during the initial stages of the pandemic, consumer credit has begun to rebound. Banks are easing lending standards on consumer loans across the board. Corporate profit margins are peaking. As a share of GDP, corporate profits are near record-high levels (Chart 6). Despite a tight labor market, wage growth has failed to keep up with inflation over the past two years. Real wages should recover over time. To the extent that households spend more of their income than businesses, a rising labor share should translate into lower overall savings. Chart 5US Household Deleveraging Pressures Have Abated US Household Deleveraging Pressures Have Abated US Household Deleveraging Pressures Have Abated Chart 6Corporate Profits Are Near Record Highs... But Wage Growth Has Failed To Keep Up Corporate Profits Are Near Record Highs... But Wage Growth Has Failed To Keep Up Corporate Profits Are Near Record Highs... But Wage Growth Has Failed To Keep Up Baby boomers are retiring. Baby boomers are leaving the labor force en masse. They hold over half of US household wealth, considerably more than younger generations (Chart 7). As baby boomers transition from net savers to net dissavers, national savings will decline. Government budget deficits will stay elevated. Fiscal deficits subtract from national savings. While the US budget deficit will come down over the next few years, the IMF estimates that the structural budget deficit will still average 4.9% of GDP between 2022 and 2026 compared to 2.0% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 8). Chart 7Baby Boomers Have Amassed A Lot Of Wealth A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle Chart 8Fiscal Policy: Tighter But Not Tight A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle Investment Will Not Decline to Offset the Reduction in Savings A favorite talking point among those who espouse the secular stagnation thesis is that slower trend growth will curb investment demand, leading to an ever-larger savings glut. There are a number of problems with this argument. For one thing, most of the decline in US potential GDP growth has already occurred, implying less need for incremental cuts to investment spending in the future. According to the Congressional Budget Office, real potential GDP growth fell from over 3% in the early 1980s to about 1.9% today, mainly due to slower labor force growth. The CBO expects potential growth to edge down to 1.7% over the next few decades (Chart 9). Moreover, US investment spending has been weaker over the past two decades than one would have expected based on the evolution of trend GDP growth. As a consequence, the average age of both the residential and nonresidential capital stock has risen to the highest level in over 50 years (Chart 10). Chart 9Most Of The Deceleration In US Potential Real GDP Growth Has Already Taken Place Most Of The Deceleration In US Potential Real GDP Growth Has Already Taken Place Most Of The Deceleration In US Potential Real GDP Growth Has Already Taken Place Chart 10The Aging Capital Stock The Aging Capital Stock The Aging Capital Stock As the labor market continues to tighten, firms will devote greater efforts to automating production. Already, core capital goods orders have broken out to the upside (Chart 11). On the housing front, the NAHB reported this week that despite rising mortgage rates, foot traffic and prospective sales remain at exceptionally strong levels (Chart 12). Building permits also surprised on the upside. Chart 11The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright Chart 12Homebuilder Confidence Remains Strong Homebuilder Confidence Remains Strong Homebuilder Confidence Remains Strong Overseas Appetite for US Assets May Wane A larger current account deficit would allow the US to spend more than it earns without the need for higher interest rates to incentivize additional domestic savings. The problem is that the US current account deficit is already quite large, having averaged 3.1% of GDP over the past four quarters. Furthermore, as a result of the accumulation of past current account deficits, external US liabilities now exceed assets by 69% of GDP (Chart 13). It is far from clear that foreigners will want to maintain the current pace of US asset purchases, let alone increase them from current levels. Chart 13The US Has Become Increasingly Indebted To The Rest Of The World The US Has Become Increasingly Indebted To The Rest Of The World The US Has Become Increasingly Indebted To The Rest Of The World The Two-Stage Path to Neutral Chart 14The Market Thinks The Fed Will Be Unable To Raise Rates Much Above 2% The Market Thinks The Fed Will Be Unable To Raise Rates Much Above 2% The Market Thinks The Fed Will Be Unable To Raise Rates Much Above 2% Investors expect the Fed to raise rates seven times by early next year and then stop hiking (and perhaps even start cutting!) in late 2023 and beyond (Chart 14). However, if we are correct that the neutral rate of interest is higher than widely believed, the Fed will eventually need to lift rates to a higher level than what is currently being discounted. It is impossible to be certain what this level is, but a reasonable estimate is somewhere in the range of 3%-to-4%. This is about 100-to-200 basis points above current market pricing. The path to the “new neutral” will not follow a straight line. As we have argued in the past, inflation is likely to evolve in a “two steps up, one step down” fashion. We are presently at the top of those two steps. Inflation will decline over the next 12 months as goods inflation falls sharply and services inflation rises only modestly, before starting to move up again in the second half of 2023. Falling Goods Inflation in 2022 Chart 15Goods Inflation Should Fade Goods Inflation Should Fade Goods Inflation Should Fade Chart 15 shows that the current inflationary episode has been driven by rising goods prices, particularly durable goods. This is highly unusual since goods prices, adjusting for quality improvements, usually trend sideways-to-down over time. As economies continue to reopen, the composition of consumer spending will shift from goods to services. At the same time, supply bottlenecks should abate. The combination of slowing demand and increasing supply will cause goods inflation to tumble. Investors are underestimating the extent to which goods inflation could recede over the remainder of the year as pandemic-related distortions subside. For example, used vehicle prices have jumped by over 50% during the past 18 months (Chart 16). Assuming automobile chip availability improves, we estimate that vehicle-related prices will go from adding 1.6 percentage points to headline inflation at present to subtracting 0.9 points by the end of the year – a swing of 2.5 percentage points (Chart 17). Chart 16AVehicle, Food, And Energy Prices Could All Retreat From Extended Levels (I) Vehicle, Food, And Energy Prices Could All Retreat From Extended Levels (I) Vehicle, Food, And Energy Prices Could All Retreat From Extended Levels (I) Chart 16BVehicle, Food, And Energy Prices Could All Retreat From Extended Levels (II) Vehicle, Food, And Energy Prices Could All Retreat From Extended Levels (II) Vehicle, Food, And Energy Prices Could All Retreat From Extended Levels (II) Chart 17Even If Underlying Core Inflation Does Not Change, Inflation Will Fall This Year As Goods Prices Come Back Down To Earth A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle Along the same lines, we estimate that energy inflation will go from raising inflation by 1.7 points at present to lowering inflation by 0.3 points by the end of the year. This is based on the WTI forward curve, which sees oil prices retreating to $80/bbl by the end of 2022 from $91/bbl today. A normalization in food prices should also help keep a lid on goods inflation. Service Inflation Will Rise Only Modestly in 2022 Could rising service inflation offset the decline in goods inflation this year? It is possible, but we would bet against it. While certain components of the CPI services basket, such as rents, will continue to trend higher, a major increase in service inflation is unlikely unless wages rise more briskly. As Chart 18 underscores, the bulk of recent wage growth has occurred at the bottom end of the income distribution. That is not especially surprising. Whereas employment among medium-and-high wage workers has returned to pre-pandemic levels, employment among low-wage workers is still 6% below where it was in early 2020 (Chart 19). Chart 18The Bulk Of Recent Wage Growth Has Occurred At The Bottom End Of The Income Distribution The Bulk Of Recent Wage Growth Has Occurred At The Bottom End Of The Income Distribution The Bulk Of Recent Wage Growth Has Occurred At The Bottom End Of The Income Distribution Chart 19Employment Among Low-Wage Workers Still Lagging Employment Among Low-Wage Workers Still Lagging Employment Among Low-Wage Workers Still Lagging Chart 20Workers Are Starting To Return To Their Jobs Following The Omicron Wave Workers Are Starting To Return To Their Jobs Following The Omicron Wave Workers Are Starting To Return To Their Jobs Following The Omicron Wave Looking out, labor participation among lower-paid workers will recover now that enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. A decline in the number of life-threatening Covid cases should also help bring back many lower-paid service workers. According to the Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, a record 8.7 million employees were absent from work in the middle of January either because they were sick or looking after someone with Covid symptoms. Consistent with declining case counts, February data show that fewer employees have been absent from work (Chart 20). Predicting Wage-Price Spirals: The Role of Expectations A classic wage-price spiral is one where self-fulfilling expectations of rising prices prompt workers to demand higher wages. Rising wages, in turn, force firms to lift prices in order to protect profit margins, thus validating workers’ expectations of higher prices. For the time being, such a relentless feedback loop has yet to emerge. Market-based measures of long-term inflation expectations have actually fallen since October and remain below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 21). Survey-based measures have moved up, but not by much (Chart 22). To the extent that US households are reluctant to buy a new vehicle, it is because they expect prices to decline (Chart 23). Chart 21Market-Based Expectations Remain Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Market-Based Expectations Remain Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Market-Based Expectations Remain Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Chart 22Survey-Based Measures Of Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Ticked Up, But Not By Much Survey-Based Measures Of Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Ticked Up, But Not By Much Survey-Based Measures Of Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Ticked Up, But Not By Much Still, if it turns out that the neutral rate of interest is higher than widely believed, then monetary policy must also be more stimulative than widely believed. This raises the odds that, at some point, the economy will overheat and a wage-price spiral will develop. It is impossible to definitively say when that point will arrive. Inflationary processes tend to be highly non-linear: The labor market can tighten for a long time without this having much impact on inflation, only for inflation to surge once the unemployment rate has fallen below a critical threshold. The Sixties as a Template for Today? The sudden jump in inflation in the 1960s offers an interesting example. The unemployment rate in the US fell to NAIRU in 1962. However, it was not until 1966, when the unemployment rate had already fallen nearly two percentage points below NAIRU, that inflation finally took off. Within the span of ten months, both wage growth and inflation more than doubled. US inflation would end up finishing the decade at 6%, setting the stage for the stagflationary 1970s (Chart 24). Chart 23The Expectation of Lower Prices Is Keeping Many People From Buying A Car The Expectation of Lower Prices Is Keeping Many People From Buying A Car The Expectation of Lower Prices Is Keeping Many People From Buying A Car Chart 24Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Our guess is that we are closer to 1964 than 1966, implying that the US economy may still need to overheat for another one or two years before a true wage-price spiral emerges. When the second wave of inflation does begin, however, investors will find themselves in a world of pain. Stay overweight stocks for now but look to reduce equity exposure by the middle of next year. This Week’s Trade Idea Given our expectation that inflation will come down sharply in 2022 before beginning to rise again in late 2023 and into 2024, we recommend shorting the December 2024 3-month SOFR futures contract versus the June 2023 contract. Current market pricing provides an attractive entry point for the trade, with the implied interest rate for the June 2023 contract 8 bps higher than that of the December 2024 contract. We expect the interest rate spread to eventually widen substantially in favor of higher rates (lower futures contract prices) in 2024. Box 1The Neutral Rate Through The Lens Of The Savings-Investment Balance A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle

Executive Summary Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth The conditions for a major rally/outperformance in Malaysian equities are absent. Profits have been the primary driver of Malaysian equity prices historically, and the corporate earnings outlook is mediocre. Domestic demand is facing headwinds from tightening fiscal policy as well as from impaired credit channels.  Muted wage growth and deflating house prices are sapping consumer confidence. This will dent domestic demand going forward. This backdrop is bullish for bonds. Malaysian bonds offer value, as real bond yields are among the highest in Emerging Asia. The yield curve is far too steep given the growth and inflation outlook.  The Malaysian ringgit is cheap and has limited downside. Bottom Line: We recommend equity investors implement a neutral stance toward Malaysia in overall EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Absolute return investors should avoid this bourse for now. Fixed-income investors, on the other hand, should stay overweight Malaysia in both EM domestic (local currency) and sovereign credit portfolios. In the rate markets, investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates or bet on yield curve flattening. Feature Chart 1Malaysian Equity Underperformance May Be Late, But It’s Not Yet Time To Overweight Malaysian Equity Underperformance May Be Late, But It's Not Yet Time To Overweight Malaysian Equity Underperformance May Be Late, But It's Not Yet Time To Overweight Malaysian stocks are still in search of a stable bottom in absolute terms. Relative to their EM and Emerging Asian counterparts however, a bottom has been forming over the past year (Chart 1). So, could Malaysia’s prolonged underperformance be coming to an end?  Our analysis suggests caution. The underlying reasons behind this market’s substantial and protracted underperformance – dwindling earnings both in absolute terms and relative to its peers – are yet to show any signs of a reversal.  While cheap, the ringgit is also negatively impacted by the meager corporate profits generated by Malaysian firms. Investors would do well to stay neutral on this bourse for now in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Fixed income investors, however, should continue to stay overweight Malaysia in both EM domestic (local currency) and sovereign credit portfolios. Also, Malaysia’s yield curve is too steep and offers value given the sluggish cyclical growth outlook. It’s All About Profits Chart 2 shows that the bull and bear markets in Malaysian stocks have been all about the rise and fall in earnings per share (EPS). Stock multiples, the other possible driver of the equity prices, have been remarkably flat over the past two decades, with only brief periods of fluctuations around the GFC and COVID-19 pandemic. The same can be said about Malaysia’s relative performance vis-à-vis EM and Emerging Asian stocks. The trajectory of the relative stock performance was set by the relative earnings (Chart 3). Chart 3Malaysia’s Relative Performance Is Also Dictated By Relative Corporate Profits Malaysia's Relative Performance Is Also Dictated By Relative Corporate Profits Malaysia's Relative Performance Is Also Dictated By Relative Corporate Profits Chart 2Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth Bull Markets In Malaysian Stocks Are Fully Dependent On Profit Growth Thus, it is reasonable to expect that for this bourse to usher in a new bull market in absolute terms, Malaysian firms need to grow their earnings sustainably. And in order to outperform the rest of the EM stocks, Malaysian earnings need to grow at a faster clip than their peers. The question therefore is, are there signs of profit recovery in Malaysian companies in absolute and relative terms? The short answer is no. Bottom-up analysts do not expect any change in the downward trend in Malaysia’s relative profits over the coming 12 months. This outlook is corroborated by our macro analysis, as is outlined below. Sluggish Growth  Malaysian profits are languishing in large part because of subdued topline growth. While profit margins are returning to pre-pandemic levels – thanks to cost cutting – subdued sales are causing the corporate profits to stay low. Chart 4Malaysian Domestic Demand Is Subdued Malaysian Domestic Demand Is Subdued Malaysian Domestic Demand Is Subdued Malaysian gross output as of Q4 last year was barely at pre-pandemic levels. The weak recovery is most evident in the dismal level of capital investments. Gross fixed capital formations – in both real and nominal terms – are still a good 15% below their pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4, top two panels). Apathy among businesses in ramping up productive capacity indicates a lack of confidence in consumer demand going forward. Consumption is indeed weak: Unit sales for passenger vehicles continue to be sluggish, and commercial vehicle sales are not faring any better. Consumer sentiment has ticked down in the latest survey indicating retail sales might decelerate (Chart 4, bottom two panels) Consistently, industrial production in consumer goods-related industries is struggling to surpass previous highs, even though strong export demand has provided a fillip to sales. In more domestic-oriented industries such as construction goods, the weakness is palpable (Chart 5). Meanwhile, unemployment rates have fallen marginally, but are still higher than they were before the pandemic. As a result, wages remain subdued. The resulting weak household income is contributing to depressed consumption. With mediocre household income growth, demand for houses has also slowed meaningfully. This is reflected in dwindling property unit sales. The advent of the pandemic and the resulting loss of household income have further aggravated the situation. In fact, prices of certain types of dwelling units, such as semi-detached houses and high-rise apartments, are deflating outright (Chart 6, top panel). Falling house prices weigh on consumer sentiment and discourage future consumption. Chart 6Contracting House Prices Is Hurting Real Estate Sector And Denting Consumer Confidence Contracting House Prices Is Hurting Real Estate Sector And Denting Consumer Confidence Contracting House Prices Is Hurting Real Estate Sector And Denting Consumer Confidence Chart 5Weak Domestic Demand Is A Headwind To Industrial Production Weak Domestic Demand Is A Headwind To Industrial Production Weak Domestic Demand Is A Headwind To Industrial Production What’s more, the housing sector does not expect an early recovery in sales and prices either. This is evident in the very depressed level of new construction starts (Chart 6, bottom panel). As such, this sector is likely to remain a drag on Malaysia’s post-pandemic recovery. Fiscal And Credit Headwinds Going forward, the recovery will face other headwinds worth noting. One of them is a restrictive fiscal policy. This is because the “statutory debt” ceiling of the government – at 60% of GDP – has already been reached (Chart 7, top panel). This ceiling for statutory debts was fixed by lawmakers as part of a stimulus bill (COVID-19 Act) passed in 2020; and leaves little room for additional fiscal stimulus. Indeed, the IMF estimates that the ‘fiscal thrust’ this year will be negative at 2% of GDP (Chart 7, bottom panel). The country’s credit channel is also compromised. The reason is that Malaysian banks are still saddled with unresolved NPLs. These NPLs are a legacy of a very rapid expansion of bank loans following the GFC. In just five years (2009 -2014), bank credit doubled in nominal terms to 1500 billion ringgit or from 95% of GDP to 125% (Chart 8, top panel). Such fast deployment of credit was bound to cause significant misallocation of capital. And yet banks were averse to recognize impaired loans in any good measure. In fact, during the years of rapid credit growth, banks were recognizing ever fewer amounts in absolute terms as impaired loans. They were also setting aside ever lower amounts as loan loss provisions (Chart 8, second panel). Chart 7Fiscal Policy Will Stay Constrained As Statutory Debt Has Hit The Ceiling Fiscal Policy Will Stay Constrained As Statutory Debt Has Hit The Ceiling Fiscal Policy Will Stay Constrained As Statutory Debt Has Hit The Ceiling Chart 8Both Demand And Supply Of Bank Credit In Malaysia Remains Compromised Both Demand And Supply Of Bank Credit In Malaysia Remains Compromised Both Demand And Supply Of Bank Credit In Malaysia Remains Compromised While bad debt recognition and provisions have risen modestly over the past year, Malaysia’s reported NPL ratio remained under 1.5% of loans (Chart 8, third panel). Loan loss provisions have been equally meager. This indicates that banks’ balance sheets are far from clean. In reality, Malaysian borrowers never went through any deleveraging process following their last credit binge. The bank credit-to-GDP ratio remains at around the same level as it was in 2015 (125% of GDP). By comparison, during Malaysia’s previous deleveraging phase, bank credit was shed from 150% of GDP to 90% (1998 - 2008). Borrowers already saddled with large amounts of debt are much less likely to borrow more to invest and/or consume. This is therefore going to cap credit demand. Chart 9Banks Are Piling Up On Government Securities By Shunning Loans Banks Are Piling Up On Government Securities By Shunning Loans Banks Are Piling Up On Government Securities By Shunning Loans As for banks, an increase in impaired loans makes them reticent to engage in further lending. Instead, they seek to accumulate safer assets such as government bonds. In fact, this is what Malaysian banks have been doing. They have ramped up their holdings of government securities materially since 2015 at the expense of loans and advances (Chart 9, top panel).   After the pandemic-related slowdown in the economy, banks’ loan books are now probably more encumbered with impaired loans.  As such, banks are even less likely to ramp up their loan books in any major way. That will be yet another headwind to economic recovery (Chart 9, bottom panel).    Value In Fixed Income The headwinds to growth do not entail a bullish outlook for Malaysian equities. The outlook for Malaysian local currency bonds, however, is promising. A tightening fiscal policy amid weak domestic demand and subdued inflation is a bullish cocktail for domestic bonds. There is a good chance that Malaysian bond yields will roll over. At a minimum, they will rise less than most other EM countries or US Treasuries. Notably, Malaysia offers one of the highest real yields (nominal yield adjusted for core inflation) in Emerging Asia (Chart 10, top panel). Given the country’s mediocre growth outlook, odds are high that Malaysian local bonds will outperform their EM / Emerging Asian peers (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10Malaysian Bonds Offer One Of The Best Values In Emerging Aisa Malaysian Bonds Offer One Of The Best Values In Emerging Asia Malaysian Bonds Offer One Of The Best Values In Emerging Asia Chart 11Steep Yield Curve Indicate Value In Bond Space; But Spell Trouble For Bank Stocks Steep Yield Curve Indicate Value In Bond Space; But Spell Trouble For Bank Stocks Steep Yield Curve Indicate Value In Bond Space; But Spell Trouble For Bank Stocks The Malaysian swap curve is also far too steep given the country’s macro backdrop. Going forward, the 10-year/1-year swap curve is set to flatten from its decade-steep level of 130 basis points (Chart 11, top panel). That means investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates. On a related note, a fall in bond yields will not augur well for Malaysian stocks in general, and bank stocks in particular. The middle panel of Chart 11 shows that bank stocks struggle in absolute terms whenever bond yields decline. Incidentally, at 38% of total, banks are by far the largest sector in the MSCI Malaysia Index. And in recent months bank stocks have been propelling the Malaysian market (Chart 11, bottom panel). Should the bourse begin to miss the tailwind from rising bond yields, Malaysian equity performance will be hobbled.    Finally, investors should stay overweight in Malaysian sovereign credit. The country’s orthodox fiscal policy has accorded a defensive nature to this market. As such, periods of global risk-off witness Malaysian sovereign spreads fall relative to their EM counterparts, as they did in 2015 and again in 2020. In the months ahead, rising US inflation and a slowdown in Chinese property markets could cause another such period. That will lead Malaysian sovereign US dollar bonds to continue outperforming their EM peers. What’s With The Ringgit? Chart 12Malaysia Has Not Been Able To Benefit From A Cheap Currency Malaysia Has Not Been Able To Benefit From A Cheap Currency Malaysia Has Not Been Able To Benefit From A Cheap Currency The Malaysian currency is cheap, both in nominal and real terms (Chart 12, top panel). As such, it will likely be one of the most resilient currencies in EM this year. That said, the ringgit has been cheap for a while now (since 2015), and yet the Malaysian economy does not seem to have benefitted much all these years. The inability to take advantage of a cheap currency points to a fundamental malaise in the Malaysian economy: Loss of manufacturing competitiveness, as explained in our previous report on Malaysia. Perhaps equally worryingly, the country has not been able to attract much in the way of capital inflows. What this implies is that global investors did not find Malaysian assets attractive enough despite the benefits of a significantly cheaper currency (Chart 12, bottom panel). A major reason investors have not found the country attractive is because the return on capital on Malaysian assets has continued to deteriorate relative to the rest of the world. The upshot of the above is that, should Malaysian firms be able to improve their profits going forward, Malaysian stocks’ relative performance would get a boost from both higher relative earnings and a stronger currency. However, given the sluggish business cycle outlook as explained above, a sustainable rally in Malaysian stocks or currency is not imminent. Investment Conclusions Chart 13Malaysian Relative Stock Valuations Are On The Cheaper Side Malaysian Relative Stock Valuations Are On The Cheaper Side Malaysian Relative Stock Valuations Are On The Cheaper Side Equities: Malaysian stocks have cheapened. Both in terms of P/E ratio and P/book ratio, they are at the lower end of the spectrum relative to their EM counterparts (Chart 13). Yet, given the mediocre growth outlook, we recommend that dedicated EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios stay neutral on this market for now. Absolute return investors should stay on the sidelines in view of the worsening risk outlook in global markets, and wait for a better entry point later in the year. For local asset allocators in Malaysia, it is too early to overweight stocks relative to bonds over a cyclical horizon. Even though the equity risk premium in general has been much higher since the advent of the pandemic, stocks have struggled to outperform bonds in a total return basis over the past two years. That will likely be the case for several more months given the country’s growth outlook and rising global risks. Fixed Income: Malaysian domestic bonds will outperform their overall EM / Emerging Asian peers. So will Malaysian sovereign credit. Fixed income investors should overweight them in their respective EM / Emerging Asian portfolios. In the rate markets, investors should continue receiving 10-year swap rates. Finally, Malaysian yield curves are set to flatten. Investors should position for a narrowing of the 10-year/1-year yield curve, which is at a decade-high level of 180 basis points. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary The recent 26 percent overspend on durable goods constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history. An overspend on goods is corrected by a subsequent underspend; but an underspend on services is not corrected by a subsequent overspend. This unfortunate asymmetry means that the recent overspend on goods at the expense of services makes the economy vulnerable to a downturn. And the risk is exacerbated by central banks’ intentions to hike rates in response to inflation. As the spending on durable goods wanes, so too will monthly core inflation and the 30-year T-bond yield. As the 30-year T-bond rallies, so too will other long-duration bonds, long-duration stocks, long-duration sectors, and long-duration stock markets such as the S&P 500 versus short-duration stock markets such as the FTSE 100. Fractal trading watchlist: We focus on emerging markets, add financials versus industrials, and review tobacco versus cannabis, CAD/SEK, and biotech. If A 26 Percent Overspend On Goods Is Not A Massive Economic Imbalance, Then What Is? If A 26 Percent Overspend On Goods Is Not A Massive Economic Imbalance, Then What Is? If A 26 Percent Overspend On Goods Is Not A Massive Economic Imbalance, Then What Is? Bottom Line: As the spending on durable goods wanes, so too will monthly core inflation and the 30-year T-bond yield. Go overweight long-duration bonds, long-duration stocks, and long-duration stock markets such as the US versus non-US. Feature My colleague Peter Berezin recently wrote that recessions tend to happen when: “1) the build-up of imbalances makes the economy vulnerable to downturn; 2) a catalyst exposes these imbalances; and 3) amplifiers exacerbate the slump.” Peter is spot on. Using this checklist, I would argue that right now: There is a massive imbalance that makes the economy vulnerable to a downturn. Specifically, a 26 percent overspend on durable goods constitutes one of the greatest imbalances in economic history – the 26 percent overspend on durables refers to the US, but other advanced economies have experienced similar binges on goods. The catalyst that exposes this massive imbalance is the realisation that durables are, well, durable. They last a long time. So, if you front-end loaded many of this year’s purchases into last year, then you will not buy them this year. If you overspent by 26 percent in 2021, then the risk is that you symmetrically underspend by 26 percent in 2022. If central banks hike rates into this demand downturn, they will amplify and exacerbate the slump. A Massive Imbalance In Spending Makes The Economy Vulnerable To A Downturn Much of the recent overspend on goods was spending displaced from the underspend on services which became unavailable in the pandemic – such as eating out, going to the movies, and going to in-person doctor’s appointments. Raising the obvious question, can a future underspend on goods be countered by a future overspend on services? The answer is no. The consumption of services is constrained by time, opportunity, and biology. For example, there is a limit on how often you can eat out, go to the movies, or go to the doctor. If you are used to eating out and going to the movies once a week, and the pandemic prevented you from doing so for a year, that does not mean you will eat out and go to the movies an extra 52 times for the 52 times you missed! Rather, you will quickly revert to your previous pattern of going out once a week. This constraint on services spending means that the underspend will not become a symmetric overspend. In fact, the underspend on certain services will persist. This is because we have made some permanent changes to our lifestyles – for example, hybrid office/home working and more online shopping and online medical care. Additionally, a small but significant minority of people have changed their behaviour, shunning services that require close contact with strangers. To repeat the crucial asymmetry, an overspend on goods is corrected by a subsequent underspend; but an underspend on services is not corrected by a subsequent overspend (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Therefore, the recent massive overspend on goods at the expense of services makes the economy vulnerable to a downturn, and the risk is exacerbated by central banks’ intentions to hike rates in response to inflation. These hikes will prove to be overkill, because inflation is set to cool of its own accord. Chart I-1An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend... An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend... An Overspend On Goods Can Be Corrected By A Subsequent Underspend...   Chart I-2...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend ...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend ...But An Underspend On Services Cannot Be Corrected By A Subsequent Overspend   Durables Are Driving Inflation, And Inflation Is Driving The 30-Year T-Bond The recent binge on goods really comprises three mini-binges, which peaked in May 2020, January-March 2021, and October 2021. With a couple of months lag, these three mini-binges have caused three mini-waves in core inflation. To see the cause and effect, it is best to examine the evolution of inflation granularly – on a month-on-month basis – which removes the distorting ‘base effects.’ The mini-binges in goods lifted the core monthly inflation rate to an (annualised) 7 percent in July 2020, 10 percent in April-June 2021, and 7 percent in January 2022 (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Spending On Durables Is Driving Inflation Spending On Durables Is Driving Inflation Spending On Durables Is Driving Inflation Worryingly, the sensitivity of inflation has increased in each new mini-binge in goods spending, possibly reflecting more pressure on already-creaking supply chains as well as more secondary effects. Nevertheless, the key driver of the mini-waves in core inflation is the demand for durables, and as that demand wanes, so will core inflation. As monthly core inflation eases back, so too will the 30-year T-bond yield. What about the 30-year T-bond yield? Although it is a long-duration asset, its yield has recently been tracking the short-term contours of core inflation. So, when monthly inflation reached an (annualised) 10 percent last year, the 30-year T-bond yield reached 2.5 percent. At the more recent 7 percent inflation rate, the yield has reached 2.35 percent. It follows that as monthly core inflation eases back, so too will the 30-year T-bond yield (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Inflation Is Driving The 30-Year T-Bond Inflation Is Driving The 30-Year T-Bond Inflation Is Driving The 30-Year T-Bond Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You’ll Get Most Things Right For the past year, the story of stocks has been the story of bonds. Or to be more precise, the story of long-duration stocks has been the story of the 30-year T-bond. Through this period, the worry du jour has changed – from the Omicron mutation of SARS-CoV-2 to an Evergrande default to Facebook subscriber losses and now to Russia/Ukraine tensions. Yet the overarching story through all of this is that the long-duration Nasdaq index has tracked the 30-year T-bond price one-for-one (Chart I-5). And the connection between S&P 500 and the 30-year T-bond price is almost as good (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The Nasdaq Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The Nasdaq Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The Nasdaq Right Chart I-6Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The S&P 500 Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The S&P 500 Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The S&P 500 Right The tight short-term connection between long-duration stocks and the 30-year T-bond makes perfect sense. The cashflows of any investment can be simplified into a ‘lump-sum’ payment in the future, and the ‘present value’ of this payment will move in line with the present value of an equal-duration bond. So, all else being equal, a long-duration stock will move one-for-one in line with a long-duration bond. The story of long-duration stocks has been the story of the 30-year T-bond. ‘Value’ stocks and non-US stock markets which are over-weighted to value have a shorter-duration. Therefore, they have a much weaker connection with the 30-year T-bond. It follows that if you get the 30-year T-bond right, you’ll get most things right: The performance of other long-duration bonds (Chart I-7). The performance of long-duration growth stocks (Chart I-8). The performance of ‘growth’ versus ‘value’ (Chart I-9). The performance of growth-heavy stock markets like the S&P 500 versus value-heavy stock markets like the FTSE100 (Chart I-10). Of course, the corollary is that if you get the 30-year T-bond wrong, you’ll get most things wrong. Observe that the 1-year charts of long-duration bonds, growth stocks, growth versus value, and S&P 500 versus FTSE100 are indistinguishable. Proving once again that investment is complex, but it is not complicated! Chart I-7Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The 30-Year German Bund Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The 30-Year German Bund Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get The 30-Year German Bund Right Chart I-8Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get Growth Stocks Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get Growth Stocks Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get Growth Stocks Right   Chart I-9Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get Growth Versus Value Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get Growth Versus Value Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get Growth Versus Value Right Chart I-10Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get S&P 500 Versus FTSE100 Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get S&P 500 Versus FTSE100 Right Get The 30-Year T-Bond Right, And You'll Get S&P 500 Versus FTSE100 Right Our expectation is that as the spending on durable goods wanes, so too will monthly core inflation and the 30-year T-bond yield. Go overweight long-duration bonds, long-duration stocks, long-duration sectors, and long-duration stock markets such as the US versus non-US. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week we focus on emerging markets, add financials versus industrials, and review tobacco versus cannabis, CAD/SEK, and biotech. Emerging markets (EM) have been a big underperformer through the past year, but it may be time to dip in again, at least relative to value-heavy developed market (DM) indexes. Specifically, MSCI Emerging Markets versus MSCI UK has reached the point of fractal fragility that signalled previous major turning-points in 2014, 2018, and 2020 (Chart I-11). Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to go long MSCI EM versus UK (dollar indexes), setting the profit-target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent.  Chart I-11Time To Dip Into EM Again, Selectively Time To Dip Into EM Again, Selectively Time To Dip Into EM Again, Selectively Financials Versus Industrials Is Approaching A Turning-Point Financials Versus Industrials Is Approaching A Turning-Point Financials Versus Industrials Is Approaching A Turning-Point Image CAD/SEK At A Top CAD/SEK At A Top CAD/SEK At A Top Awaiting A Major Entry-Point Into Biotech Awaiting A Major Entry-Point Into Biotech Awaiting A Major Entry-Point Into Biotech Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations I Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Image   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations III A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face A Massive Economic Imbalance, Staring Us In The Face Image    

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (February 15 at 10:00 AM EST, 15:00 PM GMT, 16:00 PM CET). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

Highlights A feedback loop has emerged in European markets. Tightening financial conditions will preempt the European Central Bank from hiking rates as much as the money market is pricing in. The widening in peripheral and credit spreads is overdone. Investors already long should maintain their positions. Investors without exposure will soon find an attractive entry point. Despite these near-term gyrations, the ECB is still on track to hike interest rates once in Q4 2022 and lift them aggressively in 2023. Feature Last week’s hawkish pivot by the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to affect markets. We take the words of the ECB at their face value; we anticipate the Governing Council (GC) to begin lifting interest rates at the end of 2022 and to continue to do so steadily over 2023 and 2024. However, as the shock filters through financial asset prices, we become more confident that the ECB will not lift rates five times in 2022 as the Euro Short Term Rate (ESTR) curve currently anticipates. Chart 1Growing Tensions In The Periphery... Growing Tensions In The Periphery... Growing Tensions In The Periphery... First, the behavior of Italian and Greek bond markets constitutes a major support to our view. Italian and Greek 10-year spreads have widened by respectively 46 and 65 basis points over the past six trading days (Chart 1). This tension highlights that investors still view these economies as continental trouble spots. Meanwhile, the ECB’s communication continues to highlight the need for flexibility to maintain order in the sovereign debt market. The GC does not want inadvertently to engineer a severe tightening in financial conditions in the already fragile periphery. In this context, it is highly unlikely that the ECB will rush to terminate the Asset Purchase Program (APP), an end on which rate hikes depend. Second, the corporate bond market is also going through a significant period of ruction. Both investment grade and high-yield bond yields have risen rapidly in recent days, and they are now retesting their late-2018 levels (Chart 2, top two panels). Spreads too are widening meaningfully, even though they remain further away from their 2018 highs (Chart 2, bottom two panels) The ECB is unwilling to let a liquidity shock morph into a solvency problem for European firms. For now, the behavior of the European credit market remains consistent with a liquidity shock. Funding markets are experiencing a violent adjustment, which is bleeding into the overall level of spreads. However, investors are not differentiating based on credit risk. Chart 3 shows that CCC credit (the lowest rated HY bonds) is not selling off relative to the overall high-yield index, which we would anticipate if investors were worried about underlying default risk. Chart 3No Distinction On Credit Risk No Distinction On Credit Risk No Distinction On Credit Risk Chart 2...And In European Corporates ...And In European Corporates ...And In European Corporates If the liquidity shock were to deepen further and last long enough, the resilience of the corporate sector would fritter away. However, the GC has tried to resist a deflationary shock for more than ten years now, and a solvency problem would undo all the progress made toward escaping the European liquidity trap, especially because wages have yet to recover. Third, members of the ECB’s GC are already trying to talk down the market. President Christine Lagarde displayed a more dovish tone when she spoke in front of the EU Parliament on February 7, 2022. ECB Chief Economist Philippe Lane remains steadfast that wages are not yet a problem. The Governor of the Bank of France, François Villeroy de Galhau still sees an imminent peak in CPI, and Olli Rehn, Governor of the Bank of Finland, recently lectured about the need for a gradual normalization of policy. Even hawks like the Bundesbank’s Joachim Nagel or the DNB’s Klaas Knot have gestured toward higher rates, but only toward the end of the year. In this context, we expect credit spreads to begin to narrow again; however, it will likely first require an easing in funding pressures. This is unlikely to happen until US yields form an interim peak. However, as Chart 4 highlights, the Treasury market is becoming extremely oversold. Moreover, a JP Morgan survey shows that its clients are massively short duration. The risk of a pullback in Treasury yields is growing, even if rising inflation and fears of a tighter Fed prevail for now. If US yields were to decline Bunds would likely follow the Treasury market because the ECB is becoming louder that it does not want to tighten financial conditions abruptly. Hence, a pullback in global risk-free yields will be the key to a period of calm in credit spreads, since valuations have improved materially, with the breakeven spreads on investment grade and high-yield bonds moving back to their 43rd and 44th percentiles, respectively (Chart 5). A stabilization in global yields and European spreads should also percolate to the peripheral sovereign bond market and limit the upside to Italian and Greek spreads. Chart 4Oversold Treasurys Oversold Treasurys Oversold Treasurys Chart 5Restoring Value In Corporates Restoring Value In Corporates Restoring Value In Corporates Bottom Line: The tightening in financial conditions taking place in Europe indicates that money market curves are pricing in the path for European policy rates too aggressively. The ECB has changed since 2011. It will not let peripheral borrowing costs threaten the recovery in Southern European economies, nor will it allow a liquidity shock in the corporate bond market to become a solvency issue that will damage growth prospects. European peripheral and corporate spreads will narrow once global risk-free rates peak.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Presidential elections are due in Brazil on October 2, 2022. While the left-of-center former President Lula da Silva will likely win, the road to his victory will not be as smooth as markets expect. Incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro will make every effort to cling to power, including fiscal populism and attacks on Brazil’s institutions. These moves may roil Brazil’s equity markets as they may provide a fillip to Bolsonaro’s popularity. Bolsonaro’s institutional attacks have triggered down moves in the market before and any fiscal expansion may worry investors as it could prove to be sticky. We urge investors to take-on only selective tactical exposure in Brazil. Equities appear cheap but political and macro risks abound. To play the rally yet stave-off political risk in Brazil, we suggest a tactical pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Long Brazil Financials / Short India 2022-02-10   Bottom Line: On a tactical timeframe we suggest only selective exposure to Brazil given the latent political and macro risks. On a strategic timeframe, we are neutral on Brazil given that its growth potential coexists with high debt and low proclivity to structural reform. Feature Chart 1Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil’s equity markets underperformed relative to emerging markets (EMs) for a second consecutive year in 2021 (Chart 1). But thanks to this correction, Brazilian equities now appear cheap (Chart 1). With Brazil looking cheap, China easing policy, and Lula’s return likely, is now a good time to buy into Brazil? We recommend taking on only selective exposure to Brazil on a tactical horizon for now. Brazil in our view may present a near-term value trap as markets are under-pricing political and economic risks. Lula Set For Phoenix-Like Return Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or popularly Lula) of the Worker’s Party (PT) appears all set to reclaim the country’s presidency in the fall of 2022. The main risk that Lula’s presidency may bring is a degree of fiscal expansion. Despite this markets may ultimately welcome his victory at the presidential elections as Lula is in alignment with the median voter, is expected to be better for Brazil’s institutions, will institute a superior pandemic-control strategy, and may also undertake badly needed structural reforms in the early part of his tenure. Despite these points we urge investors to limit exposure to Brazil for now and turn bullish only once the market corrects further. Whilst far-right President Jair Bolsonaro managed to join a political party (i.e., the center-right Liberal Party) late last year, he is yet to secure something more central to winning elections i.e., a high degree of popularity. To boost his low popularity ratings (Chart 2), we expect Bolsonaro to leverage two planks: populism and authoritarianism. These measures will bump up Bolsonaro’s popularity enough to shake up Brazil’s markets with renewed uncertainty, but not enough to win him the presidency. Chart 2Lula Is Ahead But His Lead Has Narrowed Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Lula is a clear favorite to win. After spending more than a year in jail on corruption charges, Lula is back in the fray and has maintained a lead on Bolsonaro for the first round of polling (Chart 2). Even if a second-round run-off election were to take place, Lula would prevail over Bolsonaro or other key candidates (Chart 3). By contrast, Bolsonaro’s lower popularity means that in a run-off situation he stands a chance only if pitted against center-right candidates like Sergio Moro (his former justice minister) or João Doria (i.e., the center-right Governor of São Paulo) (Chart 4). Chart 3Lula Leads Run-Off Vote Against All Potential Candidates Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 4In A Run-Off, Bolso Stands Best Chance Of Winning If Pitted Against Moro Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ What has driven the swing to the left in Brazil? After the pandemic and some stagflation, Brazil’s median voter’s priorities have changed. In specific: Brazil’s median voter’s top concerns in 2018 were centered around improving law and order (Chart 5). A right-of-center candidate with concrete law-and-order credentials like Bolsonaro was well placed to tap into this public demand. Chart 5In 2018-19, Law And Order Issues Dominated Voters’ Concerns Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Now, however, Brazil’s voters’ top concerns are focused around improving the economy and controlling the pandemic, where Bolsonaro’s record is dismal (Chart 6). Given this change of priorities, a left-of-center candidate with a solid economic record like Lula is best placed to address voters’ concerns. Lula had the fortune to preside over a global commodity bull market and Brazilian economic boom in the early 2000s (Chart 7). Regarding pandemic control, almost any challenger would be better positioned than Bolsonaro, who initially dismissed Covid-19 as “a little flu” and lacked the will or ability to set up a stable public health policy. Chart 6In 2022, Median Voter Cares Most About Economic Issues, Pandemic-Control Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 7Lula’s Presidency Overlapped With An Economic Boom Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ A left-of-center candidate like Lula, or even Ciro Gomes (Chart 8), is more in step with the median voter today for two key reasons: Inflation Surge, Few Jobs: Inflation has surged, and the increase is higher than that seen under the previous President Michael Temer (Chart 7). Transportation, food, and housing costs have all taken a toll on voter’s pocketbooks (Chart 9). The cost of electricity has also shot up. For 46% of Brazilian families, expenditure on power and natural gas is eating into more than half of their monthly income, according to Ipec. Chart 8Left-Of-Center Candidates Stand A Better Chance In Brazil In 2022 Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 9Under Bolso Inflation Has Surged Across Key Categories Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​ Distinct from inflation, unemployment too has been high under Bolsonaro (Chart 10). Chart 10Unemployment Too Has Surged Under Bolsonaro Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 11Brazil’s Per Capita Income Growth Has Lagged That Of Peers Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 12Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Stagnant Incomes: Despite a strong post-pandemic fiscal stimulus, GDP growth in Brazil has been low (Chart 7). In a country that is structurally plagued with high inequalities, the slow growth in Brazil’s per capita income (Chart 11) under a right-wing administration is bound to trigger a leftward shift. It is against this backdrop of rising economic miseries (Chart 12) that Latin America’s largest economy is seeing its ideological pendulum swing leftwards. This phenomenon has played out before too - most notably when Lula first assumed power as the president of Brazil in 2002. Brazil’s GDP growth was low, inflation was high and per capita incomes had almost halved under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (or popularly FHC) over 1995-2002. This economic backdrop played a key role in Lula’s landslide win in 2002. Brazil’s political differences are rooted in regional as well as socioeconomic disparities. In the 2018 presidential elections, left-of-center candidates like Fernando Haddad generated greatest traction in the economically backward northeastern region of Brazil. On the other hand, Bolsonaro enjoyed higher traction in the relatively well-off regions in southern and northern Brazil (Maps 1 & 2). Now Bolsonaro has faltered under the pandemic and Lula can reunite the dissatisfied parts of the electorate with his northeastern base. Map 1Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Supported Bolso In 2018 Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Map 2Left-Of-Center 2018 Presidential Candidate Haddad Had Greatest Traction In Regions With Low Incomes Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Bottom Line: The stage appears set for Lula’s return to Brazil’s presidency. But will the road be smooth? We think not. Investors should gird for downside risks that Brazilian markets must contend with as President Bolsonaro fights back. Brace For Bolso’s Fightback The road to Bolsonaro’s likely loss will be paved with market volatility and potentially a correction. Interest rates have surged in Brazil as its central bank combats inflation (Chart 13). Even as BCB’s actions will lend some stability to the Brazilian Real (Chart 13), political events over the course of 2022 will spook foreign investors. Bolsonaro will leverage two planks in a desperate attempt to retain control: Plank #1: Populism Brazil’s financial markets experienced a major correction in the second half of 2021. This was partially driven by the fact that Brazilian legislators approved a rule that allows the government to breach its federal spending cap. Given Bolsonaro’s low popularity ratings today and given that his fiscal stance has been restrained off late, Bolsonaro could well drive another bout of fiscal expansion in the run up to October 2022. Such a move will bump up his popularity but at the same time worry markets given Brazil’s elevated debt levels (Chart 14). Bolsonaro can technically pass these changes in the Brazilian national assembly given that in both houses the government along with the confidence and supply parties has more than 50% of seats. Chart 13Brazil’s Central Bank Has Hiked Rates Aggressively Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 14Brazil Is One Of The Most Indebted Emerging Markets Today Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Plank #2: Institutional Attacks To rally his supporters, the former army captain could also sow seeds of doubt in Brazil’s judiciary and electoral process. Given the strong support that Bolsonaro enjoys amongst conservatives, he may even mobilize supporters to stage acts of political violence in the run up to the elections. Bolsonaro could make more dramatic attempts to stay in power than former US President Trump, whose rebellion on Capitol Hill did not go as far as it could have gone to attempt to seize power for the outgoing president. Last but not the least, there is a possibility that the Brazilian judiciary presents an unexpected roadblock to Lula’s candidacy. Given the unpredictable path of Brazil’s judicial decisions, investors should be prepared for at least some kind of official impediments to Lula’s rise. Even if Lula is ultimately allowed to run, any ruling that casts doubt on his candidacy or corruption-related track record will upset financial markets. Global financial markets rallied through the Trump rebellion on January 6 last year. But US institutions, however flawed, are more stable than Brazil’s. Brazil only emerged from military dictatorship in 1985. Bolsonaro has fired up elements of the populace that are nostalgic for that period, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: Brazil’s equities look cheap today, but political risks have not fully run their course. President Bolsonaro may launch his fightback soon, which could drive another down-leg in Brazil’s markets. His institutional attacks have triggered down moves before and any potential fiscal expansion that Bolsonaro pursues may worry investors, as this expansion could stick under the subsequent administration. In addition, there is a chance that civil-military relations undergo high strain in the run-up to or immediately after Brazil’s elections. Is A Self-Coup By Bolso Possible? “One uncomfortable fact of the dictatorship is that its most brutal period of repression overlapped with what Milton Friedman called an economic miracle.… Brazil’s economy, nineteenth largest in the world before the coup, grew into the eighth largest. Jobs abounded and the regime then was actually popular.” – Alex Cuadros, Brazillionaires: Wealth, Power, Decadence, and Hope in an American Country (Spiegel & Grau, 2016) It is extremely difficult for President Bolsonaro to win the support of a majority of the electorate. But given his open admiration for Brazil’s dictatorship, is a self-coup possible in 2022? The next nine months will be tumultuous. A coup attempt could occur. However, we allocate a low probability to a successful self-coup because: Bolsonaro’s Popularity Is Too Low: Even dictators need to have some popular appeal. Bolsonaro has lost too much support (Chart 15), he never had full control of any major institutions (including the military), and few institutional players will risk their credibility for his sake. If he somehow clung to power, his subsequent administration would face overwhelming popular resistance. Chart 15Bolsonaro’s Low Approval Ratings - A Liability Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Bolsonaro’s Economy Is Too Weak: The dictatorship in Brazil managed to hold power for more than two decades partially because this period of authoritarianism was accompanied by a degree of economic well-being. Currently the public is shifting to the left because low growth and high inflation have dented the median voter’s purchasing power. The weak economy would make an authoritarian government unsustainable from the start. Lack Of American Support: Some military personnel may be supportive of a coup and several retired military officers are occupying civilian positions in the Brazilian federal government, thanks to Bolsonaro. So why can’t Brazil slip right back into a military dictatorship led by Bolsonaro, say if the election results are narrow and hotly contested? The coup d'état in Brazil in 1964 was a success to a large extent because this regime-change was supported by America. Back then communism was a threat to the US and Washington was keen to displace left-leaning heads of states in Latin America, such as Brazilian President João Goulart. But America’s strategic concerns have now changed. America today is attempting to coalesce an axis of democracies and the Biden administration has no incentive whatsoever to muddy its credentials by supporting dictatorship in Latin America’s largest country. Even aside from ideology, any such action would encourage fearful governments in the region to seek support from America’s foreign rivals, thus inviting the kind of foreign intervention that the US most wants to prevent in Latin America. The Brazilian Military Has Not Been Suppressed Or Sidelined: History suggests that coups are often triggered by a drop in the military’s importance in a country. However, the military’s power in Brazil has remained meaningful through the twenty-first century. Brazil has maintained steady military spends at around 1.5% of GDP over the last two decades. Thus, top leaders of Brazil’s military have no reason to feel aggrieved or disempowered. Having said that, it is not impossible that an extreme faction of junior officers might try to pull off a fantastical plot, even if they have little hope of succeeding, which is why we highlight that markets can be rudely awakened by the road to Brazil’s election this year. In Turkey in July 2016, an unsuccessful coup attempt caused Turkish equities to decline by 9% over a four-day period. Bottom Line: Investors must gird for the very real possibility of civil-military relations undergoing high degrees of strain in Brazil, particularly if a contested election occurs. While Bolsonaro’s supporters and disaffected elements of the Brazilian military could resist a smooth transition of power away from Bolsonaro, the transition will eventually take place because two powerful constituencies – Brazil’s median voter and America – will not support a coup in Brazil. Will Lula Be Good For Brazil’s Markets? Looking over Bolsonaro’s presidency, from a market-perspective, some policy measures were good, some were bad, and some were downright ugly. In specific: The Good: Pension Reforms And Independent Monetary Policy In Bolsonaro’s first year in power, he delivered pension sector reforms. The law increased the minimum retirement age and also increased workers’ pension contributions thereby resulting in meaningful fiscal savings. Bolsonaro passed a law to formalise the BCB’s autonomy and the BCB has been able to pursue a relatively independent monetary policy. BCB has now lifted the benchmark Selic rate by 725bps over 2021 thereby making it one of the most hawkish central banks amongst EMs (Chart 13). This is in sharp contrast to the situation in EMs like Turkey where the central bank cut rates owing to the influence of a populist head of state. The Bad: Poor Free Market Credentials And Fiscal Expansion In early 2021, President Bolsonaro fired the head of Petrobras (the state-owned energy champion) reportedly for raising fuel prices. Bolsonaro then picked a former army general (with no relevant work experience) to head the company. Although Bolsonaro positioned himself as a supporter of privatization in the run up to his presidency, he failed to follow through. Another area where the far-right leader has disappointed markets is with respect to Brazil’s debt levels. Under his presidency, a constitutional amendment to raise a key government spending cap was passed. Shortly afterwards came the creation of the massive welfare program Auxílio Brasil. Bolsonaro embraced fiscal populism to try to save his presidency after the pandemic. Consequently Brazil’s public debt to GDP ratio ballooned from 86% in 2018 to a peak of 99% in 2020. The Ugly: Poor Pandemic Response And Institutional Attacks The darkest hour of Bolsonaro’s presidency came on September 7, 2021, i.e., Brazil’s Independence Day. During rallies with his supporters, Bolsonaro levelled attacks on the Brazilian judiciary and sowed seeds of doubt in Brazil’s electoral process. More concretely, the greatest failing of the Bolsonaro administration has been its lax response to the pandemic. Bolsonaro delayed preventive measures, and this has meant that Brazil was one of the worst hit major economies of the world. The pandemic has claimed more than 630,000 lives in Brazil i.e., the second highest in the world. In relative terms too, Brazil has experienced a high death rate of about 2,960 per million which is even higher than the US rate of 2,720 per million. President Bolsonaro’s poor handling of the pandemic will cost the President in terms of votes in 2022 as the highest Covid-19-related death rates were seen in Southern Brazil (Map 3) i.e., a region that had voted in large numbers for Bolsonaro in 2018 (see Map 1 above). Map 3The Pandemic Has Had A Devastating Impact In Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Given this backdrop, a Lula presidency will be welcomed by global financial markets, potentially for three reasons: Superior Pandemic-Control: An administration headed by Lula will bring in a more scientific and cohesive pandemic-control strategy thereby saving lives and benefiting the economy. Alignment With Institutions: Lula will act in alignment with Brazil’s institutions. He stands to benefit from the existing electoral system, the civil bureaucracy, academia, and the media. He may have rougher relations with the judiciary and parts of the military, but he is a known quantity and not likely to attempt to be a Hugo Chavez. Possibility Of Some Structural Reform: Given Brazil’s unstable debt dynamics, and the “lost decade” of economic malaise in the 2010s, there is a chance that Lula could pursue some structural reforms. Lula is more popular than his Worker’s Party, which is still tainted by corruption, so his strength in Congress will not be known until after the election. But Brazilian parties tend to coalesce around the president and Lula has experience in managing the legislative process. The probability of Lula pushing through some bit of structural reform will be the greatest in 2021. Back in 2019, it is worth recounting that only 4% of the Brazilian public supported pension reforms. Despite this Bolsonaro managed the passage of painful pension reforms in 2019 because market pressure forced the parties to cooperate. Faced with inflation and low growth, Lula may be forced to push through some piecemeal structural financial sector and economic reforms. However, if commodity prices and financial markets are cheering his election, he may spend his initial political capital on policies closer to his base of support, which means that a market riot may be necessary to force action on structural reforms. This dynamic will have to be monitored in the aftermath of the election. Assuming Lula does pursue some structural reforms while he has the political capital, and therefore that his first year is positive for financial markets, there is a reason to be positive on Brazil selectively on a tactical basis. However, electoral compulsions could cause Lula to pursue left-wing populism, fiscal expansion, and to resist privatization over the remaining three years of his presidency. Given Brazil’s already elevated debt levels (Chart 14), such a policy tilt would be market negative. It is against this backdrop that we expect a pro-Lula market rally to falter after the initial excitement. Bottom Line: Once the power transition is complete, a relief rally may follow as markets factor in the prospects of institutional stability and possibly a dash of structural reform in the first year of Lula’s presidency. But given Brazil’s elevated inequalities, even a pro-Lula rally will eventually fade as the administration will be constrained to switch back to the old ways and pursue an expansionary fiscal policy when elections loom. Investment Conclusions Brazil Presents A Value Trap, Fraught with Politico-Economic Risks From a strategic perspective, we are neutral on Brazil. A decade of bad news has been priced in but there is not yet a clear and sustainable trajectory to improve the country’s productivity. History suggests that both left-wing and right-wing presidents are often forced to backtrack on structural reforms and resort to cash-handouts in the run up to elections. This tends to add to Brazil’s high debt levels, prevents the domestic growth engine from revving up, and adds to inflation. Low growth and high inflation then set the wheels rolling for another bout of fiscal expansion (Chart 16). Chart 16The Vicious Politico-Economic Cycle That Brazil Is Trapped In Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Exceptions to this politico-economic cycle occur when a commodity boom is underway or if China, which is Brazil’s key client state, is booming. China today buys a third of Brazil’s exports (Chart 17) and is Brazil’s largest export market. The other reason we remain circumspect about Brazil’s strategic prospects is because of the secular slowdown underway in China. China is not in a position today to recreate the commodity and trade boom that buoyed Lula during his first presidency. China’s policy easing is a tactical boon at best, which can coincide with a Lula relief rally, but afterwards investors will be left with Chinese deleveraging and Brazilian populism. Political Risks Are High, Selective Tactical Exposure Brazil Will Be Optimal We urge investors to buy into Brazilian assets only selectively, even as Brazilian equities appear cheap (Chart 18). Political risks and economic risks such as low growth in GDP and earnings (Chart 19) could contribute to another correction and/or volatility in Brazilian equities. Chart 17China Buys A Third Of Brazil’s Exports Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​ ​​​​​Chart 18Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Chart 19Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag China’s policy easing is an important macro factor playing to Brazil’s benefit. As we highlighted in our “China Geopolitical Outlook 2022,” Beijing is focused on ensuring stability over the next 12 months. But history suggests that Brazil’s corporate earnings respond to a pick-up in China’s total social financing with a lag of more than six months (Chart 19). Thus, even from a purely macro perspective it may make sense to turn bullish on Brazil after the election turmoil concludes. Given that politically sensitive sectors account for an unusually high proportion of Brazil’s market capitalization (Chart 18), and given the political risks in the offing for Brazil, we suggest taking-on selective exposure in Brazil. To play the rally yet mitigate political risks (that can be higher for capital-heavy sectors), we suggest a pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. We remain positive on India on a strategic horizon. However, in view of India approaching the business-end of its five-year election cycle, when policy risks tend to become elevated, we reiterate our tactical sell on India. India currently trades at a 81% premium to MSCI EM on a forward P-E ratio basis versus its two year average of 56%. A Quick Note On The Nascent EM Rally Investors should gradually look more favorably on emerging markets, but tactical caution is warranted. MSCI EM and MSCI World are down YTD 1.1% and 4.6% respectively. Despite the dip, we are not yet turning bullish on EM as a whole, owing to both geopolitical and macroeconomic factors. Global geopolitical risks in the new year are high. We recently upgraded the odds of Russia re-invading Ukraine from 50% to 75%. Besides EM Europe, we also see high and underrated geopolitical risks in the Middle East in the short run. Both the Russia and Iran conflicts raise a non-negligible risk of energy shocks that undermine global growth. Once these hurdles are cleared, we will turn more positive toward risky assets. Macroeconomically, the current EM rally can be sustained only if China delivers a substantial stimulus, and the US dollar continues to weaken. The former is likely, as we have argued, but the dollar looks to be resilient and it will take several months before China’s credit impulse rebounds. Hence conditions for a sustainable EM rally do not yet exist. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)